PYRRHIC VICTORY:
EAST ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY, POLITICS AND SERBIAN NATIONALISM IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD

Maria Falina

A DISSERTATION

in

History

**Presented to the Faculties of the Central European University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

Budapest, Hungary

2011

Supervisor of Dissertation: Professor Balázs Trencsényi

I hereby declare that this dissertation contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions and no materials previously written and/or published by another person unless otherwise noted.

Abstract

The dissertation analyzes the position and political agenda of the Serbian Orthodox Church in interwar Yugoslavia. The primary aim of the project is to demonstrate how the fusion and the idea of fusion between Serbian nationalism and East Orthodox Christianity were forged and evolved in the interwar period. The dissertation, thus, problematizes the bond between religious and national identities, which seems to be taken for granted in the academia and by the general public. The temporal focus is on the two interwar decades, as it was precisely in this period that the formulation and justification of the blurring of religious and national identities gained most strength. The thesis argues that the context of the interwar Yugoslav and broadly speaking European political life was of great significance for the development of the Serbian Orthodox political project. The Church, essentially, reacted to contemporary challenges posed by political modernity that included, but were not limited to, the existence of multinational and multi-religious Yugoslav state, ideology of Yugoslavism, fear of secularization, the rise of communism and fascism. The work aims at describing the Serbian phenomena in a manner that makes it comprehensible and comparable to other European cases, in the region and beyond. Along these lines, the concept 'Political Orthodoxism' initially coined for the Romanian context is applied creatively to the Serbian case. The interaction of nationalism and religion are analyzed with the emphasis on ideas and ideologies through the close reading of public discourses and narratives. At the same time, attention is paid to the individual actors, their personal histories and agendas.

Acknowledgments

I have always considered myself lucky to have met and enjoyed the company of many extraordinary people who have been sources of inspiration, intellectual challenge, and moral support. This dissertation is the result of personal and professional friendships, as much as it the result of my individual work.

First and foremost, my deepest gratitude goes to my supervisor, Balázs Trencsényi, who believed in the project before it took form, and has supported my work through six years of research and writing. His patience, dedication to the scholarly exercise, and intellectual depth has never ceased to amaze and inspire me. Radmila Radić, of Belgrade, generously shared her knowledge on the history of the Serbian Church, and helped me to find my way through the thicket of people and books. The staff of the *Library of the Serbian Patriarchate* in Belgrade have been helpful and I am grateful for their patience and assistance. Johannes Wischmeyer guided me through the intricacies of German theories, and I profited a lot from our discussions of the thesis' conceptual framework during my stay at the *Institute for European History* in Mainz. A special mention is due to the fantastic team of the *Negotiating Modernity* project (Balázs Trencsényi, Monika Baár, Michal Kopeček, Maciej Janowski, and Luka Lisjak Gabrijelčič), whose expertise on a wide range of themes and countries broadened my perspective. Central European University, that over the years has become my second home, was a perfect place to discuss my work with the faculty and fellow students. The write-up grant that I have received from the Rector's office made the last six moths of writing a much more enjoyable experience.

Many thanks go to friends and colleagues in Moscow, Belgrade, Budapest, and elsewhere. Amongst them, particular thanks go to Olga Dieva, Tatiana Fazio, Tamara Dondurey, Anastasia Mitiushina, and Mur Soboleva, who always believed that my work is worth the effort. To Vladimir Petrović, a perfect host, challenging conversation partner, guide

(both socially and academically), and dearest friend who for many years made my stays in Belgrade not only productive but also truly joyful. To Sarah McArthur who taught me never to give up. To Jana Bacevic for our discussions of the intricacies of academic life. And to Simina Badica, Ferenc Laczó, Uku Lember, Anna Mazanik, Marko Zubak, Zsófia Lóránd, Katalin Stráner, Gábor Kármán, and many others for their friendship. I am fortunate to have Ernst by my side, who has put up patiently with all the ups and downs of the last stages of the writing process.

And last but not least, nothing would have been possible without love and support of my family, who always stood there to support me, even when thousands kilometers away. It is to my parents, Irina and Anatoliy; and to the memory of my grandparents, Aleksandra and Ivan, Anna and Nikolay, who sadly did not live to see the end of this project, that I dedicate this work.

Introduction

The classic understanding of the relationship between the Serbian nation and the Serbian Orthodox Church (both in the sense of an institution and of a religious community) is that the two are intimately linked and inseparable. This link is normally presented as given and existent "since times immemorial" i.e. since the Slavic tribes of the Balkan Peninsula converted to Christianity. And if the latter disturbing aspect is more characteristic of political and publicists texts, the 'naturalness' with which this phenomenon is presented even in scholarly texts is bothering. One of the most established scholars in the field wrote that "the Serbian Orthodox Church was a cultural and quasi-political institution, which embodied and expressed the ethos of the Serbian people to such a degree that nationality and religion fused into a distinct 'Serbian faith'. This role of the Serbian church had little to do with religion either as theology or as a set of personal beliefs and convictions."[1] These things are cited again and again, similar claims travel from one text to another. As a matter of fact, it is so widely cited and used, that it ceases being seen critically and from a distance.

The question that is asked, and hopefully answered, in this dissertation is 'Was the bond between East Orthodox Christianity and Serbian national identity indeed so natural and straightforward, as it seems to be?' The central aim of the thesis is to show how the idea of fusion between Orthodox Christianity and Serbianness came about, evolved over time and was eventually coined in the way we know it today. The temporal framework is limited to the two decades of the interwar period, as it was precisely during this period that the formulations and justification of the blurring of religious and national identities gained most strength. I will describe and try to understand the interaction of nationalism and religion in

[1] Michael B. Petrovic, *A History of Modern Serbia: 1804-1918* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 10 quoted in Vjekoslav Perica, *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 6.

interwar Serbia with the emphasis on ideas and ideologies through the analysis of public discourses and narratives on the material of published sources.

Religion and National History: A Historiographical Overview

The aim of this review is to present a structured outline of the major debates in the fields of study relevant to the history of church and religion on the one hand, and to identify problematic points and existing lacunae on the other. The review has two sections. The first deals with the literature devoted to the history of Serbia and analyzes how Church History is narrated and incorporated into national and regional narratives. Only the modern period is treated here, with a focus on the first half of the twentieth century. Medieval and early modern eras are not discussed. The second part of the review is focused on more theoretical works that deal with the issue of the interconnection of religion, nationalism and political modernity in Europe. The overwhelming majority of research done in this field, unfortunately, is focused neither on Yugoslavia nor on South Eastern Europe. Surprisingly, or not, there is very little theoretical or theoretically informed research that would discuss these important matters in relation to the Eastern Orthodox Christianity if Russia were excluded.

Religion in Serbian National and Regional Histories

If there is any way to briefly describe the state of the art in the field of church and religious history in South Eastern Europe, it most likely would go along the following lines: everybody agrees on the fact that since times immemorial up to 1918 religion in general and Orthodox churches in particular were very important for national cultures and communities; nobody agrees on anything when later periods are in question; the disputes border violence when communism enters the discussion either as an oppressive regime or only as a memory. While it is relatively easy to explain why the communist and post-communist eras are so

sensitive politically and emotionally, there is no ready-made answer as to why religious history of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries is not a battle ground for historians.

There is little doubt that the research in religious and church histories in Eastern Europe (broadly speaking) and in the Yugoslav successor-states was specifically boosted in the last 15 years by at least two independent factors. The first source of influence is laying on the surface and has already become a common place – the break up of Yugoslavia with its radicalization of nationalism and frequent use of religious symbols and rhetoric for mass-mobilization purposes, as well as the rise of religiosity in the region after the fall of communism.[2] The second, more important in the long run, impulse for research in this direction comes from the interesting developments in the field of Religious Studies, e.g. profound critique of the secularization thesis, methodological input from anthropology and literary studies, etc. Academic research that is a reaction to and a reflection upon these two sources has only begun to appear and unfortunately forms a minor, almost negligent fraction of the overall production in the field.

The unproblematic way church and religious history is narrated and incorporated into national histories prior to the First World War throughout the region is striking. The only exception here may be Greece, where from early on the question of the uneasy relationship between Christianity and Classical Hellenic heritage was under scrutiny. Paschalis Kitromilides has argued that the association of Orthodoxy with nationalism was the product of the nineteenth century nationalism, and in fact contradicts the universal nature of the East

[2] Paul Mojzes, *Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans* (New York: Continuum, 1994); Detlef Pollack, "Modifications in the religious Field of Central and Eastern Europe," *European Societies* 3, No. 2 (2001): 135-165; Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel, *The Vitality of Religion-Church Integration and Politics in Eastern and Western Europe in Comparison* (Frankfurt(Oder): Frankfurter Institut für Transformationsstudien, 2000); Mattei Dogan, "Accelerated Decline of Religious Beliefs in Europe," *Comparative Sociology*, 1, No. 2 (2002): 127-149.

Christian teaching. However, in the rest of the region most researches seem to be blissfully ignorant of any serious discussions on the pre-communist time.[3]

The mainstream narrative has it that the Orthodox churches in the Balkans were the institutions that preserved the local network during the five centuries of Ottoman rule.[4] In church authorities' jurisdiction fell upon a wide range of affairs, including not only those related to family and marriage, but also commercial and criminal cases if only Christians were involved. Thus, in the absence of local (ethnic/ national) secular organizations, the church took over the tasks of civil administration. The creation of a proper national secular administration and governance system was the first task for new (semi)-independent Christian states in the Balkans. Besides quasi-state functions, the Orthodox Church in the Balkans fulfilled another important task: with church ritual the memories of the glorious past were transmitted through the centuries. For instance, all medieval Serbian rulers were canonized as Orthodox saints. In the age of modern nationalism such close interaction of ethnic and religious consciousness resulted in the creation of a phenomenon that Peter F. Sugar, after Emanuel Turczynski, referred to as *nation-confession*. With this notion both of them described "the stage in historical development in which the national church-state identification descended from the political realm of the elites to the popular level, under the

[3] Paschalis M. Kitromilides, *Enlightenment, Nationalism and Orthodoxy: Studies in the Culture and Political Thought of Southeastern Europe* (Aldershot, Hampshire: Variorum, 1994). For a critical interpretation of Kitromilides' argument and its applicability to other Balkan cases see e.g. Carsten Riis, *Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs; New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 129-134.

[4] In the Ottoman Empire, it was not ethnicity that formed the basis of the administrative division of the lands and governance; instead, the population was organized into five groups (millets) along religious lines. In the millet-system, the custom of using the leaders of religious communities for government functions was established early. By the eighteenth century the powers and responsibilities of the Patriarch who was based in Istanbul (Constantinople) grew immensely: he was the head of the rum-millet (*millet bashi*) and secular ruler of the Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire. Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans. Vol. 1 Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 50.

influence of modern nationalism, creating a new identification of nation with church membership on a somewhat vague purely folk religious emotional level".[5]

With the rise of modern nationalisms religious Orthodox identification gave place to a new secular identity, which was strongly influenced by European liberalism. Later in the nineteenth century, church hierarchs and intellectuals, in an attempt to secure their own position, strengthened and promoted the notion of the national church as the savior of the nation, which, of course, increased the symbolic value of religion and the church institutions within the framework of an independent national state. The first striking characteristic of this conventional narrative in Serbia is that it operates even today as a coherent account without evident internal contradictions. Given the high level of politicization of history in the region, such an agreement of the public and professional research community is exceptional. The reason for this unanimity lies in the way the historical narrative was constructed and developed. In Serbia, church history primarily means the history of the church's contribution to the national cause, and as such it was created in the modern period, first as an institutional narrative, and then made its way into the national history and cultural canon. In accordance to the more generalized regional narrative, the Serbian Orthodox Church is perceived as the only national institution that managed to preserve a sort of independence during the Ottoman period and hence took over some of the state functions. The role of the clergy as the savior of the nation is traditionally emphasized.[6] The narrative was widespread among both secular and

[5] Peter F. Sugar, "Religion, Nationalism and Politics," in *Nationalism and Religion in the Balkans since the Nineteenth century* (Seattle, WA: Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, 1996), 7.

[6] Serbian historian Vasa Čubrilović presented a view widely accepted up to nowadays of the role of the Orthodox clergy in the struggle for national liberation: "Because of the close connection between the Church and masses and the limitation of the power of the church hierarchs, the Church was in the service of the people and its struggle. That is why it was used for the cultural and national-political ends, and already by the end of the XVI century it was involved in the struggle of the Serbian people against the Ottoman Empire. Because of this fight the Church suffered great losses; and because of this fight in 1766 the Peć Patriarchate was abolished". Vasa Čubrilović, "Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva pod Turcima od XV do XIX veka," in *Odabrani istorijski radovi.* Belgrade: Narodna Knjiga, 1983, originally published in *Zbornik Filozofskog fakulteta*, Knj. V-1. Belgrade, 1960). The same narrative can be found in I.V. Tchurkina, ed., *Rol' religii v formirovanii yuzhnoslavyanskikh naciy*. (Moscow: URSS, 1999).

church intellectuals already by the middle of the nineteenth century. Although not often challenged, the claim that the Orthodox Church had always supported the cause of national liberation is problematic, especially when the matter concerns the Serbs of the Habsburg Empire.[7] Nonetheless this problem has not been sufficiently researched.

The fiercenesses and emotional sensitivity of the debates on the post-Second World War era becomes especially striking in comparison.[8] The highly emotional level of discussions and their political sensitivity can make research 'hot' and thus attract more scholars. It also may obscure judgments and hinder the impartiality of researchers. For better or worse, the time frame from the early-nineteenth century until 1945 is under-researched on the one hand, and is governed by a consensus of the 'national contribution of the churches' on the other. In these circumstances those rare critical works that challenge the established consensus are especially valuable. Exceptional in this sense are the works of Bojan Aleksov and Iurii Kostiashov who examine certain aspects of the church-state relationship and

[7] The first to voice a substantial critique of this point was the American historian of Serbia Gale Stokes. See e.g. Gale Stokes, "Church and Class in Early Balkan Nationalism," *East European Quarterly*, 13 (1979): 259-270.

[8] The posthumous fate of Serbian theologian and Archbishop Nikolaj Velimirović (1880-1956) constitutes one of the finest examples of the public debate about and around the Church. In May 2003 Velimirović was canonized by the Serbian Orthodox Church. The event was the culmination of the long debate about bringing back to Serbia his remains from the USA. An important part of the myth-making process that surrounded this debate concerned the imprisonment of Velimirović together with the Serbian Patriarch Gavrilo at Dachau in 1944. The brief internment has been used to construct Velimirović's image as a martyr and a victim of brutal Nazi persecution. This generally led to the suppression of anti-Semitism, and extreme nationalism in his writings and thought that did not fit the desirable image of a new national saint. For detailed analysis of the problems that accompanied the process see Jovan Byford, *Denial and Repression of Anti-Semitism: Post-Communist Remembrance of the Serbian Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović* (Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 2008). Byford pointed out that "The inclusion of the name of Nikolaj Velimirović in the diptych of Serbian saints revived the long-standing public debate surrounding the merits of the bishop's contribution to Orthodox Christianity and to Serbian culture as a whole […] As critics on the liberal left frequently point out, Velimirović was one of the principal ideologues of 1930s Serbian fascism, whose clerical nationalist, antimodernist, and anti-Semitic religious writings continue to inspire the forces of the Christian right in present-day Serbian society". (Jovan Byford, Canonizing the 'Prophet' of Anti-Semitism: The Apotheosis of Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic and the Legitimization of Religious Aanti-Semitism in Contemporary Serbian Society (Part 1)," *East European Perspectives* 6, No. 4 (February 18, 2004) http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1342451.html (last accessed March 2011). Another recent study has clearly demonstrated that the sufferings during the imprisonment is too a large degree a *post-factum* construction, which nonetheless has made it to the public opinion and therefore is very hard to object. Predrag Ilić, *Srpska pravoslavna crkva i tajna Dahaua: mit i istina o zatočeništvu patrijarha Gavrila i episkopa Nikolaja u koncentracionom logoru Dahauu* (Belgrade: P. Ilić, 2006). The SPC as well as its counterparts in other post-Communist countries tends to present itself as a victim of the communist regime and creates an aura of martyrdom around its suffering and losses at the Second World War and during Socialism. Similar tendencies can be observed in Romania.

religious life in Vojvodina in the period from 1600s up to the break up of the Habsburg Empire.[9] Interestingly enough both of authors are rather outsiders to the Serbian national historiography.

Despite the important place religion and church are given in the national narrative, there is only one comprehensive history of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The three volume *History of the Serbian Orthodox Church* was written by Djoko Slijepčević, a Serbian émigré cleric, who was close to the circle of Nikolaj Velimirović and Dimitrije Najdanović.[10] His book appeared for the first time in Munich in the 1980s, was republished in Belgrade in 1991, and remains to the present day the most detailed account of the history of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Slijepčević, one of the creators of the narrative, made it into a solid scholarly oeuvre, which nevertheless is not free from his subjective partisan opinion.[11] Slijepčević almost exclusively tells the story of institutions: administrative, educational and political. He thus pays almost no attention to the contents of teaching and religious thought.

The historical narrative runs flawlessly up until the interwar period, where the first interpretative debates start. They concern above all the so-called *'Concordat crisis'*, political unrest caused by the refusal of the Serbian Orthodox Church to accept the terms of the agreement signed between the Yugoslav government and the Vatican in the period between 1935 and 1937. Leaving aside the publicist and conspiracy theory writings on the mysterious death of Patriarch Varnava, which coincidentally happened on the night of the largest street demonstration in Belgrade led by the Orthodox clergy, we are left with quite a limited number of pieces of scholarly historical analysis. Most authors analyze the crisis in the light

[9] Iurii Kostiashov, *Serbi v Avstriiskoi monarkhii v XVIII veke* (Kaliningrad, 1997); Bojan Aleksov, *Religious Dissent between the Modern and the National. Nazarenes in Hungary and Serbia 1850-1914* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006).
[10] Djoko Slijepčević, *Istorija Sprske Pravoslavne Crkve*, Vol. 1-3 (Belgrade, 1991).
[11] Wayne Vucinich commented that "Since the author is deeply engaged in church politics, the book cannot claim to be a model of dispassionate historical analysis. Yet, it is the only work on the subject, and, thus, will be of considerable interest to contemporary historians and to church scholars" Wayne Vucinich, Review article of Istorija Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve by Djoko Slijepcević, in *Slavic Review* 48, No. 3 (Autumn, 1989): 526.

of the problematic Serbo-Croatian relationship and political difficulties the government faced at the time. It is not surprising that it was Serbian historiography that produced most pieces on the Concordat, as it was, in their eyes, a good illustration and proof to the general claim that the failure of the interwar Yugoslav political project was caused by the Croats who sabotaged the idea.[12]

Among the writings produced by Serbian historians the most solid and comprehensive account is authored by Miloš Mišović. His *Serbian Church and the Concordat Crisis* is based on an impressive range of archival materials and provides the reader with a detailed account of the struggle of the Serbian Orthodox Church against the Concordat.[13] However, Mišović in many ways follows the traditional uncritical interpretation of the relationship between religious and national communities and their elite. He routinely points out the overlap of interests of the churches and national entities in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. He states that in the Kingdom "although religion and politics formally were separated, they remained to be closely connected, because the interests of distinct churches and national bourgeoisies were so much entangled that they were not to be easily separated."[14] It is not my aim here to discuss the applicability of the Marxist paradigm to the Yugoslav interwar context. It becomes clear from Mišović's remark that he accepts 'by default' the idea of the overlap of the Church's interests and the interests of the nation. In this way he overlooks possible

[12] Mark Biondich in a recent historiography review rightly observed that "In Serbian nationalist historiography, virtually all Serb actions of the interwar era are seen as defensive and an attempt to save the Yugoslav state from Croat secessionist intrigues, which were ultimately to blame for the country's dysfunctional parliamentary system. According to this interpretation, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes stood a good chance of evolving into a liberal democratic society had it not been for Croat recalcitrance. The nascent state found itself under constant attack by disaffected Croat intellectuals and politicians who, working in conjunction with the Catholic Church, Vatican, and revisionist powers like Italy and Hungary, worked to sabotage the state." Mark Biondich, "The Historical Legacy: The Evolution of Interwar Yugoslav Politics, 1918-1941", in *State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia's Disintegration, eds.* Lenard J. Cohen and Jasna Dragović-Soso (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 2008), 45. The examples of this approach include but are not limited to the following publications: Nikola Žutić, *Kraljevina Jugoslavija i Vatikan: odnos jugoslovenske države i rimske crkve, 1918-1935* (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 1994), idem., *Rimokatolička crkva i hrvatstvo od ilirske ideje do velikohrvatske realizacije, 1453-1941* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1997), and Dragoljub R. Živojinović, *Varvarstvo u ime Hristovo: prilozi za Magnum Crimen* (Belgrade: Nova knjiga, 1988).

[13] Miloš Mišović, *Srpska Crkva i konkordatska kriza* (Belgrade: Sloboda, 1983).

[14] Mišović, 23.

important incoherencies within the discourses and policies of the churches, not to mention multiple contradictions in the state policies and the agendas of the national elites in Yugoslavia.

Another important point of dispute is the question of what was the role of religion in the development of political crisis in interwar Yugoslavia. Here the disagreement of Ivo Banac and Milorad Ekmečić is symptomatic. Both scholars deal mostly with the national question and the formation of national identities and ideologies in the "first Yugoslavia", so they touch upon religious issues only indirectly. Their almost opposite opinions on whether religion and church institutions had a significant impact on the development of the national consciousness of the Yugoslav nations can be summarised in the following way: Ekmečić argues for religion and religious ideology to be the main obstacle on the way to the creation of Yugoslavia and the main reason for the Serbo-Croat conflicts; Banac, in turn, claims that religion did not have a prominent place in the national ideologies of the South Slav peoples, and that the conflicts between Serbs and Croats were rather a result of the clash between different political cultures.[15] In this perspective, the approach suggested by Dejan Djokić has the advantage of shifting the emphasis from the 'given' static characteristics of the national ideologies to the interaction between them and other political actors.[16]

Academic consensus on the role of church and clergy in history, however distant, may have non-obvious consequences. Thus, in the Serbian case, lack of historical debate and challenges to the conventional narrative led to the situation in which, in the words of one of the leading scholars in religious history in Serbia, "the Church continued to maintain that it was the only institution which, throughout history, had remained the protector of the Serbian nation, that it had never abandoned the Serbian nation, that it stood above the state, that it

[15] Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press 1993, c1984); Milorad Ekmečić, *Stavaranje Jugoslavije*, Vol. 1-2 (Belgrade, 1989); idem, *Srbija izmedju srednje Evrope i Evrope* (Belgrade, 1992).
[16] Dejan Djokić, *Elusive Compromise: A History of Interwar Yugoslavia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

represented the highest moral arbiter, and that its intentions and positions could not be questioned."[17] Even though it is clear, that the claims of the Church did not always have firm ground, the local intellectual community does not really analyze the tradition of making such claims which existed long before the recent political radicalization of religious institutions.

It happened so that one of the sources of inspiration for the post-communist conservative nationalist political projects (that often enjoyed significant support of the Orthodox churches) was religious thought and political agenda of the interwar period. The phenomenon, wide-spread in Serbia and Romania, came to be known under the name of *Neo-Orthodoxism*, as it clearly revived some ideas of 'political Orthodoxism' of the 1930s. Having said that, it is and at the same time not surprising that more attention has not been paid to the thoughts and personalities of interwar thinkers who continue to serve as a source of inspiration today in a historical perspective. The research in this direction comes mostly from the international academic community. Local researchers focus on the question of how Church discourse was instrumentalized by radical nationalists in the 1990s and 2000s.[18]

Two German scholars, Thomas Bremer and Klaus Buchenau, conducted research on the theological thought and intellectual production (broadly speaking) of the Serbian clergy in the first half of the twentieth century.[19] Both researchers focus on the important figures of

[17] Radmila Radić, "The Church and the 'Serbian Question'," in *The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis*, ed. Nebojša Popov (Budapest: CEU Press, 2000), 271.

[18] Milan Vukomanović, "Religious freedoms in Yugoslavia and the Relations between Religious Communities and the State," *Religion in Eastern Europe* 22, No. 1 (February 2002): 38-44; idem, "Srpska pravoslavna crkva izmedju tradicionalizma, konzervatizma i fundamentalizma," in *Istorija i sećanje*, ed. Olga Manojlović Pintar (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2006), 175-190; idem, *Homo viator: religija i novo doba* (Belgrade: Čigoja štampa, 2008). It is characteristic that in the last decade there appeared a number of volumes with collected works of leading ideologues of the 1930s-1940s who underlined the ties and necessary cooperation between the nation and the Serbian Orthodox Church. See, e.g. Dimitrije Najdanović, (editor and author of the preface Željko Z. Jelić) *Filosofija istorije Imanuela Hermana Fihtea i drugi spisi iz filosofije, bogoslovlja i književnosti* (Belgrade: Jasen: Fond istine o Srbima, 2003).

[19] Thomas Bremer, *Ekklesiale Struktur und Ekklesiologie in der Serbischen Orthodoxen Kirche im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1992) was the first work of its kind. The study was translated and published in Serbian as Tomas Bremer, *Vera, kultura i politika: eklezijalna struktura i ekleziologija u Srpskoj pravoslavnoj crkvi u XIX i XX veku* (Niš: Gradina: Jugoslovensko udruženje za naučno istraživanje religije, 1997). Klaus Buchenau, "*Svetosavlje* und *Pravoslavlje*: Nationales und Universales in der serbischen Orthodoxie," in *Nationalisierung der Religion und Sakralisierung der Nation in Ostmittel-, Südost- und Osteuropa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Martin Schulze Wessel (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2006). The latest comprehensive

Nikolaj Velimirović and Justin Popović, but differ significantly in their research aims. Bremer's project was oriented more towards the analysis of the theological doctrine, while Buchenau's prime interest lies in anti-Western aspects of theology and its political implications.[20] Importantly, Buchenau contextualizes intellectual developments that took place among Serbian clergy in the first half of the twentieth century within a wider tradition of Orthodox thought and reflection on political modernity, with an emphasis on Russian religious thought. These contributions are of the utmost importance, especially due to the fact that the mainstream research in Serbian church and religious history is focused more on church-state relations and social history, rather than on the history of ideas.

From a fairly big corpus of literature on church-state relations and the position of religious communities the work of Radmila Radić stands out in its depth and comprehensive use of archival material.[21] Although the main timeframe of her research is post-1945, she provides valuable and accurate overview of social structures of the Yugoslav religious communities in the earlier periods. The same could be said for an interesting comparative study of Buchenau.[22]

The last section of the existing literature that is worth mentioning here is the production of the Serbian Orthodox Church and university theology departments. Although the reputation of the SPC is that of a conservative and non-dynamic institution, certain recent developments seem to suggest the opposite. The finest example of this trend is the work of

publication in the field is Klaus Buchenau, *Auf russischen Spuren. Orthodoxe Antiwestler in Serbien, 1850-1945* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2011). Full text of the later publication unfortunately was not available to the author of the dissertation before the submission.

[20] Anti-Westernism of the Serbian clergy is also tackled in Bojan Aleksov, "History taught us not to fear anything from the east and everything from the west. A Historical Perspective on Serbian Occidentalism", in *Prowestliche und antiwestliche Diskurse in den Balkanländern/ Südosteuropa*, eds. Schubert, G., Sundhaussen, S. (München: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 2008), 31-46.

[21] Radmila Radić, *Država i verske zajednice: 1945-1970* (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2002) and Radmila Radić, *Život u vremenima: Gavrilo Dožić, 1881-1950* (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2006). Radmila Radić, *Narodna verovanja, religija i spiritizam u srpskom društvu 19. i u prvoj polovini 20. veka* (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2009). Radić is one of the very few lay scholars who deals with the history of the Serbian Orthodox Church who was granted the access to the archives of the Serbian Church that are normally closed to the outside researchers.

[22] Klaus Buchenau, *Kämpfende Kirchen: Jugoslawiens religiöse Hypothek* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2006).

Radovan Bigović who analyses the philosophical views of Velimirović, including his views on history, science, and anthropology.[23] Regardless of a number of debatable claims of the author and the tendency to identify with his protagonist, his study fills an important gap in the scholarly analysis of the views of Velimirović and other churchmen of the first part of the twentieth century.[24] Since 2006 the Theology Department of the Belgrade University has organized and hosted academic meetings and conferences in the framework of the project "Serbian Theology in the 20th c."[25] Unlike most of the previous scholarly production of this kind, which were centered on theology and Christian philosophy in Serbia, this new initiative proves to have much broader aims. The new research attempts to go beyond positivistic historical research and aims at reaching a degree of self-reflection within the academic circles of the clergy and lay theologians that would allow for the creation and use of theoretical conceptualization of the developments of Serbian theology and religious philosophy.

Some concluding remarks are necessary here. However divergent the opinions of the authors on the role of religion and church in historical perspective could be, there is one thing that brings many of them together: their theoretical approach. Lack of methodological diversity, characteristic of Serbian historical writing during the communist period, plagues it up to this day. New methodological developments in Serbian historiography were brought about later than in many neighboring countries and mainly took place in social history, social and cultural anthropology, etc. The turn towards social history was also caused by the general disappointment in political history experienced within the historical profession in the years

[23] Radovan Bigović, *Od svečoveka do bogočoveka: Hrišćanska filosofija vladike Nikolaja Velimirovića* (Belgrade: Društvo Raška škola, 1998).

[24] Due to a rather different, in comparison to most historians, professional background of Bigović his analysis cannot be called 'historical' in the strict sense of the word. Most of his evaluations are ideologically and politically loaded. See for example: "Ideological and spiritual disorientation were characteristic of the Serbian culture and spirituality of the end of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century … That was a period of rash and uncritical Europeanization of the Serbian culture, but also a period of weakening and disregard of the traditional St. Sava's [Svetosavska] thought and spirituality". Bigović, *Od svečoveka do bogočoveka*, 15.

[25] A series of publications under the same title "Srpska teologija u dvadesetom veku: istrazivacki problemi I rezultati" started to appear in 2006 under the editorship of Bogoljub Šijaković. At the moment eight consecutive volumes have been published.

after the break up of Yugoslavia[26]. This would partially explain why the questions of church-state relationship and the role of the clergy in nation-building and the social composition of clergy for many decades used to be major research questions for the scholars of religious history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[27]

Another possible explanation for the relatively late appearance of theoretically sensitive works is the persistence of the secularization thesis among the students of history. While in the field of Sociology of Religion the secularization theory is increasingly criticized and challenged by alternative approaches, many historians tend to think of religion as an obstacle on the way to a more modernized society. In this sense, recent studies on German nationalism provide valuable insights into the role of religious factors in modern political development.[28] The academic community in Serbia was isolated from the new theoretical and methodological innovations for a longer period of time even compared to their colleagues elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The next section of the literature review briefly sketches these most interesting and relevant scholarly trends in international academia for the field of religious history.

