# DISCOURSE AND THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS: 'SECURITIZATION' OF STATE-BUILDING, AND CANADA'S ENGAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

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# Abstract

The decade long engagement in Afghanistan is the single most important issue in Canada's foreign policy. For what purpose is Canada in Afghanistan? Drawn into Afghanistan minimally with the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), then in a more substantial way under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (commanded by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)), the initial stated objective was to topple the Taliban government for harbouring Al Qaeda, which claimed responsibility for the 9/11 attacks. However, the goal broadened to include not only combating the Taliban, but preventing any future terrorist group from finding a safe haven in Afghanistan. In order to do this, Western powers, including Canada, embarked on an ambition project of international state-building. This paper will examine state-building in Afghanistan, as a tool for combating future terrorism and therefore promoting national security. Utilizing the securitization literature of Ole Waever (1995), and the case study of Canada, this paper asks: what are the implications of 'securitizing' state-building for Canadian foreign policy in Afghanistan?

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# Chapter 1: Introduction

The decade long engagement in Afghanistan is the single most important issue in Canada's foreign policy. Canada's presence in Afghanistan has cost 156 Canadian lives to date (CBC News 2011), and is expected to cost $18.1 billion by 2011, the equivalent of $1,500 per Canadian household (CBC News 2008). There is no doubt that Canadians have invested (and continue to invest) in a costly, lengthy mission.

What is the purpose of Canada's engagement in Afghanistan? Drawn into Afghanistan minimally with the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), then in a more substantial way under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (commanded by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)), the initial stated objective was to topple the Taliban government for harbouring Al Qaeda, which claimed responsibility for the 9/11 attacks. However, the goal broadened to include not only combating the Taliban, but preventing any future terrorist group from finding a safe haven in Afghanistan. To this end, Western powers, including Canada, embarked on an ambitious project of international state-building. While there are multiple legal and cultural definitions, Max Weber's definition of a modern state is utilized in this analysis, as it most closely reflects how a state is conceptualized in state-building policy. This definition, as a community which claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in a territory (Weber 1946, 78) thereby closely corresponds to common definitions of state-building: " the deliberate actions by national and/or international actors to establish, reform, or strengthen state institutions and build state capacity and legitimacy" (Jones and Chandran 2008, quoted in ODI 2009, 2)

This paper will examine state-building in Afghanistan, as a tool for combating future terrorism and therefore promoting national security. Utilizing the securitization literature of Ole Waever (1995), and the case study of Canada, this paper asks: what are the implications of 'securitizing' state-building for Canadian foreign policy in Afghanistan? Broadly speaking, securitization is process through which traditionally non-security issues are brought into the security realm (Waever 1995, 51-2). In this instance, weak or failing states are considered to be a national security threat as potential safe havens for terrorist activity. State-building is therefore used to combat this.

Existing literature on securitized state-building focuses on the militarization of aid, and the negative consequences for development projects (Cornish 2007; Brown 2008). The common argument is that when state-building is used for a national security purpose, it compromises the initial intent and integrity of the state-building project itself. The recommendations often can be reduced to "less military, more aid". Other literature focuses on uncovering if failed states do, in actuality, constitute a security threat (Dempsy 2002; Simons & Tucker 2007; Piazza 2008). Countless studies focus either primarily on the counter-terrorism aim of the intervention (Fitzgerald 2009), or on state-building in Afghanistan as a stand-alone endeavor (Rubin 2005, 2006; Suhkre 2010, 2008, 2006a, 2006b).

By taking a different approach, this analysis contributes to the broader literature in three ways. First, contrary to existing securitization state-building literature, this paper challenges the assumption that "more aid" in necessarily positive. It uses the framework established by Suhkre (2010), which examines the inherent tensions in internationalized state-building, showing that international actors face trade-offs and dilemmas when embarking on development projects in foreign countries. Second, utilizing Waever's securitization literature, it treats security as first and foremost a "speech act", meaning that an issue becomes a security threat once it is defined as one by state elites (1995, 55). The argument is that there is no objective, material yardstick against which to measure if a particular issue constitutes a security threat or not. What is considered a threat is constructed and intersubjective (Lipschutz 1995, 10). For the purpose of this analysis, it is more important that Canadian policy-makers have *declared* Afghanistan to be a security threat, and the political consequences of this framing. This paper's third contribution is the combination of these approaches, examining the effect of this securitization act on the tensions inherent internationalized state-building.

The second chapter looks at the concept of states, failed states and state-building. It looks at the main functions of a state (capacity and legitimacy), the process of state-building, and introduces three main tensions when state-building is attempted by external actors: Control versus Ownership, Dependence versus Sustainability, and Dependence versus Democratization (Legitimacy).

The third chapter introduces the case of Afghanistan. It looks in general at the international presence in the country, and introduces the concept of "securitization". Through examining multilateral agreements and policy statements, it demonstrates how state-building in Afghanistan is securitized. It also introduces the role of Canada in Afghanistan.

The fourth chapter looks more specifically at the securitization of policy in Canada. It examines the 2008 Manley Report as a mechanism of securitization, and argues that this had three main outcomes for state-building policy: Prioritization, Funding, and Policy Integration. Lastly, it examines the impact of these securitization outcomes on the three tensions mentioned above.

The paper then concludes with reflections on these tensions, and speaks more broadly on impact of securitization, and the ways in which discourse and framing can shape, enhance or delimit policy options in practice.

# Chapter 2: States, Failed States, and State-Building

## Capacity and Legitimacy

What is a "state", and how do we know when a state is "weak" or has "failed"? Max Weber defined a modern state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in a given territory" (1946, 78). In this definition, we can identify two main components of a state: the monopoly over force, and its legitimate use.

In the first instance, the monopoly of the use of physical force implies *enforcement* – of laws and policies of the state, for example (Fukuyama 2004, 7). This refers to the broader concept of *capacity*, which includes not only the ability to enforce, but also to plan and execute laws and policies through state institutions (ibid). The second component is that this enforcement is carried out legitimately. Legitimacy can be derived from agreed upon rules and procedures regarding political processes (*input legitimacy*), or from the performance of the government, and the quality of the goods and services delivered (*output legitimacy*) (Bellina et. al. 2009, 15).

Legitimacy can be understood in two ways: normative or empirical (8). In a normative sense, legitimacy is concerned with an order, actor or institution conforming to and meeting standards based on moral or normative considerations. Closely related to input legitimacy, examples of these standards can be democratic elections, or a separate executive, judiciary and legislature, which are based on liberal-democratic ideas of what constitutes a "good" state (ibid). This means that by virtue of meeting such criteria, an order, actor or institution can be considered legitimate.

