

POLITICAL ISLAM IN SUDAN AND SOMALIA: EXPLANATION OF VARIATIONS IN ‘STATENESS’

MA Thesis

By

Ephrem Dawit

Submitted to

**Central European University
Department of Political Science**

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts

Supervisor: **Professor Anton Pelinka**

Second Reader: **Professor Emel Ackali**

Budapest, Hungary

(2011)

ABSTRACT

Pursuing Political Islam in Sudan and Somalia takes the simultaneity approach that shows both a “top down form of Islamisation (Tibi 2009, p.155) and “bottom up policy” for building the state (Baran 2008, pp.55-69). The present thesis provides an explanation on how Islamism revives as a social and political movement especially in the 1990s and gives birth to variants of Islamist groups in both countries. The findings of the research demonstrate the failure of Islamism as a state building project in countries under study. It explains a ‘top down form of Islamisation’ as one of the reasons for the recent partition of North and South Sudan. It also examines how a ‘bottom up policy’ by the militant Islamists in Somalia contributes to the deadliest forms of conflict and lawlessness. The relationship between Islamism and the aspects of state building processes are explained with the application of the concept of the ‘stateness’ of the countries.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the support of a number of people. I would like to thank Professors Anton Pelinka and Emel Ackali for the invaluable comments and guidance, provided throughout the writing of the thesis. My appreciation goes to the Center for Academic Writing, especially Eszter Timar, for finding valuable time to comment on the thesis. I also express my gratitude to my friend Dante Mena for proofreading. I owe a great deal to the Central European University and Department of Political Science that provided me with the scholarship and numerous assistances for completing the Masters Degree. Finally, I want to thank my family for their endless support throughout the whole duration of my study.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	1
RESEARCH QUESTION AND LIMITATIONS	3
METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS.....	6
CHAPTER 1: POLITICAL ISLAM, STATE, AND ‘STATENESS’	10
ISLAMISM AND ITS VARIETIES	10
POLITICAL QUIETISM	12
NEW ISLAMISM: THE CONCEPTS OF ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY	14
ISLAMIC EXTREMISM	20
THE ASPECTS OF STATE, ‘STATENESS’ AND ISLAMISM	25
CHAPTER 2: VARIANTS OF ISLAMISM IN SUDAN AND SOMALIA	30
THE SIMULTANEITY APPROACH.....	30
A POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES’ AND ISLAMISM	32
THE COLLAPSE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE	32
THE FACTOR OF VAST NUMBER OF MUSLIM MAJORITIES	34
THE MUSLIM BROTHERS EXPERIENCE	35
FRAMING ‘JIHAD’	38
CHAPTER 3: POLITICAL ISLAM AND STATE BUILDING PROCESSES	40
SECULARIZATION VS. ISLAMISM	40
HASSAN AL TURABI’S INFLUENCE	41
POLITICAL ISLAM IN SOMALIA	43
MILITANT EXTREMISM	45
CHAPTER 4: CONFLICTS, LAWLESSNESS AND ISLAMISM	47
ANALYSIS OF STATENESS IN SUDAN	47
THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT IN SUDAN	47
THE 1989 MILITARY COUP	49
THE COMPREHENSIVE DA’WA.....	51
JIHAD IN THE NUBA MOUNTAINS	52
THE SPLIT BETWEEN HSSAN AL TURABI AND OMER AL BASHIR.....	54
WAHHABISM AND MILITANT ISLAMISM IN SOMALIA	55
THE ISLAMIC COURT AND PEACE AGREEMENT EXPERIENCES	57
CONCLUSION	61
BIBLIOGRAPHY	65

INTRODUCTION

Sudan achieved its independence in January 1, 1956 from the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899-1955). During this period the “rival political parties” of the countries started to disagree on the way forward in building the state, especially “on the form and content of a permanent constitution.” The historical tie with the former colony, Egypt, left a strong Islamic (as well as cultural) legacy that continued to exist up to the present day. The history of this vast nation shows how Islam moved into two different “waves.” The first wave resulted in the accommodation of “local custom (*‘urf*) within local schools of Islamic law and practice” and the second is “associated with promoting specific social mores alongside legal orthodoxy and Arabic” cultures. These early waves of Islamism that brought Islamic laws and customs to Sudan are characterized as “non-violent” referring to its coexistence with other religions (de Waal 2004, p.64).

After independence in 1960, the Somali Republic (1960–1991), “constituted the former Italian colonies of South-central Somalia and Puntland and the former British Protectorate of Somaliland” (World Bank 2005, p.6). The Somaliland is united with the Somali Republic on July 1, 1960 but its territory was handed over to a United Nation’s mandated Italian Trusteeship (Ministry of National Planning & Development of Somaliland 2010, p.3). After the collapse of the regime of the Somali Republic in 1991, Somaliland unilaterally declared its independence, though it couldn’t receive recognition of legitimacy from a vast number of countries and the U.N.

In spite of repeated peace conferences and mediation efforts Somalia couldn’t achieve a functioning government since 1991. South-central Somalia occupies Mogadishu, where in the

north Somaliland and Puntland are “governed by their own constitution.” The two self-declared and autonomous provinces, established Islam as “the official religion of their regions... and set penalties for conversion from Islam” (US Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2010, p.293).

Based on the theories and practices of the schools of Political Islam, this study explored the processes of state building in Sudan and Somalia. It examined the empirical evidences that indicate the relationship between the two phenomena and the wider implications that it brought to ‘statness’ of the countries. The study, while discussing Political Islam and state building in Somalia, focuses on the South-central part of the country where Islamism as a movement has become a factor for the country’s contentious politics and lawlessness.

Since independence, the elites of both Sudan and Somalia have implemented variants of different political projects to build and reconstruct the states. Pressured by domestic, regional, and international situations the elites now find themselves in a dilemma between pursuing the policy of establishing an Islamic state and adapting to secularization, such as a federal and unitary government system.

A lack of better understanding of the theories and practices of the schools of Political Islam in Sudan and Somalia is the gap that this study identified as a major problem. Through a comparative study this thesis aims to fill the gap. Had Islamism in both countries been well researched the problem of state building processes could have identified and some solutions proposed. Thus this thesis strives to make a substantive contribution to the ongoing debate on the feasibility of Political Islam as a state building project.

More importantly, this thesis aims to further knowledge on the discussion of state failures. Each year, the institution called Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy (a global magazine)

put together the Failed State Index through “using a battery of indicators to determine how stable or unstable a country is.” The indices of Failed States are numerical. These indices identify state failures based on a certain points that states score. Nonetheless, the indices did not help the reader to understand; why and how the states became categorized as failed. According to Foreign Policy’s 2010 report, Somalia scored a total of “114. 3” points and was considered to be the number one failed state in the world. On the other hand, Sudan registered “111.8” point and became the third country after Somalia and Chad. But ‘Why is it so?’ These measurements and accompanying indicators, whose scores are summed up, do not identify the different factors that contributed to state failure. To illuminate the important concepts beyond the numerical categorization of states, the present thesis singles out Political Islam and explains what it does to the failure states in Sudan and Somalia.

Research Question and Limitations

The processes of state building in Sudan and Somalia are mostly shaped by the economic, social, political, cultural, and religious legacies that were inherited from former colonies. During the decolonization movement most African countries faced the problem of choice between the “liberal-nationalist (some might prefer ‘bourgeois’)” and the “neo-colonialist” approaches. In the period of “evolution to self-government”, Islamism as a strategy for decolonization and hence for building states, was not an appealing choice compared to nationalism (Flint, 1983, p.389). Besides nationalism the former colonies were accused for their attempt to adopt neo-colonialism. The emergence of “transnational networks”, including “multinational companies, aid agencies, and international organizations led to the rise of economic as opposed to political nationalism.”

The multinational organizations and their agencies are still held in suspicion by many Africans and are often accused of continued indirect colonialism and of serving the interests of former colonial powers (M. Shaw 1982, p.241).

After the independence of Sudan and Somalia, policies regarding the process of decolonization were inspired and dominated by former colonies. Due to this fact, the nationalist and other resistance movements opposed western backed proposals (Flint, 1983, p.390). After the spread of decolonization which took place in Africa, however, “religion obviously played a double role in post-colonial state building in the Muslim world” and also in the non-Muslim countries (Jung, 2007, p.29). Considering these factors, the present thesis analyzed the trend in the interaction between Islamism and state building processes in Sudan and Somalia. The major focus is how the interaction affected the various dimensions of the state, specifically termed as the country’s degree of ‘stateness.’

To define the term ‘stateness’ is as problematic as to define the concept of state. Various scholars have given different definitions, making the achievement of a standard and universal definition a difficult task. Nettl (1968, p. 579) initially pointed out ‘stateness’ as “the saliency of the state” in analyzing society’s politics. However, Evans (1997, pp.62-87) enhanced the concept based on Nettl’s conception and defined ‘stateness’ as “the institutional centrality of the state – varied in important ways among nations.” According to this concept, analysis on the ‘institutional centrality of the state’ reflects a higher or lower degree of ‘stateness’ that may vary from one society to another. These variations can be studied across countries vis-à-vis any given factor that might have effect on the state and the function of its institutions. This thesis, however, analyzed Islamism as one of the factors that affects the capacity of a state and hence it is a function to the variations of the degree of ‘stateness.’ Different factors that contribute for the

capacity of state are discussed in the second chapter. Accordingly, the research question of the thesis is:

How does Political Islam explain the variations in 'stateness' of Sudan and Somalia after the late 1980s and early 1990s regime changes?

For the purpose of comprehensive analysis, I control some variables that might have a similar or different effect on 'stateness.' These are nationalism (self identity), geopolitics, and western foreign policy decisions (especially with reference to the United States). Many studies have been conducted to examine the relationship between US foreign policy and Islamism in the two countries. Especially after September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, the research interest in the field has experienced an incremental increase. Some of the research works include *US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa* by Woodward (2006), *The United States and Africa: Shifting Geopolitics in an Age of Terror* by Kraxberger (2005) and *The Impact of U.S. Disengagement on African Intrastate Conflict Resolution* by Rothchild (2000). The other reason for the focus on Islamism is the importance of domestically focused inquiry. The understanding of the origins and characteristics of domestic political dynamism is crucial for the researcher groundwork to come up with plausible recommendations and conclusions.

However this research is not without its own limitations. A study that has a focus on explaining the relationships between religion and state generally, or Islam and politics particularly faces a problem of specificity. Whether to show a "fixed relationship" between the two phenomena as Jung (2007, p.1) points out, or to explain how they converge, is a painstaking task for the researcher. The borderline between religion and politics becomes more blurred once the researcher is engaged in the empirical analysis. This is not only unique to Islam and politics;

to find exactly how any religion influences politics, or the vice versa is problematic in general. It is also debatable as to how contemporary modern western state's politicians and law makers are influenced by the different denominations and interest groups. Furthermore, the identification of sources of reliable information concerning Islamism is the second obstacle that I have struggled. Nonetheless, a painstaking research in this complex phenomenon is worth taking as few is written on Political Islam in the two countries.

Methodology and Analysis

To assess how Islamism brought influences on the countries variations of 'stateness', this thesis deploys the "Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST)" model that sets out twelve indicators. CAST is developed by Baker in the year 1996 and further enhanced for "diagnosing the risk of violence in weak and failing state" (Baker 2006, Introduction, pp.1-5). Baker indicated that CAST can help to "track trends, identify the principal drivers of conflict" and assess if there are any mechanisms to alleviate conflicts.

The reason that I want to apply CAST is consistent with what Baker identified as the aim of the tool. CAST has the capacity to provide a comprehensive conceptual framework to determine whether Islamism contributed to the conflicts in Sudan and Somalia. The purpose of analyzing the data based on the indicators is to examine the overall variations that are brought in to 'stateness.' An international organization, the Fund for Peace uses the twelve indicators for producing quantitative annual ratings of statehood of the countries of the world, the Failed States Indexes. However, this does not mean that CAST indicators are immune to any errors; but I tried to be cautious by avoiding the chance of making confirmatory claims while explaining the

phenomena. The twelve CAST indicators, which Baker (p.6) classified as social, economic, political, and military are:

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures
2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons
3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia
4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight
5. Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines
6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline
7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State
8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services
9. Suspension of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights
10. Security Apparatus Operates as a State within a State
11. Rise of Factionalized Elites
12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors

In addition to CAST, I also looked for indicators of “STINGS (Surprises, Triggers, Idiosyncrasies, National Temperaments and Spoilers).” In states like Sudan and Somalia unexpected occurrences like, “assassinations” and a “coup d’état” might trigger instabilities. Also actions ‘Spoilers’, i.e., “excluded parties and alienated leaders” can take the states to a different dimension. Therefore, my explanation embraced whether indicators under STINGS are happening due to Islamism and thereby became factors that affected their ‘stateness’ of the two countries (Baker: 17).

