CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2011
| Author | Vasile, Laura Janett |
|---|---|
| Title | Moral Disagreement and Moral Indeterminacy |
| Summary | My aim in this dissertation is to provide an answer to the question whether the argument from moral disagreement undermines the plausibility of moral objectivism. I focus on a recurrent argument in the recent metaethical literature, according to which the moral objectivist can respond to the challenge posed by the pervasiveness and intractability of moral disagreement by appealing to the idea of moral indeterminacy. A substantial part of the dissertation is devoted to showing that this response to the argument from moral disagreement is not free of difficulties. One of the main worries has to do with the fact that, since moral indeterminacy cannot be a pervasive phenomenon, it seems that the best strategy available to the objectivist is to maintain that there is also a considerable amount of convergence in moral belief, and that this convergence in belief is best explained on objectivist assumptions. Yet, if responding to the argument from moral disagreement involves defending both the claim that there are indeterminate moral issues and the claim that convergence in moral belief can suitably be regarded as the result of a reliable epistemic mechanism, a worry might arise as to whether an adequate defense of both the aforementioned claims can be mounted from the perspective of the same version of moral objectivism. The worry is that defending the former claim may be easier if one embraces a version of cognitivism which delivers a weaker form of objectivity, while defending the latter claim may be easier if a version of cognitivism which delivers a stronger form of objectivity is vindicated. I claim that moral realism has the resources to account for both the aforementioned claims. On the one hand, I argue that moral realism has no trouble accommodating moral indeterminacy. On the other hand, I argue that moral facts figure in the best explanation of our moral beliefs. Moreover, I argue that despite common assumptions to the contrary, the claim that moral facts can play causal explanatory roles can consistently be endorsed by both naturalists and nonnaturalists. |
| Supervisor | Kis, Janos |
| Department | Philosophy PhD |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2011/fphval01.pdf |
Visit the CEU Library.
© 2007-2021, Central European University