By contrast, empirical legitimacy is concerned with the beliefs and perceptions of people subject to an order, actor or institution, and if they consider it to be legitimate, rather than if the state meets some abstract standard (ibid). That is, a state can be *de facto* legitimate if its people consider it to be so, regardless of whether it meets established (usually procedural) benchmarks or not. While meeting these standards may affect people's support for an order, actor, or institution, it does not necessarily guarantee it. As such, this paper will take legitimacy to mean "empirical legitimacy": "a particular quality that is conferred upon a social or political entity by those who are subject to it or a part of it, thus granting it *authority*" (ibid, 8, emphasis in text).

From Weber's definition, we can see that a state can be measured by both its capacity (to plan, execute, and particularly to enforce laws and policies) and its legitimacy. It follows then that a "failed" or "weak" state can be one that lacks (or is deficient in) these aspects.[1] However, is it possible that state capacity can be

[1] It is recognized that there is an entire literature on definitions of "weak" or "failed" states, as a contested term itself. However, this analysis uses an intentionally narrow definition (the opposite of

separated from legitimacy? Legitimacy can functionally enhance capacity, in the sense that a government that is seen as legitimate by its population may be able to implement its policies more smoothly, and with less resistance or opposition (Fukuyama 2004, 27). Moreover, a reasonable level of capacity, measured by the state's ability to meet a population's expectations, can improve legitimacy (Bellina et al. 2009, 9). However, legitimacy is not a necessary condition for the strength of a state. For instance, authoritarian states (such as the former Soviet Union and some East Asian states) can suppress societal demands, implementing policies and even creating economic growth without popular support (ibid). Legitimacy therefore "gives an *added* value to power/capacity, [while the] lack of legitimacy *undermines* state power and capacity by making compliance and governing more costly" (ibid, emphasis in text). As such, the absence of state capacity is the defining feature of a weak or failing state, while the absence of legitimacy is an important secondary factor.

## State-Building: (Re)Building Capacity

What does it take to build a state? Building upon Weber's definition of a state, historian and sociologist Charles Tilly (1990) posited that state formation consisted of the mobilization of three interlinked resources: coercion, capital, and legitimacy (1990, cited in Rubin 2005, 95). This list elaborates and builds upon Weber's definition of a state mentioned above. Coercion takes the form of a sovereign wielding a monopoly of force over a territory through security institutions. The sovereign needs to accumulate capital, in part to fund such institutions, but also to pay for other state functions and services. In turn, security institutions ensure that the constant accumulation of capital is protected. Legitimacy induces people to voluntarily comply with the state as citizens, allowing the sovereign to be the sole arbiter of force, and also giving it the authority to extract income and spend public revenues. This legitimacy can in part be gained from the state's ability to effectively provide basic services, including security (95-6).

Political scientist Astri Suhrke (2010) adds a fourth dimension to state formation: national leadership (2). Such leadership is required to mobilize the other three components, and to maintain momentum and support for such projects. While Tilly's analysis was focused more on state-*formation,* which is a long historical process, the same resources are seen to be mobilized in shorter, more active periods of state-*building* (9). Here the difference is in time horizon, where state-building is a dramatic transformation in a short period of time, which intensifies the process and requires a concentration of these resources (Suhkre 2006a, 1).

State-building takes on new dimensions when it becomes internationalized. In this instance, contemporary international state-building is

> …an externally driven, or facilitated, attempt to form or consolidate a stable, and sometimes democratic, government over an internationally recognized

what is considered a "functioning state") as it most broadly reflects how policy-makers define "weak states" in the policies examined in the succeeding chapters.

> national territory against the backdrop of the establishment and consolidation of the UN and the universalisation of a system of sovereign nation-states (Berger 2006, 5).

Exogenous state-building still requires the same components as nationally-led state-building (coercion, capital, legitimacy, national leadership), however these four components change character when international actors are involved. For example, foreign aid is often the primary source of capital, which, while providing an immediate injection of funds, can also be susceptible to the short-term funding cycles of the external donors (Suhkre 2006a, 2). By extension, the state's functions and services, including its security apparatus, can become heavily dependent on foreign funding, training and equipment (Suhkre 2010, 9). The nature of legitimacy changes as well in situations of international state-building. Sovereigns face a "dual legitimacy" problem, where they are at once principles in service of nationally defined goals, seeking domestic legitimacy, as well as agents for internationally determined goals, defined by their donors' preferences (Rubin 2005, 97). Related to this is the complicated role of national leadership, which is placed in the tenuous position between meeting the expectations of the international community and those of its domestic constituency.

In Suhkre's view, external actors can perhaps provide coercion and capital, but legitimacy and national leadership must be generated domestically (2010, 15). Taking the definition of *empirical legitimacy*, legitimacy can only be conferred upon an order, actor, or institution by those who are subject to it (Bellina et. al. 2009, 8). This extends to national leadership, which will have to be determined by processes that are deemed legitimate by the population in order for persons holding leadership positions to be considered legitimate.

In addition, in the current global geopolitical regime of "universal juridical sovereignty", international actors must walk a fine line between co-operating alongside sovereign states, rather than simply absorbing them (Rubin 2006, 177). The result is a somewhat paradoxical project of "helping others build sovereign states" (176).

## Tensions in Internationalized State-Building

Internationalized state-building contains many inherent tensions related to the exogenous nature of the project. The degree and severity of these tensions vary according to the degree of foreign intervention. ranging from block grants of foreign aid with few conditionalities, to direct implementation of programs by international actors. The point of this analysis is to show that there is no clear measure in which these conflictual factors can be in balance. They are dilemmas in the classical sense, meaning a difficult choice to be made among two or more alternatives. Three tensions identified by Suhkre (2010) will be examined in this analysis:

(a) Control versus Ownership
(b) Dependence versus Sustainability

(c) Dependence versus Democratization (Legitimacy)

## Control versus Ownership

"Control" can be understood as the extent to which international donors are able to decide, at minimum, how donor funds are spent, versus the ability of recipient countries to determine the character and direction of the state-building process on their own (Suhkre 2010, 10). In other words, the degree of "ownership" a recipient state has over the process. "Ownership" is promoted for both functional and ideological reasons. Functionally, it is argued that domestic "ownership" allows for policies to be better tailored to local needs. Greater participation of local actors can mean that they will have a greater interest in its implementation and enforcement (ibid). Ideologically, "ownership" is democratic, rooted in the principle of self-determination which strongly implies that states should have ultimate control over the direction and character of their own development (ibid).