Through Content Analysis or an “empirical, methodological controlled analysis of texts” (Mayring, 2000, p.2), I extracted information that matches CAST and STINGS indicators. In

terms of periods, the extracted data mostly show the trend of the movement of Islamism after the regime changes in both countries during the late 80s and early 90s. Because of the opportunities that were created in this period, Islamism its advocates experienced a rise in both countries.

The sources that are used to extract information are books, research articles, periodic reports and publications of international organizations; African Rights, Commission on International Religious Freedom, Council of Foreign Affairs, International Crisis Group, and Counter Terrorism Country Report. Because of the limitation on data availability, I looked into information from a reliable mass media sources, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).

To further analyze the information gathered from the above sources, I deploy a sub-technique called “thematic content analysis”. This technique helps me to develop a “categorization of themes” to indicate how Political Islam related with one or more of the CAST and STINGS indicators. Accordingly, the first step is to record and examine “the appearance or frequency” of Islamism in Sudan or Somalia in a certain document. Secondly, I measured “the values of a variable” whether Islamism brought the higher or lower degree of variation in ‘stateness.’ This means measuring to what extent the situations are influenced by Islamism. After the overall assessment, it became possible to compare the resultant variations between the two countries (Hudson 2007, p.57).

The objectives of the present thesis are explored in four chapters. The first chapter, ‘Political Islam, State and Stateness’, deals with the basic tenets of the school of Islamism through an examination of its literature. The concepts of the three variants, namely ‘Political Quietism, New Islamism, and Extremism are explained. Finally the relationships between Political Islam, state, and ‘stateness’ are demonstrated.

The second chapter, 'Variants of Islamism in Sudan and Somalia', provides a brief history of Political Islam in both countries. It then identifies how Political Islam is simultaneously pursued by the Islamists as a 'top down Islamisation' and 'bottom up policy', where both approaches are more salient in Sudan. It also analyzes how the Islamists capitalized on the 'political opportunity'; made open during the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the period of independence. The role of the Muslim Brothers and the different meanings of *jihad* are also examined.

The third chapter, 'Political Islam and State Building Processes', briefly presents the role of Islamism as a state reconstructing project in the countries. The Islamic school dominated by al Turabi in Sudan and the experience of violent militant Islamism in Somalia are the focus of the chapter.

The last chapter, 'Conflicts, Lawlessness and Islamism', observes the data on the association between Islamism and state in both countries. It demonstrates how Islamism brought variations in 'stateness.' The conflict and separation of North and South Sudan and the failed attempt of the peace conferences for establishing a government in Somalia drawn from above vis-à-vis Islamism are discussed.

CHAPTER 1: POLITICAL ISLAM, STATE, AND 'STATENESS'

1.1 *Islamism and its Varieties*

Unlike other social, political or religious phenomena that can be explained with relative ease and through utilizing corresponding theories, Political Islam stood as a difficult subject for analysis. It is a fairly under-theorized and hence the complexity of its phenomenon has remained as much unanalyzed. Despite the fact, Tibi, (2009, p.136) stresses the need to engage in analyzing it, by pointing out that Islamism is a “huge movement with a considerable mobilizing power that no one can afford to overlook.” This ‘mobilizing power’ of the movement according to Tibi, is termed as Political Islam, where he defined it as a “mobilising religious ideology, represented by a transnational movement” of which its aim is to establish a “*shari’a*-based Islamic order.” Others, like Hansen and Kainz (2007, p.56) explained it as a “wide range of attempts to revive Islam’s political legacy after the end of the Caliphate of Constantinople in 1924.” Nonetheless, the main reason that Islamism demands analysis is not because it is under researched but due to its huge effect on the processes of state building and reconstruction in the Muslim world.

The Islamists, especially in Sudan, implemented this mobilizing ideology through imposing it as a political project in a “top down form of Islamisation” (Tibi, 2009, p.155) and simultaneously advanced it as a “bottom up policy” (Baran 2008, pp.55-69) to revive the religion. Empirically, this is explained in detail in the data analysis part of the study where a ‘top down’ approach is more pronounced in Sudan than Somalia. This simultaneous approach in both countries aimed to establish a strong Islamic government and then to join other Islamists in brining “global *siyadat al-Islam* (Islamic supremacy)” as Tibi (p.159) puts it.

Before going further, let me first point out the definition of key terms that are going to be used repeatedly throughout the thesis. According to Ayubi (1993, pp.68-9) “the term Islamists (*al-Islamiyyun*) is usually applied to... salafis, fundamentalists and neo-fundamentalists” where “it implies a conscious, determined choice of an Islamic doctrine, rather than the simple fact of being born Muslim, or... a pious practicing one.” According to Ayubi’s statement this definition implies variation that exists within the term, Islamists. He explained the characteristics of Political Islam “*al-Islam al-siyasi*” as the one more “confined to the... fundamentalists and the neo-fundamentalists [because] these are the ones that tend to emphasize the political nature of Islam.” Nevertheless, Ayubi’s conception of Islamists, as consisting only of radicals creates a huge misconception.

Not only Ayubi thought of Islamists only as extremists, but also most people perceive Islamists in the same manner. Considering all the Islamists as extremists, who engaged in suicide missions or armed struggle is simply a myth. The rush and quest for easy explanations (a kind of journalistic analysis) is the factor that contributed to the erroneous conceptions of this important phenomena. Carefully analyzing the various terminologies helps to clearly understand and differentiate the Islamists from other Muslims. Even if they are those who articulate the political ideologies of the movement they are not a monolithic group.

Generally, Islamism has continued to be dynamic and progressive as the environment surrounding Islam forces the Islamists to be pragmatic and change their course of action. As a result, it got a type of another wave “in the second half of the twentieth century” where “the world witnessed a return of religion to challenge the secularization that had everywhere seemed an inevitable dimension of modernization” as Baker said (2003, p.2). In the Muslim world this wave took the form of “an Islamic awakening... the generalized revitalization of Islam.” The

movement, thus, has grown in a non-monolithic fashion. The rhetorical reinterpretation of its political ideology and the strategies for the struggles are furthered by “varied Islamist currents, groups” that range from “quietists who focused on individual belief and ritual to extremists who sought to remake their societies... with the focus of violence” Baker added. The performance of Islamism in Sudan and Somalia is examined in the last chapter in light of the failures and successes that have so far been maintained by the ‘quietists, moderates (centrists) and the extremists’ variations of the movement. The next section of this chapter explains these variations in greater detail.

1.1.1 Political Quietism

Quietism stands at the far left within the continuum of Political Islamism. This continuum, however, is not without risk as it subsumes the Muslims who are engaged only in ‘individual belief and ritual’, as the participant in the huge politico-religious movement. This raises a question, both normative and practical. Can we categorize the ‘quietists’ as one of the types of the movement which also includes the most active participants within Islamism, the moderates and extremists? What factors constitutes groups as Islamists? There should be a careful investigation both by the student and researchers of Political Islam in each of the terminologies frequently used. As shown in the subsequent sections, most of the definitions and analysis does not support the categorization of ‘quietists’ in the movement.

In his analysis of Political Quietism, Lewis (1986, p.1), laid down the two dominant principles that exist in the “political tradition of Islam”, as contradictory to each other. The focus of the principles, according to Lewis, resolve basic problems that evolve around “government

and obedience” in Islamic tradition. He pointed out “authoritarian and quietist” as the first one and the “radical and activist” as the second. These principles trace back to the “the career and teachings of the Prophet” and also “the history of the early caliphate”, he added. Political quietism, thus, refers to the relationship between the unquestionable authoritarian rule and the complete obedience demanded from the quietists. According to this philosophy the quietists are expected to obey the command of their rulers without any second thought. This is not based on what the rulers request but upon what the Muslims are commanded to do by God.

The rationalization for the authoritarian politics comes from verse found in *Quran* chapter 4:59 which says, ‘O you who believe! Obey Allah and obey the messenger [the Prophet] and those [having] authority over you. Then if you disagree in anything refer it to Allah and the Messenger.’ This is not the only verse that justifies Political quietism, and the authoritarian has also looked for supporting evidences from the various *hadiths* (authoritative words and deeds of the Prophet). The ultimate purpose is to convince the quietists and to get consent and obedience without questioning the legitimacy of the authorities.

Quietism, whatever the justification might be, has undoubtedly encouraged tyranny and shattered the chance of introducing and promoting democratic practices. There is no question that this type of authoritarianism, through the passage of time, brings revolt and upheavals among the people which lead the Islamic nations into chaos.

1.1.2 New Islamism: The Concepts of Islamic Democracy

Islamic modernism has held a centrist position between quietism and extremism. The defining characteristic for the centrists is the “notions of both ends and means” that embodies “the core values of Islam, notably justice.” Islamists, mainly in Sudan claimed to be the advocates of Islamic Democracy, but I have demonstrated in the analysis section that the project of state building in Sudan through applying the ideas of this school is a story of failure. Moreover, the practices of the Islamists of this school expose them to be equated with extremists. They are also criticized as authoritarian regime who just wants to give a lip service to the idea of democracy and utilize it as a vehicle to gain state power (Baker 2003, p.3).

Notwithstanding, one of the interesting characteristics of the New Islamists is the way that they emerged in the first place which basically shows their pragmatic approach. Baker added that, “when the Muslim Brothers in Egypt came under the repression... violent minority of the Brothers took the extremist path.” In other words, the movement divided, into extremist and the remaining portion of the movement to the concept of New Islamism which lent itself to pragmatism. The manner that they have responded to the contemporary situation was a shift from the original position of the Muslim Brothers, which might have offended those who remained loyal to extremism. Their conscious realization of the prevailing political discourse in their countries forced them to recognize a “strategy of accommodation with the government and a program of peaceful social change.” Opposed to this was extremist’s strict stance that provided zero compromise toward the contemporary regimes. Yet, the centrists asserted that the “problems challenging contemporary Islamic societies do not necessitate the overthrow of existing institutions” (p.3).

Interestingly, the New Islamists identified their purpose and main task as “to bring a deeper and more rational understanding of Islam” (Baker: pp.12-4). This view, a kind of mission statement of the school, is an attempt to marginalize the extremists, who are always blamed for their dogmatic propositions; allowing no room for Islamic ideas like *shura* (consultation). It is also a systematic and modern appeal to the vast Muslims who might be convinced and finally cast vote for the Islamist parties of the moderates.

The National Islamic Front (NIF) in Sudan and its architect Hussien Al Turabi demonstrated the tactical utilization of the concept of democracy in order to gain state power through an election. Some of the other leading figures who advanced this paradigmatic and pragmatic view (mostly in Egypt) are Yusuf al Qardawy, Kamal Abul Mag, Selim al Awa and Fahmy Huwaidy. The New Islamists are composed of lawyers, judges, historians, journalists, and Islamic scholars who have tried and are trying to redefine the role of Islam in the different sectors of the society including “gender relations; the status and rights of non-Muslims; the nature of Islamic Banking and economics; the relationship of state and society; and Islam’s global role” (Baker: p.4). Most of the analysis in the literature toward the New Islamists has focused on their role on a macro level, state building and reconstruction. There are some claims of success made by the moderates on providing micro level remedies to the problems facing the society, which are yet to be verified by independent studies.

In recent history, whether the centrists actually achieved or begin to achieve the goals that they set out has been the focus of debate among their supporters and foes. The paradigmatic shift of the centrists is, according to Baker (pp.170-1), that of their view; democratic principles “founded on commitments to independence and reform and set within an Islamic framework” can be achieved through the application of *shura* (consultation). The primary reason for this shift

is their *ijtihad* (interpretation of the Quran) which resulted in the conclusion that Islam basically “establishes the realization of justice as the prime purpose of a political system.” Their view toward contemporary ideas of democracy is that it is an effective “means to achieve justice” (Magd 1991, p.31). In rhetoric, New Islamism asserts its firm belief in Islamic Democracy for reconstructing the state that promotes dialogue and consultation (*shura*) for any disagreements as a basic principle. This concept of *shura* made the school different from that of quietism who advocates obedience to authorities, even in times of disagreements. The implementation of this school in Sudan, however, shows the absence of such democratic practices.

Generally, the goal of the New Islamists is maintaining justice within the Muslim nations where democracy is deemed to be an effective vehicle to realize it. The main reason for their focus, on justice as the ultimate goal, is however tempered in that specifics are not clearly laid down by the proponents of the school. However, I would say that their pragmatic analysis of the contemporary regimes and the Muslim society led them to target justice as the most crucial element, and as a factor of Islam. The justification for their justice-centered position is also a conclusion reached by their retrospective evaluation of previously successive regimes. The previous regimes were thus blamed for their failure in maintaining justice and equality among the polities in addition to other democratic and economic deficits. These made the New Islamists to take more pragmatic and tactical political positions, differentiating them from the extremists.

