SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE, CHANGING POLITICAL CLEAVAGES, AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW PARTIES

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I hereby declare that this work contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions. This thesis contains no materials previously written and/or published by another person, unless otherwise noted.

Abstract

This dissertation analyzes how social and economic changes, brought about by the process of deindustrialization, affected developments in patterns of political divisions in advanced industrial democracies. The principal argument of this dissertation is that social and economic changes in advanced industrial societies linked to deindustrialization produced a social structure that is by and large more complex than that of classic industrial societies before or just after the Second World War. The complexity of post-industrial societies can be described as 'greater fragmentation', which is caused by the crosscutting of a large number of social characteristics that define one's position in post-industrial societies. In short, fragmentation essentially means that both middle and working classes in post-industrial societies do not represent a unified actor to the same extent that they did in classic industrial societies. In the middle-class there is a new sizable group of professionals, and in the working-class there is a division between exposure to market risk and sector of employment. Such fragmented social structure made it difficult for established parties of the left and right to cover the whole newly emerged political space, so the emergence of new parties of the new left and the new right was inevitable. What exact shape these new competitors took in each country depended upon the type of welfare regime, models of capitalism and the policies that governments implemented in response to the process of deindustrialization. This dissertation advances two principal propositions:

(1) The first proposition states that the social and economic change of advanced industrial societies produced a social structure which is more fragmented than the social structure of postwar industrial societies, and that this fragmentation of the social structure allowed for the emergence of new parties.

(2) The second proposition states that this whole process was characterized by a significant degree of cross-national variation, concerning both the developments of the social structure and the party system. This cross-national variation is dependent on the characteristics of the welfare regime, the model of capitalism in interaction with pre-existing political divisions, and the reactions of governments to deindustrialization and globalization.

To investigate these propositions, the empirical part of the dissertation investigates sources of divisions in both the social structure and political attitudes in order to map the structure of political divisions and find support for the fragmentation hypotheses. The second segment of the empirical analysis used in the dissertation focuses on the manner in which macro-level variables (such as types of welfare regime and models of capitalism) interacted with micro-level variables (such as indicators of socioeconomic position) in the structuring of political preferences, and whether this resulted in the emergence of new parties. The analysis finds support for both hypotheses: new parties did emerge due the emergence of social groups not yet represented in the party system, and the manner in which this development took place is dependent on the variation in contextual factors, notably the type of welfare regime, and actions (policies) that political figures used in the development of a welfare state, in reaction to deindustrialization.

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Chapter 1
Introduction, Literature Review and Theoretical Preliminaries

1.1 Introduction

During the 1970s and 1980s the party systems of West European countries went through a significant and lengthy period of instability. This instability manifested itself through three concurrent trends: an increase in electoral volatility, an increase in effective number of parties and a decline in the share of the vote held by the established parties mirrored by the rise and stabilization of the vote for the new parties (Pedersen 1990, Mair 1997, Wolinetz 1990). A decade or so later, in the mid 1990s, party systems largely stabilized in a new equilibrium. The volatility was higher and had higher amplitudes between elections; the effective number of parties was also higher and the established parties permanently lost hold over as much as a fifth of the electorate in most countries (Webb 2002).

Instability of the party systems was closely linked to changes taking place in societies and economies of West European countries. The political impact of these changes was reflected in the restructuring of political divisions, the rise of new issues and the emergence of new parties. In the dissertation, I argue that the emergence of new parties is one of the consequences of a comprehensive restructuring of political divisions and the rise of new political demands. More specifically, the dissertation treats the rise of new parties as one of the elements in a broader process of restructuring of political divisions and the final consequence of the developments that had taken place in the social structure and political values.

The number of new parties emerging in advanced western democracies after the Second World War and up to mid 1980s tops 230 (Harmel and Robertson 1985). On average between two and three new parties contested each election since 1970 (Hug 2001). Only about half of these were truly new parties, the rest being splinter parties or parties formed through the merger of previously existing parties. Of this number, more that two thirds were almost completely inconsequential for the development of their respective party systems, winning less than 1% of votes. Of the remaining one third, only a few parties had a systemic impact on the development of party systems and these usually belonged either to the new left or the new right party families.

Despite the fact that the number of consequential new parties is small compared to the total number of new parties, their emergence was one of the more noteworthy political developments in advanced industrial democracies of Western Europe. After some newcomers suffered reversals of fortune and disappeared, surviving new parties took a sizable share of the vote from the established parties and entered competition for participation in government, some with notable success (Harmel and Robertson 1985, Mair 1997). This more often than not changed the pattern of competition in the party system and government formula, bringing what Mair considers a wholesale change of the party system (Mair 1997).

The fact that most of the successful new parties belong to the new left or the new right party family suggests that the emergence of new parties has some systemic characteristics and is not just related to idiosyncratic political developments in individual countries. With very few exceptions, most of the successful and relevant new parties can be included into three party families. On the right of the political spectrum they belong to the radical right party family. On the left of the political spectrum two types of new left parties emerged: the first type belongs to the ecological or green party family and the second belongs to the left socialist party family.

There are two types of explanations in contemporary political science regarding the emergence of new parties. One focuses on developments on the demand side of politics, and the other on the supply side. On the demand side, propositions about the emergence of new parties can be found in the elements of theories explaining political impact of social and economic developments in western societies after 1970s (Inglehart 1977, Franklin, Mackie and Valen 1992, Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984, Esping Andersen 1993, Oesch 2006). This explanation is essentially sociological; it considers the emergence of new parties after 1970s as a consequence of social and economic changes taking place in advanced industrial societies.

In terms of the supply side of politics, the emergence of new parties is seen as a consequence of a strategic interaction between the established parties and the new political actors, and their reactions to the developments on the demand side of politics (Meguid 2008, Hug 2001, Harmel and Janda 1994, Adams *et al*. 2004). These two groups of studies give different elements of the story about the emergence of new parties. The studies of the first approach concentrate on the underlying reasons for the emergence of new parties, while the studies of the second approach on the mechanisms bringing it about through the actions of political actors. Most of these studies, with few exceptions (Hug 2001, Redding and Veterna 1999, Harmel and Robertson 1985) do not handle the issue of the emergence of new parties as such. Instead, they consider this topic within the wider question of the political consequences of social and economic changes.

I view the emergence of new parties to be a consequence of a more extensive reshaping of the politics of western industrial societies in a time of deindustrialization and globalization. Apart from the emergence of new parties and a weakening of the established parties, a significant reshaping of political divisions also took place (Kriesi 1998, Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi *et al*. 2006). The dissertation argues that these two developments are closely

linked. The emergence of new parties is a direct consequence of changes in social structure, the rise of new political issues and values and, consequently, of the reshaping of political cleavages in advanced industrial societies. I further argue that social and economic changes produced a more fragmented social structure and political issue space compared to their previous incarnations from the immediate post-war period. The fragmentation of the social structure and the political issue space created new constituencies, which in turn provided new parties with a permanent electoral base and enabled them to establish and stabilize their presence in the party systems of advanced industrial democracies.

This dissertation focuses primarily on the demand side of politics, and argues that new parties emerged as representatives of new social demands, which emerged as a consequence of social and economic changes. Strategic interactions on the supply side of politics are considered mainly to illustrate the behavior of political actors' in reaction to changes on the demand side and political opportunity structure (Hug 2001, Janda *et al.* 1995, Adams *et al.* 2004).

Firstly, I place the argument of the dissertation in the context of a broader literature, explaining political and economic developments and their impact on the political divisions of West European societies. Four approaches consider the emergence of new parties as a result of social and economic developments and new social demands in need of political representation. The first approach focuses on the rise of protest politics and new social movements in advanced industrial societies; it argues that new parties are in fact protest parties that mobilized resentment against the political elites and their policies (Ignazi 1992, Sankiaho 1984). The second approach has its roots in the 'value change' theory; it argues that new parties essentially emerged to mobilize a new postmaterialist-materialist value dimension, while the established parties continued to compete on the materialist left-right and religious-secular value dimension (Inglehart 1990, 1997). The third approach argues that

socioeconomic changes produced societies within which social structure and values do not play an important role in the structuring of political divisions, and where cleavages lost organizational closure. As a consequence, widespread dealignment took place and classic political cleavages were replaced with a larger number of issues of changeable salience, while electoral behavior became more volatile (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984, Franklin, Mackie and Valen 1992). In such a setting, new parties emerged through the actions of political entrepreneurs, who either mobilized issues left unrepresented by the existing parties, or politicized new issues. The fourth approach is derived from studies of the social structure and the political economy of advanced industrial societies; according to the logic of this approach, new parties are the consequence of social change, the rise of new constituencies and new issues (Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi 1998).

The argument of the dissertation builds on the argument of the first and the fourth approaches: I argue that new parties emerged as a consequence of new social demands, emerging as a result of social and economic change linked to deindustrialization, the expansion of education, a growing service economy, changes in the labor market and other related trends. These social and economic changes brought about a more fragmented social structure, reshaped existing political divisions and eventually led to the emergence of new parties.

Before proceeding with the broader outline of the principle argument of the dissertation, I will briefly discuss each of the four approaches mentioned above. Later in this chapter I would also briefly discuss the studies by analyzing the causes of the emergence of new parties on the supply side, in order to provide a full overview of the research concerning equally causes of changes in political divisions and the emergence of new parties.

1.2 Failure of the Established Parties and New Parties as Protest Parties

Since the emergence of new social movements and new left and new right parties, it has been frequently argued that changes in political divisions of advanced industrial societies, including the emergence of new parties, happened as a consequence of an increased citizen dissatisfaction with the political system and the political elites (Sankiaho 1984, Kitschelt 1988, Ignazi 1992, Harmel and Gibson 1995). The origins of the developments leading to the rise of protest politics lie in social changes that took place in advanced industrial societies several decades after the end of the Second World War. Educational expansion and accessibility of political information through mass media reduced the dependence of mass publics on elites for political leadership and information, while value change brought about a value system which challenged institutional and traditional authority, and demanded a more participative, inclusive and democratic society (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984, Inglehart 1990). A new system of values and cognitive mobilization facilitated the rise of new social movements on the left challenging the established order and demanded both a new form of politics and substantial policy changes (Kitschelt 1986). The established left parties failed to incorporate and provide representation for the demands of new social movements because dominant coalitions within the left parties did not deem them as important. At the same time, the hierarchical organizational structure of the established left parties did not provide avenues for new social movements to bring forward their agenda from the bottom-up (Ignazi 1996a, Kitschelt 1988, 1994); this failure led to the emergence of new parties, founded upon the basis of new social movements and their organizations.

Assertive social movements on the left then provoked reaction on the right side of the political spectrum, in what is described by Ignazi as the 'silent counter-revolution' (Ignazi

1992). He argues that this reaction was facilitated by the radicalization of conservative politics, where mainstream conservative parties mobilized previously dormant cultural issues. This was done in an effort to change the strategic setting of competition and to introduce the issues on which the mainstream left parties could not effectively compete. These issues, such as moral traditionalism, xenophobia, law and order and social and political authoritarianism broke the consensus of post-war politics (Ignazi 1996a). Later on, as conservative parties got into government, they largely abandoned radical positions and returned to the mainstream. At this point new political actors picked up these issues and mobilized the radicalized electorate on the right (Taggart 1995, Ignazi 1996a). This electorate sought to protect the traditional social order and moral values from attacks coming from the left, and at the same time protested against the political establishment, clientelistic policies linked to welfare state programs and the heavy taxation needed to pay for this. Later on the protest was directed at the inability of political elites to deal with immigration and economic insecurity, caused by globalization (Sankiaho 1984, Anderson and Bjorklund 1990).

Therefore, the protest politics approach argues that new political parties emerged from protest movements, which mobilized the resentment of the mass publics, first on the left and later on the right, and directed it at the established political elites, their policies and system of corporatist interest mediation. The resentment directed at the established political order was channeled into the support for new parties (Ignazi 1992, Betz 1994). Ignazi further argues that the emergence of new parties was facilitated by the failure of the established parties to perform their representational and expressive functions and accommodate new social demands (Ignazi 1996a).

Sankiaho (1984) argues that the welfare state, taxation and a bureaucratized society is at the heart of protest politics. Although it did eliminate poverty, the welfare state expansion did not produce a more participatory and democratic pattern of decision- making. But, it did

bring about high taxes, politics dominated by the established elites and large bureaucracy. The bureaucratization of societies and unresponsive elites created a democratic deficit in modern polities, and opened the gate for the emergence of the new establishment-antiestablishment cleavage. This cleavage creates opposition between two social groups: one that has vested interests in the welfare state, and the other that opposes the welfare state because of its increasing tax burden, bureaucracy that stifles democracy and exercises a high degree of control over the lives of its citizens, and because it creates a sizable group of outsiders by failing to provide for their needs (Sankiaho 1984).

It has been argued that the rise of protest parties is more likely to happen in countries where some sort of power sharing and corporatist arrangements exist (Kitschelt and McGann1995). Consociational arrangements, which existed in the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria, are said to be particularly conducive to the rise of protest parties, given that in these countries political parties' penetrated the state, collaborated to keep some issues of the agenda and extensively used clientelistic policies (Kitschelt 2002, Ignazi 2002). The Austrian Freedom party or Belgian Vlaams Blok emerged precisely because of its citizens' protest against the high penetration of the state by mainstream parties, widespread clientelistic practices and the collusion between parties in the implementation of policies geared heavily towards the supporters and clients of the established parties (Kitschelt and McGann1995).

Somewhat different stories are behind the emergence of progress parties in Denmark and Norway; these parties emerged on the wave of the middle class and petty bourgeoisie rebellion against the welfare state (Anderson and Bjorklund 1990). This rebellion was directed against the heavy taxation brought about by the need to finance the creation of a universalist welfare state and the implementation of social policies, which undermined entrepreneurship and the incentives to work (Harmel and Gibson 1995). It was further

facilitated by the acceptance of the policies of a universal welfare state by the mainstream bourgeoisie parties.

Green parties, on the other hand, emerged on the wave of new social movements mobilizing against nuclear energy, authoritarian social norms, bureaucratized societies and clientelistic systems linked with the established left parties (Kitschelt 1986). Left-libertarian parties are consequently more successful in countries where the left was in power for an extended period of time, and where institutions of corporatist interest mediation played an important role in policymaking (Redding and Viterna 1999). This happened because the left parties in control of government in the context of strong corporatist institutions failed to react to demands from new social movements; their failure to do so did provide opportunity for new social movements to fill this gap by entering the political competition through green and other left libertarian parties (Kitschelt 1986).

While explanations revolving around the concept of a protest party have some credence when it comes to explaining the immediate causes for the emergence of new parties, they fail to account for why these parties continued to be important elements of party systems and managed to increase their share of the vote long after the initial protest wave, which brought them into the existence had passed.

The protest party approach also fails to explain why the established parties could not eliminate new competitors using oligopolistic strategies. Arguably, research on shifts in party positions found that political parties rarely adjust their position unless deterioration in their electoral fortunes warrants it (Janda *et al.* 1995). However, after the deterioration of electoral performance takes place, parties are prompt to react to challenges, sometimes engaging in oligopolistic strategies against newcomers, taking over the issues they compete on and reducing their electoral appeal in the process (Kitschelt 1994, Strom 1990, Meguid 2008).

The research on the electoral performance of new niche parties, a group in which most of the new left and new right parties are placed, shows that if the established parties adopt the position of niche parties, the vote share of niche parties will decline (Meguid 2005, Harmel and Svasand 1997). However, while managing to limit the share of the vote of the niche parties, these strategies fail to eliminate new competitors altogether.

Furthermore, several studies of quintessential protest parties, namely the extreme right parties, find that the rise of new parties is clearly related to a set of structural conditions which open the space for these parties (Swank and Betz 2003, Van der Brug *et al.* 2000). Other studies find that the emergence of new parties is linked to both the movements of the established parties toward the centre and also to the distinct ideological appeals presented by the new left and new right parties (Abedi 2005, Van der Brug 2003 and 2005). The findings of these studies suggest that new parties, usually described as protest parties, emerged as representatives of the new constituencies with distinct political demands, suggesting that protest could at best be a transitory phase towards the stabilization of voter alignments and the incorporation of new demands into the party system. Following similar line of reasoning Kitschelt (1988) argues that while protest politics can be used to explain why new parties came into existence, their long-term existence depends on structural changes in the society and the emergence of new social groups which constitute the future electorate of these parties.

The protest party approach also fails to account for why only new left and new right parties, both types being the only new parties with truly distinctive ideological positions and constituencies, managed to survive in the long-run and why some parties initially starting with predominantly protest appeal, notably Danish and Norwegian Progress parties, and, perhaps less so, FPO in Austria, fairly soon changed their ideological orientation and adopted radical right ideology.

The ideology of new parties arguably has elements of protest; it includes new issues and their voters, especially of the radical right parties, were mobilized by appeals that carried strong elements of opposition to the established order. However, this does not constitute the underlying mechanism that brought these parties into existence. Furthermore, the empirical analysis of radical right parties did not find the protest against the established parties to be a particularly potent explanation for the persistent presence and the success of these parties later on (Van der Brug *et al.* 2000).

To conclude, the argument that new left and new right parties emerged and survived as a consequence of the increasing incidence of protest voting does not provide a comprehensive explanation for the emergence of new parties; true, the protest party approach provides some insights about the initial reasons that brought about the emergence of new parties. However, it does not explain the failure of the established parties to react to newcomers by addressing the grievances of their voters and it fails to explain how these parties managed to maintain a stable and distinct electorate over time. Furthermore, it does not explain why these parties, on the left and right alike, converged to a similar ideological profile of new left and new right parties in all countries where they appeared.

1.3 Value Change, Value Divisions and New Parties

Studies of shifts in value priorities analyze the sources of change in political divisions and see the emergence of new parties as a consequence of a comprehensive reshaping of values among mass publics in Western societies, since the late 1960s (Inglehart 1977, 1990; Flanagan and Lee 2003). Rapid and sustained economic growth of western countries after the Second World War brought about an unprecedented level of material affluence, accompanied

with a long period of peace. These developments, combined with a generational change and different socialization experiences of new cohorts, created conditions under which value priorities of the population in advanced industrial societies started to change (Inglehart 1977, 1990).

According to Inglehart (1997), increasing levels of material affluence produced the effect of diminishing returns from additional increases in the economic well-being as rising affluence and the expansion of the welfare state substantially equalized living conditions in western societies. The further increase in the size of the welfare state programs led only to the increasing levels of taxation and bureaucratization of the society, while marginal returns of those increases started to diminish rapidly. As cohorts born under the conditions of security and affluence entered the socialization process, their priorities turned toward the needs left unsatisfied by the economic developments up to that point (Inglehart 1977). While cohorts born in a period of war and economic crisis place a higher emphasis on physical security and economic affluence, cohorts born in a period of peace and economic affluence focus on other needs, and seek a freer life-style, the protection of the environment (as opposed to economic growth), the democratization of societies, a participative style of decision making and gender equality (Flanagan and Lee 2003).

The value shift on the aggregate level is a shift towards postmaterialist value priorities. So, as the shift toward new value priorities takes place, Inglehart expects new political division to emerge, pitting the postmaterialist value-orientations against materialist value-orientations (Inglehart 1977). The emergence of postmaterialist value orientations might provoke the counter reaction (so-called silent counter revolution) on the materialist side of this value division, from losers of economic and social changes who called on tradition, community and protectionism in the face of uncertainty caused by social change (Ignazi 1992). Traditional socioeconomic political divisions, described as materialist-left

versus materialist-right, grounded in social class and centered on issues of income distribution and ownership of economic resources are expected to fade away. Programs of income distribution and welfare state expansion eliminated the need for redistributive policies and state intervention and with it the conflict potential of class and economic issues (Inglehart 1984). As a result, economic divisions are expected to be supplanted with postmaterialist-materialist divisions as a dominant political cleavage in advanced industrial societies.

A value shift toward materialist-postmaterialist division is causing some dissonance within party systems of advanced industrial countries as most of the established political parties hold positions on the materialist left-right dimension, and the most salient political issues are along the new materialist-postmaterialist value dimension (Inglehart 1997). The causes for the rise of new parties lie in this dissonance: in this situation the established parties must either change their appeal and organization to incorporate both new demands into their message and new social groups into their support base, or lose a share of the electoral market (Inglehart 1997). If the established parties do not adjust their appeal, the space will be open for new parties to emerge. Inglehart does not expect that the established parties will be able to do so sufficiently quickly, and as a consequence new parties will emerge (Inglehart 1990).

While Inglehart is largely right to argue that new parties emerge along the new issue dimension and mobilize unrepresented social groups, his argument is overly simplistic and forces complex reality into a rather restrictive framework of the value change theory. The largest weakness of his argument is related to the expected developments on the demand side of politics, but his interpretation of the immediate cause of the emergence of new parties is also overly simplistic.

On the demand side of politics, while Inglehart's argument about the emergence of new issue dimensions is supported by empirical evidence, his claim that the content of this division is principally about value orientations and that the economic left-right cleavage is in

decline is rather exaggerated. The support for such an argument cannot be found in empirical research, as economic issues are still found to be principle sources of political cleavages and the dominant content of ideological divisions in a number of countries with high levels of affluence and security (Knutsen 1988, 1995a, 1995b). Furthermore, some studies of the political impact of value divisions find that the rise of post-materialist values is linked more with the structural changes taking place in western societies, notably educational expansion, the rise of new constituencies in the middle class, than with cohort effects and different socialization experiences (Duch and Taylor 1993, Warvick 1998).

Inglehart's approach cannot account for this cross-national variation since it does not allow for anything other than a deterministic relationship between affluence, security and the rise of postmaterialist values. Cross-national variation within this framework appears to be explained away as a manifestation of different stages of development in the process of value change. Finally, the deterministic relationship between value change and social change is not able to factor in any individual level variables, nor the actions of political actors in the formation of political cleavages. This goes against a number of studies which argue that parties not only shift positions in order to accommodate the movements within the electorate, but also use policies while in government to shape preferences and build a coalition of voters (Dunleavy 1991, Lynch 2006). In conclusion, while the value change approach is able to detect changes in value priorities and the aggregate distribution of values, it has difficulty dealing with other aspects of change, including the exact nature of new political demands and the causes of the emergence of new parties.

1.4 Dealignment, Decline of Cleavages and New Parties

The third explanation for the emergence of new parties concerns the weakening of links between parties and voters, and the declining capacity of traditional cleavages based on class and religion to structure electoral behavior in advanced industrial societies (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984, Dalton 2002a, Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg 2000). Dalton and others view the sources of these developments in a comprehensive modernization of western societies characterized by secularization, rising educational levels among the mass public, embourgeoisiement of the working class, the equalization of lifestyles between classes, the declining significance of associations based on class and religious affiliation and the increasing accessibility and consumption of media among mass publics (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984, Dalton 2002b). As a consequence of these developments, political divisions in modern societies are less and less group cleavages with stable foundations in the social structure, clear membership and organizational closure (see also Frankin, Mackie and Valen 1992). Expansion of education, media accessibility and the weakening of cohesion of traditional social groups and their organizations resulted in mass publics that are both more competent in relating to politics and less bound by traditional group loyalties. Mass publics in modern societies are comprised from increasingly knowledgeable and critical citizens, who are also willing to use unconventional and more direct methods of political participation and are less linked to political parties through partisan identification or membership of parties and affiliated organizations (Dalton 2002b).

These developments directly affected the hold that the established parties had over the electorate. Some scholars find that partisan identification declined significantly, and consider this trend to be directly caused by the effects of the increasing educational levels of younger cohorts and their socialization in a less segmented and more fluid social environment (see

Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg 2002). The declining strength of partisan identification and party membership, the reduction of the importance of collateral organizations in the mobilization of voters, together with the rising importance of media in political communication all facilitated the weakening of links between parties and their electorates (Poguntke 2000). Also new social movements provided another avenue for political involvement not linked with the established parties, and it provided a channel for voicing new political demands.

As a consequence, traditional cleavages were replaced by the less stable issue-based divisions that divided the society along multiple lines of opposition. Consequently, voters who had belonged to a number of single-issue groups were suddenly confronted by a range of issues scattered along the classic left-right and new left-new right lines of polarization. Because voters are mobilized primary by appeals on concrete issues and have weak links with political parties, they can easily shift partisan allegiances between elections. As this process advances, a larger and larger fraction of voters will become detached from political parties and will become available for mobilization by single issue appeals based on salient topics of the moment (Franklin *et al*. 1992).

The decline of cleavages is inevitably closely followed by a change in the type of political parties which populate the party systems of advanced industrial countries; political parties in a dealignment setting tend to be less connected to any specific social groups and their organizations, and tend to be freer in the selection of issues on which they contest elections (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984). This is particularly the case for new parties which emerged as a consequence of new social movements that mobilized new left issues, and parties on the right which emerge as a counter-reaction to new social movements and new left agenda. Therefore, established political parties are facing more volatile electoral prospects because they cannot expect that partisan identity or collateral organizations will

stabilize their electorate. Parties can try instead to broaden their appeal through the diversification of messages aimed at the inclusion of different segments of the population into their electorate. On the other hand, this opens a space for the emergence of single-issue parties which focus on particular segments of the electorate with clearly defined interests.

Dalton and others find manifestations of dealignment and instability at the level of individual voting behavior indicated through the increased incidence of vote switching between parties across elections, and the increased incidence of split voting in countries where more than one election is held simultaneously (Dalton, McAllister, Wattenberg 2002). At the level of party systems, changes are manifested through increased fractionalization, an increase in the absolute and the effective number of parties, and the increased volatility between the elections (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984, Dalton, McAllister, Wattenberg 2002). An important cause of changes in these indicators is due to the emergence of new parties.

Studies of the dealignment approach do not discuss at length causes behind the emergence new parties, but rather link the changes in party systems directly to social modernization and the consequences it has on the nature of the link between parties and voters (Dalton *et al.* 2002, Franklin, Mackie and Valen 1992). The second element in this account is the cognitive mobilization of the electorate. The increasing ability of the electorate to access and process political information allows voters to reflect on their interests and take positions along a range of specific political issues; the increased sophistication of the electorate and the weakening of links between parties and voters allow parties to mobilize the electorate by assuming positions on issues that particular groups of voters have a high interest in. In such setting, new social movements and new parties can easily emerge by mobilizing salient issues left unrepresented by the established parties.

Studies of the dealignment approach provide a convincing evidence that links between parties and voters are getting weaker and that party systems are changing as a consequence, but they provide a very cursory account of how the new structure of political demands is supposed to look like, what would replace the existing cleavages and how party alternatives would be positioned (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984, Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg 2002, Franklin, Mackie and Valen 1992).

Some studies within this approach believe that the sources of new political issues in divisions are caused by value change or that the divisions are based over the conflict between establishment and anti-establishment groups and the welfare state (see Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984); however, they do not provide detailed explanations about the form that these changes will take. It is beyond doubt that links between parties and voters in advanced industrial societies have weakened, and that traditional cleavages have largely lost their structuring power. Still, this does not mean that the political divisions in advanced industrial societies do not have a more permanent structure and some degree of stability: as established in a number of studies which research the state of political divisions in western societies, political divisions in advanced industrial societies do have a degree of structure (Knutsen 2001, 2005). So the weakness of the dealignment approach lies in the failure to account for this fact.

1.5 Changes in Social Structure and New Parties as Representatives of New Constituencies

The fourth approach of explaining changes in political divisions in western societies views the emergence of new parties as part of the broader process, including changes in the

social structure, the rise of new political issues and demands and realignment of voters and parties. New parties within this setting came into existence as one of the consequences of changes in the structure of political divisions.

New parties emerged in the process of broader socioeconomic change as representatives of new social groups and their demands. The causes of changes in the cleavage structure lie in the developments that took place in the social structure as a result of a shift towards postindustrial societies. This shift is characterized by changes in the occupational structure, the sectoral composition of the economy, globalization, increased economic openness, the expansion of higher education, changing gender roles and an increase of female participation in the labor market (Lane and Ersson 1991). The shift from industrial to postindustrial societies brought about significant changes in the social structure of western societies (Esping Andersen 1993, Oesch 2006, Weeden and Grusky 2005).

Deindustrialization and the growth of employment in the service sector split the middle and working classes alike (Esping Andersen 1993, Oesch 2006): within the middle class it brought about splits between service sector professionals employed on symbol processing and communicative jobs, and technical and managerial professionals based on different job experiences, education and market positions; a similar division existed on the lower end of the occupational scale between employees in industry and services based on types of jobs and employment security (Kriesi 1999, Kitschelt 1994, Oesch 2006, Esping Andersen 1993).

Changes in the labor market, deindustrialization and the new openness of economies due to globalization caused splits between groups with mobile skills and resources and those without such assets, among the owners of both capital and labor. Globalization, economic openness and budget pressures highlighted the opposition of interests between employees in sectors *exposed* to the discipline of the international market and those *protected* by the

government intervention or its location within the public sector (Garret and Way 1999, Knutsen 2005). A difference in work experiences, market position, economic interest and to an extent, gender differentiation between private and public sector employees made this sectoral division more salient (Knutsen 2001 and 2005).

The replacement of industrial employment with service employment created jobs characterized by less employment security and lower wages for medium and low-skilled workers than that which is offered by industrial jobs. This additionally split what used to be a homogenous working class and created two constituencies with significantly different market and job related experiences (Kitschelt 1994). The entry of a large number of women to the labor market made gender division more salient and added a new dimension to the socioeconomic cleavage (see Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006, Esping Andersen 1999a, Huber and Stephens 1993, Knutsen 2001, Nieuwbeerta and Manza 2000, Nieuwbeerta, Manza and Brooks 2006). At the same time, these developments brought about changes in the political space of these societies; the changes in the political space were mainly caused by the change in the structure of political attitudes and preferences as new social groups with distinct preferences, came into existence.

The mechanism through which these sociostructural developments translated into political divisions and finally gave rise to new parties links social position, political preferences and voting behavior: Kitchelt, Kriesi and others argue that social placement, market experiences, the characteristics of jobs and consumption styles shape the policy preferences and general political attitudes of voters (Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi 1999, Kitschelt and Rehm 2004 and 2005, Rehm 2004 and 2005). These political attitudes are aligned along a two-dimensional issue space, where one dimension represents economic issues and the other dimension represents a range of cultural issues (Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi *et al.* 2006). Apart from social groups, parties are also aligned on these dimensions because their positions are

defined by the stance that they take on each dimension and component issue. As a consequence, established parties faced difficulty in combining an electorate made of disparate social groups into a stable and unified electorate (Kitschelt 1994, 1999). As a consequence they were exposed to a trade-off: parties had to decide which position to choose and which social group to leave out of their electoral coalition. In the end, this led to a realignment of the positions of political parties and their electorate and opened the space for the emergence of new political parties. Therefore, new parties came into existence by both mobilizing and representing the demands of new or unrepresented social groups.

A number of studies find that the fragmentation of the social structure has effects on the structure of political preferences and that it leads to realignment of political divisions and the rise of new parties (Kitschelt 1994, Ivarsflaten 2005, Kriesi *et al.* 2006, van der Brug *et al.* 2003, Kitschelt and Rehm 2004 and 2005, Evans 2003, Meguid 2005, Adams *et al.* 2004 and 2006, Abedi 2002, Bornschier 2007, van der Brug and van Spanje 2007). While none of these studies performed comprehensive tests of these propositions, their findings about the positioning of political parties and the structure of support of these parties suggest that the argument made in studies of the fourth approach credibly describes the political developments of advanced industrial democracies in the time of deindustrialization.

1.6 Old Parties, New Parties and Strategic Interactions

In order to complete the picture of recent political developments in advanced industrial societies this section presents a short review of the research which analyzes changes in party systems and the emergence of new parties from the standpoint of political competition and strategic interaction between political actors.

In a study of the emergence of the new parties, Hug (2001) offered a model of strategic interactions between the established parties and new challengers: his model states that new parties emerge only if they can mount a credible challenge to the established parties on either an uncontested dimension of competition or on a new issue; if the established parties fail to respond to this challenge, new parties have high chances of success, providing that costs of forming a new party are not high.

Hug's model therefore presupposes that the important condition for the emergence of new parties is the presence of unrepresented political demands, and that this defines the opportunity structure of political entrepreneurs. While Hug's model offers useful insights about the mechanism of the emergence of new parties, it does not provide any explanations about the underlying causes which brought about the emergence of the new parties in the first place; he does not consider the structure of potential new demands and does not even try to account for it in his empirical analysis. The variables that he included in the analysis to capture the underlying changes in the demand structure are focused mainly on the overall economic performance. Such a limited focus significantly reduces the potential of his study to provide a full account of the emergence of the new parties. His theoretical model, however, does offer useful insights into the strategic interactions between the existing parties and new political entrepreneurs in the process of the emergence of new parties.

Hug's arguments about the interaction between mainstream parties and challengers and the ability of challengers to mount a credible challenge to the established parties is supported by other authors. Kitschelt finds that new left-libertarian parties had higher chances of success when social democrat parties were in government, were unable to include the demands of the new social movements into their electoral appeals or lacked credibility to address these new issues (Kitschelt 1986). Findings of Redding and Viterna's (1999) study go along similar lines: left-libertarian parties in Western Europe were successful in countries

where social democrat and other mainstream left parties were linked to corporatist systems, or mass organizations, and also participated in government for a significant period of time. Mainstream left parties in these countries did not include new left issues in their platform, thus enabling left-libertarian parties to fill the gap. A similar mechanism exists in the case of radical right parties, where it is argued that the emergence of new radical right parties is a consequence of the convergence of mainstream parties of left and right at the same time as new demands emerged further on the right (Abedi 2002, van der Brug and Fennama 2003). In a study of niche parties' success, Meguid (2005) finds that the way established parties responded to demands raised by new parties had a significant effect on the electoral fortunes of these parties: when the established parties pursued dismissive or adversarial strategies, ignoring or trying to de-legitimize the appeals of the niche parties, it had the effect of reinforcing the ownership of new issues by the niche parties and fuelling their success. Established parties had pursued accommodative strategies aimed at incorporating the issues advanced by the niche parties, the effect on the electoral fortunes of the niche parties would have been negative.

All in all, studies focusing on the supply side of politics largely show that new political actors emerged by mobilizing and representing new political demands without either explaining what these new demands were or and how they came about. So the research topic of the dissertation is about Investigating sources of new demands and how they manifest themselves in advanced industrial societies, which is outlined in the following section.

1.7 The Argument of the Dissertation

The aim of the dissertation is to assess how changes in the social structure and the structure of political divisions have impacted on party systems; it links the emergence of new parties to changes that took place in the societies and economies of advanced industrial societies. These changes lead to a more fragmented social structure, which underpins the more complex structure of political divisions. Social and economic changes and a more complex social structure resulted in the rise of new issues and political demands, which provided a foundation for the emergence of new parties.

To establish the presence of a fragmented social structure, the dissertation relies on research concerning the impact of deindustrialization, the expansion of education, the rising economic importance of services, and other concurrent trends on the development of the social structure of advanced industrial societies. It further relies on research about the sources of individual political preferences in order to form hypotheses about the impact of changes in the social structure on voting behavior. To explain cross-national variation in the development of social structure and political divisions, the dissertation links these with characteristics of welfare states, the structure of historical political divisions and the actions of political actors in the process of deindustrialization. Finally, the dissertation examines how the positioning of the established political actors (parties and governments), in particular a socioeconomic context and competitive environment, affected the emergence of new political parties. The argument of the dissertation is visualized in the Figure 1.

The argument of the dissertation can be summarized in the following way: social and economic changes that took place in advanced industrial societies since the early 1970s significantly changed the social structure of advanced industrial societies (see Oesch 2006, Esping Andersen 1993, 1999a and 1999b, Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi 1998, 1999);

deindustrialization and the growing economic importance of services increased employment in the service and public sectors. This development, combined with the expansion of higher education, made the social structure of advanced industrial societies more complex by splitting the middle and the working classes into what Esping Andersen (1993) calls 'industrial and postindustrial hierarchy'. This structural division was augmented by both the gender segmentation of the workforce and the increasing segmentation within the labor market between those with competitive and mobile skills and resources needed to compete, and those without such skills and resources (Huber and Stephens 2000, Rueda 2005, Esping Andersen 1999a and 1999b).

These developments made the social structure of advanced industrial societies more complex and more fragmented in comparison to the social structure of post-war industrial societies (Kriesi 1998, Esping Andersen 1993). Such social and economic developments comprehensively reshaped the structural base of political divisions. The impact of changes on employment conditions, task structure, exposure to labor market risk, life-styles, education and various forms of interactions made the individual social position increasingly atomized and harder to link with larger social identities. Splits within the middle and working classes, or manual and non-manual classes, and the interaction of class with the sector of employment reduced the significance of broad social classes in structuring political divisions, and substituted them with smaller and more homogenous occupational groups defined by interactions between the type of work, labor market exposure and the sector of employment (see Werfhorst and de Graaf 2004, Muller 1999, Oesch 2005, Knutsen 2005).

As a consequence of social and economic changes and the reconfiguration of the social structure, a range of new political demands and new issues emerged. New demands and issues are linked to both the new left (environmentalism, nuclear energy, participative democracy and individual freedom) and new right agenda (cultural homogeneity and the

protection of traditional morality and authority) (Kriesi 2006 *et al*., Bornschier 2007, 2008). The rise of new political demands resulted in the emergence of new lines of political divisions with significant mobilization potential.

In such an environment, it became increasingly difficult for the established parties to both hold on to previously held levels of support and keep their traditional electoral coalitions in place. The transformations taking place in the social structure, its fragmentation, the emergence of new social groups with distinct preferences and values and the rise of new political issues changed the previous lines of political conflicts and forced parties to realign their positions and reshape the coalitions of social groups that make up their electorate.

The end result of these changes is a more complex political space characterized by a greater fragmentation of the electorate and multiple lines of political divisions cross cutting each other (Warvick 2002, Kriesi *et al*. 2006). Politicizing new lines of conflict provided opportunities for new political actors to emerge and establish themselves as a permanent fixture of party systems in western European countries. Simultaneously, established parties reshaped their electoral coalitions and adjusted their ideological position in response to new competitors (Harmel and Janda 1994, Janda *et al*. 1995). However, due to the fragmentation of the social structure and difficulties to reconcile preferences of certain social groups, these efforts failed to reduce the support for new parties (Kitschelt 1994).

The fragmentation of the social structure and the rise of new issues is a trend that is by and large common to all advanced industrial countries, as is the rise of new parties on both the left and on the right. But the exact shape of issue divisions and the alignment of particular parties vary across countries (Knutsen and Scarborough 1995, Knutsen 1995 and 1988 Kriesi *et al.* 2006). I argue that the source of this variation is likely to be a combination of the path-dependent development of previously existing cleavages with social and economic developments linked to the welfare state and deindustrialization.

Figure 1. Mechanism of political change and the emergence of new parties



The way deindustrialization and related trends affect the social structure of each society depends on the nature of the welfare regime and the patterns of previously existing political divisions. The welfare state and historical political divisions determine the political opportunity structure and the strength of particular political actors by affecting the size and position of social groups relative to other groups, thereby affecting which political divisions will have higher salience. Later on these two trends jointly affected the third factor, the policies that governments used in response to social and economic change. Huber and Stephens (2001), Lynch (2006) and Esping Andersen (1990) show that the construction of the welfare state was an exercise in political coalition-building, with parties of different ideological orientations choosing different paths, and consequently implementing policies and shaping coalitions that would enhance their electoral support in the future. Accordingly, policy responses to deindustrialization were also to a large extent shaped by the need to construct viable political coalitions on the top of being path dependent on the initial developments of the welfare state (Iversen and Wren 1998).

The variation in policy responses affected both the way political divisions developed and the opportunity structure for new political parties. I therefore expect that the particular development of political divisions and causes behind the emergence of new parties vary in accordance to national welfare regimes, the historical salience of cultural and economic divisions (e.g. religion and class), policies that some governments used in the process of building of a welfare state and as a response to deindustrialization. The interaction of these three variables produced distinct structural developments, which provided political entrepreneurs with a distinct opportunity structure and led to different patterns of postindustrial political divisions.

The dissertation therefore advances two main propositions.

The first proposition states that social and economic change in advanced industrial societies produced a social structure that is more fragmented than the social structure of post-war industrial societies. The fragmentation of the social structure brought about the realignment of links between social groups and parties, and allowed for the emergence of new parties as the established political parties were not able to provide representation for all groups in this reconfigured electorate.

The second proposition states that the whole process was characterized by a significant degree of cross national variation, concerning the developments in both the social structure and within party systems. This cross national variation is dependent on the characteristics of welfare regimes and models of capitalism in interaction with pre-existing political divisions and the reactions of governments to deindustrialization and globalization.

The dissertation analyzes developments in only the advanced industrial countries of Western Europe with continuous democratic regimes since the end of the Second World War. This is because countries which democratized since the 1970s do not have similar patterns of socioeconomic development as countries which were democratized since late the 1940s, nor did they have comparable political development. Party systems of these countries and the divisions within their mass publics developed in a very different setting, where the impact of transition had huge effects. For these reasons, I will exclude these countries from the study, leaving in the analysis 13 countries of Western Europe with stable democratic regimes since the end of the Second World War. As my aim is to test the validity of the argument in a very specific socioeconomic context, the selection of cases does not produce bias in the analysis. The theoretical framework of the dissertation specifies that the presence of stable competitive politics of industrializing and welfare state policies in the period before the one on which the analysis in the dissertation focuses, is a necessary precondition for the investigated effects to emerge.

The contribution of the dissertation to the scholarly analysis of the development of politics in advanced industrial countries lies in the following elements: firstly, the dissertation provides a more systematic account in linking the socioeconomic changes related to or simultaneous with deindustrialization, with the developments of political divisions in advanced industrial democracies of western Europe; secondly, it explains how these changes affected political divisions in countries with different welfare regimes and patterns of political competition, thereby explicitly linking the welfare state (as one of the key institutions of modern industrial societies), to variations in patterns of political divisions; lastly but perhaps most importantly, the dissertation seeks to provide a comprehensive explanation of the impact of developments that took place on the demand side of politics, during the emergence of new parties of the new left and the new right party families.

1.8 Plan of the Dissertation

The dissertation proceeds as follows: in the second chapter, I discuss the theoretical framework for the proposition that the fragmentation of the social structure provides opportunities for the emergence of new parties. I also present a review of macro trends which lead to changes in the structure of cleavages, and I review the logic of micro preference formation. Finally, I discuss how variation in welfare regimes, historical salience of economic and cultural divisions, and policies used in the formation of a welfare state in response to deindustrialization affect the final shape of political divisions.

In the third chapter, I deal with structural divisions on the demand side and its impact on the supply side. I test the validity of the fragmentation thesis and the proposition that the welfare state conditioned how postindustrial political divisions developed at the structural

level. The chapter also analyzes the character of structural divisions in postindustrial societies, and contrasts the electorate of the new and the established parties in order to examine the link between the fragmentation of the social structure and electoral divisions.

The fourth chapter follows the same pattern as chapter three, but focuses instead on political values and issues. The intention of the fourth chapter is to investigate whether new parties have distinct positions on new issue-dimensions, and to what extent the electorate of new parties, especially those of the new left and the new right, have ideologically distinct positions from the electorate of the established parties of the left and right. Apart from locating positions of the electorate of new parties, this chapter also aims to asses whether the structure of value divisions across countries varies in accordance with characteristics of the welfare state and historical cleavages.

The fifth chapter deals with the impact that policies of the welfare state have on the formation of electoral divisions. It investigates whether policies of the welfare state affected the patterns of political mobilization in the process of welfare state formation, and in the period when changes related to deindustrialization started to manifest their effects.

In chapters three, four and five empirical analysis focuses on differences between the electorate of individual parties. This is because only by looking at the electorate of individual parties can we fully observe the complexity which characterizes postindustrial political divisions and the location of the electorate of new parties within them. Therefore, the empirical analysis is focused on comparison of the electorate of individual parties, and groups of parties and provides a detailed account of their differences. The methods used in all three chapters reflect this approach.

Chapter 2
Shift toward Postindustrial Societies and Development of Political Divisions

2.1 Introduction

The first chapter outlined the main argument of the dissertation concerning the impact of social and economic changes on the reshaping of political cleavages, and finally, on the emergence of new parties. In this chapter, I discuss in more detail the mechanisms which brought about changes in the structure of political demands, and led to the emergence of new parties. To this end, I first discuss the societal trends responsible for the reshaping of the social structure in advanced industrial democracies. This discussion is followed by a review of the literature analyzing the way that these societal trends affected political preferences at the individual level. Finally, in line with expectations that the socioeconomic context affected how societal change influenced political divisions in individual countries, I present the argument that these developments are linked with welfare states, historical political divisions and responses to deindustrialization.

This chapter has two purposes. The first is to provide a more detailed review of the literature, which studies the development of political divisions in postindustrial societies. The second aim of the chapter is to further develop and explain in more detail the mechanism leading to changes in the structure of political divisions. The chapter is organized in the following way: in the second section I discuss the nature of political divisions, the exact form of the dependent variable and the level at which it is analyzed; in the third section I present the aggregate trends responsible for changes taking place in the social structure; in the fourth

section I review the literature on the formation of political divisions at the individual level; the fifth and sixth sections discuss the causes of the transformations of political cleavages and their cross-national variation; the seventh section discusses how differences in cleavages developed through the interaction of welfare and production regimes with historical political cleavages, and how they vary across countries.

2.2 Operationalizing Political Divisions in Advanced Industrial Societies

As the dissertation analyzes changes in political cleavages, the dependent variable is voting behavior at the individual level. As the argument of the dissertation focuses on the effects that political divisions have on party systems and the presence of cross-national variation in cleavage structures, the operationalization of the dependent variable must be able to capture both the distinctiveness of the electorate between the old and the new parties, and the presence of differences in patterns of political divisions across countries. Therefore, the key question is really about the level at which political effects of the fragmentation in the social structure and expected cross-national differences in political divisions can be observed.

According to Bartolini and Mair's definition of cleavages developed for the purpose of their analysis of political mobilization of the left parties in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, cleavages have attitudinal, behavioral and organizational components (Bartolini and Mair 1990). Their work covers the period when most societies were segmented on the basis of class and religion and mass organizations cementing those divisions, such as unions, religious associations or various social organizations linked to political parties, encompassed almost the whole of society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In such circumstances, the

organizational component of cleavages was extremely important. However, in modern societies where mass organizations are all but absent, organizational component plays a much smaller role (Enyedi 2008). Therefore, any analytical focus of studies of political divisions in advanced industrial societies should be placed on an attitudinal and behavioral dimension.