In internationalized state-building, capital is often generated through foreign aid agreements, instead of domestic taxation. Donors may have a direct interest in how these funds are used, as they themselves are accountable to their own domestic constituencies and national interests. This is not to say that the preferences of the donor governments and the recipient country cannot align. However, at its base, the tension lies in the fact that international donors cannot have control over state-building processes without infringing on the control (ownership) of local actors. Conversely, local ownership is impossible unless international donors relinquish some of their own ability to make decisions.[2]

## Dependence versus Sustainability

"Dependence" in this context is dependence of the recipient country on foreign resources (economic, material, or otherwise) for state services (11). "Sustainability" is the ability of the recipient state to generate these resources on its own, and to provide these services in the long run, without foreign assistance (ibid). Situations where states depend heavily on foreign aid are considered unsustainable for several reasons. First, continued streams of foreign aid cannot be guaranteed, as aid can fluctuate depending on strategic interests of the donor, which are inherently shifting (ibid). Second, over-reliance on aid can act as a disincentive for recipient states to create domestic mechanisms for raising capital (ibid). The result can be a

[2] It is recognized that the line between who has control and who does not is not easily drawn at the level of ideas. For instance, while a recipient country may have ultimate decision-making power with the aid it receives, its decisions are shaped within a specific ideational context. This may include dominant notions of what is considered "responsible" fiscal policy, or other standards and expectations around what it means to build a "good" state. In such a context, the ability to shape preferences themselves is an exercise of power (see Hay 1997). While not unimportant, the scope of this analysis when looking at donor/recipient country relations only looks at agenda-setting and decision-making power.

pattern of self-sustained dependence, where aid is used to compensate for the lack of domestic capital, which in turn discourages the creation of domestic capital due to the availability of aid.

This tension can be seen when international assistance focuses on delivering *services* as the primary objective, versus building the *capacity* of the recipient state to deliver those services itself, however that may be achieved (Fukuyama 2004, 41). For example, a foreign donor may seek to reduce infant mortality through a vaccination program. In its implementation, the donor will have to decide if it will provide these services directly, given that it already has the funds, personnel and expertise, or if it will focus on developing the capacity of the local health infrastructure so that the recipient state can gain the ability to deliver these services without assistance. Implementation of the program by the foreign donor will likely be more efficient in the short-run, however capacity-building efforts could help make the program more sustainable in the long-run. Given that foreign aid budgets are held accountable to the needs and policies of the donor states, policies that allow for quicker results (for example, within a 3- or 4-year election cycle) are likely to be favored.

## Dependence versus Democratization (Legitimacy)

While democratic reforms have become a common aim in international state-building, a dependence on aid by the recipient country can undermine this. The main argument is that "accountability follows the direction of resource flows" (12). In this sense, governments can become more accountable to their donors, the primary source of capital, rather than their own citizens. Related to a donor government's ability to "control" how its funds are spent (versus the ability of recipient state to "own" the process), it is more likely that policy priorities will be shaped more by the preferences of the donor government, rather than by the recipient state's public.

While Sukhre points to this dependence as being in contradiction with "democracy", it may be more accurate to describe this as being in tension with domestic legitimacy. Recall the Bellina et. al. (2009) definition of empirical legitimacy as "a particular quality that is conferred upon a social or political entity by those who are subject to it or a part of it" (8). Legitimacy is therefore dependent upon the expectations and perceptions of the domestic constituency. However, when a state depends on foreign resources, they are faced with a "dual legitimacy" problem (Rubin 2005, 97), where they must contend with both international and domestic expectations, which may contradict. Dependence on aid may cause states to concern themselves more with maintaining legitimacy with donors than with their own people. This heightens when the degree of donor control over aid increases, which is often the case if donor-country constituencies place a high premium on domestic accountability.

Moreover, international actors may have different ideological conception of sources of legitimacy than the domestic population. For instance, Western donors may have a liberal-democratic understanding of the state-society relations, seeing

elections as being the only way to select leadership legitimately, as an example. However, these interpretations may clash with non-Western countries, which traditionally recognize different sources of legitimacy.

It is argued that these three tensions (Control versus Ownership; Dependence versus Sustainability; Dependence versus Democratization/Legitimacy) are inherent to any state-building process with international intervention. The next section examines one such example of highly internationalized state-building: Afghanistan, post-2001.

# Chapter 3: Afghanistan – State-Building, Securitization, and Canada's Engagement

## State-Building and the International Presence in Afghanistan

Using Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter providing for the right to individual and collective self-defense, the United States and its allies began a military invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 in response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. The aim of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was to topple the Taliban regime, which had provided shelter and support to Osama bin Laden and the perpetrators of the attack. While the Taliban regime collapsed in November 2001, it was not wholly defeated but rather withdrew into the east and south of Afghanistan, and into Pakistan. In its wake, the regime's collapse resulted in a precarious security environment (with a dispersed yet still active Taliban) in an already weak state. Afghanistan has known only brief periods of stability throughout its recent history of Communist rule, Soviet occupation, civil war between rival mujahideen factions and Taliban rule. It is also one of the world's poorest countries, ranking 155 out of 169 on the Human Development Index (UNDP 2011). While the initial stated intention of the NATO invasion was to oust the Taliban (and then stabilize Kabul), the intervention also took on a more normative, political character as it also sought to reduce poverty, engender social justice, and build democratic institutions, characteristic of a state-building project.

The state-building character of the intervention became clear in the early phases of engagement. With the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, which established the transitional role of the interim government led by Hamid Karzai, the international community committed to continue its engagement in Afghanistan. This "international community" was loosely constituted of: the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and other UN agencies; NATO (leading the stabilization presence through ISAF; international financial institutions (for example, World Bank), and; individual countries providing bilateral assistance. With a multitude of actors with distinct interests, the UN formally led this "international community" in diplomatic relations, however the United States played the most significant role, as an important NATO member country, in command of its own mission under OEF, as well as being the largest financial donor (Suhkre 2006b, 3-4).

Initially, foreign actors expressed their desire for a "light footprint" approach in Afghanistan (Suhkre 2008, 215). However, the high degree of international involvement was immediately evident within the Bonn Agreement. For instance, the Agreement outlined that the members of the Interim Administration, including the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen, were to be "selected by the participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan" (U.N. Security Council 2001, 4). In regards to security, the Bonn Agreement set out a request to the international community to help establish and train new Afghan security forces, as well as for the UN to authorize a military force responsible for safeguarding post-Taliban Kabul (ibid). Subsequently, the UN

authorized a new International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which then came under NATO command in 2003.

Notably, the Bonn Agreement also begun to outline broad visions for a new Afghan state, mandating the creation of new state institutions commonly found in modern, Western states. For instance, in the preamble, it noted that the interim arrangement was "intended as a first step toward the establishment of a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government" (UN Security Council 2001, 2). Other new institutions included: an independent civil service commission responsible for staffing government agencies on a merit-based system; a human rights commission, and; a commission responsible for drafting an Afghan constitution (5-6). All bodies listed would be established "with the assistance of the United Nations" (ibid).