Among the New Islamists, Yusuf al Qardawy on the *Al Shaab* newspaper (1997), clearly appreciated the role of dialogue and consultation by saying the “abandonment of *shura* was the first thing that had harmed the Islamic nation.” This happened when Muslims imitated the bad political practices of some ancient systems like the Roman and Persian Empires. Thus, they call for the openness of the Muslims to the outside world where good practices can be imitated and

the democratic experiences of others can be adapted. Public discussions, cultures of debates and discussion can be acquired through long-term educational processes. For the New Islamists this stands as the prerequisite for the achievement of lasting justice.

Fahmy Huwaidy (1993) pointed out seven main democratic theories of the New Islamists as the bedrock of the school. Accordingly the first one is the “legitimate authority” (p.103) that requires the consent of the people to put and remove the rulers from their power whenever necessary. The difference between this view of Islamic democracy and the liberal ideologues of popular rule, lays on the way that it has been practiced so far. The second doctrine of the centrists notes that, the society has responsibilities and accountabilities to the rights it exercises in regard to its rulers, regardless of the demand of the authorities for the mechanism of checks and balances (p.66).

Baker (p.174) summarized the other three tenets of the New Islamism. Accordingly, the third, fourth, and fifth doctrines indentified the “freedom as a right for all, equality of all citizens, and the explicit recognition of the rightful place [for] the non-Muslim, as a full partner with Muslims.” These are the defining characteristics of the school that became completely opposed to the extremists who necessitated the flight of the non-believers from the Muslim lands because of their practices were poisonous toward the Islamic beliefs. The sixth pillar of Islamic democracy recognizes the previous three characteristics and equates any “injustice” made to the stated principles as “*haram* [religiously forbidden] and its confrontation a duty of all citizens.” Finally, the seventh doctrine recognizes *shari’a* “as the source of legislation to which rulers as well as the people must yield”, Baker identified.

Here *shari'a* is understood as a divinely given law for the Muslims to observe. Its validity is further confirmed by the availability of the of *sunna*, the traditions of the saying of the Prophet Mohammed, “that are compiled in more or less authoritative collections” (Jung: p.25). According to the centrists like Huwaidy, *shair'a* is the ultimate origin all legislations. It also supposed to bring a power separation between the legislative and the executive, which basically is intended to limit the power of the government. Not only the rulers are restricted from limitless exercise of power but also citizens have a duty to be bound by the *shari'a*. For the rulers, their legitimacy springs from their adherence and protection of the divine law. Yet, *shari'a* has been a point of differences and divisions for the Islamists in the movement who reinterpreted it time and again. It is also the reason for the birth of sects in Sudan and Somalia, as (re)theorization continually provided by the school of *Shi'i* and *Sunni ulamas* (legal scholars).

The seventh characteristic, however, exposed the New Islamists for their theoretical and practical affiliations to the Islamic Political extremism. The firm belief in the strict and full implementation of *shari'a* has been a core defining doctrines for the extremists. Nonetheless, the moderates did not state whether they are in favor its partial or full implementation. Even if the first six characteristics seem plausible and acceptable to many Muslims and Westerners, the alleged incompatibility of *shari'a* with any modern ideas may require the centrists to withdraw from their position. Otherwise the possibility of equating moderates with the extremists becomes inevitable.

Unlike Baker, who seems endorse the New Islamism, Tibi (pp.137-142) defined the modernist camp as being wrongly promoted by the Westerners “as a pro-democracy movement.” He denounced the possibility of a “peculiar combination of Islamism and democracy” and asserts the impossible compatibility between them. After providing numerous empirical evidences he

clearly argued for the “blurred line between institutional Islamism [New Islamism] and *jihadism* [extremism].” Due to this and other several factors Tibi goes further to criticize the West for their attempt to “appease” the totalitarian Islamist regimes. Tibi categorized the goal of all moderate Islamists as incompatible with the democratic principles.

Turkey’s ruling Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) is hailed by the West for its success in the New Islamism experiment. Larrabe (2007), in one of the article published in the Kurdish Institute of Paris, praised AKP for bringing about the compatibility of Islamism with democracy and for taping into the “rising popular nationalism by fusing it with Islam.” Despite the good appraisal given for the New Islamists by the West and many scholars, a deep analysis of the theoretical and practical analysis of the school provides no genuine compatibility between Islamism and democracy. The apparent compatibility is just the outward democratic impression that political elites want to be made. It is a modern tactic to divert attention from the malevolent nature of Islamism and get recognition from the West and others instead. Here it becomes worth to notice Tibi’s argument:

“All Islamists want to establish what they view as a *nizam Islami* (Islamic system of government) based on the notion of *hakimiyyat Allah* (God’s rule of sovereignty), as opposed to the notion of popular sovereignty associated with secular democracy... The core issue in Islamist ideology is the contention that only God, not man, is entitled to rule the world” (p.142).

Tibi’s plausible argument is the challenge to the compatibility of the ideologies of the Islamists with democracy. It also exposed to notice the similarities of the moderates with the extremists. To have a distinction between the two schools, it requires the centrists to withdraw from a transcendental backed rationalization in the political processes of state building.

Otherwise, the centrists shares the dangerous idea held by the extremists, i.e., uprooting the existing structures of the society, overthrowing the state institutions, and replace human authority with a theocracy.

It is a common strategy for the New Islamists or ‘intuitionists’, however, to frame the various religious symbols and portray themselves as loyal to the deep-seated Islamic traditions. This was manifested by the Islamists and explained more in the analysis section that deals with Sudan. Tibi (p.136) described the principles of ‘institutional Islamism’ as “the most popular public choice in the world of Islam.” This refers to the ‘bottom up’ approach that was discussed earlier, where Islamists compete in democratic elections with other political parties. This is more evidenced in the 1986 election of Sudan, where the National Islamic Front managed to win 51 seats out of 227, thus was able to represent “the third largest parliamentary party” and hence became “the main opposition force” (Ayubi 1993, p.110).

1.1.3 Islamic Extremism

In spite of differences among extremists found in different parts of the world, their most commonly shared attributes can be identified. There are mainly four dominant theoretical and practical aspects that are commonly shared by the extremists and which are developed by some scholars. The first is the extremists’ firm belief to “return to original Islam as the religion of oneness of God” (Choueiri 1990, p.23). This includes igniting the revival of the religion, setting it anew in a given territory, and ultimately securing Islamic government. Under this process antagonism by the Islamists is expressed not only against other religions but also against quietists or moderates who remain loyal to authorities and different in ideologies. This is evidenced and

explained in the analysis of Somalia, where *Wahhabism* is advanced and negatively influenced the dimensions of the state.

This first characteristic is also explained slightly different by Qutb (1990 p.50-2); “Islam’s first and preferred option is preaching and exposition (*da’wa*).” If obstacles appear on the way of preaching there is no option left for the Muslims but to remove the barriers using physical force. This use of force refers to *jihad* or holy war. Qutb’s concluding remarks urges the Muslims to continuously wage *jihad* when faced with barriers. The Muslims should not be concerned about the outcome of the struggle as it is “being in the hands of God” who wanted to be the ultimate ruler over the nation (de Waal 2004 pp.28-31). On the last chapter I have demonstrated how *da’wa*, as it is asserted by Qutb for its use in the movement, implemented in Sudan and exposed the moderates’ affiliations with the ideologies of the extremists.

Qutb’s principle raises the question of whether extremism needs a political theory for its struggle. If God is the one who is wanted as the absolute ruler on the earth, then what should be required is nothing more than the faith of the believer. Muslims physical struggle and the required lack of concern for the outcome is an irony.

Therefore, if there is no complete withdrawal from the transcendental assertion made by the Islamists, the holy struggle waged by them still lacks political rationalization. A simple question that also should be raised is how can man fight physically to set up God’s spiritual throne on earth? As far as my understating is concerned this shows one of several flaws in the idea of the extremism. The *jihad* principle of the school lacks a political justification and hence it is apolitical assumptions. Referencing this point and identifying an Egyptian, Sayyid Qutb as the

founding father of extremism and “an anti-neo colonialist Islamist philosopher”, de Waal critically pointed out that:

“the utopianism of Qutb’s aims and the concluding pages of the Milestone [his influential book] – which are concerned with the Muslim’s unconcern for outcomes... make for a tempting interpretation that *jihad* needs no political strategy, only faith” (p.31).

Secondly, the aim of the extremists reads as “the advocacy of independent [Islamic] reasoning in matters of legal judgments.” By this, the Islamists foresee the strict and full implementation of *shari’a*. They seriously consider *sharia* “as an all encompassing body of ritual, liturgical, ethical, and legal rules” Jung (p.30).

However, Jung disqualifies this argument of the school by saying that *shari’a* didn’t exist during the time of the Prophet Muhammad in the way today’s extremists perceived. Jung also pointed out that “it is almost an irony of history that political Islamists today perceive[s] the implementation of the *sharia* by political authority” in a ‘top-down’ form.

The confrontation between the New Islamists and extremists is due to this second characteristic - the question whether *shari’a* should be fully implemented and the originator of all laws. Jung denounced all Islamists who rely on *shari’a* (for its full or partial implementation) and equated their view as portraying “a boomerang effect regarding state policies to instrumentalize Islamic law as a source in the struggle for political legitimacy” (p.31).

The debate on the interpretation of *sharia*, are the core of the rivalry to achieve political legitimacy and consent from the people. This attempt to maintain ‘political legitimacy’ is directly related with one of the building blocks of ‘stateness’ that will be discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter.

The third common characteristic that the extremists share is, the “necessity of fleeing the territories dominated by unbelievers, polytheists and heathens.” This view of the Islamists first recognizes that the Muslim land becomes corrupted by the “materialistic civilization of the West.” Because of the individualism and self interested Western society God’s law was cast down by the “evil (*jahiliyya*).” The extremists, therefore, require a no compromise and “complete reversal of the moral order” (Qutb 1964 p.12).

Given the absence of room for compromise, the goal of making others flee is believed to be directed by “the emergence of a vanguard that takes over control and determinedly fights the *jihad* against the” corrupters of the holy lands in which the virtuous Muslims society is supposed to live (Hansen and Kainz 2007 pp.61-2). The ‘vanguard’, according to Qutb is the leader who is expected to bring the revival of Islam and perform a transcendental leadership for all martyrs. The leadership of the vanguard, however, is also political, if the Islamists have to be successful in toppling down the *jahiliyya* (evil) political regimes at the end. The instrumentality of these leaders is manifested by the Islamist leader Ayatollah Khomeini of the Islamic Republic of Iran or Osama Bin Laden of the global *jihadist* movement, al Qaeda. These vanguards undoubtedly played a crucial double role, i.e., through providing spiritual inspiration and political leadership that further paved the way for many Muslims to join the struggle.

Undertaking *jihad*, nevertheless, does not cease after the eradication of all evils but rather it will continue until a world dominance of Islam is secured. The term *jihad*, therefore, within the movement of Islamism becomes another point for debates and differences (in addition to *shari’a*) resulting in the (re)theorization and production of various meanings. This thesis discussed some of the different meanings of *jihad* as provided by the Islamists and analyzed how the Islamists positioned themselves toward the concept.

Finally, the extremists commonly share the idea of executing *jihad* in and through securing the instrumentality of ‘a vanguard’ in “beginning the fight”, Hansen and Kainz noticed. We are not only witnessing the instrumentality of these leaders (in leading the *jihad*) to their movement but their perceived instrumentality to their enemies.

For instance, it was among the top priorities to achieve the goal of security in the West, specifically the United States (US), to “capture’ or “kill”, Osama bin Laden in order to bring an end to the movement according to the National Terror Alert Response Center (2010). The capture or death of the Islamist leaders is widely believed to be an important step to cease the advancement of the movement.

However, this predisposition of the West, the belief that just killing the vanguard or leader will end the movement, comes from the “incorrect assessment of *jihadist* Islamism as a grouping of super-hawks on the margins of Muslim politics” (Hansen and Kainz: 136). The deep rooted problem of assessment toward the extremist school is also true for other variants of Political Islam. Given the dominant characteristics of the extremists previously considered, thus, there should not be a rush to equate all variants of Islamism with the contemporary grand narratives like ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist organizations.’ This will result in the erroneous conception that obscures an effort to compare and further understand how Islamism, operates differently in various regions of the world.

Wary of such a tendency Dickson (2005, p.3) pointed out that “Political Islam, by definition, is neutral. It is any variant of Islam inspiring as a vehicle for political mobilization.”

This indicates that any monolithic or single-sided examination of Islamism might not be productive and thus should be rejected as it treats Political Islam as “either a malevolent or benevolent force”, Dickson added. Islamism in Sudan and Somalia, however, seems to have

blurred the possibility of drawing lines between the two characteristics. The terrific terrorist attack on Western interests in the North-East Africa and the catastrophic internal displacement of the civilians, as a result of conflict instigated by rival Islamist parties, however, manifested the ‘malevolent’ nature of Political Islam. Contrary to this, a striking example for the ‘benevolent’ outcome of the other variant comes from Senegal where “religious and social networks with deep historical roots – have bolstered a democratic and secular government”, Dickson pointed out. According to the aforementioned concepts of the New Islamism, the Senegalese model is the manifestation of the school of the moderates where the culture of peaceful coexistence and the toleration for plurality is promoted.

