

**SHORT NOTICE MILITARY DEPLOYMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN
NATO MEMBER COUNTRIES: BARGAINING OVER BUDGETS AND DOMESTIC
SOURCES OF FOREIGN POLICY**

by

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to propose an answer to two questions: how do the governments bargain on the domestic level about foreign policy issues and how do the governments create budgets for short notice military deployments. To accomplish this goal, the thesis looks at the case of the NATO Response Force and how the eight former socialist countries from the Central and Eastern Europe, namely Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, allocate resources for their national contributions to it. It also looks at how the theoretical propositions of the two-level games and the bureaucratic politics model help to understand the influence of the domestic politics on the foreign policy issues in general and budgeting procedures in particular. The thesis uses a structured and focused comparison and congruence method together with country surveys to account for the results.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System

CBRN: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear

CHOD: chief of defense

CJSOR: Combined Joint Statement of Requirement

FPA: Foreign Policy Analysis

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

HQ ARRC: Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps

ISAF: International Security Assistance Force

KFOR: Kosovo Force

NAC: North Atlantic Council

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO PDD: NATO Public Diplomacy Division

NRF: NATO Response Force

MF: ministry of finance

MFA: ministry of foreign affairs

MoD: ministry of defense

SACEUR: Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe

US: United States

USD: United States Dollar

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In today's world one cannot predict all the possible scenarios which may result in necessary or inevitable deployment of an army. Therefore, for any state it would be ideal to be provided with an army prepared for all the possible kinds of operations with the shortest deployment time. But to build such an army would need an immense number of resources which are in reality very limited. A brief look on statistics will show us that a considerable number of states are decreasing their defense budget both proportionally to GDP and in absolute numbers (See Table 1 in Appendix). This is not only posing a long term question about the future quality of national armies and challenge for management of defense resources. Consequently army deployment becomes an acute problem when an eruption of conflict calls for unforeseen force to be put in operations for which there was no budget planned, all the more when it is posing a direct threat to vital national interests and the forces should be deployed out of national area.

After the 9/11 we have seen two major conflicts which were unforeseen and more or less unplanned from the long term perspective and needed large coalition building which involved deployment of armies from several states ranging from the leader in military preparedness, the United States to small countries as Albania. Undoubtedly the army deployments in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003 required an enormous amount of resources. While the need for the resources seems obvious, the issue of where the money for these kinds of operations comes from does not have to be that straight forward. Taking into account the enormous American investments much is known about various kinds of procedures by which the money for extra defense spending were collected in the United States and probably much more information could be hidden in the number of pages of government

material that were made public through Wikileaks. But how do these procedures work in other countries?

Probably no one would disagree that budgeting is a powerful tool in governance not only in state but in general terms as distribution of resources has a recognizable impact on performance of particular organizational unit. In several cases then it is not only about the performance but also it is an issue of accountability and appropriateness of the spending. For every democratic regime the right to distribute the budget which is consisting of the money of citizens is a primary tool of control of the legislature over the executive. Once the yearly budget of a state is approved in parliament and planning of expenses is made in particular departments of the state executive it is hard to alter the streams and gather resources for unforeseen expenses. Cutbacks and restreaming of organizational budgets are painful because nobody likes to give up his share and therefore serious bargaining between various state actors on various levels should be activated. These bargaining processes should then be of a particular concern because the accountability function of budgeting might be seriously altered during this process.

A significant part of the restructuralization and reshaping of national armed forces in Europe after the Second World War onwards was done with influence of the common defense planning of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) including the last significant still ongoing shift that came about after the end of the Cold War and even stronger after the attacks of 9/11 and subsequent engagement of countries in Iraq and Afghanistan, namely the shift from building the armed forces for territorial defense to armed forces with strong means of power projection. The need for military transformation and rapid military forces for crisis responses was the main purpose for the development of NATO Response Force (NRF). The conception that encompasses both was introduced in Prague in late 2002. NRF represents a highly ready multinational force that can be deployed to any mission, anywhere in the world

if agreed by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). It consists of national contributions that are put under NATO command for individual rotations that last for 6 months. This stand-by force can be then deployed for a mission by a “consensual political decision, taken on a case-by-case basis“ (NATO 2010a). Although, in addition to a decision to contribute by a certain national force to the NRF, a decision to send the NRF to an operation is taken by the states at the NAC, an additional national approval is needed to really deploy the force in out-of-area operation in most of the countries.

One of the features of the NRF that gets lots of attention is represented by budgeting. All the national contributions made to NRF are to be paid by the nation states. But the financial resources needed to train and equip national forces to participate in the stand by NRF rotation could turn out to be only a fraction, if the particular rotation gets to be deployed in a mission. A ‘costs lie where they fall’ system is employed in NATO operations that include also operations with NRF engagement. NRF functions as a catalogue of readily available forces in the case they will be needed. So as a decision to deploy NRF to an operation is decided upon in the NAC, they also decide which parts from the current stand-by rotation are going to be needed for a particular operation. That means the costs are shared unequally among the member states, as only those need to pay, whose forces came to be selected for the particular operation. Another layer of the issue is represented by the fact that even though you provide part of your national force to the NRF with the knowledge of their possible deployment you will need to pay for, in reality you need to have the financial resources only when your contribution is deployed.

Making decisions about how to budget army deployment outside the state territory becomes part of the general question of sending the national army abroad and because of this, it can be considered a foreign policy issue. As a foreign policy decision it would differ from an issue that would be exclusively in terms of domestic politics. The difference is at least

twofold: foreign policy differs from domestic politics in the nature and in actors that would be involved. Foreign policy is typically referred to as a boundary activity that takes place at the edge of two environments: the domestic environment which serves as a background against which the policy is made and external, international environment where the chosen policy is implemented (Evans and Newnham 1998, 179-180). Because of the substantive difference in the nature the difference in actors involved follows, but the particular exhaustive constellation might be issue dependant, nonetheless the actual process of policy making and bargaining will take place in the given institutional setup of a state.

The particular problem of insufficient contributions on the level of NATO and insufficient resources to fill the gaps on level of states comes to represent a general inconsistency between the commitment that was made by the state on the international level towards NATO and the seeming inability to fulfill this commitment adequately by the member states. On one hand the international commitments create pressure on finding solutions. On the other hand NATO represents an intergovernmental organization where every decision is taken by consensus of all member states. So if a nation agrees to a particular decision it represents a commitment that was taken by the nation, not a commitment of the organization itself (it becomes NATO's commitment only after all member states agree it is their commitment). If there is no middle man between NATO as an international organization and the member states and the commitments are not created by the organization but by the member states, why does a problem exist in the fulfillment of these commitments? Research in foreign policy offers a well accepted explanation that can be represented by Robert Putnam's (1988) two level games concept and more generally by the domestic sources of foreign policy. The recognition of the interconnectness of international relations and domestic politics in foreign policy issues allows us not only to explore the way in which these two levels are entangled. It also allows us to move from the purely systemic level of analysis and

beyond the rational actor model to look at explanations offered by the domestic sources of foreign policy.

If we will remain with the case of the short notice deployment of the NRF and the issue of their budgeting we can ask two general questions, one empirical and the second one theoretical:

- 1.) How do the governments create budgets for short notice military deployments?
- 2.) How do the governments bargain on the domestic level about foreign policy issues?

The anticipated answer to the empirical question includes three possibilities. Either the financial resources are allocated in advance, or a mechanism to generate financial resources once they are needed exists, or neither is true and there are no financial resources allocated in advance and no mechanism to generate them. In order to answer this question a series of questions was developed in a form of questionnaire that was sent to all 28 NATO members through their permanent national delegations at the NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium and at the Allied Command Transformation, Norfolk, Virginia. At the empirical level the survey aims to find out how states approach the issue of short military deployments in general and in particular in the case of NRF, who are the domestic actors involved and how the power is distributed among them. Given the response structure of the survey the analysis is based on eight former socialist countries from Central and Eastern Europe, namely: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

When it comes to the theoretical question the aim of this thesis is not to provide a comprehensive theory of the domestic bargaining games on the foreign policy issues. It will

rather critically approach some of the existing propositions on the domestic sources of foreign policy and test these propositions to see if they match the empirical case. In addition to the two level games, bureaucratic politics model initially developed by Graham T. Allison (1969; 1971; 1999) and Morton H. Halperin (1974; together with Allison 1972) will be used to look beyond the rational actor model. Generally the literature on domestic sources of foreign policy claims that the recognition of the existence of conflicts on what is the national interest among various actors inside the state and the understanding of the internal bargaining among those actors helps to understand and predict outcomes in foreign policy (Putnam 1988, Milner 1997). Two level games logic also recognizes the interaction between the domestic and international arena, where the games are played simultaneously by the actors, who have different interests to push on the different levels. Bureaucratic politics model on the other hand represents “complex intersection of small group dynamics, organizational process and domestic political forces” (Hudson 2007, 89). According to Putnam (1988, 435) central executives play special role of a middle man between the domestic and international pressures as they are exposed to both of the levels. General assumption behind the bureaucratic politics model is:

If a nation performed an action, the action was the outcome of bargaining among individuals and groups within the government. That outcome included results achieved by groups committed to a decision or action, resultants which emerged from the bargaining among groups with quite different positions and foul-ups. Model III's explanatory power is achieved by revealing the pulling and hauling of various players, with different perceptions and priorities, focusing on separate problems, which yielded the outcomes that constitute the action in question. (Allison 1969, 710-711)

If Allison was criticized by Robert J. Art (1973, 471-472) for putting too much emphasis on the lack of intent in governmental decisions and action and overstating the pulling and hauling by the executive in expense of the “politics of getting elected”, Milner (1997, 16) in her study of domestic influences accounts also for this possibility. In her view

different groups within government have different preferences because they are unevenly affected by the governments' policies. The consequences are then twofold, electoral and distributional. So every international commitment that is taken by a state will create winners and losers on the domestic level as it incorporates distribution of costs and benefits. This distribution can provide us with understanding of which actors within government will favor and which will be against a certain policy (Milner 1997, 9, 61).

Milner's understanding is close to the central catch phrase of Allison's (1969, 711) bureaucratic politics model "where you stand depends on where you sit." In this respect Allison gives budgeting as an example of an issue where a position of a particular issue could be predicted based on the position of the actor within the government. More extensive discussion of the issue of budgets in bureaucratic politics is given by Halperin (1974, 56-58). While discussing organizational interests, he also examines the role of budgets. Generally each proposed policy is examined for its effect on budget of the given actor and with noting else modified, larger budgets are preferred to smaller budgets. But the budget changes usually do not come alone and are rather connected to some kind of change in the functions of organizations. This may lead to a situation where new functions are assigned without appropriate increase in budget and the organizations are asked to find the additional resources through restructuring of their current budgets. Therefore actors assess at least two issues, namely how closely is the new function related to the standing ones and the overall nature how the budget making process is done. The nature of the process tells organization how probable is that the new function will come also with increased budget. So the worst case scenario is represented by a situation where there is low possibility of budget increase and moreover the new function does not match the understanding of its overall function by the organization.

In addition to the empirical examination of the budgeting process for the short notice military deployment the case of the NRF can serve as a test case for some of the propositions coming from the theories of domestic sources of foreign policy. The actor of the prime concern here is the ministry of defense with the armed forces who will have the responsibility for carrying out the contributions to the NRF. According to the propositions as expressed above the preference of this actor should be increase of budget and powers in the decision making process if they are to be obligated to fulfill the commitments from the NRF contributions. Also crucial is the distribution of the costs and benefits connected with the decision to contribute and deploy the NRF among the other involved actors within the government as well as the procedures that are applied in the process. The survey is constructed in a way that it allows also to test these propositions on the case on the NRF short notice deployment.

This thesis will argue that the governmental bargaining on domestic level about foreign policy issues is influenced by the distributional consequences that are spread unevenly among the actors involved. Based on the preferences of the actors and the power distribution it is possible to show how these distributional consequences create winners and losers in the bargaining games. Being able to establish this relationship among the actors involved, the thesis will assess the validity of a proposition based on Allison's bureaucratic politics model which holds that a position of an actor on a given issue can be predicted based on his stand in the government. Specific attention will be given to the role of appropriate budgets when accounting for the proposed relationship. In this respect an actor who will be responsible for carrying out a particular decision would create its position on a decision based on his assessment of the availability of the needed budgetary resources for him. The case of the NATO Response Force will be used to demonstrate the influence of actors' preferences and power distribution on the foreign policy decision making and to assess the validity of the

predictions on the behavior of the actors involved in the domestic bargaining on the foreign policy issues.