Scholarly isolation alone does not explain another major lacuna in the field of East European religious history: the almost absolute lack of comparative and/or regional research. The programmatic manifestos of the need for these kinds of studies began to appear already a

[26] See Predrag J. Markovic, Milos Kovic, Natasa Milicevic, "Developments in Serbian Historiography since 1989," in *(Re)Writing History: Historiography in Southeast Europe after Socialism,* ed. Ulf Brunnbauer (Münster: Lit, 2004), 277-316.

[27] Brian Porter-Szűcs draws a similar conclusion about the state of the art in religious studies in general, but for a somewhat earlier period. He writes "[A]s social history swept the discipline in the 1970s and 1980s, attention turned to popular religious practices, usually embedding these within sick descriptions of social life in particular times and places. In all too many cases this entailed a near erasure of theology and doctrine, tainted as these topics were by their association with the "old-fascioned" scholarship that studies only the elites who articulated and enforced religious dogma". (Brian Porter-Szusc, Introduction to *Christianity and Modernity in Eastern Europe,* eds. Bruce R. Berglund and Brian Porter-Szűcs (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010), 8.

[28] As a student of German nationalism observed "the reemergence of confessional conflict in the late nineteenth century must be understood … not as an atavism in an otherwise modernizing society, but rather as an integral part of the complexities of the jagged, irregular process by which German lands became a modern, secular, increasingly integrated, nationally cohesive polity." Helmut Walser Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology, Politics, 1870-1914* (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1995), 79.

decade ago.[29] But as time passes by the concerns remain the same. One cannot fail to note that comparative study in the history of ideas (the contemporary form of religious history comes very close to the history of ideas) with the focus on Eastern Europe is a relatively young field and its students have only begun to examine cross-border, transnational aspects of the individual national cases.[30]

Comprehensive comparative regional studies are virtually absent. Pedro Ramet's volume on Eastern Christianity and twentieth century politics is by today dated in many respects, but remains to be the only one that covers the region in totality.[31] Contemporary comparative research goes in several directions; the most innovative seems to be the analysis of the relationship between nationalism/national identities and religions.[32] The other vastly popular style of comparative research that incorporates religion is closer to political science and focuses on the issues of European integration.[33]

Most recently Brian Porter-Szucs set a new agenda for research in the history of East European Christianity in modernity. This new history should "avoid entirely the misleading question of whether the region does or does not fit some imagined normative pattern of secularization. Instead, our histories should explain the choices made and the constraints

[29] In relation to a more narrow question of anti-Westernism in Orthodox culture two authors diagnosed the following: "What is missing, therefore, is the comparative analysis and examination of two or more Orthodox cultures not only in terms of anti-Western discourses and practices, but also in terms of their interrelations, the transfer of ideas from one Orthodox culture to the other and their differences. In this way, the inter-Orthodox exchange of anti-Westernisms may come to light and many trans-Orthodox aspects of this phenomenon will be revealed". Vasilios N. Makridies and Dirk Uffelmann, "Studying Eastern Orthodox Anti-Westernsim: The Need for a Comparative Research Agenda," in *Orthodox Christianity and Contemporary Europe: Selected Papers of the International Conference Held at the University of Leeds, England in June 200, eds.* Jonathan Sutton and Wil van den Bercken (Leuven: Peeters, 2003), 87-120.

[30] Klaus Buchenau's *Auf russischen Spuren. Orthodoxe Antiwestler in Serbien* goes in this direction.

[31] Pedro Ramet, ed., *Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988).

[32] Lucian N. Leustean analyzes the relationship between Balkan national identities and Eastern Orthodox Christianity through the analytical framework of political myth and sacralization of politics in "Orthodoxy and Political Myths in Balkan National Identities," *National Identities* 10, No. 4, (December 2008): 421-432. Pål Kolstø, ed., Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe (London: Hurst, 2005); Martin Schulze Wessel, ed., *Nationalisierung der Religion und Sakralisierung der Nation im östlichen Europa* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2006); Hans-Christian Maner and Martin Schulze-Wessel, eds., *Religion im Nationalstaat zwischen den Weltkriegen 1918-1939: Polen, Tschechoslowakei, Ungarn, Rumänien* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2002).

[33] John Madeley, T.S. and Zsolt Enyedi, eds., *Church and State in Contemporary Europe: The Chimera of Neutrality* (London: Frank Cass, 2003).

faced by Poles, Hungarians, Bulgarians, and others as they simultaneously constructed and responded to their own particular versions of modernity".[34]

Religion, Nationalism, and Political Modernity

Less than ten years ago a scholar complained that "despite the prolific literature on nationalism, and the growing literature on religion, there seems to be no general theoretical framework or systematic discussion focusing specifically on the linkage between the two […] Most [scholars], apparently, regard this linkage as given, or as incidental."[35] Since then quite a few interesting approaches and productive concepts have been suggested by the specialists in church history, historical theology and early modern history, as well as by the students of totalitarian regimes and movements.[36] If in the mid-1990s general view among scholars of nationalism was that religion is "a social force available for nationalist manipulation"[37], a decade later one can register more profound and serious interest in religion and its interaction with the forces of nationalism. This is primarily due to the rethinking of the secularization paradigm and the realization of the need to pay closer attention to religion as an inherent part of modernity in general, and European political modernity in particular.[38]

For many years scholars in the humanities and social sciences believed that with the advance of modernity religion gradually loses its central place in political, social and cultural

[34] Brian Porter-Szucs, "Introduction" to *Christianity and Modernity in Eastern Europe*, eds., Bruce R. Berglund and Brian Porter-Szűcs (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010), 5-6.
[35] George Th. Mavrogordatos, "Orthodoxy and Nationalism in the Greek Case," in *Church and State in Contemporary Europe: The Chimera of Neutrality*, eds., John T.S. Madeley and Zsolt Enyedi (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 117.
[36] For a short account of the pre-history of the contemporary debate see: e.g. Hartmut Lehmann, "Die Säkularisierung der Religion und die Sakralisierung der Nation im 20. Jahrhundert. Varianten einer komplementären Relation," in *Religion im Nationalstaat zwischen den Weltkriegen 1918–1939*, eds., Hans-Christian Maner and Martin Schulze Wessel (Stuttgart; Steiner, 2002), 13–27.
[37] John Kent, "Religion and Nationalism," in *Religion in Europe: Contemporary Perspectives*, eds., Sean Gill, Gavin D'Costa and Ursula King (Kampen: Kok Pharos Publishing House, 1995), 180.
[38] For an account of the changes in the discipline see Jeffrey Cox, "Master Narratives of Long Term Religious Change," in *The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-2000*, eds., Hugh McLeod and Werner Ustorf (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), 201-217; the volume addresses the issue throughout. For the discussion on the secularization theory itself, see an informative collection of texts: Steve Bruce, ed., *Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis* (Oxford, 1992).

development.[39] Hence, according to the proponents of modernization and secularization theories, religion stops to be a meaningful object of a scholarly analysis. It is even more important that the *secularization thesis* informed the thinking of many scholars dealing with nationalism and beyond. Jeffrey Cox convincingly argued that "There certainly are many sociologists, not to mention historians, anthropologists, economists, clergy and journalists, who believe that religion in the modern world will survive only in forms that are sectarian and therefore marginal, fundamentalist and menacing, or internally secularized and therefore 'not really religious'."[40] Talal Asad argued at some point that "to insist that nationalism should be seen as religion, or even as having been shaped by religion, is […] to miss the nature and consequence of the revolution brought about by the Enlightenment doctrine of secularism in the structure of modern collective representations and practices. Of course modern nationalism draws on preexisting languages and practices – including those that we call 'religious'. Yet it does not follow from this that religion forms nationalism."[41]

Jose Casanova put forward an argument that the Enlightenment formatted the way Europeans, European scholars included, think of religion and faith. He wrote of the secularization thesis as a "self-fulfilling prophecy", according to which there is a direct causal relationship between the level of modernization and 'progressive' development of a given society on the one hand, and the decline of religious practice and belief on the other.[42] And students of nationalism when they write of nationalism as a 'secular', 'political', 'civil' or 'ersatz' religion are part of the story. George Mosse, for instance, in his analysis of national mass movements of the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries repeatedly pointed

[39] David Martin, *On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); Owen Chadwick, *The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
[40] Jeffrey Cox, "Master Narratives of Long Term Religious Change," in *The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe*, ed. McLeod, David Hugh and Werner Ustorf, 201.
[41] Talal Asad, "Religion, Nation-State, Secularism," in *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia, eds.* Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), 187.
[42] José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

out the fact that they take on the form of a secular religion.[43] At the same time, already in the 1970s Mosse acknowledged that the connection between cults, rites, symbols of nationalism and Christianity was not limited to a formal resemblance. He agreed that "the de-Christianization of the worship of people was never to become an accomplished fact", and underlined the importance of German Pietism for the development of German national movement.[44] Research of the past decades has further demonstrated that the relationship of religion and nationalism is not that of a simple substitute. One the one hand, sociologists made a great deal to prove the secularization theory wrong, on the other hand, historians contributed to a much more nuanced understanding of nationalism's religious aspects and roots. Without denying the significance of nationalism and national feeling in the modern period scholars claim that in nineteenth and twentieth century European history religion continued to play an important role.

It is clear today that the secularization narrative should be taken seriously, among other reasons precisely because it proved to be so persuasive. But it should serve not as a heuristic tool, but rather as source material, analysis of which can help us understand the complex relationship between (institutionalized) religion and nationalism (or the political sphere in general for that matter). As Mark Edward Ruff pointed out, "[N]arratives of secularization and religious decline often served as a way to create religious identity, defining it against a hostile outside world […] The fact that secularization was so widely used as a concept in the past, means that it cannot simply be suddenly brushed aside. Historians must examine precisely why for nearly two centuries so many churchmen believed it to be critical to elevate religious decline to a master narrative and how they shaped their own discourses

[43] "This book is concerned with the growth of a secular religion. As in any religion, the theology expressed itself though a liturgy: festivals, rites, and symbols which remained constant in an ever-changing world". George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1975), 16.
[44] George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masse.,* 14.

and program for renewal around this phenomenon".[45] Echoing concerns voiced by Ruff, Renato Moro noted that an approach which does not take into account the specifically religious and focuses exclusively on church-state relations, various political powers and religious institutions is quite limited. Such an approach, Moro claims, "can perhaps explain the birth of Catholic movements and parties; it can interpret their actions; but it cannot ever explain the ways, the forms in which they express themselves".[46] Analysis of the 'secularization threat' as it was perceived and processed by the Serbian clergy constitutes an important part of the thesis. 'Secularization' and 'secularity' were important concepts in the discourse of the Serbian Orthodox Church, in fact, without taking this part of their reasoning into account; it becomes impossible to understand the inner logic and driving force behind much of the Church's agenda.

What seems to be accepted by many students of nationalism today is the importance of religious roots of nationalism. And even if the nature of the link between religion and national feeling still remains unclear, the powerful impact the former had in 'the age of nationalism' is widely acknowledged. One of the best known attempts to conceptualise the relationship between the nation and nationalism on the one hand, and religion and religious communities on the other, is *Chosen Peoples* by Anthony D. Smith. Smith presents an extensive critique of modernist approaches to nationalism and in particular challenges their tendency to downplay the roles of religion(s) in it.[47] By contrast Smith argues that "two of the nation's most important cultural resources and traditions are constituted by 'ethnicity' and 'religion'."[48] Although Smith suggests a clear cut division of the interaction of religion and nationalism into three analytical levels ('official level' of regimes, leaders and elites;

[45] Mark Edward Ruff , "The Postmodern Challenge to the Secularization Thesis: A Critical Assessment," *SZRKG* (2005): 385-401.
[46] Renato Moro, "Religion and Politics in the Time of Secularization: The Sacralization of Politics and Politicization of Religion," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 6, No.1, (June 2005): 75.
[47] Anthony D. Smith, *Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, c2003).
[48] Smith, *Chosen Peoples*, 25.

'popular' level of religious beliefs and practices of the 'people' or 'folk'; and the third 'basic' level of the *sacred foundations* of the nation constituted by four dimensions of the nation: community, territory, history, and destiny)[49] the study does not provide a working theoretical framework that would enable, for instance, an understanding of the mechanisms of the complex relationship and mutual influences of religion and political ideologies in an ethnically and religiously heterogeneous society in the middle of a structural political crisis, which is effectively the subject of this study.

Adrian Hastings - yet another classic of nationalism studies - pointed out several important issues that need to be taken care of in the analysis of the links between religion and nationalism. The topics that Hastings finds crucial include myths of foundation, i.e. sanctifying the starting point of the life of a nation; mythologization and commemoration of great threats to national identity.[50] Both "myth-making points" are well-taken as indeed myths form an essential part of national identity, while religiosity and institutionalized religions play an important role in the process of myth-making. There are a number of myths of nations that do not talk about its grandeur, but about suffering, defeats and persecution. These are myths of victimhood and martyrdom: "a major advantage of the *martyrium* myth is that it invests the identity boundary with a moral significance: those who are down-trodden are morally superior to their oppressors".[51] 'Crucified Poland', 'Serbian Golgotha', the Kosovo epic cycle in Serbian national mythology, and many other belong to this type and are central to respective national identities. Even if biblical vocabulary is not central to a myth of martyrdom (e.g. Jasenovac myth in Serbia), there is an obvious link between the political function of a myth and a concept of sacred suffering, which once again brings us to the issue of structural similarity between religious and national feeling.

[49] Smith, *Chosen Peoples*, 28–31.
[50] Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
[51] Pal Kolsto, "Introduction", to *Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe* (London: Hurst, 2005), 21.

The second unit in Hastings's list concerns the discovery of a unique national destiny and the provision of a biblical model for the nation. Discussion of these issues leads to the question whether nation and nationalism as we know them today are characteristically Christian developments; to the problem of inherent ambiguity of their relation to politics and power in Christianity, etc. And, last but not least, a large topic that can be singled out from Hastings's observation is the role of the clergy in the process of nation-building; the production of vernacular literature, etc. and finally, the struggle for and the existence of autocephalous 'national' churches (which concerns more Protestant and Orthodox churches). The later point has been researched sufficiently in Balkan case-studies of the nineteenth century. The three big topics that he raised are bound to attract scholars' attention again and again in any discussion of religion and nationalism.

To nobody's surprise the overlap between religious and national identities, their mutual dependence and reinforcement were especially strong in some European cases: Poles and Irish are believed (by themselves and others) to be Catholic, Serbs in juxtaposition to Croats – Orthodox, etc. It is also generally accepted that the religious factor had a greater impact on ethnic/national identity if a group found itself in a minority position, when religion served as the main differentiating factor. For instance, "many ethnic Germans in Central and Eastern Europe understood piety as intrinsic to their German identity, whether they were Lutherans surrounded by Catholic Poles, Roman Catholic living among Orthodox Romanians, etc. […] For those self-conscious religious minorities religion and ethnicity were often indistinguishable."[52]

Mary Anne Perkins saw one of the reasons for the continuous association of religion with nationalism today in the fact that "language of nationhood offered a way in which they

[52] Doris L. Bergen, "Christianity and Germanness: Mutually Reinforcing, Reciprocally Undermining?" in *Religion und Nation, Nation und Religion: Beiträge zu einer unbewältigten Geschichte*, eds., Michael Geyer and Hartmut Lehmann (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2004), 89.

[traditional Christian symbols] could be transformed and re-empowered."[53] She underlined the hidden common roots of certain aspects of national consciousness and identity on the one hand, and of religious beliefs and practice on the other, "even where secularization appears complete".[54]

Nationalisms are normally built around the idea of the unique character of a given nation; its singular and glorious past and extraordinary future. This sense of particularity does not necessarily have to be coined through religious vocabulary; there are other options as well, e.g. various types of racial thinking, national characterology grounded in anthropology and ethnology, etc. Nonetheless, religious concepts and themes indeed play an important role in the process of inventing and even more importantly *justifying* the nation. "One of the most powerful archetypes of unique national identity remains that of the Biblical narrative of the chosen people of Israel. It was central to the self-consciousness of nationhood among peoples who were beginning to assert their uniqueness and independence as sovereign nations in revolutionary Europe. Combined with the dynamics of Romanticism on the one hand, or with the impetus to new and reformed social and political order on the other, the theme of chosenness became powerfully associated both with past glory and future mission in the world."[55]

Due to their very nature religious concepts tend to be 'strong' and powerful. When applied to the sphere of national thinking they retain their strength and potential for the

[53] Mary Anne Perkins, *Nation and Word, 1770-1850: Religious and Metaphysical Language in European National Consciousness* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 14.
[54] Perkins, *Nation and Word*, 15. Although some scholars are skeptical about the contemporary state of the art in the field, e.g. Moro sadly notes that "hardly ever does the historiography of saints and cults, which so flourishes among medievalists and modernists, cross the border into the history of the last two centuries." Renato Moro, "Religion and Politics in the Time of Secularization: The Sacralization of Politics and Politicization of Religion," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 6, No.1 (June 2005): 76. Yet, there appear projects such as the one of Stefan Samerski, who put together a volume on the twentieth century renaissance of national saints-patrons in Central in Eastern Europe that seem to indicate that sophisticated research is being done in this direction. Stefan Samerski, ed., *Die Renaissance der Nationalpatrone: Erinnerungskulturen in Ostmitteleuropa im 20./21. Jahrhundert* (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2007). There is a multitude of case-studies that engage into the discussion of the religious mobilization; appropriation of religious symbols by secular political actors; (ab)use of religious symbols and rhetoric in the context of nationalism and especially right-wing politics.
[55] Perkins, *Nation and Word*, 155.

national self-assertion; which explains their wide-spread use by politicians, governments, etc. for mobilization purposes. Friedrich Wilhelm Graf observed that religious semantic in modern nationalisms serves the purpose of strengthening the emotional binding of the individual to the nation at the deepest level of one's soul and stabilization of national community as a comprehensive, innerly-binding *Heilsgemeinschaft*.[56] Graf continues by arguing that thanks to the common usage of such concepts as 'New Israel', 'God's people', etc. the nation starts to represent an idea of Heaven on Earth, the place of collective longing, an ideal of a harmonious community.[57] One can take different perspectives to the recurrent use of biblical themes in modern nationalisms. On the one hand, it indicates that nationalism has appropriated certain characteristics of a religion, and hence could be described as a 'political religion'; on the other hand, this is a clear example of the sacralization of the nation, i.e. of the nation's configuration as a sacred entity.

Once the existence and importance of the link between religion and nationalism is established, a whole new set of questions appears: how do they interact? How is this relationship structured; and what are the factors that form and influence it? There is a multitude of types of interaction and the results also vary from region to region and from period to period. In European history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries different processes in the realm of interaction of religion and nationalism took place: separation of the two, their hybridization and synthetization. They led to the creation of very different religious and national identities. One should always bear in mind that the setting is crucial for the outcome.

There are a number of explanatory models of the interplay between religion and nationalism available in contemporary scholarship; these models emphasize different aspects of the inter-relatedness and mutual influence of religion and nationalism. As the models raise

[56] Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, *Die Wiederkehr der Götter. Religion in der modernen Kultur* (München: C. H. Beck Verlag, 2004), 119.
[57] Graf, *Die Wiederkehr der Götter*, 119.

different questions, they are rather supplementary than mutually exclusive. None of them has the ambition to explain all possible phenomena, cases and variations that fall under the header 'religion and nationalism'.

An impressive part of studies on religion and nationalism come from German scholars. The role and place of religion in the history of German nationalism was analyzed, perhaps, better than any other European case.[58] In the center of scholarly scrutiny today is the bond between religion and nationalism, the issue of mutual infiltration of religious and national discourses, rather than religious roots of nationalism, or the role of institutionalized religion at the early stages of nation-building.

Martin Schulze Wessel defined *sacralization of the nation* as the transfer of functions and forms of display from religion to the nation. As a result of this transference a structural analogy occurred between modern nation and religion.[59] Thus, nation becomes a sacred entity.[60] *Nationalization of religion* in its turn describes an adjustment process in consequence of which religious people incorporate national values into their thoughts and actions. The aim was not to secularize, but rather to find a new modern justification for religion to retain its significance.[61] From a slightly different perspective the same phenomenon is often referred to as 'politicization of religion', when "as a consequence of an unexpected turning point in history, cults and religious symbols acquire definite political

[58] There is however new and upcoming research on other national contexts as well: Franziska Metzger, *Religion, Geschichte, Nation: Katholische Geschichtsschreibung in der Schweiz im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert - kommunikationstheoretische Perspektiven* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2010); Hans-Christian Maner, *Multikonfessionalität und neue Staatlichkeit. Orthodoxe, griechisch-katholische und römisch-katholische Kirche in Siebenbürgen und Altrumänien zwischen den Weltkriegen: 1918-1940* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2007); Ricarda Vulpius, *Nationalisierung der Religion. Russifizierungspolitik und ukrainische Nationsbildung: 1860-1920* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2005).

[59] Martin Schulze Wessel, ed., *Nationalisierung der Religion und Sakralisierung der Nation im östlichen Europa* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2006), 7.

[60] The connection between nation and the sacred is a complex one, and cannot be reduced to a simple model. During WWI and in its immediate aftermath in many European nations one could see a clear tendency to unite nation and religion through the act of consecration of the nation, royal dynasty and/or the ruler himself to God, and to the Sacred Heart of Jesus. In France, Belgium, Spain, etc. the act of the consecration had strong national(ist) connotations; as faithfulness to the Sacred Heart was seen as a guarantee of victory in War. Renato Moro, "Religion and Politics in the Time of Secularization: The Sacralization of Politics and Politicization of Religion," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 6, No.1 (June 2005): 73.

[61] Renato Moro, "Religion and Politics", 73.

meanings".[62] Although the term itself is contested by some – on the grounds that at least in Europe Christianity has always had an important political dimension to it – the point in itself is relevant. 'Politicization of religion' is often accompanied by the 'sacralization of politics', a concept that is similar to the 'sacralization of the nation' with the difference that it refers to the entire realm of the political, not just to the nation.

'Sacralization of politics', as a concept, emerged from the debate on political religion. In contrast to 'nationalization of religion', it "does not refer to the political mobilization of traditional religions, but to the modern political ideologies and movements which adapted religious habits to secular ends".[63] Contrary to the emphasis put on Christian roots of certain characteristics of modern politics described above, Emilio Gentile maintains that through the process of the sacralization, the political sphere in modern society takes on a religious character, which is autonomous from traditional religions or can even be hostile to them. Students of political religions usually underline the connection between secularization processes and the sacralization of politics; and the latter is seen as a result of the former.[64]

[62] Renato Moro, "Religion and Politics", 77.
[63] Emilio Gentile, "Political Religion: A Concept and its Critics – A Critical Survey," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 6, No.1 (June 2005): 29.
[64] There are also theories and explanatory models that do not directly address issues of religion and nationalism, but are still of importance for the discussion, as they either touch upon some details or provide interesting methodological and conceptual insights. 'Political religions' – a concept first introduced by Eric Vögelin in 1938 – was later on revived by scholars analyzing totalitarian regimes and ideologies. The term, its usage and applicability have been in the center of scholarly debate for many years, and no general agreement has been reached so far. In the narrow sense 'political religion' refers to an ideology (normally totalitarian, e.g. Fascism, National Socialism or Stalinism) which has a pseudo-religious nature and whose cults, rites and a salvation theory have religious character. Emilio Gentile remarked that "Although the expression 'political religion' was born before totalitarianism, only after it was associated with Bolshevism, fascism and Nazism in early comparative analyses of those regimes, did the concept of political religion became more prominent. It was employed to define the absolute exaltation of the party and of the state, the cult of the leader, mass fanaticism, rites and symbols of collective liturgies, which were fundamental aspects of the new totalitarian regimes". Gentile, "Political Religion", 25. In a broader meaning (which is a source of dispute) 'political religion' stands for a new type of 'true' religion that took form of a political ideology/ regime. Which ever the position, all authors agree that the phenomenon is closely related to the processes of secularization, modernity in general and 'the rebellion against God' in particular. This connection, whether accepted or not, opens up a range of research questions about the nature of religious change in modernity. If one agrees that in modern Europe nationalism was one of the formative factors in almost every sphere of life, then the discussion about political religions becomes very relevant for the research on religion and nationalism. Nationalism itself is often described as a political or a surrogate religion.

'Confessionalization of society and nation', 'the nineteenth century as the second confessional era', 're-confessionalization of society in the nineteenth century' – all of this falls into a large and vaguely defined pool of studies in nationalism and church history that underline the importance of religion in the nineteenth century and later on, especially regarding the development of modern nationalisms. Studies like Olaf Blaschke's or Helmut Walser Smith's make a strong point in this direction.[65] Nevertheless, there is no unanimity among researchers concerning applicability and relevance of the concept of (re-)confessionalization for nineteenth and early-twentieth century history.

The so-called 'confessionalization paradigm' [German: Konfessionalisierung] was originally coined by Heinz Schilling and Wolfgang Reinhard for the Early Modern period. It was used in order to describe the process of "a fundamental social transformation that includes ecclesiastical religious and psychological cultural changes as well as political and social ones".[66] The emphasis was made of the simultaneous formation of the early-modern state and new church structures – confessions that took place across Western and Central Europe from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. As Reinhard put it in one of his later re-statements of the theory: "advanced state-building favored effective 'Confessionalization' just as 'Confesionalization' favored state-building".[67] An important part of confessionalization was the churches' striving for the new groups to be as homogeneous as possible, i.e. for the 'confessionalization' of the subjects. The goal was achieved through close control over the educational system, press, migration policies, etc.

[65] Olaf Blaschke, "Das 19. Jahrhundert: Ein Zweites Konfessionelles Zeitalter?" *Geschichte und Gesellschaft: Zeitschrift für historische Sozialwissenschaft* 26, (2000): 38-75; Halmut Wesser Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict.*

[66] Heinz Schilling quoted in Thomas A. Brady, Jr., "Confessionalization – The Career of a Concept," in *Confessionalization in Europe: 1555 – 1700. Essays in Honor and Memory of Bodo Nischan,* ed. John M. Headley (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 4.

[67] Wolfgang Reinhard, "Reformation, Counter-Reformation, and the Early Modern State: A Reassessment," *The Catholic Historical Review* LXXV, No.3 (July 1989): 399.

When applied to the modern period in the most meaningful way confessionalization of politics/nation stands mostly for the creation of competitive national narratives and discourses about the nation by different confessional actors. This explanatory model is closely related to the one which makes use of 'nationalization of religion' and can be regarded as a particular case of the phenomenon. In this sense, when one does not talk about 'confessio' which essentially belongs to the Latin Christianity, but rather about religiously informed and inspired narratives of and about the nation, the problem of whether the confessionalization approach is applicable to the Orthodox cultures and nations does not seem unsolvable.

In Bismarck's Germany the Protestants "quarreled with the Catholics less about theology than about moral life and custom; less about the meaning of Christian ritual than the fate of national culture; less about God than the inner life of nations. In short, they quarreled with Catholics about history".[68] The rivalry between these narratives could eventually lead to their radicalization; in this sense national and religious feelings reinforced each other, as a group which identified itself by a religious marker had to enter into national competition. Helmut Walser Smith comes to an important conclusion (in this context) about German political Protestantism. He maintains that it had the potential for radical nationalism:

> Indeed, for some German Protestants, nationalism was not an ersatz for, but part of religious belief. […] religious belief supported national identity, provisioning it with memory, myth and tradition. In its ultramontane inflection Protestantism not only reinforced national identity, but equally important, Radićalized the discourse of German nationalism.[69]

Students of Eastern Europe can recognize easily the pattern. Should one exchange 'German' for 'Serbian' and 'Protestant' for 'East Orthodox', the statement would retain its accuracy and validity. The analysis of national narratives that were influenced by their authors' religious affiliation is of special importance for such cases as Germany, Switzerland

[68] Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict*, 54.
[69] Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict*, 236-237.

or Ukraine and Yugoslavia i.e. for societies with clear-cut religious divisions. Yet, similar development can be found in religiously homogenous cultures as well, if a religious narrative was clearly opposed to a secular(ist) one. This brings us once again to the argument about the necessity to look attentively into the causes of the long and powerful impact that the secularization narrative had. Religious mobilization could be triggered not only by the perceived threat of some other confessional/religious group, but also by the increasing (imagined or real) secularization. In such cases the clergy (and/or concerned members of a religious community), in order to mobilize population, defend and reinforce its own position and influence could use the secularization narrative as a justification for active involvement of institutionalized religion into public and political life.

Theoretical Framework and Research Questions

The current research project in its theoretical approach had two principal sources of inspiration and influence that guided the project as it developed. Both are an attempt to react to and reflect upon the state of the art of the field that lies on the intersection of the history of Serbia (and South Eastern Europe) and the religious history of Europe in the modern era. Both axes went through considerable change in the past two decades, the aspects of this evolution most relevant for the thesis, are outlined above. The first inspiration came from the profound critique of the secularization thesis that completely reformatted the field of religious studies and religious history in particular. The internalization of this critique primarily results in the way how religious tradition is treated in this dissertation; in an attempt to 'take religion seriously' and try to understand it in its own terms. In other words, it is an exercise in trying "to pay attention to how people describe their religious worlds,

acknowledging that the actual substance of a particular faith has a significance that transcends the social function of religion".[70]

The second guiding-line was the increasing feeling of uneasiness caused by the all too common and unreflective association of Serbian nationalism/Serbianness with Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Thus, I saw my task to be the close examination of the bond between the nation and religion in Serbia as it was imagined, created, supported and rejected in the interwar period. This exercise seems to be necessary for the understanding of the many developments of the 1990s and 2000s. I argue that in order to meet the aim it is necessary to show the complexity of the intellectual constructions created by the interwar East Orthodox clergy and lay thinkers who were closely connected to the Serbian Church. To demonstrate the ambiguities, self-contradictory character and vagueness of the national and religious bonds which were present even at the height of the fusion of Christianity and Serbian Nationalism, as it was precisely this density that allowed for the later simplification and use for purely political ends of interwar ideas. That is to say, that their mobilization potential has been used to the full extent in the interwar period as well as after the change of regime at the end of the twentieth century.

The German historian Hartmut Lehman pointed out that the task of church historians (and all others who deal with matters related to religion and religious institutions) is not to restrict their research only to "those aspects of religious life which are in complete agreement with official theology as taught in seminaries and in theological faculties". Because when they do so, they "fail to perceive how in coping with the contingencies of life people may have used and did indeed use a variety of religious approaches".[71] In this dissertation, 'religion' (limited only to the study of Eastern Orthodoxy) is understood as a set of beliefs,

[70] Brian Porter-Szűcs, "Introduction", 9.
[71] Hartmut Lehman, "History of Twentieth-Century Christianity as a Challenge for Historians," in Hartmut Lehmann, *Transformationen der Religion in der Neuzeit: Beispiele aus der Geschichte des Protestantismus* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2007), 219.

ideas and practices as they were articulated and performed by the institutions of the Serbian Orthodox Church, religious communities (organized groups and the community of believers in general) and individual figures, mostly public intellectuals, who explicitly or implicitly dealt with religion and faith in their work. Being no theologian myself, I do not intend to start any debate, which involves theological argument or discusses certain aspects of Christian doctrine. Instead, the focus is on the external secular implications such debates could have. The object of analysis here is not some abstract religion that has an agency of its own, but a consortium of people and communities that interacted with each other and reflected on the world around them, the world of political modernity, dynamic and full of challenges.