1.2. The Aspects of State, ‘Stateness’ and Islamism

In order to bring the state as a unit of analysis in the field of social science researches, Nettl (1968), examined the various conceptions of state and ‘stateness.’ He first provided four basic definitions for a state. This section of the chapter analyzes them and discussed their relationship to Political Islam.

Most scholars, who adopted and/or replicated based on Nettl’s work, *State as Conceptual Variable*, focused on the analysis of a capitalist states. However, the conceptions that are laid down by Nettl do not prevent researchers who are interested in examining different forms of states, like that of Sudan and Somalia. What Nettl presented is the various concepts of state that should be considered while studying states, despite the different economic, social and political circumstances found across states.

Nettl's (pp.562-5) first conception refers to state as "a collectivity that summates a set of functions and structures in order to generalize their applicability." Here state is related to the notion of "nation, territory, or sovereignty in law." It refers to a situation where the polity expects the "provision of central administration [to be] carried out by the state." This definition indicates the extent to which different states are able to deliver administrative services to the community, hence affecting the variations found in 'stateness.' Secondly, state "represents a unit in the field of international relations... the basic, irreducible unit." This conception defines the role of Islamism vis-à-vis the international relations any specific country. The empirical evidences discussed in the final chapter demonstrate how the Islamists and their opponents (the military elites) in Sudan conceived different policies towards other countries.

Thirdly, Nettl defined state as "an autonomous collectivity as well as summing concept of high societal generality." State referred here as a "distinct sector or arena of society" where it enjoys autonomy and also prevents intervention from other sectors, such as religion. This third conception works against the aim of the Islamists. It contradicts the aim of the extremists who want to maintain a theocracy, the replacement of human leadership with a divine one. Thus opposition to the separation of religion and politics is expressed. It was seen in the way the moderates and extremists wanted *shari'a* to be imposed as derived from a divine command.

Finally Nettl defined state as "essentially a sociocultural phenomenon" that demonstrates an "organized diffusion of common experience" by different actors that belong to a certain nation. Political Islam, as a state building project from above, refers to the goal of diffusing the Islamic beliefs till they become a 'common experience' and a way of life for all. Thus it affected the state and its institutions that are expected to channel the different religious values to the society.

Nettl (p.571) further discussed the concepts in how the variations in ‘stateness’ and how its variations could take place. He related the variations as affected by the “political movements of dissent [that] appear to focus on the state as the object of dissatisfaction.” Accordingly, any movement of dissent might affect the “variableness of the development [or underdevelopment] of stateness.” Islamism, thus, can reasonably be considered in Nettl’s ‘movement of dissent’ theory.

Islamists’ dissatisfaction (depending on whether they are moderates or extremists) is expressed toward the idea of secular state system as explained from the rhetorical perspective. Nonetheless, Islamic movements are not simply one of the movements of dissent. Borrowing Nettl’s other notion they are also “antisystem movements” that have been emerging in different societies in opposing secular systems of state building. One of the reasons that served as the basis for their ‘anti system’ view is the marginalization and injustice made by the regimes in the “religious, socioeconomic and political” spheres. Thus, Islamism can be understood as a religiously oriented ‘antisystem’ movement which also involved social, economic and political factors as the object of dissatisfaction toward the existing regimes. With this background, the study demonstrated how Islamism especially in Somalia manifested itself as a ‘movement of dissent’ and ‘anti system’ movement that has brought variations in the ‘stateness’ of the countries

Nettl’s rich normative assumption is very crucial and served as a background consideration for the relationship of state, ‘stateness’ and Political Islam. However, it could not make a basis by which I could empirically measure the variations of the degree of ‘stateness’ in the countries under consideration. Nettl may not have imagined the form of today’s African states when he argued for different conceptions of state and ‘stateness’ in 1968. Thus, it became imperative to

laid down the normative aspects first and associate the conceptualization of recent scholarship on ‘stateness’ that took the African states into consideration.

Accordingly, Bratton (2004, p.3) provided a concise and comprehensive conceptual framework for the operation of the concept of ‘stateness.’ Bratton developed his notions in the Afrobarometer, a research project that examines the social, political, and economic situations in Africa. He introduced the three major “building blocks necessary for an operational theory of the state” and indicators for the ‘variableness of stateness.’

The first block is the “scope of the state”, i.e., the degree “to which a central administrative elite succeeds in incorporating an entire geographical area within territorial boundaries.” This first block can be empirically measured by the “presence of an institutional infrastructure of armed posts, administrative offices, or service centers”, as Bratton said.

Bratton identified the second block as a “state capacity” that is the ability of “each state agency to execute its appointed tasks.” This concept of ‘state capacity’ and its agencies are directly related to the notion of ‘stateness’ as stated in the introduction section of the thesis, i.e., the ‘centrality of state institution.’ Thus, the variations of ‘stateness’ becomes the function of state agency’s capacity to ‘execute appointed tasks.’

Finally he pointed out the third block as the “willingness of citizens to accept the jurisdiction of the state and obey the commands of its agents” or known as state legitimacy. I have discussed how the Islamists, based on their preferred belief, argued for achieving legitimacy and in so doing win the hearts and minds of the Muslims. The competition to gain political legitimacy by the Islamists and how Islamism practically undermined legitimacy is explained in the last chapter of the thesis.

Bratton's conceptual development helps to study the different forms of state, like that of Sudan and Somalia. Thus, the present thesis analyzed the variations in the '*scope, capacity and legitimacy of the state*' together termed as 'stateness', of Sudan and Somalia. The extent to which Islamism affected the variations of the 'three building blocks' of 'stateness' are the sole purpose of the thesis. The empirical explanations of the variations are demonstrated in the fourth chapter. A broad array of CAST and STINGS indicators are used to explain the relationship between Islamism and the variableness or the higher or lower degree 'stateness.'

CHAPTER 2: VARIANTS OF ISLAMISM IN SUDAN AND SOMALIA

2.1 The Simultaneity Approach

Islamism in Sudan and Somalia, at different historical times is implemented by the elites of the countries. Without a broad consensus, it is imposed as a political project for building the state from above. Like many other authoritarian types of regimes in Africa the elites in the countries have tried to strengthen their “political legitimacy by reverting to the symbolic sources of Islam” (Jung: 29). The project implementation of a ‘top down’ approach took place while Islamism as a movement is also pursued in a ‘bottom up policy.’ The Islamists mobilized their people to cast their vote during election and provide necessary resources to have a solid foundation for Islamism from below.

Islam in these countries evolved as “a source of political legitimacy for the ruling elites” which can be related to the ‘top down’ approach. Borrowing what Jung said, it can also be said that Islam served as “a symbolic and organizational source for civil society” (one of a ‘bottom up’ policy). The reason for this simultaneity of pursuing Islamism is the belief of the Islamists that only one approach would not be an effective and every possible means should be tried to achieve their goal. Some evidences demonstrated to the existence of this simultaneity in both of the countries and hence affecting the variations in their ‘stateness.’

We can further understand this simultaneity from Bayat’s (2005 pp.893-4) normative analysis of the movement. He defined Islamic activism as an “inclusion of various types of activities, political, social and cultural, that emerge under the rubric of Islamic movement.” It can be understood from this statement that the advancement of ‘different types of activities’ of the movement takes both a ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ approach.

From Bayat's point of view, the final stage of a successful movement, that takes a multifaceted activity, results in a revolution. Once the Islamists topple the regime that they stood against through a 'bottom up' approach, Islamism will then be enforced from the top. The kind of revolution, however, that Islamists aims is not only that of political, social or legal but also religious. Islamists foresee theocracy and direct their effort to bring it through popular uprising or revolution. Because of the aforementioned unique nature, Bayat also characterized Islamic activism as "extra-ordinary", "extra-usual" and "socio-religious movement." Strikingly, these 'extra-usual' characteristics of Islamism first began to manifest during the life of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad. Jung explained this by saying:

"In assuming a political role in Medina, so runs his paradigmatic argument, the prophet combined religious and political functions. He was prophet and statesman at the same time, and set the example for future political developments in the Muslim world" (p.23).

Jung's statement illuminates the exceptional and peculiar characteristics of Islamism. The Prophet probably played both a role of movement organizers and Islamic political leader. It would not be naïve to think that this historical instance made contemporary Political Islam practitioners refer to "the community of Medina" as "the point of departure for the formation of a large system of patrimonial domination" (Jung: 24). This situation on the early history of Political Islam is widely analyzed in the literatures and compared with the contemporary Islamic Republic of Iran. However, the analysis shows a huge deviation both in terms of theory and practice, as it negates with the "religious prescripts of the Qur'an and the *sunna* of the Prophet" (p.27). Jung also added that the political system in Iran is "the political project of specific state elite, a kind of Machiavellian politics in religious guise." Contemporary Islamists in Sudan and Somalia, who made references to the origin of Political Islamism in Medina, could not escape the

same analysis and criticism that was made to Iran. Simply, their practice is contrary and a negation to what they theorize.

2.2 A political opportunity Structures' and Islamism

2.2.1 The Collapse of the Ottoman Empire

An opening up of the “political-opportunity structures”, on the breakup of the Empire, highly influenced the future of Islamism. This political situation provided the Islamists an “incentives to undertake collective action” to reinstate Islamic governance in their respective countries (Tarrow 2011, p.89). Before the breakup of the Ottoman Empire “three different unifying ideologies” started to compete “for the loyalty of Ottoman subjects.” They are known as the “Islamic, the Ottoman and the Turkish principles of” nationalism. They continued to surface among the religious and political elites of the breakaway countries and affected the way they want to rebuild their states. According to the first thought, it is asserted that the “Muslim Empire” is the best alternative to “preserve the heritage of the Prophet” (Lewis 1980, p.27). The rise of the movement that followed this third option aims to bring a revival within Islam and extend its influence to other spheres including politics. The danger of this idea, however, was seen when the propagators held the presumption that “non-Muslims at least to be subjugated and preferably converted”, Lewis noticed.

Some adopted strategies to reinstate this lost union between Islam and politics, through the “gradualist strategy of Islamisation from below, which may involve the formation of a political party and the participation in elections.” On the other hand, some groups “follow a dominantly violent strategy” (extremism) to bring a unity between Islamic religion and politics, in their territory and beyond. This group is further divided in to two variants and includes “those which

are operating on a national and regional level.” Secondly, the group which implements a violent strategies has “a global agenda and are sworn to carry out a worldwide fight against the West and all unbelievers” (Hansen and Kainz 2007, pp.56-7).

In sum, the revival, if not the birth of Islamic activism that began after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire is shaped as the movement grows and spread to other part of the world. During the breakup of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924, the international political structure faced a great challenge and millions lives were affected. It mainly “brought an end to the traditionally close union between religion and politics in Islam.” Above all many Muslims considered the breakup “as a highly disturbing loss” (Hansen and Kainz: 56).

Middle East countries, after the breakup of the Empire, called together with other countries as the ‘successor states.’ Iraq and Palestine found themselves under the colony of the British. Jordan found itself as a new nation, and Lebanon turned into the French colony. Some of today’s huge Arab states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia liberated from colonial rule and become independent. The Ottoman Empire finally “turned into a secular republic”, what we know today as Turkey (Barkati Net, 2010). Islamic activism, thus, started to grow, as a political movement and “spurred by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the abolition of the Caliphate.” In the quest of preserving and defending a long standing Islamic tradition from a threat paused by a colonial expansion and prevailing secularization, Islamism once again emerged as “a creative approach to the challenge of how Muslims could live” and should “respond to the political challenge” that is posed by the un-Islamic regimes (de Waal 2004, p.5).

The formation of the nation-states and the emergence of opposing Islamist groups in the aftermath of the breakup, made Islamism a ‘movement of dissent.’ The collapse of the Empire gives rise to the necessity for the theorization of Islam by the elite groups in the ‘successor

states', in order to pursue the political project of building a state. In the Muslim nations, it is stated that Islam continued to be an arena where it is "possible to articulate political issues such as state sovereignty, legitimate authority, and democratic reforms" (Jungs: 29). This statement clearly indicates how Political Islam and the dimensions of state are interconnected through the aspects of sovereignty, legitimacy and democracy. According to Tarrow's thesis (p.89), the breakup of the Ottoman Empire opened a "political opportunity structure." The productions of ideologies and various meanings of the belief system and the mobilization of resources by the Islamists become more possible due to the 'political opportunity.' This is an "external" opportunity to the Islamist groups. On the other side, the distribution of resources like, money and power for the organizers is "internal" to the group where it is necessary to maintain unity within.