The thesis will continue as follows. The second chapter introduces the theory that will be used to set the boundaries to the scope in which the theoretical question will be answered and to conceptualize the question and identify variables that will allow to test the theoretical propositions on an empirical case. The aim here also is to argue for the relevance of the topic and of the selected approach to it. The third chapter presents the research design of the thesis. It introduces the methodology and methods used during the research, survey as the main tool for data collection is presented and the questions of the survey are linked here to the theoretical propositions and selected variables that will be used to analyze the case of the NATO Response Force. The fourth chapter introduces the general framework of NATO crisis management operations, and the fifth includes a description of the NATO Response Force and sets the stage for the analysis of the budget for the short notice deployment of the NRF. The thesis finishes with a concluding chapter which summarizes the outcomes of the analysis and gives a brief overview of the answers to the research questions.

CHAPTER 2: DOMESTIC SOURCES OF FOREIGN POLICY IN LITERATURE AND RESEARCH

Domestic sources of foreign policy represent one of the main areas of foreign policy analysis, which is now a well developed subfield of international relations. Its general role is in creating actor-specific theory that will help to understand the human decision-maker inside the black box of the actor-general approach of international relations (Hudson 2005, 1-2). Good overview of the current state of the field is given by Valerie M. Hudson (2005). She defines here the scope of foreign policy analysis by identifying the explanandum and explanans of FPA. “The explanandum of foreign policy analysis includes the process and resultants of human decision making with reference to or having known the consequences for foreign entities ... The explanans of FPA are those factors that influence foreign policy decision making and foreign policy decision makers” (Hudson 2005, 2) which makes FPA a multifactor and multilevel area of study. There is no doubt that a great interdependency exists between foreign policy and domestic politics but as pointed out by Robert D. Putnam (1988, 427) “theories have not sorted out the puzzling tangle.” It is not the objective of this paper to sort out the puzzle but rather to critically approach the existing matter on this issue and create an analytical framework that would fit my subject of study.

Before turning to the discussion of the existing literature, a basic understanding of what will be perceived as foreign policy is presented as well as a brief discussion of the level of analysis. In general the following statements are going to be used as a background identification of what is foreign policy and further on additional distinctions between domestic and foreign policy and foreign policy decision making will be made. Foreign policy is a state policy; is leading the steps of a state in international environment; and it is a

boundary activity between the domestic and international environment. From outside, the state is a monolithic actor but from inside it is shaped by the domestic political organization that is dividing the influence on particular decision making among various bodies. These bodies then do not have to have fully compatible objectives on the given problem and common procedures and so, consequently the form of the foreign policy is a compromise among actors involved.

Generally international relations literature presents three levels of analysis, or as labeled by Kenneth Waltz (1959), three images of international relations behavior. The first image is the individual level, the second image represents the level of nation state and the third image is the level of the international system. Even if foreign policy analysis is predominantly oriented on the individual level of analysis, given the nature of the research design this thesis is going to be situated on the state level of analysis. This allows us to analyze impacts of international framework on state of foreign policy and structure of domestic bargaining games. It is also the level that is appropriate for the application of the two-level games concept or in other words to account for domestic influences on foreign policy that acknowledges the interaction with the systemic level. Although the reader might feel a lack of elaboration on the sources of the foreign policy decision making from the systemic level of the international relations, this is because the level to which an emphasis is given here and level on which this work is based is the domestic level of the foreign policy decision making. Higher level is represented by the level of an international organization and this level and its attributes are going to be discussed only for the purpose of control for their impact on the domestic process of the foreign policy decision making. The need for systemic level in the analytical framework is discussed by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1969, 199-216) who claim that “foreign policy is not determined by international-systemic pressure but the

domestic political constellation (especially the setup of the decision-making process) is similarly important determinant” (Koran 2004, 12).

The different levels of analysis are connected with different sources of foreign policy and have to do with how the actors are perceived on the international and domestic level. From the systemic perspective states are monolithically units and the nature of the international relations is expressed by the interaction among them. It means that the systemic perspective does not perceive actors on the domestic level, where the foreign policy making is seen to be influenced by the nature of the regime of the state and as interaction inside of it (Koran 2007, 11-12). So foreign policy can be seen as one of the state policies, but one has to look beyond the state actions, where decisions are made by lower level actors (humans as the lowest, but also for example organizations). These decisions are then influenced by the actors with geopolitical and economic motivation as well as distinct social values and the international perspective is bringing information about the relative position of a state in the international system and about the position of the other states (Evans and Newnham 1998, 177-178).

2.1 Two-Level Games

The two conceptual approaches to domestic sources of foreign policy that are going to be discussed here are two-level games and bureaucratic politics. Two-level games are going to be represented by Robert Putnam’s (1988) original approach and Helen Milner’s (1997) reinterpretation of it. The aim of this discussion is the recognition and conceptualization of the role of the domestic level rather than the utilization of the concept as whole.

Robert Putnam (1988) in his *Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games* links all the domestic actors with the actors from the international level to play a

game on two connected game boards, namely game board of domestic and international politics. This way he tries to touch upon how the influence works between domestic politics and international relations. In his viewpoint (1988, 436) interpretations concerned with “domestic causes and international effects” or “international causes and domestic effects” are not exhaustive because they miss “how the domestic politics of several countries became entangled via as international negotiation.” Connecting the two game boards a two-level game is created. “At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to minimize the adverse consequences of foreign developments” (436). Putnam further recognizes the central role of government as a mediator between the domestic and international pressure. The central role is then coming from the exposure to both of the levels but it does not come from the assumption about the unity of views on given issue by the government members. This leads then the two-level approach to assume “the inevitability of domestic conflict about what the ‘national interest’ requires” and “recognizes that central decision makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously” (459).

Although in my thesis I am not going to utilize Putnam’s two-level approach in its whole depth because I am not so interested in the negotiation on the international level and the impact of domestic level on this negotiation, I still will utilize the two lastly mentioned assumptions when looking on the domestic bargaining about the implementation of decision from the international level.

Milner’s (1997, 9) central proposition is that “cooperation among nations is affected less by fears of other countries’ relative gains or cheating than it is by the *domestic distributional consequences* of cooperative endeavors. Cooperative agreements create winners and losers domestically; therefore they generate supporters and opponents.” She examines the

impact of domestic interests, institutions and information as independent variables on the dependent variable which is represented by international cooperation. The role of the systemic level is considerable and there are international factors that influence cooperation among states, but what is needed from Milner's (1997, 10) perspective is theory of domestic influences that will "categorize the differences among the states, that are relevant to international politics" as the "cooperation is continuation of domestic struggles by other means." This is where Milner closely relates to Putnam's understanding of two-level games that is created by the connection between the two levels.

The inevitability of conflict between actors on the domestic level in the process of policy making comes from the difference in policy preference and distribution of information and power. These three categories define what Milner (1997, 11-16) calls polyarchy, a structure between the anarchy of the international system and hierarchy of the domestic politics, and are central to understanding policy making. Interests of actors, the difference of their policy preferences and the overall structure of domestic preferences represent the essence of the recognition that a state is not a unitary actor and therefore domestic politics must matter. As already mentioned in the introduction, the difference in preferences exists because adopted policies have "domestic distributional and electoral consequences" that affect actors differentially. Political institutions are important because they give the structure to the policy making process and predefine the way in which preferences are aggregated. Milner (1997, 18-20) is mostly interested in the factors that determine how a policy is chosen and "which actors share what powers over the policy-making process." The key powers are represented by "the ability to initiate and set the agenda, to amend any proposed policy, to ratify or veto policy, and to propose public referendums." Finally distribution of information matters because it creates inefficiencies and political advantages.

Two-level games give voice to the domestic politics in foreign policy making and the role of the bureaucracy in it. The main representation of this is the inevitability of the conflict among actors within a state about what is the national interest. This is where Milner's understanding of the domestic influences on the foreign policy becomes important for this thesis. Again as with Putnam, there are only certain aspects that will be used further on. It firstly applies to the dichotomy of electoral and distributional consequences of the policy decisions where the thesis will concentrate on the distributional consequences. Secondly from the three variables identified by Milner as those playing a role in foreign policy making I will concentrate on the interests/preferences of actors and the political institutions/power distribution, leaving out the role of distribution on information.

2.2 Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm

The bureaucratic politics paradigm refers to the theoretical approach developed at the end of 1960's and throughout the 1970's by Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin (Allison 1969; 1971; 1999; Allison and Halperin 1972; Halperin 1974). As it was pointed out by Allison himself and also by one of his early critics Robert J. Art (1973) a solid body of literature on the role of bureaucracy existed before Allison's study of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Among the most prominent authors were Richard E. Neustadt, Samuel P. Huntington, Warner Schilling and Roger Hilsman.

Allison (1971, 147) identifies Richard E. Neustadt's (1960) *Presidential Power* as the main source for the bureaucratic political paradigm. The central assumption of Neustadt's (1960, 10) work is that "presidential power is the power to persuade"¹. This assumption is derived from the understanding that the government in a state comprises of different

¹ This study was done on the US presidential system.

independent institutions, so none of these is able to make decision alone – the power in the state is shared. As Allison (1971: 148) puts it: “constitutional prescription, political tradition, governmental practice, and democratic theory all converge to accentuate differences among needs and interests of individuals in the government, and to divide influence among them.” Those who are there to carry out the work of the government have responsibilities of their own, stemming from their position in the particular institution and they have to carry out these responsibilities. Therefore they can not just unquestionably stick to the president’s will which led to the assumption that presidential power is rather encompassed in his ability to persuade his people than from his formal power given him by the constitution.

The three other mentioned authors concentrated on the policy process and its bureaucratic side. Probably influenced by the period, they look in many occasions at military policy and issues of how much to spend on defense. Samuel P. Huntington’s (1961, 146) analyzes the decisions in military policy. He distinguishes between executive and legislative process that is the result of negotiations and bargaining among different interest of different state agencies. Executive character means “(1) the participating units differ in power ...; (2) fundamental goals and values are not an issue; and (3) the range of possible choices is limited.” And legislative character of the policy making process represents “(1) the units participating in the process are relatively equal in power (and consequently must bargain with each other); (2) important disagreements exist concerning the goals of policy; and (3) there are many possible alternatives.” Warner Schilling (1962, 21-24) uses bureaucratic politics in his model of budgeting as political process. According to Allison (1971, 154-155) as there is never conclusive answer for how much to spend on defense the process is based on “(1) problems that have no right answer; ... (2) participants whose policy differences stem from both intellectual and institutional differences; (3) processes that distribute power and advantages differentially among participants; (4) a “strain towards agreement” that

encourages compromise and consensus; and (5) outcomes that result from conflict coalition, and bargaining.” Similar propositions are made by Roger Hilsman (1967). He sees policy-making as politics and a process of “conflict and consensus building” with three main characteristics of the process: “diversity of goals and values that must be reconcile before a decision can be reached ... the presence of competing clusters of people within the main group who are identified with each of the alternative goals and policies ... the relative power of these different groups of people included is as relevant to the final decision as the appeal of the goals they seek or the cogency and wisdom of their arguments” (Hilsman 1967, 553-555).

Art (1973, 468-467) gives an extensive summary of what he calls the first wave of theoretical approach of bureaucratic perspective to foreign policy making. It can be five propositions: (1) diffusion of the power among various actors in the government is a structural feature of the system and actors must take this into consideration when carrying out their tasks; (2) different positions bring different responsibilities that might bring the emphasis different aspects of the issue and therefore these different perspectives can in part explain the different positions on given policy; (3) leadership in and between the governmental institutions is carried out mainly through persuasion; (4) therefore the process of foreign policy making is a process of consensus building among those who share the power to influence the issue; (5) there is effect of the process on the substance as the way the decision is made will affect the content of the decision that will be adopted. These points summarize what the first wave authors found out about the bureaucratic nature of policy making and at the same time identify the basic propositions which were adopted by Allison in his conceptual models.