Recent analysis concerning the impact of societal changes on political divisions has focused predominantly on the attitudinal dimension. A range of studies have analyzed the impact of social structure on the development of political preferences in advanced industrial societies (Werfhorst and de Graaf 2004, Oesch 2005, Oesch and Lachat 2007, Kitschelt and Rehm 2004 and 2005, Rehm 2005, Rehm, Iversen and Soskice 2001, Schweisgush 1995). In these studies, the impact of socioeconomic variables on political attitudes is *not* found to vary significantly across countries; most of these studies find that the impact of social structure on political attitudes becomes more complex as countries move towards postindustrial societies, but these studies do not find overall differences in the patterns of links between political attitudes and socioeconomic positions across countries.

Several studies have attempted to find differences in the patterns of political divisions across countries at the attitudinal level. For example, Svallfors (1997, 2004) analyzed the presence of economic attitudinal divisions based on differences in welfare regimes, according to Esping Andersen's typology of the welfare state. He expected to find sectoral and gender cleavages in social-democrat welfare states, 'insider-outsider' cleavages in Christian-democrat welfare states and class cleavages in liberal welfare states. Svallfors expected these variables to be a primary explanatory factor of economic attitudes in their respective welfare regimes. However, he did not find such differences; in fact, he found visible similarities among individuals with common socioeconomic traits across countries. Linos and West (2001) replicated Svallfors' analysis, adjusting for missing data and with slightly recoded variables, but they reached the same result as Svallfors. So did Andreß and Hein (2003), who

used the same data with slightly different model specifications[1]. Gelissen (2001) who analyzed preferences for pension policies found essentially the same result. In the end, all these authors questioned the existence of different political cleavages corresponding to the type of welfare regime.

Other studies searched for sources of differences across countries through research of a significantly different focus: Metherns (2004) looked at the aggregate distribution of preferences and reached fairly inconclusive findings regarding the link between the welfare state and attitudinal divisions at the aggregate level. Oesch and Lachat (2007) tried to link the strength of cultural and economic attitudinal divisions between occupational groups to the size of postindustrial employment. They found that the strength of divisions within social and cultural professionals and technical and business professionals corresponds to the size of postindustrial employment. Still, this relatively weak effect is far from comprehensive and persuading evidence.

To summarize, studies of political divisions at the attitudinal level do find a more complex structure of political attitudes in advanced industrial societies. They also find that these attitudes are in a large part responsible for new patterns of political divisions, and that these new political divisions are related to the emergence of new parties (Kitschelt and Rehm 2005, Werfhorst and de Graaf 2004, Muller 1999, Ivarsflaten 2005). However, these studies fail to establish the presence of significant differences in patterns of attitudinal divisions across countries.

When it comes to the formation of political preferences, numerous studies argue that the decisive mechanism is the one operating at the individual level[2] (see Kitschelt 1994,

[1] All these papers used ISSP Role of Government module from 1990 and 1996.

[2] Individual preference formation essentially operates through two mechanisms. The first works through rational self-interest and the second through socialization. Self-interest based mechanism depends on the individual‘s ability to understand hers/his position and to develop some perceptions and attitudes about the policies that might enhance it or damage it. This does not imply fully formed preferences and attitudes, or necessity for such preferences and attitudes to be organized into a coherent system of assigned values and ranks. Rather, it means that, when faced with a range of alternatives, provided they are well presented, individuals will be able to select the one they favor based on its expected impact on their position.

Kitschelt and Rehm 2004, Rehm 2004, 2005, Kriesi 1998, 1999, Iversen and Soskice 2001, Werfhorst and de Graaf 2004, Kriesi and Lachat 2007). The main question is whether we can expect that the mechanism of individual preference formation works similarly in different contexts. The cited literature, focusing almost exclusively on western advanced capitalist societies, makes no reference to the possibility that this mechanism would work differently depending on the context, as long as we stay within the world of advanced industrial countries. The theory advanced in these studies does not see the potential that identical sets of socioeconomic traits would produce widely different sets of attitudes in different national contexts. The empirical analysis by and large supports these expectations.

A range of differences in attitudes of social groups that could be observed across these countries would at most be those of degree and salience. There is no reason to expect that individuals who share similar social positions, but live in different welfare regimes, will not have similar relative attitudinal positions with respect to other members of their societies. We might find that in different countries some attitudes can be more salient or can have a larger range and intensity of positions (see Kitschelt and Rehm 2004 and Oesch and Lachat 2007). But overall, looking at the relative position of members of particular social groups in a broader social context we would find a rather similar picture[3]. Still, this does not presuppose that similar individuals in different context will hold identical positions; sometimes they will not, but they will very likely have similar relative positions with respect to members of other social groups. Particular national contexts can make the average citizen more or less socially liberal or more or less supportive of pro-market policies, as national socioeconomic contexts and variation in the composition of various social groups produces differences in their

Socialization mechanism operates in a more diffuse way through the social environment. Individuals are held to draw general Conclusion about the society from the environment they live in and their individual experience shapes their perceptions about the society in general (Macy 1988). In this case we are not talking about rationalized interests, but rather about internalized values and attitudes that are the product of one's everyday experiences.

[3] A word of caution is in order at this point: both the theory and the analysis of general preferences, such as a general preference for or against redistribution, for or against social insurance systems and so on. But we cannot exclude the possibility that if we look at more concrete policy issues, we could find that there are in fact differences that Svallfors and other expected to find.

national reference points. But it would hardly change the position of particular social groups relative to each other (Kitschelt and Rhem 2004a and Oesch and Lachat 2007).

While political divisions in advanced industrial societies can be observed at the level of attitudes and political behavior, the presence of cross national variation in political divisions is most likely to be observable at the behavioral level. To explain why this is so, we have to take into account developments at the macro-level, and in interactions between macro and micro levels.

The mechanism behind these interactions affects the salience of particular political divisions across countries and has effects observable mainly at the behavioral level. Institutional and policy characteristics of the welfare state and production regimes will have direct influences on the size of particular social groups, their importance and their position with respect to other social groups. In other words, some countries will have large employment in the public sector services and others will not; some countries will have a large female participation in the labor market and others will not. Some countries will have large segments of labor market outsiders and others will not. Similar statements can be said about the interactions between groups. But not all countries will have similar types of interaction between the public and the private sector. To take this division as an example, interactions will depend on the size, organizational strength of unions and their position in wage setting mechanism, export orientations of the private sector and the skills and gender composition of public and private sector employment (Iversen 1996, Garret and Way 1999).

How would these variables affect electoral divisions? The size of any particular social group will affect its electoral importance. Interactions and positions with respect to other groups will decide which groups can be combined into a viable electoral coalition. This will also decide the trade-offs in support that political actors will face in the process of building support among the various segments of the electorate. A frequently discussed example

illustrating such a situation is the trade-off that social-democrat parties face among manual constituencies when they try to incorporate left-libertarian constituencies such as public sector workers, young women and sociocultural professionals into their electorate (see Kitschelt 1994, 1999). We can expect that similar situations will exist on the right side of the political spectrum, producing trade-offs between pro-market but libertarian professional middle classes in the private sector and similarly pro-market but more authoritarian constituencies such as the petty bourgeoisie.

Political parties will respond to this situation in the electoral market, and differences in opportunity structures across countries will bring about a diversity of outcomes in patterns of political divisions and the type and competitive positions of new parties.

2.3. Societal Change at the Aggregate Level

In the late 1960s and early 1970s a number of trends interacted to produce new social divisions that started to take shape. These trends changed the composition of the workforce, the structure of the economy, the levels of employment and unemployment and the educational composition of the society. They also brought about an end to the traditional definition of the role of sexes, and further increased the influence of education and skills as determinants of individual socioeconomic positions. These trends had dual effects: firstly they changed the composition of the social structure, and secondly, they changed the relative positions of particular social groups, and through this, their interaction with other social groups and political preferences.

In terms of changes in the aggregate social categories, these trends brought an increase in the share of employment in the public sector as a consequence of the rise of the

welfare state, and an increased share of employment in the service sector, as a consequence of the expansion of the service economy (Iversen and Wren 1998, Cusack *et al.* 1989). The magnitude of an increase in the public sector and service employment sector was not equal across countries (Wren 2005, Cusack *et al*. 1989); it increased in countries which responded to deindustrialization with the expansion of employment in the public sector, and followed the large increase in the participation of women in the labor market with a sizable increase in public sector service provisions (Iversen and Wren 1998, Esping Andersen 1999a).

The decline in industrial employment was large and had noticeable effects on the employment levels: it caused a rise in the structural unemployment and a rise in the share of the workforce with precarious labor market position and in unconventional employment (Wren 2006, Esping Andersen 1999b); it also brought a rise in the size of the dependent population as early retirement and disability became favored labor reduction schemes in the 1970s and 1980s.

Service sector employment was the only solution to offset the declining rates of employment in industry. However, due to lower productivity in the service sector at the lower end of the skill range, and consequently lower wages, the rise of private sector employment in the service sector required the deregulation of the labor market. The result of a deregulated labor market was an increase in inequality and an increase in the number of jobs with high labor market risk (Iversen and Wren 1998, Esping Andersen 1999b); where the deregulation was absent, the result was an increase in structural unemployment and a rise in the number of labor market outsiders (Esping Andersen and Regini 2000).

The gender composition of the workforce was changed by an increase in the participation of women in the labor market, and its educational composition was affected by an increase in the numbers of individuals enrolling into higher education. However, all these trends changed the composition of the social structure of advanced industrial societies in

terms of the total sizes of particular social groups. But this did not produce politically relevant divisions that differed much from those already in place.

The shift these social divisions into political divisions happened as a consequence of the second set of trends. These trends changed the context within which various social groups were situated and were instrumental in producing divisions among and within social groups. These trends reflected the new outcomes of economic scarcity, such as high public sector deficits, high unemployment, especially in some categories of the population, downward levels of participation in the labor force among those with lower skills, declining economic growth, increasing competition from international markets, capital mobility which put national competitiveness under strain, and the rise in the share of the population dependent on the welfare state, due to the deterioration of employment performance and population ageing. At the same time, the level of public sector spending, and taxation related to it, reached its peak as a consequence of the growing entitlements and increasing number of claimants (Castles 2004, Esping Andersen 1996, Huber and Stephens 2001).

High public sector deficits and taxation resulted in differences in economic positions between the public and the private sectors. Higher levels of employment in services and the public sector brought about divisions within the middle class between both cultural and social professionals and technical and managerial professionals. Increasing numbers of workers in precarious employment, high exposure to market risks and high unemployment led to heightened divisions within the working class. Increasing immigration and the openness of the economic exchange increased a feeling of insecurity among those with non-transferable skills and resources. Increasing competition and openness also caused a split within classes on low and high ends of the skill scale alike, on the basis of growing variation in distributive outcomes and market exposure (Pontusson and Rueda 2000, Pontusson, Rueda and Way 2002, Bermanadi and Cusack 2004).

The first group of aggregate trends changed the relative composition of the social structure and the size of the different groups within it; the second group of aggregate trends changed the social and economic context within which social groups were placed, and created the conditions for the emergence of new conflict lines. The interaction between these two sets of macro trends turned the fragmentation of the social structure and the rise of new political issues into new patterns of political divisions, and consequently, new parties. Figure 2.1 presents in graphic terms how this mechanism is expected to work.

The next section provides an overview of the developments that took place at the micro level; it presents the logic of micro preference formation and discusses sociostructural determinants of individual political attitudes and behavior.

Figure 2.1 Mechanism linking transformation of societal changes and changes in individual preferences into political divisions



2.4 Sources of Preferences at the Micro Level

Substantial literature exists which analyzes the impact of social structure on the formation of individual preferences in the social structures of advanced industrial societies (see Kitschelt 1994, Kitschelt and Rehm 2004, Rehm 2005, Rehm Iversen and Cusack 2006, Iversen and Soskice 2001, Kriesi 1998, 1999, Esping Andersen 1993, 1999b, Werfhorst and de Graaf 2004, Bonoli 2004). Variables identified in these studies as important sources of preferences are sector of employment, occupation, task structure and the focus of work, gender, skill specificity and transferability, social risk status, personal consumption styles, the level and type of education, and labor market status. This literature is a rich source to draw upon when developing hypotheses about political behavior, and it provides us with the micro level explanations of political divisions. Therefore this section provides a review of the sources of preferences divided into five groups: (1) occupation, task structure and workplace experience; (2) sectors of employment; (3) labor market positions and market risk exposure; (4) gender; (5) consumption styles, social risk status and life cycle effects.

2.4.1 Occupation, Task Structure and Workplace Experience

Occupational divisions stem primarily from differences in the characteristics of industrial and postindustrial jobs. Deindustrialization and the expansion of the service sector together with business, personal consumption and public sector services created a large pool of workers with substantially different occupational experiences than workers in the previously dominant manufacturing, transport and sales sectors (Esping Andersen 1993). The separation of industrial and postindustrial jobs created what are in effect two separate

occupational hierarchies, and split the middle class and the working class into separate industrial and postindustrial hierarchies.

Esping Andersen (1993) argues that differences in market position, work environment and task structure are present at every level of the occupational hierarchy, cross-cutting traditional divisions based on hierarchical position and creating two essentially separate occupational hierarchies: industrial and postindustrial. Postindustrial jobs, located mostly in services, differ from industrial jobs of similar hierarchical positions by being characterized by predominantly communicative and symbol processing type of work, focus on client servicing in a relatively autonomous work environment. Industrial jobs, predominantly in manufacturing, transports and sales, are characterized by object or document processing work with focus on organizational efficiency and a stronger hierarchical line of control.

Within these two hierarchies and among professional occupations we can broadly distinguish between sociocultural professionals, technical professionals, and managers and business professionals; within less-skilled groups we can broadly distinguish between manual workers, lower service workers and routine office and administrative non-manual workers (see Oesch 2006). Among the self-employed there are separate categories for professionals and small business owners. Furthermore, we can differentiate between additional hierarchical levels by separating full professionals and higher grade managers from semi-professional and lower grade managers, skilled from routine manual workers, and service from office workers (Oesch 2006).

Work focused on clients or cultural symbols, a communicative work environment, a non-routine work procedure and work autonomy generally foster preferences for social reciprocity in interaction, tolerance of different views and lifestyles, and preferences for an egalitarian and inclusive type of social organization (Macy 1988, Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi 1998, Grusky and Weeden 2005). On the other hand, work focused on objects and document

processing is characterized by routine operations and is mainly performed in organizations which are strongly hierarchical and have clear lines of command and control. Such organizational and workplace experiences are likely to foster attitudes respective of authority and compliance to social norms, preferences for hierarchical and exclusive types of social organization, and preferences for standardized norms of behavior that are applicable to all members of society (Macy 1988, Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi 1998).

Occupational groups also differ in the type of education that they receive (Werfhorst and de Graaf 2004).Tolerance of different positions and lifestyles, preferences for inclusive or exclusive type of social organization and egalitarian or hierarchical types of society will depend on whether one receives education that strongly favors communicative skills, or technical education that is focused on rational and efficient problem-solving. Since the type of education will to a large extent determine the marketability of skills and income levels, Werfhorst and de Graaf argue that it can also affect preferences for the way that economic resources are allocated.

To determine the exact impact of occupational position on preferences (apart from the task structure and hierarchical position), we have to take into account educational levels and market positions. Those with higher education take more open, tolerant and libertarian positions, as opposed to those with lower education (see Weakliem 2001). Those with marketable and transferable skills and resources prefer market allocation and oppose redistribution as opposed to those with highly specific skills and skills characterized by low skill mobility (Iversen and Soskice 2001, Iversen, Cusack and Rehm 2005).

To summarize, among occupational groups with similar types of task structure, those with higher education will have preferences that are generally more open and tolerant than those that have lower education. At the same time, among groups that have similar hierarchical positions, those with better market position and marketable skills and resources

will be more supportive of liberal market economic policies. The preferences and relative positions of particular occupational groups are presented in table 2.1.

Table 2.1 Relationship between occupational position and policy preferences

Occupation	Skill level/educational level/ occupational position	Skill marketability/ income	Communicative /client interactive task structure	Sociocultural preferences	Economic preferences
Managers and business professionals	High	High	Medium/low	Centrist/ Moderately libertarian	Intensely pro-market
Technical professionals	High	High	Medium	Moderately libertarian	Pro-market
Sociocultural professionals	High	Medium	High	Highly libertarian	Redistributive
Small business owners	Medium/low	Medium	Low	Highly authoritarian	Intensely pro-market
Office and clerical employees	Medium	Medium/low	Low	Moderately authoritarian/ centrist	Mildly redistributive
Skilled service	Medium/low	Low	High	Libertarian	Intensely redistributive
Skilled crafts	Medium/low	Medium/low	Low	Authoritarian	Redistributive
Routine operators	Low	Low	Low	Highly authoritarian	Intensely redistributive

2.4.2 Sector of employment

Sector of employment is a particularly strong source of economic preferences (Kitschelt 1994). Sectoral divisions are primarily the consequence by differences in market positions and competitive exposure of various sectors; they can be conceptualized either as divisions between the public and private sectors, division between exposed and sheltered sector or between industry and service sectors[4] (see Kitschelt 1994).

[4] Sector of employment does not only influence preferences through the logic of market position. It is argued that public sector employees also have different socialization experiences (Kitschelt 1994, Werfhorst and de Graaf 2004, Knutsen 2001, Svallfors 1997). Since they work mostly with welfare state clientele, they are likely to develop links of solidarity and understanding with their clients. This will make public sector employees more libertarian and egalitarian than their private

Private and public sector employees have very different market levels of exposure to market competition: employees in the private sector depend primarily on market performance and the competitiveness of their companies, while public sector employees depend primarily on the size of government spending, and consequently, taxation. Therefore we could expect that economic preferences of public and private sector employees will vary significantly (Kitschelt 1994, Svallfors 1997, Knutsen 2005). Furthermore, public sector employees will generally favor redistributive policies and government spending, while private sector employees will be more likely to oppose redistribution and high levels of government spending. But more specifically, their support for redistributive policies will depend on their exposure to labor market risks and market competition: the more exposed they are to labor market risk (unemployment) the more likely they are to support redistributive policies and government spending (Iversen, Cusack and Rehm 2005, Iversen and Soskice 2001). However, apart from supporting spending on social security, the more exposed private sector employees are to market competition, the more likely they will oppose government spending, redistributive policies and the high taxation needed to pay for it as these measures could undermine the competitiveness of their companies (Kitschelt 1994, see also Garret and Way 1999).

Differences between the public and private sectors can also be conceptualized as differences between sheltered and exposed sectors: employees in sheltered sectors are likely to use their protected positions to press for a higher income, thus passing this cost to the taxpayer or the consumer on the domestic market, while exposed sector employees will oppose such demands because they could undermine their competitive position by triggering increases in tax burden and labor costs, and eventually, inflation (Iversen 1996, 1998, Garret and Way 1999).

sector counterparts. It must be noted that this logic applies only to public sector services such as education, health, social and caring services. It does not apply to employees of state enterprises who in this respect can be expected to be more similar to their counterparts in private sector with similar level of market exposure (Werfhorst and de Graaf 2004).

Sectoral divisions can also be conceptualized as divisions between the services and industry as employment in these sectors produces very different labor market experiences (Esping Andersen 1993, 1999a). The service sector (especially at its lower end of the skill scale), namely in personal and consumer services, suffers from lower productivity growth compared to the industrial sector. This means that in order for most service jobs to stay competitive on the market, wages and job security can not follow those of the manufacturing sector, unless service jobs are clustered in the public sector and are therefore effectively unexposed to the pressures of the market (Iversen and Wren 1998, Iversen and Cusack 2000). Since most of the services at the lower end of the skill scale are provided through small business service workers, they are also much less likely to be unionized and less likely to be under employment protection laws. This will place employees who are in the private service sector at the lower end of the skill scale into very precarious economic positions, or in the case of the public sector, it will make them dependent on public spending. So, those in private sector services are likely to end up demanding protectionist policies, including the limitation of immigration, and are likely to develop anti-establishment sentiments (Derks 2004); whereas those in the public sector will have preferences for redistributive economic policies.

Very different conditions can be found at the high end of the skill scale in business services where information technology enables huge gains in productivity, equal to or potentially even higher than in industries. This translates into high earnings and a very good labor market position for those employed in this segment of the service sector. We can therefore expect that lower skilled service workers will be supportive of redistributive policies, while service professionals will prefer redistributive policies, depending on whether they work in the marketable sector or in the public and not-for-profit sector: those working in

the market sector are likely to support pro-market policies, while those working in the public sector are likely to support redistributive policies.

2.4.3 Labor Market Position and Risk Exposure

The decline in industrial employment, technological change, and the expansion of the service sector changed the structure of employment in advanced industrial countries. The number of industrial jobs, especially low skilled manual jobs, declined while the number of professional and service jobs increased. At the same time, the influx of immigrants increased competition at the lower end of the skill scale. This decline in industrial employment triggered policy responses that were directed at the reduction of labor supply (such as early retirement and disability schemes) or the creation of service sector jobs (such as an increase in public sector or the deregulation of labor market) (Iversen and Wren 1998, Iversen and Cusack 2000). The increased participation of women in the labor force produced additional demands on job supply, and, at the same time, demands for policies to facilitate female employment. Faster transformation of production technologies increased the rate at which skills became obsolete and increased the need for permanent learning. This in turn increased the premium on general skills that are easily transferable between jobs and adaptable to new tasks.

Such developments intensified divisions in the labor market between (1) groups with stable employment in good jobs safeguarded by employment protection regulation (and retired workers whose income comes from pensions defined on the basis of their income and occupational history), (2) outsider groups that move between precarious employment on low wage-low skill jobs and unemployment, and (3) those whose participation in the labor market

is made difficult by a regulatory framework with a lack of policies and services that support their employment (Rueda 2007, Esping Andersen 1999b).

Labor market differences can also be viewed as differences between those who have skills and resources which can be moved between jobs and are adaptable to new work tasks, and those whose skills are either specific to a particular job or task structure, (and therefore hard to use on other jobs), or obsolete (and therefore useless) (see Kriesi 1999, Iversen and Soskice 2001). Essentially, all these divisions can be described as oppositions between winners and losers in the labor market.

Among those who have insider positions in the labor market and transferable skills, we can include educated middle class professionals and some segments of skilled industrial workers and technicians, whose skills, although more specific and not easily transferred to other jobs, are still in demand. The second group is more heterogeneous: it is in part composed of (1) low skilled workers that do not have sufficient skills, and skilled workers whose skills became obsolete and (2) small business owners who face the competition of big corporations and do not possess the skills necessary to adapt to new production technology, nor do they possess skills which are transferable to some other type of marketable activity (Kriesi 1999).

The conflict between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' can be ameliorated through an implementation of a particular set of social policies aimed at reducing labor market insecurity and increasing the role of active labor market policies. However, in some settings these policy goals can be incompatible. In countries where structural unemployment is high, we can expect that outsider groups will oppose the implementation of social policies aimed at outsiders and that they will favor policies that protect the status of insiders (Rueda 2007). The division between these two groups over policy deepens the split within once homogenous working class and combined with high immigration created potential for high levels of

disenchantment of the outsider groups and their mobilization through anti-elite and anti-immigrant appeals. In such a setting, outsiders are expected to be an anti-establishment group with preferences for welfare chauvinism, protectionist and authoritarian appeals; insiders are expected to be status quo supporters and potentially a veto group that will oppose any reform (specifically of labor market regulation and the pension system) that would undermine their position (Esping Andersen 1999b and Kriesi 1999, Rueda 2007). This understanding makes sense if we look at insider-outsider division mainly as a division between workers; excluding middle class professional groups (see Rueda 2005).

Outsider groups are exposed to a high risk of unemployment, but also, the risk of unemployment is considered partly to be a function of the possession of specific and non-transferable skills. Those with highly specific (and immobile) skills are likely to support redistributive policies aimed at protection from labor market risks and regulatory policies that protect employment (Iversen and Soskice 2001). Those with more general (and more transferable) skills will be less keen on redistributive polices, but how much less will depend on the exact transferability of their skills and the interaction between their labor market position and other determinants of their socioeconomic positions.

Labor market losers are generally expected to be supportive of exclusivist welfare chauvinistic and authoritarian policies (Kriesi 1999). In economic terms, they are likely to call for protectionist policies, but whether or not they support redistributive policies will depend on whether they are owners of uncompetitive small businesses or low skilled workers (Kriesi 1999). Owners of small businesses are expected to combine a mix of protectionist and exclusivist preferences aiming at limiting the competition from foreign workers and capital combined with demands for deregulation of the market and anti establishment protest. Low skilled workers on the other hand will combine protectionist and exclusivist demands with demands for redistribution focused on the protection of domestic workers.

2.4.4. Gender

The expansion of public sector services, and service sector employment in general, that took place simultaneously with the movement of a large number of women from housewifery to the labor market, produced visible gender segregation within the labor force (Esping Andersen 1999a). Given that in some countries the transition from housewifery to employment was not followed by an increase in public sector service provision conducive to the employment of women (child care), gender differentiation in the labor market manifested itself through a high concentration of women in part-time and temporary employment (Huber and Stephens 2000, Becker 2001). But in other countries, the expansion of public sector employment, especially in services that care for the children and the elderly, produced significant gender divisions in the labor force along sectoral lines and a concentration of women employed in the public sector (Esping Andersen 1999a, Klausen 1999).

At the root of gender based divisions was (1) a high level of employed women and gender segmentation of the labour force and (2) cultural change regarding the position of women in society. Iversen and Rosenbluth (2006) argue that women as a constituency have a higher interest in public sector services because of the increasing significance of exit options from marriage. Since women are more likely to face career interruptions due to childbirth and are more dependent on caring services in case they end up single, they will favor welfare spending and public sector services provision as a source of employment, child and elderly care support, and redistributive policies as an insurance against the loss of income.

Apart from economic issues, gender contributed to divisions over cultural issues as well. Gender equality is an issue of high importance for educated women, especially in terms of equality of employment opportunities and promotion. Because of their position in society, it is likely that younger women will put more emphasis on the freedom of choice of one's

lifestyle and be very libertarian (Kitschelt 1994). This however, does not apply to older women with lower levels of education, who spent most of their lives as housewives and are also highly likely to be the most religious segment of the population; they are also likely to be the most conservative and authoritarian segment of the population.

2.4.5. Consumption Styles and Social Risk Status

Consumption of welfare services and exposure to social risk are considered to be the likely source of preferences for policies aimed at the affordable provision of risk-reducing services through public sector and redistribution of income (Bonoli 2004). It is likely that consumers of welfare state caring services (such as child and elderly care), and social security programs (such as health care, public pensions and unemployment insurance), or those that are exposed to poverty inducing risks (such as low or obsolete skills, single parenthood, unemployment and old age poverty), will favor redistributive policies and provision of welfare services and transfers. On the other hand, those who use services provided by the market, usually higher income groups, will be opposed to redistribution policies that they do not benefit from. Similar logic can be applied to consumers of so-called superior goods such as education, culture and the arts (see Kitschelt and Rehm 2004), and public or private housing (Dunleavy 1991). There is also a high likelihood that life-cycle effects can be expected to affect the salience of preferences regarding particular types of services such as health care, pensions and child care (Kitschelt and Rehm 2004).

On the other hand, how respondents feel about cultural issues such as individual freedom or immigration is likely to depend on his exposure to crime and education, ability to understand other cultures, and perception of threat that immigrants and other minorities represent to the society and individual himself.

2.5. Welfare States, Capitalist Production Regimes and Political Divisions

Welfare states and capitalist production regimes are easily the most important features of advanced industrial societies. This is because they affect almost every social and economic aspect of these societies, and to a large extent, they structure the lives of individuals or social group living in them. As such we can expect them to have a large impact on the political development of those countries, and especially on developments in electoral politics.

The recent literature on varieties of capitalism and welfare regimes (see Hall and Soskice 2001, Huber and Stephens 2001, Esping Andersen 1999a, Hall and Gingerich 2004) demonstrates that there are substantial institutional and policy differences among advanced industrialized countries. These societies, although sharing a relatively similar level of economic development, differ substantially in terms of detailed institutional arrangements and policies used to achieve it. As a consequence, they also differ in terms of distributive outcomes and the relative positions of various social groups. As shown by the data about labor force composition, employment, unionization, social spending, poverty levels and income distribution, institutions and policies developed in the process of the creation of welfare and production regimes had a huge impact on the social composition of respective societies and the positions of different social groups within them (Esping Andersen 1999a and 1999b, Huber and Stephens 2001, 2000, Iversen and Wren 1998, Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005, Pontusson and Rueda 2002, Western 1993 and 1994**,** Wallerstein and Moene 1999). The differences in social structure produced by the variation in welfare and production regimes, do not constitute totally different patterns of social structure; but on the whole, they do lead to a significant amount of variation between societies.

The importance of welfare states and capitalist production regimes for advanced capitalist societies may lead us to expect that these factors play a significant role in the analysis of political cleavages. However, the literature on electoral behavior pays very little attention to the role of these variables in the analysis of electoral divisions. Some of the most prominent approaches in the analysis of electoral behavior, such as class or value voting, barely make a reference to it (see Evans 1999, and his contributors, Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984, and their contributors, Franklin Mackie and Valen 1992, and their contributors, Inglehart 1990). By failing to do this, these approaches are neglecting an important element of the social context and political opportunity structure.

The benefits of using these variables in analysis of political cleavages are exemplified by findings of Swank and Betz (2003) in their analysis of cross-national differences in voting for radical right parties. In their study, they find that the aggregate vote for the radical right parties is closely correlated with the level of social security society provides for its citizens. High levels of social security is found to depress the radical right vote by reducing the number of social and economic outsiders, who are one of the core constituencies of radical right parties (see Ivarsflaten 2005, Kriesi 1999). Oskarsson (2007) used characteristics of welfare regimes to explain differences in the level of class voting and class-based turnout, and found these to vary between countries depending on, among other things, their levels of social spending and unionization. Finally, in a study of cross national differences in political cleavages, Knutsen (1989 and 1995) finds left-right materialist, religious-secular and materialist-postmaterialist divisions to vary visibly in accordance to variation in welfare regimes.

The literature that deals with changes taking place in welfare and production regimes, especially literature concerning welfare state retrenchment (see, Pontusson 1995, Pierson 2001, Iversen 2001, Iversen and Wren 1998, Iversen and Cusack 2000, Huber and Stephens

2001, Korpi and Palme 2003, Esping Andersen 1999b, Scruggs and Allen 2003), focuses on conflicts and coalitions between social and political actors (such as parties, unions, business associations, groups of welfare state clients and so on), their preferences and actions. But it was not until recently, and only in a small number of studies, that those insights were actually used in the analysis of political preferences and electoral behavior (see Knutsen 2001 for the analysis of electoral behavior; Svallfors 1997, 2004, Linos and West 2003, and Andreß and Hein 2001 for the analysis of attitudinal divisions and support for social policy based on welfare regime; Gelissen 2001 for analysis of pension preferences). Given the importance of welfare state and capitalist production regimes in the character of advanced industrial societies, and the rich literature dealing with political aspects of the welfare state, it would be very difficult to find a plausible argument that would justify not including these variables in the analysis of political cleavages and electoral behavior.

Another element necessary in the analysis of this type concerns the historical strength of particular cleavages. Welfare regimes in a large part define an opportunity structure for political parties by affecting social structure and making some divisions within it more important than others (Huber and Stephens 2001, Huber, Ragin and Stevens 1993, Hicks and Swank 1992, Swank 1988, Hicks and Misra 1993). But on the other hand, pre-existing political divisions also define the nature of partisan alternatives and make some divisions more important than others (see Kriesi *et al.* 2006, Bornschier 2007, Kitschelt 1996).

This and the following sections provide a theoretical framework which establishes the connection between models of capitalism, welfare regimes and historical political divisions on the one hand, and contemporary political divisions and new parties on the other. Starting with institutional and structural differences between welfare and capitalist production regimes, consequences at the micro-level of individual preference formation and macro level of aggregate preference distribution, and their interaction with historical cleavages, the

second part of the chapter describes the development of electoral cleavages and their cross-national variation. In this, I emphasize the role of feedback effects and the actions of political actors, and consider these as crucial elements of the mechanism which brings about cross-national diversity in cleavage patterns.

2.6 Transformation of Political Divisions

Different trajectories in political and social developments across western societies invariably caused variations in the nature and the importance of political cleavages. According to the classic literature on political cleavages, an economic left-right cleavage is present in all societies, while the nature and the importance of cleavages based on religion differs from country to country, depending on the religious composition of their population (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967 and their contributors). The pattern produced by the interaction of those two cleavages varies: in some countries, cleavages based on religion and economic conflict cross-cut each other, forming an essentially two-dimensional pattern of ideological divisions. In other countries, they reinforce each other, and in a third group of countries, the center-periphery division intersects predominant economic and religious divisions (Kitschelt 1996).

The structure of political cleavages in classic industrial societies was largely dominated by class and religion (Manza, Hout and Brooks 1995, Brooks, Nieuwbeerta and Manza 2006, Nieuwbeerta and Manza 2000). At the level of values, these structural divisions were complemented by divisions between economic redistributive and economic liberal values, as well as divisions between secular and religious values. Since in many countries these cleavages also had an organizational dimension supported by the existence of class-based organizations (such as unions and their affiliates, or various religious associations),

undoubtedly classic industrial cleavages were cleavages in the full sense of Bartolini and Mair's (1990) definition.

As Western societies moved to a postindustrial phase, cleavages fitted less and less Bartolini and Mair's concept. Though still rooted in social structure, modern cleavages are harder to link to general structural concepts such as class or religiosity (Oesch and Lachat 2007, Kitschelt and Rehm 2004, Werfhorst and de Graaf 2004, Weeden and Grusky 2005). Greater fragmentation of social structure in modern societies brought about splits within previously homogenous social groups, and the decline of traditional organizations based on class and religion mean that contemporary political divisions have less organizational closure. In turn, this led to a weakening of links between political parties and voters, causing shifts in partisan alignment of sizable groups of voters, enabling new parties to enter the field (Dalton 2002). This led some authors to conclude that 'cleavage' is an obsolete concept and that structured political divisions are being replaced by an increasing fluidity and volatility in voting behavior (Franklin, Mackie and Valen 1992).

Several studies argue that political divisions still have a high degree of structuration but there is disagreement as to how it actually looks like in postindustrial societies (see Inglehart 1997, Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi 1998). Inglehart claims that the materialist-postmaterialist value-cleavage cross-cuts old divisions between economic left and right, as well as religious and secular positions, and that it will soon supersede both in importance (Inglehart 1997). This is because as western societies grow richer and take the absence of major threats of war for granted, the political significance of economic and security issues are bound to decline. As this happens, and as new cohorts enter the electorate, the left-right ideological division based primarily on economic issues will eventually be replaced by a division predominantly based on materialist and postmaterialist value orientations. The more developed and the wealthier the society, the bigger the importance of divisions between

materialist and postmaterialist value orientations (Inglehart 1977, 1990). According to Inglehart, this mechanism is at work in all societies equally and independently of pre-existing variations in social conditions and past developments.

While the value change theory predicts a relatively uniform, but differently timed, development of materialist-postmaterialist cleavages, it fails to account for the effects of social and economic changes related to deindustrialization and globalization. Consequently, it fails to account for cross-national differences in cleavage patterns. However, empirical analyses of cleavages in advanced industrial societies find cross-national variation in the strength and salience of structural and value cleavages, which can not be explained only by the different timing of a uniform developmental pattern (see Knutsen 1988 and 1995a).

Likelier causes for the cross-national variation of ideological cleavages can be found in interactions between relevant historical factors, such as the historical strength of religious and other communitarian divides and more recent political divisions related to welfare state formation and, even more recently, responses to deindustrialization and globalization. These historical factors influenced the developmental paths of cleavages, shaping the form they exist in at present.

Given the historical salience of particular forms of divisions, we can reasonably expect to see the following developments: the strength of religious and communitarian divisions could affect the salience of modern ideological cleavages (based on cultural issues or values), and their alignment with political divisions (based on economic issues). Intense historical competition along cultural and identity issue dimensions is likely to increase the mobilization potential of 'new politics' issues, and create conditions for the replacement of religion and related cultural issues with new politics and politics of identity issues, as existing parties and voters were already accustomed to competition over cultural issues. On the other hand, the strength of economic divisions is likely to be affected by the divisions within

middle and working classes and their cross-class coalitions, the shape of political coalitions, and the policies pursued by main political actors during the formation of the welfare state. Historically intense competition over economic issues is likely to be maintained as parties will start competing over a new set of policies related to deindustrialization and transformation of the welfare state. Policy responses to deindustrialization and service sector growth affect how established parties will manage to incorporate new social groups into their electoral coalitions, and what effect issue niche(s) provide opportunity for successful new parties' entrances.

Comparative empirical analysis of political cleavages in advanced industrial countries conducted by Oddbjorn Knutsen and Elinor Scarborough (1995) finds that the importance of left-right cleavages does not decline across the board, and that countries differ sizably in the salience and structuring power of religious, left-right materialist, and materialist–postmaterialist divisions. In countries with historically strong political divisions based on class and socioeconomic status, economic divisions were more important in structuring political divisions in the 1980s and 1990s than was the case in countries where historical political divisions were either mostly based on religion, or where religion and class were of equal importance (Knutsen and Scarborough 1995, Knutsen 1988, 1995a and 1995b). The pattern of differences between countries also largely corresponds to cross-national variation in welfare regimes. Knutsen's analyses (1988, 1995a) of political cleavages reveal that economic left-right cleavages are dominant in countries characterized by a social-democratic welfare regime and historically insignificant communal or religious divisions. In countries with historically salient communal or religious divisions and a Christian-democratic welfare regime, the salience of new political issues is found to be much higher. Knutsen (1995b) finds similar results regarding the defining features of left and right ideology among the mass public, and the importance of postmaterialist and left-right materialist values in it.

Deindustrialization and globalization also created qualitatively new divisions which combine economic and cultural elements. More recent studies of political cleavages in postindustrial societies argue that a whole new cleavage based on cultural divisions emerged as a result of social and economic changes that took place since the 1970s (Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi 1998, 1999, Kriesi *et al*. 2006, Bornschier 2007). This new cleavage is usually defined as libertarian-authoritarian, and its prevailing content has been changing over time (Kriesi *et al*. 2006, Bornschier 2007). With the decline of the religious-secular cleavage and the rise of new social movements, New Left issues such as ecology, peace and women's rights dominated the content of the cultural cleavage. As the New Left provoked a response in the form of a New Right (Ignazi 1992), issues of cultural homogeneity, attitudes toward immigration and globalization came to the fore. Recently, Kriesi and his co-authors (2006) claim that the new cultural cleavage is largely defined by issues related to economic and social openness, and label it as 'demarcation' versus 'integration' cleavage. Structurally this cleavage is based on a division between insiders and outsiders, or those with transferable skills and resources, and those without such assets (Kriesi 1999, Rueda 2005). Part of this cleavage calls for more economically protectionist and socially exclusivist measures, while the other part calls for integrative, liberalizing and culturally libertarian policies. Overall, the increased salience of the libertarian-authoritarian cultural cleavage significantly changed the nature of cleavages in advanced industrial societies; depending on the salience of underlying issues and structural divisions (namely the insider-outsider division), it also contributed to cross-national variation in cleavage patterns.

Building on these studies, I argue that the origins of cross-national variation in cleavage patterns lie in the interactions between welfare regime characteristics, the historical strength of religious and other communitarian divides, and political divisions related to redistribution and welfare state formation. The strength of religious and communitarian

divisions is likely to affect the salience of modern cultural cleavages, and their alignment with economic cleavages. Intense historical competition along cultural and identity politics dimensions is likely to increase the mobilization potential of 'new politics' issues, and create conditions for the replacement of religion and related cultural issues with new politics and politics of identity (Kriesi *et al*. 2006, Bornschier 2007). On the other hand, the strength of economic divisions is likely to be affected by the historical strength of class divisions, the presence of cross-class coalitions, and policies pursued by the main political actors during the formation of the welfare state. Intense competition over economic issues is likely to be maintained as parties start competing over a new set of policies related to deindustrialization and transformation of the welfare state.

The transformation of cleavages, as described here, represents a path-dependent development of the historical cleavages in interaction with social and economic changes, which provided the opportunity structure for established political parties to realign their position, and for new parties to enter competition. In short, it is an interaction between structure and agency with feedback links running in both directions, as political actors attempt to form electoral coalitions of social groups through policy.

It should be stressed that this mechanism presupposes an important role for political actors (parties) in the development of cleavages. The strength of particular political actors, the way they formed coalitions and the policies they pursued, shaped the formation of ideological cleavages in the future. Therefore, a variation across countries is caused by not only societal differences, but rather, it is the consequence of interaction between societal differences and the actions of the political actors[5]. How exactly this development played out in individual countries is the subject of the following sections.

[5] One of the best examples for such development are policies of expanding welfare state services that created large left constituencies in the public sector and could be expected to be among the causes of the rise in importance of the new politics issues. Such development could also be responsible for potential division within constituencies of the left on old left workerist concerned with economic issues and new left social professional

2.7 Welfare Regimes, Historical Divisions and Political Cleavages

The interaction between welfare regime characteristics and the historical foundations of political divisions produced distinctive patterns of voting behavior across countries. These different patterns are reflected in the presence and strength of structural as well as value divisions, and affected the opportunity structure which determined the emergence of new parties. This section discusses the foundation of cleavages in advanced industrial societies and the links between their structural and value components, and presents how three combinations of historical cleavages and welfare state characteristics yielded specific cleavage patterns. Table 2.2 summarizes the characteristics of the three configurations described below.

2.7.1. Configuration 1: Liberal Welfare Regimes with High Salience of Economic Cleavages and Low Salience of Cultural Cleavages

In this configuration, cleavages are historically predominantly economic in content and structurally rooted in class and socioeconomic status. Cultural issues and identity politics historically did not play a very important role as the salience of religion and nationalism was generally low in the politics of these countries (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Great Britain is the only true case of this configuration in Western Europe and outside of Europe Australia, New Zealand and Canada and potentially also the United States, can be placed within this configuration, tolerating for idiosyncrasies of differences in their political development.

concerned about new politics issues. Such development could also be responsible to the change it the base of economic cleavage from class to sectoral (between public and private sector) (Knutsen 2001, 2005).

Table 2.2 Summary of political divisions in three configurations based on the characteristics of welfare regimes and historical political divisions.

Type	Principal divisions	General dividing issue dimensions	Party carriers
Social democrat welfare regimes with high salience of economic cleavages and medium salience of cultural cleavages	High polarization - economic issues Medium polarization - sociocultural issues	Primary economic and less sociocultural (size of the public sector and taxation, attitudes toward welfare state clients) /public-private sector, socioeconomic status. Economic and sociocultural (welfare services, gender equality, redistribution and moral permissiveness) Dominantly economic (taxation an redistribution) Sociocultural (morality and autonomy of religious groups)	Left socialists vs mainstream right (conservatives, liberals) and radical right Left socialists and social democrats and other libertarian parties (liberals or greens) vs conservatives. radical right and christian democrats Left (social democrats and left socialist) vs right (conservatives and liberals) Christian democrats vs secular parties
Christian democrat welfare regimes with medium salience of economic cleavages and high salience of cultural cleavages	High polarization - sociocultural issues Medium to low polarization -economic issues	Sociocultural (morality and individual freedom, definition of community, cultural homogeneity) Primarily sociocultural but also economic (welfare service, gender equality and moral permissiveness) Dominantly economic (market and welfare system reform) Mix of economic and sociocultural (inclusion of outside groups and position toward established welfare state and its establishment)	Christian democrats vs secular parties Libertarian left, left socialists and potentially social democrats vs mainstream right Social democrats and left socialist vs christian democrats, liberals and potentially libertarian parties Social democrats vs left socialist or radical right
Liberal welfare regimes with high salience of economic cleavages and low salience of cultural cleavages	High polarization - economic issues Low polarization - sociocultural issues	Economic (taxation and redistribution, welfare services and size of public spending) Economic and cultural (immigration and cultural homogeneity, protectionism from globalization)	Left vs conservatives Left and left libertarian vs conservatives

Political competition in these countries is principally about economic issues such as taxation, welfare spending and economic openness, while cultural and identity issues have lower, though generally increasing salience.

The strength of economic divisions did not change significantly over time, as conflict over redistribution and state economic management was replaced with a conflict between protectionist and market-liberal responses to deindustrialization. The rise of issues related to immigration and cultural homogeneity mainly reinforced the existing division between those who are able to compete on the market and those who are not, but these issues did not add significantly to the complexity of the political space. Deregulated labor markets prevented the appearance of sizable groups of outsiders, who were excluded from the labor market; however, the same mechanism produced large groups of low skilled workers in precarious employment, who felt threatened by immigration and free trade (Swank and Betz 2003, Iversen and Wren 1998). While this increased the political salience of immigration, the proximity of the economic-protectionist positions and the cultural-protectionist positions enabled this issue to be largely subsumed into an economic cleavage.

The economic cleavage in these countries is structurally based on class and market position and attitudinally based on a division between redistributive-protectionist positions and market-liberalizing positions. This cleavage first and foremost divides mainstream left and right parties as the principal political actors along clear class/occupational lines and left and right economic values. Although in these countries religious differences sometimes did transform into communitarian divisions, they failed to generate strong self-standing political cleavages (the notable exceptions from this pattern are Northern Ireland and potentially Quebec in Canada). The role of religion in party formation was only minor or non-existent, and there are no significant parties that would predominantly compete on religious or socio-cultural issues. The absence of strong historical communitarian divisions and large

immigration resulted in the low salience of identity politics. The low salience of religion and identity politics allowed these societies (US being a notable exception) to deal with cultural issues relatively easily, and resulted in political divisions that continue to be primarily economic in nature.

The cultural cleavage is closely linked with the economic cleavage, and is based mainly on the division between protection-seeking 'losers' calling for more restrictions on immigration and greater cultural homogeneity, and liberal 'winners' favoring a more open society (see Kriesi *et al.* 2006 and van der Brug and van Spanje 2007). As cultural cleavages are closely linked to economic cleavages, so are partisan alignments, however the space for other parties depends on the overlap of the economic value-cleavage with the cultural value cleavage. Principal political actors in these countries were and still are mainly in secular conservative and labor parties with constituencies that were (and in a way still are) divided mainly along class lines. However, if the overlap of these issues is small, then we can expect to see smaller parties on the radical right with culturally conservative positions, and the emergence of smaller parties on the left-libertarian end of political issue space.

2.7.2. Configuration 2: Social Democrat Welfare Regimes with High Salience of Economic Cleavages and Medium Salience of Cultural Cleavages

The second configuration of political cleavages is characterized by a combination between a dominant economic cleavage and a somewhat less prominent cultural cleavage. This cleavage pattern can be found in countries that have a social democratic type of welfare state such as Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland. The political domination of economic issues has its origin in the formation phase of the social-democratic welfare states, the redistributive policies they brought about, and the class divisions that they accentuated

(Esping Andersen 1990, 1985). The main political cleavage in such a setting became a division between those who supported policies aimed at the creation of a universalist welfare state, and those who opposed it, with significant groups of the middle class holding centrist, but generally supportive views, of the universalist risk-sharing policies (Esping Andersen 1985, Edlund 2003, Svallfors 1999).

