

LEADER-BASED VOTING IN CROATIA IN A LONGITUDINAL PERSPECTIVE: 1990 - 2007

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Abstract

The importance of the leaders in determining voters' choice has been subject of research for decades. However, most of the studies relate to the old western democracies, while research on this topic in 'new' democracies remains modest. This study tries to track down the evidence of a leader-based vote in Croatia in a longitudinal perspective, from 1990 to 2007. Drawing on some established correlations, it looks how socio-demographic variables influence voting and if there is any evidence that voters who watch television base their vote more often on leader preferences. Lastly, it looks at thermometer feelings about politicians and parties to see if there is any gap in respondents' evaluation of leaders and parties. The findings confirm that we can talk about leader-based voting in Croatia in different time periods, before death of Franjo Tudjman in 1999 and after his death till 2007. Furthermore, the paper attempts to explain reasoning behind the leader-based vote in Croatia by looking into socio-psychological explanations, institutional arrangements, and common theories that explain leadership effects in the 'old', industrial democracies.

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Introduction

Leader-based voting has been researched topic already for decades. Ever since classic in voting behaviour *The American Voter* (Converse, 1960) was published, leaders have been seen as important factors in determining voter's choice. The American Voter was the first study that revealed the importance of party identification, issues and leaders, in determining the voters' choice (Converse, 1960). This school of thoughts has been called Michigan school, and it is based on socio-psychological explanations of voting behaviour. Except for socio-psychological explanations, leader-based vote is explained in the literature with institutional arrangements and with the process of modernization. It is argued that different institutional arrangements and electoral formulas have different impact on leader-based vote (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987; Carey and Shugart, 1995). The studies show that candidate based voting is specially favoured in presidential and semi-presidential political systems and in majoritarian and combined electoral systems with open lists (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987; Carey and Shugart, 1995).

The third explanation of leader-based vote goes with the process of modernization. Dalton, Flanagan and Beck (1984) demonstrate that in the last few decades many social and economic changes happened and which were followed with the rise of education opportunities and development of information society. These changes have influenced and political life. In this new environment, with all available information, education, and social and occupational mobility, voters were set free from any ties that they had with political parties, with church, and other associations; they became "dealigned" (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck; 1984). Long-term factors in determining their vote choice, such as religion, class and party identification were replaced with short-term changeable variables: candidates, issues, performance in the office etc (Dalton, 2006). Development of new technologies and electronic media, have had the great impact on leader-based voting (Wattenberg, 1991). Ever since Kennedy beat Nixon

in presidential elections in United States in 1960 because of his charismatic, telegenic appearance, it is believed that television has great impact on voters' decisions and that personality of leaders matter in determining voter's choice (Druckman, 2003).

In this research I want to examine if there is any evidence of leader-based voting in Croatia, in longitudinal perspective, from the very beginning of the democracy in 1990 to 2007 when the last parliamentary elections took place. The case of Croatia is interesting for scholars for several reasons. In the first place because this is still a relatively new topic in the Croatian literature about voting behaviour; more precisely, only two studies on leader-based voting exist (Grbesa, 2008 and Kasapovic, 2004). Secondly dramatic political situation, homeland war and seeking for independence from 1990 to 1995 certainly had an influence on how voters rationalized voting for the certain party. Thirdly Croatia changed two political systems and three electoral systems in first ten years of its' independence, what makes it relevant and attractive case for studying how institutional arrangements influence voters' behaviour. Fourthly, strong polarization and democratic changes followed by implementing trends in political communication from western democracies left impact on the way in which voters based their vote. In this context I will examine if voters who relay on television for political information, more often cast leader-based vote.

Leader-based vote in Croatia shall be presented in two different contexts: one in the context of authoritarian leader, Franjo Tudjman, and another, from 2000, in the context of modern but "presidential" leader Ivo Sanader. The particular focus of my research will be the last two parliamentary elections, 2003 and 2007. I will be specifically focused on the leadership effects looking at them in terms of how they emerge in Western democracies. In my research I will use the public opinion longitudinal survey carried out by the Faculty of Political Sciences in Zagreb since 1990. My research questions will be the following:

Q1: Is there any evidence of leader-based voting in Croatia?

Q2: Is there any evidence of change in voters' behaviour in terms of a shift from long-term factors to short-term factors in case study of Croatia?

Besides this more general research questions, I shall be looking at leader-based vote among the six parties that have had seats in parliament from 1990 till now. I shall also look how socio-demographic variables influenced voting; thirdly, is there evidence of declining of partisanship; fourthly, is there any evidence that voters who watch television base their vote more often on leader preferences; and lastly, I will look at thermometer feelings for politicians and parties to see if there is any gap in how respondents evaluated leaders and parties. This last point will be considered only for the two elections in 2003 and 2007, because thermometers feeling have not been used in previous research. However, to overcome this gap, I shall compare findings from Croatian case with the findings from other parliamentary democracies that have been included in Module1 survey Comparative Electoral Studies and which have used the same variables that exist in Croatian dataset for 2007.

The first chapter deals mainly with the theoretical concepts that will be used in explaining leader-based voting in Croatia. In the first place these are socio-psychological explanations, institutional arrangements, and process of modernization and leadership effects in general. The second chapter introduces the case of Croatia, context which is very important due to the homeland war and dramatic political changes, it will familiarise readers with Croatian party and electoral system. The third chapter elaborates the research questions, introduces the data set and statistical methods employed to answer the research questions, and limitations of the research. The second section of this chapter will discuss the findings. Finally, in the conclusion, results will be summarized, and synthesized answer to research questions will be offered, together with recommendations for further research in the field.

Chapter I

1.1 Theoretical overview

In this part of the paper socio-psychological models of voting that support the idea that people vote on the basis of long-term factors, such as are religion, social background and party identification, will be discussed. Furthermore, it will be shown how voters rationalize their voting decisions. In the next section of the chapter, institutional arrangements in the context of personal vote will be discussed. Finally, I shall focus on the short-term factors emphasizing in the first place leadership-effects and incorporating explanations that will be discussed in the first part of the chapter.

1.1.1 “What determines the vote?”¹

According to Michigan school of thoughts there are three important factors in determining voter’s choice: issues, leaders and party (Niemi and Weisberg, 1993: 137). Leaders will be the main focus of my paper, without underestimating the importance of remaining two factors. But before starting with the evaluation of literature about leader-based vote, I shall briefly discuss and the remaining two factors.

The earliest controversy in this field (cited in Niemi and Weisberg, 1993: 137) was about the importance of the issues in voting. Conclusions drawn from the first studies in the United States were that only candidates and party matter in determining the voter’s choice (Niemi and Weisberg, 1993: 137). However, revisionist literature from the 1960s changed this view, emphasizing the importance of the issues (Niemi and Weisberg, 1993: 138). Up to now scientist have not answer the question which factor influences the voter’s choice more, but they all agree that all three factors are important and that different voters will vote differently (Niemi and Weisberg, 1993: 137).

¹ Niemi, Richard G., and Herbert F. Weisberg. 1993. "What Determines the Vote?" In *Controversies in Voting Behavior*, ed. R. G. Niemi and H. F. Weisberg. Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc.

Scholars from revisionist literature, first examined the importance of the issues, considering issues in the relation with the candidates, investigating whose candidate position was closer to certain voter. Current research is focused on the issue voting, such as on the retrospective voting, directional voting, foreign policy voting, and especially economic voting (Niemi and Weisber, 1993: 138). However, this topic will not be discussed here. Before moving to the candidates, it is important to stress that, although issues and candidates are considered as short-term factors, they are evaluated differently when it comes to explanations why voter chooses to vote on the basis of issues or candidates. More precisely, increased attention to the candidate factor is mainly explained with the influence of cognitive perspectives borrowed from psychology, while the importance of the issues is based on the influence of rational choice borrowed from economics (Niemi and Weisber, 1993: 138).

1.1.2 The Personal vote – explanations from electoral formulas

In Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina's (1987: 9) words the personal vote is "that portion of a candidate's electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record." Emergence of the personal vote is drawn firstly with "the lack of party leadership control over access to and rank on ballots, secondly with degree to which candidates are elected on individual votes independent of co-partisan, and thirdly whether votes cast a single intra-party vote instead of multiple votes or a party-level vote" (Carey and Shugart, 1995). It is widely accepted that personal characteristics of the candidate play the more important role in determining the vote in open list systems than in closed list systems (Sartori, 1976). Furthermore, findings demonstrate that the personal vote is important in the single-member district plurality electoral systems where "the distinction between the interests and fortunes of an individual representative and those of any collectivity, especially party, to which he or she belong" is of crucial importance for winning the seats (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1984: 111). Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987) examined the case of United States

which has presidential system, where, as one can assume, personal vote is very important, but interesting results are found in United Kingdom, where the personal vote was more important than it was expected, due to fact that United Kingdom has parliamentary system which does not favour personal vote.

Besides personal incentives of representatives to draw personal vote, many characteristics of some political systems favour personal vote, such as are “resources available for certain candidate, the nomination system, the electoral system, the needs, ideologies, and party loyalties of constituents (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987: 9).” According to the authors “the import of personal vote depends on its magnitude; the electoral swings common in the systems, and the degree of competition for legislative seats.” Carey and Shugart’s study shows that the effect of district magnitude changes between open and closed list in proportional systems in a way that “in open lists higher magnitude leads to more personal vote, while in closed lists higher magnitude decreases the incentive for the personal vote (1995).” The main finding of this study is that generally, single-member district systems and open list proportional representation systems are more personal, than other systems.

The authors bring a complete ordinal ranking of electoral systems, thirteen of them, from most party-centred to most candidate-centred (Carey and Shugart, 1995). Since Croatia is the country that changed two political and three electoral systems in first decade of its independence it will be interesting to see if institutional arrangements had any impact on leader-based voting in Croatia. According to Carey and Shugart’s findings, the expectation is to find connection between the type of electoral system and candidate-based vote in the period from 1990 to 1999, when Croatia had semi-presidential system. Although, the focus in my paper is on parliamentary elections, my assumption is that personal vote of Croatian president had huge impact on voters on parliamentary elections as well, because he was president of the winning party at that time.

To sum up, the main finding of these studies is that electoral system matters in determining the personal vote, and it matters more in systems with open lists than in ones with closed lists, and it matters more in proportional representation systems with open lists and in systems with single-member districts. Furthermore, this influence works in few directions; first one is visible as incentive of the candidates to appear in good light, even if this will mean that he or she will advocate position that is not position of his or her party, secondly parties itself will sometimes expose some candidates if they think that this could gain them extra votes, thirdly, citizens as well mainly wants to have candidates who “think with their own head”, and not with the head of the party, with what this triangle between actors is closed (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987; Carey and Shugart, 1995).