More defined state-building and long-term development goals were set out in the Afghanistan Compact. Launched at the January 2006 conference in London, the Afghanistan Compact is a framework for cooperation between Afghanistan and the international community. Its goals centered on three areas: Security, Governance (including the rule of law and human rights) and Economic and Social Development (Afghanistan Compact 2006, 2). While not a formal treaty, the Compact is a political commitment where "[t]he Afghan government hereby commits itself to realising this shared vision of the future [and] the international community, in turn, commits itself to provide resources and support to realise that vision" (ibid). During this meeting, international donors from 51 countries pledged to provide nearly $2 billion USD in aid to Afghanistan, while Russia indicated they would write off the country's $10 billion USD Soviet-era debt (BBC News 2006).

## The Securitization of State-Building

Why did the international intervention in Afghanistan take on state-building as an aim, in addition to dismantling the Taliban? It was made explicit early on that a weak Afghanistan was also considered to be a security threat. The link between failed states and terrorism was made clear in the September 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy:

> The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders (U.S. White House 2002, 2).

Similarly, a study produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) along with the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) echoed the same sentiments, indicating that this became conventional wisdom among Washington think tanks and members of the security elite:

> One of the principal lessons of the events of September 11 is that failed states matter – not just for humanitarian reasons but for national security as well. If left untended, such states can become sanctuaries for terrorist networks with a global reach [...] Expelling Al Qaeda and removing the Taliban regime that supported it from Afghanistan are only the first steps. Helping create a set of conditions that will deny opportunities for Al Qaeda and other would-be terrorists to return is the next step (Hamre and Sullivan 2002, 85-6).

Humanitarian and developmental aims in this context are seen as a means to an end: to develop Afghanistan, lift it out of poverty and strengthen its state institutions, so that it may become uninhabitable for terrorists. Fundamentally, this connection is based on two assumptions: (a) terrorist activities would not be able to thrive or go undetected in a state with strong institutions, such as rule of law and a functioning security services, and; (b) formation of a liberal-democratic state discourages fundamentally illiberal acts. Here, state-building is framed as a policy tool to reach a national security objective. In a word, state-building becomes "securitized".

"Securitization", a concept coined by political scientist Ole Waever in 1995, begins as its entry point that "security" is first and foremost a *speech act* (Waever 1995, 55). This means that situations of "security" cannot objectively or materially be measured, but rather are socially constructed, having a specific meaning only within a specific context, created and changed through discourse and discursive action (Lipschutz 1995, 10). Generically, discourse "describe[s] not only what is said, or the ideas that are the substantive content of discourse, but also who said what to whom, where and why" (Schmidt 2010, 15). Discourse is about 'what is and what ought to be' at different levels of generality: policy or programmatic ideas, paradigms or deeper philosophical ideas (Schmidt 2010, 3, emphasis in text). These ideas can be represented through vehicles such as frames, narratives, myths and collective memories (ibid).

Discourses are precursors to policy outcomes, delimiting the range of policy options through defining "what can and cannot be thought" (Litfin 1991, quoted in Lipschutz 1995, 8). As such, by saying that something is a "security problem", the elite who define it claim a *special right* to use whatever means necessary to combat it (Waever 1995, 55). The lack of security is not insecurity, but rather that something is not perceived as a threat at all (Waever 1995, 56). It is also worth noting that while subjective and socially constructed, the concept of security is not entirely independent of material conditions that shape particular interpretations of threats:

> To be sure, policy makers define security on the basis of a set of assumptions regarding vital interests, plausible enemies, and possible scenarios, all of which grow, to a not-insignificant extent, out of the specific historical and social context of a particular country […] But, while these interests, enemies, and scenarios have a material existence and, presumably, a real import for state security, they cannot be regarded simply as having some sort of "objective" reality independent of these constructions (ibid).

In other words, security is intersubjective – created from an interpretation of material conditions, which in turn shapes that construction: "Enemies, in part 'create' each other, via the projections of their worst fears onto the other […] To the extent that they act on these projections, threats to each other acquire a material character" (ibid).

State-building in Afghanistan is securitized, in the basic sense that it is being used and justified as a policy tool in order to achieve a national security goal (Menkhaus 2003). Put differently – failed states are considered to be security threats, and therefore state-building is seen as a way to combat this. In Afghanistan, the explicit goal of state-building has been to prevent future attacks of terrorism (like the one seen on 11 September 2001), with all other goals (humanitarian, commercial) as secondary (Freeman 2007, 3). Using Canada's engagement in Afghanistan, the mechanisms through which policy is securitized, its outcomes, and its effects on state-building are discussed in the next chapter.

Before proceeding, it is necessary to emphasize that labeling Afghan state-building as "securitized" is not an indictment on whether Afghanistan (as a failed state) does, in actuality, pose a "security risk". Recalling the explanation above, there is no objective yardstick against which to measure if a particular issue constitutes a security threat or not, as what is considered a threat is both constructed and intersubjective. Therefore, this analysis begins by recognizing that Afghanistan's failed state status *is* (and has been) securitized. The purpose of this inquiry is to discover the mechanisms of securitization, its impact on state-building, and to reflect on these processes using the case of Canada in Afghanistan.

## Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan: An Overview

Under the NATO Article 5 provision on collective self-defence, Canada joined other NATO countries in the UN-authorized ISAF in February 2002. Despite also participating in a minimal deployment to Kandahar as part of the U.S-led OEF in 2002, Canadian troops primarily were stationed in Kabul under ISAF command until 2005, when they were redeployed to Kandahar. As of 30 November 2010, there were 2,922 Canadian Forces troops deployed in Afghanistan (Government of Canada 2011b). Contributing the fourth highest number of troops among the ISAF countries, Canada has suffered the highest causalities per capita of any coalition member (DeYoung 2010). As of May 2011, there have been 156 casualties among the Canadian Forces since the beginning of the invasion (CBC News 2011).

In addition, Canada has contributed significantly to civilian aid projects, averaging approximately $100 million annually beginning in 2002 (Manley et. al. 2008, 25), to a height of $280 million in 2007-2008 (Government of Canada 2009). Civilian aid, primarily dispersed through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), ranged from the repair and construction of roads, to providing microfinance loans for starting small businesses (Manley et. al. 2008, 25). In addition, Canada supports three "signature projects" in Kandahar, which are intended to be high profile, large-scale and intensified over a short period of time,

with the intention that they be "identified with Canada and led by Canadians" (36). The three signature projects are: repairing Dahla Dam to secure water access for Kandaharis 80% of who live in the Arghandab river valley; building and expanding 50 schools, and; a polio eradication program, which would administer vaccinations to seven million children across Afghanistan and 400,000 in Kandahar (Government of Canada 2011a).