2.2.2 The Factor of Vast Number of Muslim Majorities

The vast number of Muslims in Sudan and Somalia is one other factor that served as an opportunity for Islamists to pursue mobilizing their ideology. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook's (2011) publication, the total population of Sudan is estimated to be 45 million, out of which the Sunni Muslims accounted for "70% (in North), Christians 5% (mostly in South and Khartoum)" and "indigenous beliefs 25%." This phenomenon didn't expose Sudan for the benevolent manifestation of Political Islam; a peaceful coexistence with other religions. Rather Islamism was mostly matched in Sudan with a malevolent manifestation resulting in conflict, massive human rights violations, and mass displacement of civilians. Islamism in Sudan could be studied by examining what it caused to the

citizen's religious freedom or the country's national identity or other factors. But I stated in the introduction, this thesis demonstrates how Islamism influenced the state building processes and hence variations in the 'stateness.'

The estimated 10 million Somalis represent the inhabitants in South-Central (3.5), Somaliland (3.5) and Puntland (3) respectively. Sage (2005, p.16) wrote that "Somalis are almost entirely Muslims from the *Shafi'i* school of Sunni Islam." This totality phenomenon didn't neutralize rivalry among the Islamists. Rather the differences in terms of Islamic ideologies and divisions across clan lines led Somali's elites into further polarization, conflicts and ultimately to the rampant lawlessness of the country.

2.2.3 The Muslim Brothers Experience

In Sudan and Somalia, "like all social and political projects" Political Islam sought to be one of the promising alternatives for building a state that possesses the capacity to maintain law and order (de Waal 2004, p.21). The global development of Islamism also begins to exert its influence in these countries as it brought its variant from the Islamist group of Egypt, the Muslim Brothers. Not only had the strength of Muslim Brothers inspired the Islamists in Sudan and Somalia, but also the fragility of the regimes in both countries gave a rise to the emergence of the Islamist opposition groups. This is to say that while the regimes became weak in keeping things right, Islamists took it as a 'political opportunity' where resources could be mobilized around issues of opposition. By imitating best practices that were proved to be working, especially in Egypt, Islamists in Sudan and Somalia became more inspired by the Muslim Brothers experience in Egypt.

Egypt is also pointed out by Tibi (p.141) as “the birthplace of political Islam” which is able to provide “a textbook case for the well organized opposition”, through the Muslim Brothers. The Islamic revival as well as the rise of Muslim Brothers are the results of the “failure of the Arab and other Muslim liberals” which “led first to the rise of the praetorian military (e.g. in Nasirism) and thereafter to the emergence of political Islam.” Islamism in today’s world and particularly in Sudan and Somalia, thus, traces back its origin to Egypt. The Muslim Brothers are known for its role in diffusing Islamism to neighboring countries and beyond, as they are the most “intellectual, social and political” dominant Islamist group of the Arab world. The Muslim Brothers thus stood as a representative of Islamic activism, where its diffusion welcomed as an alternative to other religiously oriented parties, including in the two countries under study (de Waal 2004 p.17).

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Muslim Brothers experience, and the liberation of the countries from former colonies, widely opened the structures of political opportunities and thus intensified the movement. Nevertheless, Islamism resulted in the rise of heterogeneous Islamist groups that made the movement less successful. Because of this heterogeneity and competition different strategies were developed by the Islamist to maintain success over other Islamists. One of the strategies is the perception that a “political action” should be taken early when there is an opening of a “partial political space” rather than waiting till it widens (Tarrow: p.86). Such approach is considered to be the best means to capitalize a ‘political opportunity.’ This study demonstrated the rivalry condition that was exemplified in the conflict between the different Islamist groups in Somalia.

Related with the concept just discussed above Inglehart (1990, p.44) also pointed out that, “effective political action requires the presence of certain skills among the relevant individuals.”

With regard to Islamism, mobilization of resources and support demands the participation of those who know the religion better or the Islamic scholars. In the analysis of the extremist variant, I have showed how a ‘vanguard’ is so important in the struggle for they are the one who believed to have the necessary skills. Their political and religious knowledge are supposed to determine the success of the movement. The elites or the ‘vanguard’, thus, are primarily responsible for the success of the movement and engaged in “framing collective action” (Tarrow: p.118). In the attempt to find appealing symbols “that will be familiar enough to mobilize” Muslims around the movement, the Islamists engaged in reframing and reinterpreting the different concepts found in Islam. This aspect of ‘framing’ is highly salient in Islamism than any other types of movement. Variants of Islamists claimed to restore lost aspirations, values and standards of the religion through citing the verses found in the Islamic scriptures.

Islamists, while sharing some common mobilizing strategies with other movements, systemically frames ‘collective action’ around religious “symbols that are selectively chosen from [religious] touches” (Tarrow: 119). The struggle between different Islamist groups is dominantly relied on the different interpretation of ‘symbols’ of the religion. The process of advancing ideological indoctrinations toward their supporters follows the (re)interpreted symbols. This ‘framing’ factor is more pronounced in the theorization and re-theorization of *jihad*.

One of the other possible explanations for Islamism (other than socio-religious movement) is the “clash of civilization” thesis. However, here I would just express my position as to why I didn’t apply this concept while analyzing Islamism in both countries. Religious fundamentalism according to this thesis is believed to emerge when an attempt in providing a “literal cause-and-effect explanations” was made. This is primarily pursued to respond “to the challenges of

modernity.” This thesis by Huntington’s (1993) puts “scientific rationalization” as a challenge to religion in providing “a comprehensive world-view.” Islamic religion became more confronted by the sustained leap in scientific knowledge and found itself in a difficult situation on how to provide alternatives to the successful liberal ideologies behind modern secular states.

The clash of civilization thesis may seem to be an appropriate tool to explain the emergence of Islamic activism as response (clash) to modernism. However, the variety of Islamism that can be identified based on their different theories, cannot allow putting all Islamists to the opposition bloc of civilization. Thus, it becomes more plausible to point out some of the variants and show how its contemporary practitioners in these countries pursued them. Not making an attempt to discuss the variants of Islamism is doing injustice to the explanation of the phenomena.

2.3 Framing ‘Jihad’

Islamists, through framing the various religious symbols and portraying themselves as loyal to the deep-seated Islamic traditions, tried to make their idea of Islamic governance as the best alternatives for reconstructing the state. Some of the literature on Islamism shows the various (re)interpretation of the Prophet Muhammad’s meaning on *jihad* by the Islamists. This undoubtedly resulted in the abstraction of the concept of *jihad*. Notwithstanding this, the Prophet, according to many Islamic writers, “distinguished between the lesser *jihad* (fighting Islam’s enemies on the battlefield) and the greater *jihad* (striving for personal virtue).” After the Prophet, an Egyptian philosopher Sayyid Qutb, opened a new dimension for the meaning of *jihad*. Qutb labeled by other scholars as a “single-handedly responsible for the Islamist re-theorisation of *jihad* as a central element in the struggle” (de Waal, pp.24-30). His writing on

Milestone manifested the new philosophy on *jihad*, which can be considered as a ground breaking development in the extremist world:

“It was also explained that war should be declared against those from among the People of the Book who declare open enmity, until they agree to pay *Jiziyah* or accept Islam. Concerning the polytheists and the hypocrites, it was commanded in this chapter [of the Quran] that *jihad* be declared against them and that they be treated harshly” (Qutb 2006, p.31).

Qutb’s *Milestone* is an influential book in the world of Islamic *jihadism* and rationalized the political struggle therein. Most Islamists later embraced the Qutibist view as the appropriate way to declare the holy war. However Qutibist view on Islamism generally and *jihad* specifically encouraged the activists to be more inclined to ‘lesser’ or violent extremism as opposed to the “non-violent struggle.” As a result of this, Qutb is considered as “the most prominent of those who have sought to reverse this order [Prophet Mohammed’s], and focus on *jihad* as *both* violent combat and personal purification” (de Waal: 24).

Qutb’s reinterpretation of *jihad* is driven by the quest of framing the popular sentiments among the Muslims. With this background I looked into data and analyzed which varieties of Islamism in Sudan and Somalia fitted Qutibist view and how did it affect the variations in ‘stateness.’

CHAPTER 3: POLITICAL ISLAM AND STATE BUILDING PROCESSES

3.1 *Secularization vs. Islamism*

In the late 1950s Sudan faced a dilemma between adopting a Federal or an Islamic system for the purpose of state building. Contrary to what most people expected, Ali Talb-Allah who was the first leader of Sudan's Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikwhan*), opposed the proposal of different state building systems toward North and South Sudan. He was much influenced "by the romantic vision of... north-south unity." On the one hand, the Southern Sudanese represented by Liberal parties, advocated for a Federal system. On the other hand, the North "represented by the *Ikwhan* and the Islamic Front for the Constitution (IFC)" campaigned for an Islamic state. On the year 1957 the Constitution Commission of Sudan rejected both proposals. The political elites in Khartoum regarded "both views as extreme." During these periods, the military regime of General Ibrahim Abboud pursued Islamism and advanced a 'top down' policy of "Arabization and Islamization in the south to counter rising opposition" (El-Affendi 1990, p.373).

The rejection of the Commission and the act of the military elites were seen as un-Islamic, done in the name of Islam. This situation led to the emergence of factionalized and Islamist elites. The Islamists then began to regroup themselves, reinforce their ideology and get the message across the Muslim population. El-Affendi (p.374) also added that the actions of the political authorities in Khartoum "contributed to the downfall of the military regime and also caused Turabi to emerge as the undisputed leader of the *Ikwhan*."

Contemporary Islamic regime in Khartoum also faces an unprecedented challenge, which is related to the need to co-exist with the inescapable independence of the Southern Sudan. The political elites in the North continued to disagree on the basic tenets behind the idea of building an Islamic North Sudan. This study, in the data analysis part clearly demonstrated how the elites

of North Sudan continued to dispute on the adoption of “Islamic laws and how each side understands the rulings of these laws” (Arab Human Development Report of United Nations Development Programme 2009, p.70).

3.2 Hassan Al Turabi's Influence

Dr Hassan al Turabi is categorized as “one of the most outstanding thinkers and practitioners of Political Islam” in Sudan, who is also hailed for “having revolutionized Islamist thinking, making it compatible with the right of women, democracy and arts, and uniting together *Sunni*, *Shi'a* and *Sufi* philosophies” (El-Affendi 1991a). The praise given to al Turabi requires an analysis of the practical achievement of Political Islam in Sudan. However, the ideologies of al Turabi at the first glance might make one to put him in the modernist Islamic school. Nevertheless, as discussed in the last chapter his view matched more to the extremist variant.

Turabi's National Islamic Front party is not the only one to maneuver Islamism in Sudan. The two “Islamic sectarian parties”, i.e., the Umma and Unionist party have been the challengers to Turabi's popular ideologies. Despite differences on political beliefs among the parties they all share the danger of siding with extremists' view. For instance, the leader of the Umma Party (Sadiq el Mahdi) advocated an “anti-secularist” view that is more related with Sayyid Qutb. This phenomenon intensified the competition for power among Sudanese Islamists and opened a door for further theorization and interpretation of concepts like *jihad*. Thus competing with a rivalry of ideas and framing popular grievances for collective political action, explains how Islamists competed for gathering support from the Muslims (de Waal 2004, pp.75-6).

Al Turabi tried to withdraw from his accused position of extremism. His effort to modernize Islamism, and coexist with other political thoughts could not coincide with the theories of New Islamism. If Turabist ideology differs, at least from the extremist conception of violent *jihad*, it then becomes appropriate to praise his contribution as a new dimension in the history of Political Islam. However, Turabi's Qur'anic interpretation of struggles in Islamism could not "obscure his recognition of the role of violence" in the struggle of the movement (de Waal: pp.71-4).

The following excerpt from Turabi's book called *'The Islamic State'* (1983, p.241) shows how he attempted to refrain from the direct wording of violent extremism or 'lesser' *jihad*:

"Religion is based on sincere conviction and voluntary compliance. Therefore an Islamic state evolves from an Islamic society. In certain areas, progress towards an Islamic society may be frustrated by political suppression. Whenever religious energy is thus suppressed, it builds up and ultimately erupts in isolated acts of struggle or resistance which are called terrorist by those in power or revolution."

I would interpret Turabi's view, i.e., 'isolated acts of struggle or resistance' as an indirect endorsement of *jihad*. If this is to mean a non-violent *jihad*, Turabi should give a justification to how 'Islamic society' should respond when authorities become repressive. As discussed in the foregoing section, the argument to the incompatibility of democracy and Islamism became more plausible for Sudan.

Al Turabi remains one of Sudan's influential elite who continued to shape the discourse of the country's politics. Distinguishing New Islamism from extremism as a prevailing variant of Political Islam in Sudan, however, is obscured in the incongruity of al Turab's theory and practices as shown in the last chapter.

