"EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES:" THE FUNDING OF HUNGARIAN REFUGEE STUDENTS BY THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATIONS, 1956-1958

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF THE ARTS

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BUDAPEST, HUNGARY
2011

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ABSTRACT

The important role of American Foundations during the months following the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, while understudied, deserves the attention of scholarship. This thesis provides a study of two major programs sponsored by Rockefeller grants- the Bard English Language program to assist Hungarian refugees who had emigrated to the United States and the scholarship program which was established at the University of Vienna. Based upon an examination of archival materials located at the Rockefeller Archive Center, these case studies provide valuable insight into the functioning of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund during the early Cold War. The Hungarian Revolution presented a challenge to the Rockefeller Foundations, forcing them make decisions as to whom and for what purposes should their financial support be granted.

This thesis aims to challenge some assertions made by scholars regarding the nature of Foundations during the Cold War. Utilizing key concepts such as public diplomacy, the state-private network, and Americanization it will be possible to assess the ways in which the grants of the Foundations were cast. I argue that the Rockefeller Foundations wished to maintain autonomy from governmental intervention, crafting policies in the light of their own objectives. Such objectives, however, often aligned themselves with those of the government, reflecting the close ties between the Foundations and the governmental elite. Moreover, I argue that the programs reflected a form of public diplomacy which aimed to integrate the students into their respective communities, whether that be in the United States or within Austria, and establish intellectual networks which would promote Western scholarship. Based upon the amount of money allocated to the respective programs, it is also argued that the Rockefeller Foundation placed an emphasis on supporting refugees who were to remain in Europe, as opposed to those

within the United States, as it was felt that such support would fit their objectives of establishing global intellectual networks and supporting scholarship for those under communist influence.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CIA- Central Intelligence Agency

ESL- English as a second language

EFL- English as a foreign language

IEB- International Education Board

IIE- Institute of International Education

FBI- Federal Bureau of Investigation

NAS- National Academy of the Science

OCB- Operations Coordinating board (of the CIA)

ÖH- *Österreichische Hochschülerschaft* (Austrian Student Union)

RAC- Rockefeller Archive Center

RBF- Rockefeller Brothers Fund

RF- Rockefeller Foundation

RFE- Radio Free Europe

USIA- United States Information Agency

VOA- Voice of America

WUS- World University Service

INTRODUCTION

Béla Lipták was a 20-year-old engineering student studying in Budapest when the Hungarian Revolution broke out in October of 1956, just one of the many students who joined the struggle for Hungarian independence from Soviet occupation. After the Soviet military brutally crushed the resistance in the beginning of November, Lipták was imprisoned within the very walls of the University of Budapest where he had been a student only weeks before. Due to his knowledge of the elaborate tunnel system which lay beneath the university he was able to escape the building, crawling through dark and narrow water pipes which led him to the cold Danube. Following his harrowing escape Lipták then traveled to the border, crossing into Austria and joining the over 200,000 refugees who had fled Hungary as a result of Revolution.[1]

Of those 200,000 refugees who fled Hungary, over an estimated 8,000 of them were students like Béla Lipták. It is suggested that during the weeks of the Revolution over twenty percent of the post-secondary school population left Hungary for the West, with eleven percent being enrolled college students.[2] Relief efforts specifically directed at students were quickly organized, with main coordination and screening efforts in the hands of the World University Service (WUS). In order to provide funds for the massive undertaking of providing scholarships to thousands of displaced students, a wide variety of financial sources were solicited from governments, relief charities, and private individuals and foundations. A great deal of funding came from the United States who opened their doors for an unprecedented 30,000 refugees.[3] One the largest source of funding was from American private philanthropic foundations within the United States.

[1] See Bela G. Liptak's memoir, written while at an Austrian refugee camp, *A Testament Of Revolution* (Texas A&M University Press, Sep 2007).
[2] Peter Hidas, "The Hungarian Refugee Student Movement of 1956-57 and Canada," *Canadian Ethnic Studies/études ethniques au Canada* 30, No. 1 (1998): 19.
[3] Carl Bon Tempo, *Americans at the Gate: the United States and Refugees during the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

The role of United States private foundations in the support of Hungarian refugees has been an understudied area of research when examining both the 1956 Revolution and, on a more general level, the politics of the Cold War period. This is surprising considering the important role foundations played during the Cold War, both in terms of their philanthropy and their inherent ideological representations. Private foundations became progressively more important due to a rapid increase in their endowment sizes during the years of post-war prosperity in the United States. Two of the largest foundations within the United States were the Rockefeller Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, both created through massive endowments from the billionaire John D. Rockefeller in 1913 and 1940 respectively.[4] As the Foundations developed, both in assets and structurally, they progressively saw their role in international projects to be expanding, a reflection of both the United States' new role as a global superpower and a fulfillment of the Rockefeller Foundation's core founding institutional mission of "promoting the well-being of mankind throughout the world."[5]

Such a dedication to international policies by the Rockefeller Foundations was effected by the Cold War climate. Volker Berghahn has studied the ways in which private foundations, in particular the Ford Foundation, functioned within the Cold War environment.[6] He argues that because the United States government knew that they could not play an explicitly visible position in promoting Western culture and politics abroad, they saw the role of private foundations to be fundamental in supporting such international projects. Foundations, including the Rockefeller foundations, established themselves as one of the fundamental promoters of

[4] I will refer to the Rockefeller Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund as "Rockefeller foundations" for the sake of simplicity. Though they were separate legal entities, with individual funding and direction (the Brother's fund was managed by the Rockefeller family itself while the Rockefeller foundation was managed by its officers and a board of trustees), there was considerable shared policy and administration. The foundations will be distinguished as when necessary.

[5] This is a phrase which is repeated in all annual reports of the foundation. Beginning in 1950s the annual reports begin to emphasize strongly international programs, separating them out as a distinct branch of the foundations work.

these objectives, providing grants for, among other agenda items, foreign scholars and universities, the establishment of English language programs both within the US and abroad, the Congress for Cultural Freedom,[7] and the development of area studies programs.

This thesis will attempt to connect U.S. foreign and domestic policy to the millions of dollars the Rockefeller Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund spent on international programs during the Cold War. Such a study will demonstrate how the foundations used their grant funding to promote pro-Western social and political ideals, principles which often closely reflected those of the U.S. government though were not necessarily in complete alignment. The complex relationship between the U.S. government and the American foundations will be explored to determine the level of autonomy these foundations had in their domestic and international programs.

In order to examine this topic, I will analyze one unique undertaking, the funding of Hungarian refugees in the period of 1956 to 1958. Given the significant changes which the Hungarian refugees precipitated in U.S. refugee policy, the lack of attention given to the topic by scholars is surprising. Literature regarding United States-Hungarian relations during the period immediately following the Revolution has tended to focus on the failures of U.S. governmental policy, especially regarding their promotion of liberationist rhetoric through such outlets as Radio Free Europe, in providing support for the revolutionaries. However, some scholars such as Charles Gati and Johanna Granville do acknowledge the important, and largely successful, refugee relief programs which were organized and supported by the United State

[6] Volker Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001).

[7] The Congress of Cultural Freedom was anti-communist activist group composed of artists which was founded in 1950. The organization lost a great deal of its credibility in 1967 when it was revealed that the CIA had been covertly providing funds and managing the programs through the cover of private Foundations, most notably the Ford Foundation. For more information see, Peter Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy. The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe* (New York: The Free Press, 1989) and Frances Stoner Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: The New Press, 2000).

government and private groups and individuals within the United States.[8]

Despite the large contribution made by these private sources, no major work has focused on the refugees themselves or, more specifically, on refugee students within the United States. Two studies have been conducted concerning the reception of refugee students, in Canada in an article by Peter Hidas, and in the United Kingdom in a book by Magda Czigany.[9] These texts, however, focus far more upon the work of the respective governmental and university level support networks of the students than the external funding through private sources. Not only can examining the topic fill in an important gap in our knowledge of the funding of Hungarian refugee students as a whole but can also contribute to the scholarship concerning how American foundations operated during the early Cold War.

The funding of the Hungarian refugees provoked a number of intriguing internal debates within the Rockefeller foundations which will be addressed over the course of the thesis. First, there was the question as to whether or not the foundations should provide direct humanitarian relief to the refugees and how such funding should be allocated, either directly through the Foundations themselves or through partner organizations. These inquiries touch upon the relationship between the Rockefeller Foundations and the United States government, exploring the potential federal influence on the Foundations' policies. Second, there was the pressing issue as to whether or not the Foundations should concentrate their funding on refugees within the United States or on the greater numbers still in Europe, as their traditional policy regarding refugees and foreign scholar support would dictate. Third, how could the Rockefeller Foundations fund the refugees while not appearing to direct the educations of these

[8] See, for example, Johanna Granville, *The First Domino: International Decision Making During the Hungarian Crises of 1956* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004) and Charles Gati, *Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt*, Cold War International History Project series (Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006).

[9] Magda Czigany, *Just Like Other Students: Reception of the 1956 Hungarian Refugee Students in Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009) and Peter Hidas, "The Hungarian Refugee Student Movement

students and thus by implication their values?

In order to answer these fundamental questions, I will address two key areas of Rockefeller support for the Hungarian refugees: the funding of English language instruction within the United States and the scholarship support scheme they established with European universities. Two case studies will be examined in order to determine how these two programs demonstrated the different streams of thought in how the funding should be allocated in the Hungarian program. I have selected as my first case study the Bard College English program, established in the months immediately following the Revolution, to teach the newly arrived refugee students the necessary English to resume their studies. My second case study concerns the University of Vienna, the university which received both the highest number of Hungarian refugees and the greatest amount of funding from the Rockefeller Foundation in their support of students remaining in Europe.

These case studies will be examined in a comparative manner in order to draw conclusions about the nature of Rockefeller grant making during the late 1950s. First, I will demonstrate how the Rockefeller Foundations' policies evolved over the period between 1956 and 1958 as reflected in the change from funding refugees at home to funding them abroad. Second, I will assess the degree to which a desire for "Americanization" influenced the administration and overall assessment of these programs by the Rockefeller Foundations.

This thesis is based upon extensive research conducted at the Rockefeller Archive in Tarrytown, New York. This archive holds the collections from both the Rockefeller Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, making it the prime location for research into this topic. Sources which were utilized in this study include trustee minutes, public announcements, officer diaries, financial reports, and correspondences between foundation officials and partner

of 1956-57 and Canada."

organizations. Such documents, the majority unpublished, provide valuable insight into the decision-making processes of the organization in the tense months following the Revolution through the cessation of the programs in 1958, the year in which the Rockefeller Foundations felt funding would no longer be needed for both programs in Europe and the United States.

The thesis will be organized into four chapters. The first two chapters serve as preludes to the more substantial case studies. The first chapter will address the concept of public diplomacy, defining both public and cultural diplomacy with a particular emphasis on international education and exchange. The politicization of public diplomacy was also reflected in the perception of refugees during the Cold War, another topic which is to be addressed in this chapter. This chapter will rely heavily on the work of those who have studied cold war diplomacy including Kenneth Osgood, Liping Bu, Scott Lucas, Nicholas Cull, and Giles Scott-Smith.

The second chapter will provide an introduction to the Rockefeller Foundations and the state of educational exchange under the auspices of the Institute of International Education (IIE) during the 1950s. By tracing the evolution of the Foundations it will be possible to address how their decision-making process was influenced by the political context of the period. This chapter will demonstrate that the Foundations were at a unique crossroads in which their policies regarding international programs were being considered within the new domestic and international climate shaped by the Cold War while also being influenced by the traditional focus and grant making practices which had guided the organizations since their formations.

The third chapter will be the case study of the Bard College English program. Established in December of 1956, the Bard College English program was organized by the IIE, the oldest and largest organization within the United States devoted to international educational

exchange, and was funded by grants from the Rockefeller Foundations and the Ford Foundation. I have selected the Bard College program because the program was the largest of the numerous English language programs which were established to instruct the newly arrived refugees in basic English. Bard College taught over 300 students during the course of its operation and served as the model for subsequent teaching programs which were organized in varying degrees of formality for the over 1,000 Hungarian refugee students who came to the US.

This chapter will primarily focus on examining three questions. First, what were the reasons the Rockefeller Foundations provided funding to IIE? Second, what concerns were expressed regarding the structure and content of the curriculum and what degree of oversight did the foundations have over them? Finally, what was the final assessment of the project and what impact did it have on subsequent funding of refugees, especially considering that the Hungarians were the first in a succession of refugee movements during the period?

The fourth and final chapter will be a case study of the University of Vienna. Universities located within Austria received the majority of funds allocated to the Hungarian relief project, over $700,000 of the 1.2 million allocated in 1956 and early 1957.[10] These funds were dispersed to 13 universities in Austria, with the University of Vienna receiving the greatest amount of funding due to their acceptance of over 325 refugee students. The University of Vienna is an interesting case study not only because it was the institution with the greatest number of Hungarian refugees but also because it was the site of a great deal of controversy caused by both the students, who protested insufficient funding, and administrators, who the Rockefeller Foundation determined to be mishandling funds.

The chapter on the University of Vienna will address two major points. First, it will

[10] To place this figure in perspective the average yearly salary for a university professor during the 1930s was less

determine why the Rockefeller Foundation deemed it necessary to devote the majority of its funds for the Hungarian relief to universities in Europe, more specifically within Austria. Second, an assessment of the level and effectiveness of supervision that the program received by the Rockefeller foundations will be conducted. Such assessments will be analyzed in order to determine whether the desire for greater supervision over first the selection process of students and then their academic progress while attending the university implied an expression of power over the educations of the students by the Rockefeller Foundation. The rhetoric, controversies, and eventual resolutions which dominated the conversations within the Rockefeller Foundation will reveal a great deal about the ways in which the Foundation wished to operate as a grant provider to universities within Europe.

Béla Lipták began his English studies at Bard College in picturesque upstate New York in December of 1956. During those three short but important weeks he met his future wife, Marta, and gained the English language skills necessary to continue his studies at Stevens University. While it can be argued that the American government failed the Hungarians in many respects, the outpouring of aid from private organizations, universities, and individuals during the years following the Revolution should not be forgotten. The aid which was provided by the Rockefeller Foundations was ultimately extremely beneficial to hundreds of Hungarian student refugees.

This thesis will demonstrate that aid to the Hungarian students reflected very specific ideological goals of the organization, expounding Cold War sentiments, Americanization rhetoric, and evolving views concerning refugees from socialist countries. A comparison between the two case studies will reveal how such concepts were revealed and how the experiences from each program dictated future grant making policy. An outspoken figure

than $4,000 a year. The overall budget of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1956

within the 1956 refugee community, Lipták was interviewed in the small publication the *Poughkeepsie New Yorker* on November 8th, 1959. At the end of the piece, the comfortably settled Lipták summarized his interview with the statement, "'When someone asks us what America means to us, we answer gratefully- Our very lives."[11]

[11] Bela and Marta Liptak, "What America Means to Us," *Poughkeepsie New Yorker* (November 8, 1959): 1.

CHAPTER 1: CAMPAIGNS FOR HEARTS AND MINDS: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY DURING THE COLD WAR

> *The world struggle is shifting more than ever from the arena of power to the arena of ideas and international persuasion.* - Nelson Rockefeller to then President Dwight Eisenhower, December 2, 1955[12]

Introduction

Public diplomacy was an integral part of the Cold War. Oftentimes labeled by policy makers and historians as the fourth weapon in the Cold War, an addition to the traditional arsenal of military, political, and economic programs, and encompassing a multitude of diverse activities, public diplomacy involved the transmission of images and arguments to hopefully receptive audiences. Such programs were designed to alter, confirm, or deny the presumed assumptions of recipient audiences concerning the United States. This chapter will explore the concept of public diplomacy and the fields of educational exchange and refugee support.

In order to explore the nature of public diplomacy within the context of Rockefeller funding of education, a definition must be provided. For the purposes of this study the concept is related to "educational exchange" and "Americanization" within the particular context of the 1950s. I will also explain how refugee policy, educational exchange, and international education took upon political significance during the Cold War, with differences in meanings and character within the domestic and international fields. Finally, I will discuss how public diplomacy involved an approach to propaganda by government agencies which utilized private resources, such as nongovernmental organizations, as instrumental facilitators. This interaction will be described in terms of the development of complex state-private networks. What will become apparent from this discussion is that during the early Cold War, education became an

[12] Cited in Matthew Armstrong, "Operationalizing Public Diplomacy," in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ed. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (Routledge, 2009), 65-66.

increasingly important tool of public diplomacy and reflected the political agendas of not only the organizations that provided such funding, such as the Rockefeller Foundation, but on a larger scale the United States government.

Defining Public Diplomacy

Following World War II, the United States found itself in a new global position as an emergent superpower.[13] As a result of this new standing and the desire to enforce American hegemony, the governmental elite of the United States were now faced with the responsibility of asserting its legitimacy abroad. The Cold War only heightened the necessity of diplomacy abroad as United States officials faced a battle to assert the dominance of democratic beliefs over communism. The Cold War enhanced the need to combat what was perceived to be ideological attacks on the American way of life and culture by the Soviet Union. One area in which this battle occurred was in Europe, with its traditional conception of the United States being a less cultured nation.[14] When examining public diplomacy this shift is especially important as the twentieth century represented the first time in which the United States had the opportunity to influence Europe in ways that extended beyond brute military force, most notably through their cultural products and practices.[15] This notion of European cultural superiority is especially pertinent when examining educational exchange and the ways in which

[13] For the rise of the United States into a global superpower there is an immense collection of literature. As useful examples, see Warren Kimball, ed., *America Unbound: World War II and the Making of a Superpower* (Saint Martin's Press, 1992); Thomas McCormick, *America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After* (Baltimore: John's Hopkins University Press, 1995); and Walter Le Ferber, *The American Age: US Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad 1700 to the Present* (New York: W.W. Norton Company, 1994).

[14] A number of detailed studies of the attempts to combat anti-American beliefs in Europe during the Cold War period have been made. See, as fine examples, Giles and Hans Krabbendam, eds. *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-1960* (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Alexander Stephan, ed. *The Americanization of Europe: Culture, diplomacy, and anti-Americanization after 1945* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005); and Frances Stoner Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: The New Press, 2000).

[15] Marsha Siefert, "Twentieth- Century Culture, 'Americanization,' and European Audiovisual Space," in *Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary Histories*, eds. Konrad H. Jarausch, and Thomas Lindenberger (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 165.

Europeans reacted to American efforts for academic exchange and the imposition of American academic and intellectual culture in Europe.

Termed the "cultural cold war" in a piece by Christopher Lasch in 1967, there was a recognition that overt and covert activities were propagated by governments and private organizations at home and abroad to meet specific ideological goals and purposes.[16] However, despite being identified in the 1960s as a core component of diplomatic action, there were relatively few studies of Cold War culture conducted prior to the late 1990s.[17] Since that time there has been a great deal published on the subject, which according to Christian Appy recognizes that "policy-making, intelligence-gathering, war-making, and mainstream politics might be profoundly shaped by a social and cultural world beyond the conference table and the battlefield."[18]

With these concepts in mind, any historian dealing with cultural history during the Cold War must take care not to read policy documents too literally or work under the assumption that the ideas and events which they describe can "be understood as unmediated, objective realities rather than dynamic historical constructions."[19] According to Appy, "culture is inherently political and that it is embedded in, and expresses, relations of power."[20] In this sense, the transmission of culture to foreign countries expresses political motives, whether that is the spread of democracy or the containment of communism. The broad term which encompasses these elements of statecraft is public diplomacy, the term that shall be utilized to designate political action and policy expressed in the form of cultural influence.

[16] Christopher Lasch, "The Cultural Cold War," *The Nation* (September 1967): 198-212.
[17] Robert Griffith, "The Cultural Turn in Cold War Studies," *Reviews in American History* Vol. 29, No.1 (March 2001): 150-157.
[18] Christian Appy as quoted by Robert Griffith, "The Cultural Turn in Cold War Studies," *Reviews in American History* Vol. 29, No.1 (March 2001): 150.
[19] Ibid, 150.
[20] Christian G. Appy, ed. *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1966* (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), 4.