1.1.3 Shift: long term factors vs. short term factors

All societies have witnessed the process called “modernization”. This process has influenced all aspects of these societies. But main concern of this short overview of the related theory will be how this process changed patterns in voters’ behaviour. To understand that, in the first place we have to discuss what the process of modernization will mean here. I will use Halman’s definition, that the process of modernisation has been marked by growing prosperity, rising levels of education, growing use of communication technologies, which have all resulted in expanding social welfare networks, increasing geographic, economic and social mobility, specialization of occupational knowledge and professionalization (2007: 314). Furthermore, he finds that in this new social environment, individuals started developing their own values and norms that often do not match to conventional ones: “People’s values, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour are based increasingly on personal choice and are less dependent on tradition and social institutions” (Halman, 2007: 314). Furthermore, Ignazi points out that in this changed environment voting “is no longer the confirmation of belonging to a specific social group but becomes an individual choice..., an affirmation of a

personal value system: “the issue voter” tends to replace the traditional “party identification voter” (Ignazi, 1992: 4).”

Dalton offers several theories which tend to explain how and what have caused environment mentioned above (1984). The first theory that tries to find connection between the general trends in the environment with the partisan changes is called *embourgeoisement* and followers of this theory believe that class voting declined, because with the industrialization the differences between class became significantly smaller; second theory is *social mobility thesis*, which points out that class voting is in decline because people are more and more mobile, in a sense that they change social and occupational environment much easier, than in previous decades (Dalton, 1984: 16). Especially influential theory is *mass society thesis*, whose followers argue that loyalty in institutions declined, in the first place loyalty in the church, in the family, in the unions, and this is important for understanding the changes in the patterns of voters behaviour, because these institutions usually were attached to certain party, meaning that the members of that institution were and the voters of the party that it supports (Dalton, 1984: 17). In Dalton’s words this resulted in appearance of the “newly independent voters without any ties who were now open to a variety of appeals and may be mobilized for variety of causes.”

A fourth thesis, so called *community integration*, discusses how the ties between community and individual weakened because of growing residential mobility, what resulted in decline of party attachment to those individuals, because community was what kept them together. A very important *cognitive mobilization*, is focused on the political sophistication of citizens through the mass media; according to this theory “sophisticated and well-informed voters need not depend on social cues or party identification to make their voting decisions; they can make their own decisions based on issues and candidate positions (cited in Dalton, 1984: 18).” However, *cognitive mobilization* brought two types of voters, one who dealigned

because of the sophistication, while others aligned with a party because they got more information from the media that otherwise they would not be aware of (Dalton, 1984: 19).

Aging party system is different approach to contemporary political change in advanced industrial democracies which suggests that parties have their “life cycle” and that this “revolutionary change is actually only reoccurring “biological” process” (Dalton, 1984: 19).” The last approach is called *value change* and it discusses connections between “advanced industrialism and the values of the mass public”, pointing out that value changes emerged, because, after wars and recovery periods, people gained their economic and personal security that they did not have during these periods, and now they shifted their interests to the post material goals (Dalton, 1984: 20).

To sum up, taken together these theories can explain complex process of politics that takes place in advanced industrial environment (Dalton, 1984: 21). Furthermore,

“The process begins with the weakening of traditional political alignments, following either the social mobility, mass society, community integration, or the aging party systems thesis. These eroding cleavages mean that many social groups are open to new political appeals and might be mobilized by new issues or new ideology... (Dalton, 1984: 21)”

As a result of this process, the dealigned and independent voter appears, and this voter is identified with the advanced industrialism; furthermore, the struggle between “new and old politics” emerges (Dalton. 1984: 21). However, as Dalton stresses, the process is much more complex, and it can not be explained only with the replacement of one values with another, one issues and cleavages with another, it also includes and the changes in social relations, in the first place relations between mass public and elites, where in this new environment, masses are more and more sophisticated and able to act, while at the same time elites use the same tools to reach these masses.

Evidence of dealigned voter and dealignment of the parties are numerous. First evidence of this trend was found in the United States, where partisanship declined after the 1964 elections and where this trend remained stable since then (Dalton, 2006: 188). Declining of partisan loyalties has been spread among many advanced industrial democracies (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Fiorina 2002). Decline of partisanship have been found and in Great Britain, where in 1960s, more than 40 percent of British voters claimed that they were strong partisans, while in last decades less than 20 percent declare themselves as strong partisans (Dalton, 2006: 190). Dalton reports that in Eastern Germany in 2002, “45 percent of easterners claimed to lack any partisan ties”, while western Germans reported somewhat stronger party ties, but which also weakened from 81 percent in 1970 to 65 percent in 2002. French case marks decline of partisans from 1970 to 1990, when the biggest drop-off have been found (Dalton, 2006: 190). Furthermore, the research done in nineteen advanced industrial democracies, brings evidence of partisans decline in seventeen countries, while in all nineteen countries was found that the strength of partisanship is decreasing (Dalton, 2006: 190). Other trend that was found is decline of public confidence in political parties as institutions (Dalton, 2006: 190).

To conclude, concept of party dealignment that has been discussed, has influenced voters behaviour in a way that short-term variables, such as issues, individual candidates, performance in office, in the first place economic evaluations, government record, party policy preferences etc. have become more important predictors of vote choice, than long-term variables, such as partisanship, religion, class, ideology etc. which had been strongly influencing voters' behaviour for a long time (Grbesa, 2008). According to Kirchheimer (1996) these new conditions have led parties to accept new “catch-all” strategies and to abandon their strong ideologies. Furthermore, Hazan finds that parties have had to adopt

alternative forms of gaining voters' support, they started focusing on candidates and not any more on parties, on campaigning instead on elections (2003: 125).

1.1.4 Television – the rise of leader based politics

Party dealignment on the one hand and emergence of catch-all parties were followed to the great extent with the development of new technologies, what has been discussed within the theories about changing patterns in voters behaviour in the context of the process of modernization. But what has this meant for the candidates and candidate based politics? Wattenberg (1991: 22) finds that rise of the media ensured certain independence to the candidates, because they were not any more dependent on the party's organization and structure, to spread information, but they have had electronic media to do that now for them.

Furthermore, television has brought many changes in politics. How powerful and sometimes even decisive this medium was, the best demonstrates old well-known story about Kennedy and Nixon, in which people who watched TV show liked Kennedy more, while those who listened the radio liked Nixon more (Keeter, 1987). In 1984, Reagan's rival, Walter Mondale, said that one of the reasons why he lost elections was the fact that Reagan looked much better on television (Wattenberg, 1991: 68).

Survey done in 1986 in United States demonstrates that 92 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that they "vote for the person they think is the best, regardless of the party they belong to" (quoted in Wattenberg, 1991: 34). However, there is evidence that shows that with voters' dealignment from the parties and with disappearing of automatic unquestionable support for the parties, they become more free to like or dislike individual candidates, and it appeared that they have been more critical to them (Wattenberg, 1991: 66).

1.1.5 Leadership effects

Although already the scholars from the Michigan school of voting behaviour emphasized the importance of candidate in determining voters' choice, this factor remained underestimated in the literature about voting behaviour until the last two decades. The assumption was that candidate based voting is irrational, that voters are concerned only with candidates' persona and not with his or her stands on the issues (quoted in Niemi and Weisberg, 1993: 149). However, studies in the 1970s and 1980s changed these beliefs, revealing that voting against the candidate who is not seen as competent leader or who is seen as weak leader is not irrational (Niemi and Weisberg, 1993: 143). Once we agreed that candidate voting can be rational as issue voting (Niemi and Weisberg, 1993: 143), we can proceed with the explanations of the candidate voting, that are borrowed from the social psychology. Two approaches in explaining motives for candidate voting exist, one based on emotions and other based on cognitions (ibid). Since the researches on this topic became more and more sophisticated, scientists developed different models for examining this field of voting behaviour. What I find as important to note is the term "cognitive misers", where citizens are considered as misers who are making political decisions using shortcuts, cues and information that they already have (Niemi and Weisberg, 143). It is also important to mention models developed by political psychologists; "memory-based" model, meaning, as we can assume from the name itself, that voters using this model, have to recall all what they know about the candidate from their memory and then make an evaluation summary and make a decision (Lodge, McGraw and Stroh, 1989); "impression-driven" or "on-line processing" model where voters are updating information when there is opportunity to do that (Hastie and Park, 1986). McGraw, Lodge and Stroh, in their later study came to conclusions that more sophisticated voters are using on-line processing model more often than the nonsophisticates who are regularly using memory-based model (1990). However, taking this into consideration

it is interesting to note that “sophisticated respondents, who presumably are more interested in the subject and are more capable of retaining a large volume of information, more frequently use shortcuts (Niemi and Weisberg, 1993: 149).”

Furthermore, leadership effects are examined, first in the United States, where we can freely say that it is logical that leaders matter, since United States have presidential system of government, but what is most interesting is the fact that researches done in 1980s in Britain and Australia, in the countries that have parliamentary system, have demonstrated that leadership effects have influence on the voters’ decisions (quoted in Niemi and Weisberg, 1993: 145).

The idea of the importance of candidates and their personalities in determining voters’ choice is based on two assumptions (Grbesa, 2008: 39). Firstly, Webb and Poguntke bring evidence of de-aligned voters who are more interested in short-term factors, than in long-term factors when it comes to voting: “Undoubtedly, a large (and growing) number of voters in modern societies are less constrained by stable party loyalties, and are thus likely to be free to base their voting decisions on the personal and political qualities of the leading candidates” (Webb and Poguntke, 2005: 346). Secondly, “by focusing attention on the prime minister as the individual who is accountable for the government’s collective performance, the public finds it easier to deliver reward or punishment, when compared to an abstract collectivity (McAllister 2007: 7).”

In contrast to authors who advocate the growing importance of candidates and their personalities in determining voters’ choices, some other authors like King (2002) find that real evidence of leadership effects is weak. King stresses that “election campaigns in most democratic countries today are leader-centred rather than ideology-centred or policy-centred” and that attention of the media is focused on the leaders more than on the policy”, which all leads politicians to believe that candidates have more important role in shaping voters’

behaviour (2002: 4). Moreover, he finds that candidates who are more presentable have better chances to become party's representatives. However, King concludes that leaders have only minor impact in shaping electoral outcomes, and that they can not be decisive factor for voter's choice.

King (2002: 4-7) also argues that there are two types of leadership effects that have impact on voters' decisions: direct and indirect. "Indirect influence is exerted when a leader influences voters, not as a result of anything he or she is, but as a result of things that he or she does". In King's terms, this means that, for example, leader who has changed party's programme, or who has improved party's image, has indirect influence on voters, which can be very important and influential in determining voter's choice (2002: 5). He defines direct effects as "the influence that a leader or candidate exerts on voters by virtue of who he or she is, how he or she appears and how he or she publicly comports him or herself". King points out that these "direct effects" are the subject of politicians' and their image-makers' influence and constructions. He stresses that "If it turned out that direct effects were not desperately important, or were important only on rare occasions, then it would also turn out that a great deal of campaign consultants' time and money would have been wasted". However, image makers believe in the importance of direct effects, and that is why they advice their clients to take "elocution lessons, hair transplants, face-lifts, heavy make-up, and all manner of undignified photo opportunities" (King, 2002: 7).

