A STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE
Explaining the Actions, Motives and Fall of German Social Democracy in the First Czechoslovak Republic

By

Claudia Breit Whiteus

Submitted to
Central European University
History Department

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Supervisor: Professor Alfred J. Rieber
Second Reader: Professor Jacek Kochanowicz

Budapest, Hungary

2010

Abstract:

This work examines the twenty year lifespan of the German Social Democratic Worker's Party (DSAP) during the First Czechoslovak Republic, from it's foundation in 1918 until the annexation of the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany through the Munich Agreement in 1938. I explore the party's struggle to find a voice in the multinational State and, in the thirties, to oppose the radical nationalist politics of first the Sudeten-German National Socialist Worker's Party (DSNAP) and, upon its creation in 1933, the Nazi-backed Sudeten German Party (SdP) led by *Turnverband* leader Konrad Henlein. My study aims to understand why the DSAP, as the most popular German party throughout the nineteen-twenties, failed to maintain its popularity. I explore a range of external factors, factors outside the party's control, and internal factors, mistakes or failures of the party leadership which, combined, led to the party's rapid downfall in favor of the SdP. By 1938, the DSAP was the only remaining democratic party.

For this study, I have used a variety of secondary sources, mainly German, and a selection of primary sources in the form of party newsletters and newspapers, memoirs, propaganda, and party protocols, mostly found at the Collegium Carolinum in Munich, Germany.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Professor Alfred Rieber for helping me develop and expand this piece. Due thanks also go to Robin Bellers for his help in the editing process.

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION

For the five years this atmosphere [of Nazi domination of German life in Czechoslovakia] has lasted, we have done nothing to support those people in the German camp who resisted fascism. In those five years not one of us-not even the last few months-has been able to recognize one of the most important truths of our time, a truth that will shape the fate of Europe: the one German is not like the other.[1]

Journalist Milena Jesenska for the magazine *Přítomnost* in May 1938

Germany's surrender in 1945 unleashed a gigantic backlash or terror and retribution against collaborators in the territories which Nazi Germany had occupied during the war. This was no different in Czechoslovakia, where the retribution took an especially vehement form. Not only were the postwar trial of war criminals and Nazi collaborators considered one of the most thorough in Europe, the collective scope of anti-German policies were arguably the most extreme.[2] Widely regarded as responsible for deliberately provoking the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia through the 1938 Munich Agreement, all members of the country's sizable and historic German minority were targeted collectively as traitors, Nazis, and, more generally, as Hitler's opportunistic "fifth columnists."

Just months after Czechoslovakia's liberation, this sentiment was manifested in the Beneš Decrees, which identified the country's German and Magyar citizens as "persons upon whom the country cannot place reliance" and mandated their expulsion and the immediate confiscation of their property.[3] By 1948, the State had successfully purged its country of its roughly three million Germans, who either by force or coercion

[1] Milena Jesenska, "There Will Be No *Anschluss*" in *The Journalism of Milena Jesenska* (Oxford: Bergham Books, 2003), 166.
[2] Benjamin Frommer, *National Cleansing: Retribution against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia. (*Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2.
[3] "The Beneš Decrees, Article 4a. in *Documents on the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans,* Dr. Wilhelm K. Turnwald, ed. (Munich: University Press, 1953).

had abandoned their country and homes for Germany and Austria.[4] Germandom, like the Germans, was dead in Czechoslovakia; German schools, newspapers, and organizations were, by 1946, gone from the Czechoslovak landscape. Some 1,700 German antifascists also willingly chose to leave the country where their native tongue was now a curse on the job market and in the socio-cultural world.[5]

The strength of the Nazi contingent among Czechoslovakia's Germans before the Munich Agreement, and even during the war, can hardly be mitigated. Having been hit hardest by the economic depression, many Sudetens complained they were being deliberately discriminated against by the Czech-dominated government. By 1938, over ninety percent of Sudeten Germans voted for the *Sudetendeutsche Partei* (SdP), Henlein's radical nationalist party which, in 1938, demanded the Sudetenland's incorporation into Hitler's Reich.[6] In doing so, the Henleinists actively collaborated with Hitler and gave him a tangible rationalization for his demands on Czechoslovakia in 1938, aiding his success at the infamous Munich Conference in the same year. The terror of the years that ensued fostered among many Czechs an uncompromising, and collective hate against all things German.

---

[4] The estimation of the number of Germans expelled differed widely by source, nationality and political inclination. Three million is a rough compromise drawn from various sources. The Czech government in its publication *Facing History*, suggests 2.5 million Germans were expelled, According to a 1958 demographic study in Germany, 3,000,400 Germans were expelled.

Zdenek Beneš, Vaclav Kurl, eds. *Facing History: The Evolution of Czech-German relations in the Czech Provinces, 1948-1948* (Prague: Gallery s.r.o, 2002), 219.

"Die deutschen Vertreibungsverluste," in *Bevölkerungsbilanzen für die deutschen Vertreibungsgebiete 1939/50*. (Wiesbaden - Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1958)

[5] Barbora Cermakova and David Weber, eds., *Sie bieben der Tschechoslowakei treu: Biographische Interviews mit deutschen Antifaschisten.* (Czech Republic: Ustav pro soudobe dejiny, 2008), 7.

[6] I will use term "Sudeten" or "Sudeten German" to refer to Germans native to the regions within the borders of the Czechoslovak State. Alternatively, I will use "Czechoslovak Germans."

Yet only a surface level analysis would focus exclusively on the guilt of Czechoslovakia's Germans. However, a deeper examination of their prewar and their wartime activities will reveal that the German population of the country was by no means a collective mass of Nazi-enthusiasts. As a result of the constraints in accessing sources in Communist Czechoslovakia, only few historical studies, largely German, have focused on those Sudeten Germans who actively opposed Hitlerism and the dismemberment of the Czechoslovak State. These studies reveal a deep fragmentation within Sudeten politics between 1918 and 1938, the rapid rise and extraordinary success of radical Henleinism often overshadowing the slow decline of the previously dominant Sudeten German political groups which fundamentally opposed a union with Germany and whose politics were invested in pursuing progressive policies by collaborating in the mainstream Czech government.

The historical resistance of one such group, the German Social Democratic Party (DSAP) was perhaps the most significant.[7] Given their status as the largest German party of the country on the eve of Hitler's rise to power, having consistently received the highest percentage of Sudeten German votes since the elections of 1919[8] and, since 1929, part of the government coalition, this group was fundamentally replaced in favor of the radical, anti-state policies of Henlein's new Sudeten German Party in its fateful victory in the elections of 1935. Historically referred to as an "activist" party, that is a party which fundamentally supported the existence of the State and its constitution, the German Social Democrats attempted to temper the considerable nationalist mood among the country's

[7] Hundreds (exact number is unknown due to the international character of the party itself) of Communist Sudeten Germans remained members of the KPČ, the communist party in interwar Czechoslovakia, fighting with their Czech comrades in the interest of the State even after the rise of Henlein. Since the party was *not* devoted to national interests, I see their fight as one separate from that of the DSAP, whose voter base lay exclusively in among the German population of the country.

[8] See Figure 1: "Wie die Sudetendeutschen politisch wählten." [How the Sudeten Germans voted politically]

Germans, insisting that Hitler was not the solution to the Sudeten's economic plight, or its perceived discriminate treatment by the central government in Prague. Instead, they insisted on cooperation with Prague and fighting for democratic reform in terms of federative national politics to defend a State-centered understanding of the country.

In what was truly a multinational State, the DSAP, as the formerly most popular German party, seemed the only hope of combatting popular Nazism in the sphere of Sudeten politics. The direction in which these politics were heading threatened not only the liberty of Czechoslovakia's Germans, but also the safety of the entire State. Given the disastrous consequences of the radicalization of the Sudeten German population, the study of the DSAP's political decline and failed resistance not only deserves due scholarly, but also popular attention. After virtually ignoring the existence of German antifascists of the period for some sixty years, the topic has been brought to the attention of the Czech public through generous grants from the government, and has now, in the last year, finally become recognized and finally presented to the general public by Czech state-sponsored cultural campaigns.

Despite a considerable effort by the DSAP to oppose radical German fascism and to promote Czech-German cooperation before and during the war, these politicians, until quite recently, were hardly spoken of until beginning of the twenty-first century. In August 2005, fifty years after the end of the war, the Czech government officially recognized the efforts of the German antifascists, and apologized for the humiliation they suffered after the war.[9] In accordance with this apology, the Czech government sponsored a project which aimed at the documentation of the fates of active Nazi-opponents. The result of interviews and archival research were a series of publications (historical analysis

[9] "Erklärung der Regierung der Tschechischen Republik gegenueber aktiven NS-Gegenern, die nach dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges von den in der Tschechoslowakei angewendeten Massnahmen gegen die sog, feindliche Bevoelkerung betroffen waren." from the Museum "Vergessene Helden" in Ústí nad Labem.

and interviews), a short film, and an exhibition in the former German city of Aussig/Ústí nad Labem called "Forgotten Heroes" documenting the struggle and suffering of German antifascists before, during, and after the war.

Given the recent resurgence in the topic on the public sphere, I propose to write a comprehensive narrative, a political biography of the party, which follows the fate of the DSAP from the foundation of the First Republic in 1918 through its decline in favor of radical German nationalism in the nineteen-thirties. I will analyze the factors which led to this decline, which I propose can be explained by a combination of factors outside the party's control and within it, and how the DSAP attempted to struggle against the Sudeten nationalist movement.

The DSAP's efforts have still not been extensively analyzed on a broad scale. What historians *have* shown is that the DSAP's allegiance to the State, its resistance to Sudeten nationalism, and the ideals represented by the party ultimately failed to affect the looming Munich Agreement, the eventual dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and the elimination of Czechoslovakia's German population after the war.

The sources from which I base my study are largely rooted in political memoirs and interviews of active party members, selected party newspapers and memorandums, as well as a plethora of secondary sources which peripherally deal with the DSAP, the Sudetenland, and interwar Czechoslovakia in general. Literature dealing with the DSAP itself is sparse and much of these studies are concentrated on a specific aspect of the party, or on Sudeten antifascism in general.

Martin K. Bachstein's *Wenzel Jaksch und die sudetendeutsche Sozialdemokratie*[10] provides a heavily researched account of internal party politics, concentrating specifically on the party's later leader, Wenzel Jaksch. Bachstein's concentration of Jaksch, however,

[10] Martin K. Bachstein, *Wenzel Jaksch und die sudetendeutsche Sozialdemokratie.* (Munich, 1974).

obscures his ability to present the party's evolution and struggle objectively, drawing primarily from Jaksch's writing. Perhaps the strongest history of pre-Munich Sudeten politics was written by J.W. Bruegel in *Czechoslovakia before Munich,*[11] whose particular emphasis on the failure of German Social Democracy considering the negativist policies of the German radical nationalists sheds light on crucial elements of my study, yet does not specifically follow the the DSAP. Nancy Wingfield's *Minority politics in a multinational State,*[12] perhaps the most study most specific to the the DSAP, provides a detailed structural narrative of the DSAP in the context of Czechoslovakia's government, if primarily political and lacking firsthand accounts. My study bridges the gap in these works, focusing solely on the DSAP, dealing directly with first-hand accounts of a wide range of participants and witnesses.

The structure of my study will largely follow a linear path. The early years of the Republic, I will argue in my first research chapter, were crucial in debilitating the DSAP's capacity for popular support at the turn of the decade, a combination of the State's problematic constitution, and the DSAP's lonely position as a simultaneously socialist and national party acting to deter it from early government involvement until their participation in the government coalition in 1929. The second research chapter will deal with the consequences of economic crisis of the late twenties and Hitler's *Machergreifung* in Germany in 1933, which served acted to weaken, if not cripple the DSAP's continued reign in German politics in the State. As the years progressed, as I explore in the following chapter, I propose that several internal elements worked to handicap the movement even further. Political divisions, fragmentations within the party, and the lack of a clearly designed political program exasperated the party's precarious

[11] J. W. Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia before Munich: the German minority problem and British appeasement policy*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
[12] Nancy Merriwhether Wingfield, *Minority Politics in a Multinational State. (*New York, Columbia University Press, 1989).

position, making it easy for further external developments to destroy its capacity for successful activist, antifascist politics. In the final research chapter, I will explore the DSAP's efforts and, ultimately, their failure to oppose Henlein's SdP and later the Munich Agreement in the crucial year of 1938.

In this study I aim to show, as acclaimed Czech journalist Milena Jesenska rightly pointed out in May 1938, that "the one German *is not* like the other."[13] Czechoslovakia's Germans, by October 1938, were not all part of the Hitler's war machine. Some, like those members and supporters of the DSAP, were part of a determined and well-established democratic Sudeten movement.

[13] Jesenska, 166.

I. THEORETICAL APPROACH

My investigation into the role of the German Social Democrats in interwar Czechoslovakia draws upon of two concepts. First, my study requires a clarification of what a nationality-based social democracy *is* and the prewar influences which dictated the formation and beliefs of the party. To understand the circumstances of both the party's politics and their role in the State, one must also define the position of minorities in the newly created Czechoslovak State, and in postwar Europe in general. A brief, yet candid analysis of these two principles will elucidate the evolution of the enormous ideological and national conflicts also within the Czechoslovak State.

1.1 German Social Democracy in the pre-1918 Context: The Legacy of Austro-Marxism

Several opposing terms appear in the name of the German Social Democratic Party, officially founded in 1919. First, "German" implies an agenda based on the protection and support of a specific ethnicity. "Social" implies the left-wing politics of internationalism, multicultural understanding, and economic equality within the State. Thus, a brief history of the evolution of the social democratic principle, as it had evolved in Austria-Hungary before the war, is necessary to understand the DSAP's complex conglomeration of political ideology in a historical context.

The idea of social democracy, as it had developed in the Austro-Hungarian Empire by its collapse, had been framed most prominently by Austrian politicians, self-proclaimed "Austro-Marxists" led by Otto Bauer and Karl Renner. Austro-Marxists of the prewar period, the *only* supranational party of the Empire, hoped to solve the empire's multinational construction by working on tempering class conflicts rather than following the didactics of a proletarian revolution, as suggested by Lenin. [14] While radically leftist

[14] Norbert Leser, "Austro-Marxism: A Reappraisal," (*Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 11, No. 2/3, Special Issue: Conflict and Compromise), 134.

when compared to the German Habsburg loyalists, Austro-Marxists of this period felt that nationality and individuality *could* coexist in the multinational Empire. While, as historian Mark Blum argues, "the Austro-Marxists did not represent a school of thought besides their diverse orientations to Marx, nature, and culture," their various ideas "survive[d] over generations" and can "still be applied to present problems."[15] The idea that nationality, socialism, and democracy could exist side-by-side is what the legacy of the Austro-Marxists brought the DSAP in the years after the war.

Though leading Austro-Marxists differed slightly on several political ideas, they were proximally, according to Otto Bauer in 1927 united by the "particular nature of their scholarly work" which dealt largely with balancing Marxist ideas with the concept of history and nationality.[16] While stressing the importance of a realistic approach to the unity of the working class, Bauer, in his editorial introduction to a 1907 edition the movement's mouthpiece, *Der Kampf,* contends that certain nations have certain qualities, which, if mixed together, will be "to everyone's advantage." Bauer assigns the Austrians the particular the task of "translating internationalism into *living* reality."[17]

Herein, as will become clear in the first chapter of my study, the reader will see how the legacy of the early Austro-Marxists became the ideological basis of the DSAP. Bauer argued in 1907 that "common descent and common culture [which defines the nation] are both instruments for the same effective factor," namely the factor of producing a sense of community among people.[18] Though commonalities in national descent provide the history of community-based solidarity, a "common destiny" has the ability to unite

[15] Mark E. Blum, *The Austro-Marxists, 1890-1918*: *A Psychobiographical Study* (Lexington, KN: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 20-21.
[16] Otto Bauer, "What is Austro-Marxism," in *Austro-Marxism,* Tom Bottomore and Pattrick Goode, trans. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 45.
[17] Otto Bauer, "Editorial Introduction to the First Issue of *Der Kampf,"* in *Austro-Marxism.* 53. Italics added.
[18] Otto Bauer, "The Concept of the 'Nation," in *Austro-Marxism.* 102-103.

people based on laws, class, and ideology. If ethnicity (which I take from Bauer's reference to mean common descent and culture) can produce community, then common laws can also produce a community. This community of laws, however, cannot stand on its own. Common laws," Bauer argues, "certainly are an important means of forming the common character, but the latter can exist *provided that* the other elements are effective enough to unite the individuals in a cultural community."[19] Thus, the nation is *not* a dispensable formation. It provides the framework for providing a community based on sociopolitical laws and practices. Karl Renner, Bauer's close associate, principally agreed with Bauer's principle of balancing nationalism and Marxism, holding that ethnic identities must be preserved in order to justify the "international" character of the socialist system in a multinational state.[20]

Bauer and Renner political ideas were roughly translated into the party policy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, by nowa nationally heterogeneous party with increasingly divergent nationalist interests. By the late eighteen-eighties, writes historian Arthur Kogan in his 1949 study on Habsburg Social Democracy, the Social Democratic Party realized that "the settlement of the nationalities problem was the prerequisite of social and political progress in Austria."[21] This realization led to a comprehensive dialogue among the party's multiethnic parties, who, while insisting on a general, federalized state, divided by nationality, agreed on the necessity and possibility of maintaining the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a political entity, as well as a certain cohesion of the nationally diverse party.

At the party congress in Brno in 1899, leaders of various social democratic factions, were fully "ready to contribute to the search for a solution that would restore

[19] Ibid. 103. Italics added.
[20] Blum, 26.
[21] Arthur Kogan, "Social Democrats and the Conflict of Nationalities in the Habsburg Monarchy," *Journal of Modern History,* Vol. 21. No. 3 (Sept., 1949). 206.

peace among the nations and further the advance of political and social democracy of the State."[22] Finally, after a series of disputes concerning the official use of minority languages versus German, the party decided on five major principles which would provide a new party line, insisting on the transformation of Austria into a federation of nationalities, on universal suffrage, the protection of minority rights, and on loyalty to the Parliament.[23] The most important "decision" made in Brno, seemed to be the lack of a decision at all. The various national party leaders of the SDP agreed that they would *not* push the "[recognition of] any national privilege," rejecting "the demand for an official language," [24] in a sense avoiding the most crucial problem plaguing increasingly nationally divided empire and, in my view, weakening the party with a less-than-clear manifesto. In his article, Kogan concludes that Austrian socialism of the period "unquestionably stands condemned by history,"[25] the united program of Brno eventually failing and serving to "split [the party] wide open along the lines of nationality."[26]

As the years progressed, the party's fragile structure and weak national cohesion were irrevocably interrupted by the political upheaval of the First World War. On the eve of the Empire's destruction, the Czech and German Social Democrats drifted apart in their occasional alliances with respective Czech and German nationalist groups. By the founding of the new Czechoslovak republic in 1918, the political status of the Czech and German social democrats had developed two entirely independent goals. "The supra-national party," lamented DSAP founder Josef Seliger in 1920, "fell victim to the *Machtdiktat"* of the newly created Czechoslovak constitution, forcing the party to split

[22] Ibid, 207.
[23] Ibid, 210.
[24] Ibid, 110.
[25] Ibid, 215.
[26] Oszkar Jaszi, *The dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 184.

and reform.[27] The Czech Social Democrats created their own party, leaving the previously predominant German sector of the party, now formally organized into the DSAP, suddenly in a defensive position, highly tied to the territorial base of the Sudetenland. With the party essentially split in two, the initial multinational character of the party was lost, weakening the position of both, and especially the German sector of the originally "multinational" party envisioned by the early Austro-Marxists.

