Overcoming Ethnicity- Student Protests, Nationalism and New Solidarities

by

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Submitted to

Central European University

Nationalism Studies Program

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Advisor: Professor Anton Pelinka

Budapest, Hungary

2011

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor, prof. Anton Pelinka, for encouraging me to continue working on this topic, and also to the students of Zagreb and Tuzla, without whom this thesis would not have been possible.

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Table of Contents

Introduction

In 1991, with the declaration of Independence of Croatia and Slovenia, the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia starts to disintegrate, which yields in ethnic conflicts, which later will define the demographic and political constitution of its successor states. The most drastic and obvious example of course would be Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, with the emergence of ethic conflict, i.e. violence, and the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina was to become a consociation democracy, which is best in its terms described by the Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart, whose model I will follow in this thesis. Due to the nature of a consociation democratic system a reification of ethnic identity emerged, it is safe to say that the importance of ethnicity, or in this case nationality was not reinvented but rediscovered. This is not true only for Bosnia and Herzegovina but also for its neighbor to the west, Croatia. This occurrence facilitated the dominance of nationalist politics in both of the countries, and in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, coupled with a consociation democracy, further deepening the ethnic cleavages present. One particular aspect of society is suffering in such a setting, that being civic society. If we observe the voting statistics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we will see that each of the constituent peoples will vote for the representative of a certain ethnicity[1]. Even more so, given that there is a great Diaspora of Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina with Croatian citizenship, but residency, or even citizenship in the former country, they are entitled to voting rights in both countries, thus having a substantial influence on the election outcomes. This results in, as Boris Buden[2] points out, a widespread cynicism and general lethargy

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[1] For more information on this visit
http://www.ccbh.ba/public/down/USTAV_BOSNE_I_HERCEGOVINE_engl.pdf (last accessed: 04/28/2011)
[2] Buden, Boris. *Zone des Übergangs: vom Ende des Postkommunismus*. Suhrkamp, 2009.

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amongst the public, especially the intelligentsia and the youth, i.e. students. However, in another text that was used as the foreword for the *Occupation Cookbook*[3], he says:

> *...they are fighting this very difference, that is to say the hegemony that forces us do differentiate the world in such a manner. Solidarity is neither the prerequisite nor the product of this struggle, but its actual form.*

Here he claims that solidarity is not to be neglected, and that this should not only be applied to particular struggles, but to society in general. Here I wish to turn to the case study I am going to be looking at during this thesis, and how such an act can aid in overcoming ethnic cleavages, thus generating new solidarities amongst people, not only on a transnational basis, but very much so, as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on a local one. I am talking about the student protests in Zagreb, Croatia in the spring of 2009, and how they were transposed to a university in Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina. We will see how exactly through the dynamics of acts such as these student protests, and their decision making model, which they denominated as the *Students Plenum*, the importance of things like ethnicity or nationality will be rendered unnecessary, thus yielding in the creation of an unified and to a great extent egalitarian public sphere. As the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas[4] puts it, the chief aim of democracy is to reach a consensus and that such a consensus is only possible if people leave aside their particular differences, or interests (nationality, class, ethnicity etc.) and act as rational beings.

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[3] The 'manual' for protesting written by the students of the University of Zagreb. For more information, or the entire cookbook visit http://slobodnifilozofski.org/?p=1915/#0 (last accessed: 04/28/2011)

[4] Habermas, Jürgen. *Toward a rational society: student protest, science, and politics*. Beacon Press, 1971.

In chapter one of the thesis, by looking at different theories of hegemony, pioneered authors such as Antonio Gramsci[5], Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe[6], how exactly it is created and how it influences everyday life in a more general sense. We will see how democracy in settings like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, is actually given a 'hegemonized' content due to both the political and the public sphere with the implementation of nationalist doctrines. This is most visible in Bosnia and Herzegovina due to the ethnic composition of the country, but also in Croatia with regard to its nation-building process after 1990. This claim will be evident in the interviews of the student protestors and the status quo. Another aspect, I wish to look at are some of the personal stories of ethnic and national discrimination students were facing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the second part of the chapter, I will be looking at the very dynamics of the protests, which I believe are crucial in helping us to understand how these student protests serve in overcoming the aforementioned ethnic cleavages, but also in how they aid in creating new spaces of solidarity. Here I will rely on Sidney Tarrow's [7]concept of modular collective action as he discusses, that as opposed to types of old social movements, the new ones will rely on similar repertoires i.e. social settings which are easily transferable from one setting to another, thus making them very effective. On another note, through the aforementioned interviews, we will see what mattered to the students more, the creation of the decision making structure under which they operate, or the empirical goals under which they justified the protests. I will also rely upon Robert D. Putnam's conception of social capital which[8] he discusses in his works, and the interrelation it

[5] See Gramsci, Antonio, and Joseph A. Buttigieg. *Prison Notebooks*. Columbia University Press, 2010.

[6] See Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. *Hegemony and socialist strategy: towards a radical democratic politics*. Verso, 2001.

[7] Tarrow, Sidney G. *Power in movement: social movements and contentious politics*. Cambridge University Press, 1998.

[8] See Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti. *Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton University Press, 1994.

has with Tarrow's concept of modular collective action. With regard to the aspects of new solidarities I will rely on the theories of Jacques Derrida who in his essays[9], where he claims that the principle of truth remains the core of the university's resistance, therefore making it the perfect space of as Rogers Brubaker calls it *cross-ethnic*[10] solidarity.

In chapter two, I will be looking at the decision making process the students implemented in their plenary sessions. A first reading of this occurrence might appear at what Robert A. Dahl[11] considers to be a theoretical democratic utopia, namely in this case, the demos is not bound by any social constraints, anyone who believes to have something valid to say, or who believes is affected by the decisions can participate in the plenary sessions. The students themselves claim that their model is a direct democratic one, however, as we will see through the theoretical explanations by Chantal Mouffe[12], we will not be able to assume it being directly democratic, but rather a hybrid of a deliberative democracy and Mouffe's conception of agonistic pluralism. Of course there is a fear as authors such as Robert E. Goodin or Philip Petit[13] point out that there is a danger of the disenfranchising of minority opinions, or even their assimilation into the majority opinion. We will see how this model deals with these issues through its own dynamics, hence appearing to successfully overcome the paradox of democracy. For the second part of this chapter I will be looking at some of the interviews I conducted with former and current student activists who participated in the protests in both of the countries, I will also be looking at interviews conducted with the status quo to see whether they believe that such a decision making process will actually be

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[9] See Derrida, Jacques, and Peggy Kamuf. "University Without Condition" in *Without alibi*. Stanford University Press, 2002.

[10] See Brubaker, Rogers. *Ethnicity without groups*. Harvard University Press, 2004.

[11] See Dahl, Robert Alan. *Democracy and its critics*. Yale University Press, 1989.

[12] See Mouffe, Chantal. *The democratic paradox*. Verso, 2000.

[13] See Goodin, Robert E., and Philip Pettit. *Contemporary political philosophy: an anthology*. Wiley-Blackwell, 2006.

completely inclusive, and will not serve to marginalize people by creating certain groups which therefore opt for similar ideological enclaves within the process. I also want to show how within the status quo group in Bosnia and Herzegovina the stance towards such acts and civic duties in general shifted from quite cynical to rather optimistic, hence how it aids in eliminating, i.e. not leading to interethnic conflicts, as a first view on Lijphart's writings might suggest.

Chapter three will be dealing with the implications the protests had in both of the countries thus far. I will use critical discourse analysis to look at some of the interviews from the third interest group, this being the opposition to the student protestors, i.e. the official institutional sides, such as the student unions of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. We will see that the stance of the opposition groups, as with most institutional organizations will always take, in the case of Croatia a rather populist turn, whereas in Bosnia and Herzegovina it will still remain under a reconciled ethno-national pretence.[14] I will also be looking at one of the latest developments with regard to the institutional sphere, namely the case of the Croatian Student Union intervening in the internal politics of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, given that there is a great number of students in Croatia, who are from Herzegovina, therefore ethnic Croats, they are considered to be rather conservative, in possession of Croatian citizenship, and very pro-Croatia oriented. They decided to petition CIK BiH (Centralni Izborni Komitet Bosne i Hercegovine, English, The Central Voting Committee of Bosnia and Herzegovina) to review the votes for the last presidential elections in 2010, under pretences to stop the assimilation of the Croats, since the representative for the Croat people President Željko Komšić, does not belong to a national party but is a social democrat, and therefore considers himself a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and not ethnically affiliated

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[14] Here it is important to notice that this reconciliation is just the official stand point, whereas in reality as the interviews of the opposition will show, the societies seem to be reconciled as long as there is no need of any form of interaction between the ethnic groups.

with any of the constituent groups. This is a clear example of a direct interference of a third party foreign organization, which by its own constitution must adhere to be apolitical, and where members must not be affiliated to any political parties because a conflict of interests might occur. I will talk about this case much more in detail later on in the thesis.

The approach I intend to use in the analysis of the opposition interviews, and the rhetoric used in writings referring to the above mentioned case interviews is the Viennese approach to critical discourse analysis, developed by Ruth Wodak, Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl and others[15]. On another note in this chapter I will be looking at what these protests have done with regard to civic society, the key question here would be in fact to ask what was the main goal of these protests, either to fulfill the empirical goals set forth by the students, i.e. in both cases a free education for everyone, or the establishment of a decision making structure such as the student plenum which will be the mediator in all levels of society, and why this is considered to be not desirable by the hegemonies in both of the countries.

In short, this thesis will aim to answer some of the following questions, firstly, will this act of student protests enable a political situation which will start yielding in a post nationalist structure as discussed by Jürgen Habermas, or will it take a turn into a more liberal view of nationalist coexistence, as discussed by authors such as David Miller. Secondly, what does such an act do with regard to the civic traditions in ethnically divided societies; will it aid in rediscovering them, or even reinvent them? Thirdly and finally, is the model as implemented by the student protestors a more acceptable solution when it comes to bridging inequalities, and will it therefore yield in the creation of new solidarities in ethnically divided settings such as Bosnia and Herzegovina?

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[15] See Wodak, Ruth, Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl, and Karin Liebhart. *The discursive construction of national identity*. Edinburgh University Press, 2009.

With this thesis I do not wish to give any predictions of what will happen, neither do I wish to say that we should turn to such a decision making model if everything else fails, I simply want to give an account on what has been done so far regarding the current discontent caused by ethnic and national segregation, the reason is two-fold, first of all, this is a particularly young occurrence, therefore needing time to unfold completely, secondly it still is gaining in its own momentum, and therefore cannot be predicted where it will stop, that is to say if it will remain only in the arena of the university, or will it spread to other levels of society as well, but thus far it tends to be very optimistic.

Research Methodology

Before I go into the thesis, I first need to explain on how I approached the research part. I will resort to Robert Lawrence Neuman's definition of a case study, which seemed the most suitable for this thesis, namely Neuman states:

> *Research that is depth examination of an extensive amount of information about very few units or cases for one period or across multiple periods of time… In case study, a researcher may intensively compare two or more cases or compare a limited set of cases, focusing on several factors. Case study uses the logic of analytic instead of the enumerative induction. In it, the researcher carefully selects one or a few cases to illustrate an issue and analytically study it (or them) in details.*[16]

Following this definition I chose to examine the case of the student protests in Zagreb and in Tuzla in 2009. The method for gathering the necessary information fort he case study, I applied were a mix of structured and semi-structured interviews. I designated three target or interest groups in the case study:

a. Student protestors and their supporters

b. The opposition to the protests (mostly university teachers and official representatives of the student body)

c. The Status quo.

For each of the groups a different set of questions was prepared, to which I will come in a bit, but first of all I need to explain on how I went on with the sampling for the respective groups. Originally one could say that my approach to the sampling resembled the snowball model, however it is a bit different, since I did it only in the initial phases when I was looking for

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[16] Neuman, William Lawrence. *Basics of social research: qualitative and quantitative approaches*. Pearson/Allyn and Bacon, 2006.

potential candidates using networking. However, in the end the selection of some candidates was to some extent done through networking.

