Limits of Civil Society

Response to the Needs of Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia after the war of 2008

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Abstract

The thesis studies the long term results of the response to the needs of Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia after the war of 2008. It aims to understand the reasons of the shortcomings in the provision of solutions to the needs of displaced. The case of post war response of Georgia is placed in theoretical debates about the neoliberal understanding of the role of the state and role of the civil society while resolving social issues. The study concludes that even though the attempts of the government to bring about the durable solutions were impressive and involvement of donors and numerous civil society organizations was high, the attempt to bring about the valid and long term problem solution was not successful. The explanation of the shortcomings in the post war response to IDPs needs is based on theoretical criticism of neoliberal understanding of the state and civil society. Creation of minimal state after the revolution has made the government incapable to respond to emerged social problem effectively and high level of engagement of civil society proved to be insufficient to address the long term needs and to bring about durable solutions. The thesis suggests that the limitations of civil society in the resolution of social problems should be acknowledged and neoliberal understanding of role of the state should be reconsidered.

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Introduction

In the light of the war in 2008 the problem of internal displacement reoccurred in Georgia. The thesis studies the response to the needs of Internally Displaced persons (IDPs) in Georgia. The Problem of displacement has started after the ethnic conflicts in the country in the beginning of 1990s. In the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the declaration of independence by the former soviet republic of Georgia ethnic conflicts occurred between ethnic Georgians and ethnic Abkhazians and Ossetians of former soviet republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia which fell under the territorial jurisdiction of newly independent Georgia. Russia was actively involved in the conflicts as mediator and peacekeeper. By the mid 1990's Georgia had lost control over the two regions; inherited over 300 000 displaced persons amidst hard political and social-economic circumstances.

More than a decade after the on 1990's open warfare and confrontations started between Georgia and de facto independent region of south Ossetia in August 2008. Soon Russia got involved on the side of Ossetia and a war started between Georgia and Russia. With the involvement and mediation of international community warfare finished in about a month. Georgia has not managed to regain control over the lost territories and security problems of country were further complicated as Russia recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent republics and mobilized its army on the borders and also inside the de jure territories of Georgia. Nearly 130000 people fled their homes because of the conflict majority of which then returned home. While people displaced within Georgian territory returned, about 37 thousand ethnic Georgians displaced from the territory under South Ossetian control didn't have opportunity to return back after the war.

My paper investigates how the humanitarian response proceeded to respond to the long term needs of the IDPs from South Ossetia who are not able to return in foreseeable future and therefore are in need of being integrated. These IDPs were called 'new' IDPs by the civil society organizations and also the state in contrast to 'old' IDPs –people displaced in the 1990's.

The reason why it is important to study the response to the needs of IDPs is that this topic gained incredibly high national and international attention but despite this, the outcome of the efforts is still questionable. Together with political Support that International Society provided to Georgia the support in terms of social and economic recovery was also significant. Four point five billion dollars were provided for the recovery from numerous donors to Georgia and big part of it (about) fourth was meant for settling IDPs. Besides, plurality of international institutions and national and international non-governmental organizations got involved in providing assistance to displaced people. Government was also motivated to coordinate the activities and took full control on accommodation of IDPs and worked out strategic plan aiming "to support decent living conditions for the displaced population and their integration in all aspects of society". (Ministry of Refugees and Accomidation 2010)

Immediately after the war number of independent organizations got involved in the monitoring of this process and valuable reports were produced to study the issue[1], and concerns were raised about the quality and durability of the response. Though these reports are concentrated on specific issues and do not give the full account of the problem and the

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[1] The most significant studies were conducted by Transparency International Georgia, Norwegian Refugee Council, etc.; The reports will be analyzed in detail in the following chapters.

causes of the problems in the structural manner; in the context of overall ability of state to respond to social problems. In this light it is interesting to see how valid the solutions in the long term perspective are.

The broader aim of the thesis is to observe how far can large civil society involvement contribute to and guarantee the successful resolution of certain social problems. In the thesis I will argue that Georgia went under neoliberal transition since the rose revolution. Therefore I raise the question against the role of civil society and role of government in resolution of social problems in the neoliberal state. I will show how neoliberal approach in general views the role of state versus civil society, how specifically Georgian state considers this issue and how beneficial the neoliberal approach can be for the society. The case of post 2008 war response was chosen because it is the case when the widest variety of nongovernmental actors got involved in problem solving process, and considerable amount of resources were spent. This gave the hope of also considerable success but problems also arouse. So I want to show what were the causes of the shortcomings in the situation were efforts were the biggest. I will place this discussion in the existing theoretical debate about the neoliberal understanding of role division between the state and civil society and use the criticism of Neoliberalism as an explanation of the problems that arose while responding to the needs of IDPs in Georgia.

Research Questions and Hypothesis

Therefore I elaborated two research questions:

The first question asks: did the Georgian government with the help of large humanitarian aid and involvement of national and international non-governmental organizations/institutions

manage to bring about long term and sustainable solution to the needs of Internally Displaced People aftermath the 2008 Georgia- Russia's war?

The hypothetical answer to this question is following: despite considerable achievements government with the help large humanitarian aid and involvement of national and international non-governmental organizations/institutions did not manage successfully to bring about valid and durable/ long-term solutions.

The second question aims to explore the reasons of the shortcomings in the response: What is the explanation of the shortcomings of the long term problem solutions to the needs of Internally Displaced People aftermath the 2008 Georgia- Russia's war? I envision the inherent inability of the state to resolve social issues which is the outcome of neoliberal transition of Georgia since the Rose revolution as the reason and explanation of the shortcomings.

Research Design

In order to find the answers to the proposed questions and test the hypothesis I conducted the research in two parts: firstly I examined the documents and the reports produced by the government to see what were the projects that government accomplished to respond to humanitarian crisis after the war; and examined the projects and reports on humanitarian response by major national and international NGOs. I made qualitative content analyses and identified the major issues of concern about 'new IDPs'.

As the second part of my research I conducted qualitative interviews during April 20- May 3 in Georgia. I lead semi structured interviews with three groups: Firstly I conducted interviews with representatives of IDP's in 3 settlements: Tserovani, Khurvaleti, Gori. Overall I

interviewed 14 persons. Secondly, I conducted interview with the Representatives of Georgian government (The ministry of refugees and accommodation of Georgia); and thirdly I conducted interviews with the representatives of civil society organizations taking part in post-conflict response. Three of the organization were national: CHCA (Charity Humanitarian Centre Abkhazeti), GYLA (Georgian Young Lawyers' Association)and Georgian Ombudsmen. Two interviews were conducted with international nongovernmental organizations: Transparency international Georgia and Norwegian Refugee Council. [2]

The Interviews were organized around the themes identified in the desk research on reports, projects and other documents[3]. For the questioners for all three groups see the appendix1.

The structure of the thesis

The thesis contains three chapters. The first chapter is literature review which introduces the definition of civil society and different positions on the relationships between civil society and government. Then it concentrates on neoliberal understanding of state and civil society and the criticism of neoliberal approach concerning this issue. The works of critiques of neoliberal approach are used as a theoretical explanation of the results of the research therefore they are discussed in more detail.

The second chapter answers the first question of the research identifying in long term solutions were provided for the needs of IDPs. In this chapter the empirical evidence of field

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[2] The interviews were conducted in Georgian with the exception of the interview with the representative of TI Georgia. The translations of the quotations used in the text are provided by the author of thesis.

[3] I keep some of the full names and surnames confidential and I will refer to the interviewees 'representative of NGO'.

research and the results of desk analyses are used to show what the remaining problems which were not tackled successfully are.

The third chapter explores the reasons for the shortcomings in the response. It discusses the neoliberal transition of Georgia since the rose revolution and shows how Georgian state minimized public support to the society; it shows the link of governmental stance about own role and role of the civil society in the explanation of reasons of shortcomings in the solutions of IDPs problems. It uses criticism of neoliberal approach to civil society as theoretical frame. Finally I provide conclusions and discuss the implications as well as limitations of the thesis.

1   Chapter One: literature review

1.1   Civil society and role of the state / general definitions

In this chapter I will examine what does political and social theory say about civil society and role of the state. Also, as long as I examine Georgia going through market oriented, neoliberal transformation I will show what are the premises and promises of Neoliberalism, how does neoliberal ideology view the role of the civil society versus government/state role.

The scholarly discussion about civil society has centuries' long tradition, but as most of the literature on the issue sorts out, the debates was revived by the end of 20th century hand in hand with the occurrence of importance of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe to challenge illegitimate state. Political challenges to modernity and the social-political and economic systems of modern states occurred since 1970s. As the book edited by Peter Wagner called "the Languages of Civil Society" argues as the main conclusion of various articles presented in the book: "re-emergence of the notion of civil society is directly linked with the erosion of the social setting which predominantly characterized organized modernity. Such erosion reopened a space in which the notion of civil society could appeal as an important resource for agents trying to find a way to respond to a situation of increased contingency". (Jean Terrier 2006):p.223 The book argues that the reemergence of focus on civil society was a result of the crisis of Keynesian model state and in general highly consolidated socio-political settings experienced after the second world war. They identify

several approaches that became apparent in response to mentioned crisis one of which was economic liberalism, or Neoliberalism which argued that "social is capable of self regulation thanks to intrinsic qualities of market liberalism… this response was enormously successful in 1990's, giving birth to a whole tendency downsize the state institutions and dismantle welfare mechanisms". (Jean Terrier 2006) p.225. As the article notes this approach draws almost entirely on the origins of classical political economic theories of 18th and 19th centuries.

However to simplify the debates that are based on Victor Perez-Diaz's analyses coming from Hegelian conceptions of state: there is still and oscillation between those who see the state at the centre of the ordering process and those who do not see the state playing a central role". (Perez-Diaz 2009) p.242.

Cohen and Arato in their book produced in the beginning of 1990s offer systematic and detailed study of development of concept civil society in their book "Civil Society and Political theory". (Jean Cohen 1992). They define civil society as: "a sphere of social interacgtion berween economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations, social movements, and forms of public communication. Modern civil society is created through forms of self-construction and self mobilization". (Jean Cohen 1992) They illustrate several important debates in political theory about civil societ. The most interesting from those debates for the purposes of thesis is 'the defense of welfare state versus neoconservative antistatism'. It outlines the promises of Keynesian vision of social economic architecture of the state which brings about high growths and economic stability but is also oriented on creation of just and egalitarian society; while the neoconservative attack bring the concern of too much bureaucratization of

everyday life, concern about lack of competition and individual liberties. Cohen and Arato summarize the dilemma of this debate flowingly: "It seems that liberal democratic market societies cannot coexist with, nor can they exist without the welfare state". (Jean Cohen 1992)p.15

One of the major contributors of twentieth century concerning civil society is Habermas who brought up the concept 'public sphere'. As Ted Fleming summarizes: "The public sphere is located in civil society and is where people can discuss matters of mutual concern as peers, and learn about facts, events, and the opinions, interests, and perspectives of others in an atmosphere free of coercion or inequalities that would incline individuals to acquiesce or be silent". (Fleming 2008)p.2

Habermas himself saw the civil society part of 'organized public sphere', "network of associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres". (Habermas 1996)p. 367.