As I will explain in the next chapter, the DSAP's devotion to territorial jurisdiction and loyalty to the Czechoslovak political system indicates a deeply rooted connection to the Austro-Marxists, who felt that socialism and ethnic issues were not mutually exclusive, but rather deeply dependent on one another. In the following chapters, I will show how these two issues intertwine.

1.2 Minorities, Czechoslovakia, and the League of Nations

"A minority," writes historian Alain Fenet, "cannot be defined on its own, but only in relation to other concepts."[28] Here, Fenet indicates the mercurial nature of the definition of a minority. The idea of a minority has been part of Europe's various conflicts for hundreds of years. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, religious minorities were those who did not conform to the dominant religion of the state in which they found themselves, leading to persecution and years of war. The definition of a minority, at the end of the First World War, gained a new meaning with the emergence of various new central European states created by the breakup of the Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman empires,

Where the idea of "nationality" had shaped the course of history in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, it would be the added problem of the "minority" which

[27] Josef Seliger, "2. DSAP- Parteitag in Karlsbad (3.- 7. October 1920)," printed in *Der Sozialdemokrat,* April 1940, 48.
[28] Alain Fenet, "The Question of Minorities in the Order of Law," in *Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation-States*, Gerrard Chaliand, ed. (London: Pluto Press, 1989), 13.

would lead to Europe's next big conflict, tainting the hope rung in by the Peace of Versailles. These new states, which, in reality, were multinational, peppered by several different ethnic and linguistic groups, *all* maintained that they were true nation-states. Each state, fearing the practical dangers of a nationally fragmented country, attempted to make the "fiction [of the nation-state] a reality" by attempting to assimilate their respective minorities.[29]

Czechoslovakia's constitution, whose final draft was implemented in 1920, followed the prescriptions of the Treaty of Saint Germain, whose terms frequently came into conflict. On the one hand, Czechoslovakia's inhabitants, like those of other new states in the region, were to duly assume the "nationality of the state exercising sovereignty over such territory,"[30] giving every occupant of these territories a new and official identity. On the other hand, the treaty demanded that the state "protect the interests of inhabitants of that state who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion."[31] So, while these inhabitants were to become citizens of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, or Romania, they were nevertheless entitled to maintain their national identities, which, in many cases, was *not* their constitutional identity. It would be the conflict between Czechoslovak citizenship and German nationality which would lead to the existence and rise of German nationalist politics in the country

This confusion manifested itself on a profound level. Where these minorities were technically co-citizens with the majority group, they were not equals in the nation-building project, but rather annoying obstacles which the majority had to overcome. In

[29]Miklos Lojko, ed. "Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Successor States" in *The Versailles System and Central Europe,* (Aldershoot, HA and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004), 228.
[30] "Section IV: Clauses Related to Nationality, Article 70," *Treaty of Peace with Austria (St. Germain-en-Laye, 10 September 1919) (*Australian Treaty Series 1920: Commonwealth of Australia. <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1920/3.html> 17 March 2010.
[31] Ibid. "The Czecho-Slovak State," Article 57.

the years following independence, Czechoslovakia's 1920 constitution was even more generous towards its minorities than required by the Treaty of Saint Germain by allowing minorities to participate in parliamentary elections as national political groups. "Under these circumstances," historians Jaroslav Krejci and Pavel Manchonin argue, "there was little scope for complaints from the German minority save for the fact that Czechoslovakia was built up as a *composite* nation-state in which the Germans were not considered as partners but only as minority, albeit a fully respected one."[32]

Here, Krejci and Machonin make a crucial observation about postwar minority-majority relations. The minority was not in a position to decide *their* position in the state, but were tolerated on the terms of the ruling majority-dominated government. In 1918, newly elected President Masaryk, in his first presidential address, referred to the country's Germans as "colonists and immigrants" whose fate was to be determined by "the State which *we* [the Czecho-Slovaks] created."[33] This infamous statement was perceived by many German citizens to mean that they were simply guests, not equal co-nationals of the new State in whose territories they had been living for over eight hundred years.[34] The condition of the minorities in which these new states found themselves was foreseen by the acclaimed British historian, Lord Acton as early as 1862. "By making the state and the nation commensurate with each other in theory," he argued, "it reduces

[32] Jaroslav Krejci and Pavel Machonin, *Czechoslovakia, 1918-92: A Laboratory for Social Change* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1996), 14. Italics added.
[33] Peter Glotz, *Die Vertreibung* (Berlin: Ullstein Buchverlage, 2004), 20. Italics added. All translations mine unless otherwise indicated.
[34] Ibid. 21.
Masaryk, later tempered, or corrected this bold statement, which had an enormous impact on the self-perception of Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia upon its founding. In his 1927 book *The Making of a State*, Masaryk maintains it " does not mean that, as colonists, our Germans are second-class citizens."
From: Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, *The Making of a State: Memories and Observations, 1914-1918 (USA: Noble Offset Printers, Inc., 1969 (English version),* 432.

practically to a subject condition all other nationalities which may be within the boundary."[35]

Given the increasing trouble caused my minority dissatisfaction and perceived discrimination under the new states of the post-Versailles system, Europe, "policed" by the newly formed League of Nations, began working to meticulously define, classify, and deal with minority issues, which seemed to threaten the relative calm of the postwar period, showing that these issues were not just a concern of the state, but also of the postwar European structure at large. By 1922, as stated in the Murray Proposals, the League had officially abandoned the term "minority," substituting it with a more comprehensive definition of "persons belonging to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities,[36]" and proclaimed a dualistic structure of minority-majority relations, citing that where the majority must respect minorities' rights, the minorities must abide the laws of the state. In the case of a breach of these laws, the country or minority in question would be subject "the decision of the Permanent Court [of the League]."[37] Thus, by 1922, the League had officially taken minority-majority issues in their own hands, *theoretically* limiting the free reign of majority politics, a move disputed by many state leaders, including Czechoslovakia's foreign minister Edvard Beneš.

Yet despite the League's *willingness* to deal with these issues, the resolutions of twenties and early thirties failed miserably in their practical application. "Minorities treaties," argues League historian F. P. Walters, "had no made no provision for the organs or institutions which were to ensure that their obligations were respected."[38] Furthermore,

[35] Lord Acton, "Nationality" in *Mapping the Nation*, Gopal Blakrishnan, ed. (London and New York: Verso, 1996), 36.
(orig. "Nationality," *The Home and Foreign Review*, 1862)
[36] L.P Mair, *The Protection of Minorities: The Working and Scope of the Minorities under the League of Nations* (London: Christophers, 1928), 65-65.
[37] Ibid. 65.
[38] Ibid. 404.

the League tiptoed around the majority and minority institutions, careful not to offend either party, fearing an explosive reaction. As a result, League committee meetings were "wrapped in silence and discretion," making it hard for the majority, or minority to know what exactly was being done to protect them.[39] Thus, the international organ which was supposed to keep a traumatized Europe balanced, remained a limp organ when it came Central European minority issues. Their treaties seemed to have only a theoretical purpose in the region, with no consequential effects on minority issues.

Where the League itself expressed an interest in solving minority problems, it seemed that the League's largest and most powerful members were less concerned with the minority issue, and rather in their own national affairs. The French, argues historian Mark Mazower, were more concerned with the stability of their national borders, and Britain's leaders felt that the League's minority treaties were slowing the process of assimilation in the affected countries, a Foreign Office official even suggesting that such interference would be detrimental to these new countries as a whole.[40] "Allow these minorities," he suggested in 1922, "to settle down under their present masters...So long as these people imagine that their grievances can be aired before the League of Nations they will refuse to settle down."[41] With the seemingly lackadaisical support of Europe's two bulwarks, the League was en route to failure, and its concern with minority treatment made trivial.

To drive the final nail in the League's coffin, Germany left the League in 1933, and minorities, it seemed, were more or less left to fend for themselves. The disastrous consequences of an unsolved, or unheeded minority settlement in the interwar and post World War Two years had disastrous consequences not only for the minorities

[39] Ibid. 403.
[40] Mark Mazower, "Minorities and the League of Nations in Interwar Europe," Daedalus, Vol. 126, No. 2, Human Diversity (Spring 1997), 51-52.
[41] Ibid, 52.

themselves, but also for the "nation-states" which found themselves at the mercy of hostile neighbors. This atmosphere is crucial to understanding the radicalized state of Sudeten German politics, as well as the Czech government's attitude towards minorities.

By the mid-thirties, both nationalities, the German minority and the Czech majority in Bohemia had not reconciled national differences, and, without outside intervention (by the League and the "appeasers" of France and Britain), were left with an explosive situation, seemingly unsolvable by ideological or political cooperation, proving the failure of the League to intervene in minority politics for the sake of international security. In the course of this paper, I will show interwar Europe's arguably failed policies regarding minority issues, combined with the liberal, leftist orientation of the DSAP led to the party's decline in favor of the radical nationalism of the SdP.

II. 1918- 29: The Foundations of the DSAP's Downfall:

Problematic Position of the DSAP in Czechoslovakia and Problems Facing the Party

"You must live in your house, even if you did not choose the house in which you live."[42]
Ernst Paul, former DSNAP Member, 1983

Though the enormous success of Henlein's *Sudetendeutsche Partei* in the thirties and the consequent decline of the formerly dominant DSAP cannot be judged as the *inevitable* result of Czechoslovak State policy in the nineteen-twenties, political decisions of this period undoubtedly affected the relative strength of the State and the political sentiment of its Germans. Its constitution and the policies which emanated from it established the country as a nation-State, though its physical reality was a State which housed an extremely multinational population, and one particularly large and problematic minority; the Germans. I propose that a series of decisions, especially those espoused in the Czechoslovak constitution of February1920, crippled the development of a strong, democratically stable, and nationally balanced government, making it difficult for reforms advocated by pro-State German parties to come to fruition within the government's confines, indefinitely hindering the development of a State solution to the nationalities problem. Another factor leading to the weakness of the party by 1929 is the DSAP's initial failure to join the State government, which implicitly hindered later party participation in the government, even after the DSAP's decided shift to activism, or pro-State politics.

In the following pages, I will discuss how the framework of Czech-German relations in the nineteen-twenties failed to evolve in a positive way, and what external factors (that is factors not relating directly to party decisions and leaders) and internal

[42] Ernst Paul, "Man muss wohnen," in Adolf Hasenöhrl,ed, *Kampf, Widerstand, Verfolgung der sudetendeutschen Sozialdemokraten: Dokumentation der deutschen Sozialdemokraten aus der Tschechoslowakei im Kampf gegen Henlein und Hitler* (Stuttgart: Seliger-Gemeinde, 1983), 39.

factors (factors within the control of the party) were instrumental in the continued failure of a positive evolution between the State and the DSAP in the twenties.

2.2 Czechoslovak State and Its Constitution: The External Hindering of the Progress of the DSAP and a Solution the Nationalities Question

The largest crack in the foundation of the Republic was that it was conceived as and perceived by its creators to be an *Einheitstaat*, or a nation-state. As the heirs of the Crown of St. Wenceslas, the newly empowered Czechs maintained their unreserved right to keep these historic lands united, refusing to cede the Sudetenland to the new German-Austrian State.

At its very foundation, the State's people were, without reserve, addressed as a singular nation of "Czechoslovaks" rather than as a multinational population, or even as a nation-state of Czechs and Slovaks. "Czechoslovakian people," exclaimed a group of leading Czech politicians in an early manifesto at the State's declaration in October 1918,

> your ancient dream has been realized. Today, the Czechoslovak State stepped into the ranks of the world's sovereign, free culture states!...Czechoslovakian people! What you do, from this moment on, you do as a free member of the great family of free states.[43]

Such a statement, while celebratory and jubilant in nature, reflects the general attitude of most Czech leaders towards the new State. It was *their* state which *they* had established with the help of Woodrow Wilson and Tomas G. Masaryk[44], and it was *theirs* to construct along the lines of their historic, national desires.

The constitution of February 1920 reflected this attitude. While the revolutionary national assembly did not entirely ignore the existence of non-Czechoslovak nations, it failed to award any degree of political autonomy to German, or other, national groups,

[43] Dr. Franz Soukup, Ant. Svehla, Georg Stribrny, Dr. Al. Rasin, Dr. Srobar, "(IV.) Manifest des Nationalausschusses vom 28. Oktober 1918," *Studien-Ausgabe der Verfassungsgesetze der Tschoslowakischen Republik,* Dr. Leo Epstein, ed.(Reichenberg: Gebrueder Stiepel Ges. m. b. H., 1923*)*, 12.
[44] Ibid.

which upon the State's founding in 1918, constituted about fifty percent of the country's population.[45] Drafted entirely by Czechs with only a small minority of Slovaks. Any German, or other minorities' involvement in the development of the country's founding laws were seen, so historian Vaclav Kural, "as an undesired complication."[46]

German exclusion in drafting the constitution seemed to have been more of a tactical move. In *Czechoslovakia before Munich*, J. W. Bruegel, future DSAP chairman Ludwig Czech's private secretary between 1930 and 1938, suggests that Czech leaders of the time may have feared that "any discussion of the [German] autonomy in question in connection with the constitution would only have intensified Czech national passions, exacerbating the right-wing oppositional agitation with dire results for the Government," most threatening, a potential Communist uprising which was already raging in neighboring Hungary.[47] Thus, German exclusion from the revolutionary national assembly did not necessarily reflect an anti-German bias, but more of a decision made on the basis of the new State's democratic security. Nevertheless, German exclusion was a

---

[45] The exception to this rule is the Sub-Carpathian Ukraine, which by the conditions stipulated by the Treaty of St. Germain en Laye were awarded their own parliament and which would regularly send a certain number of representatives to as a committee the government in Prague. ("Artikel X, 3, *Studien-Ausgabe der Verfassungsgesetze der Tschoslowakischen Republik.* 135-6.)

Figure from: Alfred Bohman, *Menschen und Grenzen, Band 4: Bevölkerung und Nationalitäten in der Tschechoslowakei* (Koeln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1975), 151.

[46] Vaclav Kural, *Konflikt anstatt Gemeinschaft?: Tschechen und Deutsche im Tschoslowakischen Staat, 1918-1938* (Prague: Institut für internationale Beziehungen), 48.

[47] J.W. Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia Before Munich*, 57.

The the threat posed by the Communists and Czech nationalists was not a realistic danger in 1918. The Communist threat at the time did not extend beyond a propaghanda campaign against Masaryk, who was accused of being extremely anti-Soviet. Furthermore, the threat of radical Czech nationalism was marginal, the first real radical Czech nationalist party having been formed as the National Democratic Party in 1919.

(Karel Hulicka, "The Communist Anti-Masaryk Propaganda in Czechoslovakia," *American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Apr., 1957), 160-174.)

fact. The views of German national leaders were not heard and incorporated into the constitution of the country of which almost a quarter of the population was German.

The resulting constitution rejected the federalization of the State and took on a heavily centralized character, with Czechoslovak as the official language of the country.[48] While giving minorities the right to freely speak their own languages, nationally oriented institutions (including schools) were to be established at "their own costs."[49] Furthermore, minorities were given the guarantee that each *individual* inhabitant of the State would have "full and unconditional protection of their lives and their freedom, without regard for nationality, language, race, or religion."[50] Attempts at the "violent denationalization" of minorities was also declared illegal.[51] Administrative organs were to cater to national minorities (if they constituted more than twenty percent of a certain district), yet the definition of "catering" to the nationality was left mysteriously vague. Finally, all administrators within the State bureaucracy were to be able to use "Czechoslovak" in their written reports, essentially eliminating German administrators, who largely did not speak Czech, from the bureaucracy.[52]

While democratic in one sense, the constitution seems utterly undemocratic in the other. Though the State fully respected the right of the individual members of a minority, it failed entirely to account for the freedom of collective national rights. In ignoring the rights of the minority as a collective unit, the State seemed to be pushing its minorities to integrate into the dominant Czechoslovak nationality. In a way, post-1920

[48] "Sprachgesetz Nr. 122," *Studien-Ausgabe der Verfassungsgesetze der Tschoslowakischen Republik*, 165.
[49] "XI. Schutz der nationalen, religösen und Rassenminderheiten, 130." *Studien-Ausgabe der Verfassungsgesetze der Tschoslowakischen Republik*, 207
[50] "Gleichheit, 106,2." Ibid, 194
[51] Ibid. 208.
[52] "26. Das Nationalitäten.- u. Sprachenrecht Sprachengetz: 3." Ibid. 265.

Czechoslovakia mirrored a "reversed Austria"[53] by favoring one language, set of traditions (in this case Czechoslovak) over all others. By instituting Czechoslovak as the *de facto* language of the State, Czechoslovakia's language laws would, in the years which followed, engender resentment towards the State among its German population resentment, not unlike the nationalist Czech attitude towards the Empire's disregard for the Czech language in old Austria.

From the point of view of language and minority laws, the 1920 constitution was not a healthy document. In the years which followed its conception, despite a marked willingness on the part of minority parties like the DSAP to participate in the government, the government's failure to reconcile its minorities would eventually poison the relations between the Czech and Germans of the country. The Czechoslovak leader's continued unwillingness to practically institute autonomy weakened an already fragile relationship. Though the laws of 1920 certainly did not facilitate conciliation between the two groups, it did not, so Kural "go so far as to make coexistence impossible."[54] Only the events of the next decade would point to the holes in the constitution, weakening the possibility for an eventual solution to the national confusion in multiethnic Czechoslovakia.