With regard to the student protestors in Zagreb, it was fairly simple, I attended a plenary session (the 124th so far) where at the end of the main discussion I introduced myself said that I was writing a thesis on the dissociation of democracy and the nation state; and asked for volunteers and left my contact information, within the next hour, I received some ten replies from students, five of which came from the department of humanities and social sciences, whereas the other five came from other departments such as mechanical engineering, political sciences, biology etc., out of these ten candidates due to time constraints I chose five for the interviews, two of the candidates came from humanities, and three came from natural sciences respectively. All of these students provided rather similar answers, which proved to be a quite coherent sample, with a minimum of diverging opinions. Regarding the student protestors in Tuzla, since it was the exam period and the plenary sessions did not take place, I sent an e-mail to the student protestors group mail account, which counts over 2500 members for now. I received about the same number of replies as in Zagreb and also due to limited time I chose five candidates, this time three of the students came from the faculty of economics, and two of them from English and German literature.

Regarding the opposition, in both Zagreb and Tuzla, I had the same method, prior to going to the respective cities, I sent an e-mail to the both the universities in Zagreb and in Tuzla (which also are group mail addresses) and asked for volunteers to talk to me the same issue I asked the student protestors, i.e. the dissociation of the nation state and democracy. From Zagreb, I received replies from two university teachers, and five replies from members of the student union. Again I chose only five candidates, and the answers again were quite homogeneous. In Tuzla however I received only four replies from members of the student union there, and interviewed them.

9

Lastly, the status quo was the most difficult category with regard to sampling, and I had quite a small number of candidates, but nevertheless included these as part of the research. Students of the sociology department in Zagreb showed me the method I used in sampling of this group, since they have done something similar right after their first occupation of campus. Namely I created an ad on social networks on the Internet such as Facebook and Twitter, in which I asked: *Studying? Protesting? You don't care? Would you like to share why?* This was rather unfruitful in Tuzla, but worked well in Zagreb, where I received some 50 replies, and again chose five candidates who were mostly students. Something interesting happened with this category, even though I asked a different set of questions, most of the candidates were very pro-protest oriented, and lead me to assume that the status quo is actually in support of the protests. In Tuzla however, I only got two responses from former students, who shared rather personal experiences with me, regarding ethnic discrimination in class, but again due to time constraints I did not have the time verify the truthfulness of their stories, however I decided to include them in this thesis, due to the character of the content.

With regard to the naming of the candidates in the research, i.e. publishing their real names, I had the consent of some of the candidates, especially the opposition to publishing their names, but I decided not to for two reasons:

1. Regarding my own involvement in the happenings of the student community in Tuzla, I had to mask some of the intentions I had on what to do with the interviews, since only the opposition interviews were meant for critical discourse analysis whereas the interviews with the student protestors and status quo were intended to support some of the claims I had.

2. I simply did not wish to have on one hand anonymous interviewees and on the other someone's entire information.

10

I approached this issue from Neuman's point of view who on the claim of confidentiality states:

A researcher learns intimate knowledge that is given in confidence. He or she has a moral obligation to uphold the confidentiality of data. This includes keeping information confidential from others in the field and disguising members' names in field notes. Sometimes a field researcher cannot directly quote a person. One strategy is instead of reporting the source as an informant, the researcher can find documentary evidence that says the same thing and use the document (e.g., an old memo, a newspaper article, etc.) as if it were the source of information.[17]

However, since the interviews do not contain the names of the candidates, and I was given consent to publish them, I will upload them on a website, with the full transcripts and translations.

Finally I wish to list the questions I asked in all three categories:

A. Student protestors and their supporters:

1. In your opinion, what do the following mean: a nation, ethnicity, and democracy.

2. Do you think democracy must necessarily be defined through something we call the nation or, does the nation need be defined through democracy?

3. If yes, do you think there is a way to dissociate one from another, and what would that be?

4. With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, you know that the ethnic cleavages, which had some importance in Yugoslavia, gained more importance now, and therefore were deepened, do you see any possibility of overcoming these, do you think that a model generated through the protests can help in achieving that?

5. Moving on to the protest, what do you think was more important, the goals under which you formulated the protests, or the structure you established with regard to decision-making?

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[17] Ibid.

11

6. If I understand the structure of the plenum correctly, it serves as a political arena, which is, characterized through a complete inclusiveness, therefore an, so to speak egalitarian society, how true do you think this is?

7. What do you think these protests contributed with regard to civic citizenship in your country?

8. What kind of image of your country do these protest send to the international community do you think, if any?

9. Final remarks

B. The opposition

All the questions remained the same as in the first group; however, there was an additional one:

1. Do you think that the democratic process is allowed to function properly in settings like the Yugoslav successor states? If yes/no, why?

C. The status quo

This is where I opted to have a semi structured interview, where I encouraged the candidate to tell me their story, while steering the conversation in a direction towards democracy and nationalism, and much later on in the interview, when they felt comfortable enough in the conversation I asked a question whether they know someone who has been discriminated against.

This is a brief overview of how I went on with the sampling of information on the subject of the thesis, however I have to note that out of the total twenty-seven interviews I conducted, for the sake of the length of this thesis I used only seven. The other interviews and their transcripts will be available on a website, which can be found in the bibliography section of this thesis.

Chapter 1

The Post-War Period and the Student Protests

This chapter will be dealing with the key aspects that lead to the protests but also with the dynamics of the protests themselves. I will be looking at the broader political settings in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the post war period, in order to gain better insight with regard to the reasons of the current importance of nationalist politics in the two respective countries, and how it implicates not only civic society, but other aspects of life as well, such as education. I will also be looking at personal stories of students from Bosnia and Herzegovina who were discriminated against on the basis of ethnicity, but also at some interviews I have conducted with current and former student protestors, as well as the status quo, and how they view the influence the protests had on the public sphere in general.

The Setting

As mentioned before, with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, a reification of ethnic identity in all of its successor states became evident, the two examples I wish to single out here are Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The process of this reification is quite peculiar in these two countries, first of all with Croatia, with regard to its secession process, where there was a nationalist undertone provided by the as in the political discourse in Croatia. The reason for that being the HDZ (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, English: The Croatian Democratic Union), is as the name says a national party, which is center right-wing and conservative. The HDZ was formed in 1989 by Croatian nationalist dissidents headed by Franjo Tuđman, who himself claimed to be inspired by Tatcherism[18], later the party defined itself as Christian democratic, however, the main ideology of the party was nationalist. This is

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[18] Tatcherism describes the conviction politics, social and economic policies of British Conservative politician Margaret Tatcher (in office from 1979-1990)

evident with regard to many things, one I would like to point out here is the revival of the current legal tender in Croatia, the Kuna, which was introduced in the Nazi state of Independent Croatia in 1941. Secondly, if we talk about Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1992, with the declaration of independence, the then Serb members; mostly consisting of the Serb Democratic Party, of Parliament under the leadership of Radovan Karadžić[19], backed by Slobodan Milošević[20], started to mobilize the troops of the Yugoslav National Army in an effort, as Karadžić said, to not lead Bosnia and Herzegovina to hell, and save the Muslim people from extinction[21]. Naturally, ethnic conflict followed soon after which lasted for almost four years. In 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement ended the conflict, and Bosnia and Herzegovina became a consociation democracy[22], with a presidency consisting of representatives for the three predominant ethnicities in the country. Such a political atmosphere with regard to the past and current ethnic tensions served to deepen the ethnic cleavages that in post-socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina have been reified.

As we can see from these examples, the importance of what we can call ethnic identification has great influence, not only in the political, but also in other aspects of everyday life. One of these being the educational sphere, in this case higher education, or the idea of the university as such. However, there is one quite new occurrence, which is believed to bridge the current ethnic lacuna in societies such as Bosnia and Herzegovina. I am talking about the student protests, which arguably can be viewed as an example of what Chantal

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[19] Leader of the Bosnian Serbs
[20] The President of SFRY after Tito
[21] This is a paraphrase of a speech Karadžić gave in Parliament in 1991, the entire speech available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xtk5LG8xvfw (last accessed: 05/04/2011)
[22] See Lijphart, Arend. "Consociational Democracy." *World Politics* 21, no. 2 (January 1, 1969): 207-225. & Lijphart, Arend. *Patterns of democracy: government forms and performance in thirty-six countries*. Yale University Press, 1999.

Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau call hegemonic struggle[23]. In the next section of this chapter we will look at why and how the protests transpired, but also why they can be viewed as examples of hegemonic struggle.

The Problems

Before I go into the theories surrounding the spread of the protests and hegemonic struggle, I believe it is important to say something about the backgrounds of both the protests in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, in April 2009, students of the faculty of humanities and social sciences at the University of Zagreb launched a campus-wide occupation, as a reaction to the increase of tuition fees, and a general dissatisfaction with the official representation of the entire student body, which was carried out by the Student Union of the University of Zagreb. Due to corruption, and an enormous influence of nationalist political parties, such as the HDZ, one could only become a member of the Student Union if one were a party member, and preferably being ethnically Croat coming from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The occupation of the campus lasted thirty-five days, when students finally voted to suspend the occupation. During the occupation, no regular classes were to be held, but the university continued to function, the administrative services were still working, whereas there were alternative lectures, by activists, NGO members, etc. in the classrooms. Every evening during the occupation a plenary session would be held, where in a direct democratic manner the participants[24] voted on how to proceed in the days to come. A couple of weeks later it was decided to suspend the occupation for the time being, so that the students could take their exams. After the summer break in November 2009 the unofficial student

[23] See Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. *Hegemony and socialist strategy: towards a radical democratic politics*. Verso, 2001

[24] I am deliberately using the word participant and not student, since the sessions were open to anyone, not only students.

initiative became known as the Students Plenum, voted to continue the occupation, this time however, it lasted only two weeks, when the Student Union voted to hand over the executive power of student representation over to the Plenum.

Following this example, students at the faculty of philosophy at the University of Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina, decided they should also mobilize, however, some of their reasons were slightly different from the ones of their colleagues in Zagreb. Two months after the events in Zagreb an informal group of students came together in order to mobilize for equality and free education, the goals under they framed the protests were (1) Kasarna studentima (The Barracks to the students)[25] (2) Free education for everyone. However, some of the problems the students addressed with the second goal in particular, was the discrimination on an ethnic basis that has been going on for years at the respective university. The students managed to occupy the campus of the faculty of philosophy for one day, where they established the Students Plenum, as the highest representative tool of the students, and claimed to delegitimize the student union (Studentska Unija)[26], which by majority opinion of the students operated as an oligarchy, and did not serve to protect the rights and interests of students. The case of the student union in Tuzla is the same as the case of the union in Zagreb. After the occupation of the campus however, one more plenary session was held at the faculty of law in Tuzla, ten days later, after which the federal government of Bosnia and Herzegovina decided on handing over jurisdiction of the aforementioned barracks to the canton government of Tuzla.

As we have seen in the previous section, with regard to the historical and political context within Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, a certain type of subordination to

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[25] More information available at http://studentskiplenum.blogger.ba/ (last accessed: 05/04/2011)

[26] More information available at http://studentskiplenum.blogger.ba/ (last accessed: 04/04/2011)

16

nationalist doctrines. I would like to define this as hegemonic subordination. Hegemony, as its name suggests comes from the Greek word *hegemon*, which means leader, and can be described as the political, ideological or cultural power utilized by a dominant group over others. According to Mouffe and Laclau, hegemony is in need of majority consent to keep the dominant group in power. If we take into account the concept of interpellation[27], which, as the French philosopher Louis Althusser states, constitutes the subject, as we will see further on in the section, this consent is given unconsciously. Taking into account Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the consociation system, as described by Arend Lijphart[28], under which the state is formed, this indeed may be proven to be true. Evidence from that can be taken from voting statistics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where we clearly can observe the choice people make towards their ethnically affiliated party, namely in 90% of the cases, up until the last general elections in 2010, Bosniaks will vote for a Bosniak, Croats for a Croat, Serbs for a Serb and so forth[29]. We can clearly see that this is perpetuated through the consociation system, thus reifying the ethnic differences from the past. Donald Horowitz, in his article claims *Conciliatory Politics and Constitutional Process in Post-conflict States* that consociation can lead to the reification of ethnic divisions, given that grand ethnic coalitions, due to intra-ethnic competition, will become unlikely, and that the very act of forming multi-ethnic coalitions will provide space for intra-ethnic competition. Coming back to Althusser and his concept of interpellation, or as some refer to as hailing, this ethnic competition i.e. division is enabled, thus going further and further in dividing the population.

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[27] Althusser defines interpellation as the process by which ideology addresses the pre-ideological individual, thus effectively producing them as a subject proper.

[28] See Lijphart, Arend. "Consociational Democracy." *World Politics* 21, no. 2 (January 1, 1969): 207-225.