3.3 Political Islam in Somalia

Somalia's societies are primarily, "organized according to segmentary lineage principles that divide communities into patrilineal clans." Islam in Somalia has been "one of the horizontal identities that cut across clan lines" (Sage 2001, p.472). Islamism began to build momentum after the country got independence in the 1960s. The first Islamist group that emerged is "*Wahdat al-Shabaab al-Islamiyya* (The Islamic Youth Union) and the *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya* (The Islamic Group)." Both groups "were inspired by Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood", Marchal (2004, p.119) added. This is an evidence for the influence of Muslim Brothers in the region as discussed in the previous chapter.

Among those who wrote on Somalia, Nelson (1982, p.105) pointed out that Islam, "developed in Somalia from the ninth century and 99 percent of the population are Muslims." Despite this fact there are many variants of the movement within the country. The different clans and traditions across the country should be considered as a factor for the emergence varieties of the movement. Contrary to South-Central Somalia, Somaliland has "more cultural bonds with Arab culture" (Marchal 2004, p.116).

Compared to Sudan which is mostly influenced by al Turabi's ideologies, Somalia do not have an influential Islamic scholar who has determined the country's political discourse. The emergences of the different schools are related to the practices that are brought during its trade relations with other countries. According to Marchal Southern Somalia was much "influenced by travelers from Islamic countries like Persia, Yemen, Oman and the Zanzibar Sultanate." It would not be naïve, thus, to assume the Islamic belief diffused from these countries, like Persia, made *Shi'ism* to be dominant. This is in turn likely to develop antagonistic relationship between *Sunni*

and *Shia* Muslims. This is also one of the factors that contributed to the rise of sectarian and militant Islamist groups in Somalia.

However, the phenomena become more complex as “the former British and Italian colonies” of Somalia merge in July 1960. Islamism then took a new fold as the environment opens a new structure for ‘political opportunity.’ Those who thought Political Islam as an alternative for the state to be reconstructed capitalized on the situations after the independence.

Moreover, changes began to emerge when General Mahamed Siyaad Barre became President in a military coup in October 1969. Barre, contrary to the Islamist agenda, started to give priority to “the scientific socialism” and “subsequent modernization agenda of the government.” Thus, the growing of opposition from the Islamic bloc can be anticipated who denounced Barre’s ideologues and promoted an anti ‘scientific socialism’ (Marchal: 118).

Because of the repression of the Islamists by the Barre regime, Islamism could not appear in the fore front of Somalis politics. Islamists were viewed as “religiously backward-oriented people who were siding against progress” (Adam, 1995). For Islamists this is coupled with the dominant discourse, i.e., a clan-based solidarity, thus, making the political space available for pursuing Islamism even so narrow. However, circumstances for the Islamists began to change in the late 1980s when the Siyaad Barre regime started to lose popular support and regime legitimacy because of some factors that Marchal summarizes:

“the defeat by Ethiopia and the collapse of Somali irredentist nationalism; the lack of success in dealing with the opposition without entering into a military confrontation; and his [Barre’s] inability to understand the changing period of the late 1980s where the Cold War was no longer enough to justify international support to a predatory elite” (p.121).

A popular upheaval against Barre's regime started in December 1990 and reached its peak in the next year. It becomes evident that the sustained and unprecedented revolt weakened Barre's regime and finally made it collapse. In January 1991, when the Barre regime toppled in Mogadishu, "Somalia had limped along with no central government" and the country continued to be torn apart by violence. Disastrously, thousands of weapons "fell into the hands of Somali teenagers" (Stevenson 1993, p.138). The period after 1991 exhibited an outbreak of conflict and the start of one of Africa's deadliest civil war.

In the early and mid of 1990, variants of Political Islamism began to emerge. Competition was intensified among the Islamists who want to appear as legitimate representatives of Islam. According to Marchal (pp.125-7), "*al Itihadd al Islaami* became the most visible group" and considered to be the most extremist. Though it is difficult to categorize the emerging Islamist groups in Somalia along ideological lines, most of the Islamists "appear to have the same Islamic references, which include Sayyid Qutb, Amwududi and Hassan al Banna", Marchal noticed. Thus, this variant that traces its origin to the Qutbist ideology represents extremism in Somalia.

3.3.1 Militant Extremism

Somalia continued to be a "collapse polity, which has frequently been cited as a heaven for terrorists and a home to sympathizers of militant Islamists." A repeated peace conferences and attempt to set up a functioning government after 1991 is proved to be not working. The militant Islamists rejected any alternative other than the full application of *shari'a* (Kraxberger 2005, p.60).

Most extremist groups and militant Islamists in Mogadishu, including *al-Ittihad* received financial supports and assistances “from Sudan and Iran, with the former also arranging links between Somali and Saudi Arabian financiers.” Despite the wider implication of Iran’s involvement in the region, this shows that the effect of Sudan’s transnational view of Islamism. This is also the spillover and an ambition of Khartoum to have strong Islamic states in the region. But this ambition has resulted precariously and to some, beyond their expectations. *Al-Ittihad* in Somalia showed a transnational militant endeavor when it spread Islamism “into the Muslim peoples of Ethiopia, notably the Ogadeni and Oromo in the east.” This spillover has made Ethiopia to collaborate with the West, especially the United States, on its fight against “militant transnational Islamism” (Woodward, 2006, p.60).

CHAPTER 4: CONFLICTS, LAWLESSNESS AND ISLAMISM

4.1 Analysis of Stateness in Sudan

The analysis of texts based on the CAST and STINGS indicators in Sudan covers four major areas. These areas are chosen to show the ‘variableness’ in the building blocks of ‘stateness’, i.e., the scope, capacity, and legitimacy of the state vis-à-vis Islamism. The four factors that are identified in Sudan are the conflict between North and South Sudan, the 1989 military coup, the comprehensive *da’wa* (Islamic call) program, the declaration of *jihad*, especially in the Nuba Mountains, and the dispute between President Omer al Bashir and Hassan Al Turabi. The scope of the study, the necessity of providing comprehensive analysis where Political Islam is more salient, and the amount of information gathered on the research topic demanded a focus on the most explainable factors that have brought variations in the ‘stateness’ of Sudan.

4.1.1 The North-South Conflict in Sudan

Like most African countries, state building processes in Sudan and Somalia are shaped by the legacies of policies left by former colonies. The British adopted a policy toward the Southern Sudan which is different from that of North. It was commonly known as “Southern policy” which is implemented between 1930 and 1945. It contributed to the devastation of the country and the partition of the North and South Sudan. This policy of the British “aimed not at creating a non-Islamic culture, but an anti-Islamic one” (El-Affendi 1990, pp.371-382).

One of the core objectives of this policy, according to El-Affendi is to stem “the tide of Islamic expansion” toward South. This colonial legacy believed to ignite “an opposite if not

equal reaction from Muslim northerners” (p.372). It became legitimate for the northerners to respond to “the anti-Islamic bias of the policy by reaffirming the value of Islam.”

As a consequence of this condition the elites in the Southern Sudan took arm and emerged as rebel force against the north. Both groups started to criminalize and delegitimize each other - showing evidence for one of the CAST indicators; Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State. The Sudanese People Liberation Army (SPLA), led by John Garang emerged as the secessionist group that began its struggle in 1983, hence contributing to the ‘Rise of Factionalized Elites’ in Sudan. This political environment became one of the major reasons for the rise of Islamism and civil war in Sudan.

In January 2011, as part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005 between the Khartoum government and SPLA, Southern Sudanese held a historic referendum. An overwhelming turnout led to a 99% vote “for independence... in favor of dividing Africa’s biggest country” (BBC, February 2011). Despite the grave concern over disputed border areas and unsettled refugee issues, Southern Sudan is expected to formally declare its independence in July 2011.

The North-South conflict is both a cause and effect of Islamism in Sudan. The North responded to the policy bias that was implemented in the South and intensified the program of Arabization and Islamisation in a ‘top down’ approach. The resistance and secessionist movement by the SPLA is the reaction to the Muslim and Arab dominated northern part. The legitimacy of the state of Sudan was undermined by this conflict. The conflict and continued delegitimization process carried out by both groups brought a very lower degree of ‘stateness.’

4.1.2 The 1989 Military Coup

When Brigadier Omer al Bashir's took power in June 1989 through a military coup, the role and future of the Islamist party, especially the NIF and its leader Hassan al Turabi was not known. During this unpredictable political situation al Turabi was put in jail "along with other parliamentarians" and his party was banned (de Waal 2004, p.184). President Bashir could not continue leading Sudan by ignoring a coalition and power sharing agreements with the influential Islamist group that was also opposed the ousted regime. Evidencing this, de Waal noticed how the Sudan government appeared as "a coalition between ideologues (Hassan al Turabi, Ali Osman Mohamed Taha) and military officers (General Bashir and Zubeir)."

The Islamists didn't cause the coup but their movement began to gain momentum as a result of it. In the *Roots of Extremism* analysis, BBC (Oct 19, 2001) evidenced that, the "Islamists in Sudan came to power on the back of a military coup, and for a time Sudan became a magnet for militant Islamists for many countries." Representing Islamists, Al Turabi's held a key position as the Chairman of Sudanese National Assembly during the 1990s. Though the Islamists didn't militarily bring down the previous regime from power, they hugely have contributed by allying with the military juntas. They also helped to consolidate political power in the state during the aftermath. The military elites also could have not consolidated the power without the coalition of the Islamists.

Thus, the 1989 coup was one of the Surprises (STINGS indicators) that brought the Islamists to power unexpectedly. Because the coup is the reason for General Bashir's accession to presidency and later Turabi chairmanship in the Assembly, the regime lacked legitimacy thus it undermined one of the building blocks of 'stateness.' Even if the coalition was set up by the two groups, the aftermath of the coup also triggered the emergence of factions and Islamic groups,

showing evidence for STINGS indicators. It later became a reason for the divisions between the Islamists and the military elites, due to ideological differences.

The Islamists were focusing advancing Islamism within Sudan and beyond “to the neighboring states.” The wars and conflicts in the Horn of Africa that destabilized the states for years made the militaries to be suspicious to this Turabi’s ambitions, i.e., the “security implications of antagonizing neighboring states.” However, the military officers latter realized that “a regionally offensive strategy could be an integral part of defining the security of their revolution.” This position of the elites widely ignored the need to aggregate the interests of the larger society and other groups and showed the tactical shift of strategies to consolidate power. However, the militaries were finally convinced that “their regime, and the Islamist project in Sudan, would never be safe unless their revolution could also be exposed to their neighbors.” As a result of this, Sudanese foreign policy toward its neighbors has been “the reflection of the internal power struggle between a ‘realist’ doctrine of foreign and security policy and an ‘Islamist’ school (de Waal: 189-190).

This shows the irrationality of the Sudanese foreign policy, as being the ‘reflection of internal power struggle.’ It also indicates how much delusions Islamism created with regard to foreign policy decisions and international relations. This is one of the circumstances which indicate the Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia (CAST’s indicator).

4.1.3 The Comprehensive da'wa

The Islamists in Sudan called the comprehensive *da'wa* program, a “civilization project (*al mashru' al hadhari*)” which reached its pick in the period of 1992-96. This is an Islamization program that is enforced by the Khartoum government in as a ‘top down’ form, in the pretext of “Islamic social planning.” It simply means a “continuing revolution for the remoulding of the human being and the institutions in society in accordance with Qur’anic guidance” (de Waal: 89). After the implementation, the domestic policy of the Sudanese Islamist School seemed working for few years. The opponent of this program and the arch enemy of the Islamists has always been the Southern People Liberation Army (SPLA).

SPLA was attacked by the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) of Sudan for its rejection of the *da'wa* program. Backed by the military forces, the *da'wa* program was mutually beneficial for the two elite groups in Khartoum, who was able to gain supports from the majority of the Muslims. Imam (1996) pointed out the Islamist’s *da'wa* program is the aim to bring an “*inter alia*, a complete view of making it a living” and also a project to build and reconstruct “all state institutions on principles derived from the Qur’an.” Due to these two factors, the *da'wa* program became an interesting evidence for the relationship between the top down and bottom up simultaneous approach of Islamism.

However, the *da'wa* program is a systematic hybrid of the school of New Islamism and extremism which stood as contrary to what Al Turabi claimed to be. The reason for the necessity of renewing the ‘human being and the institutions’ is the result of the Islamists’ analysis of the present situation. They Muslim land is seen as either corrupted by the rejection of ‘the law of God’ or the ‘western civilization.’ This shows how the theoretical rationalization of the *da'wa*

program by the New Islamists became similar to the extremist's analysis of current affair which blames the wicked (non-Muslims) for being evil.

As it was discussed earlier the unacceptable current situation for the extremists requires 'the complete reversal of the moral order' by making the flight of the non-believers from the territories. According to the New Islamists this is renamed and called as a 'remoulding' of human beings through introducing *da'wa*. The *da'wa* is destined to alleviate the lack of knowledge that Muslims might have toward their faith. Hamad (1995) pointed out one of the goals of the program as the "departure from the reality of ignorance and illiteracy and the actualization of total interaction with the Islamic project." The program also aimed at achieving unity among the system of "education, proselytization [convert one's religion], humanitarian development, economic assistance, and counter-insurgency efforts" (Glickman and Rodman, 2008). It is clear that the attempt to convert one's religion unwillingly (proselytizing) is a violation of basic human rights.