To conclude, the scholars still have not agreed on what we are precisely looking at when looking for leader effects, and what the methodologies to find evidence for these effects should be, what all resulted in discrepant findings (Grbesa, 2008: 44). For instance, Kasapovic (2004) used the variable about confidence in the leadership of the party as evidence for party identification in determining the voters' choice and not as evidence for the leader-based vote. Furthermore, Mughan (2000: 111-114) argues that the voters' positive

evaluations of Margaret Thatcher's successor John Major, had decisive role in uncertain 1992 British elections. By contrast, Crewe and King argue that based on the evidence available to them they were "not in a position to distinguish between genuine leader effects and (other) effects that manifest themselves through the leaders but are in fact rooted in voters' prior dispositions and attitudes" (Crewe and King, 1994, in King, 2002: 27). Denver (1996: 122), in this context, brings results of the BES survey indicating that in 1997 "Blair was a major electoral asset to Labour", while Bartle and Crewe challenge his findings with a results of series of statistical calculations of the three studies concluding that "the best evidence from 1997 is that the effects of the party leader's personal traits were small" (King, 2002: 93). However, although he does not have empirical evidence, Denver stresses that it would be "hardly credible that the huge leads in personal popularity that Blair enjoyed over his main opponent had little or nothing to do with Labour's triumphs" (2003: 124).

Although these concepts are considered as Western and most of the presented studies have been done in "old-democracies", in this paper I want to examine how these trends shape voting behaviour in one new democracy, Croatia. Cular finds evidence from several post-communist countries suggesting that anti-party sentiment in these countries is strong, party identification generally quite weak and the overall level of citizens' involvement in party politics significantly lower than in the "old" democracies (Cular, 2005: 125).

Still, to weight the intensity of influence and to define the type of effect of this particular variable, one must take into account the structural framework of the election (system type, type of election, party system etc.), the remaining variables that normally influence electoral behaviour, the personality of a specific leader and the context of a particular election (Grbesa, 2008). Since scholars still have not come up with the operational definition of leadership effects, for purpose of this paper, I shall measure leadership effects by

looking at the variable “reason for the voting for that particular party”, more precisely, at one of the offered answers, which is “leaders”.

Chapter II

2. 1 The Case of Croatia

In this chapter I will discuss the brief context and bring the overview of the electoral and party system in Croatia because I find it very important for the further interpretation of my results. Kasapovic argues that good institutional, semi presidential government, majority and mixed-member electoral system and transitional conditions, weak political parties and unstructured party system; favour leader based voting but that this was not the case in Croatia (Kasapovic, 2004). On the contrary, Grbesa (2008) finds that leader based vote has been important and that its importance varied with the time periods. Both, Grbesa (2008) and Kasapovic (2004) find some evidence of leader based vote in Tudjman's era, and my intention in this paper is to see whether we can talk about "Tudjman based vote".

2.1.1 Context

On 25 June 1991 Croatia declared its independence and left the Yugoslav federation where it was one of the six constitutive republics (Little and Silber, 1996). Conflicts that had started before declaration of independence, now escalated into a brutal war. Rebellion of Serbian nationalists, supported by the federal army and regime of Slobodan Milosevic, began an open aggression which has lasted till the August 1995 (Little and Silber, 1996). In this period, around one third of Croatian territory was occupied, where mostly ethnic Serbs lived, which caused more than 300,000 people to leave their homes and led to enormous human losses, on the Croatian as well as on the Serbian side (Grbesa, 2008: 69). In May and August 1995, Croatia liberated most of its territory in two military operations Flash (*Bljesak*) and Storm (*Oluja*). The remaining occupied parts in Eastern Slavonia were liberated by the UN between 1995 and 1998. At this point the war was finished, at least on the battlefields. But the consequences have been huge and one could feel them on each step in everyday life. Expect,

for enormous human and material losses, political consequences of the war have been numerous; nationalistic ideology that has been expanded during the homeland war, did not disappear from the public opinion, which could have been seen from the cooperation with the Hague tribunal (Čular and Zakošek, 2004: 454), before arrest of Ante Gotovina in 2005.

In this period, from 1990 when first elections took place, while Croatia still was part of the Yugoslav federation, till election in 2000, HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) was in power. Besides winning the parliamentary elections, HDZ's leader, Franjo Tuđman, won presidential elections in 1992 with 56.7 percent of votes, and in 1997 with 60.3 percent (Grbesa, 2008: 70). Čular and Zakosek (2004: 454) stress that semi-presidential political system and Tuđman's authoritarian political style resulted in a concentration of "personalized political power". Grbesa (2008: 68) finds that "the hegemonic government of Tuđman, his obedient parliamentary majority and clientelistic organisations have further destroyed an already depressed post-war economy." International organizations were warning about the state of human rights; conditions for return of the refugees were inadequate, because politics of HDZ and Tuđman never encouraged them to come back, on the contrary their message at that time was quite clear: refugees should not come back. Furthermore freedom of the press was in bad conditions; almost all media were controlled by the government, and the free media at that time, were subject to law suits, high taxations etc. This is how Freedom House reported Tuđman's death in 1999:

The death of President Franjo Tuđman on December 11, 1999 marked the end of years of heavy-handed nationalist regime (...) Tuđman, who died after a long bout with cancer, is seen by many as the leader who unified Croatia in 1991 and led the country to victory in the Balkan wars. By the end of the decade, however, many Croatians had grown weary of Tuđman's virulent nationalism, the rampant corruption under his regime, and his mismanagement of the economy (Freedom House, 2000).

New parliamentary elections took place less than a month after Tudjman's death, on January 3rd 2000 (Ksapovic, 2003). Considering the conditions in which Croatia was, it is not surprising that opposition parties joined in big coalition, and led by Social Democrat Ivice Račan, beaten HDZ for the first time (Kasapovic, 2003). In this context of great change in political life of Croatia, two weeks after the parliamentary elections, third presidential elections took place. Everyone was predicting that the leader of the HSLS and communist dissident from Tito's period, Dražen Budisa will beat Stjepan Mešić, who was the leader of HNS and the last president of Presidency of Yugoslav Federation. However, Mešić won the elections and became the third Croatian president. Grbesa (2008: 70) points out that Mešić won because of "his attractive personality and relaxed approach which seemed extraordinarily well-suited to the context of the 2000 presidential election" because public wanted president who will be completely different from authoritarian and pretentious Tudjman.

The new government improved many aspects of the political life. It changed the political system from the semi-presidential to parliamentary; it encouraged and ensured all necessary rights for return of refugees, and it enabled press to be free (Kasapovic, 2003). According to Freedom House (2000) report, in 2000 Croatia was for the first time marked as a free country.

However, coalition government, led by social democrats appeared to be unstable, which resulted in electoral defeat in 2003 by HDZ which was transformed into modern and democratic pro-European Christian party (Grbesa, 2008: 69). The new government under the Ivo Sanader's leadership was doing everything in order to bring Croatia into the European Union, which was Sanader's top priority (Grbesa, 2008: 70). Sanader succeeded in making first steps toward membership, and in 2004 Croatia became the candidate country. In 2007 HDZ again won the election and has remained in the power till now. Still, no matter of how hard Sanader tried to present that the country was going in good direction, negotiations with

the European Union have been slow, mainly because of problems with corruption, conflict of interest and a lack of transparency that were shaking HDZ's government (Grbesa; 2008: 70).

In this paper six parliamentary elections that took place in different contexts will be examined: 1990, the first democratic and pluralistic election that prepared ground for building an independent country; 1992, election held in the middle of homeland war, after Croatia was recognized as the independent country by the international community; 1995 election took place right after the liberation of most of the territory and they past in the atmosphere of war victory; 2000, election were extremely important because dominant HDZ was ruled out, and leftist parties came in power, this was crossing point towards democratic consolidation; 2003, first election in stabile and normal democracy were held, and for the first time vote choice was determined with the evaluation of the governance's performance in the office (Siber, 153; 2007), and this trend was continued in election 2007.

2.2 Electoral and party system

2.2.1 Electoral system

First Croatian independent Constitution was adopted in December 1990 and it was constituted of the House of Representatives, the first chamber, and the House of Counties, the second chamber (Kasapovic, 1993). Croatian first electoral system was a "majority system modelled under the French electoral system of 1986, and its elements were: single member districts, run-off elections, winning by absolute majority in the first round or by plurality in the second round, with a seven percent threshold for candidate's participation in the second round of the election (Kasapovic, 1993)." Furthermore, Kasapović (1993) finds that majority system was sending a clear message to the voters: the reformed Communists (SDP) or anti-Communists (HDZ). In 1992 the absolute majority system was abounded and segmented system with the equal ratio of direct and closed list seats was adopted (Kasapovic, 2000: 5).

This system was remoulded in 1995 in the segmented system with the preponderant share of the closed list seats (Kasapovic, 2000: 5). In 1999 instead of the segmented electoral system Croatia introduced proportional system “with proportional voting in ten multi-member electoral constituencies (each entitled to 14 seats), closed party lists, the d’Hondt method of converting votes into seats and a five percent electoral threshold at the constituency level (Grbesa, 2008).”

Kasapovic (2000: 5) finds that in comparison with other new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, Croatia has been the most specific case. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania, have had different varieties of proportional system with some structural and technical changes with the time, except Hungary which have had compensatory electoral model (Kasapovic, 2000: 6). Latvia, Moldova, Albania, Lithuania, Macedonia, Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Serbia, had one radical change, from the majority electoral system to the proportional representation or to a combinet model (Ksapovic, 2000: 6).

To sum up, Croatia was unique case in the entire transitional region, which changed three electoral systems in only one decade: majority (1990), plurality (1992) and proportional representation (2000) and which applied the majority, segmented, and proportional electoral model for the first chamber of the Parliament (Kasapovic, 2000).

The president of the state is elected in direct election (The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Article 93-95). A candidate who receives more than 50 per cent in the first round is a winner. If no candidate is elected in this way, the second round is to be held after 14 days between the two frontrunners. Presidential mandate is five years and the same person can be elected only twice. The semi-presidential system that was originally grounded in the Constitution was abandoned in November 2000 to introduce the parliamentary system

of government, which Croatia has to this day (The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Article 93-95).