[29] More information on the voting statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina are available at http://www.izbori.ba/eng/default.asp (last accessed: 05/04/2011)

With regard to Croatia, we can observe the same principle of interpellation, only through other means. Given that in the case of Croatia we are dealing with constitutional nationalism, which according to Robert M. Hayden*, was asserted as an openly anti-communist doctrine by the nationalist parties, especially in Croatia, hence basing their politics mostly on chauvinism[30]. Thus one may assume that this sort of nationalism, can result in a form of cultural hegemony, a term coined by the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci, who says that a culturally diverse society can be ruled or dominated by one of its social classes, it is the dominance of one social class over the other. He also claims that the ruling class will become to be seen as the norm, as the universal ideologies supposedly benefiting everyone, whilst really only benefiting the ruling class[31]. If we take a look at post-war Croatia, but also Bosnia and Herzegovina, we are indeed able to observe this. In an interview I conducted with a student protestor from Zagreb, when asked the question whether or not an act such as these student protests can aid in overcoming the reified ethnic cleavages in Croatia but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus disassociate democratic decision making from the nation state he answered:

> *I am going to be extremely perverse and honest with this answer, namely, Croatia has solved it's national i.e. ethnic question with the Serbs by means of ethnic cleansing, so this problem was solved easily with militaristic means, which I don't agree with, and I believe no one should agree with, so there are no real national minorities in the context of the nation state, where the other nationalities are more or less minorities. I guess, this question is much easier to answer in the context of 2009 in my opinion, so the issue is that there is something that is superseding the national question, which is more or less solved, with things like "Oluja" etc. so that question is solved. Similarly, with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the privatization is applied in the cruelest way, and the national contamination of the political community, no importance is attributed to the social question of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Croatia, in the last year, there were worker strikes, which I guess is not dominant in the political discourse, this is evident in Bosnia and Herzegovina in*

[30] See Hayden, Robert M. "Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics." *Slavic Review* 51, no. 4 (December 1, 1992): 654-673.

[31] See Gramsci, Antonio, and Joseph A. Buttigieg. *Prison Notebooks*. Columbia University Press, 2010.

the last ten years, thus making such a decision making process which is bottom-up easily applicable in the social context. So such a context of democracy as applied by us can aid ultimately in overcoming the ethnic cleavages, in a context where you get equality, and in a context where ethnic, religious and national aspects are eliminated, the people gain some sort of collective feeling, without the particularities of different identifications. [32]

First of all I have to say something about this interviewee, namely this is a student as I later found out coming from Herzegovina, but studies in Zagreb, so we are able to say that even though differences in the political and historical contexts of both countries, there are observable similarities with regard to the aspects ethnicity and nationhood, thus it is safe to claim that the nation-building processes in both countries hail from the same myths and conceptions of nationhood and ethnicity, and that there is a grand importance attributed to both of these aspects, and that this serves segregation and exclusion, as we have seen. I would also like to assume that with the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we are fairly unable to talk about minority rights and their application and protection, since there is no clear distinction in what minorities are in Bosnia and Herzegovina, if one is not considered either of the three ethnicities, they fall into the category of Others, thus having no chance to participate in the political sphere, as it was the case with Drevo Sejdić and Jakob Finci[33]. Thus undermining some of the basic rights, people according to the Dayton Agreement i.e. the Constitution are entitled to.

On a more personal level however, when I interviewed two former students form the University in Tuzla in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I came across something rather extreme,

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[32] Anonymous, interviewed by author, Zagreb, April 13th 2011

[33] The famous case, where Jakob Finci a person of Jewish origin, and Drevo Sejdic a Roma, sued the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for not being able to run for the Presidency because they are not considered constituent peoples even though they are citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. More information about this case available at http://www.coe.org.rs/eng/news_sr_eng/?conid=1545 (last accessed: 05/10/2011)

when asked the question whether they knew someone who was being discriminated against on

the basis of their ethnicity, the student answerd:

> *...yes, I have been excluded from an exam because of my name. It was a philosophy exam some five years back, I passed the written part, but did not have enough points to get a grade, so I had to take the oral part as well. There I was waiting for my turn, and after two hours, I am invited into the classroom, I sit down in front of the professor and give him my grade booklet, he opens the first page and sees that I am not a Muslim, a Bosniak, however you want to call it, then he looks at me, closes the booklet and says better luck next time, and throws it through the door.[34]*

In another interview, also by a former student, the story seemed quite similar, although it was

a different professor, this happened before the above story:

> *It was the first class of the semester, we were going through the classroom introducing ourselves, I was the third person to stand up and say my name, and by coincidence the only one who was not a Bosniak in the group, after this had passed, to professor stood up from his chair, and approached me, he started to talk about the Srebrenica genocide, and then he gave an explanation in which he said, something like girl you failed this class. So one of my classmates gets up and asks, why I failed the class, given that it is the very beginning of the semester and that I just said my name. The professor looks at him and tells him to mind his own business if he wanted to pass, but my classmate keeps insisting, so the professor makes him leave the classroom, and I being really shocked also leave. A day after I found out that this classmate had left the university due to his revolt against that professor, and I really did fail the exam on two terms, until I decided to ask for an exam commission in which I passed, the sad thing however, that professor still works at Tuzla university.[35]*

For obvious reasons, these former students asked me to remain anonymous, but were

surprisingly willing to share these stories with me. When I asked them why they shared these

stories with me, both of them gave the same answer[36], that such a thing must not happen in

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[34] Anonymous, interviewed by author, Tuzla, April 17th 2011
[35] Anonymous, interviewed by author, Tuzla, April 17th 2011
[36] This is only one of the answers I chose not to include the second one, because it is really similar to this one.

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any official institution, if it were on a personal level, then this was nothing of concern since, and I quote:

> *… this happens in Bosnia every day of the week, it is nothing new if someone in my neighborhood yells you dirty Serb at me, and I deal with it, but when it happens within an institution where you have a clear-cut power structure, and that those in power decide to make your life a living hell, than something needs to be done about it.*[37]

Considering the given examples, as we have seen due to the complicated nature of the problems of nation-building in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, we have seen that ethnic identification and national identification play key-roles, which leads to the deterioration of the entire social context in both of the respective countries. This is mostly reflected in the irrationality in the institutional decision-making structures mainly in Bosnia and Herzegovina due to its ethnic composition, but also in Croatia with the constant rhetoric of the 'nation being there if the citizens lose everything'[38]. The question, therefore unfolds, what can be done in order to have rational decision making which will go towards actual progress, can this be achieved by a bottom-up approach, and finally, is it going to be started in the institutional sphere or will it begin in the public sphere and later on transgress into the institutions? The answer to these questions might actually be found within the student protests of Zagreb and Tuzla in 2009.

New Solidarities and the University as a Political Arena

In the previous section I have outlined some of the problems caused by the constant reification of ethnic and national identities, and as we have seen from the historical and

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[37] Anonymous, interviewed by author, Tuzla, April 17th 2011
[38] This is often heard in political speeches given in Croatia, I suggest looking at this one: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P4xVX2_13JE (last accessed: 05/06/2011)

political contexts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina the emergence of reduplicative ethic cleavages is visible, in Croatia it is with the Serbs, whereas in Bosnia and Herzegovina it is with all the three predominant ethnicities, i.e. Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks. Such a situation creates an even greater need for overcoming these in order to start strengthening the social aspects in both. Therefore, we must start looking for a space in society which will serve as an appropriate arena where new solidarities will be formed amongst people, disregarding their differences (ethnic, religious, national, etc.) and start making, as Jürgen Habermas calls it rational choices towards prosperity and progress[39]. In this section I will take a look at how a place as the university can serve as a place of creation of new solidarities amongst people.

I wish to start by looking at some theories by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida, who discusses the phenomenon of the university in his essay *University Without Conditions*[40]. Namely, Derrida poses the question whether the university can affirm something that is considered an unconditional independence, and even more so will it be able to claim some sort of sovereignty without risking of being forced to give up without condition, and let itself be taken over? If we observe the example of the University of Tuzla in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with regard to the importance of nationality and ethnicity, this indeed may be true, as we have seen before, and as we will see later on in the analysis of the interviews I conducted with the opposition. However, Derrida goes on in saying that:

> *The principle of unconditional resistance is a right that the university itself should at the same time reflect, invent and pose, whether it does so through its law faculties or in the new Humanities capable of working on these questions of right and of law- in other words, and again why not say it without detour, the Humanities capable of thinking on the tasks of deconstruction, beginning with the deconstruction of their own history and their own axioms.*[41]

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[39] See Habermas, Jürgen, and Pablo De Greiff. *The inclusion of the other: studies in political theory*. Polity Press, 2002.
[40] See Derrida, Jacques, and Peggy Kamuf. *Without alibi.*
[41] See Derrida, Jacques, and Peggy Kamuf. *Without alibi.*

Thus we see that Derrida considers the university to have an obligation in questioning and deconstructing everything, if we can presuppose this than the university is a place of something he refers to as unconditional resistance, thus opposing the university to other powers such as the state powers, as in this case the power of the nation-state and its as Derrida calls it 'phantasm of invisible sovereignty', thus indicating:

> *… the university might be in advance not just cosmopolitan, but universal, extending beyond worldwide citizenship and the nation-state in general) to economic powers (to corporations and to national and international capital), to the powers of the media, ideological, religious and cultural powers and so forth- on short, to all the powers that limit democracy to come[42].*

He goes on in saying that the university should be a place where nothing is beyond questioning, not even the current manifestations of democracy, nor the traditional idea of critique, not even the authority of the question form. If this can be considered true, than indeed a university might serve as an arena for cross-ethnic solidarity, thus overcoming the ethnic question, so that it might not appear as trans-ethnic, as it would be suggested by David Miller, who [43]claims that, nation, in this case ethnicity has not to be constructed in a way so that it would exclude minorities, but can be rather understood in secondary terms to accommodate minority groups while being generally sufficient enough to generate appropriate sentiments of solidarity, loyalty and trust. As we will see later on in the thesis, when I will be talking about the decision making process and its dynamics, the university and its symbolic value provide a space which will show appreciation for the different cultural aspects of everyone who is a part of it, but will not allow them to be put in the first place. Jürgen Habermas[44] argues that human beings are in need of starting to act rationally so that

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[42] Ibid.
[43] See Miller, David. *Citizenship and national identity*. Polity Press, 2000.
[44] Habermas, Jürgen. *Toward a rational society: student protest, science, and politics*. Beacon Press, 1971.

democracy will unfold in its truest form, as described by authors such as Robert Dahl, to whom I will come back later on I the thesis, Habermas goes on in saying that state institutions need to become an arena where democratic decisions will be made regardless of issues of gender, race, ethnicity and so forth, and actually as I said before, focus on issues directed towards progress[45]. This arena must then be, according to Habermas, based on the merits of institutional law and human rights[46]. On the other hand, if we interpret the theories of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau, this arena does not need to have bounds with the demos through institutional apparatuses, which in this case would be the university as an institution of the state, i.e. nation-state[47].

If we follow Derrida's philosophical argument about the unconditional universality of the university, than this indeed can be shown as that arena both Habermas and Mouffe and Laclau would agree with, hence there will be a space created which is not in need of reaffirming ethnic and national differences. Thus we can say that the university can serve as a reference point of a post-nationalist point of view, if we look at the case at hand. On another point of view, supporters of the liberal nationalist point of view such as Yael Tamir[48], David Miller[49], but also liberal multiculturalist Will Kymlicka[50], agree that democracy is historically contingent to the nation, and that the dissociation of democracy and the nation is neither possible, nor is it necessary, since nationhood if understood in secondary terms according to Miller can quite sufficiently generate feelings of mutual solidarity and loyalty, which will be

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[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.
[47] See Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. *Hegemony and socialist strategy: towards a radical democratic politics*. Verso, 2001.
[48] See Tamir, Yael. *Liberal nationalism*. Princeton University Press, 1995.
[49] See Miller, David. *On nationality*. Clarendon Press, 1997.
[50] See Kymlicka, Will, *New Forms of Citizenship* in Courchene, Thomas J., Donald J. Savoie, and Institute for Research on Public Policy. *The art of the state: governance in a world without frontiers*. IRPP, 2003.

enough to create an egalitarian society. However, as history has shown, as it is with the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, these feelings will not always be generated towards the other nationality, thus yielding in over-appreciation for one's own national or ethnic identification, therefore creating animosity towards the other.