This program showed how the New Islamists tactically pursued their agenda. Thus, the *da'wa* program made the centrists in Sudan destined to have the same objective as the extremists.

4.1.4 Jihad in the Nuba Mountains

In April 27, 1993 a radical Islamist jurists or *mufti* issued a *fatwa*, "a legal report regarding social, juridical or ethical questions" (Jung: 30) against the SPLA rebels in the southern part of Kordofan and its supporters. The SPLA were primarily accused for waging war against Islam. The *fatwa*, thus, asserted the importance of mobilizing resources to wage "*jihad* in order to fight in the war which is taking place in the Southern part of Kordofan State" and hence eradicate the

infidels (Manger 2002 p.133). Villagers in the Nuba Mountain, who opposed the Khartoum government's policy, became one of the targets for the *jihad* according to the *fatwa*. The *jihad* became the strategy for implementing Turabi's agendas and a mechanism of cracking down "all who opposed the campaign" of *da'wa* (Salih 1995, p.75).

The Nuba Mountain devastation and the killings of civilians were like "a step beyond the al *Gama'a al Islamiyya* [Egyptian group] murdering Copts simply because of their faith and the Taliban blowing up Buddhist statues." CAST indicators, especially Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons come as a result of the attack in the Tullishi Mountain (one of Nuba Mountains), between February and May 1992. The war that took place in this region, between the Sudanese force and the SPLA was reported as "one of the most sustained and ferocious battles of the entire war, with day-and-night bombardment of the mountain." It also involved air strikes which were directed daily by the General's Headquarters in Khartoum. The worst situations followed when the civilians in the Nuba Mountain relocates to the Northern part of Kordofan. Their relocation was unplanned and the villagers were "simply dumped, starving and often naked, on the outskirts of towns" showing the Widespread Violation of Human Rights (de Waal: pp.100-1) very low degree of 'stateness.'

Opposition and rebellion against the programs of Sudanese government was taken by the elites as "rebellion against Islam" even if an individual is a Muslim. In its fight against the rebels "the destruction of a mosque by an avowedly Muslim government" become inexplicable for most Muslims. Moreover this appeared to be the "antithesis of his [Turabi's] avowed liberal Islamism" (de Waal: 73).

Another indicator for the Suspension of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights took place when the Islamists started a "forced conscription." As the Sudanese

military force required more men and implementing the “conscription among the townspeople of the North was deeply unpopular... the focus was shifted to marginalized areas and displaced people including street children”. This is one of the devastating situations that Islamism has brought in Sudan according to the report released by African Rights (1995a).

4.1.5 The Split between Hssan al Turabi and Omer al Bashir

It is not long before that Turabi’s “adventurism had led the Sudan government into deep trouble” both with its neighboring countries and the international community. Sudanese isolation and the characterization by the U.S. as a State Sponsors of Terrorism, has also triggered a division between the political elites in Khartoum and brought the continuous Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State. Turabi’s idea was not only establishing “an Islamic government” but also to be an influential “Islamic opposition” within. This adventurist stance of Turabi began to worsen his relationship with President Bashir. Their internal power struggle came to known to the public, when the President on 12th of December 1999 surprisingly imposed a State of Emergency. This decision followed by the suspension of the National Assembly and its Chairman, al Turabi. This “split fatally undermined the legitimacy of the Islamist project in Sudan” and Mr Bashir generally halted Turabi’s “project of a quasi-democratic Islamic state” (de Waal: pp.107-9).

The state of emergency situation clearly indicated the Suspension of the Rule of Law (CAST) that came also as a Surprise, one of STINGS indicators. The military regime’s decision occurred unexpectedly and took the state in to a different dimension. It undermined the legitimacy of the regime and resulted in the very low degree of ‘stateness.’ The alienation of al Turabi and the

disgruntling of his followers also pinpointed to the Spoilers indicators, who might have used violence or other unlawful means to regain power.

This led the both the military officers and the Islamists to continue delegitimizing and criminalizing each other. Turabi accused Bashir of being a “dictator, accompanied by a group obsessed with power and wealth, destroying the fundamentals of the Islamic project” (de Waal: 108).

The aftermath of this split between the two key power players led to the Rise of Factionalized Elites (CAST’s indicators) and this was evidenced when Al Turabi established the Popular National Congress (PNC) party opposing Bashir’s National Congress Party. According to BBC’s (2009) al Turabi also boycotted the parliamentary election in 2000.

4.2 Wahhabism and Militant Islamism in Somalia

This part of analysis on Islamism in Somalia focuses on the main factor that ploughs the state for years and led it in to deeper conflict, i.e., *Wahhabism*. As Sunni Islamism dominated Somali’s society, views expressed toward others belief system as “sects” and “deviants”. *Sufi* Islam is “particularly disliked because of [alleged] saint worship and other idolatrous (*shirk*) acts.” Through the course of time *Wahhabism* in Somalia “evolved into *Salafi jihadism*” that in turn fueled an “intra-Islam conflict” (International Crisis Group 2010, p.3). The activities of the transnational militant group *al-Ittihad al-Islami* are considered to be the reflection of *Wahhabism*.

After the fall of the Barre regime, dozens of Islamic movements have emerged that made a task of classifying them within the three dominant variants of Islamism, difficult. Wary of this

Sage (2001, pp.473-4) warned against “any simple conflation of all politically organized Islamists [in Somalia] as fundamentalists or terrorists.” However, *Al Ittihad*, as influential militant Islamist group ensued “a power struggle between clan based militia-factions across the country.” Sage also noted that fierce struggle in 1991 between *Al Ittihad* and the loyal militias of General Farah Aideed “(mainly drawn from the dominant Hawiye clan)” was took place to control the key town of Kismayo. Because of the aim to rise as dominant military elites, this rivalry among them made the destabilization of the country to be worse. This evidences the Rise of Factionalized Elites (CAST indicator) that contributes to the very low degree of ‘stateness.’

Al Ittihad was not only foes to other clan based movements in Somalia but also posed a potential threat to the neighboring country, Ethiopia. It has linked to the Ogaden National Liberation Front (a secessionist group within the Ogaden region of Ethiopia). The confrontation between the Ethiopian regime and the Islamists reached its climax when in the year 1997 the Ethiopian military crossed Somalia, defeated *Al Ittihad* and drove them out “further south along the West bank of the Juba River” (Sage: 174). This clearly indicated how Islamism brought the Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors to Somalis, as laid down in the CAST’s model.

Marchal (2004, pp.124-7) noted that the year 1992 witnessed the rise of more groups, where “at least seven organizations whose influence were anything but marginal.” Among the sects the dominant are (1) *Ahle Sunna wa Jama’a*, “whose constituency was potentially huge, since it controlled a good number of mosques”; (2) *Ansar-e Sunna*, a *Wahhabi* organization; (3) *Al Majma al Islam* which gathered “true representative of all Muslims within Somalia; (4) *Tabliq* which is known “for its *quietist* proselytism” of which its groups toured the countryside and taught “religion to the local communities”; (5) *Al Islaah* - the interface between Somalis and

international Islamic NGOs”, especially Kuwait. The fourth group that showed a Political quietism represented the idea of the obedience of the Muslims to the authorities, even authoritarian. Such an attitude held by the quietists, is due to the predisposition that a peaceful way of building and reconstructing the state is preferable than a violent strategy that makes everyone to be worse off.

An additional evidence for the indicator (Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors) comes from the United Task Force intervention in Somalia that took place from December 1992 to March 1995. This intervention became a ‘political opportunity’ for the Islamists and the world witnessed how numerous extremist group “developed more during the international intervention than beforehand”, Marchal noticed. Among the groups, the Islamic Courts, led by Sheykh Ali Dheere was highly influential until the Ethiopian intervened militarily in 2006, another CAST indicators for the destabilizing consequences and lower degree of ‘stateness’ due to Islamism.

4.2.1 The Islamic Court and Peace Agreement Experiences

In Somalia, it’s a long existed tradition to apply the “Islamic law as a separate, but complementary system to modern judicial institutions.” After the regime collapse in 1991, however this practice changed and “independent *shari’a* courts” began to emerge as an alternative, mostly in the urban areas. The implementations of the court’s decisions were enforced by the “militia forces” that have also given the mandate of maintaining peace and security in the country. The establishment of the ‘*shari’a* courts’ and the operation of the militias were an “ad hoc mechanism” aimed at bringing relative peace that the people could not have

since 1991. However, this system neither has the indigenous traditional basis nor granted legitimacy by the Somali society (Sage 2005 pp.14-5).

At the beginning the relationship between the Islamists and the establishment of the courts was not clear. Barnes et al (2007, p.2) characterized the setting up of the courts as alien to “Islamist imperative”, “not particularly programmatic” and “not presided over by expert Islamic judges.” Moreover the workings of the courts were not in accordance with any of the Islamic school as the “enforcement of the Courts’ judgment depended on militias recruited from the local clan.” As a result of this practice, the court’s operation was begun to seen in suspicious and concern was raised by regional countries for its affiliation to the extremist group (Sage, p.14).

Two scenarios have dwarfed the progress and workings of the courts. In the period between 1999 and 2000, the Somalia National Peace Conference held in Arta, Djibouti and resulted in the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) of Somalia. President Abdiqasim Salad Hassan became the President of the TNG. This was a significant step to reconstruct the state and bring back a functioning government. However, the TNG could not “control a significant amount of territory” of the country. Most of the representatives of the Somalia’s “milita-faction had refused” the participation in the peace conference. As a result the TNG denied power sharing arrangements with the militias. The TNG, to make things worse, looked for partnership with the civil societies, business people and various groups in the neighboring countries. Thus, the militia-factions including those affiliated to the *shari’a* courts began to oppose the TNG (Sage: 25).

On its few periods of operation in Mogadishu the TNG brought a “temporary decline” to the activities of the “*sahri’a* militias” (Menkhaus 2006, p.38). However, in the mid of 2000 the militant Islamist group called *Al-Shabaab* (the Youth) emerged as a major military force among

the factions and began to fight the forces of the TNG. This further weakened the fragile TNG. As a consequence chaos and lawlessness continued to be seen in the country.

The failure of the attempt to build state in Somalia became evident when the TNG collapsed after four years of experiment. Another agreement was reached in 2004 to form the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). After the TFG formed in Nairobi, Kenya as a result of the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference, it immediately faced “serious internal split and widespread defection.” It is long before “an ascendant Islamist movement” began to wield more power than that of the TFG. The reason for the failure of both the TNG and TFG is the wrong establishment of central government in top down form. This experiment has received criticism as “in-organic state building processes” that shouldn’t take place in the situation like Somalia (Menkhaus: p.77).

However, the Courts experience in Somalia and its attempt to the strict implementation of the *shari’a* is a story of failure. The Courts achieved relative success in terms of security for a very small period of time. Especially in the northern part of Mogadishu “a quasi-normal level” was maintained. This made part of the population of to grant support and recognition to the Courts (Marchal 2004 pp.129-133). It can be seen how this phenomenon affected the variations in ‘stateness.’

One of the reasons for the failure of the Courts was the lack of effective institutions that could enforce and implement the decisions. Marchal (p.136) said that, “thieves, when arrested, were kept in jail for a while and then released. Occasionally, killers arrested on the spot were killed.” The courts experiment, thus, stands as concrete evidence for the Suspension of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights.

The US Commission on International Religious Freedom (2010, p.288) also reported that the continuation of a “serious religious freedom abuse” is the result of “an on-going conflict with a strong sectarian nature.” The Commission also explained the Courts implementation of *shari’a* as the “reminiscent of the Taliban under which practices deemed unIslamic are repressed, *Sufi* clerics and non-Muslims are killed, and *Sufi* religious sites are desecrated.”

CONCLUSION

The thesis has identified the basic thoughts of Political Islam as found in the three Islamic schools, namely Political Quietism, New Islamism and extremism. It pointed out the dangerous of subsuming quietism in the huge and dynamic movement of Islamism. Muslims, who just practice the rituals and does not want to engage in opposing the political authorities, should not be immediately considered as quietists and hence obedient to authoritarianism. They should be identified as undecided citizens who are not participating in the politics of their country for any reasons.

The study provided an empirical and comparative analysis to the relationship between the three schools of Political Islam and state building processes in Sudan and Somalia. The variations within Islamism are examined in their influence on the higher or lower degree of the ‘stateness’ of the countries. Among the three building blocks of ‘stateness’, Political Islam has highly undermined the legitimacy of the different regimes in the two countries. The project of state building and reconstructing on a ‘top down’ approach have found to be a failed attempt in both countries. In Sudan it rather contributed to one of Africa’s deadliest conflicts, massive violation of human rights, rise of factionalized elite, and the separation of North and South Sudan.

