


Determinants of Party Unity in Europe

A comparative study of parliamentary parties in twenty-three countries



by

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STATEMENT 1

This is to confirm that the thesis contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions.

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Gabriela Borz,

Budapest

May 2009

To my mother and father

Abstract

Empirically, this thesis presents an original cross-country comparison based on raw data about 187 European political parties and their levels of unity, as influenced by party characteristics and national political institutions. I offer various ways to measure party unity of behavior: measures based on elite surveys, the expert survey I have conducted myself, and roll-call data. *Firstly*, I argue that there is no significant discrepancy between the levels of behavioral unity in Central Eastern Europe and Western Europe. This suggests that the two regions are not significantly different in all aspects of party politics, and further substantiates the need for comparative party research to include Central Eastern Europe. There is however a significant difference in the unity of attitudes between Eastern and Western Europe, and the same difference in terms of unity of attitudes is also significant when old and new democracies are compared. *Secondly*, the results show the supremacy of party characteristics in explaining unity of behavior. Ideological congruence is a good predictor of how united a party is going to be in parliament. However, unity of attitudes is not a sufficient predictor of party unity of behavior. High centralization and disciplinary rules contribute as well to achieving a high level of behavioral unity. *Thirdly*, the MPs' focus of representation does predict their future behavior in the legislature. The more importance MPs allocate to representing their constituents, the lower will be their unity of behavior in the parliament. This tendency accentuates if an MP is elected under open lists. *Fourthly*, contrary to expectations and against many propositions advanced earlier in the party literature, systemic factors, like federalism, parliamentarism, and electoral system perform poorly in explaining MPs' voting unity in the legislature. The only systemic factors with a positive direct effect on the unity of behavior are: the amount of state subsidy that a party receives, the ceiling on donations and party system age. Systemic factors impact however, more strongly on the unity of attitudes and therefore indirectly on the unity of behavior.

Theoretically, the thesis explains party unity from state and party perspectives and advances a model which works for European political parties. While doing this, the thesis touches upon several theoretical issues in party politics, comparative politics and democratic theory. First of all, I suggest that *definitions* of political parties which regard them as unitary actors could be revised to consider the distinction between attitudes and behavior. My PhD thesis builds on the differences between unity of behavior and unity of attitudes, a conceptualization which better addresses the complexities inherent in the issue of party unity because unity on one of these dimensions does not always guarantee the same level of unity on the other. Secondly, my thesis shows that even if institutional conditions would not favor unitary party behavior in parliament, parties adapt and use their own tools in order to become a unitary voting bloc. Consequently, whether *party government* is in danger or not, because of declining partisanship within the electorate or because of the convergence of parties into a mainstream consensus, party unity will always enhance it and maintain it. Thirdly, the findings of this thesis allow me to conclude that some *paradoxes of representative democracy* still persist. If one assumes that external democracy is achieved, then there are instances in which this happens at the expense of internal party democracy. Some parties apply high levels of central control and disciplinary rules in order to be unitary in the parliament, to vote for the policies proposed and, consequently, to implement them. Fourthly, the process of *party formation* and *development* are also related to unity of attitudes and unity of behavior. While unity of attitudes develops rather slowly, the latter can change more rapidly when intra-party mechanisms of coercion are applied.

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1. Introduction

Fifty eight years ago, the American Political Science Association's Committee on Political Parties became one of the primary advocates of the responsible parties paradigm and issued a report that stated: "An effective party system requires, first, that the parties are able to bring forth programs to which they commit themselves and, second, that the parties possess sufficient internal cohesion to carry out these programs"¹. What they emphasized at that time was that achieving party unity matters for many reasons. First, it gives voters a clear choice at election time, second, it gives the governing party/parties a mandate for governing, and third, it makes sure that the parties are the instrument through which voters can influence politics.

European political scientists have paid little attention to the concept of party unity and they have studied it more or less additionally to topics such as party decline, party organization, party systems and electoral systems, or parliamentary activity. The topic has received more attention in the United States, where scholars were more interested in explaining party unity inside Congress because parties barely exist outside the legislature. This is one of the reasons why I intend to focus this research on party unity and to conduct a comparative study across European countries.

The problem with the literature on party unity is the conceptual overlap and lack of clarity that persists in many studies. In the present research I separate the concept of party unity into unity in terms of behavior and unity in terms of attitudes. **Behavioral unity** will be the major focus of the project. This project concentrates on the overt

¹ APSA Committee on Political Parties, *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System*, New York: Rinehart, 1950, pg. 1.

behavior of the party, how the party acts in the legislature, if it is factionalized or not, or if it experiences splits. Especially in Europe, where parliamentary systems predominate, united party behavior (particularly in the legislature) matters. Therefore the research aims to construct a model that explains and identifies the possible determinants of party behavioral unity.

This thesis proposes an integrated model about the unity of the party per se, therefore the goal is to explain not only the behavior of the MPs in the legislature, but also the unity of the party outside the legislature with regards to its policies, though only at the elite level. For reasons pertaining to data collection and data availability the project investigates only the electorally relevant parties which have representatives in the legislatures. The time-frame used is 1996-2007 in order also to include the new European democracies in the analysis. Therefore the research focuses on the political parties from Western and Central Eastern Europe. Those European countries are selected in which the left-right scale has a meaning, in the sense that the elite, masses and the country experts (Klingemann et al. 2006, Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2007, Benoit and Laver 2007) can place themselves and the parties on the left-right continuum. This criterion for country selection is justified by the fact that the political parties will need to be compared across countries. Also the selection of countries has to do with reasons pertaining to data availability, more precisely the availability of elite surveys.

Research question:

What are the determinants of party unity in Europe?

The **primary units of analysis** are political parties, since the major purpose is to measure the level of unity inside the parties. Since the analysis will introduce some explanatory variables that function at the state level (electoral system, political system, state structure, and cultural factors), the countries will become part of the analysis. The study is a cross-national one, looking at the differences between parties and countries in terms of party unity. As the research progresses, because of different organizational styles and of different national institutional settings, I would expect to find differences between the parties of the same country, differences across countries and possible differences across regions in Europe.

Research importance and justification:

The research is important because it contributes to the literature regarding party organization, party change theory and coalition government theories. Party unity, either in terms of attitude or in terms of behavior, is essential for *political representation*. Voters' choice between the parties and the election of their representatives is very much related to party unity. The parties should be united "because otherwise they may prove incapable of translating their mandates into effective action and indeed because without cohesion [unity] the very concept of an electoral mandate is ambiguous. Only if the party acts together as a team, can the voters reward or punish it at the polls as a team. Only if each candidate advocates the

same policies and can be trusted to act with his copartisans to carry them out [...] unless this condition is met, an election cannot truly be said to have given anyone a mandate at all” (Katz 1980: 3). A specific situation when misrepresentation of voters may occur is when a party that has many factions has parliamentarians who belong to only one of the party factions.

Another aspect with which the topic is associated is *government performance and stability*. Party unity is perceived as necessary to the delivery of efficient government and group cohesion is regarded as a good predictor for performance. A cohesive (united) party, as Ozbudun (1970: 304) contends, is supposed to govern better than a noncohesive one and party cohesion is a factor that “enables the party to enact its program into governmental policies”.

Party unity is related to *the parties’ public image*. Parties in the parliament, parties in the government or opposition seek to behave as cohesive entities because a party’s popularity is related to a positive party image. Lack of party unity can damage party image (Boueck 2002), the party’s “brand name”, the party’s electoral expectations, government performance and ultimately, office holding. “The more a party presents itself as divided, the less confidence voters may have in its policy-making ability and the sincerity of its central policy commitments. It is precisely this competence and coherence of parties in dealing with hard policy choices that the mass-media and politicians in rival parties may wish to probe into in order to discredit a party in the eyes of at least moderately sophisticated voters” (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 136, 137).

Some empirical studies revealed that “voters rely more heavily on the label of a more unified party” (Grynavski 2001: 13); the more ideologically and behaviorally homogeneous party having more value in the eyes of American voters. Boucek (2001) also showed that disunity has a damaging *effect on the party’s electoral success*. The perceptions of party unity among the voters were found to be highly correlated with the measures of party popularity for the Conservative and Labour parties between 1965-1997.

Research on *party decline* (significant electoral decrease) and *party failure* (failing to maintain an organization in order to contest elections), suggests that maintaining the cohesion of the party is necessary for party survival. Rose and Mackie (1988: 540) argue that “if a party is to continue, it must maintain some organizational cohesion” and adapt to changes in the social and political environment if they want to preserve their electoral support.

Since the research on the topic paid more attention to the behavior of the American legislators, the present project, with the focus on party unity in Europe, will balance the literature. Scholars have been constantly trying to explain the characteristic disunity of American parties manifested up until late 1990s (Janda, Berry, Goldman 2008: 350). However, at the European level, it is even more challenging to study what the determinants of behavioral party unity are, to assess which are the necessary and sufficient conditions for party unity, and also, what accounts for different levels of unity across parties, countries and regions.

This research aims to be a comprehensive comparative endeavor which will go against some early opinions that a cross-national comparison on party cohesion or discipline is simply impossible. Olson (1980: 257) declared that given the variety of voting procedures and rules across parliaments “we are limited in the trends we can identify and in the degree of confidence we can place in our own observations”. Twenty years later Bowler, Farrell and Katz (1999) also maintained that a comparison is very difficult to realize in practice given the different rules under which parliaments operate.

The thesis’ chapters proceed as follows. Chapter 2 presents a theoretical overview of party unity, offers theoretical and empirical justification for this particular research and then advances an integrated model designed to explain party unity. Chapter 3 discusses the concepts, methodology employed and the data quality of the overall study. An aggregate country analysis and regional similarities or differences are the focus of chapter 4. The subsequent chapters 5 and 6 present in detail the analysis of party unity determinants at two levels: systemic and party, and further disentangle the factors which have a restrictive effect on party unity or enhance it in various ways. The concluding section summarizes the empirical and theoretical contribution of this study, while the appendix offers more details about the data generated for the research and the empirical analysis.

In this thesis I developed an integrated model of party unity, a model which takes into account organizational characteristics of political parties and the institutional frameworks in which they operate. At a broader level, party characteristics influence on the unity of behavior much more than state institutions do. The latter impact,

however, more strongly on the unity of attitudes. This offers an overall picture about how state institutions and organizations like political parties actually work together in practice in a representative democracy. The empirical analysis I have conducted showed no significant discrepancy between the levels of unity of behavior in Central Eastern Europe and Western Europe. This suggests that the two regions are not significantly different in all aspects of party politics, and further substantiates the need for comparative party research to include Central Eastern Europe. A regional difference is visible however in terms of unity of attitudes, with Eastern Europe displaying a lower congruence of within party ideology. My model illustrates the supremacy of party characteristics in explaining unity of behavior, while the systemic factors including electoral system, parliamentarism and party financing more directly influence unity of attitudes. High centralization and disciplinary rules contribute to a high level of unity of behavior and often compensate for low levels of party attitudinal unity.

2. Theoretical Framework

This chapter presents a theoretical framework for party unity, discusses the concept in relation to political representation, and investigates systemic factors and party characteristics which could influence unity. It further advances an integrated model designed to explain unity which will be tested in the subsequent chapters.

2.1 Redefining the concept of party unity

The literature related to party unity refers to political parties and party systems, party decline issues, party organization, electoral systems, and coalition governments either by stating the importance of party unity or the implications of all the specified factors on it. There is no theory of party unity as such and no extensive comparative study has been conducted on the topic, with the exception of one tentative study, Ozbudun (1970), which remained at the stage of a working paper. More recently Kitschelt et al. (1999), Kitschelt and Smyth (2002), Chaisty (2005), Kitschelt (2003), Morgenstern (2004), Carey (2007) concentrated on Central Eastern Europe or Latin America, but the latter studies are related only to party programmatic cohesion (unity in terms of party policy positions) or to roll-call voting solely.

There is a conceptual overlap and confusion between concepts such as *party unity*, *party cohesion* and *party discipline*. This creates two common problems in the literature; the first one relates to the definitions of these three concepts and the second to the measurement advanced for them. Often, one step is overlooked when defining the concepts, and most scholars, instead of offering a conceptual clarification and definition, refer directly to measurements.

Jenkins (2001), Parker (2001), and Depauw (2003) use the concept of party unity to refer to MPs' vote inside the legislature. Most of the time, the concept is used by the above mentioned authors interchangeably with that of *party discipline* and *party cohesion*, all being presumed to mean exactly the same thing: "the average percent of partisans who voted with the party line, on party votes during a given session" (Jenkins 2001: 9) or as a party unity vote "in which a majority of the voting Democrats oppose a majority of voting Republicans" (Parker 2001).

In a similar vein with Owens (2003: 3), Heller and Mershon (2000: 3) define a party as *cohesive* when it is "made up of like-minded people who vote together because they share preferences", and infer that uniformity in voting behavior and in preferences should coexist. On the same line, Janda (1980: 118) who used the concept of party coherence as equivalent with party cohesion in the ICPP project (International Comparative Political Parties) defines it as "the degree of congruence in the attitudes and behavior of party members." The problem with these studies is that, as measurements for the concept, they use roll-call votes, which are mainly a behavioral expression and do not necessarily imply similarity in attitudes. Furthermore, no evidence has been advanced to show that behavior and attitudes are always correlated, or that the attitudes are a prerequisite for behavior. Kitschelt and Smith (2002: 1229) offer another approach to cohesion, and refer more to preferences and attitudes when they define *party programmatic cohesion* as the "general agreement within a party organization on specific issue positions".

On the other side, "*party discipline* [emphasis added] as measured by the uniformity of legislative roll-call voting conduct among representatives of the same party... may

be a matter of organizational coercion more than of programmatic cohesion” (Kitschelt 2000: 859). Parliamentary parties, as Heller and Mershon (2000: 3) contend, are disciplined when “members of the same party vote the same way”. Discipline is also referred to as the sticks and carrots used in order to maintain the unified vote inside the parliament (Linek and Rakušanová 2002) and, besides this, discipline and cohesion are used interchangeably with party unity. Fear of the consequences of disobedience (electoral defeat, loss of policy benefits or of office holding privileges) may materialize in tight discipline inside the party (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Cox and McCubbins 1993) and the result is the MPs’ unified voting patterns. Although party discipline has been used more in relation to party behavior inside the legislature, there is still no clear separation between the concept of discipline and cohesion. Some studies (Haspel, Remington, Smith 1998) continue to use cohesion as denoting partisan loyalty in floor voting, exactly the same way as others define discipline.

Recent studies briefly mention that both party discipline and party cohesion are observations of party unity (Heller and Mershon 2000: 3) or that both discipline and cohesion are “overlapping routes to party unity” (Malloy 2003: 1) without too much clarification about the relationship that exists between concepts or in-depth research to bring more theoretical and empirical justification for their statements.

Few authors draw a distinction between party cohesion and party discipline. Ozbudun (1970), Bowler, Farrell and Katz (1999), Kitschelt et al. (1999), Kitschelt (2000), Kitschelt, Smith (2002), Hix, Noury and Roland (2006) speak about party cohesion and party discipline as being different. The difference between the above mentioned

concepts, to which the author of this thesis subscribes, is that cohesion is in relation to the preferences of party members/representatives, while discipline denotes uniformity of voting inside the legislature.

What needs to be clarified is that party discipline has two components: similar actions by different party members (result behavior) and a relation of power within the party when one party member is obliging the other to act in ways he would not otherwise do (i.e. imposing disciplinary measures). In other words one could speak of *organizational discipline* and *acting discipline*. In my analysis I will use the concept of organizational discipline, meaning the disciplinary measures imposed within the party, and consider acting discipline as a component of party behavioral unity, meaning similar voting on laws by MPs of the same political party.

The same clarification has to be made overall for the concept of party unity. There are two aspects of it to be scrutinized: unity in terms of attitudes and unity in terms of behavior. In order to avoid any confusion or conceptual and measurement overlap, this thesis clearly differentiates between party *unity of attitudes* – which represents the ideological convergence of party representatives, respectively the uniformity of their opinion with regards to their party policies, and party *unity of behavior* – which denotes uniformity of party conduct inside the legislature. Behavioral party unity encompasses more than the voting behavior of MPs in the legislature. It also includes party factionalism and other MPs' actions such as writing petitions or letters.

2.2 Representative democracy and party unity

Party unity, expressed either as attitude or as behavior, is essential for *political representation*. Voters' choice between the parties and the election of their

representatives is very much related to party unity. The parties should be united “because otherwise they may prove incapable of translating their mandates into effective action and indeed because without cohesion [unity] the very concept of an electoral mandate is ambiguous. Only if the party acts together as a team, can the voters reward or punish it at the polls as a team. Only if each candidate advocates the same policies and can be trusted to act with his copartisans to carry them out [...] unless this condition is met, an election cannot truly be said to have given anyone a mandate at all” (Katz 1980: 3). A specific instance of misrepresentation of voters may occur when a party, that has many factions, has parliamentarians who belong to only one of the party factions.

There is agreement between scholars that modern democracy is representative democracy (Katz 2005: 42, Ankersmith 2002: 107, Heidar and Koole 2000a, Kitschelt et al. 1999). But when it comes to representation, what one may ask is: who is represented, who is going to represent and what is the representative going to do in order to represent the represented? (Katz 2005: 42) For every question there can be several answers: the represented can be all the citizens of a country, particular groups of citizens, voters of the party, individual citizens, or the party membership organization. The representative can be the parliament as a whole, the national party, the constituency party, or the individual MP. As for the actions of the representative, they can mirror the demographic characteristic, the distribution of opinions, they can do what the represented told them to do (delegate), they can use their own judgment in order to advance their interests (trustee), or they can act as an ombudsman.

Representation at the individual level is more linked to the party or the MP for who the citizens have been voting. The ballot structure plays an important role in this situation. In the case of closed electoral lists, the link between the elected MP and the electorate in the constituency or the electorate overall is not as close as in single member districts or open lists. Therefore we can speak of different levels of representation. At the individual level, the MP is the trustee or the delegate of his voters, while at the national level political parties put representation in practice through their party programmes. In the later case it is the party rather than the individual MP which acts as the link between the citizens and the state (Kopecký 2004: 353).

While there is a long established debate about whether the representative is a delegate or a trustee, representative democracy theorists speak more about delegation (Strøm, Müller, Bergman 2003: 21) and the delegate as representative of the citizen rather than the trustee. Following from this, party unity appears as a necessity inside the political party in order to ensure the attainment of representation and in order to avoid the accountability punishment of not being re-elected. The present research will pursue only one chain of delegation, which is from the voters to their elected representatives (Strøm, Müller, Bergman 2003: 20), although the chains of delegation can continue up to the level of civil servants.

Katz and Mair (1994: 5), emphasize that leaders of the party in government “are more likely to look outward, towards the society as a whole, or at least toward the party’s potential electorate, while leaders of the party as membership organization are more likely to look inward, toward the current members.” Therefore different opinions

about representation may exist between different faces of the party and if there is an overlap between the faces of the party, this may affect the party's behavior in the legislature.

Departing from the normative requirements about how parties are expected to behave in a representative democracy, in this research I also acknowledge the supply side of the representation process. I therefore consider the MPs' perceptions about political representation a potential explanatory variable for party behavioral unity. MPs' behavior inside the party and in parliament may depend on their perception of whom exactly they represent - their direct voters, all the voters, the constituency party, specific social or interest groups, the national party or the nation as a whole. This explanatory variable may be relevant to explaining the Central-East European legislators' behavior during the early 1990s since democracy was in its early phases and MPs were not fully familiar with the rules of the democratic game.

2.3 Determinants of party unity

The factors which influence party unity can be classified according to their positive or negative influence, according to their short-term or long-term impact, strong or weak impact, as will be shown in the subsequent chapters. Depending on their specific arguments and level of analysis, the determinants could also be classified into system and party level explanations, or macro and micro explanations. This section presents a theoretical overview of party unity and its determinants. I discuss the scholarship which links state institutions to unity and also the literature which relates party organization or other party traits to party unity. As in most cases, these factors have

been treated separately in relation to unity, the aim is to arrive at an integrated model which explains party unity.

I begin the discussion with the **macro level explanations (systemic)** which mainly emphasize the role of state level factors in determining/influencing party unity. These theories highlight the role of the political system (either presidential or parliamentary), the type (structure) of state (federal or unitary), the type of electoral system (from single members district plurality to list proportional representation), the nature of the party system (two-party, two-and-a half or multi-party systems).

2.3.1 Systemic determinants of party unity

Federalism is one of the factors often blamed for the low cohesion in American parties (Key 1964: 334) because of its decentralizing effect on the party system. Along the same lines, Epstein (1967: 32) argued that “party organization tends to parallel governmental organization, particularly the governmental organization prevailing when parties originally developed”. It seems that in a federal system, state parties count more than the local and regional parties in a unitary state. The federal form of state is usually perceived as the result of regional diversity and may further encourage diversity “by channeling the claims of local socio-economic interest groups. Thus, a local interest, provided that is strong enough to dominate the state government, may efficiently oppose adverse national policies” (Ozbudun 1970: 355). Maybe the presence of federalism has generated a lack of unity in US parties but it may not be the only and sufficient cause for disunity and certainly the US case is not sufficient to make generalizations.

Recent cross-national studies (Tan 2000: 44), have found a reverse relationship between federalism and party centralization. It appears that federalism contributes to more party centralization and concentration of power, which is in contradiction with Key's arguments. The explanation that Tan offered for this result was that the very existence of a formal federal structure does not necessarily imply that power will also be decentralized in the polity and, consequently, political parties will not have to decentralize power. Still, his explanation is not based on empirical evidence and therefore further research is needed in order to clarify the impact of federalism on party unity.

A constitutional factor that does have importance for party unity in the legislature is the relationship between the legislative and executive authorities. This structure might be either a **parliamentary, presidential or a semi-presidential form of government**. In the case of parliamentary systems, the parliamentary majority has the power to form and to change the cabinet. But in presidential systems, neither the parliament nor the executive can put an end to the legal existence of the other, hence the executive remain in office even if it does not enjoy majority support in the legislature.

Parliamentary systems lead to party unity² “by making a great many roll-call questions of confidence in the government” (Ozbudun 1970: 355). If certain members of the parliament vote against their party in parliament, this means not only that they oppose their leaders on particular issues, but can also mean that they are “willing to see their party turned out of power and the other side put in to defeat the particular

² Ozbudun (1970: 305) uses party cohesion as a synonym for party unity and defines it as “the extent to which, in a given situation, group members can be observed to work together for the group's goals in one and the same way”. He looks at party cohesion inside the legislature (behavioral unity) and measures its level by roll-call votes.

bill” (Ranney 1965: 11), especially when the government’s majority is small. This is one explanation for why few parliamentarians choose to vote against their party in parliament under the conditions of a parliamentary state. In presidential systems however, the legislators can vote against their party’s legislative program without immediately causing negative consequences for their party.

Parliamentary government instead provides rational incentives for behavioral party unity. One aspect that each MP must consider is the question of party loyalty. If they decide to behave against their party line, they might lose their share of the obvious benefits of executive power exercised by their party and, of course, electoral fortune if the party fails to maintain its leadership in office (Epstein 1964: 56). Another rational reason for an MP to remain loyal to the party leadership is that, in parliamentary systems, the leadership of the majority party has the power to distribute the ministerial offices among its parliamentarians. By comparison, in some presidential systems, such as the USA, membership of the legislative body is constitutionally incompatible with holding a ministerial position (Epstein 1956: 361, 376).

The power of dissolution associated with the parliamentary system is seen as an effective instrument to strengthen party behavioral unity. This power may give the parliamentary leaders and the party executive extensive control over the parliamentary party. Sartori (1997: 94) acknowledges the importance of cohesion and discipline for parliamentary democracy and argues that “parliamentary democracy cannot perform – in any of its many varieties – unless it is served by *parliamentary fit* parties, [emphasis in original] that is to say, parties that have been socialized (by failure, duration, and appropriate incentives) into being relatively cohesive and/or disciplined

bodies... [And] disciplined parties are a *necessary condition* for the ‘working of parliamentary systems’”. Sartori is not very specific in what party cohesion means and does not give any specific definition of party discipline either, he only specifies that party discipline is connected to parliamentary voting.

The type of party system that functions in a country has also been related to party unity. Considering the number of parties within a political system, the claims are contradictory. Turner and Schneier (1970), Loewenberg and Patterson (1979) argue that multi-party systems produce smaller and more homogeneous parties with greater intra-party cohesion. But when, besides the numerical criterion (i.e. fragmentation), other dimensions are considered, the arguments relating party unity to party system fragmentation are reversed. In two-party parliamentary systems, party unity is expected to be high because the majority party has to maintain itself in government (Epstein 1967, Sartori 1997), but it is still not clear which of the two variables (two-party system or parliamentary system) has a bigger impact on party unity, or whether the two factors have a joint effect. Subramanian (2008) brings a different perspective on the chain of causation and argues that the rules used to enforce high party cohesion in the legislatures actually lead to high party system fragmentation, because the legislators who can not express voice will exit and form other parties.

In extreme multipartism, bearing in mind Sartori’s (1990) typology of party systems, the incentives for behavioral party unity inside the legislature are weaker than in two-party or moderate multipart systems. Because the parties situated in the center of the ideological spectrum may always be in the government, parliamentary representatives can afford to vote against the majority of their party. Even if this act causes a reshuffle

of the cabinet, it does not mean a loss of power or prestige for the center parties. In this way, the parliamentarians of the center parties can manifest their dissent on a particular issue. Similarly to a two-party parliamentary system, a moderate multiparty system with two blocs of parties, or one major party and an opposing bloc of parties, also creates incentives for party unity. It is the bipolar nature of the party system and the possibility of alternation in government that should generate high behavioral party unity, as in the case of the two-party system (Ozbudun 1970: 360). The difference between the predictions is thus evident: if, in defining a party system, other dimensions besides numerical criteria are added (such as polarization, or parliamentary/presidential system), then the inferences in relation to party unity change, which leaves the problem of party system influence on unity altogether unsolved.

According to theorists of **electoral systems** (Katz 1980, Taagepera and Shugart 1989, Carey and Shugart 1995), the electoral formula, the district magnitude and the ballot structure are related to party unity. Party list proportional representation (PR) is expected to generate more united parties than single member district systems (SMD) using plurality or majority because, in the latter case, the relationship with the constituency makes the MPs less attached to the party at the central level (Taagepera and Shugart 1989).

With proportional representation, a separate preference vote, cast by electors choosing that party, might determine the order in which candidates are declared elected. Katz (1980) undertook an extensive study into the influence of preferential voting on party

unity. He argued that “the pattern of cohesion or disunity³ exhibited by a party in parliament can be predicted from district magnitude, the possibility of intraparty choice and the distribution of resources in the country” (Katz 1980: 34). His predictions relate intra-party choice to intra-party competition, which, in turn, will determine a candidate’s electoral fortunes and consequently candidates’ behavior in maintaining separate campaign organizations.

Katz’s expectations concerning party unity were that whenever the preferential vote is allowed, parliamentary parties will tend to be disunited. “In the case of small districts, this will be manifested in personalistic factionalization. In the case of large districts, the pattern of party factionalism or fractionalism will reflect the distribution of electorally mobilizable resources” (Katz 1980: 34). The empirical verification of these propositions in the case of US, British, Irish and French parties, led to the result that, indeed, preferential voting and party disunity are positively associated. But Katz’s did not consider all the important parliamentary parties within each country as his analysis took into account only the US Democrats, British Conservatives, Irish Fine Gael and the French Communists. The sample was altogether too small to generate further generalization.

Working along the same lines as Katz, Carey and Shugart (1995) developed a theoretical model based on electoral rules in order to assess the relative value that each legislator assigns to personal or party reputation. In order to maintain party reputation, it is assumed that politicians should refrain from taking positions and

³ Katz used cohesion and unity as synonyms and according to him, we speak about cohesion when the “party acts together as a team” (1980: 3), when it lacks internal conflicts and more precisely when parties vote the same way inside the legislature (1980: 4-5). His approach towards party unity was more on the behavioral side and operationalized the concept as the level of factionalism existent inside the party and the leadership concentration (the number of individuals claiming a share in leadership of the party).

actions that would contradict the party platform. If the electoral results depend on votes cast for individual candidates, then politicians need to evaluate and decide between the value of personal and party reputation.

Among the factors that they considered to influence personal vote-seeking is the lack of ballot control (the control that party leaders exercise over ballot rank in electoral lists), vote pooling (whether votes are pooled across entire parties or candidates), types of votes (whether voters cast a single intra-party vote instead of multiple votes or a party-level vote). As far as the district magnitude is concerned, they offered a more complex prediction compared to Katz (1980). District magnitude, as Carey and Shugart (1995: 418) contend, “affects the value of personal reputation in opposite manners, depending on the value of the ballot. In all systems, where there is intra-party competition, as M [district magnitude] grows, so does the value of personal reputation. Conversely, in systems where there is no intra-party competition, as M grows, the value of personal reputation shrinks.” However their model, besides the fact that it has not been empirically tested, keeps constant the other systemic factors that may influence party unity, such as the state structure, the legislative-executive power relations or the type of party system. There is however some empirical evidence from Harmel and Janda (1982: 76) which shows that, in the US, party unity tends to be higher in non-election years than in election years, which may “reflect the MPs’ desire to vote constituency interests over party policy when running for reelection.”

Another variable, often not considered and which could matter for the end result of voting on the floor, are the parliamentary specific **rules on the functioning of party**

parliamentary groups (PPGs). The rules can be expressed in the parliamentary standing orders or sometimes can even be stipulated in the party statutes. The more clear and strict these rules are, the more united the behavior of MPs is expected to be.

Party financing as regulated by the state can be another explanatory variable for party behavioral unity because like the state institutions or other state level factors it shows the link between the state and the parties. Party scholars have also emphasized (Biezen, Kopecký 2007) that party finance is a dimension which shows the considerable importance of the state for political parties in general. Financial resources, their magnitude and the way in which the funds are used can all play an important role in explaining party behavioral unity. Subsidies can be restricted to election campaigns, or given to parties, irrespective of the electoral campaign. Also, campaign financing can be directed to the parties as organizations or directly to the candidates (Katz 1996) and this may influence the way in which party representatives behave. A party-centered system of financing could uphold party unity, as opposed to a candidate-centered system. Similarly, high level of subsidies could generate a more united party, with no clientelistic favors to be exchanged when voting on various bills.

2.3.2 Party level explanations for party unity

Micro level explanations (party level) for party unity put emphasis on the political party characteristics: party size, party age, party origin, party centralization (Janda 1980, Harmel and Janda 1982, Janda and King 1985, Norris 1996, Hazan 2002). These studies relate party traits to party unity but do not have a particular theory about party unity with clear causal mechanisms that explain it. I take further parts of their conceptual framework with the aim to construct a model of party unity in Europe.

Concerning **the size** of a party it has been argued that differences in party membership may explain differences in party behavior. A small organization has been perceived to favor internal cohesion. As Kirchheimer (1969: 250) argues, it is in a party leaders' interest to prevent internal conflicts by maintaining a small number of party members. But as Panebianco (1988: 187) shows, there are many examples such as the Italian Communist Party or the British Conservative Party, both with large membership and high unity. Therefore the question of the impact of party size on party unity remains open. We do not know if a large or small party membership enhances unity, and the current trend is towards lower membership figures (Mair and van Biezen 2001). Except for size of party membership, what is relevant for the purpose of the present research is party size in the legislature or whether the party is or not in government.

Party age was also associated with an increase in the political experience of the party elite, so that the older the party, the more cohesive it is expected to be (Heidar and Koole 2000a: 19). As a party becomes more mature, it acquires value and stability (party institutionalization process) and becomes reified in the public mind while engaging in valued patterns of behavior (Janda 1980: 19).

Duverger (1967) has an extensive theory about parties and party systems, with many laws that were not tested empirically, but for each law he offered carefully selected examples that could fit the theory. Related to party discipline, Duverger pointed out that organization is very important for the political party in controlling its parliamentary representatives. Based on his theory, Maor (1997: 137) formulated the following three hypotheses: “the more **centralized** [emphasis added] the party is, the

higher its cohesion⁴, the greater its leftist tendency, the higher its cohesion; and the more ideologically extreme, the higher its cohesion.” Maor tested these hypotheses only on the British case (Conservative and Labour parties for the period 1945-1995), which impede any further generalization and made his theory limited.

Dalton (1985) also uses party centralization when relating party unity to responsible party government. Responsible party government presumes that the parties should act as a unitary body inside parliament and their unity of action is often linked to a centralized and hierarchical party organization. Comparing elite-voters’ opinions from nine countries, Dalton’s findings show that centrally organized parties are more representative of their supporters, in terms of voter-party agreement on policy issues. Still, the research was not carried further and no further evidence has been brought forward to link party centralization and unity, expressed either as ideological positions or behavior. Nevertheless, Dalton (1985: 294) suggests that a centralized party “is more likely to project clear party cues and [...] helps elites agree on a party’s general political orientation”.

Little attention has been paid to **party ideology** in explaining party unity. As mentioned earlier, Maor (1997), drawing from Duverger (1967), studied the British party system and checked if the leftist tendency of parties fostered high cohesion, and if ideological extremism was also associated with high cohesion. A comparative study would help to see the influence of ideology on a party’s behavioral unity, not only for the Western European democracies, but for the Central Eastern Europe as well.