In the context of deindustrialization, the economic conflict in content is about the size of the public sector and its economic impact (Garret and Way 1999). This division causes splits within the middle class and the working class constituencies into protectionist and market supportive groups, and is based on employment differences between those in the private and the public sector, differences in exposure to market competition, and dependency on welfare state programs (Knutsen 2001 and 2005). Support for market-based solutions is highest among high income groups and the professional middle class in market-competitive sectors. An intermediate position is held by various segments of workers in industry and services, and middle class groups dependent on public sector services: they are generally supportive of welfare policies but opposed to excessive taxation. The most protectionist groups are public sector employees, low skilled workers exposed to highest market risk, and those highly dependent on the welfare state for income and services.

Cultural-ideological divisions in these countries are somewhat less prominent. Historically, cultural divisions sprung from the cultural and economic divide between center and periphery (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The center-periphery division took the shape of a conflict between the urban and rural economy, and between state Protestant churches and nonconformist denominations over nation building policies, where nonconformist Protestants wanted to maintain the autonomy of their social groups against state interference (Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

In modern times, cultural divisions have taken a more complex shape. The rise of new issues brought left-libertarian and right-authoritarian positions on cultural and moral values, issues of cultural homogeneity, environmental protection and nuclear energy into the heart of this dimension (Granberg and Holmberg 1988). Yet in part, contemporary cultural divisions also resemble an old center-periphery cleavage by taking the form of a division over the role of the welfare state in social life. Modern cultural divisions are about the autonomy of families, religious groups, and local communities from welfare state institutions and regulations. This division provides the foundations for the presence of smaller centrist and religious parties, thus splitting the right vote.

The change in the cultural cleavages partly happened because the policies used to establish social-democratic welfare states and export-oriented economies also created sizable groups of sociocultural professionals in the public as well as private sectors. Public sector employees and part of the professional middle class share left-libertarian positions on cultural issues and pro-environmental positions (Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi 1998, Kitschelt and Rehm 2004); traditional working class constituencies hold opposite views. This created the potential for issue divisions within the left over the question of whether mainstream left parties should adopt a new politics agenda and take a more open and libertarian position on these issues favored by sociocultural professionals, or adopt a protectionist and exclusivist position catering to their traditional working class constituencies. This split of the left electorate opened the way for new left parties or left socialist parties with left-libertarian platforms.

The content of dominant cleavages in countries where this configuration prevails is still economic in character. Cultural divisions distinguish constituencies within both the left and the right. The division between globalization's 'winners' and 'losers' is not likely to be as prominent in these countries partly because high economic openness made the populations of these countries more accustomed to such risks and the presence of an array of welfare and

employment policies, aiming simultaneously to achieve high employment and low inequality, thus preventing the emergence of substantial groups of outsiders (Katzenstein 1985, Iversen and Wren 1998).

2.7.3. *Configuration 3: Christian-Democrat Welfare Regimes with a Medium Salience of Economic Cleavages and a High Salience of Cultural Cleavages*

The third configuration of political cleavages combines two strong but not equally significant cleavages which cross-cut each other. This configuration characterizes countries that were historically predominantly Catholic or religiously mixed, and have a Christian-democratic type of welfare regime. The main political cleavage here is cultural, and concerns new politics issues and cultural homogeneity; the economic cleavage remains important, but slightly less prominent.

Countries belonging to this configuration (Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Italy and Belgium), exhibit strong historical divisions based on religion, and links between church and state (Kalyvas1996, Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The high political salience of religion increased the potential for the emergence of cultural and identity issues, first relating to the conflict between the church and secular elites over the control of education and the legal system and later to issues associated with the secularization of the public space and the relationship between individual rights and religious morality.

Economic divisions are less intense due to the nature of competition between the main parties in the post-war period. In line with the principle of subsidiarity, Christian-democrat parties supported the creation of a corporatist welfare state with a social security system, based on the provision of insurance against risks and income support for families while opposing any significant government intervention in the economy and service provisions

(Manow 2005, Wilensky 1986, Kalyvas 1996). This brought christian democrats closer to social democrats on economic issues, thus rendering the economic cleavage less competitive. The relative weakness of the economic dimension was compounded by the division of the working class between a Christian and a socialist block, as well as by the strong system of corporatist interest mediation, particularistic social policies and clientelistic links between parties and organized interests groups (Wilensky 1986, Keesbergen 1999). Christian-democrat parties frequently used particularistic social policies to forge electoral coalitions among assorted groups of the working class, middle class and petty bourgeoisie (Huber and Stephens 2001, Manow 2005). In the end, the division in the working class reduced the significance of class-voting while the support of christian democrats for a welfare state and redistributive policies reduced the polarization of economic issues (Lynch 2006, Kalyvas 1996).

In recent several decades, with the rise of the new politics agenda, the increasing cultural heterogeneity of Western societies and globalization, the meaning of cultural cleavages has shifted to issues such as environment, multiculturalism, gender equality, immigration and response to globalization and EU integration (Kriesi *et al*. 2006). The rise of these issues brought about a conflict between traditionalists, who wanted to preserve the existing welfare regime, gender division of labor, traditional morality and the cultural homogeneity of societies, and modernizers and new social movements, who wanted to make society more open, whilst respecting individual freedoms and supporting the changing of women's roles (Kriesi 1999, Kitschelt 1994). Calls for greater gender equality and the rise of alternative lifestyles raised issues concerning the role of Christian morality and individual freedom in the definition of basic rights, and it represented the continuation of the division pertaining to the role of religion in public life, although these divisions were not religious.

Another important source of sociocultural divisions is related to the definition of community. Multiculturalism and immigration exerted a strain on the traditional definition of community in continental societies where religion was an important element of social identity. The formation of new bonds of social solidarity inevitably entailed redefinition of the role of religion, and redefinition of what being a member of the community means. This had an impact on the salience of issues regarding the status and integration of immigrants and the definition of citizenship. Finally, the worsening economic position of unskilled workers and other 'losers' of globalization increased perception that immigration constitutes an economic threat to them (Kriesi *et al*. 2006).

On the structural level, the rise of new politics and the expansion of the private service sector in continental countries helped to bring about a division between the old and new left. This division was also predominantly cultural in character, and divided the old working class and trade union constituencies as well as professional middle class constituencies. Due to the small size of the public sector, a large segment of new service professionals was employed in the private and semi-private service sector. So, it is plausible that they hold less redistributive preferences than both the old left and their counterparts in Scandinavian countries, making the division on the left deeper.

Deindustrialization and an increased female participation in the labor market in continental countries produced a large surplus of labor force that could not be absorbed by the rise of employment in the service sector, due to fiscal constraints and the heavily regulated labor markets (Iversen and Wren 1998). Large structural unemployment affected unskilled young males particularly hard, and contributed to the growing significance of a division between insider and outsider groups. Significant insider-outsider divisions increased the political salience of issues related to immigration, globalization and access to the welfare system. Specifically, the insecurity of groups which had a difficult time coping with social

and economic changes pushed forward a 'New Right' agenda characterized by social exclusivist attitudes, welfare chauvinism, and an anti-establishment appeal. Therefore, in continental countries we expect a greater range and higher salience of sociocultural issues. The economic cleavage is expected to be less aligned with the cultural cleavage than in the other two configurations and less polarizing. The rise of cultural issues related to the agenda of new left, such as ecology, gender equality and individual freedom created the space for the emergence of new left parties. On the other hand, the rise of cultural issues related to immigration and identity politics together with the rise of insider-outsider divisions in the labor market opened the space for the emergence of the parties with a radical right agenda.

Chapter 3
Changes in Political Divisions at the Structural Level, Support for New Parties and Cross-National Variation in the Structure of Modern Political Divisions

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter I focus on structural divisions within the electorates of advanced industrial democracies, the shape that these divisions take in the postindustrial period, and the sources of support for new parties. Specifically, I examine the role that structural factors play in the shaping of electoral divisions between electorates of the mainstream left and mainstream right parties, as well as between the new left and mainstream left, and the New Right and mainstream right parties. Through such an analysis, this chapter aims to assess the effects of the fragmentation of postindustrial social structure on electoral divisions, and it seeks to illuminate the link between changes in the social structure and the emergence of new parties.

Chapter two presented sources of changes in the social structure of postindustrial societies, and how these changes affected the aggregate distribution of preferences; it also presented the shape of structural divisions and described how these affected the formation of preferences at the individual level. In this chapter I build on the argument presented in chapter two and develop and test a set of hypotheses describing the development of the structural foundations of electoral divisions in countries of West Europe.

The chapter proceeds in the following manner: in order to establish the link between the social structure and the voting behavior of various social groups, I link the determinants

of structural position with preferences on cultural and economic issue dimensions. For this, I rely on the extensive literature that analyzes sources of political preferences on economic and cultural issue dimensions, and determinants of electoral behavior in advanced industrial democracies (see Kitschelt and Rhem 2004a and 2005, Werfhorst and de Graaf 2004, Oesch 2005 and 2006, Oesch and Laschat 2007, Muller 1999, Evans 2003 and 2005, Knutsen 2001 and 2005, Ivarsflaten 2005). In the process, I link social groups and their preferences with the positions of political parties, and I derive a set of propositions outlining their expected voting behavior and how it varies across countries. At the same time, I use the framework provided in chapter two to crystallize hypotheses about differences in the impact of individual-level structural variables on voting behavior across countries. I expect their impact to vary in accordance with characteristics of the welfare state, responses to deindustrialization, and historical political divisions.

The empirical analysis in this chapter focuses on the structural determinants of electoral behavior at the individual level, and is analyzed in each country separately. I use individual level data from 13 countries at two time points, and use multinomial regression as a method of analysis in assessing the impact of a set of structural variables on voting behavior. The first time point covers the period of the early 1970s when the developments discussed in this study did not yet start to take shape or were in their initial stages; the second time point covers the period at the beginning of this decade when changes in the political divisions of postindustrial societies were apparent for some time and are fully translated into electoral divisions. The selection of these particular time points is expected to provide a useful contrast of the impact of main structural divisions between the industrial and postindustrial social structure.

The data for the analysis at the first time point covers 11 out of 13 countries, and is taken from the Political Action Survey and International Politics and Mobility data file. The

data for the analysis at the second time point comes from the first two waves of the European Social Survey and includes all 13 countries. The selection of these time points was, in a way, restricted by both the lack of survey data for certain countries in the 1980s and 1990s and the problem of comparing measures of social structure across surveys. Surveys used in the analysis here have the benefits of comparing measures of social structure across countries and time points, and almost complete cover the 13 countries included in this analysis.

The chapter proceeds as follows: in the second section I briefly discuss the issues raised in the literature on political divisions in advanced industrial democracies, regarding the impact of social structure on political attitudes and behavior, and the issues relating to its measurement in an empirical analysis. Given that the effects of social and economic context are expected to affect the way individual level variables shape political attitudes and behavior in each country, the hypothesis will also account for the cross-national variation in the effects of individual level variables. In order to fully explain my hypotheses in this and the following chapter, the third section presents positions of political parties grouped into seven party families, as found in data derived from expert surveys and the content analysis of party programs (Laver and Benoit 2006, Kriesi *et. al.*2006, Marks *et. al.* 2002); the fourth section outlines expectations about the impact of individual determinants of social positions on political attitudes and behavior; the fifth section outlines propositions describing the impact of structural variables on political divisions in postindustrial societies, and their differences across countries; the sixth section describes the data and discusses the method used in the empirical analysis; the seventh section presents and discusses the results from both levels of analysis, while the final section provides a summary of conclusions.

3.2 The Role of Structural Factors in the Analysis of Political Divisions

Within the last several decades, a number of comparative studies raised questions regarding the continued importance of social structure in shaping political divisions in advanced industrial societies. These studies claimed that the role of the social structure in the shaping of political divisions waned when declining levels of class and religious voting took place while West European societies entered into a postindustrial phase of development (Franklin, Mackie and Valen 1992, Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984, Nieuwbeerta 1996). Most of these studies argue that the social structure of postindustrial societies became more fluid and more complex, with less clear lines of demarcation between social groups and almost a total absence of closure in social group membership. However, as already stated in the previous two chapters, these conclusions are mostly based on the analysis using operationalization, or variables that measure individual positions in social structure based on concepts made largely obsolete by the social and economic developments related to the shift of West European societies towards the postindustrial phase of development.

Recent research sheds an entirely different light on the role of social structure in the formation of political divisions in advanced industrial societies: the social structures of postindustrial societies is more complex and substantially more fragmented than the social structures of classic industrial societies (see chapter two for a review and Macy 1988, Esping Andersen 1993, Weeden and Grusky 2005, Oesch 2006a). This complexity and fragmentation was inevitably translated into the political sphere and political attitudes and behavior.

More recent studies of political attitudes and behavior using operationalization of social structure designed to capture divisions' salient in postindustrial societies find a very different picture regarding the impact of social structure on both (Kitschelt and Rehm 2004,

2004, Werfhorst and de Graaf 2004, Oesch 2005s and 2006, Laschat and Oesch 2007, Knutsen 2001 and 2005, Evans 2003 and 2005, Ivarsflaten 2005). The impact of social structure on political behavior did not decline to the extent suggested by Franklin, Mackie and Valen (1992), Inglehart (1990) or Nieuwbeerta (1996). However, given the difficulties encountered in operationalizing measures of structural divisions in empirical analyses, it is difficult to make a comparison between the periods and reach a conclusion about the importance of social structure over time. This challenge is amplified as postindustrial social structures cannot be captured through parsimonious concepts such as class (Weeden and Grusky 2005). The social structure of postindustrial societies is more complex and contains a larger number of elements which determine the position of an individual or social group in it (Oesch 2006, Weeden and Grusky 2005, Esping Andersen 1993). Therefore, the analysis of social structure and its impact on political behavior require a more detailed operationalization of variables measuring individual socioeconomic positions (Grusky and Weeden 2005). This is rarely possible in an empirical analysis, given the sample sizes available in most social science surveys and the need to use a manageable operationalization of an individual's sociostructural position, but also because the variables used to measure social structure in most survey are seldom tailored to fit the concepts they are required to measure. Furthermore, some elements which determined an individual's socioeconomic position is considered as highly relevant in postindustrial societies (such as the status in the labor market and specificity of skills), are either conceptually not very clearly defined or are very difficult to measure with variables available in the existing social science surveys.

In order to contend with these problems, recent studies of social structure in advanced industrial societies proposed the use of a number of additions and modifications to concepts which define social structures and to the manner these concepts are operationalized. These recommendations range from the use of new class or occupation schemes, to the creation of

new concepts which tap some structural divisions, such as sector of employment, skill specificity or insider/outsider labor market status, which were not as relevant in the analysis of social structure and its effects in classic industrial societies (Oesch 2006a, Esping Andersen 1993 and 1999a, Kriesi 1999, Rueda 2005). Weeden and Grusky (2005) went even further and recommended the abandonment of the aggregated class and occupation schemes used in studies of industrial social structures, and a switch towards a more detailed and more fragmented scheme, in which categories are defined by more complex criteria in interaction with several factors which defined an individual's sociostructural position.

Still, despite these difficulties, a number of studies tackled the impact of social structure on political divisions and found it to be highly relevant for the structuring of political attitudes and behavior in advanced industrial societies, and, at the same time, more complex and more fragmented compared with a social structure of classic industrial societies. In a study of divisions within the middle class, Macy (1988) finds that experiences related to a position within an organization and the focus of work and task structure vary significantly between the new and the old segments of the middle class, this variation brings about differences in the political attitudes and behavior between these segments. Also, he discovers that new segments of the middle class among social and cultural professionals are substantially more libertarian and in favor of economic redistribution than segments of the old middle class. Werfhorst and de Graaf (2004) also find that the middle class is divided due to differences in the organizational and work-process related experiences, but also because of differences in the focus of the education that members of middle class receive. Education which focuses on communicative skills fosters preferences for a more tolerant and inclusive society and greater individual freedom, as opposed to education focused on efficient problem-solving and management of organizations and hierarchies, which fosters preferences

for hierarchical and a more authoritarian type of social organization and individual compliance to social norms.

Lachat and Oesch (2007) analyzed the impact of occupational positions defined in terms of work characteristics and hierarchical positions on attitudes of cultural and economic issues using European Social Survey data (ESS) in more than 20 countries. Specifically, they searched for divisions within that middle and working classes and for divisions based on market status and occupational hierarchy. The findings of their rather comprehensive analysis found divisions on horizontal and vertical dimensions of occupational hierarchy. Divisions based on market status and occupational hierarchy, are found to be the strongest over economic issues between the traditional middle class and self-employed on the one hand and working class on the other. Within the middle class they found sociocultural professionals to be somewhat more to the left on economic issues, and more libertarian than traditional segments of the middle class in managerial and technical professions. On the cultural dimension, small business owners are significantly more authoritarian than any segment of the middle class, which deepens the cultural divide, but at the same time they are fairly close to the traditional middle class on the economic dimension. On the lower end of the occupational scale, Lachat and Oesch observed that industrial workers are more authoritarian than service workers, but these divisions are not as strong and pronounced as those on the upper end of the occupational scale. In any case, results of this study provide a strong support for the argument that an increased complexity of the occupational structure in postindustrial societies is translated into the political sphere.

In a comprehensive study analyzing the impact of social placements on a range of preferences for various social and economic policies, Kitschelt and Rehm (2004) find that the positions of individuals on a number of these issues is substantially affected by the interaction of market experiences, organizational and work related experiences, and skills. Among other

things, they find that the possession of more marketable skills and resources and work on jobs which are more exposed to the market leads to stronger support for the market allocation of resources, while the possession of less sophisticated and marketable skills and a greater dependency on social services supports a centralized political allocation of resources. Higher education and communication-intensive work in organizations where hierarchical lines are less clear fosters preferences for social reciprocity and less hierarchical social organization, while object processing work in hierarchical organizations fosters preferences for the organization of society along similar lines and preferences for the compliance to social norms over individual freedom.

Similarly, several studies found that the elements of the social structure of advanced industrial societies are visibly linked to voting behavior. For example, Kitschelt and Rehm (2004 and 2005) find that the propensity of an individual voter to vote for the left and right parties is affected by different combinations of work-related experience, market position, education and gender. Exposure to the market and ownership of marketable skills and assets is found to increase support for the right parties, while communicative work experiences is found to have an opposite effect and increases the likelihood of support for left parties. Also, strong support for left parties (especially the new left) is found among women and more educated segments of the population, as well as those located at the middle and lower end of the occupational hierarchy.

In a longitudinal study of structural cleavages in Scandinavia since the 1970s, Knutsen (2001) finds the increasing role of gender and sector of employment in the structuring of electoral behavior. His analysis shows that since the 1970s the impact of divisions between the middle and the working classes has declined; he observed a large increase in the vote of middle class for the left parties (especially left socialists), and at the same time he found the opposite to be the case for the working class, with an increase in the

support for bourgeoisie parties. Knutsen attributes these changes to an increase in the size of the new middle class of cultural and social professionals employed mostly in the public sector, and to the growing importance of distributive divisions between public and private sectors. At the same time, he also finds that the sector of employment and gender are increasingly important in determining voting behavior in Scandinavian countries, where public sector workers and women tend to vote predominantly for the left parties, especially left-socialists. The longitudinal element in Knutsen's analysis reveals that the observed trends have gained strength since the 1970s as traditional class voting has declined and the role of the sector of employment and gender increases in importance as Scandinavian societies shift toward the postindustrial phase of development.

In a broader analysis of the impact of the sector of employment on electoral behavior, Knutsen (2005) finds that the impact of sector of employment varies in accordance with characteristics of the public sector across countries: he finds the sector of employment is strongest in universal welfare states with strong service provisions, followed by countries such as France or Britain with smaller public sectors but a still visible role of the state in the provision of services. He attributes the divisions manifest in the electoral behavior of the middle class to the effects of differences in their sector of employment.

In the analysis of class voting in Germany, Muller (1999) finds an increasing split in the voting behavior of the middle class, mostly visible in cohorts born after the Second World War. He finds that the members of the new middle class increasingly tend to support left parties, and especially the Green Party, while traditional middle class members continue to support mainstream right parties. This trend is also reflected in the impact of education on voting behavior, with reduced differences in the impact of education on voting for the left and the right parties, and a high concentration of educated segments of the population in the electorate of the Green Party. The finding that the electorate of the Green Party is

predominantly composed from the educated new middle class professionals in a way suggests that the rise of green parties, akin to the revival of left socialist parties in Scandinavia, is a consequence of the emergence of a qualitatively new constituency. A comparative study of the electorate of green parties conducted by Dolezal (2007) also finds that the electorate of green parties in most countries of West Europe is composed from educated middle class professionals employed mostly in services. Heath and Savage (1995) and Werfhorst and de Graaf (2004) find occupational divisions very similar to those found by Muller: both studies find that social and cultural professionals are located on the left-libertarian end of the political space and vote for the left parties, while business and technical professionals are located at the opposite end and vote for the liberal and conservative parties.

Several studies which focus on the sources of support for radical right parties finds further evidence that the impact of social structure on voting behavior became more complex, but did not decline in postindustrial societies. Ivarsflaten (2005) finds that the support for the radical right is composed of low skilled segments of the working class and the petty bourgeoisie, groups which hold otherwise visibly different economic preferences, are united in their preferences for cultural protectionism and opposition towards globalization. Similar results are found in a study by Evans (2003), who also finds that radical right parties are supported by segments of the population adversely affected by globalization, namely unskilled workers and the petty bourgeoisie. Evans also finds visible differences between countries in the characteristics of the radical right electorate. In European countries with universal welfare state the radical right electorate is composed predominantly of segments of the petty bourgeoisie which are opposed to a universal welfare state and the taxation needed to pay for it. In European countries with less extensive welfare states, a sizable segment of the radical right electorate comes from low-skilled workers, including those employed in the services (Evans 2005). He argues that differences between countries are linked to

characteristics of the welfare regimes: in universal welfare states, low skilled workers (especially those in services), are either employed in the public sector or effectively protected by active labor market policies; as a result, these workers feel less exposed to risk and therefore less amenable for mobilization with appeals calling for the exclusion of immigrants and cultural protectionism. The opposite is the case in countries with conservative welfare states characterized by large groups of labor market outsiders, especially among unskilled workers employed in the private sector services.

The point that these studies make is that the structural determinants of politics did not disappear and became irrelevant as Franklin, Mackie and Valen, Dalton, Flanagan and Beck argued. Rather, determinants of an individual's position in the social structure, including work-related experience, position in the market, lifestyle and education, still largely affect the interests, attitudes and the way members of particular social groups act politically. Furthermore, these studies show that there are signs which impact the structural variables in some aspects of electoral behavior, which varies visibly across countries. Also, contextual factors need to be brought into the analysis if this variation is to be assessed.

However, the fact remains that the complexity of the social structure and limitations posed by the data available in social surveys makes it difficult to operationalize and analyze the impact of social structure in accordance with the concepts advanced in the literature (see Oesch 2006a and Kitschelt and Rhem 2004a for examples of this). This affects the credibility of empirical studies, as most of their findings have a rather unimpressive performance in terms of model fit. Still, when these limitations are factored in, the findings of these studies provide a useful guidance for the formation of hypotheses about the impact that changes in the social structures in postindustrial societies of West Europe have on the formation of political divisions, the fragmentation of the political space, and the support base of new political parties.

In order to establish the link between the impact of social structure on political divisions, the mechanism connecting the social position of an individual voter with his preferences, and further down the line also with his voting behavior, needs to be established. In order to do this, the preferences of social groups need to be linked with the positions of political parties.

Therefore, this chapter in the following sections link the position of political parties provided in the next section, and the preferences of individual voters and social groups on the economic and cultural issues outlined in chapter two. This chapter develops hypotheses about the exact effects of individual positions in social structure on electoral behavior. In the following step, the linking of these two elements with the contextual factors (also discussed in chapter two), is used as a foundation for the formation of hypotheses about the impact that contextual variables have on the role of particular structural variables in the development of divisions among electorates in postindustrial societies of West Europe.

3.3 Positions of Political Parties

A number of empirical studies which use data collected through expert surveys and the content analysis of party messages in the media, map the positions of political parties in the political space, as defined with economic and cultural issue dimensions (see Marks *et al.* 2006 and Marks *et al.* 2002, Laver and Benoit 2006, Kriesi *et al.* 2006). The conclusions of these studies concerning the general position of parties belonging to individual party families are broadly similar. Marks, Hooge and others (Marks *et. al.* 2006 and Marks *et. al.* 2002) using expert surveys, find that parties are principally distributed along a single dimension which they define as GAL (Green Alternative Liberal) – TAN (Traditional Authoritarian

Nationalistic) dimension. Kriesi and his co-authors, who derived their data about party positions from the analysis of the content of party messages seen through newspaper reports, find that parties are similarly distributed along a single dimension of competition ranging from the left-libertarian end to the right-authoritarian end (Kriesi *et. al*. 2006). They find that the distribution of main parties is fairly similar and stable over time; the only difference is that the content of the cultural dimension has changed since the 1970s when their analysis begins. Based on the results of their expert survey data, Laver and Benoit reach similar conclusions regarding the dimensionality of political space on the supply side, and the distribution of parties within it (Laver and Benoit 2006). This conclusion is based on factor analysis with measures of party positions on a number of individual issue dimensions indicating positions on economic and cultural issues and issues, related to the European integration.[6] Factor analysis yields one dominant factor which explains the bulk of variance, and has very high loadings from almost all variables measuring party positions on economic issues (such as taxation and deregulation), and positions on cultural issues (such as social liberalism or immigration). The results show that parties are distributed along a single dimension ranging from the left-libertarian end where new left parties are located, to the market-authoritarian end where new Right parties are located.

All these studies find roughly similar results and draw fairly similar conclusions regarding the content of dimensions of political competition and the distribution of political parties. With the use of this expert survey data, this section briefly outlines the general positions of parties which belong to seven party families used in the analysis in this and the following chapter. The presentation is restricted to only general positions on economic and cultural dimensions, and does not address specific issues which compose these dimensions.

[6] The variables included in the factor analysis include measures of party positions toward public spending. Social liberalism, environment, decentralization, immigration, deregulation and the European union.

The general location of party families on economic and cultural dimensions derived from expert surveys corresponds to the following pattern:

- Radical left parties (communist and left socialists) are on the left end of the economic dimension. Their position on the cultural dimension depends on the roots of these parties and the composition of their electorate. Old working class parties, notably communists (such as those in France and Italy) but also some newer parties, which heavily represent working class (SP in the Netherlands) are closer to the authoritarian end, while new left parties such as left socialists and related parties in Scandinavian countries are closer to the libertarian end of the cultural dimension.
- Green parties are on the far libertarian end of the cultural dimension. Their position on the economic dimension is likely to be very similar to the position of social-democrat parties, or slightly more to the left of social democrats. In some countries (Germany recently – see Kriesi *et. al.* 2006), these parties may also take a position which is economically more centrist than the position of social democrats.
- Social-democrats are found in most countries to be slightly left of the center on the economic dimension, and hold mildly libertarian positions on the cultural dimension. On both dimensions, the positions of social democrat parties can vary somewhat between the center and middle of the range on the libertarian end of the cultural dimension, and between the center and the middle of the range on the left side of the economic dimension. This depends on the position of competitors and the importance of the new professional middle class and working class in their electorate (Kitschelt 1994).
- Christian democrats are likely to hold positions located in the range from slightly right of center toward substantively right-of-center on the economic dimension, and are closer to the authoritarian end on the cultural dimension.

- Liberal parties combine pro-market right positions with positions on the cultural dimension, which can extend from slightly libertarian to substantially libertarian.
- Conservative parties are found to be on the pro-market pole of the economic dimension, and between the center and mildly authoritarian position on the cultural dimension.
- Radical right parties are found to hold distinctively authoritarian positions on the cultural dimension, and economic positions located somewhere between the center and the right end on the economic dimension.

As outlined in the previous section these positions are matched with general preferences of social groups outlined in chapter two, and this pairing is used to form propositions about the impact of structural divisions on voting behavior in all countries covered by this analysis.

3.4 The Impact of Social Structure on Political Preferences

This section briefly summarizes how the determinants of an individual's position in the social structure affect political preferences and behavior, and how their impact varies across countries. Building on the previous chapter, this section first reviews how factors which determine the position of an individual in the social structure of postindustrial societies affect preferences and voting behavior. Then, I outline more precisely how the effects of these variables vary across countries.

The determinants of an individual's position in the postindustrial social structure can conceptually be classified into three groups: the first group of factors includes the determinants of an individual's work-related experiences, such as focus and the type of work

position in the organizational hierarchy, the degree of autonomy and hierarchical control one is exposed to at work, the nature of communication, and the degree of reciprocity in social interactions (see Kriesi 1999, Kitschelt 1994). These factors affect what type of social organization one prefers, the level of tolerance one has for different views and positions, and how one perceives the position of others in society (Werfhorst and de Graaf 2004, Macy 1988).

The second group of factors is related to an individual's position in the market and the nature of assets and skills he owns, their mobility and marketability (see Kitschelt 1994 and Kitschelt and Rhem 2005, Iversen and Soskice 2001). One's position in the market also depends on the location within the system of production, which determines the preferences for the particular mode of production and allocation of resources. Factors that belong to this group affect how individuals perceive the distribution of goods and resources in society, and the preferences for the type of mechanism that society uses to allocate goods and resources.

The third group of factors is related to consumption styles and one's position within a life-cycle. The mechanism that influences the formation of preferences by this set of factors is based on the need for particular goods and services and the way in which these needs are fulfilled. The nature of need for certain goods affects preferences for a particular system of allocation of goods, while at the same time, the consumption patterns and the social environment one is exposed to is also said to affect the views on how society should be organized, who should belong to it, and what the position of an individual within it should be (see Kitschelt 1994, Kitschelt and Rhem 2004a and 2004b).

In short, the first set of factors primarily affects the way one thinks about the role of social hierarchy and authority, the boundaries of a community, and the role of an individual within a society; the second set of factors primarily affects preferences for the rules which regulate the distribution of resources: the role of the market or centralized allocation of

resources, and the views on who should have access to these resources; the third set of factors affects preferences on both of these dimensions. These preferences are allocated on a two-dimensional issue space, where one dimension contains the positions of citizens who regard the rule governing the allocation and production of economic resources, while the other dimension contains positions for the rules which define the boundaries of a community, type of social organization, and rights of individual citizens (Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi *et. al*. 2008). These two dimensions are described as 'libertarian-authoritarian' and 'economic left-right', where the bulk of the electorate is said to be allocated on an axis connecting the left-libertarian and right-authoritarian ends, while only minor groups of voters are located in the space not aligned to the principal axis. Recent analysis of political value cleavages by van der Brug and van Spanje (2007) found that the position of the bulk of the electorate is closer to the authoritarian pole of the cultural dimension, and is divided on an economic dimension; smaller segments of the electorate are located on the libertarian pole, mostly on the end which combines libertarian and left positions with smaller groups located on the right and libertarian pole.

Given the nature of the data available in social science surveys at the individual level, these concepts cannot be easily measured directly, since measures available in surveys are rarely designed with the aim of capturing these concepts (Weeden and Grusky 2005). Concepts which belong to the first group are measured with the indicators of the level and the type of education and indicators of occupational status, which indicate the type and the focus of work that one does and the position within the organizational hierarchy that one holds. Occupational categories at this level are distinguished by whether their primary focus of work is on dealing with people and symbols, or processes and objects; and also whether occupational placement generates intensive communicative engagement and social

reciprocity in interactions, or whether the communicative process is less intense and takes place in a hierarchical context (see Kitschelt 1994, Oesch 2006).

The second group of concepts is measured with multiple indicators. The location in the system of production is measured by the sector of employment, distinguishing those exposed to the pressures of the market and those protected from it on the one level and those dependent on the budget financing and those dependent on market competitiveness for survival on the other. The asset possession is usually measured by indicators of income, and the skill levels are usually measured with indicators of education. Insider or outsider status in the labor market is measured by indicators of employment position, skill specificity, or both. Occupation is used to measure the placement in the organizational category and the type of skills that one possesses. This is necessary to distinguish between skilled and unskilled workers, and the middle class professionals and petty bourgeoisie, as groups are easily distinguishable by the level and mobility of skills.

The third group of concepts is operationalized with variables indicating an individual's position in the life cycle, notably age, and measures indicating the position in the social structure, presumably related to a certain form of need (such as indicators of retired status or gender). Lastly, these concepts can be operationalized with indicators measuring the actual use of services and goods, and the way in which these are acquired (measures of home ownership or the use of some social services for example), organizational affiliations and religiosity.

At the level of operational measures, occupational status is measured in a way which distinguishes groups of occupations horizontally and vertically (Oesch 2006). Horizontally this measure captures differences with respect to the focus and the type of work, while vertically it captures differences with respect to market positions and skills. The main groups on the vertical dimension are skilled and unskilled workers, middle class professionals and

petty bourgeoisie. On the horizontal dimension, the main differences are between those working on communicative and client interactive jobs (sociocultural professionals and service workers), and those working on administrative and object-processing jobs (administrative and technical professionals, office clerks, and industrial workers). Differences between occupations on the horizontal dimension affect their divisions over cultural issues, while those on the vertical dimension affect their divisions over economic issues.

Education measures the level of skill and mobility of skill, but it also indicates the exposure to the socialization process, which leads to the adoption of a broader and more tolerant world view (Weakliem 2001). Education is considered a determinant of positions on both cultural and economic dimensions.

Income is a measure of wealth and ownership of mobile resources, such as capital assets or other forms of wealth. It is considered to be mainly a determinant of positions on the economic dimension (Kitschelt and Rehm 2004).

The sector of employment is a measure of a location in the system of production and the type of work. It is operationalized either as the difference between employment in the public and private sectors, or the difference between employment in the market-oriented and not-for-profit sectors. In this form, it is expected to affect preferences on economic issues. Due to differences in the type of work and gender composition of the employment between sectors, the sector of employment is also likely to affect positions on cultural issues (Knutsen 2001, 2005, Huber and Stephens 2000).

Labor market status, in interaction with skill level, is used to distinguish between insiders and outsiders in the labor market, and as a measure which clearly separates those who are capable of adapting to deindustrialization and globalization, and those who are not capable of doing so (Kriesi 1999, Esping Andersen 1999b, Rueda 2005). It also captures the

level of exposure to threats posed by some side effects of globalization and deindustrialization, such as the reallocation of jobs and immigration (Kriesi 1999).

The remaining indicators of structural determinants of political divisions include: sex, which, in interaction with age, affects the structure of preferences for both cultural and economic issues; religiosity, which affects positions on cultural issues and age, and work and activity status, for which there are no clear hypotheses regarding the direction of their effects.

After discussing these indicators, I turn to their effects on preferences on the cultural and economic dimension and expected voting behavior, as advanced in the literature. It must be noted that some studies argue that it is hard to derive clear hypotheses about the impact of postindustrial social structure on political divisions in advanced industrial democracies (Bornschier, forthcoming, Kitschelt and Rhem 2005): These studies argue that in the fragmented social structure, several determinants impact voting behavior at the same time and can often pull in opposite directions. However, while this is indeed the case, some characteristic effects will still be visible and can provide enough evidence to support the hypothesis that fragmented social structure is transferred into fragmentation in political divisions. For this purpose, it suffices to show that the electorate of new parties is composed from social groups which emerge in the process of sociostructural changes brought about by deindustrialization and globalization.

The positions of occupational groups on economic and cultural dimensions can be summarized in the following way: sociocultural professionals and service workers with intensive communicative experiences and client-interactive work are more libertarian on cultural issues, and more supportive of redistribution and regulation on economic issues than occupations with comparable levels of education and at a comparable position in the occupational hierarchy (namely administrative, technical professional, manual workers and clerks respectively), who work on jobs focused on object processing and administration. At

the same time, it is expected that within occupational sub-hierarchies, those with higher levels of education and positions in the occupational hierarchy are likely to be more libertarian on cultural issues; those at the lower level of their respective sub-hierarchy are expected to hold the opposite views: this means that social and cultural professionals are likely to be more libertarian and economically left than technical and social professionals, and that a similar division can be observed between service workers and administrative and manual workers. The petty bourgeoisie, as a separate category, is located closer to the authoritarian pole and pro-market pole. Table 3.1 summarizes the positions of these occupational groups along both cultural and economic dimensions.

Table 3.1 The distribution of occupational groups in horizontal and vertical divisions on cultural and economic issue dimensions.

	Vertical division	Horizontal division		
Economic dimension **Market supportive**	Middle class	Petty bourgeoisie	Business and technical professionals	Sociocultural professionals
	Petty bourgeoisie			
	Non-manual workers		Administrative and clerical	Client interactive services
	Manual workers		Skilled craft workers	Skilled service workers
Redistributive	Unskilled workers		Unskilled manual workers	Unskilled service workers
		Cultural dimension **Authoritarian** **Libertarian**		

Given this distribution of cultural and economic preferences, we expect that social and cultural professionals will be supportive of either social-democrat or new left parties, while technical and social professionals will support conservative or liberal parties. Industrial and office workers with higher skills are equally likely to support mainstream left and center-right parties, depending on the position of these parties on economic and cultural issues. Service workers can be described as supporters of the left parties, including both mainstream social democrats and radical left parties. The petty bourgeoisie is considered to be the core constituency of the radical right parties, while low-skilled workers are equally likely to be supportive of radical left parties (if mobilized by economic appeals), or radical right parties (if mobilized by anti-immigrant and authoritarian appeals) (Ivarsflaten 2005, Evans 2005 and 2003).

Turning to the expectations of the impact that sector of employment has on vote choice, employees in the public and not-for-profit sector hold strongly libertarian and economically left preferences. Therefore, public sector workers are more likely to vote for the left parties and particularly new left parties (Knutsen 2001). Depending on the position of social-democrats in the economic and cultural dimensions, this group will vote for new left parties if mainstream social-democrats hold centrist positions and are closer to the left-libertarian pole. Private (for profit) sector workers form a more heterogeneous group, and their voting behavior depends on their occupation, skills and assets. Controlling for other factors, this group is likely to be located to the right of public sector workers on both issue dimensions, and is consequently more likely to support mainstream right parties.

The impact of the market position and transferability of skills, and of insider or outsider status can be described in the following way: outsider groups are likely to be strongly economically protectionist and culturally exclusivist, which this is likely to make them vote for the radical left parties which emphasize economic protectionism (such as

French and Italian communists, SP and PDS in Germany), or radical right parties which emphasize sociocultural protectionism. Insider groups (here I use the term in accordance with Rueda's (2005) definition), meaning unionized workers with protected employment, are likely to vote for social democrats parties or centrist right parties such as christian democrats, if these parties maintain support for the existing systems of employment protection.

Higher education is said to foster libertarian views and preferences for economic liberalism, but its effect on economic preferences in advanced industrial societies has recently become more muted (Weakliem 2001). Weakliem argues that this is likely to be the consequence of a decline in the earnings premium previously related to higher education, which occurred as a consequence of massive expansion in high education enrolment. As argued by Werfhorst and de Graaf (2004), the effect of education on economic and cultural preferences most likely shifted from the *level* of education towards the *type* of education. However, given that most surveys do not allow for the measurement of the type of education, these effects are better captured by an indicator of occupational position. Therefore, the only expectation that is that higher education fosters libertarian preferences, and that after controlling for occupation, it should be correlated with the higher likelihood of support for the new left or liberal parties.

Gender division in the labor market exists at the level of preferences and voting behavior. Women (especially younger) are more likely than men to be employed in jobs with intensive communicative work and located in the public sector (Esping Andersen 1999a and 1999b). So since they have a greater need for public provisions of social services than men (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006), it is argued that women (controlling for other factors), are more likely to support left and libertarian positions, and therefore more likely to vote for the new left or social democrat parties (see Knutsen 2001, Kitschelt and Rhem 2005).

The impact of structural variables on political divisions, and consequently on the electoral base of new parties, is expected to vary across countries. This variation is likely to be dependent on the characteristics of social structure as such, but also on the elements of the competitive situation and partisan composition of government. As is argued in chapter two, characteristics of the social structure are highly dependent on the type of welfare state and response to deindustrialization. In accordance with the three configurations of political divisions introduced in the second chapter, I expect to observe the following differences in the structure of political divisions across countries: these differences do not imply that the direction of the impact of individual variables will differ across countries. It does, however, mean that some divisions will be more important in countries where structural conditions are favorable for their emergence. Also, the support base of new parties on the left and right is also likely to vary somewhat, depending on the characteristics of the social structure as defined partly by the type of welfare regime. The described developments take place simultaneously as the process of fragmentation of the social structure. In fact, a more accurate description would be that the formation of such divisions represents the national manifestation of the fragmentation process. This brings us to the following set of expectations.

Because of the size of public sector employment and female participation in the labor market, it can be expected that structural divisions based on the sector of employment will play a prominent role in the structuring of political divisions in countries with social-democrat welfare states, characterized by high public sector employment and women participation in the labor market. Furthermore, we can also expect to see strong occupational divisions, both on horizontal and vertical axes, because of the impact of taxation, size of the public sector and the distributive conflict between private and public sector workers (see Garret and Way 1999, Iversen 1996). Structural divisions within the electorate, based on

socioeconomic positions, are likely to produce the structural underpinnings for the maintenance of cleavages based on an economic divisions, founded on the distributive interests of various social groups, and manifested through value divisions over economic values (for the discussion of values, see chapter four).

The electorate of new parties in these countries is likely to come from groups who are employed in the public sector and highly dependent on its services. As the social-democrat party moves to the center to capture parts of the middle and working class in the private sector, public sector employees and those dependent on the welfare state for income and services will most likely turn to the new left parties, and primarily left-socialist parties. In the absence of large groups of outsiders in these countries, the electorate of the radical right parties is more likely to come from those dissatisfied with the size of the welfare state and resulting high levels of taxation than in countries where large groups of outsiders exist (see Swank and Betz 2003 and Kitschelt and Mc Gann 1995 for a review of this argument, also Evans 2003 and 2005).

In the second configuration, in countries with low employment in public sector services and obstacles to the creation of service jobs at the low end of the skill scale, we can expect to see more pronounced divisions between groups of insiders and outsiders. As presented in chapter two, it is expected that cultural divisions will have more prominence in these countries. While it is difficult to link these sources of these divisions to a structural concept specific to these countries, we can expect to see some distinctiveness in the composition of the electorate of new parties in these countries. Where present, far left parties (both old and new), are likely to have an electorate composed from protection seeking working class outsiders and younger, less educated segments of the population with weak prospects in the segmented labor market. New left parties such as greens are likely to be supported by educated middle class professionals who do not vote for the mainstream right

parties such as christian democrats due to their (previously held) culturally conservative positions, nor do they support social democrat parties if these parties hold mainstream left positions (Kitschelt 1999). The electorate of radical right parties in these countries, due to the large number of outsiders in the social structures of these countries, is likely to be composed of labor market outsiders who are low-skilled workers, unemployed and small business holders. Together, they are mobilized by appeals that combine cultural exclusivist positions, opposition to globalization and economic populism (Bornschier forthcoming).

In the third configuration, structural divisions based on socioeconomic status are likely to be dominant, while the impact of other structural factors will be rather muted. The discussion in the above paragraphs brings us to the following set of propositions regarding the vote for new parties and expectations regarding the effects of divisions across countries.

3.5 Summary of Propositions

From the discussion in the preceding sections it is possible to draw several general and specific hypotheses regarding the impact of the fragmentation of the social structure on voting behavior in postindustrial societies, the emergence of new parties, and cross-national variation in the impact of changes in social structures on political divisions. Some of these propositions have been confirmed in other studies, and in this they do not represent original hypotheses. However, in this analysis they are tested in a more comprehensive manner within a broader analytical framework, and are used to inform the direction of the analysis in this chapter.

The first proposition concerns the impact of horizontal divisions in the occupation structure and the decline of homogenous social classes. The expected effects can be summarized in the following way:

P1:*The middle and working classes are both split between the left and right parties, with segments of the middle class voting for new left parties and segments of the working class voting for new Right parties.*

The second proposition concerns the rise of new divisions emerging as a consequence of social changes related to deindustrialization, the expansion of the service sector and educational expansion.

P2: *In postindustrial societies structural divisions such as sex, sector of employment and labor market insiders versus outsiders, gained prominence which contributed to the fragmentation of voting behavior and the rise of new parties.*

In more specific terms, the effect of these variables on electoral behavior in postindustrial societies and the emergence of new parties can be described with the following two propositions:

P3: *The electorate of new left parties is recruited from public sector employees, women, and social and cultural professionals.*

P4: *The electorate of new Right parties is recruited from labor market outsiders among low skilled workers and the petty bourgeoisie.*

The propositions regarding the impact of the welfare state on the character of electoral divisions can be expressed in the following way:

P5: *In countries with a social-democrat welfare state and a sizable public sector, sectoral divisions are more relevant for structuring the division between left and right parties, than in countries where these conditions are not present.*

P6: *In countries with a large number of labor market outsiders, we see a higher prominence of electoral divisions based on insider-outsider labor market division.*

3.6 Method and Data

In the empirical part of this chapter I test these propositions on 13 countries of West Europe. These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. The empirical analysis focuses on two time points: the first time point is in the 1970s at a time when social and economic changes started to take shape, but their impact was not yet visible nor did it start to materialize; the second time point covers the beginning of this decade, as the period when the long-term impact of fragmentation of the social structure on political divisions was fully revealed. It would have been preferable to include multiple time points in between these two endpoints; however, this was not possible given the availability of comparable data and demographic measures in surveys, and the spotty coverage of countries included in various international social survey programs. While data from the Eurobarometer is available for the periods of the 1980s and 1990s, demographic variables in the Eurobarometer are not compatible with the operationalization of measures of the structural positions required by the

analysis in this chapter. The International Social Survey Program started its coverage in the mid-1980s, but it does not include all countries of interest until the second half of the 1990s, which significantly reduces any potential value added by its inclusion in this study.

The analysis in this chapter relies on data from three sources: for the 1970s, the data is taken from the first wave of Political Action Surveys conducted in 1973; this survey covers eight countries, of which seven are subject of the analysis in this chapter. These countries are Austria, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands and Switzerland. The data for four countries comes from the International Politics and Mobility dataset and these countries are Denmark, France, Norway and Sweden. The International Politics and Mobility dataset, combines and standardizes data from various sources and from different time points, but has unequal coverage of countries across time. Because data for the remaining countries is not available in this dataset for the 1980s, it could not be used to fill the gap in coverage of other comparative survey programs. The data for Ireland was not available in any of these surveys, while the Belgian sample lacked comparable measures of occupational status and is therefore excluded from the analysis.

The data for the second time point is taken from the European Social Survey, from a cumulative data file of the first two rounds of surveys conducted in 2002 and 2004. The large sample size and standardized variables makes this dataset particularly well-suited for the purpose of this chapter.