The incompatibility of Islamism with democratic theories and the failure of state building processes in Sudan are both theoretical and practical. The implausible characters of the mobilizing ideologies, which are predominantly promoted by al Turabi, become evidenced in failure of their application. The analysis of the basic thoughts of the centrists and the extremists showed a very blurred line that exists between. Without the complete withdrawal of the

transcendental assertion, the differences between the New Islamism and extremism are fluid. This thesis raised the legitimate concern for the practices of Sudanese Islamists as it unpacked their similarity with that of the extremists.

In Sudan, the *ulamas* (Islamic scholars) and the military elites were able to work together till the division between Al Turabi and President Bashir started in the late 1990s. The eloquently written ideologies of al Turabi could not resolve the differences made among the Islamist parties in the country. Thus, at least three dominant Islamic parties emerged as challengers to al Turabi and his party.

A ‘top down’ experiment of Islamism was tested through the ‘comprehensive *da’wa*’ program. The military force of Sudan was participated in its implementation in the Nuba Mountains. *Jihad* was declared even to those Muslims who opposed to the program and they are considered as betrayers. Moreover, destruction of the villagers, the deaths of civilians, forced conscription, and the massive violations of human rights made Islamism a failed alternative to state building processes in Sudan.

The elites and the few *ulamas* are continued to give a lead in evaluating their own performance of the movement, where the vast majority is continued to be dictated by their prevailing assumptions. The Muslim community in Sudan and Somalia should be empowered to evaluate the discourse of the movement that has passed through many tests.

Violent extremism was pointed out by the study, as the prevailing variant of Political Islam in Somalia. Because of the absence of the functioning government since 1991 and the spillover effect of Sudanese Islamism, dozens of militant Islamist groups were able to spread rapidly. *Wahhabism* was found to be one of the reasons for conflict and antagonism, especially expressed toward the *shia* minority.

A zero-sum calculation and absence of compromise by the extremist groups in Somalia is not only manifested toward their foes (the West and non-believers) but also toward the different ideologies held by other Islamists. This together made a huge problem to reconcile the polarized views and interests among the different sects. Countless efforts had been made to reconcile the warring parties. Due to the repeated intervention of regional and international actors, the disputing parties had been suspicious to any deal that was offered during mediation efforts.

The international community, after the humiliating experience of the US military forces in the mission called Operation Restore Hope (1992-1994) in Somalia, became reluctant to commit any peacekeeping mission. This failure of the US intervention in Somalia coined as the “Somalia-effect.” The consequence of this effect not only affected Somalia but also had spillover in other parts of Africa. As a result of this, the international community became so slow to take the necessary and timely “action in the face of the Rwanda genocide of 1994” (Woodward, 2006, p.73).

However, the international community should not plug its ears to the outcry of rights organization, i.e., massive violations of basic human rights and suffering of civilians both in Sudan and Somalia. Analysis to the failed operation by the U.S. military forces in Somalia should result in the lasting mechanism for alleviating lawlessness. These can be made through the proper assessment Political Islam and its varieties in the two countries. Carefully identifying the basic theories behind each Islamists and contrasting it with their practical achievement should be the focus of the assessment.

Two major attempts are made to set up a government in Mogadishu through a ‘top down’ approach. The marginalization of the *shari’a* Courts in the peace conference, that was held in Arta and the conflicts that followed made the TNG to exist only for four years. The present TFG,

which was established in 2004, was able to control the small parts of the country and depended for its protection on the African Union troops. The way the Islamists and the *shari'a* courts tried to restore peace is similar to the failed attempts of the political elite's and international community to set up central governance. They both embraced a 'top-down' approach. This failed experiment should convey a message, both for the elites of the countries and the regional and international actors in their future attempt of state building.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Adam, Hussein M. (1995). Islam and Politics in Somalia. *Journal of Islamic Studies*, 6 (2).
2. African Rights. (1995). *Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan*. London.
3. Al Sudan al Hadith. (1993). A martyr lives. *An independent Sudanese Newspaper*.
4. Al Shaab. (1997). January 24. *Egyptian Daily Newspaper. Cairo, Egypt*.
5. Al Turabi, Hassan. (1983). 'The Islamic State' in John L. Esposito (ed), *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, Oxford University Press.
6. Alex de Waal editor. (2004). *Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa*. Indiana University Press. USA.
7. Ayubi, Nazih N. (1993). *Political Islam. Religion and Politics in the Arab World*. Witwell Ltd, Southport. Great Britain.
8. Baker, Pauline. (2006). *The Conflict Assessment Tool. An Analytical Model for Early Warning and Risk Assessment of Weak and Failing States*. The Fund for Peace. Washington D.C.
9. Baker, Raymon William. (2003). *Islam without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists*. Harvard University Press. USA.
10. Baran, Zeyno. (2008). Turkey Divided. *Journal of Democracy* 91/1, pp.55-69
11. Barkati Net. (2010). History of Islam: From 6th Century to 20th Century. Accessed on Dec 16, 2010. <http://www.barakati.net/english/>
12. Barnes C. and Hassn H. (2007). *The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts*. Briefing Paper. Africa Programme. Chatham House.
13. Bayat, Asef. (2005). Islamism and Social Movement Theory. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 6. Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
14. Beckford, J.A. (2003). *Social Theory & Religion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
15. Besteman, C. (1999). *Unraveling Somalia*. Philadelphia. University of Pennsylvania.
16. Bratton, Michael. (2004). *State Building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Forwards, Backwards, or Together?* African Studies Center. Michigan State University.
17. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (7 February 2011). South Sudan backs independence – results. *NEWS Africa* <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news-africa-12379431>

18. _____ (15 January 2009). Profile: Sudan's Islamist leader. Africa: Country Profile. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3190770.stm>
19. _____ (19 October 2001). Roots of Extremism. World: America. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1609184.stm>
20. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (2011). World Fact Book. ISSN 1553-8133. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/su.html>
21. Choueiri, Youssef M. (1990). Islamic Fundamentalism. Printer Publishers Limited. London.
22. Dickson, David. (2005). Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Need for a New Research and Diplomatic Agenda. United States Institute of Peace.
23. El-Affendi, Abdelwahab. (1991a). Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan, London: Grey Seal.
24. _____ (1990). Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemma for Islam in Africa', African Affairs, 89, 371-89.
25. _____ (1990). Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemmas for Islam in Africa. African Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 356, pp. 371-389. Oxford University Press.
26. Evans, Peter. (1997). The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization. World Politics, Vol. 50 No. 1 pp 62-87). The Johns Hopkins University Press.
27. Flint, John. (1983). Planned Decolonization and Its Failure in British Africa. Oxford University Press.
28. Foreign Policy. (2011). The Failed States Index 2010. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/the_failed_states_index_2010. Accessed 22/05/2011.
29. Glickman H. and Rodman E. (2008). Islamism in Sudan. Middle East Review of International Affairs. Vol. 12, No. 3.
30. Hamad, Ordesse. (1995). On NIF Ideological Indoctrination and Islamist Education Programmes. Alwah, Journal of Sudanese Writers and Journalists in UK.
31. Hansen, H. and Kainz P. (2007). Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology: A Comparison of Sayyid Qutb's Islamism with Marxism and National Socialism.

- Totoalitarian Movements and Political Religions. Vol. 8, No. 1, 55-76. University of Pasau.
32. Hudson, Valerie M. (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc. United Kingdom.
 33. Huntington, Samuel P. (1993). *The Clash of Civilizations?* Published by the Council on Foreign Affairs. Summer 1993 Vol. 72. No. 3.
 34. Huwaidy, Fahmy. (1993). *Islam and Democracy*. Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Publications and Translations.
 35. Imam, Zakaria Bshir. (1996). *From the Laws of Dynamism in the Holy Koran: Social and Economic Planning*. Al Inqaz al Watani.
 36. Inglehart, R. (1990). Values, Ideology, and Cognitive Mobilization in New Social Movements. In Dalton, R. J. and Kuechler, J. *Challenging the Political Order. New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.
 37. International Crisis Group. (2010). *Somalia's Divided Islamists*. Policy Briefing, No. 7. Nairobi/Brussels.
 38. Jung, Dietrich. (2007). *Islam and Politics: A Fixed Relationship? Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 16, No. 1, 19-35. Danish Institute for International Studies.
 39. Kepel, G. (2004). *The War for Muslim Minds*, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
 40. Kraxberger, Brennan M. (2005). *The United States and Africa: Shifting Geopolitics and in an Age of Terror*. *Africa Today*. Vol. 52, No. 1, pp.47-68
 41. Laitin, david D. (1998). *Political Culture and Political Preferences*. *American Political Science Review*.
 42. Larrabe, F. Stephen. (2007). *Turkey Rediscovered the Middel East*. Kurdish Institute of Paris. <http://www.institutkurde.org/en/info/turkey-rediscovered-the-middle-east--1216228619.htm>. Accessed 17/05/2011.
 43. Lewis, Bernard. (1980). *The Ottoman Empire and Its Aftermath*. *Journal of Contemporary History*. Vol. 15, No. 1. Imperial Hangovers. Sage Publications, Ltd.

44. _____ (1983). On the Quietist and Activist Traditions in Islamic Political Writing. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London*, Vol. 49, No.1. Cambridge University Press.
45. Magd, Kamal Abul. (1991). *A Contemporary Islamic Vision: Declaration of Principles* (Cairo: Dar al Shuruq).
46. Marchal, Roland. (2004). *Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War*. (Chapter 5 *Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa*, in de Waal (ed)
47. Manger, Leif Ole. (2002). *Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies* (2001-2). Department of History, Lancaster University. United Kingdom.
48. Mayring, Philipp. (2000). *Qualitative Content Analysis. Forum: Qualitative Social Research (FQS)*. Volume 1. No. 2 Art. 20.
49. Menkhaus, Kenneth John. (2006). *Governance without Government in Somalia Spoilers, Sate Building, and the Politics of Coping*. *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 3. The MIT Press.
50. Ministry of National Planning & Development of Somaliland. (2010). *Somaliland in Figures*. Edition 7.
51. Nelson, H. (1982). *Somalia: A Country Study*. Washington D.C: US Government.
52. Nettl, J. P. (1968). *The State as a Conceptual Variable*. *World Politics*, Vol. 20 No. 4, pp.559-592. Cambridge University Press.
53. Qutb, Sayyid. (2006). *Milestones Ma'alim fi'l-tareeq*. Edited by A.B. al-Mehri. Maktabah Booksellers and Publishers. Birmingham – England.
54. _____ (1990). *Milestones. Revised Translation*. Indianapolis, IN: American Trust Publications.
55. _____ (1974). *Islam. The Religion of the Future*. Delhi: Markazi Maktaba Islami.
56. _____ (1964). *Milestones*. Damascus: Dar al-Ilim, no publishing date; first published 1964.
57. Rahaman, Fazlur. (1982). *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition*. University of Chicago Press.
58. Rothchild, Donald. (2000). *The Impact of U.S. Disengagement on African Intrstate Conflict Resolution*. In *Africa World Politics: The African State System in Flux*, 3rd ed.

59. Roy, O. (2004). *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*, New York: Columbia University Press.
60. Sage, Andre Le. (2005). *Stateless Justice in Somalia: Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives*. Henry Dunant Center for Humanitarian Dialogue. Geneva, Switzerland.
61. _____ (2001). Prospects for Al Itihad & Islamist Radicalism in Somalia. *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 89, State of the Union African in 2001.
62. Salih, M. A. Mohamed. (1995). Resistance and Response: Ethnocide and Genocide in the Nuba Mountains, Sudan', *GeoJournal*, 36, 71-8.
63. Shaw M., Timothy. (1982). *Beyond Neo-Colonialism: Varieties of Corporatism in Africa*. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 2. Cambridge University Press.
64. Stevenson, Jonathan. (1993). Hope Resorted in Somalia? *Foreign Policy*, No. 91 Washington post. Newsweek Interactive.
65. Tarrow, Sidney. (2011). *Power in Movement: Revised and Updated Edition*. Cambridge University Press.
66. The National Terror Alert Response Center. (2010). Petraeus – Capturing Osama bin Laden still a Primary Goal. <http://www.nationalterroralert.com/2010/08/15/petraeus-capturing-osama-bin-laden-still-a-primary-goal>. Accessed on 16/12/2010
67. Tibi, Bassam. (2009). Islamism and Democracy: On the Compatibility of Institutional Islamism and the Political Culture of Democracy. *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 135-164.
68. United Nations Development Programme. (2009). *Arab Human Development Report*. (2009). *Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries*.
69. United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. (2010). *Annual Report (Covering April 1, 2009 – March 31, 2010)*. Washington, DC.
70. Woodward, Peter. (2006) *US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa*. University of reading, UK.
71. World Bank/International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2005). *Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics*.