Apart from the laws of 1920, the general structure of the State decision-making bodies, as defined by the constitution, ignored, or perhaps purposefully manipulated, the national imbalance which was caused by the huge population of national minorities within Czechoslovakia's borders. First of all, the Czechoslovak leaders of the original revolutionary assembly, according to DSAP leader Ernst Paul, manipulated the establishment of the country's electoral districts to benefit Czech interests by joining large German-speaking districts with Czech districts in an attempt to prevent the existence of large minority voting districts and thus a large German mandate in the Senate

[53] Kural, 51.
[54] Kural, 57.

and House of Representatives, according to Paul an "ingenious" move on the part of the Czechs, functionally "[giving] the impression of a nation-state."[55] This tactic resulted in a reduced number of democratically elected German party representatives in the early years of the Republic, weakening the power of the German minority by preventing a proportional participation in the government.

The problem resulting from the very multinational make-up of the State and the introduction of a proportional government representation was the obvious rift between economic and ethnicity-based voting, a problem examined by historian Carol Skalnik Leff in her book *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*.[56] The German vote, like the Czech, Magyar, or Slovak vote, was logically split by class interests. The system of proportional voting, Leff points out, generally led to the "loss of control of party proliferation," in other words, to the uninhibited fragmentation of nationally based parties into parties which combined national interests with economic interests.[57] Instead, German parties of the 1920s, living in relative prosperity, worked against, rather than with each other, undermining the progress of German national interests. Under these conditions, each German party, the DSAP included, worked individually rather than together. With a fragmented voter base, national minorities had little room to express their national concerns as a group. Given a system which accounted for national interests in the form of national autonomy, the German governing parties may have had a platform for a stronger, more decisive voice in Czechoslovak Czechoslovakia.

As I have demonstrated, the founding of the State added to the already existing Czech-German conflict within the borders of the new country. The shortsightedness of Czechoslovakia's founding fathers made it difficult for pro-State German parties, like the

[55] Bohman quoting Ernst Paul, 166.
[56] Carol Skalnik Leff, *Nation Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton of University Press, 1988), 64.
[57] Leff, 64.

DSAP, to facilitate reforms which would satisfy a potentially explosive German minority, whose position in the State remained unclear in the first ten years of the Republic, years which were crucial in preventing the nationalist upsurge at the end of the twenties.

2.2 1918-1929: The DSAP's Decade of Relative Inaction

Aside from the framework of the constraints dictated by the framework of Czechoslovakia's constitution, factors outside the DSAP's control, a series of internal failures, that is, within the control of the party leadership, led to the party's relative weakness by 1929. It's political agenda, often inflexible and resolute, worked against, rather than for the success of its political aims.

Which factors led to this failure of national compromise from the point of view of the DSAP? What early mistakes may the party have made which caused it to so easily lose power in the early thirties? The answer to these questions can be found in various mistakes, misunderstandings, uncompromising dogmatism, and inherited resentments which reared their ugly heads in the early years of the Republic.

The first mistake occurred even before the official founding of Czechoslovakia in the Versailles Peace Treaties, during which time the region's Germans showed a marked unwillingness to join a State ruled by the Czechoslovak majority. In retrospect, the early reluctance of the German parties in Czechoslovakia, the DSAP included, played a crucial role in creating their position in the State, labeling them, in the eyes of the government, as anti-State, bothersome revolutionaries, whose attitude towards Czechoslovakia would forever be tainted by their fundamental unwillingness to be included within the borders of the Republic. Although the DSAP, like the many other German parties, would later come to accept the State and actively participate in its government, its early disinclination towards their inclusion made it difficult for Czech leaders to trust their loyalty to the Republic.

Not included in the drafting of the constitution, German desires found no voice in the document which would govern the country's politics until 1948.[58] Leaders of German national groups, including German Social Democrat Josef Seliger, had, in 1918, advocated the cession of the Sudeten territories to the new State of Austria, citing their right for national self-determination as outlined by Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen points. Czech leaders, on the other hand, cited their historic right to all lands of the former Bohemian Kingdom, which included the heavily German-speaking areas.[59]

To fight their impending "imprisonment" in the Czechoslovak State, the German Social Democrats joined the German Agrarians and the German Clericals to create a revolutionary national council which sought to influence the Allies' decision in their favor. [60] In March of that year the German Social Democrats organized a strike succeeded by a series of demonstrations met with violence of the Czech military, the "bloody baptism," in the words of Emil Franzel, DSAP party historian, of the Sudeten Germans as citizens of the new Republic.[61]

It was this reluctance to join Czechoslovakia, members of the "activist" German parties would later lament, which planted the first seeds of the conflict between Czechs and Germans in the framework of the new State. In his article on the evolution of the DSAP, German historian Fred Hahn argues that the anti-State attitude of German parties at the founding of the Republic labeled the German politicians, in the eyes of Czech

[58] Siegfried Lammich, Karin Schmid, "Einführung in der Verfassungsordnung der Tschoslowakischen Sozialistischen Republik: Zur Enwicklung," in *Die Staatsordnung der Tschoslowakei* (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1971), 12.
[59] Fred Hahn, "Die Deutsche Sozialdemokratische Partei im Tschechoslovakischem Staat: Von Negativismus zum Aktivimus," *Ostmitteleuropa: Berichte und Forschungen*, Ulrich Haustain, Georg W. Strobel and Gerhard Wagner, eds (Stuttgart: Verlagsgemeinschaft Ernst Klett, 1981), 336-337.
[60] Hahn, 336.
[61] Emil Franzel, "Die Bluttaufe der Sudetendeutschen: der 4. März 1919." (Loose document from Carolinum Collegium.)

leaders, as "rebels."[62] In 1928, Professor Franz Spina, later member of the German Agrarian party and anti-Henlein activist, wrote that he

> [was] convinced that the Germans could have gained considerable political advantages if, during the revolution of 1918-19, in correct apprehension of the temporary political helplessness of the German people, they had *promptly* started negotiations with the Czechs about their collaboration in the affairs of the State.[63]

Like Spina, Franzel agreed that these early acts of dissidence were crucial to the poor relationship which would form between the Czechs and Germans in the years to come. "Back then," he wrote of the year 1918, "the Germans could have peacefully become willing co-founders of a Bohemian state and, thereby, a nationality equal to that of the Czechs."[64]

In retrospect, the idea of a "prompt" acceptance of the new circumstances seems practical, given the later positive attitude that most German parties would assume towards the State. Yet the historical context of the German Social Democrats, the heirs of the old Austro-Marxists, made it difficult to conform to what was being asked of them. The German Social Democrats saw national self-determination as a means to achieve a certain class consciousness. The opportunity to join a German nation was thus also seen as an agency for the party's more economically oriented goals.

The Czech leaders, however, saw German separatism as treason, and saw its advocates "rebels" working against the State-forming process. Even the famously tolerant and humanitarian President Masaryk writes, in his memoir, *The Making of the State*, that the Germans had no real right to sovereignty based on the historic boundaries of the state, and their historical status as colonists to the region. "To this end," Masaryk remarks, "our

[62] Alois Rašin, first Czechoslovak Finance minister, quoted as saying "One does not negotiate with rebels." (from Emil Franzel, "Die Bluttaufe der Sudetendeutschen")
[63] Franz Spina, "Die Politik der deutschen Parteien in der Tschechoslowakei (1938)," quoted in J.W Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia before Munich*, 30. Italics added.
[64] Emil Franzel quoted in Hahn, 136.

Germans must de-Austrianize themselves and get rid of the old habit of mastery and privilege,"[65] implying that the German's period of superiority had definitively passed, and indicating his desire for them to accept their new country and the new dominance of the Czechoslovaks.

In the summer of 1919 the Sudeten Germans were finally denied their annexation to German Austria in the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain. Months later, party leader Joseph Seliger finally mandated the DSAP's political involvement in the new Czechoslovak State, ruling out the option of *Abstinezpolitik*.[66] "Social democrats," he declared, "will, under all circumstances, in *whatever state* they may find themselves, always work and fight."[67] True to word, the German Social Democrats participated in the country's first official election, under their new party name, die *Deutsche Sozialdemokratische Arbeiter Partei,* constituting the strongest German party in Czechoslovakia by winning the majority of German votes, a combined sum which exceeded all the votes for other German parties put together.[68]

Though nearly all local German parties which emerged from within the borders of Czechoslovakia initially rejected their incorporation into the Slav-dominated State, the later actions the more popular "activist," pro-State parties demonstrated a consistent acceptance of their presence in Czechoslovakia. By 1920, almost eighty percent of the German vote went to those parties which supported participation in the central

[65] Thomas G. Masaryk, *The Making of a State: Memories and Observations, 1914-1918* (New York: Horward Fertig, 1969), 387.
[66] German term for the politics of deliberately abstaining from politics.
[67] Protokoll, 1919, 34. Italics added.
[68] At this point, in June 1919 however, the State had not yet officially recognized the DSAP as a legitimate party.
(J. W. Bruegel, *Ludwig Czech: Arbeiterfuehrer und Staatsmann* (Wien: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchandlung, 1960), 64.)

government in Prague.[69] The DSAP, who in 1920 held 11.29 percent[70] of the country's vote was the country's most popular German party and showed a consistent desire to accept, rather than reject, the authority of the new government, working diligently to achieve a certain degree of cultural and linguistic autonomy within the Sudeten region while promoting the well-being of the German working class. While the rise of Adolf Hitler and the disastrous consequences of the economic crisis in 1929, as I will later discuss, served as decisive factors in the rise of popular German nationalism in Czechoslovakia, it is important to examine the framework of Sudeten politics in the years which preceded them.

Following the DSAP's initial reluctance to join Czechoslovakia, its uncomfortable position within Sudeten politics made the realization of its party goals, real social and economic progress for the country's Germans difficult. From the foundation of the new Republic, the German Social Democrats found themselves severed from the Czechoslovak Social Democrats based on divergent national interests. They were also disconnected from other German parties, with whom they disagreed principally on social issues. Alone in a new, coalition-based State, the German Social Democrats, who, after a brief struggle in 1918 actively supported the existence of the State, were a crippled political party, unable to find a practical connection to any major party until its rapprochement with the Czechoslovak Social Democratic party (ČSDSD)[71] in 1928, which I will discuss in the next chapter.

[69] Figure based on 1,577,692 votes toward German parties in the year 1920. (J.W. Bruegel, *Ludwig Czech*, 79)
[70] "Elections for the National Assembly, 1920-1935," Česky Statisky Uřad. http://www.czso.cz/csu/2006edicniplan.nsf/t/22005E7C52/$File/4219rr_1.pdf. <01. May 2010>
[71] The Czech Social Democrats were called Československá sociálně demokratická strana dělnická, the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Worker's Party.

As the party with the consistently largest voter base among the country's German population, the DSAP's failure to participate in the ruling coalition until 1929 reflects a kind of "negative balance sheet" of the ten years which preceded their direct involvement in the government, unable to realize any of its proposed aims, and, most importantly, not in the position to facilitate a stable relationship or compromise between the German minority and Czechoslovak majority. Thus, by 1929, the nationally fragmented State was not prepared for the looming *Machtergreifung* of Adolf Hitler in Germany, or the unexpected catastrophe of the world economic crisis in October of that year.

The most obvious handicap of the DSAP was its seemingly juxtaposing dual interests in both German national and general socioeconomic issues within the State. In these early years, under the strong influence of the party leader Seliger, and later under his successor, Ludwig Czech, the DSAP worked to straddle these two politically divergent goals. "We are not held together by hate against the Czechoslovak people," explained Seliger, "who we believe deserve their liberation from the old Habsburg slave-State...Only the love of our people and our rights binds us together."[72] So, on the one hand, the DSAP was willing to participate in the new Czechoslovak State, yet, on the other hand, they were still determined to find a solution to the German minority problem within the State.

In the new Republic the DSAP was isolated on all sides, and therefore, the party found itself in a constant state of tension between the Republic, other German parties, and their own party aims. First, as a German party, they were severed from their former Czech Social Democratic colleagues, who since 1917 constituted an entirely separate party. Principally, the DSAP rejected cooperation with the "bourgeois" parties of the German

[72] Josef Seliger, 1919 quoted in Hasenöhrl, 21.

political right, most notably the German Agrarians, the German Clericals,[73] and, of course, the German National Socialist Party (DNSAP), which would later provide the basis for Henlein's SdP. In their quest for a political balance between national and social welfare, the DSAP had no ally who fit their very narrow social and national specific profile.

Further complications arose out the split between the radical leftists and moderates of the worker's movement. Already in 1919 the more radical elements of the German Social Democratic wing, centered largely in Reichenberg, advocated for a definitive shift to the left, towards Leninist Communism, opposing participation in the new government and demanding its membership in the Third Communist International. The party leadership, however, felt that these demands failed to "directly address the nationality question, which was of paramount interest to all factions within the DSAP," as historian Nancy Merriwhether Wingfield points out.[74] Moreover, the Social Democrats, both German and Czech, had fundamental reasons for their aversion to the Czechoslovak communists. "The Social democrats," German historian Olaf Meiler explains, "despised the 'terroristic' methods of class-warfare and accused them of '*Putschismus.*'"[75] Furthermore, the German Social Democrats with their "activist" attitude towards the State, felt that "the Communists were using the Parliament as stage on which they could openly advocate revolution."[76]

The definitive split between the DSAP and Communists, who became the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KPČ) in 1921, had a profound effect on the power of the DSAP by diminishing Social Democratic Party membership and embodying yet

[73] Also known as the German Christian Socialist Party.
[74] Wingfield, 18.
[75] Olaf Meiler, Die Deutsche Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei in der Tschechoslowakei (DSAP) im Spannungsfeld zwischen tschechischen Sozialdemokraten und Kommunisten: 1918 -1929 (Munich: Seliger Gemeinschaft, 1989), 34.
[76] Ibid.

another "enemy" in the party's lonely existence within the State. The division of the Communists and the Social Democrats served first to split the Socialist Youth Groups, and eventually even the Social Democratic parties (both the DSAP and the ČSDSD), continually weakening and fragmenting the membership quotas of both parties.

The split between the Communists and German Social Democrats had dire consequences for the DSAP's popularity among the working class by splitting its constituency. In 1920 the DSAP boasted 120,000 members, yet directly following the split, its membership went down by 17,000 people. By 1922, DSAP membership shrunken to 78,000, and, three years later in 1925, to 68,000 members, losing fourteen representative and three senatorial seats in Prague. [77] Thus, the new Czechoslovak Communist Party (KPČ), which included all nationalities of the Republic, was increasingly working to undermine the cause of both the Czech and the German Social Democrats.

Aside from the Communist threat to the party's popularity in the nineteen-twenties, the DSAP was weakened by the German "bourgeois" parties (the Agrarians, Small Traders and Clericals), who joined the governing Czechoslovak parties in 1926 as part of the so-called "Gentlemen's Coalition," which for the first time excluded the Czechoslovak Social Democrats. The coalition, which remained in place until 1929, reflected the powerlessness of the DSAP, who despite winning the popular German vote, did not participate in the government for another full four years. Instead, the moderate right-wing German parties entered the government, forming, with major Czechoslovak parties, a front against the country's working-class parties. "It is a curious irony of history," writes Bruegel

> that the party most willing to compromise, the Czech Social Democrats, did not find their way to an agreement with the German Social

[77] Ibid, 26-28.

> Democrats, and that instead it was the nationally minded Czech right, that created the first Czechoslovak-German coalition.[78]

Here, Bruegel makes a pertinent observation. Socialism, a fundamentally international ideology, had failed to overcome basic national issues where the right-wing "bourgeois" parties had.

Where the DSAP had failed to reconcile its national interests with its Czech "brother party," the ČSDSD, its bourgeois opposition had managed to overcome these differences, effectively plunging both parties into four years of opposition.[79]

DSAP did not see the entrance of German parties into the government as a positive development, accusing these parties of having strictly class, rather than national motives. [80] During the three year reign of the "Gentlemen's Coalition," little was done to satisfy German national equality. Instead, the government seemed to be centralizing the country via the creation of provincial diets (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia), serving to "standardize administration", which did not take account of minority groups or politics.[81] In these years of relative prosperity in the Republic, and perhaps more importantly, of relative economic comfort of the country's Germans, no move towards increased autonomy of the German minority was made, despite the presence of three German parties in the governing coalition.

The DSAP, still waiting in the wings, was desperately awaiting its chance to temper the bourgeois government. As much as the DSAP had criticized the German parties of the "Gentlemen's Coalition" for ignoring German national issues by joining a heavily Czech coalition, they too began to consider a relationship the Czechoslovak

[78] Bruegel, *Ludwig Czech*, 95-96.
[79] Both the ČSDSD and the DSAP had joined the Second International in August 1925, and in doing so had began moving closer together as a political force, who put "moral pressure: on the two parties to mend their differences," yet their relationship would not improve until the ČSDSD was no longer part of the ruling coalition. (Wingfield, 69.)
[80] Wingfield, 81.
[81] Ibid, 83-84.

Social Democrats, with whom they slowly began to grow closer with in light of their "common status...as part of the loyal opposition."[82] In January 1928, the DSAP and the ČSDSD held their first common congress which the DSAP hoped would bring "the working class one step closer to realizing their deep-rooted desire to achieve a union among all proletarian forces" in an effort against the ruling bourgeois coalition, which the congress decided was a regime which was a "class oriented regime" working against the country's proletariat.[83] Despite the reconciliatory atmosphere of the congress, its final resolutions were seemingly ineffective and, in the opinion of DSAP delegate Ernst Paul, "overestimated" by both parties.[84] The congress only vaguely addresses the national struggle which had separated them ten years earlier, offhandedly vowing to "bridge understanding between the nations of the State" in order to more effectively found a true proletarian State.[85] By the turn of the decade DSAP and the ČSDSD were, according to Ernst Paul "not concentrated on facilitating an agreement of a national program, but could more easily agree on common sociopolitical goals."[86]

When in January 1929 the DSAP won the German vote with a total of seven percent of the entire country's vote, and the ČSDSD, recovering from their losses in 1925, became the second most poplar Czech party with twenty-one percent of the vote,[87] the newfound friendship between the two parties became the foundation for a new, left-

[82] Ibid, 87.
[83] Ludwig Czech, "Die Eröffnungsrede des Vorsitzenden der deutschen Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei,Genossen Dr. Ludwig Czech." (*Der Erst Kongress Aller Sozialdemokratischen Parteien der Tschechoslowakei: Protokoll am 28. und 29. Jänner 1928 in Prag* (Prag: Verlag des Partei-Vorstandes der detuschen sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei in der Tschechoslowakischen Republik, 1928), 6.)