⁴ Maor (1997: 136) has an extensive definition of party cohesion: “discussions of party cohesion cover several angles of intra-party consensus. First, the object of consensus with respect to the following: (i) general values, that is societal or communal values not peculiar to the organization under study; (ii) the means available to the organization for achieving goals; (iii) the organizations’ goals; (iv) participation in the organization; (v) performance obligation, that is, who is to carry out what duties.” However Maor’s definition is too broad and too general, incorporating behavioral and attitudinal elements at the same time, for which, it is difficult to find reliable empirical indicators.


Duverger's hypothesis have been tested using data from the ICPP project (Janda and King 1985) and one of the findings was that left parties are associated with centralization and with high levels of administering discipline. However, the ICPP project contains data about political parties from all over the world in the period 1950-1962. At that time, most of the parties were mass parties, but nowadays, given their transformation (towards catch-all and cartel parties), it is questionable if Duverger's hypothesis still holds.

There could also be other individual level explanations for party unity such as demographic variables for the MPs, especially their education levels and socio-economic backgrounds, and the levels of economic development in the regions where they were elected. All these type of explanations are disregarded by this thesis as the unit of analysis is the political party and the aim is to construct a model which explains unity of the party per se.

2.4 Towards an integrated model of party unity

In the context of post-communist democracies and at the early stages of party development, there are many instances in which attitudinal homogeneity is not a prerequisite for behavioral unity. Those parties that have low attitudinal unity will try to construct an organizational apparatus with strict disciplinary measures and high centralization in order to reach a high level of behavioral unity and implement the policies announced. These in turn will eventually bring a high level of behavioral unity. The mechanism is presented graphically in figure 1.1 on the next page.

Figure 1.1 Party level mechanism of achieving behavioral unity



In order to achieve behavioral unity, especially for the Central East European parties, my model of party behavioral unity asserts that there is a compensation mechanism between, on the one hand, attitudinal unity, and on the other, organizational disciplinary measures or party centralization. The compensation means that discipline can be a substitute for attitudinal unity and also that disciplinary measures are used if there is no attitudinal unity. The mechanism is expected to work under the assumption that parties can be both programmatic and clientelistic in their orientations. Programmatic linkages should generate a party with a high attitudinal unity. Clientelistic linkages do not necessarily imply low attitudinal unity at all times, but certainly lower than that of a party purely programmatic in its orientation.

Behavioral unity can be the result of the attitudinal similarity of the party members, of the disciplining organizational rules, or the result of both. At the same time, in a context characterized by the lack of unity inside the parliament, an unfortunate event, like a government defeat, can oblige the party to increase the centralization and disciplinary rules in order to ensure uniform behavior in the future. In other words, the

democratic representation process can be fulfilled at the expense of intra-party democracy. High levels of internal and external democracy cannot always coexist and, as Janda (2005: 50) stipulates, this is at odds with the theory of parliamentary government.


From the above described mechanism the question to be asked is then: who exactly within the party will increase the centralization and disciplinary measures? Will it be the party members or the party leadership? The most probable answer to the question is the party leadership. Cox and McCubbins (2005) argue that despite diverse policy preferences among the party members, in order to ensure unity the leader can control the agenda setting by filtering out issues which may cause discontent. Besides this, there are disciplinary measures like warnings, expulsion, or loss of various privileges associated with public office. At the same time the leader can control the agenda setting better in conditions of high party centralization in the process of decision making. It is expected that in Central Europe, due to a lower attitudinal homogeneity, the carrots and sticks may have a larger role in achieving behavioral unity, while in Western Europe, where parties have existed for longer, their attitudinal homogeneity may be higher and more important in explaining party unity of behavior. This will be investigated in greater detail in chapter 4.

There has been emphasis put on the institutional determinants of party unity and their direct impact on it within the party literature. However, the systemic variables are too far from party behavioral unity and intra-party dynamics may play an important role in facilitating or impeding their expected effect on party behavioral unity. Party literature addressed mainly the question of a direct link between the system level

factors and party unity without giving much importance to party organizational factors. These may constitute an important intervening factor in achieving behavioral unity. It may be the case that some institutional systemic factors directly affect party unity independently of the party organization features, or there may be an indirect effect of the systemic factors on the behavioral unity through party organizational features or attitudinal homogeneity.

As explained in the above sections, no clear connection between institutional arrangements at the state level, party organization and party behavioral unity has been offered by the scholarly work so far. This research offers therefore a comprehensive model of party unity (figure 1.2), which comprises possible determinants of it at the system and party level. The model presents possible path-ways to party unity of behavior which are either direct or indirect passing through the two intervening variables: attitudinal homogeneity and party organization factors. Using this model, the research seeks to show that there may be different paths from the systemic level factors, which lead to the same outcome (behavioral unity).

Figure 1.2 Integrated model of party unity



2.5 Deriving hypotheses

Considering the independent variables discussed and the integrated model in figure 1.2, the following general expectations and hypotheses are going to be tested in relation to party unity⁵. The theoretical and empirical case for each of these inferences will be discussed and further refined in the subsequent chapters. After they have been subject to this test, the result will be a fully fledged model which explains party unity in a representative democracy. The general derived hypotheses are outlined below with a short reasoning after each of them:

1. Parties with high unity of attitudes also show a high level of behavioral unity.

Most parties with a high programmatic cohesion are expected to behave as a united group in the legislature given their congruence of opinions on the party policies.

2. The higher the centralization, the higher the party unity of behavior.

Parties with a high degree of centralization, are expected to score high on all measurements of behavioral unity.

3. Parties with low attitudinal homogeneity have strong centralization.

Parties with a low level of attitudinal homogeneity are expected to apply strong centralization measures in order to ensure their representatives acting as a unitary body.

⁵ The same hypotheses and an overview of the factors influencing unity are presented in table A2, Appendix A. More refined versions of these hypotheses and the reasoning behind each of them is explained in more detail in chapters 5 and 6.

4. The stricter the PPG rules and the disciplinary rules applied, the greater the behavioral party unity.

The stricter and more restrictive yet more rewarding the PPGs rules are, the more united the MPs' behavior in the legislature.

5. Parties in government (compared with those not in government) have more behavioral unity.

The behavioral unity in the parliament is expected to vary according to a party's power status (in government or in opposition). Parties that are in government are expected to be very united in parliament.

6. Compared with other parties, left parties have more behavioral unity.

Left parties are expected to be more centralized and therefore more united in their behavior than other parties.

7. The more ideologically extreme the parties are, the higher their unity of behavior.

Low internal party democracy inside ideologically extreme-parties is expected to generate a highly united behavior for these parties. As in the case of leftist parties above, centralization is expected to be the facilitating factor and the effect of ideology on unity should therefore be indirect.

8. The broader the MPs' understanding of representation, the higher the level of party behavioral unity.

Parties with MPs who take the party program and the voters of their party as the main point of reference are expected to show a high level of party behavioral unity.

9. MPs elected in single member districts, show a low level of behavioral unity.

MPs who are elected in single member districts are expected to see representation just in terms of their constituency voters and, consequently, to show a low level of party behavioral unity. The behavioral unity of incumbent parties is expected to differ according to their share of seats. The bigger the parties size in the legislature, the higher the probability for a disunited behavior.

10. MPs elected under open lists with preferential voting, show a low level of behavioral unity.

MPs elected under open lists with preferential voting allowed are expected to have a broader understanding of representation but to show a low level of behavioral unity.

11. Parties in unitary states are more united in their behavior than parties in federal states.

Because of the decentralization associated with federalism, parties in federal states are expected to be more disunited than parties in unitary states.

12. Parties in parliamentary states are expected to have a higher unity of behavior than parties in semi-presidential or presidential states.

Given the power associated with the vote of confidence in parliamentary regimes, especially incumbent parties in these regimes are expected to show higher unity.

13. The higher the fragmentation of a party system, the higher the party unity of behavior is expected to be.

High fragmentation is expected to generate highly cohesive parties in terms of attitudes and therefore to generate, in an indirect way, parties with high unity of behavior.

14. The larger the amount of subsidies, the higher the party unity of behavior.

The higher the amount of subsidies received from the state, the lower the incentives for MPs to promote the interests of certain groups and be disloyal to their parties.

15. The higher the restrictions on party donations, the higher the party unity.

State regulations on the amount of donations political parties can receive may decrease the propensity for clientelistic linkages and act as a promoter of party behavioral unity.

16. The older the party system in a democracy, the higher the party unity.

Older democracies, given their relatively higher institutional stability and older party systems are expected to have higher party unity as opposed to the new democracies.

3. Data and methodological considerations

This study starts with a country overview in chapter 4 and proceeds further in chapter 5 and 6 with a large N statistical analysis completed with specific examples, which will offer more robustness to the analysis. Based on the distinction between party unity of attitudes and party unity of behavior, not only will the study retest in a comparative perspective some propositions stated earlier in the party literature, but it will also focus more on what happens within the party organization (imposing discipline and ideological homogeneity) and add other factors which work at the national level. The test of the integrated model of party unity and its determinants for the European parties will offer some answers regarding the importance of state level factors and party organization factors and an overall theoretical and empirical framework showing how party unity works in Europe.

3.1 Concepts, operationalization and measurements

Party unity of behavior

The dependent variable of this research is party behavioral unity defined as uniformity in the actions/conduct of party representatives. By party representatives I mean the party elite, or, more precisely, the members of the parliament.

Behavioral uniformity is observed in legislative **roll-call voting** conduct among representatives of the same party, the lack of party factions, and the lack of party splits. In theory, factions (ideological, issue, leadership, strategic) and splits denote low party unity of behavior as they clearly relate to open party behavior. The theoretical assumptions will however be further tested.

All the above mentioned indicators (uniformity of roll-call votes, lack of factions and lack of party splits) are different manifestations of the same overarching concept. Roll-call votes are manifestations of behavioral unity inside the legislature similar to party factions and party splits. The difference between splits and factions is that, though party splits occur less frequently, party factions may exist without necessarily leading to party splits. Party splits moreover may occur not only as a result of exacerbated factionalism, but also suddenly due to unexpected party leadership decisions. The quantification of party splits however, does not permit a unity score for each party. The thesis will not therefore focus on party splits, but will only provide several examples with the aim of testing if indeed splits happen when the party has a very low unity of attitudes, or when it scores very low on unity of behavior.

Party unity expressed as behavior can be measured accurately within legislative parties, since roll-call analysis is available for the study of the behavior of the legislators. **Roll-call votes** can be examined statistically with more confidence than can be granted to data whose reliability depends upon the objectivity of visual observation or verbal reporting. One aspect that needs to be mentioned in using roll call data is that attention has to be paid to the importance of issues on which legislators vote. The reason for this is the possibility that a high degree of party unity may be found on unimportant issues while low levels of party cohesion may be seen on very important issues. Deciding which are the more important issues for the party/country can prove to be subjective. The more important issues treated in the legislation may differ from legislature to legislature and from country to country. Therefore, the time period and the bills chosen to measure party behavioral unity can play an important role in the interpretation of the results in a research. The aggregate

roll-call data currently available across Europe did not allow weighting on the basis of issue importance. The experts in the 2007 party unity study however, were asked to rank the policy areas according to their salience and to identify those which caused dissent within parties.

“Roll-call votes”, meaning the records of the voting positions of individual legislators from each political party, are usually a public record. The most famous and used index in the literature concerning party unity is the mean index of cohesion, used under the name of Rice’s index. The index was developed by Stuart A. Rice in 1928, and is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Rice's index} = \frac{|N^{\text{YES}} - N^{\text{No}}|}{|N^{\text{Yes}} + N^{\text{No}}|} = |\% \text{ Yes} - \% \text{ No}|$$

The index of party cohesion (coefficient of cohesion) (Rice 1928: 208-209) is useful to describe the behavior of a group of elected representatives. It is obtained by dividing the number of votes cast by the majority of each party on roll-call by the total number of party members who voted. After that, the number obtained is converted to a scale from 0 to 100. The starting point of this measurement was that a fifty-fifty split in a party signifies zero cohesion. The index has value 1 when all MPs of a certain party vote in the same way, which may be all “Yes”, or all “No”. If the index is taken as a mean, the formula shows “the average index of all bills voted on” (Janda 1980: 118) which were considered by the various research projects.

A similar unity score index was proposed by Carey (2000 and 2002). It measures the absolute difference between the percentage of MPs voting “yes” and those voting

“no” on a bill, where the percentages of yeas and nays are calculated as shares from the total number of MPs which represent a party or a coalition of parties. However, like the Rice index, it produces an unweighted measure, as not all the votes have equal importance.

In this research, the bills voted by the lower house in each country are considered for the calculus of Rice index. The Lower House is the best choice in assessing the legislative behavior of the MPs, because it is regarded as being more representative. The Upper House, on the other hand, is usually elected under a different set of rules, although some states, like Hungary, are unicameral.

Scholars who have worked on this topic, have also developed other indicators for measuring party unity. But each of these measurements has its own application and flaws. For example, *Lowell's party voting* score dates from 1902 and is “one in which more than nine-tenths of its members who voted were on the same side of the question; a non-party vote is one in which one-tenth or more of its members are found on each side, that is, a vote where at least one-tenth of the voting members of the party split off from the rest” (Ozbudun 1970: 306). But this measurement can only be applied in a two-party system because it depends on the opposition of two parties – one in government and one in opposition. “True” party votes, as Ozbudun (1970: 36) specifies “are those in which both parties cast party votes on opposite sides”. Therefore, it would be of no use to apply the Lowell's score for the multiparty systems in Europe where, in case of coalition governments for example, majorities of more than one party would be on the same side when voting.

The index of party loyalty or *the index of party orthodoxy* was developed by Turner (1951) in order to assess the behavior in the legislature of each MP. The index equals the percentage of votes the MPs cast with their own party, when the majority of the other party opposed the majority of their own party on roll call. The index takes values from 0 to 100; zero indicating the lowest degree of loyalty to the party and 100 perfect party regularity (Turner 1951: 78-79). But as with the previous indicator, the party loyalty index is designed for and more useful in a two-party system because the loyalty percentage calculated for each individual MP better reflects the competition between the two parties, one in government and one in opposition.

Other vote-based measures for equating party unity are *party strength* (Hurley and Wilson 1989) and *party unity votes* (Hurley and Kerr 1997). The “party strength” index combines the party vote score (which shows the extent to which parties are in opposition and is measured by the percentage of times a majority of the government party opposes a majority of the opposite party) with the Rice index of party unity and multiplies the two in order to better reflect the opposition between the Democrats and Republicans in the US Congress. “Party unity votes” is also a hybrid between party votes and cohesion indexes calculated for individual MPs and is more useful for comparing party support of new and returning members of parliament from each party. The present research will therefore use Rice’s index of party unity as a more appropriate measure for party unity inside the legislature considering that most countries observed have multiparty systems. Moreover scores of unity for each party are of interest in this research, as opposed to unity scores of party blocs - in government or in opposition - or to unity scores of single MPs.

Concerning the other measurements for party behavioral unity, **factions** are an “intra-party combination, clique, or grouping whose members share a sense of common identity and common purpose and are organized to act collectively - as a distinct bloc within the party- to achieve their goals” (Zariski 1960: 33). Factions inside a party may be *formal* (officially recognized in the party statutes, with a separate organization and with recognized leaders) or *informal* (with no recognition from the party leaders or even forbidden by party rules).

The second operationalization of this concept in the present research refers to four manifestations of intra-party dispute (ideology, issues, leaders, strategy) which are discernible in the behavior of the party elite (Janda 1970: 110-111). *Ideological factionalism* refers to the division of parties into labeled factions with different ideological orientations and with approximately the same strength. *Issue factionalism* concerns factions that give attention to specific issues rather than overall ideology. In this case a party can be coherent on issues that are not the object of debate between party leaders. *Leadership factionalism* is generated by personal conflicts between the leaders, while *strategic (tactical) factionalism* stems from disagreement between party members on matters concerning the achievement of party goals and ends.

As for other measures of party unity which are not considered in this research, party defection/party switching and party splits need to be mentioned. Party splits may or may not be a result of exacerbated factionalism, but they definitely show that the party can no longer behave as a united entity. The interpretation of party splits depends on the timing of the event and the time period considered for research (Janda 1980: 120). If a party split occurs at a time t , this may indicate low behavioral unity at a time $t-1$

and also high behavioral unity at time $t+1$. Party splits together with party defection/party switching are not static concepts; they offer information about party unity in a given period. Party defections, when MPs switch from one party to another, do not usually happen all at once and the measure is therefore of better use in research that considers certain time intervals. The case is the same for party splits. For reasons pertaining to the time period chosen and the data available, these two measurements are not suitable for this thesis' comparative endeavor.

Other measurements that will be used for party behavioral unity are the **behavioral attitudes** of the MPs as tapped by elite surveys. In some countries such as Hungary, Poland, Czech and Slovak Republic (Kopecký 2001), the question addressed to MPs was about their behavior inside the legislature. In the hypothetical situation when he or she has to vote, but holds an opinion which is different from the one held by the party, the MPs are asked if they would vote (a) in accordance with the opinion of the party or (b) in accordance with their own opinion. The first answer would mean high unity score while the opposite applies for the latter answer. The questions in the West European surveys read more or less identically and are presented in detail in the Appendix A.

The 2007 **expert survey**⁶ on party unity with specific questions on unity has been used for most of the analysis undertaken in this thesis. Scholars specializing in political parties were asked to rank parties on a five point scale of party unity. The surveys enlarged the information available for this kind of research and made possible

⁶ The Appendix C presents details about the expert survey and also a sample questionnaire with the operationalization of the unity scale. The expert survey was a collaborative effort, designed during my visiting fellowship at Northwestern University in spring 2007. The collaboration and suggestions of professor Janda at that time and the Doctoral Research grant from CEU are gratefully acknowledged.

the construction of a comparative data set on party unity, which altogether incorporates 187 European political parties. Not only proved the on-line expert survey to be less time consuming and less costly than an elite survey for example, but it made possible for valid data to be gathered for almost 200 political parties across Europe. The survey collected data for 132 parties from Western Europe and 55 parties from Eastern Europe on critical organizational variables not in the elite surveys. Most importantly the survey has gathered data on party unity as conceptualized in the form of attitudes and behavior.

Determinants of behavioral party unity (operationalization and measurements):

Party unity of attitudes

Party unity of attitudes, as I mentioned in chapter 2, represents the ideological agreement of party representatives and it is considered a possible determinant of behavioral unity. In the elite surveys and in the expert survey party attitudinal unity is observed in the form of party programmatic cohesion. The measurement for this variable from the 1996 elite surveys is the standard deviation of MPs' issue positions. High levels of programmatic cohesion indicate that the party is building programmatic linkages, meaning that politicians pursue policy programs that distribute benefits and costs to all citizens, regardless of whether they voted for the present government or not. Conversely, as Kitschelt and Smith⁷ (2002: 1229) contend, "low levels of

⁷ Kitschelt et al (1999), Kitschelt and Smith (2002) and Kitschelt (2003) studied the programmatic party system structuration in Eastern Europe and Latin America and identified as possible determinants of it (besides constitutional provisions and electoral system) the presence of democracy for extended periods of time, the early formation of lasting parties, the early professionalization of the civil services, the nature of authoritarianism repression antedating democratization. Other variables considered to determine party programmatic cohesion have to do with the economic situation and the education level inside the polity. However this project does not fully explain the party programmatic cohesion but uses it as an intervening variable which leads to party behavioral unity.

cohesiveness are indicators of alternative linkages: either clientelist linkage formation or the highly volatile personal charisma of individual politicians”.

One qualification that needs to be addressed when using this measure is that it may be difficult to interpret in the case of parties whose mean issue position is close to the center of a salient issue space. If the respondents assign a party to the middle position, this may also be as a result of not knowing where the party stands on that particular issue. Another fault of the measure is that it is sensitive to outliers (a few extreme values) and may not bring a real image of the party's attitudinal homogeneity if only few people rate the party. Besides standard deviation, the inter-quartile range may be used as a complementary measure. Since it is not sensitive to outliers, the inter-quartile range (the difference between 25th and 75th percentile) may overcome some of the faults of the former measure.

In the Borz, Enyedi, Janda expert survey party unity of attitudes was tapped by the question: “On a scale from 1 to 5 please assign a score for each party regarding its ideological unity (party programmatic cohesion) for the 2006/2007 period”, where a score of 1 represents 50 percent or less agreement among MPs, and a score of 5 stands for over 90 percent agreement among MPs over party's policy stance.

Systemic institutional determinants and their operationalization:

- (i) electoral system (electoral formula, district magnitude, ballot structure)

The electoral system refers to rules and procedures with the help of which the distribution of seats in parliament is determined on the basis of electoral results. The

fundamental dimensions of an electoral system include electoral formula, district magnitude, electoral threshold, chamber size, and vote structure (Lijphart 1994: 7, 8). In employing this variable, the purpose is to see if the electoral rules are more candidate or party centered, which may consequently influence party unity, both in terms of attitudes and behavior.

The present research considers the fundamental dimensions of the electoral system, with special attention paid to the district magnitude (the number of representatives elected in a constituency), the electoral formula (single member districts, list proportional representation or mixed), and the vote structure (categorical or ordinal). Categorical voting allows the expression of choice only for one of the candidates or political parties entered in the competition. Ordinal voting permits the expression of voters' preferences. Under preferential voting, the voters have the opportunity "to express a relative preference among the candidates of a single party" (Katz 1980: 32), and this device should hinder party unity and lead to intra-party competition.

(ii) type of political regime (presidential, semi-presidential, parliamentary)

At the European level, political regimes range from parliamentary regimes (the majority), to semi-presidential regimes (such as Romania, Poland, France) or presidential (Russia). For this variable the Lijphart (1999), Krouwel (2003) and Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000) criteria of classification for European political systems in terms of executive-legislative relations will be used to analyze the impact of the latter on party unity.

(iii) state structure (federal/unitary)

State structure is expected to have an indirect influence on the level of party behavioral unity since it is expected to have a direct effect on the party attitudinal homogeneity and party centralization. The variable can be arranged on a scale from 1 (unitary and centralized) to 5 (federal and decentralized), taking into account two criteria: decentralization and whether the states have a formal federal constitution (Lijphart 1999: 186-188). Additional measures, such as the actual decentralization in federal states are further discussed in chapter 6.

(iv) type of party system: party system fragmentation, age

Considering Sartori's (1990) typology based on the number of parties, a two-party system is characterized by two major parties that are always in parliament and get to form minority or majority governments. In a multiparty system, present in the majority of European states, there are more than two parties in a parliament and usually the government is formed by a coalition of those parties. The measure employed for party system fragmentation is Taagepera and Shugart's (1989) index of least squares⁸, for all countries after the legislative elections.

Party system age refers to the period since the party system began to function in a democratic regime. In a party system that functions in a long established democracy, the parties are expected to have learned the rules of the game and behave in a unitary manner. Therefore, a distinction between old and new democracies in this sense it is likely to reveal the impact of party system age on unity.

⁸ The index has the following formula, $N_s = 1 / \sum (p_i^2)$, where, p_i = fractional share of votes or seats of the i -th component (party) and N = the effective number of political parties.

(v) party finance (state subsidies, ceiling on donations)

Party finance refers to the amount (relative *magnitude*) of subsidies that parties receive from the state during the year and during the electoral campaign and to *the funds' structure* (distribution to the party organization for managing or directly to party candidates). The data for this variable were obtained from secondary sources for some countries and by analyzing the laws on parties and party finance for the rest. The countries in my sample were assigned scores according to the magnitude of subsidies received. Party finance is important for party unity from the perspective of parties being both programmatic and clientelistic oriented. Direct state subsidies are not expected to replace completely clientelistic linkages, but to reduce their importance in influencing legislator's behavior. Party finance may have an indirect effect on party unity of behavior through party centralization. If the magnitude of state subsidies is high, this may favor a centralized party organization since the party leaders are not then dependent on the contributions of their party activists or other private business corporations. This could consequently lead to high behavioral unity. High subsidies could also decrease the propensity of clientelistic linkages between party members and various donors and lead to a party more united in terms of behavior.

Party organizational variables:

(i) party centralization

Party centralization means concentration of effective decision making in the hands of the national party organs. Centralization refers to many aspects, such as the *nationalization of the structure*, the *selection of the national leader* by a small number

of top leaders, the selection of *parliamentary candidates* by the national organization, and *the allocation of funds* to the local organizations in which the national organization must have a primary role. In a centralized party, *policy* is also formulated and promulgated at the national level, the control of communication is made by the national level of the party, and the *disciplinary measures* are settled and implemented by the national organs. The most obvious characteristic of a centralized party is that the leadership is concentrated in the hands of a few persons or of a single powerful figure (Janda 1970: 108-109). In the analysis, I consider all these aspects of party centralization with the aim of verifying if the predicted connections with party unity work in different countries.

(ii) disciplining organizational rules (disciplinary measures, rules of party parliamentary groups)

Among the intra-party rules, those related to disciplinary repression applied to party members who defect from the party line are considered. The variable will be considered on a continuum, from parties which have explicit disciplinary measures, to parties with no stipulation about sanctions in their party statutes. In our 2007 expert survey the question on disciplinary measures asked in detail the frequency with which they are applied by parties. There is a debate whether to consider the PPGs' disciplinary rules as a systemic or party factor (Döring 1995) considering that some countries have those rules stipulated in the constitution (Sweden, Portugal) or in the rules of legislatures. Overall the balance inclines however towards the party organization, because ultimately it is the party which implements them. Regardless of whether disciplining rules are mentioned in the party statutes or not, what is of higher importance here is if they were actually used by the party officials.

Some party parliamentary groups may sanction rebellious members by reducing their privileges, withholding promotions or even expelling them from the PPGs. Furthermore, a parliamentary fraction can be accountable to the party members at the National Council of the party and the National Convention. What is important for this variable is to see if, relative to party unity, a PPG is independent from its extra-parliamentary party, if it establishes its own rules, or if the party sets the rules for the PPGs.

(iii) party size in the legislature

The size of a party within the legislature is a trait that can influence the behavior of party representatives. The variable reflects the percentage of seats held by the party in a Lower House. If the allocated mandates are more than the party would need to maintain a coalition government, then it can afford to have some MPs defect from the party line.

(iv) power status (government/opposition)

Whether the party is in government or in opposition could matter for party behavioral unity. Parties that are in government are expected to be more united than those in opposition, although the question arises whether parties become more united as they get into government or government aspiration makes parties more unitary, both in terms of behavior and attitudes.

(v) party ideology

This independent variable is operationalized both as the left-right party positions and also as the major party families under the heading of which parties are grouped. Left-right scale is the standard ideological dimension according to which one can infer

parties' position on various issues. Left-right is regarded as an overall ideological dimension, as a kind of "superissue" (Gabel, Huber 2000) and very often the scale has an economic meaning (egalitarian distribution and state intervention – left; and free market, justified inequality - right). More recently, scholars have extended its significance to include other issues, such as abortion, military matters, gender, and the environment. In measuring this variable, the research relied on data from studies based on experts' judgments (Benoit and Laver 2007) and from other studies based on the content of party election manifestos (Klingemann et al. 2006). For each country, I use comparative manifesto project (CMP) left-right estimates from most recent election year covered in the latest CMP dataset as well as the assigned party family affiliation.

3. 2 Overview of data gathering, data quality and data analysis

The research combines quantitative and qualitative methods both for collecting and analyzing data. The process of data gathering consisted of two parts: one which relied on extant data for the independent and dependent variables and one of data collection for the variables pertaining to party organization label and party behavioral unity. Party unity indicators were calculated using public records data (for roll-call votes), party statutes (factionalism), expert surveys from 2007 and elite surveys from 1996. Roll-call votes were either available on the parliaments' web sites or, in some cases, the Rice index was obtained from secondary sources. Party statutes, secondary literature and expert surveys have been used to define the level of factionalism. Substantive information already exists about party organization on Western European parties (Katz and Mair 1992), to which experts' judgments, for both East and West

European parties have added more information that cannot be easily accessed otherwise. Additional expert data was also obtained from Rohrschneider/Whitefield Expert Survey of Political Parties in Thirteen Central and East European States.

Party programmatic cohesion was measured using the elite surveys conducted for Central Eastern Europe (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Kitschelt 2002) and Western Europe (Miller et al. 1999). Parties' ideological positions were taken from the comparative manifestos program (Klingemann et al. 2006), while measures of centralization are obtained from Kenneth Benoit's (2006) expert survey and our 2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda expert survey on party unity on which the final results of this thesis are extensively based.

Multivariate regression analysis is the method applied to unveil the most powerful factors that might influence the attainment of different levels of party unity across Europe. After this step, the analysis focuses on the integrated model and tests the direct or indirect effects of the independent variables on party behavioral unity. It may be the case that conjunctural causation plays an important role in studying party behavioral unity. Different factors may affect and determine party unity in different countries. Therefore, as well as the analysis focused on political parties, the thesis also investigates interaction between these variables across countries.

As already mentioned, the focus of the research is Western and Central Eastern European countries, where the left-right scale has a meaning for both the voters and the party elites. The left-right continuum is meaningful to employ when a large part of the electorate and political elite can place themselves and political parties along it.

There are two time periods on which the analysis is based: 1996 and 2007, in order to allow for a symmetric comparison between the Western and the Eastern European political parties.

The ‘large N’ statistical analysis considers political parties from the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, France, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Romania, Slovakia, United Kingdom. The countries were selected also because of the availability of current data allows for a valid comparison. The statistical analysis is complemented by in-depth examples and descriptions at both the party and country level. For the robustness of the analysis, this implies a close examination of the specific parties and countries which integrate in the discovered patterns and also an examination of the outliers.

Party Unity Expert Survey 2007

The Borz, Enyedi, Janda expert survey on party unity was conducted between the months of September and December 2007 in the twenty three countries of my European sample. The data gathering process has undergone several steps. Firstly, the experts were identified in the persons of party politics experts, researchers, public policy and parliamentary politics experts within each of the considered countries. Secondly, separate questionnaires were prepared for each country and sent off electronically to every expert. The questionnaires were all prepared in English. All questions pertained to key variables in my study and most of them were close ended, with a clear choice of answers on an ordinal scale from 1 to 5. Thirdly, the survey was

administered electronically via a professional on-line account with Survey Monkey⁹, and no financial incentives have been offered to the respondents.¹⁰ An e-mail was sent to each expert in order to solicit participation in the survey. It has informed each expert that we are conducting a survey on Party Unity in Europe, and that we respectfully request them to participate as an expert on party politics in their country. The experts have been told from the start that the survey is short and in the same e-mail we have provided the link to the survey which uniquely tied the survey to their e-mail addresses. In order to remove any ethical concerns, we did commit ourselves to maintaining the confidentiality of your responses and to sending a file containing summary scores of parties in each country after the survey is completed, if they should so wish. If however they were not willing to receive further emails from us, each expert had the option to be automatically removed from our mailing list. Fourthly, during the three months periodical reminders were posted every two weeks to all experts who did not answer during the first attempts.

The number of respondents varied from country to country, from three experts' answers in Luxembourg to 34 or 35 answers in Germany and Ireland. On average, compared to other expert surveys on party politics already conducted in Europe, the 2007 Party Unity Study has received a relatively close to average response rate for such studies, especially because no financial incentives were offered. Benoit and Laver expert survey received an average a response rate of 23 per cent in Eastern Europe and 32 per cent in Western Europe (Benoit and Laver 2007). The Party Unity expert survey received on average almost 18 percent per cent from the Central East

⁹ The gateway for professional accounts using survey monkey as an on-line tool is www.surveymonkey.com.

¹⁰ Given the fact that no financial incentives were offered to the respondents, the survey was also dressed up with the names of both my supervisors on the thought that it would increase the response rate.

and West European experts altogether (see appendix C, table C1). The response rate was slightly higher in Western Europe where the number of available English speaking surveyed experts was higher as well.

Data quality

The data quality assessment revealed reliable results on the basis of which the analysis has been conducted especially in chapters 5 and 6. In the process of assessing data quality, several factors (Janda 1970: 968) on the adequacy-confidence scale were followed, such as the number of experts that provide relevant coding, the proportion of agreement-disagreement in the information reported by different experts, and the degree of discrepancy among the experts when disagreement exists. Across countries, the variation in the number of respondents ranged from 5 to 35. However, whether there were 5 or more respondents, the standard deviations of their responses were not very high. The correlation between party scores (assigned by the country experts on each variable) and the standard deviations of the responses was 0.11 (at sig. 0.01). As correlations express how much variance in one variable is associated with variance in another variable, this establishes that the small disagreement in the scores offered is not related to the number of respondents. This in turn, shows that the reliability of our estimates is not related to the number of respondents to the expert survey.

Statistically, in a hypothetical situation when 5 different experts give 5 different answers, the maximum standard deviation of the responses, which we could obtain, is 3, given that our questions have a scale from 1 to 5. The disagreement among experts was between 0 and 1.20, which suggests that the respondents tend to agree in their ratings. Finally, it should be mentioned that the correlation between the voting unity

based on the expert survey and the Rice index is 0.60. On the basis of this, the measure generated by the expert survey can be treated as a proxy measure for behavioral unity. All in all this makes the expert survey a reliable tool to examine party unity along with other measures based on roll-calls or elite surveys. Whether or not all these measurements go hand in hand will be examined in the next chapter.