'Nation' and 'nationalism' are used nowadays so often in all sorts of scholarly and near-scholarly texts that their meaning is not always clear. Both terms are indeed overloaded with meanings and bear a burden of multiple interpretations. This thesis is based on the assumption that nation essentially is a modern phenomenon, a product of modernity and at the same time one of the formative components of the modern world, an axis around which a significant part of modern thinking is organized. It is also understood that the nation is a social, political and cultural construction, not a pre-given reality. This understanding of nation and nationalism is built to an extent on Benedict Anderson's concept of an 'imagined community', hence a lot of attention is paid to narratives, representations, to everything that belongs to a field of meanings and symbols that is associated with the national life.

Methodologically this dissertation is a project in intellectual history. It draws, often subconsciously, on the long and complex tradition of the discipline and combines parts of a number of approaches, of which the most important one is the direction in the history of political thought that is often referred to as the 'Cambridge-school'.[72] Sensitivity towards contextualization comes also from Roger Woods, who in his analysis of the 'conservative

[72] See e.g. J. G. A. Pocock, "The Concept of a Language and the Métier d'Historien: Some Considerations on Practice," in *The Languages of Political Theory in Early-modern Europe*, ed., Anthony Pagden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 19-38.

revolution' in Weimar Germany formulated an approach, which retains its validity today. Woods pleaded for conservative revolutionary thought "to be examined not as a static ideology but rather as ideas worked out in response to a series of conflicting pressures, as ideas which cannot simply be portrayed as if they were a political program, but rather an expression of tension".[73] The thesis seems to be applicable to virtually any kind of intellectual construction that has political and/or ideological relevance and was born out of a complex set of influences. And, so clearly was the case of the national political project(s) of the Serbian Orthodox Church as they were developed in the 1920s and 1930s. Attention to concepts, their formation and usage clearly derives from the methodology of *Begriffsgeschichte* in Germany.[74]

In general, this study is not about what the nation is. The question rather is *how* and *why* in given circumstances by certain groups of people a nation was imagined and conceptualized in a particular way. The emphasis is put on the continuous alternation of the discourses of national identity, ever-changing understanding of the Serbian nation, i.e. constant negotiations about what the nation means, how it should be represented and developed. Craig Calhoun said that "nations are constituted largely by the claims themselves, by the way of talking and thinking and acting that relies on these sorts of claims to produce collective identity, to mobilize people for collective projects, and to evaluate peoples and practices".[75] Homi Bhabha, a classic of nationalism studies, argued for the importance of textuality and immense value of close reading of texts written by and about nations: "Traditional histories do not take the nation at its own word, but, for the most part, they do

[73] Roger Woods, "The Radical Right: The 'Conservative Revolutionaries' in Germany," in *The Nature of the Right: European and American Politics and Political Thought since 1789*, eds., Roger Eatwell, Noël O'Sullivan (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989), 128.

[74] See e.g. Reinhart Koselleck, "Social History and Begriffsgeschichte," in *History of Concepts: Comparative perspectives*, eds., Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans, and Frank van Vree (Amsterdam University Press, 1998), 23-35.

[75] "Nations are constituted largely by the claims themselves, by the way of talking and thinking and acting that relies on these sorts of claims to produce collective identity, to mobilize people for collective projects, and to evaluate peoples and practices". Calhoun quoted in *Theorizing Nationalism*, eds., Graham Day and Andrew Thompson (Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 102.

assume that the problem lies with the interpretation of 'events' that have a certain transparency or privileged visibility".[76] Most of the following analysis deals with specific narratives of the Serbian and Yugoslav nation as they were created and articulated by multiple actors of the interwar period.

The question of agency and actors is vital for the present study, despite the fact that discourses and narratives very rarely have an easily identifiable author. Attention to the agency brings in the contextual aspect, for the narratives are grounded into social, cultural, and political reality as their creators and reproducers were. It has been pointed out that "intellectuals create different ideologies of national identity within a larger discursive universe of available materials. They do the imaginative ideological labor that brings together disparate cultural elements, selected historical memories, and interpretations of experiences, all the while silencing the inconvenient, the unheroic, and the anomalous".[77] There are of course groups of intellectuals within one and the same discursive national field who produce conflicting and even mutually exclusive ideas; it is the competition between discursively (and politically) rival national narratives that lies in the center of the current project.

A note on primary sources is necessary at this point. The analysis is based on the examination of a large pool of published sources, and involves only a handful of unpublished materials. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, the analysis of public discourses and debates presupposes a focus on public open sources: publications in press, individual booklets, and parliamentary debates, etc. The survey of press over a twenty years period also allows for a perspective on the dynamic development of the debates in time, one can see how new questions gained prominence, and old one were rethought, etc. Secondly, the archives of the Serbian Orthodox Church are, unfortunately, almost impossible to access for a researcher

[76] Homi K. Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge, 1990), 3.
[77] Ronald Grigor Suny and Michael D. Kennedy, eds., *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 2.

who is not affiliated with this or any other religious institution.[78] Some important issues seem to be irresolvable without archival documents, i.e. the question of regional cooperation between Serbian, Bulgarian and Romanian Orthodox Churches.

The problem of accessibility of the Serbian Church archives is not new, and has been there for decades. In an attempt to counter the obstacle many researchers made extensive use of the state archives, which contain interesting material. In my research, I draw upon this extensive archival research and combine its findings with the close reading of official church publications, which reflect day-to-day church affairs. The list of the main periodicals scrutinized in the dissertation includes both the official publications of the Serbian Orthodox Church and newspapers and journals run by various groups and societies, professional and local. In 1920 after a break caused by WWI the Serbian Church renewed the publication of its official organ *Herald: The Official Newspaper of the Serbian Orthodox Church* [Glasnik: Zvanični list Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve] It has been continuous since. The subtitle changed several times, for the most of the interwar period is was "The official Newspaper of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate". Among other important periodicals are: *The Courier: Ecclesiastical, Political and Social Newspaper* [Vesnik: Crkveno-politički i društveni list] (1919-1930); *Christian Life: Monthly Journal of Christian Culture and Essclesiastical Life* [Hrišćanski život: mesečni časopis za hriščansku kulturu i crkveni život] (1922-1927); *Christian Thought: Journal for Christian and Social Questions* [Hrišćanska misao: Časopis za hrišćanska i društvena pitanja] (1935-1941); *Svetosavlje: Publication of the Students of the Orthodox Theology Department* [Svetosavlje: Organ studenata Pravoslavnog bogoslovskog faulteta] (1932-1941); and, *Theology: Publication of the Belgrade University Orthodox*

[78] In an informal conversation a librarian of the Library of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate, which is the open to general public, confirmed that a special recommendation letter from a high-ranking church official would be necessary for gaining access to archival materials. He also confessed, that use of the Church archives even for those few who have been granted access is significantly complicated by the fact that there the catalogs and descriptions of archival collections are in very poor condition.

Theology Department [Bogoslovlje: Organ Pravoslavnog bogoslovskog fakulteta u Beogradu] (1926-1940).

Individually published sources, i.e. pamflets and brochures, were of special importance for the analysis of the Concordate debate (Chapter IV). They were also nesseary to track down the marginal voices from within the Church, who did not neccessarily make it to the pages of central press publications.

One of the aims of the project was also to describe and analyze phenomena that is most often treated only in relation to a specific national context, in such terms that the Serbian case becomes comparable to other European cases. The project, thus, is not comparative, however desirable that would have been, but adopts the attitude of extensive contextualization whenever it seems appropriate and possible. This opens up an infinite sequence of research questions: Do things work for Orthodox Christianity in the same way they do for Latin Christianity? Is Political Orthodoxism comparable to Political Catholicism? What is the specific role of the Yugoslav political context in the formation of the Serbian Orthodox political project?

Structure of the thesis

This thesis is organized chronologically; apart from the Introduction and Conclusion it has four research chapters and an Epilogue. A chronological structure was chosen in order to highlight the temporal dimension of the changes and emphasize the significance of dynamic political and cultural contexts. Each chapter covers a period (although not strictly defined) that is defined by a beginning/end of a process significant for the development of the political project of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Chapters II, III and IV follow the same logic internally, which theoretically should allow the reader not to get lost in detail and always know how the argument unfolds.

Each chapter opens with the introduction and analysis of the general political context. The second part discusses institutional changes and challenges, i.e. church-state relations and issues of internal Church organization. And the third, concluding part focuses on the narratives and discourse of the Church in relation to the political and socio-cultural contexts, as well as the challenges of the church-state relationship in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and beyond.

Chapter I stands apart as it provides a necessary historical background for the main body of research. It deals with the pre-WWI period with a specific focus on the two decades prior to the Great War. The next three chapters do not follow the 'classic' periodization of political history of interwar Yugoslavia.[79] Instead, attention is shifted to the events that were of special significance for the SPC and other religious communities: the establishment of the Patriarchate in 1924; church-consolidation reforms which ended by the early 1930s and thus overlap with the beginning of the dictatorship period; the start of the religious festivals in the mid-30s, the Concordat crisis and the collapse of the state in 1941.

Chapter II covers the period from the creation of the new state (and a little bit before, whenever the public discussion was relevant) to the mid 1920s. The latter time limit is tied to the creation of the Serbian Patriarchate and the surrounding reforms, debates, etc. Chapter III takes up at the time when the unification of the Church was largely completed and follows the introduction of the royal dictatorship up to the death of King Aleksandar in 1934. Chapter IV begins with the end of the dictatorship and follows up to the collapse of the state in the invasion in 1941. It focuses on the festivities and debates of the year of St. Sava; the events

[79] According to the most typical periodization the interwar decades are divided the following way: a) 1918-1928 the period of parliamentary democracy; b) 1929 – 1935 the period of royal dictatorship; and c) 1935-1941 from the death of Aleksandar to the Nazi invasion and the partition of Yugoslavia (see for example Mark Biondich, "The Historical Legacy: The Evolution of Interwar Yugoslav Politics, 1918-1941," in *State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia's Disintegration*, eds., Lenard J. Cohen and Jasna Dragović-Soso (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 2008), 43.

surrounding the negotiation and eventual failure of the Concordat with the Holy See. In the Epilogue the developments of the Second World War and post-1945 are briefly outlined.

Chapter I

Religion and Serbian State- and Nation-Building before 1918

Ivo Banac, nowadays a mandatory classic for the students of Balkan history and politics, argued that in the late-nineteenth century

> [T]he Serbs, because of the patriotic tradition of Serbian Orthodoxy, *naturally* looked upon their Church as a national institution. Even when they were totally irreligious, many of their intellectuals propagated Orthodoxy, much to the irritation of those who wished to establish pure linguistic Serbianism.[80]

Banac captured the view that was (and still is) widely shared by the academic community. If there is one non-contested aspect of the Serbian tradition of writing and thinking about national history, it is the view that Eastern Orthodox Christianity and the Serbian Orthodox Church as its representative institution contributed a great deal to the preservation of the Serbian national identity under Ottoman rule and the creation of the independent Serbian state in the nineteenth century. The degree to which this position, initially articulated and promoted by the Serbian Church, came to be accepted by all layers of society and professional commentators is truly astonishing. Banac, of course, is right in his observation that the representatives of the entire political spectrum in Serbia (with the single exception of rather marginal social-democrats) accepted Orthodoxy as an important part of the national cultural and spiritual heritage. In the party program of 1889 the Liberals (who one might assume were rather secular and anti-clerical) stated that they would act "in accordance with the traditions of the ancient Serbian state and the spirit of the Orthodox Church"[81], implying that the two more or less coincide. However, Banac as many other scholars before and after him, does not scrutinize the nature of this essential link between the state and the Church, nationalism and religion. A critical approach to the matter does not presuppose a complete

[80] Banac, *National Question in Yugoslavia*, 107. Italics are mine.
[81] Program of the Liberal Party (1889), in *Programi i statuti Srpskih političkih stranaka do 1918. g.*, eds., Vasilije Krestić and Radoš Ljušić (Belgrade: Književne novine, 1991), 171.

negation of this point of view; it does nonetheless historicize it and raises questions about those who have created this well-established narrative. In other words, it is important to analyze how it occurred that the link between the nation and religion was seen as natural. This chapter deals with the narratives that contributed to the forging of this link in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. As such, it provides the historical background, telling a pre-history of the interwar developments. The creation the Yugoslav state in 1918 was a great rupture. In order to grasp the depth of the change, one has to have at least an overview of how the state of affairs in the preceding period looked.

Before the Nation-State: Serbs under Habsburg and Ottoman Rule

After the last bits of the medieval Serbian state fell down under the military pressure of the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth century, and its territories were incorporated into imperial framework, the majority of the Christian Orthodox Slavic speaking population of the Balkans found themselves to be the subjects of the Sultan. In the course of the military, economic and diplomatic fight between the Ottoman Empire and various European states, primarily the Habsburg Empire, the northern border of the Ottoman territories was shifting back and forth. As, since the eighteenth century the border moved mostly in the direction shrinking the Ottoman lands, and a major migration from southern Serbia (today's Kosovo and Metohia) took place in two waves in the late seventeenth and the first third of the eighteenth century, the Serbs who populated the northern fringes of the Empire were to be found on both sides of the border.

In the Ottoman Empire, to whom a significant portion of the Serbian lands belonged technically till the Congress of Berlin (1878), the basis of the administrative division of lands and governance was religion. In the Ottoman *millet system* all peoples of the Empire were divided into five big communities according to their religious affiliation: Muslim, Orthodox

Christian (*Rum millet*), Jewish, Armenian (Apostolic, Catholic and Evangelical), and Syriac Orthodox. The Ottoman system specifically referred to the separate legal courts pertaining to personal law under which minorities were allowed to rule themselves (in cases not involving any Muslim) with fairly little interference from the Ottoman government. Thus, in Rum millet upper clergy of Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbs represented their respective communities in front of the Ottoman authorities. The traditional Serbian national narrative has it that the Orthodox Church was the most important nationally based institution that survived during the five centuries of the Turkish rule; that the Church played a pivotal role in the preservation of the national identity in the absence of the nation-state and during the nineteenth century struggle for national liberation.

When at the turn on the eighteenth century Serbs under the leadership of their Patriarch, Arsenije Černojević, moved from the Kosovo region to southern Hungary they were granted by Emperor Leopold I a set of privileges. Most importantly, they comprised of freedom of the Orthodox religion and internal autonomy, including education. The Patriarch, who settled in Sremski Karlovci, was regarded by the Imperial government as the head of the Serb population and was endowed with secular powers such as particular judgment in civil disputes, collection of feudal dues, and disposal of heirless properties.[82] The privileges were granted to the Serbian Orthodox Church and were not dependent on a territorial base, which meant that the Serbian Orthodox citizens could enjoy their rights wherever they settled. Similar to the situation in the Ottoman Empire, the clergy became the leaders of the whole Serb community within the borders of the Habsburg Empire. National Church Councils (*Narodno-crkveni sabor*) that were held regularly came to resemble national assemblies. Their official task was to elect bishops, heads of monasteries and the Patriarch; in practice, however, they also discussed "general problems and matters of interest to the Serbian

[82] Robert A. Kann and Zdenek V. David, *The Peoples of the Eastern Habsburg Lands, 1526-1918* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1984), 181; J.H. Šviker, *Politička istorija srba u Ugarskoj* (Novi Sad: Matica srpska, 1998), 25.

community".[83] This peculiar situation is often referred to by historians as "the Habsburg version of *millet*".[84]

While negotiating in 1690 the conditions on which the refugees from the Ottoman territories would settle in the Empire, Leopold I talked about recognizing the Serbian military leader *vojvoda* as secular head of the community. That would have been Djordje Branković (1645-1711). The government, however, never fulfilled its promise. Although Branković was initially recognized by the authorities and even was given a title of Count of the Holy Roman Empire, he was kept in Vienna and never allowed to execute his duties.[85] Leopold I agreed on having vice-vojvoda, but even this decision was revoked in 1706, during the Rakozi insurrection. Leopold I reconfirmed the privileges of 1690, but the Serbs were forbidden to have even vice-vojvoda as military leader. What was probably more symbolic, the next head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Arsenije III died by that time, held the title of Metropolitan, instead of Patriarch.[86]

During the reign of Joseph II more active intervention of the Vienna administration in Serb religious affairs and restrictions on their national autonomy began. In 1770 and 1777 the Metropolitan's secular powers were abolished, in 1776 Orthodox schools were placed under the government control, in 1777 the Illyrian Court Deputation was abolished and its functions were assigned to the Hungarian Court Chancellery.[87] In 1779 the general introduction of the Hungarian county system began, meaning that the estates took control over the lands previously under Vienna jurisdiction. The Banat was somehow an exception and was not reincorporated into Hungary.

[83] Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*: *Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1983), Vol.1, 149.
[84] Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, 149.
[85] Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Serbia: The History behind the Name* (London: Hurst & Co., 2002), 20.
[86] Yuriy Kostiashov, *Serbi v Avstriyskoy monarkhii v XVIII veke* (Kaliningrad, 1997), 38.
[87] Kostiashov, *Serbi v Avstriyskoy monarkhii* 67; Kann and Zdenek, *The Peoples of the Eastern Habsburg Lands*, 280.

Throughout the centuries the Serbs would constantly insist on having *vojvoda* as their secular leader, but were never able to achieve this goal. Nevertheless, the name *Vojvodina* stuck to the territories inhabited by the Serbs and remains on the map up to the present time. Hence the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, i.e. the Patriarch and later the Metropolitan, was not only the spiritual leader of the Serbian community within the Habsburg monarchy, but also represented the higher administrative authority and was recognized as such by Vienna.

Under these conditions the cultural influence of the Orthodox Church became very strong, which resulted in the way ethnic and national identity was preserved and developed. When the Turks abolished the Patriarchate of Peć in 1776, the center of Serb spiritual life had already long moved to Hungary. And, as Ivo Banac pointed out, "by that time the Habsburg Serbs were increasingly adjusting themselves to the cultural climate of Central Europe".[88] This meant that for a significant period of time ideas, technologies of modernity were transmitted via the Vojvodina Serbs from the more developed Habsburg territories to Belgrade *pashalik.*

By the early-nineteenth century, Vienna, Pest, Novi Sad, and Sremski Karlovci were main centers of Serbian cultural and intellectual life.[89] For a number of reasons it remained so until quite late into the nineteenth century. The Enlightenment intellectual and political tradition, which importantly included anti-clericalism, also took root in the Serbian intellectual community, however small it was. Dositej Obradović, a former Orthodox monk, the first Serbian Minister of Education, and the most significant author of the Serbian Enlightenment, emphasized in his work anticlericalism and anti-traditionalism. As Ljubinka Trgovčević observed, Habsburg religious tolerance and the new anti-clericalism helped the

[88] Banac. *The National Question in Yugoslavia*, 65.
[89] For instance, Jovan Rajić's four-volume *Istoriia slavenskikh narodov, naipache Bolgar, Khorvatov i Serbov* [The History of Various Slavic Peoples, especially the Bulgars, Croats and the Serbs], the first significant history of the Serbs to be published appeared in Vienna in 1794-95.

Orthodox Serbs "to liberate themselves from the strong traditionalist impact of their church. Both education and a new awareness of their own rights strengthened national consciousness, eventually leading to the creation of a nation state and modern national culture".[90]

Working Together: Church and State in Independent Serbia

Almost immediately after Serbia acquired a degree of political autonomy within the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire (1815), Prince Miloš Obrenović, the leader of the Second Serbian Uprising and the founder of one of the two Serbian ruling dynasties, started negotiating with both secular and church authorities in Istanbul about the re-establishing of an independent Serbian national Orthodox Church.[91] In the course of the nineteenth century parallel to the struggle for an independent state, the Serbian Orthodox Church sought to become the national church in its full sense and to be independent from the Constantinople Patriarchate. As Pedro Ramet rightly noted, "the establishment of national patriarchates in Bulgaria and Serbia, in particular, figured as part of the state-building process and was closely associated with the assertion of national identity".[92] He argues further that "Church autocephaly has been usually valued both as authentication of Christian culture/national identity and as an assurance of the exclusion of foreign clerical or even political influence".[93] The second part of the argument applies to the Bulgarian case much more than to the Serbian one, as unlike in Bulgaria the conflict with the Greek hierarchy was not a formative experience for the Serbian clergy and lay political elite.

[90] Ljubinka Trgovčević, "The Enlightenment and the Beginnings of Modern Serbian Culture," *Balcanica* XXXVII (2006): 110.
[91] For a detailed account of the church's involvement in national liberation see: *Rol' religii v formirovanii yuzhnoslavianskih naciy* or Vasa Čubrilović, "Srpska pravoslavna crkva pod Turcima od XV do XIX veka" and a monumental study Djoko Slijepčević, *Istorija Srpske Pravoslavne crkve*. Vol. 2 *Od početka XIX veka do kraja drugog svetskog rata*.
[92] Ramet, *Eastern Christianity*, 7.
[93] Ramet, *Eastern Christianity*, 18.

Institutional history of the Serbian Church in the nineteenth century is a story of the transition from the 'millet system' to the nation-state framework. Accompanied by many problems, this transformation sometimes resembled a struggle for survival. Lack of material and human resources was coupled with the situation of legal chaos and disunity: separate dioceses existed in Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Hungary (the latter two were foreign territories, often unfriendly); not all of them were under the rule of Belgrade Metropolitan. The relationship between two major centers, Belgrade and Sremski Karlovci (in southern Hungary, today's Vojvodina) was not ideal. Archbishop Mojsej in 1895, in his book *Church Question in Serbia*, which focused on the crisis of 1881 and the conflict of Metropolitan Mihailo and King Milan, mentions an episode connected with the election of a new Metropolitan and the unjustified (from the author's point of view) involvement of the Metropolitan of Sremski Karlovci in it. Mojsej accuses the Serbian government for having such a careless strategy of asking for help of Austria in a deeply national affair: election of a new Metropolitan. He tries to convince the government of his own (i.e. Serbian) superior position in comparison with the Metropolitan of Sremski Karlovci, who allegedly serves Austrian interests. He asks rhetorically "Did our government realize to what a threat it exposed peace and order in the church of our nation, and with that the base of its survival and development in the national spirit"[94] when it decided to ask for the help of Austrians?

Institutional disintegration is normally held the chief reason for the Serbian Church's support of the Yugoslav cultural and later political project. The Serbian clergy saw in it a possibility for the unification of the numerous Church jurisdictions in one legal entity. And that was easier to achieve in the framework of a common state. In fact, despite the seemingly complete overlap of interests, the church-state relationship in Serbia was complex, problematic and far from ideal. One of the prime points of contention was the view held by a

[94] Mojsej, episkop, *Crkveno pitanje u Srbiji* (Belgrade: Štamparija Pere Todorovića, 1895), 83.

part of the upper clergy that "the metamorphosis of Orthodoxy into an extension of the state, as the religious expression of the nation, weakened the church".[95] Should this be true, the argument put forward by Banac and quoted in the opening of this chapter seems rather more problematic than it appears at first glance.

From the Church's point of view, the history of the church-state relationship, from the moment of the formal independence of the Church (1830), was a story of a gradual loss of Church's independent position within state framework. From the perspective of the young Serbian state, it was trying to make a necessary step: to override the Church institutions and to establish structures of the secular state as the only source of legitimate power in the principality. The state did not hesitate to intervene in the internal affairs of the Church, and the Church was gradually giving in. The removal of Metropolitan Mihailo in 1881 and his seven year long exile is usually regarded as the perfect illustration of this process.[96]

In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, Skupština, (the Serbian Parliament) passed a number of laws regulating various church related procedures. The crucial one was on the electoral procedure for a new Metropolitan. The King could not forget how difficult it was to find a way to expel Mihailo in 1881. After the Metropolitan's return to Serbia from exile, a new law was passed that basically put the entire procedure under the control of the King: the council that elected the Metropolitan now included members of Parliament and some ministers appointed by the King. Thus, the system in which secular authorities had the upper hand in the elections and appointments of relevant people to important positions was

[95] Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture, and Religion in Yugoslavia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 51.

[96] The conflict between Mihailo, the Metropolitan of Serbia, and the Archbishop of Belgrade (1826-1898) was purely political and had little to do with church-state relations. Mihailo was an active and influential member of the Liberal Party, and notably a close associate of its leader Jovan Ristić. Unlkie the Prime Miniseter, Ristić, and the Metropoitan, Prince Milan (King from 1882), was not a russofile in his foreign policy. After the disappointment with Russia's behavior at the Congress of Berlin, Milan reoriented Serbia's foreign policy preferences towards Vienna. Ristić resigned in diagreement. Metropolitan Mihailo stayed and opposed the foreign policy of the new governemnt in which the Progressive Party was now playing the first role. It took some months, before Milan and the governemnt found a way to remove the Church hierarch. Mihailo was dismissed on the grounds of his and generally clergy's opposition to the new taxation law, which introduced new payments for the clergy.

created. It remained in action until 1918, only to be reinstated in a slightly different format in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia after WWI.

The material and financial state of the Serbian Church throughout the nineteenth century was remarkably poor. One of the most pressing requests repeatedly made was concerned with the issue of the fixed annual salary that the parish priests wanted to receive from the state. The government in its turn repeatedly rejected this idea. Meanwhile, parish priests had to perform agricultural activities together with their flock in order to survive, as the money they got from the flock for their work and charity was not enough. The critique of this situation that came from the priests themselves was fairly logical, as their main argument was that under such conditions a priest cannot perform all required activities with a desired degree of commitment. In order to achieve its goal the Serbian Orthodox Church had to justify its request in the eyes of the national public and to find ways to persuade the government that the measures the Church was asking for were indeed essential. Statistical data shows that the number of priests in relation to 1000 citizens decreased continuously from 0,91 in 1846 to 0,6 in 1874 to 0,35 in 1914 and is often used to prove the story of decline.[97]

However, the Orthodox Church in Serbia enjoyed many privileges and, as it often happens in religiously homogeneous and rather traditional societies, took most of them for granted. Under the Serbian constitution of 1903 (as well as under the previous constitution from 1888), Greek Orthodox Christianity was recognized as the official state religion, and all state national holidays were celebrated with church ritual; religious instruction was compulsory in the entire country.[98] That is to say, that the process of church-state separation was not completed, moreover, one could argue it had barely started. Interestingly enough,

[97] Radić, *Verska elita i modernizacija*, 169. It is importnat to note that the narrative of the diminishing church presence of authority can and is used by at least two positions. Firstly, by the church itself who laments the situation, and secondly by the proponents of the modernization/secularization theory who see in these figures an undisputable proof in favor of the argument: the decline of religion.
[98] Ramet, *Eastern Chrustianity*, 233.

neither side saw it as an absolute necessity at least for the time being, a development worth attention when seen comparatively in European perspective. One of the prime reasons for the reluctance of both secular and Church authorities to elaborate on the issue of church-state separation laid in the role ascribed to Orthodox Christianity, its structures and institution in Serbian nationalism.

The Serbian Church and the Idea of Serbian Nationalism prior to WWI

One of the chief arguments regarding the contribution of Eastern Orthodoxy in general, and the Serbian Church specifically to the national cause was based upon the fact that all the medieval Serbian rulers were canonized as Orthodox saints. Serbian clergy indeed put considerable effort into the preservation of the memory of the Serbs' glorious past. Since the eighteenth century religious cults of the Nemanjić dynasty were established across Serbian territories and quickly gained prominence in church ritual as well as public consciousness. One of the most important for contemporaries, as well as for the future generations, was the cult of Prince Lazar, the main protagonist of Kosovo epic and myth. It has been noted by various scholars, that "in popular perception Kosovo became a paradigm of a just struggle, self-sacrifice and dying on the 'cross of honour' for a 'golden freedom'". In the course of the nineteenth century, as a paradigm of collective self-understanding "Kosovo became intimately tied to the life of an entire people which was gradually becoming aware of itself as a nation in the context of other European nations and aspiring to define itself as one, in counter-distinction to the wretched 'raja' (rayah) of the Ottoman Empire"[99]. In its capacity of a foundational myth, and a part of the nation-building process the Kosovo epos has analogies in many European contexts. This interpretation of the myth is well known and is widely spread across historical studies.

[99] Milica Bakic-Hayden, "National Memory and Narrative Memory: The Case of Kosovo," in *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory*, ed. Maria Todorova (New York: New York University Press, 2004), 34.

However, the Kosovo myth could and should also be read and interpreted in the framework of the interaction between religious and secular actors. In this analytical framework, it can be seen as an important, but not the singular instance of the sacralization of nation. Should one opt for such an approach, the discursive practice of a religions community and religious institutions become as important as the discourse of 'mainstream' secular national actors. In this framework, religious community is treated as an important actor and the discourse it has created is taken on its own terms. This sub-chapter looks at the narratives employed by the Serbian Church in the discussion of nationalism and politics broadly speaking, beyond the Kosovo theme. The temporal focus is on the two decades before WWI. The narrative presented here adds nuances and complexity to a somewhat more conventional story told by the students of nationalism and politics, e.g. by the renowned Peter F. Sugar (see Introduction).

The Serbian Church and Politics: Why should we get involved?

One would expect the Church, that considered itself to be an important national institution, to keep track and react to major political events and trends in Serbia and elsewhere, to be an active public actor. Nonetheless, with rare exceptions such as Metropolitan Mihailo, individual clerics were surprisingly silent even as late as the turn of the twentieth century. This passivity could be partially explained with the poor educational level of the greater part of clerics on the one hand, and their pre-occupation with the matters of immediate importance that often bordered the survival issues, on the other. Furthermore, the judgments that were cast in their greater mass were predictable. The 1903 *coup d'état* and the change of the dynasty, deemed so important by the contemporaries as well as by the generations of historians, is a good example.

In 1903, after the assassination of Alexander Obrenović and his wife in a coup orchestrated by the Serbian military, Petar Karadjordjević became the new Serbian King. There cannot be any doubts that the Serbian political elite perceived this event as the opening of a new period in the national life. The modernizing western-oriented elite had high hopes linked to the new sovereign who was raised in Western Europe, had received a good classical education and translated J.S. Mill's *On Liberty* into Serbian. They expected the new King to promote and strengthen democracy in Serbia. The religious elite, generally more conservative, in its turn also hoped that with the coming of the new ruler things would become better. It hoped that the "new period will be inspired by the spirit of general renaissance, which will also help us, the clergy, to create from the people's heart a reach treasury of moral good".[100] The hopes of the Serbian clergy, who "waited impatiently for the new governmental program […] to see whether it will include in its agenda the question about promotion of the Church and the clergy", remained unfulfilled. To their great disappointment in the governmental address presented to the Parliament there was not a single word about the Church.[101]

Even a brief glance through the row of church publications from the two decades before the Great War gives a strong impression that the Serbian Orthodox Church was obsessed with the idea of proving its own magnitude with all available means. The number of deep, reflexive and critical (from any point of view) publications is very limited. They were authored by those few who had better education and felt it was important to make their voices heard. One of the most important differences of the periods before WWI and WWII was this lack or presence, respectively, of voices from below. The glorification and idealization of the past and sharp and even aggressive criticism of the present was, perhaps, the most widely

[100] Lj. Kalušević, "Čuvajmo naše moralno blago," *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1904): 125.
[101] N.D. Božić, "Sveštencima narodnim poslanicima," *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1903): 980.

used technique. The answer to the question "Is it true that with every year our society falls down in the increasing moral deficit?" was positive by default.[102]

In the first decade of the twentieth century the feeling of dissatisfaction and even frustration started to gain ground in the circles of higher clergy. In 1905 one of the few reflexive authors, published a lengthy article *Current Questions in the Serbian Church*, in which he touched upon the issue of the Serbian politics and its impact on society and the Church.