Graham T. Allison (1969, 1971) is, in his texts *Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis* and *Essence of Decision: Explaining Cuban Missile Crisis*, exploring “the

fundamental assumption and categories employed by analysts in thinking about problems of governmental behavior, especially in foreign and military affairs” (1969, 413). He is introducing here three different approaches to the study of the state behavior in foreign policy issues. The first model is that of the rational actor, which holds that actors seen as unified national governments act based on the rational choice assessing expensing and gains where the option with the highest gains and lowest expenses is chosen (Goldstein 2005, 157). As already mentioned actors here are nations, states or governments as unitary actors that are reacting on specific problems with maximization of its strategic goals. The next two models are composed as alternatives to the Rational Policy model based on the assumption that approach where “monoliths perform large actions for big reasons must be balanced by an appreciation of the facts (a) that monoliths are black boxes converging various gears and levers in highly differentiated decision-making structure, and (b) that large act are the consequences of innumerable and often conflicting smaller actions by individuals at various levels of bureaucratic organizations in the service of variety of only partially compatible conceptions of national goals, organizational goals, and political objectives” (Allison 1969, 690).

Bureaucratic politics model is one of the alternative models of explanation that was further developed by Allison and Halperin (1972, 42-43). They understand bureaucracy as a large body consisting of organizations and political actors that differ in their opinion on any issue and compete over the influence on the governmental actions and decisions. The main focus is on impact of interaction among individuals on actions of governments on international level. The bureaucratic politics model is represented by bargaining games along regularized channels constituted by interactions among individuals. These individuals are seen as men in jobs with various conceptions of national, organizational and personal goals. They are hierarchically positioned within government with unequal powers over particular

issue and separable objectives in distinguishable sub-games. Decisions in these games and adopted through pulling and hauling between the competing concepts of goals held by the different players. Therefore governmental actions are seen as collages and the outcomes of the bargaining games are not direct solutions to problems but rather results of compromise between the players.

The basic unit of analysis used by Allison and Halperin is the action of government which is the result of the bargaining games between the actors coming from within the government. Allison (1971, 173) writes that the explanatory power of the bureaucratic model is “achieved by displaying the game- - the action channels, the positions, the players, their preferences, and the pulling and hauling – that yielded, as a resultant, the action in question.” The action channels are understood as “regularized sets of procedures for producing particular classes of actions” (Allison and Halperin 1972, 45, 47) and they determine who, with what kind of powers enters the game. Preferences are constituted by individual characteristics and responsibilities determined by the position. According to Allison and Halperin (1972, 48, 54-55) the preferences are generally formed by “national security interests, organizational interests, domestic interests, and personal interests.” Constraints on the whole process of the decision-making that bias the outcome of the game are labeled organizational constraints, represented by various context variables. Among them is information available to particular actor and options that are considered by the actors.

In the light of the theoretical question there is one more aspect of the bureaucratic political model that should be considered. It is the question of how should the bargaining, look like, or in Allison’s and Halperin’s words (1972, 50-52) “how are the players’ stands aggregated to yield decisions and actions of a government.” In this respect they distinguish between policy and decision games and actions games. In the former case a game is mostly initiated out of necessity to get something done. An important position is given to the action

channels. They are usually determined by fixed rules prescribing the way how a policy or decision is created. The importance is coming from the ability of the action channels to “structure the games by pre-selecting the major players, determining the usual points of entrance into the game, and by distributing, and by distributing particular advantages for the game.” In the latter case if action is “result of routine behavior of organization one needs to explain the organizational standard operating procedures that produced that behavior.” The probability to affect the bargaining game in favor of a particular actor depends upon the power of this actor. Powers of the actor is then given by “formal authority, control over the resources necessary to carry out the action, responsibilities for carrying out the action ... and persuasiveness with other players, particularly those responsible for implementation.”

2.3 Critics of Allison’s Approach to Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm

When talking about the first wave of bureaucratic perspective on foreign policy making Art (1973, 471) points out that, contrary to Allison’s approach, the compromise reached by the actors involved in the policy process as not completely intentless, as the participants have at least the initial intent to reach that compromise. This initial intent is taken into account as a natural part of the process and so the actors “frame their actions with a view towards what is required to get a policy adopted. Last but not least, the first wave authors does not neglect, as according to Art Allison does, the prime factor in the domestic influence on foreign policy, the politics of getting elected, staying in office and retaining the support of constituency.

The main potions of Art’s (1973, 486-487) critique towards the “bureaucratic paradigm as an approach for analyzing American foreign policy” are: “first, it undervalues the influence (or weight) of both generational mind-set and domestic politics on the manner in

which top decision-makers approach foreign policy; second, it is too sloppy, vague, and imprecise as presently constituted to make its use worthwhile.” These points leads him to conclude that the main problem for using bureaucratic paradigm for analyzing policy process could be found in “too many constraints of a non-bureaucratic nature must be set before the paradigm works, and more often than not, once we set the constraints, the paradigm will account for very little, if anything”. But in turn Art does not consider the bureaucratic paradigm to be useless at all, rather we should adopt a systemic perspective “not looking for thing that are not there and seeing things that we should over look” and work to specify external and internal constraints of the paradigm.

More recent critiques of Allison’s Model III includes article by Edward Rhodes (1994). Concluding that the main point of objection towards the Model III given the previous literature is that the concept is too complex to produce testable hypotheses, Rhodes (1994, 6) would like to move towards limitation that were not touched upon before, namely not just the logic but the empirical verification of the Model III. Already at the beginning of the article he mentions that his case study failed to pass the test of the expectation that the outcomes of the policy process could be “predicted on the basis of parochial interests and the distribution of bureaucratic power” (Rhodes 1994, 3). Based on the analysis he concludes that “the findings from this case give us considerable reason for skepticism about any generalized claims that bureaucratic politics are critical in shaping state behavior ... even in areas of apparently routine bureaucratic decision making, state behavior must be seen as driven not by parochial, bureaucratic self-interest but by the influence of particular sets of widely shared beliefs” (Rhodes 1994, 40-41).

The Basic categories Rhodes (1994, 6) uses to test the Model III paradigm are the “four crucial questions posed by a bureaucratic politics model: Who plays? What are their interests? What is their relative strength? And what are the rules under which participants

interact?” These questions are based on the main inference frame proposed by Allison (1971, 173). Rhodes (1994, 7-10) further elaborates on these categories to properly conceptualize them for the analysis as follows: (1) Who plays? is described by the players who are assumed to be individuals that take place in the policy making and their position is given by their relationship to the other players; (2) What are the interests of the players? these are given by the, according to Allison (1971, 166), “parochial priorities and perceptions” that goes with the position of the player and are filtered through the perspectives of the individual that he brings in with him to settle in the position; (3) Who determines the relative influence of the players? is determined according to the power of the player which comes from the resources given by his position and the ability of the player to exercise this power; (4) What are the rules of the game? is set up by the action channels that are represented by standardized procedures and ad-hoc paths created by the players.

Another critique and modification of the bureaucratic politics model as developed comes from Ralph S. Brower and Mitchell Y. Abolafia (1997). In their study they employed the method of ethnographic study to account for the work of the lower level participants in bureaucratic politics whose involvement in the policy process they labeled as “politics from below” which can be characterized as “action or intentional inaction that defines, opposes, or sidesteps the rules, roles, or routines of the organization” (Brower and Abolafia 1997). The difference between the bureaucratic politics of bargaining “among those at the top” and the bureaucratic politics from below is the factor of hierarchy. “Those whose positions are relatively less powerful cannot bargain to influence agency outcomes in any substantial way. But they can and do engage in bureaucratic politics. Since their actions embrace out-of-bounds behaviors they are not captive to the usual conventions and expectations. Their actions are nondeterministic and improvisational by nature, but they are not devoid of social constraint” (Brower and Abolafia 1997). If the action channels are one of the main analytical

categories in bureaucratic politics then in this case their regularized version is part of the problem why the engagement of the lower level officials is improvisational and ad-hoc. The reason for this is that they are preventing the lower level officials to enter the game and they modify the whole perception of the bureaucratic politics from the bargaining for the desired outcome to the preservation of identity and selfhood in the politics from below (Brower and Abolafia 1997).

Brower and Abolafia (1997) formulated their general critique of the Allison's conceptual model of bureaucratic politics (1969, 1971) in three points. The first one relates to the extensive critique of Bendor and Hammond (1992) who assume that it is hard to determine what are the factor that actually should not be included in the analysis under the Allison's Model III, where they find as exceptionally pressing the assumption about the behavior of the players and if this behavior should be recognizes as relatively voluntary or rather relatively deterministic. The second point of critique is directed towards the lack of specification of the influence of the authority on the activity individual players, which would be a crucial point also for their analysis where the lower level participants might be under even greater pressure of the authority then the top representatives of the bureaucracy. Finally, a point that seems to be a usual part of the Allison's critique is the thickness of the model where it is hard to identify the main elements of the model.

Nevertheless they (Brower and Abolafia 1997) consider the model to be a useful framework for their analysis. Within Allison's work they identify five key elements of the bureaucratic politics. These are channels, positions, players, preferences and the rules of the game. The element of the model they downplay, for the reasons explained earlier, is the view of bureaucratic politic as a bargaining game. Their analysis is carried out using these five key elements as defined by Allison. Channels here refer to Allison's action channels which lend the game its structure and access to the action channels is necessary for getting the desired

outcome. Positions define the obligations and abilities of the participants that critically influence action and give the underlying power to the organizational structures of the organization involved as well as to the structure of the government as such. Positions in Allison's perspective then create what can be mainly described as equal horizontal relations between the players. Players then are "men in jobs" (Allison 1971, 164) individuals who oscillate between what they are from the nature of their character and previous experience and what they are given their position in the bureaucracy. As we already seen in Rhodes (1994, 7) preferences are given by the "parochial priorities and perceptions" (Allison 1971, 166) meaning the organizational interest in particular outcome viewed through perceptual filters of the particular player. Finally rules of the game steam from the formal structure of the given regime. Rules establish positions with the points of entry to the game, they constrain the range of permissible decisions and actions and they sanction certain moves (Allison 1971, 170-171).

The chapter to follow will utilize the discussion on the theoretical approaches of the two-level games and the bureaucratic politic model in creating variables and categories to be identified in the subsequent analysis of the case under study.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN

From the methodological perspective the thesis is going to be modeled as a comparative case study largely following propositions made by Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett (2005) and will employ a structured, focused comparison and the congruence method. This choice is given by from the nature of the issue under study and the preferred modes of data collection, which will be based on survey, interviews and text analysis. The main aim is not only to describe the empirical case but also to test the theoretical propositions on the case and to contribute to the development of the paradigm of bureaucratic politics.

3.1 Research Objective, Research Questions and Methods

Generally the thesis looks at the behavior of states in the instances when they make decisions on foreign policy issues. The scope of the investigation will be limited to budget related decisions in NATO member countries, as the case under study deals with budgeting of short notice military deployment of the NATO Response Forces. The main focus will be on the variations in the process on the state level, within the government, that leads to the outcome which is defined as decision on the deployment and it's financing. Important is also the relation to the international level where the obligation to take the decision comes from and represents a source of a partial regulation of the processes that take place on the domestic level. The process is then, according to bureaucratic politics model, described as a bargaining game. As already mentioned in the literature review the main inference pattern proposed by Allison (1971, 173) holds that:

If a nation performed an action, that action was the resultant of bargaining among individuals and groups within the government. Model III's explanatory power is achieved by displaying the game – the action-channel, the positions, the players, their

preferences, and the pulling and hauling – that yielded, as a resultant, the action in question.

This inference pattern will be used as the main explanatory frame for identification of variables and for answering the research questions. The thesis poses two questions, one empirical and second one theoretical:

- 1.) How do the governments create budgets for short notice military deployments?
- 2.) How do the governments bargain on the domestic level about foreign policy issues?²

The questions directly relates to each other and create the overarching research objective, which is to describe the procedure of the budget-making for short military deployments, particularly in the case of the NATO Response Force and to contribute to the development of the bureaucratic politics paradigm by using the case of the NRF as a test case for the proposed relations between variables. In this respect the most common critique of the bureaucratic politic model, discussed in the literature review is represented by the objection towards the complexness and thickness of the model and the need of too many constraints to be taken into account before applying the model, which makes it hard to use for formulating testable hypothesis or predicting and explaining outcomes (Art 1973; Rhodes 1994; Brower and Abolafia 1997). The inference pattern identifies the outcome, that is the action that was performed by a government, as a dependent variable that should be explained by looking on the structure of the bureaucratic politics process which is represented by independent variables that constitute the bargaining game and include “the action-channel, the positions, the players, their preferences, and the pulling and hauling” (Allison 1971, 173). There is not much of further specification of the causal relation between these variables and also the scope

² How is the foreign policy outcome influenced by the governmental bargaining on the domestic level?

conditions in which the inference pattern should hold true is specified too vaguely and broadly. It is not clear if under the bureaucratic politics model the same process should lead to the same outcomes or whether the same outcomes should be produced by the same processes. This lack of clarity deprives the bureaucratic politics model of its potential predictive power. On the other hand we may look on all of the Allison models and see that what he proposes are three different explanations on three different levels but for the same outcome. These are presented as rather complementary than competing explanations, which makes Allison's propositions even more complex.