Statistical modeling issues

Starting from the integrated model introduced by figure 1.2, chapters 5 and 6 focus on testing the effect of party characteristics and systemic factors on party unity. The chapters individually test separate models: model 1 on party explanations and model 2 on systemic explanations for party unity. The thesis further provides a test of the integrated model of party unity (model 3) which includes model 1 and 2 and mainly corresponds to the variables already introduced by figure 1.2.

Multivariate regression analysis at the party level allows the test of direct effects of each of the variables considered as possible factors which influence unity. However, as it was already explained, some indirect effects are also expected and that will be tested in chapters 5 and 6 by considering the factors at stake both as dependent and independent variables.

The thesis proceeds further with chapter 4 which prepares the way for the statistical analysis with a country overview and a regional comparison based on aggregated country values. Then chapters 5 and 6 offer a detailed report on possible determinants of party unity with party as the main unit of analysis.

4. Party unity in European national parliaments. A differentiation between East and West democracies?

This chapter offers a detailed account of the measurements for party behavioral unity. It further presents an overview of the patterns for achieving unity across Europe with the aim of exploring any differences between parties and countries across Central Eastern and Western Europe. As previously explained in chapter 1, my approach towards party unity is to distinguish between party unity as behavior and party unity as attitudes. While party unity in terms of attitudes refers to the party representatives' congruity of opinions with regards to their party policies, **party behavioral unity** refers to the *overt actions of the party MPs inside the legislative arena*. That overt behavior of MPs can take many forms: from legislative roll-call voting, writing a letter, a petition or a question in the parliament, to active participation in an informal or formal party faction, public declarations against MPs' colleagues, party splits or defections to other parties.

The party elite's overt behavior can be portrayed by indicators such as roll-call votes in Rice's index, the existence of party factions and other measurements, such as MPs' attitudes towards behavior or direct measurements of unity generated by experts. I begin this analysis by discussing the strengths and weaknesses of each indicator and continue with a validity and reliability check for these measurements. The second section of this chapter presents a regional comparison of party unity across Europe and the last section aims to find common ways in which parties seek to ensure unity of behavior. The entire investigation presented in this chapter is based on country aggregated data.

4.1 Behavioral unity: dimensions and indicators

Voting unity (inside the parliament)

Roll call votes are by no means a perfect measure of behavioral unity and that they are a limited measurement can be demonstrated in various ways. First, they may not be called on all issues; the sample of roll-call votes in a legislative session is unavoidably selective (Owens 2003: 11) and the importance of selected issues may differ across countries. Secondly, legislators are able to voice dissent by other means; for example early day motions, private members' initiatives and amendments, questions writing and petitions. Thirdly, party leadership strategies can be changed so that, through agenda setting in the parliament, priority can be given to issues which are less likely to result in a negative vote. The result after voting may show a relatively united party, while in reality this is only superficial (Hix, Noury and Roland 2006: 145). Lastly the drawback of this measurement is that for some very sensitive policies, parties may not arrive at a vote at all, given their internal conflicts (the Italian parliament is an example). These situations are not accounted for by the indexes which rely on roll-call votes.

The comparisons using roll-call measures need to account for issue importance. Certain issues (war, EU, student loans, education) can shatter unity and MP support, especially if the proposed action is unpopular with constituents. Such voters, especially those who vote in single member districts or those who express their preferences by ranking the candidates, can take their revenge at election time. Furthermore, the rate of legislative activity is not constant either across countries or within the same country across time. A test for possible bias caused by these inconsistencies will be carried out in order to ensure there is a basis for a valid cross-country comparison.

Expressed voting dissent

Expressed voting dissent refers to the MPs' intended behavior, and is a measure borrowed from political psychology, which argues that attitudes are a good prediction of future behavior (Eysenck 1998, Tetlock 1989). The questions in the elite surveys point to MPs' future behavior in a parliament in hypothetical situations. The measure has its limitations but it does constitute a good proxy, at least in theory, for party behavioral unity. The standard questions used for MPs all over Europe is: "If an MP has to vote, but holds an opinion which is different from the one held by his parliamentary party, should he then vote in accordance with the opinion of the parliamentary party or should he follow his own opinion?". Or "If you would ask a written question, would you seek prior approval from the: chairman of the parliamentary party, the parliamentary party meeting, someone else, or I would not ask prior approval". If the legislator response is mainly in favor of not asking prior approval, that is considered to be a low level of party behavioral unity.

Factionalism (outside and inside the parliament)

Besides the fact that factions can be perceived to have an integrative function, and to help parties to clearly define their profile (Kopecky 1995), factions are also seen as "instruments of division and conflict" which have the power to split parties (Carty 2004: 12). It all depends on the actual moment that we look at them. At moment t , when the party it is factionalized without experiencing any splits, one could argue that they have a negative impact on the overall behavioral unity score. At moment $t+1$, when they actually generate a formal split of the party, the new party and the remaining party are expected to behave in a more united manner because, at least for a while, the main source of conflict has been eliminated.

The measurement of party behavioral unity by **party factions** gives a better image of the party's representatives' behavior than the roll-call votes, simply because factions are more obvious to voters. Party factions operate inside parliament among the party's MPs and are also manifest outside the legislature, in a formal or informal manner. It is usually the case that party factions from inside the parliament reflect the party factions from outside the parliament. What can differ from party to party is the degree of faction institutionalization. Drawing from Zarisky (1960) and Janda (1980) who constructed a typology of factions, I refer to factions as meaning "any intra-party combination, clique, or grouping whose members share a sense of common identity and common purpose and are organized to act collectively-as a distinct bloc within the party-to achieve their goals" (Zarisky 1960: 33). To these approaches I add the faction status in the party statute, which can be formal or informal. The institutionalization of factions can make the party more united in terms of behavior as factions will be allowed to express their views thus reducing the danger of party splits.

There is theoretical justification for considering party factions as a dimension/element for both behavioral and attitudinal party unity. Typologies of factionalism, like those offered by Sartori (1976), Hine (1982), Bettcher (2005), consider factional conflict based on dimensions such as organization, coverage, and policy/ideology. These show the existence of conflict either in terms of behavior or in terms of attitudes. That intra-party conflict can be based on leadership, issues, strategies, or tactics. However, as Janda (1980, 1993) contends, all types of factionalism are interrelated. For example, leadership factionalism is closely related to ideological or issue factionalism.

Factionalism is a negative instance of party behavioral unity, in that it denotes low unity but not necessarily complete disunity. Some scholars argue that factions are “a fact of life within most political parties” (Harmel, Heo, Tan and Janda, 1995: 7). Consequently, in order to maintain their position of power and their image in voters’ eyes, party unity will be sought, and can be achieved, provided that the party finds the appropriate mechanisms. In this case it is up to the party leaders to manage the factional battles and to keep the party united in parliament and in the public’s eyes.

High values of Rice’s index are expected to go hand in hand with low levels of factionalism, if these two indicators are to measure the same thing and also be associated with low levels of expressed voting dissent.

After the operationalization and description of the measurements for party behavioral unity, the aim is to check their validity and reliability. Internal and construct validity are of interest here as the main objective is to see if what is measured is indeed party behavioral unity. One way to estimate this is to correlate the three measurements of party behavioral unity and to use factor analysis as another tool to check for internal and construct validity. Uncorrelated indicators, which are used to portray the common concept of interest, are made automatically suspect by this analysis. If all three indicators measure the same thing, their mutual correlations are very high, they are almost interchangeable and have only one dimensional structure (Tacq 1997: 267), while the reverse happens if the underlying concept is multidimensional.

The Rice index scores, the level of factionalism and intended voting behavior are all employed as measures of party behavioral unity. If the concept is one-dimensional,

these measures can be used in a factor analysis and a common index can be created. If the measurements are not highly correlated, they represent different aspects of party behavioral unity. It may be that roll-call votes are more a matter of behavioral party unity only inside the parliament while party factions deal both with the intra and extra-parliamentary organization, as mentioned earlier. All indicators of behavioral party unity are compared to the expert assessments of party unity in more detail in chapters 5 and 6. The expert survey provides the final validity and reliability check.

From table 4.1 on the next page, 69.4 percentage points of those MPs (from CEE) who, in 1996, would dissent and follow their own opinion when voting, openly declared that factionalism exists inside their parliamentary party. A similar percentage however, acknowledged the existence of factionalism, but declared they would vote along the party lines. In all instances, however, 315 MPs out of a total of 631 interviewed recognized that their final vote depends on various other factors.

The figures in the table 4.1 show no clear association between the existence of factionalism, as recognized by the MPs, and their decision about which opinion to follow when voting in parliament. Lack of party unity is manifested even among those who declared that there are no party factions. Out of those who would toe the party line and follow their own opinion, 29.5 percentage points declared that there are no party subgroups within their parliamentary party. Whether they would have decided to defect or not, over 60 percentage points of the total number of MPs admitted the existence of party factions. Therefore, there is behavioral unity even when the party is factionalized. The unexpected result is that the frequency of MPs manifesting high unity (in terms of intended behavior) is almost two times higher, among those who admit the party

factions, as compared to those who deny their existence (36.6% compared to 60.2% in table 4.1). Consequently we can state that factionalism is perceived as a common fact of life in most of the Central Eastern European parties in the 1990s and regardless of its declared existence, parties vote as unitary bodies in the parliaments (in table 4.1 below 60.2% of the MPs who follow their party opinion when voting admit the existence of party subgroups within their own party).

Table 4.1 Behavioral party unity as voting intention and factionalism (elite surveys)

Factionalism/Voting intention	Follow their own opinion	It depends	Follow the party opinion	Total
Party subgroups non-existent				
% <i>Within factionalism</i>	26.9%	51.9%	21.2%	100%
% <i>Within voting intention</i>	29.5%	34.9%	36.6%	33.6%
Party subgroups present				
% <i>Within factionalism</i>	32.9%	48.9%	18.2%	100%
% <i>Within voting intention</i>	69.4%	63.2%	60.2%	64.5%
TOTAL	193	315	123	631
% <i>Within factionalism</i>	30.6%	49.9%	19.5%	100%
% <i>Within voting intention</i>	100%	100%	100%	100%

Note: the question on party sub-groups was part of the CEE questionnaires only; chi-square=60.8 df=12 sig. at 0.05


There is a very low correlation at the limit of statistical significance between the two measurements for party behavioral unity (factionalism and intended voting dissent as expressed by the MPs). Explanations for this could be that: (i) behavioral unity depends on policy issues and is not always associated with any type of factionalism. Chapter 5 reveals that unity of behavior is mainly associated (in a negative direction) with *issue* factionalism which consequently makes leadership, ideology or strategic factionalism compatible with unity of behavior; (ii) the issues on which MPs defect relate more to their conscience (for example, Nigel Griffith, Labour MP, resigned on March 2007 because he felt he could not vote with the government on the matter of the nuclear fleet. Similarly Robin Cook resigned his cabinet post over the Iraq war in 2003 and

represented the side of the Labour Party which opposed the war). Besides these, roll-call voting in the parliament is a less frequent process, and does not get recorded on all the bills voted, while factionalism is a more dynamic, every-day process, which, as we have seen, cannot entirely predict how unitedly a party will vote.

The results suggest that, at least in the Central Eastern European case shown in the figures below, the measurements of party behavioral unity behave differently and do not always go together. *Factionalism* is expressed more openly, in either parliamentary sessions or party meetings, while *roll-call votes* are a final manifestation of elite behavior, with important consequences for the future of incumbent parties. Expressed voting dissent is the percentage of those MPs who said that they will follow their own opinion when voting.

Figure 4.2 shows a different ranking of countries in terms of factionalism and voting intentions based on MPs' own opinions. The most obvious example is Poland, which experiences the highest level of voting unity that follows the party line, but also the highest level of declared factionalism.


Figure 4.2 Factionalism and expressed voting dissent



Moving ahead to the third measure, the aim is to see if any of the previous measures go hand in hand with the roll-call votes and Rice's index. High levels of Rice index are expected to go hand in hand with high levels of voting intentions that follow the party line and go hand in hand with low levels of factionalism.

Figure 4.3 shows the Czech Republic having a higher level of voting unity when compared to Poland, again in a reversed ranking order as compared to the voting intention measure in CEE countries from figure 4.2. As mentioned above, there is no correlation between the level of declared factionalism and expressed voting dissent, very low correlation (0.14) between the Rice's index measures and the level of expressed dissent, and a slight correlation (0.29) between the level of declared factionalism and the Rice index at the party level for the four countries shown in figure 4.3. Consequently, the last correlation coefficient does not justify the usage of both measures as a factor or index of party behavioral unity (at least as far as the CEE countries are concerned).

Figure 4.3 Factionalism and Rice's index



The same procedure was repeated for the Western European countries in the sample. No correlation has been found between the Rice index levels and the declared dissent levels. The most striking example is Germany, where 70 percent of the MPs declared that they would follow their own judgment when voting, as compared to only 16 percent who declared that they would definitely follow the opinion of their party. Regardless of this, Germany had one of the highest scores of roll-call voting unity in Europe in the early 1990s.

As a consequence of these results, the experimental indicators for **party behavioral unity** are rejected as parts of a unity index. *Unity of behavior* as measured by roll-call votes, *factionalism* and the *intention of dissent*, as declared by the MPs, do not appear to converge. Even if in theory the concepts should be related, in practice unity in roll-call voting, which is the most important expression of MPs' behavior, seems to be most valued by the parties and is manifested even in conditions of factionalism or where there is a verbally declared intention to dissent. A more systematic operationalization of the concept, using data from our expert survey, will be at the basis of further analysis. Whether the high levels of voting unity are achieved as a consequence of the institutional constraints or because of party internal constraints is a question to be answered in the following chapters.

4.2 An East – West differentiation of behavioral party unity in Europe?

The following two sections provide an aggregate image of party unity in Central Eastern Europe as compared to Western Europe and search for possible country patterns to achieve behavioral unity in both regions. Drawing on the literature on parliaments (Kopecky 2001, Heidar and Koole 2000b), democratic consolidation, transitions and party systems development and institutionalization (Tóka 1997, Kitschelt et al. 1999, Kitschelt 2003, Mainwaring and Torcal 2007, McAllister and White 2007), East European parties are expected to have lower levels of unity of behavior when voting in parliament as a result of differences between the party systems' age and less knowledge and experience among MPs of democratic systems. Stable Western democracies, with elites accustomed to the rules of the game, are therefore expected to have higher levels of party unity. Low party identification in Eastern Europe together with high electoral volatility can negatively impact on the accountability and responsiveness of MPs and result in low party unity.

This section starts with a descriptive account of party unity of behavior across Europe, compares Eastern Europe to Western Europe, as well as old and new democracies, both in 1996 and 2007. It then continues with a presentation of policy areas which cause dissent within parties and arrives at a country ranking based on the aggregate scores of party unity of behavior. Table 4.2 shows an overview of party behavioral unity in both regions. There is a very small difference in voting unity between Western Europe and Central Eastern Europe. The average scores of Rice index values in Central Eastern Europe are around 0.80 as compared to values over 0.90 in Western countries, which means that the Eastern European MPs have a greater room for maneuver before voting.

Table 4.2 Aggregate unity of behavior across Europe

Country	Follow own opinion when voting	Follow party view when voting	Unity of behavior (Rice index) 1997	SDs Rice index	Unity of behavior (expert survey) 2007	Within country SDs (expert survey)
Austria			98.33	2.64	3.72	.50
Belgium	42.5	17.5	95.87	2.26	3.47	.56
Czech Rep.	50.0	10.7	86.5	5.44	3.10	.72
Denmark	7.0	50.0	99.93	0.10	3.67	.32
Finland	69.0		88.62	2.59	3.10	.31
France	79.2	8.3	99.3	0.62	3.30	.67
Germany	72.1	78.1	96.7	1.87	3.07	.63
Hungary	30.9	70.0			3.07	.42
Iceland	2.0	30.9	96.88	2.83	3.00	.74
Ireland	53.8	13.8	100	0	3.50	.34
Italy	65.6	49.3	96.5	1.43	3.44	.41
Luxemburg	60.7	62.8			3.40	.65
Netherlands	60.9	60.7	99.01	0.18	3.68	.83
Norway	7.0	43.1	97.53	1.77	3.48	.15
Poland	12.7	34.1	58.00	0.05	3.00	.47
Portugal	30.8	15.4			3.95	.62
Romania					2.69	.54
Russia			94.0	0.06	3.34	.99
Slovakia	34.4	16.7			3.25	.54
Spain	27.6	57.1			3.97	.27
Sweden	10.0	20.8	96.57	1.51	3.65	.25
Switzerland			87.33	6.40	3.09	.84
UK			99.20	0.48	2.93	.44
Mean	39.8	22.8	93.5	1.77	3.3	0.6

Sources: Scarrow, Susan E., Paul Webb and David M. Farrell 2000: "From Social Integration to Electoral Contestation: The Changing distribution of Power within Political Parties." In Dalton, J. Russell and Martin P. Wattenberg. 2000. *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; John Carey and Sam Depauw data archives, 1996 elite surveys, 2007 expert survey and own calculations.

German and Polish MPs are special cases as their voting intentions are more or less opposite to what actually happens when they vote. A small number of Polish MPs declared that they would follow their own opinion when voting even if their opinion would contradict that of the parliamentary party but, in practice, the Rice index in Poland has one of the lowest scores. By contrast, in Germany, 70 percent of the MPs interviewed declared that they would follow their own conscience/opinion when, in practice, the Rice index scores for Germany are quite high. This could be explained by

greater attitudinal convergence within the German parties. That would account for German MPs seeming to follow their own opinions, when in fact for most of them, their own opinion is the same as the party opinion.

While on average there are approximately 23 percent of MPs who say they would not toe the party line, a much higher percentage of MPs declare that they would follow their own opinion in voting. In reality though, the figures of voting unity as measured by Rice's index are higher than expected. One explanation could be that the party position generally matched the MPs' own opinion but also, as it will later be shown in chapter 5, that what MPs say and what they actually do can be completely different.

A comparison of MPs' propensities to vote according to their party line is shown in figures 4.4 and 4.5. The mean unity *expressed* by the MPs from Eastern Europe is higher than their Western counterparts, but when it comes to actual voting unity as shown by the Rice index or the expert survey in table 4.2, their scores are lower.

The figures represent the percentages of surveyed MPs within each country, who have stated that they would follow the opinion of their party when voting on a bill. As they have declared, this would happen even in the case of disagreement between their personal position and the party position on a particular bill. The country scores shown in the figures are very low if one is to consider that a party or a coalition of parties need a voting majority in order to pass a bill. They are, however, compensated for by the fact that many parliamentarians admitted that their vote would depend on the issue to be voted or on other specific circumstances.

Figure 4.4 Party unity as voting intention Central Eastern Europe 1996





Figure 4.5 Party unity as voting intention in Western Europe 1996




Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch MPs have the highest behavior convergence in parliament, both in 1996 as declared by them personally, and in 2007 as assessed by experts. The low percentage of German and French MPs (fig. 4.5), who in 1996 declared that they would follow the party line even in the case of disagreement, is in opposition to the actual Rice index scores and also to what experts have said about party unity one decade later. The MPs' answers are only in line with the constitutional requirements. Article 38 of the German constitution stipulates that "Members of the German Bundestag shall be elected in general, direct, free, equal and secret elections. They shall be representatives of the whole people, not bound by orders or instructions, and *responsible only to their conscience* [emphasis added]."

When comparing unity of behavior at the aggregate level, one can group the countries into categories. Looking at the values of Rice's index (table 4.2 on page 63), one can observe that, on average, the sample scores for party unity are quite high, although there are some exceptions in Central Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, the differences are very small, being between ten and five percentage points in the index values. In Eastern Europe, the outlier is Poland with the lowest scores on voting unity. This low Rice index score and the experts' assessments are consistent with the legislative turmoil manifested in the Polish parliament during that period. It is not only that MPs defected on a frequent basis but, for example, in 1998 alone eight percent of the bills introduced by the government for discussion in the Sejm were actually rejected or no final vote was reached, compared with only two percent in other years (Goetz, Zubek 2007).

Figure 4.6 on the next page illustrates the 2007 experts' assessment on party unity in terms of behavior and attitudes for all the twenty-three European countries. The experts

in each country considered by our sample were asked to assess the level of unity of behavior and unity of attitudes for each party on a scale from one to five, where one means very low unity and five means very high unity.¹¹

Figure 4.6 Unity of behavior and unity of attitudes 2007



When countries are compared by region, there is no prominent difference in behavioral unity between the Western and Central Eastern countries. The aggregate mean of WE countries is 3.46 and of CEE is 3.21. The Anova significance test and the regional means are shown in table 4.3 on the next page. The experts, however, evaluate the attitudinal unity of Western parties higher than in the new democracies – an average of 3.94 on the 5 point scales in Western Europe as opposed to 3.58 in Eastern Europe, difference which is statistically significant in the group comparison. This confirms the initial expectations of this chapter about the regional difference in party unity levels. The difference between the two regions and especially when we compare the old and

¹¹ The question wording of the expert survey is presented in Appendix C.

new democracies, resides not in the unity of behavior but in the unity of attitudes. The lack of MPs' experience with the democratic institutions or their slow adaptation to the rules of the game accounts therefore only for the lower preference homogeneity of the party representatives in Central Eastern Europe, and not for regional differences in unity of behavior, as the latter are not significant. This further enhances the argument that unity of behavior can be more rapidly attained using various sticks and carrots.

Based on the 2007 expert assessments, table 4.3 below presents an aggregate regional situation of party unity of attitudes and behavior and the statistical tests for regional comparison on these two variables.

Table 4.3 Aggregate mean party unity in Europe and regional comparison 2007

	Unity of Behavior	Unity of Attitudes
Western Europe; N=12	3.46	3.94
Eastern Europe; N=11	3.21	3.58
Old Democracies; N=10	3.38	3.85
New Democracies; N=13	3.33	3.64
Anova sig. (old vs. new)	.68	.04
European mean	3.34	3.77
European max	3.97	4.50
European min	2.64	2.79
European SD	.33	.49

The same result and regional difference is maintained when old and new democracies are compared (Spain and Portugal are considered new democracies because their experience with dictatorship is similar to the East European countries which fall in the same category). No significant differences emerged in unity of behavior but only in unity of attitudes (in table 4.3 where old and new democracies are compared, the Anova significance test for unity of behavior is .68 and .04 for unity of attitudes). The ideological congruence of party elites appears to be very much under the influence of the country's length of experience with the democratic rule.

In chapter 2, in the party unity model, I have inferred that the level of coercion, especially coming from the internal party organization is higher in Eastern Europe as compared to Western Europe. This was predicted to happen as part of a compensation process between unity of attitudes and centralization or disciplinary measures, in order to achieve high voting unity. The 2007 similar regional scores on unity of behavior reported in table 4.3 bring evidence which partly confirms this argument when we also consider centralization. A comparison of party centralization applied in both regions (East vs. West and old vs. new democracies) reveals significantly more concentration of decision-making in the hands of the central party office in Eastern Europe as opposed to Western Europe (see tables 3, 4 and 5 in appendix D) and it is the former region again where the unity of attitudes is significantly lower. The same is true when disciplinary measures are compared across regions. New democracies and East European democracies in particular have applied much more disciplinary measures over the last decade. A further validation test of the dynamic mechanism implied in the argument will be carried out in chapter 5. At this stage, these results lead to the conclusion that, even if behavioral unity is similar in both regions, the way it is achieved is different, and this can be observed by comparing the aggregate levels of party centralization.

Party unity and policy areas

US legislative voting studies (Hurley and Kerr 1997) have shown that party unity is slightly lower on key votes, such as the budget, than on all party votes. Likewise, in Europe, the level of party unity, both in attitudes and behavior may depend on the policy areas considered. The expectations are that unity of behavior slightly declines on issues of high importance in national politics. This is because more opinions are taken into consideration when MPs cast their vote: the party position, the constituency

position, and their own consciences, which may be different especially on controversial issues, for example, homosexuals' rights. Regional differences in party unity may also appear due to different degrees of importance attached to certain policy areas from country to country. This is the reason why the country experts were asked to rank the issues that normally cause disagreement within parties.

The types of issues which create the highest dissent amongst party elite are most often economic. Redistribution issues, like taxes, welfare state spending and the extent of state interference in the economy, EU enlargement and integration, are all issues prone to cause dissent within parties, all over Europe. Besides these, the laws on the social rights of homosexuals, especially the same sex partnership issue and abortion issues also led to disunity within parties in both Western and East European countries. As indicated by the party and parliamentary experts in 2007, the issues which caused tensions were, in the majority of the cases, the most important issues in the respective countries.

Besides these, environmental issues not only raised general concern but also internal conflicts within parties. Energy policy, particularly nuclear power and its environmental consequences, caused dissent when discussed in the Swedish parliament. Defense policy also caused tensions within The Swedish Moderate Rally Party (M) when the divisions between the neo-liberals and conservative factions were expressed in voting.

To the above mentioned policies, country specific issues can be added, such as the regional divisions in Spain or Belgium. Spanish nationalism versus the nationalism of the periphery, the distribution of power from the state to regions, creates conflict within

parties. Regional divisions are also said by experts to cause dissent within the Russian parties. Though, as it has been emphasized by the country experts, the major source of disagreement within the Russian parties is how to position themselves vis-à-vis president Putin and how to tackle foreign policy, especially Russia's relations with the West. Ireland, where the partition and the peace process in Northern Ireland causes internal party disagreements, is also a special case. The expert survey reveals that Irish MPs defected when voting on issues such as decommissioning of weapons or on local issues such as hospital downgrading and closures, or the cessation of services from Shannon Airport to Heathrow, largely opposed by MPs elected in the mid-west region of Ireland.

Relatively new issues which generate low unity, especially in Western Europe, are minority/ethnic rights and immigration issues, terrorism and the ways to tackle terrorist violence, plus foreign policy during the Iraq war. Internal security, nuclear arms and intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan have divided, for example, the D66, PvdA and CDA in the Dutch parliament. The same problem of security issues and military intervention in Afghanistan has divided the SPD and the Bündnis/Grüne in the German Bundestag. Views of the communist past and its legacies, how to strengthen the democratic institutions and the choice of appropriate reforms to be carried out, caused, as might be expected, more dissent in Central Eastern Europe.

Party unity - country ranking

According to their aggregate scores set out on the basis of Rice's index and the expert survey, countries can be grouped into three categories of party unity of behavior: very high, high, or low unity. A value above 90 per cent for Rice's index is considered as the

threshold for a very high level of party unity, above 80 per cent a high level of unity, and any score below 80 per cent a low level of party unity. There are no large discrepancies between the East and West regions; the visible difference being 10 percentage points average voting unity higher in Western Europe than in Central Eastern Europe in 1996. Similarly, based on our expert survey, countries were ranked in the same three categories (low, medium and high as shown in table 4.4). The low unity category includes countries which are below the mean in our sample (3.3), the medium category has values between 3.3 and 3.5, and the high unity country category includes aggregate scores over 3.5.

Table 4.4 Degrees of party unity of behavior: country ranking based on the 2007 expert survey

I. Very high unity	II. High unity	III. Low unity
Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, Sweden, Ireland	Norway, Belgium, France, Italy, Russia, Luxembourg, <i>Iceland</i> , <i>Switzerland</i> , <i>Czech Republic</i> , <i>Germany</i>	United Kingdom, Finland, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia

Note: The italics refer to the cases with the highest within country differences amongst parties.

Based on the elite survey, roll-call and expert survey data shown in this section (tables 4.2 and 4.3), one can conclude that there is indeed party unity in Europe. The low values portrayed in the third category still mean that incumbent parties manage to vote and to pass bills in parliament, but with a relatively high difficulty, resulting from some internal conflicts and from MPs who occasionally defect from the party line in parliamentary votes. No party from our sample was given by experts the maximum score on unity and, similarly, no country had parties with maximum scores on the Rice index. The low unity category shown above in table 4.4 basically represents the group with the highest deviations from the ideal point characterized by one hundred percent party unity.

The country grouping needs, however, to be treated with caution as it is based on country average scores. The *within* country differences are higher than *between* country differences, which could mean that, if we exclude the parties with the lowest scores on unity from the countries with the highest standard deviations, they will qualify for a category upgrade. This, for example, fits the cases of Germany, Switzerland, Czech Republic and Iceland. This further makes the case for a detailed party analysis to follow in the subsequent chapters. How behavioral unity is achieved, in which context, and if there are any commonalities among countries, is to be investigated in the following section.

4.3 Patterns of achieving party unity in Europe

This section gives an overview of voting unity in Europe taking into account the existing combination of systemic and party level factors in every country in the sample. The country descriptions refer mainly to the Rice index scores from late 1990s and to the 2007 expert survey. Each case is presented in light of the general expectations that relate party unity to country specific institutional contexts. They facilitate the search for patterns in the different levels of party unity achieved across Europe.

Norway seems to validate the hypotheses about the association between a very high level of party unity in parliament and most of the systemic factors (list PR, unitary state, parliamentary regime) mentioned in the previous chapter. The mean value of Rice's index for all parties in the period 1993-1994 was 97.53 (Scarow, Web and Farrell 2000: 171). All the institutional factors are present except that the Norwegian parties are decentralized as far as candidate selection is concerned. Party leadership selection is made by the party Congress and the national party leaders can not impose or veto the

selection of candidates for the parliament. Candidate selection, however, is not the only aspect of party centralization. Our 2007 expert survey reveals that decision-making, and especially the distribution of finances, is more centralized. One aspect that should be considered when speaking about party behavioral unity in Norway is the parliamentary party groups (PPGs). Traditionally, in the Nordic countries, PPGs have been considered very strong, mainly because of their frequent coalition governments. Policy decisions are taken at group meetings which set down the party position in the parliament. The MPs attribute a high importance to these group debates and to intra-party opinion before internal group decisions are made (Heidar 2000: 192). Therefore the Norwegian PPGs are considered to be directed by the extra-parliamentary party organization more at the constituency level than at the central level. Party whips are present but they do not have the same importance as in the case of the UK because Norwegian MPs are less likely to vote against their party.

Netherlands also appears to correspond to the general predictions about the relationship between party unity and systemic factors. Dutch parties are highly united, which could be attributed, at least without detailed consideration, to the fact that the country is a unitary state with a parliamentary regime. The electoral system used is proportional representation working in the framework of a multiparty party system. The parties have a medium level of centralization. Party leadership selection is decided by the parliamentary party in the case of CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal), VVD (Liberal Party), and CD (Centre Democrats). For PvdA (Labor Party) and D'66 (Democrats '66) the election of the national leader is decided by the Party Congress and members (Scarrow, Web and Farrell 2000: 152). All the general conditions for party unity (except centralization) are encountered but, in the Dutch case, there are other factors that must

be taken into account for explaining party unity; namely the weakened pillarization, that still exists after 1990. The fact that an MP is a member of a party that represents a pillar in society can be an incentive to vote according to the party line and not to defect. Another factor that is worth mentioning is the strength of the parliamentary groups which, by their rules, restrain the MPs from defecting from the party line (Andeweg and Irwin 1993, Andeweg 2000). As in the German system, the Dutch system is dominated by PPGs and the term *fractiocracy* is often used to denote the ascendancy/dominance of the PPG over the party as a whole.

Another country that corresponds to the general hypotheses concerning party behavioral unity is **Spain** where the very high level of party unity goes hand in hand with the predicted institutional and party level factors. The experts portray the Spanish MPs in 2007 as almost never defecting from the party line, despite minor internal conflicts. In the context of a unitary state, but decentralized into autonomous regions, parliamentary monarchy and list proportional representation with closed lists, parties are very centralized, with the party leader playing a very important role in the party life (Keating 1999). As in the case of the UK or Germany, the party system is a two-and-a-half type, with the government formed after 1982 being either the Socialists (PSOE) or, after 1996, the People's Party (PP). The party system in combination with the parliamentary system generates a very high level of party centralization. The powerful leadership of PSOE adopted a closed and highly centralized structure precisely in order to maintain the government after 1982. Before the introduction of primaries for selecting the candidates in 1997, the party decision-making structures were easy for party leadership to control (Hopkin 2001: 355) but even after primaries, the party leadership remained

able to control and constrain the choices of its members. The overall result is a behavioral unity much higher than the European country average.

Germany is an exception to the scholarly inferences regarding the negative influence of federalism on unity. Despite federalism and a party system, which is characterized as being a two-and-a-half party system (or three-party system), and despite the decentralization of parties, the level of party unity is very high, as shown by the Rice index in the early 1990s. The level of behavioral unity in the period 1991-1994 is 96.7 per cent for the following parties: CDU-CSU, SPD, FDP. One explanation for this level of party unity is that it results from the discipline that is established or imposed inside the *party parliamentary groups*. The complex organization of the parliamentary party helps maintain unity and forms consensus. Formally, each parliamentary party group's caucus is the highest decision-making body and their decisions are binding on the MPs. The decisions of the caucus are prepared by working groups which, in the two major parties, reflect most of the federal government's departments. These groups attempt to resolve conflicts within the parliamentary party group before the issues are referred to the caucus. Their chairpersons are usually part of the core leadership of a PPG along with their parliamentary party group's chairpersons, a number of backbenchers and the party whips. Another factor that contributes to unity inside parliamentarian groups, are the substantial resources available at their discretion. High degrees of party unity coincide with substantial aid from the state (Koole 1994), for which reason, the party parliamentary groups are often defined as being "parliamentary party complex" with full-time MPs and supporting staff. In 2007 however, SPD and the Grüne were portrayed by experts as very disunited and this lowered the country score to a value below the overall European mean.