> When we will become sober from today's party drunkenness, when the party fire will go out, which today with its flames seized all the children of this land that is called Serbia, then sober we will notice even deeper wounds on the moral and religious side of our Fatherland, and will feel even harder pains, and then we will come back to the question: how can they be cured, and what is to be done so that damaged and crannied building of the religious and moral life of our people gets better and in order, so that in the future we would be the same people…[103]

The criticism of Mihajlović is not surprising. It represents a larger spectrum of political opinion, that overall can be characterized as mildly conservative, and was permeated with the acute feeling of the coming crisis. The inevitable crisis was often associated with the advance of modernity and technological progress. As one of the most prolific church publicists of the time, Miloš Andjelković stated, "one has to mourn over the fact that today in the world next to the progress and civilization there is less sincerity, less morals than we should have".[104] From all the evils of modernity it was atheism and materialism that the Church feared the most:

> More that 100 years have passed since the times of Rousseau, science and education, culture and civilization made big progress and proceed with big steps from one year to another. But together with this process broaden and develop atheist and materialist theories… Contemporary state of moral order in society is based on the principle opposite to the Christian morals – it is based on rough egoism…[105]

The egoism, which is opposed to the Christian morality, could be translated into a critique of liberalism. It is hard to tell whether the criticism of modernity was grounded in theological

[102] Petar S. Protić, "O moralnom vaspitavanju u školama," *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1895): 2.
[103] D. Mihajlović, "Savremena Pitanja u Srpskoj Crkvi," *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1905): 678.
[104] Miloš Andjelković, "Bez vere nema morala," *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1895): 916-917.
[105] Protić, "O moralnom vaspitavanju u školama," 5.

arguments, or was a mere political opportunism. In the early-twentieth century the Serbian Radical Party, who had a large number of the lower clergy in its membership, had already shifted from its left socialist background to national populist rhetoric. Pasic and his colleagues often used similar types of populist critique and appealed to the national sense of collectivity, as opposed to either class or a liberal individual.

Mihajlović's passage, in which he shares the concern about the state of morals in Serbia, is interesting also for its implicit criticism of a too active political life of the clergy:

> We hope that the renewed monkshood, a new generation of monks will … correct the mistakes of their predecessors and in their hidden monastic cells with their sincere *prayers for the happiness and progress of their people and their tribe, with a lot of love and devotion will work on the moral and cultural revival of their people and their Fatherland…* [106]

The mentioning of monks who pray calmly and devotedly in their secluded monasteries was supposed to create an image of stark contrast with those parish priests who preferred party rallies to sermon and sacrament.

The issue of the priests taking part in political life was acute for a number of reasons. At the turn of the century, it was a rather widespread phenomenon in the Serbian countryside that it was a priest (and/or a teacher) who acted as a main source of information but also of opinion about the outside world, the capital city, and politics. A large portion of the Orthodox parish clergy belonged to the Serbian Radical Party of Nikola Pasic, which after the 1903 coup dominated the political scene in the Kingdom.

The arguments in favor of this *status quo* were the following: the right of priests as citizens to take part in party politics is secured by the Constitution (put forward by the Radicals); active political position of the clergy would secure a situation when "in all parties there will be people filled by religious feelings, inclined to the Church and the clergy" (articulated by the Church higher clergy).[107] Yet another argument (usually put forward by

[106] Mihajlović, *Savremena Pitanja u Srpskoj Crkvi*, 359.
[107] D.D., "Pred izbore narodnih poslanika,"*Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1912): 98.

the Radicals who politically benefited the most from active participation of the parish priests in political life) was based on the concept of civic duty of the clergy, who, as a better educated part of society, was to guide politically non-educated and immature population and to make sure that political demagogues (read political opponents of the Radicals) do not confuse them.[108] Presence of the critical mass of priests in the parliament, in the eyes of some, potentially could have a positive effect on the work of the legislative body, in the sense that it would pass necessary laws for the Serbian Church. Nikola D. Božić, the parish priest of the Belgrade Cathedral in the early-twentieth century and the proto-presbyter of the Belgrade district, appealed in the pages of *Courier of the Serbian Church* to his fellow priests in Skupština to advance the Church question in parliamentary debates and to convince the deputies to pass the law on Church authorities which got stuck in Parliament.[109]

Approximately, from 1907-1908, *Courier of the Serbian Church* began to pay more attention to the parliamentary debates, especially when it was a priest who held a speech. A special section under the title *From the National Parliament* was started, where some of the speeches, that the editorial board considered to be important, were published. Interestingly, most of them were concerned with the material/financial state of the parish priests. In order to legitimize their request for greater state support, the orators used the same arguments most of the other articles of *Courier of the Serbian Church* employed: the Serbian Orthodox Church contributed a lot to the national progress; Orthodoxy led the country to the community of cultured states and gives Serbia the right to remain within the circle of these civilized states.[110] It was a historically oriented narrative that lacked a deeper philosophical or metaphysical dimension.

[108] Božić, *Sveštencima narodnim poslanicima*, 121.
[109] Božić, *Sveštencima narodnim poslanicima*, 982-984.
[110] "Iz narodne Skupštine" [A speech of archpriest Milan Djurić], *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1909): 309. The same argument is present in many other articles, e.g. "Narodnoj Skupštini"(1904): 979-982.

One of the "loud cases" when the clergy actually did react to the parliamentary debates took place in 1909. Church representatives in the parliament brought in the case of a school teacher who was accused of propagating atheism outside the class-room. They argued that "a teacher always remains a teacher, a priest remains a priest, and a professor remains a professor" in order to enlighten the environment in which he works by his personal example.[111] Naturally, the clergy found him guilty of spreading atheistic views and damaging the society.

This discussion triggered something very important in terms of the transformation in the rhetoric. In his denunciatory speech, Archpriest and a member of the Radical Party, Milan Djurić extended the historicist argument into the present time. He claimed that East Orthodox Christianity was the foundation of the Serbian state; hence it was the task of [the deputies/the people] to preserve this "vivifying force, force of persuasion for freedom, happiness, culture and progress of the Serbian people, for our freedom and its future".[112] He went on to mention St. Sava and his great deeds, and concluded that the Serbian Orthodox Church is united with the Serbian nation, and "the Serbian Church is the source of the vitality of the Serbian people".[113] Clearly, this kind of rhetoric was different from the then traditional historicist argument employed by the Church and anticipates the rhetoric of the Serbian Orthodox Church from the mid-1930s. At the same, there are reasons sufficient to claim that Djurić did not aim at the fusion of the Serbian national identity and East Orthodox Christianity and that there was no serious theoretical/theological thought behind it. He was well known for his oratory skills, and the tendency towards patriotic style. Milan Stojadinović, Yugoslav Minister of Finance and Prime Minister in the 1930s, later recalled that Djurić had the habit to make references in his parliamentary speeches to "the bones of the forefathers". He also recalled that Djurić, who was the leader of the Radical Party in the town of Užice, spent more

[111] "Iz narodne Skupštine," 938.
[112] "Iz narodne skupštine," 940.
[113] "Iz narodne skupštine," 941-943.

time at political meetings and conferences than he did in his parish church.[114] Yet, it is important to register the appearance of this rhetoric if only on the margins of the political public sphere, for it may shed light on the origins of the nationalistic discourse of Nikolaj Velimirović a decade later. The fact that the 1909 case of a school teacher made it all the way to Parliament demonstrates that the work of the Church with the public was not absolutely in vain.

National or Social: Alternative Visions of the Serbian Orthodox Church

Nationalism by all means was the most powerful feeling that formatted political field in Serbia in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century. There was no non-national politics. That is why, in order to understand how and why the Serbian Orthodox Church related to the political sphere, one has to be sensitive to what the hierarchy and clergy though and publicly said about the national sphere, national life and the nation.

By the turn of the century, the nationally oriented historical narrative was already a fixed one and had a number of significant features. The most important of them was the contribution of the Church to the defense of and being an inspiration to the Serbian national identity. The overwhelming majority of the clergy who ever happened to write on this issue underlined the role the Church had had during the fight for liberation, as well as the fact that the Serbian Church has always been national [narodna]. Such a position of the Church led inevitably to the construction of a specific national canon, as the rhetoric of the Church argument most of the time involved national history, national development, freedom of the Serbian people, etc. The references to the times when "[T]here was no ruler, no government,

[114] A. L. Shemiakin, "Serbskoye obtshestvo na rubezhe XIX-XX vv.: tradicionalizm i modernizatsiya. Vzgliad iznutri," in *Chelovek na Balkanah v epohu krizisov i etnopoliticheskih stolknoveniy XX v.*, eds. G. Litavrin and R. Grishina (St. Petersburg: Aleteyia, 2002), 48; Milan Stojadinović, *Ni Rat Ni Pakt: Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata* (Belgrade: Glas, 2002), 11.

no nobility, but the priests, God's saints were with the people…"[115] were very common. As a next step in the narrative, a conclusion was drawn that "[I]t is the indisputable truth that Serbian Orthodox priest as *national* priest has always been a true friend of his nation".[116]

One of the bishops in an article with a characteristic title, *Historical Contributions of the Serbian Clergy to the Service of Orthodoxy and Its People*, emphasized the devotion of Serbs to Orthodoxy since the times of St. Sava, that led them to prefer to lose their political independence (on the Kosovo field) rather than change their faith. He claimed that only those Serbs who retained Orthodoxy as their confession remained Serbs, those who converted to Islam or Catholicism ceased to be Serbs. And, it was "due to such a close rapprochement of the Orthodoxy with the life of the Serbs, and the nation with the Orthodoxy, that the Serbians as an independent nation managed to survive".[117]

In 1899 yet another cleric wrote in a similar way: "Our Orthodox faith is closely linked to and united with Serbianness [*srpstvo*], since when a Serb abandons just his Orthodox faith he abandons his nationality as well. That is why we cherish our Orthodoxy like the apple of our eye, as by preserving Orthodoxy we will preserve our nationality, our beloved Serbianness."[118]

Before the Great War, unlike in a later period, there was no theory that would argue for the indivisibility of nation and religion with any degree of sophistication. Jevrem Bojović, a professor at Belgrade Theological Seminary, the educational institution of the highest available level at the time, tried to connect them by creating an argument about universal laws of historical development. He wrote,

> Good, justice and truth which fundamentally rational, ideal force maintains as norms, according to which the life of the people should develop – that is the historical law. It

[115] Božić, "Sveštencima narodnim poslanicima," *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1903): 981.
[116] Nikola Božić, "Sveštenici i učitelji u službi narodne prosvete," *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1903): 215.
[117] Milentije, episkop Timočki, "Istorijske zasluge srpskog sveštenstva u službi Sv. Pravoslavlja i naroda svog," *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1899): 215.
[118] Lazar R. Petrović, "Beseda na proglas kraljevine," *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1899): 622.

> incorporates as its base the morals; morals [in their turn] are conditioned by the belief in God. Hence, none of the peoples without belief can follow the historical law, as it will not have justice in its life.[119]

Bojović states that it is only the Church who is capable of preserving "those moral forces without which no state or people can understand and fulfill their historical task".[120] It seems that the clergy at the turn of the century was not interested in either defining exactly the boundaries of the Serbian nation, or in creating an elaborated intellectual construction to support their claims. In most instances when a clergyman made a purely political statement, he did so not in a capacity of a priest, but as a member of a given political party.

Perhaps, the only sphere, to which some theoretical analysis was applied, was education. This partially can explained by the importance of the issue for the Church, and to a degree by the personality and character of Čedomir Marjanović one of the first Serbian clerics to receive proper theological training. Čedomir Marjanović enrolled at the Old Catholic Theology Department of the University of Bern (Nikolaj Velimirović studied at the same department several years later) in 1903/04, after he had completed one semester in Leipzig. He successfully graduated from the University of Bern with a doctoral degree in theology in 1909 after he defended a doctoral dissertation with the title *Utilitarianism and Christianity*. Marjanović stood out from the mass of his colleagues not only in his higher level of education and a richer international experience, but also in his political orientation. He was hard to label politically. His sympathies lay with the political left, but not with the internationalism of the revolutionary social-democrats and most importantly not with their materialism and atheism.[121]

In 1905, i.e. while he was studying in Bern, Marjanović admitted the inevitable: "We now live in the period of transition from patriarchal culture to modern, in the time when our

[119] Jevrem Bojović, "Istorijski zakon," *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1897): 105.
[120] Jevrem Bojović, "Istorijski zakon," 109-110.
[121] Čeda Marjanović, *Socjializam: Kritički pregled najosnovnijih tačaka socijalističkog učenja* (Belgrade: Državna štamparija Kraljevine Srbije, 1907).

social conditions are far from what they should be"[122]. Marjanovic's personal experience of having lived and studied in Switzerland and Germany allowed him to draw parallels and make comparisons in a very sensitive manner. His conclusions were not favorable to the Serbian society. He lamented that "this is the time when the necessary traditions are not preserved; and when even a thought of harmony between various social groups is far away". A way to solve the problem, according to him, was to raise social awareness of the people by placing the emphasis of the school instruction "not on practical education, but on the social – humanitarian one".[123] Marjanović argued for the promotion of "social education" the foundation of which should be religious education, literature and history.[124] It is very likely that Marjanović witnessed the results of Catholic educational policy while studying in Bern and was rather impressed by it. Yet, a student of the Old Catholic department, he was not uncritical of the official Catholic model either. Marjanović claimed that cosmopolite education did not fit with the tasks that Serbia had in front of her. He insisted on the necessity of the national character of school instruction. That provided yet another justification for why more attention should be devoted to religion and history in school curricula.[125]

Some aspects of Marjanović's proposal were shared by Milos Andjelković who repeatedly rephrased quite simple idea that only that "nation is truly educated and civilized, which has its morals based on religious principles, whose morals are religious and not philosophical, not human".[126] Here, he emphasized the national aspect much stronger than Marjanović did. And not only the broader social-oriented humanitarian aspect was missing from the writings of Andjelković, but he was openly hostile to it. Andjelković also drew comparisons between Serbia and other national cases; he did so in a quite peculiar manner:

[122] Čedomir Marjanović, "Veronauka u našim srednjim školama," *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1905): 1068.
[123] Marjanović, *Veronauka u našim srednjim školama,* 1069.
[124] Ibid., 1068.
[125] Ibid., 1072.
[126] Miloš Anđelković, "Bez vere nema morala," *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1895): 917-918.

> Everything shows that together with the decline of faith and religiosity in the nation comes the decline of the morals, which as a natural consequence has a political decline <…> What makes today's Russia as well as England strong states? With no doubt, it is religiosity and piety of the people <…> Both states have religions as motto and an ideal of life. And the policy itself and the entire state diplomacy are founded of the principle "religion is nationality"[127].

The position presented and articulated by Andjelković was shared broadly by the hierarchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and arguably to a much bigger extent than the plan proposed by Marjanović.

Andjelković made a successful career; he became a professor and archpriest and was actively publishing until his death in 1931. Marjanović's life-story was not as straightforward. Together with a group of young better trained theologians he tried to implement his view in practice and took the initiative of publishing a text-book for the 4th grade of the elementary school at his own expense. The second edition of the book was banned by the Metropolitan Dimitrije who accused the author of propagating heresy. Marjanović tried to defend himself by arguing that his was only an alternative way of bringing Christianity to the masses, but the conflict escalated and eventually resulted in Marjanović being dismissed from his teaching position at the gymnasium.[128] Arguably, the dissatisfaction and disappointment of Marjanović with the clergy and the way church institutions reformed themselves were very deep. In fact, they were serious enough, to make him join the quisling government of Milan Nedić in 1941 as a Minister of Justice.

However obvious and natural it may seem today that the Serbian Orthodox Church supported and promoted the national cause, invented and re-invented itself via claiming an important place in the national narrative, one has to remember that in the late-nineteenth century and in the early-twentieth, prior to WWI, was the period of fluctuation and in which other, however marginal in retrospective, opinions were articulated as well. Towards the end

[127] Ibid., 923.
[128] This conflict is described in greater detail in Aleksa Ilić, *Moji doživljai* (Belgrade, 1931), 287-291. According to Ilić, the Metropolitan was infuriated by Marjanović's complaints that a person without proper thelogical training is occupying such a high position.

of the nineteenth century the Serbian clergy had reached a level of training and education that allowed it to keep track of intellectual and political developments in religious sphere outside the country. The story of Marjanović's failure demonstrates that new trends in social, political, and religious thought made it to the Serbian Orthodox milieu, but were not necessarily picked up by a lot of people.

It has been assumed in literature, that the Serbian students who went to study in Russian theological seminaries (the majority went to Kiev) brought back the spirit of Russian Orthodoxy, Dostoyevsky, and a Russian-Serbian Slavic bond. However, recent research demonstrates that this was not the case. According to Klaus Buchenau, most of the Serbian students did not engage with theology or philosophy, and instead wrote on the "ecclesiastical history of their home countries, for which they often lacked source material and which they usually interpreted in a shallow nationalist manner".[129] They thus came back to Serbia more patriotic and nationally minded, rather than inspired by the depth of East Orthodox theology. In the early-twentieth century the predominant attitude in Serbian clerical circles towards Russian theological education was rather critical, and preference was given to secularized institutions of Western Europe. Thus, French and German intellectual sources were of importance.

The choice of readings that had some kind of impact in the circles of Serbian clergy seems rather arbitrary, but the tendencies are telling. For instance, the ideas on the relationship between Christianity and politics, social issue, liberalism, tolerance, and democracy put forward by a French publicist and a specialist in Russian and Balkan histories, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu (1842–1912), found a friendly reception in Serbia. [130] In the preface

[129] Klaus Buchenau, "Just as Real-Life Brothers: Serb-Russian Contacts in the Ecclesiastical Academy of Kiev (1850–1914) and in Orthodox Schools of Interwar Yugoslavia (1920–1941)," *Tokovi Istorije* 3/4, (2005): 57.
[130] *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* published a translation of excerpts from his work *Christianisme et démocratie, christianisme et socialisme* (Paris: Bloud, 1905) under the title "Hriščanstvo i Demokratija" *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1906): 856-863. Leroy-Beaulieu wrote extensively on the Liberal Catholics of France in the nineteenth

to the Serbian translation the editor complained about the contemporary attitude of the Serbian democrats to the clergy, who they (the democats) claimed to be an obstacle on the way of the democratic development of the country.[131] Leroy-Beaulieu was presented to the public as an alternative to such an attitude, a democrat, who did not reject patriotism and positive values of national feeling. Most probably, the French scholar was picked up by the editor not because of the outstanding quality of his study, but because his work on Russia and the Balkans was known to people in Belgrade.

However superficial and hollow political and philosophical judgments and opinion put forward by the clergy may be, already in early-twentieth century one could see how two opposing ways of dealing with political participation appeared. One led to the strengthening of the Church's position through binding national identity to Orthodoxy; and the other one went more in the direction of social work comparable to that of *Rerum Novarum* and liberal Catholics.

The mainstream Serbian Orthodox Church showed mild interest (usually critical) in various political movements (socialism, communism), and in some of the theoretical notions, e.g. "democracy". Socialism, clearly, did not gain any sympathy of the clergy, as secularization was one of the key-points of the socialist program. *Herald of the Serbian Church* published a number of very repetitive texts and translations, mainly from Russian, that were blaming socialism as an ideology and its adherents for being aggressively anti-religious and anti-clerical. Authors regretted that the socialist movement became part of Serbian political and social reality.[132]

An important part of the Church discourse was the critique of the Serbian political elite, which was intricately linked to the ambiguous attitude toward Europe and 'the West' which

century, and his book *La papauté, le socialisme, et la democratie* was the first to welcome Leo XIII's Encyclical "Rerum Novarum".

[131] "Hriščanstvo i Demokratija", 856.

[132] "Zakletva socialističkih odbornika u Belgradeu i Kraguevcu," *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1906): 116-122.

was seen as the model that the Serbian elite looked up to. Also, the Church's critical opinion of the national elite partially was a reaction to the critique of the Church from the side of the liberal secular minded elite. One of the basic complaints of the clergy with respect to the national elite was that the secular educated people were far from being good parishioners. In 1988 Miloš Pantelić in the article *Our Intelligentsia and Religion* compared the degree of devotion towards religion in the Austrian and Serbian educated circles:

> Having seen how one of the enlightened nations, even its intelligentsia, respect its religion, and how people go to churches and heartily pray there, it harmfully occurs to us that the situation in our country is different. We also have doctors, professors, scientists. We have intelligentsia. But how many of them receive communion annually? How many of them in their death hour would ask the priest to pray for them in order to be united with Christ? No one![133]

Andjelković saw one of the reasons for the contemporary disbelief, religious indifferentism and skepticism in the philosophical systems of such European thinkers as Schopenhauer and Feuerbach.[134] The fact that Serbian elite on average followed the materialist trend of European thought makes Andjelković ask why they could not have followed such scientists and philosophers as Newton, Copernicus and Kant, who happened to be religious or at least idealists in their philosophical constructions.

The Church, although anti-European in many respects, did not deny the positive aspects of the material and cultural progress (often associated with Europe and the European impact) of the Serbian nation. In 1903 one of the contributors of *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* wrote that the "Serbian nation from the point of view of its general cultural state is much more progressive that it used to be half a century ago, but from the point of view of religion and morals it shows bad results, far worse that it had then."[135] Other voices were much harsher towards the influence of the West on the Serbian political climate. An argument was put forward, which combined this critical negative attitude with the critique of contemporary Serbian politicians:

[133] Milos S. Pantelic, "Nasa inteligencija i religija," *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1899): 230.
[134] Ibid., 70.
[135] V. Vitorović, "Vera i moral u narodu našem nekad i sad," *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1903): 352.

> General contemporary evil in the human society that rejects anything religious and divine in the heart and soul of a human-being i.e. this terrible universe of the West that devours its victims there as well, and endangers to destroy from the foundations the culture and the most beautiful expressions of human heart and mentality. Apostles of this evil we find in our press, and unfortunately in our parliament.[136]

Some self-reflexive Church authors acknowledged the problematic nature of the situation the Serbian Church found itself in, but retorted to the historicist argument: "Yes, there are some problems, but the intelligentsia should acknowledge previous work of the clergy and should try to understand the difficulties the Church faces today".[137] The next step some of the church affiliated authors took was to readdress the same kind of critique the Church was exposed to, to the elite itself.

In 1908 *Herald of the Serbian Church* initiated a new column in which the editor commented on the articles that appeared in political and social press about the Orthodox Church. As the secular press was very critical towards the Serbian clergy and the Church, this part of *Herald of the Serbian Church* basically was one continuous answer to this critique. As the pressure increased the answer of the Church radicalized. The mainstream argument of the clergy about its own contribution to national development and progress was incorporated in the answer the Church gave to liberal critique. As an anonymous author observed, history cannot go backwards and "Serbianness and Orthodoxy, clergy and the people may not be separated".[138]

We can see that in the narratives articulated by the Serbian clergy at the turn of the century a variety of tendencies and opinions was present. It is important to underline, that first, the mainstream legitimization strategy of the clergy was based on a historicist argument about the contribution of the Serbian Church to the national cause. It was accompanied by the development of the cults of national saints. Together these two tendencies contributed to the

[136] D. Mihajlović, "Savremena Pitanja u Srpskoj Crkvi," *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1905): 239.
[137] Milojević, P.R., Naše sveštenstvo i savremeni pogled našega obrazovanog društva na isto," *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1902): 208-211.
[138] "Pjesnik o sveštenstvu," *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1900): 90.

creation of an image of the Church, as primarily a national institution. Second, this discourse was in polemic with those inside the Church who, like Marjanović, emphasized social aspect of the Church's mission. But most importantly it was directed towards the state in an attempt to convince secular political actors of the indispensability of the Church as a resource. In the period before 1918 few open conflicts between the Serbian Church and the state derived from the political activities of the Church hierarchs (the case of Metropolitan Mihailo), and not from any kind of the contradiction in Church and governmental agendas. The Serbian Church was to a great extent dependent on the state support, primarily in financial terms. But also in the borderlands of the Serbian Orthodox realm, i.e. southern Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia, where the interests of the Church coincided with the foreign interests of the Kingdom of Serbia. In these conditions, the leadership of the Serbian Church had neither the recourses nor the interest to support and develop ideas of social work and social education.

Chapter II

New Church for a New State: 'Liberation and Unification' of Lands, People and Institutions

This chapter focuses on the period immediately following the creation of the Yugoslav state in 1918. It maps and analyzes the state of affairs in the sphere of church-state relations with the focus on the Serbian Orthodox Church on the one hand, and surveys the attitudes of the Serbian Orthodox clerics towards the new state and the Church reform, on the other. It captures the general feeling of euphoria and anticipation of great changes that were characteristic of the first post-war years, while at the same time points out that the program of "Liberation and Unification" was not accepted as easily and eagerly as the superiors would have liked it to be. The chapter argues that the period of intensive Church reform (1918-1924) was characterized by many ambiguities: in the church-state relationship, church attitudes and agenda.

The New State

Creation of the New State: Political and Ideological Background

The appearance of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on the European political map in December 1918 was the result of the difficult negotiations between the leaders of South Slavic nations on the one hand (Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašič and a Croat, Ante Trumbić, were the spokespersons of the respective nations); and of the implemented interests of the Allies in the region, on the other. The establishment of the new state depended greatly on the developments in international relations, but also had a powerful domestic driving force, which was no less complex than the international factor. *Yugoslavism*

– an ideology, or ideologies, that talked about the unity and/or kinship of the South Slavic peoples of the Balkans was the main prerequisite that made Yugoslavia possible to begin with.

The importance of the national question in the first Yugoslavia (and in all states that succeeded it for that matter) cannot be underestimated. "No understanding of the problems faced by the first Yugoslavia or the solutions proposed to them can proceed without recognition of the crucial ethnocultural belief that underpinned the county: that the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes formed a single nation"[139], writes Andrew B. Wachtel.

By the time Yugoslavia was established, the idea of a state that would unite the South Slav nations together had already had a long history. It started in the 1830s in Croatian lands under the name of the Illyrian movement and was mostly concerned with the questions of cultural unity and cooperation between the Serbs and Croats within as well as outside the borders of the Habsburg Empire. Actual political collaboration of Serbian and Croatian parties dates back to the early-twentieth century, when a Croatian-Serbian coalition was active in Croatian politics. Ante Trumbić and Frano Supilo who were active members of the coalition government established in 1905 later on played a crucial role in the negotiations with the independent Kingdom of Serbia and its powerful Prime Minister Nikola Pašić that eventually resulted in the signing of the Corfu declaration in 1917.

Yet, despite the precedent of political partnership before 1918, Yugoslavism in its full diversity remained to be primarily a cultural movement. Adepts of Yugoslavism provided very different answers to the task of forging new nation and culture. Yugoslavism has been a very loose concept. It encompassed trends and opinions that were often contradictory and politically incompatible. Ljubodrag Dimić, a Serbian historian of politics and culture, distinguished four varieties of Yugoslavism: integral Yugoslavism, Yugoslav nationalism,

[139] Andrew B. Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, 69.

real Yugoslavism, and minimal Yugoslavism[140]. The criterion, upon which Dimić based his typology, was the perceived relationship between the Yugoslav nation and the 'old' constituent nations. 'Integral Yugoslavism' did not acknowledge any ethnic/tribal peculiarities and maintained that the Yugoslav nation had been already formed. That was the view promoted by King Aleksandar, especially during the years of the dictatorship (1929-1934). 'Yugoslav nationalism' was characterized by the acceptance of existing difference between the constituent nations and the strong belief that they were bound to completely disappear in the nearest future. Its adherents supported strong centralist state and integrative policies that often had authoritarian touch to them. 'Real Yugoslavism' saw the 'brotherly' nations as different and separate entities and did not have the intention to eliminate the differences between them all together. It hoped however for the possibility of creation of a Yugoslav nation in the distant future through cultural and education policies promoted by the state. Supporters of this type of Yugoslavism allowed for regional autonomies within the common state. And the last type, minimal Yugoslavism, saw the Yugoslav idea to be the foundation of the political supranational entity in the form of a federation or even confederation.

Although united by a common idea, the four ideologies were barely compatible. They contradicted each other not only on the political scene, but in the cultural life as well. For instance, art of the Yugoslav(ist) modernist sculptor Ivan Meštrović who worked towards the creation of a common Yugoslav culture were often met with sharp criticism. Jovan Dučić, a famous Serbian poet, said that it was possible either to be a Catholic sculptor or a Serb, but there was no way to combine both.[141] However problematic and disputed Yugoslavism was the central ideology but also the discursive field of the 1920s and 1930s. Arguably,

[140] Jovo Bakić, *Ideologije jugoslovenstva izmedu srpskog i hrvatskog nacionalizma 1918-1941: sociološko-istorijska studij (* Zrenjanin: Gradska narodna biblioteka "Žarko Zrenjanin", 2004), 85; Ljubodrag Dimić, *Kulturna politika u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji, 1918-1941* (Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 1996).
[141] Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 114.

"Yugoslavism, in its versions, was the only common denominator in Serb political discourse" throughout the interwar decades."[142]

For the sake of the living up to the idea of Yugoslav unity, politically the Kingdom was organized as a simple national state. Although theoretically the idea of a single Yugoslav nation presumed the equality of the three constituent nations (or *tribes*, according to the original terminology), not everybody was happy with the arrangement. Partly the problem arose from the dominance of the centralist/unitarist parties. At the same time part of the Serbian political elite (numerically the largest) was not ready to give up nearly a century long tradition of a romantic national idea, as presented by Ilija Garašanin in the 1840s. Dejan Djokić recently shifted the traditional for scholarly analysis, drawing emphasis away from these inbuilt weaknesses of the new state, when he observed that "the existence of national, cultural and historical differences between the South Slavs in 1918, and economic and social problems, combined with external pressure, can only partly explain events in interwar Yugoslavia. The country's stability – and instability – rested very much on post-1918 internal political developments, and in particular on Serb-Croat relations"[143].

Where Does the Faith Come in? Yugoslavism and Religion

Chapter I of this thesis discussed the place of religion and religious institutions in modern Balkan nationalisms with the special focus on Serbian pre-1918 developments. It also demonstrated how the importance of religion and religious institutions for the national past was emphasized and repeatedly underlined by the clerics and religious representatives on various occasions throughout the long nineteenth century; and how it has become an inherent part of the respective national histories, mythologies and canons. In the period immediately

[142] Marko Bulatovic, "Struggling with Yugoslavism: Dilemmas of Interwar Serb Political Thought," in *Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of Twentieth-century Southeastern Europe*, eds., John Lampe and Mark Mazower (Budapest: CEU Press, 2003), 254.
[143] Dejan Djokić, *Elusive Compromise*, 39.

after the First World War it was not essential anymore whether the Church's contribution had really (in the Rankean sense) been that great; for the link between religion and nation (Orthodox Christianity and the Serbian nation in our particular case) had been firmly established and was no longer questioned to any noticeable extent.