"Kundgebung und Entschliessung I," Ibid, 55.
[84] Ernst Paul, "Zur Vorgeschichte," Ibid, 4.
[85] "Kundgebung und Entchliessung IV," Ibid, 57.
[86] Ernst Paul "Man muss wohnen" in Hasenöhrl, 29.
[87] Votes for the CSCSD had increased by fifty-two percent since the 1925 elections. (Wingfield, 93-94.)

wing coalition. Laying aside their more national goals of national autonomy, the DSAP joined the all-national ČSDSD-led coalition in early 1929 in its self-recognition as a working-class party, with party leader Ludwig Czech appointed as the new Minister for Welfare.

Although the DSAP had finally managed to join the governing coalition, its national goals were obscured by the very internationality of the government, which included Czech, Slovak, and German nationals, who all disagreed fundamentally on the future of German politics in the country. The DSAP *still* represented a minority in what the government continued to treat as a nation-state, and whose constitution favored the linguistic rights of the Czechoslovak majority. The DSAP's "negative balance-sheet" of one decade as the Sudeten German's most popular party showed their relative weakness to achieve nationally oriented goals. This unsolved national question, by the year 1929 and the later rise of Adolf Hitler, in 1933, had become a dangerous liability. No one, at this point, could predict the terrible consequences of the failure of a peaceful national agreement with the activist, pro-State Germans. In ten years as its constituency's most popular party, the DSAP had not solved the question which, in the years that followed, Hitler and his Sudeten supporters were all-too eager to answer.

III: 1929-35: The DSAP in Response to the Changing Character of Sudeten Politics

Today, the Czechoslovak Republic is more free than all of her neighbor states, and its workers are also more free than workers in Germany. In their own interest, the Sudeten German workers must defend the Czechoslovak Republic.[88]

-Josef Hofbauer, Member of DSAP Party Executive Committee

German politics in Czechoslovakia were not isolated to the Sudeten region or even to Czechoslovakia. They were affected by both European and world events which forever destroyed the relative calm in German-Czech relations. In the following pages, I will describe the effect international events had on Sudeten politics, followed by an assessment on how and why the DSAP opposed this new strain of Sudeten politics, and, finally, why they failed.

3. 1 The Effect of External Forces on the Sudeten Political Sentiment, the Decline of the DSAP, and the Rise of Radical Nationalism

Two important factors, completely outside of the control of the DSAP party leadership, led to the increased popularity of German nationalist parties and, conversely, to the decline of the DSAP in the late nineteen-twenties and the thirties, combining with one another to create a radical nationalist atmosphere in the Sudeten territories. The economic depression in the years following the New York stock market crash of October 1929 was the first of these events. Facing unprecedented unemployment[89] and poverty caused by the financial crisis, many Sudetens began to closely follow the rise of Adolf Hitler and National Socialism in neighboring Germany. Hitler, who became the German Chancellor in 1933, promised an end to the economic plight of Germany, attracting the attention and support not just of German citizens, but of Germans living outside its

[88] "Die letzte Bastion" article by Josef Hofbauer, exact date unknown, roughly 1935, in *Kampf, Widerstand, Verfolgung der sudetendeutschen Sozialdemokraten, 164.*
[89] By 1933, Czechoslovakia's unemployment rate had reached 5.01 percent.

borders. Thus, Sudeten "activist" politics, then led by the DSAP, became the victims of two external phenomena which would forever destroy the cooperative mood of Czech-German relations which had taken almost a decade to create.

The economic distress affected the political inclinations of ethnic Germans because of their economic and geographic position in Czechoslovakia. The Sudetenland, located on the heavily industrialized borders of the country, had an economy based heavily on industry and was thus hit the hardest by the depression. High-yield industries such as the textile, motor, glass, and toy manufacture, all based largely in the Sudetenland, were "fatally dependent," write the editors of the Czech publication *Facing History* "on exports at a time when customs barriers erected because of the crisis affected them sooner and more markedly."[90] As a result, Czechoslovakia's citizens were disproportionally affected by the economic crisis, with German citizens facing a higher degree of unemployment than the Czechs. In German areas, unemployment in 1931 is estimated to have affected 19.2 percent of the population, where in Czech areas only 9.16 percent were affected.[91]

As a result of this visible inequality, many Germans began to view the government in Prague as inherently anti-German in its failure to provide adequate financial relief to the Sudetenland. This resulted in a dramatic increase in the popularity of nationalist parties. As *Facing History* points out

> It would be a mistake to underestimate the social and psychological implications of that grim situation [of German unemployment]. It undoubtedly affected political sympathies, contributing significantly towards a radicalization of political opinions or attitudes, which also started to reflect the national stereotypes and prejudices. Negativism [which describes an anti-State attitude] received a fresh impetus.[92]

[90] *Facing History,* 92.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Ibid.

The failure of the Czech leadership to rectify this *perceived* inequality led towards a turn to more nationally oriented politics which represented a way out of the desperate national plight of the Sudeten regions.

Until 1933, the radical German nationalist was embodied by the German National Socialist Worker's Party (DNSAP) and its partners, the tiny German National Party (DNP), with which it was inextricably linked. The DNSAP and DNP had received little attention in the twenties due to their small voter base and self-seclusion from the Czechoslovak government which they detested for its democratic, Czech-centered character.

Founded in 1903, the DSNAP's initial program mandated the "fight for the international German *Weltanschauung* against Marxism [and against] the overflow of Czechs and foreign workers in German areas,"[93] representing a radical alternative to the dominant tide of German Social Democracy of the nineteen-twenties. In the twenties, the program DNSAP, often described as a "twin Hitler movement," largely followed the rhetoric of the Nazi party in Germany in its pan-German, anti-Jewish, and fundamentally antidemocratic program.[94]

The growth of the DNSAP can be clearly linked to the worsening economic conditions in the Sudetenland, attracting especially younger voters, many of whom joined the party's paramilitary organization *Volksport*.[95] Between 1925 and 1929, the DNSAP's votership increased by approximately thirty-five thousand people. [96] Between 1930 and

[93] Hans Krebs, "Sudetendeutschland marschiert," *Sudetendeutscher Schicksalskampf: Die maßgebende Darstellung der sudetendeutschen Not in ihren Grundlagen, Zusammenhängen und Auswirkungen.* ed. Erich Kühne, (Leipzig, 1938). <http://www.bohemistik.de/krebssm.html>. 16 Dec. 2009.
[94] Wiskemann, 195.
[95] Ibid.
[96] "Stammtafel des sudetendeutschen Nationalsozialismus," in *Kampf, Widerstand, Verfolgung der sudetendeutschen Sozialdemokraten, 155.*

1932, party membership had more than doubled.[97] This move clearly indicated a deep dissatisfaction with the political status quo and a turn to the revolutionary right. Though DSNAP party (along with the DNP) would be disbanded by the Czech government in 1933, the party was instrumental in creating the framework for Henlein's SdP, established in the same year.

Perhaps the most import factor leading to the popular rise of nationalism and radicalization of Nazi politics in the Sudetenland was the rise of Hitler and eventual Nazi *Machtergreifung* in Germany in 1933, which marked the official ascendance of Hitler as the head of the German State and the consequent foundation of the DSNAP's successor, the *Sudetendeutsche Partei*. It would be this political movement, formed outside of Czechoslovakia, which would give Sudeten German Nazism its place as the most popular party in Czechoslovakia. After the dissolution of the DNSAP under pressure from the Czech government, who felt threatened by its growth in light of political circumstances in Germany, Hitler's government became involved in the party's resurrection as the Sudetendeutsche Partei (SdP)[98] led by *Turnverband* leader Konrad Henlein.[99] According to Henlein, he was approached by Reich Nazis in autumn of 1933 and asked to take over

---

[97] Wingfield, 121.

[98] Initially founded as the *Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront* (Sudeten Geman Home Front), a lose semi-political organization and later, in order to participate in elections, renamed itself *Sudetendeutsche Partei* (Sudeten German Party).

[99] German *Turnverbände*, or Gymnastics societies, were historically linked with German nationalism, and thus Henlein, as leader of the Sudeten Germand *Turnverband*, was ideally suited for his new position as head of the SdP. Originally founded in 1860 under Habsburg rule, the Sudeten German *Turnverband* was a forum for the expression of German nationalism and pan-Germanism, anti-Slavism, and, particularly, anti-Semitism. Since the foundation of the Republic, the Sudeten *Turnverband* had been active in nationalist activism, often holding large festivals, often turned violent, which the Czech press referred to "as typical examples of treasonable pan-German irredentism."

Quotation from Mark Cornwall, "The Struggle on the Czech-German Language Border, 1880-1940,"*The English Historical Review*, Vol. 109, No. 433 (Sept, 1994), 938.

Wiskemann, 54.

the leadership of the Sudeten Germans.[100] Thus, Hitler and his party were directly responsible for the establishment of the SdP.

Apart from reestablishing Sudeten Nazism, Hitler, now Chancellor, was able to support the SdP financially. In 1934, the year preceding the 1935 parliamentary elections, the Reich, through its international NS organ the *Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland* (VDA), contributed over three hundred thousand *Reichsmark* to the SdP for election and other propaganda expenses.[101] By the elections of 1935, the Henlein party had taken an unexpected sixty-six percent of the Sudeten vote, over fifteen percent of the Republic's votes, definitively ousting the DSAP from its seat in the government with thirty-three seats to the DSAP's eleven.[102]

The change in Sudeten attitudes towards the State was not only visible in figures delineating the decline in support for activist parties, and particularly of the DSAP, who, like the National Socialists looked to the working class for voter support, but also in the general atmosphere in Sudeten regions. As unemployment rates steadily declined in neighboring Germany as a result of Hitler's rearmament policies, many Sudetens, according the contemporary historian Elizabeth Wiskemann, began to believe "that Germany had become a heaven on earth filled with happy enthusiasm and jobs for everybody." As a result, Wiskemann remarks "the activists continued to lose and the negativists [those anti-State parties or individuals] to gain."[103] future party chairman Wenzel Jaksch noted that "the dark days of depression created a mystical mood in the

[100] Konrad Henlein, "The Fight for the Liberation of the Sudetenland," *The Trial of German Major War Criminals*. Vol. 2. (London: Pub. under the authority of H.M. Attorney-general by H.M. Stationery off., 1946), 29.
[101] Radomir Luza, 75.
[102] "Elections for the National Assembly, 1920-1935," Česky Statisky Uřad. http://www.czso.cz/csu/2006edicniplan.nsf/t/22005E7C52/$File/4219rr_1.pdf. <01. May 2010>
[103] Elizabeth Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans: A Study of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia* (London: MacMillan and Company Limited, 1967) 198.

masses."[104] The power and radiance of Nazism, emanating from neighboring Germany and its new leader had clearly influenced the struggling masses in the Sudetenland, charming them with its speed, its leader's charisma, and its pan-German aspirations.

As I have argued in chapter three, the DSAP had little to show for its activism in the twenties, arriving, in 1929, with a "negative balance sheet" in the eyes of its skeptics. The rise of German radicalism can also be seen as an indirect result of the failure of activist politics, and specifically the *perceived* failure of the German coalition parties, like the DSAP, to practically support the working class in their darkest hour. Its program, which mixed activism with national politics, could hardly satisfy its increasingly pro-Nazi constituency. The DSAP, as part of the government, thus became the enemy. Sources from the period suggest that the perceived failure of the DSAP as part of the ruling coalition to swiftly rectify the desperate situation in the Sudetenland led to its decline. Maria Lippert, an active member of the DSAP in the German city of Eger [105] links the economic depression to a dramatic change in political sentiment in Eger, where she observed that

> unemployment played a role in the in the decline of voter support for the DSAP. Even worse was that at the time, the government failed to invest in the Sudeten region, and did not try to give people, who were massively unemployed, work. And that was a good reason to vote for the Nazis.[106]

From statements like the above, fascism could be seen a a preferable substitute to parliamentary democracy in these hard times, changing the course of Sudeten and Czechoslovak history. But how, in the next six years before the next nation-wide election, did the DSAP challenge radical German nationalism?

[104] Wenzel Jaksch quoted in Luza, 68.
[105] Eger (known as Cheb in Czech) was a predominantly German city in the Sudeten borderlands.
[106] Maria Lippert, "Von den eigenen Volksgenossen unterdrückt" in *Helden der Hoffnung: Die Anderen Deutschen aus den Sudeten, 1935-1989,* Alena Wagnerova, ed. (Munich: Aufbau Verlagsgruppe), 65.

3.2 1929-1935: The DSAP and Failed Activist Policies

The year 1929 marked ten years of the dominance of German activist politics, and, at the same time, the beginning of the end of its popular reign. The DSAP, which since January 1929 was finally part of the governing coalition, was deeply shaken by these international factors and would, in the next nine years, never recover its popularity in German politics in Czechoslovakia. In the years between 1929 and 1935, the external pressure of economic depression combined with the political radicalism emanating from Germany seemed to uncover both the failures of the DSAP in twenties and, in the thirties, the political impossibility of duly participating within the framework of the Czech centered government *and* simultaneously representing the interests of a troubled minority. The failure of the DSAP to win the popular vote against the Nazi-sympathetic SdP in May 1935 showed that the party's pro-active policies of the past six years had, on the whole, failed in its efforts against Sudeten radical nationalism.

While international and not domestic forces were the immediate cause of the shift away from German Social Democracy and activism in general, the ability of radical German nationalism to maintain its popularity and its near monopoly on German politics in Czechoslovakia can, *conversely*, be attributed to the DSAP's failure to effectively respond to the threat of Henleinist and Hitlerite politics in the thirties. In the following pages, I will explain how and why the DSAP responded to these politics and how their response failed to temper the radicalism and popularity of their right-wing adversaries by their fateful decline in favor of the SdP in 1935.

From a practical standpoint, the DSAP's pro-State position can be explained by its determination to support its voter base in light of the economic depression. In the early thirties, the DSAP used its position in the current coalition to attempt to improve the economic situation which was causing such discontent among the country's German constituency. Under the party leadership of the politically conservative Ludwig Czech,

then the Minister for Welfare and later Minister for Public Works, the DSAP continued in its steadfast allegiance to the coalition and to the political status quo, hoping to rectify the economic situation in the Sudetenland by reforming the welfare system, not the nationalities problem. According to Bachstein, this policy, supported especially by the older members of the party, "promised less risks and was an easier policy to justify" than that of national reform and government opposition. Czech's supporters within the party argued that more could be achieved, in terms of economic reform, from continuing their tenure in the coalition than as an opposition party. [107]

Thus, the DSAP embarked on a mission to reform the current welfare system, which had been created during more prosperous times. In 1931, Czech carried through a proposal to triple unemployment benefits and quadruple the period of government assistance to the unemployed.[108] Furthermore, in the summer of the same year, a hunger-relief program, initiated by Czech, was introduced. The government distributed vouchers (to the unemployed) which were exchangeable for food and other life necessities. Although the value of the vouchers ranged from ten to twenty Czechoslovak crowns, Wiskemann, a contemporary witness to the events, maintains that "this [amount] is little enough but it is infinitely more than nothing."[109] Overall, the Czechoslovak government poured over 100 million crowns into the economic assistance programs throughout the country.

Despite the government's effort to provide equal relief for German and Czech citizens, its policies were still regarded as unfair and biased by the increasingly popular negativist camp. As summed up by Czech politician Jaromir Nečas,[110] such propaganda purported that the "Czechoslovak State acts as an oppressor of the German minority

[107] Bachstein, 42.
[108] Wingfield, 82-83.
[109] Wiskemann, 195.
[110] Nečas was a member of the ČSDSD would succeed Czech as Minister of Welfare.

which it is endeavoring to reduce to economic and social misery."[111] Many Germans bitterly referred to the government's food vouchers as "Czech cards," playing on a pun on Ludwig Czech's name and his supposed lack of support for his German constituency in favor of his dominant position in the government.[112] These accusations further enflamed the radical nationalist movement and deteriorated government-minority relations. Since the DSAP, and primarily Czech, were responsible for taking action in the crisis, they were logically the party to blame for the continued economic strife in the Sudeten region. Yet how accurate were the accusations against the DSAP and the government?

Though the German negativist press would continually complain of discrimination under the government's various relief plans, historical sources suggest otherwise. When Czech assumed his post as Minister for Public Works, he consciously ensured that public schemes were instituted in those regions with the highest degree of economic distress, thus concentrating the government's budget for public works and welfare largely on the German borderlands. Between 1934 and 1935, the government spent fourteen million crowns on public works (such as street and bridge reconstruction) in Czech areas, and up to seventeen million in German areas. Wiskemann, who spent time among the Sudetens in the early thirties, also reports that aid was supplied equally in German and in Czech areas. "I have spoken to Germans who have regularly helped distribute coal, potatoes, and bread in the Reichenberg district," Wiskemann points out,

> and they assured me that they had never been witnesses to any kind of discrimination in favor of the Czech population...On the occasion when Germans have wished to prove this kind of thing to me, the evidence has always broken down.[113]

[111] Jaromir Nečas, "Economic and Social Problems in German-Bohemia," *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 15, No. 45 (Apr, 1937), 600.
[112] Jože Bruegel, *Memoirs*, 20. <www.ibrk.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/Joza2.pdf> 12 May 2010.
[113] Wiskemann, 195-196.

Although Wiskemann's observation and the proportional distribution of money in public works suggests that government relief programs were, in fact, not discriminatory, it seems that the negativist's continued accusation of discriminatory treatment more easily explained the pain and suffering they experienced as part of the depression. It is also a documented fact that the DSAP, under Czech, did not manage to balance the inequality of unemployment among Czechs and Germans. By 1935, fifteen of the country's top seventeen counties with the highest unemployment rates were largely German-speaking.[114]

The DSAP sought to meet the threat of fascism head-on, clarifying their position within the government and their program for the future. In the months before the May 1935 elections, DSAP members began to hold public speeches which drew large crowds and were often followed by mass demonstrations. In October 19234 in Böhmisch Leipa, Henlein held a speech highlighting his party's demand for German cultural autonomy, which drew a crowd of 20,000 supporters. In response, the DSAP held a rally in response to Henlein's public speech one month later in Karlsbad. The rally, advertised as a demonstration against "open and disguised fascism, and for freedom and fread" included speeches by party leaders on its program for its next term, which was largely in line with the program it had followed for the past six years, citing demands for shorter working and increased State investment in economically struggling areas.[115] Here, we can observe a direct comparison to the radical ideas of Henlein and those of the DSAP. Where Henlein promised to radically change the entire system, the DSAP merely sought to reform it.