As long as Neoliberalism takes its roots from classical liberal ideas, we can have a look at what classical liberals like Adam Smith, John Lock, David Hume and others think of role of the state and civil society. They think that limitation of scope and size of government and letting social problems be solved by voluntary organizations is the best solution for societies. (Steven Scarlet 2002) "classical liberals are great optimists… they believe that in a free society people are not only willing to help each other; they believe that in a free society people love to help each other- that freely helping others is one of life's great joys". (Steven Scarlet 2002) p.30

This approach has been challenged in political thought by liberal-egalitarians, who think that voluntary transactions and actions in general are not able to redistribute resources fairly and they formed another vision of relationships between civil society and state that alters the support of the minimalist state. This point of view is well described by Will Kymlicka: "The state ensures that everyone has a fair share of rights and resources; individuals then deploy their rights and resources in civil society…liberal egalitarians have realized the full significance of discrimination in civil society for liberal justice, and the limits of liberal expectancy regarding the voluntary forms of associations". (Kymlicka 2002)p.103

However the civil society is defined in lots of different ways. Here, to bring more clarification I will also bring the most general, accepted, complete and in a sense neutral definition: "Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organizations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organizations, community groups, women's organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy group". (London School of Economics 2004)

The literature about state and civil society is extremely wide and given the limited length of the thesis it is impossible to discuss all of the authors, therefore I will farther concentrate in more detail about neoliberal understanding as the one applied in Georgian case.

1.2 Neoliberal approach to Civil Society and role of the State

However Neoliberal approach, which has dominated international world order since 1970' and 80's doesn't, encounter mostly the assumptions of classical liberals and shapes the idea of civil society as favorable to own existence of Neoliberalism. Firstly let me describe what is Neoliberalism, how did it emerge and how does it see the role of the state and non state actors in societal life.

The Neoliberalism emerged as the major doctrine of Thatcher and Reagan in 70-80s. As Mike Davis formulates, this brought about the new type of age "it is now customary, except perhaps in the pages of Wall Street journal to refer to this new and greatest gilded age - the outgrowth of the global counterrevolution against social citizenship unleashed by Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s, and continued by Tiny Blair, Bill Clinton, Boris Yeltsin, and Li Peng during the 1990s – as **the reign of Neoliberalism**". (Mike Davis 2007) p.10

This phase of Neoliberalism is dominated by the approaches of Milton Friedman and the Chicago School of Economics. Milton Friedman also advocated for: "extreme government deregulation and laissez-faire economic policies that allow businesses (and, in reality, especially multinationals) to operate with virtually no governmental oversight". (edstrong.blog-city 2006) This was a counter revolution against Keynesian economies preferring market regulation and putting emphases on social issues. "Economists of the Chicago school sketched a picture of human beings as selfish utility maximizes, spurred on by materialism and consumerism – Homo economicus". (Wethuizen 2009)

The argument of neoliberals is that more competition brings more efficiency. So the state should let the market 'free' and reduce share of public sphere and increase the role of private actors, and civil society; state should 'deregulate' which means to reduce state control and regulation and enhance international trade, open boundaries to international investments; state should cut the public expenditures as it is harmful for growth and creates budget deficits; state should privatize everything that can be privatized, all the previously state owned assets and the vital resources like water, energy, education and so on can be now ruled by private sector in the name of more efficiency; Thus the 'new modes of government' are created that put less and less responsibility on government as "state's functions are no longer to ensure full employment, to redistribute wealth, or to provide welfare protection against the socially destructive aspects of market operation" (Wethuizen 2009)p.2.

The milestone period, when the ideas of Neoliberalism were officially incorporated in the stance of all major international institutions, and all major actors was thus in the beginning of 1990's and its realization was known as 'Washington consensus'. "Washington Consensus' which has been dominant economic agenda pushed by wealth states and international institutions to make the developing world to open up markets and follow the path of 'privatization' 'liberalization' and 'deregulation', while "Washington Consensus put little emphasis on equity". (Stiglitz 2006) p.11 Since that milestone moment world remains dominated by neoliberal policies and also shaped the developmental agenda as well as opinions about transition; the policies pushing for 'shock therapy' transition were applied elsewhere and among the other countries in - Georgia.

The concept of government is changed by the concept of 'governance'. Thomas Risse is presenting the concept of "new modes of governance" Two distinct features of it are:

"inclusion of non state actors, such as firms, private interest groups, or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in governance arrangements; as emphasis on non-hierarchical modes of steering". (Risse 2005) Here is when the neoliberal understanding of civil society comes into the picture. Civil society is acquiring task of supplementing the state in provision of social goods, in redistribution and frees the state from responsibilities.

This understanding is also consistently present in the general agenda of international institutions that are themselves involved in the "new modes of governance" like UN, TWO, World Bank, IMF. The concept of good governance is present and promoted on their web sites and publications. (Internationa Monetary Fund 2005)The new concept of "good governance" has emerged in developmental perspective which stresses role of participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, orientation on consensus, equity and inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency and accountability. (UN Economic and Social Commission on Asia and Pacific n.d.) And this understanding is also shaping our today's reality of how governance is experienced. This general discourse is presenting the hope in the new forms of governance and presents it as a good mean to improve governance in general on local and global levels.

But this approach has been criticized severely by numbers of scholars.

1.3   Criticism of Neoliberal Understanding of Civil Society and role of the State

In general there has been substantial amount of criticism on Neoliberalism, the major argument about unregulated market policy is that free market fails largely to heal social

problems; society is left out of interest or politics and also left out of any security schemes; huge inequalities are produced and the rise of poverty is evident. (Harvey 2005)

Concerning the transitions guided by neoliberal principles, which is of our interest as Georgia falls into the category, there also exist the numerous objections. Kolodko argued for example that: "Transition to a market economy is a lengthy process comprised of various spheres of economic activities. New institutional arrangements are of key importance for successful transformation. A market economy requires not only liberal regulation and private ownership, but also adequate *institutions*. For this reason transition can be executed only in a gradual manner, since institution building is a gradual process based upon new organizations, new laws, and the changing behavior of various economic entities. The belief that a market economy can be introduced by "shock therapy" has been wrong, and in several cases, when attempted, has caused more problems than it has solved". (Kolodko 1999) p.3

He showed that the promise of the liberal consensus that liberalization and the shift of property to the private hands was not the guarantee of economic growth and argued that transition economies illustrated this:" In all transition economies, before any growth has occurred (and in some countries there is no growth yet) there has been severe contraction, ranging from 20 per cent over three years in Poland, to over 60 per cent in nine years in Ukraine". (Kolodko 1999)p.3. This type of institutionalist arguments were quite frequent, argument went that institution building is the most important part in recovery of economy and this can't be done overnight and only by macroeconomic measures. "In particular, the progress of development economics in the 1990s led to a major focus on the importance of institutional reforms, which were simply not on the agenda in 1989, when all the concern was

with reforming policies. The Washington Consensus was a product of its time, and so there was little recognition of institutional issues". (Williamson 2004) p. 198

The criticism has occurred against the ways that Neoliberal approach draws the role of civil society, as being the healer of social issues and letting state withdraw from that sphere. Some criticism is based on Gramscian theory on civil society. Gramsci saw civil society as being also one which legitimized existing hegemonic powers and also one that resisted it. As analyzed by Katz: "Elements of civil society are coopted by the state and used to secure acquiescence of the dominated classes and identification with the hegemonic world-order. In this state of affairs civil society becomes part of an extended state, utilized by the ruling class to form and maintain its hegemony by *transformismo*, or cooptation, through which the ruling class assimilates ideas that it sees as potentially dangerous, and thus creates cultural and political consensus. It becomes an instrument of passive revolution, through which hegemonic forces allow limited (and to an extent, false) freedom of self-expression for the dominated groups, thereby maintaining the continued consent to the current relations of force". (Katz 2006)p. 335. Thus Katz sees current civil society web as being the force that legitimizes current hegemonic structures, the structures which are in themselves dominated by neoliberal thought. The political project of Neoliberalism has seen the convergence of states and global actors, including transnational corporations (TNCs) and international governmental organizations (IGOs), around the neoliberal creed, and resulted in the establishment of a new orthodoxy". (Katz 2006)p.335 Although the same analyses on the other hand view civil society as counterforce, still the problem of part of civil society being the agent of dominant ideology remains unresolved.

The other authors criticizing Neoliberalism base their analyses on Foucault. They see this system as creating 'enterprise society' which privileges markets, competition and favors inequalities. The civil society is there only to fill in the existing gap between economy and social life and reinforcing the same structure: "In order for governmentality to preserve its all-inclusive character and not be split between two branches – an economic and a juridical art of government –liberalism invents and experiments with a set of techniques that apply to a new frame of reference: civil society. Civil society is here not the space where autonomy in relation to the state is produced, but the correlate of techniques of government. Civil society is not a primary and immediate reality, but something which is part of the modern technology of governmentality. It is at this juncture, it is in the management of this interface that liberalism is constituted as an art of government". (Lazzarato 2009)p.116

The problem that arises is that civil society, including development discourse is acquiring more and more importance, while the dominant strategy of state withdrawal from social sphere is never challenged, and the promise of this opinion is that activism through civil society can bring about more efficiency and help to the needed. In the official discourse the concern for poor and needed is incorporated but this continues to be in harmony with existing system. As Pablo Alejandro Leal recalled the words of Michel Chossudovsky: "The 'official'neoliberal dogma also creates its own 'counter-paradigm' embodying a highly moral and ethical discourse. The latter focuses on 'sustainable development' while distorting and stylizing the policy issues pertaining to poverty, the protection of the environment and the social rights of women. This 'counter-ideology' rarely challenges neoliberal policy prescriptions. It develops alongside and in harmony rather than in opposition to the official neoliberal dogma". (Leal 2007)p.540

The other authors pay attention how this new concept of governance introduced also by marketist forces, inviting multiplicity of actors to take part in the policy making and resolving social issues is creating numerous problems. Held is systematically presenting the challenges and the problems of globalised public policy making. He outlines several dilemmas: firstly nonexistence of division of labor among different actors, that creates the situation that their mandates, aim, functions often overlap; secondly, absence of adequate tools when collective problem solving is required because of the conflicting objectives among these actors; and thirdly lack of distinction between the responsibilities of domestic and international actors. (Held 2005) p.245-6

1.3.1 Why is this situation of dominance of neoliberal perspective and its realization through civil society problematic for the communities?

Theoretical framework

So as we saw the Neoliberalism and the way it combats the meaning of state and civil society has been majorly criticized but here I want to discuss the last two articles that most systematically indicate why described situation is extremely painful for the societies experiencing neoliberal policies? Why should we be concerned about 'good governance' project which is promising better resolution of socio-economic issues, and the inclusion of wide range of actors? What is the negative effect that it brings to countries and communities?