2.2.2 Party system

Croatia has had three different party systems: first one had all characteristics of two-party system where two major parties had more than 90 percent of the seats in the parliament (Zakosek, 2002: 86-90). According to Zakosek this was due to strong polarization among the two major parties on the issue of Croatian independence. In 1992, two-party system was changed in a moderate party pluralism with one dominant party, and finally, with the death of Franjo Tudjman and electoral victory of opposition parties in 2000, system dominated by one party collapsed and the new electoral law encouraged development of the moderate party pluralism (Zakosek, 2002: 86-90).

In the first ten years of Croatian independence more than 80 parties were registered and the number of them in parliament was increasing from seven in 1990 to ten in 1992, 13 in 1995, 12 in 2000 and 15 in 2003, while only in 2007 it dropped to 11 (Grbesa, 2008: 72).

In my analysis of leader based voting six parties will be included, HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union), SDP (Social Democratic Party), HSLS (Croatian Social Liberal Party), HNS (Croatian People's Party), HSS (Croatian Peasant Party) and HSP (Croatian Party of Right). I have chosen these parties because they have participated in almost all the elections and they have won seats in parliament each time, what shows their electoral and parliamentary strength (Grbesa, 2008: 72). Besides that they have demonstrated *coalition* and *blackmail* potential, which all together makes them *relevant parties* according to Sartori (1976: 121-125).

HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union), Croatia's most dominant party, was established in 1989, as conservative party with some nationalistic characteristics. It was in power from 1990 to 1999 under the leadership of the authoritarian Franjo Tudjman. After his death in 1999, the

party was transformed into modern and democratic pro European party, under the leadership of Ivo Sanader, who led the party to win the election in 2003 and again in 2007 (Croatian Democratic Union). It can be stressed that Croatia in the first three elections has had referenda and not real multiparty elections (Kasapovic, 2003).

SDP (Social Democratic Party) is the leading party on the left spectrum and the strongest opposition to HDZ. The party was established from the League of Communists of Croatia. It was the ruling party in coalition government from 2000 to 2003. Since the death of its first leader Ivica Racan in 2007, the party has been ruled by Zoran Milanovic (Social Democratic Party).

HNS (Croatian People's Party) is liberal party on the left centre. It was formed in 1990 under the leadership of several well-known politicians who were participants in Croatian national movement in 1971. The party was in ruling coalition from 2000 to 2003. Vesna Pusic and Radimir Cacic are the leaders of the party (Croatian People's Party).

HSS (Croatian Peasant Party) is the traditional centrist party which represents the interests of the peasants. Cular and Zakosek (2001: 472) note that this is the only Croatian party with the "organisational continuity" from the 1904, which during the communist regime existed in exile and was re-registered in 1989 in Croatia. It was in power as part of big coalition from 2000 to 2003 under the leadership of Zlatko Tomcic. In 2007, before the election, the party led by Josip Friscic, formed coalition with HSLS and has come in the power in the post-election coalition with HDZ in the same year (Croatian Peasant Party).

HSLS (Croatian Social Liberal Party) was formed in 1989, and has been in power as part of ruling coalitions since 2000. Since 2006 the president of the party has been Djurdja Adlesic.

HSP (Croatian Party of Right) formed in 1990 is nationalistic party on the right spectrum. From 1996 to 2009 it was led by Anto Djapic; in 2009 Daniel Srb replaced him.

2.3 Political behaviour in Croatia

Siber (2007) finds that political behaviour in Croatia in first decade of its independence was determined with the ideological orientations and quite stabile values. Zakosek (2002) argues that these values and ideological orientation of voters' behaviour have been determined by three main cleavages: territorial-cultural, which splits the promoters and opponents of Croatian independence and its territorial and political autonomy; ideological-cultural, divides promoters and opponents of privileged position of the Catholic Church in Croatia, and socio-economic is about conflicts related to the process of privatisation and its consequences in the Croatian society.

The first cleavage appeared to be very important in shaping voting behaviour in Croatia. It involved conflicts between *periphery* and *centre*, where *periphery* presented those who saw Croatia as culture open to multiculturalism and integration with other societies, while *centre* advocated Croatian nationalism and was against any international influence (Zakosek, 2002). Furthermore, Siber finds that this cleavage was strongly influenced by the *political bibliography of the family* (Šiber, 2007: 199-205). This term refers to the conflict between “ustashas” and “partisans” during the Second World War, where “ustashas” were supporters of fascist Independent State of Croatia, while “partisans” were followers of communist resistance movement (Grbesa, 2008). Traumas and suffering from these conflicts left impact on almost every family in Croatia. Since parties on the right spectrum were seen ideologically close to “ustashas” while left parties were affiliated with “partisans”, it is not surprising that family's heritage had impact on voting behaviour in Croatia (Siber, 2007: 199-205). However, Siber finds that from election in 2000 this has changed and that younger generations care less and less about family heritage, which leads to conclusion that younger voters have become dealigned.

The second very influential cleavage, ideological-cultural, is closely related to territorial-ideological, because nationalists are usually identified with devoted Catholics and traditionalists, which means that on the *centre* there were religious and traditional people, while those who support secular-modernist concepts of culture were on the *periphery* (Zakosek, 2002).

According to Siber, socio-economic cleavage has not been influential in voting behaviour in Croatia in the first decade of its independence (2007). However, Zakosek finds that HDZ was thrown out of power in 2000 because of bad economic performance (2002: 94).

Grbesa concludes that according to these findings, long-term patterns have been more important in determining the voters' choice in Croatia than short-term factors (2008: 75). However, this notion is worth reconsidering, because only after the election in 2000 parties started pushing forward socio-economic issues (Siber, 2007). Moreover, taken that anti-party sentiment in Croatia is very high and that party identification is very low (Grbesa, 2008: 76), one has to assume that voters will rely on short-term variables more and more.

Up to now only two research projects have been done to examine leader-based voting in Croatia. Kasapovic (2004), claims that there is no evidence of leader preference voting in Croatia. She emphasizes that the findings of the electoral research in Croatia in the period between 1990 and 2003 show that leader based voting influenced voters' decisions less than their party identification or issue orientation. Moreover, she stresses that although institutional and transitional conditions favoured leader based voting, it still was irrelevant (Kasapovic, 2004). However, Grbesa (2008) comes up with quite different conclusions. She argues that candidate preferences in Croatia have played a different role in voters' decisions about who to give their vote to and that leadership was a relatively important factor in determining voters' choice in the 1990s. She points out that after the death of Tudjman in 1999 this vote decreased, but then in 2007 it again significantly increased (Grbesa, 2008). Kasapovic (2004)

focuses her research on the elections in 2003; she examined socio-demographic variables to see which voter were more willing to base their vote on the leader preferences, besides that she uses feeling thermometer to see how have voters evaluated leaders of the relevant parties in Croatia. Grbesa (2008) was focused on two last elections, 2003 and 2007, and she looked at voting cues among relevant parties in these two elections, seeking for the clues of leader-based vote.

Since Grbesa and Kasapovic, did their research with the same data that I am going to use as well, my hope is that I will be able to interpret my results in the best way and maybe conciliate these two articles together with mine in some meaningful conclusion about leader-based voting in Croatia. Moreover, in my research, I shall be looking on voting cues among six parties in all six elections, as well as on the socio-demographic variables. Following the relevant literature about leader based voting and effects of television on it, I shall examine whether voters who get political information from the television, are more willing to vote for the leaders. And lastly, I shall compare case of Croatian leader based vote, with the leader based vote from the CSES module1 countries for one election year.

Chapter III

3.1 Empirical part

3.1.1 Research questions and objectives

As mentioned in the previous chapter, already two studies have been done to try to answer the question *If there is any evidence of leader-based voting in Croatia?*, but no agreement in their conclusions is found. My intention is, taking into consideration these two articles, one from Grbesa (2008) and the other from Kasapovic (2004), to do my own analysis and to see if we can talk about leader-based voting in Croatia. My expectation goes with Grbesa's findings that we can talk about leader-based voting, but for different reasons in different contexts, such as the Tudjman era in Croatia and in the context of advanced democracies affected by the personalization of modern audio-visual political communication (Grbesa, 2008).

To pursue this line of argument I want to see if there is any evidence of the Tudjman-based vote and Sanader-based vote. Tudjman-based vote will be explained in the context of institutional arrangements and their influence on personal vote, because, according to the literature that has been discussed in the first chapter, in the first decade of its independence, while Tudjman and his party were in the power, Croatia had political and electoral system that favoured leader-based vote. Furthermore, after Tudjman died in 1999, political circumstances have changed and new democratic period arisen, parties have started adopting new electoral techniques to gain voters support, and one of them was focusing on the leaders and not on the programme, on the campaigning and not on the elections (Hazan, 2003: 125). Due to this observation, and the assumption that Sanader was adopting these techniques in the best manner (Grbesa, 2008), I will be focused on Sanader-based vote, trying to explain it with the process of modernization. Grbesa suggests the "Sanaderization of HDZ", arguing that that

“the image of Ivo Sanader is in the voting public entirely equated with the image of HDZ, i.e. that Sanader is entirely and effectively “partified” (Grbesa, 181; 2008).” Drawn from this, my second research question will be: *Is there evidence of Tudjman-based vote and Sanader-based vote?* Although this question is already incorporated in the first research question and it concerns explanations from different contexts, I wanted to discuss it separately, while the first question concerns all examined parties and their leaders.

Furthermore, I will compare the magnitude of leader-based vote in other parliamentary democracies to parallel findings from Croatia. If there is much stronger (or much weaker) evidence for such voting in Croatia than elsewhere, then the proposition gains some credibility that the phenomenon has some peculiar local determinants in the Croatian case, while otherwise we should feel on safer grounds in attempting to explain Croatian findings with universalistic theories, such as the impact of television on voting behaviour.

Fourthly, I shall examine how different demographic variables determine on what basis one will cast his or her vote. Kasapovic shows that in 2003, among voters who cast their vote on the basis of leaders, 36.5 percent were Christian-democrats, 31.7 percent liberals and 19 percent socio-democrats, and that among them these were mostly women, younger population and less educated voters (Kasapovic, 2004: 374). Since Kasapovic did this research only for 2003, I shall look at all six Croatian parliamentary elections to see if this trend was changing with the years. This exercise should provide further evidence for or against my hypothesis that the causes of leader-based voting changed in Croatia between the Tudjman-era and the 21st century.

Finally, since the theoretical part of my paper is mostly concerned with the theories of modernization and personalization of political communication that has taken place in western democracies in the last two decades; I shall be looking at the last two elections in Croatia in this frame and examine if voters who watch television more often are more likely to vote for a

party on the basis of its leaders. Grbesa finds that election campaigns in 2003 and 2007 were leader-centred, that the newspaper coverage of the election was leader-centred, and that leader-based vote increased between these two elections (Grbesa, 2008: 188-191). My research probes the question of whether one can interpret these results in light of the theories of personalization of political communication due to the impact of television (Heyes, 2008).