Public diplomacy, as identified by scholars Giles Scott-Smith and Nicholas Cull, is broadly defined as "an attempt to manage international relations and influence opinion abroad through advocacy, communication, cultural relations, and exchange programs."[21] Although the modern term "public diplomacy" was not coined officially until 1965 by Edmund Gullion, who later established the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy, the history of the idea dates back much further.[22] It was during the 1950s that the concept, typically associated with civility in political relations, shifted into the "realm of international information and propaganda" as a result of "diplomacy being practiced and understood differently," with diplomatic events being recognized as public performance.[23] Moreover, it was during the 1950s that the practices of public diplomacy began to increasingly overlap with those previously associated with outright propaganda,[24] such as the broadcasts of Voice of America (VOA) in Europe.[25]

As a result of the overlap between public diplomacy and propaganda, the phrase was reconfigured, acquiring a meaning in the 1960s which positioned it as an alternative to propaganda. As an explanation to the success of the term, according to Richard Arndt, a

[21] Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam, eds., *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-1960*, 175.
[22] For a comprehensive history of the term "public diplomacy" see Nicholas Cull, "'Public Diplomacy' Before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase," USC Center on Public Diplomacy, http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/pdfs/gullion.pdf or Nicolas Cull, "Public diplomacy: The evolution of a phrase," in *The Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, eds. Snow and P.M. Taylor (London: Routledge, 2008), 19-24.
[23] Nicolas Cull, "'Public Diplomacy' Before Gullion,"5.
[24] Though there are multiple definitions of the term propaganda, I choose to utilize Oliver Thomson's definition which broadly defines propaganda, which can be either deliberate or unintentional in nature, as the use of communication skills of all kinds to achieve attitudinal or behavioral changes among one group by another. This term is especially relevant to this thesis because it states that propaganda can be an unintentional means of behavioral modification, which is a far more inclusive definition than that provided by, for example Harold Lasswell and the early social scientists who merely defined propaganda in terms of conscious psychological manipulation in order to achieve various ends. See Oliver Thompson, *Easily Led: A History of Propaganda* (Stroud: Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 1999) and Harold Lasswell, *Propaganda Techniques in the World War* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1927).
[25] The VOA was established during WWII to broadcast information about the war in Europe. In 1945 control of the VOA was transferred to the Department of State who used the broadcasts as a component of anti-communist foreign policy. They broadcast throughout Europe with the objective of fighting Soviet propaganda. Much has been written about the role of the VOA during the Cold War. See as an example, Alan Heil, *Voice of America: A History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

prominent figure in the early United States Information Agency (USIA), the term public diplomacy was a specific phrase adopted by the agency in order to describe their propaganda activities.[26] The use of less vehement terminology to refer to propaganda, as demonstrated in the use of such a neutral term as public diplomacy, grew out of an attempt to "make the psychological warfare rose smell sweeter to a public that regarded propaganda as an instrument of totalitarian repression."[27]

Furthermore, according to Laura Belmonte, forms of propaganda, psychological warfare, political warfare, and psychological strategy, terms used often interchangeably to describe similar actions, were often publicly described by U.S. policymakers as information.[28] Information and public diplomacy, they claimed, "connoted an impartial recounting of facts."[29] Under this terminology, "Americans would do public diplomacy and the Communists were left peddling propaganda."[30]

Due to its nonspecific nature, the term public diplomacy had and retains variant meanings for different people as a function of their relationship to the content.[31] According to Richard Arndt, for those at the USIA the term referred to programs which would reach audiences over the heads of their respective governments. Diplomats saw it as the opposite of private diplomacy, which would imply a covert, as opposed to public, means of influencing the populous. Finally, for Americans public diplomacy "evoked the diplomatic version of public

[26] Richard Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century* (Virginia: Potomac Books, 2005), 512.
[27] Kenneth Alan Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2006), 374. In this text Osgood presents the interesting term "total Cold Ear" which describes the ways in which the cold war mobilized all of society, to an unprecedented degree, in an ideological struggle against the Soviet Union and communist ideology. In this sense, the Cold War ideology and mindset found itself present in all facets of society, from political organizations to cultural production.
[28] Laura Belmonte, *Selling the American Way: US Propaganda and the Cold War* (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 7.
[29] Ibid., 7.
[30] Nicholas Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Seven lessons for its future from its past," *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* Vol. 6 (Feb. 9, 2010).
[31] Richard Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings*, 512.

relations."[32] This idea of public was essential in establishing the legitimacy of the organization both abroad and at home. However, the early skepticism directed towards public, specifically cultural, diplomacy was still present. Nicholas Cull argues that, in fact, "the United States is at its heart a skeptical participant in public diplomacy and the development of the practice was contingent on the anomalous politics of the Cold War."[33]

I intend to use the term public diplomacy throughout this thesis as it was the way in which such creators of policy intended to portray themselves to audiences both at home and abroad, even though the term was not explicitly used in this fashion during the 1950s. The rhetoric associated with public diplomacy, for example the use of terminology such as "information" in the place of "propaganda," is clearly evident in the Rockefeller policy documents from the 1950s. As a result, it was during this period when the definitions and methods of public diplomacy, as it was to be understood during the 1960s, were being formulated and devised. This is particularly important when examining the new methods of support which were granted to forms of cultural promotion.

Within the realm of public diplomacy, culture was perceived to be a prime means through which to transmit American and democratic ideology. Termed "cultural diplomacy" by historians, this branch of public diplomacy was one of the most important components of Cold War foreign policy. Following WWII, American diplomats recognized the importance of spreading American culture and, as a result, created organizations and programs which "aspired to export American culture…abroad."[34] Jessica Gienow-Hecht convincingly attributes this change to several factors. First, American lawmakers believed that the promotion of American

[32] Ibid., 512.
[33] Nicholas Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 499.
[34] Prior to the 1930s, culture was not seriously seen as an instrument of foreign policy, as had other nations such as France. The division of Cultural Relations was established by the State Department only in 1938 and even then faced a great deal of controversy. For greater discussion see Jessica Gienow-Hecht, "Shame on US? Academics, Cultural Transfer, and the Cold War- A Critical Review," *Diplomatic History* vol. 24, no. 3 (2000): 465-494.

culture abroad would spread democracy, and as a result, would contain "unpalatable foreign ideologies" such as fascism and communism.[35] Moreover, communist regimes had made both the spread of knowledge and high culture key components of their own propaganda or public diplomacy actions. The American government thus felt the need to counter this ant-Americanism. A final reason which Gienow-Hecht identifies is that many Americans felt that their reputation was worsening within the international arena and thus they required a means through which to combat this decline.[36]

Cynthia Schneider provides useful criteria for evaluating cultural diplomacy in the Cold War context.[37] She begins by defining cultural diplomacy as something that cannot be effectively measured as it makes a qualitative not quantitative impact on various people, working best when it specifically caters to the interests of the host country or populations.[38] Moreover, according to Schneider, cultural diplomacy emerges predominately at times of crisis with a strong expectation that it can "somehow repair the damage caused by unpopular policies."[39] Cultural diplomacy acted in a way that allowed, and sometimes even fostered, dissent, which, as a key defining aspect of democratic ideals, was part of the intended ideological propagation.[40]

Public and cultural diplomacy are often understood as elements of the expression of "soft power." This term is useful in distinguishing public diplomacy from other types of diplomatic actions which were employed during the early Cold War. Soft power is a term most elaborated upon by Joseph Nye, a prominent scholar within the field of international relations.[41]

[35] Jessica Gienow-Hecht, "Shame on US?," 467
[36] Ibid., 469.
[37] Cynthia P. Schneider, "Cultural Diplomacy: Hard to Define, but You'd Know It If You Saw It," *Brown Journal of World Affairs* (2006): 196.
[38] Ibid., 196.
[39] Ibid., 192.
[40] Ibid., 193.
[41] See Joseph Nye, "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy* 80 (Autumn 1990): 153-171.

As conceptualized by Nye, soft power is an element of diplomacy through which a foreign policy objective is obtained through cooperation and incentive as opposed to "hard power" which is expressed through coercion and force.[42] Soft power is composed of the state's promotion of values, policies, culture, and institutions and is thus an indirect means of exercising power.[43] As such, a "country (or to be more precise, its national power holders, governmental or non-governmental) may obtain the outcomes it wants because other countries or peoples want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to specific practices or its general way of life."[44] Such power rests on the ability to entice and attract as opposed to force which often leads to the desired result of acquiescence or imitation within the targeted population. The concept of soft power is useful for the purposes of this study as it pithily reflects the means through which cultural diplomacy was expressed during this period.

Educational Exchange as Public Diplomacy

Educational exchange is a crucial area of soft power and public diplomacy. Educational exchange, as the term was used during the Cold War, encompassed a wide range of cultural, economic, and military education activities.[45] As such, the designation educational exchange became so inclusive that it became a frequently employed synonym for cultural relations during the postwar WWII years.[46]

Public diplomacy abroad often took the form of international educational exchange and scholarship, key components of the large subdivision of cultural diplomacy. The creation of the Fulbright Program in 1946 and the passage of U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act

[42] Ibid., 171.
[43] Mel Van Elteren, "Rethinking Americanization Abroad: Toward a Critical Alternative to Prevailing Paradigms," *The Journal of American Culture* 29.3 (September 2006): 363.
[44] Ibid., 363.
[45] Liping Bu, "Educational Exchange and Cultural Diplomacy in the Cold War," *Journal of American Studies* Vol. 33, No. 3, (Dec., 1999): 393.

in 1948 both demonstrated this new emphasis on education as a means of public diplomacy both at home and abroad following World War II. Moreover, the United States Department of State, along with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, coordinated thousands of exchanges between the United States and communist countries, with the majority of such programs beginning in the mid-1950s.[47] The connection between education and diplomacy is asserted by Philip Coombs, historian and former assistant secretary of state for Education and Cultural Affairs during the 1960s. He stated that educational exchange was "an irrevocable component of American foreign policy" following World War II.[48] Moreover, he constructs educational exchange as a clear constituent of cultural diplomacy, which according to Coombs constituted "the fourth dimension" of foreign policy, the human side of diplomatic relations outside of the traditional focus on political, economic, and military considerations."[49] As expected from this situation, "many propaganda experts acknowledged that exchange programs were the most effective instruments for extending American influence abroad, even though they were [thought to be] the least 'propagandistic.'"[50]

The political implication of educational exchange is also supported by Giles Scott-Smith, who when discussing educational exchange during the Cold War, argues that we can make two assumptions about the development and implementation of such programs during the 1950s. First, some form of political intent lay behind the application of exchange programs with the State Department explicitly defining the exchanges as an element of foreign policy.[51]

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[46] Ibid., 393.
[47] Frederick Barghoom, "Cultural Exchanges between Communist Countries and the United States," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* Vol. 372, Realignments in the Communist and Western Worlds (Jul., 1967), 116. See also, Robert Byrnes, "Academic Exchange with the Soviet Union," *Russian Review*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Jul., 1962): 213-225.
[48] Philip Coombs, *The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 6-7.
[49] Ibid., 17.
[50] Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 305.
[51] Giles Scott Smith, "Mapping the Indefinable: Some Thoughts on the Relevance of Exchange Programs within International Relations," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (2008): 175.

Second, there were political effects from exchanges, which, although often fragmentary, inconsistent, and diluted, can be identified and understood in a coherent framework.[52] Educational exchange was seen as a tool of foreign policy. As a form of foreign policy it was also seen as a necessary component in the imposition of cultural hegemony because intellectual elite and universities were seen as crucial for the development of consensus in society and the rationalization and the legitimization of specific social and democratic orders.[53]

An often congruent component of educational exchange was English language instruction. Understanding how English language programs were established as part of policy objectives is an essential component to the case study of Bard College. English language instruction was important in two main ways to Cold War foreign policy according to Kenneth Osgood. First, the spread of the English language would enhance the prestige and influence of the United States. Second, the establishment of English as an international language would tie "nations culturally and intellectually to the United States."[54]

In addition to the international benefits of the spread of the English language, Eric Hobsbawm has written extensively on the use of language in the creation and support of national identity.[55] Arguing that the concept of a homogenous culture or identity is dangerous, he states that language is a necessary component of assimilation and the creation of a unified national identity.[56] Language instruction, both within the United States as directed towards recent immigrants into the country and to those living abroad, served the important functions of promoting assimilation and asserting of American hegemony.

The establishment of educational exchange and English language programs were not,

[52] Ibid., 174.
[53] Richard Arnove, "Introduction," *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad*, Ed. Robert F. Arnove (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 3.
[54] Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 309-310.
[55] See for example, Eric Hobsbawm, "Language, Culture, and National Identity," *Social Research* Vol. 63, No. 4 (Winter 1996): 1065-80.

however, without controversy. As documented by Arndt, there was a tension between those "unidirectional informationists" who were interested in spreading American beliefs and values abroad and those who were proponents of reciprocal exchange with the goal of establishing mutual understanding.[57] This tension is a core consideration when I examine the debates which occurred among the Rockefeller officials over what educational programs to support for the refugee students.

Refugee Policy during the Cold War

When studying the history of refugee movements within the United States it is necessary to have a model of how these refugees were received during that particular period of time. It is well known that the Hungarian refugee crisis precipitated many changes to refugee law and policy within the United States, a reoccurring theme which will be developed throughout the thesis. When analyzing the treatment of refugees, Carl Bon Tempo's recent work on refugees during the Cold War is particularly illuminating.[58] He argues that in order to understand refugee affairs during this time there must be two recognitions. First, "refugee policies, laws, and programs in the post-World War II era were the product of interactions between foreign policy imperatives and domestic political and cultural considerations."[59] As a consequence, domestic and international history cannot be distinguished. Second, Bon Tempo asserts that the history of refugee affairs during the mid-twentieth century must not, as traditionally had been done in diplomatic history, be studied only with regards to policy and political battles but must also encompass the implementation and administration of those

[56] Ibid., 1065.
[57] Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings*, 53.
[58] Carl Bon Tempo, *Americans at the Gate: the United States and Refugees during the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
[59] Ibid., 3.

programs and laws in practice.[60] Since this thesis will be studying a multitude of sources regarding the enactment of the Bard English language program and the University of Vienna scholarship program, this approach is extremely relevant as it explicitly deals with refugee reception.

Another important concept is the definition of "refugee" as it was denoted during the Cold War. Prior to the 1950s, there was no common definition of the term refugee, although the tide of displaced persons in the wake of World War II did put the issue into the public spotlight.[61] In 1951, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was formed and during that same year the "United Nations Convention in Relation to the Status of Refugees," commonly referred to as the Geneva Convention, was passed. The definition of refugee which was established by this Convention was:

> owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.[62]

Such a narrow definition made the main criterion for determining refugee status to be persecution, thus excluding victims of "general insecurity and oppression or systematic economic deprivation."[63] Political ideology was a key component to this definition.

The definition of refugee was in some ways distinct from that of "expellee" or "escapee" though they were often used interchangeably within the policy documents, as can be easily seen in the Rockefeller sources which this thesis will examine. According to Bon Tempo, the latter were said to be those who were forced to flee communist countries, ensuring that they

[60] Ibid., 3.
[61] Andreas Gémes, "Political Migration in the Cold War: The Case of Austria and the Hungarian Refugees of 1956-57," in *Immigration and Emigration in Historical Perspective*, ed. Ann Katherine Isaacs (Pisa University Press, 2006), 167.
[62] Ibid., 168.

were in fact political opponents of the Soviet Union and its ideology.[64] A refugee, on the other hand, had to "only be living in a communist country and to be in danger of persecution; the definition lacked a geographical component that stood in for ideology."[65]

However, the Hungarian refugee crisis, as it was the first and largest of the major exoduses from communist countries which occurred during the latter half of the twentieth century, dramatically influenced these definitions. As the majority of the Hungarian refugees admitted under the new visa program were escapees, the very definition of refugee took upon a more distinctively political, and anticommunist, tone.[66] Under the definition provided by the Geneva Convention, the legal status of the Hungarian refugees was unclear although they all were generally considered to be refugees by Western countries.[67] The decision to admit the Hungarian refugees, Bon Tempo asserts, was more a result of foreign policy considerations than foreign and domestic policy motivations as had been previously.[68]

Understanding the political connotations of refugees in the 1950s is essential when addressing the degree to which Americanization was a present force in the educational programs of the Rockefeller Foundations. Moreover, it is essential to realize the important political significance of refugee scholars in particular as they were a group specifically targeted by the Rockefeller Foundations for reasons which will be discussed during the course of this thesis.

63 Ibid., 168.
64 Bon Tempo, *Americans at the Gate*, 39.
65 Ibid., 39.
66 Ibid., 39.
67 Andreas Gémes, "Political Migration in the Cold War," 170.
68 Carl Bon Tempo, *Americans at the Gate,* 60.

"We are all Americans now, like it or not"[69]- Americanization and Ideology

The last term which must be defined is "Americanization" as an ideological construct. Ideology in the milieu of the twentieth century political climate was highly conditioned by foreign and domestic policy concerns. Americanization, as it will be connoted within the thesis, will be considered the leading way in which the dominant ideologies of the United States were presented to refugees. Defending and depicting the American way of life was considered to be of the utmost importance in the climate of the Cold War. Americanization as a word was first introduced in 1902 by English journalist William T. Stead and used to describe "the movement to integrate immigrants in order to create a national identity" as necessitated by the growing tide of immigrants to the United States during the nineteenth century.[70]

The expression took upon great political consequence during the Cold War.[71] According to Mirko Gropp, "during the Cold War it [Americanization] was often used in the context of the confrontation between the forces of democracy and international communism."[72] Therefore, during the 1950s and 60s, Americanization, that is the propagation of American culture, values, and beliefs, was defined in terms of a confrontation between conflicting ideologies.[73] Americanization during the early Cold War was equated in positive terms with economic modernization and political and cultural democratization.[74] Mel Van Elteren provides a comprehensive definition of Americanization as it existed during the Cold War. She states that Americanization "refers to the real or purported influence of one or more forms of

[69] Zachary G. Pascal, "The World Gets in Touch With Its Inner American," *Mother Jones Magazine* (Jan. / Feb. 1999): 4.
[70] Mirko Gropp, *Americanization- The US Strikes Back?* (Munich: GRIN Verlag, 2007), 3.
[71] Americanization is a topic of a great deal of scholarship. One notable scholar is Stephan Alexander who has extensively studied the Americanization efforts in Europe during the Cold War period. See Stephan Alexander, ed., *Americanization and Anti-Americanism: The German Encounter with American Culture after 1945 (*New York: Berghahn Books, 2005) and Stephan, Alexander, ed. *The Americanization of Europe: Culture, diplomacy, and anti-Americanization after 1945* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005).
[72] Mirko Gropp, *Americanization- The US Strikes Back?*, 3.
[73] Ibid., 5.
[74] Elteren, "Rethinking Americanization Abroad," 356.

Americanism on some social entity, material object, or cultural practice."[75] Such processes can occur within or outside of the United States and can transpire through cultural imperialism, local assimilation, transculturation, and behavioral modification.[76]

Within Europe in particular, Americanization was a potent force following World War II. Alexander Stephen, who has studied extensively the so-called Americanization of Europe, argues that such efforts at "Americanization" invaded Europe during the second half of the twentieth century, "first by winning over the young and then by gradually eroding the resistance put up by elites eager to protect traditional high culture."[77] When addressing the means through which Americanization was expressed, Michael Olneck describes it as largely symbolic behavior, an attempt "to secure cultural and ideological hegemony through configuration of the symbolic order."[78]

When studying Americanization it is essential to examine several key elements. According to Elteren these elements are:

> the geographic dimension, place, or location of the process; the relational dimension, such as the social positioning of the actors involved; as well as the temporal dimension, such as historical memory; and the juxtaposition of historical experience and interpretation among the recipients of American imports.[79]

Specifically related to this thesis, Americanization is often perceived to be inherently tied to the development of English as the dominant world language and the use of American funds to support education programs abroad. This study will question if and how Americanization was spread by such channels through the grant funds supported by the Rockefeller Foundation. Moreover, whether or not Americanization was the intent of the

[75] Ibid., 353.
[76] For an in depth discussion of the means through which Americanization can occur see Elteren, "Rethinking Americanization Abroad," 346-353.
[77] Alexandar Stephan, "Cold War Alliances and the Emergence of Transatlantic Competition: An Introduction," in *The Americanization of Europe: Culture, diplomacy, and anti-Americanization after 1945* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), 1.
[78] Michael Olneck, "Americanization and the Education of Immigrants, 1900-1925: An Analysis of Symbolic Action," *American Journal of Education* 97 (August 1989): 399.

organization in relation to their refugee programs is a fundamental question which will be expanded upon through the course of this thesis.

State-Private Networks

During the early Cold War the U.S. government placed an increasing emphasis on obtaining collaboration with private networks to support their public diplomacy actions. The exploration of the role of private organizations during the Cold War has been largely understudied, with Kenneth Osgood being one of the few scholars to publish a monograph on the subject.[80] It has been only recently that scholars have connected diplomatic history with cultural history in such a manner.[81] Osgood argues for the recognition that U.S. foreign policy was undeniably connected to the programs which were supported by the large private foundations within the United States.[82]

Commenting on the complexity of the situation, Volker Berghahn states that the U.S. government knew that they could not actively play a visible role in promoting Western culture because they thought it would be embarrassing "to support some of these organizations in view of the constraints which the occupation statute places upon the U.S. authorities to lend open, overt support to these organizations."[83] As a result, covert funds were often channeled to these seemingly private organizations, such as Congress of Cultural Freedom, not to mention the degree of interaction and exchange between the political elite and those running the major foundations. Foundations, as private, civil society based efforts, were held, to varying degrees of success and truth, during the Cold War to be "idealistic, non-political, based on mutual

[79] Elteren, "Rethinking Americanization Abroad," 356.
[80] Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 6.
[81] Ibid., 6.
[82] Ibid., xvi.
[83] Volker Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy*, 156.

exchange and respect whereas state-led cultural efforts are seen to have a tendency to be one-directional, concerned with short-term objectives and exclusively promoting the national interest."[84]

In order to define the liaison between state and private groups, a framework must be developed which establishes a relationship of exchange. Such an approach goes beyond the traditional presentation of political conflict and decision-making being constructed only by the direct political elite. Known as the "state-private network" model, Scott Lucas has defined this unique and multi-disciplinary relationship. The state-private network refers to the "the extensive, unprecedented collaboration between 'official' U.S. agencies and 'private' groups and individuals in the development and implementation of political, economic, and cultural programs in support of U.S. foreign policy."[85] Lucas asserts that the state-private networks, which were often covert in nature, formed the locus of the U.S. foreign policy work within Eastern Europe.[86] Major philanthropic groups, such as the Rockefeller Foundations, formed an essential component to this program as they had more flexibility and legitimacy in working within Europe than the U.S. government could obtain direct sense.[87]

In a comprehensive study of the state-private relationship, Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford assert that the construction of the networks formed a practical, and less forceful, means of communication and the dissemination of information (i.e. propaganda).[88] Moreover, these networks contributed to the creation of specific ideological constructions which represented the

[84] Katharina Rietzler, "Before the Cultural Cold Wars: American Philanthropy and Cultural Diplomacy in the Inter-War Years," *Historical Research* 84, Issue 223 (February 2011): 149.
[85] Scott Lucas, "Mobilizing Culture: The State-Private Network and the CIA in the Early Cold War," in *War and Cold War in American Foreign Policy 1942-1962*, Dale Carter & Robin Clifton, eds. (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 83-107.
[86] Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: the American Crusade against the Soviet Union* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 229.
[87] The legitimization of the work of foundations, and the interactions between the US government and the Rockefeller foundations, will be explored in chapter 2.
[88] Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford eds., *The US Government, Citizen Groups, and the Cold War: The State-Private Network* (New York: Routledge, 2006), preface.