Broadly speaking, the Canadian engagement in Afghanistan is centered around three connected areas: security, governance, and development. These three areas are the same as those listed as critical in the 2006 Afghanistan Compact (2). Building upon this, the Canadian government has six stated priorities that fall within (and at times, cut across) these categories:

1) *Security:* helping the Afghan government strengthen the Afghan National Army, and increase capacity of Afghan National Police to promote law and order
2) *Basic Services:* help strengthen Afghan government capacity to deliver core services, such as education, health, sanitation and electricity
3) *Humanitarian Aid:* helping the Afghan government provide humanitarian assistance to refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons
4) *Border Security:* facilitating dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan to help promote economic development, stability and security
5) *National Institutions:* enhance capacity for democratic governance
6) *Political Reconciliation:* support an Afghan-led reconciliation process between the new government, insurgency and other communal divides (Government of Canada 2011f).

## Canada and State-Building in Afghanistan

While not explicitly labeled as such, Canada is heavily involved in state-building in Afghanistan, as expected of a partner in the Afghanistan Compact. The priorities above can be related to the four components of state-building developed by Tilly (1990) (and reconceptualized by Rubin (2005) and Suhkre (2010)): coercion, capital, legitimacy, and national leadership. As argued by Suhkre, it is operationally easier for international actors to provide coercion and capital to a recipient state, but inherently difficult to provide legitimacy and national leadership (2010, 15). Below, this paper examines how Canada's priorities attempt to meet these basic components of state-building, and the following chapter examines how this policy is securitized.

### *Coercion*

One of Canada's primary objectives is building the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces (*Priority #1: Security*). Made up of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP), Canada has contributed training, expertise, equipment, and has even paid for police officer salaries (Government of

Canada 2011c). These efforts, along with facilitating talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan officials (*Priority #4: Border Security*) as well as between the new government, the insurgency, and other communal groups (*Priority #6: Political Reconciliation*), all attempt to establish the state's monopoly on the use of force.

Building up Afghan forces is of particular importance in the face of an insurgency, which escalated rapidly in 2006 (Manley et. al. 2008, 12). In Canada, there seems to be some recognition that the counterinsurgency war "will have to be won by Afghans […] [as] few counterinsurgencies in history have been won by foreign armies" (Manley et. al. 2008, 14). However, as the insurgency grew, NATO forces also grew, from a modest 4,500 soldiers in 2001 to almost 50,000 in 2008, to over 132,000 as of June 2011 (Suhrke 2008, 214; NATO 2011). This indicates that while much time, effort and money was focused on building Afghan troops, foreign donors still felt them too underdeveloped to combat the insurgency on their own.

### *Capital*

Canada has provided Afghanistan with capital in several ways. As mentioned above, Canada has provided for cash directly to provide services for the Afghan people, such as ANP wages, equipment and infrastructure (*Priority #1: Security*). In this instance, Canada is providing capital for services that are delivered by the Afghan state. However, this makes up a minority of the funding that is provided. Only 35% of CIDA funding is channeled through programs that are administered by the Afghan government (Manley et. al. 2008, 25). Most aid is funneled through multilateral agencies, which administer and deliver services related to health, food, sanitation, as well as vocational training and job creation (*Priority #2: Basic Services*) (Government of Canada 2011).

Canada also leads and administers projects in Afghanistan directly. Examples of this are the three "signature projects" mentioned above, as well as the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (K-PRT). PRTs are combinations of diplomatic staff, development specialists and military, which provide security support to the Afghan government, as well as directly undertake development and reconstruction activities. Among these are "quick impact" projects, such as delivering humanitarian aid and food to highly insecure areas (*Priority #3: Humanitarian Aid*) (Government of Canada 2011e).

### *Legitimacy*

Along the lines of Suhkre's (2010) argument, while mechanisms to try to promote legitimacy of the state can be put in place by external actors, they can by no means ensure that legitimacy will actually be achieved. Applying the idea of *empirical legitimacy,* legitimacy can only be conferred upon an order, actor, or institution by those who are subject to it (Bellina et. al. 2009, 8). It also becomes more problematic when the sources of legitimacy for the domestic population are not considered to be the same for international legitimacy.

*Priority #5: National Institutions* deals with developing democratic institutions as a way to create legitimacy of the state. Its efforts primarily concentrate on *normative legitimacy* (Bettina et. al. 2009, 8) of a Western, liberal-democratic type, in its focus on developing elections. In this area, Canada provides financial and technical support for the establishment of a national voter registry and the newly created Independent Elections Commission (Government of Canada 2011d). However, the elections have experienced low voter turnout as well as conflicts between the executive, legislature and judiciary over election results (International Crisis Group 2011). Such trends may indicate skepticism for these foreign-installed institutions. Moreover, while all other priorities can be understood as fulfilling *output legitimacy* (regarding the delivery of public goods and services) (15), they are only minimally provided by the government itself, and therefore unlikely to contribute to domestic legitimacy.

### *National Leadership*

Canada supported the appointment of Hamid Karzai's interim government during Bonn, and recognized his presidential election in 2004 and 2009 (Brewster 2009). As such, *Priority #5: National Institutions* is the one of the only routes through which Canadians can contribute to building national leadership. Through elections, Canada hopes to support an indigenous process whereby Afghans choose a legitimate leader. However, as mentioned above, the elections have been fraught with controversy. For example, serious allegations of voter fraud and manipulation of the Electoral Complaints Commission (EEC) and the Independent Election Commission, (IEC), surrounded the 2009 presidential election and the 2011 parliamentary election (International Crisis Group 2011). Following Suhkre (2010) argument regarding legitimacy, it seems unlikely that Afghans would select a national leader they deem to be legitimate, if the processes in place for selection are also deemed illegitimate.

# Chapter 4: Securitization and the Tensions in State-Building

## The Manley Report and Canada's Securitized State-Building

Canada's state-building agenda is securitized. State-building and development were aims of the Canadian intervention as early as 2002, with a development aid budget committed to Afghanistan within the same year. However, it is argued that state-building did not become fully prioritized (and thus, more fully *securitized*) until the implementation of several recommendations listed in the Manley Report, released in January 2008. The Manley Report, and the scaling-up of state-building efforts that followed, is the scope of this analysis.

The report was written by the "Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan", formed at the request of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, and led by former Deputy Prime Minister John Manley. The Panel was tasked with Canada's first comprehensive public review of its policy in Afghanistan, and to make recommendations going forward in preparation of the then-projected February 2009 withdrawal. In the report, the Panel clarifies what it sees as the primary objective of Canada's presence in Afghanistan:

> Countering the terrorist threat, by foreclosing the regression of Afghanistan as a haven again for terrorists, is plainly one objective. To achieve that imperative, and to protect regional and international stability, most people (Canadians and Afghans alike) can agree on a larger and overarching purpose – to help build a stable and developing country in which the rights of all citizens are respected and their security is protected by their own government […] A primary Canadian objective, while helping Afghans, has been to help ensure that Afghanistan itself does not again revert to the status of sanctuary and head office for global terrorism (Manley et. al. 2008, 20-21).