Although the DSAP continued its work with the government, the DSAP strongly reaffirming its faith in the Czechoslovak system, this move was simultaneously a big

[114] "Counties with Highest Unemployment, *Mitteilungen des deutschen Hauptverbandes der Industrie*, featured in Wingfield, 162.
[115] See Figure 2
Wingfield, 123-124.

mistake because it tragically failed to address the State's problematic nationality structure, which had gripped the emotion, and not necessarily the intellect, of Sudeten politics of the time. In the unprecedented success of the SdP in the fateful elections in May 1935, it would become clear that purely activist policies did not satisfy the radicalized German masses, inspiring, as I will address in the next chapter, right-wing members of the DSAP to attempt a shift in party policy which dealt more directly with nationality issues.

From an ideological standpoint, the DSAP considered continued participation in the State to be a reflection of their democratic principles in a Europe which was becoming increasingly radical and repressive. This view was presented in DSAP party newspaper *Sozialdemokrat* in October 1933, on the eve of Hitler's *Machtergreifung*. "Among the democratic states of Europe," the article argues,

> Czechoslovakia has special relevance. In Central Europe, she is now the last democratic stronghold of the rule of law, of a European outlook, of humanity and love of peace...It is for this reason that today we stand firmly by this State, not as a historical necessity, but as a factor in Central European politics whose importance we want to see strengthened, whose existence safeguarded and whose fate assured.[116]

From this statement, we can understand the DSAP's pro-State attitude as a defensive stand against political extremism, and not necessarily as a patriotic ambition. In defending Czechoslovakia, the DSAP felt, it was defending the principle of democracy itself.

Therefore, apart from proactive government participation in these ways, the DSAP also fought the threat of negativist politics in their messages to the Sudeten public through propaganda, public speeches, party newspapers and other media outlets, This approach was two pronged. On one hand, as demonstrated by the above quotation, the party hoped to connect their party with prosperity, peace, growth and stability. A similar message is shown on the cover of a weekly political magazine which shows a collage of pictures

[116] *Sozialdemokrat*, 28 Oct 1933 quoted in Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia before Munich*, 107.

showing workers building bridges, a political speech been given in front of a crowd, and the DSAP flag flying proudly in the wind, with the subtitle "We are building a new world!," giving the impressing of a growing and stable party built in the interest of freedom of speech and focused on the progress of the working class.[117]

On the other hand, the DSAP sought to inform the public about the first the DSNAP's, and later the SdP's *true* intentions in an attempt to discredit their logic and policies. This approach, largely inspired by the DSNAP's and the SdP's denial of their connections to the Nazi party in Germany, sought to simultaneously discredit the sincerity of these German negativist's allegiance to the State, and at the same time warn people about the potential danger of Nazism.

Evidence from as early as 1931 points to the use of this tactic in discrediting the then increasingly popular DSNAP. The February edition of the Social Democratic monthly newsletter *Freundschaft* reflects the general use of this strategy in action. Party member Rudolf Geißler identifies the DSNAP as *Hakenkreuzler* in reference to the DSNAP's deference to Nazi politics.[118] In his article, which appears on the front page of the newsletter, Geißler argues that "the Sudeten German national socialist movement is now completely immersed in the program of [Germany's] Hitler party and carelessly adopts their program and tactics."[119] Furthermore, the author endeavors to uncover lies told by the DSNAP to members of their party. Though the party claimed to have instituted special unemployment benefits for members of DSNAP-led trade unions in March 1931, a luxury the DSNAP claimed denied to members of other German parties, Geißler points out that it was, in fact, Czech who instituted these unemployment measures across the Sudetenland as early as January of that year. Thus, it was the DSNAP who

[117] See Figure 3.
[118] *Hazenkreuz* is German for swastika.
[119] Rudolf Geißler, "Kampf dem Hakenkreuz," *Freundshaft*, Feb. 1931.

failed to collect it's trade union's due benefits two months earlier. "For these benefits we have, therefore, the DSAP to thank," Geißler writes.[120]

The DSAP continued its attack against radical nationalist politics after the creation of the SdP in 1933. Following the party's rapid rise in popularity, the DSAP aimed to uncover Henlein's fraudulent politics. Since the SdP party publicly denied any anti-State sentiments and continually denied any connection to fascist or Nazi ideology until 1938, the DSAP endeavored to show the public the SdP's real intentions.[121] In an article which appeared in the December 1933 issues of the *Tribüne*, another DSAP monthly, Jaksch mockingly refers to the SdP as "the newly minted Sudeten-German messiahs," and points out that although Henlein refused to admit it, he wanted nothing more than to "copy Hitler."[122] At best, Jaksch maintains, Henlein's program is not one of activism, but rather one of pure "fascism, tempered by Czechoslovak patriotism."[123] Furthermore, Jaksch identifies Henlein as an enemy of the nationality-based community which he supposedly advocates. Henlein, who Jaksch portrays as a staunch capitalist, is attempting to "perpetuate the social and political disunity of the [Sudeten-German] people."[124] In directly associating Henlein with Hitler, Jaksch attempted to show that Henlein's allegiances were not with the State, but rather to Germany.

Besides their failure to address the nationality problem in everyday politics, the DSAP's propaganda strategy, which tried to demonstrate the link between Sudeten

[120] Ibid.
[121] In a summary of their party line in late 1934, the SdP officially announced that they fundamentally opposed Nazism and Fascism on the grounds that either ideology "lose the natural conditions for their existence at the frontiers of their respective States." Furthermore, the document announces that the party "shall never abandon the unconditional respect for individual rights." (Luza, 74.)
[122] Wenzel Jaksch, "Arbeiterfront gegen Henleinfront," *Tribüne*, Dec. 1933.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Ibid.
On a more superficial level, DSAP propaganda at the time also repeatedly shed light on the fact that the SdP's leader, Henlein and his right-hand man, Walter Brand, were respectively of Czech and Polish origin (Bachstein, 80-81).

nationalist politics and Hitler, it did not seem to bother its audience. Likely, NSDAP or SdP voters had already made the connection between German Nazism and local Sudeten nationalism, and maybe even supported these groups *because* of their association with Germany. DSAP functionary and German Bodenbach's mayor, Fritz Kessler, revealed after the DSAP's 1935 electoral losses that he believed that the largest part of Henlein voters were already strong supporters of the annexation of the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany.[125] Thus, warnings tying the SdP to Nazism may have gone in vain, and were probably seen as already stating the obvious. Conversely, the SdP's propaganda, much of which was focused on the DSAP's "betrayal" of the working class, seemed to have a "far better reception" than the DSAP's accusatory propaganda. [126]

While I have largely concentrated on the failed efforts of the DSAP to resist radical nationalism in the Sudetenland, it is also important to examine missed opportunities during this period. In September 1934, with the 1935 communal elections coming up, the Communists approached the DSAP hoping to form a "united front,"[127], an "aggression pact" against Henlein fascism. The letter included a proposal for mutual assistance, common campaigns, and common demonstrations which would "direct all the ferocity of this fight against Henlein fascism."[128]

The DSAP, however, duly declined the offer, still strongly invested in the existing ČSDSD-DSAP coalition, and, perhaps, still exhausted after its split from the communists

[125] Kessler quoted in Bachstein, 82
[126] Wingfield, 126.
[127] A concept whose roots go back to the 1917 revolution, and represents the idea that the revolutionary communists must work with the more moderate working-class political organizations to face a common enemy, often bourgeois- nationalist forces.
[128] "Angebot der KPTsch an die Deutsche Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei in der ČSR von 12. September 1934 zur Herstellung der Einheitsfront gegen den Henleinfascismus," document in Gerhard Fuchs, *Gegen Hitler und Henlein: Der solidarische Kampf tschechischer und deutscher Antifaschisten von 1933 bis 1938* (Berlin: Rütten & Loening, 1961), 293-294.

a decade earlier.[129] In the years following the initial 1934 offer, the KPČ repeatedly offered to form a "unity front" with the DSAP against the SdP, yet were continually turned down, most likely, Bachstein surmises, because of Jaksch's inherent personal distrust of the Communists.[130] If the DSAP had accepted the Communist offer, it is difficult to say whether or not they would have posed a greater threat to the Henleinists. Needless to say, however, the physical strength and power of the combined parties would have increased the size of the antifascist movement.

The DSAP's strong involvement in State politics and their struggle to ideologically undermine their opponents were largely without success considering their surprising losses in the 1935 elections. Although the resulting coalition remained largely the same as the previous one, the SdP surprising success, having won sixty-seven percent of the German vote and ten percent of the entire vote,[131] posed a serious threat to the program of the DSAP, still the leading German party in the coalition with a mere sixteen percent of the German vote. The SdP's large voter base, mainly restricted to the largest German cities, would remain active and persistent in their nationalist politics, posing a danger to the legitimacy of the DSAP and the government coalition in general.

The failure of the DSAP to maintain its popularity between 1929 and 1935 can hardly be explained by a single mistake, or a single external factor. Following the elections, the DSAP began to look at itself critically. In a speech at the party's post-election conference, its leaders took it upon themselves to examine their actions from a broader perspective. Jaksch, who for the past five years had been criticizing the DSAP's failure to put national issues in the forefront, saw the current situation as a failure of the party because of a "gap in [DSAP's] theory, namely the application of Socialist theory on

[129] Wingfield, 133.
[130] Bachstein, 95.
[131] Wingfield, 132.

the psychology of the people."[132] In other words, Jaksch felt that Socialist theory was *not* enough to fight the SdP, who appealed to the psychology of a people affected by poverty and unemployment. These realizations would lead to a dramatic change in both the DSAP's leadership and program.

[132] Jaksch quoted in Bachstein, 83.

IV: 1935-1938: DSAP in Response to the SdP: Jungaktivismus,[133] Opposition, and Consequences

Henlein's march is surely leading to the White Mountain of the Sudeten German's fate.[134] His politics are national suicide. We oppose him in the interest of our own people. We want to save the Sudeten Germans from a blow that would be bigger than any suffered during the Hussite or Thirty-Years War.[135]

Wenzel Jaksch, *Tschechoslowakische Bäderzeitung*, 29. April 1936

For the first time in the Czechoslovakia's history, the DSAP was no longer the most popular German party. By 1935, popular Sudeten political sentiment had become radical, nationalist, and militant, implying the need for the DSAP to reassess its politics and ideology, which led to a period of confusion and internal party disagreements. While I will later explore the response of the DSAP to the rising popularity of the SdP's radical pro-German ideology, it is important to understand how the SdP grew ever stronger in the years following their overwhelming electoral success in 1935. It was these factors, outside of the DSAP's control, which posed increasing opposition to German activist politics between 1935 and 1938, and, eventually, to their enormous losses in the elections of 1938. Developments external to DSAP party politics between 1935 and 1938 ran parallel to the actions of Henlein and Hitler, who were busy constructing a master scheme for the annexation of the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany, while the DSAP, among other pro-State parties, struggled desperately for survival.

With the election secured, Henlein and his party now had the political weight to move closer to Germany. In the years that followed, the Henlein movement would assimilate to the Nazi movement by drawing nearer to Berlin and actively cooperating

[133] *Jungactivismus* can be translated in "Young Activism" in English.
[134] Jaksch's reference to the "White Mountain" alludes to the Battle of White Mountain in 1620, where a group of Czech nobles were defeated by German Habsburg forces.
[135] Jaksch quoted in Bachstein, 101.

with Reich Nazis in subversive, anti-State activities, surrendering the movement (for all practical purposes) entirely to the whims of the German dictator. A year after the elections, Henlein publicly admitted his support for the Nazi regime, stating, in a speech in Eger that he "[preferred] to be hated in company with Germany than to draw any advantages out of the hatred of Germany."[136] In June 1937, Henlein officially apologized to the Führer for his former adherence to Spannist teachings and his membership in the *Kamaradschaftsbund*,[137] reaffirming his allegiance to Reich Nazism.[138] Months later, Henlein wrote to Hitler stating that an "understanding between the Czechs and Germans is practically impossible," and that in the face of these differences, he and his party desired the complete annexation of the Sudetenland to the Reich.[139]

The most crucial step towards the total fusion of the Henleinists and the Reich Nazis was Hitler's increased interest in Germans living outside the Reich, made public in 1938. After publicly accepting responsibility for the ten million Germans living in foreign states,[140] all results of the hated Treaty of Versailles, Hitler initiated a very close relationship with Henlein. It would be this mutually dependent relationship which would

---

[136] Konrad Henlein quoted in Luza, 93.

[137] Viennese university professor Othmar Spann was perhaps the most prominent personage in the development of such ideologies in postwar Czechoslovakia. His political philosophy, like Hitler's, preached the superiority of the German people and sought the rebirth of the Germans as masters of their own and Europe's fate. Spann's theory, known as Universalism, was hailed as an alternative to liberal democracy and revolutionary Bolshevism and taught that the German spirit could be rejuvenated if "Germanness" was seen more as a spiritual endeavor. Using Spannism as an ideological backdrop, Sudeten German nationalists created the semi-political organization *Kamaradschaftsbund*, for which Henlein was a member, whose goal, according to historian John Haag, was to "create an intellectual elite of spiritually superior leaders." Affiliation with this group in the thirties was considered by Hitler to be against the teachings of National Socialism. (John Haag. "'Knights of the Spirit: "The Kamaradschaftsbund." *Journal of Contemporary History*. Vol. 8, No. 3 (July 1973). 136-138)

[138] *Facing History*, 95.

[139] Ibid. 108.

[140] "No. 5 : Reichstag Speech, February 20, 1938," *Yale Law School: Documents on Law, History, and Diplomacy* <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk05.asp> 25 May 2010.

lead to the ill-fated Munich Agreement and the eventual dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

These developments made the DSAP's struggle to resist Nazism ever more difficult than it had been in the years before 1935. With first Henlein's and later Hitler's open acknowledgement of Sudeten and Reich German cooperation, the DSAP was suddenly faced not only with Sudeten radicals, but were also threatened by the full force of the now powerful Third Reich.The DSAP's response to these politics were mixed, forcing the party to face a series of internal battles. Despite its strong-willed, determined leaders, the DSAP eventually fell victim to the overwhelming external events. SdP's unexpected success in the 1938 elections, winning over ninety percent of the German vote, reduced the power of the DSAP and induced its definitive downfall by the Munich Agreement in September of that year.

Yet despite the numerous obstacles faced by the DSAP in these final years, their leaders stubbornly continued in their struggle to maintain its democratic, socialist principles. Why was this fierce struggle not sufficient in fighting the threatening German *Anschluss*? Although it is clear that the Nazi threat, coupled with the persistent economic depression in the Sudeten areas, led to the decline of the party, it still does not explain why the formerly most popular German party, the DSAP, failed to resurrect German Social Democracy in Czechoslovakia during the Nazi area. In the following pages, I will discuss the various strategies made by the DSAP to regain their voter base, popularity, and secure place in the Czechoslovak government, and how these strategies eventually failed to produce the desired outcome.

In the months following the elections of 1935, the DSAP was faced by fierce intra-party disputes, yet the true division was only made clear at the party congress in June 1935. Here, internal conflicts among leading members of the DSAP were finally

brought to the forefront. The conservative, older members of the party, led by Czech, insisted on maintaining and nurturing the party's relationship with their Czechoslovak counterparts and thereby fighting their constituency's primary enemy: capitalism.[141] Furthermore, Czech and his supporters argued that by continuing their support of employment programs, they would eventually regain the voters they had lost to the SdP that year. Another contingent of members, led most prominently by Wenzel Jaksch,[142] and later referred to as the *Jungaktivisten*, advocated an entirely new program which directly challenged the SdP and strove to become a "younger and more active"[143] political force.

Thus, the party congress set the scene for the unofficial division of the party. Where Czech remained party leader and continued in his position as Minister for Public Works, consistently maintaining his steadfast conviction that the DSAP's political problems could eventually be solved by improving the economic situation, Jaksch, as newly appointed deputy chairman, began a campaign to rejuvenate the DSAP by a decided turn to the right by addressing pressing national issues and putting Marxist ideology on the back-burner. Thus, the DSAP's post-1935 political struggle against Henlein can be considered as a two-pronged, somewhat disorganized approach.

The first approach was that followed by the party leader, Ludwig Czech, who seemed to be motivated by the traditional, Austro-Marxist ideology of Bauer and Renner. Czech held speeches and wrote articles designed to make the population aware of the dangers of Henleinism and Nazism, but reminding them, as I mentioned earlier, that capitalism was the true evil holding Czechoslovakia captive. In a speech broadcast in May 1936, Czech announced that "the difficult task [of destroying the capitalist system]

[141] Wingfield, 140-141.
[142] Jaksch's "allies" included Kessler, Richard Reitzner, and Rudolf Storch.
[143] Wingfield, 141.

can only be achieved if we are successful in removing Fascism, which is capitalism's only remaining crutch. Thus, Fascism is enemy number one!"[144] From the above statement, it can be surmised that Czech's negative attitude towards fascism was based on a Marxist point of view.

From a practical viewpoint, Czech, now Minister for Public Works, continued to fight capitalism and the fascism he connected with it by putting his ideas into action. In the years following the party congress, Czech's group steadily continued the somewhat futile approach he had practiced in the years before 1935, attempting to build the strength of socialism and democracy by economically strengthening the country. Czech, along with ČSDSD ministers, began an affirmative action program which began appointing an increased number of Germans to government positions. Furthermore, Czech initiated a massive railroad project in 1937, giving 4,270 Sudeten Germans temporary employment. German companies began to prosper as a result of government contracts.[145] In the same period, the number of Germans in public service positions was increased from four to twelve percent as a result of the success of DSAP's (and other German activist's) February 1937 memorandum, which mandated proportional ethnic representation in all public service jobs.[146]

These actions all combined to significantly improve the economic situation in the Sudetenland, yet sadly failed to change the increasingly radical mindset of the Sudeten Germans by 1938, who had already been indoctrinated in Nazi ideology. The Henlein front proceeded to mock the DSAP's economic and employment policies, which they saw as a pitifully small step towards equality. Furthermore, Bruegel suggests that the February memorandum pushed the SdP to the "provocative move of sending an official

[144] Ludwig Czech, "Eine erste Warnung: Der Faschimus, das ist der Krieg!" *Rundfunkansprache des Parteivorsitzenden Minister Dr. Ludwig Czech am 1. Mai 1936.*
[145] Wingfield, 152-153, Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia before Munich*, 148-149.
[146] Memorandum shown in Bruegel, *Ludwig Czech*, 191-193.

SdP delegation to the Nazi Party Rally in Nuremberg,[147] symbolically pushing the SdP and Germany closer together; unintended and undoubtedly harmful to the anti-Nazi aims of the DSAP.