United States. According to Scott Lucas, within the context of cultural arguments during the Cold War, the impetus for the formation of a network came from both sides and was not solely at the discretion of the state.[89] Therefore, the state-private network is a useful tool for evaluating the role of the state in the grant making decisions of the Rockefeller Foundations.

Conclusions: Refugee Education as a Tool of Public Diplomacy

When approaching the topic of public diplomacy during the Cold War it is necessary to recognize the fluidity of the definitions associated with the subject. For the purposes of this thesis, public diplomacy is recognized as an important tool through which private philanthropies worked with foreign policy advisors from the United States department in order to promote certain ideals and objectives. It is important to understand the concepts of public diplomacy, educational exchange, and Americanization in order to position the actions of the Rockefeller Foundations in a particular social and political climate. Moreover, there must be a recognition that the work of the private organizations was inherently influenced by foreign policy and domestic political concerns.

In 1954 a study on the importance of educational exchange was conducted by the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) of the CIA. This study, compiled by Harold Hoskins, stated that "All international education programs should include operations 'intended to make evident the basic principles of free world ideology, to contrast the American way of life with that of the Communist-dominated world and to provide material for arguments with which to counter those of Communism.'"[90] Although educational promotion and scholarship were just two means through which the policies of public diplomacy were realized they shall serve as the

[89] Scott Lucas, "Beyond Freedom, Beyond Control: Approaches to Culture and the State-Private Network in the Cold War," in *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-1960*, ed. Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 58.
[90] Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 307.

focus of this thesis. Recognizing the political meaning of educational exchange as a potent form of public diplomacy is essential in assessing the motivations of the Rockefeller Foundations in their funding decisions.

CHAPTER 2: THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATIONS FORMULATING POLICY ON EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE AND REFUGEE ASSISTANCE

Introduction

Responding to Andrew Carnegie's 1889 essay, "The Gospel of Wealth," fellow industrialist John D. Rockefeller wrote, "The time will come when men of wealth will more generally be willing to use it for the good of others."[91] That time quickly arrived in the early twentieth century. The emergence of several large philanthropic foundations, established by the major industrialists of the time such as Andrew Carnegie, Henry Ford, and John D. Rockefeller, represented a unique confluence of economic, political, and social forces which were present at the turn of the century.[92] According to Richard Arnove, who studies the emergence of the philanthropic sector within the United States, the great disparities in income precipitated by the Industrial Revolution resulted in a call for social reforms that proposed the use of great wealth to address social ills.[93]

This chapter will explore the emergence and growth of the Rockefeller Foundations, with a particular emphasis on the increasing importance of international programs during the Cold War period. This will involve a discussion of the interactions between the Foundations and the U.S. government and the resulting influences on foreign policy. This exploration will prove necessary in understanding the grant-making decisions of the organization during this crucial period of history with special regards to international education and the support of refugees from areas under communism.

The Early Years: The Rockefeller Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund

[91] Raymond Fosdik, *The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation* (New York: Transaction Publishers, 1952), 5.
[92] Robert Arnove, "Introduction," *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad*, 1.

The Rockefeller Foundation, incorporated in the state of New York in 1913, was just one example of the large corporate foundations which were established in what is known as the Progressive Era. The early focus of the Rockefeller Foundation was to fund large-scale research and development programs in the area of public health in the Americas and Asia.[94] Such programs reflected the overall mission of the emergent philanthropies, that giving should seek causes and cures not temporary solutions.[95] Due to the belief that they should not support temporary solutions (for example, the food and clothing supply needs of refugees), the support of academic research aligns closely with the belief that philanthropy should support objectives with lasting impact, in this case the expansion of knowledge and new ideas.[96]

From the onset, the Foundations expressed an explicitly international program of interest with programs throughout the world, particularly in developing countries.[97] However, it was only after the changes to the global balances of power initiated by World War I that American foundations found themselves in an increasingly influential position within the international political sphere.[98] Following World War I, funding initiatives were extended to Europe, which had been economically crippled by the war, with grants to individual scholars and academic research in the medical and natural sciences. The U.S. government was also unable to provide large amounts of foreign aid as a result of the economic depression during the decade preceding World War II which resulted in a return to the isolationist policies of the nineteenth century. In this capacity, the Foundations, according to Abir-Am filled a "vacuum

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93 Ibid., 1.
94 Katharina Rietzler, "Before the Cultural Cold Wars: American philanthropy and cultural diplomacy in the inter-war years," 151.
95 Judith Sealander, "Curing Evils at Their Source," in *Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility in American History*, Lawrence Friedman and Mark D. McGarvie, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 221.
96 Ibid., 221.
97 Michael Hogan, "Partisan Politics and Foreign Policy in the American Century," *The Ambiguous Legacy: U.S. Foreign Relations in the "American Century"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 384.
98 Katharina Rietzler, "Before the Cultural Cold Wars,"153.

created by an isolationist foreign policy."[99]

The funding of international education related programs was based on the assumption that such projects would enhance overall international understanding and order.[100] One of the largest early programs of international focus was the Rockefeller Foundation's creation of its own War Relief Commission, active between the years 1914 and 1918, which provided over 19 million dollars to humanitarian and war-related initiatives.[101]

Foundations were far from apolitical, often forming alliances with the United States federal government to promote domestic and foreign policy objectives.[102] Moreover, the ideology of the Foundations frequently aligned themselves with those of the government. This relationship is firmly cemented when observing the list of trustees and associated counsel at the Rockefeller Foundation during the 1950s, a directory composed of American political, economic, and intellectual elites.[103]

A useful term to describe the relationships between Foundation trustees and political, intellectual, and economic institutions is interlocking directorates. This term refers to the practice of individuals serving on the boards of multiple organizations thus allowing for the cohesion of the elites and unified political-economic power. These persons were, furthermore often appointed to government positions, as many from the Foundations were as indicated in the lists of trustees.[104] Furthermore, Dean Rusk, the President of the Rockefeller Foundation, had, both before and after his tenure, worked in the State Department. Following his role as

[99] Pnina Abir-Am, "The Rockefeller Foundation and the Post-WW2 Transnational Ecology of Science Policy: from Solitary Splendor in the Inter-war Era to a 'Me Too' Agenda in the 1950s," *Centaurus* 52 (2010), 323.
[100] Volker Berghahn, "Philanthropy and Diplomacy in the 'American Century," *The Ambiguous Legacy: U.S. Foreign Relations in the "American Century,"* ed. Michael Hogan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 385-6.
[101] Katharina Rietzler, "Before the Cultural Cold Wars,"153.
[102] Ibid.,148.
[103] Address list for trustees, 1957, folder 1, box 1, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC. There is also a listing of the trustees and officers within each annual report published by the Rockefeller Foundation since its formation.
[104] David Knoke, *Political Networks: The Structural Perspective* (Cambridge University, Cambridge University Press, 1994), 159.

President of the Foundation he became the Secretary of State under John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. As many of the Foundation's staff had worked with agencies in Washington, it is not surprising that they shared many of the same objectives and rhetoric regarding the rationale for the expansion of the overseas programs of the U.S. State and Defense Departments. One key area of this shared foreign policy outlook was encouraging foreign nations to develop social, political, and economic views which were, if not congruent with, at least not negative towards the United States.[105]

A valuable study of the connections between the major foundations and ruling class elite was completed by Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. Katz.[106] This comprehensive analysis examines both sides of the debate over the degree to which the work of the Foundations was tied economically and politically to the nation's power elite. They argue that while the existence of such elite networks is irrefutable, their relations to one another and the institutions they work with, whether that is the government or fellow private institutions, and the influence other factors such as the public's influence have on them, are not easily defined.[107] Moreover, the authors posit a question which is directly relevant to the topic of this thesis: "Were the creators of foundations using their immense resource to create a 'hegemonic class' of intellectuals who would support their commitment to industrial capitalism, or were they intending to do something very different?"[108] The support of intellectuals in the form of refugee scholars can thus be interpreted in a political light, a direct means through which to support the political visions of the foundations. As such, in the case of refugees, the decision of how, where, and to whom to make grants is necessarily affected by foreign policy, with the

[105] Edward Berman, *Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundation on American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1983), 42.
[106] Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. Katz, "Foundations and Ruling Class Elites," *Daedalus*, Vol. 116, No. 1, Philanthropy, Patronage, Politics (Winter, 1987): 1-40.
[107] Ibid., 38.
[108] Ibid., 5.

"meaning of who gets what being manifestly political."[109]

However, that is not to say that the Foundations did not retain a strong degree of independence despite the fact that many of their members belonged to this so-called political and corporate elite class. It was the perceived maintenance of the Rockefeller Foundation being a non-governmental agent which contributed greatly to establishing the positive reputations of the philanthropies. Moreover, Foundations were held in high regard in Europe itself, even if the U.S. government was not.[110] According to Rietzler, the Rockefeller Foundation in particular, at least far more than the similar, both in size and objectives, Ford Foundation,[111] was particularly successful in maintaining and cultivating an image of impartiality and independence in its work abroad.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that the overseas work of the Foundations ultimately had to receive approval from the American State Department.[112] Such supervision over the work of the foundations was often indirect, expressing itself in congressional hearings assessing the work of foundations, tax legislation guidelines which regulated the types of grants they could issue, and treasury searches of their files to ensure compliance.[113] Nevertheless, often foundations took upon projects which were "initially too risky for government officials or private organizations dependent on public approval to embrace" either for political or economic reasons.[114]

[109] Peter Bell, "The Ford Foundation as a Transnational Actor," *International Organization* Vol. 25, No. 3 (Summer 1971): 471.
[110] Volker Berghahn, "Philanthropy and Diplomacy in the 'American Century," 400.
[111] For information about the Ford Foundation, a key partner foundation in many projects undertaken by the Rockefeller foundations see Francis Sutton, "The Ford Foundation: The Early Years," *Daedalus*, Vol. 116, No. 1, Philanthropy, Patronage, Politics (Winter, 1987): 41-91; Kathleen D. McCarthy, "From Cold War to Cultural Development: The International Cultural Activities of the Ford Foundation, 1950-1980," *Daedalus,* Vol. 116, No. 1, Philanthropy, Patronage, Politics (Winter, 1987): 93-117; and Peter Bell, "The Ford Foundation as a Transnational Actor," *International Organization*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Summer 1971): 465-478. No recent general history have been written on the Ford Foundation to my knowledge.
[112] Katharina Rietzler, "Before the Cultural Cold Wars,"155.
[113] Peter Bell, "The Ford Foundation as a Transnational Actor," 475.
[114] Judith Sealander, "Curing Evils at Their Source," 221.

This state-private relationship between the major foundations and the American government can be described in terms of the formal and informal ties between the two, namely in regards to shared ideologies, staff, and core values. Moreover, it was not solely the government dictating the policies of the foundations. The Rockefeller foundation stressed that academic research should underpin all political decisions. As a result of the funding of such research projects, there was a marked increase in expert-led policy making in both foreign and domestic agendas.[115] In 1984, Waldemar Nielsen, a former Ford Foundation official, identified six main postures which the large foundations have traditionally adopted towards Washington, though obviously to varying degrees depending on the time period and the objectives of the individual foundations. He identified these postures as follows:

> They functioned as monitors and critics of government activities; they developed their programs unconcerned about Washington and the complexities of American politics; they acted as pilot fish to official policy-making; Their programs became supplementary to government work; They turned themselves into partners and collaborators of the politicians; and they allowed themselves to be used as private instruments of public policy.[116]

As such, it became clear, when describing the state-private network which was forged between the Rockefeller Foundation and the government, that they "were to assist the government, but only if those objectives were not considered to be objectionable to the objects and missions of the foundation itself."[117]

In regards to the Rockefeller Foundation's programs in Europe, they had an established Paris field office, the only Rockefeller office located within Europe, which performed the day to day administrative tasks related to their European program, including the administration of payments for allocations. In November 1956, the Paris field office was tasked with the job of making grant recommendations based on their observations of the refugee crisis and then later insuring the proper implementation of the scholarship programs in Austria. The Paris field

[115] Katharina Rietzler, "Before the Cultural Cold Wars," 152.
[116] Volker Berghahn, "Philanthropy and Diplomacy in the 'American Century," 386.

office could not approve any major funding allocations; this could only be done by the board of trustees. However, the recommendations of the field officers, such as John Maier who was the director of the Paris office, were frequently cited in the trustee minutes and the internal correspondences relating to the decision to fund the refugees, thus providing an indication that they were strongly influential in the decision-making process.[118]

The Rockefeller Brothers Fund, which was established in 1940, shared many of the same objectives as the Rockefeller Foundation, in general terms described as the "construction of a stable and peaceful world order."[119] Founded by the five Rockefeller Brothers, this fund, which was first led by John D. Rockefeller, was initially far more independent than the Rockefeller Foundation as all decisions for funding were made by the family itself as opposed to an independent board of trustees.[120] However, beginning in 1952 the Fund established a board which began to include members who were not part of the Rockefeller family. In 1956, however, the board and all decision-making activity was dominated by the family itself, with Nelson A. Rockefeller being the President of the Fund in 1956. According to their website, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund was founded with the general purpose of making grants to local, national, and international philanthropies whose activities are able to serve large numbers of persons.[121]

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[117] Ibid., 398.

[118] For more information see, Rockefeller Foundation Archives- Paris Field Office, http://www.rockarch.org/collections/rf/rfparis.php.

[119] Katharina Rietzler, "Before the Cultural Cold Wars," 153.

[120] For more information about the Rockefeller family see John Harr and Peter Johnson, *The Rockefeller Century: Three Generations of America's Greatest Family* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988).

[121] A large institutional history of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund has not be conducted. Moreover, the archives of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, housed at the Rockefeller Archive Center in New York, have not been fully investigated or catalogued making discovery of documents from the 1956 period difficult. The documents related to the Hungarian refugee project, however, were organized to some extent and have been included as much as possible throughout the thesis. The majority of scholarship which has been conducted regarding the fund has focused on their Special Studies Project. See John Andrews, "Cracks in the Consensus: The Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project and Eisenhower's America," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 28, no.3 (Summer 1998):

Facing New Challenges and Opportunities in the Cold War Period

As the Cold War progressed, the Foundations increasingly saw their potential roles to be evolving as well. One such example of the new environment in which the foundations found themselves following the Second World War was within the realm of culture. Traditionally, the foundations held a great deal of respect towards the scholarship and culture of Europe, oftentimes expressing the sentiment that it was superior over its American counterparts. As a result, international exchanges typically focused on sharing American scientific advances abroad and the benefits of democratic government.[122]

The 1950s represented a watershed moment in the history of the Rockefeller Foundations as they faced the new political and social environment shaped by the Cold War. Major programs were sponsored by the foundations which tried to counter cultural anti-Americanism abroad.[123] As a reflection of such changes, in 1951 the Rockefeller Foundation underwent a large administrative overhaul in its existent funding procedures.[124] According to Sachse, the objective of this restructuring was to define the new role in which the Rockefeller Foundation was to assume in the "new Cold War [political] order and to investigate how their continued efforts would function in this changed international environment."[125]

One key factor in this restructuring process was determining a balance between institutional autonomy and governmental involvement, with its traditional close relationship with the U.S. State Department being especially under evaluation. An interesting demonstration of this reconsideration can be observed when studying the United States' promotion of area

535-552.

[122] Katharina Rietzler, "Before the Cultural Cold Wars," 156.

[123] There is extensive literature on the topic of anti-Americanism in Europe post-WWII. See, as examples, Alexander Stephen ed., *Americanization and Anti-Americanism: The German Encounter with American Culture after 1945* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005) and Volker Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual cold wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001).

[124] Carola Sachse, "What Research, to What End? The Rockefeller Foundation and the Max Planck Gesellschaft

study programs.[126] Rockefeller officers, according to a confidential monthly report presented to the trustees, were under a great deal of pressure to join the American government in what the document identifies as "explicitly a promotional effort…for the initiation and support of the teaching and study of American civilization" abroad.[127] Despite these pressures and later criticism, the Foundation remained firm in its stance that they would only support such programs if a university's interest in American studies was proved to be genuine, "arising neither from a sense of obligation nor from an impulse to seize an opportunity, the Foundation stood ready to help; as in other fields the Foundation's proper function was nourishment- not initiation nor promotion."[128] This demonstrates that while the Foundation was a target for government influence, it did have an expressed desire to remain autonomous in its overall funding decisions.

Furthermore, as a result of the organization's institutional restructuring, new philanthropic objectives were defined, with a far broader program which expanded the Foundation's programming from its traditional support of research in the biological sciences to now include funding for research in the humanities and social sciences as well.[129] This plan, fully articulated in the early months of 1956, reflected the ambitions the Rockefeller Foundation in creating a "new world order," within the realms of academia and research.[130]

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in the Early Cold War," *Central European History* (2009): 136.

[125] Ibid., 136.

[126] For comprehensive pieces written on the development and promotion of area studies, particularly during the Cold War period see, Vicente Rafael, "The Cultures of Area Studies in the United States," *Social Text*, No. 41 (Winter, 1994): 91-111; Bruce Cumings, "Boundary Displacement: Area Studies and International Studies During and After the Cold War," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol. 29, (1997); Immanuel Wallerstein, "The unintended consequences of Cold War area studies," in *The Cold War and the university: Toward an intellectual history of the postwar years* (New York: New Press, 1998); and Louis Morton, "National Security and Area Studies: The Intellectual Response to the Cold War," *The Journal of Higher Education*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Mar., 1963): 142-147.

[127] George Gray, "American Studies in Europe and the Rockefeller Foundation," Trustee minutes microfilm number 183. Confidential Monthly Report (April 1, 1957), Rockefeller Foundation Archive, RAC, 15.

[128] Ibid., 15.

[129] Carola Sachse, "What Research, to What End?," 138.

[130] John Andrew, "Cracks in the Consensus: The Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project and Eisenhower's America," 537.

Likewise, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund also followed such trends as reflected in their grant funding of university programs from the period.

The support of universities and educational exchange during this period dramatically expanded. Programs in Asia, Latin America, and Europe were dramatically expanded, with the general idea of directing these countries "in a modern, democratic direction" through the support of education.[131] Such practices rested heavily on the notion that American educational policy could produce "cultural change comprehensive enough to transform even political culture."[132]

The restructuring of the Rockefeller Foundation's initiatives was also demonstrated in their support of new initiatives in Eastern European countries. Using Hungary as a case in point, it is evident that the Cold War presented both new challenges and opportunities to the organization. Rockefeller activity in Hungary began soon after the Foundation was first established with medical aid and support for children being the first of Rockefeller sponsored programs instituted within the country during the early 1920s.[133] In the 1920s, agricultural education became a prime area of Rockefeller funding in Hungary, with the International Education Board (IEB) directing the programs.[134]

At the start of the twentieth century the Rockefeller family created several funds, all of which would eventually become part of the overarching Rockefeller Foundation, for philanthropic purposes. One of these established funds was the IEB which was established in

[131] Frank Ninkovich, "Requiem for Cultural Internationalism. Review of *An American Transplant: The Rockefeller Foundation and Peking Union Medical College* by Mary Brown Bullock," *History of Education Quarterly* Vol. 26, No. 2 (Summer, 1986): 249.
[132] Ibid., 249.
[133] Gabor Pallo, "The Rockefeller Foundation's Activity in Hungary," *The Rockefeller Archive Center Research Reports* (2005): 2.
[134] The General Education Board and the International Education Board were two programs existing within the Rockefeller philanthropic efforts. They existed as separate entities with their own board of trustees and staff. In 1928, a major internal reorganization placed these two boards, along with the International Health Board, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, the Bureau of Social Hygiene, and the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, within one organization, the Rockefeller Foundation.

1923, again a result of the increased attentions paid to international education following World War I.[135] The IEB promoted a number of programs in Eastern Europe, including within Hungary. Not only did the program support education in farming techniques in Hungary but it also provided travel grants and fellowships to Hungarian students wishing to study in foreign countries.[136] According to Gabor Pallo, one of the few scholars to have extensively researched early Rockefeller aid in Hungary,[137] over 205 persons received funding from the Foundation for travel and study abroad.[138]

However, in the years between the end of the Second World War and 1956, there was no sign of Rockefeller activity in Hungary, which, according to Pallo, was a result of the distrust the new regime had in foreign groups which reflected itself in problems transferring grant funds successfully and getting Foundation officers the necessary visas to visit the country to identify and monitor the potential projects.[139] This was not to say that the Rockefeller Foundations did not have an interest in the country, with trustee minutes from the early years of the early1950s reflecting a desire to improve the medical standards in the country through the construction of a research hospital.[140] According to Michael David-Fox, Foundation officers repeatedly tried to resume contacts within Hungary but consistently failed. Without the ability

[135] Gabor Pallo, "The Rockefeller Foundation's Activity in Hungary," *The Rockefeller Archive Center Research Reports* (2005).
[136] Ibid., 2.
[137] To my knowledge, and that of the staff at the Rockefeller Archive Center, the only other authors who have studied extensively Rockefeller aid in Hungary during this period has been Erik Ingebristsen, Alesksandra Witczak Haugstad, and Michael David-Fox. See, for example, Erik Ingebrigtsen, "Ungarsk Nasjonalisme og Amerikansk Filantropi: Rockefeller Foundations Støtte til Modernisering av Ungarsk Vitenskap og Helsevesen 1920-1941" [Hungarian Nationalism and American Philanthropy: The Rockefeller Foundation's Support towards the Modernization of Hungarian Science and Public Health, 1920-1941], Master thesis, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (2000) and Alesksandra Witczak Haugstad and Erik Ingebrigtsen, "National Policies and International Philanthropy: The Rockefeller Foundation and Polish and Hungarian Science between the World Wars," in *American Foundations in Europe: Grant-Giving Policies, Cultural Diplomacy and Trans-Atlantic Relations, 1920-1980,* Giuliana Gemelli and Roy MacLeod, eds. (Brussels and New York: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2003), 53-71.
[138] Gabor Pallo, "The Rockefeller Foundation's Activity in Hungary," 2.
[139] Ibid., 6.
[140] Notes on Action Regarding Hungary, 1957, Trustee Minutes, 561007-9, Rockefeller Foundation Archives microfilm collection, RAC.

to assess the situation, a necessary precondition for providing grant funds, the Rockefeller Foundations were unable to issue grants to Hungary for both scholars and medical advancements, a conspicuous fact given that all other communist countries did receive some form of Rockefeller aid. Disappointingly, David-Fox provides little analysis as to why this was the case and is a subject for future possible inquiry.[141] It was the crisis in 1956 which presented the Rockefeller Foundations with a unique opportunity to aid Hungarians while not operating within the country itself.