The Spread of Protest

In this section I will look at the dynamics of how the protest in Zagreb actually spread across Croatia, and naturally to it's neighbors, i.e. Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sidney Tarrow, adapts Charles Tilly's model of distinction between different social movements, these being movements with traditional repertoires, which Tilly calls 'Old', and the 'New' social movements[51]. Tarrow claims that implicitly the concept of both of these repertoires is more or less general, however if we look at the period between the 16th and 18th century, the forms of action used against millers and grain merchants, in charivaris[52] and religious conflict, were directly connected to the target's nature and the grievances of actors who suffered from them. Tarrow continues with saying that there is a key difference with the modern or new repertoire, namely it was the vast lack of generality of the old forms that hindered the rise of broader connections of interest and action, but that the more general nature of the new forms that would give a common culture to social movements, considering our example, this indeed is true[53].

At this point I wish to introduce Tarrow's conception of modular collective action. He says that the repertoires, as opposed to old social movements, emerging in places like Europe

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[51] Tarrow, Sidney G. *Power in movement: social movements and contentious politics.* Cambridge University Press, 1998.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.

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and North America, were rather cosmopolitan and independent, they were centered around a number of key practices, thus making them applicable in different settings. As he mentions:

> *... once used and understood, it could be diffused to other actors, and be employed on behalf of coalitions of challengers. The result was to make it possible for even scattered groups of people who did not know one another to combine in sustained challenges to authorities and create the modern social movement.* [54]

Tarrow also says that as new claims are diffused together with information on how others put them into practice, people will have developed enhanced dimensions for collective action, even the old repertoires when combined with newer ones, were given almost a new meaning about generality. I will depart from Tarrow's examples here, and look at how actually the protest spread from Zagreb to Tuzla. Modular collective action, according to Tarrow[55], is defined as easily transferable from one social setting to the other, we could even go as far as in saying that if a social movement is modular in it's nature, it is the exact copy of one movement that transpired elsewhere. This is what I believe the protests in Zagreb in particular were very successful in, by providing a certain structure, which was easily to recreate anywhere, and whose repertoire seemed to be reasonable to all of these case-specific social groups, i.e. students. I will come back to the particularities of the decision making process later on. I should mention here, that even though it is easy to recreate a process in this way, the sustainability becomes a different issue, especially in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where one would be safe to assume that all the major universities can be labeled as national. This is evident if we look at the example of Tuzla, where after the occupation ended, only two plenary sessions took place afterwards, however, this was not the end of it, since this spawned something else, in this case particularly, it appears that civic responsibility was not reinvented, but rediscovered. Although, procedurally different from the models in Zagreb, and the initial model in Tuzla, whenever there is an issue that will greatly affect the

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[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.

students in Tuzla, it is being taken to the street, and it is being contested, even if the students' demands are reasonable or not, but this is another and rather new issue, and does not change the fact, that a political space was created, in which issues of nationality, ethnicity and religion do not matter, but the outcome does.

However, I will take a rather optimistic stance here, and approach the problem from the point of view of social capital. Namely, the notion of social capital was discussed among many scholars. I will look at Robert Putnam's definition[56], which describes it as a sociological concept, which is related to the connections within and between social connections. It refers to the collective value of all social networks and all the tendencies that will arise from these networks in order to help each other. Putnam also claims that social capital is necessary in creating and maintaining a democracy. He amongst other scholars argues that civic society is a manifestation of social capital. In this definition social capital is a collective mental disposition that comes close to the spirit of a community. Thus, with the strengthening of civic society we can observe this disposition towards a togetherness, which naturally will aid in not only in the collective engagement of the citizens within a state, but also with overcoming already created social boundaries such as ethnicity and nationality. In an interview I conducted with a student in Tuzla in 2009, we established that it was easier to have cooperation with neighboring states, rather than with neighboring cities.

I believe the answer to that issue is actually how the protests spread, first of all, the students in Zagreb adopted their decision-making model and mobilization methods that were used by Belgrade students and anarchist groups in the 1980's[57] with names such as Vesna Pešić, who was the founder of the Yugoslav Helsinki Committee of Human rights. The

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[56] See Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti. *Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton University Press, 1994.
[57] See Day, Richard J. F. *Gramsci is dead: anarchist currents in the newest social movements*. Pluto Press, 2005.

protests then spread over to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then to Serbia, much later on to Macedonia. However, it was only after the Tuzla occupation, that other cities, such as Pula and Rijeka in Croatia started applying the same methods of organizing. Here we could even say, that there is an evident need for a center for people in order to mobilize. In these cases the centers were the larger cities, but the case with Tuzla is peculiar, since it is neither the capital, nor is it the largest university in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To conclude this section, one plausible explanation would be the diverse ethnic composition of the university, at least with regard to the student body. Given its geographical position, Tuzla is so to speak in an ideal place for ethnically multiple societies, which in the end could serve as an example in overcoming the reified ethnic cleavages. As we have seen so far the historic and political context in the countries of former Yugoslavia is a quite complicated one, with the exclusion ranging from the exclusion of minorities of the public life, to a reified ethnic division, which results in animosity towards the other.

Chapter 2

The Decision Making Process

Introduction

In the previous chapter I looked at the historic and political context in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the implications various events had on both the social and political aspects of both, while deteriorating them, thus hindering politics and the transition from post-war countries towards progress and integrations in the international community. In this chapter I will be looking at the theoretical definitions consociational system, which, due to its dividing nature can be considered partly responsible for the problems that arose in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite all these problems created by the over-appreciation of ethnicity in all spheres of life, there are acts of resistance which are tending towards a society which will be based on rational decision making in view of progress, as it is the case with the case studies I am using, namely the student protests of Zagreb and Tuzla in 2009. In this chapter we will take a look at the dynamics of the decision making process the students applied during their plenary sessions. Using the theories of Robert A. Dahl*,* who describes democracy as a theoretical utopia[58]. A first reading of the decision making model the students apply would suggest that we are dealing with exactly what Dahl describes as an utopia, as we will see later on in the chapter. I will be looking at what we can define as a demos, i.e. the stakeholders in the decision making processes, how it theoretically is constituting itself, and how that functions in practice with regard to the student protestors. However, as we will see through some of the interviews conducted with the student protestors and the status quo, whether this indeed is possible, or whether it will as Robert E. Goodin suggest, serve to disenfranchise certain groups, which we might consider minorities, thus excluding them,

[58] See Dahl, Robert Alan. *Democracy and its critics*. Yale University Press, 1989

whereas Philip Petit says that the minorities will be assimilated within the majority opinion, which also may be viewed as a sort of exclusion[59]. In the final section of this chapter, I will be looking at the kind of democratic decision-making model the student protestors are applying, is it a deliberative democracy, a direct democracy, or is it based as Mouffe and Laclau suggest as agonistic pluralism? I will also try to answer the question whether it indeed does function as a completely inclusive and egalitarian model, thus seeing whether it will aid in overcoming ethnic cleavages and help in the formation of new solidarities in segregated societies.

Consociated Democracy

In this section of the chapter, in order to further understand the problem of the reification of ethnic identity, I will look at some of the features of a consociated democracy; I will rely on Arend Lijphart's ideas of consociation[60]. The aim here being to outline why it can be considered flawed if we consider the examples of the Former Yugoslav countries; Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular. First of all we need to explain what consociation exactly means. According to Arend Lijphart a consociation democracy[61] is based around guaranteed power sharing, this model is usually applied for conflict managing in ethnically divided societies. As it is the case with Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a joint presidency of three presidents, one for each of the constituent peoples, the Bosniaks, the Serbs and the Croats.

Lijphart adapts Gabriel A. Almond's typology of political systems[62], where a distinction is made between three types of Western democratic systems. The first being the Anglo-American, as the name suggests, in Britain and the United states, the second being the

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[59] See Goodin, Robert E., and Philip Pettit. *Contemporary political philosophy: an anthology*. Wiley-Blackwell, 2006.
[60] See Lijphart, Arend. "Consociational Democracy." *World Politics* 21, no. 2 (January 1, 1969): 207-225.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Ibid.

Continental European (Germany, France), and the third type consisting of Scandinavian and

Low Countries, which Almond considers to contain the features of both. Lijphart goes on in

saying that:

> *Political culture and social structure are empirically related to political stability. The Anglo-America democracies display a high degree of stability and effectiveness. The Continental European systems, on the other hand, tend to be unstable; they are characterized by political immobilism, which is "a consequence of the (fragmented) condition of the political culture." Furthermore there is the "ever-present threat of what is often called the 'Caesaristic' breakthrough" and even the danger of a lapse into totalitarianism as a result of this immobilism"*[63]

A first reading might suggest that this indeed seems like a feasible solution for Bosnia and

Herzegovina, however, if we go further into on what grounds the consociation democracy was

established there, then problems and questions arise. Lijphart continues to argue over the

theoretical basis for Almond's typology, which is reflected in the usage of "overlapping

memberships", formulated by group theorists Arthur F. Bentley and David B. Truman but

also with Seymour Martin Lipset's proposition of "cross-cutting cleavages"[64]. Lijphart states

that:

> *These propositions state that the psychological cross-pressures resulting from membership in different groups with diverse interests and outlooks lead to moderate attitudes. These groups may be formally organized or merely unorganized, categoric, and in Truman's terminology, "potential" groups. Cross-pressures operate not only at the mass but also at the elite level: the leaders of social groups with heterogeneous and overlapping memberships will tend to find it necessary to adopt moderate positions. When, on the other hand, a society is divided by sharp cleavages with no or very few overlapping memberships and loyalties-in other words when the political culture is deeply fragmented- the pressures toward moderate middle-of-the-road attitudes are absent. Political stability depends on moderation and therefore on overlapping memberships.*[65]

He goes on in saying that Truman's proposition states that in the long run a complex society

may experience revolution, degeneration and decay, and if it were to somehow maintain its

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[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.

stability and that it will do so vastly due to the fact of multiple memberships. Even Lipset

claims that, "the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups and

individuals have a number of crosscutting politically relevant affiliations"[66]

Lijphart, while looking at the cases in which there is the existence of mutually exclusive

cleavages, states that a country might experience instability. However, Lijphart claims that

they do not, given that this essay was written in 1968, and that he was observing the Low

Countries, Switzerland and Austria, thus he defines consociational democracies as "deviant

cases of fragmented but stable democracies", there was a real chance of this actually being

true. Lijphart therefore claims that the analysis of deviant cases will almost always yield in

the discovery of certain variables that will account for the stability of a consociated

democracy, this being the behavior of political elites, for which he says:

> *The leaders of the rival subcultures may engage in competitive behavior and thus further aggravate mutual tensions and political instability, but they may also make deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation. As a result of such overarching cooperation at the elite level, a country can as Claude Ake states, "achieve a degree of political stability quite out of proportion to its social homogeneity."*[67]

Here again I wish to stress the time period in which this essay was written, and that if we look

at the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina back then, which still was a republic in a federative

state, later on however with the signing of the Dayton Agreement, which would later be

formulated into the constitution of the state became a consociated democracy. Some scholars,

such as Ugo Vasiljević, professor of ontology at the department of philosophy at the

University of Sarajevo, argue that consociationalism as such works for Bosnia and

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[66] See Lipset, Seymour Martin. *Political man: the social bases of politics*. Heinemann, 1983.
[67] See Lijphart, Arend. "Consociational Democracy." *World Politics* 21, no. 2 (January 1, 1969): 207-225.

Herzegovina, stating that there should be no argument about whether to accept a consociated state or not, since there is no other option[68]. Such a statement could be regarded as cynical, given that in a democratic state, there is always room for a different choice, regardless for better or for worse as history shows[69]. Also, one could make the classical orientalist argument, as coined by Edward W. Said[70], where we could say, it works in the Western world, and therefore it must work for everyone else. However I do not wish to go further into this view nor to advocate it. I will just outline some of the problematic issues regarding consociationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Firstly, the acceptance of a consociated democracy, would give legitimacy to the ethnic cleansing that was going on in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war of the 1990s. Which, as logic would dictate cannot serve as a reconciliatory act. Secondly, in order to have a reconciled society, there must be an acknowledgement of acts of violence, which would implicate both of the opposing parties. Thirdly, and finally getting back to Donald Horowitz's argument, which states that:

> *Consociationalism's main focus is on diverging identities, such as ethnicity instead of integrating ones such as class, while institutionalizing the former. Furthermore it will rely on rival co-operation, which is inherently unstable. Consociationalism can lead to the reification of ethnic divisions, since grand coalitions are unlikely, because of the dynamics of interethnic competition. The very act of forming a multiethnic coalition generates interethnic competition- flanking- if it does not already exist.[71]*

If we observe what is going on in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, we can see that Horowitz's assumptions indeed can be verified, there is the intraethnic tension between the grand coalitions, as of recently the government is unstable, and after the last elections is still

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[68] See Arsenijević, Damir, and Jovanović, Nebojša. "DRUGA SMRT ANTIFAŠIZMA: O cinizmu "intelektualne elite" u BiH." http://www.tacno.net/Novost.aspx?id=1555. (last accessed: 05-28-2011)

[69] Ibid.
[70] See Said, Edward W. *Orientalism*. Vintage Books, 1979.
[71] See Horowitz, Donald L. *Ethnic groups in conflict*. University of California Press, 1985.

not formed, and with the entity system, there is the occurrence of a rouge enclave within a state, as it is the case with the Srpska Republic, whose leaders are behaving completely exclusive towards the rest of the state, finally claims for a third entity also started arising. All this leads to the further segregation and division of an already segregated society, and the question arises, about which alternatives there are to this? However, as I mentioned before, if we look at the decision-making model the university students from Zagreb are applying, there is room for optimism. In the next section of the thesis we will be looking at how that model works and why it can be helpful in the overcoming of these ethnic and national cleavages not only in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also Croatia, and furthermore the rest of former Yugoslavia.