Here I will describe two articles, by Cynthia Hewitt de Alcantara and by James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer more extensively to illustrate the problem in detail. Cynthia Hewitt de Alcantara in her essay "Uses and abuses of the concept of governance". (Alcantara 1998) is arguing that the giving the concept of governance a prominent place in their analysis of development problems in recent years "has allowed the leading international institutions to

work themselves out of an intellectual and practical dead-end, into which they had earlier been pushed by their extreme reliance on free-market". (Alcantara 1998) p.106 The neoliberal policies that constantly stressed withdrawal of state from economic and social sphere has created huge social problems in developed and developing countries that created concern for institutional reforms and 'good governance' and as she formulated this part was added to their "neoliberal economic programs". (Alcantara 1998)p.107 But this did not mean shift from free-market policies, instead to solve emerging social problems the aid was directed to the local initiatives of civil society. Localization of problems is not a durable solution but a struggle of small communities to sustain themselves through mobilization of their own resources but in the absence of overall changes their concerns remain in place: "such survival strategies are not a necessity, not a virtue… it is wrong to suppose that a new and prosperous society can be build upon the desperate efforts of various groups to deal with constant risk and penury, in the absence of any permanent public support". (Alcantara 1998) p.110

The same line of argument is pursued by Petras and Veltmeyer, while they are asserting that stress on civil society and directing financial and other resources to small local initiatives has been the part of neoliberal agenda and has caused withdrawal of attention from larger structural changes to tackle poverty or other types of social problems and causes depoliticization. This means that governments are no longer held responsible for delivery of public goods; the public activism is dispersed between numerous actors and deprived from ability to solve long term problems.

They as other authors stress that neoliberal agenda (adopted by neoconservatives) was meant against welfare state which was drawn as cost inefficient to provide most of the public goods,

and civil society emerged as constraining authoritarian state. "Reconciliation of the limits of state action also led to an increased awareness of the potential role of civic organizations in provision of public goods and social services either separately or in a 'synergic' relationship with the state institutions. In this context the idea of 'civil society', like that of 'globalization' was converted into a destructive weapon and ideological tool in service of advancing neoliberal agenda". (James Petras 2005)p.10.

Petras and Veltmeyer much like Alcantara argue against the development discourse oriented on 'capacity of self help' that fits the model of retaining minimalist state and model of 'the franchising of the state" , allowed for more privatization and leaving social services to NGOs and grass root organizations while avoiding systematic state involvement in problem solution. The reason why this approach works badly by explanation of the authors is that the approach of NGOs remains "narrowly economic and apolitical" and "becomes limited to small-scale projects". This doesn't entail concern with overall social structures and integration of vulnerable groups in social schemes: " rather than assisting the poor in improving their access to society's productive resources, such as land (natural resource) financial capital (credit) or physical capital (technology) the poor are expected(with assistance of course) to build on their own social capital- to enhance their own capacities vis-à-vis their livelihood security, achieving the sustainability of their livelihoods (James Petras 2005)p.18-24. This type of depoliticization of problems, focusing on micro-projects and false 'empowerment' leads to the situation when the attention is not paid to 'structural' change: "it has resulted in a programmatic focus on individual capacities, minimizing the concern for the 'structural' (social and political) causes of poverty, rejecting efforts to deal with them in a confrontational matter". (James Petras 2005)p.21

These systematic criticisms reveal and expose the threat that comes from neoliberal approach to role of the state and civil society. This will be used in my thesis as major explanatory tool to analyze how state/civil society efforts to create long term solutions for Georgian 'new IDP's worked.

2   Chapter Two: Long Term solutions of IDP problems

The first chapter aims to answer the first research question:

Did the Georgian government with the help of large humanitarian aid and involvement of national and international non-governmental organizations/institutions manage to bring about long term and sustainable solution to the needs of Internally Displaced People aftermath the 2008 Georgia- Russia's war?

2.1   The Effort of Georgian Government and Civil Society

2.1.1   Aiming For long term solutions

After the war in 2008 the engagement and effort of government and civil society (donors, international institutions, domestic and international NGOs) was big and impressive. As mentioned, Georgian government acknowledged very fast after the conflict, that several thousand people would not be able to return to their homes in foreseeable future. By the estimates of November 2008 there would be about 37000 people in this position. (Action plan for the implementation of the State Strategy on IDPs during 2009).The aim of the government and also other influential actors therefore from the beginning was to provide durable solution to this problem.

Even before 2008, in 2007 government had elaborated state strategy on IDPs that became displaced as a result of ethnic conflicts in the beginning of 1990's. The aim of this strategy was twofold: (Ministry of Refugees and Accomodation 2010) "to create conditions for dignified and safe return of IDPs and to support IDPs who have spontaneously returned to

their places of permanent residence; and to support decent living conditions for the displaced population and their integration in all aspects of society". After facing the new wave of IDPs the strategy was revised. New action plan for implementation the state strategy issued in 2009 explicitly said that government intended to take actions that would bring about long term solutions: "With the aim to provide *long-term and sustainable* solution to the needs of IDPs from the conflicts in the 90s, on 2 February 2007 by its Decree #47 the Government of Georgia endorsed the State Strategy on IDPs persecuted. The Annex to the State Strategy, adopted on December 2008 by the Governmental Decree #854, integrated the population displaced as a result of the August 2008 conflict into the overall State Strategy". (Action plan for the implementation of the State Strategy on IDPs during 2009,p.1)

Other influential actors also underlined that there was the need to come up with the plans that would solve the problems of IDPs in the long run. Walter Kälin, The Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, who visited Georgia in October 2008 produced the report, and "his assessment identifies key obstacles and conditions necessary to enable internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Georgia to find durable solutions". (Kälin 2009,p.2) The report of European Commission is also discussing the issue and stresses that given the huge amount of aid Georgian government produced the action plan, which "further concretizes the implementation of the provision of durable housing to the IDPs". (Commission 2009) p.2 This approach of government and other actors should be assessed as very positive and notable achievement. In addition, the same actors identified the need to incorporate all the IDPs in Georgia in the plans and distribute the aid to their benefit as well. The reports acknowledged that "The biggest challenge is to integrate the approximately 220,000 internally displaced persons who have been living in protracted

displacement for more than a decade". (Kälin 2009) p.3 The IDPs informally were categorized as 'old' and 'new' IDPs and all the official documents now mention these terms. In fact it were donors themselves that realized that so called 'old'IDPs were in the same need of support as 'new' IDPs and "As soon as donors started to intervene after the August 2008 conflict, they insisted on the importance of providing assistance not only to the "new" IDPs, but also to those of the 1990s conflict". (Commission 2009) p.2

The immediate important issues on agenda was the housing and then socio-economic integration. The amount of money that Georgian Government received to implement the plans was remarkable. On the international donor conference on Georgia held in Brussels on 22 October 2008 "donors pledged 4.55 billion dollars in support – over a billion dollars more than requested" (Transparency International Georgia 2008)p.1. The donors from 38 countries and 15 international organizations were the ones who pledged the money. "Of this money, just over two billion has been pledged by individual countries and by the European Union. The United States alone pledged nearly as much as all other donor countries taken together". (Transparency International Georgia 2009) p.2. It has to be noted that the aid money is not free money; most of it comes in form of loans which should be repaid by Georgian government throughout next decades. The aid was used for direct budget support, social sector and infrastructure. 996 million dollars were meant for supporting social sector, most of which was to be spent on resolving housing problems and immediate humanitarian needs of internally displaced persons. Besides this Money that went to Georgian Government a lot of civil society organizations received money from the donors and conducted individual projects to support the IDPs.

2.1.2   Emergency response

Even though it was in 2007 that the government adopted the state strategy on IDPs, the state did not foresee facing the new wave of displaced in 2008 and there was no actual plan about resolving the problem. As it was clear from the interview with the representative of CHCA, one of the first and the biggest Georgian national organization that has been working on the issues of displaced since 1995, the civil society organizations also were not prepared to accomplish emergency response tasks. She emphasized that in the beginning there was overall confusion in civil

society organizations as well as in government because no one had prepared for the emergency type actions. (CHCA 2010)

Nevertheless, the report of UN representative general regarded the immediate response as "generally considered to have been speedy and adequate" (Kälin 2009) p. 11. But the same report also explained that even though the generally some work had been done, this has not been enough especially in the first phase: "is shared by the Council of Europe Commissioner on Human Rights who considered, following his August visit, that neither the authorities nor the international community had done enough to provide the displaced with adequate living conditions, which had, however, improved in the course of September" (Kälin 2009)p.11.

The biggest part of IDP's fled to the capital city Tbilisi, and they entered mostly school and kindergarten or old abandoned buildings. The initial number of displaced was 133,000, but big majority would return to homes soon after the warfare. It is clear from the interviews of IDPs themselves that during the first days of displacement they didn't get any organized response so in most cases they themselves found the buildings to enter and lived in harsh conditions in schools and kindergartens. But in several days government and civil society was

mobilized to help them then with emergency needs. "The humanitarian response to the crisis in August focused on the provision of essential support to the new group of internally displaced persons across Georgia, including to some 36,600 IDPs in 382 collective centers in Tbilisi" (Kälin 2009)p.13. UNHCR was the key player. But besides Humanitarian Coordination Group was organized comprising of all the state and non state actors. The tent camp was quickly organized near Gori as a temporary shelter and dissolved by the end of October after the return started.

From the interviews of IDPs we see that the civil engagement and social mobilization of general population was quite big. All 14 interviewees mentioned that immediate help in form of food and sanitation, cloths, blankets, beds and other necessary equipment was coming from neighborhood population. Besides this, from state and NGOs. But none of the IDPs were clear about which actor was doing which type of help. During the emergency period no clear division of roles was present. This created situation that some collective centers gained more attention and others less. After a month the actors already centered to bring about more durable solutions for the IDPs that clearly would not return home.

2.1.3   Steps Undertaken in search of durable solution

The most important project that was accomplished by the Georgian government was provision of housing for 'new' IDPs. Only small part of 'new' IDPs stayed in the collective centers while most of them were placed in the settlements that were built by the government during the three months after the war. By December the 38 new IDP settlements were ready to host 21000 displaced persons. This situation is accessed by the government as a big achievement, and it has to be acknowledged that has been really important success for the state. (Interview with the representative of the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation of

CEU eTD Collection

Georgia 2010)Besides building new settlements government has also started undertaking the rehabilitation and privatization of Collective Centers where mostly 'old' displaced were living, or "offering alternative durable housing". (Ministry of Refugees and Accomidation 2010) The cottages of new settlements will also be privatized for the persons occupying the cottages currently.