Using similar language as the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy, as well as the CSIS/AUSA study quoted in the previous chapter, we see that Canada considers "build[ing] a stable and developing country" as a means towards a national security end: "ensur[ing] that Afghanistan does not again revert to the status of sanctuary and head office for global terrorism" (ibid). The statement also clarifies that while "helping Afghans" is also a goal, the ultimate objective is to discourage terrorism. State-building is thus securitized, by taking it from the realm of humanitarianism into national security.

What are the mechanisms of this securitization? Recalling Waever's definition, securitization is first and foremost a "speech act" (1995, 55). However, as discourse, it is not simply what is said, but also "who said what to whom, where and why" (Schmidt 2010, 15). In this instance, the Manley Report and panel itself are mechanisms by which state-building became securitized in Canada. Firstly, while the panel is given the title of "independent", Manley served his post as a deputy

prime minister under a Liberal government, and was a one-time contender for leadership of the Liberal party. As a prominent Liberal, he was appointed to lead this panel by the Prime Minister Harper's Conservative government. Such a gesture signals that the Report is a non-partisan effort and as such its analysis and recommendations transcend party lines. Framed in this way, securitized state-building is seen as not a partisan position, but a universalist position, a policy of necessity.

Moreover, the Panel consulted with a wide range of actors, including members from the Government of Afghanistan, Afghan civil society, foreign government officials, NATO, OEF, UN, non-governmental organizations, academics, and officials of the Canadian government. It also received over 200 submissions from individuals and organizations. Such wide consultation, with a diverse array of actors, establishes the Report's legitimacy, irrespective of the degree to which the panel may or may not have been influenced by the input. Both the non-partisan nature of the Panel, and the wide consultation, support the Report's authority and frame its recommendations as ones of necessity.

Such a discursive frame, tying the fortunes of state-building policy to national security, as well as authority attached to the Panel that suggests it, creates a type of "logic of no alternative" (see Watson and Hay 2004). In this sense, policies which would ordinarily be framed as up for political debate, contingent upon who is in power and which interests are at play, are instead framed as necessary, with no other alternative but failure. Therefore, policies different from those recommended in the Manley Report may be seen as simply illogical or untenable. Since it is within the realm of national security, the danger of failure is also deemed as too high a risk. Recalling Waever, the ultimate effect of securitization is the defining of policy objectives, and the delimiting of policy options (Lipschutz 1995, 8).

## Outcomes of Securitization on Canadian Policy

In practice, what are the impacts of securitized state-building in Canada? An analysis of the Manley Report recommendations, as well as the policies eventually adopted by the government of Canada, we can broadly identify outcomes of securitization in three areas: (a) prioritization; (b) funding, and; (c) integration.

### *Prioritization*

Elevating an issue to the level of national security increases its gravity, as it threatens the survival of a state – the basic political unit – *as a state* itself (Waever 1995, 53). In this traditional realist sense, a loss of sovereignty means the state ceases to exist, and therefore its survival (the maintenance of sovereignty) is paramount above all other policy concerns (ibid). As such, the clearest impact of securitization is that the issue now becomes prioritized. Failed states are framed as threats to security as potential terrorist breeding grounds, and state-building is seen as a way to mitigate this threat.

In general, Afghanistan policy as a whole increased in priority after the Manley Report. It recommended that all Afghanistan policy (military, diplomatic, and development) be steered at the executive level. An Afghanistan Task Force was created, led by the Privy Council Office which is responsible for strategic and policy advice to the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Government of Canada 2010). A newly formed special Cabinet committee on Afghanistan was also created, and mandated to provide quarterly progress reports to Parliament (ibid).

Specifically, the Manley Report explicitly called for increased priority to reconstruction and development:

> Canada's contribution to the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan should be revamped giving higher priority than at present to direct, bilateral project assistance that address the immediate, practical needs of the Afghan people, especially in Kandahar province, as well as longer-term capacity-building (Manley 2008, 38).

This prioritization is expressed through increased funding (elaborated below), but also organizationally in the decision-making process. The vice-president of the Canadian International Development Agency was made head of the Afghanistan country desk, which was the first time that a senior staff member was charged with a specific country portfolio (Brown 2008, 4). The centralization of decision-making, as well as the involvement of higher and higher levels of authority (up to and including the Prime Minister) signals the degree to which Afghanistan policy as a whole (and state-building, as a prominent feature) is prioritized.

Broadly speaking, increased prioritization can mean that these projects will have the political commitment needed to see them through to completion. As will be discussed below, prioritization also means increased funding. However, prioritization, particularly with the involvement of the Prime Minister, means that the cost of failure may be higher. The political fortunes of those involved become closely associated with the success of these projects in which they were directly involved. Along the same lines, projects may be chosen for their political favorability among Canada's voting public. Examples of this, to be explored below, are the "signature projects".

### *Funding*

The most evident indication of Afghanistan as a national priority is the scale of the operations, both for the mission as a whole and for state-building. In terms of scale, Canada's engagement in Afghanistan is its largest and most expansive foreign mission since the Korean War (Manley et. al. 2008, 22). By 2011, the entire Afghanistan mission is projected to cost up to approximately $18.1 billion – more than twice as much as what Prime Minister Harper initially estimated (CBC News 2008). In 2008, the year of the Manley Report, we also see that CIDA's assistance to Afghanistan totaled $280 million – more that 1.5 times the average amount of aid sent since the beginning of the engagement in 2002 (Government of Canada 2009).

Overall, Afghanistan is Canada's single largest bilateral aid recipient, with a pledge of $1.2 billion total until 2011 (House of Commons Canada 2008, 45).

A securitized policy of state-building not only means that funding increases, but that it is also re-aligned. An example of this is the three "signature projects": rehabilitation of Kandahar's Dahla Dam (up to $50 million); building and maintaining 50 schools (up to $12 million), and; the expansion of polio immunizations (up to $60 million)(Government of Canada 2011; 2011f). Since the Manley Report discovered that more than 50% of CIDA funding being funneled through multilateral agencies, and 35% through the Afghan government, it recommended that more projects should be "identified with Canada and led by Canada"(Manley et. al. 2008, 25, 36).

The purpose of these projects is two-fold. As remarked by Derek Burney, a member of the Manley Panel:

> [T]he point we're trying to make is that if three-quarters of the assistance Canada is giving to Afghanistan is going through multilateral channels, or government channels in Afghanistan, there's no awareness on the ground that we are doing anything (House of Commons 2008, 51).