Party unity in **Ireland** is higher than the average unity of the countries in our sample. Although a PR single transferable vote (STV) is employed, the level of behavioral unity is very high. MPs are constrained to follow the party line by strict party disciplinary rules stated in the party statutes or by the PPGs. The Irish parties are centralized in terms of leadership selection, which is made by the parliamentary party in the case of Fianna Fail (FF), Fine Gael (FG) and Progressive Democrats (PD). Regarding the selection of candidates, the statute of FF and FG give the option for members to vote on the selection of candidates, while local delegates vote and ratify the selection in the FF, FG, PD and the Labour Party. With the exception of PD the national party leaders can impose, veto selection or change the list order (Scarrow, Webb, and Farrell 2000: 139). In the context of a medium level of party centralization, and the use of STV, strict *disciplinary rules* are imposed on the MPs and the rest of the party members. As revealed by the country experts in 2007, the disciplinary measures imposed were not more frequent than in countries in Central Eastern Europe, but they were definitely more frequent than in other countries in Western Europe. Those who defect from the party line can be expelled from the party and any rebellion will harm their chances of promotion within the party. Provided that they are not inconsistent with the party constitution, *parliamentary party rules* are made by the PPGs themselves. As a result, every MP chooses to follow a tight discipline and to vote according to the party line.

The very high behavioral unity is in contradiction with the theories that relate low party unity to an electoral system which allows intra-party choice (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, Katz 1980, Blais 1991). PR-STV does not hinder party unity and Ireland is an example in which intra-party competition in the area of constituency service can coexist with a high consensus when voting on the floor. What can be concluded from the Irish

case is that PR-STV is not powerful in affecting negatively the unity of the parties in the legislature. More important seem to be party organization factors, like party centralization or party disciplinary rules established by the PPGs or by the party statutes.

After scrutinizing these countries with high levels of party unity in our sample, what one can observe, is that institutional factors and party organization factors believed to foster party behavioral unity, do not always go together and, in some cases, the opposite is present. This points to the possibility of a conjectural causation for party unity and enhances the importance of PPGs' working rules. The observed trend is that a very high level of party behavioral unity is encountered together with (partly) decentralized parties and strong PPGs (Germany, Norway, Netherlands). Among the four countries classified in the first category of very high party behavioral unity, Spain is the only case, which validates most of the general hypotheses (at the country level) stated earlier in chapter 3.

France operates a majority-plurality electoral system and a semi-presidential regime that are assumed to favor less united parties. Regardless of this institutional context, during the period 1968-1973 there was a 90.9 score for party unity (Scarrow, Web and Farrell 2000: 172) and about the same level continued to exist after 1990. The country is part of the middle cluster, with a 3.30 unity score in 2007, just about the average level in Europe. There are noticeable differences however among the unity of French parties. The UDF (Union for French Democracy) and the Verts (Greens) are the parties with the lowest convergence of MPs actions, while the UMP (Union for a Popular Movement) and MPF (Movement for France) situate themselves on the opposite side. An

explanation for the high behavioral party unity can be their high level of centralization and disciplinary rules, but this is not the case for all French parliamentary parties. The common element for them is that in every decision, the national party leaders have veto power over the local party branches. In this country therefore, party-level factors seem to matter more in determining party unity as compared to the system-level factors.

Belgium is a case in which the hypothesis about the relationship between the electoral system and party unity is again not confirmed. The country has a proportional representation electoral system, which allows preferential voting. This type of electoral system should generate disunited parties but the actual situation is the opposite as Belgium has a high level of party unity (88 per cent in 1991 and 1995; 3.47/5 unity score in 2007). The Belgian multiparty system applies a highly centralized selection of the candidates. The president of the party is usually very powerful and the parliamentary fractions are kept under control (Mair 1994: 105). Another explanation for the party unity is the discipline administered by the parties. Party statutes stipulate a variety of sanctions that may be applied to rebelling MPs and parliamentary groups can enforce a vote of discipline to which all parliamentarians must adhere. Party group leaders usually try to keep potential defectors in line with the party position and correct their behavior by talking separately with each of them. Another aspect that favors discipline is that most ministers and party presidents were members of the Parliament and thereby a source of party discipline as they regularly attended meetings of their parliamentary group (De Winter and Dumont 2000: 127).

Another exception to the influence of electoral system, the decentralization of parties, and the possible negative influence of the federal system on party unity, is **Switzerland**.

The Swiss electoral system is list proportional representation with preferential vote, which means that voters rank candidates on the list and express preferences for and against certain candidates. According to Katz's hypothesis, the result should be disunited parties. At the same time Switzerland is a federal state with decentralized parties and canton factions. The party has also a weak control over its candidates and consequently party discipline should be low as in the United States (Linder 1998). But, contrary to our expectations, the level of party unity was high in early 1990s. Rice index as a mean of all parties in 1991-1994 period was 85.03 per cent; 5 to 10 percentage points lower than that in France, Norway or Germany, and also higher than the Rice score in Italy. In 2007 experts assigned a mean country score below the European average which is explained by the very high difference in the unity of behavior amongst parties (standard deviation of 0.84). The party with the highest unity of behavior is SVP (Swiss People's Party) which, as declared by experts, is possibly the only Swiss party that takes strict measures if an MP is not in line with the party. The process of centralization of this party began in 1990 and most often the strict measures mentioned above translate into the failure of the respective MP to be nominated again on the party lists. The other Swiss parties use more refined techniques. For instance SP (Social Democratic Party of Switzerland) may require their MPs to show their ballots to their neighbor in the case of a "secret" vote.

In the **United Kingdom**, party unity used to be high, with a 20.5 degree of dissent as an average for all parties in the period 1992-1997. The degree of dissent was calculated as a percentage of votes cast against the party compared with votes which were in

accordance with the party line.¹² Party unity has been a feature of British parliamentary behavior since the nineteenth century and continued throughout most of the twentieth century. The highest levels were in the 1950s but even in the 1960s the level of dissent in British parliamentarians' votes was only 0.5 per cent (Norton 2000: 47). The situation changed however in the 1970s when the number of parliamentarians voting against their own party increased. For the 1990-1997 period, the level of behavioral unity decreased compared to previous decades but, compared to the other West European countries, the level still remained high. Explanations for this revolve around party organization, the organization of PPGs and, again, the disciplinary measures adopted in order to assure party loyalty. In the UK parliament, the party leader decides the policies. If an MP refuses to follow *a three-line whip*, he may have the whip "withdrawn" and his membership of the PPG suspended. Hierarchy and specialization characterize decision making within all PPGs; the party leader and the whip system determining if an MP can move within the limits determined by a three-line whip. The whip uses a written form, on which an item is underlined three times to show its importance and when members are expected to be present to vote. There are also two-line and one-line whips. Traditionally, the whips' weapon for disciplining the MPs is the appeal to party loyalty (Norton 2000: 46). Whips can additionally influence the promotion of an MP and the committees on which a member serves. If a whip cannot persuade a rebel MP, a meeting with the relevant minister will be arranged for further discussion and persuasion. As regards *centralization of power*, British parties maintained a high level in the early 1990s up to 1997 (Hopkin 2001: 352). It is also noteworthy that national party leaders can impose or veto the selection of candidates for national legislatures. According to the 2007 expert survey however, as in the German case, the prediction about extremely high

¹² An important distinction for the British case is to be made between the whipped and the unwhipped vote. In the former case, the MPs do not have to follow the party line.

unity within the British parties does not withstand scrutiny. In 2006 for example, the Labour Party chair, Chief Whip and Home Secretary, all engaged in protests against hospital closures in their own constituency and thus against government policy. The experts reported various degrees of dissent and conflict within the major parties, regardless of whether they were in government or in opposition. Their party unity scores place the UK in the third low party unity cluster with a score below the European average.

What the case of the UK shows is that party unity can still be achieved even under the condition of an electoral system which uses SMD plurality. Other factors besides the electoral system seem to be more important in determining party unity, such as the two-party system, party centralization and, even more importantly, the disciplinary measures that each party enforces on its parliamentary members.

Compared to the rest of Europe, **Italy** falls into the category of countries that have an average score of party unity of behavior in 2007. The analysis of roll-call votes in the period 1996 revealed a score of 96.5 percent, which is however, above the average European score of that period. Before 1993, disunited parties usually characterized the Italian parliament and recently scholars have drawn attention to the fact that a majority of legislative proposals simply never get to be discussed in committees or on the floor due to major disagreements (Giuliani 2008). This explains the high score of Rice index which needs to be treated with caution and clearly points to the lack of attitudinal unity as well. Explanations for the lack of behavioral unity in the Italian parties, before and after 1993, can be found in the *nature of the party system*. Extreme multipartism created low incentives for unity of attitudes and the catch-all nature of the Christian Democratic

Party tried to attract as many voters as possible. Another factor in explaining party disunity is the electoral system before 1993 which was proportional representation in 2 tiers but which employed *preferential voting*. Voters could choose to give a preference vote to a candidate on a party list. In this way candidates could demonstrate their power in attracting votes and thus enhance their status within the party. But another intervening context-specific variable is *patronage*. It was shown that the electors who chose to express preference voting were mainly from the south, where these votes were often given in exchange for personal favors from the candidates. This practice was reduced to one preference vote-expression (from three preferences allowed before), and then annulled after the 1993 electoral reform (Keating 1999: 234). Another explanation for the lack of party behavioral unity was the *secret vote*, present in parliamentary procedure until 1988. The procedure has facilitated dissenting votes simply because dissenters could not be found and disciplined by the central party office. The few *disciplinary measures* (Katz and Mair 1992) included in the Italian party statutes give another possible justification for the lack of party unity. The Christian Democratic Party had no specific rules concerning party discipline, except the general commitment of the members to follow its rules. Also, its own parliamentary group issues its own regulations which must only be accepted by the National Council. While, in the 1950s, members of the Italian Communist Party were obliged to obey party discipline, by 1979 there was little obligation to follow party discipline, and the general principles of the democratic centralism no longer applied. As in the case of the Communist party, the Italian socialists (PSI) after 1965 had no stipulation of party discipline in their statute. Italian Social Democrat Party stipulated in its statute in 1991, that any parliamentary group issues its own regulations, which also include rules for dissenters. The parliamentary party groups of the Italian republicans (PRI) had no regulations; they

were only bound by a general commitment to maintain regular contacts with party executives.

Even after the change in the electoral system in the 1993 party unity still remained average to low. The electoral system was changed to mixed rules: after 1993, 25 per cent of seats in the parliament were allocated by PR and 75 per cent of seats were distributed by plurality. The level of aggregate fluidity in the period 1996-2000 was relatively high, with the peak registered in 1999. Many MPs changed their party for another one that better served their interests. The parties which registered high fluidity were the Italian Renewal, the Christian Democratic Center, and Forza Italia. One possible explanation for so many defections is that these parties did not at that time have a clear ideological profile that could distinguish them from their closest rival on the left-right scale (Heller and Menshon 2000: 24). What can be concluded about the Italian case is that low attitudinal unity inside the parties, with regards to the MPs policy preferences and the lack of disciplinary rules for the MPs, are the factors most conducive to behavioral disunity.

As for the Central East European countries, specifically Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, some of the systemic factors are similar (parliamentary regimes, similar PPG rules, unitary state, party system fragmentation). Behavioral unity is also similar, with the exception of Poland. An in-depth analysis however reveals differences in the electoral systems and constitutional provisions concerning the roles and responsibilities of MPs. The commonality is that most East Central European parties exhibit quite high centralization, which manifests especially inside the communist successor parties (Grzymala-Busse 2002, Deegan-Krausse 2006) and overall within

most parties, as our expert survey reveals. Although, according to their aggregate scores, most of these countries fall under the third category of unity, this is only due to differences among parties *within* each country. It is the least united parties within each case which make the average country scores a great deal lower. Roll-call indexes are only available for Russia and Poland. The experts gave, on average, a regional score of 3.07 for party behavioral unity in 2007 which, on our scale, means occasional internal conflicts and some defections from the party line.

Slovak MPs vote along the party line even in conditions of intra-party competition generated by the preferential vote or other ‘unfavorable’ provisions to unity, such as those mentioned in the Slovakian constitution or in the parliamentary standing order (Malová and Krause 2000). Before 1996, the rules approved by the Slovakian parliament were such that any group of five MPs could form a PG, which means that if some MPs left their party they could easily form another PPG. Also, the current constitutional framework does not provide for mechanisms to ensure MPs’ loyalty to their party. Article 29.2 of the Constitution stipulates that the MPs “shall be the representatives of the citizens, and shall be elected to exercise their mandates individually and according to their best conscience and conviction. They are bound by no directives”. This clearly leaves space for MPs to maneuver when they vote in the parliament. The country score for 2007 given by experts is 3.25, just below the European mean. The most united party in terms of behavior is SMER (Direction-Social Democracy) which, at the same time, is the most centralized party. On the other hand, the least united party is LS-HZDS (The Peoples’ Party-Movement for a Democratic Slovakia).

Czech parliamentarians exhibit a high level of voting unity even within an electoral system with preferential voting. The PPG rules are stricter than those of their East European counterparts. Although at least 10 members of parliament are needed in order to form a parliamentary group (Kopecký 2004), there are specific restrictions as to what happens if such a group forms a fraction with different views than those of the parliamentary party. Most restrictions concern material and financial benefits, which will be much lower for the defectors than for other parliamentary groups. Article 26 and 27.1 of the Czech 1993 Constitution stipulates that “Deputies and Senators shall exercise their office in person and in conformity with the oath they have taken and in doing so they shall not be bound by any instructions. [...] No Deputy or Senator may be disciplined for his or her voting in the Chamber of Deputies or in the Senate, or in their bodies.” MPs have in this way a constitutional freedom of action, which, at least in theory, could generate low expectations for party loyalty. The 2007 average country score for unity of behavior is 3.10, but with high discrepancies among parties. The communists and civic democrats converge more in their parliamentary actions, as opposed to socials-democrats and Christian democrats.

The **Hungarian** parliamentary system functions under a very complex electoral system with three distinct sets of districts, a mixed-member system, a two-round system, two separate electoral thresholds and two different sets of rules for proportional representation. Together with Bulgaria, Hungary is the only East-European country which has implemented a mixed electoral system rather than drawing from examples of other countries (Benoit 2005). Specific Hungarian parliamentary rules regarding parliamentary groups encourage defection and the formation of parliamentary fractions. The Hungarian parliamentary rules stipulate that at least 15 seats in the parliament are

required in order to be entitled to form an official group. This is why former MPs, who defected from one party to another, could all form another party fraction together (Benoit 2005: 246). Article 20.2 of the Hungarian constitution specifies that “Members of Parliament act in the public interest”, with no further provisions or details such as are found in the Polish, Czech or Slovak cases, which leaves an MP at liberty to decide what exactly the public interest when voting on a bill is. Public interest may not necessarily coincide with the party interest. The Hungarian 2007 average score on party unity of behavior is 3.07, and relatively low. The party with the highest unity score nowadays is FIDESZ. In the mid 1990s, the party switched from liberalism to conservatism (Enyedi 2005). Although it gained votes and won the 1998 elections this was not without consequences. Many of its members left mainly for the other liberal party SZDSZ, which joined the MSZP in government after the 1994 elections. After the split, in order to maintain its unity, the party centralization increased a great deal for FIDESZ, although on average its ideological unity has increased as well.

Polish MPs are the least united in their voting behavior, in the context of a presidential system with a PR open list; a characteristic shared with the Czech and Slovak electoral systems (until 2001 elections Polish voters were allowed to express two preferences from the list). Parliamentary rules concerning the PPGs are similar to the rest of the European countries; 15 MPs being required to form a group. Article 104 of the Polish Constitution stipulates that “Deputies shall be representatives of the Nation. They shall not be bound by any instructions of the electorate”. This gives MPs two options when voting: to follow the party line or to follow their own opinion, the later being apparently more popular judging by the scores of the Rice index. The unity scores given by the experts in 2007 are similar to those of Hungarian parties. The same occasional internal

conflicts were reported but defections from the party line were still rare in parliamentary votes.

Romania displays a relatively low level of voting unity in the context of a closed list proportional system (until 2008), a system close to semi-presidentialism (which in theory should suppress unity) with a directly elected president but highly centralized parties (Grecu et al. 2003). Party parliamentary groups do not have strict rules and regulations relating to MPs' behavior, clearly evidenced by the high number of MPs' defections from one party to another without any restrictions. Article 69 of the 1991 Romanian constitution stipulates that "in the exercise of their mandate, deputies and senators shall be in the service of the people and any imperative mandate shall be null". As in the other cases in Central and Eastern Europe, the size requirements for a PPG are low: only ten MPs are necessary in order to form a group. There is no mention of PPGs disciplinary rules in the standing orders of the Chamber of Deputies or other distinct PPGs rules. The aggregated country's unity score in 2007 was 2.69, with the National Liberal Party displaying one of the lowest unity scores from our sample. The party has experienced several splits during the last decade, as a result of accumulated and exacerbated leadership and issue factionalism.

Russia is an unusual case in the sense that unexpectedly high levels of voting unity coexist with a mixed electoral system, a semi-presidential political system by the constitution (but more presidential in practice) and a federal state structure. This should, at least in theory, damage unity. The peculiarities of this case arise from the organization of the political parties at the federal level, although controlled by the presidential administration and displaying, therefore, a high level of centralization

(McFaul 2004). The PPGs (which are called factions by the Russian constitution) have strict rules under the “solidarity rules procedure” (Remington, Smith 1995: 472) according to which, with a two-third simple majority rule within the faction, they impose the vote according to the party line. One option for those who do not agree is to abstain when the actual vote in the Duma takes place. This explains clearly why there are so many cases of abstention when voting, and why the Rice index drops dramatically to 0.44 from 0.93 if one takes into account the number of abstentions recorded as “nay” votes. There are other aspects worth mentioning in the Russian case. Firstly, the large difference among the unity scores of parties. Yabloko is the party with the lowest unity of behavior, while United Russia (ER) has the highest programmatic convergence of its MPs. Secondly, the special character of Russian democracy as a model of personalized power with the president of the republic controlling most of the political arena. As country experts agree, political parties compete not for the possibility to implement their programs, but to favor the presidential administration. The fact that ER is the most united party it is not surprising, as it is also highly centralized. In 2005 an attempt was undertaken to create a left liberal wing within the party. The faction wanted to take a different turn on issues like redistribution and state intervention in the economy. The attempt was however suppressed by the leadership and in 2007 president Putin himself decided to head the ER list in the elections.

From the cross-country investigation of aggregate party unity scores, from both Western and East Europe, old and new democracies, **two** party unity **patterns** seem to emerge. The **first pattern** is that whenever party decentralization and systemic factors which do not favor party unity (i.e federal state or presidential system) are encountered, the PPGs are very powerful and their functioning explains the very high or high level of party

behavioral unity (Germany, Norway, Switzerland). The **second** observed **pattern** is an association of electoral systems which, in theory, are less favorable to party unity (plurality formula, preferential vote, STV), with high party centralization in terms of leadership selection and candidate selection and with less strict PPGs rules (Ireland, France, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary). There seems to be a trade-off between the strength of PPGs rules and the strength of party centralization such that whenever one of these traits is weak, the other is strong.

4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I have dealt first with possible measurements for party behavioral unity, which were derived either from roll-call votes, elite surveys or expert surveys. I have emphasized the strengths and weaknesses of every measurement in an attempt to construct a party unity index. I have particularly underlined that perceived factionalism, the intention to vote according to the party view or according to MPs' own views, do not really go hand in hand with the Rice index values. On the basis of a relatively high correlation found between our expert survey scores on party unity and the Rice index values, the in-depth analysis in the subsequent chapters will be mainly focused on the expert survey.

From the aggregate country perspective, the regional comparison showed no significant differences in the levels of party unity in terms of behavior between Western and Eastern Europe. A significant difference was noticed, however, in the unity of attitudes. The ideological congruence of party elites appears to be positively related to a country's experience with democratic rule as the same relationship was maintained when the old and new democracies were opposed. The hypothesis which linked party system age with

party unity (H16 chapter 2) was therefore partly confirmed. Newer democracies with younger party systems have a lower level of ideological agreement amongst party representatives but a similar level of unity of behavior as the older democracies. The only exception to this is Spain, where the unity of behavior and unity of attitudes are higher than in the rest of the countries from the same group. I have also shown that party centralization is significantly higher in Central Eastern Europe. This has partly confirmed my argument that high centralization would compensate for the low unity of attitudes found in new democracies.

Issues very important in 2007 and with negative implications for unity of behavior were economic and social, such as health care and social security, environment and energy policies. In Western Europe, a slightly higher level of dissent is caused by the laws on immigration and asylum policy; while in Eastern Europe the dissent was caused by laws more related to economic and institutional reforms.

Apart from the regional difference in the unity of attitudes, the two patterns of achieving unity of behavior also show that there are differences in the possible factors which influence or are associated with various levels of party unity. Nevertheless the two patterns include countries from both regions and this suggests that further research should not treat the two regions as separate entities, at least as far as party behavioral unity is concerned.

The cross-country comparison of unity of behavior levels revealed that in 18 countries out of the 23 in the sample, the variance within countries (between parties of the same country) was higher than the variance between countries. In order not to make the

results vulnerable to the pitfalls of the ecological fallacy, this clearly makes the case for a more valid analysis of parties across countries, with the party as the unit of analysis.

Without aiming to give exhaustive explanations about party unity of behavior at the aggregate level, this chapter offered a general overview of the European countries and distinguished two patterns to arrive at unity. A more detailed analysis is conducted in the subsequent chapters, analysis focused on the positive or negative impact of party or systemic factors and at the strength of their impact on unity. These chapters also incorporate a detailed discussion about the relation between attitudinal (ideological) unity and behavioral unity.

5. Party level explanations for party unity in Europe

This chapter deals with party level explanations for unity and it builds on the distinction made earlier between the unity of attitudes and unity of behavior, with the latter treated as a dependent variable. The chapter will not only test against the data the hypotheses relating unity to party variables, but will also show how party characteristics behave as a bloc in explaining unity compared with the systemic factors which will be the focus of the next chapter. The analysis reported refers to 1996 and 2007, and has been based on both elite surveys and expert surveys. The unit of analysis is political party and the examples which illustrate the results are from both Western and Central Eastern Europe.

In this endeavor, I consider political parties as organizations and as institutions at the same time. From the organizational side I look at the programmatic cohesion of party members, more specifically party MPs, and at the party's overall ideology, power status and size in the legislature. From the institutional point of view, I investigate the rules at work within these organizations, such as party centralization and disciplinary rules.

This analysis contributes to the debate which links internal party democracy and representative democracy and touches upon one of the paradoxes of democracy which is the achievement of external democracy (i.e. representative democracy) at the expense of internal party democracy. If we assume that high party unity of behavior translates into party government and representative democracy, the question is, can we only have party unity when parties are highly centralized? Moreover do parties

behave like united entities because they have a high level of party programmatic cohesion or because of internal constraints that they encounter? Is attitudinal unity a prerequisite for the behavioral unity of MPs? Or, if not, is it the case that systemic or internal factors influence party unity of behavior in order to compensate for low unity of attitudes?

The chapter proceeds with an emphasis on the distinction between party unity of attitudes and unity of behavior when we compare political parties across Europe. It presents further the theoretical grounds for including organizational factors and other party traits in the party unity explanatory model, and it arrives at hypotheses which are to be tested. The third section ascertains the influence of party characteristics on behavioral unity, while the last part of the chapter accounts for the changes in several party traits over the last decade, and how exactly they relate to party unity.

5.1 Party unity of behavior versus unity of attitudes

This section will show that what politicians say and what they do are two different issues. Edmund Burke defined a political party as “a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle upon which they are all agreed” (Ayling 1988: 73). In keeping with Burke’s definition, parties have been long perceived as unitary actors in government and coalition formation theories (Baron 1993, Budge and Keman 1990), but lately this assumption has been challenged (Laver and Garry 2000, Laver and Shepsle 1990) by a greater emphasis on intra-party politics and individual preferences. Working along similar lines, I explore unity of attitudes and behavior and advocate a clear distinction between them. From one opinion to a specific action based on that opinion there is a

considerable distance with many intervening factors - the voters, the constituency party, the national party, the parliamentary party - which can all alter the final decision of an individual MP. Besides these, trade unions relations, or even the influence of the church in some countries, can be possible related factors.

While there is agreement that modern democracy is representative democracy, the representation process has its paradoxes. Most parliamentary democracies emphasize individual freedom for their MPs in their national constitutions. Still, in practice, if every MP is free to vote as he/she wishes the very process of representation and translation of programs into public policies will be jeopardized and will not take place efficiently.

Even if nearly all Western and Central Eastern democracies assume that members of parliament are free to vote as they want, in reality, the MPs vote in a united manner either because they have the same opinion as their party or because the parties have increasingly strengthened the apparatus whereby they control their parliamentary representatives. The figures presented on the next page, illustrate that unity in attitudes is not the same as unity in behavior. My research shows, therefore, that simplifications can distort reality more than commonly realized. Political parties are not always united and made up of like-minded individuals who share the same opinions.

As of 1996, attitudinal unity based on the elite surveys, is compared across party families in Europe in figure 5.1. Similarly, the same comparison is presented with the unity of behavior measured by the Rice index alone in figure 5.2. Ideological unity is

based on MPs' declarations from 1996 elite surveys, on the question of their position on specific policy areas. Unity in attitudes is therefore measured by the standard deviation of the MPs' specific policy positions. The higher the standard deviations, the less similar are the party MPs in their views about policy areas. Therefore the lower the scores are in figure 5.1, the higher the unity of attitudes within party families.

Figure 5.1 Unity of attitudes by party family in 1996
(standard deviation of MP's policy attitudes)





Figure 5.1 above illustrates different levels of party ideological unity across party families in Europe. Especially the ethnic regional, ecologist and communist parties were very much united around their policies at that time. A comparison of both figures 5.1 and 5.2 portrays the difference between unity of behavior and unity of attitudes as of 1996 when party family is taken into consideration. Although unity of

behavior and unity of attitudes are correlated at 0.40, they are not the same thing and they do not always vary together. The agrarian and special issue parties appear as the most united parties in their behavior but they have the lowest attitudinal homogeneity in their MPs when compared with the other party families across Europe. In the two contradictory cases presented, there could be other factors that make the MPs very united in their voting: party restrictions or disciplinary measures imposed, the power status of the respective parties, institutional restrictions (like the electoral system) or because other outside agents impose unity, such as the church or the trade unions.

Figure 5.2 Unity of behavior by party family 1996 (Rice's index)



While there is a lot of variation in the attitudes towards party ideology, the same thing cannot be said about voting unity. There is not much variation in voting scores between party families. Voting along the party lines appears to be indeed very important for MPs and for parties. It is in parliament where public policy decisions are

ratified and a parties' policy platform put into practice, and it is also in the parliament where parties will shape policy and secure votes for future elections based on their ability to deliver the promised platform.

The situation after ten years has not changed much. The Borz, Enyedi, Janda 2007 party unity expert survey¹³ illustrates unity of behavior (voting) and unity of attitudes (ideological) correlated at .38, which clearly means that they cannot be confused with one another. Table 5.1 portrays the difference between the two, when factionalism is taken into consideration. All types of factionalism appear negatively correlated with unity of behavior but are not similarly correlated with unity of attitudes. This is an attestation that factionalism (ideological, leadership or substantive) is an indicator for the lack of unity, clearly pertaining more to behavior than to ideology. Out of the three types of factionalism considered, *issue factionalism* proves to have the highest association with a lack of voting unity. The result is not surprising, as recent issues such as redistribution, minorities' rights, EU enlargement and integration, taxation, defense policy and also social rights of homosexuals or abortion law have caused much dissent over votes in European national parliaments. In the conditions of a financial crisis, Gordon Brown, who followed Tony Blair as the new British Prime Minister in June 2007, changed the taxation process by withdrawing the ten pence tax rate which was introduced by the same government ten years ago. The measure caused rebellion among the Labour MPs who, even after discussions and negotiations with the party whips, threatened to vote against future government bills. The internal

¹³ The expert scores on voting unity are correlated at .60 with the Rice Index values from 1997, which validates the usage of experts for the future in large comparative studies. Of course there is a difference between raw calculations of Rice index and the value judgments, but I expect the expert values to give a clearer image of voting unity, overlooking many of the problems the Rice index has as a generally accepted index of party unity (i.e. instances of abstentions, types of votes considered, time period considered, instances of disagreement when a vote is not actually reached in the House etc.).

party crisis led to a ‘U’ turn strategy from the government which then introduced measures meant to ease the situation of those affected by the new policy.

Table 5.1 Factionalism, unity of behavior and unity of attitudes correlations

	Unity of behavior 2006/07	Leadership factionalism	Issue factionalism	Ideological factionalism	Unity of attitudes
Unity of behavior 06/07	1 N=175	-.437** N=174	-.569** N=174	-.439** N=174	.381** N=174
Leadership factionalism	-.437** N=174	1 N=182	.702** N=182	.637** N=182	-.391** N=178
Issue factionalism	-.569** N=174	.702** N=182	1 N=182	.877** N=182	-.402** N=178
Ideological factionalism	-.438** N=178	.637** N=182	.877** N=182	1 N=182	-.345** N=178
Unity of attitudes	.381** N=174	-.391** N=178	-.402** N=178	-.345** N=178	1 N=178

** correlation significant at 0.01 level; data source: 2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda party unity expert survey

The social democrats in Finland constitute another such illustrative example of issue factionalism. While the party is united on all other policy areas, on foreign policy alone they were still divided in 2007. The conflicts in this area occur between the traditionalists and Atlantic reformist groupings formed either around a former foreign minister or a former party leader.

Issue factionalism is more negatively associated with unity of behavior (correlation coefficient -.56 significant at 0.01, table 5.1) than with unity of attitudes. The existence of issue factionalism does not exclude unity of attitudes with respect to the overall party ideology, and the same is the case for leadership factionalism. The persistence of the latter, for example in Austrian FPÖ or BZÖ parties, does not necessarily imply that their members are not united in their political beliefs. Apart from conflicts between the populists and the nationalists, which made the former leader Haider leave the party together with other highly positioned party personalities and form BZÖ, most of the FPÖ members and representatives agree on stronger anti-

immigration laws, stricter law enforcement, and more support for families in poverty. Another clear example is the Belgian Front National Party which, according to the experts from our survey, exhibits the highest degree of leadership factionalism but still manages in practice to appear as an ideologically united party, with low levels of issue and ideological factionalism and a fairly high agreement among its MPs insofar as the party policies are concerned. Overall, this strengthens the argument that unity in attitudes and unity of behavior are distinct concepts, and their interaction with the surrounding institutional environment may be different. Whether unity of behavior results from party or institutional systemic restrictions will be clarified in the next sections and the next chapter where the major systemic and party level hypotheses will be tested.

5.2 The theoretical case for party level explanations

Micro level explanations (party level) for party unity put emphasis on the political party characteristics such as party size, party origin, party centralization or candidate selection (Janda 1980, Harmel and Janda 1982, Janda and King 1985, Norris 1996, Hazan 2002, Rahat 2007). These studies only relate party traits to party unity but do not have a particular theory about party unity. I consider some of the factors mentioned above in my model of party unity together with others which have been introduced in chapter two of this thesis with the aim of testing their effect on unity of behavior. The hypotheses to be tested are presented as follows.

The general expectation is that *parties with a high score on unity of attitudes (programmatic cohesion) also manifest high behavioral unity in parliament* (H1). If party members and MPs share similar beliefs then the level of rebellion in a

parliament will be quite low. Sometimes high cohesion can be accompanied by strong decision making at the party central office, therefore *a high degree of centralization is expected to have a positive influence on behavioral unity as well* (H2). Especially in Central and Eastern Europe, where the prospect for a lower level of programmatic cohesion is more plausible than in Western Europe, a trade-off between cohesion and centralization could take place in order to achieve unity. *Parties with a low level of attitudinal homogeneity are expected to show high centralization in order to achieve high behavioral unity* (H3).

Political parties possess various capabilities to adapt and change given the environment in which they function (Harmel 2002). In order to stay united they may apply disciplinary measures such as expulsion, warnings with loss of privileges or removal from future nominations on the party lists. *Disciplinary measures enforced by the parties will contribute positively to the behavioral unity* (H4). As with centralization, this kind of coercion cannot create unity of attitudes but could influence behavior in a parliament at least in the short term. Disciplinary measures can either be informal or formal. Officially they can be clearly stipulated in the parties' statutes and decided by the party leadership or the party's general annual convention. They may be applied prior to important voting in parliament, or after dissent has already occurred. When none of these measures work, the party will most probably suffer a split.

In order to keep their voters and maintain popularity, parties will try to preserve the image of a unified body; those which are in government will especially behave more united than the parties in the opposition. Behavioral unity is expected to vary according to a party's power status. In order to maintain themselves in power, the

incumbents will try to portray unity, if not on both dimensions of unity (attitudes and behavior), then at least in terms of behavior when voting in parliament. Party size in parliament can also matter as in larger parties it can be more difficult to come to agreement. Depending on the party size and coalition size, government parties will know if they can run the risk of having MPs vote against government bills. Consequently, *parties in government are expected to be very united in parliament, inversely proportional to their size in the legislature* (H5).