Besides, Government granted status to the IDPs and incorporated them also in poverty reduction schemes by May 2009, through which the replaced would take social benefits from the state. Government continues coordination with the Donors and NGOs constantly; on the meeting held on February 2009 government presented its aim "to increase IDP self-reliance through the provision of durable housing solutions, and to include the most vulnerable IDPs in the general social assistance program". (Norwagian Refugee Council 2009) p.7 The action plan of 2009 also puts ambitious aims in direction of covering all the IDPs with durable housing, accomplishing their social and economic integration and rising their awareness. These activities should be especially appreciated in the light of previous experiences of Georgia to handle issues of displaced. In the 1990's there was almost no state actions to accommodate and take care of more than one hundred thousands of IDPs and after 17 years they still remain in extremely hard conditions, comparable to 'new' IDPs conditions. Besides the state we can also have a look at what domestic and international civil society has done for supporting IPDs. "The August events changed donor interests dramatically. Huge resources were made available for a relatively small case-load. Compare the situation in Georgia with that in Congo. Before the August war donor support in Georgia was low and declining. Our own budget doubled almost immediately, and the government received a lot of budget support". (Hansen 2009) p.20. Huge amount of projects were conducted to support IDP

livelihood. In the recent report written by Georgian Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation "Overview of activities related to socio-economic integration of IDPs", the list of NGOs and their projects on IDPs is provided: Abkhazintercont, ACF, APLR (Association for Protection of Landowners' Rights), CARE, Caritas Georgia, Centre for Social Sciences, CHCA (Charity Humanitarian Centre "Abkhazeti"), CHF, CNFA Georgia , Community Development Centre/MRA, Counterpart International, DRC (Danish Refugee Council), Eurasia Foundation, Every Child Georgia, Every Child Georgia, ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), Mercy Corps, NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council), World Vision. (Misirtry of Refugees and Accommodation of Georgia 2010).

The work of these numerous organizations is covering lots of important issues: starting from water and sanitation, distribution of humanitarian goods and products, psychological assistance, legal assistance to employment union and economical empowering. But big amount of these projects are usually quite constrained in time. Most of them were as emergency response and their projects finished soon. Based on 2010 report of the ministry, from the 18 projects that had been conducted around Tbilisi and in Shida-Kartli only four are still continuing and the rest are ended. (Misirtry of Refugees and Accommodation of Georgia 2010) But all of these projects have been of substantial importance for the IDPs and the project by World Food Program that is distributing food supplies till now remains to be one of the most important recourses that IDPs have access to. Originally WFP was planning to leave Georgia by 2008 but after the war it extended and expanded it activities and introduced the new program, which is described on its website: "The new PRRO 10787.0 will support a smooth transition from emergency relief to livelihood creation and restoration (SO3), and prepare for a hand-over of operations to the Government (SO5) in 2011" (World Food

Program 2010). In the interviews with displaced every single interviewee mentioned the fact that now they are highly dependent on the food that UN WFP is delivering: "If this aid is finished, I do not know what will happen; we do not have farming land, we do not have anything to rely on". (Mcevelidze 2010).

Thus to conclude, the effort from both state side and national/international civil society side was big and impressive. Now I will examine if this effort was enough to reach long term and sustainable solutions for IDPs.

2.2 Are the Long term and Durable solutions brought about?

In order to answer this question I will discuss the problems of IDPs in several small chapters addressing following issues: Living conditions- housing, water and sanitation, energy; Social and economic integration and sustainability- social programs, employment, infrastructure, educational opportunities; Awareness- ability of IDPs to exercise their rights and use the opportunities they have. In the end I will conclude the chapter by discussion about the perspectives on the foreseeable future.

2.2.1 Living Conditions

The first and most important topic is the **housing** issue. The aim of the government has been to offer durable housing to IDPs. Here as I mostly concentrate on the IDPs of war in 2008, and as far as big majority of them are accommodated in the newly built settlements I will firstly discuss their conditions. Government built all the 38 settlements in 3 months and the quality of housing had been contested from the very beginning. The problem was forthcoming in each and every interview with IDPs. Especially because of the fact that

interviews were conducted in the cottages where IDPs live it was quite easy for them to show physically extremely law quality of the cottages. One of the interviewees from Tserovani said: "we live in tents and even these tents are not of a good quality… water is coming from the roof and it's always wet and cold. My little child is sick even right now". (Mcevelidze 2010).

In the settlements near the village Khurvaleti and near Gori the situation was the same: "when we entered these newly built houses in winter the water was coming down from everywhere, it was cold and we had to use a lot of electro energy to cope with cold" (Kaxniashvili 2010).

Quite detailed studies about the housing and other issues of concern on living conditions have been conducted by Transparency International Georgia. In 2009 they reported that: "TI Georgia's team was alarmed by the conditions encountered in many locations: dripping ceilings, walls covered in moisture and mold, and warping floorboards. Nearly all of these problems are a result of the hasty building process". (Transparency International Georgia 2009) p.1. More systematic study was conducted by Transparency international in spring 2010 when the study of the settlements was done by professional engineers, the costs of the constructions was analyzed and accountability and responsibility of Georgian government in the process was overseen. The major findings indicated that quality of construction is extremely poor. The major shortcomings are that the houses do not have rain gutters and overhanging roofs which means that houses are not safe from rain and moisture; TI Georgia doesn't even see what can be the solution for the persisting moisture and envisages that the problem can only worsen as time passes; the insulation is also very important as the floors of the houses are not secure and big spaces are between the woods covering the floor, and

different insects and even snakes are entering the houses from below. "Nearly every house that the teams visited in March had some kind of non-minor defect, which we define as something that will have a clear impact on the quality of life of the inhabitants, these include extensive mold on walls and ceilings, large cracks in the walls that let in cold air and contribute to high energy bills, and warped floorboards that let in cold air, rodents and insects". (Transparency International Georgia 2010) p.7. The most important finding and conclusion of this repost is that these problems cannot be explained by having really short period of time for construction, as government always brings the argument for excuse. The report concludes that "the majority of the problems were caused by oversights in the initial architectural design of the cottages and not, as initially assumed by TI Georgia and others, due to the quick construction period" (Transparency International Georgia 2010)p.7.

Besides the quality of construction of cottages there is a problem that the places that are chosen to build the settlements. Almost all of the settlements are built on the windy territories, with no trees around, very close to river banks, and often humid, so lots of houses are getting wet and destroyed easily because of natural environment. The interview with the IDP analyst of TI Georgia highlighted the reasons for these mistakes. She stressed that government pretty soon after the war knew that the housing solution they had to offer should have been durable, as they knew up to 30000 people wouldn't return in upcoming years. But the decisions about placing the settlements and contacting with construction companies were done too fast, and the problem has not been the speed of construction but the decision making process itself which didn't take time to involve professionals to give suggestions: "the decision to build the houses… was made really fast, but the later process proceeded with really an emergency approach, it was durable solution but driven with emergency needs, ….

The reason is the original architectural design; it wasn't made to prevent things like that. We did it really fast because nobody lived in tents over the winter, but actually it doesn't make any sense… one of the criticisms that TI has is that if it was an emergency period then maybe you just should have rehabilitated some existing schools and shelters in Tbilisi and Gori, and then waited for a longer term solution, and if this was a durable solution then you should have taken more time to do it… and the difference is marginal between the IDPs who lived in these cottages in January and February of 2009, cottages were damp and cold and were not any better than living in and abandoned school or something" (TIGeorgia 2010). So she concludes that: "it was done with the costs in mind and not with the needs. So if that process had taken process had taken 2-3 weeks, and some experts in durable shelter solutions, local experts, and foreign experts had been more involved in that process than we think that the end result would have been better". (TIGeorgia 2010).

Another issue is of **water and sanitation**. The UNICEF report gives a full account of the conditions in that direction at the settlements and says that the problems connected with WASH (water sanitation and hygiene) is considerably problematic. In this direction civil society projects have been active as described above, but still these efforts cannot reach universal results and big numbers of IDPs face difficulties. There are problems with quantity of water as more than half of IDPs leaving in the settlements do not have access to sufficient quantity, and the quality of water is also bad in some settlements and it can't be used for drinking; More than 33% doesn't have access to bathing facilities. Toilets also pose serious difficulties: "Toilet coverage is complete across the surveyed community, but there are still widespread problems. 67% of the surveyed population rely on pit latrines, and these are simple, wooden,

unimproved out-houses with a number of deficiencies. Amongst the 30% served by in-home toilets, there are some problems with poor water supply, damaged sewers, and installation and maintenance problems with the toilets themselves" (UNICEF, International Rescue Committee 2009) executive summary. In the settlements where the canalization system exists as such it is connected with the cannels that are crossing the middle of the settlement spreading smell and prospectively diseases. The report also asks the question- how will these problems be solved in the future and indicates that government has no further plans for the settlements. This is particularly the case in a context in which it is uncertain whether the original construction companies will be held responsible for deficiencies in construction which should be remedied under the terms of the construction contracts. Furthermore, "the local municipalities and regional governments appear to have few plans to further integrate IDP communities into the regions" (UNICEF, International Rescue Committee 2009)p.33.

While reviewing these reports there comes one obvious finding that there is big inequality between the standards in different settlements and the reason for that is not explained anywhere.

The next issue which is linked with the problems listed above is **heating** and **energy.** From the interviews that I conducted with the displaced persons not a single interview went without mentioning warming and energy problems. Some of the families didn't have electricity for last four months because of the large electricity bills that they couldn't pay and were deprived from electricity. The similar worries were expressed concerning gas as well. The problem was that initially the IDPs were not properly warned how much would they have to pay and when or how much energy was consumed; some of their consumption was covered by the

state and the rest was not. The first months were fully covered by USAID but then IDPs had to pay, but for 6 months after the aid stopped no bills arrived (Rayn 2010). After several months of using the recourses they got bills ranging from 400 to 1000 Lari, which amounts nearly– 250- 600 US dollars. Considering that the social assistance they family gets on average per month is nearly 120 Lari (about 70-80 dollars) it is obviously impossible to cover the electricity or gas payments. Because of poor quality of cottages it is impossible not to use some kind of energy for warming, so many use woods for the purpose. Tsiala Nukradze inhabitant of Khurvaleti settlement was describing the situation: "some people were coming to record how much energy we were using, we were asking, why do you come, do we have to pay for this? They said we shouldn't pay anything before January, so were using electricity a lot. Then gigantic bills came- 775 Lari, some wood supplies were provided but not enough, I had to lend money to buy more wood" (Nukradze, Interview with Tsiala Nukradze in Khurvaleti settlement 2010). Transparency international was once more the organization that took over investigating the topic and found big inequalities in the resource distribution and conditions of settlements.

"Differences in the energy dependency of each settlement are important. Some are equipped with gas heaters (such as Tserovai), some with electric heaters (such as Karaleti) and others with wood stoves (Skra and Khurvaleti, for example). We would expect that cottages heated by electric units would have the highest costs and be in the worst position, while IDPs receiving free wood fuel would be best off". (Rayn 2010). The author of blogs created on IDP issues, and Caitlin Ryan also warns donors, civil society and government: "If the problem is not addressed now, it will be left for the post-2010 period when international donor funding for Georgia's IDPs may be much less generous than it has been in 2008-10. Leaving the

current energy intensity of IDP cottages unchanged implies with near certainty that IDP families will continue facing high energy bills, which will keep them down in poverty". (Rayn 2010).