One aim is to thereby increase the visibility of Canada's state-building projects among Afghanis. This fulfills a military goal as a type of hearts-and-minds campaign, to demonstrate the benefits of Canada's presence with large, high-profile and expensive projects. The other aim is to increase the visibility of Canada to Canadians. As mentioned above, due to prioritization, Canadian government officials, including the Prime Minister, have tied their political fortunes to Canada's performance in Afghanistan. As such, high-profile projects such as these are needed to convince the Canadian public that their money is well spent.

Overall, securitization can ensure that funding is allocated to those development projects that would otherwise not receive funding. However, it also means that funding will be realigned to those projects that can support military or domestic political goals. This realignment means that other projects, which do not satisfy these criteria, may be neglected.

### *Integration*

The securitization of state-building has the effect of bringing traditional security activities into the field of development: "When a problem is 'securitized', the act tends to lead to specific ways of addressing it: threat [and] defense solutions" (Waever 1995, 65). However, as demonstrated in the Canadian case, securitization also shows development activities used in military settings. This is seen through policy coordination and integration, the Whole-of-Government approach. Initially called the "3D" (defence, diplomacy, and development), the Whole-of-Government approach involves interdepartmental coordination between the Department of Defence (DoD), the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

This coordination occurs at the highest level with the Afghanistan Task Force, led by the Privy Council Office and comprised of all the above departments, as well as members from the treasury board, correctional services and public safety (Government of Canada 2010). This also signals the prioritization of this type of coordination, with decision-making power highly centralized with the Prime Minister.

Practically, this coordination has the effect of ensuring that CIDA projects in Afghanistan keep in mind strategic and security goals. Again, the "signature projects" are an example of this. The Manley Report emphasized that "[f]or governments fighting any insurgency, attracting and holding popular support and reinforcing local confidence are core objectives" (2008, 15). "Signature projects" are intended as "quick-action projects that bring immediate improvements to everyday life for Afghans, […] readily identifiable as supported by Canada" (25-6). As a type of hearts-and-minds approach, these projects are meant to garner support for the current counter-insurgency operation, and to change long-term attitudes towards Canada's presence in Afghanistan, and Canada in general.

Similarly, military actors have also taken on state-building roles through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Canada commands one PRT in Kandahar (K-PRT), combining military, development workers and diplomats. PRTs carrying out "quick impact" development projects, as well as help the Afghan government secure the province, which is among one of the most targeted by insurgents (Government of Canada 2011e. These "quick impact" projects have a similar goodwill aim as "signature projects", which is to win the favor of the local population. In 2008, Canada's government adopted the Manley Report recommendation that K-PRT should be comprised of more civilian staff and placed under civilian leadership (Parliament of Canada 2008, 17).

In general, policy integration can allow for more coordination between previously separate spheres of government, allowing for more holistic policy solutions. In this instance, development aims are given consideration in military and diplomatic policy, and visa versa. However, policy integration also increases bureaucracy, and involves policy-makers who are advising outside of their areas of expertise. It can also mean that traditionally dominant departments (such as the Department of Defence) may end up crowding out smaller ones, such as CIDA, thereby impairing its ability to carry out its functions.

## Tensions in State-building: Implications of Securitization

As demonstrated, securitization has multiple effects on state-building policy that would have been absent if failed states were not framed as a national security threat. Recalling Suhkre (2010), it is also demonstrated that all internationalized state-building projects experience inherent tensions, and Canada's policies in Afghanistan are no exception. What impact does securitization have on these tensions?

### Control versus Ownership

Canada retains a high degree of control over the funds it spends in Afghanistan. Only an average of 35% of all Canadian aid is funneled through the Afghan government (Manley et. al. 2008, 25). The remaining aid is channeled through multinational organizations – which are accountable to the Canadian government through evaluation and reporting mechanisms, or through "signature projects", which are led and implemented by Canadians.

This is reflective of a larger trend among foreign donors, where only a third of all money spent in Afghanistan is channeled through the national government. For example, in 2004-05, Afghanistan's public expenditure was $4.9 billion, but only $1.4 billon was actually through the government budget (Rubin 2006, 179). A vast majority of the money spent in Afghanistan is therefore accountable to the political authority of donor countries, and not to the Afghan government. Canada is evidently not alone in wanting to maintain a high level of control over its funds, and is reluctant to allow for more Afghan ownership.

This is because when security is invoked, the cost of failure become greater: "[T]he securitizer is raising the stakes and investing some (real) risk of losing (general) sovereignty in order to fence of [sic] a specific challenge" (Waever 1989, quoted in Waever 1995, 61). Canadian policy states that state failure in Afghanistan carries great danger – for Canada and also for international stability. This can be seen in the way that development policy is now integrated diplomatic and military policy, thereby increasing in importance. Considering the great security risk that Canada associates with failure in Afghanistan, it would be expected that Canada would seek to exercise more control over state-building projects.

Specific Canadian policy-makers have also tied their own political fortunes to the success in Afghanistan. The centralization of decision-making through the Afghanistan Task Force and the high level of executive involvement (including the Prime Minister) bring with it political and electoral risk.

### Dependence versus Sustainability

The tension between dependence and sustainability is heightened when state-building is securitized. Due to the degree of priority that it is given on the Canadian foreign policy agenda, Afghanistan receives the most aid of any recipient country. While in the short-run, this ensures that the development projects are completed and services delivered, they are done so at a rate that will be difficult for the Afghan government to sustain. As such, many development projects may not be viable after Canada reduces or withdraws its support, and may even regress. This is particularly true for the basic services for which Canada is chiefly responsible, such as funding ANP wages. The Afghan state has become increasingly reliant on Canadian aid to fund these basic services, and Canada, through its increased funding and prioritization of Afghanistan state-building, has willingly provided it.

The issue is that priority is placed on delivering *services* rather than developing capacity of the state to deliver those services itself (Fukuyama (2004), 41). Another example where this can be seen is in Canada's "signature projects". These projects, hand-picked by Canadians, are reflective of high-profile projects that have quick, measurable and demonstrable outcomes (for example, the number of schools built, the percentage of child population vaccinated, etc.). These are favored by Canadian policy-makers who, in tying national security to the success of such programs, are under pressure by the Canadian electorate to produce measurable results in the development and humanitarian sphere. The degree of PMO involvement in such state-building projects adds to its politicization, where the political fortunes of the prime minister rest with achieving demonstrable results.

Related to the first tension, since Canada (and other countries) have wanted to retain much of its control over aid, a high amount still remains outside of the budgetary control of Afghan government. This undermines its ability to be sustainable, blocking the growth of its fiscal capacity, capital accumulation and economic management (Rubin 2006, 179). This further undermines the long-term fiscal sustainability of the Afghan state.