With regard to the supranational ideology of Yugoslavism such strong link between religious and national identities could be a serious problem. Dučić's remark reveals a lot about the destructive potential of religion for the multinational and multi-confessional Yugoslav state and the nation-building project. The question thus is how did the proponents of Yugoslavism deal with the issue? The bigger analytical problem of what role did religion play in the entire Yugoslav project and the ultimate failure of it will be dealt with throughout the entire thesis.

According to the official state supported version of Yugoslavism, the three separate South Slavic nations whose names featured in the official name of the state formed the so called 'three-named people', i.e. the Yugoslav nation. In this model the mutual relationship of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes resembled the Christian concept of the Holy Trinity. The same was fixed in the state Constitution of 1921, generally known as the *Vidovdan Constitution*, as it was ratified on the 28th of June - the day of St. Vitus [Serb. – Vidovdan[144]]. As Andrew Wachtel points out "[t]his formulation must have seemed a stroke of genius to those who coined it, for whatever the doctrinal difference that separated Orthodox and Catholic Christians, the concept of the Trinity was familiar to all."[145] It remains an open question though as to how easy it was to go beyond these doctrinal differences and most importantly,

[144] On the 28th June 1389 Serbian prince Lazar lost the battle at Kosovo Polje to the Ottoman army, and the medieval Serbian Kingdom fell. In national mythology the Kosovo battle symbolizes the choice made by Lazar in the name of its people: to lose the terrestrial Kingdom in order to achieve the celestial one. Vidovdan has been the main Serbian national holiday since the nineteenth century when the Kosovo epic cycle took its modern form.

[145] Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation,* 71.

whether is was possible at all to surpass the differences between religious-historical traditions of the two main groups in the new state.

Scholarly views on the question whether religion added to the structural problems of the first Yugoslavia differ quite drastically. Yugoslav historian Milorad Ekmečić argues for religion and religious ideologies to be the main obstacle on the way to the creation of Yugoslavia and the main reason for the Serbo-Croat conflicts. Ivo Banac, in his turn, claims that religion did not have a prominent place in the national ideologies of the South Slav peoples, and that the conflicts between the Serbs and Croats should rather be seen as the clash between different political cultures.[146] None of the approaches seem to provide a comprehensive answer. Despite being opposed to each other, both share two important features. Firstly, they do not account for the changes that have occurred during the two decades between the World Wars, and present the relationship between religions/religious ideologies and Yugoslav political project as a fixed one. Second, they differentiate very little between various positions articulated on the 'religion' side and tend to present it rather homogeneously. To analyze the historical dimension of the relationship between religion and Yugoslavism, it is vital to have a look at how the creators and proponents of the Yugoslav ideology regarded religion and its value.

In the nineteenth and early-twentieth century, projects of cultural Yugoslavism, whose authors did not have a clear perspective of actually living in a common state, could afford not to discuss religion in great detail. Curiously, solutions expressed in the cultural realm were much more creative in comparison to those provided by professional politicians. They rather emphasized the linguistic proximity of the South Slav peoples, i.e. promoted linguistic nationalism. Nevertheless, many understood the potential threat to unity posed by religious difference if it was to be instrumentalized for political purposes. Ljudevit Gaj - together with

[146] Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press 1993, c1984); Milorad Ekmečić, *Stavaranje Jugoslavije*, Vol. 1-2; idem, *Srbija između srednje Evrope i Evrope.*

Vuk Karadžić one of the creators of the common Serbo-Croatian language, and a central figure for the early stages of the Illyrian movement - denied any possibility for religion to be a prerequisite for the Yugoslav unity.[147] It was this understanding that made Jovan Skerlić a great Serbian literary scholar, politician, and public intellectual argue for the possibility of a common Yugoslav entity only under the condition of universal and total religious indifference of the people.[148] Jovan Djaja, one of the leaders of the Serbian Radićal Party, fervently called for the absolute ban of religion from public politics, because they were, in his opinion, irreconcilable. He went a step further and insisted that the concept of nationality should be separated from religion. Đaja employed two typologically different arguments. The first one was of a normative philosofical nature. He wrote, that "for anybody who can with any right count himself among contemporary educated people, there is no doubt that nationality does not depend on religion to any extent".[149] In his second, more context bound argument, he claimed that the existent irreconcilable religious differences and disputes could be used by the enemies of the Yugoslav project as a means to create obstacles on the way to the common state. Thus, religion should be eliminated from the field of public politics all together.

Others in contrast to Skerlić and Djaja did not insist on total secularization of national cultures and political sphere, and instead argued that religion could and should bring the brotherly nations together. In the context of the 1848 Revolution Croatian Ban Josip Jelačić declared that difference of faith and church was no longer the wall between the brothers.[150] Serbian Skupština in Sremski Karlovci in its address to "the Slavs of the Roman faith" assured its brothers that political cooperation with the Serbs by no means would constitute a threat to their Church, and asked them to overcome the difference of religions for the sake of

[147] Jovo Bakić, *Ideologije jugoslovenstva*, 73
[148] Jovo Bakić, *Ideologije jugoslovenstva*, 73.
[149] Viktor Novak, ed., *Antologija jugoslovenske misli i narodnog jedinstva: 1390-1930* (Belgrade, 1930), 569.
[150] Josip Jelačić, „Narodnu hrvatskome i srpskome u trojedinoj kraljevini Dalmacije, Hrvatske i Slavonije ljubezni pozdrav", in *Antologija jugoslovenske misli,ed.* Novak, 128.

national brotherhood.[151] Without a doubt, it was partially the Revolutionary context of the 1848 and the practical aims of the anti-Magyar cooperation that made the leaders of the two communities try to overcome or, one could claim neglect, potential religious tensions. At least rhetorically and discursively the option was present.

Nevertheless, later on, in 1877 Croatian Archbishop Strossmayer, one of the 'founding fathers' of Yugoslavism underlined that by its very nature Christian religion should draw Serbian and Croatian nations together, and should not estrange them, for that would be against the essence of religious teaching of love and mutual understanding. Strossmayer argued that "religion which would be able to sow discord between brothers would not be religion, but rather a sheer superstition; it would not be the God's truth, but a human delusion".[152] However appealing, this very liberal, ecumenical understanding of religion and religious difference was possible only in the framework of desired cooperation and discussions about a possible Yugoslav state in the future. Even though Strossmayer was a cleric himself and clearly aware of the political ambitions and importance of the Catholic Church, none of the pre-1918 treatments of religion's role in the Yugoslav cultural and political project took religious institutions seriously as active and important actors, who have their own aims and logic that do not necessarily correspond with the overarching Yugoslav idea.

Once the new state was in place, supporters of Yugoslavism (regardless of their understanding of it) had to deal with the religious issue in a much more down to earth manner, for it was now impossible to ignore it. It was understood by virtually everybody that religion, or rather its public representation and activities of religious institutions in the public sphere, could either pose an obstacle for Yugoslavism on its way to a new unitary state and unified national culture, or a danger to the already existent Yugoslav nation.

[151] "Poziv Srpske Skupšine u Karlovcima od 10/22 maja 1848 'Slavenima Rimske cerkve u Bačkoj, Banatu, Sremu i Baranji, koji jednim sa Serbljima jezikom govore'," in *Antologija jugoslovenske misli*, ed. Novak, 140.
[152] Vladika Strossmayer, "Poslanica" (1877), in *Antologija jugoslovenske misli*, ed. Novak, 403.

As early as 1922, Josip Smodlaka, the founder of the Croat Democratic Party in Dalmatia before WWI and a modernist-Yugoslav[153] touched upon one of the aspects of this problem in his discussion of the new state's official name. In all his dislike of the name 'Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes' which was too long and misleading (it was believed by many that the three nations have been replaced by one new Yugoslav nation, therefore no need to mention them in the name of the state), and hence should have been changed into a *national* and not a tribal name, Smodlaka openly acknowledged that one of the main reasons for why none of the already existing national state names (i.e. 'Serbia' or 'Croatia') could be used for the common state was religion. These tribal names were unacceptable (especially *Serbia* in Smodlaka's view) for they were too intimately linked with different religions and religious traditions, whereas behind this difference stood mutually incompatible histories and traditions.[154]

Many intellectuals were nonetheless quite optimistic about the prospects of the new Yugoslav nation, for they believed religion to be in decline and were expecting it to be replaced by rational science fairly soon. That was, for instance, the view of Vladimir Ćorović (1885-1941), one of the leading Serbian historians of the interwar decades, a rector of Belgrade University, and a proponent of Yugoslavism.[155] In his monumental *History of the Serbian People* Ćorović referred to Yugoslavism as "the ideology of the whole century of the best and the most observant people of our race". According to him, the Yugoslav national unity was based on "common race, language and biological mixture of the Balkan lands".[156] These optimistic expectations were inspired by the increasing social modernization and urbanization, which meant a considerable degree of secularization. They went hand in hand

[153] Dr. Joseph Smodlaka, the founder of the Croat Democratic Party in Dalmatia, and a member of the Parliament for Spalato, in R.W. Seton-Watson words was "one of the ablest and most attractive Southern Slav politicians, and what is still better, "a modern of the moderns" in the midst of medieval conditions". (R.W. Seton-Watson, *The South Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy*. London: Constable and Co., 1911).
[154] Josip Smodlaka, "Ime Države", in *Srpski Književni glasnik* 7, No. 4 (16 October 1922): 293.
[155] Vladimir Ćorović, *Srpski Književni glasnik* (1919): 57.
[156] Vladimir Ćorović, *Istorija Srpskog naroda*.

with the Enlightenment tradition of rationality, positivist belief in progress, the ability of science to explain the natural world, and of social science to explain society.

Even such a short glance at some of the authoritative contemporary authors who dealt with the issue of religion in relation to the Yugoslav national project demonstrates that at the beginning of the 1920s there was very little critical understanding of the role of religion on the side of the secular political audience. Mainstream politicians were mostly secular-minded and cautious in the matters of religion. What they had perhaps underestimated was the hidden power that the link between national and religious identities had; and the depth of popular religiosity, which many believed to be less profound than it turned out to be.

Incomplete Separation: Church-State Relationship in the Early Years of the Kingdom SHS

Legal Status of Religious Communities in the First Yugoslavia

One of the first tasks the Yugoslav government had to solve at the initial formative stages of state-building was the regulation of the life of religious communities and the establishment of a clear relationship between them and the state. The multi-religious character of the new state obviously created an additional complication in this sense, as any decision had to involve a great deal of negotiations between the three major religious communities in order to guarantee equal rights to all of them on the one hand, and keep a balance of power on the other.

The change of the state borders in 1918 and the consequent demographic changes were of greatest significance. According to the census of 1921 the Serbs made a little less than 40% of the total population of Yugoslavia, together with other Orthodox peoples (Macedonians, Bulgarians, Romanians and Vlachs) their numbers amounted to almost 45%,

versus 39% of Catholics and 11% of Muslims.[157] For the Serbian Orthodox Church this change primarily meant that as of 1918 Orthodox Christianity was no longer the dominant religion of the overwhelming majority of the population, nor did the Church enjoy a privileged status, at least not formally, according to the 1921 and 1931 Constitutions.

In 1919, equality of all religions was granted by a special *Proclamation* issued by Regent Aleksandar; the 1921 Constitution guaranteed freedom of conscience and ensured that all religions recognized under the law would enjoy equal rights; the same was repeated in the 1931 Constitution.[158] Apart from the Christian confessions Islam and Judaism were among 'recognized' religions. The state law provided for complete freedom with regards to various religious communities' internal affairs; and forbade all confessions and their representatives from using their power in order to achieve political ends.[159] The latter was a heavily debated issue in the period between 1918 and 1921 and the regulation was adopted against the wishes of the majority of the religious communities' representatives. Even after the inclusion of the regulation into the Constitution it remained unexecuted in practical terms, for there was no special law detailing legal procedures that the priests would have had to go through should they violate the Constitution.

All three communities had significant state support, although in the case of the Roman Catholics the relationship between the state and Vatican was not clearly regulated and formalized, which remained to be the most problematic issue in the relationship between the state and the Catholic Church. The old agreements (Concordats signed between Serbia and Vatican and Montenegro and Vatican; and the laws of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy) ceased to be valid as international regulations and could serve only as internal laws. The negotiations between the Yugoslav government and Vatican went on until the mid 1930s only

[157] Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia*, 49-58.
[158] Radić, *Država i verske zajednice*, 21.
[159] Ibid.

to be met with the outrage of the Serbian Orthodox Church, who opposed the Concordant vehemently (more details on this will follow in Chapter IV).

Although formally there was no more one state church in the Kingdom; the principle of church-state separation was not introduced, i.e. the government opted for an in-between option, which essentially was the most serious issue for all sides involved and a source of many structural problems in the future. Religious education at schools was first made optional (1921), but after repeated complains from the Catholic Community was introduced again as a mandatory class (1929-1933). Compared to the law of 1921, the 1931 Constitution introduced a greater degree of state patronage over religious communities. The tendency towards the state-control rather than *laisser-faire* attitude had been evident already earlier. During early December 1918, almost immediately after the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had been created; the ministry of faiths was established. It held superior supervisory and the highest administrative powers in all religious-political matters.[160]

From the Serbian Church's point of view these state policies were self-contradictory; for on the one hand religious communities and institutions were granted by the Royal *Proclamation* and the Constitution the freedom to administer their internal affairs, but on the other hand there were Ministries of Faiths and Justice who had more power over the church related affairs than the latter would like it to be. The government on several occasions indeed intervened in the elections of the Patriarch and other important decisions of the Church.

Radmila Radić, the leading authority in the Serbian historiography on modern Serbian Church history, observed that misunderstandings and one could argue miscommunication between the state and the religious communities were caused by the government's attempt to put all religious communities under state control, e.g. agrarian reform applied to church

[160] Blagota Gardašević, "Organizaciono ustrojstvo i zakonodavstvo pravoslavne crkve izmedju dva svetska rata," in *Sprska Pravoslavna Crkva 1920-1970: Spomenica o 50 -godišnjici vaspostavljanja Srpske Patriašije* (Belgrade: Sveti arhijerejski sinod Srpske pravoslavne crkve, 1971), 40.

lands.[161] In this respect the biggest clash between the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church and the Yugoslav state over the Concordat with Vatican in 1937, can be seen not just as the expression of the Orthodox Church's feelings of animosity towards the Catholics, in particular Croats, but also as a demonstration of the churches' general unhappiness with state policies.

The Concordat issue and, in more general terms, the need to clarify and regulate the relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the Yugoslav state in legal terms was the main preoccupation of the Catholic community in the first years of the existence of the Kingdom SHS. While the Catholic higher clergy insisted on the signing of the new Concordat with the Holy See straight from the creation of Yugoslavia, governmental officials were reluctant to do so prior to the establishment of clear terms of church-state relations and the adoption of the Constitution.[162] From the Catholic perspective the absence of the Concordat hindered the possibilities of the community of believers to have a full and necessary relationship with its supreme institutional and spiritual authorities in Rome.

An ambiguous situation with no strict separation of church and state on the one hand, and no state church on the other, was behind another important dispute between religious communities and the government. That was the question of the degree of clerics' participation in political life, which eventually resulted in prohibition of such activities by the Constitution, but the ban has never been really implemented. The Serbian Orthodox Church and its Croatian counterpart had pretty much the same concerns regarding the matter, as the governmental idea to limit priests' rights to 'talk politics' was a part of the larger strife to keep religion and religious authorities out of political life. We have seen already, that many politicians and intellectuals shared an opinion that complete secularization of political sphere

[161] Radić, *Država i verske zajednice*, 35.
[162] Zlatko Matijević, "Pokušaj ustavopravnog definiranja položaja Katoličke crkve u Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca: 1918-1921," in *Liberalizam i Katolicizam u Hrvatkskoj*. II Dio, ed. Hans-Georg Fleck (Zagreb: Zaklada Friedrich Naumann, 1999), 11-25.

was the only way to overcome problems created by the multi-religious composition of the state. The churches in their turn insisted that this limitation went against priests' primary task, for in the words of Dr. Anton Korošec, churches took interest in some questions of political life, and it was only natural that the priests should talk about them while performing their duties.[163] Political activities of all religious institutions remained to be a sensitive issue and a point of dispute through all years of the existence of the interwar Yugoslav state.[164]

One last, but by no means the least factor in the difficult relationship between the state and the Roman Catholic Church was the fact that the latter in the view of the former was very strongly associated with the then already non-existent Habsburg Empire. Despite the initial enthusiasm of the Catholic Church regarding the creation of the South Slavic state, the government suspected "that some Croatian bishops could not reconcile themselves with the disappearance of the Dual Monarchy".[165] Hostile attitudes towards former subjects of the Viennese Emperor were not a rarity in the new Yugoslav state, whose official rhetoric and phraseology was centered on the idea of 'liberation and unification' of the South Slavs on the one hand, and the heroic fight of the Serbian army on the other. It also has been argued that the enthusiasm of the Catholic clergy arouse not only from the understanding that the existence of Yugoslavia was the best way to protect the Dalmatian coast from Italian aspirations, but also from an idea that the territories with predominant Catholic population

[163] Zlatko Matijević, "Pokušaj ustavopravnog definiranja," 20.

[164] The issue of political participation of the clergy and lay members of religious communities had a regional, if not pan-European scope as well. In 1922 Pius XI in his formative encyclical *Ubi Arcano Dei* stated that the aim of the *Catholic Action* was to bring the laity into the apostolate of the Church, in order to work towards the establishment of 'Christ's rule across the World'. The Pope surely was not unique in his wish to ensure the prevalence of religious values in social and political spheres, nor was this the first occasion when this whish was articulated. However, the encyclical served as a powerful stimulus for the development of political life in the Catholic communities across Europe. The question of direct political participation of the clergy was hotly debated throughout the period in several national and denominational contexts. The Yugoslav debate demonstrated that all religious communities had a vested interest in having their clergy in politics. At the same time in Poland the debate of the early 1920s revealed that a segment of Catholic political circles was not in favor of the creation of a "Catholic" political party, on the grounds that "the ablest Catholic people involved in politics" were already members of this or that structure, thus a new party would be doomed to be intellectually weak and politically meaningless.

[165] Radmila Radić, "Religion in a Multinational State: The Case of Yugoslavia", in *Yugoslavism: History of a Failed Idea*, ed., Dejan Djokić, 199.

would enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy and that the state in general will be run by the Croats, hence the "Catholic element would prevail".[166]

The Yugoslav Muslim religious community, the third largest in the country, was among the religions acknowledged and recognized by the state. The initial governmental attempts to unify the heterogeneous Muslim community and put it under the direct control of the capital failed, and the seat of the *reis-ul-ulema* was not moved to Belgrade. The Muslim community remained fairly decentralized as Yugoslav Muslims lived in three different regions with the centers in Sarajevo, Belgrade, and Stari Bar, and the community was composed of six different ethnic groups: Bosnian Muslim Slavs, Muslim Albanians, Turks, Macedonian Muslim Slavs, Muslim Slavs from Sandzak and Montenegro, and Muslim Roma. Bosnian Muslims, who were a relative majority in the Muslim community, were also the most organized political force.

Those Yugoslav Muslims who stayed in the country by 1918 (many chose to move to Turkey) were generally enthusiastic about the creation of the Kingdom SHS. This feeling was weakened by the violence and intimidation the Bosnian Muslim experienced in 1918-1919 from the hands of, primarily, the Orthodox population. Constant pressure on the Muslim community from Croatian and Serbian rivaling political elites was the second factor that stimulated the formulation of Muslim political agenda within Yugoslav politics.[167] The Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO) was formed already in 1919, and in 1921 Mehmed Spaho replaced its first leader Hadzi Hasif. JMO was not strictly speaking a religious party, it argued, among other things, for the recognition of the Slavic Muslim population as a separate ethnic entity; but was very much perceived by its supporters as a religious one.[168] Although initially JMO aimed at representing all Muslims of the Kingdom, with the growing political

[166] Ibid., 198.
[167] Francine Friedman, *The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation*. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), 96-97.
[168] Mitja Velikonja, *Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003), 147.

pressure it gradually turned into a Bosnian centered party, and basically ignored the position of non-Slavic Muslims in Kosovo and Macedonia.

The situation changed in 1929 after the proclamation of the Royal dictatorship, which meant centralization in all spheres. The "Supreme Council of the Muslim Religious Community" was established in Belgrade as the supreme authority for the entire Muslim community in the country; it was moved to Sarajevo a year later, in 1930, and stayed there. At the same time, JMO, who represented the interests of Yugoslav Muslim population, together with other parties and associations based on religious principles, was banned according to the new legislation of the dictatorship.

Unification of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the (Re)Establishment of the Serbian Patriarchate

The phrase widely used at the time, 'liberation and unification', applied not only to the new state and its nations, but to the Serbian Church as one of the central institutions as well. And if the result of the state and national consolidation can be seen from today's perspective as debatable, the success of the unification and strengthening of the Serbian Orthodox Church was, and to the present day is, indisputable. For the Serbian Orthodox Church, foundation of the new multinational state primarily signified the unification of the Serbian lands in one political entity, which in its turn meant that finally six previously not closely connected church jurisdictions could now be united in one body, i.e. the Serbian Patriarchate under the rule of the Patriarch of Belgrade. The Patriarchate was indeed established (positive minded contemporaries though talked of the *re*-establishment of the old Patriarchate of Peć) in September 1920.[169]

[169] Prior to 1918 there were three independent church bodies: the Serbian Orthodox Church in the Kingdom of Serbia, the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro, and the Serbian Orthodox Metropoly in Sremski Karlovci in Vojvodina. Three others enjoyed different degrees of autonomy from the Constantinople Patriarchate: the Orthodox Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbian Orthodox Church in Southern Serbia and Macedonia, and the Bukovina-Dalmatian Metropoly.

Despite the fact that the unification of the Church was a long-awaited event and the result of several decades of longing and hope, it did not run entirely smoothly. The clergy of some previously autonomous church organizations, in particular those in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sremski Karlovci, was unwilling to submit to the centralized system administered from Belgrade, for it contradicted their long tradition of 'national' autonomy and self-government.[170] That resulted in the delay in the creation of a working and stable system of local eparchies.[171] As a sign of protest, the Montenegrin clergy abandoned their official duties at the end of 1920, the situation was so grave that the minister of Faith had to ask local bishops to intervene and promised to improve the lot of the parish clergy.[172] One of the long-term consequences of these changes was the abolition in the early-1930s of the all-Serbian union of the priests, which was very active before the Great War. This structural change which gave more authority to the episcopates was reflected in the difference of opinion displayed by both the higher and lower clergy.

In 1920 a new law on the centralization of executive and judicial power in the newly established Serbian Patriarchate was passed. It extended the basic principles of the Church administration of the Serbian Orthodox Church (of the Serbian Kingdom) law from 1910 to all newly unified territories and structures. The law gave most power to the episcopate, whereas it neglected and virtually ruined the lower level communities. Theoretically the basis of Church administration should be formed from these communities. The clergy from the former Habsburg territories, where this law had not existed previously, protested quite harshly against the way in which Church legislature was homogenized.[173] The state extended

[170] The Orthodox community of the Habsburg Empire historically enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy. The Metropoly of Sremski Karlovci had also been acting for decades as the national institution of the Serbian community in the Empire. The hierarchy of Sremski Karlovic inevitably had to give up its position as the national leader, for now the state was taking over. It also had to bid farewell to its aspirations of the spiritual leader of the community, for now Belgrade was taking over.
[171] Radmila Radić, *Država i verske zajednice*, Vol. 1, 20.
[172] Radmila Radić, *Život u vremenima*, 129.
[173] Gardašević, 47

most of the laws that previously regulated the relationship between the Serbian Kingdom and the Serbian Metropoly to the Kingdom SHS and the Patriarchate.

Generally speaking, the problems surrounding the unification process were caused by the imposed centralization of the Church structures. Curiously, there is a similarity between the discussions within the Church and the general political debates in interwar Yugoslavia. In both cases unity, centralization, and federalization were the key points. Ecclesiastical institutions and traditions that had historically developed in different ways were neglected. Belgrade-based higher clergy legitimized its homogenizing policy by making references to the previously existing homogeneous structure of the Serbian Orthodox Church, i.e. the Patriarchate of Peć, abolished by the Ottomans in the eighteenth century.[174]

According to the regulation of June 1921, which described the responsibilities of the Ministry of Faiths, the Serbian Orthodox Church was put under state control in "all politico-religious matters that fall into the range of state affairs".[175] Thus, the clergy and hierarchs of those church dioceses that were new to the Patriarchate had to put up first, with the loss of their independence and autonomy to the central church authorities in Belgrade, and second with the increased state control over their actions.

In the period between December 1918 and May 1919 two conferences of clergy were held where all necessary steps for the unification of the Serbian Church in accordance to the canonical law of the Orthodox Church were made. Dioceses that previously belonged to the Metropolies whose heads resided outside Yugoslavia (Dalmatia was part of the Metropoly of Dalmatia-Bukovina, whose head resided in Romania; Old Serbia fell under the jurisdiction of

[174] Radmila Radić, *Život u vremenima*, 113.
[175] Djoko Slijepčević, *Istorija Sprske Pravoslavne Crkve.* Vol. 2, Od početka XIX veka do kraja Drugog svetskog rata. Belgrade: BIGZ, 199, 562; see also*: Crkveno zakonodavstvo Srpske pravoslavne crkve*. Knj. 3 (Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1933).

the Patriarch of Constantinople) were negotiated to pass under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Church.[176]

On June 17, 1920 Regent Aleksandar Karadjordjević issued a regulation about the unification of the Serbian Church in 'our Kingdom'. The re-establishment of the Serbian Patriarchate was officially proclaimed in Sremski Karlovci on September 12, 1920. Two weeks later Dimitrije Pavlović, Metropolitan of Serbia and Archbishop of Belgrade, was elected to be the Patriarch of the renewed Serbian Patriarchate.[177] His official title was 'Serbian Patriarch of the Orthodox Church of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes'.

Nonetheless, the government insisted on a different electoral procedure, described in a special statute which ten years later was transformed into a *Law on the Election of the Patriarch*. According to the statute the new Patriarch was to be elected by a special electing council, which consisted of both clerics and state functionaries. The Minister of Faiths was the key figure in the process. In this fashion, Dimitrije, already once elected, was re-elected as the Patriarch a few months later. This governmental intrusion into church affairs was the first, but not the last instance of state intent to control the Church.

Various official international recognitions of the Serbian Patriarchate from other national Churches and the Patriarch of Constantinople followed in the next two years. The final ceremony which marked the end of the unification process was the enthronement of Dimitrije in Peć, the place of the last seat of the medieval Serbian Patriarchs, took place in August 1924. The ceremony was attended by the head of the state, King Aleksandar, who

[176] Djoko Slijepčević, *Istorija Sprske Pravoslavne Crkve*, Vol. 2, 558.

[177] Dimitrije Pavlović was born in 1846 in Požarevac where he spent his first years of study, before moving to Belgrade. In the capital, after finishing high school, the future Patriarch enrolled in the seminary from which he successfully graduated in 1868. After graduating from the Philosophy department of Belgrade University, Dimitrije Pavlovic in 1882 became a professor of theology there, one of the first in Serbia. During the conflict of Metropolitan Mihailo with King Milan, he became the Bishop of Niš. After Mihajlo's return from exile, D. Pavlović, together with some other clerics, left for France, where he spent several years studying literature, philosophy and economics. After Mihailo's death he returned to Serbia to become first the Bishop of Šabac, and in 1905 Metropolitan of Serbia.

brought Dimitrije to the throne of the medieval Patriarchs and later presented the religious leader with the valuable panagia.[178]

Unification of the Serbian Orthodox Church required not only homogenization of the legal regulations in all territories and dioceses. At the same time there was an obvious and stark need of one single law, issued by the state that would apply to the whole newly united and created structure and determine its position within the state. Such a law was a matter of serious debate within the church, as well as between the Church and the government. While Church representatives tried to preserve a degree of autonomy, secure a sort of special status, which they regarded to be their natural right, the state was eager to exercise more control over the Church institutions. As already mentioned above, one of the reasons for this was the perceived potential threat that the Church could pose to the new state. The Church statutes, the supreme regulations of the church life, were not approved by the government even 10 years after the church unification. It was only in November 1929 when the government passed the law, which secured the Church's autonomy in taking decisions concerning its internal affairs. Years of difficult negotiations about the position of the Church were marked by the increased understanding from all sides taking part in the process of the mobilizing potential that the Church had as an important social and national institution.[179] The negotiation process between Serbian clergy and the government about Church legislation did not end with the establishment (or *re*-establishment) of the Serbian Patriarchate in 1924 and lasted up until 1930 when the 'Constitution' of the SPC was finally adopted.

The 1929 *Law about the Serbian Orthodox Church* officially separated Church and state, but the Orthodox hierarchs' understanding of it was rather superficial, as the state continued to exercise too much (in their view) control over internal Church affairs, including

[178] Djoko Slijepčević, *Istorija Sprske Pravoslavne Crkve*, Vol. 2, 559-560

[179] Gavrilo Dožić writes in his memoirs that General Petar Živković, the head of the government after 1929, openly expressed his opinion that the real intention of the Serbian Church in the debate about the church-state relationship was to mobilize political opponents of the general and his government and force it to step down. Gavrilo Dožić, *Memoari Patrijarha Srpskog Gavrila* (Belgrade: Sfairos, 1990), 34-38.

the curriculum of the church schools and most importantly, the elections of the Patriarch.[180] Church scholars and legal experts close to the Orthodox clerical circles regarded separation of Church and state to be the reinforcement of the Church's independence, while the state logic was rather different, and the emphasis was made on the limitation of the Church's sphere of influence and on the equal position of all religious communities and institutions in the country. It was not a special attitude of the state towards the Orthodox Church, the Catholics complained about similar issues. It was, for instance, in 1930 that the Catholic Episcopate objected governmental regulations on religious education at school and insisted that the teachers were appointed by the Church, and not the government. At the end of a prolonged discussion, a minister summarized why the Episcopate's demands could and should not be met: for that would mean that "the state denies its sovereign functions and that that would prove the capitulation of the state in front of the Church".[181]

In order to understand the problematic nature of the relationship between the SPC and Yugoslav state one has to pay attention to the specific Orthodox understanding of the ideal church-state relationship. Serbian Orthodox authors tirelessly maintained that this relationship is fundamentally different from both the views of Roman Catholic and Protestant churches. In Orthodox understanding the Church does not impose its rules on state structures and institutions, nor does it subordinate to the state. They function in symbiosis, as ideally they have common aims in mind. At the same time, the Church had never abandoned its right to public presence and visibility and met any attempt to limit it with an outcry of fury and rage.