3.1.2 Data and measures

I will use the public opinion longitudinal survey carried out by the Faculty of Political Sciences in Zagreb as part of the project “Elections, parties and parliament in Croatia” (1990-2007). This survey was designed to study political behaviour of Croatian citizens in 1990 and has been continued till today. Research has been always conducted two to three weeks before Election Day. The research population are all voting citizens (aged 18 and plus). Stratification and systematization are used to generate the sample (Grbesa, 2008). “The sample is first stratified according to the region, the rural-urban divide, size of the settlement and ethnic competition for certain areas (ibid).” Systematic sampling is then applied to choose respondents from the census data. In 2003 systematic sampling was combined with the random walk method.

The final size of the samples has varied over the years: 2,608 in 1990, 2,359 in 1992, 1,144 in 1995, 1,126 in 1999, 1,153 in 2003 and 1,081 in 2007. For comparison of the Croatian case with other countries I shall use data from Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. I have chosen Module 1 of CSES, which includes election studies from 1996 to 2001, because it included similar variables to detect leader effects to some of those in the 2003 and 2007 Croatian surveys.

3.1.3 Variables and methods that will be used

I shall try to answer my research questions by looking at several independent variables: vote choice, gender, age, education, religion and party membership, and a variable that identifies whether one gets political information from the television or not, as well as variables used in 2003 and 2007 to identify how voters feel about certain parties and their leaders.

The key dependent variable used in my paper will be a voting cue variable that examines the reason for the voting for certain party. This key variable has been included longitudinally in all surveys from 1990: “Why did you decide to vote for this party or coalition of parties?” and the pre-defined response categories were: 1. Because of its party programme; 2. Because of its leader; 3. Because of the candidates that the party has put forward; 4. Because of the concrete solutions it offers to solve life and social problems; 5. I have not decided who I shall vote for. Admittedly, there are several problems with this variable. The first and most often mentioned one in the literature is rationalization (see Rahn, Krosnick and Breuning; 2001). According to this theory, voters often rationalize to themselves why they vote for a certain party. For instance, they can vote for a certain party because of the long-term ties that they have with it, but they will rationalize to themselves that they vote because of the leader, who they find the party’s greatest advantage. Drawn from this assumption, we have to take into consideration that each answer to this question can be the consequence of rationalization or just improvisation, because humans often do not understand their own motivation (Cruchter; 1994). However, since the feeling thermometers were used only in 2003 and 2007, the voting cue variable is the only tool that allows for a comparison over time in Croatia. That this comparison can yield valid results in spite of the well-known

problems associated with introspective questionnaire items is supported by previous findings that suggests that similar findings obtain about the motivation of voting behaviour with the use of introspective question as with less intrusive measures (cf. Warren and Shanks, 1996).

Besides these problems, in the years 1990 and 1992 the respondents were asked to choose two possible answers, which will complicate my interpretation and findings. To overcome this gap, I shall use only the first answer, since it was coded which answer was the first choice, and I will ignore the second one.

As already mentioned, the survey done in 2003 included a question that asks about feelings for the politicians, and the answers offered were: enthusiasm, anxiety, respect and dislike. Although the same question was not asked for the parties, so I will not be able to see if there is a gap between feelings for the party and its leader, I still can find out how candidate based vote correlates with the feelings for politicians. More clear and meaningful questions were included in the survey done in 2007 asking: “What is your attitude towards the following political parties?” and “What is your attitude towards the following politicians?”. Grbesa finds that there is a gap between the perception of the party and its leaders (Grbesa, 2008). However, in my research I want to see how much does the leader matter once when we take into account socio-demographic factors. More precisely I will look at gender, age, education, religion and party membership, in order to see what groups of people have the intention to cast their vote on the basis of candidate preferences, and how this has been changing with time. Furthermore, vote choice variable will be used for all election years in order to see “whose” voters base their votes on leader preference.

In order to get the results and answers to my research question, I shall use descriptive statistics and multinomial logistic regression. Descriptive statistics will be used because I aim to quantitatively summarize different variables from the data sets. More precisely, I will use

cross tabulation in order to create contingency tables from the multivariate frequency distributions of variables that will be used (Gray et al, 2007: 405).

Multinomial logistic regression will be used for the comparison of the Croatian case in 2007 with other countries. The variables used in this model will be vote choice as dependent variable, demographics (gender, age and education), variable like/dislike party and variable like/dislike leader, as independent variables. The aim is to see how much the leader's evaluation influences the vote choice.

3.2 Findings

3.2.1 Voting cues

The results from the longitudinal survey show that leaders have had an important role in determining voter's choice in Croatia. Table 1 demonstrates that leadership was an especially important voting cue in first three parliamentary elections. Grbesa argues that this was the case because of the institutional arrangements and political circumstances that took place at that time in Croatia (Grbesa, 2007: 191). Institutional arrangements, the homeland war and victory in 1995 certainly did have a great influence on how voters based their vote. Croatia had a semi-presidential system from 1990 to 1999, which is favourable for leader based voting according to literature (see Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987; Carey and Shugart, 1995). Although President Tudjman was not candidate for the prime minister, he was first on each HDZ's ballot list in every electorate, what clearly demonstrates what was the message to voters whom were they giving their vote. Furthermore, it is important to notice that the first three parliamentary elections were held within five years. First elections in 1990 took place while Croatia was still part of Yugoslav Federation, and that is why new elections were held only two years later when Croatia proclaimed independence. Elections in 1995 were set at that time from ruling HDZ and President Tudjman, because they wanted to make use of war

victory and euphoria. HDZ won the elections and as Table 2 demonstrates, president Tudjman was seen as saviour and hero: 57 percent of voters, who voted for HDZ, said that they did that because of Tudjman. Table 1 as well shows that the leader-based vote was more significant in 1995 than in the other five elections.

Table 1: Voting cues in longitudinal perspective²

%	1990	1992	1995	2000	2003	2007
Because of party programme	36.5	34.1	27.4	25.6	29.3	25.1
Because of the leader(s)	25.2	29.6	30.4	11.2	12.5	19.3
Because of the candidates that the party has put forward	6.7	11.2	9.6	9.1	8.7	6.2
Because of the solutions to problems that party has offered	31.6	25.2	24.6	54.1	49.6	49.4

Note: $\alpha = 0.05$

However, the findings illustrate that, although institutional arrangements and unstable party system favoured leader-based vote, the party programme and solutions to problems remained the most powerful determinants of the vote in six examined Croatian parliamentary elections (Kasapovic, 1; 2004). Table 1 demonstrates that party programme has remained frequently mentioned as the reason for the voter's choice in all six elections, with variations between the highest frequency of 36.5 percent in 1990 and a low of 25.1 percent in 2007. The variable "candidates that party has put forward" has gone from 6.2 percent to 11.2 percent frequency in the responses about the determinants of the voters' choice, which means that "candidates in constituency" were not thought to have been very influential in determining the voter's choice. One interesting finding comes with comparing percentages of votes determined by "leaders" and those determined by "solutions to concrete problems". In the

² The same results have been provided in Grbesa's research as well as in Cular's overview of the election results from 1990 to 2003.

first three election years “leaders” and “solutions to problems” had varied in similar percentages, from 25 percent to 30 percent for leaders and from 26 percent to 31 percent for solutions to problems. However, this has dramatically changed in the last three elections, when leaders got 11 to 19 percent, while solutions to problems varied from 49 to 54 percent. Grbesa argues that this has happened because of the death of HDZ leader Franjo Tudjman, what dramatically decreased the role of the leaders, while bad economic situation led voters to vote for the party they thought will offer the best “quick-fix” solutions (Grbesa, 2008: 192).

Short-term factors, “leaders” and “solutions to problems” have had an important role in determining voters’ choice from 1990s to 2007 and they were changing one in a favour of other, with exception in 2007, when leaders increased on the cost of party programme which decreased from 29.3 in 2003 to 25.1 percent in 2007. Still, it has to be stressed that significant change happened in between last to elections considering the leader based vote as voting cue, when importance of leaders jumped from 12.5 to 19.3 percent. Grbesa notes that this could be the beginning of a new trend, but and just characteristic of one particular election (Grbesa, 2008: 189). “Solutions to problems” remained almost equally frequently mentioned among the voters’ motives in these two elections. Still, it is hard to say if this is the evidence of party dealignment or again just characteristic of one particular period.

As already noted, the 1995 elections were held in the special atmosphere of the victory and liberation of Croatian territory that was held by Serbian rebels. The ruling HDZ, led by Tudjman, capitalized on this momentum and gained the biggest victory ever. In 1999, President Tudjman died, and in the end of the year parliamentary elections took place. After the death of Tudjman, democratic changes followed and “the actual notion of political leadership changed significantly (Grbeša, 2008: 189)”. Grbesa argues that only after this election can we look at democratic leadership as discussed in the scholarly literature on voting behaviour in Western democracies (2008).

To sum up, looking on voting cues in longitudinal perspective in six parliamentary elections in Croatia, it is evident that the leader-based vote has been important cue in determining the voters' choice, at least how voters themselves understood or rationalized their own motives. The importance of leaders varied across elections, and the results demonstrate that in the first three elections this variable was very important, due to the leader of the Croatian ruling party at that time, Franjo Tudjman. After his death, in 1999, the importance of leaders rapidly dropped, and "solutions to problems" jumped in perceived importance from 24.6 in 1995 to 54.1 percent in the elections in 2000 (Grbesa, 2008). References to "solutions to problems" as reasons for vote choice remained frequent in all six elections, and references to this factor increased to 30 percent in the last three elections. The "candidates that the party has put forward" have been seen less important in determining voter's choice, with the frequency of references ranging from 6.2 to 11.2 percent. "Party programmes", as a reference to a conceivably longer term factor, remained often mentioned in all six elections, with a high of 36.5 percent mentioning it in 1990 to a low of 25.1% in the 2007 elections. In comparison with "leaders" and "solutions to problems", the references to which have varied by 20 percent and 30 percent, respectively, party programme proved a relatively stable voting cue.

3.2.2 Party voting cues

Table 2 shows voting cues for the two leading Croatian parties, HDZ and SDP. Note that in the first two election years the respondents had to choose two answers, and the Table 2 presents only their first choice.