Refugee Assistance: Rockefeller Policy?

The Rockefeller Foundations were not unaccustomed to assisting refugees. Refugee policy had undergone significant changes during the course of the twentieth century, representing distinct evolutions in the political climate of the United States and the overall public perception of immigrants. Prior to the 1940s and the necessity of admitting refugees from the Second World War, the national origins quota immigration system which was in place made no special accommodations for refugee admission.[142] The Cold War, however, was a turning point in American refugee affairs, with official policy evolving to become more hospitable to the acceptance of political refugees.[143]

The reason that the Cold War became so vital in the construction of the American "commitment to refugees" lies in two explanations.[144] First, many Americans believed that the entry of refugees, especially those fleeing from oppressive communist regimes, would give the United States an advantage over the Soviet Union in the Cold War granting the country a moral

[141] Michael David-Fox and Gyorgy Peteri, eds., *Academia Upheaval: Origins, Transfers, and Transformations of the Communist Academic Regime in Russia and East Central Europe* (North Carolina: Information Age Publishing, 2008), 212.
[142] Carl Bon Tempo, *Americans at the Gate,* 14. See the text for a detailed explanation of American refugee policy both before and during the Cold War.
[143] Ibid., 3.

superiority in its promotion of democratic values which was especially advantageous as a potent rhetorical tool.[145] Moreover, easing immigration requirements to admit refugees was also seen as an important fulfillment of the liberationalist rhetoric which had dominated American foreign policy since the start of the Cold War.[146] Within this environment, and as argued by Carl Bon Tempo, refugee admissions and relief programs thus became important forms of political, anticommunist foreign policy.

The Hungarian Revolution represented the first large scale displacement crisis during the Cold War and thus was very influential in the formulation of refugee policy. The traditional immigration quotas were temporarily lifted and emergency visas were granted for over 30,000 refugees. Not only did the admission of the refugees represent a partial fulfillment of promises made through speeches and channels such as Radio Free Europe (RFE), it reflected the intense outpouring of sympathy for the Hungarian "freedom fighters," as they were frequently referred to as by the media and political figures.[147] Rockefeller Foundation press releases and annual reports utilize similar terminology when referencing their assistance to the Hungarian refugees, thus reflecting the importance of such powerful rhetoric in justifying not only the funding of the refugees but also their very presence within the United States.

However, the admission of Hungarian refugees was not without controversy. According to Bon Tempo, resurgent restrictionist beliefs among members of Congress brought increasing criticism to the refugee relief projects, finding that the country may have too swiftly admitted the refugees without properly reviewing their potential communist political affiliations. As a result, funding for such governmental relief programs as the President's Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief were limited by Congress, with such groups increasingly having to

144 Ibid., 3.
145 Carl Bon Tempo, *Americans at the Gate*, 3.
146 Ibid., 6.
147 Ibid., 67.

seek private funds to continue their projects.[148] Such criticism and hesitation by some vocal political elite, and lessening sympathy among the American people for the plight of the refugees as the headlines detailing the Revolution became increasingly less prominent, opened a space for the involvement of private philanthropies in the refugee relief project.

The Hungarian refugee crisis was not the first time in which the private foundations supported relief efforts. The involvement of private philanthropy in refugee relief projects greatly increased in the 1930s and it was during this period that the precedence was set for the protocol involving refugee support by the Rockefeller Foundations. In fact, according to Majorie Lamberti, the enhanced role of philanthropy facilitated the general overall acceptance of refugee scholars during the 1930s and 1940s, paving the way for future waves of immigrants.[149] One reason philanthropies assumed this predominant role in providing aid for refugees was because both the federal government and many universities were lacking funds for such projects in the year following the Great Depression.[150] Moreover, as previously noted, there was hesitation among the political elite to endow direct funding for refugees, with the associated political connotations amalgamated with the refugees being particularly controversial.

The first instance of the Rockefeller Foundations providing support for large groups of refugees from Europe was during the 1930s and deserves mention because it served as important model for later refugee scholar support.[151] The decision to fund refugee scholars fleeing Nazi persecution in the 1930s was seen as a unique undertaking by the Rockefeller

[148] Ibid., 75.
[149] Majorie Lamberti, "The Reception of Refugee Scholars from Nazi Germany in America: Philanthropy and Social Change in Higher Education," *Jewish Social Studies*, New Series, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Spring - Summer, 2006): 158.
[150] Ibid., 159.
[151] Though I will describe only the assistance of scholars fleeing Nazi persecution, there were obviously more examples. See Giuliana Gemeli, ed., *The "Unacceptables:" American Foundations and Refugee Scholars between the Two Wars and After* (New York: Lang, 2000).

Foundation, "a sign of the new flexibility of the organization as brought about by the new president Raymond Fosdick."[152] Prior to 1930, the Rockefeller Foundation had only played a subsidiary role in the funding of scholars, providing financial assistance for salaries after a university had decided to hire a person but never initiating such action on their own.[153] Raymond Fosdick had assumed the presidency of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1936 following a career in which he was devoted to promoting international education projects through the General Board of Education and the International Education Board. Under his tenure, which lasted until 1948, the Foundation formed the Research Aid Fund for Disposed Scholars, which sponsored financially the integration of refugee scholars into the existing framework of American universities. Over $300,000 was dedicated to this fund and it supported the salaries over of 200 scholars.[154] Policy documents from the period reveal that the prime considerations the trustees and officers had in deciding to fund the program included both an intense belief in a moral commitment to assist the refugees and also a conviction that the scholars would be of extreme benefit to the academic community within the United States.[155]

In the years between WWII and the Hungarian Revolution, hundreds of thousands displaced persons were admitted to the United States, mainly from Poland, Germany and the Baltic States.[156] The reception of these immigrants within the United States reveals a great deal about the ways in which immigration, specifically refugee, policy had evolved from earlier

[152] Majorie Lamberti, "The Reception of Refugee Scholars,"163.
[153] Claus- Dieter Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile: Refugee Scholars and the New School for Social Research*, University of Massachusetts Press, 1993.
[154] Majorie Lamberti, "The Reception of Refugee Scholars," 163-4.
[155] Ibid., 170.
[156] Joseph S. Roucek, "Education of the Refugee in the United States," *International Review of Education* 3 (1958): 377. While this is an old source, its viewpoints on the successful integration of immigrants remain viable in my opinion as explaining the perceptions and the assimilation of immigrations. See also Alan M. Kraut, *The Huddled Masses: The Immigrant in American Society, 1880-1921* (Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 1982) and Roger Daniels, *Coming to America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life* (New York: HarperCollins, 1990).

decades. Most notably this wave of immigration "escaped some of the most difficult stages of adjustment that had plagued earlier immigrants."[157] This assessment was conducted by Joseph Roucek, a contemporary professor who studied immigration history with a particular emphasis on those emigrating from Eastern Europe. According to Roucek, the new immigrants of this period represented a group which included far less unskilled laborers than previous nineteenth century immigrations with the majority having at least some schooling. Second, Roucek notes that a strong infrastructure of international, federal, state and private philanthropic organizations which had emerged in the 1910s and 20s provided these persons with guidance and support that had not existed for previous groups.[158]

The government relied increasingly on such private resources for the support of these large programs as they had the funds, knowledge, and resources to handle refugees with diverse needs. Moreover, the implementation of cultural diplomacy via educational exchange, both for economic and political reasons, was seen as something that should, in an attempt to appear neutral, best be left in the hands of private organizations. The largest group which was established for this purpose, and the one that is most relevant when discussing the case of the Hungarian refugees in 1956, was the Institute of International Education.

The Institute of International Education: Introducing International Education to the American People

The Institute of International Education (IIE) was founded in 1919 by three well known figures- Nicholas Murray Butler who was the President of Columbia University, Elihu Root who was a former Secretary of State and Senator, and Stephen Duggan, Sr., a Professor of Political Science at the College of the City of New York. Both Root and Butler had previously

[157] Joseph S. Roucek, "Education of the Refugee in the United States," 377.

won Noble Peace Prizes for their work in promoting international understanding and education in the years following World War I.

The IIE was developed to be the "first general administrative agency to organize and develop programs in international academic exchange" within the United States. [159] The organization, due to the success of its programs and motivated staff led by then President Stephen Duggan, quickly became the largest educational exchange institution in the world. The IIE primarily set up international exchange programs which were supported by the conviction that international education was essential in the promotion of peace and cultural understanding. According to Duggan, such exchange programs rested on the belief that, "If people could be enlightened and taught to understand other nations and cultures, fear and hatred would diminish."[160] The organization was also a potent political force. During the 1920s the organization successfully lobbied the government to designate a new category of nonimmigrant student visas, bypassing the post-war nationality-based quota system established by the Immigration Act of 1921.

The Institute of International Education established exchange programs throughout the world. As such, Duggan emphasized need for cultural exchange also with communist states, notably Russia. Duggan recognized the great potential of educational exchange with Russia, a nation which Duggan asserted had made "great advances in education and medicine, communications, and industry [which] could not be ignored."[161] Primarily as a result of promoting heavily the establishment of a school of intercultural exchange located in Moscow, both Stephen Duggan and his son Laurence Duggan, who had taken over control of the IIE

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[158] Ibid., 377.
[159] Stephen Mark Halpern, *The Institute of International Education: A History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 7.
[160] Stephen P. Duggan, "The War and the Campus," *News Bulletin*, Vol. 15, No. 6 (March 1940) cited in Stephen Mark Halpern, *The Institute of International Education*, 32.
[161] Stephen Mark Halpern, *The Institute of International Education: A History*, 115.

following his father's death in 1946, were frequently accused of being communist sympathizers.[162] Such accusations haunted the organization and hindered its ability to effectively lobby private and governmental organizations for funding during the height of Cold War era sentiments.[163] Such fears subsided, however, under the leadership of Donald Shank, who had assumed the presidency of the IIE following Laurence's death, and Kenneth Holland who became president of IIE in 1950.[164] Holland publicly reassured that the organization did not support communist ideology.[165]

The IIE typically provided individual scholarships for student exchange. However, during the 1930s the Institute established an Emergency Committee to Aid Displaced German scholars. This committee also assisted scholars from other areas of fascist control such as Spain and Italy. The primary objective of the organization, similar to the goals established by the Rockefeller Foundation's committee for scholar support, was to find lectureships for the hundreds of displaced scholars in universities across the United States, in addition to other Western countries.

The organization was simultaneously accused of promoting the indoctrination of arriving foreign students. Such concerns were connected to the fact that the IIE was largely

[162] The degree to which Laurence Duggan was involved with the Soviet Union has been a matter of interesting historical debate. For many years he was seen as a victim of the McCarthy era communist accusations, driven to suicide due to hounding by the House Committee for Un-American Activities. However, in 1999, Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliey published a text which studied newly released KGB documents which, in their opinions, implicated Stephan Duggan, who had worked for the US State Department, in providing sensitive information to the Soviet Union. See Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliey, *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America - the Stalin Era* (Random House: New York 1999). The text makes a strong argument as to why a number of the American intellectual elite, such as Duggan, provided information to the Soviets. They cite virulent antifascism and romanticized notions of Communism as primary contributing factors.

[163] Stephan Mark Halpern, *The Institute of International Education: A History*, 117.

[164] Kenneth Holland, prior to his employment at the IIE, had been an employee at the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (to be changed to simply the Office of Inter-American Affairs in 1945). This was a government supported organization which promoted inter-American cooperation, particularly among Latin American countries. The first leader of the organization was interestingly enough Nelson Rockefeller, who had been appointed to the position by President Roosevelt in 1940. During the 1940s the agency was primarily tasked with the function of distributing films, advertising, radio broadcasts, and newspapers to Latin America to counter Italian and German propaganda. In 1946 the office was dismantled and its responsibilities were transferred to the US State Department.

funded by the U.S. government. The organization received a great deal of money from the United States government for developing the Fulbright Fellowship program and organizing placement and orientation programs for foreign students arriving into the United States.[166] Government funding became increasingly essential and influential in the 1950s with federally directed programs dominating the traditional work of the IIE, which was the coordination of university international exchange programs.

However, like the Rockefeller Foundations, the Institute also expressed an occasional distrust of governmental involvement in educational exchange. This was despite the fact that many of their board members and Presidents had been heavily involved in Congress and the U.S. Department of State. As evidence, in 1945 Duggan protested the State Department's decision that "student exchanges were recommended to be used to 'implement' United States foreign policy."[167] As a result scholar Liping Bu identifies such an unwillingness to follow the government line as one factor which resulted in the constant government funding cuts for educational exchange and the IIE during the 1950s.[168]

Numerous publications and official statements indicate the strong degree to which the leadership of IIE refuted claims that the government was influencing their work. According to Laurence Duggan, in a letter dated December 2, 1946, the IIE "is not and must not be a means whereby our government hopes to influence foreign students in the United States in favor of particular policies and programs."[169] However, it is clear that IIE officials believed that some degree of sympathy towards American culture and government would develop as a result of the exchanges, maintaining that the government and IIE "should do nothing more than facilitate the

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[165] Stephan Mark Halpern, *The Institute of International Education: A History*, 191.
[166] Ibid., 11.
[167] Liping Bu, "Educational Exchange and Cultural Diplomacy in the Cold War," *Journal of American Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3, (Dec., 1999): 411.
[168] Ibid., 411.
[169] Laurence Duggan to William Benton, December 2, 1946 cited in Stephen Mark Halpern, *The Institute of*

coming of foreign students to the United States 'in search of truth.'"[170]

In addition to its often uneasy partnership with the United States government, the IIE was also supported by the endowments of the large foundations. The IIE's work with the Rockefeller foundation was extremely important and the critical ties between the organizations had been established far before the Hungarian crisis.[171] As with the case of the refugees from World War II, where collaborations with Jewish philanthropy groups were fundamental to the program's success, the cooperation between the groups allowed the organizations to concentrate their resources in an effective manner.[172] Educational exchange was often orchestrated through these important collaborations and allowed the financial resources of the large foundations to support the administrative activities of smaller organizations with a direct interest in the facilitation of such exchanges. This arrangement freed the Foundations from the direct responsibility of managing the programs which would have overwhelmed their resources.

Conclusions

There are often two competing views towards the work of foundations presented by scholars discussing the topic. First, there is the belief that foundations, as "intellectual actors with large financial resources, strategic vision, and acting with official policy guidance, had the power to define academic fields, to identify the most talented individuals, and the resources to build up key American institutions and the development of international knowledge networks."[173] Under this model, foundation's are interpreted in a Gramscian manner, with the

International Education: A History, 187.

[170] Ibid., 189.

[171] The first documented grant to the IIE was made in 1938, with $98,000 being appropriated for administrative costs related to international exchange programs. See Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, 1938.

[172] Majorie Lamberti, 160.

[173] Inderjeet Parmar, "American Foundations and the Development of International Knowledge Networks," *Global Networks* 2, vol. 1 (Dec. 16, 2002): 14.

actions of foundations being inherently political and used as a tool to consolidate US power.[174] An opposite view, which is more optimistic in nature is that foundations sponsor ideas for ideas' own sake, rather than for "political, strategic, or ideological ends," and exist as a third sector between the government and the corporate world. A result of this arrangement is a society characterized by increased pluralism.[175]

I argue that the Rockefeller Foundations during the 1950s existed somewhere in between these two extremes, at least in regards to their support of international education. They acted as important trans-national actors with a strong influence in global and domestic politics. In the case of the Hungarian refugee scholars, they supported educational funding which strongly reflected their mission to create and bolster intellectual elite within Eastern Europe, in regards to funding in Europe, and support incorporation of scholars into the American academic community in the case of the funding for the English language programs. While opportunistic in the sense that they desired to have an influence on the intellectual community in Eastern Europe as a means through which to combat communism and anti-American beliefs, the program also reflected humanitarian objectives which were largely free from direct ideological pressures or governmental intrusion. This paradox will be explored in the following two chapters which will survey the funding of Hungarian scholars both within the US and in Austria.

[174] Ibid., 14-15.
[175] Ibid., 15.

CHAPTER 3- A QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE PROGRAMS FOR HUNGARIAN REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES

Introduction

In December of 1956, only a few short months since the arrival of thousands of Hungarian refugees into the United States, the first group of former university students traveled to Bard College, a small liberal arts school in picturesque upstate New York. Over the course of nine weeks, Bard was to become the host of over 300 refugee students who needed to acquire the English language skills necessary to begin their studies at American universities and colleges. The Bard College program was the largest and first of the many English language centers which were organized by the Institute of International Education (IIE) and the World University Service (WUS). These centers were designed for the approximately 1,000 Hungarian student refugees in the United States. Considered to be an essential step in the successful integration of refugee students into the American way of life, this program was organized primarily by the Institute of International Education with funding by the Rockefeller Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the Ford Foundation. The decision of both Rockefeller Foundations to fund such a program was unprecedented and reflects the ways in which the policies of the Foundations, especially in regards to foreign policy, were being reevaluated and designed during the early Cold War.

This chapter will address the reasons for such a change in the course of work traditionally associated with the Rockefeller Foundations in regards to refugee relief and how such potential relief programs fit their foreign and domestic policy goals during this period. Moreover, the chapter will detail how English language instruction was recognized as a core component to efforts to incorporate the refugees into American society, in particular within the realm of academia. What becomes apparent is that the English language programs presented a

number of policy opportunities, and challenges, for the Foundations at a time in which both major foundations and governmental organizations were reconsidering their positions on educational and international funding projects given the changing politics of the early Cold War period. In addition, I argue that the English language programs fit into the sphere of domestic public diplomacy in that they both assisted in the so-called Americanization of the refugees and promoted to the American people that the Hungarian refugees were eager to become successful and contributing members of the community.

It is first necessary to describe the climate in which the language programs arose, in particular the development of English language instruction in the United States pre-1950s. With trends in international education and English language programs in mind, it will be possible to analyze the ways in which the Rockefeller Foundations justified their support of such programs, both in terms of their rhetoric to promote the projects and their subsequent evaluations of the programs' strengths and weaknesses.

History of English Language Instruction to Foreign Students during the Twentieth Century

The American attitudes towards the instruction of English for refugees and immigrants evolved greatly over the course of the twentieth century. Such attitudes precipitated many changes in policy which reflected changing views on the place and role of immigrants and refugees within American society. Additionally, such views regarding the place of the refugee within society reflected the means through which policymakers and Foundation officials believed successful integration into American society could occur. During the Cold War period, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s, this became an important policy consideration. Thus, whether or not persons formerly living under communism could adapt to the United States way

of life was an important question which had a great deal of impact on how the IIE developed the structure of the orientations and resettlement programs for the Hungarian refugees.

The history of the systematic encouragement of English language instruction in the United States began officially with the 1889 passage of the Compulsory Education Law which required English-only instruction and mandatory attendance for immigrant children living within the United States.[176] This law came at a time of increasing hostility towards the new immigrants, primarily from eastern and southern European, with the rhetoric directed against allowing such persons into the country being often tinged with racist sentiments. As a result, the needs of non-English speaking immigrant children in schools were often ignored and language learning was limited, a major hindrance for immigrant children and their potential integration and academic advancement.[177]

Perceptions concerning immigrants changed after World War I and ushered in the "Americanization movement."[178] This movement was led by the belief that immigrants needed to learn English to understand the government and culture of their new country in order to successfully assimilate. Only then could they escape the cycles of crime, poverty, and illiteracy associated with immigrants in the years prior. This drive towards "Americanization" was influenced strongly by concerns regarding the loyalty of its citizens.[179] In a statement given to the U.S. Bureau of Education in 1918, Secretary of Interior Franklin Lane urged the provision of English language classes to both "widen the opportunities for the immigrant and to ensure that he would not 'be bound and fettered by the language he originally speaks.'"[180]

[176] M.P. Cavanaugh, "History of Teaching English as a Second Language," *The English Journal,* Vol. 85, No. 8 (Dec., 1996): 40-44.
[177] Joseph S. Roucek, "Education of the Refugee in the United States," *International Review of Education,* no. 3 (1958): 374.
[178] M.P. Cavanaugh, "History of Teaching English as a Second Language," 42
[179] Ibid., 43.
[180] Franklin Lane, cited in Michael Olneck, "Americanization and the Education of Immigrants, 1900-1925: An Analysis of Symbolic Action," *American Journal of Education* 97 (August 1989): 411.

The push towards "Americanization" generally died down during times of peace but would present itself during times of conflict, World War II for example. Moreover, in the post-World War I period, and intensifying in the subsequent years, there developed in some American universities area studies programs a focus on preserving the unique values of cultural groups. Such programs included the concept of teaching English as a second language (ESL) with a recognition that retaining the culture of the immigrant groups was important.[181] Such new concepts rested on the acknowledgment that integration, as opposed to the complete assimilation, of an immigrant was a beneficial policy.