When Eastern Christianity had developed a teaching about the Christian state as some sort of an image of the Kingdom of God, it was about the nature of power and the balance of power between the Church and the Emperor. *Symphonia,* an old and complex East Christian

[180] Slijepčević, Vol. 2, 565.
[181] "Sednica Ministarskog Saveta Kraljevine SHS, 11. jan 1930." in *Zapisnici sa sednica ministarskog saveta kraljevine Jugoslavije, 1929-1931* (Belgrade, 2002), 134.

teaching about the church-state relationship supposed that ecclesiastical and temporal leaders ruled in harmony. John Meyendorf wrote that "the great dream of Byzantine civilization was a universal Christian society, administered by the emperor and spiritually guided by the Church"[182]. In this system there was no conflict between secular and religious authorities, because their aims coincided; and the two types of authorities although separated in function existed in an intimate relationship with each other. As a researcher summarized the core problematic issue of the symphonia tradition in relation to the modern church-state relationship, "there is no interdependency, nor is there a complete separation. In fact, the major problem of the concept of symphonia is that the demarcation line between church and state remains unclear. For this reason, religious leaders could achieve strong political roles in society and political leaders could influence the church's position".[183] One can argue safely that this particular aspect of the Byzantine political and ecclesiastical structure survived in the Balkans.

Overall, main problems in the relationship between the state and three major religious communities in the early years of the Kingdom SHS were caused by the unclear principles of Church and state separation on the one hand, and various initial misunderstandings of the question how secular and religious spheres should be separated, and what the balance between the two should be, on the other. Although all three religious communities and their respective institutions wholeheartedly supported the creation of the common Yugoslav state (although, for sometimes very different reasons), there was a visible tension between them and the government already in the first few years after 1918.

[182] Meyendorf cited in Zoe Katrina Knox, *Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia after Communism* (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 106
[183] Lucian N. Leustean, "Orthodoxy and Political Myths in Balkan National Identities," *National Identities* 10, No. 4 (Dec. 2008): 423.

A Happy Coexistence? Yugoslav State and the Serbian Nation in the Discourse of the Serbian Orthodox Church: 1918 - mid-1920s

Community of the Church and Nation

The Serbian Orthodox Church had produced a well-articulated national narrative already in the nineteenth century. One of the major challenges it had throughout the entire interwar period was that of reconciliation between the existing (and widely accepted) narrative and the program of action underpinned by this narrative on the one hand, and new political realities on the other. The layers of incompatibility included church-state relationship; different understanding of the overlap between national and religious communities; attitude towards the (idea of) Yugoslav nation, etc. Not all of these problems however appeared as self-evident in the first years after the end of the First World War. This initial lack of serious conflict between the Serbian Church and the government was first of all due to the political chaos of the post-war years and unclear vision of political future of the new state structures. In a manner similar to how the Constitution, state structures and other fundamental political decisions were debated in the period between 1918 and 1921 (when the *Vidovdan* Constitution was adopted) by the representatives of the national elites, for the Serbian Orthodox Church the time between the end of the war and mid-1920s was characterized by discussions of a variety of options (real or imagined) available to it. This chaos was also partly responsible for the lack of coherence in Church discourse and for its at times self-contradictory character.

In his 1917 speech Serbian Metropolitan Dimitrije in the anticipation of the creation of a common Yugoslav state talked about Serbian Orthodox Church's tolerance towards other confessions and religions; he wholeheartedly accepted "the idea of brotherhood and

unification, on which the brightest minds of our people worked". [184] In a similar mood, the birth of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 was met most cheerfully by the Serbian Church. The end of the difficult and devastating war; and final unification of all Serbian lands in one state were reasons good enough for a universal joy. Thus, Serbian clergy continued earlier discourse, shared by both Catholic and Orthodox intellectuals, which did not make problematical the multi-confessional character of the new state.

Immediately after the foundation of the Yugoslav state the ethic and moral stance of the united Serbian Church regarding its future work stemmed from the idea that once the program of the national liberation had been achieved in the previous wars, the Church should start its new program of promotion "social unity based on love and truth". That was supposed to be the program of the unification of the state, which was, as one of the Orthodox hierarchs put it, "our great national home".[185] Although not the central issue for the Church (at least not *yet* an important issue), the multi-confessional and multi-national character of the Kingdom was noticed and acknowledged by the clergy.

In his speech at the official enthronement ceremony in August 1924, Patriarch Dimitrije happily underlined that "the long centuries of tribal and religious separation" had been by then over. He went on saying that "…in the common motherland, which was blessed by God, it is the task for all of us to get to know each other better and to see that we are brothers who have been separated till the present moment by the evil fate".[186] Optimism and euphoria of the first months after the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes displayed by the Serbian Church hierarchy meant that there was no profound understanding of either the inbuilt weaknesses of the political compromise struck by the

[184] Dimitrije, Archbishop of Belgrade and Metropolitan of Serbia, "Speech held in the Serbian church on the Island of Corfu on the St. Peter's day in 1917", in *Glasnik Ujedinjene Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve* No.1 (1920): 15.
[185] Rajko Veselinović, "Ujedinjenje pokrainskih crkva i vaspostavljenje Srspke Patrijaršije," in *Sprska Pravoslavna Crkva 1920-1970: Spomenica o 50-godíšnjici vaspostavljanja Srpske Patriašije*, 17.
[186] Cited in Rajko Veselinović, "Ujedinjenje pokrainskih crkva i vaspostavljenje Srspke Patrijaršije," 25.

Serbian and Croatian political elites, or of what the Yugoslav national idea in its integral version actually implied for the 'brotherly nations' and the Church as 'the patron of the nation'.

In the first post-war years the Church was preoccupied with the pressing matters of the legal unification of the church structures, replacement of missing priests, ruined parishes, etc. It was not until the early-1920s, i.e. when the most urgent tasks have been already fulfilled, that the Church turned its attention to other issues. These first of all had to do with the transformed political environment. It was then that Church's optimism of 1918 and 1919 started to vanish. Yugoslavism, now elevated to the level of the state ideology, had to be dealt with, and, of course, the new state itself with its new structures and balance of power presented certain problems to the Church.

Judging by the survey of the Church press, the leitmotif of the Church discourse in the first half of the 1920s had almost nothing to do with the new state *per se*. It was an old and familiar refrain of 'liberation and unification' *of all Serbs*. One could argue that this choice of rhetoric speaks volumes about the political position of the Church. By consciously overlooking multinational character of the Kingdom and keeping its traditional national narrative, the Serbian Church underlined the Serbian component in the new state. For instance, the slogan 'liberation and unification of *all South Slavs*' was in contradiction with the obvious heterogeneity of the war experience of soldiers on the one hand, and elevated one type of experience, that of the victorious party, to the normative level, while many war veterans were ambivalent about their identity as ex-soldiers and felt uneasy regarding the rhetoric of 'liberation and unification'. Even Serbian war veterans were not in agreement over what was lost and won in the war they had fought.[187] Thus, the Church's embracement

[187] This interesting point is analyzed in John Paul Newman, "Forging a United Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes: The Legacy of the First World War and the 'invalid question'," in *New Perspectives on Yugoslavia: Key Issues and Controversies*, eds. Dejan Djokić and James Ker-Lindsay (New York: Routledge, 2010), 46-61.

of the official rhetoric contributed to the creation of the image of the Church as a *Serbian national* institution.

It was not just the Serbian nation (together with other brotherly nations) that had been liberated and united; it was also the Serbian Church that was unified. The rhetoric of the Church unification not just echoed the one of the national 'liberation and unification', but also in many ways continued it. The two processes were seen to be inseparable. "Enchanting centuries-long dreams have turned into glorious and majestic reality. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes resurrects, and within it resurrects the United Serbian Orthodox Church", read the editorial of the first issue of the renewed official periodical of the Serbian Church.[188]

This feeling of 'double liberation' was also reinforced by the state, who once again embraced the idea of the Serbian Orthodox Church sharing the fate of the Serbian nation. King Petar's order from 1920 about the reestablishment of the Serbian Patriarchate reads: "The Serbian Orthodox Church has always shared political destiny of the Serbian people/nation [*narod*]. That is why forced political separation [of the nation] resulted as well in the forced separation of the church".[189] The same was held true for the opposite process: the unification of the Serbian nation in one state automatically meant Church unification. Thus the state and the Church were in complete mutual understanding regarding this issue and were drawing on each other's authority and symbolic capital. Retrospectively, this light-headed attitude of the state might seem somewhat careless, especially given the suspicion towards religion articulated by some proponents of Yugoslavism already decades earlier. At all events the link between the Serbian nation and the Orthodox Church has not been broken, and in some ways even became strengthened during the two following decades. "Serbian

[188] "Naša Reč," *Glasnik Ujedinjene Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve* No.1 (1920): 16. Note the symptomatic "ujedinjena" (united) in the name of the journal. The prewar title did not contain it, nor was it kept for a longer period of time in the Interwar period.

[189] King Petar's I order about the reestablishment of the Patriarchate (30 Aug/ 12 Sept 1920), published in *Sprska Pravoslavna Crkva 1920-1970*, 29.

national Orthodox Church of St. Sava has been preserving our nationality throughout centuries; and the Patriarchate remained to be the symbol of the national unity even when the state unity fell into pieces and one Serbian state was replaced by many"[190], King Petar proclaimed in 1920. No conflicting interests have been displayed so far.

The Serbian Church as an institution that shared the national destiny of the Serbs with all its ups and downs was entitled in the view of many to some special treatment on the part of the state. It was the common understanding among Serbian clerics and many believers that due to the fact that the Serbian Orthodox clergy at the cost of heavy sacrifice contributed more than any other social strata to the creation of the new Yugoslav state (read liberated and unified state of all Serbs), the state in its turn would take this sacrifice into account when settling church related issues.[191]

The Church reported that from 3000 priests that the Serbian Church had in 1914, by the end of the war 1056 had died or were missing.[192] The great scale of the number of victims, the degree of sufferings and general input of the Orthodox clergy into the common cause were publicly acknowledged by the state. It can be found in the same regulation of King Petar about the re-establishment of the Patriarchate from August 1920.[193] Four years later King Aleksandar's charter about the enthronement of Dimitrije in Peć read: "…we are witnesses to the work of the Serbian Orthodox Church, who bore severe losses and sustained the strength of our nation to reach this liberation and unification".[194] The Church in its turn underlined the sacrifice of the Serbian people, its selfless courage and devotion to the task of the liberation of its Slavic brothers.

[190] King Petar's I order about the reestablishment of the Patriarchate (30 Aug/ 12 Sept 1920), published in *Sprska Pravoslavna Crkva 1920-1970*, 29.
[191] Slijepčević, Vol. 2, 556.
[192] Momir Lečić, "Izgradnja i obnova crkava i manastra od 1920-1941," in *Sprska Pravoslavna Crkva: 1920-1970*, 65.
[193] Petar's order from 1920 about the reestablishment of the Serbian Patriarchate, published in *Sprska Pravoslavna Crkva: 1920-1970*, 29.
[194] Aleksandar's charter about the enthronement of Dimitrije in Peć published in *Sprska Pravoslavna Crkva: 1920-1970*, 35.

Of all symbols of the suffering of the Serbian people during the years of the First World War the most famous and the most powerful one was the so called *Albanian Golgotha*, also known as *Serbia's Golgotha through the gorges of Albania* - the retreat of the Serbian troops to the island of Corfu in the winter of 1915/1916 through the mountains of Kosovo, Montenegro and Albania[195]. The use of biblical symbols, which was (and still is) common for all Christian cultures, made it even easier for the Church to link the national community and religious institutions. It also allowed the Serbian Church to join in naturally the forging of the national martyrdom narrative. This narrative was seen by many in the following decades as the reason for Serbia's 'moral right' to dominance in the country. Those state-functionaries, who supported this course, were naturally in favor of the Church's involvement as it clearly added weight and authority to any argument made or action taken.

Whereas higher clergy had not generally questioned the idea of the three-named Yugoslav nation and followed the general line of cheering the new state and the new nation,[196] different opinions have been expressed as well, and some concerns have been raised. There was an interesting discrepancy between the official statements of the Patriarch and other higher clergy on the one hand, and what the lower clergy thought about the same issues, on the other. While Dimitrije repeatedly talked of unification and beneficial coexistence of different religions and nations in one state, other people wrote of the

[195] Tens of thousands of Serbian soldiers found refuge on Corfu in the period from 1916-1918, but many died on their way through the mountains and during the winter spent in poor conditions on the Adratic coast because of exhaustion, harsh conditions, snipers' bullets, diseases and food-shortages. An estimated number of the soldiers and civilians who found their death by these means amounts to 210.000 people (70.000 soldiers and around 140.000 refugees). (Dušan Bataković, "Srpska vlada i Esad-Paša Toptani", in Andrej Mitrović (ed.), *Srbi i Albanci u XX veku: Ciklus predavanja*. Belgrade, 1991, 48). Andrej Mitrović sites somewhat different numbers: 70.000 soldiers and civilians missing during the actual withdrawal, and even more dead on the coat before the evacuation to Corfu and other safe locations. Andrej Mitrović, *Serbia's Great War, 1914-1918* (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 2007), 152. Vido island in the vicinity of Corfu, where a hospital was located, came to be known as the 'island of death', while the waters around it are to the present day known as 'the Blue Graveyard' [Plava Grobnica], after a poem written by Milutin Bojić after the end of the First World War. In 1923 King Aleksandar erected a memorial cross and in 1938 a mausoleum was built on Vido in order to commemorate fallen Serbian soldiers and to express gratitude toward the Greek and French governments who organized the rescue operation. In 1930 a *Monument of Gratitude to France*, work of the famous Ivan Mestrovic, was unveiled in the presence of King Aleksandar Kradjordjević in Belgrade's city park and fortress Kalemegdan.

[196] "Naša Reč," 15.

impossibility of the absolute equality of religions. Milos Andjelković, who belonged to the skeptics' camp, explained it in a fairly axiomatic way, by simply stating that Christianity is the most perfect faith (judging by its ethics and humanness) among all.[197]

The mere possibility of peaceful coexistence of different religions has been challenged continuously by the secularists. Even before 1918 the proponents of Yugoslavism suspected that religious differences can create serious trouble for their cause of building and sustaining a Yugoslav state. After 1918 one of the strategies of the state-minded intellectuals and statesmen regardless of their political and national affinities was to emphasize increasing secularization of society, hence the decline of the power and influence of religious institutions, hence the potential trouble they might cause was minimized. This in its essence modernist attitude was present in both Croatian and Serbian political cultures, but to a lesser extent in Slovenian, which was dominated by the clerical Catholic party of Dr. Anton Korošec.[198]

An article, which argued along these lines, was published by the Serbian historian Vladimir Ćorović in the widely read *Serbian Literary Herald* in 1919 and caused quite a harsh reaction from the Serbian Orthodox Church. For the Church understandably perceived the argument about the positive (in terms of state-building) effect of secularization as the biggest threat to its own existence, power and influence. To prove the other side wrong in its expectations of religious decline, the Church demonstrated countless examples of popular religiosity and grass-root religious movements. The clergy employed an old argument, which proved to be successful previously, the argument about the intrinsic connection between the Church and the nation, that essentially they were one.[199] Once the argument about the link between the Serbian nation and the Serbian Orthodox Church had been taken from its

[197] Andjelković, "Apologija crkve,"*Glasnik Srpske Pravolsavne Patrijaršije* No.4 (1921): 55.
[198] Jure Gašparić, *Diktatura kralja Aleksandra in politika Slovenske ljudske stranke v letih 1929-1935.* (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2007), 35, 42.
[199] Miloš Andjelković, "Apologija crkve," *Glasnik Srpske Pravolsavne Patrijaršije* No.4 (1921): 54-56 and No. 5 (1921): 75.

original pre-1918 context of *one* nation-building and ethnically homogeneous nation-state in order to be used in the multi-national Yugoslav context, the problems so much feared by the Yugoslavists were about to reveal themselves. It would be a matter of speculation to guess whether those who employed this argument in the early-1920s were conscious of its destructive potential for the multinational state. Most of the clergy simply continued to use the same argumentative strategy in their disputes with governmental officials that they had been using before WWI. There is no evidence to suggest that in the immediate postwar period the Serbian Orthodox Church deliberately sought to weaken the Yugoslav political project in its contemporary form.

The whole discussion of nation, national identity and the church and religious feeling had many aspects to it and, most importantly, has its own logic and a very long history, sometimes going back for centuries. There are at least three large sets of issues relevant for the discussion here, in the context of Serbian Orthodox Church and its relationship to the Serbian nation and Yugoslav state. First, it is the way how '*Church'* is being understood in Christianity, and in particular, in Eastern Christianity and especially the understanding of the Church as a *community of believers.* At the start of the twentieth century the doctrine of the Church was in the center of attention in all Christian theological traditions. Jaroslav Pelikan argues, that it became "as it had never quite been before, the bearer of the whole of the Christian message for the twentieth century, as well as the recapitulation of the entire doctrinal tradition from the preceding centuries".[200] Second, is the way *authority* is understood in Eastern Christianity. Here, separation between secular and sacred spheres and authorities plays an important role (this issue was briefly discussed above). These two themes have been a source of a dialogue/debate between Eastern Greek and Western Latin, primarily Roman Catholic, churches for a very long time. The third set of questions appeared with the

[200] Jaroslav Pelikan, *Christian Doctrine and Modern Culture: Since 1700* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, c1989), 282.

rise of modern nationalism and was intimately linked to the permeation of nationalism and national feeling in the sphere that previously has been confined to theology, law and philosophy.

In East Christian tradition the "Church" was predominantly perceived as a living organism. Although there is no one precise and strict definition of Church in Eastern Christianity, there is a common agreement that apart from being the "living body of mystical encounter with God" also is "a community in creation, with its own structure, form and manner of operation".[201] In contrast to Western Christianity, Eastern Orthodoxy perceives Church not merely as an institution within the state, but as the body of the faithful believers. All ecclesiological models in Eastern Christian tradition make an emphasis on the conciliar nature of the Church, i.e. its hierarchical but not monadic structure.[202] In Slavonic languages this characteristic trait of Eastern Christian Church is usually described with the concept '*sobornost'*, which alludes to the fact that the supreme administrative authority lays not in one single person, but in a communion: the *sobor/sabor*, or council. This concept has an interesting history and is of particular importance for Serbian political thought, as it was used by lay political thinkers as well as by theologians[203]. In the early-twentieth century the term was borrowed by Western theologians, and as Pelikna observesd, use of the Russian "word "sobor" for church councils to which Eastern Orthodoxy assigned authority in the church

[201] Mary B. Cunningham and Elizabeth Theokritoff eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Orthodox Christian Theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, c2008), 122.
[202] Ibid., 125.
[203] Initially a religious notion, it was introduced to the Serbian political language and thought by Nikola Pašić. He borrowed this religious concept from the Russian slavophile philosopher Khomiakov but transformed it into a secular one. Khomiakov himself connected the idea of spiritual Church community to the Russian peasant commune, but never left completely the theological grounds. He used the concept in order to analyze and criticize church – state relationship in the Romanov Empire after the reforms of Peter I. Martin Schulze Wessel, "Rechgläubigkeit und Gemeinschaft: Ekklesiologische und politische Bedeutungen des 'sobornost' Begriffs in Rußland," in *Baupläne der sichtbaren Kirche: Sprachliche Konzepte religiöser Vergemeinschaftung in Europa*, ed. Lucian Hölscher (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2007), 196-211. For Pašić as well the notion signified the importance of the traditional peasant commune – *zadruga* – and even more importantly its democratic spirit to Serbian political and social life. But unlike Khomiakov Pašić left the theological connotations aside and focused exclusively on the application of the term to the secular context of politics.

helped to make the term a way of distinguishing Eastern ecclesiology from both the 'papal monarchy' of Roman Catholicism and the 'sola Scriptura' of Protestantism."[204]

The third set of issues centered on nationalism, nation, national community, etc. The 1920s and 1930s in the history of the Serbian Church are characteristic for the intellectual complexity and sophistication of the religious and secular thought produced by the clergy, the intellectuals' and students' circles close to the Church institutions. One of the striking aspects of the intellectual product these people created was their ability to incorporate nationalism into theology. Suddenly, a scholarly debate had a distinctive national touch to it. It is symptomatic of the era, that in the many discussions of the relationship between religious community of Eastern Orthodox Christians and the Serbian national community, there was the least theoretical, conceptual debate.

Miloš Andjelković argued that the Serbian Church did not represent any terrestrial power, "but [was] the embodiment of the national individuality".[205] The discursive link between the church and the national community is thus a natural consequence of a more complex and much older intellectual tradition of the necessary and inevitable tie between religion and the nation. Bringing nation into the discussion of the Church could also be read from the perspective of the renewed interest in the social aspects of the Christian teaching, which in its turn was the reaction towards "the deepening awareness throughout modern culture that individuals were never isolated from one another but always participated in various communities".[206]

At the same time the nation was started to be seen as the totality of the believers. Miloš Andjelković, an archpriest and a professor in Belgrade known for his not too radical views, in a meta-debate with the Roman-Catholic Church stated that no religion and no church could exist without a distinguishing national feature; and that the Serbian Church in his view

[204] Pelikan, *Christian Doctrine and Modern Culture,* 287.
[205] Miloš Andjelković, "Savrmena crkva," *Glasnik Ujedinjene Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve* No.12 (1920): 182.
[206] Pelikan, *Christian Doctrine and Modern Culture,* 289-290.

complied perfectly with the definition of 'Church' as "the corpus of the members of the nation".[207] The powerful emphasis on the collective identity of the Church and religious community, which overlapped with the national identity, was one of the major legacies in the Church discourse from the preceding periods, and one of the seminal ideas of the interwar period. Later on it turned out to have important political implications, but as long as the first half of the 1920s is concerned, the politics were mostly kept out of the debate, be it with the Roman Catholic Church, or modern secularists.

Reform Movement from the Outside and from Within

The appearance of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as a new political, social and cultural context of the activities of the Serbian Church did not change much in its (Church representatives') belief in the absolute superiority of the national Church over an a-national or transnational one. One of the 'others' in this dispute was the Catholic Church, as represented by its institutions and hierarchy in Croatia. The national character of the Serbian church was thus opposed to the clerical nature of the Roman Catholic Church. However, in the post-war years the prime threat was seen to come not from Vatican but from, firstly, from the numerous sects and sectarian movements. An important part of the disputes concerned the reform attempts that came from within the Serbian Church. Often these initiatives were linked to the western (mostly Protestant) influence, and the attitude towards them was very ambivalent. The reform movement found some support within the Serbian Church, and thus divided the body of the Church. Some of reform stimuli surprisingly came from the 'enemy'; neo-protestant sects of the Nazarenes that were widespread in Vojvodina. The sectarians had a complex ideological profile which combined Evangelical practices with anarchism.[208]

[207] Miloš Andjelković, "Prava religija i autoritativna crkva," *Glasnik Ujedinjene Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve* No.6 (1920): 93.
[208] András Bozóki and Miklós Sükösd, *Anarchism in Hungary: Theory, History, Legacies* (Boulder: Social Science Monographs; New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 88.

Arguably it was the Evangelical aspect that attracted Orthodox Serbian population who actively converted.[209]

Some of the reform initiatives had a national dimension to them, e.g. a new wave of discussions about the use of Church-Slavonic in the liturgies in the 1920s. The debate which started back in the nineteenth century revolved around the question of was whether it would have been better to switch for liturgical purposes from Church-Slavonic in its Russified version to either a Serbianized version of Church-Slavonic or to contemporary literary Serbian language. The later option won eventually and was codified in the 1931 Church Statutes.

Although the main incentive for the reform was the desire to make liturgy closer to the community of believers and therefore attract more people to the church (and to prevent conversions from Orthodox Christianity), and thus was a modernization attempt, the argument could not escape the national aspect as well. Those in favor of the use of the literary language among other things frequently employed a political argument that emphasized the unity of the new Yugoslav nation and its state. In their view it was only natural that the contemporary literary language should be used during the service. One of the enthusiasts of the change called in 1921 for translating all liturgical books "into the language which our single, but three-named nation speaks. Let one nation pray to God in one language".[210] A problematic part of such a statement was that the speaker appeared to be oblivious to the fact that different 'tribes' of the single nation were also of different religious affiliations. Nevertheless, the author was not the first one to emphasize the use of Serbo-Croatian in religious ceremonies. Already in the middle of the nineteenth century Ljudevit Gaj expressed a hope that the last religious differences between the Croats and the Serbs (which he considered to be unimportant anyway) would be reduced once "the celibacy will

[209] Bojan Aleksov, *Religious Dissent between the Modern and the National,* 143-145.
[210] Katić, *Narodna crkva sa gledišta narodnih potreba,* (1921), 8-9.

be abandoned and the old law of the Croatian Catholic Church will come back, namely the [use of the] national language".[211]

Language was, however, neither the most contested, nor the most important component in, what we can label here for the sake of the argument, the 'reform movement'. Its most significant dimension that far outreached Serbian and Yugoslav national boundaries was the issue of ecumenism.

Despite its contemporary self-tailored public image, Orthodoxy did not distance itself from modernism and secularism that were necessarily associated with European ecumenical movement. For a rather short period of time, some of the outstanding representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church were actively engaging with it. On the other hand, Orthodox Christianity in general in the first half of the twentieth century was reluctant to establish a productive ecumenical dialogue with other Christian churches. One of the reasons for this, as noted by Jaroslav Pelikan, derived from the fact that it "had fixed the authority of tradition, represented (but by no means exhausted) by the actions of the first seven ecumenical councils, as the norm for the orthodox interpretation of Scripture, and had denied to any member of the episcopate […] the right to exercise authority apart from this tradition".[212] In the eyes of those adhering to this tradition, the ecumenical dialogue meant doctrinal compromise, not opening up of new horizons.

Among the Orthodox churches, the first to partake in the ecumenical movement at the official level was the Patriarchate of Constantinople. This happened in January 1920, when the encyclical "*To All of the churches of Christ*" appeared. At the very beginning of this encyclical it is said: "...rapprochement between the various Christian Churches and fellowship between them is not excluded by the doctrinal differences which exist between them..." The outrage of Orthodox clergy in Europe was primarily caused by the use of

[211] Ljudevit Gaj, "O 'Zahtevanju naroda trojedne kraljevine', 1848 na pitanja jednog Beograđanina", in Novak, Viktor (ed.), *Antologija jugoslovenske misli*, 126.
[212] Jaroslav Pelikan, *Christian Doctrine and Modern Culture*, 283-284.

'churches' in plural and by the fact that the same word applied to what previously the clerics referred to as sects.

As a first, practical step for "attaining mutual trust and love", it was reckoned necessary for the Orthodox Church to accept the New (Gregorian) Calendar, "so that all the great Christian feasts can be celebrated by all the Churches at the same time". This was quickly done by the Patriarchate of Constantinople (and later, as well, by various other local Orthodox Churches), who paid a price for this: an internal schism. The split in the Greek Orthodox Church, the most severe and longstanding one, over the introduction of New Calendar happened March 1924, when the Old Julian Calendar was replaced, but not with the Gregorian Calendar used by the Roman Catholic Church, but by the Neo-Julian, or Milanković Calendar.[213] A fraction of clergy and lay believers did not accept the reform and established the so-called Greek Old Calendarist Orthodox Church.

In the Serbian Orthodox Church the debates over the change of calendar were neither deep nor fierce. The reformers underlined primarily the fact that the secular calendar was changed in 1918 (to the Gregorian), thus it would be wise for the Church to follow the example. Those opposing the reform drew on the examples of the neighboring Greece and Romania and called attention to the possible negative consequences of public unrest and even schism. Arguably, the calendar reform did not find sufficient support because the majority of the believers did not find the issue worth much trouble and effort, opposite to the more successful language reform, meaningfulness of which was easier to argue for. The opponents

[213] The new calendar was proposed for adoption by the Orthodox churches at a Synod in Constantinople in May 1923. The synod, chaired by controversial Patriarch Melentije IV of Constantinople, and called Pan-Orthodox by its defenders, did not have representatives from many Orthodox Church, including the largest one, the Russian Orthodox Church. This Synod synchronized the new calendar with the Gregorian calendar by specifying that the next 1 October of the Julian calendar would be 14 October in the new calendar, thus dropping thirteen days. It then adopted a leap year rule that differs from that of the Gregorian calendar. Years evenly divisible by four are leap years, except that years evenly divisible by 100 are not leap years, unless they leave a remainder of 200 or 600 when divided by 900, then they are leap years. This means that the two calendars will first differ in 2800, which will be a leap year in the Gregorian calendar, but a common year in the new calendar. This leap year rule was proposed by the Serbian scientist Milutin Milanković, an astronomical delegate to the synod representing the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

of the Calendar reform used the traditional anti-Catholic and anti-Western discourse, and pointed out that there was no ecclesiastical or theological necessity for the change.

However, it would not be true to say the Serbian Orthodox Church did not display any positive interest in the Ecumenical initiative at all. The interest in Ecumenism and theology of other Christian confessions came primarily from those Serbian clerics who went to study abroad, especially those who pursued their studies at the Department of Old Catholic Theology of the University of Bern in Switzerland. Among one of the first to travel to Bern was Nikolaj Velimirović, later the most praised and famous Serbian theologian of the twentieth century for some and a controversial figure for his affinity with Serbian fascist movement and anti-Semitism for others. He successfully defended his doctorate *Faith in the Resurrection of Christ as the Foundation of the Dogma of the Apostolic Church* in 1908. In the following years Velimirović spent time in England and Russia where he devoted his time less to formal studying and more to getting to know the culture and life of the respective nations. Jovan Byford, one of the most critical authors to write recently about him, underlines that Velimirović "who belonged to the first generation of young, talented and well-educated clerics offered a promise of a better future for the Serbian Church and a break with a tradtion of paucity of intellectual and spiritual leadership. What is more, at this early stage of his clerical career [1914], Velimirović was widely perceived as a progressive young theologian and a liberal force within the Serbian Orthodox Church".[214]

He spent the war-years in England in an official diplomatic capacity. There he built up close collegial friendship with prominent English clerics, including the archbishop of Canterbury.[215] In his numerous sppeches and sermons, highly popular with the local

[214] Jovan Byford, *Denial and Repression of Anti-Semitism: Post-communist Remembrance of the Serbian Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović* (Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 2008), 23.
[215] His standing of a modernist and progressive, sympathy towards Protestans Churches, together with obvious erudition and knowledge of languages made the Serbian government send Velimirović on a fund-rasing mission to the USA and England during the War. He spent four years from 1915 to 1919 mostly in England. His

audiences, Velimirović concentrated on the Serbian and South Slav history and tradition. He did not specify Orthodox Christianity as a characteristic trait of the Serbian national character; instead, he underlined the affinity of Eastern and Western Christianity.[216] By all accounts Velimirvoić's interest and sympathy towards Ecumenism and Western Christianity evaporated by the middle of the 1920s. The vast majority of the Serbian Orthodox Church did not express much understanding and wish to cooperate along the ecumenical lines.

Thus, in the late-1910s until the early-1920s, the modernizing initiatives that originated in the Serbian Orthodox Church did not find sufficient support from the Church leadership, who was absorbed in the issues of Church reform and unification. At the same, one has to be careful to note that the reform agenda did not necessarily lead to an anti-national, or even a non-national position. These two dimensions could be easily combined.