Table 2: Party voting cues in longitudinal perspective³

	1990		1992		1995		2000		2003		2007	
	HDZ	SDP	HDZ	SDP	HDZ	SDP	HDZ	SDP	HDZ	SDP	HDZ	SDP
Party programme	74.8	77.1	68.3	66.7	18.4	32.7	37.3	23.9	38.2	23.4	24.6	31.3
Leader(s)	14.6	12.0	26.8	23.1	57.0	9.1	29.9	5.2	12.7	9.1	22.8	21.0
Candidates in const.	7.2	4.7	3.1	5.1	4.3	18.2	9.0	7.2	6.1	2.6	2.2	6.3
Solutions to problems	1.2	3.1	1.8	5.1	20.3	40.0	23.7	63.7	43.0	64.9	50.4	41.3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: $\alpha = 0.05$

If Table 1 and Table 2 are compared, the findings are most interesting. In both election years, when asked “what is their first reason for voting for that particular party” respondents in more than 66 percent of cases for both parties would answer “party programme”. However, Table 1 shows that leaders and solutions to problems were important almost equally as party programme. It could be argued that the first answer of the respondents was due to rationalization. War and polarization between two leading parties, among which the winning one, HDZ, and second party which was former communist party SDP, led voters in great number to choose the party whose programme was closer to their ideology, or at least this is the way they rationalized to themselves why they choose that party.

The most interesting finding is that in the 1995 election the importance of the “party programme” rapidly dropped from 68.3 percent in 1992 for HDZ to 18.4 in 1995 and for SDP from 66.7 to 32.7 percent, and this happened in favour of leaders (for HDZ), and in favour of solutions to problems (for SDP). Although this comparison could be biased because in elections 1990 and 1992 respondents had to choose two answers and we are looking only on their first choice here, while in 1995 and remaining elections, respondents had to choose only

³ Grbesa (2008) bring the same findings for the elections examined in her paper, 2003 and 2007.

one answer, the results from both tables show that “party programme” as a voting cue was the strongest in the first two election years, and that in later elections never gained more than 30 percent. Furthermore, Table 2 demonstrates that HDZ’s voters more often choose their party because of leaders, while SDP’s voters have cared more about “concrete solutions that the party can offer to solve the problems”.

In later elections, after the death of President Tudjman, HDZ’s voters still based their vote on leader preferences. Almost 30 percent of HDZ voters in 2000 said they had chosen that party because of its leader. However it has to be noted that survey was done only around ten day after the Tudjman’s death, and that respondents, maybe still could not accept the fact that Tudjman passed away and that HDZ did not had leader at all at that time. Furthermore, Tables 2 and 3 illustrate that among other parties, the importance of the leaders ranged from 5.2 percent to 14.3 percent. In 2003, new HDZ’s leader Sanader lost leader-based votes, which suggests that in 2000 voters actually indeed voted for Tudjman, what can be explained with the natural experiment⁴. However, the 17 percent drop in the importance of the HDZ-leader as a motive for vote choices between 2000 and 2003 happened mostly in favour of “solutions to problems”, which perhaps demonstrates that not only SDP’s voters looked for solutions to problems in this period but the HDZ voters as well. Furthermore, in 2007 a rise of more than 10 percent in the importance of the “leader-based” motive for vote can be seen among the SDP’s voters (from 9.1 to 21 percent). Grbesa notices that this is because of the sudden death of Ivica Racan, who was leading the party ever since it was formed and his replacement, only few months before elections, with young and perspective Zoran Milanovic (2008). It could be argued that this is the second natural experiment which proves that leader’ persona matters in determining the voters’ choice, first one happened when Tudjman died

⁴ according to Marshall's Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (1998) this is „an experiment in which the independent variable is not artificially manipulated, but rather changes naturally in terms of its level or presence, so that these alterations can be used to monitor its effect and attempt to determine its impact upon a dependent variable or variables“

what resulted in decrease of importance of leader for more than 20 percent, and the opposite case happened with the death of Racan, when his successor, Zoran Milanovic, gain 10 percent more votes, than Racan in 2003.

“Candidates that party has put forward” did not have any significant influence in determining voting choice of two examined parties, except in 1995 when this variable determined 18 percent of SDP’s votes.

Similar results have been found and among other examined parties. Table 3 demonstrates that in first two election years among voters of other parties the determining factor was party programme, while leaders were second most important variable in determining the vote among HSS, HNS, HSLS and HSP voters. In 1995 significant change happened in determining the voters’ choice, importance of “party programme” rapidly dropped, in favour of short-term variable “solutions to problems”. While leaders were relatively important in first two election years moving in a range from 13 percent of vote to 23 percent, in 1995 this dramatically changed: leaders dropped to only 5.5 percent for coalition of HNS and HSS⁵, from almost 23 percent for HSLS in 1992 to 16 percent in 1995, and from 13.5 percent for HSP leaders to 8 percent. In comparison with SDP, the same trend between these two election years occurred, importance of “party programme” and “leaders” declined in favour of “solutions to problems” and of “candidates that party had put forward”.

But this is not the case and with HDZ voters, for whom, the most important reason for voting for the party, was its’ leader, Franjo Tudjman, with 57 percent. In each election year, Tudjman got more votes among HDZ’s voters than any other leader among other parties, with the exception of 1992 when HSS’s leader got more votes than Tudjman. Drawn on these notions, it is relevant to state that Tudjman based vote existed and that it escalated in year 1995, when he was seen as saviour and hero among his voters, which brought him and his

⁵ Unfortunately, individual results for these two parties are not available, in research they were considered as only one answer „Coalition“, because in 1995 these two parties HSS and HNS made coalition before elections.

party victory with more than 60 percent of seats in parliament (Croatian State Election Commission, 1995). Institutional arrangements, as already mentioned, had great impact, because it is obvious that the voters actually voted for “their president” who deliberated them from the aggression of Serbian rebellions. Unfortunately, there is no research done on the popular perception of the personality of President Tudjman, but it can be stated that his charisma and appearance had a great impact on the voters’ choice. This inference is also supported by the personal observation that in some parts of Croatia in colloquial language he was called “Papa”.

Furthermore, King (2002) and Brettschneider (2002) find that leader based voting is more often among voters who are not members of any party or who do not feel close to any party. These findings are confirmed and in the case of Croatia. Table 4 illustrates that in all elections voters who were not members of any party more often based their vote choice on leader preferences, than the party members. This was not the case only in the last elections, when 19.7 percent of voters who were members of some political party, said they voted for the party because of its leader. However, leader-based vote significantly increased and among non-members between these two election years, what has already been explained with natural experiment (death of SDP’s leader) and personalized campaigns of HDZ and HNS. Looking in a longitudinal perspective, it is visible that non members more often base their vote on short- term factors, leaders and solutions to problems, while members of the parties find party programme more important for determining their vote.

However, it is important to note at this point that party membership was high only in first two elections. Cular (2005) explains that this trend of the “delignment” happened because voters’ excitement and euphoria with the free and democratic multiparty elections declined very soon. He stresses that voters, at the beginning of democratic transition, often claimed to be the members of a certain party although they actually were not, and their claim

often was just an expression of patriotic enthusiasm. Furthermore, Cular finds that antiparty sentiment among Croatian voters has been increasing, which together with the decline of party membership leads to conclusion that voters in Croatia have not develop strong attachments to the parties, “expect maybe HDZ’s voters which have always had high share of voters with party identification” (Grbesa, 2008: 72). Grbesa supports the argument of party dealignment with the fact that 22 percent of voters, who voted for one party in 2003, changed their vote choice in 2007. However, both Grbesa and Cular find evidence of a modest increase of party identification in 2007, which leads them to conclude that the party system in Croatia could finally become more mature and settled.

3.2.3 Explanations from socio-demographic variables

In this phase of my analysis I aim to test if there is any influence of socio-demographic variables on the reasons given for voting for one party or another. Moreover, I want to examine which demographic groups are most likely to vote for a person, rather than for a programme or solutions. Drawn on assumption that different groups of people vote differently (Denver, 2003), I expect to find similarities between reasoning for the vote and different groups of people. I have been looking at gender, assuming that female will more often cast their vote on the basis of leaders. However, Table 5 demonstrates that this was the case only in three elections, what leads to conclusion that gender does not make and difference when it comes to leader-based voting. Yet, it is interesting to notice the difference between male and female when it comes to evaluating the party programme variable; in last four elections males based their vote more often on the party programme than females.

Table 6 illustrates that age did not have much influence on how voters determined their vote in six Croatian elections. Still, my expectation was to find that older people more often base their vote on “solutions to problems”, because they are older and need change

“now”, but evidence for this assumption was not found. The oldest respondents, from age 62 and more, voted more often for leaders than other age groups, in 1990, 1995 and 2007. Party programme variable was the less important for them in comparison with other age groups in five elections. No other significant differences between age groups and reasons for voting were found.

It is visible from Table 7 that education has great influence on how voter's choice is determined. Less educated voters more often base their vote on leaders than educated ones. It is noticed that in five examined elections⁶, voters without school or with unfinished primary school, based their vote on leaders more often than educated voters. Furthermore, voters who have finished university or have even higher education, vote mainly on the basis of “solutions to problems”. Looking in longitudinal perspective, Table 7 demonstrates, that in 1995 voters from each education group voted more on the basis of leaders, what was occasion explained with the “Tudjman based vote”, than in 2000 and 2003, leader-based vote drops, till 2007 when it rose among all groups, even among high educated voters. This rose from 8.2 percent in 2003 to 18.2 percent in 2007 can be explained with the appearance of the new SDP leader, who was presented in the media as a young and well educated lawyer, what must have influenced better educated voters to vote on the basis of leaders.

Fourth socio-demographic variable included in longitudinal survey has been religion. My assumption was that religious voters will more often choose leaders as a reason for their vote choice. However, Table 8 demonstrates that religious and non religious voters do not differ when it comes to reasoning for voting. It could be noticed that only among Catholics there is above average propensity to “vote for leaders”.

⁶ Variable for education was not included in 1992

3.2.4 Television – “The more you know them less you like them”⁷

It is widely accepted that television has had impact on voting behaviour, making it more personality-based (Hayes, 2008: 235). However, Hayes stresses that “there is no evidence that television viewing significantly alters the vote choice criteria used by voters (2008: 246).” On the other hand, Keeter finds that voters who were getting political information from television, voted more often on the basis of personality, than for instance voters who relied on newspapers for political information (1987: 344). Furthermore, he concludes that “television has facilitated and encouraged vote choices based upon the personal qualities of candidates (Keeter, 1987: 344).” Baum notifies that “candidates now use television commercials and, increasingly, appearances on entertainment programs, to shuttle themselves into voters’ living rooms (2005).” Findings from Table 9 show that in the case of Croatia, voters did not like very much what they got in their living rooms. Wattenberg’s findings that leaders became less popular with the rise of personality-based news reporting on television and with personalization in political advertising and that for several American presidents television was “Achilles heels” (1991: 66-91) is supported in Croatia, because voters who relied on television for political information were less willing to cast their vote on leaders than voters who did not watch television at all or who watched it sometimes. More precisely, for the first four elections, respondents were asked to answer with yes or no when asked if they watch television or not, while in the remaining two elections a four point Likert-scale was used. The findings show that in first four elections, the voters who did not watch television at all voted more often on the basis of leader preferences, while in last two elections voters who watched television “sometimes” voted for leaders more frequently than those who

⁷ (Wattenber, 1991)

watched it often, rarely or never. Respondents who watched television “often” were less willing to cast ballot on the basis of leaders in both examined elections.