The Structure and the Constitution of the Demos

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the students of Zagreb and Tuzla applied, what they denominate as a direct democratic decision-making model, which was overtaken from the students in Serbia in the 1980s, and which was and now is called the Students' Plenum. To describe it briefly, issues are being debated, and then the decisions are put to a vote, everyone is allowed to partake in the plenary session, regardless if they are a student or not as long as they believe to be able to provide relevant input to the discussion. There is no hierarchy, there are no representatives, there are no names and they operate in complete anonymity. This might suggest being a completely inclusive demos, which constantly re-constitutes itself, thus having complete control over the agenda of the democratic process. As Robert A. Dahl claims that a demos can have final control over an agenda only if it depends on a prior judgment as to the scope of matters that the demos is qualified to decide. He insists on saying that a judgment of the competence of the demos must be built upon the scope of the demos' agenda, and that the nature of the agenda is built upon the very composition of the

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demos itself[72]. Thus, if we are familiar with the scope of the demos, then we will be able to determine the scope of its agenda, if the scope of the agenda is known, then the composition of the decision-making demos. To put it simply the one cannot be determined without the other. Such a view however, imposes a question, namely, who is setting the rules of the demos' inclusion or for that matter exclusion, thus will these rules be binding to everyone or just the demos in question? If the rules will be binding only to the demos itself, then the problematic occurring around inclusion and exclusion will not pose a serious challenge. If we look at our examples of the student protests, Zagreb in particular, this problem is avoided with almost no difficulties, namely, the participants of the decision-making process, i.e. the plenary sessions, are all treated equally, even though they might be students coming from another university in another country, or just someone who identifies with the goals the students, on the other hand, each and every member is allowed to leave the session at any time without publicly stating reasons for leaving. In this case, such a demos appears as completely inclusive. Answering the second part of the question, given that this group of students can be considered the demos for the university in this instance, we can assume that the rules enacted apply to everyone who is considered to be part of the demos, which in this case would mean everyone who is affected by, or contributes to the decisions being made. However, this process can be viewed as problematic in itself because of the structure alone, thus depending on the ideological type of the demos, will be reflected in the decisions being made, none the less in both of the cases as we will see, that I can work, as an example I will use three parts interviews I conducted with student protestors from Zagreb and from Tuzla. When asked the question, if the decision making model they applied was going towards a completely inclusive and egalitarian society the student from Zagreb answered:

[72] See Dahl, Robert Alan. *Democracy and its critics*. Yale University Press, 1989.

So the question here is, where does the inclusion end? There are of course the banally obvious problems, such as the spatial ones, secondly this space, the pelnum must be recognized as an arena of the articulation of particular interests, even though we formulated this as 'free for all', one has to consider that the target group of the process here were the students, and it is 'free for all' in the sense that education is important for everyone, therefore it is open to everyone… Certainly there are ideological divisions within the whole process, which does not tend to uphold or change the positions of the status quo i.e. the participants of the process, and therefore we cannot consider this act politically particular.[73]

The answer I got from the student in Tuzla was quite similar:

Yes, I agree, you see one aspect the plenum possesses, is in fact its directly democratic nature, in which the various dichotomies of nationality, race, gender, call it whatever, will have no vital function, it is as you asked, I get there, I am automatically accepted as a member and I have the same say in all of the issues the rest of the people have. And yes, people have different ideological views and convictions, but somehow, and I am going to be a bit subjective here, I feel that only the discussion and the decision matter, unlike in the other aspects of life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. [74]

These are just two of the examples taken from a number of interviews, surprisingly, as I pointed out in the methodology chapter already, the status quo in Croatia has a similar opinion to the student protestors, whereas when it comes to Bosnia and Herzegovina, some of the views are rather cynical, as this example[75] shows (the same question was asked as for the above two):

People here are sheep, I remember when I was at the first plenary session, that everyone wanted the student union to leave without hearing their side of the story, and this is nonetheless not inclusive and not free at all, they preach about equality and solidarity, but do not show it, it is that deal, either you are with us, or you are against us. What do they think they will accomplish? Some sort of freedom? Don't make me laugh, they have always been and will always remain sheep.[76]

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[73] Anonymous, interviewed by author, Zagreb, April 13th 2011
[74] Anonymous, interviewed by author, Zagreb, April 13th 2011

[76] Anonymous, interviewed by author, Tuzla, April 20th 2011

36

As we have seen there in Bosnia and Herzegovina there is quite the discrepancy in opinion, whereas in Croatia it appears to be more homogenized. I wish to take a rather optimistic stance here by giving credit to the rationality of decisions being made.

This leads us to another aspect, the eligibility of the members of the demos, in this regard Robert Dahl poses three questions[77]:

> 1. *Is it possible to get around the principle of competence in deciding on the inclusiveness of the demos?*
> 2. *If not, is it possible to avoid the contingent and contestable nature of a judgment as to competence?*
> 3. *If again not, can we develop strong criteria that such a judgment ought to satisfy?*

In order to answer these questions let us first look what Dahl himself suggests. He gives the example of children, he claims that with this regard we cannot argue, simply because it is indefensible, and that children either must be members to the state's demos or need not be subject to laws made by the demos. Secondly, Dahl claims that children do not and will not enter into legally enforceable contracts, but still they are not to be exempt from the law. Thirdly, the only criteria here that would seem defensible in order to satisfy such judgments appears to be derived from the fact of children not being fully and utterly qualified to be included in the demos. If contextualized for children, and if we take into account the rationality in the decisions being made, then this argument appears to be sound. But what is to be done if the rationality is not reflected in a fully-fledged, 'mature' demos, what if the demos takes a turn into an exclusive demos, but not in term that it excludes members of the society which are not deemed as competent enough to argue over and make decisions? Secondly what if that demos results in a totalitarian regime, as history has shown us, with for example Hitler's Germany, or even if it turns nationalist and resorts to means of ethnic cleansing and

[77] See Dahl, Robert Alan. *Democracy and its critics*. Yale University Press, 1989.

violence, as it was the case with the Former Yugoslav Republics? Can we assume this to be a logical and rational demos, and can we then still call it democratic? Thus the answer to these questions appears to be a grey area, one feasible solution to this problem in my opinion then would be that the demos needs to be constituted around the agenda, and here I agree with Dahl, that ultimately the demos needs to be in control of the outcomes of the agenda. On the other hand Dahl also claims that that every adult who is subject to a government and its laws must be presumed as eligible and has an unquestionable right to be a member of the demos, however this can serve to pose as a problem with regard to foreigners who are temporary residents in a country thus not qualifying them to participate in governing, but also a problem with regard to the boundary between childhood and adulthood; which ultimately leads us back to the first question who constitutes the demos, or to reformulate it who sets the threshold between eligibility for who is to be included and who is not. If we look at what Joseph Schumpeter suggests:

> *If we accept that the principle of leadership is the true function of the electorate in a democracy, the principle of representation is superfluous and democracy means that "the reins of the government should be handed to those who command more support"*[78]

Dahl claims that this suggestion is also unacceptable, given that it effectively diminishes the distinction between democracy and nondemocratic order, which could be dominated by an oligarchy, which we were able to witness in Bosnia and Herzegovina due to the consociational nature of the democratic order. He also claims that a categorical principle of inclusion that overrides the need for a judgment of competence is rendered unacceptable if we take into account cases like children, mentally not qualified persons and temporary residents. A decision based on competence is inherently open to scrutiny, because a judgment on competence appears dependent on weighing evidence and making deductions of the moral and intellectual qualifications of specific categories of persons.

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[78] Schumpeter, Joseph A. *Capitalism, socialism and democracy*. Harper Colophon, 1976.

The question then still remains, how do we avoid such an occurrence, how do we avoid all of the above mentioned, how do we avoid this forming of oligarchic elites, who ultimately will, to put it in Ernesto Laclau's terms give democracy a hegemonized content, thus fix it not to, according to Habermas, institutional law and human rights, but rather to exclusive doctrines based around ethnic and national identifications of people, aiding in the deepening, as it is the case with the Former Yugoslav countries, ethnic cleavages and segregating the population even more. If we look at the particular decision making model the students apply, we might be able to come to a compromising solution. In the next section we will see how the demos in the case of the student protestors is constituted and how the decision-making process looks like.

Constant Reconstitution of the Demos

In this section I will be looking at how the current decision-making model was conceived, and how it functions with regard to the demos, and how decisions are being made. Before going into the particularities of the case at hand, let us first of all look at how Robert E. Goodin defines how a demos should be constituted. Namely, Robert E. Goodin agrees that constituting a demos is the first step in constructing a democracy, however, he continues in saying that the demos cannot be a product of simple democratic decision making. If the demos, is to be constituted through a vote amongst potential members who are entitled to vote only by virtue of the very outcome, Goodin firmly believes that incoherencies are bound to arise. According to him initial membership of the demos must be itself constituted by some principle which will be independent of decisions made by the demos, thus machining the initial constitution of the demos nondemocratic, but continues in saying that once the demos is constituted it can be reconstituted later in a democratic way[79]. However, on the other hand

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[79] See Goodin, Robert E., and Philip Pettit. *Contemporary political philosophy: an anthology*.

the need to appeal to a principle, in order to constitute a demos, which is outside of democracy will not make it incoherent but rather incomplete, and if it is incomplete in this way, then it becomes too permissive. Thus helping any group of people constituted on whatever basis to constitute a proper demos.

Moving on to the example of the student protestors, in my field research for this thesis, as I already mentioned in the methodology chapter, in order to find my interviewees I had to attend the plenary sessions students were holding three times a week. I will explain a bit how that went on, firstly we entered an auditorium at Zagreb university with some 200 people, when everything settled down the moderators gave an introduction about the issues being discussed that day, after a brief discussion, the people present in the plenary session voted on the issues at hand, even though I am not a student at the University of Zagreb I was being encouraged to participate in the vote. At the end of the session there was a vote for the moderators for the next plenary session. The same happened at the following two sessions, but also on the two plenary sessions I attended at the University of Tuzla. As this example shows we are dealing with a completely inclusive demos, however, there is one rule, one has to consider themselves being affected by the issues discussed. I will come back to the issue of being affected in a bit, but first there is a need to explain on how this model came about. According to some of my interviewees, it all started as a research group concerned with the implications of Croatia's signing of the Bologna Declaration, coming across irregularities in the university's constitution, coupled with the dissatisfaction with the current model of representation the student body had, the students decided to mobilize, by applying, as I already mentioned in the previous chapter, a decision making model used by Serbian anarchists in the late 1980s. Here one could turn to Jean Jacques Rousseau's argument that

democracy inherently is founded on fraud, that being the initial decisions in constituting the demos can never be democratic, and therefore are corrupting the decisions being made[80]. One could say that the demos was constituted on that day, however we could go into the philosophical argument, that everyone belonging to the community of the university can automatically be considered a member of the demos, but this is something I will not go into. But what I want to focus on is the one rule I mentioned above, namely people have to feel affected by the issues and decisions being made.