Following 1945 another wave of immigration came from those leaving areas under communist control. Due to expanding immigration quotas, 390,000 displaced persons were admitted to the United States, mainly Germans, Poles, and persons from the Baltic states.[182] These new programs deemphasized "Americanization" and stressed only the learning of the English language as a means of integration.[183] As a result, English language programs were formulated during the early 1950s to meet the demands of the influx of foreign students and immigrants.[184] The eagerness of private organizations and the United States government to expand educational opportunities for this group of immigrants was largely a consequence of the fact that they were more or less a previously well-educated group who inspired a great deal of sympathy among the American public. As a result, there was the recognition among such organizations that the refugees could contribute to American society.[185]

[181] Joseph S Roucek, "Education of the Refugee in the United States," 374.
[182] Ibid., 377.
[183] Ibid., 377.
[184] Liping Bu, "Educational Exchange and Cultural Diplomacy in the Cold War." *Journal of American Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3, (Dec., 1999): 406.
[185] For more critical views of ESL instruction both within the United States and abroad during the Cold War see Feryal Çubukçu, "Empowerment or Disempowerment: That is the Question (English as an international language) in EIL," *International Online Journal of Educational Sciences* 2 (2010): 98-109 and D. Cooke, "Ties that

The Development of English Language Programs at American Colleges

> *Bard became a way station for many young people fleeing Hungary, who wished to enter the American university system. Bard's initiative was unusual, if not extraordinary*.-Leon Botstein, President of Bard College[186]

The idea to organize an English Language program for Hungarian refugees was developed by the IIE as one of the earliest efforts in their program to integrate Hungarian student refugees into American universities.[187] The IIE, in conjunction with the WUS, developed a two phase plan to address the immediate and long term needs of the refugee students. The first phase would involve intensive English language instruction so that the students would be prepared for their integration into the American educational system. The second phase, and the one which was to take far longer, would constitute the actual placement and scholarship support of the students into colleges and universities throughout the country.

The program was developed very quickly with the organizers at the WUS and IIE articulating several key objectives and considerations during its development. Above all else, the IIE recognized that Hungarian students, despite their intelligence and previous education in Hungary, spoke little to no English and thus could not accept the multitude of scholarship offers that were being presented by numerous sympathetic academic institutions across the country. They determined that intensive language training would be the most effective and economical way to address the problem.[188] The IIE had a history of organizing orientation sessions for foreign students as it had previously arranged orientation conferences for foreign students before they traveled to their exchange universities in the United States. While not

constrict: English as a Trojan horse." in *Awarenesses: Proceedings of the 1987 TESL Ontario Conference*, ed. A. Cumming, A. Gague, and J. Dawson (Toronto: TESL Ontario,1988): 56-62.

[186] Leon Botsein, Cited in "Bard Celebrates the More Than 300 Student Refugee Freedom Fighters from the 1956 Hungarian Revolution Who Found a Haven in Annandale," Institute for International Liberal Education, accessed November 11, 2010, http://hungary56.bard.edu/overview/.

[187] Advisory Committee for Orientation of Refugee Students, December 26, 1956, folder 2613A, box 426A, RG 3.1, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, RAC.

[188] News Release by the Institute of International Education, December 31, 1957, folder 2613B, box 426A, RG

providing English language instruction, as the proficiency of the students was to be assumed, these conferences were considered to be of fundamental importance because they enabled foreign visitors to become acquainted with not only each other but the American way of life.[189] Such experience organizing orientations was essential due to the urgent nature of the program's planning.

In addition to teaching English, the organizers of the Bard College orientation also saw the program as an opportunity to provide an introduction to social and intellectual life in the United States, a direct means of confronting the "years of Communist indoctrination and propaganda" which it was assumed had influenced the lives of students in Hungary.[190] This is not to say, however, that the orientation measures focused on the political aspects of American life. According to William Frauenfelder, director of the Bard program, there was no preaching about the virtues of democracy or the evils of the communist system they fled, for "it isn't necessary- they know."[191]

Three major obstacles faced the IIE in the establishment of the English learning programs. First, they had to coordinate the management of the programs with the WUS. The WUS was determined to take a secondary role in this first phase of the program, with their primary responsibilities being only the co-screening of the refugees and coordinating the transportation and interim housing of the student refugees. The WUS would later assume a larger role in the organization of the scholarship programs in phase two.[192] Based upon this arrangement it was clear that the IIE handled the majority of the burden for the substantial

3.1, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, RAC.

189 Stephen Mark Halpern, *The Institute of International Education: A History*, 107.

190 English Language and Orientation Program for Hungarian Student Refugees: Dec. 1956- Feb. 1957, Final Report from Bard College, 1957, folder 2613B, box 426A, RG 3.1, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, RAC.

191 Leonard Buder, "College-Bound- From Budapest," *The New York Times Magazine* (January 13, 1957), 78.

192 Joint Policy Committee- Hungarian Refugee Student Program Meeting Agenda and Minutes, January 17, 1957, folder 2613A, box 426A, RG 3.1, Rockefeller Brothers Foundation , RAC.

management of the English-language programs both financially and administratively.[193]

Second, another initial concern was finding a suitable location for the English programs. The IIE used its extensive knowledge of the international instruction programs in the United States to select Bard College, whose President James Case had volunteered the services of the college, as the best location to host the program.[194] Bard College had an established program for the instruction of English to non-native speakers complete with the necessary instructional materials, language labs and assorted equipment, and teaching staff.[195] When it became necessary to select additional sites for English instruction after the Bard program became too large, the IIE continued to select sites which had existing English instruction programs. In this fashion the IIE was not directly responsible for the instruction of the students but instead took upon the administrative responsibilities and funding coordination of the program.[196]

Third, establishing such programs in such a limited time presented a number of administrative problems, first and foremost the issue of funding. The yearly budget of IIE did not envisage the need for such programs and thus calls for donors were immediately necessary. They estimated that it would cost on average around $300 to educate each student, with an estimated total cost of the Bard program being a little over $280,000 and the total cost of all programs to be around $500,000.[197] Governmental support was initially considered but the IIE and the government both determined that such aid would best be used for the phase two of the program which was the funding of scholarships for the students. The government, as

[193] For this reason, I will focus primarily on the interactions between IIE and the foundations as opposed to with the WUS. The actions of the WUS will become more relevant during the discussions of the phase 2 of the educational relief program.

[194] For a proposal sent by Bard college outlining their facilities and goals see, Proposed Hungarian Student Refugee Program, December 1956, folder 2613 A, box 426A, RG 3.1, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, RAC.

[195] Reamer Kline, *Education for the Common Good: A History of Bard College- The First 100 Years* (Bard College: New York, 1982), 143.

[196] Document of Albert Sims, IIE, recorded telephone conversation, July 3, 1957, folder 452-55- Institute of International Education, box 55, series 200 US, RG 1.3 Projects, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.

[197] RBF- Hungarian Student Refugee Program, January 1957, folder 2613A, box 426A, RG 3.1, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, RAC.

represented through the President's Committee on the Hungarian Refugees, indicated in consultations with the IIE that they thought it would be best to focus their funding requests on the large foundations. This was largely a result of the unclear funding status of the governmental program itself which was intended to be an organization largely independent from governmental funding.[198]

In order to persuade the major foundations to provide funding, letters of solicitation were sent out to numerous large organizations across the United States. Such requests for funding were answered by three foundations- the Rockefeller Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the Ford Foundation.[199] This was not the first time these organizations had worked with the IIE. The IIE had begun to receive funding for their various international education programs from both the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations beginning as early as 1927.[200] Largely as a result of these well established and trusted relations, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation each contributed $122,059.00 respectively for the establishment of the program.[201]

Though a large sum of money, these contributions represented just a small portion of the operating budgets of the Foundations, even when considering their total allocations to Hungarian relief. For example, the total allocation of funding relating the Hungarian refugees for the Rockefeller Foundation was $1,450,000.00 in the 1956 and 1957 budgets, with the majority of the funds going to support refugees attending universities located in Austria.[202] The

198 Ibid.

199 For an interesting analysis of the Ford Foundation, and their work relating to 1956, see Volker Berghahn, "1956, the Ford Foundation and America: The Cultural Cold War in Eastern Europe," in *1956: European and Global Perspectives,* ed. Carole Fink, Frank Hadler, and Tomasz Schramm (Leipzig: Leipziger University Press, 2006). In addition, in the following months more foundations would become involved in funding the scholarships of the Hungarian students. These included the Kellogg Foundation and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.

200 Stephen Mark Halpern, *The Institute of International Education: A History,* 100

201 Institute of International Education, Committee on Educational Interchange Policy, *Hungarian Refugee Scholars and United states Colleges and Universities. One Year Later, February 1957-January 1958* (New York, 1958).

202 "The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, 1957," The Rockefeller Foundation Library (2001), 262.

decision of the Rockefeller Foundations to fund the Bard program itself represented a significant shift in the policies of the organizations which had traditionally focused on providing only individual scholarships to foreign students studying within the US.

However, in the case of the Hungarian student refugees, the Foundations recognized the immediate need of the students arriving into the country and the lack of support they had received from the American government both during the time of the Hungarian crisis and also during the resettlement process. This opinion of failure on the part of the American government regarding the Hungarian refugees was clearly addressed by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund sponsored Special Studies committee which was organized in 1956.[203] This committee, led by Nelson Rockefeller, who had taken over the presidency of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund from his brother at the start of the year, and included such influential figures as Henry Kissinger, expressed strongly condemnatory opinions concerning the failure of the United States government in its lax foreign policy regarding the Soviet Union and the spread of communism. Their report, published in 1960, explicitly denounced the Eisenhower administration's weak response to the Revolution.[204]

Moreover, the report also outlined the Fund's course of action during the Cold War period. According to the report, "Our goal [RBF] is the general promulgation throughout the free world of the basic political philosophy on which our nation was founded."[205] According to the Special Studies report, when addressing those living behind the Iron Curtain their policies and programs should encourage them to "break away from Sino-Soviet Communist domination."[206]

Condemnation of the insufficient government programs to assist Hungarian refugees by

[203] John Andrew, "Cracks in the Consensus: The Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project and Eisenhower's America," 535-552.
[204] Ibid., 537.
[205] Ibid., 537.

the Rockefeller Foundations began only a few short weeks after the last shots of the Revolution were fired. A memorandum between the Rockefeller Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund in December of 1956 indicates the concern over the funding project even at the onset of the grant decision making process.[207] This memorandum indicates that there was a high level of anxiety within the general staff at both Rockefeller Foundations as they believed that they should concentrate their funding efforts on the refugee students in Europe, primarily those still present in Austria.

Tellingly, such perceptions of inadequate refugee services were also demonstrated in January 1957 in the official correspondence within the organization. In a Rockefeller Brothers Fund report regarding the Hungarian student refugee program they state that it was becoming increasingly clear that earlier plans for refugee students were "entirely inadequate" as the scale of refugees was much larger than initially predicted in November and December of 1956.[208] As a result, such programs by private organizations and foundations would be necessary to effectively deal with the influx of refugees. Such an opinion that the government was failing in its assistance to the refugees certainly had a large impact in the decision of the Foundations to provide their support despite its unprecedented nature.

The Rockefeller programs had a tradition of funding European scholars and research schemes, both in the sciences and the humanities, but not typically relief for significant numbers of refugees. Supporting this traditional focus of the organization, in a letter directed to Dr. Wallace of the National Academy of Science (NAS) from Warren Weaver, a Rockefeller Foundation official, it is made clear that the organization would deny the organization's request for further funding for orientation and resettlement projects for the steady flow of scholars who

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206 Ibid., 537.

207 Memorandum from Charles P. Noyes to RFB, December 6, 1956, folder 2613A, box 426A, RG 3.1, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, RAC.

208 RBF- Hungarian Student Refugee Program, January 1957, folder 2613A, box 426A, RG 3.1, Rockefeller

continued to arrive from Hungary and Europe even as late as 1958. This letter states:

> We are definitely not a relief agency, and to protect us from all sorts of difficulties we have to be very careful not to indulge in any special activities which could be so interpreted. We have felt from the beginning that our primary job, in this dramatic and distressing situation, was to go as far as we possibly could in rescuing scholarship. We strained our policies considerably, being influenced by the admittedly very moving circumstances.[209]

The opinion that refugee students should remain in Europe was one echoed by the IIE and WUS. In their view the Hungarian students should remain in Europe to keep scholarship alive in Europe and represent alternative political views. The perspective that the majority of the student refugees should remain in Europe is present, though subtly, in a report presented on December 28, 1956 to an advisory committee composed of members from various colleges involved in the language programs, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, the WUS, the IIE, and others. This report states that at this meeting serious thought was given to creating a "more effective policy of discouragement" to students wishing to travel to North America for their education at the processing centers in Vienna.[210]

In the 1956 Rockefeller Foundation annual report the reasons for deviating from their traditional policies regarding refugee relief were publicly outlined.[211] The report explicitly states that the Rockefeller Foundation "does not contribute to what is commonly called relief- the provision of consumer goods and services for those in distress."[212] They indicate that to do so would overwhelm the resources of the foundation and would leave it unable to assist with what they saw as the "root causes of the distress," such as the suppression of academics.[213] This statement is included in a section praising their contributions to the English programs, thus

Brothers Fund, RAC.
[209] Letter from Warren Weaver (RF) to Dr. Wallace Atwood (NAS), July 31, 1958, folder 552, box 66, series 200, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archive, RAC, 1.
[210] Advisory Committee for Orientation of Refugee Students, December 26, 1956, folder 2613A, box 426A, RG 3.1, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, RAC.
[211] "The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, 1956," The Rockefeller Foundation Library, 2001.
[212] Ibid.
[213] Ibid.

representing how they considered this funding project to be extraordinary in nature and divergent from their traditional practices.

Another concern which is expressed in the documents discussing the proposals for refugee assistance was interaction with the United States government. Despite the close ties between the Foundations and the government, as previously explored, the Foundations were concerned with becoming too involved in supporting the work of the main coordinating agency of the relief effort within the United States, the President's Committee for Hungary Refugee Relief. This governmental committee did not receive funding from Congress for their administrative costs and scholarship schemes and was forced to solicit funds from private sources.[214]

Despite repeated requests for funding by the committee to support refugee student scholarships and their administrative costs, the Foundation declined to become involved with one exception. They did provide $35,000 for a awareness promotional campaign for the U.S. public which was designed to create sympathy for the refugees and distill any fears that the United States was admitting communist subversives.[215] They viewed this as less problematic because the funds were going to a private marketing firm as opposed to the United States government, which would be both a challenge to their tax-exempt status and their desire to appear as neutral and independent from governmental ties as possible.[216] However, the funding provides a direct example of the use of public diplomacy in a domestic sphere and how the Rockefeller Foundation supported such initiatives.

Moreover, in addition to the concern over the geographic and political distribution of funds a number of high officials, including Shepard Stone, assistant director of the Ford

[214] Letter from Tracy Voorhees to Dean Rusk, President of RF Foundation requesting funds, January 7, 1957, folder 681, box 80, series 200, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.
[215] Ibid.
[216] Ibid.

Foundation and Gerald Pomerat, a Rockefeller Foundation officer, believed that placing students in existing language programs would be preferable to sending them to ad hoc ones such as Bard as proposed by the IIE.[217] In a plan detailing the prospective funding of the Hungarian students created in late November of 1956, it is stated:

> In speaking with President Case and his colleagues last Friday, GRP [Gerald Pomerat] had indicated that the best of all possible plans for indoctrinating Hungarian refugee students who might come to this country would be to put them in small groups in many American colleges and universities, in the hands of sympathetic and understanding teachers who would be able to help them over their first most difficult weeks. Barring this...Bard was the most acceptable substitute."[218]

This passage is useful in two accounts when assessing the objectives of the Foundation. On a rhetorical level, it is important to highlight the use of the term indoctrination in this passage. While the expression frequently inspires negative connotations, as it presumes a suppression of independent thought and alternative opinions, it can be argued that in this sense the term meant assimilation into the American culture. Second, this passage highlights the Rockefeller Foundation's emphasis, when engaging in international education and exchange, on the direct incorporation of the student into the academic and social communities as the most successful means of integration into a society.

However, despite these reservations over the initial funding of the programs, the influence of a few key figures within the organizations including Jessie Smith Noyes, a project director, and the general public support for the Hungarian students, and resulting favorable publicity for the Foundations such funding affiliations would provide, proved to be essential in swaying the opinion of the trustees to approve funding of the program. One benefit to their involvement was that the Foundation received a great deal of favorable publicity from the

[217] Interview with Mr. Albert Sims, IIE, January 2, 1957, folder 196, box 71, RG 12.0002- Diaries, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.
[218] "Hungarian Refugee Program: Bard College Plan for Orientation Courses," November 30, 1956, folder 111, box 14, series 200, Rockefeller Foundation Archive, RAC, 3.

funding.[219] In addition, the organizations saw the refugees as a potential source of great academic contribution, a clear motivating factor in their decision to provide funding as the mission of the Rockefeller Foundation had always been the support of academic research and innovation both in the United States, and to a greater extent, abroad.[220] The Rockefeller Foundation used this justification in order to persuade the Rockefeller Brothers fund to also contribute 1/3 of the expenses related to the administration of the Bard English program.[221]

The strong support and perceived success of such English language programs is demonstrated in the later funding of the refugee relief efforts of the United States National Academy of Sciences (NAS). The NAS was instrumental in the placements of a large number of academic, including advanced level students, refugees who had completed varying levels of training within the scientific fields within Hungary. Based upon initial screenings conducted in Vienna and Camp Kilmer they were placed in industry and academic posts if deemed qualified or sent to intense English language training programs, such as one established at Rutgers University in New Jersey. The Rutgers program served 87 scholars over the course of eight weeks and was modeled after the Bard program.[222] Funding for these associated programs through the National Academy of the Sciences, including their English language program, totaled $180,000.[223] The largest programs, and those specifically targeting students, still, however, remained those organized by IIE.

[219] For one of the many articles which detail Rockefeller funding of the Hungarian refugee students see "Rockefeller Fund Aiding Hungarians," *New York Times* (December 8, 1956), 3.
[220] Committee on Educational Interchange Policy (IIE division) , "Hungarian Refugee Students and the United States Colleges and Universities: A Progress Report on the Emergency program to aid Hungarian university students in the United States," October 1956-Feb. 1957, August 7, 1957, Folder 452-55 (Institute of International Education), box 55, series 200, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archive, RAC, 13.
[221] Docket Memorandum Request for funding, folder 631, box 94, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, RAC.
[222] Allocation #44, February 13, 1957, folder 552, box 66, RG 1.2, Series 200, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, RAC.

The Bard Program in Practice

Once the IIE had received funding and the location had been selected it became necessary to design the program, a responsibility left primarily to the officers at Bard College with little oversight by the directors of the foundations or the IIE itself. The Bard College program was designed to last nine weeks, accommodating a total of 325 students. Many of the 325 students were there for the full nine weeks while others remained for shorter periods of time depending on knowledge of the language or personal factors, such as illness or the acceptance of an immediate university place. Very few students left the program due to complaints about its quality or their own failure to participate. [224]

There was an official screening process which was established by the IIE and the World University Service at Camp Kilmer in New Jersey, the main processing center for arriving Hungarian refugees in the United States. The process of admittance into the special Hungarian student program was based upon a swiftly established criteria system.[225] The most important qualifications were the student's academic record[226] and the acknowledgement that their academic careers in Hungary were interrupted either by the Revolution or by "discriminatory political reasons in the time prior to the Revolution."[227] Moreover, their academics would have to not be completed prior to their leaving Hungary with exception given to young teachers or university professors who would require such language skills. If they had assumed an alternative career within five years of being removed from university for political reasons they

[223] Annual Report 1957.
[224] Hungarian Student Program- Status report, March 8, 1957, folder 454, box 55, series 200, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.
[225] Outlined in Joint Policy Committee- Hungarian Refugee Student Program Meeting Agenda and Minutes, January 17, 1957, folder 2613A, box 426A, RG 3.1, Rockefeller Brothers Foundation, RAC.
[226] Since students frequently arrived without records of their academics, the assessment was based primarily on oral interviews in which the student was asked to recall precisely their status and eligibility. This lack of clear academic records was problematic, especially in the more technical fields such as engineering, and later assessments took the form of tests with professors in the related fields to ascertain the level of the student's knowledge.
[227] Joint Policy Committee- Hungarian Refugee Student Program Meeting Agenda and Minutes, January 17,

could apply to the program only in exceptional circumstances which are not clearly defined in the guidelines. Upon acceptance, the student had to enroll in a field which U.S. higher education could provide for and spouses accompanying students were not eligible for the English program unless they were qualified themselves.[228] Those students admitted to the program were a generally heterogeneous group with over 85% being male between the ages of 26-39, with the great majority being in their early twenties.[229] Regarding the character of the refugees, they were assessed as very strong intellectually but with potentially problematic political views. A final report from Bard College indicates that they approached the students assuming, "mature, critical, politically left perspectives" and also an "ignorance of the US, prejudiced ideas about economic, cultural status of the U.S." as a result of communist indoctrination."[230]

This screening process was indicated to be extremely important by the Foundations who were providing funding to the program. According to a Joint Policy Committee statement issued by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund in coordination with the Rockefeller and Ford Foundation in January of 1957, the Foundations strongly reiterated that:

> Their purpose is to assist in preserving and developing the brain power represented by the qualified students of scholarship capacity, not to provide special relief and resettlement opportunities for refugees who happen to be students. They have, therefore, stressed the necessity of careful screening.[231]

However, according to a final report on the program, when it came to admissions there was oftentimes no formal initial screening process, largely a result of how quickly the program was established and the speed in which refugees had to be processed and placed while at Camp

1957, folder 2613A, box 426A, RG 3.1, Rockefeller Brothers Foundation Archives, RAC.

[228] Ibid.

[229] Reamer Kline, *Education for the Common Good: A History of Bard College- The First 100 Years*, 144.

[230] Final Report: English Language and Orientation Program for Hungarian Student Refugees December 23- Deb. 25, 1957, folder 111, box 14, series 200, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.

[231] Institute of International Education: Joint Policy Committee- Hungarian Refugee Student Program, January 15, 1957, folder 2613A, box 426 A, RG 3.1 Grants, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, RAC.