Thus this section on the living conditions of IDPs showed the hardships that IDPs experience. Now the efforts of civil society and government can be seen in another light- even though attempts were made very significant problems are persistent- houses despite the claims do not satisfy any standards of durable housing solution. The worst problem here indicated is that the architectural design of the settlements, their placing and quality cause the health problems in the IDPs; persistent cold and wet environment worsens the health conditions of children and adults as indicated in the reports and interviews. Even though the huge amount of money is spent on the housing it can't be considered as long term solution for people. Some of the houses already started literarily falling apart, and there are no guarantees for the rest. Water and sanitation problems and persistent misunderstandings about heating and energy issues farther complicate the situation. As also mentioned by different experts the amount of aid is only going to be decreased, and taking into consideration economic hardships of Georgia the genuine new projects to replace existing living spaces are for sure not expected. So living in the settlements with extremely bad conditions might really last long for the IDPs, but if this is a solution to the problem is another question which after the above described facts cannot easily be answered positively.

2.2.2   Social and Economic integration and sustainability

The problem of integration and social economic sustainability of IDPs is the most significant one while discussing long- term problem solutions. The new term widely used in developmental perspective by NGOs is **livelihood**.

As the vast majority of IDPs are now accommodated in village type settlements and they have been mostly farmers before displacement, the first issue concerning social economic sustainability is the availability of lands to have chances for farming and securing food and income. But the topic has been extremely controversial and unsatisfactory. The in depth interviews that have conducted in three of the settlements illustrate that there is no equal distribution of land. In Tserovani people didn't get agricultural lands at all; in Khurvaleti and Gori the lands are either far away from the settlements so people can not travel to it, or the quality of land is too bad or the necessary equipment for farming is nonexistent: "we do have the land, but it is impossible to work on it. It's wet, it's far and we do not have tractors or anything to work on it; we are left without attention in this sphere just as in any other sphere" (Melkhanashvili 2008).

The organizations that monitor these conditions are also indicating that even though in some cases land is distributed overall situation is quite harsh: "TI Georgia has been unable to discover to what extent the allocation of additional farming land to IDPs in the new settlements has progressed. Where land has been allocated, the allocation process appears to have been fair, but the quantity and quality of land provided is an issue". (Transparency International Georgia 2009) p.3. Mostly the land is far less than needed for self sufficiency. Norwegian Refugee Council gives full account of the situation in all of 38 settlements indicating that conditions are quite different in different settlements. The IDPs are divided into four groups, those who don't have any land, those who has only gardens next to the

cottages, those who have only large arable land, and those who have both. The share of IDPs who do not have any access to land is up to 16% and the share of those who have only garden plots is 52%.(Norwegian Refugee Council 2009) p.10."Land plot allocation alone does not yet secure livelihoods for IDPs. Irrigation water and tools for land cultivation still remain problematic in a few areas". (Norwagian Refugee Council 2009) p.11. In this sphere as well as in others the major concern is absolute inequality of distribution of recourses to different settlements. Overall the situation concerning lands can be assessed as giving chance for very limited economic sustainability for IDPs.

As farming is not widely available option the concern of employment is in the center of attention of all the IDPs. In this issue as well the results of in depth interviews are very consistent. I haven't had a single interviewee who wouldn't mention this as a central problem. The problem of employment that is widely spread in all Georgian society is even more painful for the vulnerable group like IDPs. The government has paid attention to this aspect in the action plan 2009: "Reduction of IDPs' dependence on the State includes a number of measures that will result in the increase of employment rate among both male and female IDPs through a number of economic activities in both urban and rural settings. These measures will aim to achieve sustainable livelihoods of IDPs". (Action plan for the implementation of the State Strategy on IDPs during 2009) p.6. The stress is made on coordination with International Organizations and NGOs that are providing livelihood projects but otherwise there is nothing more specific said about accomplishing this aim by the government action plan. By today there is no sign that the goal is progressing.

Civil society organizations have truly been oriented in this direction, mostly aiming to conduct educational programs and make it easier for the IDPs to find jobs. The interview with

the representative of Charity Humanitarian Centre Abkhazeti (CHCA) was very interesting to discuss this issue. CHCA has been one of the NGOs that received the donor sponsorships to accomplish different projects with 'new' IDPs. She said that as long as one of the major problems identified was that IDPs are highly dependent on aid, all of the NGOs started proposing livelihood oriented projects: giving short loans, vocational trainings, capacity building trainings and so on. (CHCA 2010)But however the coverage is quite small and only small portion of IDPs can benefit from such programs. (Norwagian Refugee Council 2009) Besides the NGO representatives acknowledge themselves that unless the beneficiaries of these projects also have opportunities to work, these newly acquired skills of professional education will not change their economic situation: "I mentioned vocational trainings last year, and afterwards we even told to donors that we do not consider this project to have been effective. It was not effective because these people did develop some skills but how and where can they use these skills? They have no opportunities to be employed and make use of these skills… and this problem is so big and encompassing for the new settlements I do not know what kind of 'project' can solve it". (CHCA 2010).

The other issue, directly interacting and effecting employment opportunities is **infrastructure.** The settlements get different attention based on their location, and even those which are closer to urban areas have problems to afford traveling to the cities to work. "A clear regional disparity exists in terms of the overall attention received by the settlements from authorities as well as from non-governmental organizations affecting the rate and intensity of service delivery. Settlements in Kakheti (Sagarejo, Telavi, and Lagodekhi) that constitute 9% of entire locations are mostly affected by this as compared to the settlements in Shida Kartli (55%), Mtskheta-Tianeti (24%) and Kvemo Kartli (12%). Other than the

regional disparities, the location and type of the settlements also play a role. E.g. IDPs residing in the settlements located close to urban areas obviously have easier access to facilities compared to the places located far away, in some cases access roads to the settlements are in dire condition and are hardly accessible during harsh weather conditions". (Norwegian Refugee Council 2009) p.2.

CHCA representative emphasized this dimension of problem concerning integration severely in the interview: "What I still do not know now is how economic integration should be accomplished in the case of new 'IDP's. I cannot even imagine how this can be solved. I do not know how many million or billion investments should be made to employ these people. This approach of building settlements so isolated, especially some settlements in Shida Kartli in the middle of nowhere. Let's take Tserovani, it is the best settlement with the best conditions, the one that is always pointed as object of pride, I honestly do not know what can be done in Tserovani to employ or guarantee income generation to the people living there… nothing is going on there". (CHCA 2010).

Next issue concerning integration and social questions is **child protection**. Schooling can be defined as major factor for children's integration. Here just as in other sectors the big inequality is present. The Tserovani settlement has the big and well equipped school while for example in Khurvaleti the schools is 4 kilometers away from the settlement. Besides, as the school is very close to the border the security is a considerable problem there. As one of the displaced, working at school as a teacher in Khurvaleti told: "we see that in less than half a kilometer from us army soldiers are standing, we have to be careful that children didn't leave the school yard and go closer to them… we see how those people stand equipped with guns very close to us". (Javakhishvili 2010). The researches made in all of the settlements

show that In total there are 2843 school-age children (aged 5-17) living in the 34 settlements, out of which, based on the information provided by Mamasakhlisi and parents, 2658 (93%) are enrolled at school. "However, the official enrollment rate does not necessarily correspond to the attendance rate. The primary concern in the settlements seems to be that children aged 13-17 practically are not attending school and it is very hard to involve them in any kind of activities". (Norwegian Refugee Council 2009)p.4. There are at least 4 settlements where schools are 4 kilometers away from settlements and its hardly possible that children went to school. There is also problem of textbooks and other necessary materials which is also occasionally provided by NGOs but is not systematic. Pre schooling exists only in 7 settlements. Not having pre schooling also constrains parent's conditions to work or farm.

And as the last issue connected with social problems is the **healthcare.** In this aspect it has to be noted that government did put some effort to provide the insurances. Some of the respondents of the interviews did express that they were grateful because the insurances covered important surgeries or operations they needed. On the other hand, the medication is not covered by the insurance which is the heaviest burden for people. "The range of medical services provided by various insurance companies varies and mostly these services are limited to covering urgent medical cases but are not covering other types of treatment and medical care". (Norwegian Refugee Council 2009) p.6. Besides, since the April of 2010 the medical insurances are not valid, and nobody knows if they will be renewed or what will be the policy of the state regarding this issue. If we take into consideration the difficulties of living conditions that contribute to worsening health conditions of IDPs this little attention to healthcare becomes even more problematic.

2.2.3   Administration and awareness

The reason why lots of problems remain constantly unresolved is that local administration doesn't work effectively and IPDs are constantly unaware of their rights or of the decision making process.

Separate NGOs here as well try to contribute. The office of Georgian Ombudsman has projects which incorporate awareness rising, they also give legal advice and mediate between displaced and state. (Ombudsman 2010) Georgian Young Lawyers' Association is also concentrating on legal assistance projects and in the interview the representative of GYLA identified little awareness as major issue. (GYLY 2010). But the organizations themselves acknowledge that this is not all encompassing and the weaknesses of public sector in Georgia are the main source of discussed problem. The settlements are in general administered by the MRA appointed representatives called 'Mamasaklisi' or there are IDP committees. It remains quite unclear what are the responsibilities of Mamasaklisi and if they take care of spreading the information. "In some locations the coordinators are so "invisible" that IDPs say there is no MRA representative assigned to their settlement". (Norwegian Refugee Council 2009)p.3

In the in depth interviews with 14 displaced I observed that they are uncertain about everything. The displaced most often cannot distinguish which aid or which project comes from government, which comes from NGOs. They do not know what the responsibilities of different actors are; how can they ask for help and to whom. In this direction there is no change planned from the government side and the only hope remains the small scale projects of NGOs.

2.2.4   Summary of validity of Solutions and visions of the future by IDPs

In the interviewing process one of the questions was asking about the future plans of the displaced and their expectations on their future[4]. There have been several major trends in the answers of displaced in the interviews concerning their future. One most common trend was the will to return. This is unavoidable; and we could say that however all the actors involved tried to respond to their problems people would anyways have will to return to their own homes. But on the other hand, this also means that either they do not have sufficient information to acknowledge that return is impossible, or they do not know how to plan the future as they have nothing to start with, nothing to rely on. "What can I say? I hope we will return, it feels like I'm a guest, I have to leave. I do not think of anything that could improve the situation. It can be I will leave Georgia and go to Italy or Greece to work". (Nukradze 2010) Their visions quite often wouldn't go farther than saying that if the food supply is finished they just do not know how they will live; sometimes they even stated clearly that they do not want even to think about future "I do not want to face the future, what if we really stay on the only social aid like 22 Lari?" (Javakhishvili 2010). One of the respondents had very interesting vision of their conditions that clearly expressed how displaced really feel about current situation: "we are left as men lost in the desert" (Melanashvili 2010).