Taking into account Dahl's principle of affected interest, which he claims to be the best likely general principle of inclusion to be found, which in its most generic form states that ""everyone who is affected by the decisions of a government should have the right to participate in that government"[81] which we can apply to our example of the student protests. However Goodin differentiates between four types of this principle:

a. The *"All Actually Affected Interests" Principle, "which interests are indeed actually affected depends on who gets the vote. Hence it would be incoherent to determine who should get to vote asking whose interests are actually affected by the course of action actually decided upon."*

b. The *"All Possibly Affected Interests" Principle, "you are rightly said to be "affected," not merely by the "course of action actually decided upon," but also by the range of alternative courses of action from which that course was chosen. Furthermore, you are rightly said to be "affected," not merely by what the consequences of that decision actually turn out to be, but also by what the consequences might have turned out to be."*

c. The *"All and Only Affected Interests" Principle, "It would make no objection, however, to including, as well, various people whose interests are not affected. Notice that the most reliable way of ensuring that no one who should be included is excluded is simply to include everyone. Were there no objection to including people whose interests might not be affected, this would clearly be what we should do for the sake of ensuring we do not omit someone who ought be included. That in turn would yield a demos that was stable, in the sense that its composition would not change from issue to issue."*

d. The *"All Probably Affected Interests" Principle, "What agendas are probable, and what outcomes under them are probable, is a function of who has voting power within the demos, that being so, however, it would be incoherently circular to let who is a member with voting power in the demos depend on what is probable in those two*

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[80] Ibid.
[81] See Dahl, Robert Alan. *Democracy and its critics*. Yale University Press, 1989.

ways. (That is just like saying, "The person who draws the winning number out of the hat is the person who wins that very draw," once again.)" [82]

Looking at the example, we see that all four of these variations may apply, in the case of principle (a), all students are actually affected, if it somehow would be feasible to acquire the votes of all the students than this point could indeed be proven, however since we are dealing with constraints of various types, we can see how it gives room to incoherence. If we look at principle (b) through the example, we cannot actually know who might possibly be affected, so we take into consideration, that everyone will be affected who comes to the decision making process. In the case of principle (c) we can observe that the particular decision making process will most certainly include people who are not even students, so to speak passers-by who just happened to be there when a vote was going on, and then vote with everyone else, which ultimately leads us to principle (d), which appears quite similar to its predecessor. So far it seems, that Dahl might favor such a direct democratic system, however it might become problematic and incoherent in the near future. On a more optimistic note however, this model seems, at least with regard to the protests, to do away with differences, thus the all-affected principle applies only partially. This particular structure the students have established, allows everyone to participate, thus making everyone part of the demos despite their ideological, ethnic and national standpoints, therefore appearing to be successful in two aspects, actually proving that the university can serve as a ground of cross-ethnic solidarity, but also with this particular model overcoming the paradox of democracy as discussed by Chantal Mouffe in her book *The Democratic Paradox*, I will come back to this later on. So I have tried to outline, how this model of decision-making deals with the different problems of constituting its demos. In the next section we will see whether this can be considered a

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[82] See Goodin, Robert E., and Philip Pettit. *Contemporary political philosophy: an anthology*. Wiley-Blackwell, 2006.

sustainable solution.

Can Direct Democracy Be Sustained?

In this section I will be looking at some of the problems the direct democratic model can be facing with regard to the decision-making process. In addition to the banal problems of spatial constraint, as mentioned before, Philip Petit is outlining some of the problems within the very dynamics of the decision-making process in a direct democratic setting. Namely the problem being the agency, which will constrain the process in two ways, one would be by exercising active control, whether it be in its own accords or through someone representing it[83]. Such a direct or indirect control would involve the adjustment of various means to the ends of securing a desired outcome. The other mode of control Pettit refers to as virtual, thus involving restraint on behalf of one agency whereas the other agency actively controls the process, but only if we assume the nature to change what the active agency does, should the outcome be dissatisfactory.

These beings so, let us compare a direct democratic approach, and a representative democratic approach. Looking back at our example of the student protests, the organizational structure is the one of a direct democracy, one person one vote. We see that this will force us into discussing an issue over a long period of time before coming to a sound decision. Thus giving the ruling power only to the vast majority. Pettit's graph[84] will help us understand this better.

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[83] See Goodin, Robert E., and Philip Pettit. *Contemporary political philosophy: an anthology*. Wiley-Blackwell, 2006.

[84] I modified the contents this graph for the sake of the argument.

	Issue 1	Issue 2	Issue 3	Issue 4
Student A.	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Student B.	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Student C.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Total	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 1. Directly Democratic. Source: Goodin, Robert E., and Philip Pettit. *Contemporary political philosophy: an anthology*. Wiley-Blackwell, 2006.

Let us assume that the issues are interconnected, dependent on the outcome of each vote prior to it, we can see that the final outcome by majority vote will be yes on all accounts, thus creating a great deal of confusion, if issue 2 will not be feasible to accomplish if issue 1 is voted yes, then the vote loses its purpose since this might start a chain reaction. Here we can observe that we have similar voting patterns within the students or student groups making the vote. This can serve to render the discussion process irrelevant, which certainly is undemocratic. If we look at our case so far we are not able to observe this yet, since the demos reconstitutes itself every time, and eventually will reach its right composition, but it does not mean that it will necessarily not follow the above demonstrated pattern. Now, if we observe a representative democratic model and assume that students have certain delegates, who would serve as a package of opinions, for example, ethnicity does not matter to them, they are against an increase in tuition fees, but they are willing to compromise, and here the problem arises. If the delegate is willing to find a compromise in a decision making process which is held behind closed doors, then I would agree with Dahl on this, we cannot call such a process democratic, even though the delegate was elected in a democratic way. This would only serve to sacrifice one goal, for the means of another, which is clearly against the ideas set forth by the student protestors. If we completely understand the entire structure of the

students' plenum in this case we can observe that a representative model would simply serve to follow the interests of individuals instead of the interests of the entire student body.

Agonist-Pluralist, Deliberative or Direct Democracy

In this section of the chapter, I will be looking into what type of democratic decision-making we are dealing with regarding the case. Are we talking about a direct democratic model, and can it be defined as such, since there are certain enclaves formulated within the demos, as pointed out before, or is it a deliberative democracy, because there clearly is a sort of public deliberation, or are we dealing with agonist pluralism since there are indicators of overcoming social divisions within the process?

First I would like to say a few words on each of the above-mentioned types of democracy just to be able to get a clearer grasp on what we are actually dealing with. I will start of with, what some authors like Moses I. Finley claim to be the oldest form of democracy and which was assumed to have been applied in ancient Greece, even though it was not very liberal, as the demos consisted only of men, whereas women were excluded as well as slaves[85]. As the name suggests direct democracy it is a form of governance in which people collectively make the decisions for themselves, rather than having representatives decide on their political issues. It usually is considered 'pure democracy'[86].

On the other hand if we talk about deliberative democracy which is Also referred to as discursive democracy, deliberative democracy is a form of governance where public discussion and deliberation are central to lawmaking, it is evident that it applies aspects of both direct and representative democracy, thus differing from traditional democratic theory, by stating that deliberation and not voting is the primary source of legitimacy in decision-

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[85] See Finley, Moses I. *Democracy ancient and modern*. Rutgers University Press, 1985.

[86] Pure in the sense that the decision-making power is vested in the people, and not a representative, thus the decisions are being made with a bottom-up approach.

45

making. Author Joseph M. Bessette coined the term deliberative democracy[87].

Finally, Agonistic pluralism other than democracy is referred to as a political theory, which focuses on potentially positive aspects of particular forms of political conflict[88]. It accepts a permanent place for political conflict, but seeks to present how it may be accepted positively, and it is for this reason, that agonists are intervening in debates about democracy.

Coming back to the case of the student protestors, I wish to pose a question, namely, given that the students as we have seen from some of the extracts from the interviews I conducted, were protesting for direct democracy in addition to free education, and are now calling their decision-making model a direct democracy, is this really the case? Let us look at the issues which arise, first of all, if we are dealing with a direct democracy, the answer indeed might be yes, there is the bottom-up approach to decision making, there are no hierarchies, nor are there representatives who are elected and stay in that position, but there also is no danger of the assimilation of minority votes into the majority. Secondly, there is the deliberation over the issues, so if asked if we can call this deliberative democracy the answer still would be yes, because every decision is being discussed about in detail. Thirdly, it has the agonistic pluralist aspect of doing away with social differences such as gender, class, ethnicity, nationality etc. Looking at all these facts, we see that the decision-making model as such combines both the aspects of a deliberative and direct democracy with an agonistic pluralism approach. Thus the success it has might be attributed to its agonistic pluralist character, which according to authors such as Chantal Mouffe is skeptical about the capacity of current politics to eliminate or overcome deep divisions such as class, gender, ideology etc.

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[87] See Bessette, Joseph M. *The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government*. University of Chicago Press, 1997.
[88] See Mouffe, Chantal. *The democratic paradox*. Verso, 2000.

present in our society[89]. Liberalism, multiculturalism and communitarianism are believed to be essentially optimistic about finding a peaceful means of political and social cooperation, however agonistic pluralism claims that such an optimism is unjustified, thus reorienting political theory to another question, namely how should these differences be dealt with?

If we look back at Dahl's idea that everyone who is affected by decisions being made by the demos deserves to be part of it, I believe that the example of the student protests in Zagreb can answer this question, if we look at the structure of the decision making process the students are using closely, we can observe that the agonistic belief that democracy should be designed to optimize the opportunity for people to express disagreements. This however, also entails that it should not be assumed that conflict could not be eliminated given sufficient time for deliberation and rational consensus. Chantal Mouffe claims to use the concept of agonistic pluralism to present a new way of thinking about democracy, which will be different from the traditional liberal conception of it, namely a negotiation among interests. It also differs from the model developed by theorists such as Jurgen Habermas and John Rawls. She says the following about such a model:

> *While they have many differences, Rawls and Habermas have in common the idea that the aim of the democratic society is the creation of a consensus, and that consensus is possible if people are only able to leave aside their particular interests and think as rational beings. However, while we desire an end to conflict, if we want people to be free we must always allow for the possibility that conflict may appear and to provide an arena where differences can be confronted. The democratic process should supply that arena.[90]*

Following this, we see that the decision making process in Zagreb exactly gives room for these differences to be discussed amongst the demos, as everyone's arguments are heard, and then discussed, therefore there is no need for a consensus, as it is advocated by Habermas

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[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid.

and Rawls, but we can actually have a result without compromising a goal of the discussion by majority vote. Thus, of we observe what has happened so far, I will not say that this particular occurrence successfully is overcoming the paradox of democracy[91], but rather that it shows some considerable efforts to do so. Whereas other forms of democratic decision-making, such as consociationalism can yield in other side effects, which cannot be denoted as democratic.

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[91] The problem (not a true paradox) facing a democrat who recognizes the right of people to follow a majority decision with which he or she disagrees. The problem can generate a moral dilemma, although in practice we have little difficulty in accommodating the two different pressures. Source: http://www.answers.com/topic/paradox-of-democracy (last accessed: 05/10/2011)

Chapter 3

The Opposition and Implications

Introduction

In the first chapter I have outlined the issues centered on the historical and political context with regard to Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina with regard to their nation-building process. In chapter two we have seen the flaws regarding the consociational democratic model, which is applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina, causing the aforementioned ethnic reification, we also looked at some of the alternatives offered by acts of civic citizenship, as the student protests of Zagreb and Tuzla in 2009. In this final chapter of the thesis we will be looking at some of the opposing opinions towards the student protests. The institutional and official parties involved in the sphere of education express these opinions. With regard to Croatia, I will look at an interview I have conducted with a teacher at the University of Zagreb, as well as the opinions expressed with regard to the aforementioned case with the Student Union of Croatia and their stance towards the internal politics of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I will be looking at interviews using the 'Viennese approach' to critical discourse analysis developed by Ruth Wodak et al., given that the opposition has proven itself to be populist rather than ethno-nationalist in both Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a pretence of reconciliatory sentiment which would seem common for the region. The theoretical background I wish to rely on in this section will be based of the writings of Ernesto Laclau[92]*,* but also on Michael Billig's writings on banal nationalism. The aim here will be to try and determine where exactly the shift from ethnic nationalism to populism will occur given that the nation-building processes in both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina

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[92] Laclau, Ernesto. *On populist reason*. Verso, 2005. & Laclau, Ernesto. *New reflections on the revolution of our time: Ernesto Laclau*. Verso, 1990.

was and still may be considered to have been created along lines of the ethnic identification; also one goal will be to see why exactly an act such as the student protests will be considered an unacceptable occurrence. For the final part, I will take a closer look at some of the implications that followed the respective student protests, and see whether new solidarities were actually created by these means.