Kilmer.[232] While recognizing this deficiency in the admission's screening process, the Rockefeller Foundations were sympathetic to the impracticalities of intense screenings for such a large cohort of students.

Additionally, there were several considerations which had to be recognized regarding the educational backgrounds of the students. For example, the majority of the refugees accepted into the program were students in the fields of science, which according to a Rockefeller report, was a reflection of the suppression of humanities education within the satellite states.[233] While such an evaluation may not reflect an accurate assessment of education within the Soviet satellite states, it does reveal the perceptions of the communist educational systems by the Rockefeller officials.

The high predominance of scholars within the sciences presented a problem for administrators because they lacked sufficient placements for all of these students immediately following the conclusion of the program. The lack of available scholarships was a factor which created significant anxiety among the students and there is evidence that some contacted the Rockefeller foundation directly to provide support for their schooling at universities not directly offering scholarship, requests which were systematically denied due to a lack of available funds.[234] Also, while the program was initially designed to be only for those defined as students according to the established criteria such a term was often stretched, with some of the participants being professionals who had to learn English to continue their careers.[235] Regardless of these concerns, far more refugees became eligible for the program than initially expected by the IIE and WUS.

[232] English Language and Orientation Program for Hungarian Student Refugees: Dec. 1956- Feb. 1957, Final Report from Bard College, 1957, folder 2613B, box 426A, RG 3.1, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, RAC.
[233] Ibid., 3.
[234] Trustee Report on the Situation of the Hungarian Refugees, 1957, folder 111, box 14, series 200, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archive, RAC, 13.
[235] English Language and Orientation Program for Hungarian Student Refugees: Dec. 1956- Feb. 1957, Final

The instructional day at Bard consisted of intense study with over six hours of instruction conducted completely in English with the goal of complete language immersion. The Hungarians were divided into several groups depending on their level of fluency. The methods which were utilized by the English professors, most of which who were full time professors at Bard who volunteered their summer to assist with the program, had been developed due to recent research in the fields of modern linguistics and the teaching of English as a second language (ESL). Such methods had been utilized at the U.S. Army Language School in California and were thus used as the prime model for the Bard program along with methods developed by the linguistics program at Columbia University. The textbooks utilized were Wright-McGillivrary's, *Let's Learn English* and Wright's *Practice Your English.* Supplementing these texts were newspaper articles from such publications as *Newsweek* and *Time* as well as literature such as Hemingway's *A Farewell to Arms.* [236]

When discussing English language instruction it is also useful to apply some theory to address the effects of such education on the recipient populations. Skutnabb-Kangas has provided a useful model for assessing the approaches to English language education as related to refugee situations. Skutnabb-Kangas differentiates between two goals of instruction-linguistic assimilation and linguistic integration. The first, linguistic assimilation, desires to replace the person's native language with the use of detractive teaching methods. The other, linguistic integration, uses additive teaching methods which encourages the retention of the original language, thus creating a sense of linguistic equality. Placed in the context of refugee support, there is an explicit need under the second model, clearly preferred according to Skunabb-Kangas, that there is a respect for the mother language of the refugees by both their

Report from Bard College, 1957, folder 2613B, box 426A, RG 3.1, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, RAC, 3.
[236] Ibid., 4-7.

instructors and the greater community.[237] This respect for the Hungarian language was clearly present in the Bard program. One dramatic example of this is that while the American anthem was recited at the end of the group dinners, it was preceded by the Hungarian national anthem as well. In addition, students were not discouraged from speaking Hungarian outside of classes although they were told that frequent practice of English was the most successful means of learning the language.[238]

The day of study was supplemented with cultural programming which included introductions to American government and customs, movies screenings, and field trips to neighboring sites of interest. Field trips, in particular, were seen as particularly important as they would increase student familiarity with American governmental institutions, businesses, and culture.[239] Such immersion into the cultural and social life was seen as essential as the Hungarian students were often extremely anxious concerning their integration into life in their new home.[240]

A natural potential criticism of such cultural programming was that it was an attempt to indoctrinate the students. However, measures were taken to avoid such practices, such as the viewing of movies which were critical of the United States especially in terms of race relations (for example, *the Ox-Bow Incident* and *Lost Boundaries*), and the frequent incorporation of Hungarian culture, such as the multiple dance and concert performances conducted by students, into the daily curriculum. According to a 1957 final report submitted by the directors of the

[237] Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, "Language Policy and Linguistic Human Rights," *An Introduction to Language Policy: Theory and Method*. Thomas Ricento, ed. Malden (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 275 and 283.
[238] English Language and Orientation Program for Hungarian Student Refugees: Dec. 1956- Feb. 1957, Final Report from Bard College, 1957, folder 2613B, box 426A, RG 3.1, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, RAC, 3.
[239] Ibid.
[240] Institute of International Education, Committee on Educational Interchange Policy, *Hungarian Refugee Scholars and United states Colleges and Universities. One Year Later, February 1957-January 1958* (New York, 1958).

Bard program the purpose of the session was strictly "orientation not indoctrination."[241] Considering the high degree in which Hungarian culture was incorporated into the programs and the repeated emphasis away from indoctrination evident in the institutional documents, it can be supported that such a goal was not part of the mission or intentions of the IIE or those funding the programs. Moreover, I argue that the program reflected an attempt to integrate, as opposed to assimilate, the Hungarian refugees into American society.

However, one must be critical of even the foundation's positions regarding the indoctrination of students, as there have been recent studies conducted implicating the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations as having direct CIA influence, an organization frequently accused of an interest in indoctrination.[242] According to such studies, the "friendly foundations" were often very eager to assist the CIA achieve their "cultural cold war" objectives. Such a term refers to the funding, often by indirect means such as through private foundations involved in this complex state-private network, of cultural programs which were against communism.[243] In the case of the Hungarian students there does not appear to be any large-scale direct involvement of the US government with the exception of the work done by the President's Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief in a coordinating and administrative capacity. The only insistence of government intervention in the program at Bard in particular is a short reference to FBI agents visiting the campus. The purpose of such a visit was not detailed and was explicitly included in a section detailing the necessity of curtailing visitors as they

[241] English Language and Orientation Program for Hungarian Student Refugees: Dec. 1956- Feb. 1957, Final Report from Bard College, 1957, folder 2613B, box 426A, RG 3.1, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, RAC, p. 10.
[242] See, for example, Edward H. Berman, *The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy* (Albany: State University of New York, 1983) and Frances Stoner Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: The New Press, 2000) and Frances Stoner Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (Granta Books, 2000). These texts, among others, indicate that the Foundations were often used as cover for the foreign policy of the US government.
[243] Frances Stoner Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: The New Press, 2000).

disrupted the flow of the educational process.[244]

Another interesting point regarding visitors to the Bard program was that they discouraged representatives from the Hungarian groups existing within the US from visiting the campus. There is a high level of mistrust concerning the intervention of the Hungarian émigré community evident in the policy documents. An evaluation of the Bard program states:

> We had determined at the start that the group of students would not be exposed to exploitation by interested émigré organizations or subjected to emotion-packed appeals….Little political maturity or sense of historical proportion could be expected under such circumstances [their experience under 'Russian- Communism']; and the agitation of romantic and extreme émigré political groups in America did not aid in developing such understanding.[245]

It is possible, though it cannot be assumed from the available documents, that a desire to keep the Hungarian refugees away from these émigré groups at the start of their time in the US reflected a concentrated effort to only expose them to the American way of life. However, in order to give a conclusive answer as to why this mistrust is evident a further study would be required.

While indoctrination is not the proper term to use to describe the activities of the Rockefeller Foundations and the IIE it is possible to describe it in terms of Americanization. Americanization is often a subtle influence. According to Olneck, key elements of the Americanization movement during the early Cold War included activities which were practiced at the Bard program including, for example, the privileging of American public institutions, trips to public schools, museums, city buildings, and explanations of good citizenship and economic behavior within the capitalistic system.[246] The notion of integration is particularly relevant here and it is clear that their efforts were regarded with praise. For example, a *New York Times* article from February 1, 1957 indicates that the integration of Hungarian refugees

[244] Final Report: English Language and Orientation Program for Hungarian Student Refugees December 23- Deb. 25, 1957, folder 111, box 14, series 200, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC, 25.
[245] "Hungarian Refugee Program: Bard College Plan for Orientation Courses," November 30, 1956, folder 111, box 14, series 200, Rockefeller Foundation Archive, RAC, 12.

into American society was considered to be successful largely in part because of the language orientation programs.[247]

By January of 1957 it became clear that the Bard program, already determined to be a general success, had exceeded its capacity of 335 students and, as a result, a second program would have to be established in order to accommodate the additional students qualifying for instruction.[248] The primary reason for the necessity of opening another site was the lack of sleeping and eating facilities on the campus rather than a lack of qualified staff members.[249] The site which was chosen was St. Michael's College, a Catholic college located in Vermont which had sponsored intensive language orientation for several years prior. This program generally followed the model provided by Bard College, both in its student orientation and instruction, and served 101 students in the spring of 1957.[250] No concerns are expressed in the numerous policy statements or private correspondences between IIE administrative officials and the Rockefeller Foundations that establishing a program at a college with a Catholic religious affiliation would be controversial.

Growing Concerns over Funding

The relationship between the IIE and the Rockefeller Foundations was characterized by generally positive relations. However, that is not to say there were not problems and miscommunications. A frequent point of concern was over the incessant calls for more funding by the IIE and the WUS. The program went dramatically over budget as a result of the

[246] Michael Olneck, "Americanization and the Education of Immigrants," 405.
[247] Harrison Salisbury, "Hungarian Refugees Blend Easily into U.S.; 23-Year-Old Heroine Has Become a Model Housewife," *New York Times* (March 24, 1957), 1-2.
[248] Interview with Mr. Albert Sims, IIE, January 2, 1957, folder 196, box 71, RG 12.0002- Diaries, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.
[249] Advisory Committee for Orientation of Refugee Students, December 28, 1956, folder 2613A, box 426A, RG 3.1, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, RAC.
[250] Joseph S Roucek, "Education of the Refugee in the United States," *International Review of Education,* no. 3

requirements of providing instruction for more students than initially predicted. As a result, following the close of the program, the IIE requested, and was granted, an additional amount of $21,059 to cover the final administrative expenses.[251]

The high expense of the program was a frequent topic of concern during the meetings of the highest levels of the Rockefeller Foundation. There was a general consensus that due to the high expense of the program, Phase I would have to come to a close as soon as possible for continuing it would come at the expense of new and preexisting international education projects.[252] It is interesting to note that they stated that the costs of the English language programs within the United States would result in less funding for international programs. This highlights the organization's emphasis on international aid and, possibly, a recognition that programs such as Bard did not fit into the traditional domestic grants of the Foundation.

Those students who had not yet received English language training would be placed into universities which had the capacity to provide intensive English language instruction. These programs became known as "package courses" and were put into place at over 15 colleges and universities across the country.[253] The package courses, which were to instruct small groups of around 10 students for one semester, served 230 students.[254] The Rockefeller Foundation provided a limited number of grants for these programs, primarily for their associated administrative costs.[255]

Concerns also were present regarding the politics and ideology of the IIE itself. Saved within the archive are letters, including one sent to the Rockefeller Foundation by a Mrs.

(1958): 379.

[251] Allocation #76, May 17, 1957, folder 452-55- Institute of International Education, box 55 series 200 US, RG 1.3 Projects, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.

[252] Diary of Pomerat- Meeting with Sims, Neilsen, Noyes, RPB, and GRP, January 29, 1957, folder 454, box 55, series 200, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archive, RAC.

[253] Joseph S Roucek, "Education of the Refugee in the United States," 374-380.

[254] Hungarian Student Program- Status report, March 8, 1957, folder 454, box 55, series 200, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.

Dickson of New York, which indicate that some had suspicions concerning the IIE and their role in international education. She states, "Have you given consideration as to how this money will be used? Will it be used for international education? Or for communistic infiltration, ending with bombs destroying us all…I truly don't trust the whole organization."[256] Such concerns were largely based off of the fact that the former presidents, Stephen and Laurence Duggan, had been accused of having communist sympathies as previously described. Though this letter represents an extreme example, there were frequent public concerns made over not only the IIE but also the effectiveness of promoting educational exchange with, in particular, the Soviet Union. Even in the case of the Hungarian refugees, largely celebrated by the American public as fighters for freedom, there were worries expressed in the major media outlets that the United States, through the mass granting of visas to these persons without any background screening, was admitting possible communist subversives.[257] There is no mention of such a concern that the students were possible subversives mentioned in any of the relevant documents in the Rockefeller Archive.

Assessment: Success and Failures

> *I fully subscribe to the notion that you do not defeat a Messianic movement without getting a sense of Messianic purpose yourself*.- Henry Kissinger, member of RBF's Special Committee, in a letter to Adolf Berle, December 19, 1956 [258]

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[255] Meeting with Sims, Neilsen, Noyes, RPB, and GRP, January 29, 1957, folder 196, box 71, RG 12.0002-Diaries, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.

[256] Letter to President of the Rockefeller Institute from Mrs. Dickson, New York, December 1956, folder 452-55-Institute of International Education, box 55 series 200 US, RG 1.2 Projects, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.

[257] There was some press coverage of the suspicions of figures such as Senator Olin Johnston (D-SC) that a substantial number of communists had entered the United States under the Hungarian refugee program. See for example, "Communists Have Entered US under Refugee Program," *Star-News* (January 16, 1957), 3. For a discussion of the debates which the admission of the immigrants brought within the political sphere see Arthur A. Markowitz, "Humanitarianism versus Restrictionism: The United States and the Hungarian Refugees," *International Migration Review* 7, no. 1 (Spring 1973): 46-59.

[258] Henry Kissinger to Adolf Berle, December 19, 1956 cited it John Andrew, "Cracks in the Consensus: The Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project and Eisenhower's America," 537.

Despite these numerous reservations, the Rockefeller foundations did support the programs. They did, however, conduct a number of assessments of the programs in which they funded, and the English language program was no exception. Examining the concerns in which they had and the areas in which they felt were a success, it is possible to ascertain the objectives of the Rockefeller foundations when funding the Hungarian refugees. Such assessments can also be used to identify the potential reasons for which the Rockefeller Foundations greatly reduced their financial contributions to the IIE and WUS in the second phase of the special program to support the Hungarian refugees entering American colleges and universities.

The assessment reports and internal correspondences within the organizations indicate a number of problems which were associated with the Bard program in particular. Such problems can naturally be assumed to occur at the other supported universities given that they followed the same model as the one established at Bard. An interview conducted between Noyes and Pomerat indicates that the most serious concern was the psychological status of the refugees, who after the initial period of excitement had become depressed and anxious. As a result, it was suggested at a very early stage that a psychiatrist be available at Bard to assist with possible mental problems among the students.[259] Moreover, these refugees were "mixed up in their politics" and confronting the challenges of integration into a new society.[260]

In an assessment conducted by James Case, President of Bard College, which was sent to Charles Noyes in May of 1957 such concerns were reiterated. Though he stated that "great work was done in language work," he went on to determine that "efforts to introduce the students to this country were perhaps somewhat less successful, at least in terms of the formal

[259] Interview with Mrs. Henry Jacqz, December 12, 1956, folder 196, box 71, RG 12.0002- Diaries- Pomerat, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.
[260] Interview with Mr. Charles Noyes, December 11, 1956, folder 196, box 71, RG 12.0002- Diaries- Pomerat, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.

program."[261] Moreover, in the final report presented to the Rockefeller Foundations, it was stated, "in some respects the situation finally got out of hand and we lost control of the group."[262] The reasons cited for the loss of control over the group included suspicions of authority on the part of the students, a romanticization of the Hungarian flight on the part of the staff, overall fatigue, the strain of communication which was exacerbated by a lack of translators, and generally low attendance during classes and especially at the cultural programming such as movie screenings.[263] Another concern was the lack of measurement concerning student progress as the tests which were ordered to measure student progress arrived too to be utilized. Without such tests it was difficult to assess the language acquisition of the students in a quantitative manner. However, Case generally refuted the claims that the program got out of hand and said that they did the best as could be expected given the short planning time.[264]

Despite some concerns about the effectiveness of the cultural programming in particular, many of the students met the challenges of the program with a great deal of enthusiasm, especially when concerning their learning of the English language. William Humphrey, an English teacher at Bard, describes his students:

> They all came prepared; though often this meant that they had stayed awake most of the night to get finished…They were serious, without being solemn. They never lost their courage, though at times English seemed more formidable to them than Russian tanks…The rest were as a group, and to a man, the best students I have had in eight years as a college teacher. They were also the most impressive people I have ever known. Their sufferings had not embittered t hem nor destroyed their ambition. It was a time which is ordinarily a much needed vacation for me; I am not sorry I have up my vacation.[265]

Similar sentiments appear in the discussion of the effectiveness of the cultural

[261] Letter from James H. Case, President of Bard College to Charles Noyes, Staff Consultant, May 16, 1957, folder 2613B, box 426A, RG 3.1, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, RAC.
[262] English Language and Orientation Program for Hungarian Student Refugees: Dec. 1956- Feb. 1957, Final Report from Bard College, 1957, folder 2613B, box 426A, RG 3.1, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, RAC.
[263] Ibid., 13.
[264] Ibid., 7.
[265] Trustee Report on the Situation of the Hungarian Refugees, 1957, folder 111, box 14, series 200, RG 1.2,

programming though with a greater deal of hesitation. They cite that the movies and seminars were often not well attended as indications that the immersion program was not completely successful. However, the administrators at Bard did indicate some general success in introducing the students into the American way of life. The final report presented to the Rockefeller Foundations regarding the Bard program states:

> Through all of the ambiguities of their commitments and their confusion about 'democracy' and 'capitalism,' there was no doubt that they liked what they saw of the Untied States. It became more and more evident that, in spite of the emotional links with Hungary and the abortive revolution, in spite of the appeals of expatriot (sic) Hungarians, these young people were anxious to become part of the American life and to participate fully (and perhaps, at the start, uncritically) in it.[266]

Such a statement reveals a great deal about how the organizers of the Bard program saw the goals of the orientations in regards to the integration of the students. In addition, there is the implicit idea that the successful instruction of English indicates the willingness of the students to integrate. Such a notion rests comfortably with the idea that language is essential for the creation of national identity. As such, English language teaching programs were often conceptualized, for example by the Operations Coordinating board (OCB) of the CIA as "vehicles for carrying the basic concepts which we believe."[267]

Despite these recognitions, there are no indications that the Rockefeller Foundations were not pleased with the programs in spite of such reservations. The Rockefeller Foundation, did however, acknowledge that it was not the general goal of the organization to provide operating costs, as they did in the case of Hungarian refugees, except in during events of "unusual significance" and thus would not honor future requests for funds for such administrative programs.[268]

Rockefeller Foundation Archive, RAC, 8.

[266] Ibid., 14.

[267] Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 308

Conclusions

> *All of us here would want you and your associates to know how warmly we look back on our collaboration with you on this program. It was a grand thing!* - Dr. Pomerat in a letter to the Institute of International Education dated January 1958 [269]

The decision to fund the English language programs for the Hungarian refugees represented a significant shift in the prior actions of the Rockefeller Foundations. However, the program and what it represented fit strongly into the ideology which the Rockefeller Foundations were supporting during the 1950s. It is clear that the grants which provided were cast in ideological terms. The emphasis which they placed on international education and cultural awareness during this period were both two extremely motivating factors. Moreover, it can be said that the grants represented specific attitudes towards both the United States government, which was assessed as lacking in its response to the needs of refugees, and cold war foreign policy, particularly the desire to assist those freed from communist oppression and incorporate them into American society.

The funding of English language programs represented an anomaly in the traditional allocation patterns of the Rockefeller Foundations during the 1950s. The internal conflicts over offering this type of funding for students demonstrate how controversial the proposals to assist Hungarian refugees were for the organizations. Concern over the nature of the funding would reflect itself again during the calls for funding which the IIE and WUS made for phase two of the program. The Rockefeller Foundations did not provide the funding requested for the phase

[268] "The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, 1957," The Rockefeller Foundation Library, 2001.
[269] Letter from Pomerat of RF to IIE staff, Jan 20, 1958, folder 452-55- Institute of International Education, box 55 series 200 US, RG 1.3 Projects, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.

two of the program due to their desire to fund scholarships solely in Austria, a policy decision which will be discussed in the next chapter.

However, it is clear that the Rockefeller Foundations saw the opportunity to assist Hungarians learning English as a necessary first step for their incorporation into American academic communities. Moreover, as the program's encouraged the assimilation of the refugees into American society in addition to the academic components, it was a fitting part of their ideological mission. According to Raymond Fosdick, the former director of philanthropy at the Rockefeller Foundation, "the proper objective of a foundation, unless created for a particularized purpose, is to prime the pump, never to act as a permanent reservoir."[270]

[270] "The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, 1957," The Rockefeller Foundation Online Archive (2001), 37.

CHAPTER 4: THE UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA ROCKEFELLER FUNDING IN EUROPE

Introduction

On November 4th, the Soviet retaliation in Hungary began. Realizing the gravity of the situation, it was by noon that very same day that 5,000 Hungarians crossed the Austrian joining the 200,000 people in total that had fled or would flee Hungary in the weeks to come.[271] Of that total 6,800 students entered Austria, approximately 1 out of 9 of the total university population in Hungary before Revolution.[272] Over 1,000 of these students remained in Austria, welcomed into Austria's universities. However, the admission of these students was not without controversy, with Austria largely lacking the infrastructure necessary to successfully maintain these students without the support of other Western nations.