When we discuss the future of the displaced in country like Georgia one issue comes as a very significant but not outspoken question. Based on the situation described above when awareness of people is law and their channels to communicate the needs is week it becomes more obvious that they do not feel powerful to change their future. In addition to this the level of democracy and their small capacity to express their opinions and be heard, in the country is directly effecting the perceptions of the people as well as decreasing the chances

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[4] For the questionnaire please see appendix 1

that the long term solutions will be found based on their needs. This aspect is not ever emphasized in the reports, was not heard much in the media and also was not mentioned by the NGOs or government representative during the interview, but it came apparent in the in depth interviews with displaced themselves that they do not see the ways to effect the policies or decisions made about them. And besides the small transparency and awareness some of them already have negative experiences about voicing concerns. Twenty tree years old teacher in Tserovani expressed this in following words: "who can we address with our needs? Who will let us to speak up? It seems people also get used to this" (Mcevelidze 2010). When in January several settlements tried to protest the fact that they were not informed about the electricity bills for six months and received very high bills to pay which was obviously impossible for them, the brigades were sent to dissolve the protesters. So as Maka Javakhishvili explained the Khurvaleti settlement closed the highway but after the brigade came they calmly dissolved as they had no other option. (M. Javakhishvili 2010). The same scenario was repeated in Gori settlement: "if you speak up you are afraid… but I cannot stop myself. Though when we protested Special Forces were sent to prevent us. People are scared". (Bliadze 2010) The situation is not unique and is just the next manifestation of nondemocratic behavior of Georgian Government which will clearly be one of the major obstacles for the displaced to have their needs addressed.

After discussing all the evidence about how long term needs of 'new' IDPs are addressed in Georgia we can return to the question of this chapter:

Did the Georgian government with the help of large humanitarian aid and involvement of national and international non-governmental organizations/institutions manage to bring about

long term and sustainable solution to the needs of Internally Displaced People aftermath the 2008 Georgia- Russia's war?

The examination of all the aspects showed that the living conditions of displaced are bad, causing health problems in the population living in the settlements; their prospects for social and economic integration are also very little and they are dependent on the Aid coming from abroad and they have no ways to avoid this dependency; their awareness and capacity to effect the existing situation is extremely low and they do not have any vision how can they sustain themselves in coming years. The inequality in the conditions of the displaced at the same time and with the same status is obvious. The huge aid that was made after the war will not be repeated once more. The money that was meant to solve IDPs long term needs is almost spent. This means the people will most probably have to live in these settlements for coming years. So, the situation is long term but it cannot be called a 'solution of problems' as the problems remain, also for long term. Therefore the answer to the first question is that even though the aid has more or less satisfied emergency needs of IDPs; the efforts of state and civil society has helped the people compared to the situation if no attention would be paid to them (like it was in 1990's) long term and sustainable solution did not come about and IDPs still face list of life effecting problems without clear prospects of their improvement.

3   Chapter Three: Explanation of the shortcomings

The third chapter asks what the explanation of the shortcomings of the long term problem solutions to the needs of Internally Displaced People aftermath the 2008 Georgia- Russia's war is.

3.1   How is Georgia placed in neoliberal state model?

As indicated in the first chapter the promise of neoliberal view of civil society and diminished role of the state is that civil society is efficient to resolve social problems and the state should only perform minimum responsibilities. However the critiques of neoliberal approach have indicated the shortcoming of this view. The second chapter which studied the case of response to internally displaced persons in Georgia after the 2008 war showed that long term needs of IDPs were not successfully met even though civil society activism and involvement was unusually high, and state obviously also attempted to support the resolution of problems. Based on the theoretical criticism of neoliberal approach the problem here is general understanding of the government of its role in social issues and lack of systemic, strategic views about social-economic policies in the country.

But to apply the same criticism as an explanation of the shortcomings we have to see how Georgia is generally falling into the neoliberal model of understanding of state and its role.

After the hardships and painful transition process in Georgia in 1990's the political situation was quite complicated and in 2003 resulted in the revolution. Peaceful "Rose" revolution was

welcomed by international society and Georgian population and seemed to be very promising. As European Stability Initiative's recent publication highlights the revolution carried two promises, one of democratization and the second of state building, or in other words reunification of Georgia that proved to be quite difficult objective for the government. The radical reforms were made by the government in many spheres and the satisfaction of population was quite high in the beginning of this second/post revolution transformation in Georgia. (European Stability Initiative 2010)p.7

The international society welcomed the revolution and the reforms and soon portrayed Georgia as being an exemplary successful state. During his visit to Georgia President of US, George Bush declared to Georgian population gathered near the freedom square to listen to his speech: "Your courage is inspiring democratic reformers and sending a message that echoes across the world: Freedom will be the future of every nation and every people on Earth". (BBC News 2005)

As the essay 'Georgia's Libertarian Revolution summarizes: "For three years running, it appeared in the top-10 reformers' list; and was the top reformer in Doing Business 2007." (European Stability Initiative 2010)p.8 and this path was applauded by most international institutions and organizations, most devotedly by World Bank, IMF and others.

But the doubts about the means how this 'success' was being achieved rose quite soon, and the issue of concern was undemocratic way the Georgian government pushed all the reforms: "The government acts unilaterally according to the principle that "the ends justify the means", violating basic human rights and failing to achieve consent from other political forces or the nation as a whole." (Miriam Lanskoy 2008). Now if we remember the authors

criticizing Neoliberalism also because of being in bed terms with democracy picture becomes clearer.

The ideology and guidelines for these inspiring reforms and success was extreme market oriented policies. Quite often these reforms were referred as being libertarian or by some others experts as neoliberal, and if we view the policies more in social and economic light term neoliberal seems quite appropriate. In essence, the major principle was to liberalize economy and reduce state expenditure in public sphere. The most basic institutions like police and army were paid huge attention; otherwise the process involved very little concern of institution building.

The main architect of the reforms has Been Kakha Bendukidze, often referred as 'Russian oligarch' because of his long career in Russia; the man who served as the Minister of Economics in 2004 and soon became State Minister on reforms coordination serving till 2008 and influencing all the major reform policies and directions in Georgia. The reason to refer to him is that initially the young president of Georgia Saakashvili did not have radically liberal agenda, and the person who made the U-turn in policies was Bendukidze. Therefore interviews with him express the best how Georgian state was transforming: "we all will shortly witness a highly interesting social experiment. The first goal is to prove the possibility of building an absolutely liberal economy in a given country in the post-Soviet space. Any economic policy should have maximum deregulation of the economy as its priority. In Georgia, this should take the form of ultra-liberalism, since if Georgia wants to build a normal country, its economy has to grow at very high rates." (European Stability Initiative 2010) p.20. It has to be noted that the growth went fast, Georgia was often praised because of "high economic growth rates during 2004-08 (12.5% in 2007), the growth of

budget revenues and improvement in the business and investment climate". (ETF (The EU agency which supports education and training in countries surrounding the EU) 2010) p.2.

But this process ignored institution building and in many cases opposed creation institutions, especially strengthening of public administration. Once more Bendukidze's words: "If you have institutions which do not work, why keep them. My personal opinion is that most of these institutions are not needed as they do not create any public good." (European Stability Initiative 2010) p.21. So taking this approach as guidelines meant that number of public servants decreased, number of public agencies were closed, and unemployment grew: "For legal reasons, abolishing entire agencies and ministries proved to be an even easier way to accomplish large-scale dismissals. The number of ministries was reduced. According to the consolidated government budget documents, the number of civil servants declined from 102,593 in 2004 to 74,790 in 2005" (European Stability Initiative 2010)p.24

The privatization was the next neoliberal step undertaken by the Government. The special website was created www.privatization.ge and all the previously not privatized assets were advertised and soon privatized including strategic objects like Batumi and Poti ports, the Chiatura manganese mining company and so on (Thi Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia 2004). The criticism often applied to this policy was that it was mostly Russian capital that was taking over these assets. In 2007 new Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze joined the government and continued with the same path. In his interview in 2008 his speech outlined genuine neoliberal ideals that had been implemented in Georgia, and mentioned it was the 'recipe' for success: "Low and flat taxes; Commitment on a legislative level to reduce the government's fiscal footprint; Deregulation and cutting the red tape; Unilateral free trade; Very flexible labor legislation; No sector or industrial policy of any kind; No

market-distorting practices such as subsidies, preferences, or exemptions; No currency or capital controls; A 'hawkish' anti-inflationary stance, and aggressive privatization." (Martin 2008)

With the flat taxes and liberal labor code Georgia was under constant attention of international institutions: For Georgia's ranking in the World Bank's "Doing Business 2007" index, it was also a very positive development. Soon Georgia was ranked the 6th most employer-friendly country in the world with respect to labor regulations, and Georgia's labor code was declared one of the three "boldest reforms" carried out anywhere in the world in the 2005/2006 period." (European Stability Initiative 2010)p. 27. But the price for these activities appeared to be quite high, and not favorable for Georgian society, which explains the political instability since November2007, continues demonstrations and dissatisfaction.

The significant issue is the Labor Code of 2006. As it is clear from the reports of World Bank liberalization of labor regulations was regarded as a great breakthrough to create better business environment. On the other hand the same labor code only guarantees interests of employers but interests of workers are totally excluded; workers can be fired without justification and the law doesn't require the employers to provide explanations; they do not have left any rights to protest. As Vladimer Papava describes: "Presently, this code gives employers the maximum rights which one might think of and leaves employees with literally no rights at all". (Papava 2009) p.312. The new code was contested by trade unions and even by Georgian employers association. But unfortunately their opinions are not taken into consideration. "In Georgia, however, it has overwhelmingly been the government that drives the agenda when it comes to labor policy, even when both the employers and the unions disagree. The best example of this was the adoption of the 2006Labour Code, which was

done without even consulting the trade unions". (Transparency International Georgia 2010)p.7 The code was so discriminatory that even employers resisted it. Elguja Meladze the chairman of Georgian Employers' Association (GEA) in the interview with TI Georgia said that: "We may represent the employers but we too are concerned with workers' rights...we are not opposed to regulation that does not contradict free enterprise, for example safety regulations, which we think are vital and is a subject on which we agree wholeheartedly with the unions...we think there should have been more focus on these issues in the Labor Code." (Transparency International Georgia 2010)p.7.

The problems associated with incapacity of labor code to protect are worsened in the situation that the worker's rights and interests cannot be defended by the trade unions. The same report from TI Georgia summarizes how the president of Georgian Trade Union Confederation sees the approach of government to trade unions: "Irakli Petriashvili clearly places the blame on the "neoliberal government that is unacceptable to me and to the trade unions. Petriashvili talks of an ideological distaste for unions within the government which "ignores" trade unions and sees them as "enemies of economic development". Another union leader alleges that a prominent minister had said in a private conversation with him that trade unions were a "necessary evil" and that he would "abolish all trade unions in the world" if it were possible to do so". (Transparency International Georgia 2010)p.6. The minister referred in this interview is again Kakha Bendukidze who several times had expressed his negative position towards labor unions.

There are no signs of improvement recently in this direction. In 2009 with the advocacy of International Labor Organization the Minister of The minister for Labor, Health and Social Affairs, Sandro Kvitashvili became enthusiastic to make amendments in labor regulations.