Ethnic Nationalism, Populism and Banality

Before going into the analysis of the interviews and cases, it is crucial to discuss the three key-concepts here, which will be helpful to get an insight into, what I will call the *mindset*[93]. I wish to start with the concept of ethnic nationalism by looking at Eric Hobsbawm's concept of invented traditions[94]. If we look at invented traditions, according to Hobsbawm, they appear to be used in a very general, but not quite imprecise sense. He goes on in saying that:

> *It includes both 'traditions' actually invented, constructed and formally instituted and those emerging in a less easily traceable manner within a brief and dateable period- a matter of a few years perhaps-and establishing themselves with great rapidity. Invented tradition is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.*[95]

If we follow this view, we can see that nationalism indeed is something rather new, and not something drawing on a pre-existing of the group, or as Anthony Smith would put it to make an attempt to fashion history into a sense of common identity and shared history.

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[93] I use mindset here not with a reference towards a psychoanalytical approach, but rather to give a simpler picture of what people think about this occurrence, since I am concerned with individuals who claim to be representing the 'general public'.

[94] See Hobsbawm, Eric J., and Terence O. Ranger. *The Invention of tradition*. Cambridge University Press, 1992.

[95] Ibid.

I do not wish to go to deeply into the historic creation of nations and nation-states, in particularly Croatia i.e. the creation of a Croat identity, or Bosnia and Herzegovina and the creation of a Bosnian, even more so the creation of a Bosniak identity. I just wish to state the theoretical assumptions, which are tending to explain the occurrence of nationalism. For this purpose I singled out two particular events with regard to nation-building i.e. inventing traditions in the two countries, to start with Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosniak identity, originally the term Bosniak was used to refer to the Bogomils[96] coming from the region of what is today Bosnia and Herzegovina, nowadays however this term is used to denote someone coming from Bosnia and Herzegovina and belongs, or declares themselves a follower of the Islamic faith, which historically speaking is inaccurate, since Islam was not present Bosnia and Herzegovina up until the coming of the Ottomans in the mid 15th century. The category Bosniak did not officially exist in Tito's Yugoslavia, up until 1971 people of the Islamic faith were referred to as *Other*, after which the category Muslim was introduced. The term today is used, with a strong affiliation towards the late President of the short-lived Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović, who during the late 1980s and early 1990s, considered that Bosnia and Herzegovina was an Islamic state with Serb and Croat minorities. This is a short historic overview of the creation of the Bosniak national myth.

Regarding Croatia, I believe the ethnic nationalism, historically speaking starts in World War 2, with the creation of the Independent State of Croatia, which basically was a puppet state created after the Axis Powers invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941. The state was under the government of the fascist Ustashi[97] movement, with its leader referred to

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[96] Bogomils, an ancient Gnostic religious community which is thought to have originated in Bulgaria. Source: http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org/definitions/Bogumil?cx=partner-pub-0939450753529744%3Av0qd01-tdlq&cof=FORID%3A9&ie=UTF-8&q=Bogumil&sa=Search#922 (last accessed: 05/21/2011)

[97] Coming from the Croatian word *ustanak*, which means uprising.

51

Poglavnik[98] at that time Ante Pavelić, whose administration was under the influence of Hitler's Germany. Despite the fact that far-right movements emerged in Croatia inspired by the Independent state of Croatia, the official position of the country today, with regard to the current constitution, does not recognize the Independent State of Croatia as a legitimate historical predecessor state to what is today the Republic of Croatia. In contrast however, after the declaration of independence from Yugoslavia, the Republic of Croatia rehabilitated the Domobran[99], who now are receiving a state pension.

This is a brief overview of what I believe brought about an ethnic nationalist identification to both of the respective countries, however this has so to speak evolved from ethnic nationalism into a rather visual form of populism given that in both countries the social aspects such as employment are suffering, as we have seen in one of the previous chapters with the answers some of the student protestors gave. At this point I would like to turn to a theoretical explanation of the occurrence of populism, as analyzed by the political scientist Ernesto Laclau[100].

What Makes a Populist?

Before going into the relevant theories regarding populism, I need to clarify why I chose to refer to the oppositional side of the interviewees for this research as populist rather than ethnic nationalist, as we have seen in the previous interviews conducted with student protestors and the status quo, the answer in order to rid societies like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia of the ethnic cleavages, the socio-economical issues need to be addressed, however as we will see in the analysis part of this chapter this might be true.

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[98] Croatian for Chief
[99] The Croatian Home Guard, also, known as the "Homeland Defenders," was the name used for the regular armed forces of the Independent State of Croatia which existed during World War 2.
[100] See Laclau, Ernesto. *On populist reason*. Verso, 2005

Laclau in his book on Populist Reason follows two interpretations of populism, the first being Gino Germani's who claims that:

Populism itself tends to deny any identification with or classification into the Right/Left dichotomy. It is a multiclass movement, although not all multiclass movements may be considered populist. Populism probably defies any comprehensive definition. Leaving aside this problem for the moment, populism usually includes contrasting components such as a claim for equality of political rights and universal participation for the common people, but fused with some sort of authoritarianism often under charismatic leadership. It also includes socialist demands (or at least a claim for social justice), vigorous defense of small property, strong nationalist components, and denial of the importance of class. It is accompanied with the affirmation of the rights of the common people as against the privileged interest groups, usually considered inimical to the people and the nation. Any of these elements may be stressed accord- ing to cultural and social conditions, but they are all present in most populist movements.[101]

The second interpretation of populism Laclau follows is Peter Worsley's, who in his text *The Concept of Populism* does not see populism as a type of organization or ideology, which would be comparable to others such as liberalism, conservatism, communism or socialism, but as a dimension of the political culture, which can be present in social movements of quite different ideological signs. As Worsley puts it:

The populist syndrome ... is much wider than its particular manifestation in the form or context of any particular policy, or of any particular kind of overall ideological system or type of polity: democracy, totalitarianism, etc. This suggests that populism is better regarded as an emphasis, a dimension of political culture in general, not simply as a particular kind of overall ideological system or type of organisation. Of course, as with all ideal types, it may be very closely approximated to by some political cultures and structures, such as those hitherto labelled 'populist'.[102]

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[101] Ibid.
[102] Ibid.

53

Laclau however, denotes that Worsley's second definition[103] is more pertinent, as it tries to avoid reductionist attempts in accepting only a false dimension of manipulation, as it would appear necessary to give room for the emergence of populism. Thus Laclau quotes Worsley:

> *It would be desirable ... to alter part of Shils's definition of populism so that - without eliminating 'pseudo-participation' (demagogy, 'government by television, etc.) — we could also include, and distinguish, genuine and effective popular participation. 'Populism', then, would refer not only to 'direct' relationships between people and leadership (which must, inevitably, in any complex, large-scale society, be predominantly sheer mystification or symbolism), but, more widely, to popular participation in general (including pseudo-participation).[104]*

As we will see from the interviews, this can be considered true, given the already explained characteristics of the official and institutional interest groups in the case study, as for example the cases with the student unions with regard to both Universities, as the interviews will show, there are signs of popular rhetoric which are used by nationalist parties such as SDA and HDZ [105]. In this sense, we are able to justify Worsley's claim about pseudo-participation, since as I said before, the members of the two student unions are politically affiliated with the two respective parties, which might lead one to assume that these parties purposefully intend to have a presence in education.

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[103] *Worsley is, of course, referring to Third World ideologies, not giving his own opinion. However, his critical analysis concerning the limits of Lenin's conception of the overlapping, in the Russian peasantry, of socio-economic distinctions and socio-political solidarities suggests that when he discusses the rejection of class struggle by Third World populism he is not just giving an ethnographic account of some form of 'false consciousness', but pointing to a real difficulty in generalizing 'class struggle' as a universal motto of political mobilization.* Laclau, Ernesto. *On populist reason*. Verso, 2005

[104] Ibid.

[105] SDA or Stranka Demokratske Akcije (English: Party of Democratic Action) is a conservative Bosniak political party founded by Alija Izetbegovic, in 1990. HDZ or Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (English: Croatian Democratic Union), which can be considered the Croat counter-part of SDA in both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Banality of Nationalism

One last theoretical aspect I wish to mention before moving to the analysis of the interviews is Michael Billig's concept of banal nationalism[106]. Namely, Billig argues that nationalism is more than a set of separatist ideas. He claims that nationalism is everywhere; even though it might be unexpressed it will always be ready to be mobilized. Banal nationalism refers to the everyday representations of the nation, which constructs an imaginary sense of solidarity and belonging amongst people. Billig says that the term banal nationalism in itself conveys what *ideological habits* are needed in order to establish the reproduction of the nations of the West, and that these habits are deeply rooted in everyday life[107]. He goes on in saying that the nation is flagged on a daily basis in the lives of citizens. Examples of this form of nationalism consist of the usage of flags in everyday contexts, popular expressions of 'patriotism', the use of an indicated togetherness in the national press, e.g. our team. Billig claims that almost all of these symbols are effective of their constant repetition almost complete subliminal nature[108]. The reason I included this theoretical aspect is to try and determine whether the use of such rhetoric as mentioned before is happening unintentionally, or is rather something that is applied only in the official discourse with regard to the aforementioned interviewees.

Analysis

As already mentioned, in this section I will be looking at some of the interviews conducted with the third interest group, the opposition to the protests. By using the Viennese approach to critical discourse analysis[109], I wish to establish why an act such as the student

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[106] See Billig, Michael. *Banal nationalism*. SAGE, 1995.

[107] Ibid.
[108] Ibid.
[109] See Wodak, Ruth, Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl, and Karin Liebhart. *The discursive*

protests are viewed as a danger, and therefore are being dismissed as an option in the institutional discourse. In the analysis I will be looking at some of the answers provided by university teachers in Croatia, i.e. Zagreb, and student union representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e. Tuzla, the answers the interviewees provided, are quite similar to one another.

According to Wodak et al. discursive analysis can be divided into three interrelated dimensions:

    a. Contents/Topics

    b. Strategies

    c. Linguistic means and forms of realization

Following this model, I will look at the contents/topics dimension of the interviews. Wodak et al. say that this dimension is also divided into 5 different sub-categories, (1) the idea of a 'homo austracus' [110]and a 'homo externus', (2) a narrative of a collective political history, (3) the discursive construction of a common culture, (4) the discursive construction of a collective present and future, (5) the discursive construction of a national body[111].

    1. Homo Croatus/Bosniakus and the Homo Externus

According to Wodak et al. the first sub-category, the homo austracus, in this case the homo croatus/bosniakus is easily identified by the individual's emotional attachment to the nation-state; Croatia, or through the biographical genesis of the national identity, or the

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construction of national identity. Edinburgh University Press, 2009.

[110] For the sake of this thesis, I will refer to this category as the 'homo croaticus' or 'homo bosniakus'.

[111] Ibid.

activation of the national identity while being abroad. When I asked a university teacher from

Zagreb the question what he considered nation and ethnicity to be he answered:

> *Nation as an imagined concept, is not something as a made invented, just as we have our own perception as a subject, the same thing applies to the nation, it does not mean that it is imagined in the sense that we can imagine something else, as for example in Bosnia and Herzegovina they now want to invent that we are Bosnians and Herzegovinian, which I could not explain to my father in Mostar, that he is actually a Bosnian and Herzegovinian and not a Croat, which leads me to ethnicity, which I consider to be bound to biology, whereas the nation is bound to culture.* [112]

When I asked a representative of the student union in Tuzla the same question he gave

a more abrupt, but quite similar answer:

> *I would define the nation, as the belonging to a certain state, something one can claim historical rights to, whereas ethnicity is something that defines us biologically, something that is in our blood, I view it like this, above all I am a Muslim, and then a Bosniak, that is a Citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country I have a historical claim to, since other Bosniaks, and my own family members fought, so we could keep our nation and nationhood.* [113]

Despite the fact that these answers in content are different, the answers clearly resemble each

other. We can observe the emotional attachments these people have in the first case, the

mention of the father, who cannot be convinced that he will no longer be a Croat, but a citizen

of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in the second answer the probably traumatic experience of

having someone in the family who fought for their nationhood to continue to exist.