The ability of Austria to accommodate the Hungarian refugees has been a topic of recent scholarly inquiry. Scholar Andreas Gémes argues that while Austria's role in the reception of the refugees has been viewed traditionally in a positive way, archival documents reveal that the preexisting facilities and infrastructure were insufficient and the refugees were a major financial, administrative, and political problem for newly neutral Austria.[273] This opinion is also shared by Johanna Granville, who argues that there were "negative 'spillover' effects" of the crisis, namely that Austria was forced to seek funding and logistical help from other countries, thus worsening their relations with both Hungary and the Soviet Union.[274]

These arguments are extremely relevant when we examine one specific case of a

[271] Paul Nemes, "The Welcome Refugees," *Central European Review*, Vol. 1, No. 19 (November 1, 1999), http://www.ce-review.org/99/19/nemes19.html and Peter Hidas, "The Hungarian Refugee Student Movement of 1956-57 and Canada," 19-49 both provide the statistical figures used in this chapter.
[272] "Figures from the WUS," December 14, 1956, folder 159, box 22, series 100, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archive, RAC.
[273] Andreas Gémes, "Deconstruction of a Myth? Austria and the Hungarian Refugees of 1956-57," *Time, Memory, and Cultural Change*, ed. S. Dempsey and D. Nichols, Vienna: IWM Junior Visiting Fellows' Conferences, Vol. 25 (2009).
[274] Johanna Granville, "Of Spies, Refugees and Hostile Propaganda: How Austria dealt with the Hungarian Crisis

university which accepted Hungarian refugees, the University of Vienna.[275] The University of Vienna admitted the highest number of Hungarian refugee students in 1956 and 1957. As a result, they received the greatest proportion of funds from the Rockefeller Foundation, with grants totaling over 1.2 million dollars, in their support of Hungarian refugees studying at Austrian universities. However, despite these funds the University had a number of administrative problems which threatened the effectiveness of the scholarship program.

The funding of Hungarian students in Europe represented far more a continuation of previous Rockefeller policies concerning grant aid than the English language programs in the United States. This chapter will demonstrate the reasons the Rockefeller programs aligned far more with the policies of the organization as they had existed prior to the outbreak of the Revolution both in terms of the Cold War political climate and the overall objectives of the Foundation regarding their international objectives. Supporting a scholarship scheme in Europe allowed them to sponsor elite intellectuals who would, hopefully, spread the democratic ideals which the Rockefeller Foundation expounded. Moreover, the chapter will address the controversies which emerged as a result of the scholarship program between the Hungarian students, administrators at the University of Vienna, and Rockefeller officers overseeing the use of the funds. These controversies reveal key themes about the ways in which the Rockefeller Foundation interacted with its grant recipients and the reactions of their European counterparts to the provision of aid from the American foundations.

of 1956," *History* Vol. 91, Issue 301 (Jan. 2006): 62–90.

[275] This chapter will not, however, will not be a study of the Hungarian refugees who attended the University of Vienna, it is solely a look at the funding of programs by the Rockefeller Foundation. Unfortunately, there has not been made a conclusive study of the situation of Hungarian refugee students at Austrian universities of which I am aware.

"Down Go the Murder Fences"[276] - Crisis Situation in Austria

In May of 1955 Austria received its state treaty and full sovereignty after a decade of Allied occupation.[277] The Hungarian Revolution, and the influx of resulting refugees which flooded into Austria, presented the country with its first serious foreign policy crisis, challenging both its existing state infrastructure and its status as a neutral country. As a result of the nonaligned status of Austria, the country's leadership, who while clearly sympathizing with the Hungarian cause, had to carefully measure their reactions to the refugee crisis.[278]

The border between Hungary and Austria had only been open since the spring of 1956, a consequence of improved relations in a time which is commonly referred to as the "thaw period" of the Cold War. This open border allowed thousands of Hungarians to flee their country during the weeks of the Hungarian Revolution. Austria was unprepared for the arrival of these refugees with coordination between authorities and different aid and support ministries poorly managed. As an example of this lack of coordination, an action committee to synchronize the actions of the Austrian authorities was only established on November 13th due to initial reluctance by the Ministry of Interior.[279] As a result of the lack of prior planning and failures in early coordination, the Austrian authorities were forced to largely improvise the reception of the refugees. Initially, the Austrian government was eager to move the refugees to other countries as soon as possible. However, it became increasingly clear that many Western nations were unwilling to open their borders to thousands of refugees and that the process of

[276] This is a term which was used to describe the heavily fortified border between Hungary and Austria following 1948. In May of 1956 the border was cleared of fences and military patrols. See "Hungary- Down Go the Murder Fences," *Times Magazine* (May 1956).
[277] Andreas Gémes, "Deconstruction of a Myth? Austria and the Hungarian Refugees of 1956-57," 2.
[278] Ibid., 3.
[279] Andreas Gémes, "Political Migration in the Cold War: The Case of Austria and the Hungarian Refugees of 1956-57," in *Immigration and Emigration in Historical Perspective*, Ed. Ann Katherine Isaacs (Pisa University Press, 2006), 172.

repatriation would be slow and costly.[280]

Austria was presented with two critical problems. First, the refugees presented a huge financial and administrative burden for the state, with increasing complaints from the Austrian public after the initial outpouring of public sympathy in the weeks of the Revolution.[281] Chief among these problems were poorly equipped refugee camps and conflicts among charity groups and the government.[282] In early November, a Coordinating Committee for International Relief to Hungarian Refugee Students was established to deal with the specific problems facing the displaced students. This group was independent from, though frequently coordinated with, the established Austrian National Committee for Aid to Hungary. The Coordinating Committee for International Relief to Hungarian Refugee Students was comprised of the World University Service (WUS),[283] the Coordinating Secretarist of the National Unions of Students, and the Austrian National Union of Students (*Österreichische Hochschülerschaft).* The duties of the coordinating committee was to inform all partner organizations operating in Austria about the conditions of the students and their needs, to receive and distribute funds from private donations, and to raise special funds for the administration of the coordinating body from private and government sources. In February of 1957 the work of the committee was assumed by the WUS.[284]

As a result of the large influx of refugees, and insufficient funds being provided by the Austrian government, the Coordinating Committee was forced to appeal to the West for both

[280] Ibid., 172.
[281] Ibid., 176.
[282] Ibid., 176.
[283] The World University Service was the main organization responsible for the management of the Hungarian refugee affairs. The WUS was founded following WWI and was known as the International Student Service. Based in Canada, the organization was designed to provide for the needs of students in post-war Europe. In 1950 they changed their name to the World University Service, thus reflecting a commitment to student relief projects throughout the world.
[284] World University Service Memo No. 643, February 12, 1957, folder 159, box 22, series 100, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archive, RAC.

financial and logical support, thus presenting a potential challenge to their neutral status.[285] Despite these repeated desperate requests for assistance, Austrian authorities were quite upset about the West's lack of financial and administrative support.[286]

It is important to note, however, that oftentimes the unwillingness of foreign organizations to assist within Austria was a reflection of the difficult aid situation within the country itself. According to Johanna Granville, "the need of the Austrians to prove their impartiality seemed to wax paranoiac," especially considering the constant chorus of Soviet and Hungarian accusations that they violated the terms of their neutrality in their assistance of the refugees.[287] The Rockefeller Foundation was aware of this difficult situation. An interview with a correspondent in Vienna in December of 1956 demonstrates some of these concerns stating that the Austrians may face trouble if they accept assistance from aid organizations that "have strong anti-Communist sentiments."[288]

This anxiety reflected itself in the government's reluctance to accept assistance from various foreign aid organizations. Exemplifying this attitude, visitors from other countries were carefully screened by the Austrian government.[289] As a consequence of such intense screenings, there are several cases in which major international aid organizations, such as the International Red Cross, were forbidden from sending certain administrative officials because of their suspected political affiliations.[290] Moreover, the disorganization present in the coordinating agencies of the Austrian government made many foreign groups hesitant to send funds to

[285] Johanna Granville, "Of Spies, Refugees and Hostile Propaganda: How Austria dealt with the Hungarian Crisis of 1956," 71.
[286] Andreas Gémes, "Political Migration in the Cold War," 176.
[287] Johanna Granville, "Of Spies, Refugees and Hostile Propaganda," 72.
[288] Interview with Mrs. Elsie Staudinger, Officer Diaries of Gerald Pomerat, December 18, 1956, folder 196, box 71, RF 12.0002-Diaries, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.
[289] Ibid., 74.
[290] Ibid.,74.

Austria for fear of mismanagement.[291]

An example of this concern related to the educational programs for refugees in Austria is also demonstrated.[292] As documented by Stephen Duggan, then president of the IIE, there was considerable tension between the Austrian based coordinating agency for student relief, *Österreichische Hochschülerschaft* (ÖH), and the WUS, a recipient of Rockefeller grant funding for the coordination of refugee student screening. According to the report, the ÖH wanted to completely control all aspects of the Hungarian student program in Austria in order to enhance their prestige. As a result, they made charges against the WUS that they were mishandling funds and publicly denounced the group in the Austrian press.[293]

Despite these concerns, the United States remained eager to assist and became the principle source of external financial aid from both private and federal sources.[294] Granville attributes this willingness to provide aid partly to the Eisenhower administration's eagerness to atone for "unwittingly contributing to the Hungarian loss of life by proclaiming the widely misunderstood policy of liberation" and the desire to "prevail in the Cold War contest of public images."[295] Whether a calculated measure in which to receive positive publicity or a general concern for the wellbeing of the refugees, by the end of December 1957 sources, both public and private, from the United States had contributed over $71,075,000 to aid the Hungarian refugees in Austria.[296]

A large portion of these funds went to refugee support and assistance within the established refugee and processing camps within Austria. One special group was comprised of the students who had fled Hungary. Over 1,100 students remained as of June 1957 and over

[291] Ibid., 74.
[292] EDF's Diary, February 4, 1957, folder 159, box 22, series 100, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archive, RAC.
[293] Ibid.
[294] Johanna Granville, "Of Spies, Refugees and Hostile Propaganda," 75.
[295] Ibid., 75.
[296] Ibid., 75.

600 were studying in Austrian universities.[297] Those not attending the universities were considered to be "misfits," rejected by aid organizations following academic assessments conducted by the WUS during their refugee screenings.[298]

"The Politics of Guilt"[299]- Rockefeller Responses to the Hungarian Refugee Students in Austria

In the final days of December of 1956 several Rockefeller officers and trustees met to discuss the Hungarian relief program.[300] At this meeting it was determined that the Foundation was to follow its traditional course of action regarding international grant making decisions. They affirmed that they could not provide aid for general relief activities such as the provision of food and clothing. They indicated that along with the funds already allocated to the English language programs, all subsequent major allocations related to Hungarian refugee relief would be directed towards students, scholars, and artists in Europe. Summarizing this view, the recorded notes from this meeting state:

> The Foundation has given special attention to the problem of Hungarian refugee students and scholars in Austria. The largest single group of such individuals is likely to remain in Austria rather than move on to other countries. Austria itself has severely limited resources for handling them. No other agencies are giving specialized attention to this problem in Austria itself, although many are contributing in various ways in many other countries. The officers recommend that the Foundation continue our special concern for the burden now being imposed upon Austrian educational institutions.[301]

As dictated by this decision, the Foundation affirmed that they would not be providing aid for students who entered European institutions of higher education outside of Austria, despite the visible needs of these groups. Trustee minutes reveal why this was considered to be

[297] Letter to President Dean Rusk from John M., September 17, 1957, folder 30, box 4, series 705, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.
[298] Ibid.
[299] Term used by Paul Nemes, "The Welcome Refugees," *Central Europe Review* 1, No. 19 (November 1999).
[300] Notes on Further Action Regarding Hungary, December 28, 1956, folder 478, box 72, Series 750 Austria , RG 2 1956, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.

the best course of action.[302] They first make clear that they wish for students to remain in Europe as opposed to immigrating to the United States stating quite vaguely, "there are advantages, not the least of which is economic, to the training of as many students as possible in Europe rather than the United States."[303] The reasons for which they desired the Hungarian refugee students to remain in Europe become clearer by discussing the Rockefeller administration's stipulations regarding the overall selection of scholarship recipients which will be discussed later in this chapter.

The meeting notes furthermore go on to identify why they intended to solely concentrate on Austria citing two primary reasons. First, it was made clear that the Ford Foundation, an equally large American foundation, was likely to concentrate their efforts outside of Austria, providing scholarship assistance for students across Western Europe. The Rockefeller Foundations had previously coordinated with the Ford Foundation in their support of the English language programs and had a good working relationship as indicated in their frequent correspondences. The decision to divide the work was thus seen as a strategic means through which to provide scholarships in Europe.

Second, the Foundation asserted that Western European countries should "be encouraged to make their best possible effort from local resources during a period of intense public interest in Hungary."[304] This followed the assumption that other Western nations had greater resources to provide to the refugees. However, Austria, because of its political and economic position, was perceived unable to manage the situation themselves both in terms of funds and administrative structure. The minutes from the trustee meeting state, "No other generous country, however, could so ill afford to open its university doors to those young

[301] Ibid., 2.
[302] "Emergency Aid for Hungarian Refugees," Minutes of the Rockefeller Foundation, microfilm 582801, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.
[303] Ibid.

people as little Austria, only recently relieved of its occupation forces and now overwhelmed with refugees."[305]

As a result it was decided to allocate substantial funding for the programs in Austria, far more than what was given in support of the English language programs within the United States. There were a number of grants which were given to support the Hungarian refugee situation in Austria, primarily supporting students, scholars, and artists. One of the largest individual grants was to the WUS. The Rockefeller Foundation provided over $40,000 dollars to the WUS for the administration of the refugee program in Hungary. The WUS was charged with the screening process which was to determine a refugee's academic suitability, oftentimes a difficult process as many refugees arrived without documentation such as transcripts or diplomas.[306] Another interesting funding project was the support of a private boarding school called *Caritas Verband* which housed 77 young refugee students. At the direct request of the school's leadership, the Rockefeller Foundation provided over $5000 for the establishment of an English language teaching program at the school.[307]

However, by far the largest amount of funds was provided for scholarships for university students. The Rockefeller Foundation provided 13 Austrian universities with a little over 1.2 million dollars in the support of over 550 refugee scholars and students during the course of 1956-8.[308] When commenting on the initial grant of $600,000, which was made in the weeks directly following the Revolution, a *New York Times* commentator noted, "There can be

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[304] Ibid.
[305] Ibid.
[306] Ibid.
[307] Letter from the director of the *Caritas Verband* to JM, January 11, 1957, folder 14, box 2, series 705 Austria, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC. There were only a few documents related to this project which were saved for the archive. There are financial documents and a few of the promotional materials in which the school sent the Rockefeller Foundation.
[308] Hungarian Refugee Student Program in Austria, folder 1, box 14, series 705 Austria , RG: 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC. See also 1957 Annual Report of the Rockefeller Foundation.

few fields in which so little money can do so much good."[309] Despite the generous support of the program by the Rockefeller Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund did not provide any funding for the European program.[310]

The selection of the students who were to receive scholarships was left at the discretion of the receiving university itself, a departure from previous scholarship programs established by the Rockefeller Foundation when funding individuals.[311] As a result, up to $100,000 of the total was to be allocated to the administrative expenses related to the management of the scholarships and the incorporation of the students into the university system.[312] In a discussion with Dr. Molden, an official with the Austrian National Committee for Aid to Hungary, Edward D'Arms, the European associate director of humanities, discussed the practical concerns related to the funding.[313] Such topics of discussion included the size of the stipend per student, the provisions for clothing and personal items, the flexibility of the awards, and the relationship between the amount per student granted and the Austrian standard of living.[314]

More remarkable, however, is the advice which Molden presented to D'Arms. He advised D'Arms to submit extensive press releases detailing Rockefeller funding of the

[309] "Students From Hungary," *New York Times* (Dec. 10, 1956), 28.

[310] Due to a lack of organized documents concerning the Hungarian program I could not determine whether or not the funding of Hungarian scholars in Europe was an issue which was discussed by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Such documents are unlikely to be available due to the nature of the organization and the ways through which funding decisions were made largely by the Rockefeller family as opposed to an organized board of trustees. It is possible that the decision not to fund the European program was a factor of the smaller allocations budget of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, as opposed to any specific reason. Moreover, it was common for the Rockefeller Foundations to divide work. As such, it is possible that because the Rockefeller Foundation was providing a significant amount of funding to the European scholarship program that the Brothers Fund did not feel it necessary to participate. Obviously, further research to determine clear causation is required.

[311] Meeting notes of GRP, December 4, 1956, folder 30, box 4, series 705, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC. Previous grants were generally made to individual students following the submission of a proposal directly to the Rockefeller Foundation. Evidence of these individual grants to scholars, typically post-doctoral students, can be found in the annual reports from each year. It is also important to note that some Hungarian refugees, both studying in the United States and in Europe, made individual requests for scholarship assistance. The requests which were granted were specifically recorded, with the amount of the grant, in the annual reports from 1956-8.

[312] Meeting notes of GRP, December 4, 1956, folder 30, box 4, series 705 Austria, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.

[313] D'Arms officer diary, December 10, 13, 18, 19, RG 12.1, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.

scholarships. This was recommended not solely to generate positive public relations, but to also be a strategic move to ensure the accountability of the Austrian universities in the management of the scholarships. In particular, D'Arms officer's diary entry states that publishing such press releases would reduce "fears that there may be a tendency on the part of some university authorities to keep secret the existence of the scholarship funds and, hence, to award them only to those students who met the prejudices, political, religious or otherwise, of the faculty or institution involved."[315]

As to the selection of individual students as previously noted that would be at the discretion of the individual universities. However, grant letters and conversation between officers and administrators made clear that the Rockefeller Foundation believed that the universities should select scholars based on certain general criteria. The first criterion was that students should be of superior academic quality. In a letter directed to the University of Vienna, though applicable to all universities receiving Rockefeller funds, Dr. John Maier, the director of the Paris field office of the Rockefeller Foundation, stated,[316] "the foundation is able to assist the refugee students because of the potential importance to the world of science and scholarship of the capabilities of the most promising among them."[317]

Furthermore, and more tellingly, students were to selected based upon their "character, devotion to the future of Hungary, and promise of future development."[318] In essence, they regarded this program as a means of preparing a future generation of leaders for Hungary

[314] Ibid.
[315] Ibid.
[316] Dr. John Maier had a long standing career with the Rockefeller Foundation. He first joined the organization in 1940 as a research staff member of the International Health Division Laboratories. During the 1950s he served as the director of the Paris field office, the European outpost of the Rockefeller foundation. In 1958 he returned to New York to assume the position of Assistant Director for Biological and Medical Research and in 1973 he became the director of that program.
[317] Letter to University of Vienna from J. Maier, undated, folder 1, box 14, series 705 Austria, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.
[318] D'Arms officer diary, December 19, RG 12.1, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.

itself.[319] Moreover, there was an expressed desire that the refugees also make an attempt to integrate themselves into the countries in which they were living as opposed to forming separate academic and social communities as previous exile groups had done in the opinion of D'Arms.[320] However, this does not imply that they wished for the complete assimilation of the refugees, as the ultimate goal was their eventual return to Hungary. It can be assumed that the officers wished for these students to adopt the democratic views of their country in order to bring them home once they were able to do so. While the individual selection of the students to receive scholarship was left to the universities themselves, it is apparent that there were clear ideological motivations guiding the expressed recommendations.

The Rockefeller Foundation's decision to provide refugee scholarships to only those in remaining in Europe, and not those who immigrated to the United States, is extremely important. The resolution not to encourage refugee scholars to immigrate to the United States was not shared by all. In an interview with Dr. Wallace W. Atwood, head of the National Academy of the Science's international relations section, he indicates that highly educated and desirable students, scholars, and professionals were still present in Austria and must be evaluated quickly if the United States were to take advantage of the high caliber of such potential refugees.[321]

University of Vienna: "Land of Manaña"[322]

Dr. John Maier was assigned the task of evaluating the student situation in Austria. During the course of a trip to Vienna in September he toured eight of the thirteen major

[319] Ibid.
[320] Ibid.
[321] Thomas Henry, "U.S Gets Cream of Hungary's Brain Crop," *The Portsmouth Times* (Feb 21, 1957), 22.
[322] Phrase used by Dr. John Maier to describe the administration at the University of Vienna and their supposed inability to "visualize and grasp" the refugee situation in the long term. Manaña is Spanish for, in this case, an indefinite time in the future. See John Maier, Report No. 7, folder 30, box 4, series 705, RG 1.2, Rockefeller

universities receiving Rockefeller Foundation support.[323] Of particular interest to Dr. Maier were the students studying at the University of Vienna. Of the over 325 refugee students who were studying at the University of Vienna, around 145 were receiving Rockefeller sponsored scholarships making it the largest recipient of funds of the Austrian universities.[324]

The Rockefeller Foundation had a long standing history with the University of Vienna. They had made a number of grants to the university, predominately for research in the scientific and medical fields, since the 1920s.[325] Moreover, the Institute of International Education had also worked with the University of Vienna extensively both in their international student exchange programs and the establishment of a German language summer school for primarily Americans in 1949.

Despite this established and long-standing relationship, the Rockefeller Foundation encountered substantial problems with the administration at the University of Vienna. The debates between the administration of the university and the officers at the Rockefeller Foundation reveal two important details. First, while the Rockefeller Foundation did not intervene in the scholarship selection they did, however, voice their disproval at the methods through which the administration employed thus exercising a form of soft power control over the organization as the principle provider of funds.

Peter Bell convincingly describes the means through which Foundations were able to exercise control over the groups which were receiving their grants. The principle sanction, according to Bell was either terminating or suspending a grant in progress or threatening to not continue providing future grants to the organization. Moreover, the foundation is also able to

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Foundation Archives, RAC.

[323] Letter to President Dean Rusk from John Maier., September 17, 1957, folder 30, box 4, series 705 Austria, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.

[324] Hungarian Refugee Student Program in Austria, 1957, folder 1, box 14, series 705 Austria, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.