To solve these problems the thesis will employ the congruence method. As proposed by George and Bennett (2005, 181-192) it is designed to assess the ability of a theory to explain and predict outcome in a given case. If a theory is too vague or inconsistent, the congruence method can be used to refine and to develop the theory to make "it more nearly testable" (182) through its use in a case study. The first step is to "ascertain the value of the independent variable in the case at hand" and the second step is to "asks what prediction or expectation about the outcome of the dependent variable should follow from the theory" (181). The specification of the variation of the dependent variable is an important task in establishing the congruence between the independent variable and the outcomes on the dependent variable. On the other hand the congruence method does not ask to trace the causal process between the variables. The variables are seen as congruent when "they vary in the expected directions, to the expected magnitude, along the expected dimensions" (183). Finally, as pointed out by George and Bennett (2005, 115), the goal of congruence is "rarely to refute a theory decisively, but rather to identify whether and how the scope conditions of competing theories should be expanded or narrowed.

This will be complemented with the method of structured and focused comparison (George and Bennett 2005, 67-72). Structured nature of the method is given by asking each

single case under study the same set of “general questions that reflect the research objective” (62) to achieve standardize data collection and systematic comparison. In this thesis the structured nature of comparison is secured by the questionnaire that represents the main tool of data collection and asks each case the same set of questions. Secondly, the method is focused when it “deals only with certain aspects of the historical case examined” (62) and the case is focused in a way it matches the type of theory that is employed in the study. The thesis is focused on domestic variables influencing foreign policy and foreign policy decision making in the case of the NATO Response Force deployment and complemented with theories that explain behavior of actors in foreign policy decision making.

3.2 Case selection and Case Development

The primary level of analysis is the state level. The unit of analysis is the action of government (acts of officials who are exercising the governmental authority and must be perceivable outside the government) which is producing outcomes (state of the real world affected by the action) and the units of observation are actors within government. The universe of the cases is going to be limited in two respects. Firstly it is limited by the NATO membership. There are currently 28 member states³ in NATO. Secondly it is limited by the response rate to the survey which represents the main tool for data collection. Given these limitations the analysis is based on eight former socialist countries from Central and Eastern Europe, namely: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

³ Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States, Iceland, Greece, Turkey, Germany, Spain, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia.

Generally, from the state perspective, the two most important features of NATO are the intergovernmental character of the organization, which can be exemplified by the consensual decision making, and the commitment of the state to the organization and its goals that is created by the membership in NATO. From the international perspective the biggest problem for NATO is the unsatisfactory fulfillment of the commitments agreed by the member states. Problems with troop's contributions, capability improvement, unequal burden sharing and underfinancing on national militaries⁴ are real life examples of this unsatisfactory fulfillment. On the other hand we cannot speak generally about all the member states of NATO having the same problems fulfilling their commitments. So there is not only the commitment that creates pressure on the members, but also the peer pressure. Among the questions that can be asked is why states in a intergovernmental organization, where the only acceptable decision, is one that is reached by agreement of all, cannot live up to their commitments and the organization is experiencing lack of resources on the international level.

Two-level games and the bureaucratic politics paradigm offer us some answers to this question. Namely that the inconsistency between the commitment and its fulfillment is due to the domestic politics of each individual member state. They take all the factors concerning the commitment, procedural factors that work on the level of NATO and the current state of international relations home to their nation state where it meets a different set of demands. These demands then create domestic factors that influence foreign policy and represent at least partial explanation for the inconsistent behavior that is seen when we are looking for explanations only on the international level.

Working with all the domestic and international factors, governments have to decide in each particular case what is the desired degree of engagement for them, what are the goals

⁴ NATO members are committed to allocate at least 2 percent of GDP to defense in their national yearly budgets. For an overview of the fulfillment of this criterion you can see Table 1 in the Appendix. There are only five countries that passed this threshold in 2010; they are Albania, France, Greece, United Kingdom and United States.

they would like to achieve and what tools should be selected to achieve these goals, always keeping in mind public opinion (Interviewee no. 1). If we are then looking at how to provide for short notice military deployments, three distinct types of resources are needed. These include political will, financial resources and military capabilities (Interviewee no. 2), which are as such under primary responsibility of different governmental bodies. It indicates that cooperation, bargaining and finally agreement between the bodies would be necessary if a decision and afterwards implementation of that decision should be reached. It also indicates that in different cases different actors within government would be engaged in the decision making with differing competences. Therefore questions that arise on the domestic level, to further explain the inconsistency, include one on actors and their competences in particular foreign policy decision making setup and one on the role of resources in the political process and foreign policy decision making. The actors, their competences and the process then create the stage for the bargaining games and gives answer to the theoretical question. Last but not least it shows how the theoretical question relates to the empirical one and how answering the empirical question constitutes a test for theoretical assumptions that are behind the theoretical question.

To create general understanding of the issue of budgeting on the level of NATO and its member states I will perform a specific analysis of the national mechanisms for the contribution to military deployment under the NATO structures. To give more coherence to the findings of the analysis I will concentrate on the deployments of the NATO Response Force as this has its standard procedures on the level of NATO and what differs are the various national approaches to the NRF. Also as the main interest of this thesis is to provide understanding of the budgeting procedures I will be predominantly interested in the financial side of the NRF deployment. In this respect, generally three possibilities seem to be tentative given the nature of NRF as a force that is constituted for six month rotation from national

contributions and it can but might not be deployed during this six month period. As the biggest share of the money needed to support national NRF contribution comes to be necessary just after the real deployment a possibility exists for a country not to have the money ready to pay for the possible deployment (1.). This worst case scenario can be complemented by a cases where countries have funds planned and reserved for a potential deployment ahead (2.) and cases where the money are not reserved in advance before the deployment but a mechanism for generation of the financial resources is established (3.).

To account for the national procedures I conducted a survey using freely accessible on-line software to collect answers from the national representatives that are deployed at the permanent national delegations at the NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium and at the Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia in the United States. The survey was sent to all 28 member countries of the Alliance with a request for help and it was supported by the Permanent Delegation of the Slovak Republic to NATO in Brussels and the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic to ensure a high response rate. As already mentioned, given the response structure of the survey the analysis is based on eight NATO member countries⁵. The questionnaire contains 15 questions ordered from general questions about financial resources for humanitarian aid and military deployment in international crisis to particular questions about the NRF. It concentrates mainly on who are the actors that approve and manage the resources for military deployments in the NATO member countries and on how the resources for the military deployment are allocated in the case of the NRF.

The empirical question that will be addressed through the survey is how do the governments create budgets for short notice military deployments and is it meant to be linked through indicators taken from the literature review to the theoretical question how do the

⁵ They are in alphabetical order: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

governments bargain on the domestic level about the foreign policy issues. The answers gained through the survey are supposed to give a clear understanding of the actors involved in the decision making about the military deployments and the allocation and management of financial resources for these deployments and the action channels through which the decision making is made as the questions are able to indicate formal as well as partially informal relationships between the actors involved in the process on the national level. Understanding of the NRF budgeting through various national cases among the NATO member states will allow me to elaborate on the role of the resources in the political process and decision making. As this process of the NRF deployment is clearly a case of foreign policy making on the domestic level I will be also able to elaborate on the domestic sources of foreign policy and its potential impacts on the international relations.

3.3 Conceptualization and Variable Identification

The explanatory framework of the thesis is given by an overarching assumption derived from the theory. Firstly, it holds that every policy decision creates some distributional consequences domestically that are unevenly spread between the actors. Secondly, every involved actor is seeking to minimize the negative distributional consequences for himself and to maximize his power in the decision making process. At the end the uneven distribution creates winners and loser and therefore supporters and opponents. A state is a large organization and their decision making process is disintegrated among many institutions that are supposed to reduce the complexity of the tasks that are needed to be done. According to Hudson (2007), the working of the state organization is standardized and optimized to execute information processing, task execution and coordination of efforts. Generally standardization is done through firstly, common law creating institutions and distributing the competences

among them. Secondly these institutions are issuing their own rules of conduct and standardized operational procedures

To ascertain the value of the independent variable, or in other words, to show the bargaining game we need firstly, to identify the actors involved in the decision making about the deployment of the national military to a NRF operation and about the resources allocation. In the case of the actors the thesis will take into account only domestic actors that come from within the government. Given the nature of the data collection the actors here are not going to be individuals in positions. Rather they are going to be represented by various governmental institutions and organizations. Secondly the action channels need to be identified. They are represented by the procedures that structure and regularize a particular bargaining. In the case of the action channels the thesis will further identify whether the channels are part of a standard operational procedure or are constituted ad hoc as a reaction to a certain type of need. Thirdly it is important to identify the power structure that represents the relative influence of the actors in the bargaining. The power structure is created through the uneven distribution of the power resources through the institutional setup of a state. We can distinguish between tactical resources that are relevant in a particular bargaining game and strategic resources that are given by the ability to influence the distribution of advantages before a particular bargaining game (Freedman 1976, 446-447). Last but not least the preferences or interests should be identified. According to Allison (1971, 166) they are represented by “parochial priorities and perceptions” and are conditioned by the position of the particular actor within the government. These individualized organizational interests are aggregates of the general national, organizational and domestic interests and the will to preserve the perceived organizational essence (Allison and Halperin 1972, 54-55). According to Halperin (1974, 28) the organizational essence shapes the interests of an organization and

is given by the shared view about what should be the mission and capabilities of the organization.

The proposition that should be tested for its validity is based on the role of the preferences in the bargaining games. Allison (1969, 711) proposes that the standpoint of a given actor on a particular issue can be predicted based on the institutional nature of the actor or in other words based on his position in the bureaucracy. In Allison's words "where you stand depends on where you sit." Together with Halperin (1974, 56-58) they talk particularly about the issue of budgets. Given the individual perception of the organizational essence the actors who are going to be influenced by the distributional consequences once a policy is adopted they will create their standpoint in the bargaining base on the preference of higher to lower budgets. They will also assess the nature of the operation that they would need to carry out against the organizational essence and will prefer options that will enhance the essence to options that will go against the perception of their organizational essence. These propositions have impact on the definition of the outcome on the dependent variable, which is in the case of this thesis represented by the action of a government that is defined as a decision on the allocation of the financial resources for a short notice military deployment of the NATO Response Force. It means that the actor that will bear the major responsibility for carrying out the military operation will prefer a decision that will increase the budget of his organization to a decision that will decrease the budget. Moreover the strength of the preference of higher budget is influenced by the evaluation of the task against the overall interest of the organization. On the other hand the actor will be constrained by the structure of the process and by the distribution of the power. Conceptualization of the variables and of the proposition is not only given by the approaches to bureaucratic politics and two-level games explored in the literature review but it is also closely related to the survey questions. The questions allow

to account for the independent and dependent variables in the particular case of the short notice military deployment of the NRF⁶.

The next two chapters are going to introduce the case of short notice deployment of the NATO Response Force. Chapter four looks at it from a broad perspective of important debates that are going on inside NATO. It provides understanding of how operations, defense planning and budgeting works on the level of NATO. It is also aimed to problematize the issues that are happening on the international level and which the member states have to take into account when they bring the discussion of the short notice deployment of the stand-by NRF to the domestic level. Chapter five provides more detailed understanding of the NRF, how it was constituted and how it operates.

⁶ For the full version of the questionnaire including the choices provided for the answers look to Appendix 2.