The link between ideology and party unity has not been explored extensively by party scholars. Drawing from Ozbudun (1970) and Duverger (1967) the old expectation, according to which *leftist parties are more centralized and therefore more united than the rest in terms of behavior* (H6), is to be challenged by this thesis, especially given the transit from mass parties to cadre parties (Katz and Mair 1996) such that we can hardly speak of mass parties in Europe nowadays. Moreover, even the newly formed parties in Central Eastern Europe have, most of them, not experienced that stage (Enyedi 2006) and are either aiming to appeal to a catch-all electorate or to become more and more dependent on the resources coming from the state.

The more ideologically extreme the parties are, the more united they are expected to be (H7). This unity can manifest either in terms of attitudes or in terms of behavior, or in terms of both. The expectation stems from the fact that ideologically extreme parties have a shorter range of policy areas to advocate and, often, low internal democracy within these parties should deter their parliamentarians from defecting. Pedahzur and Brichta (2002: 34) associate high cohesion with extreme-right parties, especially those which are dependent on their leaders and which are not completely

institutionalized. Veugelers' (1995) argument for the success of the French National Front (FN), in continuing to nominate candidates for the national elections and to survive its electoral defeats, was the high cohesion maintained under the leadership of Le Pen, whose dominance and strength kept the party closed to factionalism. Heider in Austria, is another example of an authoritarian leader who expelled rebels and has even threatened to resign in order to re-enforce his authority and maintain party cohesion (Riedlsperger 1998). This intuitive connection between extreme-right ideology and unity has been made based upon a strong leadership and high party centralization. Those two elements can, however, exist in other parties apart from the ideologically extreme ones and this is another reason why H7 is going to be tested.

5.3 Variables and data

This section presents the major concepts to be discussed and their measurements¹⁴. The analysis is based on 187 parties from 23 democracies in Western and Central Eastern Europe. The database has been compiled using elite surveys from around 1996-97 and other data from secondary sources, my own coding and the 2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda party unity expert survey. As mentioned in the previous chapters, party behavioral unity is uniformity in the actions of party representatives in parliament. The analysis aims to disentangle party level effects on behavioral unity prior to and after increasing the number of cases with the expert survey on party unity in Europe.

Party behavioral unity was measured using the party scores of the Rice index on roll-call votes, the expert assessments and another Rice opinion index (RiceDIF)¹⁵ which was created using the responses of the parliamentarians to the question of how they

¹⁴ More details on the elite survey and expert survey questionnaires are to be found in the appendix.

¹⁵ The formula or Rice DIF is: $(\text{party_view} - \text{own_view}) / (\text{party_view} + \text{own_view}) * 100$. There is a correlation between the Rice index based on roll-calls and Rice DIF (Pearson index is .43 at sig. 0.02).

would vote in the parliament, and if they would follow their own opinion or the opinion of their party. This chapter shows the results based on the Rice index and the expert assessments on party behavioral unity. The values of the last two indicators are correlated at .60, which justifies the usage of the later in large comparative studies as a good proxy that can replace and overlook the faults of the former indicator. When aggregated at the party level, the data from the elite surveys reveals an expected negative relationship between those parties in which the majority of MPs would follow their own opinion when voting on the floor and the Rice index values (-.39). Based on the same data, a positive relationship (.43) is revealed between the parties whose majority MPs would follow the party opinion when voting and the Rice index values.

Data about the Rice index is very scarce and the existing scores were calculated on a different number of bills, only in part from the countries in our sample. The first test which was carried out in order to see if the scores were comparable at all across Europe was to correlate the number of bills taken into account in every country with the Rice index scores of the parties in the sample. There was no significant relationship found between the two variables which attests that the Rice index scores are comparable. Consequently, the different numbers of bills considered in every country did not introduce any bias into the analysis (table 1 appendix D).

The most important party factor tested for its impact on unity is *centralization*. The obvious characteristic of a centralized party is the concentration of leadership in the hands of few persons or in a single powerful figure (Janda 1970: 108-109). In the analysis, I consider all these aspects of party centralization with the aim of verifying if

the predicted connections with party unity work across European countries. The question on centralization from the elite survey reads as follows: “In case of disagreement, who has the most say in party policy?” The MPs’ responses appraising party executive predominance were to be considered evidence for high centralization. The experts were asked in a more direct way to assess the level of centralization with respect to the decision making process in the party, the selection of the candidates and the distribution of the party finances. High scores on centralization equate with very tight control from the party national headquarters on most of the above processes.

Disciplinary measures, as revealed by the experts and author’s observations, refer to expulsions, loss of privileges or verbal warnings. *Power status* depicts the difference between the incumbents and the opposition, while *party ideology* is measured both in terms of classic party family affiliation and Left-Right (L-R) ideological positions. The latter were calculated on an interval from -100 to +100, by subtracting the sum of left percentages from the sum of right percentages. These percentages which contributed to the final L-R score reflect the references to the categories grouped as left and right by the comparative manifesto project (Klingemann et al. 2006: 5).

5.4 Party characteristics and their impact on unity

The argument linking leftist parties and unity goes back to mass parties as they were portrayed by Duverger (1967: 169, 171), their centralization and discipline levels. “Vote as you are told” and uniformity of voting, as Duverger stipulates, arose as a consequence of two reasons, one mechanical and one social. *Mechanical* because “large masses of people had to be organized and discipline alone made that possible”, and *social* because “instead of uniting individualistic ‘bourgeois’, the Socialist parties

were formed essentially for the working-class masses, who by their very nature are given to communal institutions and discipline”; hence the priority they have given to party organization. Discipline and the authoritarianism of leaders were seen as the way towards efficiency. In a parliamentary setting for example, “the homogeneity of groups, which voted as a block according to the directions of the party leaders, was a considerable advantage over the individual dispersion” and has been the major characteristic of cadre parties for a long time (Duverger 1967: 171). Considering that mass parties have evolved and changed since then (Katz and Mair 2007), at least in terms of their followers and membership size (Mair and van Biezen 2001), so is expected to be their level of unity. The analysis will first explore and distinguish whether leftist parties still have the highest level of unity in behavior or in attitudes. Secondly it will further check for any link between unity and their centralization level.

Considering their origin as a party family, the analysis looks at communist and social democratic parties as being situated on the left and expected to have a higher level of unity than the centre or right wing parties. Besides the party family affiliation, a further test has been carried out looking at parties’ left-right position and their level of unity, with the left-right position being derived from party manifesto data. The additional test accounts for possible changes in the parties’ programs even if originally they would define themselves as belonging to the same party family. A justification for this second test is the weak association (0.32) between the party family scores and parties’ individual scores on the left-right dimension.

Table 5.2 represents the unity of behavior according to party families¹⁶ in 1996. Contrary to expectations, the leftist parties (i.e. communists or social democrats) do not show the highest values of Rice index, which shows that their parliamentarians were not voting along party lines at all times. Instead, the highest unity of voting is found in the agrarian and special issue parties, such as The Women's Alliance in Iceland, Progressive Party in Denmark, the Progress Party in Norway (single issue parties), Russian Agrarian Party, Progressive Party of Iceland and the Centre Parties in Norway and in Sweden (agrarian parties). Both Nordic agrarian parties have been strong for the last decades and for most of the time have been in government. This could be an explanation for their high level of unity, as aspect which will be explored further in the analysis of the explicit power status influence on voting unity. As revealed earlier, the agrarian parties do not score highest on attitudinal unity and at the same time, as shown further in table 5.6, they do not exhibit the highest level of centralization either to compensate for that.

Table 5.2 Mean Rice index values per party family 1996

party family	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Special issue	<i>97.36</i>	3	2.96
Agrarian	<i>96.16</i>	5	3.96
Ecologist	94.96	5	3.80
Social democratic	94.95	15	6.09
Communist	94.32	8	5.82
Ethnic regional	93.76	3	2.66
Liberal	92.51	13	6.99
Christian democrat	92.44	13	9.34
Conservative	<i>88.19</i>	11	9.91
Nationalist	87.25	2	2.47
Total	93.03	78	7.26

Note: italics refer to the highest and lowest values
data source: 1996 elite surveys

A general comparison of party families in Europe, in terms of their unity of behavior based on the expert survey results, shows that the twenty-one liberal parties in my

¹⁶ The grouping into party families was done by the party manifesto research group.

dataset have the lowest score on parliamentary unity, while the nationalist parties, ethnic regional parties, communist and special issue parties stand near the top. The question is, therefore, whether belonging to any of the aforementioned party families is significant for parliamentary unity. Table 5.3 portrays the level of party unity of behavior as revealed by the experts. The ethnic regional and the special issue parties score highest this time, along with the nationalist parties and the communists, while the liberals, as in 1996, are the least united parties.

Table 5.3 Unity of behavior per party family 2007(experts assessments)

party family	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Special issue	<i>4.07</i>	4	.41
Nationalist	<i>3.95</i>	15	1.5
Ethnic regional	<i>3.66</i>	12	.52
Communist	<i>3.61</i>	18	.44
Ecologist	3.45	16	.71
Conservative	3.37	22	.70
Christian democrat	3.35	28	.52
Social democratic	3.17	29	.52
Agrarian	3.14	10	.44
Liberal	<i>3.00</i>	21	.73
Total	3.40	175	.75

Note: italics refer to the highest and lowest values

data source: 2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda party unity expert survey

The Anova analysis (table 9 appendix D), showed no significant difference between belonging to a party family group and Rice index values. The differences within groups are much higher than the differences between groups, therefore there is much more variation within a party family group than between party family groups. Consequently, belonging to a certain party family and especially to the leftist parties does not make the parties more united in their voting behavior in the parliament, at least as shown by the 1996 Rice index values.

However, in the statistical test of the model against the 2007 data, party family appears significant. This means that, at least for the experts, it makes a difference as

to which party families parties belong to for their overall unity score. Anova analysis from table 5.4 confirms the above statements. What remains to be tested is which specific party family groups have a significant impact on unity of behavior.

Table 5.4 Anova analysis: unity of behavior 2007 and party family

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Unity of behavior*					
Between groups	9.32	9	1.03	2.94	.003
Party family	57.75	164	.35		
Within groups	67.07	173			
data source: 2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda party unity expert survey					

Dummy variables were created in order to test whether the affiliations with the party families which score highest or lowest on unity matters statistically for the parties' final score on behavioral unity. The results for the OLS regression are presented in table 5.5. The coefficients displayed in the table allow comparing the effects of party level variables on unity of behavior as of 2007. From all the party families considered, only *special issue parties* and, to a certain extent, the *liberals* too, show a significant difference in the final test. Not only have party families of the left been outscored in their party unity scores, but affiliation to the left does not appear to have any significant impact on unity. The hypothesis concerning the link between parties of the ideological left and unity of behavior is therefore rejected. The same applies for the hypothesis linking ideologically extreme parties and party unity, even if, for 2007, the nationalists have one of the highest scores on unity of behavior. The extreme-right affiliation, as compared to the other party families, is, however, not significant in the overall model (Table 5.5).

Table 5.5 Party characteristics regression model

Party characteristics model	Coefficients
Communist	.108
Liberal	-.121*
Nationalist	.038
Special issue	.168**
Ethnic regional	.086
Power status	-.065
Unity of attitudes	.236***
Party centralization	.270***
Party national executive/parliamentary party overlap	.033
Disciplinary measures	-.222**

Dependent variable: unity of behavior 2007; $R^2 = .28$; Adjusted $R^2 = .23$; $N = 172$;
 Data source: Borz, Enyedi, Janda 2007 party unity study
 * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .00$;

The reason why special issue parties are associated with high unity seems obvious as they mostly concentrate their programs around one major issue and so are less likely to defect from the party program. Still, they do vote on all the bills which pass the parliamentary arena and the single issue cannot be taken as the full explanation for party unity. Their relative small size in parliament could be the other explanation for high unity. There are, however, only four special issue parties in our dataset with assigned scores on unity of behavior: Sinn Fein (SF) in Ireland, Progress Party in Norway (FRP), United Russia (ER) and Party of Social Justice (PSS), also from Russia. Each of them is designated as a special issue party by the party manifesto research group (Klingemann et al. 2006) because they are not completely compatible with the main party families. This makes them however a residual category when


analyzed in relation to party unity. Sinn Fein is the political wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and attaches huge salience to Northern Ireland policy while United Russia follows the needs of president Putin. The Progress Party in Norway is loaded with paradoxes. It can neither be considered extreme right, nationalist or populist, nor can it be seen solely as anti-immigration party as it existed before the immigration question came on to the political agenda and it cannot be seen purely as a protest party which focuses only on the short term unfavorable economic and political circumstances (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990).

In opposition to special issue parties, liberal parties across Europe tend to be associated with low behavioral unity. While political liberalism (Salvadori 1977) is classically perceived as being focused on four main themes - religious tolerance, free inquiry, self-governance and the market economy - liberal values and ideas relate to the freedom of conscience, justice in politics, the rights of minorities, civil liberties and the rights of individual to be consulted about decisions which affect him or her (Bullock, Schock 1957). Theoretically, these liberal values and ideas, especially the freedom of conscience, could explain the negative association between liberals and unity. As evidenced by our survey, liberal parties experience dissent on issues like redistribution, taxes, welfare state spending, ethnic rights, religiosity and the role of the church, social rights for homosexuals, abortion and drugs issues. EU enlargement and integration caused dissent within liberal parties in France, Switzerland, Germany, Norway and the Netherlands. Apart from those issues, immigration comes as an extra source of dissent within VVD (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) in the Netherlands. The sensitive issues concerning abortion, rights for homosexuals and the role of the church has caused more disagreement in Eastern Europe (within SZDSZ in

Hungary, PNL in Romania) and in predominantly catholic countries in Western Europe such as Italy or Ireland. Market economy issues, and ideas over strengthening democratic institutions, have lead to disagreements within the liberal parties of Hungary, Romania, Poland, while regional divisions have caused disunity within the liberal parties in Belgium.

Figure 5.3 compares the unity within the liberal parties across Europe. The figures in the columns show the average unity of behavior score for each liberal party in the respective countries. Belgium, Denmark and Switzerland have more than one liberal party and usually they all perform the same way when it comes to unity of behavior inside the parliament.

Figure 5.3 Liberal parties and unity of behavior 2007



The second test of hypothesis 6 has been carried out using the ideological position of the parties on the left-right scale. The latter might be a better indicator of the party

ideology because it pins down the differences between ideological positions of parties belonging to the same party families. Klingemann et al. (2006: 3) stipulate that “the unique strength of party manifestos data is that they measure party policy positions in each election on the basis of the specific program the party lays down for it.” The scale makes parties interdependent of ideological positioning and has estimates based on published programs. The specific categories on the Left–Right dimension were investigated through factor analysis. Similar L-R categories to those generated by the manifesto research were found in Marxist writings that emphasize intervention and welfare together with the hardships of the capitalist transformation (for Left), and in the writings and speeches of Edmund Burke (for Right), where security, enterprise and traditional morality are grouped together (Klingemann et al. 2006: 6).

The left-right positioning does not explain the unity of behavior, either when it is measured by the roll-call votes, or when it is assessed by the experts. Both tests reject the hypotheses mentioned earlier by Duverger and other scholars such as Maor and Beyme. When party family and left-right position are considered in the same statistical analysis of covariance, the effect of the independent variables was tested on the mean unity of behavior of various groups based on different party families. In the covariance test, left-right position does not explain any of the variance in the unity of behavior (parliamentary unity) (table 12, appendix D). Party family however appears significant but, as shown in table 5.5, only the special issue and the liberal party family make a difference in explaining unity of behavior. Special issue parties are not even considered a party family in their own right by many scholars and this further weakens the relevance of party families when discussing party unity.

As specified earlier, only twenty percent of the variance of ideological unity goes hand in hand with the variance in voting unity (correlation coefficient .40). When ideological unity is low, is there more discipline imposed by the national party organs? Table 5.6 offers a comparative overview of the centralization inside party families across Europe. As one would expect, nationalist parties show by far the highest control at the central level due to their authoritarian leaders. Agrarian parties are not amongst those most strictly controlled at the central level but are still moderately centralized, while special issue parties are the least centralized. As one would expect, communist parties apply higher centralization than social democratic parties. An intriguing finding is that, along with the communist parties, the Christian democrats and conservative parties show a similar concentration of power imposed by their national party structures, even higher than the control within the social-democratic parties. Leftist parties do not fit the description of Duverger anymore. The leadership control manifested within communist parties is similar to the restrictions imposed within the conservative parties or within Christian democratic parties overall in Europe (table 5.6).

Table 5.6 Mean party centralization per party family 1996

party family	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Nationalist	91.90	7	46.92
Christian democrat	72.00	18	21.45
Communist	70.50	9	17.36
Conservative	70.34	13	12.45
Ecologist	68.02	6	29.54
Ethnic regional	65.43	6	37.50
Agrarian	63.13	3	17.21
Liberal	62.69	12	19.90
Social democratic	60.50	23	16.00
Special issue	44.50	3	15.27
Total	67.56	100	23.68

data source: 1996 elite surveys

There is no correlation between party families and their level of centralization and, as expected, left-wing parties are not amongst those with the highest level of centralization. Nationalist parties instead exhibit the highest disciplinary rules at the central level, while communist, conservative and Christian democrat parties across Europe have about the same level of centralization; social democrats scoring below the last three party families (Table 5.6).

In conclusion, whether a party belongs to a certain *party family* or has a specific position on the *left-right scale* does not predict how its MPs will behave in the parliament, apart from within the special issue parties and the liberals. Furthermore, the leftist parties, such as the social-democrats or communists, do not any longer have the discipline and authoritarian leadership that Duverger and other scholars emphasized. Nationalist parties instead compensate for the lack of a clearly defined and complex party program with a dictatorial style of leadership.

The effects of centralization and attitudinal unity on behavioral unity

As portrayed in table 5.5, *party centralization* and *attitudinal unity* have a positive and strong effect on party behavioral unity, which is sound evidence in the support of H1 and H2. Not only do attitudinal unity and behavioral unity vary together but the former, as expressed by parties' programmatic convergence also leads to more unity of behavior.

The impact of centralization on unity of behavior is positive and quite strong. Concentration of decision making at the central level favors unity of behavior. We can therefore confirm that unity of behavior is undeniably achieved partly at the expense

of internal party democracy. Centralization can apply in the decision making process, finance distribution or candidate selection. In the case of Spanish parties, which have the highest behavior convergence of MPs in the legislature, it is the party central office which decides who will be nominated and become an MP. It is also through the candidate selection procedure that any dissent is immediately punished. Also in Ireland, in a number of cases, the FF executive appointed candidates that were not the choice of the local branches. A former FF member, who had been expelled due to alleged dubious financial dealings, has been offered a chance to return to FF in 2007 by the central party, in return for supporting the government. The central party decision went completely against the opinions of local MPs and party members from her area, who were rather hostile to the prospect of her return.

Centralization can be low on the candidate selection dimension, which gives the impression of high internal party democracy, but also high with respect to the decision-making process. Our 2007 survey reveals that the British Labour party under Blair is one such example. Both major British parties offer quite a lot of autonomy to local branches over candidate selection but are far more centralized with respect to policy-making and distribution of resources. As our experts declared, the only difference between them is that the Conservatives hold more financial resources at the center than do Labour. The Norwegian parties also have a very decentralized candidate selection, but the decision-making process, and especially the distribution of finances, are more centralized. Ultimately, it is the concentration of decision making at the central party office that most of the time makes the difference for party unity.

Our expert survey shows that highly cohesive parties also make use of party centralization and that the latter is not only a tool for parties with low programmatic cohesion to achieve unity of behavior. Within the high unity of attitudes group of parties, 86 percent of the cases also have high levels of centralization, while almost 60 percent of the parties that are not so ideologically united also have high levels of centralization. Centralization is therefore not only a weapon of ideologically disunited parties with which to increase their unity of behavior, but is also a trait of those parties that want to uphold their unity of behavior. This distribution points to the fact that ideological unity alone is not sufficient for unity of behavior as, most of the time and regardless of its level, it is accompanied by relatively high levels of centralization.

Disciplinary measures

On the same line with centralization, *disciplinary measures* also explain unity achieved by parties and validate H4. Their frequency is not that high but, as the country experts and the British MPs declared, they are effective when needed and when they are applied in accordance to the party rules.

As we have seen so far, both centralization and disciplinary rules favor unity of behavior. The process takes place via an agenda control mechanism. If decisions are controlled from the centre, party leadership decides most of the time on the issues to be discussed in the legislatures and, if possible, the issues which could cause dissent are then postponed for later debates. Disciplinary measures applied over the last decade appear, though, to vary in the opposite direction to unity in attitudes, but they do go hand in hand with the tightening of decision-making at the central level. The negative correlation between disciplinary measures and unity of attitudes shown in

table 5.7, clearly confirms them to be a weapon of ideologically disunited parties. The lower the attitudinal unity of parties, the higher the usage of disciplinary measures has been over the last decade. It is also confirmed that the more overlap there is between the national party executive and the parliamentary party, the more decisions are made from the central party headquarters (positive correlation in table 5.7).

Table 5.7 Centralization, attitudinal unity and disciplinary measures correlations

	Centralization	Exec./parl. party overlap	Disciplinary measures	Unity of attitudes
Centralization	1 N=180	.165* N=174	.477** N=178	.137* N=178
Exec./parl. party overlap	.165* N=174	1 N=174	.033 N=172	-.355 N=174
Disciplinary measures	.477** N=178	.033 N=172	1 N=182	-.348** N=176
Unity of attitudes	.137 N=178	-.355 N=174	-.348** N=176	1 N=178

*p<.05, **p<.01; Data source: 2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda party unity study

The disciplinary mechanism of party whips in the UK parliament

The party whips in the UK are an unusual case of achieving unity of behavior by imposing disciplinary rules, warnings and by using persuasion before a vote actually takes place in the House of Commons. Their official recognition within the government structures makes them a special case in Europe. They are an example of institutionalized disciplinary rules, but the records show that they can be both favorable and detrimental to unity of behavior. The whips do not have a statutory basis, although the government whips hold ministerial offices and are therefore paid. Opposition whips are also recognized office holders within their party. Between them they organize parliamentary business through what are known as “the usual channels” (Rush, Ettinghausen 2002). As the records show, whips warn party leaders of discontent among their backbench members and of possible rebellions. There are however, stories of whips’ maneuverings causing “grown men [to be] reduced to

tears, careers aborted and shattered office accommodation in some distant Westminster out-post (in the past it was in 'a room more suitable for suicide'), of rewards and punishments, carrots and sticks" (Rush, Ettinghausen 2002: 10). These reports point to the results of my analysis, that the enforcement of too many disciplinary rules can be also detrimental to party unity. Paul Marsden is an example of an MP who defected in 2001 from the Labour Party to the Liberal Democrats, after complaining about his treatment by Hilary Armstrong, the government Chief Whip. Marsden protested against the Labour health and transport policies but, most importantly, because he was denied a vote against the war in Afghanistan. He declared: "I am an MP who wanted to dissent, I wasn't allowed to. I was bullied by the whips for trying to do it."¹⁷ As a result, the British Liberal Democrats welcomed into their ranks a number of dissatisfied Labour MPs along with party members of the so-called Pro-European Conservative Party; a small breakaway faction of ex-Torrey MEPs. Soon after these scandals, the British media started to associate the Labour whipping mechanisms with the term "control freakery". The defectors who accused the whips are therefore an example that excessive disciplinary measures can nevertheless be risky, leading to party defections instead of restoring party unity.

Incumbency effects on unity?

As can be seen in table 5.5 and table 5.8 on the next page, whether parties are *in government* or not, does not affect their unity of behavior. The mean average unity of behavior for parties in opposition is actually slightly higher than for parties in government (3.4 as opposed to 3.3 for incumbent parties, the group comparison is however statistically not significant with regards to unity of behavior). This suggests

¹⁷ BBC news, "Why Labour's Marsden defected" by Nick Robison, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/1702514.stm (last accessed June 2008)

that unity is a trait which is followed by both opposition and incumbent parties and its rewards are widely recognized by both sides.

Table 5.8 Party unity integrated model

Integrated model	Coefficients
Power status	-.097
Communist	.115
Liberal	-.111*
Nationalist	.030
Special issue	.187***
Ethnic regional	.087
Unity of attitudes	.240***
Party centralization	.282**
National exec./parliam. party overlap	.061
Disciplinary measures	-.285**
District magnitude	.099
Ballot structure	-.001
Executive/legislative balance of power	-.013
Ceiling on donations	.142*
Fragmentation	.015
State subsidies	.168**
Dependent variable: unity of behavior 2007; N=161; $R^2=.35$; Adjusted $R^2=.28$; Note: entries are standardized beta regression coefficients; * $p<.1$, ** $p<.05$, *** $p<.01$; Data source: 2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda party unity study;	

One aspect which could have an impact in this tenuous relationship is the party size in the parliament as it is reflected in the percentage of seats held by the governing parties. However, even when party size is considered, there appears to be no effect on party behavioral unity. If incumbent parties have a comfortable majority, then there is always a margin by which they can always allow for some dissent to happen.

The 1996 snapshot analysis showed no relation between party centralization and party ideological unity. As there is no correlation between the two variables it means that they independently affect party behavioral unity and, at the level of the 1996 snapshot analysis, H3 has been rejected. The 2007 analysis confirmed the same relationship of independence between ideological unity and party centralization. A trade-off relationship would require a negative correlation between the two variables. However a static analysis per specific years cannot really test if there is any dynamic relationship between the two.

Any trade-off or dynamic relation between the two variables will be explored in the following section when changes over the last decade are examined. The computed change in the two variables over the last decade and their relationship with behavioral unity can show if there is indeed a trade-off between the two variables in order to achieve unity in behavior. As predicted the quantified change in the ideological unity and party centralization shows a positive influential relationship between them. The more party centralization has increased over the last decade, the higher the MPs' convergence on policy areas, and vice versa (figure 5.4 on page 126).

5.5 Accounting for change over the last decade

The analysis in this chapter has shown the static relation between the variables considered in the party unity model. The aim was to see if the relationships are there or not, and how strong they are. The model shown in chapter 2 theoretically implies a dynamic relationship, aimed especially at those parties which, in the light of conditions x , see themselves in the position of adopting measures y . The prediction was that, given the relative young age of the party systems in Central Eastern Europe,

the parties will not have a very high degree of attitudinal unity (for which has already been given evidence in chapter 4) and, in order to arrive at a very united vote in the parliament, they will increase their level of centralization and apply more disciplinary rules.

The 2007 expert survey provides information about the change in the voting unity over the last decade in programmatic cohesion and party centralization. The results of the regression analysis presented in table 5.9 favor the argument portrayed in the above mentioned model. The higher centralization has become over the last decade, both in Western Europe and in Central Eastern Europe, the more party unity has increased, both in ideology and MPs' voting behavior. In an obvious manner, the more homogenous a party has become in terms of ideology and policy positions, the higher its agreement when voting in the parliament. As a logical consequence, the higher party unity of behavior has become by 2007, the fewer disciplinary measures have been applied over the last decade.

Table 5.9 Explaining the change in unity of behavior over the last decade

Variables	Indicators
Change in unity of attitudes	.302***
Change in party centralization	.232**
Disciplinary measures applied over the last decade	-.121*
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01; dependent variable: change in unity of behavior over the last decade; unit of analysis political parties; N=131; R ² =.20; Adjusted R ² =.18; Note: entries are standardized beta regression coefficients; Data source: 2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda expert survey on party unity;	

As shown, both centralization and disciplinary mechanisms are tools for achieving unity of behavior. There is however a fundamental difference between the two. While

they are positively associated with each other, when it comes to change over time as shown in table 5.9, centralization positively affects unity while disciplinary measures affect it negatively. The negative coefficient allows for contradictory interpretations. One is that using disciplinary measures tends to decrease party unity of behavior, while the other, and the more plausible one, is that disciplinary measures are not needed anymore when unity increases. As parties get more and more united they need disciplinary actions less and less. This however works only above a certain level and until that level of unity is reached disciplinary actions help. This interpretation requires us to differentiate between two different mechanisms which work behind centralization and disciplinary measures. Centralization appears to produce a “culture of reward” for unity, whereas disciplinary measures reflect a “culture of punishment”. As MPs behave more and more according to the organizational reward structure, there is less need for punishment.

The changes in party centralization over the last decade go hand in hand with changes in programmatic cohesion. The correlations showed by the change in both variables are much higher (.37, table 6 appendix D) than the correlations between their 2007 snapshot values (.13, already presented in table 5.7). This correlation suggests that changes in centralization and unity of attitudes vary together (at least in the memory of experts) without implying any causal relation or temporal sequence. As suggested earlier in chapter 2, especially for Central and Eastern Europe, it is expected that in the conditions of low party ideological unity, in order to achieve the desired level of behavioral unity, the party will increase its centralization. The change could normally be generated by the party leadership or the parliamentary party and arise mostly from the desire to be re-elected.

Figure 5.4 Party centralization and programmatic change over the last decade




Figure 5.4 illustrates the change in party centralization as explained by the change in party ideological unity. The scatter plot presents the parties and their country affiliation. As observed, 13 percent of the variation in ideological unity is explained by the variation in party centralization over the last decade. Especially in the right upper corner of the figure we can observe cases (parties) from Central Eastern Europe and this verifies my initial proposition that, especially in these countries, the increase in party centralization is explained by the levels of unity of attitudes within parties. Most of the remaining parties are situated in the centre (value 3 on both axes means no change), meaning that not much change occurred during the last decade and that parties do indeed change slowly. Some parties in Luxembourg, Iceland and Denmark have increased their programmatic cohesion while keeping the same level of

centralization, while others, mostly from Eastern Europe (Slovak, Russian, Polish parties and some exceptions in UK, Belgium or Italy), have maintained or decreased their programmatic cohesion but have increased their centralization level.

The disciplinary measures applied by parties always go hand in hand with the process of strengthening party centralization. The occurrence of disciplinary measures such as expulsion, loss of privileges or simple warnings is moderately correlated (.30) with leadership factionalism. This means that, with the exception of political parties which have factionalism officially acknowledged in their party statutes, a large number of the remaining parties are trying to avoid factionalism based on the personal attraction of individual party members. Besides centralization, one solution for that problem are the above mentioned disciplinary measures. Radu Comănici, a popular local leader and member of Greater Romania Party (PRM), was expelled from the party after he strongly criticized the central leadership and asked for major internal reforms in order to make the party more competitive in elections. The motive for the expulsion was the he tried to falsify the party list¹⁸ for the local elections in 2008 and did not take into account the position of central party executive on the list of candidates. Such measures and this example highlight the party's determination to avoid leadership factionalism and emphasize how centralization and disciplinary measures go hand in hand in upholding unity of behavior.

¹⁸“500 de peremiști cer demisia de onoare a președintelui PRM”(“500 members of The Greater Romania Party are asking for the resignation of the Greater Romania Party Leader”) in *Adevarul* 16 May 2008.

If disciplinary measures¹⁹ are not imposed by the party soon enough, the dissatisfied members will leave the party on their own initiative. A very recent example is Sorin Oprescu, former member of the Romanian Social Democratic Party (PSD) who, on the grounds that he was not nominated to run as a party candidate for the local elections (after two previous unsuccessful candidacies), resigned from the party and ran as an independent candidate for the Bucharest position of mayor in June 2008 local elections. Another famous example is of the Slovak MP, who not only left his original party, but then joined its opponents. The MP did this on various occasions, and even declared in the Slovak Daily SME,²⁰ in 2003, that changing parties is like changing any other job and going for the one which offers more. The MP defected first from the New Civic Alliance (ANO) and, after he had spent some time in the parliament as a non-affiliated deputy, in November 2003 joined the Slobodne Forum (Free Forum) which is a breakaway parliamentary faction of SDKU (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union). Similar cases occurred frequently in Russia where, as Mikhail Gorbachev mentioned about the 2003 elections, “A politician may be today in the list of one electoral bloc, tomorrow – of another, and the day after tomorrow - on the third list. Utter, cynical pragmatism. Only to get pork, nothing more” (Kulik 2007: 193).

¹⁹ Other measures against defection are however stipulated in the country constitutions, such as in Portugal, and discussions about similar constitutional amendments have taken place in the Romanian parliament as well.

²⁰ "Opaterny: Zmena strany? Ako zmena zamestnania", SME (Slovak Daily), November 23 2003, accessible at <http://zaujimavosti.sme.sk/c/1178255/Opaterny-Zmena-strany-Ako-zmena-zamestnania.html>

5.6 Conclusion

Table 5.10 summarizes the empirical evidence regarding the seven hypotheses presented in this chapter on the relationship between party traits and unity of behavior.

Table 5.10 Summary of party effects on behavioral unity

Party factor	Predicted effect on unity of behavior	Effect Verified
Ideological unity	Positive	Yes
Centralization	Positive	Yes
Power status (incumbency)	Positive	No
Party size in the legislature	Negative	No
Party Ideology (Left parties)	Positive	No
(Ideological extremism)	Negative	No
Disciplinary measures	Positive	Yes

Drawing on the party organization literature, this chapter has tested only part of my integrated explanatory model of party unity in Europe. I have shown that party unity can be largely explained by looking at the party characteristics and party organization. On average, in Europe, a united party in terms of behavior turns out to be a party with a high programmatic cohesion, a decision making process concentrated at the centre and which also applies disciplinary measures. What I have also shown is that left parties are not the most united, contrary to how party scholarship previously portrayed them, and also that liberal parties are generally expected to express low unity of behavior.