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[112] Anonymous, interviewed by author, Zagreb, April 13th 2011
[113] Anonymous, interviewed by author, Tuzla, April 20th 2011

2. A Narrative of a Collective Political History

This category is identifiable through usages of myths, mythical figures, political victories, prosperity and crisis. Here I asked the question about the idea of the nation state being defined through democracy as it was the rhetoric of national parties, who claimed they will bring about democracy. This is the answer I got in Zagreb:

> *In my opinion democracy is one of the forms of government of people within a community, you have to remember that even Plato denoted it as the worst form of government, since it implies the rule of the majority, and at the same time the rule of the majority carries in itself inherent dangers, since if we say democracy today it implies a level of respecting minorities and different opinions. It seems to me that if we talk about democracy in our region, it resembles those stories of Communist Yugoslavia, something we are tending to but never achieve, however it is not a finished process, it is still going on, and here I would say it started with the Croatian and Slovenian independence.[114]*

The answer in Tuzla:

> *Democracy is the rule of people, which guarantees us the participation in public life, if it were not for people like the late president Izetbegović, us Bosniaks probably would be put into an unwanted category, and therefore would not be able to control what is going on around us, and after a terrible conflict where many lives were lost, I would say that we achieved democracy, and that everything is under control.[115]*

Here we can observe two acts, which did not as I would say completely brought about democracy as the second answer suggests, but that it started in both countries due to national parties, in Croatia with the HDZ, in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the SDA.

3. The Discursive Construction of a Common political Culture

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[114] Anonymous, interviewed by author, Zagreb, April 13th 2011
[115] Anonymous, interviewed by author, Tuzla, April 20th 2011

58

This category is characterized through aspects of sympathizing with a current political hegemony and the popular demands of it. In the context of the Croatian university teacher I interviewed it is the creation of the third constituent entity[116] in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the Croatian one. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina actually establishing a political hegemony, which would only be Bosniak, while leaving the other ethnicities mostly on the margins with regard to decision-making. I asked the question on how the democratic process can be allowed to function properly in a situation like the successor states of Yugoslavia.

This is the answer from Zagreb:

The experience of Western Europe shows us that the nation-state is the best framework for the development of a state. But as the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina shows, where we had national conflicts, where the national question is solved, democracy will prevail, since the national question is generating nationalism, and therefore Bosnia and Herzegovina does not secure its internal legitimacy. So there is a need for Bosnia and Herzegovina to solve its national question, and if that means to legitimize the claim for a third Croat entity, so be it. [117]

The answer from Tuzla:

Well that is easy, I believe our politicians need to learn their place, and remember who comes first, too long has there been the obstruction of democracy because of certain groups in our country, however, we need to remember who the victims were, and who comes first, don't get me wrong, I have friends who are Croats and Serbs, however, we as a nation need to set our priorities. [118]

Here we can observe the affiliation these individuals have towards current political streams, however these streams are both related to the interviewees ethnic origins. In the first case, the interviewee is defending the stance of the Croat hegemony in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereas in the second case the interviewee is identifying with the Bosniak hegemony.

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[117] Anonymous, interviewed by author, Zagreb, April 13th 2011
[118] Anonymous, interviewed by author, Tuzka, April 20th 2011

59

There are two more aspects of this approach to critical discourse analysis, namely, the discursive construction of a common present and future, and the discursive construction of a national body. I will just briefly explain them, but I will not go into the analysis since the answers from the third aspect (discursive construction of a common political culture) apply.

4. The Discursive Construction of a Common Present and Future

This category is reflected through the political achievements and values of the certain political hegemonies. As we have seen in the answers for the previous categories, there is a strong ethnic affiliation on both sides, which was characterized as in the case of Croatia with the declaration of independence, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the resistance in the war of the 1990s.

5. The Discursive Construction of a National Body

In this category the focus is on the creation of an intra-national sameness, as it is evident in the answers of category 3, the usage of phrases like *where we had a national conflict*, in the case of the university teacher from Zagreb, or the usage of *our politicians need to learn their place* on behalf of the student union representative in Tuzla indicate this intra-national sameness. If we take into account the usage of personal pronouns such as 'we' and 'our', we can also observe the usage of Billig's conception of banal nationalism, thus applying a sameness to everyone within a society.

To conclude this section, as we have seen in the answers, there are traces of ethnic nationalism, but also of populism in the official sphere of higher education. All of the interviewees addressed social issues claiming that these could be resolved if the 'national question is resolved, this meaning Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to acknowledge the claim for a third entity which would be Croat, thus widening the ethnic cleavages even more. This

with itself carries another problem, namely, after the creation of the third administrative entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the constitution would need to be amended, which then would legitimize a claim for a referendum by the side of the Srpska Republic, in order to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina, which again would lead to another referendum for the either Bosniak or Croat side to secede, these states, then would probably claim accession rights to their navel states i.e. Serbia and Croatia, which however could not allow for accession to happen because it would render them unable to become candidates or members of the European Union, which is the respective countries main agenda at the moment.

What Happened Afterwards?

In this final section of the thesis I will be looking at some of the events after the student protests of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. First I would like to point out that despite unpopular views, the Student Plenum in Zagreb is the main representative figure of the student body, and it functions in a directly democratic way, and that it makes decisions which will include everyone and address the relevant issues. One event I would like to single out, as I mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, is the intervention of the Student Plenum of Zagreb into the petition the Student Union of Croatia is trying to accomplish. The petition is supposed to be made out to the Central Voting Committee of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to review the votes of the last presidential elections since for the Croat member of the presidency the candidate was President Željko Komšić who does not belong to a national party but is a social democrat. Given that the Student Union of Croatia has a very large number of members coming from Herzegovina, who are dual citizens of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, they are very conservative and very pro-Croatia oriented, their decision was to intervene in the process of the assimilation of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the organizational nature of the Student Union of Croatia and its centralized

61

structure it must adhere to remain apolitical in every aspect, however it is displaying ethnic affiliations by interfering with the internal politics of a neighbor state. The reaction of the Student Plenum to this issue was to pressure the Student Union to revoke their decision, which they in the end did, given that this did not represent the interests of the student body but the interests of the Student Union.

Turning to the example of Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina, after the protests ended, Tuzla experienced a new wave of protests in the Fall of 2009, it appears as though students realized that they actually can ask for better, however these demands ranged from very reasonable to ridiculous. Nevertheless though a year later at the University of Sarajevo students started revolting against the nationalist representation of the student body manifested through the Student Parliament and the Student Union of the University of Sarajevo, thus were characterized through the same statement the students of Zagreb and Tuzla *Besplatno Obrazovanje za Sve*[119] The Student Plenum in Zagreb issued a letter of support and a statement right away[120].

As we have seen in this chapter, especially in the last part, universities can indeed serve as a site for cross-ethnic solidarities, or to be more frank, a site for the creation of new solidarities which are not concerned with issues of ethnicity and nationhood, but have clear goals in mind, and are aiming towards cooperation and integration instead of segregation and differentiation.

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[119] Croatian/Bosnian for Free Education for Everyone.
[120] More about these two cases can be read at www.slobodnifilozofski.com (last accessed: 05/25/2011)

Conclusion

As we have seen so far, the situation in the countries of Former Yugoslavia is quite complex, regarding the historical and political contexts. In Croatia we are witnessing the uprising of revisionist politics, which are built on myths of Croatia's fascist past, in Bosnia and Herzegovina we are witnessing the constant reification of ethnic identification, and the importance of ethnicity in every aspect of life, either private or public. Such a context on a more subjective level makes life particularly difficult for the general public, thus in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina renders reconciliatory attempts almost useless, which is followed by a vast dissatisfaction especially within the youth population. However there are occurrences, which appear to aid in such a situation, the student protests I analyzed for this thesis are one of them.

In chapter one, we have seen the historical and political contexts, which were significant for the nation-building processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. Through Gramsci's Laclau's and Mouffe's definitions of hegemony, we have seen how in the two respective countries, democracy is given a hegemonized, in this case national content, thus as Laclau would say democracy as a floating signifier was fixed to the national, and not to something which will benefit the population. We also have seen how an act such as the student protests I used as a case study for this thesis; give a new meaning to democracy. Through the theories of Jürgen Habermas we have established that the chief aim of the democratic process is to reach a consensus, and that such a consensus can only be reached if people leave aside their differences and start acting rationally, but also Mouffe suggests, that the democratic process needs to provide an arena where dissenting opinions can be expressed, only then a consensus as Habermas suggested can be reached. We have seen that the structure established by the students in Zagreb, i.e. the Student Plenum is in accordance with what the

63

French philosopher Jacques Derrida proposed, namely that the core principle of the university's resistance is the principle of truth, therefore we have seen within the interviews I conducted with the student protestors and the status quo, how the university as a concept is misused for exclusion and discrimination, but also how acts like the student protests fight this, and establish what Rogers Brubaker calls cross-ethnic solidarities, making the university a perfect site for this. Through the theories of Sidney Tarrow and Robert D. Putnam, we have seen how the spread of these protests achieves the creation of the aforementioned cross-ethnic solidarities, and that this can be established through modular collective action, which according to Tarrow enables a social movement to be copied exactly from one setting to the other, since there is a vast resemblance of the repertories. But also one important aspect here would be social capital, which was discussed by Robert D. Putnam, who claims that it is a sociological concept linked to the relations within and between social movements. He also claims that social capital is necessary in order to maintain a democracy, and that civic society is a manifestation of democracy. If we observe the student protests we can see that this indeed is true, given that they spread from one setting to the other with similar and that cross-ethnic solidarities have been established first in different countries with the same history, and then later on within the countries. However, it might be suggested that these protests needed centers to start, and as history has showed these centers are usually the largest most developed places, and it would only seem natural that the protests in Croatia started in Zagreb, however in Bosnia and Herzegovina they did not start in Sarajevo, which has the oldest university in the country, but they started in Tuzla, where the University is not older than forty years, however one answer I would suggest, on why the protests started there and not in Sarajevo, could be the ethnic composition of the student body, which is quite diverse as opposed to other cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because of Tuzla's geographic position.

In chapter two, we have been looking on the relevant theories surrounding the democratic decision-making process the students from Zagreb and Tuzla applied, they call it directly democratic. However, we have established that it cannot be called directly democratic, since it contains elements of other democratic decision-making models, such as deliberative democracy, but also it contains elements of the agonistic pluralism model Chantal Mouffe is advocating. We also have looked at the current basis of the political system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e. consociation democracy, as advocated by Arend Lijphart, who presupposes that, if we implemented a consociation democracy in a post-conflict country than it can be assumed that these countries will work towards reconciliation and that the consociation model will lead facilitate the process, as he exemplified in his essay *Consociational Democracy* with the case of post World War 2 Austria. Ljiphart points out that post-conflict countries may tend to deepen cleavages of differentiation, but again with the case of Austria, he says they do not, to which one could assume that there is a grand need for optimism in such situations. With regard to the decision-making models the students applied, we have seen how the constitution of their demos works; we can assume that it completely follows Robert Dahl's idea of a completely inclusive demos, as it is reconstituting itself constantly with regard to the agenda. To put it simply, the constitution of the demos will be a result of the current issue, since everyone who's interests are affected. We also established through the theories of Robert Goodin and Philip Petit that a direct democratic model carries certain flaws which would mean either the disenfranchising of certain groups (Goodin), or the assimilation of the majority opinion (Petit), however, as we have seen through the interviews conducted with the student protestors and their supporters, this is successfully avoided, given the models nature.

In chapter three we have been looking at some of the statements the oppositional side gave in the interviews, through the Viennese approach to critical discourse analysis we have

established that there is reconciliatory pretence amongst the different ethnic groups, whereas preference is always given to one's own affiliation. Another interesting aspect that emerged was a character of populist behavior, rather than ethno-nationalist, since in both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the interviewees were pro-European Union oriented, but blamed the bad social situation in both countries on the *unresolved national question,* which as one of the interviewees said generates nationalism. Therefore we can assume, why an act as these student protests would be viewed as problematic, given that as I already explained they dismiss the differences of people (ethnicity, gender, religion, etc.) by giving room for dissenting opinions. But the opposing side it appears believes that there is a need for stressing these differences, which in this case is ethnicity, this might suggest that they even may be arguing for a liberal nationalist point of view, however, as history shows us such a view can be deemed problematic in countries like Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. We also have taken a brief look at some of the events, which followed the student protests, and how they actually result in a struggle against the political hegemonies in both countries, with their attempt to dissociate democracy, i.e. decision-making as such.

To conclude, this thesis serves as an account on what is being done against nationalist hegemonies in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as we have seen the stance from the liberal nationalist point of view is only leading to the further deepening of ethnic cleavages, even though this might have never been intended, it still affected and is still affecting every aspect of life, from the public to the private. However there are acts, as the case study has shown which tend to struggle against this, and even do overcome these ethnic cleavages successfully, thus they tend to create sites of cross ethnic solidarities, or rather a new form of solidarities. Given that the student protests and their decision-making model are a rather new occurrence, and that it needs more time to reach its full potential, and therefore we are allowed to be rather optimistic about the future implications.

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