CHAPTER 4: MILITARY OPERATION AND BUDGET CREATION IN NATO

4.1 NATO Crisis Management Operations

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, along with the events of 9/11 and subsequent “war on terror”, were the two most significant series of events of the last decades that shaped and changed the global security environment. They posed major challenge for all security actors including NATO. In 1993 Ronald Asmus and his RAND colleagues wrote “NATO must go out of area or it will go out of business” (1993, 31) reflecting on the possibility of marginalization of NATO if it will not face the true security challenges for Europe. They continued by drawing a picture of the new NATO:

the kind of NATO that could respond to Europe’s new strategic challenges would bear little resemblance to the NATO of the Cold War. It would be based on a new political bargain between the United States and Europe, a different set of political and military understanding, as well as a new relationship with East. This bargain would simultaneously expand the alliance’s strategic horizon geographically and find new ways to share responsibilities and burdens. NATO’s rationale and mission would be defined anew (Asmus 1993, 31)

I will define the new share of the responsibilities and burdens later on with a close connection to budget making, but let me first discuss the emergence of the type of missions within NATO that will be focus of this analysis of the budget making first.

Stepping outside the collective defense under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (NATO’s funding treaty) and refocusing the emphasis of the Alliance to the broader international environment where the conflict should be prevented and peace restored and preserved, brought new tasks and possibilities of enlargement for the NATO in the shape of non-Article 5 operations, outside the territory of the member states. These tasks of crisis management were labeled as the main and fundamental mission for NATO in its Strategic Concept of 1999. Crisis management here is understood as “both military and non-military

measures to respond to a crisis situation threatening national and international security. A crisis may be caused by political disputes or armed conflict, technological incidents or natural disasters. Crisis management consists of the different means of dealing with these varying forms of crisis” (NATO PDD 2006, 43). NATO distinguishes between two categories in crisis management. Operations involving collective defense when Article 5 is called upon labeled as “Article 5 operations” and operations where collective defense is not involved labeled as “non-Article 5 operations” (NATO PDD 2006, 43-45). With the transformation of the structures and capabilities of NATO to the new strategic security environment, maintaining capabilities for the “Article 5 operations” the Alliance has to ensure its preparedness even in situations that are not so much predictable.

4.1.1 NATO’s new Strategic Concept 2010

In autumn 2010, after a decade NATO adopted its new Strategic Concept at the Summit in Lisbon, Portugal to address the changes, to come up with a road map for the years to come and to renew its commitment to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO restated here its essential mission to protect the Alliance to be “unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values. As such it represents an important political statement and is the second most important document of the *acquis* of the Alliance after the Washington Treaty.

The chapter on defense includes the commitment to sustain a full range of capabilities necessary to ensure security for the Alliance members. This incorporates maintaining “the ability to sustain concurrent major operations and several smaller operations for collective defense and crisis response, including at strategic distance” which currently involves smaller operations in Mediterranean and off the Horn of Africa and KFOR mission in Kosovo together with the major ISAF mission in Afghanistan (Allied Command Operations 2011).

Further objectives in sustaining the capabilities include developing and sustaining forces for Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations and training and contingency planning “against the full range of conventional and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for all Allies.” The commitment to the capabilities then includes also a promise to sustain the funding of armed forces through appropriate defense spending as well as to continue in the reform in the most effective way so the taxpayer’s money that goes on defense will lead to the best security (NATO Strategic Concept 2010).

Even before the summit and during the drafting period of the new Strategic Concept, NATO recognized the financial crisis and subsequent world recession and committed itself to reduce spending. On several places in the text of the Concept is therefore the need for sufficient resources, no matter whether financial, human or military, accompanied by the commitment to use the resources in the most efficient and effective way. This commitment might further feed into the debates about cooperation in the development of capabilities of the individual member states which should not be according to the Strategic Concept only cost-effective but should also minimize duplications.

The political nature of the new Strategic Concept can make it a document that not only empowers the Allies to act in an updated framework but carries some risks that were recognized also in connection to the previous concepts. The risks stems from the possible differences between what has been declared and what will be done in reality. This also includes the capabilities which, at the end of the day, the member countries might find hard to provide. Not just few situations proved these doubts right. Currently the reluctance of the member states to contribute their forces to the ongoing NATO led ISAF mission in Afghanistan can be taken as an example. As the troop contribution is seen as one of the main contentions of the present day, the Secretary General Andreass Fogh Rasmussen toured around the member states to boost the supply and promote more collaboration during the austerity

measures brought by the global recession (Contiguglia 2010). The falling defense spending is seen as another negative signal of the determination of the member countries to improve their capabilities. It is not only ascribed to the financial crisis and austerity measures but also to the prevailing feeling of security among the Allies. Shortly after the adoption of the new Strategic Concept, David Wore (2010) wrote it is an implausible statement and the document as such is only confirmation of the political credibility of the Alliance and does not imply any political will to carry out the commitments adopted in the Strategic Concept.

4.1.2 NATO Defense Planning

Given the nature of NATO, with its underlying idea of collective defense, it might seem very natural and straightforward that the level of the Alliance and NATO as such would be the point of primary reference and coordination in defense planning at least for the European members. But in reality the opposite seems to be true. On one hand NATO, within its strategic concept, defines the capabilities and procedures for identifying what kind of forces are necessary for fulfilling its main goals and objectives and even procedures for national defense plans coordination. On the other hand the whole planning is dependent on the will of the member countries to follow this planning.

Defense planning in this respect encompasses a complex spectrum of tasks including force planning, armaments planning, logistic, standardization, nuclear planning, communications, civil emergency planning, air defense and resource planning. The objective is to harmonize defense planning among the member states to fulfill the needs of Alliance in the most effective way. The procedure in short is threefold. Firstly it rests on the general political guidance that is issued by defense ministers of the member states each four years with the possibility of reassessment every two years. It is based on the agreed objective needs for the “number, state and nature of operations that NATO should be able to conduct” (NATO

PDD 2006, 53) which are then reflected as general defense and force planning objectives drawn upon political, economic, technological and military factors which might possibly affect the capabilities. Based on this, planning targets for each member country are set according to the identified military requirements by NATO Strategic Commands and force goals proposed by Allied Command Operations. These planning targets are discussed by the Military Committee which assesses their military validity and technological feasibility. Subsequently it is submitted to the Defense Planning Committee which is the body that formally adopts this report as the NATO force goals. The force goals might lead to reinvestment goals proposed by individual member states with focus on force elements that are no longer needed from the perspective of NATO requirement goals and be exchanged for more needed force elements. After this stage, adoption of the agreed planning targets that are based upon the main goals, pointed out in the general guidance, and force goals, follows. The last stage of the defense planning process is the systematic review of the implementation of the targets and adjustability of changes if necessary. It is focused on improvement of coordination and harmonization across the whole exercise of the defense planning on both levels of the NATO force goals and the member states level of defense planning (NATO PDD 2006, 53-55).

Criticism in respect to the inability of the common defense planning is not only directed towards the still existing mismatch of the force either on the technical level or on the level of redundancy of different units but also to various problems of budgeting. As noted by Bayley (2007, 2-3)⁷: “Defense planning and budgeting is consequently a highly complex and challenging exercise in matching the size and the capabilities of national militaries to the resources that are, or realistically will be, made available to purchase these capabilities and to the missions that military leaders will be asked to undertake. This exercise is, by its very

⁷ In Bayley 2007, the text is not provided with page numbers but every paragraph is signed with a number. Therefore instead of page numbers, number of paragraph is indicated in the reference.

nature, complex and politically sensitive. Not only must national security challenges be reconsidered and prioritized, but resources must be allocated in such a way as to minimize security risks to the degree that this is fiscally feasible”

4.1.3 NATO’s Force Generation Cycle

Because in practice NATO as such does not possess any military forces and owns just a minor amount of very specialized military equipment⁸ contribution by individual NATO members and often also partner countries are necessary. After the “force generation” cycle where the multinational forces and equipment are put together, these forces operate under the Alliance’s chain of command with the general responsibility of the Allied Command Operations which is led by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and are usually referred to as “NATO forces”. The procedure of the force generation is initiated after a decision to conduct a mission by NAC and includes drafting of concept of operation by the military authorities of the Alliance and outline the troops and equipment requirements which is followed by Force Activation Directive and conference where the national offers are made, “In general the force generation follows a standard procedure. For a given operation or mission, a list of personnel and equipments requirements ... is produced by Allied Command Operations and sent to NATO member countries and, in some cases, partner countries.” Member countries’ decisions on the force contribution are made according to their capacity related to: prior commitments, force size, structure and activity level” and the decision on the contribution of troops and equipment is taken by the national governments of the member countries on their national level although this decision is underlined by continuous communication among the Alliance and the permanent missions (civil and military) which are reporting to the national governments (NATO 2010b).

⁸ Such as the AWACS aircraft and strategic communication equipment

4.2 NATO Budgeting

It is obvious that the defense planning dimension of NATO has to be complemented with sufficient financial investments. Overall the debate about defense spending is one of the most central since the creation of the Alliance with its contemporary underlying criticism of defense spending of European countries. The budget sources for the defense planning here are twofold. One has to keep in mind that there is a big difference between NATO's own budget and a budget allocated to defense spending on the national level in the member states. As (2007, 21) points out "national defense spending priorities, capabilities issues and the willingness to deploy and sustain forces in the field are real source of tension among allied countries."

There are at least two reasons why questions about military budget and defense spending are important not only in the light of the still growing gap between the military capabilities of the United States and European NATO members. The first issue is more structural and is constantly reoccurring from the end on the Cold War, namely that the role of NATO after the diminishment of its main enemy and competitor, the Soviet Union. In the era of financial crisis and subsequent budgetary cutbacks a rise of defense spending is almost impossible and this has a great impact on the development of the needed capabilities. If these military capabilities are going to continue to deteriorate it might have a negative impact on the relevance of NATO as a global actor (Pappalardo 2010).

The second group of issues is operations like the War in Iraq and Afghanistan which are posing high budgetary burdens of the military deployment and these costs are shared very unequally among the NATO members even in the case of NATO led operations. On the other hand this pressure already created at least partially, positive outcome when these army

deployments became the cause to speed up the long needed change and military transformation (Bayley 2007, 7). As pointed out by Sandler and Hartley (2001) all these pressures are leading to necessary prioritizing and allocation effectiveness in the defense sector so there will be a balance between the acceptable levels of security and the decreasing or static budgetary resources available for defense spending.

As already pointed out, when speaking about countries that are members of Alliance we have to distinguish between the national defense budget and the budget of the NATO as such, which is nonetheless created by the contributions of the nation states. The difference is also between what is paid by the NATO budget and through the national defense budget of the member states. Let me now give an overview of the overall situation in creating and using the NATO budget before I move on to the analysis of the defense budget on the national level.

NATO as an intergovernmental organization does not have its own source of income, so the budgetary resources necessary for its operation are coming in the form of contributions from the member states. NATO's whole financial structure is developed around four parts: the International Staff, the international military staff, the Security Investment Program and special Production and Logistic Operations. Each of these four parts is financed differently but the underlying principle of the financial regulations applied are the same: they are approved by the NAC and afterwards adapted for the special needs of the individual parts and different NATO sub-organizational units by attachment of specific rules and procedures (NATO PDD 2006, 61-62). The budgeting process is annual and adapted to run along the calendar year. NATO then has three different budgets that are directly managed by individual organizational units and "these are the only funds where NATO authorities identify the requirements and set the priorities in line with the overarching Alliance objectives and priorities" (NATO PDD 2006, 58). This includes: NATO's civil budget, NATO's military budget and budget for Security Investment Program. As already mentioned it consists of

contributions of the individual member states. Size of the contribution for every member state is given by pre-agreed “cost sharing formula broadly calculated in relation to the ability to pay” (NATO PDD 2006 57) that takes into consideration the per capita GDP and size of the national economy together with some additional factors. These three budgets cover a wide but still limited range of items including “the operational cost of the international military staff in Mons, Belgium, and various NATO commands in Europe and North America ... the costs of maintaining and deploying the NATO AWACS fleet, the NATO pipeline system and the Maintenance and Supply Agency” (Bayley 2007, 17).

Looking now at two of the three NATO operated budgets, the Civil Budget is primarily covered through the ministries of foreign affairs of the member states and is covering expenses and being implemented by NATO’s International Staff. The main formula under which is the Civil Budget constructed links the Strategic Objectives of NATO with resources that are needed for accomplishing them. The Military Budget consists primarily out of the contributions of the ministries of defense of the member states and is implemented by the individual budget holders. Generally it “covers operating and maintenance costs of the international military structure” and the “operating costs of the command structure for crisis response operation and missions undertaken by NATO.” More specifically this includes “the Military Committee, the International Military Staff, military agencies, the two strategic commands and associated command, control and information systems, research and development agencies and the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force.”(NATO PDD 2006, 59-60).