The behavior of a political party cannot be predicted based on its left-right position or its traditional party family affiliation. Only affiliation to special issue parties and liberal parties explains part of the variation in unity of behavior. It should be noted that while special issue parties are not considered a party family in their own right by

party scholars, parties in this category are associated with high unity of behavior, while parties close to liberal ideology are associated with low unity overall in Europe. Left-right positioning of parties is insignificant in explaining why some parties are more united in behavior than others. The parties' positions based on their manifestos have changed a great deal lately to the extent that one may question their party family affiliation in the traditional sense. This leads to the conclusion that leftist parties are not the most united, and also that party families have lost part of their overall relevance in Europe.

Ideological unity goes hand in hand with unity of behavior and contributes positively to it. High unity of attitudes it is not a prerequisite for high unity of behavior because, as we have seen, other factors may intervene. Whether in government or in opposition, parties will stay united in their behavior without much difference between them, not even when the party size in the parliament is taken into consideration. Centralization, as expected, favors unity of behavior and validates the democratic paradox presented in the introduction. It is indeed at the expense of internal party democracy that the overall external democratic process takes place. Disciplinary measures also contribute to high unity of behavior, but as the British MPs declared, apart from expulsion, the extent of their use has to be limited if it is not to become detrimental to unity, in which case the MPs will switch to another party.

6. Systemic influences on party unity

The more structured the environment in which political parties function, the more they are expected to act and interact taking into account the institutional structures at work. This chapter deals with institutional determinants of party unity and arrives at a model considering these variables. Starting from the distinction between unity of behavior and unity of attitudes and introducing the focus of representation (role perception) as a synthetic variable, the study refines and tests assumptions and hypotheses derived from the literature, provides new additional factors, and tests their impact on unity.

Many scholarly works argue that constitutional provisions or other institutional aspects, like the electoral system, may affect the interaction between political parties, MPs' behavior and their decision to follow the party line or not. The need for unity in a representative government is at the core of representative democracy, since it guarantees the articulation of voters' interests and the translation of political opinions into public policies. In a context of declining party membership, increased tendency for individual campaigning and cultivation of the personal vote, representative democracy seems to be in danger. Can parties therefore stay united despite a federal system at work or an electoral system which discourages loyalty while it favors individualism? Or, are they able to adapt and make use of internal mechanisms which counteract environmental influences that are perceived as obstacles in achieving their objectives, those being votes, seats or policy goals?

This chapter illustrates the theoretical arguments which link institutions which are the main focus of the chapter and party unity. It continues with a presentation of the data,

and a discussion of the results based on the 1996 European elite surveys and the 2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda expert survey on party unity in twenty-three European countries. In the last part of the chapter, institutional influences on unity are presented in contrast to organizational influences, such as party centralization and disciplinary rules.

6.1 The theoretical case for structural explanations

Amongst system level determinants of unity, theorists of electoral systems (Katz 1980, Taagepera and Shugart 1989, Carey and Shugart 1995) mention the electoral formula, district magnitude and ballot structure as being related to party unity. Party list proportional representation is expected to generate more united parties than single member district systems using plurality or majority, because, in the latter case, the relationship with the constituency makes the MPs less attached to the party at the central level (Taagepera and Shugart 1989). I use the principle-agent theories (Eulau et al. 1959, Miller 2005) and their distinction between delegates and trustees, in order to explain the link between the dimensions of electoral systems and the actual party behavior in parliament. Representation is the key point in this mechanism as it is an essential feature of democratic governance. It is therefore significant for the process of representation to distinguish who elected representatives see as important in shaping their legislative behavior. How representation is perceived and valued by the MPs elected under a different set of rules can influence their final voting decision in parliaments. The traditional and more recent theoretical expectations see MPs as delegates (imperative mandate), trustees (free mandate), politico (mixed delegate and trustee) or partisans (party representatives). National studies conducted on the British, Dutch, German or Australian MPs (Searing 1984, 1991, Andeweg 1997, Patzelt 1997,

Damgaard 1997, Studlar and McAllister 1996) show that while the emphasis has shifted over the years from one role orientation to another, all four roles can co-exist. Without insisting on the functional perspective of representation roles, which has social structural explanations at its core, I follow the Strøm (1997) and Müller et al. (2001) approach according to which representation roles are strategic choices that can be shaped by institutional constraints. For the analysis pursued here, I expect not only differences in the representation roles assumed by the MPs of the same party but also cross-country differences which could explain different levels of party unity. It is the partisan role which I consider to be more linked to party unity, either in terms of attitudes or in terms of behavior. Following from this, those MPs who see themselves as representatives of their constituency are expected to be less united in parliament than those who see themselves as representatives of the whole nation or of their own party. *The narrower the focus of representation, the lower the level of party behavioral unity is expected to be* (H8). MPs who are elected in single member districts or under open lists are more likely to see representation just in terms of their constituency and consequently to show a low level of party behavioral unity. Therefore, *the higher the district magnitude, the higher the level of behavioral unity is expected to be* (H9).

Because of different links established between principals and delegates vs. trustees vs. partisans, different levels of representation can be distinguished. At the individual level, an MP is the trustee, delegate or politico of his voters, while at the national level, political parties put representation into practice and they can also be considered as having the above representation roles. In the later level, it is the party rather than the individual MP, which sets the link between the citizens and the state (Kopecký

2004: 353). If we add to the party unity explanatory model further dimensions of the electoral system, the hypothesis is that *MPs elected under open lists with preferential voting allowed or in single member districts are expected to have a narrow focus of representation and a low level of behavioral unity* (H10).

Besides the electoral system, the state structure and the political regime (as parts of the state institutional structure) were for a long time assumed to impact on party unity. Federalism is one of the factors that have usually been blamed for the low cohesion in the American parties (Key, 1964: 334) because of the decentralizing effect on the party system. Blondel (1978: 151) agrees and observes that “federal countries are also those in which the parties’ state or provincial organs are strongest”. Katz and Kolodny (1994: 27) also contend that “the most fundamental point about federalism as a factor conditioning the character of American parties is simply that the states are extremely important, both as loci for political careers and as independent decision-makers”, which not only creates decentralized parties but in reality the national parties become “empty vessels”.

In theory, all the above points seem to be valid, but more recent studies show a different perspective, such as Tan (2000), who has found a reverse relationship between federalism and party centralization without investigating party unity as such. It appears that federalism contributes to more party centralization and concentration of power, which is in contradiction with Key’s arguments. Similarly, Carey (2007) has found no effect of federalism on the values of the Rice index in Latin America, apart from some increased vote losses due to disunity. It is still unclear, however, how federalism impacts on party unity. There are clear empirical cases, such as Germany,

which run counter to the classic theoretical arguments mentioned above. Also USA, the classic example of a federal state, unexpectedly portrays more party unity after 2000 (Janda 2008: 349) because the liberal wing of the Republican Party disappeared and the party became more united around a conservative agenda for America and, likewise, the conservative wing of the Democratic party declined. Given all these contradictory arguments and findings, the hypothesis that *federalism leads to lower party unity in terms of attitudes and behavior as opposed to unitarism* (H11) will be retested.

A state's constitutional organization as well as a state's balance of power between executive and legislative has long been perceived to matter for party unity. Cox (1987) pointed out that the rise of power of the House of Commons in the nineteenth century may have encouraged the formation of disciplined parties. *Parties in parliamentary states are expected to show a higher level of party behavioral unity as compared to political parties operating in presidential regimes* (H12). It is mainly the power of dissolution associated with the parliamentary system that is regarded as the effective instrument to strengthen party behavioral unity. This power may give the parliamentary leaders and the party executive greater control over the parliamentary party. Sartori (1997: 94) argues for the necessity of cohesion and discipline because "parliamentary democracy cannot perform – in any of its many varieties – unless it is served by *parliamentary fit* [emphasis in original] parties, that is to say, parties that have been socialized (by failure, duration, and appropriate incentives) into being relatively cohesive and/or disciplined bodies... [And] disciplined parties are a *necessary condition* for the 'working of parliamentary systems.'" Sartori is not very specific in what party cohesion means and does not give any specific definition of

party discipline either, except for the fact that he sees party discipline as connected to parliamentary voting. What is intriguing is the different party unity levels encountered within the group of European parliamentary states. The question then is whether those differences are caused by other party or systemic factors such as the party system or by other differences stemming from the institutional engineering of parliamentary states.

It is not only the legislative or executive power relations which could matter for unity. Another intervening variable can be the number and strength of parties composing the legislature. Therefore the *type* of party system that functions in a country has also been related to party unity. When we consider the number of parties within the political system, the claims become contradictory. Turner and Schneier (1970), Loewenberg and Patterson (1979) argue that multi-party systems produce smaller and more homogeneous parties with greater intra-party cohesion. But when, along with the numerical criterion, scholars considered other dimensions such as parliamentarism, the arguments relating party unity to party system fragmentation are reversed. In two-party parliamentary systems, party unity is expected to be high because the majority party has to maintain the government (Epstein 1967, Sartori 1997). It is still not clear which of the two variables (two-party system or parliamentary system) has a more pronounced impact on party unity, or whether there is a joint effect of the two factors, and whether the same can be argued about all the variables considered in this analysis. My expectation is that *the more fragmented the party system is, the more unity in terms of attitudes and behavior is expected* (H13).

Whether few or many in number, for optimal activity, political parties need sufficient financial resources. Given their assumed transformation into cartels (Katz and Mair 2007) and their closer link with the state, party finance in the form of state subsidies is a variable worth considering for its effect on party unity. “Providing essential funding - both during and between campaigns - and engaging the self-interest of citizens and groups in financing politics, and in political process generally, are vital aspects of democracy building” (Johnston 2005: 3). The financial resources, their magnitude and the way in which the funds are distributed can play an important role in explaining party behavioral unity. Subsidies can be restricted to election campaigns, or given to parties, irrespective of the electoral campaign. Also campaign financing can be directed to parties as organizations or directly to candidates (Katz 1996), and this may influence the manner in which party representatives behave. *The more subsidies from the state the higher the level of party behavioral unity is expected to be* (H14). The logic behind this hypothesis is that the level of clientelistic linkages will decrease given the existence of sufficient resources always being available to parties. This way parties will be less prone to the influence of business groups, for example, who could claim policy favors in exchange for generous donations. This occurred in the Flick affair in the late 1980s in Germany, where the CDU obtained illegal funds from the Flick concern, which obtained tax benefits for its contributions. Moreover, even if constituency party opinion and parliamentary party opinion differ, an MP may not feel so attached to the constituency while the majority of financial income is not derived from the party members (Walecki 2003). While comparable data on the amount of state subsidies received is difficult to find for all the European countries considered, a potential additional proxy measure can be the state regulations on the amount of donations political parties can receive. Consequently the expectation is that *the higher*

the restrictions on donations to political parties, the higher the party unity (H15). Who has the control over the state subsidies can, arguably, control the party and party behavior in parliament. When subsidies go directly to candidates instead of a party's general headquarters, this can lead to individualistic behavior, especially from the MPs elected in single member districts. The more resources those MPs control, the more they could be inclined to defect from party policy in cases where his/her constituents completely disagree with the party line. Therefore the expectation would be that *party centered systems of financing will show higher unity than candidate centered systems of party financing*. However this hypothesis cannot be tested because European countries have mostly party centered systems of finance (Grant 2005, Smilov and Toplak 2007), with a few exceptions such as Switzerland where the parliamentary groups receive money for administration costs only, and Russia where the money goes directly to the candidates. There are also some mixed models such as Germany where the finances are directed to both the central party organization and the parliamentary groups, which however provides little ground for testing the above expected relationship in Europe due to the lack of variation.

6.2 Variables and data

The dependent variable is party unity expressed as behavior, which denotes the conduct convergence of party representatives inside the legislature as measured by the Rice index, by a proxy generated from the elite surveys and by a direct measure from the expert survey on party unity. The systemic variables (plus focus of representation from the individual level) and their measurements are outlined below. The other party level variables considered in the model are the degree of party centralization observed in the decision making process, candidate selection, distribution of party finances and

the frequency of applying disciplinary measures, like expulsion, warning, and loss of privileges.

As derived from the elite surveys in Western and Eastern Europe the dependent variable refers to the MPs' answers to questions about their voting decision, whether they are inclined to base their decision on their own judgment, on the view of the voters of the party, or on the views of their party. MPs were asked which of the opinions above constituted their first choice when voting. The Rice index offers a clear count of the MPs who voted against a bill and defected from the party line, while the expert survey validates the party unity measurements and brings in the opinions of experts on party politics in each country. The proxy measure from the elite surveys correlates weakly with the other two measures which, once again, bring evidence that there is a clear difference between what politicians say they will do and what they actually do.

As discussed in the previous chapters, the Rice index has raised a lot of criticism (Krehbiel 2000) concerning the accuracy of its measurement and its failure to take into account abstentions or the various times in which MPs do not reach a vote because of an overall disagreement. Still, roll-call votes can be examined statistically with more confidence than can be granted to data whose reliability depends upon the objectivity of visual observation or verbal reporting. The relatively high correlation between unity of behavior as measured by the Rice index and the unity of behavior assessed by the country experts (0.60), on one side validates the usage of the Rice index for assessing unity of behavior and on the other side justifies the expert survey

as a useful tool for comparing party unity across Europe, especially given the difficulty of gathering reliable comparative data on the subject.

As mentioned in the introduction I make the distinction between party unity of attitudes and party unity of behavior and I consider the former as a determinant of the latter. *Party unity of attitudes* is the actual ideological congruence of party members. A party may behave unitedly because of the high convergence of preferences its members or because of the stick and carrots which come from inside the parties and the institutional framework in which they operate, or because of both. The two dimensions of unity do go together but they are definitely not the same thing. There is a moderate correlation of 0.40 between them on both data sets 1996 and 2007, which highlights the above mentioned difference.

Focus of representation

While some European constitutions clearly stipulate that any imperative mandate is considered void or clearly mention the members of parliament as the representatives of the whole nation, other European constitutions do not provide details about the mandate of the representatives. In practice we are interested only in whether MPs see themselves as being the representatives of their party, their voters, their constituency, the whole nation, or a mixture of all these roles. When interviewed, some argued that different representation roles can be assumed when voting on different bills, which means that representation roles are indeed interchangeable – on some issues they follow the party, on others the constituency or their own conscience. Their responses may also have been influenced by some degree of political desirability, as some MPs admitted when interviewed. Most British MPs, for example, say they are the


representatives of their own constituencies but in practice they confess that the role changes depending on the circumstances, such as the bill they have to vote on. This was the case in 75 percent of the interviews I have conducted with British MPs in 2007²¹. The remaining 25 percent of British parliamentarians interviewed declared that, primarily, they see themselves as representatives of their party or of the citizens of the country as a whole.

The fact that the difference between representing the party, the party voters and the whole nation, may be blurred in the minds of the representatives is further underlined when looking at the differences between those roles. The 1996 elite surveys portray two dimensions verified by factor analysis (as shown in table 2a, appendix D); dimensions stemming from the importance assigned to representing each level. The MPs who see the representation of the party as very important assign a similar importance to representing party voters. On the other side, the MPs who see themselves mainly as representatives of their constituency, also see the representation of the entire nation as highly important. My initial distinction between broad and narrow focus of representation becomes therefore more crystallized. The main difference between them stems from the policy range associated with the process of representation. Representing the party and party voters have in common representing the party program, while representing the constituency gives primacy to issues significant for constituents and the party program comes second.

²¹ Intune Research Project financed by the Sixth Framework Programme of the European Union, Priority 7 (CIT3-CT-2005-513421); for more information see www.intune.it;

Figure 6.1 on the next page shows that there is not much difference between the two underlying dimensions of representation either, except for the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Belgium with a primacy of representing the party and the party voters. In The Netherlands for example, the explanation for such a result is the nature of the electoral system. Even if voters vote in one of the nineteen electoral districts, overall there is no geographical representation (Andeweg 2008: 494). Lists of candidates are presented in one, all or several districts. The parties in the parliament are listed on the ballot in the order of their previous electoral results and followed by a list of new parties. As voters can prefer one candidate or one party, the MPs have a more party oriented focus of representation. This is further enhanced by some party practices whereby their candidates had to sign an undated letter of resignation or a declaration to the effect they would not accept election by preference votes without approval from the party executive (Andeweg 2008: 494).

Figure 6.1 Focus of representation 1996



Electoral system (district magnitude, ballot structure)

The electoral system in this analysis indicates the electoral rules that remain unchanged after one or more subsequent elections. It refers to the rules and procedures with the help of which the distribution of seats in parliament is determined on the basis of electoral results (Lijphart 1994: 7, 8). The goal is to see what happens when the electoral rules are candidate or party centered and if they influence party unity, both in terms of attitudes and behavior. Special attention was paid in this analysis to the district magnitude (the number of representatives elected in a constituency), and the vote structure (categorical or ordinal). Categorical voting allows the expression of choice only for one of the candidates or political parties entered in the electoral competition. Ordinal voting instead allows the expression of voters' preferences. With preferential voting voters have the opportunity "to express a relative preference among the candidates of a single party" (Katz 1980: 32), preferences which could hinder party unity and lead to intra-party competition.

Out of the twenty three European countries considered (Table 6.1 on the next page), half of them use open lists, with different ways of allowing voters to express their preferences over candidates, from ranking them to crossing out the disliked candidates (as in Iceland). According to my hypothesis, political parties in these countries are expected to show less unity than those which elect their MPs from PR closed lists.

Table 6.1 European electoral systems and their dimensions

Country	Electoral magnitude	Ballot	Formula
Austria 1999	42	Open list	Prop.(2-3tiers)-Hare/d'Hondt
Belgium 1999	2-33	Open list	Prop (2 tiers)-d'Hondt/Hare
Czech Republic 1998 2002	15-41 5-25	Open list Open list	Prop.- Droop Prop.- d'Hondt
Denmark 2001 Since 2006	7.9 13.5	Open list Open List	Prop (2 tiers)-m. St. Laguë Prop.- d'Hondt
Finland 1999	1-30	Open list	Prop.-d'Hondt
France 2002	1	Single	Majority/2 nd round plurality
Germany 2002	496-656 3-65 1	Double: Closed list Single	P. prop-Hare
Hungary 2002	4-58 1	Double: Closed list Single	Parallel: Prop. (2 tiers)-Droop/d' Hondt Majority/2 nd round plurality
Iceland	9	Open list	Prop (2 tiers) d'Hondt
Ireland 2002	3-5	Single transferable	Proportional droop
Italy since 1993 Since 2005	1 154	Double: Single Closed list Closed List	Plurality Prop. - Hare Prop. – Hare
Luxembourg '03	23-21-9-7	Open list	Prop-Hagenbach- Bishoff
Netherlands 2003	100-150	Open list	Prop (2 tiers)-Hare/d'Hondt
Norway 2001	4-15	Open list	Prop. (2 tiers)-M. St-Laguë
Poland 1997 2001	3-69 7-19	Open list Closed list	Prop. (2 tiers) – d'Hondt Prop. –m. St-Laguë
Portugal 2002	1-55	Closed list	Prop. – d'Hondt
Romania 2000 Since 2008	4-39 1	Closed list Single	Prop.- Hare Plurality
Russia since 1993 Since 2005	1 225 2	Double: Single Closed list Closed list	Parallel: Plurality Prop-Hare LR-Hare
Slovakia 2002	5-150	Open list	Prop.-Droop
Spain 2000	1-43	Closed list	Proportional – d'Hondt
Sweden 2002	2-40	Open list	Prop. (2 tiers)-m. St-Laguë
Switzerland 1999	1-34	Multiple/cumulative	Prop. – d'Hondt
UK 2001	1	Single	Plurality

Source: Colomer, M. Josep. 2004. *Handbook of Electoral System Choice*. N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan; Gallagher, Michael and Paul Mitchell (eds.). 2008. *The Politics of Electoral Systems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


Type of political regime (presidential, semi-presidential, parliamentary)

At the European level, political regimes range from parliamentary (which are the majority), to semi-presidential or presidential (of which there are very few). Their classification depends on the definition of concepts and no agreement has been reached so far between scholars as to which category many European regimes fall into (Krouwel 2003). While there is no doubt about Russia being a presidential regime,

scholars completely disagree when they classify the regimes of Romania, Bulgaria or Poland, for example. The latter country is considered parliamentary by Baylis (1997), limited presidentialism by Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996) and presidential by Stepan and Skach (1993). Baylis (1997: 300) also stipulates that it is not even clear to country experts what type of executive is prevalent in Romania. While some experts definitely say semi-presidential, if one looks at what happens in practice, the verdict would incline more towards a parliamentary regime but with an elected president.

In relation to party unity, the common feature emphasized in the literature is the power of dissolution associated with the parliamentary regime which in theory is expected to generate highly united parties. A simple classification of regimes in three categories (presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary) would seem sufficient in order to check for the regime impact on party unity. However, most European parliamentary regimes exhibit differences in their level of unity as it is shown in figure 6.2. This implies the existence of other factors responsible for the difference.

Figure 6.2 Mean party unity of behavior in parliamentary states 2007



The confidence procedure used in parliamentary systems permits a ruling coalition to propose a bill without allowing amendments and then to link the adoption of the bill to the survival of the coalition (Huber 1996). Confidence procedures can be authorized in three ways: by the constitutions, by parliamentary standing orders or by convention. The constitutions authorize the governments to make policies questions of confidence (i.e in Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). The standing orders of the parliaments also establish or clarify the confidence vote procedures (Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). By convention (i.e in United Kingdom, Norway, Netherlands, Romania), particular types of bills such as budgets are treated as questions of confidence (Huber 1996). In the UK a vote of confidence is regarded as binding and defeat in a motion of confidence has been treated as critical by the government since 1832 (Braziser 1988). In Germany and Spain the vote of confidence is exercised under the form of constructive vote of non-confidence. However the presence of such an explicit procedure does not appear to make any difference for the level of party unity if one compares Germany with Spain or both countries with the rest of the European cases in our sample.

Besides the dichotomous categories (parliamentary or non-parliamentary), I employ the executive-legislative index created by Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000). The index has negative or positive values according to whether the balance of power is more on the legislative or the executive side (table 6.2 and Appendix D). The closer the score is to zero, the more balanced the relationship between executive and legislative power in the polity is. A negative score implies dominance of government and/or head of state over parliament, while a positive score means the dominance of the latter. The balance of power between the executive and the legislative shows the

differences between the parliamentary states, and it could account for their dissimilarity in party behavioral unity.

Table 6.2 Executive/Legislative Index

Country	Exec/Leg. Index	Country	Exec./Leg index	Country	Exec.Leg index
Austria	-0.5	Iceland	-1	Romania	0
Belgium	-1	Ireland	0	Russia	0
Czech Rep.	0	Italy	0.5	Spain	0
Denmark	0	Luxembourg	0	Sweden	0
Finland	-1	Netherlands	0	Slovakia	0.5
France	-1.5	Norway	0	Switzerland	0
Germany	0.5	Poland	0	UK	-1
Hungary	1.5	Portugal	0		

Source: Woldendorp, J. Bugde I. and Keman, H. (2000) *Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945-1998)*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

State structure (federal/unitary)

State structure is expected to have an indirect influence on the degree of unity of behavior through its impact on attitudinal homogeneity and party centralization. The variable is operationalized on a scale from 1 (unitary and centralized) to 5 (federal and decentralized), taking into account two criteria: decentralization and whether the states have a formal federal constitution or not (Lijphart 1999: 186-188). In order to give a more detailed picture of decentralization, besides Lijphart's scores on this variable I use the Schneider index, which comprises fiscal, administrative and political dimensions, all confirmed by factor analysis. "Fiscal decentralization refers to how much central governments cede fiscal impact to non-central government entities. Administrative decentralization refers to how much autonomy non-central government entities possess relative to central control. Finally, political decentralization refers to the degree to which central governments allow non-central government entities to undertake the political function of governance, such as representation" (Schneider 2003: 33). Fiscal decentralization is measured by

subnational expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure and subnational revenues as a percentage of total revenues; administrative decentralization has as indicators: taxation, as a percentage of subnational grants and revenues and transfers, while political decentralization is identified by municipal and state elections. A validity test of all these measures is presented in table 6.3 where bivariate correlations are shown and raw values per country are compared in table 6.4 on the next page.

Table 6.3 Outline of the federalism indexes

Correlations	Lijphart index	Federalism index G. Thacker	Fiscal decentraliz. (Schneider)	Admin decentraliz. (Schneider)	Political decentraliz (Schneider)
Lijphart Index	1	-.803**	.576*	.064	.300
Federalism index (Gerring-Thacker)	-.803**	1	-.538**	-.153	-.405
Fiscal decentraliz. (Schneider)	.576*	-.538**	1	.132	.059
Admin decentraliz. (Schneider)	.064	-.153	.132	1	.029
Political decentraliz. (Schneider)	.300	-.405*	.059	.029	1

**correlations significant at 0.01 level ; ** correlations significant at 0.05 level; N=24 (countries)
 Data source: Schneider, Aaron 2003. *Studies in Comparative International Development*. 38 (3): 32-56.
 Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press; Gerring, John. and Strom C. Thacker 2004. "Political Institutions and Corruption. The Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism." *British Journal of Political Science* 34 (2): 295-330.

Decentralization is regarded by most of federalism theorists as one major element of any federal state. The Lijphart index has its limitations in the sense that, as it is calculated for the period 1945-1996, it does not provide a clear operationalization of centralization, and refers to it mostly as the decentralization of the system of government. However just by looking at Lijphart's index in the table 6.3, it can be seen that does not correlate with the decentralization indexes apart from fiscal decentralization, and this suggests one should be cautious when using the index with reference to federalism. The only high correlation observed is between Lijphart's

index and Gerring-Thacker's index. The explanation is that both indexes consider the formal criteria for federalism, which are clear constitutional provisions on the federal structure and also bicameralism. "In a fully unitary state, territorial units if any, have no constitutional standing, no independently elected territorial legislature, no specific policy purviews reserved to them, and minimal revenue-raising authority. A non-unitary ('federal') state has the opposite characteristics" (Gerring, Thacker 2004: 304). Table 6.4 below confirms that, even the federal states (defined in terms of their constitution), display different degrees of fiscal, administrative and political decentralization. While they score highest on political decentralization, the case is not the same for the administrative and fiscal areas where they show scores similar to those of unitary states.

Table 6.4 Federalism dimensions

Country	Fiscal Decentralization 1996	Administrative Decentralization 1996	Political Decentralization 1996	Lijphart's Fed. Index 1945-1996	Average Party centralization 1996 elite survey
Austria	0.6	0.59	0.62	4.5	85.11
Belgium	0.3	0.41	0.67	5	60.42
Czech Rep.	0.43	0.52	0.49		74.76
Denmark	0.71	0.53	0.87	2	80.61
Finland	0.61	0.62	0.29	2	73.17
France	0.29	0.63	0.8	1.2	78.67
Germany	0.66	0.64	0.88		
Hungary	0.34	0.38	0.59		63.77
Iceland	0.38	0.81	0.8	1	
Ireland	0.4	0.12	0.87	1	39.36
Italy	0.36	0.3	0.91	1.3	95.44
Luxembourg	0.3	0.51	0.35	1	52.03
Netherlands	0.45	0.2	0.44	3	72.05
Norway	0.48	0.56	0.75	2	
Poland	0.38	0.52	0.49		65
Portugal	0.23	0.55	0.36	1	57.37
Romania	0.19	0.69	0.67		
Russia	0.67	0.83	0.91		
Slovakia	0.16	0.76	1		76.11
Spain	0.5	0.35	0.89	3	59.02
Sweden	0.58	0.83	0.5	2	57.42
Switzerland	0.8	0.61	0.85		
UK	0.37	0.2	0.89	1	86.72

Source: Schneider, Aaron 2003. *Studies in Comparative International Development*. 38 (3): 32-56. Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Party centralization own calculations from the elite surveys.

Table 6.4 illustrates different patterns of federalism and decentralization in Europe. Some countries are high on all three dimensions of decentralization (i.e. Russia, Switzerland), while Italy, UK or France have a high degree of political decentralization and lower scores otherwise. What is important to notice is that, regardless of the constitutional federal provisions, countries can decentralize or not on various dimensions and similarly political parties can choose to behave the same way and not necessarily decentralize various aspects of their activity.

In the final analysis, in order to test the relationship between federalism and party unity, I use the Gerring-Thacker index which gives a good picture of the formal constitutional provisions on federalism and also the decentralization dimensions from the Schneider index, which offer a clearer and more detailed image of how federalism is actually implemented in practice.


Party system fragmentation

Coalition governments are very common in the multiparty systems across Europe. The number of parties in government and their size in parliament is expected to affect the behavior of parties in the legislature. The index employed to measure party system fragmentation is Taagepera and Shugart's (1989) index of least squares²² for all countries after legislative elections. The measure is appropriate for the needs of this research as the number of parties in parliament could affect in a positive or negative manner party behavioral unity. With the exception of Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Ireland, Finland and the UK, figure 6.3 on the next page shows declines in the effective number of parties in parliaments across Europe over the last

²² The index has the following formula, $N_s = 1 / \sum (p_i^2)$, where, p_i = fractional share of votes or seats of the i-th component (party) and N = the effective number of political parties.

decade. Belgium, Slovakia, Norway, Luxembourg, Hungary and France experienced an abrupt decline in late 2000, which means that not only the number of parties in parliament have reduced, but also that the vote/seat share of the smaller parties has diminished.

Figure 6.3 Variations in the effective number of parliamentary parties over the last decade



Source: Michael Gallagher, Election Indices (<http://www.tcd.ie>, last accessed January 2008)

If party system fragmentation is an important variable in explaining party unity, then differences in the levels of party unity on both dimensions: behavior and attitudes should appear between the groups of countries which have experienced high and low levels of party fragmentation.

Party finance

Party finance, as used in the current analysis, refers to the relative *magnitude* of subsidies that parties receive from the state during the year and during electoral campaign. Apart from the amount of public subsidies as percentage of party finance, another useful and comparable measure that I have used in the analysis is the ceiling on donations which parties may receive in addition to state donations.

Contributors to party finance can be individuals or organizations, domestic or international. There are rules which apply to how and how much they can contribute to campaigns. When the contribution is under discussion, from any individual or organization at large, there is often a general concern for potential corruption. While a small number of large contributors may be allowed by the party finance law to help launch campaigns, reason for the ability of super-rich contributors and their personal organizations to influence politics. An example is the case of Forza Italia (Johnston 2005: 18).

Whether or not the names of contributors are disclosed is another issue that may lead to political scandals such as in the UK where the Labour Party was forced by the opposition and by public opinion to declare publicly the source of its campaign funds. Therefore, legal limits and prohibitions imposed on contributions appear as a good proxy for the party finance variable. Limits may apply to aggregate amounts or to

specific categories of funds, to donors or to specific phase of a campaign, while prohibitions on contributing might apply to businesses, trade unions, foreign individuals and organizations.

From the data shown in table 6.5, I observe that there are still countries with no legal restrictions on party donations. Examples are Switzerland, Sweden, Slovakia, Norway, Netherlands, Iceland, Hungary, Germany, Czech Republic, Finland, Denmark, Austria. As shown in the last column of the table, the amount of subsidies varies from country to country, regardless of the region, from insignificant amounts in Italy or in the UK, to very generous amounts like in Spain or Finland. Germany is a middle range example as provides funds which amount between a quarter and a third of the major parties' national revenues, the same subventions also being available at the Land level. Overly generous subsidies can bring concerns about a lack of accountability and decreased contact with the party organization (Johnston 2005: 15) but, nonetheless, accountability to donors can also be weakened by limiting the share of overall revenues coming from donors in comparison to those coming from public funds.

Table 6.5 on the next page illustrates the comparative situation of European countries' regulations and restrictions on party financing. The columns in bold represent the variables considered in the analysis. Transparency and accountability increase in countries where anonymous donations are banned. The limit varies from country to country, from the smallest amount of 150 EUR in France, or 100 EUR in Ireland to 500 EUR in Germany, or 4.400 EUR in the Netherlands, and 175.000 EUR in Portugal where amounts exceeding 10 times the minimum wage are banned by law. How much the donors can contribute also differs from country to country. In Belgium,

a donor is allowed to contribute a maximum of EUR 500 per political party per year, while in Ireland the amount increases to \$ 6.750, or \$ 11.620 in Italy. In the United Kingdom, provisions exist for the public disclosure of contributions by parties in the first instance and also by donors in some circumstances. Companies must disclose donations of more than GBP 5000 in their annual reports. At the same time British donations of more than GBP 1000 must be reported to the Electoral Commission.