The second approach was embodied by Jaksch's *Jungaktivismus*, which seemed to be the DSAP's only remaining hope in *directly* fighting the popularity of the SdP in that it assumed some of the more national issues which helped lead to Henlein's success in the early thirties. Furthermore, Jaksch, as Wingfield points out, was "more adept than Czech at political mudslinging," therefore making him a "more effective opponent to Henlein."[148] With his reputation as a vain, excessively ambitious politician, Jaksch seemed to be the only leading DSAP member who was willing to "fight fire with fire." Unlike Czech, who proposed fighting the SdP through leftist socialist measures, Jaksch was devoted to moderate rightist-nationalist politics. Yet despite his relatively radical stance, even Jaksch, according to Bruegel, was not prepared to "tamper with...the democratic basis of the State."[149] In his mind, the DSAP could accomplish more by cooperating with the State to find a definite solution to the nationalities' problem, and more specifically, towards attaining German self-government in the Sudeten region. This, of course, required him and the other *Jungaktivisten*, or young activists, to oppose both the conservative members of the party, and consistently push and persuade the relatively conservative, and famously anti-German Czech statesman Edvard Beneš, who assumed his position as President of Czechoslovak in late 1935.

Jaksch's *Jungaktivismus* held, above all else, that the only effective counterweight to Sudeten Nazism was to satisfy the popular Sudeten desire to find a "federal solution to the central European question by granting minorities an "exceptional political and cultural

[147] Made world-famous by Leni Riefenstahl famous propaganda film "Triumph of the Will."
[148] Wingfield, 152.
[149] Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia before Munich*, 148.

position"[150] in other words, he sought to procure self-government for minority areas, an idea he called *Volkssozialismus.*[151] Although *Jungaktivismus* advocated a decided turn to the right, the Jaksch movement was invested in consolidating a clear dividing line between activist nationalist politics and Nazi-inspired nationalism in order to maintain a peaceful, progressive relationship with their Czech counterparts. "It is finally time," Jaksch argued in a 1936 *Sozialdemokrat* article,

> to draw a sharp line between adventurous youths, paid agents and spies of the Third Reich, and *true* national politics [in Czechoslovakia]. So long as the majority of Sudeten Germans fail to recognize these divisions, Czech mistrust will rise and nationalism on both sides [that is, Czech and German] will gain a foothold, endangering any chance of national cooperation.[152]

Such a statement reflects Jaksch's continued loyalty to the State despite his nationally minded program. Jaksch also held that Social Democracy could not act alone in these trying times. "The law of self-preservation," Jaksch pointed out at the party congress in 1935, "mandates that socialism in Czechoslovakia cannot work in isolation from the Agrarians and Bourgeois," suggesting a cooperation with the German right in order to establish a sounder German democratic base,[153] implicitly excluding the Communists, whom Jaksch inherently distrusted, from the proposed political alliance,.[154]

Between 1935 and 1938, Jaksch launched a large-scale program towards national reconciliation, largely manifested in his speeches and actions in parliament as the party's deputy chairman. In general, Jaksch preached the necessity of avoiding war at all costs,

[150] Jaksch quoted in Bachstein, 69.
[151] *Volkssozialismus* denotes a type of socialism which concentrates on the German *volk* or people.
[152] Jaksch quoted in Bachstein, 98. Italics added.
[153] This alliance never came to be. Here, Jaksch applied the newly-born, communist concept of the "popular front," a broad political cooperation formed to fight a "common enemy."
[154] Jaksch as quoted in Bachstein, 84, 95.

the only solution to which was, according to Jaksch, a "unanimous creed of peace."[155] At the same time, however, Jaksch turned his attention to the Czechoslovaks, insisting that in the past, the German activists had been denied the support of the ruling Czechoslovak parties, and therefore now sought "understanding from the Czech parties for the [German activist parties] for the difficult burden they now carry."[156] While admitting that the Germans do not, in fact, share the same freedom as the Czech or Slovaks in the State, Jaksch was hopeful of a future solution to the Sudeten problem, created by mutual understanding among the country's nationalities. The fact that the leading Czech politicians supported the February 1937 resolutions, "reenforced [the DSAP's] conviction that a practical solution to the national problem can be found in the arena of discussion,"[157] rather than in war. Jaksch's path to a solution is made clear in his parliamentary speeches. Germans need a better, equal position in the State. This can be achieved not through an alliance with Hitler, but rather through a constructive accommodation within the existing Czechoslovak State system.

Propaganda from this period reflects that of the early thirties in its implicit warnings of the consequences of a Sudeten alliance with Germany its blatant anti-Nazi messages. With the help of hundreds of refugees from Germany, mostly from the Social Democratic Party, the *Allgemeine Illustrierte Zeitung* was published in Prague. Among other photographs and illustrations, one particular warning stands out. Along with the caption "...And Hitler's peace offers will be followed by his 'doves of peace,'" there appears a full page picture of missiles bearing swastikas and wearing the wings of doves,

[155] Wenzel Jaksch, "Přiloha k těsnopisecké zprávé v Praze [Addendum to the Stenographer's Notes], 26. dubna [April] 1936," *Jaksch, Wenzel: Reden vor dem Abgeordnetenhaus von 1930-1938,* 109.
[156] Ibid, 110.
[157] Wenzel Jaksch, "Vertrauen in die eigene Kraft: Rede im Abgeordnetenhaus, 3 Dec, 1937," *Jaksch, Wenzel: Reden vor dem Abgeordnetenhaus von 1930-1938,* 188.

heading down to destroy a crowd of bewildered onlookers.[158] Such propaganda serves to uncover the true meaning of Hitler's definition of "peace," namely war, and warns potential SdP voters what a Sudeten- Hitler alliance could lead to.

It would be the anti-Nazi, pro-reform path of Jaksch and the *Jungaktivisten*, that the DSAP would choose to follow. In late March 1938, given the alarming Austrian *Anschluss* to the German Reich earlier that month, and, not to mention Hitler's February 1938 speech in which he publicly accepted responsibility for the ten million Germans living in foreign states,[159] the DSAP's executive committee decided that the party needed to pursue a stronger defense against the Reich Nazis and the Henleinists. Under pressure, Czech resigned as party chairman and Jaksch was duly elected as the party's new chairman, an appointment supported by Beneš himself. Jaksch's election prompted the retirement of several older DSAP leaders and the establishment of a new, younger executive committee, signaling a definite change in the party. The party, largely rid of its conservative elements, was now in position to pursue Jaksch's *Volkssozialismus* and begin their final offensive against the SdP, which would take shape in the 1938 elections and in the months before the infamous Munich agreement.

The years between 1935 and 1938 were marked by a disappointing failure on the part of the DSAP. The failed 1935 elections led to inner turmoil among the party. This turmoil led to the lack of a cohesive, comprehensive party program. While the DSAP was busy dealing with its own problems, the SdP and their Nazi allies had been amassing, organizing, and strategizing. Hitler and Henlein had come up with a plan. The DSAP had not. It had not even struck important alliances with other German activist parties. By early 1938, the DSAP was alone and isolated, the strong-willed Jaksch their only hope of

[158] See Figure 4.
[159] "No. 5 : Reichstag Speech, February 20, 1938," *Yale Law School: Documents on Law, History, and Diplomacy*

survival in the increasingly radical Sudetenland. As J. W. Bruegel points out, "democracies are used to acting slowly and hesitantly, carrying out even overdue reforms only under a certain pressure."[160] This was not only the case of the DSAP, but also of Czechoslovak politics during this period. The slowness of the democratic reform in Czechoslovakia could in no way compete at the same breakneck speed as the undemocratic SdP.

[160] Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia before Munich*, 147.

V: 1938: Towards the End

Everything is at stake! The Sudeten Germans are standing in front of a historic decision. It is about the life or death of our people! The gate to a peaceful solution of the Sudeten Germans is wide open![161]

-DSAP document, September 1938

Despite the turbulent character of Sudeten politics and extra-political events that year, history has largely ignored this struggle and concentrated on the role of the Sudeten Germans, as a whole, as "Hitler's fifth columnists." While the Sudeten Germans, as represented by their elected party, the SdP, did offer Hitler a golden opportunity for the absorption of the Sudetenland, and, eventually Czechoslovakia proper, it would be a mistake, as I alluded to in the introduction of this essay, to assume that the Sudeten Germans worked as a whole to destroy the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia. A closer look behind the scenes in 1938, and especially into the antifascist efforts of German Social Democrats, reveals a strong and determined battle which failed at the hands of the conservative Czechoslovak leadership, the powerful will of Hitler's Germany, and the war-fearing French and British appeasers. The DSAP's first lost battle of 1938 were the elections in May, which, in hindsight, seemed to hold the fate of the Sudeten Germans, Czechoslovakia, and of Europe in its hands. Despite the veritable intensity of the elections, they would end in the SdP's enormous electoral victory in 1938.

The DSAP's second battle of 1938 would be their last real battle in the First Republic, namely that against the eventual Munich Agreement and the annexation of the Sudetenland to the Reich. This final stage was the most violent, extreme, and desperate fight in Sudeten politics since the foundation of the Republic in 1918. The DSAP leadership, now under the control of Jaksch, fought their battle on three fronts. They fought on the level of Sudeten politics to re-popularize activism and attack the integrity of

[161] "Letztes Manifest," from a post, mid-September 1938 from Fiedler, 75. See Figure 5.

the SdP and Hitler, and they sought understanding and support from the Czechoslovak government and the international community.

5. 1 The Communal Elections of 1938

Beginning in March 1938, the DSAP, now newly organized and significantly more "rightest" than under its previous leadership, launched a large-scale publicity campaign in the Sudetenland and throughout Czechoslovakia to prepare for the impending communal elections in late May. As the newly elected chairman, Jaksch, announced the DSAP would no longer be an "appeasement party," but would, from here on out, be an outright "fighting party."[162]

By the end of March 1938, Czechoslovakia's only two remaining activist parties, the German Agrarian and the German Clerical parties[163], had joined the Henlein movement, leaving the DSAP isolated, save for a handful of German communists, in the fight for the State and against German irredentists, who now openly voiced in calls for Sudeten annexation to the Reich. The DSAP, despite their isolation, carried out a full-scale election campaign. Its failure, however, was ultimately the result of external factors: its diehard opponents, the SdP and its Nazi backers, and, as argued by some historians and party members, a lack of support from the Czechoslovak State.

In the two months before the elections, the DSAP strongly manifested their investment in peace and economic stability over all else. In parliament, Jaksch maintained a steady attitude of Czechoslovak cooperation, while at the same time attempting to point out the duplicitous politics of the Henleinists, the same tactic which the DSAP had used since the early thirties to combat the German extreme right. In a parliamentary session on April 5, Jaksch declared that "German Social Democracy is and will remain an innovator

[162] Jaksch as quoted in Bachstein, 152.
[163] While these parties joined the ranks of the SdP, prominent Agrarian activist politician Franz Spina, formerly Minister of Labor, and Minister Erwin Zajicek of the Clerical party resigned in protest.

of understanding between free and equal nationalities."[164] Alternatively, Jaksch urged the government to consider the connection between continuing high unemployment rates and the level of radicalism in the Sudetenland. The problem, he suggests, is not political bias, as the SdP continually maintained, but social realities.

Finally Jaksch announced the DSAP's desire never to give into the pressure and resign themselves to the new strain in Sudeten politics. "It is a difficult, glorious task," he points out

> that the last party of German activism [the DSAP] has set for itself: the task, that *someone* has to be there to carry the banner of freedom, democratic belief, and the European policy of peace in the hard days, when so many have abandoned this banner...[165]

In the same speech, Jaksch calls attention to the unfair methods of the SdP, currently raging in the Sudetenland, claiming that "the SdP has targeted the German democratic people with unashamed extortion, based on their economic dependency and fear of war."[166] In these parliamentary speeches, made public by DSAP publications, Jaksch fearlessly reaffirms the party's values and at the same time uncovers the wrath unleashed by the SdP upon those who did not support their cause.

Apart from parliamentary affirmations of the party's strong stance before the elections, the DSAP also manifested both its distaste for Nazi politics and its desire to spread the *Volkssozialismus* through its widespread propaganda campaign, which, like before 1935, focused alternatively on the positive aspects of the DSAP and the negative

[164] Wenzel Jaksch, "Přiloha k těsnopisecké zprávé v Praze [Addendum to the Stenographer's Notes]," 5. dubna [April] 1936," *Jaksch, Wenzel: Reden vor dem Abgeordnetenhaus von 1930-1938,* 36.
[165] Ibid, 39. Italics added.
[166] Ibid, 52.

Within his speeches, Jaksch is constantly interrupted by the SdP delegate Dr. Neurath, who abuptly and without further explanation spurts out the Jaksch is lying, or worse, has no right to speak for the Sudeten population because of their status as a minority party in Sudeten politics.

consequences of voting for the SdP. One particularly eerie election poster depicts a skeleton menacingly holding a torch and his gnarly, grabbing, hand held over a picturesque village, most likely intended to portray rural Sudetenland. On his forehead is a swastika and a caption reads "defend the homeland and vote list 6" (DSAP's number).[167] The message of this poster is clear: the Henlein/Hitler front is comparable to a soulless, demonic creature, eager to destroy the peace of the Sudetenland. Another popular propaganda picture, with the caption "Sudeten Germans, it will get you first!" uses the same idea. The picture shows a hardworking man plowing his field next to his cabin, unaware of a gigantic boulder labelled "war" about to kill him and destroy his property.[168] This picture, like the first one described, suggests the imminent and utter destruction possible should the SdP be elected.

On a more positive note, another DSAP pre-election poster urges voters to vote for the DSAP not out of fear of war or Hitler, but because of their progressive, peaceful, and worker-friendly policy. "Every good German," the poster reads, "who treasures freedom and democracy, who supports social reconstruction, [and] who rejects institutionalized violence, votes for the German Social Democratic Worker's Party."[169] This message reflects both the German and the social democratic character of the party, appealing to the nationality of its constituency and its responsibility as a nation to safeguard its place in free and democratic Czechoslovakia. Recent press and Henleinist propaganda as early as March 1938 had identified DSAP and its supporters as "non-Germans" or as "Germanized Czechs." [170] The message of this poster counters such accusations, suggesting just the opposite. Social Democrats, not Nazis, are *real* Germans, and *real*

[167] See Figure 6
[168] See Figure 7.
[169] See Figure 8.
[170] In the *Prager Tagblatt* on March 23, 1938, Henlein is quoted saying, "In particular, the German Social Democrats can no longer be counted among the Germans of this State..." (Henlein quoted in Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia before Munich*, 171.)

Germans demand freedom, social consciousness and a clear stance against political violence.

The DSAP's proactive campaign was severely undermined by external factors. While the historian can hardly ascertain the reaction of individuals to the DSAP's propaganda, it is a sound historical fact that the distribution of the material was severely undermined by SdP supporters. In Böhmisch Leipa, for example, posters could not be printed due to pressure exerted on local publishing houses.[171] Such pressure did not just extend to the distribution of campaign posters.

The DSAP's campaign extended to mass political rallies scheduled to be held at various cities and towns throughout the Sudetenland.[172] While they were more often than not interrupted by the SdP's *Volkssport* members, the DSAP, still 80,000 members strong,[173] was determined to continue its campaign despite the threat of physical danger posed by their increasingly militant adversaries. While most public demonstrations resulted in violence, the DSAP was not undefended. By 1938, the *Republikanische Wehr,*[174] the DSAP's own paramilitary force which had been fairly inactive since its establishment in 1926, had, by 1937, grown into a strong, organized force of 7,000 members.[175] While stationed at party meetings and demonstrations, the presence of the *Republikanische Wehr* failed to evade the inevitable violence which the *Volkssport* presented, and, as a result, party meetings were increasingly unannounced or even

[171] Wingfield, 169.
[172] See Figure 9 for a picture of the demonstration in Eger on May 1, 1938, in the midst of the elections.
[173] Pit Fiedler, *Die Sudetendeutschen Sozialdemokraten: Von der DSAP zur Seliger Gemeinde* (Munich: Verlag Eckhard Bodner, 2009), 72.
[174] German for "Republican Defense." Upon its founding in 1926, this group was referred to as the *Rote Wehr* or "Red Defense."
[175] Friedrich Kürbisch, *Chronik der sudetendeutschen Sozialdemokratie: 1863-1938* (Munich: Die Brücke, 1982), 78.

cancelled.[176] The failure of these demonstrations, which were intended to be peaceful, probably served to intimidate would-be attendees or DSAP supporters.

While the DSAP was busy campaigning, spreading their belief that democracy, not fascism would eventually solve the economic plight and the unequal balance of power between the Czech majority and the German minority, the SdP had launched a widespread offensive against DSAP members, supporters, and politically undecided or apolitical Germans. In terrorizing individuals, families, and businesses alike, SdP leaders hoped to scare people away from activism into the welcoming arms of their own party. Jaksch describes the terror faced by DSAP supporters in 1938 and, sadly, the effectiveness of this tactic.

> ...Every day our supporters are told that after the supposedly imminent invasion of Hitler, they will be massacred. Under these circumstances, we were unable to nominate [DSAP] candidates in many smaller municipalities, or, in other cases, the candidates had to, given the dreadful pressure of the Henlein terror before the election day, abdicate their positions before the elections.[177]

In this statement, Jaksch expresses the difficulty, or even the near impossibility of maintaining a geographically widespread candidacy with the constant interference and terror-tactics of the SdP.

Furthermore, as visible from several firsthand accounts, many SdP employers threatened to fire non-SdP members, or refused to hire them in the first place if they did not join the party in advance. Henlein hardly denied this tactic. In mid-May 1938, Henlein coldly announced in a newspaper article that "anyone not voting for the [Henleinists] could consider himself an emigre."[178] Thus, the Henleinst terror was not just restricted to active political campaigners, but also to ordinary DSAP voters. In her account of the late thirties, Maria Lippert, a DSAP member in Eger, claims that she never

[176] Wingfield, 175.
[177] Jaksch quoted in Bachstein, 161.
[178] Henlein quoted in Wingfield, 169.

felt repressed by the Czechs, but rather by her fellow Germans, the Henleinists. Her husband, she reports, was unable to build a career in his desired field because of his steadfast allegiance to the DSAP.[179] Another active Social Democrat, Herta Sedlačkova of the German City of Odrau, reports being openly rejected for a secretarial position in a factory run primarily by SdP members in 1938. "No one wants you in their office," she was told by the general manager.[180] These are just two examples of a well-documented phenomena. With these scare-tactics, the DSAP leadership was defenseless, outnumbered, and utterly isolated in a region with people either eager for an annexation or terrified of the consequences of voting for the DSAP.