To sum up these formal descriptions of the working cycles of the NATO defense planning and budgeting in Alliance, as already mentioned, there is a critique of the rising gap between capabilities of the member states mainly when comparing the United States with European allies, but certainly we would find also some significant gaps in capabilities among

the European member states. This is not the only topic in the current burden sharing debate in the Alliance which also includes the issue of the military expenses in NATO led operations as well as the problem of the lack of the will to participate on these operations which does not have to be connected only to the budgetary issues but also for example to the unwillingness to accept casualties. In these respects, as pointed out by Bayley (2007, 21) NATO's organizational budget as such is not the biggest issue, mainly because the proportion of the expenses for the member states here are not so extensive when compared with the national defense budgets but "national defense spending priorities, capabilities issues and the unwillingness to deploy and sustain forces in the field are the real source of tension among allied countries." So even though NATO is an organization of collective defense with its own budget, many of the resources of NATO are streamed indirectly when the member states are investing in their own armies. This leaves NATO with only a small number of its permanent headquarters and standing forces and the member states with the only option to pay the expenses for their armies' deployment when they participate in NATO led operations (NATO PDD 2006, 57). Another related issue is that participation here does not necessarily have to be completely voluntary participation since for example in the case of NATO Response Forces that became operational in 2004, countries are serving on the rotation bases and if they would need to be deployed, the increased cost would be paid by the countries in the current rotation. Even though this might seem "unjust" it is fully under the principle that is employed by NATO for the cases of its missions that goes under the label of "cost lie where costs fall". So the "member government defense budgets are the primary source of financing NATO forces in the field, both for peacekeeping and higher intensity operations"⁹ (Bayley 2007, 34, 44). Furthermore as mentioned by Theis (2003, 192) after the end of the Cold War and changes in the global security environment also the nature of the burden sharing in NATO changed from

⁹ NATO pays for the operation of the command structure.

the discussing about the economic contribution to the possibilities or impossibilities in creating abilities in power projection. This was also described on the national level in Danish case by Ringsmore (2005, 17) as “a course of ‘force restructuring’” from territorial defense to “increasing emphasis on the means of force projection.” The chapter that will follow continues with the discussion of the NATO related issues in the form of introduction to the NATO Response Forces and afterwards the chapter continues with the analysis of the data collected through the survey and by the assessment of the theoretical propositions formulated in the earlier chapters.

CHAPTER 5: NATO RESPONSE FORCE

According to Mihalka (2005: 67) the initial idea that was afterwards turned to NATO Response Force came from Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler (2002) and their critique of the Defense Capabilities Initiative. The idea is based on the observation that the strength of the US military forces comes from their joint training and exercises rather than from their capabilities. The purpose to establish the NATO Response Force was announced in 2002 at the Prague Summit. The aim was to create “an advanced, primarily European force for high-intensity conflicts that would catalyze force transformation and capability acquisition in Europe, promote transatlantic force interoperability, and provide Europe with out-of-area capabilities to match its new strategic directions and reorient NATO towards out-of-area expeditionary operations (Bialos and Koehl 2005: v).

NATO declared the initial operational capability of the NRF consisting of approximately 17,000 troops in October 2004. The full operational capability was announced by the SACEUR in November 2006 at the NATO Riga Summit consisting of up to 25,000 troops, ready to carry out the full range of missions planned for the NRF. Currently on the general level the NRF consist of “a command and control element from the NATO Command Structure; the Immediate Response Force, a joint force of about 13,000 high-readiness troops provided by Allies; and a Response Forces Pool, which can supplement the Immediate Response Force when necessary.” The Immediate Response Force then includes (NATO 2010a):

- “a brigade-sized land component based on three Battle Groups and their supporting elements”;

- “a maritime component based on NATO’s Standing Naval Maritime Groups and Standing Naval Mine Counter Measures Groups”;
- “a combat air and air support component”;
- “special forces”; and
- “a CBRN defense task force” (NATO 2010a)

NRF is a multinational force that consists of individual contributions of the NATO member states. Currently the national contribution is committed for six months stand-by period, during which it can be deployed based on a consensual decision of the all member states in the NAC. This period is going to be extended to twelve months from 2012. Forces are committed to the NRF after two rounds of training, first on the national and afterwards on the multinational level, reaching up to twenty four months of pre-commitment preparation. NRF represents flexible and readily deployable force that should be able to be deployed in five days and sustain itself for up to thirty days in operation. The forces are not expected to be deployed as whole but a particular deployment is always tailored to specific requirements of the operation (NATO 2010a; HQ ARRC 2010, SHAPE 2003). Among the operations to which the NRF may be deployed are peace enforcement operations, as an initial entry force, crisis response in both Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations as well as force demonstration (Zlatohlavek 2007: 35-36).

What seems to constitute a problem for the NRF after the announcement of its initial operational capability is the number of the needed force. The first rotations were able to fulfill the target numbers of soldier but the plan was to gradually increase the number of the force up to 25,000 men, which is currently not being fulfilled. Zlatohlavek (2007, 63-64) attributes this fact to the recognition among the nations that the NRF is not only a good tool to provide their

forces with high profile training and to gain interoperability between the various elements of their military forces but there is a high probability of the engagement in real operations.

In the case of real deployment there are two major consequences. Lack of political will is the first one, where not only the commitment to provide troops for the stand-by NRF rotation is not completely reached but the real deployment needs also an additional improvement from the national governments. Change of the force generation might be a partial solution to the problem of the lack of political will to commit their forces to the NRF. Long term planning might change the focus from two years up to six years, which in Zlatohlavek's (2007, 64) opinion would provide the necessary assurance that the CJSOR of the NRF rotations will be fulfilled. The second problem area is represented by the financial issues, including inconvenient financing of the NRF and the overall underfinancing of the military budgets of the European member states of NATO. The latter issue was addressed more in depth in the previous parts of the thesis and relates also to the capability gap between the US and the European NATO members. Taking into account the unfavorable economic situation and the austerity measures undertaken by many governments in these years the rise in the military budget is not expected. So other measures need to be developed to increase capabilities without extra expenses.

The system of financing the NRF is based on the rules that apply also to other missions carried out by NATO and they are traditionally labeled "cost lie where costs fall", as already mentioned earlier. Generally, as pointed out by Homan (2005, 21), financing for military deployment covered by an international organization might come from two sources, namely through the budget of the international organization and through the direct national contribution in the form of physical or financial resources. In the case of NRF all the resources should be provided through the national contribution to the particular rotation but the costs are created mostly just by the actual deployment. If an operation is approved by the

NAC which should include the NRF, not all the resources under the current rotation will be deployed. Rather the forces will be modified according to the needs of a particular mission. This creates further inequalities in the burden sharing among the NATO members. Not only are the contributions to the NRF rotations unequal but also the costs of an operation are going to be carried out just by those countries whose contribution to the particular NRF rotation will be chosen for the deployment in the given operation. Such a case can be illustrated by Spain that had an engineer battalion in the NRF rotation when it was deployed to help with aftermaths of an earthquake in Pakistan and had to pay approximately 20 million US dollars for the operation (Zlatohlavek 2007, 65). This is recognized as an additional aspect that causes the unwillingness of the member states to commit their national resources to the NRF (Zlatohlavek 2007, 64; Homan 2005, 28). Therefore, NATO committed itself to at least pay the expenses necessary for the transportation (airlift, sealfit) to the place of the operation if it will be a short notice NRF deployment, but this commitment was not employed in the real life situation yet (Zlatohlavek 2007, 65; Homan 2005, 30).


5.1 Actors

The survey allows us to look at the issue of actors from three different positions. First, we can distinguish between the general question of providing assistance to third countries and the particular question of the national contribution to the multinational NRF. Second, we can distinguish in the realm of the general question between the humanitarian and military assistance.


The general provision of the assistance predominantly includes ministries of foreign affairs and ministries of defense as the primary actors who are responsible for managing the financial resources for the operations of humanitarian and military assistance. From the cases where allocated funds exist, only in Lithuania is the government responsible for their

management (See Graph 1). The decision making on the provision of the humanitarian assistance involves also in the majority of cases, the government, who approves this assistance but also includes two cases where the assistance needs to be proposed by government and approved by parliament, namely in Lithuania and Poland (See Graph 2). This last arrangement is also the most typical in the case of the provision of the military assistance, only in the case of Slovenia the assistance is proposed by ministry of defense and approved by government (See Graph 3).

Graph 1: Management of resources for humanitarian and military assistance¹⁰¹¹



Graph 2: Provision of humanitarian assistance (proposed/approved by)¹²




¹⁰ Based on questions 2 and 3 of the survey.

¹¹ The number after the description of a particular slice always represents number of cases for given option.

¹² Based on question 4 of the survey.


Graph 3: Provision of military assistance (proposed/approved by)¹³




If we consider the cycle of the engagement of the national contributions to the NRF we will see participation of several actors in several stages. Two different rounds of decision making are possible in the case of the NRF. First, the member states decide on their general contribution to the current stand-by rotation of the NRF. At this stage the decision is taken by the government or by the ministry of defense (See Graph 4). Second, generally another round of decision making is needed if the NRF should be deployed to a particular operation. This decision making is held on two stages: in the NAC and on the state level. The national position presented at the NAC is usually a joint statement of the government prepared within the expert lead of the ministry of foreign affairs. The decision on the state level involves either government or parliament, in the case of Poland, the decision is taken by the president (See Graph 5). More over decision making and management of the financial resource for the NRF deployment usually involves governments and ministries of defense (See Graph 6).

¹³ Based on question 5 of the survey.


Graph 4: Decision to include military contribution to the stand-by NRF rotation¹⁴



Graph 5: Decision on the deployment of the national NRF contribution¹⁵



Graph 6: Management of the allocated resources for the NRF contribution¹⁶



¹⁴ Based on question 6 of the survey.

¹⁵ Based on questions 6, 8 and 9 of the survey.


¹⁶ Based on questions 10 and 11 of the survey.

In addition to the actors that were already mentioned, if we are trying to establish preference in the support or opposition towards military deployments, parliament as an actor brakes up to the coalition and opposition and sometimes the media and public are voicing their opinions.

5.2 Action Channels

The action channels are represented by different sets of procedures that accompany different stages of the decision making process and bargaining about the provision of military assistance and the contribution to the NRF. Already the existence of allocated funds for humanitarian and military assistance in general state budget or in the budgets of respective ministries (See Graph 7) create a precondition for the action channels. On one hand they speak about somewhat more general culture that influences the opinions of the actors in the bargaining and they can be used as a strategic power resource in setting up the stage for the decision making process. It also relates to the international level and the standardized operational procedures that are used in NATO for budgeting and force generation cycle. So in the case of the NRF deployment, national government had already made several pre-comitments that influence the final decision on the deployment as well as the one on the allocation of the financial resource.

Graph 7: Allocation of funds for humanitarian or military assistance in state budget¹⁷



The survey results show that even though the allocated funds for humanitarian assistance are predominantly managed by ministry of foreign affairs the action channel includes also the need for approval for such assistance mostly by government and in few cases by parliament (See Graph 2). In this respect the most complex procedure is employed in Poland where funds are managed by ministry of foreign affairs but their use is proposed by government and approved by parliament. In Lithuania governmental proposal and approval for the humanitarian assistance is needed but the funds are also managed by the government. The situation for military assistance is different (See Graph 3). Funds are predominantly managed by the ministry of defense but the process rather follows the Polish case in humanitarian assistance. Except in the case of Slovenia, where it is proposed by ministry of defense and approved by government, the military assistance needs to be proposed by government and approved by parliament.

Given the nature of the NRF, the procedures are even more complex what further expands the action channels. In addition to the international obligation for the member countries to contribute to the NRF stand-by rotation that was created when the members agreed to the creation of the NRF and to a obligation that is created in a particular case when the member countries approve deployment of the NRF to an operation there are several

¹⁷ Based on question 2 of the survey.


national procedures that constitute parts of the action channels. Firstly, an additional decision needs to be taken to include national units to the stand-by NRF rotation. This is usually decided by government or by the ministry of defense (See Graph 4). Secondly, an additional decision is needed for a deployment of the NRF to an operation. In this case a decision by parliament or government is needed, in the case of Poland this approval is given by the ministry of defense in cooperation with president (See Graph 5). In the case of Estonia and Lithuania, decision is not needed, because they ask for a blank mandate from parliament before the contribution to the stand-by NRF rotation is granted.