However the minister was overturned and all the proposals on changes turned down. "Sources within the unions see this government u-turn as being a result of the increased influence of the neoliberal wing of the ruling party since the dismissal of Economy Minister Lasha Zhvania in autumn 2009… The American Chamber of Commerce in Georgia (AmCham) sent out a press release stating its opposition to the proposed amendments, calling them "left wing" and arguing that they would constitute restrictions on free business". (Transparency International Georgia 2010)p.10

In this situation when radical liberalization of policies is pursued in quite undemocratic way the important social problems raise and grow- especially unemployment and poverty. But unfortunately Georgian government doesn't have any consistent social policies to heal these problems; there is no occupation with providing basic social security for Georgian citizens. All the unemployment benefits were cancelled since 2006 while the rates of unemployment keep rising. The official statistics show that since 2004 to 2008 the unemployment went from 12.6% to 16.5%[5] (National Statistics Office of Georgia 2010). However, the farmers are not included in this calculation which means that experts always contest these statistics and argue that unemployment rate is much higher.

Besides, country suffers from poverty which has been steadily increasing since the revolution. By 2003, when the new government came to power after the rose revolution the official rates of poverty showed that 52% of population lived below the poverty line and 25% were the poorest part of the population. (Papava 2009)p.313. The new government changed the schemes of measuring poverty, and the new estimates in 2004 showed only 36% of poverty. The next year, 2005 illustrated growth in percentage of poverty by 4% even with

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[5] There is no official information about unemployment since 2008.

newly established standards. Vladimer Papava observed that proof of steadily rising poverty was not beneficial for government, "it was a fact that was not only unexpected but also unacceptable for the Government. For this reason, the Government refused to make any poverty statistics public in 2006, because the poverty line further increased and reached 42% according to unofficial sources. In December 2007, when the Presidential campaign was underway in the country, some top Government officials claimed that as few as 28% of the population lived below the poverty line. If all the previous indicators of the poverty line in Georgia had been based upon the calculations of a subsistence minimum, this 28% was artificially produced by counting just those people who had received allowances from the Government". (Papava 2009)p.313

However the government never saw resolving social hardships as its responsibility. The only significant state program was the program against poverty and it was created only after 4 years since the revolution, in response to the demonstrations of 2007 November. The president had to resign and the new presidential elections were conducted. During the election campaign, for the first time, the poverty reduction became an outspoken issue on agenda. Thus, it was since 2007 that "Presidential candidate Saakashvili made an attempt to shift the public's focus towards social hardships and poverty within the electoral marathon". (Papava 2009)p.309. But the ambitious promises that Saakashvili laid out were quite short term and very soon proved to work unsuccessfully. The government made '50 day action plan' to fulfill the promises. But as experts assessed it, these were rather populist steps from government's side and no real decrease in poverty was witnessed: "however regrettable it may sound—the Georgian Government did not have any sort of realistic poverty reduction program in the period following the elections. So-called National Employment Programme

which was rather populist by nature and actually brought no results other than the further growth of inflation… Thus, as a result of wasted tens of millions, a few people actually acquired employment". (Papava 2009)p.311

These neoliberal policies have been praised for long, but the war and financial crisis proved how fragile Georgian economy was against crisis. "Before the war, growth was driven chiefly by foreign direct investment and expanding bank credit. Since the war, foreign direct investment has plummeted. Banks suffered a severe liquidity crunch, and while a total collapse of the banking system seems to have been staved off with the help of massive external intervention, credit provision is still far below pre-war levels. Construction, real estate, retail and tourism – all key sectors in the pre-war boom – have been particularly hard hit". (Transparency International georgia 2008)p.2 The 4.5 billion Aid has been the source of stability, though country still felt painfully the crisis and doesn't show signs of recovery.

This hard experience and new social issues didn't make government reconsider the policies. In autumn 2009 Georgian President presented 'Act on Economic Freedom" which reaffirmed state's commitment to liberal economy. His speech summarizes most precisely how government sees the role of the state: "Sometimes socialist ideology - like only the state can save, the state should regulate, the state should interfere - is heard in such countries that I am totally taken aback. Our experience is that nothing good is happening where there is a state" (Civil Georgia 2009).

The doubts about the usefulness of this new Act were voiced quite soon after it's issuing. The act, which puts limits to public spending and borrowing; which states that taxes can only be changed by conducting referendum; which places even greater power in hands of the

president has severely be criticized. The most painful aspect was highlighted by GeorgiaMedia : "worrying still is the proposed sub-clause 7 which purports to ban the state from setting the price for any good or service - there does not seem to be any protection for, say, free education or even for the government's own health insurance scheme which is very much a mechanism for price regulation". (Georgian International Media Centre 2009).

Thus after observing Georgia's liberal market oriented way of transformation and the opinions of government about the role of the state in resolution of social problems we can regard Georgia as falling into the model of neoliberal state. This analyses also showed that this way of transformation was welcomed by the major international players who themselves are pushing Neoliberal agenda on the developing states. Therefore the criticism that was applied by the critiques of neoliberal understanding of state and civil society can be applied to Georgian case and serve as an explanation of the shortcomings of the long term problem solutions to the needs of Internally Displaced People aftermath the 2008 Georgia- Russia's war.

3.2 Criticism of Neoliberalism as an explanation of the shortcomings in the resolution of long term problems of IDPs

The first chapter identified general criticism towards neoliberal understanding of role of the state and role of the civil society. The brief summary of this criticism is that it opposes the withdrawal of state from the social sphere that leaves the problems to be resolved in the hands of civil society; relies on local initiatives while providing no consistent public support and no overall systematic approach from the state to resolution of social problems.

The second chapter showed that in case of response to the needs of IDPs in Georgia after the war in 2008 the involvement of civil society was quite impressive; the number of actors involved, the number of projects implemented and the amount of money spent was large. Also the state attempted to play positive role. But the analyses showed that these efforts did not result into the successful resolution of long term problems of IDPs. Based on the theory the explanation of this outcome lays in the way state in general performs its duties and how the state views its own role versus the role of civil society. In the first part of the third chapter we saw that Georgian state since 2003 put emphases on economic growth and market oriented liberalization of policies, but completely dismissed social issues as the sphere of responsibility. Therefore poverty and inequality rose as it generally follows the neoliberal development of the states and societies. The civil society has been strengthened meanwhile and also contributed a lot to the post war response which still didn't lead to desirable solutions because the initiatives were often localized and couldn't cover all needed equally. The reason and explanation for this was that given the weakness of the state to make and implement policies covering all needed even with the help of the other actors still can't bring about durable solutions.

Here I want to identify several reasons of the shortcomings made from government side- first is the weakness of institutions; second is non existence of social security system generally in the country; and third is governments position about civil society and delegation of too many responsibilities on non-governmental actors.

Firstly, General **weakness of institutions** contributed to the mistakes that government made while responding the needs of IDPs after the war in 2008. The problems discussed in the second chapter – the lack of readiness for emergency response, the fast decision making

process which did not include experts and resulted in building of law quality settlements; the lack of awareness due to very poor and underdeveloped administration of the settlements and weak local governance; all these problems are the result of neoliberal approach of the state described in the third chapter. Little and extremely selective occupation with institution building (more oriented on some sectors and dismissing others) from the very beginning of the transformation was cause of the fact that the capacity of the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation was so low. The interview with the representative of Transparency International Georgia confirms this fact: "Just after the war the ministry of refugees and accommodation had very little capacity. The minister Subeliani had gone into parliament and returned back to administering later. And even today it's not a very strong ministry. It's getting there, but they have pretty big constraints in terms of everything. I've met few people there who are really good, work incredibly hard and just can't be responsible on of everything". (TIGeorgia, Interview with IDP analyst of TI Georgia 2010). Therefore this institutional weakness was the cause of the mistakes that lead to unsatisfactory quality of the response.

Secondly, **absence of social security** in Georgia also dues to neoliberal policies of government made it incredibly hard to handle social and economic integration of 'new' IDPs into social schemes. As indicated in the first section of third chapter the only significant social program aiming for poverty reduction was very weak, while there are no programs for unemployment, no regulations for labor relationships. In the interview with the representative of Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation, I raised the problem of employment as one of the vital issues and the response was: "the major problem for these people is employment, but employment is also the biggest problem throughout Georgia". (MRA 2010). It is hard not to

agree with this formulation but I would say that this is not the justification for the government but the explanation of its failure on the way of social and economic integration of IDPs. The second chapter illustrated that NGOs did put efforts into making IDPs more self sustainable through numerous vocational and professional trainings and similar projects, and they themselves acknowledged that these projects wouldn't be very beneficial as IDPs not really have opportunities to use the knowledge.

Dealing with the problem of 'new' IDPs was harsh also because of the absence of response schemes for 'old' IDPs. It is always referred that compared to 'old' IDPs 'new' IDPs received much better attention and support. This is however true, and it is also positive that 'old' IDPs were included in the projects that state and also civil society organizations implemented after having the new wave of IDPs. But this doesn't justify the government either. After being in office for 5 years, it was only in 2007 when government worked out the strategy on IDPs and implementation was not even started by 2008 when problem arouse with the new strength after the war. Overall little readiness and little experience of the government to handle IDP related issues was one of the obstacles.

 The same criticism goes on many levels. For example I described hard situation of 'new' IDPs' concerning child care and schooling. It was obvious that schooling problem is not resolved in nearby villages either and the children living there are mostly not in better conditions then displaced children. Again the gaps and shortcomings of educational system throughout the Georgia have to be identified as reason of numerous problems about child care in IDP camps.

Thus I wanted to pay attention to the topic that most of the problems that 'new' IDPs experience are large and structural and directly interconnected with the hard social conditions throughout the country. It is hard to integrate IDPs into social and economic sphere while this sphere is very weak in whole country, while country doesn't in general provide social assistance. This argument once more returns us to the theory which argues exactly the same – it is impossible to locally solve the problems even with the help of multiple actors unless the state intervenes in resolution of social problems on the systematic bases and aims long term problem solution.

The third point relates to **understanding of the role of state and role of civil society in general from the side of the government**. As we saw in the first part of third chapter official governmental position is that state should retreat. The same approach was used while responding to the problems of 'new' IDPs. Officials constantly stressed the positive role of civil society and argued it would fill in all the gaps and lead to successful solutions: "It was common to regard civil society as a guarantee of future achievements: "Civil society has developed rapidly and become the bulwark of the country's development. This should be good news for Georgia's friends, who have done all they could to help us in every possible way throughout this period. And although we have had a series of unfortunate crises of governance, the strength of civil society gives us strong reasons for believing that we are going to be able to achieve stability in future". (Kitsmarishvili 2009).

The civil society organizations express the same concern that unless some country level problems are resolved in a systematical way and unless government is able to cope with IDP issues more effectively there is no way they can solve long term problems. In the interview representative of one of the strongest NGOs in Georgia said: "in my organization for example

we are sitting and thinking, the whole team of people who has been working on IDP problems for so many years now. But this is such a huge problem that no NGO can solve it. It's the government which should do it. What can CHCA do to solve such a universal problem; we can do counseling, helping the ministry, serve as a bridge. But unfortunately government thinks so, they think that these problems should be handled by the international organizations , that USAID and EU should finance the Government constantly to deal with these problems, or they (IOs) should solve these problems without involving government". (CHCA 2010).