Orthodoxy and Symbolic Legitimization of Power

The chaos of the first post-war years notwithstanding, those sensitive to the issue noticed from the early on, that from the vast pool of symbols available to the new state and its government, those with a clear Serbian Orthodox touch dominated. In 1920 when new state holidays were established, the list featured the day of St. Cyril and Methodius and the day of St. Sava. It was only three years later that the Ministry of Faiths passed a special act by which it exempted the Muslim population of the Kingdom to pray on these days in mosques and obliged them only to close all enterprisers and shops. School children were free of classes, and again were exempt from taking part in any ceremonies.[217] This brief example demonstrates what can be labeled as a degree of insensitivity displayed by the Serbian Church, for these initiatives did not form (yet) a consistent policy. To say that the

activities abroad were part of actions taken by a more national-oriented Serbian Relief Fund and more inclusive Yugoslav Committee.

[216] Jovan Byford states, that this friendliness was only the political, superficial layer of Velimirović's view, and that his true beliefs were quite the opposite: hostile to Catholicism and Islam, etc. (Byford, *Repression and Denial*, 30).

[217] Radmila Radić, *Život u vremenima*, 117.

government and Prince-Regent from the very beginning were keen on the exclusive use of the Orthodox symbolism would be an exaggeration. What follows are brief examples from two important spheres: commemorations of the First World War and attempts at re-appropriation of classic culture and literary figures.

Despite the presence of a reform agenda in the circles of the Serbian Orthodox clergy, the overall impression the Church gave to the public was that of firmly standing on the position of the defense of the Serbian national tradition and values. This preference of the higher clergy was noticeable among other things in the many official ceremonies the Church organized, supported or took part in. The vast majority of the ceremonies were centered on the commemoration of the soldiers fallen in WWI and on the celebration of the new Yugoslav state that victoriously emerged from the battlefields.[218]

In a state which was born in the war, commemoration of the fallen soldiers was of particular importance. As it happens to be, very often the state draws on its dead in order to enhance its legitimacy, and the reference to the 'bones of the forefathers' is present in most strategies of legitimization of power. As it was already mentioned above, the Yugoslav case was not an easy one in terms of symbolic belonging of the fallen heroes: during the war future citizens of the common state often fought on different sides. After 1918 the new state had to devise a way of commemorating those who sacrificed their lives for the cause of national 'liberation and unification' without underlining national differences, i.e. imperiling the future of state unity. To add to the complexity, for the Serbs WWI was inseparable from

[218] Monuments to national heroes, commemorations of people and events, mass events and rallies – all this has been qualified long ago as an important component of the raw material suitable for analysis of nationalism, its logic and manifestations; state policies, and public discourses. George Mosse demonstrated the importance of national monuments and the debates about them for both the internal logic of nationalism and national feeling on the one hand, and the decision-making process of all actors involved in the negotiation of the national identity, on the other: "The national monument as a means of self-expression served to anchor the national myths and symbols in the consciousness of the people, and some have retained their effectiveness to the present day". (George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars Through the Third Reich*. New York: Howard Fertig, 1975, 8).

the Balkan wars of 1912-1913; together they formed the 'Wars of National Liberation', an experience that Croats and Slovenes did not have.

Serbian commemorative practices and sites of remembrance dedicated to the Balkan Wars often evoke the myth and memories of *Kosovo Polje*, thus having a distinctly Serbian national character with a very strong religious aspect. WWI memorials, cemeteries and commemorations were much more diverse and had more complex structures. It was in this field that a tension was apparent between the symbols used by the Serbian national institutions (primarily the Church and the army) on the one hand, and the attempts of the state to create all-encompassing *Yugoslav* symbolism on the other. National Serbian and supra-national Yugoslav tension was by no means the only one, nor was it the only difference among the variety of monuments erected and commemorative practices existent. "The commemorative tradition in Serbia after the wars of national liberation does not have a single narrative thread of a single arbiter of commemorative good taste. Instead, the Serbian monarchy, national and local political elites, the military establishment, veterans, survivors, historians, intellectuals, artists, and individual men and women commemorated the war in vastly different ways and for vastly different purposes".[219]

Zeitinlik, a Serbian military cemetery in Thessaloniki, and the *Victor* by Ivan Mestroivc in Belgrade are the examples of the two types of commemorations: inclusive and exclusive respectively. Zeitinlik, the biggest of its sort outside the Kingdom, was designed by Aleksandar Vasić and Nikolaj Krasnov in 1926 and built between 1933 and 1936. The cemetery is marked by a mausoleum which consists of a chapel and an ossuary. The chapel of Archangel Michael built in neo-Byzantine style reminds of the medieval Serbian monastery of Kosovo and belongs to the same series of big public constructions as the cathedral of St.

[219] Melissa Bokovoy, "Scattered Graves, Ordered Cemeteries: Commemorating Serbia's Wars of National Liberation, 1912-1918," in *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present*, eds., Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2001), 239.

Mark in Belgrade. Four lines from a poem by V. J. Ilić written on the front wall of the mausoleum talk of the fallen Serbian soldiers and express the emotions shared by the entire nation:

Padali od zrna, od gladi i zedji,
Raspinjani na krst, na Golgote visu,
Ali cvrstu veru u pobedu krajnju
Nikada, na za casak, izgubili nisu.

They fell from bullets, from hunger and thirst,
Were crucified on the Golgotha heights,
But their strong faith in the final victory
They have never, not for a moment, lost.

The Zetinlik memorial complex is dedicated to those who fell on the Thessaloniki front after they had survived the 1915 retreat from Serbia, a war episode central to the national memory of the suffering and sacrifice. The Serbian cemetery is a part of a larger memorial complex which includes Russian, Italian, English and French cemeteries. It thus unites Serbian heroes and victims of the war with other allies. At the same time the monument excludes other South Slav but non-Serb soldiers who fought on the Salonika front. The memorial had a distinctly Serbian and Orthodox character: all inscriptions were made in Cyrillic alphabet; mosaics created by a Greek artist were made in traditional Byzantine manner. As a scholar rightly summarized of the impression the site gave to the visitors, it "refashioned the deaths of these soldiers into a sacred experience that elevated Serbian national sentiment to religious heights built upon the sacrifices of saints and heroes".[220]

However important the memory of the war and its heroes was for the Yugoslav and Serbian public discourse after the war, it was not the only element of the commemorative practices. The task to find middle ground between conflicting views, intentions was equally difficult when a commemorative project was dedicated to a hero who was claimed by various actors. And that was exactly the case of Petar Petrović Njegoš, the Montenegrin archbishop and ruler, but most importantly a celebrated romantic poet.

[220] Bokovoy, 251.

The fact that Njegoš was regarded to be a (or may be even *the*) Serbian national poet, while at the same time the state sponsored and supported initiatives to re-conceptualize him as a Yugoslav poet is an interesting story in itself.[221] To add to it, let us not forget that he was also an archbishop and the head of the church and state of Montenegro. The combination of the spiritual and the national-political had never been a problem in Serbian nationalism; most of the medieval Serbian princes were canonized as Orthodox saints. What actually did create a problem in the mid-1920s was the difference in the understanding of the Serbian Orthodox Church and King Aleksandar of the extent to which Serbian (i.e. Orthodox) part of Njegoš's heritage and identity could be overshadowed by his alleged Yugoslavism. This difference became visible in the course of the preparations for Njegoš's reburial.[222] The discussions that accompanied it are quite illustrative of the balance of power and state of affairs in the first half of the 1920s.

For the Serbian Church and most of Serbian political and cultural establishment Njegoš was primarily the national poet, an important figure emblematic of the fight for national freedom and national (i.e. Serbian) unity. Nikola Pašić, Prime Minister at the time, in a conversation with Gavrilo Dožić (then Montenegrin archbishop and future Patriarch of Serbia) agreed that the reburial of Njegoš was a matter of national importance to which the government should pay close attention.[223] After several years of mostly financial difficulties, the enterprise was taken up by the King himself, who assured the representatives of the clergy that being a blood relative to Njegoš he felt it was only natural if he financed the

[221] For a detailed account of these attempts at reinterpretation see Andrew B. Wachtel, "How to Use a Classic: Petar Petrović Njegoš in the Twentieth Century," in *Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of Twentieth-century Southeastern Europe*, ed. John Lampe and Mark Mazower (Budapest: CEU Press, 2003), 131-153; or a respective chapter in Andrew Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

[222] Before his death Njegoš had asked to be buried in a chapel on top of the mountain Lovćen in Montenegro. His will was fulfilled several years after his death, only to be revoked during the years of WWI, when his body was moved back to Cetinje. Once the war was over the Church authorities in Montenegro, now a part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, decided to move Njegoš's remains back to Lovćen again. The chapel was found in a very poor condition and was to be either renovated or built anew.

[223] Dožić, *Memoari*, 18.

works from his private funds. A new design of the chapel was commissioned to Ivan Meštrović, a celebrated Yugoslav sculptor.

King Aleksandar took the chance to celebrate Njegoš not as a Serbian national poet, but to turn him into a unifying all-Yugoslav figure. Meštrović, a well-known Yugoslavist, made a project for the chapel that was free of distinct national style, but also free of any indication of the fact that Njegoš was an Orthodox archbishop. All of this could not leave the representatives of the Orthodox Church, who initiated the entire process, unbothered. According to Dožić (who we can believe expressed the collective opinion of the Orthodox hierarchy) the proposed "monument on Lovćen resembled Egyptian pyramids or even the unwieldy monuments erected to certain kings in the East". Such a monument did not conform to the ideas and ideals of Christianity, as it was in its essence "more pagan than anything else".[224] The Church thus strongly opposed the modernist and Yugoslavist in its nature project of the Mausoleum that Meštrović prepared and King Aleksandar supported.

The King although personally in favor of the project and despite the fact that he privately financed the entire enterprise, agreed with the criticism voiced by the Church. Meštrović's project had to be rejected. The new chapel built on Lovćen was in full accordance with Njegoš's will and the Serbian Church's ideas of how its hero should be commemorated. The case of the reburial of Njegoš demonstrates how the Serbian Orthodox Church defended its heroes from the desacralization and their legacy from misinterpretation. This clash of opinions, which did not develop into a fully-fledged conflict, was but one of the Serbian Church's attempts to regain cultural power and political influence from the secular forces.

In a more radical and complex way the same pattern will be repeated in the mid-1930s, when the debate about St. Sava sprung (analyzed in detail in chapter IV). Nevertheless, the

[224] Dožić, *Memoari*, 23.

early-1920s were also marked by some sort of debate around this medieval hero and the main Serbian national Saint. This time, however, contrary to Njegoš's case, the Serbian Orthodox Church tried to present St. Sava not as a national Serbian saint, but as a figure, who can be accepted by all brotherly Yugoslav tribes, regardless of their religious affiliation. In 1922 the government passed a regulation, which made the celebrations of St. Sava mandatory in all Yugoslav schools. That caused a significant outrage from the Croatian Catholics. It was in response to this, that the Serbian Orthodox Church presented an argument about the possibility of St. Sava being seen as a common Yugoslav figure, and indeed about the very natural character of this point view. This position underlined that the deeds of Sava were so much above any confessional divides, that there was no imaginable reason for his not to be acceptable for the Catholics.[225] As a matter of fact, the author went even further in his claim about Sava's universality and maintained that "[T]he manner of his work shows so much understanding of the needs of the people, that even a Muslim, if he is nationally conscious, can find [in Sava] his source of the force/energy for the national work".[226]

This interpretation of St. Sava, who was the main national saint and the patron of the Serbian nation together with the general rhetoric of unification, may suggest that the Serbian Church indeed tried to contribute to the Yugoslav cause. Nevertheless, the situation, in which this theory was put forward, suggests that it was but a lip service and that the aim instead was to justify the inclusion of a characteristically Serbian saint into all-country school celebrations. Although the main part of the debate around Sava comes in only in the 1930s, it is quite curious to see that, the seeds of discord had been already sawn as early as 1922.

[225] S. Budim, "Hrvatski problem i vera," *Glasnik Srpske Pravolsavne Patrijaršije* No. 9 (1922): 134.
[226] S. Budim, "Hrvatski problem i vera," 134.

Chapter III

The Serbian Church Facing the Challenge of Political Modernity

While the primary task of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the first post-war years was to unify the structures and to get the Church out of the chaos of the Great War, by the second half of the 1920s, with most reforms completed, the Serbian Church felt much stronger than previously the need to voice its opinion on various political (broadly speaking) issues. A decade after the end of the War, the Church once again became aware of its mobilization potential, its capacity and need to reach out to the population of the Kingdom outside Belgrade clubs and *kafanas*, something that many political parties failed to do. As Gavrilo Dožić wrote, the Serbian Orthodox Church was ready, should the need be, to go 'into the people' to uphold its rights in the dispute with the government.[227] To be more precise, a part of the higher Orthodox clergy was by then ready to take up the fight with the government and to enter quite bitter disputes. That was the case indeed. Dožić clearly stated in his memoirs that already in 1930 General Živković was unhappy with those opposition politicians who kept contact too close with the Patriarchate, as he feared that they would use the Church to undermine the authority of his government.[228] Ironically, it was not the General, but his successor Milan Stojadinovic who suffered from the alliance of the anti-governmental forces and the Orthodox Church. At the same time the Church came to the understanding that there was a possibility of its being used in political struggles (e.g. by the same political forces opposed to the government of General Petar Živković) and there was no guarantee that the result of the political action would be beneficial for the Church.

This chapter follows subtle and radical changes that occurred in the Yugoslav context and affected the way the Serbian Church positioned itself vis-à-vis the state, other religious

[227] Gavrilo Dožić, *Memoari patrijarha srpskog Gavrila* (Belgrade: Sfairos, 1990), 36.
[228] Dožić, *Memoari*, 34.

communities and the World to such an extent that the almost unanimous embracement of the Yugoslav project of the early-1920s was replaced by an open confrontation with the government in the late-1930s. The sources of this transformation were many, and this chapter focuses only on some of them. It does so by analyzing internal discussions on how exactly the Church agenda should look. The dilemma can be roughly reduced to the juxtaposition of social vs. national mission of the Church. Positions presented in this debate had been articulated earlier, but were elaborated further. The concerns of the Church remained more or less constant and continued the trend of the previous decade. From the pool of questions, secularization and a number of concomitant issues came to the fore.

It was a coincidence that the unification process was finished roughly at the same time with the introduction of the royal dictatorship. But it was this coincidence that brought about crucial changes not only in church-state relationship but also in the church-nation discursive link. Although, the new rules affected religious institutions, it is not the legal status of the communities *per se* that poses the research problem, but the way the change was perceived, conceptualized and discussed by the parties involved: the Church, and the state in its capacity of the main promoter of integral Yugoslavism. It is a part of my argument, that the dictatorship unwillingly created new opportunities for churches' (both Catholic and Orthodox) involvement in politics, which was visible, for instance, in the way the youth movements developed and transformed in the post-1929 period. Through this *national question* entered the discursive field in a much more problematic way, and in comparison to previous decades occupied much more central place. All in all by the mid-1930s, the Serbian Church made claims that were more political and *more radical* than before.

The Serbian Church continued to see itself as a defender/representative of the Serbian nation, as an important institution and hence had to have not just an opinion, but also certain, preferably independent, social and political agenda. The clergy thought of itself as of servants

of God, the nation and the people. It was in the second half of the 1920s that 'a plan of action' was formulated within the Serbian Church. In contrast to previous decades when most of the effort was directed inwards, i.e. on the reform of the Church, improvement of parish life, raising the educational level of the clergy, etc., now the energy was directed as much inwards as outwards. And that was the big change. State, society and the nation were the objects to which the Serbian Church paid most attention.

Two events were of great significance for the development and implementation of the Orthodox political project: the start of the royal dictatorship and the election of Varnava as the new Serbian Patriarch. This chapter traces how the contextual changes and the development of the internal Church discourse affected each other. First, the general political context is described and several examples of how it influenced Church discourses are discussed. Then, the secularization narrative is discussed in greater detail. The last section of the chapter attempts to demonstrate how the Church's concerns with secularization and its position in the state began to be presented in national terms.

Royal Dictatorship: Challenges and Opportunities

An American political scientist, a contemporary to the events wrote in 1929 that "to cleanse the Augean stables of Yugoslav politics was a formidable task requiring heroic measures. It was this which faced King Alexander".[229] On Christmas Eve 1929, Aleksandar Karadjordjević dismissed the parliament and proclaimed royal dictatorship. His decision followed a nasty instance of shooting in the Parliament, in which the leader of the Croatian

[229] Malbone W. Graham, Jr., "The Dictatorship in Yugoslavia," *The American Political Science Review* 23 No. 2 (May, 1929): 454.

Peasant Party, Stjepan Radić was mortally wounded. The dictatorship was Aleksandar's answer to the situation of chaos and instability, which got out of hand.

In the "*Proclamation*", which introduced the new regime, the King stated that his main aim was to protect the state and national unity, as well as order and discipline. The only way to do so was to eliminate any intermediary between the King and his people, i.e. no parliament or other representative body.[230] In order to achieve this aim, a number of laws suspended those constitutional articles in which the state was defined as 'constitutional' and 'parliamentary', but 'hereditary monarchy' was kept. A special law suspended public political life and banned the work of societies and political parties organized according to national or religious principle; in addition to this strict censorship was imposed.[231]

King Aleksandar went to tremendous lengths to make the idea of integral Yugoslavism work, the state apparatus was used in order to impose the idea of national unity on all citizens. In this regard, the dictatorship represented the highest point of integral Yugoslavism.[232] During the years of dictatorship, the "Yugoslav idea" stood not for the synthesis which might come into being over time, but morphed into a state imposed dogma which had to be implemented immediately.[233] The new, so-called *Octroyed Constitution* [Serb.: Oktroisani Ustav], imposed by the King in 1931 kept the strict regulations of societies, parties, clubs, and other organizations. In a 1931 interview the King said that "the Yugoslav politics will never again be directed by the religious, regional or particularistic

[230] Aleksandar Karadjordjević, *Mome dragom narodu svima Srbima, Hrvatima i Slovencima* (Belgrade, January 6, 1929).
[231] Ljubodrag Dimić, *Istorija Srpske državnosti* Vol. 3 Srbija u Jugoslaviji (Novi Sad: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti. Ogranak, 2001), 137.
[232] The Serbian historian Ljubomir Petrović described the situation in the following way: "The dictatorship was King Aleksandar I Karadjordjević's answer to the internal and external problems of the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Revisionism, the Croatian question, abuses of parliamentary regime, undermining of the foreign outlook of the state and authoritarian character of King Aleksandar led to the imposition of the ideology of integral Yugoslavism. It was based on the fictitious idea of the ethnic unity of the nation. The proponents of integral Yugoslavism believed that the unification of the state and society could be achieved through the imposition of 'decreed' Yugoslavism from above". Ljubomir Petrović, "U Potrazi za izmišljenom stvarnošću: Jugoslovenski identitet u casopisu 'Jugosloven' 1931-1932," *Istorija 20. veka* 1 (2007): 37.
[233] Dimić, *Istorija Srpske državnosti*, 142.

interests".[234] 'Particularistic' here meant 'tribal', 'national' in the sense of different from the 'Yugoslav national'. And the nationalisms of the constitutive nations (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) were now seen as centrifugal forces, damaging the state interests.

The question of whether the first Yugoslavia was doomed from the very beginning or whether it were the misfortunate developments of the 1920s and 1930s that led to its all too fast collapse in 1941 is out of the scope of this research. This research does suggest however, that the way political field was altered in the dictatorship years, created new possibilities for political conflict in Yugoslavia to be described and conceptualized as the Serbo-Croatian national conflict. It may seem counter-intuitive, as it was precisely the opposite, which Aleksandar sought to achieve. One could claim provocatively that the year 1929 changed everything and nothing in Yugoslav history. The rules of political life became different, but ultimately the King failed to meet his aim: to give his country unity and political stability.

The new regime was met by many with the feeling of joy and hope. Crucially, the Croatian Peasant Party was in favor of the dictatorship, Vlatko Maček was said to tell that the new government could, but should not necessarily be dictatorial. Maček argued that the government had to be able first to work without the parliament and approach it only after the agreement with the Croatian Peasant Party is reached.[235] The first reaction of the Serbian Church to the news was positive and, according to Gavrilo Dožić, the Church fully understood and supported the idea of the new regime, as it saw the necessity of it in the given political circumstances.[236] The Serbian Church like many other political actors perceived the dictatorship as the only possibility to stop the seemingly endless political crisis and poor party-politics. This understanding did not however prevent the Serbian hierarch from sharply criticizing the new Prime Minister, who "spent all his life in the barracks and did not know

[234] Cited in Ivana Dobrivojević, *Državna represija u doba diktature kralja Aleksandra, 1929-1935* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006), 63.
[235] Dobrivojević, *Državna represija*, 44.
[236] Dožić, *Memoari*, 48-49.

the life of politics".[237] The attitude to the new regime changed over time, and those who were initially understanding of the initiative could change their mind. Among the hierarchs of the Serbian Orthodox Church, complete spectrum of opinion was present. While Patriarch Varnanva was a faithful ally of the King, Montenegrin Metropolitan Gavrilo Dožić was more critical. The roots of his criticism lay in the incompatibility of his rather strong ideas of Montenegrin nationalism and the ideology of integral Yugoslavism, as well as his personal rivalry with Varnava Rosić.

In 1930 Varnava (Rosić) became the new Serbian Patriarch to replace the late Dimitrje. His election, again, was a moment of dispute between higher clergy and the government. This time, the Montenegrin Metropolitan Gavrilo Dožić, then the head of the electoral council, thought that the election of Varnava was invalid, as it was conducted according to the new electoral law which basically guaranteed the right of the King and the government to assure the election of 'their' candidate. Even under the new rules, Varnava, a personal friend of the King, was elected by only a small margin (Varnava 45 voices, Gavrilo 36, Petar (Bosnian Metropolitan) 34 and Nikolaj Velimirović only 2).[238] Gavrilo was arguing that over-centralization of the Serbian Church is in the end damaging the Yugoslav cause, as it degrades certain parts of the whole. His concerns and numerous complaints were almost always about the poor financial and material state of the Montenegrin clergy and Church property.

In the field of church-state relations in the year of 1929, on the one hand did not bring any radical changes; and state policies towards all major religious communities of the state, i.e. Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim, remained the same as in the preceding decade.[239] Despite the fact that the Ministry of Faiths stopped its existence on March 31, 1929 its

[237] Dožić, *Memoari*, 31.
[238] Radić, *Život u vremenima*, 144.
[239] Minister of Faiths at the cabinet meeting on March 14, 1929. "Sednica Ministarskog Saveta Kraljevine SHS, 14. mart 1929," in *Zapisnici sa sednica ministarskog saveta kraljevine Jugoslavije, 1929-1931*, 50.

functions were transformed in full to the V Department (Religious Department) of the Ministry of Justice. On the other hand, because of the dramatic change of the rules of public politics, the relationship between the state and religious communities was transformed. A variety of both opportunities and challenges presented itself to the religious communities and their leaders. It is important to underline, that the change in the religious field was neither envisioned nor desired by the King and came rather as 'collateral damage'.

In the spring of 1929 the Minister of Faiths, Dragiša Cvetković, underlined that the government's biggest concern in relation to the Yugoslav religious communities was the missing law on the inter-confessional relationship, which was impossible to pass before individual laws regulating the status of each of the religious communities were adopted.[240] This process of adopting regulations about religious communities had begun shortly after the establishment of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; and the new government only continued the work of its predecessors. The Prime Minister, Petar Živković, and his government regarded the church-state relationship to be such an important issue that it was even included in the end-of-year report despite the fact that no great changes were made in 1929 to the already existing regulations, as the *Law about the Serbian Orthodox Church* did not introduce anything new to the already established practices.[241] Most importantly, the Law kept the separation of church from the state a fuzzy affair.

The draft version of the *Law about the Serbian Orthodox Church* was prepared by the Assembly of Hierarchs in 1927, but was not approved by the government. The Minister of Justice introduced changes to the project without consulting the Assembly, an act that caused a new wave of the discontent from within the Church. The next round of the dispute happened in 1929, i.e. after the change of the regime, between the then Metropolitan of

[240] Ibid., 52.
[241] "Referat Pretsedinka Ministarskog saveta gen. Petra R. Živkovića Hj. V. Kralju o radu Kraljevske vlade u godini 1929. Podnesen 31. Decembra god. 1929," in *Zapisnici sa sednica ministarskog saveta kraljevine Jugoslavije, 1929-1931*, 123-127.

Montenegro, Gavrilo Dožić, and the Prime Minister, General Petar Živković. The changes introduced by the government limited the autonomy of the Serbian Church in making decisions about the matters that according to the Church's logic were not of state or national importance (these had been put under the control of the state already). The law was passed on 8 November, 1929 in a compromised form that took into account most of the Church's criticisms.[242] Based on the 1929 law, the Church Regulations (*Ustav Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve*) were finally passed in 1931. With this the reorganization of the Serbian Orthodox Church that followed the unification of the Serbian lands was completed. The law fixed new administrative practices of the united Serbian Patriarchate with their rather high level of centralization and standardization. Patriarch Varnava, one of the most active proponents of the centralization principle, effectively countered criticism from the fringes of the Church territories and asserted the need for the unified principles of organization.[243]

In relation to the Roman Catholic Church, the progress was less apparent. Negotiations with the Holy See about the Concordat started in 1925 but proved to be unsuccessful; they were resumed again in 1930 and the draft of the agreement was ready in 1934. The sudden death of King Aleksandar postponed the ratification of the agreement for a few more years.

In previous decades (and even in the nineteenth century) the representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church repeatedly condemned poor party politics, inefficient and corrupted parliamentary life, and in general could not be said to be strong supporters of democracy. Thus, the Church did not reject the new regime on the grounds of its anti-democratic character; the Church embraced the idea of order and stability. Some of the Church publications directed at the general lower educated public, talked of patriotism and love towards the fatherland as love towards their greater family, i.e. something natural. The King

[242] Slijepčević, *Istorija Srpske pravoslavne crkve*, vol. 2, 564.
[243] „Poslanica Nj. Sv. Patrijarha i Sv. Arh. Sinoda (Povodom obnarodovanog ustava Srpske pravoslavne crkve i božićnih praznika", *Bratstvo*, 1931, No. 1, 184-187.

in this image was presented as the "father of the nation".[244] Concurrently, some of the representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Clergy strongly disagreed with the imposition of the ideology of integral Yugoslavism from the onset of the dictatorship. That was one of the first and central points of future conflict between the state and the Serbian Orthodox Church.

The new regime banned all political parties, clubs and societies based on "tribal", religious, or regional principals. Whereas the political organizations based on religious principle were forbidden, the state could not close down any religious association that functioned within the Church, as the Church and the state were officially separated. That was precisely the way how Croatian Catholic *Eagles*, pre-1929 competitors of the state supported Yugoslav-oriented *Falcons*, turned into the *Crusaders* that operated as a Catholic, formally strictly religious, association affiliated with the Jesuits. There was nonetheless a significant debate in the government about whether the *Crusaders* were a genuine religious organization and whether they had or did not have a political agenda.[245] Ljubodrag Dimić argues that the Crusaders inherited the membership, structure and to a large degree program of the Eagles, and that the emphasis on the Christian upbringing of the youth in their official statements should not be taken too seriously. Dimić quotes a letter of Ivan Protulipac, in which this Catholic politician and enthusiast of the national youth movements writes, "We will pretend as though we work as a church organization, while in fact we will function in the same manner we used to", i.e. before the dictatorship.[246] The Yugoslav Muslim Organization as a political actor had to stop its activities in January 1929.

Popular religious movements have always been an effective means of mass mobilization used by various religious authorities throughout pre-modern and modern history. The concept of *Catholic Action* proclaimed in 1922 by Pope Pius XI in his

[244] Milan Mratinković, "Ljubav prema kralju i otadžbini", *Bratstvo*, 1932, no. 1, 29-33
[245] "Sednica Ministarskog Saveta Kraljevine SHS, 07 feb 1930., in *Zapisnici sa sednica ministarskog saveta kraljevine Jugoslavije, 1929-1931*, 142-145.
[246] Ljubodrag Dimić, *Kulturna politika u kraljevini Jugoslaviji*, vol. 2, 487.

encyclical, *Ubi arcano Dei*, was of outmost importance for the Catholic world in this respect. Ivan Merz, a Croatian Catholic activist, took up this concept in order to create a number of Catholic youth societies whose ambition was "to nurture, through discipline, spiritual guidance and promotion of group unity, a new generation that would bring victory to Catholicism over liberalism in Croatia".[247] The Serbian Orthodox Church on the one hand clearly saw the Catholic Action in Croatia as an example to be followed in the fight with a-religious liberalism, or to use Miloš Parenta's terminology 'false liberalism'. On the other hand, Catholic activism was bound to be perceived by the Serbian Church as a threat to its influence and authority over the Orthodox population in Croatian territories and in Bosnia. The stronger Catholic movements became the more hostile the rhetoric of the Serbian Orthodox Church vis-à-vis Roman Catholics turned.

While Catholic youth movements survived the dictatorship and even gained strength, some other important initiatives of Yugoslav churches did not have the same degree of success. One of the central points in the argument between the government and churches was school education and the role of religious institutions in it, namely, the debate about who teaches the classes of religious education in primary and secondary schools and according to what programs. Although the upbringing of the youth has always been a matter of importance for all sides in this competition, the dictatorship with its new educational policies radicalized the atmosphere and deepened whatever disagreements there were prior to 1929.

One of the most important demands of both Catholic and Orthodox Churches to the government was to make religious education in primary and secondary state schools a prerogative of priests, i.e. not to allow lay persons teach these. In former Habsburg territories that was the case prior to 1918, but not in the Kingdom of Serbia, where both options were available. Long negotiations with the government proved to be very difficult and initially

[247] Sandra Prlenda, "Young, Religious and Radićal: The Croat Catholic Youth Organizations, 1922-1945," in *Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of Twentieth-Century Southeastern Europe*, eds. John Lampe and Mark Mazower (Budapest, New York: CEU Press, 2004), 86.

unsuccessful for the churches. The 1929 *Law about the Serbian Orthodox Church* (§ 17) put teaching of religion in primary and secondary schools under the supervision of the Ministry of Education who appointed teachers of religious education either from priests or lay persons after the candidates have gained the approval of the local church authorities.[248] Parents had the last say in this question and it was up to them to opt for either of the possibilities. The textbooks used in the classrooms had to comply with the general law about the textbooks and be approved by the Ministry of Education after the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church gives its approval.[249] In general all issues concerned with schools were regulated according to the *Law about national schools* (adopted in Dec. 1929), while the law about the Serbian Orthodox Church guaranteed only that the Church will be consulted. In these circumstances the task of creating 'an Orthodox public opinion' who could lobby Church interests with the government and in the Parliament became even more pressing.