3.2.5 Feeling thermometers 2003 and 2007

In the survey from 2003 feeling thermometers for parties and leaders were included. Four different feelings, enthusiasm, respect, anxiety and dislike, were offered to the respondents on the five point scale in closed-ended questioner to evaluate leaders. Kasapovic discusses that these are standard categories in evaluating the image of candidates, where the enthusiasm, as part of candidates’ leadership talent, is seen as ability of candidate to mobilize voters for his or her ideas and programmes; where in more narrow definition, respect expresses leaders’ integrity, what is seen as part of his or her conventional political role; while anxiety and dislike are characteristics that are counted as non-political features of candidates (2004: 374). Since in 2003 leaders did not significantly influence the respondent’s choice for voting, the assumption is that leaders will not be positively evaluated, what Table 10 confirms. An interesting finding concerns the evaluation of Ivo Sanader, who was estimated to have provoked the biggest enthusiasm among the respondents, what can be seen from the Table 10., yet he also provoked the highest anxiety and dislike among respondents. Vesna Pusic follows him in both respects. However, Kasapovic concludes that not even one candidate is extremely negatively or extremely positively evaluated so that he or she could mobilize voters to vote for or against him or her (2004: 376). Still, findings on evaluation of Sanader and Pusic (Table 10) in comparison with reasoning for the voting among their voters, should not be ignored, and should lead to conclusion that leaders and how voters feel about them, matter. Besides that, Table 11, shows attitudes toward parties on the five point scale from strongly negative to strongly positive, from which it can be noticed that respondents

were mostly irrelevant when evaluating HDZ and HNS, just as they were in evaluating other parties.

In 2007 a more adequate survey on the evaluation of the parties and leaders was carried out. Respondent were asked to evaluate both parties and leaders, on the scale from one to five, where one indicated “strongly negative” feeling and ten “strongly positive”. First, I estimated a model where vote choice is regressed on a number of socio-demographics (age, gender, education) and the feeling thermometer for parties. To see whether the evaluation of the leaders significantly relates with vote choice and increases vote choice prediction, I estimated a second model where feeling thermometer for party leaders is added to the previous model as an independent variable. Table 12 reports three measures of R-squared for the two models.

Table 12: Pseudo R-Squares for Model 1 and Model 2

Pseudo R-Square	Parties	Parties and Leaders
Cox and Snell	.657	.760
Nagelkerke	.672	.777
McFadden	.279	.371

An increase in the explanatory power of the second model compared to the first one is noticeable although the simple inspection of these values is not enough for determining whether the difference is significant. To determine whether the second model fits better I conducted a test of the difference in the model fit of the two models (Chi-square test). To estimate this I employed the ‘chidist’ function in Excel, where the -2LL difference of the two models is the Chi-Square and the degree of freedom difference is the degree of freedom value. The result is 0, which indicates that the second model fits significantly better the data. This

suggests that the assessment of the leader brings an important contribution to the model and increases the model fit.

The same model has been estimated for seven western democracies; in order too see if evaluation of the leaders significantly influences the vote choice. Relying on the literature about modernization, party dealignment and increasing importance of the leaders in determining voters' choice, the expectation was to find that second model, the one that includes demographics, the evaluation of the parties and the evaluation of the leaders, will fit the data significantly better than the first model, which includes only demographics and party evaluation. Table 13 demonstrates that this was the case for all examined countries. The results show that by comparing three types of pseudo R-squares we can see improvement in the explanatory power of Model 2 compared to Model 1. However, by simple looking at R-squares we can not say if this difference is significant.

To sum up, evidence that support the idea of leader's importance in determining voter's choice have been find in all examined countries. However, this exercise does not reveal what evidence and how strong is this evidence.

Conclusion

Inspired by the literature about leader - based voting and different explanations behind it, I wanted to examine if there is any evidence of leader-based voting in Croatia from 1990 to 2007.

First I was looking for evidence of the leader-based vote during Tudjman's era. The results from the survey show that Tudjman-based vote was strong, and that in 1995 it reached the highest point with 57 percent of voters who said they voted for HDZ because of Tudjman. Such voting tendency may be at least partly assigned to institutional arrangements and political circumstances that took place at that time. Some authors find that institutional arrangements and electoral formulas can have impact on personal- based vote; more precisely, they find that personal-based vote is significantly higher in presidential systems, in single-member district systems and in open list proportional representation systems (Carey and Shugart, 1995). Bearing in mind that Croatia had semi-presidential system from 1990 to 2000, and absolute majority system with single member district in 1990 and segmented electoral system in 1992 and 1995, we can assume that institutional arrangements certainly favoured Tudjman-based vote.

Furthermore, the rise of Tudjman-based vote in 1995 may be explained by political circumstances, more precisely war victory and liberation of the territory that was occupied by Serbian rebellion. In addition to that, it is likely that Tudjman-based voting was that prominent due to rationalization, meaning that voters perceived him as a hero who brought them independence and liberty.

However, the data do not show significant findings of a leader-based vote in this period among other parties, which indicates that we can talk only about Tudjman-based vote,

and not about the leader-based vote in general since this has not been the trend, but a single case.

After the death of Tudjman in 1999, political environment significantly changed; the dominant HDZ had to step down after ten years in power and Coalition under the leadership of a social democrat Ivica Račan, took over. Besides that and new president of the state was elected. As Grbesa (2008) argues, it is only with these changes that leader-based voting in Croatia can be discussed in the context of 'Western' theories which explain the rise of a candidate-based voting. In 2000 leader-based voting significantly dropped from 30 percent in 1995 to 11 percent. Grbesa (2008) suggests that this was due to Tudjman's death who died three weeks before the elections leaving HDZ without a leader. Still, 30 percent of the HDZ voters still stated that they would vote for HDZ because of the late Tudjman. This leads to conclusion that Tudjman-based vote influenced voters' decision even after he died, in 2000. Although the survey was conducted two weeks before elections, and one week after Tudjman's death, this is another argument which underlines the Tudjman-based voting hypothesis.

To sum up, the period from 1990 to 2000 in voting behaviour in Croatia was marked by Tudjman-based vote, while leaders of other parties had little influence on their voters. Furthermore, in this period party programme was a relatively stable variable in predicting voters' behaviour, while candidates in constituencies did not have significant impact on the voters during this period. Finally, voters' intentions to cast their vote based on actual solutions to problems significantly increased in 2000 and remained a stable variable in determining voters' choices in Croatia.

In 2003 importance of the leaders dropped even more, what was due to fact that the new HDZ leader, Sanader, still did not gain the support of the voters. However, this constellation was changed in 2007, when leader-based vote significantly raised, due to

personalized campaigns of HDZ, HNS and HSLS, and the change of leadership in SDP, following the death of Ivica Račan. Furthermore, as the leader-based voting increased, the importance of the party programme as a voting cue significantly declined, and was again at the same point as in 2000. This, together with Grbesa's findings of high percent of voters who changed their vote choice between these two elections, leads to conclude, that although the party programme remains the most stable voting cue, the data suggest that the leaders, as a short-term changeable variable have had an important impact on voters' behaviour in Croatia.

These findings have been confirmed with the results which have included evaluation of the leaders and which has also shown that the leaders had impact on voters' choices in Croatia in 2007. This analysis has been repeated for seven other western democracies, and the results imply that we could talk about general impact of leaders on voters' behaviour in western democracies, because in seven examined countries the models that included leaders' evaluation have had better explanatory power than the model with only parties. However, this comparison should be taken cautiously because, the data for Croatia used in this analysis are from 2007, while the data for other countries are taken from CSES Module 1 which included elections from 1996 to 2001.

Finally, aside from examining the leader-based voting hypothesis itself, this paper attempted to test some common correlations assigned to leader-based voting. First I looked into the assumption that voters who rely on television for political information are more inclined to vote for "person" rather than "issue". Yet, the results of a longitudinal survey suggest that this has not been the case in Croatia: Croatian voters who get information from television are less likely to base their votes on leaders.

Second, I looked into the, assumption that different social groups vote differently (Denver, 2003), i.e. that socio-demographic variables influence on voters' choice in a

longitudinal perspective. However, no significant connection has been found between voters' gender, age, religion, education or party membership and reasoning behind their vote.

To conclude, this paper has found evidence of the leader-based voting in Croatia. While leader-based voting during Tudjman's era has the reasoning of its own and may be explained primarily by the country's specific political circumstances and secondly by institutional arrangements, leader-based voting in the period after Tudjman's death may be explained by modernization theories, party delignemnt and "rise of a leader-centred politics." However, two electoral cycles which fall into this period are not sufficient to give any meaningful conclusions. Hopefully future electoral studies will be able to answer questions that have remained unclear in this paper.

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Croatian Peasant Party http://www.hss.hr/onama_pov.php

Croatian Social Liberal Party

<http://www.hsrls.hr/CROATIANSOCIALLIBERALPARTYHSLs/tabid/95/language/en-GB/Default.aspx>

Croatian Party of Right <http://hsp.hr/content/view/17/32/>

Freedom House

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/countries.htm>

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIWAllScores.xls>

Social Democratic Party <http://www.sdp.hr/o-sdp-u/ivica-racan>

Tables

Table 3: Party voting cues (HSS, HNS, HSLS, HSP) in longitudinal perspective*

	1990		1992			1995			2000			
	HSS	HNS	HSS	HSLS	HSP	Coalition (HSS)	HSLS	HSP	HNS	HSS	HSLS	HSP
Party programme	62,3	65,3	63	68,3	77,9	27,6	36,8	52	22,2	14,3	16,7	37,1
Leader(s)	22,6	23	16,7	21,9	13,5	5,5	16	8	8,3	4,8	6,1	14,3
Candidates in const.	1,9	2,3	3,7	0,9	1,2	18,8	10,4	8	16,7	11,9	9,8	8,6
Solutions to problems	13,2	9,4	16,7	8,9	7,4	48,1	36,8	32	52,8	69	67,4	40
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

2003					2007			
HSS	HNS	HSLS	HSP		HSS	HSLS	HNS	HSP
24,4	25	50	35,7		22,2	4,8	21,3	29,2
8,9	19,1	0	7,1		3,7	23,8	24,6	4,2
4,4	8,8	0	26,2		22,2	9,5	11,5	16,7
62,2	47,1	50	31		51,9	61,9	42,6	50
100	100	100	100		100	100	100	100

Note: $\alpha = 0.05$

* In 1990 among „relevant parties“ that I have chosen for this research only HSS was participating in elections; in 1995 HSS and HNS were in pre-election coalition, so that individual data for these two parties do not exist; furthermore, results for the 2003 and 2007 match with the results find in Grbesa, 2008.