These tree points relate to the mistakes for the state side, while there are also concerns about civil society. As we use the term is wide perspective involving huge variety of actors starting from donor organizations to small NGOs it is hard to apply general criticism. But the most problems arouse concerning the major donor institutions.

 The empirical evidence presented in second chapter showed that involvement of civil society even though didn't appear to be enough to handle long term resolution of problems, was very helpful. And commonly this positive effect is recognized: "Positive innovations have helped to make humanitarian action more accountable, responsive, and timely. These   innovations included: independent oversight of donor and recipient   behavior by Transparency International (Georgia); and assistance to and advocacy for beneficiary access to aid resources by the Georgian Young Lawyers Association. These initiatives are worthy of wider discussion and replication elsewhere". (Hansen 2009)p.8. But on the other hand some of the actors, most often big international institutions were criticized for little transparency, and for being politically biased: The humanitarian response was demonstrably more political than humanitarian. Although operational agencies delivered a timely and effective response and

averted large-scale loss of life, the behavior of donors in response to the August 2008 war was, by their own accounts, generally inconsistent with the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship. Needs emerging from the 2008 war, including humanitarian needs were ultimately oversubscribed by western donors, most of whom took the Georgian side in the conflict". (Hansen 2009)p.7

TI Georgia was the organization which studied the transparency and accountability of the Aid coming in Georgia. Their recent study observed that aid is very complex because its coming from solid numbers of different sorts of donors and it's hard to identify which donations are spent for which purposes, study concluded that: the current lack of easily accessible and up-to-date information on aid in the public realm directly reduces the transparency and accountability of aid, and limits the scope for democratic politics. The current information deficit and resulting lack of transparency heightens the risk that aid will be misallocated, wasted or stolen in the coming years". (Transparency International Georgia 2008).

Conclusion

Answering the first research question: Assessing successfulness of response to IDP needs

In the concluding chapter I want to examine the results against the two initial questions that I posed in the beginning of the study. The first question aimed to understand if the Georgian government with the help of large humanitarian aid and involvement of national and international non-governmental organizations/institutions manage to bring about long term and sustainable solution to the needs of Internally Displaced People aftermath the 2008 Georgia- Russia's war.

In order to find answer to this question I examined the reports produced about the conditions of IDPs, the documents and projects prepared by the government and civil society organizations; besides I conducted in depth interviews with the displaced people, and representatives of government and civil society organizations.

Based on this material I observed that the level of involvement from government side was impressive especially concerning the housing issues of IDPs and the activity of civil society organizations was very big. The government as well as civil society did aim from the very beginning to bring about lone term and durable solutions to the problem.

I observed the successfulness of the efforts by analyzing three major issues: living conditions, social and economic integration and sustainability and awareness. The observation showed the problems concerning living conditions of IDPs are not responded in the durable and sustainable manner. The social and economic integration and sustainability remains to be the

most painful issue and the dependence of IDPs in international and state aid is common concern for all displaced. Poor administrative capacity in the settlements and low awareness of IDPs also remains unresolved without clear prospects of improvement.

In in-depth interviews IDPs expressed that they feel unsecure and do not even want to think about the future, they expressed that they remain dependent on the aid (which is supposedly ending soon) and do not see any way to sustain their families by themselves. Besides, the undemocratic political developments in Georgia are effecting their perceptions about their ability to communicate their needs to the decision makers and their experience of being forced to stop protests confirms this perception.

The inequality in the conditions of the displaced that possess the same status, were displaces in the same period and had exactly same initial needs is obvious. The huge aid that was made after the war will not be repeated once more. The money that was meant to solve IDPs long term needs is almost spent. This means the people will most probably have to live in these settlements for coming years. So, the situation is long term but it cannot be called a 'solution of problems' as the problems remain, also for long term.

Therefore the answer to the first question is that even though the aid has more or less satisfied emergency needs of IDPs; the efforts of state and civil society has helped the people compared to the situation if no attention would be paid to them (like it was in 1990's) **long term and sustainable solution did not come about and IDPs still face list of life effecting problems without clear prospects of their improvement.**

Answering the second research question: Explanation of shortcomings

The second question of the thesis was concerned with explaining the reasons of the shortcomings of the long term problem solutions to the needs of Internally Displaced People aftermath the 2008 Georgia- Russia's war.

In order to discuss the reasons I examined general political and socio-economic developments in the country. As my hypothesis stated that neoliberal way of transition in Georgia made the state incapable to resolve social issues successfully. The close examination showed that the government has been pursuing market oriented policies since the beginning of the transition until today. But on very little attention was paid to institution building as well as to creation of social security. The growing inequalities caused by radically liberal policies were never attempted to be balanced through providing social welfare and taking care of minimum equality of opportunity.

Based on the theoretical criticism of Neoliberalism and neoliberal understanding of the role of the state and role of civil society the problem lies in the fact that state avoids responsibility on systematic and consistent occupation with important social issues (like poverty, or unemployment, or issue of IDPs in our case) and leaves it to civil society organizations to be resolved. But this localizes the problem and restricts the universal approach. Therefore the inequalities are reinforced and never healed in the long term manner.

 This is exactly what happened in Georgia while responding to the needs of 'new IDPs'. The general retreatment of the state from provision of public goods and certain welfare to the citizens and its vision that civil society organizations are the ones who will take care of social problems has made the state unable to be effective when it got involved in the response and

unable to accomplish social and economic integration because there is no social security overall in the country where this new vulnerable group of IDPs would integrate.

More specifically several reasons for the shortcomings were identified: General **weakness of institutions** contributed to the mistakes that government made while responding the needs of IDPs after the war in 2008.Besides **absence of social security** in Georgia also due to neoliberal policies of government made it incredibly hard to handle social and economic integration of 'new' IDPs into nonexistent social schemes. Lastly, neoliberal **understanding of the role of state and role of civil society from the side of the government** has discouraged the government to put additional efforts and made the reluctant to make decisive changes and substantial projects.

Besides the governmental faults, the civil society response also had shortcomings. Concerns were expressed about the lack of transparency and accountability of major donors. The civil society organizations have been designing small scale and short term projects that are helpful but are not capable to bring about long term, structural changes; they do not cover the whole group of needed equally and this results in into reinforcement of inequality. This cannot be regarded as guilt of civil society organizations but it has to be acknowledged that their mandate is limited and not capable to bring equal and durable solutions to harsh social problems.

Thus the explanation of the shortcomings in the post war response to IDPs needs is based on theoretical criticism of neoliberal understanding of the state and civil society. Creation of minimal state after the revolution has made the government incapable to respond to emerged

social problem effectively and high level of engagement of civil society proved to be insufficient to address the long term needs and to bring about durable solutions.

Discussion of the results and identifying the limitations of the study

The results of the study showed that even though in the particular case of responding needs of IDPs in Georgia after the war of 2008 involved huge number of motivated actors and impressive resources were spent the results are not satisfactory. Theoretical criticism of Neoliberalism was used to analyze the reasons. While study has not added the new dimension to existing theoretical framework it did presented the case which proves once more that civil society involvement is not enough for the successful resolution of social problems. Civil society shouldn't be seen as supplementary but as complementary to the state.

It has to be noted that we are talking of the state which has undergone through severe hardships, conflicts and political instability during past 20 years. General weakness and lack of state capacity does affect the outcomes and gives the reasons to be less demanding to the government and lowers our general expectations of successfulness. But my argument is that since the rose revolution very impressive reformation of state was experienced, some economic recovery has been evident but the fact that state never took care of redistribution of recourses in order to heal social inequality and provide social security has lead it to being unable to solve suddenly emerged problem of IDPs successfully even with huge help and aid from non-governmental sector.

It also has to be noted that efforts of civil society organizations were very helpful for IDPs and have improved their conditions. As IDPs themselves often expressed in the interviews their everyday life has been dependent on the aid from NGOs and they sustained their lives

till today with help of the projects and initiatives and humanitarian assistance from civil society. The paper does not argue against civil society, it argues against unconditional and radical reliance on civil society while resolving social problems; argues that the civil society resources are limited and the study illustrated that even with high involvement of civil society long term problems of IDPs after the 2008 war remained poorly resolved.

The limitations of the study are twofold: firstly it unfortunately covers only case of 'new' IDPs while the issue of displacement in the country is much bigger and also poorly addressed. Secondly it doesn't present alternative ways to conduct humanitarian response. The case was not discussed versus other similar cases it was only judged against the goals of the initial plans and promised of the response to IDPs in Georgia. But this study gives good bases to conduct further research and continue studying the displacement problems; applies the theoretical framework that can be used as an explanation of continuous concerns about IDPs. As it is not a policy paper it also doesn't give specific policy proposals but it gives suggestion in a broader sense- it argues that Georgian state should reconsider its understanding of role of government and civil society in general as the neoliberal approach that country exercises is the cause of constantly unresolved social problems.

Appendix 1

Questionnaire for the IDPs:

- When did you have to leave your leaving place; what were the conditions because of which you had to leave?
- What was the first shelter, and what were the living conditions there?
- What was the aid that you got from government and/or non-governmental sector during the emergency period?
- Please describe the process of being placed in the IDP settlements in the cottages
- What are your living conditions since you live in the settlement?
- What is the aid that you have been getting during these 2 years from government and/or non-governmental sector?
- What are the major problems that you face today?
- What do you plan during next several years/ what are your expectations concerning your living place and economic conditions?
- What do you expect from government that would improve your conditions?

Questionnaire for civil society organizations:

- What is the mission and main task of your organization?
- What are the projects/researches that your organization has conducted concerning IDP issues in Georgia?
- What are the results of projects/researches?
- Could you discuss the conditions of 'new' IDPs in Georgia ?
  - o Living conditions
  - o Social and economic integration
  - o Awareness
  - o Perspectives for the next several years
- What is your assessment of the work conducted by the Georgian government to solve IDP problems?
- What is your assessment of the work conducted by non-governmental sector to solve IDP problems?
- Does your organization cooperate/coordinate with Georgian government?
- What type of cooperation/coordination do you have with government/other non-governmental organizations?
- What do you think are the reasons of the still existing problems of 'new' IDPs?

Questionnaire for the representative of the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation of Georgia

- Can you assess the state strategy on IDPs?
- What was the emergency response of the state after the war when new IDPs appeared in Tbilisi?
- How would you assess the activities undertaken by the government to respond IDP's needs during last two years?
- What was the role of non-governmental sector in humanitarian response?
- What are the coordination mechanisms between the government and non-governmental sector?
- How did recommendations of international institutions and NGOs influence the formation of new strategic plan (2009) of the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation?
- How would you assess the success and failures of the implementation of new strategic plan?
    - Living conditions
    - Social and economic integration
    - Awareness
    - Perspectives for the next several years
- What are the reasons of the difficulties in implementation?
- Is the new plan going to be changed?

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