### Dependence versus Democratization (Legitimacy)

Related to the tensions associated with dependence and sustainability, dependence on foreign resources can also cause problems for domestic legitimacy. Based on the argument that "accountability follows the direction of resource flows", the Afghan government is held more accountable to its foreign donors (the primary source of state capital) than its own citizens (Suhkre 2010, 12). This is reinforced by Canada's tendency to funnel projects through multinational organizations, rather than through block grants to the Afghan government for it to provision funds as it sees fit.

Again, Canadian "signature projects" exemplify this tension. Note the remarks made by Retired Colonel Mike Capstick:

> ... [R]enovating the Mirwais hospital and slapping a Canadian flag on it does nothing to legitimize the Afghan government. In fact, it could send Kandaharis the clear message that Ottawa can do more for them than Kabul (House of Commons Canada 2008, 51).

As such, these Canadian projects are unlikely to win the loyalty of the people of Afghanistan to the government, and may undermine Kabul's position as a "first order provider" (ibid).

Moreover, recipient states are faced with a "dual legitimacy" problem, contending both with international and domestic legitimacy (Rubin 2005, 97). Indeed, dependence on Canadian aid means that the Afghanistan government is stuck between expectations of Canadians and those of Afghanis, which may be in contradiction with each other. For example, one of Canada's five priorities is the development of democratic institutions, and chiefly, transparent elections. This is commensurate with the liberal-democratic character of securitized state-building,

which assumes that inherently illiberal activities (such as terrorism) are unlikely to prosper in liberal countries. As such, Canada is attempting to create a type of *input legitimacy* (Bellina et. al. 2009, 15), wherein authority is established through democratic elections. Moreover, the remaining priorities also attempt to establish *output legitimacy* (ibid) for the Afghan government through the provision of basic services. In the first instance, legitimacy is based on notions of democracy, and in the second, ideas of a social contract between state and society. This social contract is based on the idea that citizens freely agree to be governed (and thereby allowing the government to have a monopoly on the use of force), in exchange for the government to provide its citizens with security and other services. However, Afghan society has traditionally relied on such sources of legitimacy as patronage and tribal allegiances (see Ponzio and Freeman 2007). While not necessarily at odds with each other (and attempt to create space both for an "Islamic republic" and a Western democracy in its Bonn constitution), this signals that there may be a divergence between domestic ideas of legitimacy and international.

# Chapter 5: Conclusions

Securitization, as a discursive act, has important implications on policy. As a speech act, it defines what is security and what is not. Securitization draws the boundaries of thought, thereby delimiting the range of policy options. Creating a type of "logic of no alternative", it makes policies which would ordinarily be contingent upon who is in power and which interests are at play seem necessary, with no other alternative but failure (see Watson and Hay 2004). Once the policies enter the realm of national security, the danger of failure is deemed too high a risk.

As demonstrated, the Manley Report played this discursive role in Canada. The non-partisan panel of experts held much authority in the Canadian policy-making arena, and set a narrative which would provide the guiding principles for Canada's Afghanistan engagement: failed states are prone to harbouring terrorists that may attack us, thus state building is an issue of national security, because state-building is the way to combat this terrorist threat.

This securitization has had far-ranging effects on Canadian policy in Afghanistan. It was the justification for the extension of Canada's mission until 2011. It increased the priority that Afghanistan had on Canada's national agenda, and in particular, elevated the importance of development projects. This prioritization led to the involvement of higher and higher levels of authority in decision-making, including Canada's prime minister. Prioritization also led to changes in funding. Funding for development projects not only increased to an unprecedented level, but funds were also realigned to focus primarily on those development and state building projects that also served security aims, and in particular those that could have quick, demonstrable results. Policy became integrated, where development projects were brought into the sphere of traditional security activities, and traditional security projects were brought into the sphere of development.

All of these outcomes of securitization continue to have unique effects on state-building policy, and in particular, the tensions inherent in internationalized state-building. Primarily, these outcomes *exacerbate* these tensions. Prioritization leads to increasing the degree of control that Canada has over projects in Afghanistan, through multilateral organization or direct service provision by Canadians. This comes at the expense of promoting local ownership. Increased control, combined with increased funding, heightens the level of dependence Afghanistan has on Canadian capital, equipment and expertise.

Not only has Canada created expensive programs that are unlikely to be sustained by the Afghan state after Canada leaves, it also re-aligned its funding to focus on short-term service delivery, achieving high-profile measurable results, at the price of long-term capacity-building. This high level of dependence is also at odds with building domestic legitimacy, as local officials become more accountable to Canada than to their own constituencies.

Policy integration ensures that only development projects with security or diplomatic aims are funded. It ensures that state-building projects that have a strong

liberal-democratic influence, as it is seen as necessarily negating inherently illiberal acts such as terrorism. This enhances the divergence between domestic and international legitimacy, as Afghanistan's rulers have historically based their legitimacy on sources such as patronage or tribal affiliation (see Ponzio and Freeman 2007), as opposed to democracy.

Moreover, these lessons from Afghanistan have implications for securitization and policy-making more generally:

- *Securitization ensures that issues receive political priority and funding, but places a higher price on failure*

Elevating an issue to a concern for national security ensures that there is political commitment to combat it. It increases its priority, ensures there is adequate funding available, and restructures policy to fit security objects. However, raising the stakes also makes failure more costly. National security is a state's primary and most fundamental priority, as it regards the existence of the state itself.

- *Raising the stakes for failures reduces a policy-maker's ability to maneuver*

When securitizing an issue, policy-makers create an expectation from the electorate that they will go to any lengths for national security. The result is that policy-makers actually create less maneuverability for themselves. While securitization heightens the importance of an issue, allowing them to utilize extraordinary measures, it may trap them in being able to use extraordinary measures only. It becomes difficult to justify when projects are scaled down or eliminated when the threat still seems to be significant.

- *Stretching the definition of security can lead to unrealistic policy objectives and uncertain policy outcomes*

It is not Waever's position that securitization should not be applied to anything at all, but rather that "it is necessary to consider with care what is implied or involved if we are indiscriminate in doing so" (Lipschutz 1995, 10). The securitization of state-building was an attempt to discourage or eliminate future terrorist attacks. This stretches the scope far beyond traditional security objectives, which tend to focus on tactical or strategic aims. Instead, the aim is to create an environment of invulnerability, where countries are free from harm caused by terrorism. Such a goal is utopian, unrealistic and untenable, with no measurable results or clear end.

The impact of discourse on policy-making is significant. As seen in the case of Canada's policy in Afghanistan, it frames the terms of the debate, defining what is and is not possible. As a precursor to policy outcomes, policy-makers need to exercise care in their definition of policy problems. Such definition, which begins at the level of discourse through speech acts, sets the tenor of the policy-making process, and significantly affects policy objectives and outcomes.

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