The purpose of the analysis in this chapter is to assess the presence of structural divisions within the electorate of these 13 countries, and to consider whether the pattern of structural divisions corresponds with expectations about the impact of fragmentation of the social structure on political divisions in postindustrial societies. The chapter also aims to assess the impact of the welfare state on cross-national variation and the impact of social structure on electoral divisions. To this end, I analyze divisions in each country separately;

the analysis of structural divisions in the 1970s is used as a baseline to assess the nature and depth changes in the social structure had on electoral divisions.

The focus of the analysis is on the pattern of structural divisions between the electorate of mainstream and new parties, such as radical right parties, greens and new left parties, with old left ideology, namely left-socialist or left-populist parties. Apart from these, I also include left-socialist parties which emerged in the 1960s in Scandinavian countries, as representatives of new left constituencies; they reached the peak of their electoral strength in the 1980s, at the high point of new left politics. Parties such as Swedish and Finnish left socialists, with a longer history but similar role in party systems of their countries, are also included in this group. The exact list and classification of parties in all 13 countries is provided in the appendix 3. Only parties that played a significant role in the party system of their countries for a longer period of time are included in the analysis, providing that a sufficient number of respondents indicated that they voted for these parties. In countries where multiple parties belong to the same party family, for example the three Christian parties in Netherlands before their incorporation into CDA, they are merged into their respective party family to make the analysis somewhat more parsimonious.

The dependent variable measures respondent vote choice and is operationalized by grouping parties in all the countries into seven party families. These seven party families are: far left parties (such as communists or left socialists), greens, social democrats, christian democrats, liberals, conservatives and radical-right parties. Parties are classified in this manner in order to simplify the analysis. But when it comes to the presentation of results, this logic is not always followed; pairs of parties in the comparison of electorates of mainstream left and right parties are chosen based on the strength of parties and the roles that they play in their respective party systems. So comparisons between mainstream left and right parties

always include the strongest right parties, irrespective if these happen to be liberals, christian democrats or conservatives.

Since the analysis aims to highlight the presence of structural divisions between parties of the left and right, as well as within the left and right, I use multinomial logistic regression as a method of analysis in this chapter. Multinomial logistic regression enables accurate modeling of the true nature of dependent variables, which allows for a more accurate assessment of a model fit, and is said to give more efficient estimates than methods such as binominal logistic regression (see Whitten and Palmer 1996 and also Alvarez and Nagler 1999). This method also simplifies the process of generation of coefficients in pairwise comparisons on which the analysis in this and the following chapter is based.

I focus on comparisons between the electorate of the new left (greens and radical left separately) and the established left parties, between mainstream left and right parties and between established and new Right parties. These comparisons should enable us to establish the nature and exact location of differences between established and new parties on the left and right. In addition, since hypotheses regarding the presence of splits within middle and working classes expect these to be located on lines which separate both the electorate of bourgeoisie parties, and new left parties in the case of middle class, and mainstream left parties and radical right parties in the case of working class, the results of a comparison between electorates of these parties is also presented.

Independent variables in this chapter measure the position of an individual in the social structure with respect to five structural concepts found in previous studies to be relevant determinants of political divisions in postindustrial societies. These are: occupational position (operationalized here with two variables which measure horizontal and vertical divisions in occupational structure respectively), sector of employment, insider or outsider status on the labor market, gender, and education.

Occupational position is operationalized with two variables, created by recoding variables measuring occupational status with the ISCO 88 classification of occupations. The measure of occupational status with a variable operationalized as ISCO 88 classification of occupations are available in the European Social Survey, while in the International Politics and Mobility dataset and the Political Action Survey dataset, the ISCO 88 variable is created by recoding a ISCO 68 variable, using a recoding scheme created by Harry Gazenboom (http://www.fsw.vu.nl/~h.ganzeboom/ismf). The first of these two variables measures vertical divisions in the occupational hierarchy, and differentiates between middle class professionals, petty bourgeoisie, middle level white collar workers, skilled workers and unskilled workers. The remaining respondents are placed in a residual category. The second variable measures horizontal divisions between occupations and is operationalized in a way that captures differences between occupations on two levels of hierarchy, depending on whether they perform client-interactive and communication intensive work, or whether they perform object processing or administrative work. At the top level of the hierarchy, this variable distinguishes between social and cultural professionals, and managers and business professionals; on the lower level it distinguishes between skilled workers in crafts and industry and skilled service workers, and middle level technicians and administrative workers. The remaining two categories represent unskilled workers in all sectors and the petty bourgeoisie. As in the previous variable, respondents with no valid values on ISCO 88 variable, such as those not active in the labor force or those who never had any occupation, are classified into a residual category.

The measure of sector of employment differentiates between those employed in the private sector and those employed in the public and non-profit sector. This measure varies somewhat between surveys, and sometimes, differences are quite sizable. In the International Politics and Mobility dataset, this variable differentiates whether the respondent is employed

by the government, a government-owned company, or in some other sector, while in the European Social Survey and Political Action survey, this variable is created by recoding the classification of economic activities and grouping those employed in government administration, social services and education and similar activities into a category indicating employment in public and not-for-profit organizations. While this variable does not necessarily capture employment in publicly owned entities, it comes close to the concept by separating those working in the not-for profit sector and dependent on budget financing from those working in the market sectors.

The insider-outsider division is operationalized so that is distinguishes insiders, outsiders and an upscale group. Individual cases are classified into these three categories in accordance to the scheme proposed by Rueda (2005). According to Rueda, outsiders are those who are unemployed, those working on contracts of limited duration, those in public employment schemes, and employed workers with low skills and education below or at completed primary level. Insider groups are those who are skilled workers employed in industry, services and administration. In most countries these workers enjoy substantial protection of their jobs through labor market regulation and are heavily unionized, and therefore well-represented in the policy-making process. Two remaining groups include those employed in professional occupations and those who are not active on the labor market, and are therefore unclassifiable. This identical procedure was applied to classify the cases across the three datasets used in this chapter, and despite some initial differences, this enabled a high degree of comparability of the characteristics of this variable across countries. Education is measured as a number of years that a respondent has spent in full-time education. More details about the exact operationalization of this variable are available in appendix 3.

All results are estimated by two multinomial logistic regressions, with the only difference between these being in the operationalization of variables measuring occupational

position. To prevent potential colinearity in data, vertical and horizontal measures of occupational positions are included in the analysis one at a time. This essentially makes for two separate regression models. This alteration is necessary to enable the effects of horizontal and vertical divisions within the occupational hierarchy to emerge more clearly. All results presented come from the model which includes the horizontal measure of occupational division. Since this variable separates occupations on a hierarchical dimension as well, it essentially includes information similar to the information available in the variable which measures vertical divisions. Therefore, coefficients for all other variable are taken from the model which includes the variable that measures horizontal occupational divisions. The equation for the single model in this analysis can be expressed with the following equation.

$$\log(\Pr(vote = i) / \Pr(vote = j)) = \alpha + \beta_1 sex + \beta_2 education + \\ + \beta_3 publicemp + \sum_{k=1}^{l} \overrightarrow{\beta_{4\,k}} occupation_k + \sum_{m=1}^{n} \overrightarrow{\beta_{5\,m}} LMstatus_m \tag{3.1}$$

Where $occupation_k$ indicates dichotomies of the occupational variable and $LMstatus_m$ indicates dichotomies of the variable measuring labor market status (and hence β_4 and β_5 are vectors of coefficients, as signaled by the right-hand arrow on top).

3.7 Results and Discussion

Results of the multinomial logistic regression are presented in tables 3.1 to 3.4. These tables present results by grouping coefficients which indicate the impact of individual variables across countries, in order to simplify the presentation of results. The tables compare the coefficients of five variables: sex, education, sector of employment, insider-outsider status on the labor market and occupation. Within occupation three sets of coefficients are

presented, those indicating vertical occupational divisions, essentially between middle and working class occupations, and those which indicate the presence of horizontal divisions within the middle class and the working class respectively. The analysis of vertical occupational divisions contrasts working class occupations with those of the middle class, petty bourgeoisie and routine non-manual class; the comparison of divisions within the middle class contrasts business and technical professionals, middle level administrative and technical professionals with sociocultural professionals; among the working class, the analysis contrasts skilled workers in crafts to skilled workers in services and unskilled workers.

The analysis is focused on structural differences within the electorate of the left and right parties. It compares the electorate of social democrats with the electorate of greens and far left parties on the one hand, and the electorate of mainstream right parties and radical right parties on the other. Such presentation of the results allows for an easier comparison of the results regarding the impact of individual variables across countries. In a separate analysis, I compare the electorate of parties which are expected to be main representatives of divisions within the middle and the working class. Thus, I compare the electorate of principal right parties with the electorate of new left parties to asses whether divisions within the middle class took place along the line of differences between cultural and social professionals, and business and technical professionals, as presented in section 3.4. Also, I compare the electorate of radical right parties with the electorate of social-democrat parties to asses if the division is based on differences in skills and labor market status and sector developed within the working class. To this end, I compare skilled industrial workers, skilled service workers and unskilled workers in services and industry as a single group. Given that the regression analysis along these lines generated a large number of coefficients across countries and individual comparisons, in the chapter I only present results from comparisons

of the electorate of new parties with mainstream parties, while the remaining results are presented in appendix three.

Finally, I also compare divisions between mainstream left and right parties in order to asses if the expectations about the structure of electoral divisions (outlined in chapter two)manifest at the structural level (chapter four will provide an analysis of this subject at the level of values). These results and the results of the analysis which focuses on the electoral divisions in the 1970s are presented in appendix three in order to not obscure the main focus of the chapter, but are discussed briefly below.

The presentation of data in this chapter and the next is organized so that it reflects the competitive situation of party systems in each country. To this end, I do not always compare parties according to their membership in a particular party family. When comparing mainstream right parties to any other party, I choose the first and the second strongest mainstream right parties, irregardless if these parties are liberals, christian democrats or conservatives. In this manner, I avoid problems related to compositional differences of party systems, and present data in a manner which reflects the actual distribution of strength between parties and the location of electoral divisions within party system more faithfully.

Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present the results of comparisons between the electorate of new and established parties, with respect to education, sex, sector of employment and insider-outsider status. Table 3.2 brings forward the comparison between the electorate of new and established parties within the left and right, while table 3.3 compares the electorate of the new left and the established right parties, and the new radical right and the established left parties. The analysis of differences within occupational hierarchies along similar lines is separately provided in tables 3.4 and 3.5, respectively.

The findings of the comparisons of the electorate of new and established parties on the left and right show that with respect to sector of employment, sex, education and labor

market status, the electorate of new parties exhibits different structural characteristics compared to the electorate of the established parties. Also, these differences are fairly consistent for parties which belong to the same party family across countries. Particularly visible patterns emerge in the case of the electorate of green parties and Scandinavian left socialist parties, while for other new parties, results show a less clear pattern.

The electorate of green parties is predominantly concentrated among segments of the highly educated population. In all countries, the coefficients which compare green parties with social democrats (Table 3.2), and principal right parties (Table 3.3), show that the green electorate is more educated than the electorate of mainstream parties. Out of 23 coefficients which indicate this comparison in table 3.2 and 3.3, 22 are in the expected direction and of these, 13 are significant. Furthermore, the green electorate comes from a very specific segment of the educated population. As results in table 3.4 show, social and cultural professionals are clearly more likely to support green parties, compared to members of other professional occupations. All coefficients in the analysis of horizontal occupational divisions comparing the electorate of mainstream right parties and green parties show clearly that social and cultural professionals are the strongest supporters of green parties.

Compared to social democrats, green parties appear distinctly as parties of the middle class, more likely to be supported by professional groups than the working class. The coefficients of variables that measure vertical occupational divisions clearly confirm this difference between green parties and social democrats; the coefficients that indicate the impact of the sector of employment suggest that the green electorate is also more likely than not to be employed in the public sector.

The composition of the electorate of left socialist parties is slightly different from the electorate of green parties, in that the new middle class is not the dominant constituency in

Table 3.2 Comparisons of the electorate of mainstream left parties and new left parties and mainstream right parties and radical right parties respect to sex, education, sector of employment and labor market status. All entries are coefficients from multinomial logistic regression.

	Far left (left socialists)/social democrats				Greens/social democrats				Radical right/strongest right party			
	Sex	Education	Sector	Insider-Outsider	Sex	Education	Sector	Insider-Outsider	Sex	Education	Sector	Insider-Outsider
Austria					**1.466*** **	**0.099*** **	**0.408** **	**0.740*** **	0.320	-0.014	-0.030	0.122
Belgium F					-0.310	0.051	-0.150	0.002	0.184	-0.045	**-0.708*** **	0.150
Belgium W					-0.638	**0.054** **	-0.357	-0.178				
Denmark	-0.342	0.033	**0.495*** **	0.109					-0.261	-0.079	**0.344***	**0.598*** **
Finland	**1.231** **	0.026	-0.169	**0.766*** **	0.649	**0.061*** **	0.231	**0.745*** **				
France	**1.171** **	-0.012	0.026	-0.153	0.242	**0.059*** **	0.279	-0.346	0.434	-0.040	**0.586*** **	0.070
Germany	0.026	0.011	0.111	**0.539*** **	0.079	**0.073*** **	**0.358*** **	0.130	-1.155	-0.044	-0.081	0.436
Great Britain												
Ireland	-0.228	-0.039	-0.349	0.139	**-1.451** **	-0.009	0.030	**0.809** **				
Italy	-0.201	0.027	0.087	**0.667***	0.572	0.015	-0.222	0.553	-0.374	**0.056*** **	-0.128	-0.249
Netherlands	-0.881	0.016	0.271	0.276	**-1.105** **	**0.042*** **	**0.306***	0.019				
Norway	**1.784*** **	**0.045*** **	**0.708*** **	**0.466** **					-0.043	**-0.076*** **	-0.084	0.292
Sweden	**1.324*** **	0.033	0.323	**0.791*** **	-0.012	0.035	0.308	**0.923*** **				
Switzerland					0.092	0.025	-0.063	0.389	0.249	-0.043	-0.158	**-0.470***

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

Far left parties are SP (Socialist Party) in the Netherlands, Left Party in Sweden, Socialist people's party in Denmark, Socialist Left Party in Norway, PDS in Germany, PCF (Communists) and other far left parties in France and Italy. The strongest right parties are OVP in Austria, VLD/MR in Belgium, Liberals in Denmark, UMP in France, CDU/CDU in Germany, FI in Italy, Conservatives in Norway and Liberals in Switzerland. Radical right parties include FPO in Austria, VB in Belgium-Flanders, DFP in Denmark, FN n France, DVU, NDP and Republikaaner in Germany, Progress Party in Norway, AN in Italy and SVP in Switzerland.

Table 3.3 Comparisons of the electorate of mainstream right parties with the electorate of new left parties and the electorate of mainstream left parties with the electorate of new left parties with respect to sex, education, sector of employment and labor market status. All entries are coefficients from multinomial logistic regression.

	Strongest right party /new left				Social democrats/radical right			
	Sex	Education	Sector	Insider-Outsider	Sex	Education	Sector	Insider-Outsider
Austria	-0.542	**0.061*****	**0.461*****	**0.716*****	0.468	0.025	-0.083	0.146
Belgium F	-0.522	0.001	-0.240	-0.046	0.396	0.005	**-0.618*****	0.185
Belgium W	0.795	0.027	-0.232	**0.720***				
Denmark	0.552	0.022	**0.826*****	-0.001	**-1.055*****	**-0.080****	-0.084	**0.636****
Finland LS	**2.256*****	0.033	-0.034	**0.851*****				
Finland G	**1.674*****	**0.067*****	**0.366***	**0.830*****				
France	0.353	**0.077*****	**0.775*****	-0.359	0.324	-0.058	0.090	0.082
Germany	0.606	**0.069*****	**0.308****	0.226	**-1.682*****	-0.039	-0.031	0.340
Ireland	**-1.541*****	0.003	0.367	**1.191*****				
Italy	1.168	**0.070***	0.125	0.468	-0.970	0.002	**-0.476***	-0.164
Netherlands LS	-0.182	0.028	**0.417****	0.327				
Netherlands G	-0.405	**0.054*****	**0.452*****	0.070				
Norway	**1.830*****	**0.041*****	**0.901*****	0.169	-0.089	**-0.072*****	**-0.277***	**0.589*****
Sweden LS	**1.806*****	0.007	**0.650*****	0.157				
Sweden G	0.470	0.008	**0.635*****	0.290				
Switzerland	0.178	0.027	0.358	0.291	0.163	**-0.045***	**-0.579*****	**-0.372***

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

New left parties are either left socialist (LS), or green (G), and include the Socialist Party in the Netherlands, Left Party in Sweden, Socialist People's Party in Denmark, Socialist Left Party in Norway, and the Greens in Germany, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, France, Belgium, Italy and Ireland. The strongest right-wing parties are OVP in Austria, VLD/MR in Belgium, Liberals in Denmark, UMP in France, CDU/CDU in Germany, FI in Italy, Conservatives in Norway and Liberals in Switzerland. Radical right parties include FPO in Austria, VB in Belgium-Flanders, DFP in Denmark, FN n France, DVU, NDP and Republikaaner in Germany, Progress Party in Norway, AN in Italy and SVP in Switzerland.

the electorate of left socialist parties. Still, the electorate of these parties is also fairly distinct from the electorate of social democrats.

Apart from sociocultural professionals, public sector employees, women, and the non-industrial segments of the working class are all found to be more likely to vote for left socialist parties than social democrats in Scandinavian countries. The composition of the electorate of far left parties in other countries does not demonstrate a clearly identifiable pattern. For example, German PDS appears not to be very different from its Scandinavian counterparts concerning the composition of its electorate, while the electorate of SP in the

Netherlands, perhaps the most prominent new left socialist party with old left ideology, does not appear to be particularly different from the electorate of social democrat parties.

The results do not allow for such a clear identification of the electorate of radical right parties: in tables 3.4 and 3.5 the results show clearly that radical right parties are parties principally representing the petty bourgeoisie, as compared to the electorate of mainstream right and mainstream left parties, as clearly indicated in most countries. Furthermore, the coefficients for the variables that measure horizontal divisions between professional and working class occupations show that members of the middle class and non-manual workers are clearly less likely to vote for radical right parties than are members of the working class, while the differences between the working class and petty bourgeoisie are not significant.

The results in table 3.5 support the expectation that there are no strong differences in the levels of working class support for radial right parties and social democrat parties, which suggests that workers participate in numbers comparable to the petty bourgeoisie in the electorate of radical right parties. The distribution of coefficients for all variables indicates that there are no significant differences in the observed effects between countries which differ in the characteristics of their welfare states.

Overall, the conclusion from the analysis which compares the electorate of new left and mainstream left parties could be summarized in the following way: the expectations are broadly confirmed that the sociostructural profile of the electorate of new parties on the left and right is different from the electorate of the mainstream left and mainstream right parties. Similar is the case with expectations that a division in the voting behavior of the middle and working class occurred, and that sizable segments of the new middle class tend to support new left parties, while sizable segments of what can be broadly defined as the working class tend to support radical right parties.

Furthermore, other specific expectations about the composition of the electorate of new left and radical right parties in this study is in line with findings from previous studies, regarding the composition of the electorate of the radical right and new left parties (Dolezal 2007, Ivarsflaten 2005, Knutsen 2001, Evans 2003 and 2005). Despite some differences between countries with different types of welfare states, the electorate of new left parties is generally from the educated middle class professionals in social and cultural occupations and the public sector; radical right parties in more or less all countries are composed from a coalition of the petty bourgeoisie and segments of the working class.

Finally, the expectations that the composition of the electorate of new parties is likely to vary across countries is also partially supported. The variation is mainly related to differences in the compositions of the principal new left parties in continental Europe and Scandinavia. In continental Europe, the principal new left parties are greens, and they appear to be predominantly parties of the new middle class; in Scandinavian countries, the principal new left parties are left socialists, and their electorate appears to be composed from a more diverse combination of social groups comprising social and cultural professionals, public sector workers, women and non-industrial segments of the working class.

Turning to results of comparisons between the electorates of main parties of the left and right at both time points (tables 3.1A and 3.2A in appendix 6), it appears that the impact of most of these variables did not change between the 1970s and present time, except that educational differences between the electorates of mainstream right and mainstream left parties weakened since the 1970s, perhaps as a consequence of continued educational expansion and generational replacement.

Table 3.4 Occupational divisions between the electorate of mainstream left and right parties, and new left and radical right parties. All entries are coefficients from multinomial logistic regression.

	Far left (left socialists)/social democrats						
	Occupation-vertical divisions			Occupation-horizontal divisions			
	W/MC	W/SE	W/NM	SCP/BP	SCP/ML	SW/SeW	SW/UW
Austria							
Belgium F							
Belgium W							
Denmark	0.487	0.650	**0.574****	-0.174	-0.221	-0.504	-0.114
Finland	0.202	0.260	-0.189	0.033	-0.510	-0.438	-0.208
France	-0.568		**-0.606****	-0.239	0.057	-0.317	0.128
Germany	**0.993*****	-0.373	0.111	**-0.456****	**-1.154*****	0.182	0.004
Ireland							
Italy	-0.693	-0.047	-0.238	0.049	0.140	-0.631	-0.692
Netherlands	-0.036	0.688	0.312	-0.362	-0.312	0.119	-0.061
Norway	-0.233	-0.535	-0.027	**-0.538****	-0.380	0.162	0.008
Sweden	0.157	0.275	0.382	**-0.781*****	-0.298	-0.056	-0.508
Switzerland							
	Greens/ social democrats						
	Occupation-vertical divisions			Occupation-horizontal divisions			
	W/MC	W/SE	W/NM	SCP/BP	SCP/ML	SW/SeW	SW/UW
Austria	**1.344*****	**1.604*****	**0.913*****	-0.545	**-0.812*****	**0.763***	0.180
Belgium F	**1.357*****	0.971	0.430	-0.317	**-1.243*****	0.119	-0.160
Belgium W	0.750	0.392	0.237	**-0.799***	**-1.613*****	0.905	-0.034
Denmark							
Finland	**1.387*****	**1.770*****	**0.693****	-0.476	**-1.200*****	0.447	0.135
France	**-0.822***		-0.226	0.106	0.157	-0.431	0.279
Germany	**0.838*****	**1.146*****	**0.346***	**-0.484*****	**-0.626*****	0.346	0.312
Ireland	0.070	0.141	0.169	0.021	-0.168	-0.050	**-0.926***
Italy	0.142	0.869	1.597	0.101	0.025		
Netherlands	**0.982*****	**1.404*****	**0.804*****	0.225	0.196	0.268	0.470
Norway							
Sweden	0.871	**1.482****	0.383	-0.586	-0.480	1.024	0.482
Switzerland	**1.452*****	**1.439****	**0.985****	-0.035	**-0.764****	0.079	0.048

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
W/MC-Working Class/Middle Class
W/SE - Working Class/Self employed
W/NM - Working Class/Non manual employees
SCP/BP –Social and Cultural professionals/Business and Technical Professionals
SCP/ML - Social and Cultural professionals/Middle Level Administrative and Technical Professionals
SW/SeW –Skilled Craft Workers/Skilled Service Workers
SW/UW - Skilled Craft Workers/Unskilled Workers

Far left parties are the Socialist Party in the Netherlands, Left Party in Sweden, Socialist People's Party in Denmark, Socialist Left Party in Norway, PDS in Germany, communists and other far left parties in France and Italy.

(table 3.4 continued)

	Radical right/strongest right party						
	Occupation-vertical divisions			Occupation-horizontal divisions			
	W/MC	W/SE	W/NM	SCP/BP	SCP/ML	SW/SeW	SW/UW
Austria	-0.683	-0.439	**-0.745****	0.127	0.247	-0.543	-0.214
Belgium F	**-1.507*****	-0.545	**-0.969*****	**-1.012***	-0.138	0.093	0.101
Belgium W							
Denmark	**-1.710*****	-0.243	**-0.913*****	-0.378	-0.017	-0.651	-0.212
Finland							
France	**-0.893****		**-0.699****	0.376	0.682	-0.381	0.031
Germany	-0.784	0.238	-0.108	-0.482	0.379	-0.366	-0.177
Ireland							
Italy	-0.196	0.078	0.308	-0.456	-0.347	-0.094	0.199
Netherlands							
Norway	**-1.745*****	-0.319	**-1.038*****	-0.208	0.169	**-1.064*****	-0.256
Sweden							
Switzerland	**-0.591***	0.224	-0.380	-0.214	-0.139	-0.111	**0.881****

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
W/MC-Working Class/Middle Class
W/SE - Working Class/Self employed
W/NM - Working Class/Non manual employees
SCP/BP –Social and Cultural professionals/Business and Technical Professionals
SCP/ML - Social and Cultural professionals/Middle Level Administrative and Technical Professionals
SW/SeW –Skilled Craft Workers/Skilled Service Workers
SW/UW - Skilled Craft Workers/Unskilled Workers

The strongest right parties are OVP in Austria, VLD/MR in Belgium, Liberals in Denmark, UMP in France, CDU/CDU in Germany, FI in Italy, Conservatives in Norway and Liberals in Switzerland. Radical right parties include FPO in Austria, VB in Belgium-Flanders, DFP in Denmark, FN n France, DVU, NDP and Republikaaner in Germany, Progress Party in Norway, AN in Italy and SVP in Switzerland

Table 3.5 Occupational divisions between the electorate of mainstream left and new right parties and the electorate of new left and mainstream right parties. All entries are coefficients from multinomial logistic regression

	Strongest right party /new left						
	Occupation-vertical divisions			Occupation-horizontal divisions			
	W/MC	W/SE	W/NM	SCP/PB	SCP/MLS	W/SeW	W/UW
Austria	0.166	0.422	-0.015	**-0.548****	**-0.518****	0.383	0.231
Belgium F	-0.032	0.021	-0.350	**-1.345*****	**-1.020*****	-0.361	-0.102
Belgium W	-0.314	**-1.294***	**-0.771***	**-1.087****	**-1.168****	**1.293***	-0.296
Denmark	-0.637	**-0.972***	-0.218	**-1.231*****	**-0.589****	**-1.035****	-0.045
Finland LS	**-0.780***	**-2.855*****	**-1.069*****	-0.022	0.118	**-1.168****	**-0.748****
Finland G	0.406	**-1.344*****	-0.186	**-0.530***	-0.572	-0.282	-0.405
France	-0.744	N/A	-0.177	-0.187	0.272	-0.512	0.298
Germany	**0.580****	0.095	**0.368***	**-0.964*****	**-0.821*****	0.278	0.235
Italy	0.070	0.207	1.272	-0.236	-0.087	N/A	N/A
Ireland	0.364	-0.242	0.262	-0.413	-0.311	0.085	**-0.768***
Netherlands LS	-0.420	-0.165	-0.108	**-0.550****	-0.325	-0.243	-0.224
Netherlands G	**0.598***	0.551	0.383	0.037	0.183	-0.094	0.307
Norway	**-1.371*****	-0.868	**-0.975*****	**-0.907*****	**-0.958*****	**-0.794***	-0.327
Sweden LS	**-1.868**	**-1.961**	**-0.854**	**-1.445*****	-0.487	**-0.833***	-0.617
Sweden G	**-1.154**	-0.754	**-0.853**	**-1.250*****	-0.669	0.247	0.373
	1.179**	0.814	0.733	**-0.864*****	**-1.226*****	-0.390	0.246
	Social democrats/Radical right						
	Occupation-vertical divisions			Occupation-horizontal divisions			
	W/MC	W/SE	W/NM	SCP/PB	SCP/MLS	W/SeW	W/UW
Austria	0.035	**0.999****	-0.254	0.131	-0.047	-0.163	-0.265
Belgium F	-0.741	0.458	**-0.560****	0.016	-0.360	0.574	0.043
Belgium W							
Denmark	-0.585	**1.378*****	-0.121	**0.678***	0.350	-0.121	-0.280
Finland							
France	**-0.971****	N/A	**-0.748*****	**0.668***	0.567	0.012	0.188
Germany	-0.526	**1.290****	-0.130	-0.002	0.574	-0.298	-0.100
Italy	-0.124	**0.741***	**0.632***	-0.119	-0.235	0.182	0.406
Ireland							
Netherlands							
Norway	**-0.607***	0.014	-0.089	0.161	0.747	-0.109	0.079
Sweden							
Switzerland	-0.129	**0.331*****	0.231	0.616	0.323	0.358	**0.683****

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

W/MC-Working Class/Middle Class

W/SE - Working Class/Self employed

W/NM - Working Class/Non manual employees

SCP/BP –Social and Cultural professionals/Business and Technical Professionals

SCP/ML - Social and Cultural professionals/Middle Level Administrative and Technical Professionals

SW/SeW –Skilled Craft Workers/Skilled Service Workers

SW/UW - Skilled Craft Workers/Unskilled Workers

Far left parties are SP (Socialist Party) in the Netherlands, Left Party in Sweden, Socialist People's Party in Denmark, Socialist Left Party in Norway, PDS in Germany, PCF (Communists) and other far left parties in France and Italy. The strongest right parties are OVP in Austria, VLD/MR in Belgium, Liberals in Denmark, UMP in France, CDU/CDU in Germany, FI in Italy, Conservatives in Norway and Liberals in Switzerland. Radical right parties include FPO in Austria, VB in Belgium-Flanders, DFP in Denmark, FN n France, DVU, NDP and Republikaaner in Germany, Progress Party in Norway, AN in Italy and SVP in Switzerland

Occupational differences along the vertical dimension by and large persist (tables 3.3A and 3.4A). Divisions between the middle and working classes continue to be more pronounced in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, but in more recent times we can observe somewhat larger effects and greater consistency of divisions along the horizontal dimension. Social and cultural professionals are likely to support social democrat parties, and this effect is particularly visible in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland and Belgium. Also, the impact of the sector of employment became somewhat more pronounced and more consistent in more recent times, but its strength in separating electorates of mainstream parties does not vary across countries, depending on the characteristics of their welfare states. An interesting finding in this analysis is that differences within working class occupations became more pronounced in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, where service workers are found to be more supportive of mainstream right parties. This is contrary to expectations about divisions within the working class, where industrial workers more exposed to market pressures were expected to be more supportive of conservative parties.

The absence of findings that a larger restructuring of the electorate of mainstream parties took place can be interpreted as an indirect support for the argument that fragmentation made large scale realignment unlikely. Aggregate change in the social structure affected the electorate of mainstream parties as well, but it did not result in a dramatically different structural composition of their electorate compared to a situation several decades ago. The analysis in this chapter finds that the new professional middle class are more likely to vote for social democrats, and that difference in education between the electorate of mainstream left and right parties declined. However, the findings of this chapter suggest that the social groups that emerged or split as a consequence of changes in the social structure are more likely to vote for new parties than for the established parties. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that some old constituencies, such as the working class, appear to be

divided in such a way that the analysis in this chapter could not adequately capture, due to the lack of conceptual clarity of these differences and the unavailability of adequate operational measures for tackling these divisions in an empirical analysis. Still, it can be said that the manner in which divisions in the social structure developed resulted in the realignment of newly emerging social groups toward new parties. This was most clearly visible in the case of the working class shift towards the radical right, indicated here by the lack of differences in support of the working class between mainstream left and mainstream right parties.

The impact of the welfare state on electoral divisions at the structural level is more visible on the left than on the right, especially in the structure of the electorate of new left parties. Apart from that, differences in electoral divisions across countries (initially brought about by welfare state developmental and historical divisions), more or less preserved its character in the postindustrial period.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter focused on the presence of structural divisions between the electorate of the established left and right parties, and new left and right parties, on five variables indicating divisions that were relevant in the postindustrial social structure. The impact of occupation, education, sector of employment, sex and insider-outsider division in the labor market is analyzed through a comparison between the electorate of new and established left and right parties, with multinomial logistic regression. Overall, the findings of the analysis in this chapter broadly support the argument made in the first chapter, that new parties of the new left and radical right (which became a permanent fixture of the political landscape of countries of West Europe) managed to do so as a consequence of the increased fragmentation

of the social structures of these societies. While the research on this topic is marred by numerous problems concerning the definition of concepts necessary for understanding the exact nature of the postindustrial social structure and the exact operationalization of these concepts, this study (like several studies preceding it) found sufficient evidence that the social structure of postindustrial societies translates its complexity into the political sphere, producing divisions in the support base of the established parties and a realignment of the electorate towards new parties. While these findings are not exhaustive, they do provide us with clear indications about the consequences that changes in social structure have on the nature of political divisions across countries. The results of this analysis indicate that new parties of the left and right have electorates characterized by distinct sociostructural characteristics, and differ in a way which could not be observed several decades ago; furthermore, the results of the analysis suggest that the way in which the support for new parties develops might be in part dependent on a socioeconomic context, defined largely by the characteristics of the welfare state.

Chapter 4
Ideological Cleavages, Cross-national Differences and the Positions of the Electorate of New Parties

4.1 Introduction

The increased complexity and fragmentation of the social structure, brought about by social and economic change, also affected the structure of ideological cleavages in post-industrial societies (Kriesi *et al.* 2006), Kitschelt 1994). Societal change brought into existence a range of new political issues. These issues ranged from environmental issues, gender equality, immigration and cultural homogeneity, globalization and other issues which can be subsumed under the heading of 'new politics'. Together, these developments brought about the emergence of a wholly new political issue dimension, containing mostly sociocultural issues of a very different nature compared to those previously salient in advanced industrial societies. The emergence of a new issue dimension (1) produced a new dimension of competition between parties, by adding new divisions between parties within the left and right to those divisions already existent between parties of the left and the right, and (2) split the left and the right electorate accordingly.

This chapter aims to investigate how the emergence of a new issue dimension affects the pattern of opposition between political parties. The chapter has two more specific aims in line with the focal point of the dissertation: (1) to establish whether the rise of new issues provided a dimension that allowed for the emergence of new left and new right parties; (2) to investigate whether patterns of ideological divisions and positions of new parties vary

between countries, and whether this variation follows differences in the type of welfare regimes and historical patterns of political contestation.

Though some influential studies implicitly claim this to be the case (Inglehart 1977, 1990), there is some evidence that the emergence of new politics did not affect all the countries in a similar manner (Knutsen1995a, Knutsen and Scarborough 1995). Due to different trajectories in political and social developments across western societies outlined in Chapter 2, we can expect to find a sizable amount of variation in political divisions in post-industrial societies. In this chapter, I illustrate that despite a general similarity, there are visible differences in the salience of ideological divisions between countries, and that these differences largely correspond to differences in welfare regimes.

As a first step, I provide a brief discussion of the literature that deals with ideological cleavages in western societies and their changes within the last several decades. In the second step, I outline the mechanism at work during the process of the formation of political divisions in post-industrial societies, and how it brought about cross-national differences in the patterns of cleavages. In the third step, I propose a set of hypotheses about the nature of ideological divisions and about cross-national variation in their strength. In the final step, I test these propositions using World Value Survey data from the second and third waves conducted in 1990 and 1995/1996 respectively, and the European Value Survey from the 1999/2000 wave.

4.2 Political Space in Advanced Industrial Societies

As already discussed in Chapter 2, the structure of political cleavages in industrial societies historically (and in the immediate postwar period) was dominated largely by class

and religion (see Knutsen 1989, 2006, Lipset and Rokkan 1967). On the level of political attitudes or values, these structural cleavages were complemented by attitudinal divisions between economic left and economic right positions, and divisions between secular and religious attitudes. However, as western societies moved towards the advanced industrial or post-industrial phase, the structure of political divisions (both at the structural and value level) retains this duality less and less (Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi 1998). At both levels, as political divisions in advanced industrial societies became more complex, the link between structural and attitudinal elements became less clear, and the organizational closure of political divisions all but disappeared (see Oesch 2006, Weeden and Grusky 2006, Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi 1999). The political space in post-industrial societies is therefore quite different from that of classic industrial societies in the sense that both the content and the character of political divisions had changed.

So far the most comprehensive comparative empirical research of the significance on various political cleavages was undertaken by Knutsen (1988, 1995a, 1995b, see also 2006) and Knutsen and Scarborough (1995). They find that changes in political cleavages do not follow the universal pattern of change expected by Inglehart, who argues that the materialist/post-materialist division is becoming a dominant cleavage as a consequence of value-change in western industrial societies. Rather, they find that the importance of left-right cleavages does not decline across the board, and that countries differ greatly in the salience and structuring power of these divisions. The pattern of differences between countries corresponds substantially to cross-national variation in welfare regimes: Knutsen's analysis (1989, 1995) of political cleavages reveals that economic left-right cleavages are dominant in a set of countries which are otherwise characterized by a social democrat welfare regime, and a historically low salience of communal or religious divisions (see Kitschelt 1996). In countries where the salience of communal or religious divisions is high and the welfare

regime is corporatist, the salience of new politics issues is found to be much higher. Knutsen finds similar results when it comes to defining features of the left-right ideological dimension. The importance of post-materialist and left-right materialist values in defining the content of left-right ideology among mass publics follows this pattern.

The mechanism of change in political divisions proposed by Inglehart was questioned in several studies: Paul Warwick (1998) argues that one of the main causes for the increasing significance of new issues is related to the expansion of higher education, as individuals with higher education are more likely to hold post-materialist value orientations. Warwick argues that part of the effect observed as value-change can be explained by the increasing support for pro-democratic and liberal positions from those with high education exhibit not only in the political sphere but also with respect to a range of social issues (Warwick 1998). A similar effect of education is found by Duch and Taylor (1993) who argue that the mechanism behind value change does not operate mainly through socialization and generational replacement (as Inglehart argues), but rather through the impact of education. Education is suggested to have a positive effect on support for broad democratic values, and this, Duch and Taylor argue, is at the aggregate level manifested as value change. They suggest that the argument for the impact of socialization can be questioned on the grounds that current economic conditions are more important for the presence of materialist value-orientations than are economic conditions, which prevailed at the expected time of the socialization of cohorts in question. In another study, Weakliem (2002) finds that education is consistently related to liberal and pro-democratic attitudes. He also argues that an increase in the level of education could have resulted in value change at the aggregate level: the effect of education on attitudes of economic issues depends on the level of economic development; in countries with a higher level of development, education is found to be either unrelated to economic positions or weakly related to left economic positions. But in countries with a

lower level of development, educated people are more supportive of economically right positions, reflecting the fact that in these countries the return on educational investment did not decline as in countries where the expansion of education took place. The weakness of the effect of education on economic attitudes in advanced industrial societies indicates the presence of a new constituency. Furthermore, some studies suggest that this new constituency was not brought about by value change, but rather by changes in the social structure brought about by social and economic development (Warwick 1998, Duch and Taylor 1993).

The expansion of higher education is just one element of a broader economic and social change comprising of: educational expansion, deindustrialization, service sector expansion and massive changes in the role of women in society (see Esping Andersen 1993, Oesch 2006). Cross-national variation (observed by Knutsen 1989 and 1995, and Knutsen and Scarborough 1995) is a consequence of the interactions of broader trends mentioned above (and described in more detail in Chapter 2) with particular patterns of national social and economic conditions.

Such changes in social structure can be linked to the emergence of a new cleavage dimension which emerged in advanced industrial societies since the 1970s (Kitschelt 1994, 1995, Kriesi 1989, 1997, 1999, Kriesi *et al.* 2006, Bornschier 2008). This dimension of contestation is based on cultural issues concerning the definition of societies as well as the rights and freedoms of individual citizens. Issues of immigration and cultural homogeneity, cultural liberalism, participative democracy, and women rights all form the content of this dimension, which is usually described as the 'libertarian-authoritarian dimension' (Kitschelt 1994, Hooge and Marks 2002). Educational expansion, the growth of services and the public sector, and the increasing insecurity of low-skilled workers and the petty bourgeoisie (brought about by globalization and deindustrialization) provided the structural underpinnings for this new division. Educated professionals and public sector employees

form highly libertarian constituencies, while low-skilled workers and those threatened by globalization constitute an increasingly authoritarian constituency. In line with the argument provided by Duch and Taylor and Warwick, changes in the political issue space linked to the rise of the libertarian-authoritarian division can also be linked to changes in the social structure (Kriesi 1998).

In line with social changes, the prevailing content of the libertarian-authoritarian dimension changed over time as a consequence of societal changes (Kriesi *et al.* 2006, Bornschier 2007). At first, the educational expansion and the rise of new social movements facilitated the rise of issues related to the agenda of the new left, such as ecological issues, peace and women rights, which dominated the cultural dimension. As globalization and deindustrialization brought about increasing economic insecurity and immigration, the new left provoked reaction in the shape of the new right (Ignazi 1992), and the dominant content of cultural division started to shift in the direction of issues of cultural homogeneity, immigration and attitudes toward globalization (Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi *et al.* 2006). In a recent study, Kriesi *et al.* (2006) claim that new cultural cleavages are largely defined by issues related to globalization and economic and social openness; they call this dimension 'demarcation versus integration'.

In almost all accounts, the cultural dimension interacts with the economic left-right dimension (see Kreisi *et al*, Warvick 2002, Kitschelt 1994, Kitschelt and Rehm 2004). The nature of this interaction is decisive in forming political divisions: it decides whether there will be space for the emergence of new political parties, which hold either libertarian or authoritarian positions on the left and on the right (Kriesi *et al.* 2006, Hooge and Marks 2002, Kitschelt 1994). However, the description of this interaction varies between different accounts: although Kitschelt (1994) sees two types of main ideological divisions in western societies, the economic left-right and libertarian-authoritarian divisions, he argues that they in

fact form only one dimension of political competition. He maintains that the actual positions of political actors on economic and sociocultural issues are strongly correlated, and can be considered to form, one dominant ideological dimension; this dimension extends from economically left and socially and culturally libertarian positions, to economically right and socially and culturally authoritarian positions.

This composite left libertarian-right-authoritarian dimension is found to be the principal ideological cleavage in western societies (Kitschelt and Rehm 2004). They argue that there is only a limited potential for the existence of other significant ideological cleavages that would cross-cut this dominant dimension. Their point seems to be that principal cross-country differences, regarding political cleavages, are mainly in the content and the nature of left-libertarian versus right-authoritarian dimensions, as well as the salience of different issues within it. Only marginally the differences lie in the importance of other ideological cleavages not related to the primary dimension (Kitschelt and Rehm 2004). In this sense, Kitschelt and Rehm find differences in the pattern of divisions across countries, but do not provide any specifics about the character of these divisions, nor do they try to explain what brings it about.

Others (see Kriesi *et al.* 2006, Hooge and Marks 2002) argue that these two dimensions are not so strongly correlated. The analysis of party positions (Kreisi *et al.* 2006, also Hooge and Marks 2002) as well as the electorate (van der Brug and van Spanje 2007) finds that we do have two separate dimensions, one is economic and the other is a combination of cultural issues and issues related to globalization. But the exact nature of these divisions is not so important; what is important is that the authors agree that these divisions can provide a foundation for the emergence of new electoral cleavages if mobilized by political parties (Kriesi at al 2006, Bornschier 2007).

The distribution of political alternatives along two dimensions is not discussed at length. Marks and Hooge (2002) find that political parties are largely distributed along what they call the GAL-TAN dimension and economic left-right dimension, with parties of the new left and parties of the new right occupying niches somewhat beyond this main dimension. Kriesi and his coauthors also look at party placements along a two-dimensional space and reach broadly similar conclusion: main parties are distributed along the main dimension, combing left and right cultural and economic positions, while parties of new right and new left occupy what can be described as a niche vote on the opposite ends of the distribution. Kitschelt argues this to be the case in his overview of political cleavages in his 1994 study of social democracy and 1995 study of radical right parties. Similar findings are found with respect to the distribution among voters in a 2004 study of the distribution of partisan preferences (Kitschelt and Rehm 2004a).

These studies by and large find a high degree of similarity in the distribution of particular parties, and one common trend in the positioning of mainstream parties (Kriesi at al 2006, Bornschier 2007, van der Brug and van Spanje 2007, Kitschelt 1994, Kitschelt and Rehm 2004). The distribution of mainstream parties along dimensions corresponds broadly to Kitschelt's expectations: social democrats are the mainstream parties of the left, located to the left of the centre on the economic dimension and between centrist and slightly libertarian positions on the cultural dimension; the position of the mainstream right, either Christian democrat or conservative, is located on the economic right and on a slightly authoritarian position on the cultural dimension; the position of the liberal parties is on the economically right and on the culturally libertarian end of the scale. The position of the parties of the new left depends on whether they are green or left socialists. green parties have left but fairly centrist positions on the economic dimension and libertarian positions on the cultural dimension; left socialists are strongly on the economic left and libertarian end; parties of the

new right hold economically centrist and authoritarian positions. However, economically centrist positions of the new right are in fact a combination of protectionism and welfare chauvinism, while those of contemporary green parties embody preferences of the new middle-class in the service sector.

A number of studies also notes that the positions of mainstream parties converged in the recent period (Kriesi *et al.* 2006, Bornschier 2007, Abedi 2002). The convergence of mainstream parties is considered by Adams and his coauthors (2004, 2006) to be the product of these parties adjusting to shifts in public opinion which took place recently. Basing their conclusion on Comparative Manifesto Project data, Adams and others argue that the shifts in positions of mainstream parties were a reaction to a worsened electoral performance. Still, the shift in positions of mainstream parties did not eliminate ideological differences between mainstream parties, nor did it change their relative positions to each other (McDonald *et al.* 2004); differences between mainstream parties continued to dominate electoral politics. However, the convergence of mainstream parties opened the space at the far ends of ideological dimensions, where smaller groups of voters were left unrepresented (Kriesi *et al.* 2006, Bornschier 2007, Abedi 2002, Meguid 2005). Abedi as well as Meguid use Comparative manifesto data to show that the shift in positions of mainstream parties created an opportunity for the emergence of new niche parties in positions where groups of voters were left unrepresented. Meguid in addition argues that strategic responses to new niche parties determined their electoral fortune. If established parties reacted to the rise of niche parties by trying to adopt their position, the vote of niche parties would decline. If however, they ignored them or use adversarial strategies their vote is found to increase. In a study of radical right party success (also using Comparative manifesto data), Cole (2005) finds that radical right parties utilized issues of low salience for mainstream parties to mobilize

additional support, trying at the same time to establish and maintain a clear ideological distinctiveness between themselves and mainstream parties.

In a study using indicators of voters' and parties' positions derived from survey data, van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie (2005) find that the centrist shift of mainstream right parties favored the success of radical right parties; they believe that the support for new right parties is principally motivated by voter ideological closeness to these parties, and that increasing the distance between these voters and established centrist parties increased the space for new right parties (see also van der Brug, Fenamma and Tillie 2000 and van der Brug and Fenamma 2003).