Another obstacle to a successful campaign was the Czech-dominated government's reluctance to back the DSAP militarily or morally. The general attitude of the government during the elections, Nancy Wingfield notes, was to "allow [the Henleinists] to do generally what they liked in the border areas, thus endangering both the Czechs and the non-Henleinist Germans residents there."[181] Furthermore, the Czechoslovak leadership, as early as the spring of 1938, made it clear to emissaries from Berlin that they were prepared to accommodate the demands of the SdP, should they be elected, essentially turning their backs on DSAP, who at this point was still a coalition party.[182] At the Socialist Worker International Conference in May 1938, Jaksch lamented the "apprehensive paralysis of [the Czechoslovak] democratic system," in their failure to militarily intervene in the SdP's anti-DSAP terror. "We set our hopes on three factors," he explained

[179] Maria Lippert, "Von den eigenen Volksgenossen unterdrückt" in *Helden der Hoffnung*, 67.
[180] "Herta Sedlačkova," *Sie Blieben der Tschechoslowakei treu*, 21.
[181] Wingfield, 169.
[182] Bachstein, 155.

> on Beneš, whose courage and resolve should be undisputed; on an army, that is led by excellent officers inspired by a democratic spirit; and on the Czech people's desire for freedom. [183]

As demonstrated here, at the crucial turning point in Sudeten politics in mid-May, Jaksch was disappointed in the political character of Czechoslovak leaders.

With the reluctance of the Czechoslovak government to fully back the DSAP, the party, with Jaksch as its representative, appealed to the Socialist International which met in Brussels in May 1938. In Brussels, Jaksch commented on the political crisis in the Sudetenland, and mentioned that he feared that a rumored German mobilization on the Sudeten border might indicate the coming of a full-fledged Henleinist uprising which would most likely first target DSAP members.[184] Furthermore, he pronounced to the international socialist community that contrary to reports in the international press, the Henleinists were not being oppressed, that that the SdP themselves were the actual oppressors.[185] In turn, the International recognized the intensity of the DSAP's struggle and, throughout the next few weeks, supplied the party with popular international speakers to speak on the DSAP's behalf during their election campaign.[186] Furthermore, the International passed a resolution which recognized the DSAP for their "loyalty to the principles of personal freedom and democracy."[187] While DSAP leaders may have derived moral support from the backing of the International, the organization merely served to peripherally support the party, and did not, in a significant way, interfere in their election campaign or in the months which followed.

[183] Jaksch quoted in Bachstein, 160.
[184] Wingfield, 169.
[185] Wingfield, 170.
[186] Speakers included Richard Crossman (British Labour Politician), Philip Noel-Baker (future British Parliamentary Secretary), and Robert J. Watt (a leading intellectual in the trade union system).
Bachstein, 160.
[187] Wingfield, 170.

When the election results arrived, it is clear that none of Jaksch's hopes had become reality, and the DSAP was truly a lonely group surrounded by hostile, opportunist, or uncaring citizens and politicians. Combined, the terrorist, violent, and extortionist methods of the Henlein party, the failure of the DSAP to find a proper undisturbed public forum to voice their concerns and hopes for Sudeten German future, and the blind-eye turned on the Sudeten population by the Czechoslovak government led to the largest electoral victory of a party *ever* in Czechoslovak history, the SdP winning 90.4 percent of the German vote.[188] The DSAP only won the majority of votes in several smaller counties.[189] Yet the struggle was not over. The Sudetenland was still part of democratic Czechoslovakia, and the DSAP did not intend to sit idly by as Henlein and Hitler drafted the plans for the destruction of a atate that had taken twenty years to build.

5. 2 Munich and the DSAP's Demise

With the enormous success of the SdP in the 1938 elections, it became clear to Czechoslovak leaders and leading DSAP members that the current geopolitical situation of German Czechoslovakia had to be reformed to defend against the probable invasion of the country by Germany. Yet while the Czechoslovak leaders, the DSAP, and a handful of communists fought a life-and-death battle to maintain the territorial integrity of the State, their efforts failed at the hands of the French and British "appeasers," who, convinced that Hitler was ready to wage war against Czechoslovakia for possession of the Sudetenland, recoiled, leaving Czechoslovakia little choice but to surrender and sit idly by as foreign troops marched across the borders and into their country. But was this fate inevitable? *Could* it have been prevented? In the following pages, I will discuss the

[188] Including votes for the Communist party, the SdP had eighty-five percent of the German vote. (Joseph Rothschild,
East Central Europe between the two World Wars, (Seattle : University of Washington, 1974), 129.)
[189] Wingfield, 170.

DSAP's role in their final attempt to preserve Czechoslovakia, and their very last chance to influence the politics of a rapidly changing Europe

The DSAP struggled to overcome their devastating loss in the May 1938 elections on both a domestic and an international front. On the domestic front, the DSAP was determined to show Czechoslovakia that the SdP were not representative of the *entire* Sudeten population, and that the SdP's electoral success was based on lies, fear, and intimidation. There *were*, the DSAP set out to prove, Sudeten Germans who rejected Nazism and all that it stood for.

This approach was compromised by the SdP, who, according to Bruegel, "did their utmost to deprive [the DSAP] of all influence and eliminate them wherever possible."[190] Eventually, through pressure exerted on the Czech leadership, the DSAP was dismissed from parliament in response to SdPs refusal to cooperate in State affairs if the DSAP were involved. Their party, members of the SdP pointed out, were "the only authorized representatives of the Sudeten Germans and the Social Democrat's continued membership in the government was 'absolutely intolerable and disturbing.'"[191] Thus ended the DSAP official connection to the government in Prague, a relationship which had lasted for almost ten years.

Still, the DSAP assumed the responsibility of countering this disastrous turn of events. For one, they stressed the need for a reform concerning the question of Sudeten German self-government, considering the dangerous radical mood which had gripped the Germans of Czechoslovakia. In an article in the June edition of the *Sozialdemokrat*, Jaksch urged Czech leaders to "finally tell their people the truth, that it is *not*, in the long run, in the interest of the State to rule over an unsatisfied minority group."[192] Such

[190] Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia before Munich*, 172.
[191] Ibid.
[192] Jaksch in *Sozialdemokrat*, 5. June 1938 from Bachstein, 162. Italics added.

warnings were largely ignored. In these months, DSAP leaders was frequently invited to Prague Castle for talks with the President, who, according to Bachstein, only invited them out of a "moral obligation," because they were the last remaining, loyal German activist party.[193]

In July 1938, the DSAP had the opportunity to voice their concerns on an international platform. Concerned about the rising level of violence on the Czechoslovak borderlands and Germany's increasing interest in the Sudetenland, the British finally decided it was time to intervene, and sent an emissary, Lord Walter Runciman, to assess the situation and negotiate relations between the SdP (whose demands for autonomy had become progressively more persistent since their initial demands in April),[194] and the government in Prague. Runciman and his team devoted most of their time to consulting with SdP leaders and Czech government representatives. The British government was convinced that Germany would only be satisfied with an agreement between "Henlein (which means the German government) and the Czechoslovak government direct."[195] Nevertheless DSAP felt that they, as the last democratic German party, needed to, and

---

[193] Bachstein, 162.

[194] In April, Henlein, in close cooperation Hitler, put forth a list of conditions to be met by the Prague government including, most prominently, a stipulation for complete self-government in all Sudeten regions. The demands, which implicitly implied granting the SdP total political autonomy in Czechoslovakia, were inherently distasteful to the nationally minded Czech government, and by design, would not be satisfied. Many historians, and I believe rightly so, has judged these impossible demands to be a mere tool for creating an atmosphere of tension and agitation in Prague and that Henlein never actually expected any of these demands to be met. Though the Czech government conceded on a number of demands, the SdP, "perturbed"by the State's unexpected response, rejected any form of cooperation, creating an almost unbearable sense of foreboding in the country in the months which followed.

(Henlein is quoted as saying: "We must make demands that cannot be satisfied." *Stasi.eu. <http://www.stasi.eu/konrad_henlein_en.html>* 20 Dec. 2009, *Facing History*, 109.)

[195] William Strang, H. M. Emmissary in Berlin and Prague, "Appointment of an Observer or of a Commision of Investigation or Enquiry," in E. L Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Third Series, Volume I* (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1949), 408.

had the right to be heard. "Our opinion at a crucial turning point in the history of Czechoslovakia will decide the fate of the Sudeten Germans," Jaksch and his colleagues argued, "and we feel, as a German party, inextricably bound to this fate."

Therefore, on the second day of the mission, the DSAP, led by Jaksch, approached Runciman with a forty-three page memorandum. Therein, the DSAP insisted that "in the interest of European peace" the Sudeten region should remain part of Czechoslovakia, but that reforms should be made which ensured that the Germans of Czechoslovakia enjoyed "full equality with the other nationalities and [retained] their own distinctive national identity."[196] The memorandum outlined four points crucial in securing a Sudeten-Czech solution: proportionality in public service, linguistic equality, government reinvestment in the Sudeten region, and democratic self-administration.[197] Basically, the DSAP's proposal represented a decided shift in finally, officially addressing the nationalities problem, yet presenting a route less extreme than the demands of autonomy made by Henlein, who by now had already captivated the roused Germans of Czechoslovakia.

On the whole, the DSAP's appeal to Britain did little but make members of the Runciman mission aware that there were, in fact, "other" Germans in Czechoslovakia, and that not all Sudeten Germans were SdP supporters. R. G. D. Laffan, in *Crisis over Czechoslovakia* notes (without citation) that "Runciman was impressed by the sanity and moderation of Jaksch and his colleagues." Yet while British foreign correspondence of the period only briefly, and without description, mentions Runciman's meeting with the DSAP, historians of the period have largely concluded that the Runciman delegation probably dismissed the DSAP's memorandum as unimportant. Historian Paul Vyšný, in his book *The Runciman Mission,* surmises that Runciman "probably regarded [the DSAP]

[196] Paul Vyšný, *The Runciman Mission to Czechoslovakia, 1938: Prelude to Munich* (Hampshire, Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 154-155.
[197] Wingfield, 175.

as something of an irrelevance" based on his discovery of a document in the archives written by foreign service officer Frank Roberts,[198] who praised the DSAP's memorandum as "a very reasonable document" and lamented the fact that but the DSAP "no longer count for much among the Sudetens."[199] Even DSAP members themselves felt utterly ignored by Runciman, and felt that the British delegation failed to see them as members of a democratic party, but rather as "troublemakers."[200] Thus, the DSAP's international appeal to the European community failed at the hands of the British, who, as we will see, would stop at little to nothing to prevent a war.

As the summer progressed, organized SdP violence and acts of terrorism in the Sudetenland began to resemble a civil war. Henlein supporters targeted Czechs, State organizations, Jews, communists, and loyal Social Democrats. Antifascists, largely embodied by Communists and Social Democrats, were threatened, beaten, and even kidnapped.[201] Despite the fact that they were grossly outnumbered by *Volksport* members, and had significantly fewer weapons, the DSAP's *Republikanische Wehr* bravely fought against random attacks on Social Democratic property.[202]

Two weeks before the Munich Agreement, the DSAP released a statement, in the form of posters and flyers, which encouraged active struggle against the Henleinists in a last cry for support.[203] Therein, the DSAP urged all Sudeten Germans to "mobilize all their strength for peace and freedom, for a better future, and for a new and equal Europe." The document proposes that Czech-German equality can be achieved without war, which its authors suggest is imminent. Moreover, the authors point out that the Sudeten

[198] Roberts was a junior official at the British Foreign Office at the time.
[199] Vyšný, 155-156.
[200] Opinions of Jaksch, DSAP General Secretary Siegfried Taub, and economic expert Franz Rehwald summarized in Fiedler, 74.
[201] Fiedler, 75.
[202] Wingfield, 177.
[203] "Letztes Manifest"

Germans are being misused as a tool for "imperialistic expansionist goals," of which the Sudetens themselves will be the first victims. In gory detail, the document informs the younger generation what the "hell of war" looks like, and reminds the older generation of the terror of the First World War. Readers are offered a choice, "equality though peace, or downfall with war." With these words, with this ultimatum, the DSAP, after nearly twenty years of activism within the Republic, unofficially departed from Sudeten politics. One week later they suspended their various publications.[204]

By the end of the September, Sudeten Nazism in Czechoslovakia had reached its definitive form, and there was no stopping their separatist demands or its powerful Nazi backers. While Beneš, by late September, had agreed to a "Fifth plan" which voluntarily ceded the Sudeten regions, the French and British appeasers rejected this plan in favor of Hitler's annexation proposals. In September, Hitler used the failed negotiations between the SdP and the Czechs to rationalize his demands for the complete annexation of the Sudetenland to the Reich. Just days later, French and British leaders infamously signed the Munich Agreement officially endorsing the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

The signing of the Munich Agreement painfully demonstrated the failure of the post Versailles system and the League of Nations. France and Britain, as the League's most powerful members, shrank before Hitler's demands, eager to preserve the peace and avoid war, wary of the League's effectiveness. Months before Munich, Chamberlain himself had expressed his doubts concerning the League, stating that

> the League as constituted today is unable to provide collective security for anybody...[and that the British] must not try to delude themselves, and still more, [they] must not try to delude small weak nations, into thinking that they will be protected by the League against aggression and acting accordingly, when [they] know that nothing of the kind can be expected.[205]

[204] Out of fear of endangering its readers and subscribers. (Bachstein, 173)
[205] Chamberlain as quoted in Peter J. Beck, "Searching for Peace in Munich, not Geneva: The British Government, the League of Nations and the Sudetenland Question," in *The*

The British and French, Peter J. Beck points out in his article "Searching for Peace in Munich, not Geneva," "sought to ensure that [peace] evolved according to an assessment of present-day *national* policy interests rather than doctrinaire internationalism,"[206] suggesting that the two countries abandoned the idea of the League in favor of their own country's well-being, and not necessarily that of Europe.

Hitler's victorious entry into the Sudetenland showed his complete domination of the Sudeten political idea. Greeted in streets of German villages and towns plastered with swastikas, Hitler was widely hailed as the region's liberator-Messiah.[207] All over the Sudetenland, banners proclaimed "*Ein Volk, ein Reich, Ein Fueher*,"[208] illustrating the veritable change in Sudeten popular nationalism to one fully subscribed to Reich politics and its agenda. As of early October 1938, the Sudetens were no longer the historic minority group with which they had entered Czechoslovakia in 1918. In the next six years, the Sudetenland would act as a functional Reich territory and the SdP would be disbanded and directly incorporated into the Reich's political structure.[209]

As a political organization, the DSAP disappeared from the Sudetenland, which was now a *Gau* of the Reich. Some members physically left the Sudetenland, some for the Czechoslovak "rump State," and some for other European states which provided them asylum. Jaksch, who had extensive contacts abroad and keen negotiating skills, helped roughly one thousand DSAP officials emigrate to western European countries. Jaksch himself eventually found refuge in England. Those DSAP supporters who remained in

---

Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II, eds. Igor Lukes and Erik Goldstein (London, Portland OR: Frank Cass, 1999), 175.

[206] Ibid. 239.

[207] This can be seen in several Nazi propaganda videos at the time. Pictures, like in Figure 10 and 11, also demonstrate the intensity with which Hitler was received.

[208] See Figure 12.

[209] Ronald M. Smelser, *The Sudeten Problem, 1933-1938; Volkstumspolitik and the formulation of Nazi foreign policy* (Folkestone: Dawson, 1975), 240.

their homes in the borderlands, were subject to Hitler's regime of terror. Upon annexation, over ten thousand Social Democrats were immediately transported to the Reich's concentration camps like Dachau, Flossenbürg. Mauthausen, and Buchenwald, where many lost their lives.[210] Others, who were not immediately discovered as antifascists, were terrorized and humiliated by Henleinists and Reich officials.[211]

In a last political meeting in Prague, in February 1939, just two months before the German invasion of Czechoslovakia proper, the DSAP announced that it would continue its politics from abroad. In a sad "good-bye" to the last remaining loyal German party, Ferdinand Peroutka, an acclaimed journalist and founder of the Czech weekly *Přítomnost* wrote

> No one will deny the German social democrats the merit they deserve, that they were the only German party that did not hesitate to fight against Germany's imperialism... They showed that parties live through the ideas they were created by. It was invaluable to the Republic that the Social Democrats kept their movement alive...For five years, they endured more trouble than the Babylonian captivity.[212]

With these words, the Czech community simultaneously thanked and said good-bye to the DSAP, a party which had been part of its political community for nearly twenty years. By the German invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, the DSAP had been brutally wiped off the political map, and would *never* recover its position in Czechoslovakia.

[210] Fiedler, 78.

Ludwig Czech, who was of Jewish origin, was deported to the Theresienstadt ghetto in March 1942, where he died only five months later in August. A plague commemorating Czech can be seen on a house in the former ghetto.

[211] See Figure 13.

[212] Ferdinand Peroutka (exact date unknown, probably in late February 1939) quoted in Fiedler, 81.

CONCLUSION

In this work, I have depicted the evolution, decline, and struggle of Sudeten German Social Democracy and, most importantly, its devotion to activist politics. The failure of the DSAP, as I have explored in this study, was dictated by a combination of external events and internal mistakes. The external events, most importantly the economic crisis and the rise and interference of Nazi Germany in Sudeten politics, presented a problem which the DSAP, given their already fragile position in the Czech-dominated State, were unable to solve in the decade leading up to the Munich agreement. Though by the summer of 1938 the SdP had received over ninety percent of the German vote, their success, as I demonstrated, does not negate the existence of another type of German, a democratic, antifascist German, which, as the last remaining democratic German party in the country, was mainly represented by the DSAP.

From 1929, the DSAP engaged in a full-scale struggle to maintain the democratic character of Czechoslovakia, fighting radical German nationalism and the threat of Nazism through active cooperation in the State government bodies to improve the lives of those Germans whose quality of life had been threatened by the economic crisis. While the DSAP's struggle was a decided downhill battle, and its active members had become a tiny minority by 1938, it refused to yield to nationalist pressure until the very end. Thus, the postwar Beneš decrees, which mandated the expulsion of the German population, implied the collective responsibility of an entire ethnic group for the Munich Agreement and the destruction of the Republic, when this ethnic group, as a uniform group, *did not exist*. The Sudeten German population was not "Hitler's fifth column:" the Sudeten German Party played this role for Hitler.