Table 6.5 Regulations on party finance 2006

Country	No regulation for financing political parties	No provision for disclosure of contributions to political parties	No ceiling on contributions to political parties	Ban on trade unions contributions to political parties	Ban on anonymous donations to political parties	Public subsidies as % of party finance
Austria		√	√			68
Belgium					√	77.5
Czech Rep			√		√	73.3
Denmark			√			40
Finland		√	√			84
France				√	√	80
Germany			√		√	33
Hungary			√		√	46.6
Iceland	√	√	√			
Ireland					√	20
Italy						4
Luxembourg						75
Netherlands			√		√	20
Norway	√		√			75
Poland					√	14.2
Portugal				√	√	46.1
Romania					√	72.5
Russia					√	6
Slovakia	√	√	√			63.6
Spain					√	80
Sweden	√	√	√			47.1
Switzerland	√	√	√			20
UK			√		√	20

Source: Idea report 2004 www.idea.org. Grant, Thomas. 2005. *Lobbying, Government Relations, and Campaign Finance Worldwide Navigating the Laws, Regulations and Practices of National Regimes*. Oceana Publications. Smilov, Daniel and Jurij Toplak 2007. *Political Finance and Corruption in Eastern Europe. The transition period*. Aldershot: Ashgate. Biezen, Ingrid van. 2004 "Political Parties as Public Utilities", *Party Politics*, 10 (6): 701-722. Biezen, Ingrid van. 2003. *Political Parties in New Democracies. Party Organization in Southern and East-Central Europe*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Pierre, Jon, Lars Svasand and Anders Whitefield. 2000. "State subsidies to political parties: Confronting rhetoric with reality." *West European Politics*, 23 (3): 1-24. Roper, Steven D. and Janis Ikstend. 2008. *Public Finance in Post-Communist Party Development*. Aldershot: Ashgate. Ribář, Marek. 2006. "Powered by the State: The Role of Public Resources in Party-Building in Slovakia." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 22 (3): 320-340. Perottino, Michel et al. 2005. *Legislatie si mecanisme de control privind finantarea partidelor politice in Cehia, Polonia, Romania, Ukraina (Legislation and control mechanisms for party finance in Cehia, Polonia, Romania, Ukraine)*, Bucuresti: Institutul de Politici Publice; personal discussions with Karl-Heinz Nassmacher and country party finance laws.

6.3 Assessing the impact of systemic factors on unity

The results of the multivariate regression analysis based on the systemic factors discussed are presented in table 6.6 and 6.7 of this section. The standardized coefficients displayed allow comparing the effects of systemic variables on unity of behavior. Anova mean group comparisons have been also carried out for dummy variables like the ballot structure in order to test for significant differences (detailed tables are shown in Appendix D).

Voters' option to choose and rank the candidates on the electoral list gives candidates indeed more sense of responsibility towards their constituents and the latter are more likely to manifest defection in their behavior. The variance in the importance of representing the constituency is explained a great deal by the difference between being elected under *open or closed list* (H10), while the opposite can be said about the importance of representing the party and party voters, which has no connection with the existence of open or closed lists whatsoever (table 2 Appendix D). At the same time, whether the MPs are elected under open or closed lists has an impact only on the unity of attitudes (table 6.7) and not on the unity of behavior (table 6.6).

The results of the statistical analysis which considers the systemic factors model (model 1) compared with the party characteristics model (model 2) and the integrated model (model 3) which explain unity of behavior are reported in table 6.6. Systemic factors perform poorly in explaining the party behavior in a parliament. These institutional factors explain only 9 percent of the total variance in unity of behavior across most parties in the twenty-three countries considered by this analysis.

Comparatively, the party level model, explains more (twenty eight percent) of the variance in unity of behavior across Europe.

Out of the systemic variables, in the first model only the district magnitude appears to have a significant effect on behavioral unity (H9) together with the party finance. Whether the electoral list is closed or open and preferential voting is allowed does not impact negatively on the unity of behavior as expected (H10). Instead, the larger the district magnitude, in other words, the more MPs elected in a district, the higher the party unity of behavior. The effect of the district magnitude fades away in the integrated model when the party characteristics are considered because of its association with party centralization. As it will be explained later, its effect on unity of behavior manifests more through party centralization.

Party finance under the form of state regulation on ceiling on donations and public funding as the amount of subsidies parties receive from the state, plays an important role in making parties behave in a united manner inside parliament. As observed from the general integrated model in table 6.6, the more subsidies political parties receive from the state, the higher their behavioral unity level is (H14). This does not mean that parties need to become totally dependent on the state for their financial resources in order to behave unitedly. In Luxembourg, the European country with one of the highest amount of state subsidies offered to parties (75 percent of their total income), it is stipulated by law that the amount must not exceed that 75 percent limit. The justification given by the state authorities in 2007 for this limit was precisely that parties need to maintain their popular base and to receive private donations from their

supporters²³. Judging from the significant coefficients in both models 1 and 3, the bare existence of a ceiling on donations impacts positively on unity of behavior as well.

Table 6.6 Explaining unity of behavior

Variables	Model 1 Systemic impact	Model 2 Party level impact	Model 3 Integrated model
Ballot structure	.013		-.001
District magnitude	.330***		.099
State subsidies	.024		.168**
Exec/leg relations	-.045		-.013
Fragmentation	-.002		.015
Ceiling on donations	.298***		.142*
Power status		-.065	-.097
Unity of attitudes		.236***	.240***
Party centralization		.270***	.282**
Disciplinary measures		-.222**	-.285**
Nat. exec/parl. party overlap		.033	.061
Communist		.108	.115
Liberal		-.121*	-.111*
Nationalist		.038	.030
Special issue		.168**	.187***
Ethnic regional		.086	.087
<i>R</i> ²	.09	.28	.35
<i>Adjusted R</i> ²	.05	.23	.28
<i>Sig.</i>	.04	.00	.00

*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01; N1=163; N2=172; N3=161;
 Note: entries are standardized beta regression coefficients;
 Data source: 2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda expert survey on party unity and own coding;

²³ Rapport de la Commission des Institutions et de la Revision Constitutionnelle. Proposition de Loi portant réglementation du financement des partis politiques. 2007. (Report of the Institutional Commission for the Constitutional Revision on the law proposal for the settlement of party finance); available at <http://www.chd.lu/archives/ArchivesPortlet> (accessed January 2009).

Whether the states are *federal or unitary, presidential or parliamentary* has no direct effect on actual party unity of behavior in a parliament, which partly rejects H11 and H12. Also, from the 1996 data, when party centralization is measured by MPs' declarations concerning decision-making within the party over party policy, there is no association whatsoever between centralization and federalism in all its forms. As assessed by the German experts, the German political parties exhibit quite a high level of behavioral unity and a similar level of centralization (except the Greens) that is unexpectedly high for a federal state if we consider the previous theoretical arguments. In terms of decision-making, selection of candidates and distribution of funds, the process is still more controlled at the central federal level. The German parliamentary party groups receive financial assistance from the federal budget (Saafeld 2000: 30); money that is mainly used to pay professional staff. Central control over these funds is exercised by the Federal Audit Office, which scrutinizes the accounts of parliamentary parties.

The results appear intriguing, especially since Blondel (1978: 151) asserted that the tendency of the federal state to create decentralized parties stems from the institutional design of the respective countries. It is self-evident that decentralization will increase the number of mandates the parties can compete for at the national and regional level. The difference between a formal federal state by constitution and what actually happens in practice is very important, because the existence of a formal federal state does not necessarily imply that political parties need to decentralize power. A simple correlation between the federalism index and party centralization, as of 1996 in this analysis, reveals a negative but non-significant relation between them. This means that parties in federal states can be as centralized as parties in unitary

states. These findings are in line with what Harmel and Janda (1982: 69) pointed out when they tested the relationship between party decentralization and federalism on the ICPP data. Consequently, the theoretical argument linking federalism with low party unity does not hold.

When treated as a dummy variable, whether parliamentary or non-parliamentary (12 parliamentary states in our sample), the Anova analysis for the 1996 data finds no significant difference between the two groups of states regarding party unity, either behavioral and attitudinal. When the same analysis is repeated for the 2007 expert survey data, the same results are obtained for unity in behavior, but not for unity of attitudes. The experts have ranked all the parties in the sample as being more united in terms of attitudes in 2007 in parliamentary states as opposed to the ideological unity of parties from non-parliamentary states. The analysis of the 2007 data shows parliamentary system as one of the determinants of ideological unity and one that indirectly affects unity of behavior (H12). This result sheds more light on what Sartori has called “the parliamentary fit” parties.

The mean difference in unity of attitudes between parties in parliamentary and non-parliamentary systems is statistically significant. In parliamentary systems, the lowest score on programmatic cohesion a party received was 2 (over sixty percent agreement among MPs on party ideology and policies), while in non-parliamentary states, the lowest score for a party was 1 (fifty percent or less agreement among party MPs). The difference between the two groups is not huge but it is significant, quantified in about ten percentage points fewer MPs who do not agree with the overall party ideology and policies in non-parliamentary states as opposed to the parliamentary ones.

If in the 1996 data, as opposed to 2007, there was no difference between parliamentary and non-parliamentary systems regarding both dimensions of unity, one can ask the question: has indeed the ideological unity of parties increased over the last decade? The experts have noticed an overall increase in party unity of behavior and also in the ideological unity when we look at the average score of the 187 political parties. This is not, though, a trend applicable to every single party in all the twenty-three countries. Belgian parties, for example, are perceived as showing less and less unity in terms of ideology over the last decade (with the exception of Ecologists, Flemish Alliance and Flemish Left Liberals). Sweden is another example where parties have lost their unity in terms of ideology together with Slovakian parties (with the exception of the Slovak National Party), and also Romanian parties except the Democrat Party (PD), which has experienced the least number of conflicts over the last decade. PD is also the only Romanian party that merged with a splinter from National Liberal Party, forming the Democrat Liberal Party at the end of 2007. The vast majority of Romanian parties have experienced leadership and ideological factionalism over the last years; especially PNL and PSD. The former has suffered a split while the latter has constantly had its former and current leaders openly criticizing each other in public.

Indirect paths towards unity of behavior

Despite a long term emphasis in the party literature on systemic factors like state structure, legislative-executive relations, type of party system or electoral system dimensions, it seems that their effect is directed more towards MPs attitudinal unity and to a lesser extent on their behavior. In order to check for pathways of causation, unity of attitudes (table 6.7) was treated as a dependent variable. Party attitudinal

unity is directly affected by parliamentarism as already discussed in the previous section, type of electoral ballot and fragmentation, which all belong to the group of environmental systemic factors. A negative relationship has been found between the importance of representing the constituency and attitudinal unity - the more important the representation of the constituency is in the eyes of the deputies, the lower their attitudinal unity with regards to party ideology.

Ballot structure also impacts on attitudinal unity. Closed list PR enhances unity of attitudes and also party centralization. On the other hand, as shown by the negative coefficient in table 6.7, open lists have a negative influence on the ideological congruence of MPs (H10), precisely because they provide for intra-party competition between candidates during and after the electoral campaign.

Mixed electoral system would be expected to generate middle range values of party ideological unity. Given their double incentives nature; one would expect part of the parties' MPs to cultivate a personal vote in the single member districts and, and the rest of MPs to converge in their policy preferences as they are elected in districts with closed list PR. German, Hungarian and Russian (until 2008) parties operate under such a mixed electoral system. German and Hungarian parties, when compared to the rest of the European parties, display similar levels of behavioral unity and indeed show average scores on ideological unity. This implies that the positive and negative influences of the two segments of the electoral systems are cumulative in these cases, and cancel each other out.

Table 6.7 Systemic and party level effects on unity of attitudes

Variables	Model 1 Systemic impact	Model 2 Party level impact	Model 3 Integrated model
Ballot structure	-.273***		-.229**
District magnitude	.207**		.096
Ceiling on donations	-.131		-.200**
State subsidies	-.081		.085
Exec/leg relations	-.014		-.024
Fragmentation	.156*		.159**
Power status		-.020	-.040
Party centralization		.472***	.539***
Disciplinary measures		-.589***	-.527**
Party family		-.081	-.065
R^2	.11	.28	.35
Adjusted R^2	.08	.26	.30
<i>Sig.</i>	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)

*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01; N1=167; N2= 172; N3=161
Note: entries are standardized beta regression coefficients;
Data source: 2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda expert survey on party unity and own coding;

Fragmentation of the party system plays an important role in achieving party unity of behavior but in an indirect way again, via the unity of attitudes. There is a positive relationship between the number of parliamentary parties and their unity of attitudes, which means that the more parties there are in a parliament, the higher their unity of attitudes (programmatic cohesion) and, consequently, the higher the unity of behavior (H13). While high fragmentation increases ideological unity, it does not impact directly on behavioral unity. Even when more than one party enters government and the coalition has a comfortable majority, there is still some “space” left for defection

even for the incumbent parties. The Netherlands is a clear example of this, with 5.54 parliamentary parties after 2000, 4.55 value of ideological unity (which means between 80 and 90 percent agreement among MPs with regards to their party ideology) and only 3.68 value for unity of behavior in 2007.

High fragmentation in the Italian parliament also validates the above findings. The high fragmentation makes parties more aware of the need for ideological convergence among its members but even so, when it comes to the actual unity of behavior, Italian MPs defect when they vote, sometimes with disastrous consequences for the incumbent parties. In 2008, the Prodi government was defeated on a confidence vote over electoral law reform, mainly because a government minister, Clement Mastella, resigned and voted against the government. The fall of the government disrupted a pending election-law referendum that, if passed, would have made it harder for small parties like Mastella's to gain seats in parliament. Among the European countries considered, Danish parties appear as outliers of the inference that high fragmentation enhances ideological unity. While around 1996 the effective number of parliamentary parties was quite high (4.5), the Rice index calculated for Denmark was 99.93, which means it was hardly ever the case that an MP voted against his/her party in Parliament. However, as it was assessed by experts in 2007, unity of attitudes within Danish parties (2.79) is much lower than unity of behavior (3.67). Thus the conclusion in this case is that other factors, besides the ideological unity or the party system fragmentation, are more important for the enhancement of behavioral unity in the Danish Folketing.

Parties try to differentiate themselves from each other in terms of ideology and to have MPs who hold homogeneous opinions on most political issues. This relationship

clearly points back to the difference between unity in attitudes and unity in behavior, which, even if they are mildly correlated, are not at all the same. The parties with the highest values of ideological unity are found in Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal and Spain, where experts assessed parties with value scores over 4, meaning there is between 80 and 90 percent agreement among MPs with regards to their party ideology.

In this analysis the ceiling on donations has a negative impact on the unity of attitudes. Strict ceiling on contributions to political parties, ban on anonymous donations to parties and even ban on trade unions' contributions to parties in countries like France and Portugal appear to reduce a party's ideological convergence. This could possibly be evidenced by the scandals around the disclosure of the names of the contributors. In Spain for example, the contenders for the leadership of Partido Popular (PP), Mariano Rajoy and Esperanza Aguirre, did not only fight openly over the policy strategies to be pursued (which reflects low unity of attitudes as one is more radical and the other more moderate) but, along with this, over the control of established party donors²⁴. The contest over the control of party donors goes hand in hand with the contest over party leadership and becomes associated with a decrease in party's unity of attitudes as both contenders favor different policies. Party funding, as regulated by the state in the form of ceilings on donations, has therefore a slight and almost negligible negative impact on the attitudes of parliamentarians towards the party policies. Overall however, party funding, both in the form of ceilings on donations and state subsidies, has a positive and much stronger impact on the MPs'


²⁴ "Espionaje politico en la comunidad de Madrid." In *El Pais*. available at: <http://www.elpais.com/todo-sobre/tema/Espionaje/politico/Comunidad/Madrid> (accessed March 2009)

propensity to behave unanimously in parliament, as it has been shown in the previous section.

The institutional environment in which political parties operate seems to explain party unity of attitudes more than it explains their actual unity of behavior (Table 6.6 and 6.7). This gives us a more detailed picture about how parties actually operate in practice. While state institutions influence the formation and crystallization of preferences of party representatives, the organization of parties has more influence on their pattern of voting in parliament.

Figure 6.4 shows the direct and indirect effects on party unity of behavior arising from environmental factors via unity of attitudes. It is obvious that the structure of the environment does not directly affect unity of behavior in a parliament. The separation of unity in behavior and attitudes makes the chain of causation much clearer. Unity of attitudes is indeed the most important intervening factor through which systemic structures impact indirectly on voting unity.

Figure 6.4 Systemic influences on party unity



Indirect effects on the unity of behavior take place also through party centralization. Tables 7 and 8 in Appendix D present the effects of systemic factors on centralization. The results show that centralization is enhanced by high district magnitude in proportional electoral systems. This means that the more MPs are elected under closed list proportional representation rules, the more parties will concentrate decision making at the centre. As centralization is a strong factor which upholds unity of behavior, this relationship also explains why the effect of district magnitude fades away in the general integrated model as opposed to the simple systemic factors model of explaining unity of behavior.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has tested some major hypotheses which link systemic factors and party unity using the focus of representation as a synthetic variable facilitating the link between institutions, and the attitudes and behavior of party representatives. Some hypotheses were derived from the literature and refined, such as those concerning federalism, parliamentary systems, electoral systems or fragmentation of party systems, while I have arrived at others deductively using other theories on representation, party finance, or principle-agent theories. The analysis clarifies the impact of all the above mentioned “environmental” factors on party unity, whether it is direct or indirect, positive or negative impact and whether it is aimed at towards the behavioral or the attitudinal dimension party unity (table 6.6 and 6.7).

Table 6.8 on the next page shows a summary of the systemic effects tested on party unity of behavior across parties in Europe. If the systemic factors considered do not directly affect party unity of behavior, their influence is stronger on the attitudinal part

of unity, and therefore active indirectly. Party system fragmentation, type of political system, the existence of federalism and an MP's focus of representation, all have a significant impact on MPs' attitudes towards the ideology of their party. Apparently, the more parties there are in a parliament, the more congruence there is between MPs' attitudes on the parties' policy positions. Federalism also has no direct impact on voting unity, but it leads to low congruence of opinions in terms of party ideology (H4).

Table 6.8 Summary effects of systemic variables on unity of behavior

Systemic factor	Predicted effect on unity of behavior	Effect Verified
District magnitude (increase)	Positive	Partly (indirect)
Ballot structure (open)	Negative	No (indirect)
Federalism	Negative	No (indirect)
Parliamentarism	Positive	No (indirect)
Fragmentation	Positive	No (indirect)
State subsidies	Positive	Yes
Ceiling on donations	Positive	Yes
Focus of representation (narrow)	Negative	Yes

Focus of representation, as perceived by the members of a parliament, matters for party unity but in a negative way and only when MPs put their constituency first and disregard the party or the nation (H8). The more MPs think of representation only in relation to their constituency, the more this is detrimental to united behavior in parliament. The majority of MPs who are more attached to their constituency have been elected under open lists or in SMD and this explains their choice of representation (table 2, Appendix D). Whether the focus of representation is the party or the nation has no significant effect on unity of behavior. Given this result, and based on the interviews conducted with MPs, I conclude that MPs' focus of representation is constantly changing and depends either on the policy areas or on the nature of the bills on which they must vote on or on other specific circumstances

which are considered important at the time of the vote.²⁵ These results have also to be interpreted bearing in mind that the hypotheses about the focus of representation were tested only against 1996 data. Possible changes over the last decade in the focus of representation could not be accounted for.

The ballot structure does not impact directly on the unity of behavior as expected (H10). Whether the electoral list is closed or open with a preferential vote, it impacts directly on the ideological congruence of political parties. Closed lists facilitate unity of attitudes while open lists foster intra-party competition and low ideological unity which will later translate into low unity of behavior.

Whether states are parliamentary or not only makes a difference for unity of attitudes. The power associated with a vote of confidence seems to generate the formation of parties that are united in their ideological beliefs (H12). The number of parties in a parliament and their actual strength measured in parliamentary seats is significant only when we explain ideological unity. High number of parties in a parliament signifies more unity of attitudes to be preserved by parties (H13).

Contrary to expectations, and against many inferences advanced in the party literature, systemic factors, like those described in the present analysis, perform poorly in explaining MPs' behavior in a parliament. Party finance plays quite an important role in making parties behave as unitary bodies inside parliament. The more subsidies political parties receive from the state, the higher their unity level (H14). In a marginal way, the bare existence of a ceiling on donations also impacts positively on

²⁵ The other possibility is that the question addressed to elite during the surveys is totally redundant and lacks any significance for the MPs.

unity of behavior (H15). Even at first glance, a close relationship of a party with the state would seem detrimental for representative democracy, but in fact the effect turns out to be beneficial, making parties vote in a united manner and implement their policy program.

This chapter has shown that institutional constraints coming from the state level cannot be isolated and considered alone when explaining the parliamentary behavior of parties. In order to achieve unity of behavior, implement their program and portray themselves as a feasible choice into the eyes of their voters, parties also make use of their own mechanisms. The latter relate to centralization of decision making, candidates' selection or distribution of finances, disciplinary measures like expulsion or verbal warnings (as I have shown in chapter 5). Where it exists, high party unity of attitudes leads to high unity of behavior, but when the country institutional setting does not always favor party unity, the sticks of persuasion come from the internal party organization.

The conclusions of this chapter show the ideal institutional conditions under which a party can form and maintain its unity of attitudes and further its behavioral unity. In an ideal case, taking into consideration only the institutional environment, a highly united party in terms of attitudes and behavior will emerge in a parliamentary system where fragmentation is moderately high and the MPs are elected under closed list PR, and the parties also receive a substantial amount of financial support from the state.

7. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis brings a contribution to the party politics literature by building an explanatory model for party unity in Europe. The contribution can be quantified both theoretically and empirically.

Major empirical results

Empirically, the thesis includes a cross-country comparison of 187 European political parties and their levels of unity, as they were affected by the institutions or party characteristics. Party unity of behavior has been measured in various ways in this thesis based on the elite surveys, the expert survey or the roll-call data. I have shown that out of various types of factionalism, issue factionalism alone is highly associated with the Rice index values and with the experts' unity scores. The analysis revealed new evidence underscoring the expected discrepancy between MPs' declarations about their voting and their actual voting and, consequently, those declarations are not acceptable proxies for unity of behavior. Additionally, the MPs themselves declared during the interviews that their final vote also depends on various other circumstantial factors.

Redistribution issues, like taxes, welfare state spending and the extent of state interference in the economy, EU enlargement and integration, were issues prone to cause dissent within parties, and therefore low unity, all over Europe. According to the experts, in 2007, the issues which caused low unity were, in majority of the cases, the most important issues in the respective countries.

At a broader level, party characteristics influence unity of behavior much more than state institutions do. The latter impact, however, more strongly on the unity of attitudes. It is therefore not surprising that old European democracies exhibit higher unity of attitudes when compared to the new democracies. A stable institutional context makes parties clarify their program and consequently have a higher unity of attitudes amongst its representatives. Party organizational apparatus on the other hand, through centralization and disciplinary rules, promotes unity of behavior more effectively as there are no major differences between the two regions in this respect. This offers an overall general picture of how state institutions and organizations like political parties actually work together in practice. A short summary of the major findings which resulted from the empirical analysis are presented below.

Firstly, the analysis shows that there is no significant discrepancy between the levels of behavioral unity in Central Eastern Europe and Western Europe, which justifies the rejection of stereotypes of the two regions as being significantly different in terms of party politics, and further substantiates the need for party research to include Central Eastern Europe.

Secondly, the results show the supremacy of party characteristics in explaining unity of behavior. Unity of attitudes is a good predictor of how united the party is going to behave in parliament. However, ideological unity is not a sufficient predictor of party unity of behavior. High centralization and disciplinary rules contribute to achieving a high level of behavioral unity. The stricter the disciplinary rules of the PPGs are, the more united is the parties' behavior.

Thirdly, the MPs' focus of representation was the only individual level factor to be considered in this thesis, as it theoretically links party and systemic levels in the party unity explanatory model. Party unity is important for political representation but, besides this, I have also investigated how MPs see the process of representation, and what effect that has on party unity. As expected, MPs' focus of representation does predict MPs future behavior in the legislature. The narrower their focus of representation, the more importance MPs allocate to representing their constituents, the lower will be their unity of behavior in the parliament. This tendency is accentuated if an MP is elected under open lists.

Fourthly, contrary to expectations and against many propositions advanced earlier in the party literature, systemic factors, such as those taken into account by the present analysis, perform poorly in explaining MPs voting unity in the legislature. The only systemic factors with a positive direct effect on the unity of behavior are the amount of state subsidy that a party receives and the ceiling on donations. The higher the amount of subsidies received, the higher is the unity of behavior. However, if systemic factors do not have a direct impact on the unity of behavior, their influence is manifested more on the attitudinal dimension of unity and therefore indirectly on the unity of behavior. Party system fragmentation, the existence of federalism and the ballot structure have a significant impact on MPs' attitudes towards the ideology of their party. Apparently, the more parties in the parliament, the higher the congruence of MPs' attitudes on the parties' issue positions. Federalism leads to low congruence of MPs' opinions over the party ideology and brings an indirect negative contribution towards the final party unity of behavior.

The party unity explanatory model tested in this thesis was not intended to explore exhaustively the factors which could influence unity: for example, it does not include socio-demographic explanations. These were not taken into consideration because they are by definition very fluctuant, and in order to trace their impact a much wider data range is needed. However, the aim of the model was to predict party unity at party, country and regional levels. Judging by the model-fit based on the 1996 and 2007 data, the thesis disentangles the institutional effects from party effects on party unity.

Chapter contributions

The *first chapter* justified the importance of party unity and the need to study it in a cross-national perspective. In the *second chapter* I reviewed party unity in a theoretical perspective, identified the gaps within the party literature, and I particularly emphasized the distinction between unity of behavior and unity of attitudes. On the basis of this distinction I advanced an explanatory model for unity based on party and systemic institutional characteristics. *Chapter three* discussed the major concepts and their operationalization, the data quality and the methodology to be used in order to test the party unity model.

In *chapter 4* I introduced possible measurements for party unity of behavior and I presented an overview of the European countries with the aim of searching for general patterns of party unity across European countries. The *first pattern* found was a combination of party decentralization, systemic factors that do not favor party unity and very powerful PPGs. The *second pattern* observed was an association of electoral systems less favorable in theory to party unity with high party centralization of

decision making and less strict PPGs rules. While there are not significant differences in the levels of party unity of behavior across the two regions, there are noticeable and significant differences in the unity of attitudes.

The homogeneity of ideological preferences among MPs differs between Western European parties and Eastern European parties with the latter exhibiting on average a higher level of centralization and disciplinary measures. This constitutes pertinent evidence to support the mechanism used by parties to achieve unity of behavior, a mechanism introduced in chapter 2. This mechanism, however, applies not only to Eastern Europe, since the case of United Kingdom offers another confirmatory example.

Given that the differences in party unity scores are higher *within* countries than *between* countries, the subsequent chapters then tested the influence of systemic and party characteristics on unity, considering the party as the unit of analysis.

In *chapter 5* I argued that party behavioral unity can be explained substantially by looking at party characteristics and party organization. On average, in Europe, a party united in terms of behavior displays high programmatic cohesion, a decision making process concentrated at the centre, and applies disciplinary measures in a moderate fashion. I have also emphasized that the behavior of a political party cannot be predicted on the basis on its left-right position or its traditional party family affiliation. Only in the case of special issue parties and liberal parties can party family affiliation, in part, explain variations in unity of behavior. Liberal ideology, as I have shown, is associated with low unity in Europe while special issue parties tend to be

most united in behavior. It is worth noting however that they are not considered a party family in their own right by party scholars. The left-right positioning of parties turned out to be insignificant in explaining why some parties are more united in their behavior than others. The parties' position of based on their manifestoes has changed so much lately that one may question their current declared party family affiliation. This leads to the conclusion that leftist parties are not the most highly united in their behavior, and also that party families have lost part of their overall relevance in Europe.

Unity of attitudes goes hand in hand with unity of behavior and contributes positively to it. High unity of attitudes it is not a prerequisite for high unity of behavior because, as we have seen, there are instances in which the latter happens without a high level of the former. Whether in government or in opposition, parties will stay similarly united in their behavior. Centralization and disciplinary measures favor unity of behavior as expected, and prolong the democratic paradox; it is indeed at the expense of internal party democracy that the overall external democratic process is exercised.

Chapter 6 showed that, contrary to expectations and against many inferences in the party literature, systemic factors perform poorly in directly explaining MPs' behavior in a parliament, with the exception of PPG rules and state subsidies. However, the impact of systemic factors is direct and more pronounced on the unity of attitudes. Party finance plays quite an important direct role in making parties behave as unitary bodies inside the parliament. The more subsidies parties receive from the state, the higher their unity level. In a marginal way, the existence of a ceiling on donations also impacts positively on unity of behavior. An initial assumption that a closer

relationship between political parties and the state would most likely be detrimental for representative democracy is questionable. In fact, a closer relationship with the state, at least from the perspective of party finance, appears to benefit the democratic process by increasing the tendency of parties to vote in a united manner and to implement their policy programs.

If most of the systemic factors considered do not directly affect party unity of behavior, their influence is manifested more in the attitudinal part of unity. Party system fragmentation, the ballot structure, the federal organization of the state; all have a significant impact on MPs' convergence over their party ideology. As I showed the more parties there are in a parliament, the more congruence there is in MPs' attitudes over their party policy positions. High fragmentation impacts, therefore, positively only on unity of attitudes and has no direct impact on the unity of behavior. Federalism has no direct impact on unity of behavior. Instead it promotes low MPs' congruence insofar as overall party ideology and party policies are concerned. The electoral rules that provide for intra-party competition by allowing voters to express preferences over the candidates on the list, impact negatively only on the party unity of attitudes.

All in all, this thesis has shown that institutional constraints coming from the state level cannot be isolated and considered alone when explaining the behavior of parties in a parliament. In order to achieve unity of behavior, implement their program and portray themselves as a feasible choice for their voters, parties also make use of their own mechanisms. The latter relate to centralization of decision making, candidates' selection or distribution of finances, disciplinary measures like expulsion or verbal

warnings. Where it exists, high ideological party unity leads to high unity of behavior, but when a country's institutional framework does not always favor unity in both dimensions, the sticks of persuasion come from the internal party organization.

Positive impact on behavioral unity came more from party centralization, party disciplinary measures, from the amount of state subsidies received, from the existence of a ceiling on party donations or from the strict rules of PPGs. Special issue parties also positively favor unity of behavior.

There are no systemic or party characteristics with direct and *negative consequences* for party unity of behavior. Only parties that are affiliated with the liberal ideology were less likely to behave in a united manner. Most of the negative influence that derives from institutional factors is instead directed towards ideological unity.

Whether through high centralization of decision making or disciplinary measures, applied either by the party central office or by the PPGs, unity of behavior is achieved in all the European parliamentary parties considered. Party unity of behavior is therefore not a given party trait. It is deterministic and sought by all parties in order either to win elections or to form a government and implement policies. This leads to the conclusion that, at least for the near future, democratic politics will still be party politics.

Theoretical implications

Both party literature and democratic theory literature agree on the need for party unity for representation and party government. *Theoretically*, this thesis aimed at explaining party unity from state and party perspectives and presents a model which works for European political parties. While doing this, the thesis touches upon several theoretical issues in party politics, comparative politics and democratic theory. First of all, I suggest that *definitions* of political parties which regard them as unitary actors could be revised to consider the distinction between attitudes and behavior. Parties are not groups of individuals who act the same and (or because they) hold similar preferences. Furthermore, the united behavior of the party elite is not always a reflection of their common ideological preferences. Conceptually, by removing the standard assumption that parties are completely unitary actors, this thesis has built on the differences between unity of behavior and unity of attitudes. Substantial evidence for this conceptual differentiation has been given at every stage of the analysis, especially in chapters 4 and 5.

Secondly, while *party government* theorists emphasize the need for unity in order for policies decided within parties to be enacted (Katz 1987, Thomassen 1994), my thesis brings a further contribution and uncovers factors that promote or hinder party unity. Whether or not party government is in danger (Mair 2008), because of declining partisanship within electorate or the convergence of parties into a mainstream consensus, party unity will always be one of its requirements as long as political parties form governments and implement policies. As shown by this thesis, even if institutional conditions would not favor unitary party behavior in a parliament, parties adapt and use their own tools in order to become a unitary voting bloc. Consequently

political parties are still important as the main instrument of liberal democracy. Party-based government, through which policies implemented by public servants originate from party politicians, encourages and is maintained by intra-party uniformity of preferences and consensus of behavior.

Thirdly, the findings of this thesis allow me to conclude that some *paradoxes of representative democracy* still persist. If one assumes that external democracy is achieved, there are instances in which this happens at the expense of internal party democracy. Some parties apply high levels of central control and disciplinary rules in order to be unitary in the parliament, to vote the policies proposed and, consequently, to implement them.

Unity in terms of behavior and unity in terms of attitudes are different and the later impacts on the former. Unity of behavior can be arrived at in various ways, but the same can not be said about unity of attitudes. Enforced disciplinary measures and party centralization tend to produce unitary action. Unity of attitudes, however, changes rather slowly and it is not something that can be effectively imposed and changed radically from above. As we have seen, the institutional environment usually influences the unity of party members as far as their policy preferences are concerned, while party organization has more influence on party unity of behavior.

The forth theoretical implication of this thesis relates therefore to the process of *party formation and development*. Parties with low unity of attitudes and exacerbated factionalism experience splits. The consequences of party splits are such that both the new party formed and the old party that suffered the rupture will have a much higher

unity of attitudes. Unity of attitudes applies more to the process of party formation while unity of behavior is more important in the process of party development. While the former does change when party splits occur or when party factions appear, the latter can change more rapidly when intra-party mechanisms of coercion are used.