However, the conclusions of these studies are mainly made on general measures of partisan positions based on manifesto data or survey data, and do not account for changes in the content of issue divisions. Compared to the postwar period, in the period since the 1970s a number of positions within the economic left-right dimension became obsolete, lost relevance or became an electoral liability. Issues such as the nationalization of economic resources or wholesale redistribution lost credence as plausible policy alternatives. Because of this development, mainstream parties of the left shifted towards the center, which brought about the convergence of their positions with positions of mainstream right parties. While some economic positions became implausible for the mainstream parties to hold, a range of new issues along the cultural dimension emerged. As Cole (2005) shows, new radical right parties adopted positions on a range of issues not held or held in low salience by the mainstream parties. As Meguid (2005) shows, it is failure to react to positions held by new niche parties or adversarial reaction to these positions that allowed niche parties to gain a substantial share of the vote. When mainstream parties adopted the demands of the constituencies of niche parties, their support declined. This suggests that the cause of the emergence of niche parties is not so much the shift of mainstream parties as it is the

emergence of new issues and new constituencies with unrepresented political demands. The fact that oligopolistic strategy in most real world cases failed suggests that while accommodative strategies might work for the established parties, they cannot solve the problem of eliminating new competitors entirely.

The following section advances this argument in more detail: I argue that niche parties have emerged as a consequence of the increasing complexity of the political issue space, caused by the emergence of new issue-dimensions and the inability of mainstream parties to produce policy bundles that could preempt the emergence of niche parties. Furthermore, I argue that the pattern of divisions between new niche parties and the established parties varies across countries depending on the nature of the welfare regime and pre-existing political divisions.

4.3 Theoretical Framework

It is very plausible to say that the structure of political cleavages in advanced industrial democracies allowed for the emergence of new parties; it is also fairly safe to say that new parties emerged at points in the political issue space which were either abandoned or never occupied by the established parties. I argue that the reason for the emergence of new parties does not lie in the convergence of mainstream parties as is argued by Abedi and others (see discussion in the previous section). As presented in Chapter 2, the expansion of higher education, service employment and the public sector produced divisions in the middle-class and working-class along multiple lines. Because of the nature of these divisions, it became increasingly difficult for the established parties of the left and right to combine these

fragmented constituencies into a single electorate and maintain a consistent level of support (see Kitschelt 1999, 1994).

These structural changes effectively brought about the emergence of new constituencies, and the emergence of new constituencies caused the rise of new issues on the libertarian and authoritarian end of the cultural dimensions. Also, changes in the distribution of the electorate forced mainstream parties of the left to respond to the decline in the numbers of their working-class constituency (see Pontusson 1995). They did this by adopting more centrist economic positions and aiming to attract segments of the middle-class, and especially new middle-class, into their electorate (see Kitschelt 1994). Where mainstream left parties pursued this strategy, this opened the space on the economic left for new parties that held more extreme, or perhaps more traditional, left positions, catering to the segments of the old left working-class electorate. On the other hand, social democrats as mainstream left parties were also threatened by the new left parties which catered to the better educated segments of the new middle-class through a libertarian message.

At the same time (after initially pursuing more conservative strategies), mainstream right parties (including christian democrats) adopted somewhat less authoritarian positions in order to broaden their appeal among the new middle-class. This opened the space for radical right parties (which opposed immigration and globalization) to mobilize constituencies on the authoritarian end of the political space (Ignazi 1992).

At first, new social movements followed by new left parties used issues such as environmental protection, gender equality and social liberalism to mobilize constituencies on the libertarian left, which were unrepresented by mainstream left and right parties (Kriesi 1989). A decade or so later, radical right parties (Ignazi 1992) used issues of immigration, cultural and social homogeneity, opposition to the welfare state and calls for protectionism to mobilize constituencies at the authoritarian end of the cultural dimension.

The emergence of highly educated groups, new social movements, young women, segments of the cultural and social professional groups, and public sector employees (at the libertarian end of the cultural dimension) provided an opportunity for new left parties to secure the segments of the established left electorate. On the authoritarian end, small entrepreneurs, craftsmen and artisans, as well as low-skilled non-unionized workers and those exposed to the risk of unemployment produced an opportunity for the new right parties to secure segments of the working-class and petty bourgeoisie by combining different versions of protectionist, xenophobic and anti-establishment messages (Derks 2004, Ivarsflaten 2005).

While the emergence of new issues and new left and right parties changed the structure of political cleavages, it did not affect political divisions in all countries in a similar way. The findings of previous studies suggest that cross-country variation could be linked to the type of welfare regimes, and the pre-existing pattern of interaction between economic and cultural cleavages. While in general, divisions between the electorate of the mainstream left and mainstream right parties remained similar, the salience of the economic or cultural dimension for divisions between the electorate of these parties varied between countries. This also affected the fortunes of new parties: where cultural divisions were dominant, new parties on the right emerged primarily as the representatives of the culturally conservative and exclusive voters; where economic divisions were dominant, new right parties emerged to oppose the welfare state and interest groups related to it. Conversely, in countries where cultural divisions were dominant, new left parties moved in to mobilize the vote of those in support of feminist goals, peace and environmental movements, with strongly culturally libertarian appeals. On the other hand, in countries where economic issues were dominant, support for new left parties greatly depended on the public sector and other new left groups who opposed changes in the structure of the welfare state.

As explained in detail in Chapter 2, in countries where religious divisions historically are very strong, and where mainstream parties of the left and right were closer on the issues of welfare state and economic redistribution, the salience of cultural divisions is likely to be higher than the salience of economic divisions. The opposite case should be found in countries where cultural divisions historically had less salience, and where mainstream parties of the right competed primarily over economic issues, the welfare state and redistribution. Where the mainstream right was dominated by christian democrat parties, cultural divisions have had a much higher salience than they do in countries where the mainstream right is dominated by secular, conservative parties. The historical importance of the religious-secular cleavage created favorable conditions for the continued high salience of the culture cleavage, this time based on different issues such as cultural homogeneity, individual freedom, gender equality, environmentalism and so on. New parties in such a context would arise principally by mobilizing culturally libertarian constituencies in the case of new left parties, and culturally conservative constituencies in case of the new right parties. On the other hand, in countries where economic divisions over the welfare state were dominant, new parties would emerge as representatives of the opponents of the welfare state on the new right, or representatives of the welfare state dependent groups on the new left.

The exact position of the electorate of new left and new right parties on the cultural and economic dimensions, as well as on particular component issues of these dimensions, depends on the structural location of the constituencies of these parties. The electorate of new left and new right parties holds libertarian and authoritarian positions on the cultural dimension, respectively. At the time of their foundation, new left parties generally held left positions on the economic dimension, while new right parties combined anti-establishment appeals with economic liberalism (Kitschelt 1995). However, in the recent period, when the mobilization potential of social movements declined, the position of these parties on the

economic dimension is likely to depend on whether their electorate comes from the educated social and cultural professionals employed in the public, or in the private sector (see Dolezal 2007). If these parties cater to social and cultural professionals in the private service sector we can expect them to exhibit a stronger tendency towards pro-market positions; if the opposite is the case, new left parties are likely to exhibit stronger tendencies toward left economic positions.

Similarly, the position of the electorate of the new right parties is likely to depend on their structural location. If the electorate of the radical right parties is composed primarily from economic losers, such as younger low-skilled workers who are not union members, individuals exposed to a high risk of unemployment, and small business owners with immobile skills and resources, then they will combine authoritarian and xenophobic positions with protectionist and antiestablishment positions (Kriesi 1999, Ivarsflaten 2005, Betz and Swank 2003).

If, on the other hand, the electorate of radical right parties includes small business owners and similar groups, then their positions will combine exclusivist (but not overly authoritarian positions) with economically more liberal positions. This was the case for Scandinavian Progress parties in the 1970s and 1980s, whose initial ideological position was frequently described as 'right-libertarian' (see Kitschelt 1995, Harmel and Svasand 1997, Harmel and Gibson 1995). However, in the contemporary setting, most empirical studies argue that the electorate of the new right parties is much less likely to hold pro-market positions (Betz and Swank 2003, Ignazi 1992, Kriesi 1999); Rather, the ideological profile of the electorate of most new right parties combines protectionist and anti-integrationist positions with exclusivist and authoritarian positions.

In the recent period, in countries where voters for green parties come mainly from the professional middle-class (see Dolezal 2007), and in countries where social democrats have

attempted to build a centrist cross-class coalition by shifting to a more centrist economic position (Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Norway), we can observe the rise of new left Socialist parties or the revitalization of similar parties already in existence. The electorate of these parties comes from groups that strongly oppose any centrist economic policies of the mainstream left parties. The electorate of these parties includes principally, segments of the working-class, public sector workers and younger women. Another development in countries where social democrats adopted a more centrist economic position relatively early on and aimed to build cross-class coalition, is that instead of green parties, we find a strong presence of left socialist parties on the libertarian and economically left end of the political spectrum (Kitschelt 1994). The partial exception to this pattern is found in Sweden, where the Green Party emerged despite the centrist and cross-class appeal of social democrats. This is considered as a consequence of strong social democrat support for nuclear energy and the growth-oriented economic policy in 1980s (see Granberg and Holmberg 1988).

The discussion above shows that while we do have a general pattern of ideological cleavages between the mainstream left and right, new and old left, new and old right and new left and right, the exact content of these divisions and their structural underpinnings in each individual country depend on variation in some contextual characteristics. One of the characteristics concerns the welfare regime and its related response to deindustrialization; the other concerns the historical salience of economic and cultural divisions, combined with partisan responses to shifts in the structural determinants of their electoral support. This takes us to the following propositions, which will be investigated in the empirical section of the chapter.

4.4 Propositions

The discussion in the previous section and in Chapter 2 leads us to a set of propositions, which consider the development of political divisions and the emergence of new parties, in the context of social and economic changes in advanced industrial societies. These hypotheses deal with the positions occupied by the electorate of new parties in the post-industrial political space, and the impact that the social and economic context has had on political divisions in advanced industrial societies.

The rise of new issues, and shifts in the economic positions of the established parties towards the center, opened the space for the emergence of new political parties. Together, these trends constituted a significant shift in the structure of political divisions. As is argued in previous chapters, new parties emerged at points in the two-dimensional political space where sizable groups of voters were left unrepresented by the established political parties. These parties emerged predominantly in the shape of the radical right parties on the 'new' right and green parties and left socialist parties on the new left. The exact form of changes that took place in the structure of political divisions depends in a large part on the characteristics of the social and economic context, notably, the characteristics of the welfare regimes, policies related to deindustrialization, and the historical political divisions. This leads us to the following propositions:

H1: *The electorate of the new parties on the left and right occupies positions on the cultural and economic dimension ideologically distinct from the positions of the electorate of the established left and right parties.*

The electorate of new left parties (greens and left socialists) differs from the electorate of the established left (social democrat) parties in that they generally hold a more libertarian position on the cultural dimension and an economically left position on the economic dimension.

H2: *New left parties emerged at the position where we find that the electorate is economically more left and culturally more libertarian, compared to the electorate of the established left parties.*

Such positions of new parties are present in countries with Universalist welfare regimes, high public sector employment, and high female participation in the labor force. In countries with corporatist welfare regimes, low levels of public sector employment, and service sector employment (composed mainly from private sector services) the electorate of the new left parties can come from two distinct groups: the electorate of green parties are expected to hold strongly libertarian cultural positions and relatively centrist economic positions; and the electorate of left socialist parties, which are expected to hold economic positions of the strong left and positions on the cultural dimension closer to the authoritarian pole.

New right parties are generally expected to have an electorate that is more authoritarian on the cultural dimension and economically more centrist than the electorate of the established right parties.

H3: *Compared to the electorate of mainstream right parties, the electorate of new right parties is expected to be culturally more authoritarian and economically 'close' or less pro-market than the electorate of mainstream right parties.*

However, here as well we can expect to find certain differences between countries. In countries where deindustrialization produced sizable groups of economic 'losers', be they unskilled workers, the petty bourgeoisie or those with a precarious status on the labor market, we expect the electorate of the radical right to take both very authoritarian positions on all issues of the cultural dimension, and more pronounced protectionist positions on the economic dimension (see Kriesi 1999, Ivarsflaten 2005).

On the other hand, in countries where deindustrialization did not produce similarly sizable groups of losers (see Swank and Betz 2004) we expect the electorate of the radical right parties to take both economically centrist or slightly protectionist positions, and xenophobic and exclusivist positions on cultural issues.

The development of political divisions in post-industrial societies (including the emergence of new parties), depends highly on the nature of previous political divisions, characteristics of the welfare state and the way these countries handled social and economic changes brought about by deindustrialization and globalization. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, in countries where the historical salience of cultural divisions was lower, the contention between the left and the right over economy dominated the political space, and the high level of redistribution, government spending and public sector employment created conditions which perpetuated the salience of economic divisions, we expect to find a higher salience of economic divisions compared to cultural divisions. We also expect that economic divisions will be the principal issues which divide the electorate of the mainstream right and the mainstream left parties.

H4: *In countries where the historical salience of cultural issues was low and where the Universalist welfare regime was established, we can expect to find the dominance of economic ideological cleavages.*

At the same time, the Universalist welfare state reduced the number of 'losers' from social and economic change and introduced a range of women friendly policies, which should dampen the salience of cultural divisions. In countries where cultural divisions were historically dominant and where the establishment of the welfare state did not produce a clear-cut opposition between the mainstream left and right parties, we can expect to see a higher salience of the cultural dimension compared to an economic dimension. In these countries, the corporatist welfare state offered a lower level of protection to groups of losers and outsiders (Swank and Betz 2003); this increased the salience of protectionist and exclusivist demands, and consequently, increased the salience of identity politics.

H5: *In countries where cultural divisions historically had a high salience and where corporatist welfare regimes were established, we expect cultural cleavages to be dominant and for economic cleavages to fall to a lower importance.*

It is argued that the content of the cultural cleavage changed over time, shifting away from the agenda promoted by the new left (e.g. individual freedom and environmentalism), towards the issues of the new right (e.g. immigration and cultural homogeneity) (Kriesi *et. al*. 2006, Ignazi 1992). At the same time, an increasing salience of identity politics and law and order issues prompted parties to take clearer stances on these issues. So we can expect to see a decline in the salience of divisions based on libertarian-authoritarian values, and an increase in the importance of immigration and cultural homogeneity as defining the content of cultural divisions.

H6: *Because of changes in the content of the cultural dimension, we expect to see a decline in the importance of libertarian-authoritarian moral issues, and an increase in the importance of immigration.*

Finally, I expect that the developments in the post-industrial social structure will also have an impact on the nature of divisions between the new and the established parties on the left and on the right. These expectations can be summarized in the following way: I expect that the differences between the new and the established right parties on the cultural dimension will be more pronounced in countries with a stronger presence of outsider groups and a high level of unemployment. I also expect divisions on the economic dimension between left socialist and the established left parties to be more pronounced when these conditions are present. The presence of sizable outsider groups mainly among the working-class, but also among young women would allow for the emergence of a party that is economically to the left of the social democrats. Finally, the presence of a large service employment, especially among women and in the public sector, has the potential to increase the cultural divisions between the new left and the established left parties; large left-libertarian constituencies are created, different from the traditional social democrat electorate, which could be mobilized by left-libertarian appeals.

4.5 Data, Variables and Method

The test of the propositions advanced in the previous section rests on the data from the World Value Survey, the 1990 and 1995/1996 waves, and the European Value Survey from the 1999/2000 wave. A total of thirteen western European countries participating in

these surveys at various time points are included in the analysis. These countries are: Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, Ireland and Great Britain. Since Belgium has in effect two separate party systems, samples from Flanders and Wallonia are analyzed separately. The analysis is conducted in two steps: in the first step, I look at differences between parties which belong to different party families, on four issue dimensions in each country separately. In the second step, I use the findings from country-level analysis and use these in the analysis of sources of differences in the strength of political divisions between the electorate of principal parties of the left and right across countries. The analysis in the first step aims to map the presence of divisions between the electorates of particular parties on the left and right and within the left and right, and identity the positions of the electorate of new left and new right parties compared to mainstream parties. The purpose of the first step of the analysis is to test the validity of the fragmentation hypotheses and to map the position of the electorate of new parties in the two-dimensional space. In the second step, the analysis links the observed differences in the positions of the electorate of individual parties with factors that bring about variation in the structure of political divisions across countries. In the first step, the analysis is conducted at the micro-level, and in the second step, the analysis focuses on the macro-level and the impact of contextual variables on the effects of individual level variables in each country.

4.5.1 Analysis at the Country Level

In order to analyze the differences between individual parties comprehensively, I focus on both the economic and cultural-value divisions, which represent components of what is defined in the literature as libertarian-authoritarian and economic left-right cleavages

(Kitschelt 1994, Hooghe and Marks 2002). Economic and cultural value divisions are operationalized through four indicators of value divisions: the economic value-cleavage is operationalized as a division between redistributive-protectionist and market-liberal positions; the cultural value-cleavage is more complex and it is operationalized with three issue components (Kitschelt 1994): the first component concerns the issues of personal freedom and morality and the role of traditional authority. These issues were relatively salient in the initial phases of development of new politics. However, as homosexuality, abortion and gender equality became less divisive issues, the salience of this component of the cultural cleavage declined somewhat.

The second component concerns the issues of immigration, cultural homogeneity and community boundaries. This component is currently the most salient element of the cultural value-cleavage due to increasing immigration and the deepening of economic and political integration in West Europe (Kriesi *et. al.* 2006).

The third component encompasses attitudes towards the environment. Environmental concerns lied at the core of new politics in the 1970s and 1980s, and this issue is likely to gain prominence again with increasing public awareness about global warming.

Each component is represented by a single index[7]. The indexes are formed by taking the mean value of two, three or four related items (see Appendix 4 for details), and constructed so that lower values indicate redistributive, libertarian and pro-environmental positions, while higher values denote pro-market and authoritarian positions. The variables used in the construction of indexes are available in all three surveys and in all country samples. The exception is the variable that measures attitudes towards immigration, which is

[7] A principal component analysis including all individual items used in the composition of the independent variables shows an almost identical pattern of loadings of individual items on four easily identifiable factors in all countries (analysis not shown here). Items which measure libertarian-authoritarian moral attitudes load on the first factor, and items which measure environmentalism load on the second factor. Items that compose the economic index all load on the third factor, and the remaining items that measure positions on immigration load on the fourth factor.

missing in the data from the World Value Survey 1990 wave. Since the exclusion of 1990 wave data would reduce the number of country-years in the analysis significantly, the variable that measures positions towards immigration is composed from a singe item, measuring positions towards the presence of foreign workforce. The item is recoded in a way so that it corresponds to the metric of the immigration index composed for the World Value Survey 1995/1996 wave and the European Value Survey 1999/2000 wave. However, the lack of the second item may produce some discrepancy in the comparability of this measure across country samples. Thus, this must be taken into account when the coefficients which indicate the impact of immigration at different time points are compared.

Items used in the construction of independent variables measure general value orientations rather than positions on specific issues. While general questions might not reflect the real issues that voters base their decisions on or the appeals that parties actually compete on, their use nonetheless has the significant advantage of reducing an eventual problem of different definitions and perceptions of specific issues across national contexts. General orientations are also expected to be less sensitive to political developments of the moment and thus able to capture underlying political divisions.

The dependent variable used in the first step of the analysis in this chapter captures voting behavior and is measured with a variable that indicates voting for parties, classified into seven party families. The operationalization of the dependent variable takes into account the complexities and fragmentation of contemporary party systems and allows for a more precise identification of conflict lines, especially those between mainstream parties on the left and right, and between mainstream and new parties on the left and on the right. The seven party families are far left (left socialists, communists and similar parties), greens, social democrats, christian democrats, liberals, conservatives and the radical right. The classification of individual parties into families is presented in Appendix 4.

Since the analytical focus of the chapter maps differences between individual parties and cross-national differences in their salience, I use multinomial logistic regression as the method of analysis in the first step. Multinomial regression is used to identify the precise locations of these conflict lines within party systems, and to identify differences between the established and new parties on the left and on the right. More specifically I am interested in the strength of value divisions that divide mainstream left and mainstream right parties, and new and established parties within the left and right. I report coefficients for three sets of comparison: the first compares the positions of mainstream left and mainstream right parties; the second compares mainstream left with new left and far left parties; the third compares mainstream right parties with smaller right parties and radical right parties. The model used in the analysis at the individual level can be expressed with following equation.

$$\log(\Pr(vote = i)/\Pr(vote = j)) = \alpha + \beta_1 economic + \\ + \beta_2 libertarianauthoritarian + \beta_3 immigration + \beta_4 environmentalism \quad (4.1)$$

where $\log(\Pr(vote = i)/\Pr(vote = j))$ indicates the log-odds of voting for party *i* instead of *j*. The analysis uses the same multinomial logistic regression, but since the quantity of interest in this analysis is the comparison of the position between individual political parties of the mainstream left and the mainstream right, mainstream left and new left and mainstream right and the new right, I present parameters from these three sets of comparisons separately (some of these involve setting the reference category differently).

4.5.2 Analysis at the Aggregate Level

In the second step, the presence of differences in the structure of political divisions across countries is assessed with the measure of pseudo R square for model fit in multinomial logistic regression. This measure allows for the assessment of the relative importance of cultural as opposed to economic divisions. The pseudo R square is not a meaningful measure of variation of the dependent variable, given that categorical variables do not have variation in the standard sense of the term. Therefore, the absolute values of this measure cannot be meaningfully compared across models with different dependent variables. However, as the same dependent variable has the same number of categories across models, a measure of model fit based on pseudo R square can tell us which model performs better, allowing for the estimate of the relative importance of individual political divisions within each country (Pampel 2000). Here I compare the model fit of the full model with the model fit of four additional models, including individual variables that measure the positions of voters on cultural and economic dimensions. The first of these models includes an immigration and libertarian-authoritarian index in a combined analysis, while the remaining three models include a single variable which measures positions on economic, libertarian-authoritarian and immigration issue dimensions.

The second element of the analysis of cross-country differences in the strength of political divisions focuses on the impact of factors identified in Chapter 2 as potential sources of cross-national variation in the patterns of political divisions across countries. In order to assess the impact of the social and economic context on the strength of political divisions at the individual level, I use a two-stage regression analysis (see Jusko and Shively 2005, Lewis and Linzer 2005). Two-stage regression analysis uses parameter estimates from the regression analysis at the micro-level, which indicates the impact of independent variables of

interest on the dependent variable, and uses it as a dependent variable in the analysis at the macro-level. In the second stage, these parameters are used as a dependent variable in the regression analysis at the macro-level, where independent variables measure characteristics of units of analysis at the macro-level. For the parameters of the micro-level independent variables to be comparable and valid measures of the dependent variable at the macro-level, micro-level variables need to be comprised in an identical way across macro level units and need to have an identical range.

Macro-level analysis looks at the sources of variation in the strength of cultural and economic differences between the mainstream left and mainstream right parties. These differences are measured with three dependent variables: the first measures the strength of differences between the electorate of mainstream left and mainstream right parties on economic issues; the second measures the strength of divisions over immigration, and the third measures divisions over libertarian-authoritarian social issues.

The parameters of the impact of four independent variables in the multinomial regression analysis are used as dependent variables that indicate the strength of individual economic and cultural value cleavages between principal parties of the left and right in individual countries. Given that the metric of independent variables across countries and waves is identical, the parameters generated in the multinomial logistic regression can be considered to be comparable measures of the strength of economic and cultural differences between parties that belong to the same party family across countries. Also, the organization of dependent variables at the micro-level into party families provides a conceptual comparability of the meaning of these coefficients across countries, which could be lacking if the parties were grouped according to some criteria less substantively linked with the ideological and competitive positions of these parties.

The multinomial logistic regression generated parameters for comparisons between parties for 29 countries over three time points. The details of data and descriptive statistics for the variables used in the second step of the analysis are provided in Appendix 4.

The parameters for the independent variables from multinomial logistic regressions are entered in the new data file as dependent variables, along with macro-level variables which measure the strength of historical political divisions, characteristics of the welfare regimes, and policy responses to deindustrialization, which serve as the independent variables in this analysis. The measures of the strength of past political divisions are: the strength of class voting in the 1950s and 1960s, and the strength of the christian democratic parties in the same period. The strength of class voting here serves as a proxy measure for the strength of the economic division; it is frequently argued in the literature about class voting that the mechanism behind class mobilization for left and right parties depends on economic and distributive interests of classes (Evans 1999, Nieuwbeerta 1996).

The strength of class voting is measured by the value of the Thomsen index of class voting which takes the average values of class voting in elections across two decades, the 1950s and 1960s. The values of Thomsen index are taken from calculations published in Nieuwbeerta (1996) and Nieuwbeerta and de Graaf (1999). The measure of the past strength of cultural political divisions is the strength of christian democratic parties. In most countries, christian democratic parties mobilized cross-class coalitions and placed a heavy emphasis on the role of religious principles in politics and public life. Therefore, the strength of christian democratic parties indicates, in an indirect way, the mobilization of cultural divisions in each country and, consequently, the electoral potential of cultural issues. Characteristics of the welfare state are measured as overall public spending as a share of GDP. While a number of other measures could be used for this purpose, public spending reflects in a parsimonious way the elements of the welfare state relevant in shaping political divisions, namely social

spending, public sector employment and the tax burden. Public spending is also strongly correlated with measures of welfare state characteristics, such as social spending and public sector employment, and some measures of welfare state outcomes (see Appendix 4).

The fourth macro variable measures the impact of deindustrialization policies, and here it is measured by the size of service sector employment. As noted by Iversen and Wren (1998), an increase of employment in services was the only possible avenue for replacing industrial jobs and preventing the rise of sizable groups of labor market outsiders. The rise of service employment, especially if it happened in the public sector, could further deepen economic divisions. Conversely, the absence of the compensatory impact of service employment could increase the size of outsider groups, split the working-class, and result in a higher salience of issues related to cultural homogeneity and immigration as outsider groups could be mobilized with calls for cultural protectionism by radical right parties. The final variable in macro-level analysis is added to both control for the fact that individual level data are taken from three time points, and also to capture potential changes in the salience of cultural divisions over time.

This analysis focuses on the contrast between the principal left and right parties, as there are not enough cases for the other contrasts. The comprehensive model separately regresses each of the first three columns of coefficients from Table 4.3 on all five macro variables introduced above:

$$\beta_{Table4.3\_ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 classvote + \beta_2 CDvote + \\ + \beta_3 publicspending + \beta_4 serviceemployment + \beta_5 time \quad (4.2)$$

The dependent variable ($\beta_{Table4.3\_ij}$) is thus the *i*th column of coefficients (i=1, 2, 3) from Table 4.3, showing the relevant parameter estimates for Equation (4.1) for countries *j*.

These coefficients show the impact of the economic left-right, libertarian-authoritarian and immigration issue dimensions on voting support for the strongest left over the strongest right wing party. In order to assess the robustness of the coefficients obtained with the comprehensive model shown in Equation (4.2), three additional models were estimated using subsets of the independent variables in the comprehensive model, which will be discussed later on.

4.6 Results and Discussion

The results of multinomial logistic regressions are presented in six tables. Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 present coefficients from multinomial logistic regressions with the four indexes measuring economic and cultural value cleavages as independent variables, and vote choice as the dependent variable. Table 4.4 presents the pseudo R square measures of model fit for five models used to assess the importance of cultural and economic value cleavages across countries. Finally, the last part of this section presents the results of an aggregate level analysis, where Table 4.5 presents results from the analysis of contextual determinants of division between principal parties of the left and right.

4.6.1 Results of Analysis at the Micro-level

The results of the multinomial regression analysis at the individual level broadly support expectations stated in the first hypotheses regarding the distinctiveness of the electorate of the new parties on the left and on the right. On the left, differences can be observed between the electorate of the green parties, the far left parties and the mainstream

left parties. The patterns of differences between these parties are fairly similar across countries, with some notable dissimilarities related, it appears, mostly to characteristics of competition in these countries. As a general pattern, the electorate of green parties in almost every country, except France, is located on the libertarian end of social democrats, and clearly separated from the social democrat electorate by their strong pro-environmental positions. The parameters comparing the social democrats electorate and the electorate of green parties vary in strength across countries. Seven out of 23 coefficients comparing positions on the libertarian-authoritarian dimension are found to have significant effects, while 13 out of 23 are found to have significant effects on the variable that measures the issue of immigration. While the direction of effects in most countries is found to be fairly consistent across time, the strength of coefficients changes visibly over time. While in the 1990s, differences on libertarian-authoritarian social issues were more important and showed more consistency in effects across countries, the opposite is the case with results based on data from the 2000 wave: in 2000 it is immigration that has stronger and more consistent effects across countries while the opposite is the case with libertarian-authoritarian social issues. This might suggest that the importance of libertarian-authoritarian social issues declined during the 1990s and that the importance of the immigration issue increased as a consequence. Perhaps this occurred as issues related to moral permissiveness (such as female equality or tolerance towards alternative life-styles) became less contentious, and consequently differences between the electorate of left parties decreased on these issues. Economic differences between the electorate of greens and social democrats are not found to be particularly strong. However, it seems that the electorate of green parties is more often than not slightly less supportive of redistributive economic positions than the electorate of social democratic parties. Perhaps this can be explained by the tendency of libertarian middle-class professionals to vote for green parties (Dolezal 2007).

The sources of other divisions on the left between social democrats and far left parties are based on different foundations. The electorate of far left parties is found to be significantly more left on economic issues than the electorate of social democrats. Far left parties in this analysis include both old far left parties such as communist (France, Italy) and left socialists (Sweden, Finland, and since the 1960s in Norway and Denmark), and newer far left parties such as SP (Netherlands) and PDS (Germany). While most of these parties did not emerge until recently and do not have roots comparable to new left parties, it is likely that they benefited from the fragmentation of the social structure and mobilized some segments of the electorate left unrepresented by the social democrats. This is visible in Denmark and Norway where in the absence of pure new left parties, these parties mobilized the electorate on the left-libertarian end of social democrats.

As the results from Table 4.1 reveal, in almost 17 countries the far left voters are found to be more to the left of social democrat voters on the economic dimension, and in 11 countries these differences are found to be substantial and registered statistically significant coefficients. Regarding the differences of these parties on cultural issues, a more complex pattern emerges: the electorate of most of these parties is found to be more authoritarian on the libertarian-authoritarian dimension than the electorate of social democrat parties, but at the same time, the voters of these parties are found to be less opposed to immigration than the electorate of social democrats. Only the electorate of the Socialist Party in the Netherlands fits the profile of the working-class left- authoritarian electorate, who hold protectionist positions on both the economic and cultural dimensions.

The results in Table 4.1 show that the left electorate is divided and that there are groups of voters on the left who are more libertarian or more economically left than the electorate of social democrat parties. The recent rise of parties such as the Socialist Party in

Table 4.1. Value differences between the electorate of the left parties (social democrats, far left parties and greens). All entries are coefficients and standard errors from multinomial logistic regression, the reference category in each country is social democrat voters.

	Social democrats vs. far left				Social democrats vs. greens			
	Economic left-right	Immigration	Libertarian-authoritarian	Environment	Economic left-right	Immigration	Libertarian-authoritarian	Environment
Austria 2000					0.012	**-1.116*****	**-0.115***	**-0.895*****
					(0.075)	(0.145)	(0.064)	(0.172)
Belgium – Flanders 2000					-0.099	-0.243	-0.009	**-0.604*****
					(0.080)	(0.153)	(0.070)	(0.176)
Belgium – Walloon 2000					0.013	**-0.240***	-0.025	**-0.297****
					(0.067)	(0.136)	(0.063)	(0.140)
Britain 2000								
Denmark 2000	**-0.180****	**-0.663****	**0.120****	**-0.386****				
	(0.080)	(0.152)	(0.057)	(0.175)				
Finland 2000	**-0.330*****	**-0.380*****	0.036	-0.133	-0.007	**-0.653*****	0.000	**-0.701*****
	(0.091)	(0.163)	(0.077)	(0.202)	(0.082)	(0.142)	(0.068)	(0.189)
France 2000	0.006	-0.188	**0.153*****	0.147	0.071	**0.195****	0.052	**0.248*****
	(0.075)	(0.150)	(0.066)	(0.150)	(0.049)	(0.097)	(0.044)	(0.100)
Germany 2000	**-0.156*****	-0.020	0.096	-0.080	0.050	**-0.397*****	-0.070	**-0.336*****
	(0.073)	(0.154)	(0.068)	(0.157)	(0.067)	(0.131)	(0.057)	(0.134)
Ireland 2000					-0.141	**-0.569*****	-0.010	**-1.272*****
					(0.117)	(0.232)	(0.101)	(0.316)
Italy 2000	**-0.119***	-0.073	-0.078	0.138	0.010	-0.304	-0.134	**-0.825*****
	(0.066)	(0.134)	(0.059)	(0.169)	(0.107)	(0.217)	(0.095)	(0.290)
The Netherlands 2000	**-0.215***	**0.431****	**0.154***	-0.340	-0.116	-0.007	0.038	**-0.903*****
	(0.118)	(0.211)	(0.087)	(0.259)	(0.071)	(0.137)	(0.051)	(0.164)
Sweden 2000	**-0.167****	**-0.557*****	**0.201*****	-0.128	-0.040	**-0.548****	-0.084	**-0.527*****
	(0.081)	(0.187)	(0.062)	(0.160)	(0.095)	(0.224)	(0.067)	(0.206)
Switzerland 1995					0.145	0.268	0.077	**-0.922*****
					(0.107)	(0.254)	(0.088)	(0.246)
Sweden 1995	-0.105	-0.114	-0.077	**-0.304***	0.072	-0.315	0.038	**-0.705*****
	(0.099)	(0.231)	(0.060)	(0.174)	(0.095)	(0.233)	(0.060)	(0.188)
Norway 1995	-0.114	**-0.690*****	**0.157****	**-0.464*****				
	(0.109)	(0.217)	(0.074)	(0.171)				

(table 4.1 cont.)

	Social democrats vs. far left				Social democrats vs. greens			
	Economic left-right	Immigration	Libertarian-authoritarian	Environment	Economic left-right	Immigration	Libertarian-authoritarian	Environment
Finland 1995	**-0.187***	-0.122	-0.049	**0.545*****	-0.006	**-0.537*****	**-0.138****	**-0.432*****
	(0.110)	(0.236)	(0.081)	(0.191)	(0.100)	(0.189)	(0.067)	(0.172)
Germany 1995	-0.060	-0.066	0.035	**0.233***	**-0.106***	**-0.554*****	0.043	**-0.510*****
	(0.066)	(0.125)	(0.041)	(0.140)	(0.055)	(0.102)	(0.033)	(0.120)
Austria 1990					**0.151***	**-0.355*****	**-0.152****	**-0.816*****
					(0.089)	(0.131)	(0.072)	(0.168)
Britain 1990								
Denmark 1990	**-0.211*****	**-0.355*****	-0.050	**-0.581*****				
	(0.071)	(0.106)	(0.055)	(0.159)				
France 1990	-0.092	-0.031	**0.153***	0.087	0.075	0.078	0.016	**-0.654*****
	(0.100)	(0.191)	(0.092)	(0.206)	(0.076)	(0.140)	(0.065)	(0.164)
Germany 1990					**-0.158****	**-0.358*****	**-0.104****	**-0.619*****
					(0.063)	(0.102)	(0.059)	(0.150)
Ireland 1990					**0.326*****	0.006	**-0.226***	-0.112
					(0.128)	(0.240)	(0.123)	(0.328)
Italy 1990	-0.074	**-0.206****	-0.072	0.208	-0.053	**-0.225****	**-0.167*****	**-0.376****
	(0.057)	(0.104)	(0.054)	(0.147)	(0.062)	(0.110)	(0.059)	(0.165)
The Netherlands 1990	**-0.272*****	**-0.557*****	0.003	**-0.965*****	**0.179****	-0.126	**-0.101***	**-0.371****
	(0.110)	(0.199)	(0.075)	(0.228)	(0.081)	(0.136)	(0.057)	(0.161)
Norway 1990	**-0.232*****	**-0.222***	-0.077	**-0.548*****				
	(0.075)	(0.123)	(0.062)	(0.153)				
Sweden 1990	**-0.239****	0.143	**-0.153***	-0.046	0.150	0.131	-0.071	**-0.471****
	(0.102)	(0.176)	(0.083)	(0.204)	(0.094)	(0.154)	(0.074)	(0.200)
Belgium-Walloon 1990					**0.194*****	-0.115	0.007	**-0.582*****
					(0.063)	(0.110)	(0.061)	(0.130)
Belgium-Flanders 1990					-0.013	**-0.278*****	-0.075	**-0.750*****
					(0.066)	(0.099)	(0.059)	(0.136)

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

Far left parties are SP (Socialist Party) in the Netherlands, Left Party in Sweden, Socialist People's Party in Denmark, PDS in Germany, communists and other far left parties in France and Italy.

the Netherlands and the Left Party in Germany suggests that a sizable segment of the electorate can be mobilized with left economic populism. Incidentally, these parties emerged in countries where the post-industrial transformation produced a large group of labor market outsiders and where the radical right was either absent (Netherlands), or too closely identified with neo-Nazism (Germany). In all other countries with sizable groups of outsiders, it is the radical right that prospered by mobilizing outsiders with messages containing cultural protectionism (Ivarsflaten 2005, Betz and Swank 2003).

On the right end of the political spectrum, we can observe that the electorate of radical right parties is distinguished from the electorate of other right parties by their pronounced anti immigrant position. In all countries, the electorate of the radical right is found on the authoritarian end of mainstream right parties, and in 12 out of 17 countries these results are found to be significant. At the same time, the positions of the electorates of radical right parties do not differ significantly from the economic positions of the electorates of mainstream right parties. The exception is the German radical right, which seems to be the only case of radical right party that combines welfare chauvinism, authoritarian and exclusivist positions.

While findings in this analysis are in no way unexpected to say the least, they do show that fragmentation of the political space took place, and that new political parties with an electorate of a distinct ideological profile emerged. The analysis here spans just one decade and three time points, so this is hardly enough to provide unequivocal support for the fragmentation hypothesis. However, it does show that the electorate of new political parties on the left and right have a distinct ideological profile compared to the electorate of the established left and right parties. Also, the consistency of most of the effect across countries suggests that competitive conditions of particular party systems and the actions of the

Table 4.2 Value differences between the electorate of the right parties (christian democrats, liberals, conservatives and radical right). All entries are coefficients and standard errors from multinomial logistic regression; the reference category is voters of the strongest right parties.

	Strongest right party vs. the second strongest right party				Strongest right parties vs. the radical right			
	Economic left-right	Immigration	Libertarian-authoritarian	Environment	Economic left-right	Immigration	Libertarian-authoritarian	Environment
Austria 2000					0.007	**0.401*****	-0.059	**0.291*****
					(0.056)	(0.149)	(0.050)	(0.112)
Belgium – Flanders 2000	**-0.109****	-0.080	**0.182*****	-0.068	-0.007	**1.235*****	0.099	0.162
	(0.054)	(0.113)	(0.050)	(0.119)	(0.069)	(0.217)	(0.065)	(0.157)
Belgium – Walloon 2000	**-0.149***	-0.173	**0.184****	**-0.322***	-0.023	**1.172*****	0.225	0.056
	(0.083)	(0.166)	(0.081)	(0.166)	(0.158)	(0.452)	(0.164)	(0.290)
Britain 2000								
Denmark 2000	0.018	-0.227	0.049	-0.276	-0.004	**0.671*****	**0.191****	0.082
	(0.100)	(0.170)	(0.066)	(0.187)	(0.106)	(0.199)	(0.078)	(0.186)
Finland 2000	**-0.246*****	**0.351*****	**0.106***	-0.113				
	(0.072)	(0.131)	(0.058)	(0.151)				
France 2000	-0.102	**-0.256***	-0.013	**-0.254****	-0.147	**1.592*****	0.035	-0.292
	(0.068)	(0.142)	(0.061)	(0.134)	(0.092)	(0.370)	(0.089)	(0.188)
Germany 2000	-0.109	-0.196	-0.067	-0.072	**-0.253*****	**1.481*****	0.190	0.219
	(0.096)	(0.200)	(0.085)	(0.202)	(0.115)	(0.474)	(0.120)	(0.285)
Ireland 2000	0.074	0.082	**0.138****	-0.061				
	(0.071)	(0.160)	(0.069)	(0.184)				
Italy 2000	**-0.194*****	-0.199	**0.291*****	-0.186	-0.014	**0.319****	-0.006	**0.261****
	(0.059)	(0.137)	(0.058)	(0.150)	(0.056)	(0.144)	(0.051)	(0.140)
The Netherlands 2000	**0.192*****	**0.272****	-0.043	-0.080				
	(0.076)	(0.138)	(0.057)	(0.170)				
Sweden 2000	**-0.560*****	**-0.462****	0.084	**-0.425****				
	(0.104)	(0.230)	(0.068)	(0.187)				
Switzerland 1995	0.106	-0.244	**-0.150****	0.076	-0.031	0.261	-0.032	0.024
	(0.072)	(0.174)	(0.061)	(0.154)	(0.081)	(0.208)	(0.070)	(0.177)
Sweden 1995	**-0.337*****	-0.095	-0.067	-0.362				
	(0.128)	(0.341)	(0.088)	(0.238)				
Norway 1995	**-0.403*****	**-0.578****	**0.166***	**-0.499*****	-0.031	**1.152*****	**0.186*****	0.072
	(0.129)	(0.254)	(0.089)	(0.195)	(0.099)	(0.233)	(0.073)	(0.158)

(table 4.2 cont.)

	Strongest right party vs. the second strongest right party				Strongest right parties vs. the radical right			
	Economic Left-Right	Immigration	Libertarian-Authoritarian	Environment	Economic Left-Right	Immigration	Libertarian-Authoritarian	Environment
Finland 1995	**0.163***	-0.134	**-0.143*****	0.033				
	(0.086)	(0.187)	(0.066)	(0.151)				
Germany 1995	-0.009	**-0.387***	-0.103	-0.150	0.021	**1.373*****	-0.120	**0.750****
	(0.108)	(0.203)	(0.065)	(0.235)	(0.154)	(0.455)	(0.099)	(0.332)
Austria 1990					0.074	0.145	**-0.263*****	0.119
					(0.070)	(0.137)	(0.063)	(0.115)
Britain 1990	0.033	0.079	**0.136***	-0.086				
	(0.103)	(0.138)	(0.073)	(0.191)				
Denmark 1990	-0.082	**-0.637*****	0.016	**-0.430****	-0.187	**0.861*****	**0.306*****	-0.165
	(0.111)	(0.225)	(0.096)	(0.217)	(0.116)	(0.232)	(0.092)	(0.221)
France 1990	0.090	**-0.199****	**-0.243*****	**-0.309****	0.150	0.678	-0.065	**0.582****
	(0.067)	(0.097)	(0.057)	(0.132)	(0.141)	(0.502)	(0.120)	(0.264)
Germany 1990	0.002	**-0.234****	**-0.098***	0.027	-0.076	**0.405***	**-0.324*****	**0.535*****
	(0.052)	(0.111)	(0.058)	(0.128)	(0.098)	(0.231)	(0.090)	(0.208)
Ireland 1990	**0.139****	-0.117	**-0.376*****	-0.258				
	(0.072)	(0.124)	(0.069)	(0.183)				
Italy 1990	**0.408*****	0.067	**-0.133****	**0.456*****	**0.243****	-0.100	-0.147	-0.270
	(0.094)	(0.154)	(0.066)	(0.181)	(0.106)	(0.179)	(0.104)	(0.260)
The Netherlands 1990	**-0.531*****	**-0.697*****	**0.261****	**-0.592****				
	(0.136)	(0.209)	(0.114)	(0.274)				
Norway 1990	**-0.619*****	0.093	0.028	-0.159	0.048	**0.517*****	0.025	0.188
	(0.095)	(0.125)	(0.062)	(0.135)	(0.091)	(0.165)	(0.069)	(0.149)
Sweden 1990	**0.252*****	0.175	**-0.491*****	**0.276*****				
	(0.067)	(0.131)	(0.068)	(0.132)				
Belgium-Walloon 1990	**0.204*****	-0.003	**-0.301*****	-0.079				
	(0.053)	(0.084)	(0.048)	(0.102)				
Belgium-Flanders 1990	**0.163***	-0.134	**-0.143*****	0.033	0.102	0.361	**-0.493*****	-0.090
	(0.086)	(0.187)	(0.066)	(0.151)	(0.118)	(0.233)	(0.106)	(0.234)

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

The strongest right parties are CVP in Austria, VLD/MR in Belgium in 2000 and CVP/PSC in 1990, Conservatives in Britain, Liberals in Denmark, KESK in Finland, UMP in France, CDU/CDU in Germany, FF in Ireland, FI in Italy in 2000 and Christian democrats in 1990, CDA in the Netherlands, Conservatives in Sweden and Norway and Christian democrats in Switzerland. The second strongest right parties are Christian democrats in Belgium in 2000 and Liberals in 1990, Liberal Democrats in Britain, Conservatives in Denmark, KOK in Finland, UDF in France, FPD in Germany, FG in Ireland, UDC in Italy in 2000 and Liberals in 1990, VVD in the Netherlands, Liberals in Sweden and Switzerland and Christian democrats in Norway.

political parties within them could affect this development, but only at the margins of a broader common trend.

The findings of the analysis in general support the hypotheses regarding the positions of the electorate of new parties in countries of West Europe. Moving the focus from the positions of new parties towards the cross-national differences in the pattern of political divisions, we can observe that economic divisions on the left run deeper in countries with social democrat welfare regimes (namely Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland). Perhaps the strength of far left parties and the pronounced libertarian position of their electorate in comparison to the social democrat electorate can be explained by the size of the public sector and large number of semi-professionals and professionals employed in public sector services. On the other hand, the more centrist economic position of an otherwise libertarian electorate of green parties in countries can be explained by the high level of employment of new middle-class professionals in the private sector services with a christian democrat welfare regime where the public sector of a similar size does not exist (the data comparing regimes is provided in Appendix 2). The position of the voters of far left parties in these countries suggests that their electorate might be recruited from outsider groups.

The real effect of contextual factors can perhaps be better observed in differences between the electorate of mainstream parties. The results from multinomial regression comparing main parties of the left and right provide stronger support for this proposition. The comparison of a social democrat electorate on the one hand, and the electorates of the two strongest right parties on the other, reveals that economic division is strongest in Britain, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway. The coefficients associated with the variable that measures economic division are somewhat weaker in other countries, indicating the presence of smaller differences between the electorates of the mainstream right and the mainstream left parties. In Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy, differences between the electorates of social

democrat and christian democratic parties are insignificant on the variable which measures economic positions. As can be seen from the coefficients in Table 4.3, the electorate of christian democratic parties in these countries is in fact closer to the electorate of social democrats than to respondents who support liberal parties.

In Germany and Austria, where liberal parties do not match the electoral strength of christian democrats, economic divisions between the voters of social democrat and christian democratic parties are somewhat stronger but still visibly weaker than divisions between the electorate of the main parties of the left and right in Sweden, Norway or Denmark. France constitutes an exception to the pattern: the parties are aligned along a single left libertarian-right-authoritarian dimension, combining both cultural and economic issues which correspond to the cleavage model proposed by Kitschelt (1994).