The action channels for the allocation of the financial resources are highly influenced by the procedure employed in a given country. As already mentioned, the financial resources for the deployment of the NRF to an operation can be either allocated in advance, or a mechanism exists for the allocation when the resources are needed or there are neither resources allocated in advance nor a mechanism for their generation. In 75 percent of the cases the resources are allocated in advance and are managed by the government or ministry of defense. On the other hand, in the cases where there are no financial resources allocated and the deployment is needed the resources are taken from the general budgets of the ministries of defense.

When it comes to the question if the action channels are standardized in the form of operational procedures in more than 70 percent of cases the procedures are partially regularized by law, in one case it is completely regularized by law and in one case it is not formalized in any way (See Graph 8). So generally, we can observe three types of action channels. One is linked to the process of creation of the national contribution to the stand-by NRF rotations. The second one is represented by the process that is needed when the national contribution to the NRF should be deployed to an operation and the last one is an intermediary process that connects the two previous processes, namely the process that takes

place in the NAC when it decides about the NATO and NRF engagement in a particular operation. The focus here is on the first two that are solely taking place on the domestic level and the allocation of the financial resources might be part of either of them.

Graph 8: Standardized operational procedures for military deployments¹⁸



5.3 Power Structure

The power structure or the power relations are largely determined by the action channel, and by the nature of the political institutions or actors involved in the process. This means that nature of the political regime and institutional composition pre-distribute the power among the actors and in the most cases the actors are not powerful enough to intervene. So most of the actors identified dispose only with tactical power resources. All the cases under analysis are parliamentary systems, where most of the executive power is held by the government and the ministries are bureaucratic organizations constructed for carrying out the tasks given to them by the government. Therefore it is natural that the only actors on the domestic level that dispose with strategic power resources are government and parliament, in some cases it might be shared also by the president who has the ability to influence the

¹⁸ Based on question 13 of the survey.

institutional setup and laws in a given state. But the results of the survey show only minimal positive results in this respect. Except for Poland and Lithuania where presidents take part on the decision making in some respect, presidents do not play any role in the decision making on the NRF contribution and allocation of financial resources for these contributions.

On the general level once the decision about allocation of financial resources is done, the managerial function over these resources is carried out by the ministries (See Graph 1). Overall it holds true more for the humanitarian assistance than military assistance and it applies also to the case of NRF contributions and deployment. But from the perspective of the power structure and power relations among the actors the management functions could be seen secondary to the ability to decide on the allocation of the resources and the deployment. In this respect the power is more concentrated in the hands of government and parliament, so that in addition to their strategic power resources they possess also significant amount of the tactical power resources. If we look at the case of sending military to an operation outside the borders of a state generally, in such a situation the deployment is predominantly proposed by government and approved by parliament (See Graph 3). In the case of the particular deployment of the national contribution to the NRF some differences can be seen. In half of the cases it is enough if the decision to include military contribution to the stand-by NRF rotation is taken by the ministry of defense (See Graph 4). But when it comes to a deployment of the NRF to an operation an agreement of the government or parliament is needed, just in the case of Poland the decision is taken by the agreement of the ministry of defense and the president (See Graph 5). The difference between these two instances might be result of processes on two different levels. On one hand the national contribution to the stand-by rotations are discussed also extensively on the level of NATO which employs the force generation cycle also for the NRF. On the other hand, if the NAC is deciding about the deployment of the NRF to operation the national position presented is created by government

or ministry of foreign affairs and in most of the cases the approval for the deployment of the national contribution as a part of the NRF to operation is decided on the national level as any other provision on the military deployment for operation that is going to be held outside the national boundaries. Here the authority for the decision goes back to the government and parliament.

If we look on the national management of the budgets for the NRF contributions we can see it differs from the pattern in the case of the general provision of military assistance and in half of the cases when there are pre-allocated resources for the NRF deployment, they are not managed only by the ministries of defense but also by the governments (See Graph 6). Moreover if the resources are not allocated in advance in several cases they come from the annual budget of the ministry of defense. This can be an indication of a further limitation of the power of the ministry of defense which needs to reallocate its own resource based on decision of other actors.

5.4 Preferences/Interests

General interest or preference for the allocation of necessary resources at the state level is already shown by the very existence of resources allocated in annual budgets for the humanitarian and military assistance. In most of the cases this is true and states allocate some resources for the international crisis and humanitarian assistance mainly under specific ministries. This can indicate existence of awareness about the need for the contribution if one wants to be a valid member of the international community and at least minimal agreement through the spectrum of all involved actors.

In half of the cases a positive preference and in no case a negative preference towards the support of the military contribution is expressed by the ministry of defense. Among the


other actors that support the military contributions are ministries of foreign affairs in two cases and in single case president and government is mentioned. Two questionnaires reported that this issue is very dependent on the nature of the contribution and in Estonia the process is set so, that they reach a wide political support and agreement before the decision about the contribution is made by the responsible actors. Among the actors that are traditionally against the military contributions are predominantly the opposition parties and parliament as such together with the ministry of finance which are usually concerned with increased spending. Two questionnaires also reported a role of information in the creation of the preferences among the actors, mainly in a negative way, where insufficient or incorrect information was connected with opposing stands towards military contributions and deployments. The issue of the preferences will be expanded in relation to the particular cases in the subsection on the individual country paths.

5.5 Outcome

Results of the survey on question 10 that asks about the allocation of the resources simultaneously with the national contribution to the stand-by NRF rotation indicate the results on the outcome. They show that there are five out of the eight countries with pre-allocated resources. Only Slovakia and Slovenia do not allocate these resources in advance, together with the contribution to the stand-by rotation and only in the case of Estonia a mechanism for generating the financial resources once they will be needed for an operational deployment is used (See Graph 9). In several cases this allocation is planned to be a part of the government's budgetary reserve and in other cases, the resources are planned as a part of the budget of the ministry of defense. The management of these financial resources is also divided between the cases where they are managed by governments and cases where they are managed by the

ministries of defense (See Graph 6). Last but not least, in the case of Slovenia where no resources are allocated and no mechanism for their generation exists, the resources are presupposed to come from the budget of the ministry of defense.

Graph 9: Allocation of resources for the NRF contributions¹⁹



Except for several rounds of decisions which are taken by the national representatives at the level of NATO, predominantly in the NAC, the process of the military contribution to the NRF and allocation of the resources for the deployment of the contribution consists of several major decisions on the domestic level for which support needs to be generated and which has potential distributional consequences. The opinions expressed by the national representatives in NAC, when a decision on the deployment of the NRF is debated, are predominantly influenced by governments and ministries of foreign affairs. The first decision is represented by the agreement to include the military contribution to the stand-by rotation of the NRF. Here the decision making power in different cases is given to two actors, the government or ministry of defense. Another decision is taken if a separate agreement on the deployment of the contribution to a mission is needed. In one case such a decision is not needed, in two cases there is a pre-agreement on this issue in a form of blank mandate and in

¹⁹ Based on question 10 of the survey.

the remaining five cases a separate decision is needed to be taken by either government or parliament. The last decision, in which this thesis is interested in, is the one on the allocation of the resources as it was discussed at the beginning of this section.

From the outcome perspective it is also important to note that the survey indicates a predominant role of the government in the bargaining process in most of the cases. In all the cases it possesses both the strategic and tactical power resources and the process of the NRF contribution, deployment and the allocation of the financial resources for it are in some way or another regulated by the government. To account for the prediction on the outcome we should look at the spread of the competences and the individual preference more closely. In the cases of Romania and Lithuania, where the outcome was pre-allocation of the potentially needed financial resources together with contribution to the stand-by NRF rotation we can see that these resources are managed by the ministry of defense and their allocation was done within the budget of the ministry of defense. In these same two cases ministry of defense shares even bigger proportion of the responsible decision when they also decide on the contribution to the stand-by NRF rotation itself. No other pattern is straightforwardly conclusive on validity of the tested proposition. To decide more precisely on this issue the thesis will now look closer to the paths of the individual countries. It should be noted that what had been presented by now where trends from aggregated data and that the individual paths differ one from another. Therefore what follows, represents a different look at the data as in the previous part; the analysis separated data according to categories; here they are going to be integrated on this level and separated according to cases.

5.5.1 Individual Paths

Different way how to look at the results of the survey than at the aggregated data is to follow individual paths of the countries from the survey. With the focus on the outcome I will

now discuss firstly the cases that have financial resources allocated in advance followed by the case with mechanism for future allocation and as last the cases that do not have the financial resources planed ahead.

In the case of Hungary, we can see a strong position of the government in the whole process. The contributions to the stand-by NRF rotations are planned 3-4 years ahead together with envisaging the financial resources in the government's reserve which are also managed by the government. Generally provisions for military assistance are in Hungary proposed by government and approved by parliament. Government also decides about the national offers to the stand-by NRF rotations and approves the potential operational deployment. This shows that the action channels in Hungary are controlled by government leaving almost no space for the ministry of defense. As the survey mentions the general opposition against military contribution to military deployments and contributions comes from parliament and actors who oppose foreign military involvement. What cannot be observed based on the survey and is important for a conclusive statement on the relationship between the variables is the position of the ministry of defense who would be responsible for carrying out the contributions and operations as the governmental body who controls the Hungarian Defense Forces. On the other hand, we can expect, that the accumulation of the power by the government in this case leads also to the accumulation of the responsibility for it on the shoulders of the government and the contributions and potential operations are not going against the organizational essence of the ministry of defense, except the fact that the resources are managed by the government. But the distributional consequences are minimized by the pre-allocation of the financial resources from the government's resources.

Competences are more evenly spread in Czech Republic, but still with the leading role of the government. Ministry of defense traditionally supports military assistance contributions and it is also their responsibility to decide on the nature of the Czech contribution to the NRF.

On the other hand when it comes to the deployment it needs to be approved by the government and the resources that are allocated for the deployment in advance, are also managed by the government. Relationship between these two main actors can be described as relatively stable. Ministry of defense controls what kind of forces they are provided to the stand-by rotation of the NRF and consequently also what kind of forces might be deployed. Also, even though the resources are managed by the government, the ministry of defense can be sure that it is not going to affect their own organizational budget in a negative way as the resources are allocated in advance. On the other hand, in the case of Czech Republic the survey does not specify where the pre-allocated resources are coming from, which might have effect on the relationship.

Similar paths with higher level of responsibility and competences for the ministries of defense are shared by Lithuania and Romania, as already mentioned. In both of the cases there are resources for an operational deployment of their NRF contributions allocated in advance and these resources are managed by the ministries of defense as a part of the organizational budget. Ministries of defense also decide on the actual contributions to the stand-by rotation of the NRF. Just the actual deployment is under authority of other actors. In both cases a general military assistance needs to be proposed by government and approved by parliament but in the case of the operational deployment of the national NRF contribution only an approval of the parliament is needed. In the case of Lithuania this approval is even obtained in advance. During the preparation for the stand-by contribution a blank mandate is asked from the parliament for the deployment of these national forces if need for a short notice deployment occurs.

The case of Poland brings yet another actor in addition to those that were already mentioned with other countries. In Poland the president has traditionally superior role over the military and he is the prime actor in the decision making in this respect. The general

provisions for military assistance are in Poland proposed by government and approved by parliament and the decision for inclusion of the national contribution to the NRF is taken by the government. But the decision on the deployment of the national contribution in the NRF is taken by the president in cooperation with the ministry of defense and the deployments are usually much welcomed and supported by the president. On the other hand, in respect of the resources he has in most of the cases, only informal role and is not able to formally affect the issue of resources allocation. Resources for the deployment are allocated in advance and managed by the ministry of defense. We can see the relationship between government and ministry of defense as quite stable as in the case of Czech Republic. More general, we can even say political decisions are taken by the government and the managerial functions are carried out by the ministry. Pre-allocated budgets minimize severe distributional consequences. Only thing that stands out is the way how decision on the deployment of the national NRF contribution is made. The results for Poland as well as for Slovenia show importance of the distribution of the information in the creation of the individual preferences of the actors. In the case of Poland this is indicated as the main reason why in some instances there is an opposition to a deployment from public and part of the parliament members.