APPENDIX A Measurements and coding

I. ELITE SURVEYS 1996:

Sources: European Study of Members of Parliament 1996, Political Representation in Europe International Research Project, University of Twente, The Netherlands; Elite Study for Kitschelt et al. (1998); Elite study for Kopecký (2001). When the questions and their response scales were different from one region to another, multipliers have been applied in order to arrive at comparable scores across regions.

1. Party unity (behavior) - conduct convergence of party representatives in the legislature;

WE Questionnaire:

“In many cases people have different views concerning matters that the National Parliament must decide upon. On which one of the following would you be most inclined to base your decision in such cases?”

Answers: follow the view of the voters of your party; follow the view of your national party; own judgment; view party voter, own opinion plus party opinion; own opinion plus the opinion of party voters;

Coding: percentage of MPs who follow the opinion of their national party;

CEE Questionnaire:

“If an MP has to vote, but holds an opinion which is different from the one held by his parliamentary party, should he then vote in accordance with the opinion of the parliamentary party or should he follow his own opinion?”

1. opinion of the parliamentary party
2. own opinion
3. it depends

2. Party unity (attitudes) – ideological congruence of party representatives

Coding - Standard deviation of MPs' positioning their party on the L-R scale.

WE questionnaire:

“In political matters some people talk about left and right. Where would you place yourself and others on the following scale?”

1- Left; 10 – Right

your position, your party position, your party voters’ position

CEE questionnaire:

“Please place each party on a scale ranging from the political left” to the political right.”

3. Party centralization – concentration of decision making at the central levelWE questionnaire:

“How much do you take the opinion of each of the mentioned groups into account when you are making political decisions?” (Leaders of your party)

1 - very much; 7 - very little

Coding - Average percentage of MPs per party answering from 1 to 3.

CEE questionnaire:

In your party, who has the most say in party policy, the parliamentary party or the national executive?

Coding: percentage of MPs per party who answer national executive;

4. Focus of representation – percentage of MPs ranking the importance of representing the party, the party voters, the constituency and the nation;CEE Questionnaire:

Could you tell me, using the scale at the bottom of the card, how important it is for you to represent the voters in your constituency who voted for you or your party?

1 - not important; 7 - very important

Using the same scale, how important is it for you to represent all voters in your constituency?

And how important is it for you to represent all voters who voted for your party, nationwide?

How important is it for you to represent the nation as a whole?

How important is it for you to represent specific social or professional groups?

WE Questionnaire:

How important is it to you to represent the following groups of people:

1 - of little importance

7 - of great importance

All the people in the country

All the people who voted for your party

All the people in your constituency

Your party

A specific group in society; Which one?

II. SYSTEMIC VARIABLES:

5. Executive-Legislative balance index - extent to which the relationship between the executive and the legislative powers is more or less balanced; the scores are computed by deducting **(Parl>Gov)** from the sum **(HoS>Parl)+(Gov>Parl)**;

(Parl>Gov)- extent to which parliament is dominant over government; cumulative index by adding the scores of: vote of investiture is necessary condition to govern and vote of confidence is a necessary condition to continue to govern;

(HoS>Parl)- extent to which the head of state can influence the composition and continuation of the existence of government thus indicating the independent power of the head of state vis-a-vis parliament; cumulative index by adding the scores of: HoS is directly involved in the formation of government, HoS can dissolve parliament; HoS has also executive powers;

(Gov>Parl)- extent to which government is dominant over parliament; cumulative index by adding the scores of: government can ignore the vote of confidence; government (or PM) can dissolve parliament;

Table A1. Relation between the executive and legislative

Country	(Parl>Gov)	(HoS>Parl)	(Gov>Parl)	ExLegBal
Austria	1	0.5	1	-0.5
Belgium	1.5	0.5	1.5	-1
Czech Rep.	2	1	1	0
Denmark	1	0	1	0
Finland	0.5	0.5	1	-1
France	0.5	1	1	-1.5
Germany	2	0.5	1	0.5
Hungary	2	0.5	0	1.5
Iceland	1	1	1	-1
Ireland	2	0.5	1.5	0
Italy	2	1	0.5	0.5
Luxembourg	1	0	1	0
Netherlands	1	0.5	0.5	0
Norway	1	0	1	0
Poland	2	1	1	0
Portugal	2	1	1	0
Romania	2	1	1	0
Russia	1.5	1.5	0	0
Slovakia	2	1.5	0	0.5
Spain	2	0.5	1.5	0
Sweden	2	0	2	0
Switzerland	0	0	1	
UK	1	0.5	1.5	-1

Source: Woldendorp, Jaap, Bugde Ian and Hans Keman. 2000. *Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945-1998)*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

6. District magnitude – average number of mandates per constituency

7. Ballot structure

1 – Open

0 – Closed

8. Fragmentation: effective number of parliamentary parties

9. Federalism – Lijphart's index

1 - unitary and centralized

2 - unitary and decentralized

3 - semi-federal

4 - federal and centralized

5 - federal and decentralized

10. Party finance (a) Restrictions on donations

0 – no ceiling on donations

1 – ceiling on donations

11. Party finance (b) Public subsidies – amount of public funding as percentage of total party funding

12. Government status (incumbency)

0 – not in government

1 - in government

13. Party family

10 - Ecologist

20 - Communist

30 - Social democrat

40 – Liberal

50 – Christian democrat

60 – Conservative

70 – Nationalist

80 – Agrarian

90 – Ethnic regional

95 – Special issue

III. BORZ, ENYEDI, JANDA 2007 EXPERT SURVEY VARIABLES**Party unity of behavior:**

“Please assess the level of parliamentary unity inside the (country X) parties as of 2006/2007. Give a score from 1 to 5 for each party, where 1 means very low unity and 5 means very high unity.”

- 1 - Much internal conflict and MPs frequently depart from the party line in parliamentary votes
- 2 - Some internal conflicts and MPs occasionally defect from the party line in parliamentary votes
- 3 – Occasional internal conflicts but MPs rarely defect from the party line in parliamentary votes
- 4 - Despite minor internal conflicts, MPs never defect from the party line in parliamentary votes
- 5 - No internal conflicts and MPs never defect from the party line in parliamentary votes

Change in party unity of behavior:

“Over the past decade (1996-2006), how has unity of party voting in the parliament changed? Please assign a score for each party, which specifies if unity of voting has decreased a great deal, decreased somewhat, not changed, increased somewhat, or increased a great deal.”

- 1- decreased a great deal
- 2- decreased somewhat
- 3- no change
- 4- increased somewhat
- 5- increased a great deal

Party unity of attitudes:

“On a scale from 1 to 5 please assign a score for each party regarding its ideological unity (party programmatic cohesion) for the 2006/2007 period.”

- 1- 50% or less agreement among MPs
- 2- over 60% agreement among MPs
- 3- over 70% agreement among MPs

4- over 80% agreement among MPs

5- over 90% agreement among MPs

Change in party unity of attitudes:

“Over the past decade (1996-2006) how has the IDEOLOGICAL UNITY of parties changed? Please assign a score for each party, which specifies if ideological unity has decreased a great deal, decreased somewhat, not changed, increased somewhat or increased a great deal.”

1- decreased a great deal

2- decreased somewhat

3- no change

4- increased somewhat

5- increased a great deal

Party centralization:

“Centralization of power refers to the location and distribution of effective decision-making authority within the party with regard to the top national party organs. Assign a score from 1 to 5 to each party for the level of centralization in decision-making, selection of candidates, and the distribution of party finances as of 2006/2007.”

1- very low; 2- low; 3- medium; 4- high; 5- very high

Change in party centralization:

“Over the past decade (1996-2006) how has party centralization changed? Please assign a score for each party, which specifies if party centralization has decreased a great deal, decreased somewhat, not changed, increased somewhat or increased a great deal.”

1-decreased a great deal

2-decreased somewhat

3-no change

4-increased somewhat

5-increased a great deal

Disciplinary measures:

“The rules on parliamentary factions can differ from party to party and they can be party external or party internal. Please try to specify if Slovak parties have actually engaged in applying strict disciplinary rules to their MPs (like expulsion, loss of privileges etc.) in case of dissent over the last decade.”

1- never 2- rarely 3- occasionally 4- often

Factionalism:

(a) Leadership factionalism

“Some parties have "factions," defined as intra-party groups organized to act collectively as distinct blocs within the party. Factions may pursue various objectives. Please rate each party as of 2006/2007 for the extent of factionalism based on the personal attraction of individual leaders.”

1- none 2- little 3- some 4- a lot 5- a great deal

(b) Issue factionalism

“Still defining "factions" as intra-party groups organized to act collectively as distinct blocs within the party. Please rate each party as of 2006/2007 for factionalism based on disagreement of one or more substantive political issues.”

1- none 2- little 3- some 4- a lot 5- a great deal

(c) Ideological factionalism

Please rate each party as of 2006/2007 for the extent of factionalism based on its overall ideology.

1- none 2- little 3- some 4- a lot 5- a great deal

Table A2. Hypotheses overview

Systemic factors	Hypotheses relating to party behavioral unity
Electoral system (intra-party choice)	MPs who are elected in single member districts are expected to see representation just in terms of their constituency voters and consequently to show a low level of party behavioral unity. MPs elected under open lists with preferential voting allowed are expected to have a broader understanding of representation but to show a low level of behavioral unity.
State structure (unitary/federal)	Political parties in federal states are expected to show a lower level of party behavioral unity as compared to those operating in unitary states.
Political regime (parl./ pres.)	Parties in parliamentary states are expected to show a higher level of party behavioral unity as compared to political parties operating in presidential regimes.
Party system	The more fragmented the party system is, the more parties will be interested in constructing a high level of attitudinal homogeneity, which will keep their representatives attached to the party and make them act unitary.
Party financing	The more subsidies from the state the higher the level of party unity.
Party characteristics	
PPG rules/ Disciplinary rules	The more restrictive and rewarding the PPGs rules are, the more united the MPs behavior in the legislature.
Centralization	Parties with a low level of attitudinal homogeneity are expected to apply strong centralization measures in order to keep their representatives acting as a unitary body.
Ideology	Left parties are expected to be more centralized and more united than the rest in terms of behavior.
Unity of attitudes	Parties with a high score on unity of attitudes and a high degree of centralization, supplemented by strict disciplinary measures, are expected to score high on all factors of behavioral unity
Power status	Parties that are in government are expected to differ in terms of behavioral unity accordingly to their seats share. The bigger the party size in the legislature, the higher probability for a disunited behavior.
Individual factors	
Representation Focus	The broader the focus of representation, the higher the level of party behavioral unity.

APPENDIX B Party acronyms

Table B1. List of party acronyms

Party name	Acronym
Austria	
Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (Social Democratic Party of Austria)	SPÖ
Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian People's Party)	ÖVP
Die Grünen (The Greens)	GRÜNE
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria)	FPÖ
Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria)	BZÖ
Belgium	
Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (Flemish Liberal and Democrats)	VLD
Socialistische Partij. Anders (Socialist Party. Different)	SPA
(The Flemish Left Liberals)	SPIRIT
Christen-Democratisch & Vlaams (Christian-Democratic and Flemish)	CD&V
Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance)	N-VA
Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party)	PS
Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest)	VB
Mouvement Réformateur (Reform Movement)	MR
Centre Démocrate Humaniste (Humanist Democratic Centre)	CDH
Écologistes (Ecologists)	ECOLO
Front National (National Front)	FN
Czech Republic	
Občanská Demokratická Strana (Civic Democratic Party)	ODS
Česká Strana Sociálně Demokratická (Czech Social Democratic Party)	ČSSD
Komunistická Strana Čech a Moravy (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia)	KSČM
Křesťanská a Demokratická Unie (Christian and Democratic Union)	KDU-ČSL
Strana Zelených (Green Party)	SZ
Denmark	
Venstre - Danmarks Liberale Parti (Denmark's Liberal Party)	V
Socialdemokratiet (Social Democracy)	SD
Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People's Party)	DF
Konservative Folkeparti (Conservative People's Party)	KF
Radikale Venstre (Radical Left)	RV
Socialistisk Folkeparti (Socialist People's Party)	SF
Enhedslisten - De Rød-Grønne (Unity List - The Red-Greens)	EL
Christian Democrats	KD
Finland	
Suomen Keskusta (Finnish Centre)	KESK
Kansallinen Kokoomus (National Coalition Party)	KOK
Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue (Finnish Social Democratic Party)	SDP
Vasemmistoliitto (Left Alliance)	VAS
Vihreä Liitto (Green Alliance)	VIHR
Suomen Kristillisdemokraatit (Finnish Christian Democrats)	KD
Svenska Folkepartiet i Finland (Swedish People's Party in Finland)	SFP
Perussuomalaiset (True Finns)	PS
France	
Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (Union for a Popular Movement)	UMP

Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party)	PS
Mouvement Démocrate (Democratic Movement/Union for French Democracy)	MoDem/UDF
Nouveau Centre (New Centre)	NC
Parti Communiste Français (French Communist Party)	PCF
Les Verts (The Greens)	VERTS
Parti Radical de Gauche (Radical Party of the Left)	PRG
Mouvement pour la France (Movement for France)	MPF
Germany	
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party)	SPD
Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union)	CDU
Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)	FDP
Die Linke (The Left Party)	PDS
Bündnis 90/GRÜNE (Alliance 90/The Greens)	GRÜNE
Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (Christian Social Union in Bavaria)	CSU
Hungary	
Magyar Szocialista Párt (Hungarian Socialist Party)	MSZP
Fidesz–Magyar Polgári Párt (Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Party)	FIDESZ
Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége (Alliance of Free Democrats)	SZDSZ
Független Kisgazda Párt (Independent Smallholders' Party)	FKGP
Munkáspárt (Workers' Party)	MUNK
Centrum (Center Party)	CEN
MIÉP (Hungarian Justice and Life Party)	MIÉP
Iceland	
Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn (Independence Party)	SSF
Samfylkingin (Alliance)	S
Vinstrihreyfingin - Grænt framboð (Left-Green Movement)	VG
Framsóknarflokkurinn (Progressive Party)	FSF
Frjálslyndi Flokkurinn (Liberal Party)	FF
Ireland	
Fianna Fail	FF
Fine Gael	FG
Labour Party	LAB
Sinn Féin	SF
Green Party	GP
Progressive Democrats	PD
Italy	
Democratici di Sinistra (Left Democrats)	DS
Democrazia e Libertà-La Margherita (Democracy and Freedom)	DL
Partito Rifondazione Comunista (Communist Refoundation Party)	PRC
Socialisti Democratici Italiani (Italian Democratic Socialists)	SDI
Radicali Italiani (Italian Radicals)	RI
Partito dei Comunisti Italiani (Party of Italian Communists)	PdCI
Italia dei Valori (Italy of Values)	IdV
Federazione dei Verdi (Green Federation)	VERDI
Unione Democratici per l'Europa-Popolari (Democrat's Union for Europe)	UDEUR
Südtiroler Volkspartei (South Tyrolean People's Party)	SVP
Forza Italia (Forward Italy)	FI
Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance)	AN
Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e di Centro (Union of Christian and Centre)	UDC

Democrats)	
Lega Nord (League North)	LN
Movimento per l'Autonomia (Movement for Authonomy)	MpA
Nuovo Partito Socialista Italiano (New Italian Socialist Party)	NPSI
Democrazia Cristiana per le Autonomie (Christian Democracy for the Autonomies)	DC
Luxembourg	
Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei (Christian Social Party)	CSV
Lëtzebuergesch Sozialistesche Arbechterpartei Socialist Worker's Party)	LSAP
Demokratesch Partei Democratic Party)	DP
Déi Gréng (The Greens)	GRENG
Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei (Alternativ Democratic Reform Party)	ADR
Netherlands	
Christen Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Appeal)	CDA
Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party)	PvDA
Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party)	SP
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy)	VVD
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (Freedom Party)	PVV
Groen Links (Green Left)	GL
Christen Unie (Christian Union)	CU
Democraten 66 (Democrats 66)	D66
Partij voor de Dieren (Party for the Animals)	PvdD
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (Reformed Political Party)	SGP
Norway	
Det Norske Arbeiderparti (Norwegian Labour Party)	A
Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Party)	FRP
Høyre (Right)	H
Sosialistisk Venstreparti (Socialist Left Party)	SV
Kristelig Folkeparti (Christian People's Party)	KRF
Senterpartiet (Centre Party)	SP
Venstre (Left)	V
Poland	
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice)	PiS
Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform)	PO
Samobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland)	SRP
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democratic Left Alliance)	SLD
Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families)	LPR
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People's Party)	PSL
Portugal	
Partido Socialista (Socialist Party)	PS
Partido Social Democrata (Social Democratic Party)	PSD
Partido Comunista Português (Portuguese Communist Party)	PCP
Partido Ecologista Os Verdes (Ecological Party The Greens)	PEV
Centro Democrático Social (Democratic Social Centre)	CDS-PP
Bloco de Esquerda (Left Bloc)	BE
Romania	

Partidul Social-Democrat (Social Democratic Party)	PSD
Partidul Conservator (Conservative Party)	PC
Partidul Național Liberal (National Liberal Party)	PNL
Partidul Democrat (Democratic Party)	PD
Partidul România Mare (Greater Romania Party)	PRM
Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania)	UDMR
Russia	
Edinaja Rossiya (Unified Russia)	ER
Kommunističeskaja Partija Rossijskoj Federacii (Communist Party of the Russian Federation)	KPRF
Spravedlivaja Rossiya - Rodina, Pensionery, Žizn' (Liberal - Democratic Party of Russia)	LDPR
Spravedlivaja Rossiya - Rodina, Pensionery, Žizn' (Just Russia - Motherland, Pensioners, Life)	SR
Rossijskaja Obedinennaja Demokratičeskaja Partija (Yabloko - Russian Democratic Party)	JABLOKO
Sojuz Pravych Sil (Union of Rightist Forces)	SPS
Agrarnaja Partija Rossii (Agrarian Party of Russia)	APR
Rossijskaja Partija Pensionerov (Russian Pensioners' Party-Party of Social Justice)	PSS
Partija Vozroždenija Rosii (Party of Russia's Rebirth)	PVR
Slovakia	
Smer - Sociálna Demokracia (Direction - Social Democracy)	SMER
Slovenská Demokratická a Kresťanská Únia (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union)	SDKU-DS
Magyar Koalíció Pártja (Hungarian Coalition Party)	MKP
Slovenská Národná Strana (Slovak National Party)	SNS
L'udová Strana - Hnutí za Demokratické Slovensko (People's Party - Movement for a Democratic Slovakia)	LS-HZDS
Kresťanskodemokratické Hnutie (Christian Democratic Movement)	KDH
Spain	
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Worker's Party)	PSOE
Partido Popular (People's Party)	PP
Izquierda Unida (United Left)	IU
Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (Initiative for Catalonia Greens)	ICV
Convergència i Unió (Convergence and Union of Catalunya)	CiU
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Left of Catalunya)	ERC
Eusko Alderdi Jeltzalea (Basque National Party)	EAJ-PNV
Coalición Canaria - Partido Nacionalista Canario (Canarian Coalition)	CC
Bloque Nacionalista Galego (Galician Nationalist Bloc)	BNG
Sweden	
Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet (Social Democratic Workers' Party)	SAP
Moderata Samlingspartiet (Moderate Rally Party)	M
Centerpartiet (Centre Party)	C
Folkpartiet Liberalerna (Liberal People's Party)	FP
Kristdemokraterna (Christian Democrats)	KD
Vänsterpartiet (Left Party)	VP
Miljöpartiet de Gröna (Environment Party, The Greens)	MP
Switzerland	

Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People's Party)	SVP
Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz (Social Democratic Party of Switzerland)	SP
Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei (Freethinking Democratic Party)	FDP
Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei (Christian Democratic People's Party)	CVP
Grüne Partei der Schweiz (Green Party of Switzerland)	GPS
Evangelische Volkspartei (Evangelical People's Party)	EVP
Libérale Partei der Schweiz (Liberal Party of Switzerland)	LPS
Eidgenössische Demokratische Union (Federal Democratic Union)	EDU
Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz (Labour Party)	PdA
United Kingdom	
(Labour Party)	LAB
(Conservative Party)	CON
(Liberal Democrats)	LD
(Scottish National Party)	SNP
(Democratic Unionist Party)	DUP
(Plaid Cymru)	PC
(Sinn Féin)	SF
(Social Democratic and Labour Party)	SDLP

APPENDIX C Party Unity Study 2007

Party unity Study 2007 - Borz, Enyedi, Janda Party unity expert survey

Time range: September - November 2007.

Table C1. Survey details

Country	Total respondents	Total experts surveyed	Response rate (%)
Austria	5	42	11.90
Belgium	9	94	9.57
Czech Republic	9	74	12.16
Denmark	8	53	15.09
Finland	14	99	14.14
France	7	59	11.86
Germany	34	167	20.35
Hungary	8	92	8.69
Iceland	7	22	31.81
Ireland	35	106	33.01
Italy	34	108	31.48
Luxembourg	3	47	6.38
Netherlands	6	56	10.71
Norway	6	39	15.38
Poland	7	42	16.66
Portugal	7	62	11.29
Romania	12	99	12.12
Russia	7	25	28.00
Slovakia	6	52	11.53
Spain	20	150	13.33
Sweden	28	141	19.85
Switzerland	11	32	34.37
United Kingdom	21	74	28.37
<i>Mean</i>	<i>13.21</i>	<i>75.43</i>	<i>17.74</i>

1. Party unity survey- Sample Questionnaire

Welcome to our Party Unity survey!

We are interested in your views as an expert on parties, party system and parliamentary activity in Slovakia. The questions that follow regard a number of issues like party unity, party internal organization, the distribution of power and the main issue dimensions in the party system. We pay particular attention to the programmatic cohesion of parties and their voting behavior in the parliament.

The project has a broad comparative character and some complex issues may be missed by the close-ended questions. However open-ended comments pertaining to any question are very much welcomed.

The questionnaire consists of only 13 questions.

Thank you very much for taking the time to complete it.

Your expertise is greatly appreciated.

2. Party unity and policy areas

1. Here is a list of issues in European politics. Please rate the importance of each issue in the party system of Slovakia as of 2006/2007.

	1- most important	2- very important	3- somewhat important	4- a little important	5- not important at all
Economy: redistribution issues (taxes , welfare state spending)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Economy: State-run versus market economy	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Democracy : strengthening democratic institutions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ethnic rights (minorities)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
EU enlargement and integration	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Religiosity (role of church)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Social rights (lifestyle, homosexuality , women's rights, abortion, drugs)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Views of the Communist past and its legacies	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Regional divisions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Urban -rural divisions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Other (please specify)

2. Could you specify which of these (or other) issues usually cause dissent within the parties?

	Redistribution issues (taxes , welfare state spending)	Economy: State-run versus market economy	Democracy: strengthening democratic institutions	Ethnic rights (minorities)	EU enlargement and integration	Religiosity (role of church)	Social rights (gays , abortion , drugs)	Views of the Communist past and its legacies	Regional divisions	Urban - rural divisions
SMER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SDKU-DS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MKP	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SNS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
LS-HZDS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KDH	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KSS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ANO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

3. Degree of party unity in parliament

1. Please assess the level of parliamentary unity inside the Slovak parties as of 2006/2007. Give a score from 1 to 5 for each party, where 1 means very low unity and 5 means very high unity.

	1 - Much internal conflict and MPs frequently depart from the party line in parliamentary votes	2 - Some internal conflicts and MPs occasionally defect from the party line in parliamentary votes	3 - Occasional internal conflicts but MPs rarely defect from the party line in parliamentary votes	4 - Despite minor internal conflicts, MPs never defect from the party line in parliamentary votes	5 - No internal conflicts and MPs never defect from the party line in parliamentary votes
SMER (Direction - Social Democracy)	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SDKU-DS (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union)	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
MKP (Hungarian Coalition Party)	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SNS (Slovak National Party)	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
LS-HZDS (People's Party - Movement for a Democratic Slovakia)	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
KDH (Christian Democratic Movement)	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

2. Over the past decade (1996-2006), how has unity of party voting in the parliament changed? Please assign a score for each party, which specifies if unity of voting has decreased a great deal, decreased somewhat, not changed, increased somewhat, or increased a great deal.

	1- decreased a great deal	2- decreased somewhat	3- no change	4- increased somewhat	5- increased a great deal
SMER	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SDKU-DS	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
MKP	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SNS	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
LS-HZDS	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
KDH	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
KSS (Communist Party of Slovakia)	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
ANO (Alliance of New Citizen)	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SDK (Slovak Democratic Coalition)	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

4. Nature and extent of party factionalism

1. Some parties have "factions," defined as intra-party groups organized to act collectively as distinct blocs within the party. Factions may pursue various objectives. Please rate each party as of 2006/2007 for the extent of factionalism based on the PERSONAL ATTRACTION OF INDIVIDUAL LEADERS.

	1- none	2- little	3- some	4- a lot	5- a great deal
SMER	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
SDKU-DS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
MKP	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
SNS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
LS-HZDS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
KDH	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
KSS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
ANO	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

2. Still defining "factions" as intra-party groups organized to act collectively as distinct blocs within the party. Please rate each party as of 2006/2007 for factionalism based on disagreement of one or more SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL ISSUES.

	1- none	2- little	3- some	4- a lot	5- a great deal
SMER	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
SDKU-DS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
MKP	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
SNS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
LS-HZDS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
KDH	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
KSS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
ANO	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

3. Please rate each party as of 2006/2007 for the extent of factionalism based on Its overall IDEOLOGY.

	1- none	2- little	3- some	4- a lot	5- a great deal
SMER	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
SDKU-DS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
MKP	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
SNS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
LS-HZDS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
KDH	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
KSS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
ANO	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

5. Programmatic cohesion

1. On a scale from 1 to 5 please assign a score for each party regarding its IDEOLOGICAL UNITY (party programmatic cohesion) for the 2006/2007 period.

	1- 50 % or less agreement among MPs	2- over 60% agreement among MPs	3- over 70% agreement among MPs	4- over 80% agreement among MPs	5- over 90% agreement among MPs
SMER	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SDKU-DS	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
MKP	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SNS	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
LS-HZDS	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
KDH	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
KSS	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
ANO	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

2. Over the past decade (1996-2006) how has the IDEOLOGICAL UNITY of parties changed? Please assign a score for each party, which specifies if ideological unity has decreased a great deal, decreased somewhat, not changed, increased somewhat or increased a great deal.

	1-decreased a great deal	2-decreased somewhat	3-no change	4-increased somewhat	5-increased a great deal
SMER	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SDKU-DS	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
MKP	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SNS	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
LS-HZDS	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
KDH	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
KSS	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
ANO	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SDK	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

6. Party centralization

1. Centralization of power refers to the location and distribution of effective decision-making authority within the party with regard to the top national party organs. Assign a score from 1 to 5 to each party for the level of centralization in decision-making, selection of candidates, and the distribution of party finances as of 2006/2007.

	1- very low	2- low	3- medium	4- high	5- very high
SMER	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
SDKU-DS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
MKP	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
SNS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
LS-HZDS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
KDH	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
KSS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
ANO	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

2. Over the past decade (1996-2006) how has PARTY CENTRALIZATION changed? Please assign a score for each party, which specifies if party centralization has decreased a great deal, decreased somewhat, not changed, increased somewhat or increased a great deal.

	1-decreased a great deal	2-decreased somewhat	3-no change	4-increased somewhat	5-increased a great deal
SMER	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
SDKU-DS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
MKP	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
SNS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
LS-HZDS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
KDH	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
KSS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
ANO	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
SDK	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

3. In general terms, please indicate the current level of overlap between the parliamentary party and the party national executive by estimating the percentage of the national executive who are also MPs.

	1- very low: less than 20%	2- low: between 20% and 40%	3- medium : between 40% and 60%	4- high : between 60% and 80%	5- very high: over 80%
SMER	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
SDKU-DS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
MKP	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
SNS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
LS-HZDS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
KDH	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

7. Disciplinary measures

1. The rules on parliamentary factions can differ from party to party and they can be party external or party internal. Please try to specify if Slovak parties have actually engaged in applying strict disciplinary rules to their MPs (like expulsion, loss of privileges etc.) in case of dissent over the last decade.

	1- never	2- rarely	3- occasionally	4- often
SMER	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
SDKU-DS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
MKP	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
SNS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
LS-HZDS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
KDH	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
KSS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
ANO	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

8. Comments

1. We would very much appreciate if you could please add comments about the things we may have missed in our survey or about how some issues/scores/responses should be interpreted.

APPENDIX D Statistical tests

Table 1. Rice index bias test

Correlations		Rice index values	Number of roll-calls
Rice index values	Pearson Correlation	1	-.194
	Sig.		.101
	N		73
Number of roll-calls calculated per country	Pearson Correlation	-.194	1
	Sig.	.101	
	N	73	

Table 2. Anova analysis: ballot structure vs. representation focus constituency and party 1996

		Sum of squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig	Eta	Eta Squared
Open or closed list *represent constituency	Between groups	284.3	68	4.1	18.8	.000		
	Within groups	4.6	21	.2			.9	.9
	Total	288.9	89					
Open or closed list *represent party	Between groups	213.6	68	3.1	.835	.717		
	Within groups	75.3	20	3.7			.8	.7
	Total	288.9	88					

Table 2a. Rotated component matrix (focus of representation)

	Component	
	1	2
Represent: All people in your country	-.086	.885
Represent: All party voters	.848	.216
Represent: Your national party	.903	-.027
Represent: All people in your constituency	.359	.653

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Data source: 1996 elite surveys

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Rotation converged in 3 iterations

Table 3. Anova analysis: centralization and disciplinary measures
East vs. West European democracies 2007

Mean	Centralization	Disciplinary measures
East (N=53)	3.98	2.50
West (N=129)	3.56	2.02
<i>Anova sig.</i>	.00	.00

Source: 2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda party unity study; N=parties

Table 4. Anova analysis: centralization and disciplinary measures
Old vs. new democracies 2007

Mean	Centralization	Disciplinary measures
Old (N=123)	3.53	1.99
New (N=59)	4.02	2.51
<i>Anova sig.</i>	.00	.00

Source: 2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda party unity study; N=parties

Table 5. Party centralization descriptive measures in Old/New and East/West Democracies;

	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
New Democracies	4.02	0.56	2.82	5.00
Old Democracies	3.53	0.63	2.00	5.00
Total	3.68	0.65	2.00	5.00
Eastern Europe	3.98	0.57	2.82	5.00
Western Europe	3.56	0.57	2.00	5.00
Total	3.68	0.64	2.00	5.00

Data source: 2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda party unity study

Table 6. Correlations of changes registered over the last decade

Changes in	Unity of behavior	Unity of attitudes	Party centralization
Unity of behavior	1	.412**	.329**
Unity of attitudes	.412**	1	.369**
Party centralization	.329**	.369**	1

**correlation significant at 0.01 level; N=183

data source 2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda party unity study

Table 7. Regression model party centralization 1996

Model	Beta Standardized coefficients
Constant	
Eff. no. of parl. Parties	-.187
Restrictions on donations	-.151
Av. distr. Magnitude	.680***
Exec-Leg. Relations	-.499**
Federalism index	.090
Party unity of attitudes	.100
Representation focus voters	-.163
Representation focus constituency	.378**

Dependent variable: party centralization; data source: 1996 elite surveys; $R^2 = .28$; Adjusted $R^2 = .18$

Table 8. Regression model party centralization 2007

Model	Standardized coefficients
Fragmentation	-.246***
District magnitude	.430***
Exec-leg. Relations	.079
Party finance (Ceiling on donations)	.474***
Ballot structure	.048
R^2	.26
Adjusted R^2	(.23)
Sig	(.00)

Dependent variable: centralization 2007; N=169;
 Data source: Borz, Enyedi, Janda 2007 party unity study
 *p<.1, **p<.05; ***p<.00; standard errors in parenthesis

Table 9. Anova analysis: Rice index and party family

Rice index*	Between	526.832	9	58.537	1.126	.357
groups		3534.553	68	51.979		
Party family	Within	4061.385	77			
groups						

Table 10. Anova analysis: ballot structure vs. party centralization 2007

		Sum of squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig	Eta	Eta Squared
Open or closed list *party centralization	Between groups	2029.5	2	1014.7	1.3	.252		
	Within groups	79886.0	110	726.2			.157	.025
	Total	81915.5	112					

Table 11. Anova analysis: power status vs. party centralization 2007

		Sum of squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig	Eta	Eta Squared
Power status*party centralization	Between groups	645.8	1	645.8	1.9	.166		
	Within groups	23366.3	71	329.1			.164	.027
	Total	24012.1	72					

Table 12. Covariance analysis

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	Df	Mean square	F	Sig
Corrected model	19.609	19	1.03	3.936	.00
Intercept	1.44	1	1.44	5.52	.02
Centralization	.84	1	.84	3.22	.07
Unity of attitudes	2.89	1	2.89	11.03	.00
Power status	.02	1	.02	.09	.75
Disciplinary measures	1.13	1	1.13	4.31	.04
District magnitude	.05	1	.05	.20	.65
Party finance	.99	1	.99	3.77	.05
Fragmentation	.05	1	.05	.19	.65
Exec/leg relations	.02	1	.02	.09	.76
LR position	.01	1	0.01	.05	.81
Party family	4.53	9	.50	1.9	.05

$R^2 = .44$; dependent variable: unity of behavior;

Data source: 2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda party unity study

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