The interwar struggles involving Sudeten Germans, Germany, and Czechoslovakia must be viewed as an international phenomena. Interwar Czechoslovakia has often been

praised by historians for being "an island of democracy" among the raging dictatorships and violence of Europe.[213] If an island, it was hardly spared the radicalism of "mainland Europe." Czechoslovakia, with its multinational population and central location was not only economically, but nationally connected to its neighbors, and so, the infiltration of foreign politics was seemingly inevitable. The dangerous combination of Sudeten German nationalism and Nazism, whose strength had steadily been escalating since 1929, proved to be an unstoppable force which the combined efforts of the Czechoslovak government and the antifascist German politicians failed to halt. Once a bastion of peace and democracy, Czechoslovakia became one of the Second World War's first casualties, and would, for the next fifty years, endure the presence of oppressive, dictatorial regimes.[214]

While one can point outside of Czechoslovakia's borders to explain how the Sudeten crisis was sparked and escalated, it is important to understand the State's very construction along historic, rather than national boundaries. In the age of nationalism, Czechoslovakia became the victim of its multinational population, and the popular, somehow contradictory notion that this country could be constructed as a nation-state. In this State, which, in reality, was not a nation-State, the DSAP embodied a complicated, sometimes contradictory political body.

While the DSAP was a national party with a specific national constituency, at the same it time accepted the Czech leadership of the country, and, eventually the partnership

[213] This term was used in publishing as early as 1938, when *Time*-founder and journalist Henry R. Luce, in reference to the recent Munich agreement, lamented the "dismemberment of central Europe's one island of democracy," (*Time* vol. 32, 1938, pp. 17) and is still commonly used in articles, books, and studies surrounding interwar Czechoslovakia. (i.e. Hugh Agnew's definitive *The Czechs and the lands of the Bohemian Crown*, or Norman Stone's *Czechoslovakia: crossroads and crises, 1918-88*).

[214] Excluding the brief, three year period (1945-1948) of the short-lived Third Czechoslovak Republic, after which the State became subject to the one-party rule of the KPČ, and indirectly to the whims of the Soviet Union.

of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats. While it espoused socialist rhetoric and catered to the needs of the working man, the party distanced itself from Czechoslovak Communism. Thus, during its nearly twenty years of existence the party was neither fully nationalist, nor was it fully socialist. Therefore, like its predecessors, the Austro-Marxists, who by the dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy had failed to fully achieve its dual program of a national and socialist fusion, the DSAP, too, had failed. The DSAP could not compete with the fully nationalist program of the SdP, commit to fully to the concept of "Czechoslovakism," nor could it fully subscribe the international politics of communism.

Of the many divergent words in its name, the DSAP only managed to *fully* embody one of them, their lifeline: democracy. So, when radical non-democratic politics emanating from Nazi Germany took hold of Czechoslovakia, the DSAP was stripped of its main, and most important ideological root. The DSAP's struggle to resist the rising tide of the DNSAP's and Henlein's fascist politics in the nineteen-thirties reflects its devotion to the democratic process in its fierce defense of Czechoslovakia's existence. Its (perhaps belated) flexibility to approach the nationalities issue demonstrates its desire to appease the needs and desires of the people within the framework of the democratic structure established by the Czech-dominated government.

On the whole, the DSAP can be seen as a democratic, if flawed, alternative to Sudeten Nazism. Given the consequences of its failure to maintain Sudeten-Czech cooperation and to prevent Sudeten Nazism, the DSAP's decline proved an affront to democracy and a sad ingredient to the failure of the First Czechoslovak Republic.

Appendix: Pictures and Figures

Figure 1: How the Sudeten German Voted Politically[215]



[215] "Wie die Sudetendeutshen politisch wählten, 1920-1938," *Documente zur Sudetenfrage*, ed, Fritz Peter Habel (LangenMüller: Munich, 1984), 475.

Figure 2: "We are demonstrating on the fourth of November, 1934... against open and disguised fascism [and] for Freedom and Bread: Party Chairman Comrade Dr. Ludwig Czech will be speaking.[216]

Figure 3: "We are building a new world!"[217]

[216] Fiedler, 54.
[217] "Propagandacollage der DSAP, Arbeiter-Jahrbuch, 1933," V*ergessene Helden (*Ústí nad Labem : Muzeum Mesto Ústí nad Labem, 2008), 26.

Figure 4: "...And Hitler's peace offers will be followed by his 'doves of peace'"[218]

MITBÜRGER!

Es geht um alles!

Die Sudetendeutschen stehen vor historischer Entscheidung.
Es geht um Leben oder Tod unseres Volkes.
Das Tor zur friedlichen Sicherung der sudetendeutschen Lebensinteressen steht weit offen.

Nationale Gleichberechtigung, weitgehendste **Selbstverwaltung** unserer Angelegenheiten, **wirtschaftlicher Wiederaufbau** und **soziale Hilfe** können erreicht werden **ohne Krieg. Auf der anderen Seite lauert** die **tödliche Gefahr**, daß unser Volk als Werkzeug **imperialistischer Vorherrschaftspläne** mißbraucht und in einen Abgrund der Vernichtung gestürzt wird.

Nur einmal in Jahrhunderten ergibt sich eine solche Gelegenheit, einen dauernden ehrenvollen Frieden mit unseren slawischen Nachbarn zu schließen.

Wir haben die Möglichkeit in der Hand, auf dem heißumkämpften Boden Böhmens und Mährens ein Friedenswerk zu vollbringen und damit einen entscheidenden Beitrag zur friedlichen Neuordnung Europas zu leisten.

Ein Deutschtum aber, welches wieder die verhängnisvolle Bahn der imperialistischen Gewaltpolitik einschlägt, das Gleichberechtigung ablehnt und nach Vorherrschaft über andere Völker strebt, wird früher oder später in einen **blutigen Konflikt** mit der aufstrebenden slawischen Welt und mit den jungen Völkern des Südostens verstrickt werden.

In einer gewaltsamen Entscheidung wird wieder eine waffenstarrende Welt gegen das deutsche Volk aufstehen.

Die Sudetendeutschen werden das erste Schlachtopfer sein. Ihre Heimat würde im Zusammenprall der Weltkräfte vernichtet, ihre Zukunft ausgelöscht!

Mitbürger, Sudetendeutsche!

Bedenkt es in dieser Schicksalsstunde: **Die** jugendlichen Fanatiker, die nach der Gewalt rufen, haben keine Ahnung, welche Summe von Grauen und Zerstörung das Wort „Weltkrieg" umfaßt. Sie haben noch kein Trommelfeuer erlebt, sie wissen nicht, wie das Giftgas die Lungen zerfrißt, sie sahen noch keine blühenden Dörfer und Städte in Flammen aufgehen. Das Elend heimatloser Flüchtlinge, das Sterben unschuldiger Kinder, der Schmerz der Frauen und Mütter, die um die zerfetzten Leiber ihrer Liebsten trauern, ist ihnen fremd.

Ihr aber, Männer und Frauen des Sudetenvolks, habt die Hölle des Krieges kennengelernt. Ihr habt die Sandfelder Galiziens mit eurem Blut getränkt, die Schrecken des Kriegswinters **in den Karpathen erlebt, in den Isonzoschlachten die Schädel hingehalten.** Ihr habt euch in **den Gefangenenlagern** in Sehnsucht nach der Heimat verzehrt. Ihr habt in den Kriegsbetrieben, in den Munitionsfabriken die Peitsche der Kriegsdisziplin ausgekostet. Ihr habt im Hinterlande gedarbt und **an** den Fronten geblutet wie kein zweites Volk Europas!

Wahrlich, die Toten müßten aus den Massengräbern aufstehen, auch zu warnen und zu beschwören und auch zuzurufen: Laßt euch kein zweites Mal als Opfer des ehrgeizes unverantwortlicher Machtpolitik auf die Schlachtbank führen.

Wir deutsche Sozialdemokraten wollen **vor unserem** Gewissen und **vor der Geschichte rein** dastehen.

In Augenblicken, **die über Sein oder Nichtsein eines Volkes entscheiden, müssen alle** Parteischranken fallen.

Sudetendeutsche!

Ihr alle steht nunmehr vor der Wahl: Gleichberechtigung durch Frieden oder Untergang durch Krieg.

Erfüllt von brennender Sorge um den Frieden Europas und die Zukunft unserer Heimat appellieren wir an euch:

Entscheidet für den friedlichen Ausweg!

Wir rufen alle unsere Mitbürger ohne Unterschied der Weltanschauung und des politischen Bekenntnisses, ob Arbeiter, Bauern, Beamte, Industrielle oder Gewerbetreibende auf, ihren guten Willen zur rettenden Tat zu vereinen, ihre Kräfte zusammenzufassen zur Schaffung eines sudetendeutschen Friedens- und Aufbaublocks.

Wir wenden uns an das Volk mit der Parole:

Vereinigung aller Kräfte für Frieden und Freiheit, für eine bessere Zukunft der Sudetendeutschen, für ein neues Europa gleichberechtigter Völker.

Deutsche sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei
Der Vorsitzende: **WENZEL JAKSCH.**

Figure 5: "Last Manifest"[219]

[218] "Nazi Peace Doves, 1936," *Vergessene Helden (*Ústí nad Labem : Muzeum Mesto Ústí nad Labem, 2008),, from Muzeum Mesto Ústí nad Labem
[219] Fieldler, 75.

Figure 6: "Protect the homeland![220]

Figure 7: "Sudeten Germans, it will hit you first!"[221]

[220] "Anti-fascist Poster for the Communal Election in 1938," from Muzeum Mesto Ústí nad Labem

[221] Picture from *Allgemeine Illustrierte*, 1938. Ústí nad Labem : Muzeum Mesto Ústí nad Labem

Figure 8: "Every good German votes for the German Social Democratic Worker's Party!"[222]

Figure 9: 1. May: Against War and Fascism! For: Work, Bread, Peace, Freedom, and Socialism! At the big rally" (Eger)[223]

[222] "Plakat der DSAP, 1938," *Vergessene Helden (*Ústí nad Labem : Muzeum Mesto Ústí nad Labem, 2008), 13.
[223] Fiedler, 73.

Figure 10: Hitler Greets Crowds in Eger, October 3, 1938[224]

Figure 11: A Sudeten woman in Eger Greeting Entering *Wehrmacht*[225]

[224] "Prewar German Expansion." *United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, D.C.*<*http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/media_ph.php?lang=en&ModuleId=10005439&MediaId=1891*> 20 Dec. 2009.

[225] From "A History of the Sudetenland." <http://www.skylighters.org/graden/history.html> 20. Dec. 2009.

Figure 12: Jubilant Sudeten Germans welcome Nazi troops in 1938 (See title on top of photograph)[226]

Figure 13: Antifascists being humiliated: "I am a scamp who betrayed the Nazis"[227]

[226] "Prewar German Expansion." *United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, D.C.*<*http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/media_ph.php?lang=en&ModuleId=10005439&MediaId=1891*> 20 Dec. 2009..
[227] Fiedler, 85.

Works Cited

Acton, Lord. "Nationality."*Mapping the Nation.* Gopal Blakrishnan, ed. London and New York: Verso, 1996.

Bachstein, Martin K. *Wenzel Jaksch und die sudetendeutsche Sozialdemokratie.* Munich, 1974.

Beck, Peter J. "Searching for Peace in Munich, not Geneva: The British Government, the League of Nations and the Sudetenland Question." *The Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II,* eds. Igor Lukes and Erik Goldstein. London, Portland OR: Frank Cass, 1999.

Beneš, Zdenek and Vaclav Kural, eds. *Facing History: The Evolution of Czech-German relations in the Czech Provinces, 1948-1948*. Prague: Gallery s.r.o, 2002.

Blum, Mark E. *The Austro-Marxists, 1890-1918*: *A Psychobiographical Study*. Lexington, KN: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985.

Bohman, Alfred. *Menschen und Grenzen, Band 4: Bevölkerung und Nationalitäten in der Tschechoslowakei.* Koeln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1975.

Bottomore, Tom and Pratrick Goode, eds. *Austro-Marxism,*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.

Bruegel, J.W. *Czechoslovakia before Munich: the German minority problem and British appeasement policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.

Bruegel, J. W. *Ludwig Czech: Arbeiterfuehrer und Staatsmann*. Wien: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchandlung, 1960.

Cornwall, Mark. "The Struggle on the Czech-German Language Border, 1880-1940."*The English Historical Review,* Vol. 109, No. 433 (Sept, 1994).

Cermakova, Barbora and David Weber, eds. *Sie bieben der Tschechoslowakei treu: Biographische Interviews mit deutschen Antifaschisten.*

Epstein, Dr. Leo, ed. *Studien-Ausgabe der Verfassungsgesetze der Tschoslowakischen Republik,* Reichenberg: Gebrueder Stiepel Ges. m. b. H., 1923.

Fenet, Alain. "The Question of Minorities in the Order of Law," in *Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation-States,* Gerrard Chaliand, ed. London: Pluto Press, 1989.

Fiedler, Pit. *Die Sudetendeutschen Sozialdemokraten: Von der DSAP zur Seliger Gemeinde*. Munich: Verlag Eckhard Bodner, 2009.

Frommer, Benjamin. *National Cleansing: Retribution against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Glotz, Peter. *Die Vertreibung*. Berlin: Ullstein Buchverlage, 2004.

Hasenoerl, Adolf, ed. *Kampf, Widerstand, Verfolgung der sudetendeutschen Sozialdemokraten: Dokumentation der deutschen Sozialdemokraten aus der Tschechoslowakei im Kampf gegen Henlein und Hitler*. Stuttgart: Seliger-Gemeinde, 1983.

Hulicka, Karel. "The Communist Anti-Masaryk Propaganda in Czechoslovakia." *American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Apr., 1957).

Jaszi, Oszkar. *The dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961.

Jesenska, Milena. *The Journalism of Milena Jesenska*.Oxford: Bergham Books, 2003.

Kogan, Arthur. "Social Democrats and the Conflict of Nationalities in the Habsburg Monarchy," *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 21. No. 3 (Sep., 1949)

Krejci, Jaroslav and Pavel Machonin. *Czechoslovakia, 1918-92: A Laboratory for Social Change.* New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1996.

Kural, Vaclav. *Konflikt anstatt Gemeinschaft?: Tschechen und Deutsche im Tschoslowakischen Staat, 1918-1938.* Prague: Institut fuer internationale Beziehungen.

Kürbisch, Friedrich. *Chronik der sudetendeutschen Sozialdemokratie: 1863-1938*. Munich: Die Brücke, 1982.

Lammich Siegfried, Karin Schmid, "Einführung in der Verfassungsordnung der Tschoslowakischen Sozialistischen Republik: Zur Enwicklung." *Die Staatsordnung der Tschoslowakei.* Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1971.

Leff, Carol Skalnik. *Nation Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton of University Press, 1988.

Luza, Radomir. *Transfer of the Sudeten Germans*. New York: New York University Press, 1964.

Leser, Norbert. "Austro-Marxism: A Reappraisal." *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 11, No. 2/3, Special Issue: Conflict and Compromise.

Lojko, Miklos, ed. "Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Successor States." *The Versailles System and Central Europe*, Aldershoot, HA and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004.

Mair, L.P. *The Protection of Minorities: The Working and Scope of the Minorities under the League of Nations.* London: Christophers, 1928.

Masaryk, Thomas Garrigue. *The Making of a State: Memories and Observations, 1914-1918.* USA: Noble Offset Printers, Inc., 1969. (English version)

Mazower, Mark. "Minorities and the League of Nations in Interwar Europe." Daedalus, Vol. 126, No. 2, Human Diversity (Spring, 1997), 47-63.

Nečas, Jaromir, "Economic and Social Problems in German-Bohemia." *The Slavonic and East European Review,* Vol. 15, No. 45 (Apr., 1937), 599-611.

Smelser, Ronald M. *The Sudeten Problem, 1933-1938; Volkstumspolitik and the formulation of Nazi foreign policy.* Folkestone: Dawson, 1975.

Turnwald, Dr. Wilhelm K. ed. *Documents on the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans,* Munich: University Press, 1953.

Vyšný, Paul. *The Runciman Mission to Czechoslovakia, 1938: Prelude to Munich.* Hampshire, Palgrave MacMillan, 2003.

Wagnerova. Alena, ed. *Helden der Hoffnung: Die Anderen Deutschen aus den Sudeten, 1935-1989*. Muenchen: Aufbau Verlagsgruppe.

Wingfield, Nancy Merriwether. *Minority Politics in a Multinational State.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1989.

Wiskemann, Elizabeth. *Czechs and Germans: A Study of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia.* London: MacMillan and Company Limited, 1967.

Woodward, E. L and Rohan Butler. *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Third Series, Volume I-II.* London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1949.

Primary Documents

Bruegel, Joza, Memoirs. <www.ibrk.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/Joza2.pdf> 15 May 2010.

Česky Statisky Urad. http://www.czso.cz/csu/2006edicniplan.nsf/t/22005E7C52/$File/4219rr_1.pdf. <01. May 2010>

Czech, Ludwig, "Eine erste Warnung: Der Faschimus, das ist der Krieg!," *Rundfunkansprache des Parteivorsitzenden Minister Dr. Ludwig Czech am 1. Mai 1936.*

Franzel, Emil, "Die Bluttaufe der Sudetendeutschen: der 4. März 1919." (Loose document from Carolinum Collegium.)

Henlein, Konrad. "The Fight for the Liberation of the Sudetens." *The Trial of German Major War Criminals*. Vol. 2. London: Pub. under the authority of H.M. Attorney-general by H.M. Stationery off, 1946.

Jaksch, Wenzel. *Reden vor dem Abgeordnetenhaus von 1930-1938.*

Jaksch, Wenzel, "Arbeiterfront gegen Henleinfront," *Tribüne*, Dec. 1933.

Krebs, Hans. "Sudetendeutschland marschiert," *Sudetendeutscher Schicksalskampf: Die maßgebende Darstellung der sudetendeutschen Not in ihren Grundlagen, Zusammenhängen und Auswirkungen.* ed. Erich Kühne. Leipzig, 1938. <http://www.bohemistik.de/ krebssm.html> 16 Dec. 2009.

Geißler, Rudolf, "Kampf dem Hakenkreuz," *Freundshaft*, Feb. 1931.

Seliger, Josef. "2. DSAP- Parteitag in Karlsbad (3.- 7. October 1920)," printed in *Der Sozialdemokrat,* April, 1940

"Section IV: Clauses Related to Nationality, Article 70," *Treaty of Peace with Austria (St. Germain-en-Laye, 10 September 1919) (*Australian Treaty Series 1920: ommonwealth of Australia.
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1920/3.html> 17 March 2010.

"Konrad Henlein." *Stasi.eu.* <*http://www.stasi.eu/konrad_henlein_en.html*> 20 Dec. 009.

Der Erst Kongress Aller Sozialdemokratischen Parteien der Tschechoslowakei: Protokoll m 28. und 29. Jänner 1928 in Prag (Prag: Verlag des Partei-Vorstandes der detuschen sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei in der Tschechoslowakischen Republik, 1928

Protokoll der deutsche sozialistische Arbeiterpartei, Parteitag 1919