Coefficients from the regression analysis in Table 4.3 which compare the electorates of the mainstream left and mainstream right parties show that cultural divisions have the highest importance in countries belonging to the christian democrat welfare regime, and with historically strong religious and communitarian cleavages. Cultural divisions matter very little in distinguishing the electorate of the left and right in Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Britain. In all other countries, we observe significant cultural divisions over immigration and libertarian-authoritarian moral values between social democrats on the left, and christian democrats and liberals on the right. The cultural value cleavage is dominated by the immigration issue in all countries covered by the analysis, while the other two components do not register equally strong effects.

The dominance of immigration as the primary component of a cultural value cleavage is in line with the argument about the recent shift in political agenda towards the politics of identity described by Kriesi and others (2006) and the emergence of a new cleavage they define as ‘demarcation versus integration’. However, the relevance of the demarcation-

integration cleavage in the analysis of this chapter is established only in countries of continental Europe. In these countries, the inability of christian democratic welfare states to deal effectively with large groups of labor market outsiders combined with the high historical importance of identity politics created favorable conditions for the rise of cleavage over economic and cultural integration and protectionism (Esping Andersen 1999a and 1999b, Kriesi 1999). Germany and the Netherlands are countries where this new cleavage achieved the greatest visibility after the emergence of far left parties that combined left-protectionist and authoritarian appeals.

The fact that mainstream right parties, christian democrats in Germany and Austria, liberals in Belgium and the Netherlands, the UMP in France, and Forza Italia in Italy are economically more liberal but also more authoritarian on immigration than their social democrat competitors, suggests that the demarcation versus integration cleavage might exist in parallel with a classic cultural cleavage where identity politics is important but does not bind economic liberalism and support for cultural openness.

The coefficients in Table 4.3 further confirm the expectations about the strength of the left-right economic division in Sweden, Denmark and Finland: all of these countries have parties in the far left family and we find that the electorate of these parties is significantly more redistributive than the electorate of social democrat parties. A similar rift on the left also exists in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. In Italy, the far left represents the unreformed wing of the former Communist Party; in the Netherlands and Germany, the electorate of relatively recent far left parties appears to be composed of economic losers who are dissatisfied by social democrat parties and so move to the center on economic issues (Volkens 2004). This is particularly evident in the case of the Netherlands, where the electorate of the Socialist Party is very much to the left on economic issues and quite authoritarian.

Table 4.3 Value differences between the electorate of the mainstream left parties and mainstream right parties: social democrats and christian democrats, liberals and conservatives. All entries are coefficients and standard errors from multinomial logistic regression; the reference category in each country is social democrat voters. The two strongest right parties are taken from each country.

	Social democrats vs. the strongest right party				Social democrats vs. the second strongest right party			
	Economic left-right	Immigration	Libertarian-authoritarian	Environment	Economic left-right	Immigration	Libertarian-authoritarian	Environment
Austria 2000	**0.181*****	**0.213***	**0.122*****	**-0.281*****				
	(0.049)	(0.114)	(0.045)	(0.101)				
Belgium – Flanders 2000	**0.150****	**0.356*****	-0.085	-0.114	0.041	**0.276****	0.096	-0.182
	(0.071)	(0.144)	(0.064)	(0.155)	(0.066)	(0.130)	(0.060)	(0.143)
Belgium – Walloon 2000	**0.181****	0.205	-0.016	-0.015	0.033	0.032	**0.168****	**-0.337****
	(0.073)	(0.146)	(0.068)	(0.144)	(0.080)	(0.162)	(0.079)	(0.166)
Britain 2000	**0.272*****	0.114	-0.007	-0.014	-0.022	-0.130	0.005	-0.261
	(0.059)	(0.107)	(0.052)	(0.132)	(0.071)	(0.126)	(0.062)	(0.165)
Denmark 2000	**0.569*****	0.179	-0.059	**0.327****	**0.587*****	-0.049	-0.010	0.052
	(0.072)	(0.119)	(0.046)	(0.136)	(0.106)	(0.178)	(0.069)	(0.200)
Finland 2000	**0.160*****	0.106	**0.114*****	0.103	**0.406*****	**-0.245***	0.008	0.216
	(0.064)	(0.128)	(0.055)	(0.142)	(0.075)	(0.135)	(0.061)	(0.159)
France 2000	**0.291*****	**0.755*****	0.011	**0.300*****	**0.189*****	**0.499*****	-0.002	0.046
	(0.064)	(0.132)	(0.057)	(0.127)	(0.062)	(0.124)	(0.055)	(0.124)
Germany 2000	**0.114*****	**0.273*****	0.041	0.034	0.005	0.077	-0.026	-0.038
	(0.036)	(0.075)	(0.032)	(0.075)	(0.097)	(0.201)	(0.086)	(0.203)
Ireland 2000	0.074	0.082	0.041	-0.061	**0.115***	0.143	**0.128****	-0.044
	(0.071)	(0.160)	(0.032)	(0.184)	(0.062)	(0.139)	(0.059)	(0.160)
Italy 2000	**0.261*****	**0.711*****	0.044	0.118	0.068	**0.512*****	**0.335*****	-0.068
	(0.055)	(0.122)	(0.049)	(0.139)	(0.057)	(0.125)	(0.057)	(0.148)
The Netherlands 2000	**0.124***	**0.281****	0.012	-0.075	**0.316*****	**0.553*****	-0.031	-0.155
	(0.075)	(0.138)	(0.055)	(0.166)	(0.068)	(0.125)	(0.050)	(0.152)
Sweden 2000	**0.784*****	-0.166	-0.081	**0.343****	**0.224****	**-0.627*****	0.003	-0.082
	(0.083)	(0.155)	(0.053)	(0.140)	(0.094)	(0.220)	(0.066)	(0.183)
Switzerland 1995	**0.146****	**0.466*****	**0.131****	0.128	**0.251*****	0.222	-0.019	**0.294****
	(0.070)	(0.169)	(0.059)	(0.152)	(0.063)	(0.145)	(0.051)	(0.135)
Sweden 1995	**0.568*****	-0.003	-0.053	**0.423*****	**0.231***	-0.098	-0.120	0.061
	(0.078)	(0.203)	(0.052)	(0.140)	(0.130)	(0.330)	(0.086)	(0.234)
Norway 1995	**0.303*****	0.159	-0.026	**0.338*****	-0.099	**-0.419***	**0.140***	-0.162
	(0.080)	(0.162)	(0.056)	(0.122)	(0.116)	(0.228)	(0.080)	(0.177)

(table 4.3 cont.)

	Social democrats vs. the strongest right party				Social democrats vs. the second strongest right party			
	Economic left-right	Immigration	Libertarian-authoritarian	Environment	Economic left-right	Immigration	Libertarian-authoritarian	Environment
Finland 1995	0.011	-0.045	**0.193*****	**0.210***	**0.174****	-0.180	0.051	**0.243***
	(0.073)	(0.161)	(0.056)	(0.127)	(0.083)	(0.178)	(0.061)	(0.144)
Germany 1995	0.041	**0.177***	**0.051***	-0.109	0.032	-0.211	-0.052	-0.259
	(0.048)	(0.095)	(0.030)	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.198)	(0.063)	(0.231)
Austria 1990	**0.154*****	-0.003	**0.230*****	**-0.167***				
	(0.051)	(0.097)	(0.049)	(0.088)				
Britain 1990	**0.384*****	-0.002	**-0.088****	-0.153	**0.225*****	0.114	**-0.176****	**-0.348****
	(0.040)	(0.079)	(0.042)	(0.102)	(0.069)	(0.143)	(0.073)	(0.188)
Denmark 1990	**0.604*****	**-0.220***	-0.057	0.093	**0.637*****	-0.141	**-0.193*****	0.007
	(0.090)	(0.126)	(0.067)	(0.173)	(0.086)	(0.120)	(0.061)	(0.164)
France 1990	**0.377*****	**0.682*****	0.099	**0.283****	**0.295*****	0.045	0.115	-0.146
	(0.073)	(0.166)	(0.064)	(0.142)	(0.102)	(0.187)	(0.088)	(0.203)
Germany 1990	**0.254*****	**0.125****	**0.225*****	-0.028	**0.344*****	-0.074	-0.018	**-0.337*****
	(0.037)	(0.063)	(0.036)	(0.079)	(0.066)	(0.096)	(0.056)	(0.132)
Ireland 1990	**0.232*****	**0.428*****	**0.287*****	0.303	**0.234*****	0.194	**0.188****	0.330
	(0.076)	(0.155)	(0.080)	(0.202)	(0.082)	(0.165)	(0.086)	(0.216)
Italy 1990	-0.036	-0.064	**0.325*****	**0.328****	0.102	-0.181	-0.051	0.070
	(0.052)	(0.098)	(0.052)	(0.133)	(0.079)	(0.139)	(0.074)	(0.201)
The Netherlands 1990	**0.294*****	0.121	0.035	**-0.250***	**0.702*****	0.188	-0.098	0.206
	(0.070)	(0.118)	(0.050)	(0.138)	(0.101)	(0.163)	(0.070)	(0.702)
Norway 1990	**0.561*****	0.152	**-0.209*****	0.058	0.030	**-0.545*****	0.052	**-0.533****
	(0.073)	(0.113)	(0.057)	(0.125)	(0.128)	(0.199)	(0.109)	(0.264)
Sweden 1990	**0.990*****	-0.006	**-0.200*****	**0.457*****	**0.371)*****	0.087	**-0.171*****	**0.298****
	(0.094)	(0.122)	(0.061)	(0.136)	(0.080)	(0.121)	(0.060)	(0.135)
Belgium-Walloon 1990	**0.406***	0.125	**0.420*****	**-0.614*****	**0.358*****	**0.299*****	-0.071	**-0.338*****
	(0.060)	(0.116)	(0.065)	(0.106)	(0.062)	(0.121)	(0.059)	(0.125)
Belgium-Flanders 1990	**0.104****	0.026	**0.223*****	**-0.228****	**0.308*****	0.023	-0.078	**-0.307*****
	(0.052)	(0.084)	(0.049)	(0.106)	(0.059)	(0.094)	(0.053)	(0.117)

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

The strongest right parties are OVP in Austria, VLD/MR in Belgium in 2000 and CVP/PSC in 1990, Conservatives in Britain, Liberals in Denmark, KESK in Finland, UMP in France, CDU/CDU in Germany, FF in Ireland, FI in Italy in 2000 and Christian democrats in 1990, CDA in the Netherlands, Conservatives in Sweden and Norway and Christian democrats in Switzerland. The second strongest right parties are Christian democrats in Belgium in 2000 and Liberals in 1990, Liberal Democrats in Britain, Conservatives in Denmark, KOK in Finland, UDF in France, FPD in Germany, FG in Ireland, UDC in Italy in 2000 and Liberals in 1990, VVD in the Netherlands, Liberals in Sweden and Switzerland and Christian democrats in Norway.

The expectation that in Finland, Sweden and Denmark cultural divisions separate the electorate of parties on the left and on the right side of the political spectrum is generally supported by the coefficients presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. In these countries, the division of the left is accentuated by the existence of far left parties that combine a somewhat unusual mix of libertarian positions towards immigration, and authoritarian views on moral issues. Cultural divisions on the left similar to those present in Sweden, Finland and Denmark, are observable only in the Netherlands where apart from centrist social democrats, we find the left-authoritarian electorate of the Socialist party and left libertarian electorate of the green left.

In Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Austria, the position of the electorate of green parties further towards the libertarian end indicates the depth of the cultural value cleavage. Similar can be said of the presence of cultural differences between parties of the mainstream right and radical right in Germany, Belgium, France, Austria, and Italy, as shown in Table 4.2.

The analysis that compares parties of the right in Table 4.2 shows that secondary cultural divisions are present in Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland. In Sweden, the presence of radical right parties seems to be prevented by the mobilization of anti-immigrant voters by the Conservative Party. In Denmark and Norway, the absence of these similar differences between the conservatives and the liberals most likely enabled the radical right party to entrench itself within the party system. In the Netherlands, similar to the Swedish case, groups of voters with authoritarian attitudes towards immigration either support the Socialist Party on the left or the liberals on the right.

Cultural cleavage changes since the 1970s enabled radical right and new left parties to become permanent fixtures of the party systems in continental European countries. While the emergence of new left parties seems to be a consequence of the rising salience of new issues

related to the cultural value cleavage in the 1970s and 1980s, the emergence of radical right parties can be linked to the increased salience of the immigration issue, and the reshaping of the cultural value cleavage's content. Radical right parties' electorates do not seem to differ significantly from supporters of other right parties on other issues. The exception is the electorates of the German radical right parties, which hold fairly redistributive views. In general, support for the radical right is said to come from the working-class and petty bourgeoisie constituencies, unified by authoritarian anti-immigrant appeals, but otherwise separated by different economic positions (Ivarsflaten 2005). German radical right parties appear to be different, as the economically left position of their electorate reflects the fact that support comes predominantly from members of the working-class who faced losses due to globalization.

It seems that the cultural cleavage does not have equal structuring power in other European countries, and this paper did not find it to be relevant in Britain. The cultural cleavage is also largely subdued in countries with a social democrat welfare regime, where the dominant value cleavage is economic in nature. The reason for the absence of an overarching value cleavage can be found in the absence of large groups of economic and globalization losers (Swank and Betz 2003, Iversen and Wren 1998). On the other hand, the strength of economic divisions is probably linked to the presence of a sizable public sector and large segments of the population that benefit from welfare state transfers and services. As is found in the analysis of EU integration, the position of these groups on integration and globalization mostly depends on whether or not they expect that globalization will threaten the welfare state and the benefits it provides (Brinegar and Jolly 2004, Ray 2004). It follows from this that the welfare state may well be a key element in the shaping of an eventual divide due to globalization and its consequences for politics in advanced industrial societies.

4.6.2 Differences in Value Cleavages across Countries

At the macro-level analysis, I first focus on the differences in importance of economic and cultural value cleavages. Since it is not a core part of the cultural cleavage, I do not present the measure of model fit for the variable that measures divisions over the environment. The measure used in this analysis is pseudo R square from multinomial logistic regression. I present results for the full model and for the four additional models. The first model in Table 4.4 includes all four independent variables and is used as a reference to evaluate the explanatory power of four other models; the second model includes two components of the cultural value division which indicates libertarian or authoritarian orientations towards immigration, individual freedom and morality; the remaining three models are composed from one variable, each measures economic value positions, positions towards immigration and positions on individual freedom and morality.

The size of the model fit for the full model and remaining four models varies significantly across countries. However, because the number of categories of the dependent variable varies across countries, it is difficult to compare the absolute importance of economic and cultural value cleavages using the pseudo R square measure. Still, by comparing the values of the pseudo R square of models with the same dependent variable but different combinations of independent variables, we can assess the relative importance of these cleavages within each country.

Pseudo R square values show that the economic value division has the highest explanatory power in Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Great Britain. All these countries belong to the social democrat or liberal welfare regime, with a high historical salience of economic cleavages.

Table 4.4. Importance of cultural and economic issues in the structuring of ideological divisions in advanced industrial democracies of West Europe. All entries are Nagelkerke pseudo R square from multinomial regression.

Model	Austria	Belgium-Flanders	Belgium-Walloon	Great Britain	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Ireland	Italy	The Netherlands	Norway	Sweden	Switzer-land
EVS 1999/2000														
FM	0.239	0.189	0.129	0.059	0.307	0.187	0.181	0.085	0.085	0.203	0.146		0.261	
I+LA	0.182	0.153	0.100	0.009	0.129	0.073	0.146	0.063	0.044	0.151	0.054		0.062	
E	0.027	0.027	0.030	0.052	0.181	0.091	0.039	0.019	0.013	0.052	0.062		0.189	
I	0.167	0.136	0.076	0.009	0.101	0.062	0.142	0.053	0.028	0.104	0.047		0.039	
LA	0.021	0.019	0.027	0.001	0.029	0.013	0.008	0.011	0.021	0.055	0.009		0.024	
WVS 1995/1996														
FM						0.102		0.089				0.203	0.174	0.133
I+LA						0.060		0.064				0.149	0.020	0.061
E						0.015		0.013				0.036	0.099	0.033
I						0.018		0.060				0.088	0.013	0.045
LA						0.044		0.004				0.068	0.008	0.016
WVS 1990														
FM	0.108	0.151	0.216	0.123	0.269		0.224	0.151	0.144	0.166	0.243	0.277	0.274	
I+LA	0.052	0.087	0.125	0.008	0.081		0.099	0.078	0.094	0.137	0.127	0.123	0.021	
E	0.021	0.035	0.063	0.119	0.186		0.089	0.058	0.025	0.012	0.102	0.149	0.235	
I	0.014	0.022	0.018	0.001	0.061		0.083	0.031	0.027	0.011	0.050	0.057	0.003	
LA	0.035	0.065	0.115	0.008	0.024		0.027	0.052	0.069	0.132	0.085	0.072	0.018	

FM - Full model
I+LA – Immigration + Libertarian - Authoritarian
E – Economic Issues
I – Immigration
LA – Libertarian - Authoritarian.

The results for Ireland, another country with a liberal welfare regime, do not correspond with any of the expected patterns; this can be explained by the specific political history of the country and a very idiosyncratic cleavage structure originating at the time of Irish independence. The results for Norway and Finland in 1995 are the only ones at odds with expectations of R square measure showing cultural value divisions to be more important than economic divisions.

Furthermore, Table 4.4 shows that the cultural divisions in Great Britain are rather weak compared to economic divisions. Also, cultural divisions are relatively strong in Denmark, Norway and Finland, but quite weak in Sweden. The weakness of cultural divisions in the countries of the first configuration, and their lesser importance compared with the economic divisions in the countries of the second configuration also fit the expectations regarding cross-national variation in the strength of political divisions.

The results for countries with christian democratic welfare regimes and strong historical cultural cleavages show that in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Italy the cultural cleavage plays a more important role in the structuring of political divisions than the economic cleavage. Whereas in the Netherlands, the pseudo R square shows the nearly equal significance of the cultural and economic value divisions. This finding can perhaps be interpreted as a consequence of the historical split of the bourgeoisie class into fairly equally strong secular-liberal and Christian pillar which resulted in three way competition and made the economic cleavage fairly equal in importance to the cultural cleavage.

As expected, the importance of different cultural issues changed over time in these countries. In the early 1990s, the libertarian-authoritarian divisions were a more important component of the cultural value cleavages. However, already at the end of a decade, as indicated by R squares from the regression analysis, immigration started to overtake libertarian-authoritarian values and became a more important component of the cultural value

cleavage. As said above, it could be that the issues related to the libertarian-authoritarian dimension lost divisive power, and because partisan positions on these issue converged. On the other hand, the issue of immigration increased in importance because of increased immigration and developments on the labor market related to globalization. Either way, this finding fits with the argument made by Kriesi and others (2006) about the changing nature of the cultural cleavage in accordance to changes which took place in the social environment of post-industrial societies, and also due to the rise first of the new left agenda and later because of the reaction by the new right parties to new left messages.

Patterns across countries and across time-points in general fit with the expectations made earlier in this chapter and in the second chapter. The test of sources of these differences is the topic of the last part of the analysis in this chapter. In this part of the analysis I focus on the strength of differences between the principal parties of the left and right. The similar analysis that focuses on differences between the new and the established parties on the left and right finds that there are no strong differences in divisions between these parties across countries that are included in the analysis. The separate regression analysis which focuses on differences between these parties does not find a significant impact of contextual variables (results not shown here).

Table 4.5 presents the results of the second stage of the two-stage regression, which analyzes the effects of welfare state characteristics and historical cleavages on divisions between the principal left and the principal right parties. The analysis focuses on the strength of differences over economic values, immigration and libertarian-authoritarian values. As there are no clear expectations regarding the impact of contextual variables on the strength of divisions between the electorate of these parties on the issue of environment, the measure of differences on this dimension is not included in this part of the analysis.

Findings of the analysis show that the expectations outlined previously in the chapter about the effect of these variables are generally supported by the findings of this two-stage regression analysis: the strength of christian democrat parties, used as a proxy measure for the historical strength of cultural value cleavages, is found to be negatively related to the strength of economic divisions; the opposite is the case with the impact of the strength of christian democratic parties on the strength of libertarian-authoritarian cultural divisions. The impact of this variable is visibly lower in the analysis of the determinants of the strength of divisions between the electorate of two groups of parties on immigration. However, the impact of the strength of class voting, here used as a measure of the strength of economic divisions, is found to be significant and negatively affects the strength of divisions over immigration between the electorate of the principal left and right parties. The fact that we do not observe the impact of class voting on economic divisions can be attributed to the high correlation of this variable with measures of government spending and the measure of strength of christian democratic parties (see Appendix 4). When these two variables are excluded from the analysis, as is the case in model three, the impact of the strength of class voting increases in accordance with expectations. The absence of the effect of christian democrat strength on the size of divisions over immigration is not likely the consequence of an otherwise fairly strong correlation of this variable with the measure of class voting, as its effect does not improve in a reduced model when the measure of class voting is not included in the model.

The remaining three models, which include these variables independently, do not show that their strength changes significantly when other variables are omitted. The impact of government spending, used here as a measure of welfare regime characteristics, shows that countries with higher public spending (in this case countries with social democrat welfare

Table 4.5 The determinants of the strength of divisions between the mainstream left and the mainstream right parties on economic, libertarian-authoritarian and immigration issue dimensions. All entries are OLS regressions coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis).

	Economic				Immigration				Libertarian-Authoritarian			
	Model 1 B(s.e.)	Model 2 B(s.e.)	Model 3 B(s.e.)	Model 4 B(s.e.)	Model 1 B(s.e.)	Model 2 B(s.e.)	Model 3 B(s.e.)	Model 4 B(s.e.)	Model 1 B(s.e.)	Model 2 B(s.e.)	Model 3 B(s.e.)	Model 4 B(s.e.)
Constant	-0.352	-0.344	-0.681	**-0.694*****	0.373	0.527	0.264	0.385	0.506	**0.331****	**0.779****	**0.570*****
	(0.428)	(0.225)	(0.491)	(0.236)	(0.536)	(0.326)	(0.439)	(0.247)	(0.313)	(0.167)	(0.312)	(0.170)
Class vote in 1960s	-0.100		**0.166****	0.012	**-0.320*****		**-0.288*****	**-0.296*****	0.079		-0.055	0.006
	(0.082)		(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.103)		(0.072)	(0.090)	(0.060)		(0.051)	(0.062)
CD strength in 1950s	**-0.006*****	**-0.005*****			-0.001	0.002			**0.004****	**0.003****		
	(0.002)	(0.002)			(0.002)	(0.002)			(0.001)	(0.001)		
Service employment	0.000		0.013		0.002		0.003		-0.003		**-0.010***	
	(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.005)		(0.005)	
government spending	**0.020*****	**0.017*****		**0.021*****	0.001	-0.010		0.002	**-0.009****	**-0.006****		**-0.010****
	(0.005)	(0.004)		(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)		(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)		(0.004)
Year 2000	-0.054	-0.054*	-0.064	-0.057	**0.080***	**0.083***	**0.077***	**0.081****	-0.036	**-0.041***	-0.029	-0.039
	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.027)
R^2	0.643	0.620	0.293	0.480	0.452	0.217	0.446	0.443	0.516	0.470	0.277	0.320

N=29, ***p<0.01,**p<0.05, *p<0.10

states) are characterized by a higher importance of economic issues in dividing the electorate of the principal left and right parties.

The opposite is the case with the impact of public spending on the importance of libertarian-authoritarian cultural issues: service employment, here used as a measure of the way countries reacted to deindustrialization, does not register visible effects when a measure of public spending is included in the analysis. In models where this variable is lacking, its impact increases; this seems to be a consequence of a high correlation between these two variables. The results show pretty consistent effects of the variables that measure the strength of christian democrat parties and the size of public spending across models, suggesting that the findings of this analysis are fairly robust.

The last finding coming from this analysis supports the expectations about the changes in importance of the immigration and libertarian-authoritarian cultural issues over time: the analysis finds that the importance of the former increases while the importance of the latter decreases over the decade covered by the data used in the analysis.

The findings in the last section show that the pattern of political divisions in post-industrial societies does vary in accordance with structural characteristics of welfare states and historical political divisions. This variation is observable when comparing principal parties of the left and right, while the effects of contextual variables on the salience of divisions between the new and established parties are not as strong (not presented here). The lack of findings could in part be the consequence of differences in the number of cases, as not all parties were present in all countries. The lack of a visible impact of contextual variables on these divisions does not disprove propositions of the fragmentation hypothesis, or the hypothesis, which links political divisions with the socioeconomic context. The individual level analysis presented in the first part of this section shows that the electorate of new parties

is ideologically different from the electorate of established parties, and that the positions they hold vary across countries, more or less in line with their contextual characteristics.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter tested the validity of the principal propositions of this dissertation with the analysis of value divisions between the electorate of the established and new political parties in post-industrial societies of West Europe. The findings of this chapter provide some degree of support for both propositions made in the dissertation: new parties of the left and right hold positions which significantly differ from the positions of the established left parties on one or more value dimensions. While the finding that the electorate of green parties is more keen on protecting the environment, or that the electorate of radical right parties holds anti-immigrant positions, may sound trivial, it does provide support for fragmentation hypotheses, in this case the fragmentation of the political space defined by cultural and economic value dimensions. But new parties are found to be different in more than obvious ways: the results indicate that constituencies of new parties are different and that they seek appeals not presented by the established parties. This is why the positions of the electorate of new left parties on economic and cultural value dimensions vary between countries of continental Europe and Scandinavian countries. The socioeconomic context and differences in the social structure in these countries can be said to provide a foundation for differences in the type of new left parties and the composition of their electorates. Similar conclusions, but not as visible, can be derived from the findings which relate to the characteristics of the electorate of new right parties.

The second proposition of this dissertation regarding the variation in the pattern of political divisions in countries of West Europe also receives a degree of support from the findings of this chapter: the economic cleavage is dominant in countries with liberal or social democratic welfare regimes and high historical importance of economic divisions; the cultural value cleavage plays a secondary role in these countries, mainly dividing parties on the left and on the right.

In countries with christian democrat welfare regimes and historically highly salient cultural divisions, cultural value cleavages are found to be more important than economic cleavages. The similar position taken by supporters of the christian democratic and the social democratic parties is the primary reason behind the relative weakness of the economic value cleavages in these countries. In countries where the right is divided and strong secular liberal parties are present, the salience of economic divisions is higher but the primary cleavage is still cultural. In countries where the bulk of the electorate on the right is represented by a strong christian democratic party, economic differences between the christian democrats and the social democrats are more accentuated. But this is still weaker than the divisions between the social democrats and the electorate of liberal or conservative parties in countries where the welfare regime does not belong to a christian democratic type.

Immigration is found to be the main component of the cultural cleavage in the later period covered by the analysis. The dominance in the early 1990s belongs to libertarian-authoritarian values. This indicates that the content of cultural cleavages changes over time, just as expected by Kriesi and others (2006 and 2008) and Bornschier (forth).

In the end, it can be concluded that findings of the analysis in this chapter indicate that social and economic changes leading to post-industrial societies are linked with the fragmentation of the political space and the creation of constituencies, allowing for the

emergence of new parties. It also shows that changes in the political space across countries are linked with the socioeconomic and historical characteristics of these countries.

In a broader context, it can be concluded that the arguments that cleavages lost structuring power in the politics of advanced industrial societies of West Europe are exaggerated. While cleavages might be harder to identify and do not correspond to the concepts conceived decades ago, stable patterns of political divisions can still be observed. It also seems that value divisions maintained some kind of temporal consistency as economic and cultural divisions, albeit with a different content and on a different base, maintained their structuring power across countries. The welfare state plays an important role in the shaping of value and structural cleavages: it influenced the way that political cleavages developed in the industrial age, and it appears that it will continue to influence cleavages and the positions of partisan alternatives in the years to come.

Chapter 5
The Impact of the Welfare State and Policies of Deindustrialization on Electoral Divisions

5.1. Introduction

Chapters 3 and 4 analyzed the structure of post-industrial political divisions at the structural and value levels, respectively. This chapter takes a step further and analyzes the link between electoral divisions and socioeconomic context in a more direct way, that is, by analyzing the role that welfare state policies and deindustrialization have on the mobilization of political divisions in societies of Western Europe. Apart from looking at the impact that differences in the process of deindustrialization had on the development of political divisions in post-industrial societies, this chapter takes a deeper view and looks at the impact of policies used in the development of welfare state on the mobilization of political divisions in advanced industrial societies in the 1970s. This focus on the mobilization of political divisions which took place during the process of the formation of a welfare state, or at the end of this process, enables us to get a full picture of the role of the welfare state in electoral politics of western European countries. The analysis in this chapter aims, in a way, to fill in the gap left open by the studies on the mobilization of cleavages in advanced industrial societies, which by and large have ignored the role of the welfare state in this process.

Principal comparative studies of electoral cleavages in West Europe, with few notable exceptions, largely ignored the role of policy preferences and party programs in the structuring of electoral behavior (for exceptions see Alvarez and Nagler 1999, Kitschelt and Rehm 2005). This is particularly evident in studies of class voting as one of the more

prominent theories of cleavage voting, where the comprehensive theory that links social position, preferences and political choice is largely missing. Class voting theory assumes that members of the working-class vote for left parties, while members of the middle-class and petty bourgeoisie vote for right parties (see Nieuwbeerta 1996, Manza, Hout and Brooks 1995, Niweubeerta and Ultee 1999b, Evans 1999, Goldthorpe 1999, Korpi 1972, Evans 1993).

But more importantly for the purpose of this chapter, what is missing from the analysis of cleavage-based voting behavior is the impact of agency, or to be more precise, the analysis of the role of parties in the mobilization of cleavages and the analysis of the importance of socioeconomic context in shaping of their opportunity structure to do so. So far, few studies provide a comprehensive picture of under what economic and social conditions is class voting or other cleavage voting likely to be higher and why (Weakliem and Heath 1999, Nieuwbeerta and Ultee 1999). We also do not know the impact of a range of policies, implemented since the Second World War and during the development of the welfare state and corporatist economic regimes, on the political behavior of different social groups.

The importance of welfare state and corporatist institutions on the development of political divisions in western societies can hardly be understated; it is also hard to dismiss the influence of these factors on the formation of electoral divisions in the long run. Research about the development of the welfare state established that political factors play a decisive role in this process, and that it is highly unlikely that these developments would not feed back into political divisions (Huber and Stephens 2001, Huber, Stephens and Ragin 1993, Swank and Hicks 1992, Hicks and Misra 1993, Swank 1988).

Furthermore, developments of the welfare state in the period of globalization and deindustrialization, and also the way in which deindustrialization unfolded across countries of

West Europe, have substantially different manifestations and distributive consequences across countries (Iversen and Wren 1998, Wren 2001, Pontusson and Rueda 2000 and 2002). The findings of several studies of voting behavior in post-industrial societies of West Europe, as well as of the analysis in Chapter 3, show that differences in the characteristics of the welfare state and its distributive consequences also have their manifestations at the level of voting behavior (see Swank and Betz 2003, Evans 2005, Knutsen 2005).

In the analysis of the mobilization of political divisions in or at the end of the process of welfare state formation, this chapter brings the policy context into the analysis through the argument that the nature of political divisions in industrial societies is in a large part linked to the ability of the social democrat and christian democratic parties to mobilize the support of their core constituencies (working and middle-class respectively) and build cross-class coalitions by integrating segments of the middle and working-class, respectively, in their electoral coalition through the use of welfare state policies.

In the second part of the argument, this chapter introduces the role of policy responses to deindustrialization. Directly building on the argument made in Chapters 2 and 3, I argue that the policies used as a response to a loss of industrial jobs, labor market adjustment and the development of service sector employment affected the way in which political parties of the new left and radical right built their support; it also affected the ability of the mainstream parties to hang on to their electorate and reshape their electoral coalitions in a changed social structure.

In this chapter I rely on elements from research on welfare states that fall within the power resource hypotheses approach in order to build and test a set of propositions about the impact of policies and parties on the process of the development of electoral divisions in advanced industrial societies. In the second part of the argument, I rely on the studies of responses to deindustrialization in order to develop and test propositions regarding the impact

of changes on the labor market and the development of the service sector on the formation of electoral support for new left and new right parties.

The power resource hypotheses approach to the development of the welfare state (or 'democratic class struggle' in Esping Andersen's words) holds that variation in welfare regime characteristics is largely shaped by the partisan composition of government, the strength of trade unions, the feminist movement and the institutional setup which allows for an easy implementation of policies (Esping Andersen 1990, Huber and Stephens 2001).

The studies of the impact of deindustrialization argue that the manner in which countries reacted to the loss of industrial jobs, development of the service sector and new challenges to the welfare state produced distributive effects and outcomes on the labor market and the structure of the service sector, which vary substantially across countries and has the potential to translate into political divisions by providing a different opportunity structure for the emergence of new parties (Iversen and Wren 1998; Rueda 2005).

The chapter proceeds in the following way: the second section discusses both studies of the power resource approach and studies which examines the impact of responses to deindustrialization on the social structure and distributive divisions in post-industrial societies; the third section outlines the main argument of this chapter and states the propositions regarding the impact of political parties' actions and role of policies and policy outcomes in the shaping of electoral divisions in both the period of welfare state formation and deindustrialization; the fourth section outlines the propositions tested in the chapter, while the fifth sections presents data and discusses the analytical methods used in the chapter; the sixth section presents and discusses the results of two separate statistical analyses, one focusing on the impact of welfare state policies on the mobilization of electoral divisions in the 1970s, and the other focusing on the impact of deindustrialization on differences in mobilization patterns of the electorate of new parties.

5.2 Policies of the Welfare State and its Impact on Politics

Research on the establishment of the welfare state within the power resource hypothesis approach sees the development of the welfare state, and differences between welfare regimes, as a result of political contestation where political parties, sometimes in conjunction with trade unions, brought a particular welfare regime into existence (see Huber and Stevens 2001, Huber, Ragin and Stevens 1993, Hicks and Swank 1992, Swank 1988, Hicks and Mira 1993, Pempel and Williamson 1989, Hicks, Swank and Ambhul 1989). Numerous studies found that the political compositions of governments are relevant determinants of the level and type of welfare state programs; while social democrats favored universal welfare states with universal programs funded from general taxation and high service provision, christian democratic parties opted for occupationalist welfare states which rely heavily on transfers from occupational social funds and almost completely transfer-based family policy (Esping Andersen 1999a).

In a study of welfare spending in advanced industrial democracies, Hicks and Swank (1992) find the governmental dominance of christian democrat and social democrat parties to be strongly correlated with higher overall welfare effort. Welfare effort was further found to be stronger in countries characterized with the combined effects of strong and concentrated unions, working-class mobilization and left party governmental dominance in the post-war period. A similar effect on welfare spending is present in countries where christian democratic parties are dominant in government. Looking into patterns of electoral competition, Hicks and Swank also find that the increasing strength of left parties forced right parties in government to increase welfare spending, while the opposite occurred when left parties faced strong opposition from right or center parties. This suggests that parties in

government modified their policies in order to both build coalitions of electoral groups and prevent the increase in oppositional strength.

In another study, Hicks, Swank and Ambhul (1989) find that welfare spending in crisis and expansionary economic conditions is mediated by the dominance of left or right parties in government, the strength and concentration of trade unions as well as the strength of corporatist coordination mechanisms. They find that left parties are more prone to engage in countercyclical policies where unions are strong rather than where unions are weak. Left and right parties are also found to implement policies with different distributive consequences in the context of economic crisis. Furthermore, left parties tend to focus on reducing unemployment, while the right parties focus on ameliorating the consequences of unemployment. In a study of public employment, Cusack, Notermans and Rein (1989) find that the strength of left parties in government and the levels of unionization are positively correlated with levels of public employment, while the opposite can be said for the impact of right parties.

Hicks and Misra (1992) also find left government dominance to be positively correlated with both the level and change in welfare spending. In their analysis, center government is positively but not significantly correlated with government spending. Looking at the political resources of particular social groups, they find that strong corporatism, but also protest and pressure activity of the working-class is positively correlated with welfare state expansion. On the other hand, the incidence of petty bourgeoisie protest activity is found to be negatively correlated with welfare spending. By estimating the effect of political protest separately for the periods before and after the 1973 economic crisis, they find that the political protest effects of the working-class play a stronger role in the pre-1973 period, and the petty bourgeoisie protest is stronger in the post-1973 period. This finding suggests that the political parties in control of the government reacted to changes in pressures from the

demand sides, which in themselves were a consequence of the changing economic and social conditions.

In a separate study, focusing on the determinants of government spending in the period before and after the 1973 economic crisis, Swank (1988) finds that in the pre-1973 period, left and christian democrat control of government was associated with higher levels of government spending, as was the level of unionization and working-class protest activity. In the period following the 1973 economic crisis, the impact of political parties weakened while the impact of unionization persisted, but only where centralized unions existed. In the period following the 1973 economic crisis, the impact of class protest activity on government spending increased. Working-class protest activity increases in importance and maintains a positive correlation with government spending, while at the same time bourgeoisie protest activity becomes significantly and negatively correlated with government spending.

In a comprehensive study of welfare state development based on a power resource hypothesis (*Development and Crisis of the Welfare State,* 2001), Huber and Stephens provide a more comprehensive picture of the impact of political factors on the creation of different welfare regimes (see also Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993). The authors argue that overall measures of welfare effort are not sufficiently sensitive to capture both the variation, which takes place among countries with higher levels of spending, and the variation in the institutional characteristics of welfare regimes. Huber and Stephens differentiate between welfare states with a strong provision of services and programs financed through general taxation, and welfare states with low service provisions and high income transfers financed through social security contributions. They link these differences in welfare policies to the dominance of particular political parties, and find that differences in the characteristics of welfare regimes are clearly linked to the strength of social democrat or christian democratic parties in government. Dominance of left parties in government is found to be strongly

correlated with overall government revenue, non-transfer government spending, and public sector employment. On the other hand, dominance of christian democratic parties in government was clearly linked to higher spending on social security transfers.

Boix (1997 and 2000) finds that the partisan composition of government is not only correlated with welfare spending, but also to overall economic policy reaction to deindustrialization and the type of policies used to preserve economic competitiveness in the context of globalization. Boix finds that right parties in government favor deregulation, reduction in taxation, and policies that favor private investment. Left parties, on the other hand, favor policies which increase the overall competitiveness of the economy such as improving education, infrastructure and public services. The consequences that these policies had on distributive divisions and the social structure varied widely across countries.

One study analyzes these developments in a more detailed way: Iversen and Wren (1998) analyzed responses to deindustrialization in terms of employment and fiscal policies, and found that these responses in a large part depended on the previous developments of the welfare state. They found that in countries with a social democrat universal welfare state, the response to deindustrialization was centered on the creation of a large public sector, which facilitated the employment of women, broadened the fiscal base, and prevented the rise of large groups of labor market outsiders. It also produced divisions between industrial and service workers, as the public sector grew and its workers became an influential constituency in the electorate of left parties (Garret and Way 1999).

Virtually the opposite development took place in christian democratic corporatist welfare states, which aimed to protect industrial workers and reduce the excess of the industrial labor force through labor reduction measures such as early retirement (Iversen and Wren 1998). This amplified the fiscal pressures that these countries faced, and prevented the implementation of active labor market policies and increased employment in public sector

services. High levels of labor protection, aimed at protecting industrial workers, at the same time prevented the creation of private sector employment for workers with lower skills, which when combined with other measures, resulted in the emergence of sizable groups of low-skilled workers, women and laid off industrial workers with a very precarious position on the labor market. Also, the small rise of the public sector and high labor market protection resulted in the concentration of social and cultural professionals in private or semi-private services (Huber and Stephens 2000).

Huber and Stephens (2000) find that the development of public sector services and female employment followed the pattern of previous welfare state development and is closely linked with the control of government by the left parties. In countries where social democrats controlled the government and where female employment was high, provision or public sector services and public sector employment increased markedly. On the other hand, in countries where christian democratic parties dominated and where a large constituency of employed women was absent, public sector provision of services and employment was low.

It is clear that the partisan composition of government and the strength of particular interest groups in interaction with institutional structures affect policies. The question is whether social democrat and christian democratic parties devised policies in the way described above with the purpose of mobilizing particular social groups.

Several studies find that welfare state programs were deliberately used to mobilize certain groups of voters during the development of the welfare state, but also in the later period when countries were faced with the challenges of deindustrialization. In a study of social democracy in Scandinavia Esping Andersen (1985, see also Iversen 1998) suggest that this is indeed the case. Social democrat parties used social policy at different junctions to build coalitions between different social groups. At first, in the 1950s, these parties used social policy to build a coalition between industrial workers and farmers (Esping Andersen

1985, Huber and Stephens 2001). Afterwards, social democrats used active labor market policies, pension policy and the expansion of education and public sector services to mobilize segments of the expanding middle-class who would benefit from these policies (Esping Andersen 1999a). Julia Lynch (2006) also shows that in the development of pension and unemployment programs, parties in countries such as Netherlands, Italy, France and Germany, politicians in control of government used these policies to build electoral coalitions of social groups including industrial unionized workers, the middle-class and small business owners.

Historical divisions over religion and cleavages present before and during the initial phase of industrialization, shaped the opportunity structures for political parties to mobilize the middle and working-classes by affecting whether these aggregate social groups based on socioeconomic position and economic interests were either unified or divided by religion and culture (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Wilensky 1986). However, political parties used policies over the long-term in order to mobilize certain segments of the electorate and to build stable links with them (see Esping Andersen 1985, Keesbergen 1995, Lynch 2006). In effect, this would mean that parties in control of government engaged in what Patrick Dunleavy (1991) describes as preference-shaping strategies, where a particular policy is used to change socioeconomic position and thus the interest of a particular group of voters. This link created in this way can also be based on a symbolic identification with party or ideology, or on clientelistic exchange or a combination of both (see Kitschelt 2000, Grofman 2005). But the exact nature of this link does not matter for the argument advanced here; what matters is that this link is shaped over an extended period of time, and does not change until underlying conditions change.

But even if these policies were not deliberately designed to boost support for particular parties, this could have been its unintended consequence as these could have

created the link (based on symbolic identification or interest), between parties and voters. In the following section, I will outline the mechanism that explains how the use of policies can affect the development of electoral divisions; I will also state hypotheses about the impact that policies have on the exact shape of political divisions and their differences between countries.

5.3 Welfare State Policies and the Mechanism of Cleavage Mobilization

Power resource approach studies find a clear link between the development of the welfare state and policy responses to deindustrialization on the one hand, and the ideological orientation of governmental parties, the strength of interest groups (especially those which mobilize the working-class), and political competition on the other. Other studies find that these policies are more explicitly linked with the attempts of political actors to build links (either clientelistic or programmatic) with particular groups of voters (Esping Andersen 1985, Keesbergen 1995, Lynch 2006). Studies of political cleavages find differences in voting patterns between countries based on class, religion and left-right economic attitudes, which upon closer inspection, broadly correspond to the differences between welfare regimes (Nieuwbeerta and Ulte 1999a and 1999b, Knutsen 1989, 1995a, 1995b). Finally, studies of voting behavior in post-industrial societies find that structural divisions and sources of support for new parties vary substantially between countries and in accordance with characteristics of the welfare state (Knutsen 2005, Dolezal 2007, Evans 2003 and 2005, Swank and Betz 2003).

This leads us to the following conclusion: if, as power resource hypotheses posit, the choice of policy had the purpose of satisfying the preferences of particular social groups, then it can also be said that it mobilized these same social groups in favor of particular policy outcomes. When political actors, acting as agents of interest or social groups, implemented policies which met the demands of these groups, then it follows that groups on whose behalf they acted developed vested interests in keeping these political actors in power. In other words, the implementation of policies created a mobilization effect by delivering preferred outcomes to targeted constituencies. As political parties delivered policy outcome that were favored by segments of the electorate who supported them, the stakes that this electorate had in keeping them in power increased, since keeping parties associated with preferred policy outcomes in government guarantees the continuity of policies which produce these outcomes.

This is why we can expect to see different voting patterns in countries where social democrat and christian democratic parties in government pursued different policies in the process of welfare state development. So, I expect these differences to be a function of two developments: (1) a function of the ability of social democratic parties to mobilize the bulk of the industrial working-class and service workers and also segments of the middle-class who are dependent on welfare state services and (2) a function of the ability of christian democrats to mobilize the bulk of the middle-class and petty bourgeoisie, together with segments of the skilled working-class.

Social democratic and christian democratic parties in this effort followed different strategies, but both strategies had elements of cross-class coalition building; social democrats aimed to increase the mobilization of workers as their core constituencies combined with segments of the middle-class, while christian democrats pursued the opposite strategy.

Social democratic parties, either in coalition or as single party minority or majority governments, increased the social protection of industrial workers through the development

of universal, tax-financed benefit schemes in which trade unions had a significant role in the process of this policy development. This strategy was complemented by efforts aimed at attracting women and sections of the middle-class through the expansion of earnings-related pensions, publicly funded education and public services funded from general taxation (Esping Andersen 1985, Iversen 1998, Moene and Wallerstein 1999).

Christian democratic parties, on the other hand, pursued strategies aimed at mobilizing the majority of the middle-class and petty bourgeoisie, and segments of the working-class. Christian democrats used fragmented occupation based schemes to build a coalition of middle-class, petty bourgeoisie and segments of the working-class. This is because occupation based social security programs allowed christian democrats to avoid controversies over taxation and redistribution, and allowed them to offer preferential treatment to petty bourgeoisie and farmers, giving tax-free access to social programs for this particular group (Keesbergern 1995, Lynch 2006). Christian democrats used similar strategies, aiming to mobilize segments of the working-class attached to Catholic unions and skilled workers. Such strategies allowed christian democrat parties to build a cross-class coalition, split the working-class, and prevent the rise of public sector middle-class that would be more inclined to vote for the left parties.

I expect that in countries where social democrat parties controlled government and used it to develop a universal welfare state, the working-class will be more homogenous in their support for left parties, while the middle-class will be likely to demonstrate visible splits, depending on the exposure of particular groups of the middle-class to market pressures and their dependence on public services.

On the other hand, in countries where christian democrat parties controlled government and established a corporatist welfare state, I expect to see higher homogeneity in the voting behavior of the middle-class and petty bourgeoisie in their support for right parties,

as well as a lower probability that the working-class vote will be concentrated on social democrat parties. In both cases, class voting as usually defined is likely to be suppressed because strategies aimed at cross-class coalition building would reduce clear-cut class division.