No funds allocated in advance but a mechanism for their generation in the case of the necessity of a short notice deployment is established in Estonia. Generally, in Estonia there are no pre-allocated resources for any kind of humanitarian or military assistance and provision of such assistance is proposed by ministry of foreign affairs or ministry of defense and approved by government. In the process of the preparation of the national contribution to the NRF in Estonia a wide political support across variety of actors is sought before the final decision is taken. As in the case of Lithuania a blank mandate for a short notice operational deployment of the national contribution in the NRF is asked from the parliament. The decision to include the contribution to the stand-by rotations of the NRF is taken by the

ministry of defense and the mechanism for allocation of the resources that are needed once the contribution is deployed plans to draw the money from the governmental reserve. Government then also manages these funds. Blank mandate together with a wide political support for the national contribution to the NRF might represent solutions for some of the general problems with the NRF mentioned earlier in this chapter and also influence the convergence of the preferences of actors towards a common goal, minimizing negative reactions towards the distributional consequences.

The two countries that do not have the financial resources allocated in advance and neither have a mechanism for their generation once the resources are really needed due to a deployment, are Slovakia and Slovenia. In Slovenia, the process is principally regulated by the government. Together with the ministry of foreign affairs and ministry of defense, they also represent actors that are traditionally for the operations of military assistance, even though the governmental positive attitude depends also on its actual composition. Generally propositions for military assistance are proposed by the ministry of defense and approved by the government but in the case of the contribution to the stand-by rotation, the decision is taken by the government as well as the decision about the deployment of that contribution. As there are no resources allocated for the potential deployment and the operation would be carried out by the ministry of defense and the armed forces. But the decision making authority is on the side of government, it creates considerably unequal position between the actors. Ministry of defense and the armed forces would be externally obligated to carry out an operation which they have no power to decide about and also the presumption is that the money that would be necessary to invest would come from the budget of the ministry of defense. Without plans for these expenses it might create problems for the resource management of the whole organization and in the view of ministry of defense it will create very unfavorable distributional consequences.

The case of Slovakia is even more problematic because there is no standardized operational procedure for the cases when a short notice deployment to an international crisis is needed. The decision on the national contribution to the stand-by rotation of the NRF as well as the decision on the deployment of this contribution is taken by the government that creates the same situation and unequal relation between government and ministry of defense as in Slovenia. Interestingly the survey results show that in both of these cases among the actors who traditionally support military deployments to international crisis operations are also the ministries of defense. There were no real opportunities to observe the behavior of the actors as there was no large scale operational deployment of the national contribution to the NRF in these countries. But if such situations will occur and no further and stronger opposition from the ministries will be observed the explanation could be then seen not in the relation to the budgetary expenses, where ministries of defense are clear underdogs, but in relation to the organizational essence, where the ministries see the contributions as helping to strengthen the organizational essence. In this case additional information would be needed to prove this statement or disapprove both of the options for explanation. Summary of the analysis presented in this chapter will follow in the conclusion.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

The overarching goal of this thesis is to account for influences of domestic politics on foreign policy decision making and foreign policy issues in general. To reach this goal two sub-issues were discussed, namely the empirical question of how do the governments create budgets for short notice military deployments and a question of how well can the propositions formulated on the basis of the two-level games and bureaucratic politics model predict the behavior of the domestic actors in their decision making in the question of the financial resources allocation for the national contribution and deployment of the NATO Response Force.

Categories of actors, action channels, power structure, preferences and outcomes were identified in the literature review and further specified in the research design chapter to structure the analysis and make it possible to test the proposition, put in simple words, “where you stand, depends on where you sit” (Allison 1969, 711) appropriated for more particular proposition made specifically for issue of budgeting. This proposition applies to the specific issue of resource allocation for a new task in two respects. Organizations obligated to carry out that task would prefer higher to lower budgets and would also estimate the preference to the adoption of this task in relation to its own understanding of their organizational essence.

To fill the identified categories with data, a survey was developed and distributed among all the NATO members. Based on the structure of the response, the group of 8 Central and Eastern European countries was selected for the analysis. The results on the outcome category showed that the resources needed for a short notice deployment of the NRF are allocated in three ways as expected. Five countries allocate the resources in advance, together with the initial creation of the national contribution, one country has a mechanism for allocating the resources that is initiated when the resources are needed and in two cases, there

are no resources allocated or mechanism for their allocation established. Both, the analysis of the data through its aggregation along the categories and of the individual country paths show rather a variation of different possibilities how the combination of the categories of the independent variable could reach a particular outcome on the dependent variable, than one or few conclusive patterns. Cases closest to the verification of the proposition established in the research design chapter are Lithuania and Romania.

The results of the analysis could be further improved through additional research to reach more conclusive statements on the issue. This can be done in several ways. Deeper analysis on the level of individual countries can be performed on the current sample through detailed analysis of decision making environment with particular stress on the establishment of the preferences of the actors. Or the current sample can be expanded through additional data collection to include either the missing post-socialist Central and Eastern European NATO members or all the NATO members and same analysis could be performed again, to see if more stable patterns would not occur.

Another limitation, along with the insufficient data, is the state in which the NRF can be currently observed. Reaching the full operational capability just in 2006, there were not enough cases where the actual decision making process could be tested and experienced by the countries. This can have an effect on the answers that were provided through the survey and on the rather wide variation of the actual processes through which the outcome was reached. It can be expected that more real life experience with the contribution and mainly with the deployment of the NRF would bring the different individual processes of the countries closer together and more conclusive pattern in the procedures will be formed.

Nevertheless the thesis presents a comprehensive look on the issue of the budget making of the national contributions to the NRF in the case of the Central and Eastern European countries and suggests the role of the resources in the political process and in the

foreign policy decision making. But it is again a case for further research to establish more stable statements on the domestic sources of the foreign policy and their relation to the international sources. In the case of the NRF, it can be the case, that the inability of NATO to meet the troop numbers is related to the insufficient resources on the domestic level. On the other hand, the individual country paths shown, that some countries are more prepared for a short notice deployment, than the others, which can be source of inspiration for improvement not only on the domestic level, but also on the level of NATO to make the rotation system and the system for deployment more stable. In this respect, the case of Estonia, with the wide political support, blank mandate for the deployment and mechanism for allocation of the necessary resources can be the most instructive.

APPENDIX 1: DEFENSE BUDGETS OF NATO MEMBER COUNTRIES, 1990-2010

Year	1990		1995		2000		2005		2010	
Country	%GDP, AVR 1990-1994	DEFENCE EXPENDITURES	%GDP, AVG 1995-1999	DEFENCE EXPENDITURES	%GDP, AVG 2000-2004	DEFENCE EXPENDITURES	%GDP, AVG 2005-2009	DEFENCE EXPENDITURES	%GDP	DEFENCE EXPENDITURES
Albania	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	2.0	242
Belgium	1.9	4644	1.5	4449	1.3	3191	1.2	4229	1.1	5238
Bulgaria	//	//	//	//	//	//	2.2	667	1.7	832
Canada	1.8	11547	1.3	9077	1.2	8292	1.3	13204	1.5	23736
Croatia	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	1.5	923
Czech Republic	//	//	//	//	2.0	1148	1.6	2211	1.4	2672
Denmark	1.9	2650	1.7	3118	1.5	2393	1.4	3468	1.4	4486
Estonia	//	//	//	//	//	//	1.6	204	1.8	333
France	3.3	42589	2.9	47768	2.5	33815	2.3	52909	2.0	52017
Germany	2.1	42319	1.6	41160	1.4	28150	1.3	38054	1.4	45116
Greece	3.9	3863	4.1	5056	3.2	5522	2.8	6752	2.9	8860
Hungary	//	//	//	//	1.6	804	1.3	1596	1.1	1355
Italy	2.0	23376	1.9	19375	2.0	22411	1.6	33527	1.4	28189
Latvia	//	//	//	//	//	//	1.4	204	1.0	242
Lithuania	//	//	//	//	//	//	1.1	305	0.9	329
Luxembourg	0.7	97	0.7	142	0.7	128	0.5	244	0.5	267
Netherlands	2.3	7421	1.8	8012	1.5	5972	1.5	9567	1.4	11357
Norway	2.8	3395	2.2	3508	1.9	2922	1.5	4885	1.5	6393
Poland	//	//	//	//	1.8	3087	1.8	5536	1.9	8836
Portugal	2.3	1875	2.1	2670	1.7	2204	1.5	3143	1.6	3682
Romania	//	//	//	//	//	//	1.6	1976	1.3	2140
Slovak Republic	//	//	//	//	//	//	1.6	823	1.3	1098
Slovenia	//	//	//	//	//	//	1.5	514	1.6	772
Spain	1.6	9053	1.3	8651	1.2	7001	1.2	13054	1.1	15335
Turkey	2.8	5315	3.2	6606	3.2	9994	2.0	10301	1.9	14197
United Kingdom	3.7	39590	2.7	33836	2.3	35608	2.5	55894	2.7	60438
United States	4.6	306170	3.3	278856	3.4	301697	4.5	503353	5.4	785831

Table 1.: Defense Budgets of NATO Member Countries

%GDP: Defense expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic products based on current prices

DEFENCE EXPENDITURES: Defense expenditures of NATO countries in current prices and exchange rates (million US dollars)

Source: adapted from NATO Public Diplomacy Division. 2011. Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defense, for methodology and further notes please see http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110309_PR_CP_2011_027.pdf.

APPENDIX 2: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Please write name of your country and your e-mail contact.
2. Are there allocated funds in your state budget for humanitarian aid to other countries or for potential military deployment to deal with new international crises?
 - a. Yes
 - b. Not
 - c. Other
3. If so, which department manages the funds?
 - a. Government
 - b. MFA
 - c. MFA for humanitarian aid, MoD for military operations
 - d. Other
4. Who proposes and who approves the provision of humanitarian assistance to other countries?
 - a. Proposed by Government, approved by Parliament
 - b. Proposed by MFA, approved by Government
 - c. Proposed MoD, approved by Government
 - d. Other
5. Who proposes and who approves the provision of military assistance to deal with international crises?
 - a. Proposed by Government, approved by Parliament
 - b. Proposed by MFA, approved by Government
 - c. Proposed MoD, approved by Government
 - d. Other
6. At which level the decision to include military contribution to the "stand-by" NRF rotation is taken?
 - a. Government
 - b. MoD
 - c. CHOD
 - d. Other
7. Who has the strongest voice in the creation of the national position that is presented at NAC when it is taking decision about engaging NATO in an operation that will include deployment of NRF?
 - a. Prime Minister
 - b. Government
 - c. MoD

- d. MFA
- e. Other

8. If the NAC decided to use the NRF to address the international crisis is in your country a national agreement needed for the deployment of your contribution under the NRF?

- a. Yes
- b. Not
- c. Other

9. If the national agreement for your country's contributions to NRF be deployed after decision of NAC is necessary, on which level the decisions are taken on the deployment?

- a. Parliament
- b. Government
- c. MoD
- d. CHOD
- e. Other

10. In case of contribution of your armed forces to "stand-by" NRF rotation is there simultaneously allocated resources for their potential use?

- a. Yes
- b. Not
- c. Other

11. If in case of contribution of your armed forces to "stand-by" NRF rotation are simultaneously allocated resources for their potential use, who manages them (in which budget are included)?

- a. Government
- b. MFA
- c. MoD
- d. Other

12. If in case of contribution of your armed forces to "stand-by" NRF rotation are not simultaneously allocated resources for their potential use, how these resources are generated?

- a. from Government reserves
- b. from budget MOD
- c. from budgets of individual departments providing their free resources
- d. Other

13. Is there in your country a standardized operational procedure that deals with all the necessary steps for the military deployment to deal with international crises?

- a. Yes, it is regularized by law

- b. Yes, it is partially regularized by law
- c. Yes, it is formalized by internal guidelines
- d. No
- e. Other

14. Who are the national actors that are traditionally more prone to support military contributions and what are their typical arguments?

- a. Parliament
- b. MFA
- c. MoD
- d. MF
- e. Government
- f. President

15. Who are the national actors that are traditionally more against military contributions and what are their typical arguments?

- a. Parliament
- b. MFA
- c. MoD
- d. MF
- e. Government
- f. President

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