[325] The first Rockefeller grants to the University of Vienna were noted in the 1922 Annual Report of the

act as "an informal institutional and policy advisor" thus becoming a partner with resources and competence that "is able to make exactions and is attentive to the performance of others."[326]

Two of the anxieties which were expressed by the Rockefeller officers concerned the screening process which was conducted in the admission of students and in the continuation of funding for students who were no longer qualified, either as a result of unsatisfactory academic progress or age. A second concern was the alleged mismanagement of funds. The first allegation was that, as a consequence of providing too many scholarships to under qualified students, they provided insufficient funding to individual students. A letter to the Rockefeller foundation from the Hungarian student association at the University of Vienna, sent in December of 1957, detailed the problems associated with the size of the scholarships offered by the university.[327] This letter is noteworthy because within their plea for more aid money from the Rockefeller Foundation they appeal to ideological concepts typically associated with the U.S. Cold War rhetoric, with markedly anti-communist connotations. The letter states:

> We have had the possibility to remember to all the orders of the communist regime which caused the absolute ruin of our country. Now we are able to study all the facts, and we can see the danger of the anti-democratic ideas. Realizing the importance of this fact, we want to instruct ourselves further and further. To fulfill all these purposes we need help which would give us sufficient aid to our work.[328]

Such a letter goes on to make surprisingly detailed requests for more funding for, among other things, cigarettes and spending money for cultural programming such as theater tickets. Yet another letter, this time sent from medical students at the University of Vienna, reiterates the ideological appeals found in the first example stating, "We believe in you and in mankind and ask you to listen to this urgent cry for help, not only because we are Hungarian refugees but

Foundation.

[326] Peter Bell, "The Ford Foundation as a Transnational Actor," *International Organization* Vol. 25, No. 3 (Summer 1971): 472-3.

[327] Letter from Hungarian student association at Vienna to Prof. Samuel Williams, December 16, 1957, folder 30, box 4, series 705 Austria, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.

[328] Ibid.

also because we are human beings in distress."[329] It is interesting to note that when this letter was placed into the archive it included a small message which stated that these same students had written an article appearing in *Die Presse* which clearly blamed the Rockefeller Foundation for the lack of available scholarship funds.[330]

As a result of these negative feelings experienced by the students, the Rockefeller Foundation wrote a number of letters to the University of Vienna demanding that they administer the scholarships in a fair manner and make apparent to the press and the students that it was not the Rockefeller Foundation who administered the scholarships, a fact not understood by some students. Internal correspondences reveal the strong degree of frustration expressed by officials at the Rockefeller Foundation regarding this mismanagement. In a particularly vehement letter from Gerald Pomerat to John Maier regarding the financial mismanagement Pomerat states that the administrative and financial problems are "realized to be so overwhelming, immense, urgent, and recent that it has stupefied a placid, low-geared 19th century University administration."[331]

The financial situation in Austria was indeed quite precarious for the refugees. Half of the 500 students studying at the University of Vienna under scholarship were left without funds during their second year of studies.[332] The scholarships were dramatically reduced by 16.8% in this second year.[333] However, this was not the fault of the Rockefeller Foundation who had made clear their limit to the amount of funding which could be provided. Repeated requests for

[329] Letter from University of Vienna medical students plea for more money as their scholarship ended, Nov. 24, 1958, folder 31, box 4, series 705, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.
[330] Letter to Professor Dr. Fushsig from J. Maier, November 20, 1958, folder 31, box 4, series 705, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.
[331] Letter to John Maier from Gerald Pomerat, January 1957, folder 30, box 4, series 705 Austria, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.
[332] "Hungarian students in exile without funds: American scholarships dramatically curtailed consternation among those affected," Report from Vienna correspondent, 1957, folder 29, box 4, series 705 Austria, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.
[333] Letter to Dr. Fuchsig, University of Vienna, November 20, 1958, folder 31, box 4, series 705, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.

more funds were denied and the officials at the Austrian universities, primarily at the University of Vienna, were told that such a denial was a result of the Rockefeller Foundation's need to "economize."[334]

As a result of the limited available funds, Rockefeller Foundation encouraged the University of Vienna to enforce strict academic standards on those students who were to continue to receive scholarship. As a consequence of these changes, only students receiving "good" academic qualifications, as opposed to the previously accepted "satisfactory," would continue to receive monthly stipends.[335] Another main channel to assess academic progress was through the student's ability to acquire adequate German language skills. One problem the University had encountered, even as late as 1957, was that it continued to admit and provide scholarship for students who, because of poor German language skills, could not fully participate in the academic program.[336] In order to curtail this problem, the Rockefeller officials recommended that a language test be a condition for further scholarship support. This was an effective measure as the number of students eligible for scholarship fell as a result of such testing.[337] Another recommendation was that the stipends be limited to only undergraduate students. They had previously been providing scholarships for graduate students and researchers, some as old as 60, who the Rockefeller Foundation believed should be able to find alternative means of support through individual fellowship or employment. To address this problem it was also specifically mentioned that the University should impose an age limit of 35

[334] "Hungarian students in exile without funds: American scholarships dramatically curtailed consternation among those affected," Report from Vienna correspondent, 1957, folder 29, box 4, series 705 Austria, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC, 2.
[335] Report from the Vienna Correspondent, October 1957, folder 29, box 4, series 705, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.
[336] Letter from Maier to Pomerat, March 11, 1957, folder 30, box 4, series 705 Austria, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.
[337] Ibid.

on those eligible to receive the scholarship funds.[338] Suggesting an age requirement also serves to support the notion that the Rockefeller Foundation intended to support predominately younger scholars.

The recommendations bolstered by the threat of the withdrawal of funding, were of course not met with enthusiasm by the university. There was a perception that the Foundation was trying to compel the school to accept an "odium" for judging students without their input and that they infringed upon normal university functioning.[339] In addition, they condemned the perceived failure of the Foundation in providing assurances for sustained funding, creating an unstable ground for which the program for refugees to operate and fostering discontent among the students.[340]

Moreover, the blame the university placed on the Rockefeller Foundation for the discontinuation of funds was reflected in student complaints beginning late in the 1957-8 academic year as a response to decreased stipend amounts. According to a report from the Vienna correspondent regarding the situation at the University of Vienna, the "radical curtailment of the scholarships has caused among the students affected consternation and despair and in addition to this has perturbed the Hungarian colony in Austria."[341] Moreover, the report goes on to state that "the Hungarian quarter censure this measure as an act of great political shortsightedness."[342] This statement is important because there was recognition that the grants were both strategically and politically minded.

[338] Letter to the Rector of the University of Vienna, April 29, 1959, folder 32, box 4, series 705-Austria, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC,

[339] Excerpt from diary of John Maier, January 1959, folder 32, box 4, series 705 Austria, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.

[340] Ibid.

[341] "Hungarian students in exile without funds: American scholarships dramatically curtailed consternation among those affected," Report from Vienna correspondent, 1957, folder 29, box 4, series 705 Austria, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.

[342] "Hungarian students in exile without funds: American scholarships dramatically curtailed consternation among those affected," Report from Vienna correspondent, 1957, folder 29, box 4, series 705 Austria, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.

Such poor relations between the University and the Rockefeller Foundation caused the Foundation to reconsider its funding. An excerpt from the diary of Dr. Maier reveals that the dissatisfaction which the university was expressing towards the Foundation provided them with an excellent excuse if they wanted to remove the responsibility of scholarship disbursement from the university entirely.[343] Another suggestion was that they provide the grants directly to the Austrian Education Ministry who they felt would be in a better position to "light fires, or perhaps Roman candles, under the Rector" of the University of Vienna.[344] However, due to governmental regulations the Ministry could not accept funds from sources outside of Parliament and the potential solution was discarded.[345] Despite these reservations the Rockefeller Foundation did continue to provide funds until the 1958-9 school year, the original expected end date for the programs.

Conclusions: Contextualizing Rockefeller Educational Aid

As in the case of the establishment of English language programs within the United States, the scholarship grant program in Austria was considered to be fundamental to the wellbeing of the Hungarian refugees. The story of the University of Vienna, and the other universities and educational organizations which received funding, is significant on several accounts. First, it is clear that the Rockefeller officials placed far greater emphasis on the European program of refugee assistance than in their support of those who immigrated to the United States both in terms of funding and the length of the overall program. However, ultimately it is important to note that large grants were also made to other universities at this time. For example, a grant of $570,000 was accorded to the University of the Andes in Bogota

[343] Excerpt from diary of John Maier, January 1959, folder 32, box 4, series 705 Austria, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.
[344] John Maier, Report No. 7, folder 30, box 4, series 705, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.
[345] Ibid.

to help develop a school of premedical studies.[346] Hungarian refugee assistance did not become the most important agenda item despite the sympathies which developed for this particular group.

A second important point is that in spite of the freedom the foundation gave to the universities in selecting scholarship students, they did exercise a degree of control through their funding provisions. According to Indeerjet Palmer, the economic support of universities abroad represents a direct means through which to "construct and consolidate intellectual hegemony."[347] This approach aligns itself with the Gramscian attitude in which power is not understood only in terms of coercion but also in regard to the "mobilization of knowledge, information and ideas" by the intellectual and power elite.[348] The Rockefeller Foundation, as international "intellectual actors with large financial resources," had the power to support, design, and modify academic fields, to identify talented and driven individuals, and to build up key institutions.[349] The power in this lies in the fact that not only will these individuals hopefully share the perspectives of the foundations but will also 'sell' it to others" within their home countries.[350] As a result, through the support of institutions such as the University of Vienna the Rockefeller Foundation exercised a significant degree of power over the intellectual sphere and utilized a form of public diplomacy in the support of spreading American values.[351]

Moreover, this influence over the intellectual sphere within Europe can be interpreted in

[346] "FUND GIVES $8,104,849; Rockefeller Foundation Tells of Grants in 3 Months," *New York Times* (Feb 21, 1957), 1.
[347] Inderjeet Parmar, "American Foundations and the Development of International Knowledge Networks," *Global Networks* 2, vol. 1 (Dec. 16, 2002), 14.
[348] Ibid., 14.
[349] Ibid., 15.
[350] Edward Berman, *Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundation on American Foreign Policy*, 13.
[351] The degrees of influence were obviously dependent on other simultaneous factors even if existing in the same Cold War environment. One main factor was the geographic location, the perceived communist influence, and cultural perceptions. For an interesting case study of Rockefeller support of universities in Latin American and Asian countries in the Cold War see, Mary Brown Bullock, *An American Transplant: the Rockefeller Foundation and Peking Union Medical College* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

terms of a desire for "Americanization." Winning over the young scholars of Hungary by providing scholarship funds, and demonstrating the benevolence of the American Foundations to the elite establishment at the University of Vienna, reflected the goals of the "Americanization" movement in Europe following the Second World War.[352] This demonstrates that the push for Americanization was present, though in different ways, in both the support of the refugees in the United States, where a desire to successful integrate the refugees into American society dominated the rhetoric and justifications for financial support, and within Austria, where an aspiration to promote the intellectual culture of the West was reflected.

A third important point is that in both the case of the universities in Austria and the English language programs in the United States, the Foundation was supporting what they perceived to be future intellectual elite of Europe, Hungary in particular. Such a support of elites represented a core component to American cultural initiatives during the Cold War, both in government directed programs and those funded by the major foundations. The emphasis on training the intellectual elite of a future, hopefully democratic, Hungary, with the assistance of American money, was supported by the lofty notion that these future elites "like Archimedes' fulcrum, would move the world."[353] The decision to not finance the overall general refugee crisis, and focus only upon the smaller group of scholars, students, and artists, reflects this elitist bias of the Foundation and their overall objectives in providing assistance to the intellectual elite of Europe, especially within the context of those who were in the Soviet states. The study of the University of Vienna is an interesting one because it most heavily demonstrates the great deal of emphasis the Foundation placed in funding only the most

[352] Alexandar Stephan, "Cold War Alliances and the Emergence of Transatlantic Competition: An Introduction," in *The Americanization of Europe: Culture, diplomacy, and anti-Americanization after 1945* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), 1.

[353] Frank Ninkovich, "Requiem for Cultural Internationalism. Review of *An American Transplant: The Rockefeller Foundation and Peking Union Medical College* by Mary Brown Bullock," *History of Education Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Summer, 1986), 251.

promising students. In this sense, the Foundation's support for educational institutions gave them "great leverage in the production and dissemination of knowledge."[354]

A final point is revealed through the examination of the funding of Austrian schools. On a macro-level, the Rockefeller Foundation's involvement in these programs demonstrated the significant degree of responsibility which was assumed by non-state actors during the Cold War. While the United States government did contribute a great deal of funds to the refugee relief project in Austria, it did not support the scholarship scheme within the country, in contrast to the scholarships managed by the domestic President's Committee on Hungarian Refugee Relief. Giles Scott-Smith, who has studied educational exchange programs during the Cold War, argues that non-state actors were essential to establishing the credibility of the exchange program and "enabled grantees to testify to the lack of political interference in their experience when they returned home."[355] This same theme can be applied to the private support of scholarships and institutional grants such as those made by the Rockefeller Foundation. Therefore, the Rockefeller Foundation filled a niche in refugee support that would potentially be considered too politically motivated if it were to be conducted by the United States government.

[354] Edward Berman, *Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundation on American Foreign Policy,* 13.
[355] Giles Scott Smith, "Mapping the Indefinable: Some Thoughts on the Relevance of Exchange Programs within International Relations." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (2008), 183.

CONCLUSIONS: PRIMING THE PUMP: THE NATURE OF ROCKEFELLER AID IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

> *'The best ones are dead, the good ones are still there, the ones who have come to America are the opportunists.' This was said of the German refugees in the thirties, of the Czech refugees, and it was said again last fall of the Hungarians. If it is true, and the three dozen young men and women whom I taught in Bard's Hungarian Student orientation program last winter are the worst, then Hungary must indeed be the land of heroes.'* - A quote from William Humphrey, a Bard College English teacher[356]

The Cold War presented unique challenges and benefits for the Rockefeller Foundations. The Rockefeller Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund were forced to reevaluate and form specific policies during this period that were largely a result of the changing nature of foreign politics during the early Cold War. One particular area which was constantly reevaluated was the realm of international education. The course of aid for Hungarian refugees was debated extensively at the Rockefeller Foundation leading to the formation of policy decisions which would have a lasting impact on future programs not only in regards to refugee support but also to the support international education.

The Rockefeller support of the Hungarian refugees provides just one example of the Foundations' support of international education and the construction of transnational intellectual networks. The decision to fund refugees both within the United States and in Austria reflects a confluence of their domestic and international policy goals regarding the support of intellectuals in a time in which such policies were being reworked and evaluated. The Rockefeller resolution not to support the phase two of the scholarship scheme of Hungarian refugee students within the United States demonstrates their decision that Rockefeller aid best served those Hungarian students who were to remain in Europe. As

[356] Trustee Report on the Situation of the Hungarian Refugees, 1957, folder 111, box 14, series 200, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archive, RAC, 8.

evident in the policy documents from the period there was a genuine hope that such students would transmit pro-democratic and Western beliefs to their home countries in Europe. As clearly stated in the 1956 Annual Report of the Rockefeller Foundation, "Putting aside purely humanitarian considerations, all of us have a stake in man's intellectual capital and in the minds which are most likely to widen our knowledge and find its application to human well being."[357]

The means through which to meet the objective of supporting intellectuals was heavily debated by the Foundations' officers in the months preceding the Revolution. It was determined that private partnerships with organizations which had extensive experience with international education would be the most successful, as demonstrated through their coordination with the IIE and the WUS. It was also seen that the direct support of university scholarships within Austria would be the most useful means of assisting students as opposed to the time consuming and bureaucratic process of filtering funds through a third party such as the committees which were established throughout Europe to aid Hungarian refugees.

Largely absent from this picture of inter-organizational cooperation was the United States government. In Cold War literature there has been an ongoing debate concerning just how independent the American foundations were from governmental influence during particularly the heavily politicized Cold War. Research on this topic took upon an increasingly negative tone during the 1980s and 90s, with Foundations implicated as co-conspirators with governmental agencies in the promotion of American propaganda abroad. However, this opinion has been reevaluated, with the actions of agencies such as the USIA being contextualized in more neutral terms such as done by Laura Belmonte. This thesis fits into this second stream of thought. Based upon an examination of available documents at the Rockefeller Archive Center, it is clear that while the Foundations shared many of the beliefs of

[357] The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, 1957, Rockefeller Archives Online, 17.

the American government, it was not the government dictating the actions of the Foundations. The Rockefeller Foundations explicitly indicated their desire for neutrality with the government, declining, for example, a partnership with the President's Committee for Hungarian Refugees.

In addition to the desire to be independent from the government, the Rockefeller Foundations programs to support Hungarian students also reflected a keen desire to appear ideologically neutral. Both programs recognized that it was essential to appear as though they were not indoctrinating the Hungarian students. A close examination of the sources suggests that such standards were in fact maintained in practice. This is perhaps a surprising discovery and supports the opinion of Emily Hauptmann, who has studied Rockefeller grants made for the study of political theory during the 1950s, that "although they provided the dominant rationale for the funding of academic research during the 1950s, Cold War imperatives did not dictate the shape of every grant program developed during the decade."[358]

The Rockefeller Foundations did view the Hungarian program as an overall success as indicated in the correspondence between the officers and the evaluations completed at the conclusion of the programs. A monthly report compiled for the trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation confirms this perception stating, "looked at in its broadest dimension and from the perspective of many years, it may well be that the Foundation's finest contribution to the Hungarian refugee problem will have been the aid it gave to the students in Austria and the United States."[359] However, there is evidence which indicates that the programs were not considered a priority by the Foundations, at least following the initial outpouring of sympathies expressed by Foundation officers and trustees at the onset. This was largely a result of

[358] Hauptmann Emily, "From Opposition to Accommodation: How Rockefeller Foundation Grants Redefined Relations between Political Theory and Social Science in the 1950s," *The American Political Science Review,* Vol. 100, No. 4 (Nov., 2006), 643.

[359] George Gray, Confidential Monthly Report- April 1, 1957, Series: Trustee Bulletin, RG: 1957-8, Rockefeller

problems with the management of the programs.

First, there is the issue of financial prioritization of the Hungarian refugee student relief programs. The Hungarian programs received a significant sum, with a combined total of over 1.8 million dollars being allocated to the programs over the course of 1956-1958. However, when one examines the total yearly spending of the Foundations this is a relatively small program.[360] Many individual universities for example received a substantially larger amount of funding than did the Bard program. What is unique about the Hungarian program, however, is the way in which the support by the Rockefeller Foundations was publicized as being extremely crucial and demonstrative of the philanthropic goals of the charities. As evidence of this assertion, the Hungarian program occupies a large portion of the annual reports from the associated years and frequent press releases were created in order to detail their work to the public. This creation of the image of the Rockefeller Foundations supporting the brave Hungarian freedom fighters, as they were characterized in such press releases, was essential in what we can call the public diplomacy objectives of the organizations during the early Cold War.

Public diplomacy has traditionally been conceptualized by scholars predominately in regards to international as opposed to domestic programs. In the case of international education, public diplomacy has been seen mainly through the development of exchange programs, usually under the sponsorship of the government. This thesis has argued that such views can be expanded to include the direct financial support, with little supervision, of existing educational institutions such as the University of Vienna in Europe but also the support of domestic programs for refugees. Domestic and international programs of public diplomacy,

Foundation Archive, RAC, 12.

[360] As context, the total amount of appropriations made by the Rockefeller Foundation during 1956 was a little over 30 million dollars.

as demonstrated in these case studies exhibit many similar features, for example the promotion of intellectuals and the formation of academic networks which would supply the recipients with the skills and training necessary to, as conceived of by Parmeer, "fit Western notions of development."[361]

According to Joseph Nye, "The effectiveness of public diplomacy is measured by minds changed, not dollars spent or slick production packages."[362] Despite not receiving a dramatically high amount of funding, the financial support of the Hungarian refugees was considered a wise move by the Foundations. The idea that the Rockefeller Foundations supported Hungarian students and scholars, who were seen as both a class particularly targeted by the oppressive policies of the communist regime in Hungary but also as the hope for a democratic future as well, was extremely important in forming the vision of the work of the Rockefeller Foundations. Support of scholars and universities would only increase in the years following 1956 as demonstrated in the annual budget reports.

Second, one of the main frustrations expressed by the Foundations was their lack of administrative control, especially in the case of the University of Vienna. There is a feeling from the documents that working with partner organizations, while an effective means through which to create successful programs, as these were generally assessed to be, left the Rockefeller Foundations with some hesitations. The conflicts with the University of Vienna and their administration made the Foundation extremely cautious in continuing to provide scholarship funds, as demonstrated in the fact that they repeatedly refused to provide the University with more funds despite frequent calls from its administrators. While the Bard program was evaluated to be more of a success in terms of partnership work, the Rockefeller Foundations

[361] Inderjeet Parmar, "American Foundations and the Development of International Knowledge Networks," *Global Networks* 2, vol. 1 (Dec. 16, 2002), 24.
[362] Joseph Nye, "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (2008): 101.

felt that they did not want to continue a partnership with the WUS and the IIE during the second phase of the support scheme. This was largely due to the fact that it would strain the financial resources of the foundations to support such a large undertaking as providing scholarships and living stipends to the Hungarian refugees within the United States.

It is possible to argue that because of the experiences of these programs that the Rockefeller Foundations were able to articulate their grant making policies regarding international education during the Cold War. Though this is a topic which deserves further study, it is indicated through annual reports that the Rockefeller Foundations increasingly focused on the funding of individual scholars based upon direct application to the Foundations and the support of the development of university departments and research as opposed to scholarship programs for students.

The Hungarian refugee support by the Rockefeller Foundations occurred at a major crossroads in the history of the Foundations. It was during the early Cold War that they were forced to evaluate and reformulate their policies in the new political and international climate in which they found themselves to be operating. The Hungarian crisis precipitated many changes in the ways in which refugee policy was formulated within the United States. In the case study of the Rockefeller Foundations, the crisis required them to evaluate how they were to handle not only the support of refugees from communist states but also international education in a new set of global circumstances.

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