Essentially, the same mechanism can be expected to operate when welfare states need to respond to new challenges brought about by deindustrialization and globalization. Policies used to respond to these developments usually carried a strong element of path-dependency, as options were limited by both previous policies and the presence of interest groups with vested interests in the continuity of policies. In this sense, policies which responded to deindustrialization, like policies used to develop the welfare state, also catered to different constituencies and can be expected to have direct consequences on the electoral mobilization of particular social groups. But in the situation of a more complex social structure, it was also the case that the policies implemented produced distributive outcomes, which in the end had effects on the electoral alignments of a range of social groups, and on the support base of the new and the established parties alike.

As the exact direction of these effects was already presented in Chapter 3, I will not discuss it in detail here. Instead, I will discuss the logic of the mobilization of electoral groups in the context of deindustrialization, and the effect that particular policies and their consequences had on it. The response of social democrat welfare states to deindustrialization was characterized by the expansion of employment in the public sector and active policies aimed at increasing employment (Iversen and Wren 1998, Huber and Stephens 2000, Iversen 1996, Rueda 2007). The expansion of the public sector enabled an extensive provision of various social services of relatively high quality through the public sector. This occurred at a time when the expansion of education and a shift in the economic structure both increased the size of the professional class and eliminated the privileged economic positions previously

attributed to professional occupations (Kriesi 1999). It can be expected that this development is likely to increase support for social democrats among the professional groups (and especially lower professionals), and not only among those employed in public sector, since these are groups which can be expected to benefit substantially from public service provision. The opposite can be expected in countries with liberal or conservative welfare states, where such provision of subsidized services does not exist and where professional groups are employed predominantly in the private sector. In these countries, market-oriented professionals are likely to concentrate their support on conservative or liberal right parties, which favor economic liberalization and deregulation, while social service professionals are likely to support green parties because of their cultural liberalism. Therefore, we could expect that the higher the provision of services through public sector and public sector employment, the greater the support from segments of the middle-class for social democrat parties.

The opposite can perhaps be expected for skilled workers in industries, because of the distributive conflicts between the public and private sectors, and the pressures which heavy taxation imposes on market sector. In this case, the support for social democrat parties among skilled workers might be lower in countries where the public sector is larger. A different situation might be expected in countries where skilled workers enjoy high levels of employment protection, but where unemployment (including long-term unemployment) is otherwise high (Rueda 2007). In these countries, skilled workers and other labor market insiders would strongly oppose liberalization and reform of the labor market, which would increase their support for social democrat parties.

Apart from affecting support for mainstream parties, differences in responses to deindustrialization are also likely affect support for new parties. This topic is also already discussed in Chapter 3, so here I focus only on the mechanism of mobilization of voters for new parties. In countries where deindustrialization and globalization produced a large number

of labor market outsiders, we can expect that the resentment of outsiders could either be mobilized by the left or the right populism (see Derks 2004). This would manifest itself by a higher likelihood that unskilled workers (and other outsiders) would vote for either radical right or far left parties with old left appeals. A different situation would occur in countries where the welfare state prevents the emergence of large labor market outsider groups, and instead deals with the problems of unskilled workers through active labor market policies and social protection measures (Rueda 2007). In such countries we can expect that these groups would support parties most supportive of the increased role of the public sector, such as left socialist parties (see Laver and Benoit 2005). Such conditions would also have an effect on the support for radical right parties. The substantial role of the state in the economy and high taxation would produce strong mobilization of petty bourgeoisie for radical right parties as the most prominent opponents of the welfare state (Swank and Betz 2003, Harmel and Gibson 1995).

The expansion of higher education increased the number of new middle-class professionals, which formed the natural constituency of the new left and libertarian parties. However, the way in which this group voted depended in a large part on their relationship with the welfare state: if the majority was employed in welfare state services or dependent on them, as is the case in countries with a large public sector and extensive service provision, than we can expect that their support was concentrated on parties which combined libertarian positions with strong support for high taxation and a government role in the provision of services; if, on the other hand, new middle-class professionals were predominantly employed in private or semi-private sector services, as is the case in countries with small public sector employment, then their support would move on to new left parties, such as greens, with a strong libertarian orientation and somewhat less pronounced left economic appeals.

The mechanisms described in this section are translated into two sets of propositions regarding the impact of the welfare state on the mobilization of political divisions. The first set of propositions specifies the link between policies used in the process of welfare state formation and the mobilization of electoral divisions, while the second set details the link between policies used as a response to changes brought about by deindustrialization, globalization, and the mobilization of political divisions in post-industrial societies.

5.4 Hypotheses

The first set of propositions describes the impact of welfare state policies on the electoral mobilization of the industrial working-class, middle-class and lower non-manual class, during the formation of the welfare state:

H1: *The probability that manual and non-manual workers will vote for social democratic parties is higher in countries where social democratic parties that were in power, in conjunction with strong unions, implemented universal social policies.*

Social democrat control over government was a necessary precondition for the implementation of universal social policies. Therefore, the longer and deeper that the social democrat control over of government is, the greater is the likelihood that implemented policies will not be changed by occasional bourgeoisie government (see Huber and Stephens 2001). Trade unions played an important part in mobilizing heavily unionized manual and non-manual working-class support for the welfare state and social democrat parties. The potential of unions to deliver support to social democrat parties was higher in countries where

both manual and non-manual workers were unionized, and where union density and concentration were high (Moene and Wallerstein 1999, Western 1993 and 1994). High concentration meant that union members were *not* divided between politically aligned confederations affiliated with different parties (Golden, Wallerstein and Lange 1999). Whereas in countries where social democrat parties did not control power for any significant period of time and where they could not rely on strong and concentrated trade unions, the mobilization potential of these parties is likely to be lower, and consequently, the probability that the working-class vote will crystallize around social democrat parties will also be lower.

H2: *The probability that members of the working-class, manual and non-manual alike, will vote for christian democratic parties is higher in countries where christian democrats implemented transfer-heavy social policy, and where unions did not constitute a unified actor.*

In countries where christian democratic parties controlled government, and where unions were fragmented between politically aligned confederations, the conditions needed for the mobilization of the working-class were absent. Christian democratic parties could mobilize segments of the working-class with particularistic social security programs focused on individual occupational groups. The existence of confessional trade union confederations further enabled these parties to mobilize segments of the working-class vote (Hicks and Misra 1994).

The voting behavior of the middle-class is likely to vary depending on the context: where left parties were dominant and complemented universal welfare policies with extensive government service provision, the expansion of public sector employment, and education spending, we can expect to see middle-class support divided between social democrat and

bourgeoisie parties; in countries where social democratic parties could not implement such policies we can expect that the middle-class will be significantly less likely to support social democrats and will be more clearly concentrated in the electorate of bourgeoisie parties.

H3*: The voting behavior of the middle-class is likely to vary between contexts dominated by social democrat government and universal welfare, state and christian democrat government, and a transfer-heavy welfare state.*

The second set of hypotheses outlines expectations about the effect of deindustrialization on the mobilization of political divisions in post-industrial societies. The first two hypotheses deal with differences observable in the mobilization of support for principal parties of the left and right.

H4: *In countries with a strong universal welfare state and extensive provision of services through the public sector, we can expect that new middle-class professionals and semi-professionals (social and cultural professionals) are more likely to vote for social democrat parties than in countries where these conditions are absent.*

The opposite effects can be expected with respect to the voting behavior of skilled industrial workers. In countries with high protection of labor market insiders, we can expect to see a stronger support for social democrat parties as parties that protect the status quo on the labor market from skilled industrial workers, lower technicians and administrators (Rueda 2007). Contrary would be the case in countries where a sizable public sector and heavy taxation created distributive conflicts within working-class and their unions, and between those employed in public and private sectors (Garret and Way 1999).

H5: *In countries with a large public sector, the electoral behavior of industrial workers is likely to exhibit stronger differences compared to service workers, than in countries where the insider-outsider division is more prominent.*

The remaining hypotheses refer to expectations regarding the impact of developments related to deindustrialization on the mobilization of support for new parties of the left and right. In countries with sizable groups of outsiders on the labor market, unskilled workers and other outsider groups, they are more likely to vote for radical right parties. The opposite is expected in countries with a strong public sector and active labor market policies, where these voters would be more likely to vote for the left parties and predominantly left socialist parties.

H6: *In countries with large groups of labor market outsiders, unskilled workers and other outsider groups are more likely to vote for radical right parties than left parties; the opposite is expected to be the case in countries where efficient social protection prevents the emergence of such groups.*

As the petty bourgeoisie is found in several studies to be a natural constituency of the radical right (Evans 2003 and 2005, Ivarsflaten 2005), the differences in support for these groups are dependent on the ability of these parties to mobilize low-skilled workers, and this in itself depends on the characteristics of the welfare state.

The composition of the electorate of new left parties is also likely to depend on the size of the public sector and employment in it. In countries with high public sector employment, new left parties are likely to enjoy higher levels of support among unskilled

workers, professionals, and workers employed in the public sector than in countries where this is not the case. In such countries the new left vote would predominantly come from the new middle-class professionals.

H7: *In countries with high public sector employment new left parties are likely to enjoy higher levels of support among unskilled workers and workers employed in the public sector, than in countries where this is not the case.*

5.5 Method and Data

The analysis in this chapter, as in Chapter 3, includes two separate datasets and covers two time points characterized by different socioeconomic contexts. The first part of the analysis focuses on the impact that welfare state policy had on the electoral mobilization of social classes at the end of the process of welfare state formation in the 1970s. The second part focuses on the impact that policies and the outcomes of changes related to deindustrialization had on the mobilization of electoral divisions in the more recent period. The data used in the analysis in this chapter comes from the same sources as data used in the analysis in Chapter 3. Additionally, in this chapter micro-level data are integrated with macro-level variables that measure the characteristics of welfare state policies and outcomes in a pooled dataset.

The first part of the analysis relies on micro-level data from the International Social Mobility and Politics Data File collected by Nieuwbeerta and Ganzeboom and obtained from the Steimnetz data archive in Amsterdam. This data set compiles a number of individual-level datasets which comes from different sources such as electoral surveys and public opinion

surveys, covering the period between 1956 and 1990. For this analysis, I selected a set of eleven surveys from the same number of countries conducted between 1968 and 1974. This time frame was chosen because this is the period when programs of the welfare state were already institutionally fully established, though spending continued to grow. It is also the period when structural developments, related to shifts toward a post-industrial social structure, which caused splits within middle and working-class, did not begin to show their effects. Therefore this is the period when the effects hypothesized in the previous section can be expected to have the highest visibility. The countries included in the data set are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Great Britain, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

The second segment of the analysis is based on pooled European Social Survey data from the 2002 and 2004 waves. This dataset includes samples from the thirteen countries of West Europe that this dissertation examines. As in the first dataset, individual-level data from the European Social survey are also integrated with macro-level data that measures the characteristics of welfare states and responses to deindustrialization.

Since the effects hypothesized in the previous section are based on the interactions between micro and contextual variables, I added three types of macro-variables to the first dataset. The first variable measures the participation of Christian democrat or social democrat parties in government. Each variable is intended to capture the impact of these parties on policies over the long-term, as we can expect that the partisan impact on policies, and also voter identification with policies advanced by individual parties, could materialize only if either party was in control of government over a longer period of time. To this end, both variables measure the cumulative share of seats that these parties have had in government since 1945 and up to the year of the survey that individual-level data for individual countries

are taken from. The data for this variable is taken from the Comparative Welfare State Data Set compiled by Huber, Ragin and Stephens.

The second variable measures characteristics of welfare policies. A general measure of welfare spending is not considered to be sensitive enough to capture the variation in welfare policies as it does not reveal which policies are actually in place. Because of this, Huber, Stephens and Ragin (see Huber and Stephens 2001 and Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993) propose to use measures that capture the most distinctive features of welfare regimes. As social democrat welfare states are based on universal tax-financed policies and service provision, they propose to use the measure of overall government revenues as a share of GDP to measure the presence of social democrat welfare policies. On the other hand, since christian democratic welfare states are based on fragmented insurance-based programs financed mostly through social security contributions, with a low provision of services and dominance of transfers in social policy, they propose to use the measure of overall social transfers as a share of GDP to measure the prevalence of welfare policies characteristic of christian democratic welfare regimes. These variables are also taken from the Comparative Welfare State Data Set.

The final macro variable captures the strength and centralization of trade unions. A high density of membership and organization concentration is considered to be instrumental in the mobilization of working-class political support for welfare policies and social democrat parties. The higher the density of union membership and the higher the centralization of trade unions, the higher is the potential for trade unions to deliver working-class support for the left parties, but also to influence what the left party does when in government. If trade unions are divided politically, then we can expect that their members will follow the political affiliation of their unions (see Hicks and Misra 1994). Therefore, we can expect that in trade unions with a high rate of membership and organizational concentration, they will be able to

mobilize the working-class to support the left parties and social democrat welfare policies. On the other hand, if trade unions are divided politically, their members will follow the political affiliation of trade unions, leading to political divisions within the working-class of those who support the left parties and those who support christian democratic parties. To measure union strength and the centralization of trade unions, I use a variable that combines trade union density with an index of trade union concentration. The new variable is constructed by the multiplication of overall trade union density and the Herfindahl index of union concentration across all confederations. The data for this variable is taken from the "Union Centralization among Advanced Industrial Societies, update 1995/2000" data sets collected by Golden and Wallerstein.

The macro variables used in the second dataset include measures of the share of public sector employment in total employment and an incidence of long-term unemployment. The size of public sector employment measures the extent to which welfare states rely on the public sector to facilitate employment by creating jobs in public services and by supporting the participation of the rest of the population in the labor market through the provision of services to the employed and those seeking employment. It is argued that public service provides well paid and highly secure employment and at the same provides caring services which facilitate the employment of women, and active labor market policies which prevent the emergence of labor market outsiders (Huber and Stephens 2000). In this respect, the size of public sector employment represents a summary measure of policy responses to deindustrialization. Alternatively, measures of active labor market policies and flexibility of the labor market could be used, but these indicators measure rather specific policies, and their inclusion would increase the complexity of the analysis and number of interaction terms. The size of public sector employment also indirectly indicates the location of the employment of service sector professionals: in countries where public sector employment is low, a larger

share of new service professionals are located in the private and semi-private sector. This variable is also fairly closely correlated with other measures of post-industrial employment such as service employment, female employment, and the measures of differences in welfare state policies such as the government spending and social spending (see Appendix 4). Therefore, to simplify the analysis and avoid redundancies, other measures correlated with the size of public sector employment are not used in the analysis. This variable is measured as a share of public sector employment in total employment. The source of this variable is the OECD Public Sector Pay and Employment Database, but data are obtained from the Quality of Governance Social Policy Dataset. The second macro variable in this segment of the analysis measures the size of long-term unemployment, which summarizes the reaction to changes in the labor market and the size of outsider groups. The source of data for this variable is also the Quality of Governance Social Policy Dataset.

On the micro-level analysis, the first step uses measures of social class, sector of employment, education, sex and age. Some relevant measures, notably union membership and religiosity, were not available in the International Politics and Mobility dataset in all eleven countries, and thus could not be included in the analysis. Social class is operationalized through four categories which capture class position in the middle-class, non-manual routine class, manual class and self-employed. An additional category includes those not classified in one of the above categories. Classes are derived by collapsing nine categories of the Erikson, Goldthorpe class scheme into four. The selection of categories resembles aggregate class actors found relevant in the politics of welfare state formation. In addition, given the extensive use of interaction terms in this chapter, smaller number of categories in the variable that measures class position helps in keeping the analysis more parsimonious.

In the second segment of the analysis, independent micro variables include measures of occupational position, labor market status and sector of employment, sex and education. The operationalization of micro-level variables is identical to the one used in Chapter 3 and is presented in Appendix 3.

As indicated above, in the first segment of the analysis each macro-level variable is interacted with indicators of respondent placement in the middle-class, manual working-class and non-manual working-class. In the second step, each macro variable is interacted with six indicators of occupational position, sex, indicator of outsider status, and indicator of sector of employment.

The dependent variable measures voting behavior and is operationalized with two dichotomous variables in the first segment of the analysis. The first variable measures the votes for social democrat parties as opposed to votes for right parties, including christian democrats, conservatives and liberals. The second variable measures vote choice for christian democrat and centrist/agrarian parties as opposed to left parties, including social democrats, communists and other left parties. The dichotomization of both dependent variables is done to avoid the trappings of compositional differences in party systems between countries and to avoid a loss of cases.

In the second step, I use three dependent variables. The first measures voting for mainstream left and right parties; mainstream left parties are social democrats while mainstream right parties are liberals, conservatives and christian democrats. The remaining two dependent variables, apart from these two categories, also include separate categories for voters of new left and new right parties, respectively. While such operationalization of the dependent variables reduces their variability and the degree of information that they carry, it also avoids the problems related to compositional differences of party systems and minimizes

the loss of cases. The operationalization of these dependent variables is presented in Appendix 3.

I estimate a total of six models in the first segment of the analysis. Of these, the first three models have a dependent variable that measures vote choice for social democrat parties as opposed to parties of the right. The remaining three models have a dependent variable that measures voting for christian democrats as opposed to left parties. Due to the dichotomous dependent variable, all models are estimated with logistic regression. Since the dataset pools individual-level data from eleven separate country surveys and model specifies cross-level interactions, logistic regression with robust standard errors is used to adjust for the clustering of data by countries**.**

The correlations between the between macro variables, namely between measures of social security transfers and christian democrat participation in government on the one hand, and total tax revenue, left government participation in government and union density one the other, are fairly high (see Appendix 5). Also, the dataset contains only eleven macro-level cases, which reduces the number of degrees of freedom substantially. To reduce these potential problems, each model contains only one macro-level variable and the interactions of this variable and indicators of class position as time.

The first three models have support for social democrat party (SD) as opposed to right parties (R) as the dependent variable and estimate binary logistic regression equations:

$$\log(\Pr(vote = SD) / \Pr(vote = R)) = \alpha + \beta_1 age + \beta_2 sex + \beta_3 education + \beta_4 publicemp + \\ + \sum_{k=1}^{l} \overrightarrow{\beta_{5k}} class_k + \beta_6 leftgov + \beta_7 leftgov * MC + \beta_8 leftgov * WC + \beta_9 leftgov * NMC \quad (5.1)$$

$$\log(\Pr(vote = SD) / \Pr(vote = R)) = \alpha + \beta_1 age + \beta_2 sex + \beta_3 education + \beta_4 publicemp + \\ + \sum_{k=1}^{l} \overrightarrow{\beta_{5k}} class_k + \beta_6 ttax + \beta_7 ttax * MC + \beta_8 ttax * WC + \beta_9 ttax * NMC \quad (5.2)$$

$$\log(\Pr(vote = SD) / \Pr(vote = R)) = \alpha + \beta_1 age + \beta_2 sex + \beta_3 education + \beta_4 publicemp + \\ + \sum_{k=1}^{l} \overrightarrow{\beta_{5k}} class_k + \beta_6 uniond + \beta_7 uniond * MC + \beta_8 uniond * WC + \beta_9 uniond * NMC \quad (5.3)$$

where *leftgov* denotes the prevalence of left government, *ttax* denotes government revenue as a % of GDP, and *uniond* denotes the density and concentration of trade unions. The next three models have support for christian democrat (CD) as opposed to left parties (L) as the dependent variable and again estimate binary logistic models:

$$\log(\Pr(vote = CD) / \Pr(vote = L)) = \alpha + \beta_1 age + \beta_2 sex + \beta_3 education + \beta_4 publicemp + \\ + \sum_{k=1}^{l} \overrightarrow{\beta_{5k}} class_k + \beta_6 cdgov + \beta_7 cdgov * MC + \beta_8 cdgov * WC + \beta_9 cdgov * NMC \quad (5.4)$$

$$\log(\Pr(vote = CD) / \Pr(vote = L)) = \alpha + \beta_1 age + \beta_2 sex + \beta_3 education + \beta_4 publicemp + \\ + \sum_{k=1}^{l} \overrightarrow{\beta_{5k}} class_k + \beta_6 sstran + \beta_7 sstran * MC + \beta_8 sstran * WC + \beta_9 sstran * NMC \quad (5.5)$$

$$\log(\Pr(vote = CD) / \Pr(vote = L)) = \alpha + \beta_1 age + \beta_2 sex + \beta_3 education + \beta_4 publicemp + \\ + \sum_{k=1}^{l} \overrightarrow{\beta_{5k}} class_k + \beta_6 uniond + \beta_7 uniond * MC + \beta_8 uniond * WC + \beta_9 uniond * NMC \quad (5.6)$$

where *cdgov* indicates the prevalence of christian democrat government and *sstran* indicates the share of social security transfers in GDP.

In the second segment of the analysis, I estimate two models of vote choice in three separate regressions. First regression compares the electorate of mainstream left and mainstream right parties in binary logistic regression. The remaining two regressions compare the electorate of mainstream left and right parties with the electorate of new left and new right parties.

Both models include the same set of individual-level variables, one of two macro variables, and interaction terms between some individual-level variables and the macro variable in the model. As before, the macro-level variables are included separately in the analysis because of the small number of countries in the analysis, and in order to keep the analysis and presentation of results more parsimonious. The micro-level variables included are: sex, age, education, sector of employment, insider-outsider status in the labor market, religiosity and occupation. Occupation is operationalized so that it distinguishes between seven occupational categories and the residual group of respondents that could not be classified in any occupational category. The occupational categories are: business and technical professionals, sociocultural professionals, middle-level technical and administrative professionals, self-employed, skilled workers in industry, skilled workers in services, and unskilled workers. The insider-outsider division is operationalized in line with the division proposed by Rueda (2005), which distinguishes between upscale groups, insiders and outsiders.

The first model uses a measure of the size of the public sector, while the second model includes a measure of long-term unemployment instead. These variables are interacted with six dummy indicators of occupational status, and one each for sex, sector of employment, and labor market status. This yields a total of nine interaction terms per model. These models can be expressed with the following two equations:

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\log(\Pr(vote = i) / \Pr(vote = j)) = \alpha + \beta_1 age + \beta_2 sex + \\
&+ \beta_3 education + \beta_4 publicemp + \sum_{k=1}^{l} \vec{\beta}_{5k} occupation_k + \\
&+ \beta_6 outsider + \beta_7 religiosity + \beta_8 sizePS + \\
&+ \sum_{k=1}^{l} \vec{\beta}_{9k} occupation_k * sizePS + \beta_{10} sex * sizePS + \\
&+ \beta_{11} outsider * sizePS + \beta_{12} publicem * sizePS
\end{aligned}
\tag{5.7}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\log(\Pr(vote = i) / \Pr(vote = j)) = \alpha + \beta_1 age + \beta_2 sex + \\
&+ \beta_3 education + \beta_4 publicemp + \sum_{k=1}^{l} \beta_5 occupation_k + \\
&+ \beta_6 outsider + \beta_7 religiosity + \beta_8 LTunemp + \\
&+ \sum_{k=1}^{l} \beta_9 occupation_k * LTunemp + \beta_{10} sex * LTunemp + \\
&+ \beta_{11} outsider * LTunemp + \beta_{12} publicem * LTunemp
\end{aligned} \tag{5.8}
$$

where $class_k$ indicates dummy indicators of occupational status, *publicemp* indicates employment in the public sector, *sizePS* indicates the size of the public sector, *LTunemp* indicates the magnitude of long term unemployment, and *outsider* indicates dummy indicators of outsider status on the labor market. As in the first segment of the analysis, both models are estimated with cluster-adjusted robust standard errors.

5.6 Results and Discussion

The results of regressions from both segments of the analysis provide partial support for the hypotheses advanced in this chapter. The results from the first segment of the analysis are presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Table 5.1 presents results from logistic regression with the vote for social democrat parties as the dependent variable, and table 5.2 presents results from the logistic regression with the vote for christian democrat and centrist parties as the dependent variable.

The results presented in Table 5.1 provide support for the hypotheses that support of the working-class for social democrat parties is more concentrated in countries where social democrats were in power, where strong and concentrated unions were present, and where universal welfare policies were implemented. In all three models with vote for social

democrats as the dependent variable, the interaction terms with contextual variables and indicator of working-class membership have significant effects in the expected direction. It could be argued that the positive impact found in an interaction of the measure of social democrat control over government with an indicator of working-class membership could be the consequence of an overall higher vote share of social democratic parties in these countries. However, this could not explain the strength and direction of interactions of an indicator of working-class status with the remaining two macro variables. Furthermore, the findings of interactions of measures of social democrat control of government with the other two indicators of class membership are in the direction opposite to the expected, suggesting that this is not just the consequence of higher marginal support for social democrats in these countries. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that long-term social democrat dominance of government and universal welfare policies do increase the mobilization of the working-class for social democrat parties. Strong and centralized trade unions have similar effects, presumably by providing organizational support for social democratic parties and mobilizing the working-class vote for social democratic parties. The findings for non-manual workers, however, do not fit the expectations stated in the first hypothesis; interaction terms including a dummy variable for non-manual workers with three contextual variables show effects contrary to the expectations. In fact, the first interaction term, including the measure of social democrat control of government is significant and negative, indicating lower support from the non-manual class in countries where social democrats dominate over government. This finding is rather unexpected, given that the universal welfare state policies and public services are expected to facilitate the mobilization of non-manual workers in voting for social democrats. On the other had, perhaps such expectations relate more to left parties in general, rather than social democrats in particular, since other studies found that in countries with

universal welfare states non-manual classes are more likely to support left socialist parties than social democrats.

The results of interactions of an indicator of middle-class status with contextual variables show that support of the middle-class for social democratic parties is actually lower in countries with universal welfare and social democratic dominance over government. This in itself is a fully expected finding given the fact that social democrat welfare policies mean high taxation, which is likely to increase the mobilization of the middle-class and intensify class voting (see Nieuwbeerta and Ultee 1999).

The findings of the regression analyses with vote for christian democratic parties versus left parties as a dependent variable presented in Table 5.2 also partially confirm the expectations outlined in the chapter. The second hypothesis stating that working-class support for christian democrats will be higher in countries where christian democratic parties controlled government and implemented transfer heavy social policy is generally supported by the data, though the effects are not as strong as are findings from the analysis of voting for social democrat parties.

The interaction term between an indicator of working-class status and christian democrat control of government is marginally significant and is in the expected direction. The interaction term of an indicator of working-class status and social security transfers is also positive but insignificant and fairly weak. The expectations regarding the non-manual class, as in the previous case, are not confirmed by the results of this regression analysis, which suggests that the voting behavior of the non-manual class does not vary across countries differing in the partisan composition of their government and characteristics of their welfare state.

Table 5.1 Results of logistic regression with vote for social democrat as the dependent variable. All entries are logistic regression coefficients and robust standard errors.

	Model 5.1		Model 5.2		Model 5.3	
	B	S.E	B	S.E	B	S.E
Age	-0.002	(0.003)	-0.003	(0.003)	-0.004	(0.003)
Sex	**-0.470*****	(0.112)	**-0.464*****	(0.120)	**-0.455*****	(0.117)
Education	**-0.086*****	(0.033)	**-0.098*****	(0.032)	**-0.095*****	(0.035)
Public sector	-0.180	(0.176)	-0.219	(0.171)	-0.146	(0.167)
Middle-class	**1.651*****	(0.239)	**3.312*****	(0.839)	**2.339*****	(0.590)
Self-employed	ref		ref		Ref	
Non-manual	**1.389*****	(0.216)	**2.162*****	(0.575)	**1.616*****	(0.351)
Manual	**1.481*****	(0.334)	0.669	(0.700)	**0.859****	(0.358)
Not employed	**1.429*****	(0.212)	**1.369*****	(0.205)	**1.411*****	(0.195)
Left government	**0.067*****	(0.021)				
Middle-class*left government	**-0.068*****	(0.018)				
Manual*left government	**0.034****	(0.016)				
Non-manual*left government	**-0.023*****	(0.007)				
Total taxation			**0.065*****	(0.024)		
Middle-class*total taxation			**-0.057*****	(0.022)		
Manual*total taxation			**0.028***	(0.017)		
Non-manual*total taxation			-0.024	(0.015)		
Union density					0.022	(0.014)
Middle-class*union density					**-0.026****	(0.013)
Manual*union density					**0.019*****	(0.006)
Non-manual*union density					-0.009	(0.008)
Constant	**-1.124*****	(0.290)	**-2.969*****	(0.866)	**-1.487****	(0.642)
Nagelkerke R^2	0.074		0.082		0.066	
-2 log likelihood	-6734.22		-6680.54		-6793.86	

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

Table 5.2 Results of logistic regression with vote for christian democrats as the dependent variable. All entries are logistic regression coefficients and robust standard errors.

	Model 5.4		Model 5.5		Model 5.6	
	B	S.E	B	S.E	B	S.E
Age	0.005	(0.004)	0.006*	(0.004)	**0.008****	(0.003)
Sex	**0.629****	(0.178)	**0.534****	(0.136)	**0.614****	(0.133)
Education	**0.058****	(0.018)	0.037	(0.028)	**0.125****	(0.046)
Public sector	0.153	(0.116)	-0.350	(0.271)	0.060	(0.287)
Middle-class	**-0.803****	(0.344)	**-1.929****	(0.696)	**-2.406****	(0.500)
Self-employed	ref		ref		ref	
Non-manual	**-1.217****	(0.515)	-0.857	(0.687)	**-1.441****	(0.585)
Manual	**-2.013****	(0.541)	**-1.590****	(0.583)	**-1.112****	(0.389)
Not employed	**-1.175****	(0.373)	**-1.189****	(0.314)	**-1.253****	(0.357)
CD government	**0.164****	(0.023)				
Middle-class*CD government	-0.007	(0.019)				
Non-manual*CD government	0.004	(0.025)				
Manual* CD government	**0.035***	(0.019)				
Social transfers			**0.172****	(0.081)		
Middle-class*social transfers			0.066	(0.055)		
Manual*social transfers			0.009	(0.049)		
Non-manual*social transfers			-0.023	(0.052)		
Union density					**-0.033****	(0.016)
Middle-class*union density					**0.023****	(0.008)
Manual*union density					**-0.009***	(0.005)
Non-manual*union density					0.002	(0.010)
Constant	**-2.454****	(1.201)	**-2.626****	(0.727)	0.657	(0.546)
Nagelkerke R^2	0.190		0.084		0.077	
-2 log likelihood	-4853.3		-5485.31		-5529.529	

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

The coefficient for the third interaction term, including the indicator of working-class status and measure of union strength and concentration shows that support of the manual working-class for christian democratic parties is lower in countries where unions are numerous and unified. The effect is not particularly strong, but it is significant and in the expected direction. On the other hand, the results of interactions including the middle-class do not show significant differences in the behavior of middle-class between countries characterized by christian democrat dominance of government and christian democrat welfare states, and countries where this is not the case. The only significant interaction term including the indicator of middle-class membership is that of measures of union strength and concentration. Again, as concentrated and strong unions are held to be an effective

mobilization tool of working-class vote for the left parties, this result is likely to reflect stronger class polarization in countries where unions perform such a role[8]. Finally, the results in a way also support the third hypothesis, as we can observe that the effect of social democrat policies on the mobilization of the middle-class, though in the opposite direction, are visibly stronger than are the effects of christian democrat governmental dominance and are characteristic of christian democratic welfare states.

A summary of findings in the first segment of the analysis show that the welfare state has some impact on the structure of political divisions in industrial societies. The findings in the above mentioned analysis are broadly in line with findings of the analysis in Chapter 4 about the impact of the welfare state on political divisions. While the analysis in the previous chapter indicates that the social democrat welfare state increases the salience of economic divisions, the analysis in this chapter sheds some light on the potential mechanism behind this result. This mechanism lies in the deepening of divisions between socioeconomic groups that benefit from welfare state policies and groups that do not. The findings of country-by-country analysis of vertical divisions between occupations in Chapter 3, suggest that this mechanism is also at work, to an extent, in the social structure of post-industrial societies.

Turning to the findings of the second segment of the analysis that focuses on the impact of the socioeconomic context on the mobilization of political divisions in post-industrial societies, the results of the regression analyses presented in Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 also show some support for the hypotheses advanced previously in this chapter. First, I present the results of the analysis about the impact of responses and outcomes of deindustrialization have on the mobilization of electoral divisions between mainstream left and mainstream right parties. The dependent variable in the logistic regressions presented in

[8] On the other hand, it needs to be said that union concentration is relatively highly correlated with social democrat dominance of government and universal social policies, i.e. heavy taxation. Therefore, this effect could also reflect the impact of these other variables, found in Table 5.1, to increase working-class mobilization for social democrat parties.

Table 5.3 measures voting for mainstream left parties as opposed to voting for mainstream right parties.

The comparison of the direction of coefficients in models 5.7 and 5.8 in Table 5.3 shows that the effects of some variables do vary across countries that differed in response to deindustrialization. However, not all of the effects are in accordance with expectations; in contrast with the expectations stated in Hypothesis 4, the results of logistic regression in model 5.7 presented in Table 5.3 show that members of various segments of the working-class, notably skilled workers in services and industry and unskilled workers, are in fact more likely to vote for social democrat parties in countries with a large public sector and public service provision. The interaction term of indicators of membership of social and cultural professional group with measures of the size of public sector employment are not significant and have the effect which is not in the expected direction. Although this finding is in direct contrast with the proposition of the Hypothesis 5, it is not in dissonance with a general logic of the argument advanced here.

This finding is also in line with results from the country-by-country analysis in Chapter 3 and confirms expectations stated in Chapter 2 that socioeconomic divisions are likely to play a more important role in the structuring of post-industrial political divisions in social democrat welfare states. As workers are the group which in absolute terms benefits most from the extensive provision of public services and other policies of the universal welfare state, it can be expected that this will increase their support for social democratic parties. On the other hand, the expectations regarding the presence of divisions within the working-class between its market and public sector segments in countries with a large public sector are clearly overestimated.

However, it is the case that outsiders are less likely to vote for left parties in countries where public sector employment is high. This finding is somewhat surprising since it can be

expected that outsiders are the first group to benefit from the policies of the activist welfare state. Turning to the results of model 5.8 in Table 5.3, we see only a few interaction terms that registers any impact. It is expected that unskilled workers in countries with stronger divisions between insiders and outsiders, measured here by the incidence of long-term unemployment, are less likely to support mainstream left parties than in countries where insider groups are less numerous.

Table 5.3 Results of logistic regression with ESS data and a dependent variable which indicates voting for mainstream left or mainstream right parties. All entries are logistic regression coefficients and robust standard errors.

	Model 5.7			Model 5.8	
	B	S.E		B	S.E
Age	**0.005***	(0.003)	Age	**0.005***	(0.003)
Sex	0.038	(0.185)	Sex	0.062	(0.066)
Education	-0.005	(0.005)	Education	-0.006	(0.005)
Public employment	0.176	(0.194)	Public employment	**0.285*****	(0.096)
Buss.Tech. Prof.	**0.511****	(0.211)	Buss.Tech. Prof.	**-1.138*****	(0.245)
Soc. Prof.	**0.749****	(0.305)	Soc. Prof.	**-0.772*****	(0.238)
Self employed	-0.176	(0.269)	Self employed	**-1.484*****	(0.258)
Mid. Prof.	**0.535*****	(0.168)	Mid. Prof.	**-0.797*****	(0.187)
Service W.	0.120	(0.146)	Service W.	**-0.403*****	(0.132)
Skilled W.			Skilled W.		
Unskilled W.	-0.083	(0.191)	Unskilled W.	0.085	(0.134)
Outsiders	**0.462*****	(0.128)	Outsiders	**-0.244****	(0.113)
Religiosity	**-0.489*****	(0.076)	Religiosity	**-0.512*****	(0.090)
Public sector size	0.012	(0.018)	LT Unemployment	0.001	(0.080)
BTP* Pub. Sec. size	-0.013	(0.014)	BTP* LT Unemp.	0.030	(0.074)
SP* Pub. Sec. size	-0.007	(0.014)	SP* LT Unemp	0.025	(0.065)
MLP* Pub. Sec. size	0.002	(0.013)	MLP* LT Unemp	0.029	(0.065)
SeW* Pub. Sec. size	**0.032*****	(0.011)	SeW* LT Unemp	-0.049	(0.058)
SW* Pub. Sec. size	**0.051*****	(0.014)	SW* LT Unemp	-0.098	(0.064)
UW* Pub. Sec. size	**0.052*****	(0.011)	UW* LT Unemp	**-0.146*****	(0.051)
Sex* Pub. Sec. size	0.001	(0.008)	Sex* LT Unemp	-0.003	(0.024)
Out* Pub. Sec. size	**-0.025*****	(0.006)	Out* LT Unemp	**0.077*****	(0.031)
PubEmp* Pub. Sec. size	0.001	(0.008)	PubEmp* LT Unemp	-0.028	(0.033)
Constant	-0.557	(0.338)	Constant	**1.034*****	(0.277)
Nagelkerke R^2	0.084			0.0786	
-2 log likelihood	-19325.310			-15935.473	

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
Social democrat voters are coded as 1 and voters of mainstream right parties are coded as 0.

Unskilled workers are, as expected, less likely to support social democrat parties in countries where the measure of long-term unemployment is indicated by the presence of a large number of labor market outsiders. However, the interaction between long-term

unemployment and outsider status is in the direction opposite to that expected. This apparent contrast is perhaps the consequence of the operationalization of a variable that measures insider or outsider status, which might be a less sensitive measure than occupation in identifying those with insufficient skills and resources to compete in the markets of post-industrial societies. If this is the case, then it would appear that the effects of the interactions of indicators of working-class occupation with two contextual variables fit well with the expectations outlined in this chapter. It seems that it is indeed the case that universal welfare states decreased divisions between occupational groups at the lower end of the occupational scale, while the opposite is the case in countries that are characterized by strong insider-outsider divisions.

Turning to the results of models 5.7 and 5.8, which contrasted new parties of the left and right with the established parties presented in Tables 5.4 and 5.5, we see very few significant effects among the interactions of individual-level and macro-level variables. The results confirm general expectations about the composition of the electorate of new left and new right parties and about the expected impact of sector of employment, gender, education and class on the likelihood of voting for new right and new left parties (see Chapter 3). However, the results do not show a significant impact of interactions between micro and macro variables, except those already found to have an impact in the logistic regression that contrasts voters of social democrats and mainstream right parties in Table 5.3. The findings presented in Table 5.4 suggest that segments of the working-class are more likely to support new left parties in countries with a universal welfare state and large public sector. This finding is in accordance with propositions made in Hypothesis 6 and 7 and supports the expectations that characteristics of the post-industrial social structure are likely to have effects on the shape of new left parties and the composition of their electorate. Interactions of indicators of occupational status and contextual characteristics in Table 5.5 do not show

differences in the propensity of unskilled workers to vote for radical right parties in countries with a larger number of labor market outsiders. In fact, the only significant coefficient is in the direction opposite to expectations.

Overall, findings of the second segment of the analysis also provide support for the expectations that characteristics of the welfare state in post-industrial societies affect the mobilization of electoral divisions. Regression analysis found that differences exist primarily in the electorate of left parties, where a universal welfare state and response to deindustrialization aimed at the reduction of the number of labor market outsiders is found to increase the cohesion of groups at the lower end of occupational hierarchy in their support for left parties. The results also found that support from the occupational groups at the lower end of the occupational hierarchy for principal new left parties, greens and left socialists, also varies across countries and shows stronger support of these groups in countries with universal welfare states. When it comes to radical right parties, the analysis in this chapter does not show the presence of differences of a similar magnitude.

Table 5.4 Results of multinomial logistic regression with ESS data and a dependent variable which indicates voting for new left parties in contrast to social democrats and mainstream right parties. All entries are logistic regression coefficients and robust standard errors.

	New left/ social democrats				New left/mainstream right			
	Model 5.7		Model 5.8		Model 5.7		Model 5.8	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Age	**-0.027*****	(0.003)	**-0.028*****	(0.003)	**-0.022*****	(0.003)	**-0.022*****	(0.004)
Sex	0.026	(0.132)	0.099	(0.085)	0.062	(0.179)	**0.214****	(0.099)
Education	**0.051*****	(0.006)	**0.052*****	(0.006)	**0.047*****	(0.006)	**0.048*****	(0.006)
Public employment	-0.022	(0.201)	**0.424*****	(0.153)	0.143	(0.204)	**0.697*****	(0.149)
Bus.Tech. Prof.	0.014	(0.433)	**-0.473****	(0.190)	**0.666****	(0.328)	-0.088	(0.199)
Soc. Prof.	0.006	(0.341)	-0.143	(0.195)	**0.878****	(0.400)	0.580	(0.247)
Mid. Prof.	-0.370	(0.387)	**-0.521*****	(0.197)	0.327	(0.266)	0.164	(0.103)
Service W.	**-0.648***	(0.387)	**-0.882*****	(0.194)	-0.359	(0.366)	0.188	(0.236)
Skilled W.	**-0.923****	(0.448)	**-0.964*****	(0.330)	-0.589	(0.356)	0.392	(0.384)
Unskilled W.	**-0.859****	(0.438)	**-1.031*****	(0.310)	**-0.663****	(0.273)	0.412	(0.305)
Outsiders	0.095	(0.214)	**0.496*****	(0.197)	**0.482****	(0.208)	0.277	(0.185)
Religiosity	-0.070	(0.046)	**-0.083*****	(0.047)	**-0.525*****	(0.068)	**-0.553*****	(0.080)
Public sector size	0.014	(0.022)			0.017	(0.020)		
BTP*Pub. Sec. size	-0.014	(0.018)			-0.023	(0.017)		
SP*Pub. Sec. size	0.001	(0.012)			-0.003	(0.018)		
MLP*Pub. Sec. size	-0.005	(0.015)			-0.002	(0.011)		
SeW*Pub. Sec. size	0.002	(0.015)			**0.033****	(0.017)		
SW*Pub. Sec. size	0.009	(0.016)			**0.048*****	(0.018)		
UW*Pub. Sec. size	0.002	(0.019)			**0.045*****	(0.012)		
Sex*Pub. Sec. size	0.007	(0.007)			0.011	(0.008)		
Out*Pub. Sec. size	0.011	(0.011)			-0.009	(0.009)		
PubEmp*Pub. Sec. size	0.013	(0.009)			0.015	(0.010)		

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p≤0.10

(table 5.4 cont.)

	New left/ social democrats				New left/mainstream right			
	Model 5.7		Model 5.8		Model 5.7		Model 5.8	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
LT Unemployment			-0.116	(0.128)			-0.128	(0.097)
BTP*LT Unemp.			0.075	(0.083)			**0.107****	(0.049)
SP*LT Unemp			0.075	(0.083)			**0.099***	(0.060)
MLP*LT Unemp			0.025	(0.081)			0.053	(0.045)
SeW*LT Unemp			0.125	(0.073)			0.070	(0.064)
SW*LT Unemp			0.118	(0.106)			0.037	(0.105)
UW*LT Unemp			0.129	(0.089)			-0.001	(0.085)
Sex*LT Unemp			0.032	(0.030)			0.028	(0.027)
Out*LT Unemp			-0.078	(0.050)			-0.009	(0.042)
PubEmp*LT Unemp			-0.066	(0.053)			-0.090	(0.056)
Constant	-0.211	(0.570)	0.405	(0.382)	-1.014	(0.489)	-0.267	(0.367)
Nagelkerke R^2	0.075		0.073		0.075		0.073	
-2 log likelihood	-26798.1		-26871.249		-26798.1		-26871.249	

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

Table 5.5 Results of multinomial logistic regression with ESS data and a dependent variable which indicates voting for radical right parties in contrast to social democrats and mainstream right parties. All entries are logistic regression coefficients and robust standard errors.

	Radical right/ social democrats				Radical right/mainstream right			
	Model 5.7		Model 5.8		Model 5.7		Model 5.8	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Education	-0.020	(0.022)	-0.024	(0.017)	-0.026	(0.025)	-0.030	(0.020)
Public employment	-0.446	(0.409)	-0.079	(0.166)	-0.279	(0.361)	0.206	(0.190)
Age	**-0.015*****	(0.004)	**-0.013*****	(0.004)	**-0.010****	(0.004)	**-0.008****	(0.004)
Sex	**-0.839*****	(0.198)	**-0.762*****	(0.120)	**-0.802*****	(0.221)	**-0.699*****	(0.118)
Bus.Tech. Prof.	**-1.412*****	(0.452)	**-1.156*****	(0.396)	-0.745	(0.594)	**-0.797****	(0.406)
Soc. Prof.	**-0.755****	(0.312)	**-1.539*****	(0.402)	0.158	(0.375)	**-0.820****	(0.360)
Self employed								
Mid. Prof.	-0.757	(0.514)	-0.549	(0.362)	-0.071	(0.671)	0.152	(0.315)
Service W.	-0.449	(0.782)	**-0.789*****	(0.224)	-0.195	(0.872)	0.304	(0.263)
Skilled W.	-0.898	(0.937)	-0.355	(0.345)	-0.795	(1.071)	**1.138*****	(0.387)
Unskilled W.	-0.652	(0.800)	-0.375	(0.408)	-0.613	(0.851)	**1.190*****	(0.370)
Outsiders	0.230	(0.202)	0.145	(0.117)	**0.686*****	(0.214)	-0.093	(0.141)
Religiosity	0.063	(0.114)	-0.005	(0.104)	**-0.421*****	(0.153)	**-0.515*****	(0.162)
Public sector size	0.046	(0.053)			0.056	(0.053)		
BTP*Pub. Sec. size	0.015	(0.013)			0.003	(0.021)		
SP*Pub. Sec. size	**-0.022****	(0.012)			**-0.029****	(0.014)		
MLP*Pub. Sec. size	-0.004	(0.018)			-0.001	(0.026)		
SeW*Pub. Sec. size	-0.020	(0.027)			0.014	(0.030)		
SW*Pub. Sec. size	0.002	(0.031)			0.056	(0.037)		
UW*Pub. Sec. size	-0.007	(0.028)			0.047	(0.030)		
Sex*Pub. Sec. size	**0.013***	(0.008)			**0.014***	(0.008)		
Out*Pub. Sec. size	-0.003	(0.006)			**-0.028*****	(0.008)		
PubEmp*Pub. Sec. size	0.009	(0.015)			0.011	(0.013)		

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

(table 5.5 cont.)

	Radical right/ social democrats				Radical right/mainstream right			
	Model 5.7		Model 5.8		Model 5.7		Model 5.8	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
LT Unemployment			0.174	(0.149)			0.183	(0.177)
BTP*LT Unemp.			0.057	(0.106)			0.083	(0.090)
SP*LT Unemp			0.119	(0.115)			**0.141***	(0.081)
MLP*LT Unemp			-0.062	(0.072)			-0.039	(0.056)
SeW*LT Unemp			0.019	(0.090)			-0.036	(0.119)
SW*LT Unemp			-0.112	(0.138)			-0.217	(0.160)
UW*LT Unemp			-0.057	(0.105)			**-0.204***	(0.114)
Sex*LT Unemp			0.064	(0.044)			0.060	(0.043)
Out*LT Unemp			-0.031	(0.023)			0.044	(0.046)
PubEmp*LT Unemp			-0.022	(0.053)			-0.051	(0.069)
Constant	-1.192	1.140	-0.722	(0.876)	-1.911	1.216	-1.204	(0.923)
Nagelkerke R^2	0.076		0.070		0.076		0.070	
-2 log likelihood	-21239.171		-21367.969		-21239.171		-21367.969	

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to investigate the role that welfare state policies and their outcomes play in the mobilization of electoral divisions. As is expected, this variation in the structure of welfare state policies and outcomes in the industrial, as well as post-industrial period, is likely to lead to differences in the structure of electoral divisions, and consequently new parties. This chapter aimed to test this mechanism and strived to provide partial insight into the mechanism that created the divisions observed in Chapters 3 and 4, which led to the increased fragmentation of electoral politics and party systems in most countries covered by this study. The analysis in the chapter focused on the impact of the welfare state in the mobilization of electoral divisions at the time of its foundation, and at a later time when globalization and deindustrialization raised new challenges for the welfare state.