Table 4: Party membership

	1990		1992		1995		2000		2003		2007	
Party member	Member	Not m.	Member	Not m.	Member	Not m.	Member	Not m.	Member	Not m.	Member	Not m.
Party programme	78,4	69,2	75	66,9	39,7	23,8	39,7	23,8	44,2	27	24,8	26,8
Leader(s)	12,7	14,8	18,6	23,5	9,1	11,3	9,1	11,3	6,7	13,3	19,7	17,3
Candidates in const.	2,4	3,3	2,2	1,6	10,2	8,7	10,2	8,7	5,8	9,2	6,3	5,5
Solutions to problems	6,3	12,7	4,1	8	40,8	56,2	40,8	56,2	43,3	50,5	49,2	50,4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: $\alpha = 0.05$

Table 5: Gender

	1990		1992		1995		2000		2003		2007	
Gender	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Party programme	68,8	75	67,5	68,7	32,7	22,8	26,4	24,5	34,2	24,3	29,8	21,1
Leader(s)	15,1	13,1	23,2	22,6	26,7	33,7	11,5	10,9	11,5	13,4	17,6	20,9
Candidates in const.	2,6	3,2	1,2	2,1	9,4	9,8	8,9	9,3	7,9	9,6	6,9	5,6
Solutions to problems	13,5	8,6	8	6,6	31,2	33,7	53,1	55,3	46,4	52,7	45,7	52,4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: $\alpha = 0.05$

Table 6: Does the age of respondent have influence on reason for voting?

Age	1990					1992				
	18-28	29-39	40-50	51-61	62 and more	18-28	29-39	40-50	51-61	62 and more
Party programme	72,1	74	70,2	71,4	73,8	68,5	66,7	69,3	68,8	65,6
Leader(s)	13,5	11	16,1	14,3	19,2	22,7	24,6	22,5	20,4	23,8
Candidates in const.	2,2	2	4,9	4,4	0,9	1,3	1,4	2,3	2	1,3
Solutions to problems	12,2	12	8,7	9,8	6,1	7,6	7,4	5,9	8,9	9,3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

1995					2000				
18-28	29-39	40-50	51-61	62 and more	18-28	29-39	40-50	51-61	62 and more
26	34,9	27,1	25	22	19,5	23,4	29	33,3	24,6
27,5	20,6	29	32,1	51,2	15,7	8,6	7,2	8,5	13,5
8	9	12,9	9,3	8,1	11,9	8,6	7,7	6,8	7,1
38,5	35,4	31	33,6	18,7	52,9	59,4	56	51,3	54,8
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

2003					2007				
18-28	29-39	40-50	51-61	62 and more	18-28	29-39	40-50	51-61	62 and more
25,6	32,1	31,2	30,7	27,6	23,4	27,1	24,5	26,3	24,4
8	12,4	14,3	14,3	12,2	17,2	15,3	18,2	19,4	23,9
12	10,2	10,4	7,1	5,9	6,2	11	6,3	5,4	4
54,4	45,3	44,2	47,9	54,3	53,1	46	51	48,9	47,8
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: $\alpha = 0.05$

Table 7: Education and reason for the voting in longitudinal perspective

Education	1990						1995				
	Secondary school – general	Up to 8 th grade of Primary school	University	Secondary school - vocational	Polytechnic school	No formal education	Incomplete primary school	Primary school	High school	Polytechnic school	University
Party programme	67,3	68,9	75,6	73,3	73,3	15,4	9,4	21,1	29,2	31	33,3
Leader(s)	21,2	17,7	11,3	11,5	10,1	73,1	65,6	39,4	27,3	21,8	17,4
Candidates in const.	2,4	1,8	2,8	4,8	3,8	0	6,2	11,3	10,4	5,7	11,4
Solutions to problems	9,1	11,7	10,3	10,4	12,9	11,5	18,8	28,2	33,1	41,4	37,9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

	2000						
	No formal education	Incomplete primary school	Primary school	High school	Polytechnic school	University	Postgraduate study
Party programme	33,3	46,7	23,1	25,5	29	22,3	37,5
Leader(s)	16,7	26,7	24,2	8,9	5,4	10	0
Candidates in const.	16,7	0	8,8	10	8,6	6,9	12,5
Solutions to problems	33,3	26,7	44	55,6	57	60,8	50
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

2003							
	No formal education	Incomplete primary school	Primary school	High school	Polytechnic school	University	Postgraduate study
Party programme	57,1	22,6	20,2	29,5	34,2	37,6	12,5
Leader(s)	14,3	19,4	11,4	13,4	10,1	8,2	12,5
Candidates in const.	0	3,2	9,6	9	7,6	9,4	12,5
Solutions to problems	28,6	54,8	58,8	48	48,1	44,7	62,5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

2007							
	No formal education	Incomplete primary school	Primary school	High school	Polytechnic school	University	Postgraduate study
Party programme	18,8	21,4	19,4	28,3	29,4	27,3	50
Leader(s)	34,4	23,5	24	14,5	17,6	18,2	0
Candidates in const.	6,2	5,1	5,7	5,5	9,4	8	0
Solutions to problems	40,6	50	50,9	51,7	43,5	46,6	50
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: $\alpha = 0.05$

Table 8: Religion

Religion	1990					1992				
	Catholic	Orthodox	Islam	Other	none	Catholic	Orthodox	Islam	other	none
Party programme	69,5	81,9	77,3	58,3	75,7	68,3	78,4	68	66,7	65,8
Leader(s)	16,4	13	4,5	16,7	10,1	23,1	16,2	20	13,3	22,6
Candidates in const.	2,8	2,2	0	8,3	3,4	1,5	0	0	0	3,1
Solutions to problems	11,2	2,9	18,2	16,7	10,7	7,1	5,4	12	20	8,6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

1995					2000				
Catholic	Orthodox	Islam	other	None	Catholic	Orthodox	Islam	other	none
27	20	0	50	32,4	26,3	27,3	0	33,3	22,4
32,6	20	25	0	12,2	12,1	0	33,3	0	5,1
9,2	10	0	0	14,9	9	18,2	0	0	10,2
31,2	50	75	50	40,5	52,6	54,5	66,7	66,7	62,2
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

2003					2007				
Catholic	Orthodox	Islam	other	None	Catholic	Orthodox	Islam	other	none
28,7	25	37,5	50	32,2	24,1	35,1	20	25	31,7
12,7	7,1	25	0	11,9	19,2	16,2	20	12,5	22,2
9,5	3,6	0	12,5	3,4	6,2	2,7	20	0	7,9
49	64,3	37,5	37,5	52,5	50,5	45,9	40	62,5	38,1
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: $\alpha = 0.05$

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Table 9: Do the voters who rely on television for political information, vote more often on the basis of leaders?

Television	1990		1992		1995		2000	
	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	Yes	no
Party programme	72,8	61,4	68,8	53,5	27,7	22,4	25,5	25,9
Leader(s)	13,9	25,7	22,6	26,8	30,3	32,7	10,1	24,1
Candidates in const.	2,9	1,4	1,6	2,8	9,8	6,1	8,8	11,1
Solutions to problems	10,4	11,4	7	16,9	32,1	38,8	55,6	38,9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Television	2003				2007			
	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
Party programme	28,8	28,2	32,6	39,1	16,7	16	32,7	23,8
Leader(s)	11	16,7	13	13	16,7	24	17,6	19,7
Candidates in const.	7,7	13,2	6,5	4,3	16,7	12	8,5	5,1
Solutions to problems	52,4	42	47,8	43,5	50	48	41,2	51,4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: $\alpha = 0.05$

Table 10: Feelings for the leaders in 2003*

	Entuzijazam					Tjeskoba				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Dražen Budiša	43,1	19,7	24,4	8,9	4,0	48,0	18,0	18,1	7,2	8,6
Anto Đapić	41,1	16,0	21,3	12,6	9,0	51,6	18,3	15,1	6,0	9,0
Vesna Pusić	40,5	12,9	22,1	13,2	11,3	54,6	13,8	13,7	5,0	12,9
Ivica Račan	32,4	17,4	27,6	12,6	9,9	51,4	17,2	16,9	4,9	9,6
Ivo Sanader	45,1	14,1	19,2	10,0	11,6	46,7	14,8	16,4	8,1	14,0
Zlatko Tomčić	30,0	19,3	29,9	14,8	6,0	51,6	19,3	18,4	5,8	4,9

	Poštovanje					Odbojnost				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Dražen Budiša	32,3	18,1	28,5	13,2	7,9	42,8	15,8	16,2	9,7	15,5
Anto Đapić	32,7	17,1	26,7	13,9	9,5	48,0	15,3	15,3	8,2	13,3
Vesna Pusić	31,8	13,8	24,0	16,0	14,4	49,8	14,2	10,7	6,5	18,8
Ivica Račan	23,5	16,1	30,5	17,9	12,0	49,1	15,9	14,6	7,5	12,9
Ivo Sanader	36,3	15,6	21,7	13,4	13,0	42,1	12,0	15,0	10,6	20,3
Zlatko Tomčić	18,0	18,3	34,7	19,4	9,5	49,4	18,2	17,2	7,3	7,9

Note: $\alpha = 0.05$

* The same results have been provided in Kasapovic, 2004

Table 11: Evaluation of the leaders in 2003

	Attitude toward parties 2003					Total
	Strongly negative	Mostly negative	Neither negative neither positive	Mostly positive	Strongly positive	
HDZ	21,8	22,9	24,8	17,9	12,6	100
HNS	15	13,5	34,7	30,4	6,4	100
HSS	7,4	11,9	38,8	36,8	5,1	100
HSLs	13	21,5	41,5	21,5	2,5	100
HSP	14	16,8	38,4	21,6	9,1	100
SDP	16,1	15,5	32,7	27,2	8,5	100

Note: $\alpha = 0.05$

Table 13: Pseudo R-squares for seven western democracies

	Pseudo R-square	Model with parties	Model with parties and leaders
Britain	Cox and Snell	.721	.741
	Nagelkerke	.780	.801
	McFadden	.494	.522
Germany	Cox and Snell	.721	.794
	Nagelkerke	.752	.829
	McFadden	.401	.499
Netherland	Cox and Snell	.821	.872
	Nagelkerke	.840	.892
	McFadden	.455	.543
Norway	Cox and Snell	.884	.893
	Nagelkerke	.904	.914
	McFadden	.570	.593
Portugal	Cox and Snell	.744	.777
	Nagelkerke	.811	.845
	McFadden	.544	.595
Spain	Cox and Snell	.696	.750
	Nagelkerke	.732	.788
	McFadden	.396	.456
Denmark	Cox and Snell	.897	.905
	Nagelkerke	.916	.924
	McFadden	.589	.609