In the first part of the analysis, the results partially confirmed expectations that the politics and policies of welfare state formation, so to say, have an effect on the mobilization of political divisions. This finally led to differences in the structure of the political divisions outlined in Chapter 2 and established in the empirical analysis in Chapters 3 and 4. Not all results of various regression analyses in this chapter are in accordance with expectations; however, they do provide sufficient evidence that we can conclude that the welfare state is a relevant factor, in the 1970s as well as in more recent times, which shapes the pattern of electoral divisions across countries.

In brief, the analysis finds that in countries where social democratic parties implemented universal and service-intensive welfare policies, the support for these parties among the working-class increased. However, expectations that this combination of factors might increase support among segments of the middle-class were not borne out in the

analysis. Similar results, though with weaker effects, were found in the analysis of the impact of christian democratic parties and occupationalist welfare policies.

The analysis also confirmed the role that centralized and strong trade unions might have in the mobilization of the working-class for social democratic parties. However, due to the strong link between union strength and presence of social democrat policies, this link did not appear very clearly in the analysis. On the other hand, it emerged that the presence of strong and centralized trade unions had a negative impact on the support of the working-class for christian democratic parties.

Very similar results were found in the analysis of the impact of variables that measure the response to deindustrialization. The analysis showed that universal welfare states tend to reduce the split on the lower end of occupational hierarchy based on the insider or outsider status of workers. This can be attributed to the active approach that these welfare states took towards problems in the labor market. It also showed that in countries where a universal welfare state is present, labor market outsiders tend to support left parties rather than radical right parties, thus producing compositional differences between the electorate of the principal new left and radical right parties.

As a final conclusion, it can be said that while the analysis did not find support for all of these hypotheses, this chapter did show that characteristics of the welfare state, and perhaps also the actions of political actors, matter in the process of the mobilization of electoral divisions in industrial and post-industrial societies alike. It also demonstrated that these factors also have consequences on the structure of the electorate of new parties and can perhaps be credited as being an important source of cross-country variation in the characteristics of new parties emerging since the 1960s.

Chapter 6
Conclusion

The shift of western European countries towards post-industrial society did not leave the structure of party systems and political cleavages unchanged; there is very little debate about the validity of this claim in the political science literature (see Chapter 1 for a review). However, some debate however exists about the causes of this change and the mechanisms that brought it about. This dissertation aimed to research equally the causes and mechanisms that lead to the emergence of new patterns of political divisions and new parties in the post-industrial societies of West Europe. In this, the dissertation focused on the developments on the political demand side and the manner in which these developments affected electoral alignments in these societies. In short, the dissertation started from a claim strongly verified in various comparative studies of political cleavages in western societies, that a shift of western societies towards the post-industrial phase of development created a new structure of political demands. Changes in the structure of political demands in turn enabled the emergence of new political actors, striving to mobilize these new demands, which in the end lead to electoral realignment and the creation of a new structure of political cleavages.

While acknowledging the contribution of the value change and dealignment approaches to the debate concerning changes in political conflict lines, I base my argument mainly on the research about the impact that sociostructural changes, brought about by deindustrialization, education and service sector expansion, have on the mechanism of micro-level preferences formation and the aggregate distribution of preferences in post-industrial societies of West Europe. Following this line of argument, the dissertation advances two general hypotheses: the first hypothesis argues that the rise of new parties is a consequence of

the fragmentation of the social structure brought about by the emergence of new social groups and splits within the existing groups in the changed social and economic environment; the second hypotheses states that the whole process did not proceed equally across countries, both with respect to developments in social structure and in party systems, as the type of new parties emerging in different countries and characteristics of their electorates varied across countries. I argue that this variation is the consequence of the characteristics of welfare states in interaction with pre-existing political cleavages and policies used to react to the challenges brought about by deindustrialization and globalization.

The empirical part of the dissertation focuses solely on the demand side of politics, and does not investigate how the interactions between political actors affected the process that lead to the emergence of new parties. Arguably, the supply side is an important element in the story of the emergence of new parties, but it is also a topic of sufficient complexity to constitute a separate dissertation.

The empirical part of the dissertation in the third, fourth and fifth chapters generally supports the argument made in the first and second chapters about the impact that fragmentation of the social structure has had on the opportunity structure, which affected the emergence of new parties, and about the expected composition of the electorate of these parties. Findings in the empirical chapters also support the claim that the socioeconomic context, defined primarily by characteristics of the welfare state, is the source of variation in political cleavages in general, and in the social composition of support for new political parties in particular.

Chapter 3 analyzed the character of electoral divisions at the structural level between the established and new parties, both on the left and on the right. In a supporting analysis, the chapter also compared the nature of differences between the established parties in the 1970s and three decades later, at the point before changes in the social structure produced effects on

the politics of these countries, and at the point when this impact became fully apparent. The chapter also established that the electorate of new parties, specifically new left parties such as greens and left socialists and radical right parties, have visibly different compositions compared to the electorate of social democrat and conservative parties. The analysis further managed to clearly identify the main characteristics of the electorate of green, left socialist and radical right parties, and found that the composition of the electorate of parties belonging to these party families is fairly similar across countries.

Furthermore, the results of the supplementary analysis of divisions between mainstream left and right parties at both time points suggest that the pattern of structural differences between the electorate of the established right and left parties did not change significantly, despite the fact that the social structure and the political values changed significantly in the three decades since the 1970s. The conclusion that this advances is that new constituencies were mobilized primarily by new political parties, and that the realignment of the electorate of the established parties was not as large as it could have been expected by the magnitude of change.

The fourth chapter analyzed the structure of value divisions in societies of western Europe and the placement of new parties within the political issue space, as defined by the economic and cultural value dimensions. The chapter also tested propositions advanced in Chapter 2 regarding the impact of characteristics of the welfare state and historical cleavages on cross-national variation in political divisions. As in Chapter 3, the analysis revealed that supporters of new left and new right parties tend to display value profiles fairly distinct from the value profiles of voters of social democrats and their bourgeoisie competitors. In combination with the findings in Chapter 3, this discovery further indicates that the electorate of new parties constitutes clearly distinct social groups.

The fourth chapter also provides substantial support for the argument that the whole process of changes in the structure of political divisions is, and was previously, strongly conditioned by characteristics of the welfare state and the nature of historical cleavages. The pattern of findings from cross-country comparison and results from the macro-level analysis clearly indicate that this is indeed the case.

The fifth chapter aimed to assess the mechanism through which cross-country differences in the structure of political divisions came into existence in industrial and post-industrial societies, and the role that the welfare state played in this process. The chapter found that the welfare state plays an important role in the process of mobilization of electoral divisions, and that it contributes substantially to variation in their structure. While not all findings are in accordance with the expectations stated in the Chapter 5, they do however show that the welfare state is and continues to be an important factor that shapes variation in political cleavages in countries of Western Europe in both the industrial and post-industrial periods. The impact of differences in welfare states characteristics on differences in composition of the electorate of new left and new right parties were not supported to the extent expected in the previous chapter. Still, it did reveal the presence of marginal differences in the electorate of new left parties and radical right parties across countries differing in the size of the public sector and in the importance of division between insiders and outsiders on the labor market.

The overall conclusion of the dissertation and perhaps its most important contribution to the comparative research on political cleavages is that political divisions in post-industrial societies are a consequence of the differences in interest and ideology of their electorate, which are in turn consequences of the differences in socioeconomic positions of various social groups. In this sense, perhaps we can even talk about distinct post-industrial cleavages brought about by changes in the social structure of West European societies. The shift of

these societies towards the post-industrial phase created a set of new social groups which provided political entrepreneurs with an opportunity structure to launch new parties. The fact that successful new parties belong to three clearly identifiable party families suggest that the process of the emergence of new parties was not random, but had a clear common logic and common sources across countries. The exact mechanism of how the opportunity structure developed varied across countries of Western Europe depended on the type of welfare state and historical political divisions. Finally, apart from producing substantially different structures of cleavages, such developments also resulted in somewhat different compositions of the electorate of new left and new right parties across countries of Western Europe.

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Appendix 1
List of datasets used in the dissertation

Micro-level datasets

1. European Social Survey (2002), First Wave, Edition 3, Norwegian Social Science Data Services

2. European Social Survey (2004), Second Wave, Edition 2, Norwegian Social Science Data Services

3. European Value Survey (1999/2000), ZA3811, Zentral Archiv, Cologne

4. International Social Mobility and Politics File (1996) Version 1.0, P1145, Steinmetz Archive, Amsterdam

5. Political Action Survey: An Eight Nation Study, 1973 – 1976, ZA 0765, Zentral Archiv, Cologne

6. World Value Survey (1990-1993), Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, MI

7. Value Survey (1995-1997), Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, MI

Macro-level datasets

1. Comparative Welfare States Data Set, Northwestern University, University of North Carolina, Duke University and Indiana University

2. The QoG Social Policy Dataset, version 4, Nov08. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se

3. Union Centralization Among Advanced Industrial Societies: Update to 1995/2000, Version 3.1

Appendix 2
Selected indicators of socioeconomic context and historical cleavages in thirteen countries of Western Europe

Table 2.1A Indicators of the characteristics of: socioeconomic context, historical political divisions and deindustrialization

Country	Class voting in 1960s (Thomsen Index)	Strength of CD parties in 1960s (% votes)	Service Employment as % of total employment	Government spending as % of GDP	Employment as % of labor force	Long-term unemployment as % of labor force	Unemployment as % of labor force	Public sector employment as % of total employment	Female employment
Austria	1.220	44.0	60	50	68	1.0	3.78	21	60
Belgium	1.210	44.0	71	49	59	5.2	8.65	19	50
Great Britain	1.670	0.0	70	41	70	1.5	5.98	19	71
Denmark	2.330	0.0	68	57	75	1.15	4.64	31	64
Finland	2.240	30.0	65	56	67	2.8	9.81	24	64
France	0.760	13.0	69	50	60	4.4	10.97	22.5	55
Germany	1.060	45.0	59	46	65	4.2	8.46	15	57
Ireland	0.880	0.0	60	36	63	3.2	5.76	14	52
Italy	0.660	43.0	60	45	53	7.0	11.52	15.5	38
The Netherlands	0.650	31.0	74	49	71	1.52	3.51	15	62
Norway	1.380	9.0	72	55	74	1.2	4.97	28	73
Sweden	1.730	2.0	71	60	73	1.7	7.17	32	71
Switzerland	0.820	22.0	67	33	83	1.1	3.35	11	67

Note: the measure of class voting in the 1960s and the strength of the Christian democratic parties in the 1960s are proxy measures of the strength of historical and economic divisions. The indicator of class voting is Thomsen index (source of Nieuwbeerta 1996), the strength of Christian democratic parties is measured as the average vote of the Christian democratic parties in the 1960s. The source of the remaining data is Samanni, Marcus, Jan Teorell, Staffan Kumlin & Bo Rothstein. 2008. The QoG Social Policy Dataset, version 4Nov08. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se.

Appendix 3
Description of micro-level variables used in the analysis in Chapters 3 and 5

Dependent variables

The dependent variable in Chapter 3 measures voting behavior by grouping individual responses into seven party categories. In data from the European Social Survey, this variable is created from country specific variables asking respondents for which party they voted for in the last national elections. This question was asked separately in each of the thirteen countries. In the Political Action survey, the dependent variable is derived from variable v0121 which measures which party the respondent voted for at the last national elections. In the international Politics and Mobility dataset, the dependent variable for Norway, Denmark and Sweden is derived from the variable (votenow) asking respondents which parties they would vote for if the elections were held tomorrow. For the French sample, the dependent variable is derived from a question asking respondents which party they voted for in last national elections (voterel). Individual parties are coded into seven party families in accordance with the scheme presented below.

1. Parties of the far left group are PCF and smaller radical left parties in France, PDS in Germany, PDCI and PRC in Italy, Socialist Party in the Netherlands, Socialist People Party (SF) and Red Green Alliance in Denmark, Left Party(VP) in Sweden, Socialist Left Party (SV) in Norway and Left Alliance (VAS) in Finland
2. Parties of the green group are AGALEV and ECOLO in Belgium, Green Left in the Netherlands, Greens in Italy, Germany, Austria, France, Ireland, Switzerland and Sweden and Green League in Finland.
3. Parties of the social democrat group are SPO in Austria, SPD in Germany, SP in Switzerland, PvDA in the Netherlands, social democrats in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland, Labor in the UK and Ireland, Left Democrats and social democrats in Italy, PS and SP in Belgium and PS in France.
4. Parties of the Christian democrat group are OVP in Austria, CDU/CSU in Germany, CCD, UDC and PPI in Italy (DC in PA and IPM datasets), CDA in the Netherlands (KVP, CHU and ARP in PA dataset), FG in Ireland, CVP, PSC and VU in Belgium, CVP and EVP in Switzerland and KESK in Finland.
5. Parties of the liberal group are FPD in Germany, VVD in the Netherlands, UDF and DL in France, FPL in Sweden, Venstre in Denmark and Norway, Liberal Democrats in the UK, Radicals and Democrats in Italy progressive democrats in Ireland, FDP and LPS in Switzerland and VLD, Vivant and PRL-FDF-MCC in Belgium.
6. Parties of the conservative group are Forza Italia and Lega Nord in Italy, UMP in France, Conservatives in the UK, Denmark and Finland, Moderates in Sweden, Conservatives in Norway and FF in Ireland.
7. Parties of the radical right group are FPO in Austria, Aleanza Nazionale in Italy, Republikaaner, DVU and NPD in Germany, Front National in France and Belgium, Vlaams Blok in Belgium, Danish People Party and Progress Party in Denmark, Progress Party in Norway and Swiss People Party in Switzerland.

In the analysis in Chapter 5, the five dependent variables used are created by recoding the seven-category measure of voting behavior in the following way:

1. The first variable that measures voting for social democratic parties or right parties is created by coding all parties classified into third category into 1 and variables classified into categories 4, 5 and 6 into 0.

2. The second variable that measures voting for Christian democratic parties is created by coding all parties classified into categories 1 and 3 into 0 and parties belonging to category 4 into 1.
3. The third variable that measures voting for mainstream left or right parties is created by coding all parties in category 3 into 1 and all parties in categories 4, 5 and 6 into 0.
4. The fourth variable that measures voting for new left parties is coded into three categories. Two are the same as in the previous variable and the third is created by combining parties in the category 1 from Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden and parties from category 2 from Austria, Belgium, France Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands and Switzerland into a single category.
5. The fifth variable measures voting for radical right parties and is similar to the fourth variable with the difference that instead of parties from categories 1 and 2 it includes radical right parties classified in the category 7 in the base measure of voting behavior.

Independent variables

Independent variables in this analysis include measures of occupational status, sex, education, sector of employment and insider-outsider status on the labor market.

OCCUPATIONAL STATUS is measured with two variables, one measuring vertical occupational divisions and the other measuring horizontal occupational divisions. Both of these variables are derived from the ISCO 88 standard classification of occupation in the European Social Survey. In the Political Action Survey and International Politics and Mobility data, this measure was not available and an ISCO 68 measure was used instead. The values of ISCO 68 were translated in ISCO 88 standard with a conversion file composed by Harry Ganzeboom and available at his website (http://www.fsw.vu.nl/~h.ganzeboom/ismf.)

OCCUPATION VERTICAL separates between middle-class occupation, self-employed non-professional occupations, routine non-manual occupations, skilled workers and unskilled workers. Respondents who could not be classified into any of these categories were classified in a residual category to prevent the loss of cases. Initial classification is done by classifying the ISCO 88 occupations into the Erikson Goldthorpe class scheme, also with a conversion scheme composed by Harry Ganzeboom. EG categories were collapsed in the second step into these six categories in the following way: service class I and II were classified into middle-class occupation, class IIIa and IIIb were placed into routine-non manual occupation, class IVa, IVb and IVc were classified as self-employed, classes V and VI were classified into skilled workers and class VIIa and VIIb were classified into unskilled workers.

OCCUPATION HORIZONTAL differentiates between business and technical professionals, combined groups of lower and higher social and cultural professionals, middle-level administrative and technical professionals, self-employed non-professional occupations, skilled workers in crafts and industry, and skilled workers in services and unskilled workers. Those without an occupation and otherwise not classifiable were merged into a residual category to prevent a loss of cases. Cases are classified from an ISCO 88 class into Kriesi and Oesch (Oesch 2006) scheme of occupations, and from there these categories are recoded into eight categories. Higher and lower technical and administrative professionals are merged into their respective groups depending on the hierarchical position. Skilled office workers are merged into the same group with lower administrative and technical professionals. Lower and higher social and cultural professionals are merged into a single group. Self-employed professionals are allocated to their respective professional groups. Other self-employed are separated into an additional group for self-employed. Skilled craft and service workers are placed into separate groups while unskilled workers are combined in a single group.

EDUCATION is coded as a number of years that a respondent spent in higher education. To make the variable comparable across all three surveys, all points below 5 and above 18 are recoded into these categories respectively.

SEX is coded as 1 for women and 0 for men

SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT in the European Social Survey is composed from NACE rev.1 classification of economic activities. All employed in education, social services, public administration and related non-profit activities are coded into a category indicating employment in the public sector. In the Political Action survey, this variable is created from country specific measures of the sector of employment, which are recoded along the same lines as in the European Social Survey. In the International Politics and Mobility data, this variable is created from a variable indicating if the respondent is employed in public services. The variable is coded as 1 for those employed in the public sector and 0 for others.

INSIDE-OUTSIDER labor market status is coded into three categories in accordance with classification proposed by Rueda (2005). These categories are upscale groups, insiders and outsiders. An additional category is created for those which could not be classified into any other category. Upscale groups include those in middle-class occupation and those with higher education which are not exposed to risks that workers are exposed to. Insiders are employed skilled workers in services and industry, technicians and similar occupations with at least secondary education. Outsiders are low-skilled workers with elementary education or less, unemployed or in employment promotion schemes and those with employment contracts of limited duration.

Two additional variables used in the analysis with the European Social Survey data in Chapter 5:

AGE measured with the number of years of the respondent.

RELIGIOUS SERVICE ATTENDANCE coded into five categories ranging from the lowest which indicates that the respondent never attends religious services, and highest which indicates that the respondent attends religious services once a week or more frequently.

Appendix 4
Description of variables used in the analysis in Chapter 4

Variable description

Dependent variable

The variable measuring vote choice and based on the v256 variable from the European Value Survey recording respondents' party preferences through the answer to the following question: "If there was a general election tomorrow which party would you vote for?".
For those respondents who failed to indicate party preference, the answer recorded on the question in V257 saying "And which party appeals to you most?" was added instead.
Responses on the v256 and v257 were coded into seven categories corresponding to the following party families: 1) far left (communist and left socialist parties), 2) greens, 3) social democrats, 4) christian democrats, 5) liberals, 6) conservatives and 7) radical right parties.
Responses indicating preferences for parties not belonging to these families are omitted from the analysis.

Parties are classified into seven party families:

1. Parties of the far left group are PCF and smaller radical left parties in France, PDS in Germany, PDCI and PRC in Italy, Socialist Party in the Netherlands, Socialist People Party and Red Green Alliance in Denmark, Left Party(VP) in Sweden, Socialist Left Party (SV) in Norway and Left Alliance in Finland
2. Parties of the green group are AGALEV and ECOLO in Belgium, Green left in the Netherlands, Greens in Italy, Germany, Austria, France, Ireland, Switzerland and Sweden and Green League in Finland.
3. Parties of the social democrat group are SPO in Austria, SPD in Germany, SP in Switzerland, PvDA in the Netherlands, social democrats in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland, Labor in the UK and Ireland, Left Democrats and social democrats in Italy, PS and SP in Belgium and PS in France.
4. Parties of the Christian democrat group are OVP in Austria, CDU/CSU in Germany, CCD, UDC and PPI in Italy, CDA in the Netherlands, FG in Ireland, CVP, PSC and VU in Belgium, CVP and EVP in Switzerland and KESK in Finland.
5. Parties of the liberal group are FPD in Germany, VVD in the Netherlands, UDF and DL in France, FPL in Sweden, Venstre in Denmark and Norway, Liberal Democrats in the UK, Radicals and Democrats in Italy progressive democrats in Ireland, FDP and LPS in Switzerland and VLD, Vivant and PRL-FDF-MCC in Belgium.
6. Parties of the conservative group are Forza Italia and Lega Nord in Italy, UMP in France, Conservatives in the UK, Denmark and Finland, Moderates in Sweden, Conservatives in Norway and FF in Ireland.
7. Parties of the radical right group are FPO in Austria, Aleanza Nazionale in Italy, Republikaaner, DVU and NPD in Germany, Front National in France and Belgium, Vlaams Blok in Belgum, Danish People Party and Progress Party in Denmark, Progress Party in Norway and Swiss People Party in Switzerland.

Independent Variables

Measure of **economic value divisions** is an index formed by taking the mean values from variables v186, v188 and v189 in EVS 2000. In the WVS 1990 these variables are designated as v251, v252 and v254 while in 1995/1996 they carry the designation of v126, v127 and v128 respectively. All variables are 10 point scales and ask respondent to place herself on the scale with respect to two proposed alternatives. v186 records whether respondent thinks that the state should take more responsibility to provide for everyone or individuals should take more responsibility to provide for themselves. v188 records whether respondent thinks that competition is harmful and brings the worst in people or that competition is good and that it stimulates people to work had and develop new ideas. V189 records whether respondent thinks that the state should control firms more effectively or that the state should give more freedom to firms. This variable is coded in a way that redistributive values have the lower score and liberal values have the higher score.

Measure of positions on **immigration** is an index formed by taking mean values from variables v98 and v258. In 1990 WVS only variable available for is v130 which corresponds to v98. In the 1995/1996 WVS these variables are designated as v63 and v134 respectively. v98 records whether respondent agrees, disagrees or neither aggress or disagrees that when the jobs are scarce the employers should give priority to citizens over immigrants. v258 records what respondent thinks the government should do about people from less developed countries coming to work in the country. Respondent is asked to choose between the following options 1) let anyone come who wants to, 2) let people come as long as jobs are available, 3) put strict limits on the number of foreigners who want to come here or 4) prohibit people coming to the country from other countries. This variable is coded so that inclusive values have lower score while exclusive values have higher score.

Measure of positions on **libertarian-authoritarian moral values** is an index formed by taking the mean value from four variables, v232, v233, v234, v235 recording on a 10 point scale whether respondent thinks homosexuality (v232), abortion (v233), divorce (v234) and euthanasia (v235) are justified always, never or somewhere in between. The variable is coded so that low values indicated libertarian position and high values indicate authoritarian position. In the WVS 1990 these variables are designated as v307, v309 v 310 and v312 while in 1995/1996 they carry the designation of v197, v199 and v200 and v201 respectively.

Measure of the positions on the **environment** is an index formed by taking the mean value from two variables v8 and v9 recording respondent whether he agrees strongly, agrees, disagrees or disagrees strongly with the following statements: (v8) I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent environmental pollution; (v9) I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money is used to prevent environmental pollution. The variable is coded so that lower scores indicate pro-environmental positions and higher scores indicate the positions opposite to these. In the WVS 1990 these variables are designated as v12 and v13 while in 1995/1996 they carry the designation of v38 and v39 respectively.

Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Macro-Level Analysis

Table A.4.1 Descriptive Statistics for the variables used in the macro analysis

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Class vote in 1960s	29	0.650	2.330	1.296	0.527
Christian democrat vote in 1950s	29	0.000	45.000	23.413	19.094
Service employment as % of total employment	29	55.000	74.000	65.068	5.522
Government spending as % of GDP	29	33.000	64.000	48.310	7.550
Long-term unemployment rate	29	0.200	10.000	3.572	2.522
economic left-right	29	-0.036	0.990	0.284	0.239
immigration	29	-0.220	0.755	0.180	0.241
libertarian-authoritarian	29	-0.209	0.420	0.059	0.150
environment	29	-0.614	0.457	0.059	0.249

Correlation matrix of independent variables and alternative variables for macro analysis in Chapter 4

Table 4.2A Correlation matrix of independent variables used in the macro analysis and additional measures of welfare state characteristics. Entries are: correlation coefficients and significance levels of parenthesis.

	class vote in 1960s	CD vote in 1950s	service employment	government spending	employment rate	long-term unemployment	unemployment	public sector employment	female employment
class vote in 50s and 60s		-0.545 (0.002)	0.325 (0.085)	0.648 (0.000)	0.485 (0.008)	-0.400 (0.031)	-0.048 (0.804)	0.731 (0.000)	0.568 (0.001)
CD vote in 50s and 60s	-0.545 (0.002)		-0.408 (0.028)	-0.387 (0.038)	-0.580 (0.001)	0.478 (0.009)	0.127 (0.513)	-0.612 (0.000)	-0.623 (0.000)
service employment	0.325 (0.085)	-0.408 (0.028)		0.429 (0.020)	0.396 (0.034)	-0.296 (0.118)	-0.181 (0.346)	0.481 (0.008)	0.456 (0.013)
government spending	0.648 (0.000)	-0.387 (0.038)	0.429 (0.020)		0.402 (0.031)	-0.412 (0.027)	-0.106 (0.584)	0.896 (0.000)	0.533 (0.003)
employment rate	0.485 (0.008)	-0.580 (0.001)	0.396 (0.034)	0.402 (0.031)		-0.898 (0.000)	-0.726 (0.000)	0.496 (0.006)	0.900 (0.000)
long-term unemployment	-0.400 (0.031)	0.478 (0.009)	-0.296 (0.118)	-0.412 (0.027)	-0.898 (0.000)		0.828 (0.000)	-0.473 (0.010)	-0.895 (0.000)
unemployment	-0.048 (0.804)	0.127 (0.513)	-0.181 (0.346)	-0.106 (0.584)	-0.726 (0.000)	0.828 (0.000)		-0.169 (0.381)	-0.598 (0.001)
public sector employment	0.731 (0.000)	-0.612 (0.000)	0.481 (0.008)	0.896 (0.000)	0.496 (0.006)	-0.473 (0.010)	-0.169 (0.381)		0.615 (0.000)
female employment	0.568 (0.001)	-0.623 (0.000)	0.456 (0.013)	0.533 (0.003)	0.900 (0.000)	-0.895 (0.000)	-0.598 (0.001)	0.615 (0.000)	

N=29 for all variables

Appendix 5
Description of macro-level independent variables used in Chapter 5

Table 5.1A Descriptive statistics of macro variables used in the analysis in Chapter 5.

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Total taxation as a % of GDP	11	26.4	49.5	39.171	6.980
Social security transfer as a % of GDP	11	8.1	18.8	12.987	3.398
Left parties cumulative share of government seats	11	1.5	25.9	9.352	7.037
Christian democratic parties cumulative share of government seats	11	0.1	19.5	10.543	7.641
Combined measure of union density and concentration	11	32.5	69.2	49.096	13.899
Public sector employment as a share of total employment	13	11.00	32.00	20.113	6.342
Long-term unemployment	13	1.00	7.00	2.682	1.720

Table 5.2A Correlation between macro variables used in the analysis in Chapter 5.

	Total taxation as a % of GDP	Social security transfer as a % of GDP	Left parties cumulative share of government seats	Christian democrat cumulative share of government seats	Combined measure of union density and concentration	Public sector employment
Total taxation as a % of GDP	.	0.548*** (0.000)	0.715*** (0.000)	-0.284*** (0.000)	0.702*** (0.000)	n.a.+
Social security transfer as a % of GDP	0.548*** (0.000)		0.013* (0.093)	0.610*** (0.000)	0.328*** (0.000)	n.a.+
Left parties share of government seats	0.715*** (0.000)	0.013* (0.093)		-0.695*** (0.000)	0.603*** (0.000)	n.a.+
Christian democrat share of government seats	-0.284*** (0.000)	0.610*** (0.000)	-0.695*** (0.000)		-0.332*** (0.000)	n.a.+
Union density and concentration	0.702*** (0.000)	0.328*** (0.000)	0.603*** (0.000)	-0.332*** (0.000)		
Long-term unemployment	n.a.+	n.a.+	n.a.+	n.a.+	n.a.+	-0.293*** (000)

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

+: data are not available as these variables appear in different data sets that refer to different time points.

Appendix 6
Supplementary analysis of electoral divisions between mainstream left and right parties in Chapter 3

Table 6.1A Comparison of the electorate of left and right parties with respect to education, sex and the sector of employment in the 1970s.

	Social democrats/Strongest right party			Social democrats/Second strongest right party			Strongest right party/ Second strongest right party			Strongest right party/ Far left party		
Country	Education	Sector	Sex	Education	Sector	Sex	Education	Sector	Sex	Education	Sector	Sex
Austria	**0,170*****	0,052	-0,235	**0,151***	-0,234	**1,866***	-0,019	-0,286	**2,102***			
Britain	**0,188*****	0,152	-0,393	0,122	**0,791*****	0,472	-0,067	**0,640****	0,865			
Denmark	**0,457*****	-0,386	**1,131*****	**0,605*****	0,363	**0,790****	**0,148*****	0,748	-0,341	**0,465*****	0,404	-0,269
Finland	0,108	-0,189	0,130	**0,404*****	0,111	0,854	**0,296*****	0,300	0,723	-0,056	0,021	-0,258
France	0,023	**-0,556*****	0,196	0,014	**-0,855*****	**0,354****	-0,008	-0,299	0,157	-0,023	0,082	-0,046
Germany	**0,073****	-0,146	-0,173	**0,080****	-0,134	0,338	0,007	0,012	0,511			
Italy	**-0,088****	-0,088	-0,138	**0,129****	-0,371	0,910	**0,217*****	-0,282	1,048	**-0,101*****	-0,306	0,473
Netherlands	0,029	-0,013	-0,497	**0,278*****	-0,147	-0,430	**0,249*****	-0,134	0,067	**0,127****	0,505	-0,288
Norway	**0,416*****	**-0,630***	0,632	**0,189*****	-0,310	**2,161****	**-0,227*****	0,320	1,529	**0,315*****	-0,136	0,001
Sweden	0,062	0,410	0,047	**0,311*****	0,239	1,029	**0,207*****	0,062	-0,193	0,088	-1,260	1,165
Switzerland	**0,073*****	**-0,987****	-0,057	-0,031	-0,330	-0,328	**-0,104*****	0,658	-0,271	-0,143***	0,638	-0,599

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

The strongest right parties are: OVP in Austria, Liberals in Denmark and Switzerland, RPR in France, CDU/CDU in Germany, Christian democrats in the Netherlands, DC in Italy, Conservatives in Britain, Norway, Center party in Sweden. Second strongest right parties are: Liberals in Britain, Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Austria, UDF in France, Christian democrats in Norway, Conservatives in Finland, Denmark and Sweden and Christian democrats in Switzerland.

Table 6.2A Comparison of the electorate of left and right parties with respect to education, sex and the sector of employment in 2002-2004.

	Social democrats/Strongest right party				Social democrats/Second strongest right party				Strongest right party/ Second strongest right party			
	Sex	Education	Sector	Insider-Outsider	Sex	Education	Sector	Insider-Outsider	Sex	Education	Sector	Insider-Outsider
Austria	0.148	**0.038****	-0.053	0.024								
Belgium F	0.212	**0.050***	0.090	0.036	0.093	0.042	-0.065	-0.195	-0.119	-0.008	-0.156	-0.126
Belgium W	**-1.433*****	0.026	-0.124	**-0.898*****	0.517	0.003	0.264	-0.566	**1.950*****	-0.023	0.388	0.332
Denmark	**-0.894*****	0.012	**-0.331*****	0.110	**-0.988***	**0.054*****	-0.257	0.173	-0.115	**0.030***	0.012	-0.318
Finland	**-1.025*****	-0.007	-0.135	-0.085	-0.663	0.009	-0.054	-0.029	0.362	0.016	0.082	0.056
France	-0.111	-0.018	**-0.496*****	0.013	-0.255	0.037	**-0.679*****	-0.416	-0.144	**0.055****	-0.183	-0.429
Germany	-0.527	0.005	0.050	-0.096	**-0.930****	0.002	**-0.303***	0.136	-0.403	-0.002	**-0.353***	0.232
Great Brain	**-1.022*****	-0.006	-0.140	-0.031	-0.243	**0.027***	0.124	0.020	**0.779***	**0.033****	**0.263***	0.051
Ireland	0.090	-0.012	**-0.337****	**-0.382***	0.456	0.009	**-0.479*****	-0.119	0.366	0.022	-0.142	0.264
Italy	-0.596	**-0.055*****	-0.347	0.085	0.194	-0.014	-0.458	0.553	0.789	0.041	-0.111	0.468
Netherlands	**-0.699****	-0.012	-0.147	-0.051	**-0.734***	0.014	**-0.258***	-0.192	-0.035	**0.026****	-0.112	-0.142
Norway	-0.046	0.004	-0.193	**0.297***	0.307	-0.031	-0.252	0.151	0.353	**-0.035***	-0.059	-0.146
Sweden	-0.482	0.026	**-0.328****	**0.633*****	0.125	0.021	-0.226	**0.683*****	0.607	-0.005	0.102	0.077
Switzerland	-0.086	-0.002	**-0.421*****	**0.098*****	-0.698	**-0.059***	**-0.483*****	-0.146	-0.611	**-0.057***	-0.062	-0.244

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

Table 6.3A Comparison of the electorate of left and right parties with respect to horizontal and vertical occupational divisions in the 1970s.

	Social democrats/Strongest right party						
	Occupation-horizontal			Occupation-vertical			
	W/MC	W/SE	W/NM	SCP/BP	SCP/ML	SW/SeW	SW/UW
Austria	**0,819****	**2,637*****	**1,025*****	**0,898*****	0,625	0,067	**1,900*****
Britain	**1,527*****	**2,337*****	**1,341*****	**1,418*****	-0,077	0,976*****	**1,870*****
Denmark	**1,520***	**4,712*****	0,408	-1,670	0,553	**-2,450****	**3,888*****
Finland	-0,039	**2,998*****	-0,077	0,185	-0,295	0,286	**3,078*****
France	**0,493****	**0,520*****	0,153	0,069	**1,953*****	-0,233	0,370
Germany	**0,545****	**1,639*****	**0,648*****	**0,483****	0,071	**0,750*****	**1,872*****
Italy	0,451	**0,594***	0,612	0,497	1,203	-0,148	0,091
Netherlands	-0,178	**1,704*****	0,147	-0,026	**1,363****	-0,724	1,105
Norway	**1,842*****	**2,068*****	**1,974*****	**2,340*****	1,398	**1,179***	**1,304***
Sweden	0,525	**2,546*****	0,580	0,117	0,316	-0,499	**1,962*****
Switzerland	**1,354*****	0,948	0,403	-0,175	1,028	-0,865	0,409
	Social democrats/Second strongest right party						
	Occupation-horizontal			Occupation-vertical			
	W/MC	W/SE	W/NM	SCP/BP	SCP/ML	SW/SeW	SW/UW
Austria	0,762	**1,756*****	**0,936****	0,842	NA	1,224	**1,989****
Britain	**1,365****	**2,340*****	**0,957***	**1,045***	0,808	0,167	**1,614****
Denmark	0,888	**3,159*****	0,259	-0,301	-0,528	0,314	**3,735*****
Finland	0,668	**1,429*****	**0,738***	0,507	**1,594****	**1,173****	**2,006*****
France	**1,271*****	**1,081*****	0,321	0,312	1,165	**-0,831*****	-0,001
Germany	**1,161*****	**1,183*****	**0,958*****	**0,751****	-0,369	0,256	0,637
Italy	0,050	0,086	-0,057	0,267	0,986	0,315	1,022
Netherlands	0,418	**3,126*****	0,519	**0,892***	**2,386*****	0,307	**3,233*****
Norway	**1,858****	**2,377*****	1,288	1,091	0,158	-0,480	0,623
Sweden	0,826	1,021	**1,432*****	**1,069****	**1,331****	-0,262	-0,139
Switzerland	**1,793*****	**1,899*****	0,854	**1,207***	**1,905***	0,580	-1,551*

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
W/MC -Working-class/Middle-class
W/SE - Working-class/Self-employed
W/NM - Working-class/Non-manual class
SCP/BP – Social and Cultural professionals/Business and Technical Professionals
SCP/ML - Social and Cultural professionals/Middle Level Administrative and Technical Professionals
SW/SeW – Skilled Craft Workers/Skilled Service Workers
SW/UW - Skilled Craft Workers/Unskilled Workers
The strongest right parties are: OVP in Austria, Liberals in Denmark and Switzerland, RPR in France, CDU/CDU in Germany, Christian democrats in the Netherlands, DC in Italy, Conservatives in Britain, Norway, Center party in Sweden. Second strongest right parties are: Liberals in Britain, Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Austria, UDF in France, Christian democrats in Norway, Conservatives in Finland, Denmark and Sweden and Christian democrats in Switzerland.

(Table 6.3A cont.)

	Strongest right party/ Second strongest right party						
	Occupation-horizontal			Occupation-vertical			
	W/MC	W/SE	W/NM	SCP/BP	SCP/ML	SW/SeW	SW/UW
Austria	**0,616***	-0,456	0,310	0,085	0,237	-0,440	-0,314
Britain	-0,057	**-0,880***	-0,089	0,751	0,089		**-1,384****
Denmark	-0,162	0,003	-0,384	-0,451	-0,810	0,885	0,779
Finland	-0,401	-0,508	-0,669	**1,222***	0,463	-0,217	-1,183
France	**0,778****	**0,561****	0,169	**-0,851*****	**-0,598****	-0,788	0,377
Germany	0,440	0,950	0,451	-1,196	0,520	0,877	**1,525****
Italy	0,596	**1,423*****	0,372	**1,512*****	**1,031****	1,023	-0,577
Netherlands	0,706	**-1,570*****	0,815	**2,366*****	0,886	1,889	-0,734
Norway	-0,633	**-1,552****	-0,149	1,048	**2,764****	**-1,394***	1,369
Sweden	0,016	0,308	-0,686	**-1,760****	**-1,659****	-1,241	0,300
Switzerland	0,301	**-1,525****	0,852	0,332	0,519	1,015	0,732
	Strongest right party/ Far left party						
	Occupation-horizontal			Occupation-vertical			
	W/MC	W/SE	W/NM	SCP/BP	SCP/ML	SW/SeW	SW/UW
Austria							
Britain							
Denmark	-0.395	-19.955	0.403	0.681	**1.374***	-0.202	-0.166
Finland	-0.987	0.048	**-1.171****	0.390	0.313	-0.028	-0.006
France	**-0.844*****	**-1.089*****	**-0.485*****	-0.144	0.190	-0.407	-0.033
Germany							
Italy	0.642	**-1.018*****	-0.459	0.227	-0.806	-0.529	-0.399
Netherlands	0.346	**1.946****	**0.907****	-0.231	-0.470	1.095	-0.209
Norway	0.558	-0.256	-0.043	-0.838	-0.084		-0.240
Sweden	-0.515	**1.636****	0.309			1.390	0.368
Switzerland	-0.989	**2.058*****	0.392	-0.558	0.477		**1.268***

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
W/MC -Working-class/Middle-class
W/SE - Working-class/Self-employed
W/NM - Working-class/Non-manual class
SCP/BP – Social and Cultural professionals/Business and Technical Professionals
SCP/ML - Social and Cultural professionals/Middle Level Administrative and Technical Professionals
SW/SeW – Skilled Craft Workers/Skilled Service Workers
SW/UW - Skilled Craft Workers/Unskilled Workers
The strongest right parties are: OVP in Austria, Liberals in Denmark and Switzerland, RPR in France, CDU/CDU in Germany, Christian democrats in the Netherlands, DC in Italy, Conservatives in Britain, Norway, Center party in Sweden. Second strongest right parties are: Liberals in Britain, Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Austria, UDF in France, Christian democrats in Norway, Conservatives in Finland, Denmark and Sweden and Christian democrats in Switzerland.

Table 6.4A Comparison of the electorate of left and right parties with respect to horizontal and vertical occupational divisions in 2002-2004.

	Social democrats/Strongest right party						
	Occupation-horizontal			Occupation-vertical			
	W/MC	W/SE	W/NM	SCP/BP	SCP/ML	SW/SeW	SW/UW
Austria	**0.718*****	**1.438*****	**0.491*****	0.003	-0.294	0.380	-0.051
Belgium F	**0.766****	**1.004****	**0.409***	**1.028*****	-0.223	0.480	-0.058
Belgium W	**1.063*****	**1.686*****	**1.008*****	0.288	-0.445	-0.388	0.262
Britain	**0.818*****	**1.198*****	**0.955*****	0.263	**0.465****	-0.009	**-0.426***
Denmark	**1.125*****	**1.622*****	**0.792*****	**1.056*****	**0.368***	**0.531***	-0.068
Finland	**1.688*****	**3.019*****	**1.317*****	0.054	**-0.628*****	**0.540****	**1.509*****
France	0.008	N/A	0.237	0.293	-0.116	0.081	-0.020
Germany	0.258	**1.052*****	-0.022	**0.480*****	0.195	0.068	0.077
Ireland	-0.294	0.383	-0.093	0.434	0.144	-0.135	-0.158
Italy	0.072	**0.662***	0.324	0.337	0.112	0.276	0.208
Netherlands	**0.384***	**0.853*****	**0.420****	0.188	0.013	0.362	0.163
Norway	**1.138*****	0.333	**0.949*****	**0.370***	**0.578*****	**0.956*****	0.335
Sweden	**1.732*****	**1.430*****	**0.998*****	**0.664*****	0.189	**0.777****	0.109
Switzerland	0.273	**0.625***	0.251	**0.829*****	**0.463***	0.469	-0.197
	Social democrats/Second strongest right party						
	Occupation-horizontal			Occupation-vertical			
	W/MC	W/SE	W/NM	SCP/BP	SCP/ML	SW/SeW	SW/UW
Austria							
Belgium F	0.515	**0.762***	0.065	0.002	-0.439	0.274	0.136
Belgium W	**1.355*****	0.622	**0.930****	**0.807***	0.731	0.243	0.375
Britain	**0.699*****	**0.779****	**0.814*****	-0.078	0.051	0.130	-0.270
Denmark	**2.096*****	**2.021*****	**1.197*****	**1.175*****	**0.614***	0.815	-0.026
Finland	**2.545*****	**2.441*****	**1.839*****	**0.473****	**-0.624***	**1.517*****	**0.535***
France	-0.078	N/A	-0.049	-0.281	0.175	0.258	0.563
Germany	**0.590***	**1.229*****	**0.404***	-0.073	-0.399	0.472	0.165
Ireland	**0.571***	**1.303*****	**0.843*****	0.350	0.266	0.439	0.466
Italy	0.393	-0.096	0.289	0.578	-0.085	1.912	0.727
Netherlands	**0.900*****	**1.367*****	**0.896*****	0.295	0.054	**1.249*****	0.425
Norway	0.421	0.225	0.001	**-0.692****	**-0.630***	-0.442	0.015
Sweden	**2.025*****	**2.235*****	**1.236*****	0.068	-0.306	0.229	-0.153
Switzerland	0.005	**0.664***	0.328	0.078	0.109	-0.378	0.304

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
W/MC -Working-class/Middle-class
W/SE - Working-class/Self-employed
W/NM - Working-class/Non-manual class
SCP/BP – Social and Cultural professionals/Business and Technical Professionals
SCP/ML - Social and Cultural professionals/Middle Level Administrative and Technical Professionals
SW/SeW – Skilled Craft Workers/Skilled Service Workers
SW/UW - Skilled Craft Workers/Unskilled Workers

(Table 6.4A cont.)

	Strongest right party/ Second strongest right party						
	Occupation-horizontal			Occupation-vertical			
	W/MC	W/SE	W/NM	SCP/BP	SCP/ML	SW/SeW	SW/UW
Austria							
Belgium F	-0.251	-0.241	-0.344	**-1.026*** **	-0.216	-0.207	0.194
Belgium W	0.291	-1.065	-0.079	0.519	**1.177** **	0.631	0.113
Britain	-0.118	-0.420	-0.141	-0.341	-0.414	0.139	0.156
Denmark	**0.971** **	0.400	0.405	0.118	0.246	0.284	0.043
Finland	**1.563*** **	**-0.674** **	**0.960*** **	**0.418** *	0.004	**0.787** **	-0.005
France	0.086	N/A	0.286	-0.573	0.291	0.177	0.582
Germany	0.333	0.177	**0.426** *	**-0.553** **	**-0.594** **	0.404	0.088
Ireland	**0.864*** **	**0.920*** **	**0.936*** **	-0.083	0.122	**0.575** *	**0.623** **
Italy	0.321	-0.758	-0.035	0.241	-0.197	1.637	0.519
Netherlands	**0.516** *	0.514	**0.475** **	0.108	0.041	**0.886** **	0.263
Norway	**-0.717** *	-0.108	**-0.948** **	**-1.062*** **	**-1.208*** **	**-1.398*** **	-0.320
Sweden	**-0.805** **	-0.238	-0.112	**-0.596** **	**-0.496** *	-0.548	-0.263
Switzerland	-0.268	0.039	0.077	**-0.752** **	-0.353	-0.847	0.501

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
W/MC -Working-class/Middle-class
W/SE - Working-class/Self-employed
W/NM - Working-class/Non-manual class
SCP/BP – Social and Cultural professionals/Business and Technical Professionals
SCP/ML - Social and Cultural professionals/Middle Level Administrative and Technical Professionals
SW/SeW – Skilled Craft Workers/Skilled Service Workers
SW/UW - Skilled Craft Workers/Unskilled Workers
The strongest right parties are: OVP in Austria, VLD/MR in Belgium, Conservatives in Britain, Liberals in Denmark, KESK in Finland, UMP in France, CDU/CDU in Germany, FF in Ireland, FI in Italy, CDA in the Netherlands, Conservatives in Sweden and Norway and Liberals in Switzerland. The second strongest right parties are: Christian democrats in Belgium, Liberal Democrats in Britain, Conservatives in Denmark, KOK in Finland, UDF in France, FPD in Germany, FG in Ireland, UDC VVD in the Netherlands, Liberals in Sweden and Switzerland and Christian democrats in Norway.