It took Yugoslav churches another half a year to introduce significant and necessary, from their point of view, changes to *the Law about national schools*. A correcting law was passed in July 1930 and made religious education mandatory again; and it was to be taught by priests appointed by local religious authorities. Bigger schools were to have special teachers with theological background. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Education retained the right to fire those teachers/teacher-priests who did not comply with general educational policies of the state.[250] Another major success of the churches was that the new variant of the law allowed school students to be members of religious organizations outside school, which was not the case according to the initial law.[251] This was especially important for the Roman Catholic Church who invested a lot of energy in youth movements. Under the conditions of the dictatorship, with other ways of manifestation of nationalism restricted, the churches

[248] "Zakon o Srpskoj Pravoslavnoj Crkvi", § 17 *Glasnik Srpske Patrijaršije* No. 22 (1929): 337-341.
[249] Ibid.
[250] *Glasnik Srpske Pravolsavne Patrijaršije*, 1930, Broj 15, 225.
[251] "Zakon o Srpskoj Pravoslavnoj Crkvi", § 68.

became bearers of national feelings different from Yugoslavism. In integral Yugoslavism the state aggressively insisted on total leveling of ethnic and cultural differences between the three 'tribes'. In contrast to the previous decade, this time official policies and rhetoric were met by the Serbian Orthodox Church in a quite hostile way. In some instances the Church entered into an open confrontation with the government.

If Gavrilo Dožić never attempted to hide his dislike of Aleksandar's new Prime Minister, Patriarch Varnava seemed to be more than happy with the new state policies. Svetozar Pribićević even accused Varnava of acting solely in favor of the King and his integral nationalism, instead of taking care of the believers, and the Serbian Church of becoming a state office.[252] Nevertheless, just before the death of Aleksandar, Varnava had a conflict with him in which he, reportedly said, that it was easier for him to be a Metropolitan under the Turks, than a Patriarch under the Karadjordjević dynasty. Apparently, this referred to the Patriarch's discontent with the position of the Roman Catholic Church in the state and proposed renewal of the Concordat talks.[253]

If one had to summarize the position of the Serbian Orthodox Church towards integral Yugoslavism, one could cite Gavrilo Dožić who in his memoirs claimed to have said to Živković in 1930 (not yet as a Patriarch but as a Montenegrin Metropolitan and a leader of the Church delegation who was supposed to discuss the elections of the new Patriarch and Church law with the head of the government): "Under these circumstances we, the Serbs, want to remain in the future who our ancestors had been and for what they were fighting over centuries with the motto "*Za krst časni i slobodu zlatnu*!".[254] "We can not forget, Mr. General, what is born to our blood, what we have inherited from our ancestors with our mothers' milk…. I think that the Serbs can not and should not denounce Serbdom in the

[252] Pribicevic, *Diktatura Kralja Aleksandra.*
[253] Radić, *Život u vremenima*, 145.
[254] This motto can be loosely translated as "For faith and freedom". Literal translation reads "For the Holy cross and golden freedom".

name of Yugoslavdom, if the Croats and the Slovenes do not want to do the same …"[255]. Dožić, according to his own account, then continued: "Today it [Yugoslavism] is a utopia, with no real foundation. And now the Serbs alone, without the Croats, have to build and propagate Yugoslavism as a common state idea. For me that is a naïve aberration".[256]

In 1927, two years before the change of the regime Miloš Parenta in an official publication of the Patriarchate and the Synod expressed general hope that "in several generations the unity of cultural and state life" will make the three tribes truly one nation. But before that, they remain to be distinct even if brotherly nations.[257] Both secular and religious authorities became aware of the role religion plays in keeping 'tribal differences' alive. If before 1918 it was still possible for the proponents of Yugoslavism to disregard the issue of religious differences, after a decade of coexistence in a common state nobody could turn a blind eye to it. Parenta underlined the role of religion already in 1925: "The blood is one, the language is one, the national spirit is one, but the cultural spirit is not. And in it religious moment plays the most important role".[258] With all necessary interpretative precautions, the words of Gavrilo Dožić, even if not really said to Živković in 1930, were written by the then exiled Patriarch in the 1960s. There is little possibility that the attitude of the hierarch towards an idea of Yugoslavism changed to a more favorable one in the course of his émigré life. If any change at all, one should take this phrasing as probably slightly exaggerating the real animosity between the Church and the state.

Political actors who were unhappy with the state imposed integral Yugoslavism were happy to use the Church, and the Church was ready to cooperate as it was also unsatisfied with the government. It is, however, necessary to distinguish between different levels of (dis)loyalty expressed by the Serbian Church. If the government was sharply criticized, the

[255] Dožić, *Memoari*, 36-37.
[256] Dožić, *Memoari*, 37.
[257] Milos Parenta, "Srpsko-Bugarsko bratstvo," *Glasnik Srpske Pravolsavne Patrijaršije* No. 6 (1927): 27.
[258] Milos Parenta, "Proslava dana ujedinenja," *Glasnik Srpske Pravolsavne Patrijaršije* No. 23 (1925): 359.

royal dynasty and King Aleksandar Karadjordjević enjoyed the fullest support a monarch could get. Gavrilo Dožić, Montenegrin Metropolitan until 1937 and later Patriarch, proved his loyalty to the royal dynasty back in 1918, when he was the first one to propose the overthrow of the old Petrović dynasty in the Montenegrin parliament in favor of the unification with Serbia under the rule of the Karadjordjević family.[259] The Karadjordjević dynasty remained in the eyes of the Orthodox Church to be primarily a *Serbian* dynasty, and the hierarchy took it only naturally that the royal family takes care of its own nation first. To what extent the King shared this understanding of his family's national belonging and loyalty is a complicated one. To the same extent as Aleksandar was a *Serbian* king, the 'nation' [narod] in the church rhetoric was in the first place the Serbian nation. In this sense the Serbian Church has never given up the rhetoric of 'liberation and unification', which emphasized the sacrifice of the Serbian nation to the common cause. The government of Petar Živković in its turn represented precisely what the Church did not like about the new regime: integral Yugoslavism in action. Živković is repeatedly and to no surprise unfavorably compared to Nikola Pasić, who was presented and remembered as the defender of the Serbian national interests.

Responses to Modernity

East Orthodox theological and philosophical tradition is not generally read and understood in the framework of the discussion of modernity, it is rather taken to represent a conservative, traditionalist, and generally anti-modern position. I will argue instead, that it was precisely the critique of modernity offered by the Serbian Orthodox thinkers that makes their tradition modern. As it was correctly observed by Kristina Stöckl, "being modern means taking a stand on these [related to modernity] issues, but what exactly the stand will be is

[259] Vladimir Ćorović, *Istorija Srba*, (4th edition) (Niš: Zograf, 2001), 745.

always a subject to a concrete societal and historical elaboration".[260] The spectrum of opinion articulated by the Serbian Orthodox thinkers falls within the range of the 'philosophical-ontological critique' of modernity. This type of critical reflection is different from the criticism of, for instance, economic capitalism and over-bureaucratization of the state, as it disputes the very underlying philosophical notions of modernity: rationalism and individualism.[261] These are the themes that are recurrent in the publications of the Serbian clergy of all levels. In the specific Serbian case, the criticism of modernity often took form of the criticism of generalized 'West' and Europe. This trend was present already before the WWI, and never disappeared from the discourse. In 1921, an editorial preface to one of the first books of the series *Library of the Contemporary Religious-Moral Questions* opened with the following passage:

> Spiritual life of entire Europe is today in the state of turbulence. Old views at the World and life, expressed in the spirit of Christian religion are falling under the impact of science and scientific philosophy; and the new [views] are being created in their place, which, as they have proved in practice, do not promise [us] anything good. Old ways of social life are also ruined, and attempts are made to create new structures. In one word, religion gives place to science, spirituality to materialism, democracy to socialism and communism. But parallel to that one can feel the decline of idealism in favor of materialism, decline of altruism in favor of egoism. In practice, more and more corruption, anarchy and nihilism spread, which are followed by assassinations, murders, dictatorship and the most brutal terror.[262]

The passage contains in a compressed form more or less all most important key words of the Orthodox critique of modernity, it reveal concern for the decline of religiosity and morality, as well as for the troubling trajectory of social and political development.

In the specific circumstances of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the late-1920s and the political crisis of the Yugoslav Kingdom, the first step in clarifying the position of the Church in relation to the world around was to identify the enemies, be they real or imagined, people, movements or historical processes. Miloš Parenta pinpointed major perils that could

[260] Kristina Stöckl, "Modernity and Its Critique in Twentieth Century Russian Orthodox Thought," *Studies in East European Thought* 58, No. 4 (2007): 248.
[261] Ibid.
[262] Editorial to Čedomir Marjanović, *Izbacivanje veronauke iz naših gimnazija* (Belgrade: Štamparija "Sv. Sava"), 192.

possibly harm the Church in the following way: "Orthodox Christianity finds itself today between the hammer and the anvil: between atheism, godlessness, materialistic direction in thought and life on the one hand, and propaganda of various Christian churches and sects on the other".[263] In the minds and writings of Serbian Orthodox clerics these two threats often appeared as a single whole and were intrinsically liked to each other. In fact, not only the two were obviously separate, but the Yugoslav Catholics (who were almost always perceived by the Orthodox clerical circles as rivals and often as enemies) were facing very much similar problems in terms of advancing secularization, de-Christianization, etc. In a manner similar to the Russian theologians after 1917, the Serbian religious thinkers connected modernity to the 'West', and their critique of modernity primarily took the form of criticism of the West, and within Yugoslavia of the Catholic areas, that were historically associated with the Habsburg monarchy and 'Europe'. It is an undeniable fact, that secularization tendencies and religious competition were closely linked to and inscribed into the context created by the Yugoslav state. Thus, the state (i.e. the government) was simultaneously an actor who could (and did) promote secularization, and at the same time provided a framework for the inter-religious cooperation, the primary aim of which was to counter the negative sides of advancing modernity. Very often though, the latter was seen by the Serbian clergy as a competition and rivalry, not as a dialogue.

In a way similar to that suggested by Russian émigré theologian Sergey Bulgakov, some of the Serbian clerics proposed that the Church ought to take a more active role in the world, in order to counterbalance the negative effect of secularization and general modernization of life. Active engagement of the Church with the world was possible, according to Bulgakov and some of his Serbian followers, only after the modernization of the Church itself. In the Russian theological circles this attitude was opposed by another stream,

[263] Miloš Parenta, "Opasnosti za pravoslavlje," *Glasnik Srpske Pravoslavne Patrijaršije* No. 12 (1927): 180.

know as 'Neo-Patristic', which argued to the reexamination and re-assertion of the Byzantine theological tradition. Some prominent representatives of this stream settled in Serbian Sremski Karlovci.[264]

Given the circumstances the Serbian Church thought of creating an 'Orthodox public' as its primary task. This public would have Orthodox worldview and be immune to materialism, atheism, socialism, Marxism, communism and all other evils that the contemporary world could possibly present. This new public, which consisted both of elite and common folk, would also defend positions of the Serbian Church in the ongoing struggle with its rivals; and lobby the Church interests as their own. That was no easy goal, but the stakes in this game were high. For the clergy was thinking and talking in grand and universal terms of survival of the nation and the humankind. Large-scale war required appropriate means of defense and offensive.

The Serbian Church therefore was taking up a fight against the *Zeitgeist*, and by doing so it brought itself into the *Zeitgeist*, for it was not alone in this struggle. This spirit of the fight was not characteristic of the Serbian Orthodox Church only. Its Catholic counterpart in Croatia faced similar problems in the nineteenth and in the first decades of the twentieth century, as did many other European churches. Secularization and accompanying it atheism, materialism, etc. has been one of the major concerns of most European churches since the beginning of the modern era; and it remained so for the Serbian Church in the first decades of the twentieth century.

One can distinguish two dimensions to which the Church critique applied, institutional and philosophical. Both of course, were political, but the arguments used had different logic. In the eyes of the Orthodox clergy, secularization was dangerous for the Church in at least two ways: as a policy which created less favorable conditions for religious institutions; and as

[264] Branislav Gligorijević, "Russkya pravoslavnaya tserkov' v period mezhdu dvumya mirovymi voinami", in *Russkaya Emigratsiya v Yugoslavii*, ed. A. Arsenyev (Moscow: Indrik, 1996), 109-117.

a way of thinking which eventually could lead to the secularization of society, and consequently diminish the authority of the Church. While in reality these two policy types were of course connected, they could also exist separately from each other. That is to say, that not all policies directed at the limitation of public visibility of the churches had in mind complete secularization of society. When the drive towards secularization came from philosophical and non-context bound background, it came as a part of a more general strive towards modernization. The latter, in its mild variant, included secularization in the sense of limiting public presence of religious institutions and confining religious life exclusively to the private sphere. The more radical version suggested the complete elimination of religion. Policies with this kind of background did not differentiate between religions and religious institutions, and were not directed against one particular confession; their aim was global, not local. There were also local, context bound secularization policies, when limitation of public presence of religions was not meant as absolute, but relative. This secularization attitude grew out of fear that religious differences might damage the state unity of the multinational Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In this case, the proponents of integral Yugoslavism were the most enthusiastic supporters of the idea to eliminate religion from public sphere. They hoped to diminish in that way the existent differences and pacify conflicts between the three 'tribes'.

Paradoxically, the idea that secularization will strengthen the Yugoslav national unity was possible only if one acknowledges that nationalisms of the constitutive nations had a strong religious character. Yugoslav nationalism, in its turn, was supposed to be as much supra-religious as it was supra-national. The ambiguity and problematic nature of such an intellectual and political construction was obvious to many contemporaries. Religious institutions of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia were not the only one who expressed doubt about it.

Obviously, the two reasons behind secularization policies were not mutually exclusive and were often combined in the same argument. Intellectually though they have very different origins and thus, it is meaningful to pay attention to these differences. The issue of church-state relations, for instance, was dealt with quite differently depending on what was the dominant logic (global or local) behind a certain political suggestion. The Serbian Orthodox Church in its reactions to these challenges employed a variety of arguments; the most typical of them will be analyzed below. The general strategy of the Serbian Church was to treat all attempts of secularization policies as 'global' even when they clearly had in mind interests of the unitary state and did not aim at elimination of religion, and were not materialist/atheist, etc. In other words, the representatives of the Serbian Church provided answers to the institutional challenge, as though it was ontological. Should one look at the situation in its mirror-reflection, it would become apparent that while the clergy was largely unable to contribute to the dialogue about institutions and religious balance in the country, the state officials were equally unable to see the problem from a non-secularist perspective. The catastrophic consequences (for the government) of this incapability will become apparent during the Concordat crisis of 1937.

The Serbian Church displayed its attitude very clearly during the discussion of religious education in primary and secondary schools. The discussions about school curriculum of religious education at school were prominent already before the dictatorship. In 1926 Dr. Dimitrije Kirilović suggested to the parliament to exclude religious education from school curriculum all together and to introduce instead of it a course in the history of religions.[265] In Kirilović's view in a state of several religions religious education in state schools was unacceptable, for it worked towards the disintegration of the state, instead of

[265] Dimitrje Kirilović (1984-1956) was an archivist and historian of education, who worked in Novi Sad. He started his education in a seminary in Sresmki Karlovci, but apparently became disappointed and continued his studies in a number of lay institutions. He studies philosophy in Budapest, Prague and Zagreb, where, in 1924, he received his doctorate with the thesis "Serbian primary schools in Vojvodina in the 18th c.".

strengthening the national unity. That was a clear example of 'national secularization', when the value of a unitary Yugoslav state is put above any religious arguments. The Church treated these initiatives as manifestations of 'global secularization' and refused to see any sound logic in Kirilović's project.

In a response to this initiative Aleksandar Živanović, an Orthodox priest and a professor published an article in *Glasnik Srpske Patrijaršije* in which he explained why his opponent's view was fundamentally wrong. First of all, Živanović assured his audience that Serbian Orthodox priests and Serbian Orthodox Church all together was only in favor of national, i.e. Yugoslav unity. But they understand this unity as unity "ethnic and political", and strongly oppose any idea of absolute leveling of all differences between people.[266] After 1929 this point of view would not be acceptable anymore for the state who decided that the Yugoslav nation had already been in place. Živanović did not elaborate on the question whether religious differences weaken or strengthen common state, but he made it clear that taking religious education out of the school curriculum could not be a solution to any problem, for it would destroy the morals of the youth. In this Catholic and Orthodox priests and hierarchy had common understanding. Dr. Jure Turić, a Catholic priest, seconded Živanović and called for a better and more profound confessional education. He believed that it was not necessary to silence religious differences, but instead through a more thorough religious education people were to reach such stage of knowledge and understanding that would be stronger than confessional differences and would thus make hate, defiance, and intolerance impossible.[267] Nonetheless, this sort of humanitarian and ecumenical justification for the need of religious education did not find significant support among state officials.

[266] Aleksandar Živanović, "Da li se predavanje nauke o veri ostaje sveštenicima?" *Glasnik Srpske Patrijaršije* No. 22 (1926): 344.
[267] Dr. Jure Turić, "Versko vaspitanje i konfesijska nastava u nasim skolama," *Glasnik Srpske Patrijaršije* No. 5 (1924): 74.

Another suggestion was brought up in the Parliament in 1933 by Dr. Nikola Kešeljević, a member of the Yugoslav National Party which promoted integral Yugoslavism. Kešeljević suggested complete separation of Church and state in Yugoslavia, as a step necessary to limit the scale of the Churches' public activities. This legal project aimed at radical restriction of the social activities of the Church and the restriction of its cultural influence. All hospitals, schools and other social institutions that belonged to any religious institutions should be passed to the state; civil marriage was to become mandatory, the priests should be regarded as "ordinary persons", etc.[268] The project, on the one hand, represented an anti-clerical way of thinking, which sought a more profound secularization of society as a part of the modernization process. On the other hand, Kešeljević's party affiliation suggests that he supported the ideology of integral Yugoslavism, hence his interest to limit the public visibility of the churches. The limitations that Kešeljević suggested were much more restrictive even in comparison to the initial policies of the dictatorship period. Kešeljević obviously was the proponent of profound and complete secularization, but his proposal was also a reaction to the growth of public visibility of religion and strengthening of political position of Yugoslav religious institutions. Here, the ambivalent character of the state policies towards religious communities becomes apparent: despite their best intentions, the King and his government failed to cut religion out of public sphere. Even more so, under the conditions of restricted political life, religion came to the forefront of the political debate and was increasingly used as a national symbol.

Whatever their philosophical and/or political origin, all these initiatives, projects and drafts were naturally seen by the Serbian hierarchs as an ultimate proof of the danger that the ideas of secularization pause to the Church and society in general. An official comment on the draft of the Kešeljević's law published in *Glasnik SPC* compared the Kešeljević idea with

[268] Slijepčević, *Istorjia Srpske Pravoslavne crkve*, Vol. 2, 570.

the policies implemented in communist Russia: "From such thunders fired at the church there is only one step to the communist order of the state and society".[269] Given the openly hostile attitude of the Yugoslav public towards Soviet Russia, such contrast meant not a simple comparative perspective, but a harsh critique and warning. Thus, the Church never stopped defending its position and was ready if necessary to project possible troubles of the Church institutions onto the entire society and state structures. The Roman Catholic Church reacted to the initiative with similar outrage, but linked this incident to the theory of the Freemason conspiracy.[270]

Since the Serbian Church treated both types of the attacks as one, i.e. 'global secularism', it kept repeating more or less the same argument to defend itself. In its reasoning with the opponents the Serbian Orthodox Church tirelessly explained that the nature of the Orthodox Church was thus, that it could and should not be limited to the private sphere of life only. Orthodox Church balanced on a thin line and claimed that the Church "can not coalesce with the state and state life, nor can it completely disentangle itself from it".[271] This fragile balance derived from the very nature of the Orthodox Church and from the long tradition of symphonia, or rather church-state relationship in the Orthodox Byzantine world.

Chapter II has already touched upon the theological understanding of church in Orthodox world in general and the Serbian case in particular. Here once again theology becomes important for the understanding of certain aspects of the Serbian Orthodox discourse. Jaroslav Pelikan argued convincingly that in the twentieth century "one of the first and most vital tasks of any theological justification in the church – any church – for the attention to the redemption of society was to clarify its doctrinal legitimacy within the structures and traditional authority, whatever those might be for a particular church".[272]

[269] *Glasnik Srpske Pravolsavne Patrijaršije* No. 15-16 (10 April 1933): 250.
[270] Dr. A.J., „Povodm dvoju zakonskih pregloga u Narodnoj skupštini," *Katolički list* No. 9 (1933): 90-91.
[271] Miloš Parenta, „Crkvena politika," *Glasnik Srpske Pravolsavne Patrijaršije* No. 2 (1928): 21.
[272] Pelikan, *Christian Doctrine and Modern Culture*, 317.

Given the rising importance of social teaching in the Christian world, it is not surprising then, that the Serbian Orthodox Church starts to pay more attention to the justification of its authenticity and even superiority over its main rival on the Yugoslav terrain, the Roman Catholic Church. The predominant majority of the Serbian Orthodox clerics made use of the specific East Orthodox nature of the Church structures that are not hostile to the state and society, and on the contrary are beneficial. Thus, arguments which involved references to the Church as a collective, a community of believers need to be contextualized both politically and theologically.

Miloš Parenta, a long standing editor of *Glasnik Srpske Patrijarsije*, on multiple occasions reiterated that 'clericalism' and 'false liberalism' are alien to the Serbian Church. Clericalism, in his understanding, was characteristic of the Roman Catholic Church, in which the episcopate and the hierarchy occupied position superior to both the community of believers and the state. True liberalism which was typical of the Orthodox Church fights against these tendencies. 'False liberalism' in its turn tries to oust religion and the Church from public sphere and allows it to exist only as a matter of individual choice and private life.[273] Parenta then emphasized that due to the very character of Orthodoxy and especially due to the nature of Church institutions in Orthodox Christianity neither Clericalism, nor 'false liberalism', i.e. secularism was possible in Serbia and in the Serbian Orthodox Church. He thus achieved two goals: to argue for the right of the Serbian Church advocated to public visibility; while concurrently the he rejected all accusations of being involved in political life and partaking in decision making process about the issues not concerned with the Church. These two statements could easily be seen as self-contradictory, but apparently for the Church active public presence did not equal taking part in politics.

[273] Miloš Parenta, "Klerikalizam i liberalizam," *Glasnik Sprske Pravoslavne Patrijaršije* No. 21 (1925): 327.

An important source of new and/or familiar but rethought ideas was the Russian immigration that was quite large in the Balkans, with the centers in Sofia, Belgrade, and Istanbul. Although the majority of Russian immigrants in the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes were formed by the army (General Vrangel is still buried in Belgrade), several hundred university professors and other people of "free professions" found refuge there. Some of the immigrants made successful careers: Evgenii Spektorski was a professor of the Belgrade and Ljubljana universities; a Church historian with conservative political views Vladimir Titov became a professor in Belgrade, Vladislav Maevski served as a chief-librarian in the library of the Serbian Patriarchate and a personal secretary of Patriarch Varnava, etc. The Serbian Church in particular was happy to employ Russian émigrés who normally had better education than Serbian graduates and at the same time were willing to go to quite remote areas of the country. With this the Church secured a better level of teaching and made sure that newly acquired territories where the Church had yet to establish itself were taken care of.[274]

Russian scholars of fairly conservative worldview played a visible role in the intellectual evolution of the Serbian Orthodox Church, or at least, a part of it. As a matter of fact Russian intellectual influence in the church circles had been strong even before the 1917 Revolution. Despite the fact that Serbian clergy had been educated in the Russian Empire since the nineteenth century, in Kiev and Odessa in the nineteenth century, and mostly in Saint-Petersburg in the early-twentieth century, it was rather through reading and traveling that Serbian students of theology became Russofiles and adepts of Russian religious philosophy of Khomiakov and Dostoevskiy.[275] Nonetheless, a relatively long history of sending students to Russian educational institutions in the pre-1917 period facilitated the initial incorporation of Russian émigrés into the Serbian Orthodox community. The same

[274] Klaus Buchenau, "Just as Real Life Brothers: Serb – Russian Contacts in the Ecclesiastical Academy of Kiev (1850-1914) and in Orthodox Schools of Interwar Yugoslavia (1920-1941)," *Tokovi Istorije* 3-4 (2005): 65.
[275] Klaus Buchenau, "Just as Real Life Brothers," 54-66.

could not be said though of the religious institutions of the émigré communitiy, namely the Russian Orthodox Church, abroad with its center in Sremski Karlovci.

Whatever the institutional conflicts between Russian and Serbian churches in Yugoslavia, the presence of the Russians in the Kingdom added to the idea that now, after the Russian Empire had collapsed and the Bolsheviks were pursuing Radićal anti-religious policies, it is up to the Serbian Orthodox Church to lead and protect the Orthodox not just at home but also abroad. This self-imposed burden of responsibility and world significance added a new angle to the self-image of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Structurally it was similar to the old *Antemurale Christianitatis* myth that had been present in all European national cultures in the Modern period. The feeling of being the last bearer of Orthodoxy, i.e. in the Church's eyes *true* Christianity, was one of the reasons behind the shift towards more active policies towards the external world (both in the sense of secular and international). For now it was up to the Serbian Church to take care of the "entirety of the Orthodox world" and to "ensure the mission of Orthodoxy in the World".[276]

Having identified the problems, the Serbian Church came to the conclusion that the current situation was not acceptable. Consequently, the hierarchy turned its attention to possible measures directed at the improvement of the situation. Church hierarchs and intellectuals singled out several areas where certain actions need to be taken in order to possibly stop secularizing tendencies, improve the position of the Church and defend the future of the nation, who would otherwise lose its morals and Christian character. National elites, education, and mass (youth) movements, all of which could qualify as propaganda to a hostile observer, were the focus of attention.

Many Serbian religious authors saw the core of the problem in the character of the national elite, or rather the national intelligentsia. The hierarchs assumed that the chances to

[276] Miloš Parenta, "Opasnosti za pravoslavlje," *Glasnik Srpske Pravolsavne Patrijaršije* No. 12 (1927): 180.

create a profoundly religious and Christian nation and society in its character – not an easy task even in favorable conditions – were extremely low if the leading social strata were indifferent towards religion at best, and openly anti-clerical and anti-religious at worst. One the other hand, with the national elite who shares and supports an Orthodox worldview, the Serbian Church would be able to exercise impact on wider circles of society. The task therefore was to "first equip the Orthodox intelligentsia with the Orthodox worldview. Make sure that she accepts it. And then make out of her disciplined elite […] that will defend church teaching and Orthodox culture".[277] The ultimate goal was, according to the same writer, to create *Orthodox public opinion.*

Despite the Church's grievances about non-religious national elite supporters of Yugoslavism estimated the situation quite differently. They saw the national elite to be too bound to their ethnicity, or 'tribal origins', and religion. What was even worse in the Yugoslavists' point of view was the unwillingness of national elites to give up their ethnic and confessional orientation; something that effectively hindered development of the Yugoslav state.[278] Similar to the debates around the school curriculum, it was a matter of perspective to view the leading social strata as overly secular or excessively religious. Another reason for this difference in opinions was that the Church judged the level of piety and religiosity, while secular intellectuals paid attention rather to the cultural connotations of one's religious affiliation. That is to say, that while the clergy was not satisfied with general lack of interest in the Church and Orthodoxy, a part of Yugoslav oriented politicians and intellectuals were unhappy with the still strong existent link between confession and nation that was visible in many public manifestations of both religious and national identities. One has to admit that both sides had sound reasons to worry. A foreign observer reported in the

[277] "Da li imamo pravoslavno javno mišlenje?" *Glasnik Srpske Pravolsavne Patrijaršije* No. 15-16 (10 April 1933): 251.
[278] Ljub. Stojanović, "O našoj inteligenciji: Pamet i srce," *Nova Evropa* 22, No. 1 (1930): 2.

late-1920s: "[The] Serbian peasant has nothing against Croats and *prečani* in general; on the contrary he talks of them as honest people, although often regards them – Catholics – to be 'non-Christian' or '*Švabi'*. At the beginning I did not understand what they meant by it, until I realized that it was about a different faith".[279] Religion never ceased to be a differentiating factor (together with regions) inside the presumably unified "Yugoslav nation".

One of the natural ways to bring up religiously minded elite was to make the Church more attractive. To do so, it was wise to invest in religious education, both general and professional. In order to achieve the goal it was necessary to open more seminaries (and indeed five were opened in the years after the unification of the Church)[280] and to finally have an institution of higher education in theology within the country. The theology faculty of Belgrade University was opened in 1920, although it had been planned already in 1905.[281] It was here that a group of young theology students started the journal *Svetoslavlje*, which was to become the herald of the new religious ideology in the late-1930s. A decade later, in 1931 a monastic school was established in Rakovica; it was moved in the next year to the famous monastery of Visoki Dečani. According to Slijepčević by the beginning of WWII the majority of the Serbian Orthodox priests and hierarchs were educated at home, and not abroad, which used to be typical in the early-twentieth century. Thus, the generation of Irinej Djordjević, Justin Popović, and Velimir Hadži-Arsić was the last one to go to the West European and Russian universities, just before and during WWI[282]; which made it the last generation of Orthodox theologians to be largely educated abroad.

[279] C.D. Booth, "Politički utisci iz Jugoslavije," *Nova Evropa* 19, No. 1 (1929): 22.
[280] Slijepčević, Istorija Srpske Pravoslavne crkve, 2 vol., 572.
[281] For an overview of the debates surrounding the creation of the Theology Faculty see e.g. Bogoljub Šijaković and Akelksandar Raković, *Univerzitet i srpska teologija: Istroijski i prosvetni kontekst osnivanja Pravoslavnog bogoslovskog fakulteta u Beogradu* (Belgrade: Pravoslavni bogoslovski fakultet, 2010).
[282] Irinej Djordjević after having studied in Belgrade went on to Saint-Petersburg and Oxford where he receieved a doctoral degree in theology; Justin Popović spent a year in Saint-Petersburg and more than ten years (1916-1926) in England, in Ofxord and London, where he studied theology and philosophy.

Educational policies promoted by the Serbian Orthodox Church paid out. This was true both for the general education and for the professional education of clergy. *Svetosavlje* published both the writings of students and their professors from the Theology faculty as well as other departments of Belgrade University. The journal was one the few common intellectual forums for the clerics and secular contributors, and thus worked towards the familiar aim of garnering the Orthodox elite. The 'core-group' of people involved featured Djoko Slijepčević, Vasilije Kostić, and Vlajko Vlahović; the group was influenced by their older colleague Dimitrije Najdanović, and through him by Nikolaj Velimirović, at that time already a bishop and a well-respected theologian.[283] As can be easily seen from the journal title, the members of the editorial board subscribed to the idea of *Svetosavlje*, but in contrast to Velimirović and Najdanovic they highlighted questions that were not particularly discussed by the master-mind of this intellectual construction himself, e.g. the social role of the Church, peculiarities of parish life, etc. The editorial statement in the first issue of the journal noted: "Svetosavlje is our distinct, truly devoted service to the man through Christ. And that is our unique goal."[284] The journal which was apparently launched with the idea of social work evolved with time and drifted towards more nation-bound themes and topics.

Thus, the strategic goal of the Serbian Church was to find and/or create a social strata, or a group, that would share and defend the Church' s Christian spiritual and political values and would have the capacity to captivate and inspire large parts of society. The ways to fulfill the task were many, and in this particular case international experience was of great help. The task that the Serbian Church set up for itself was the task that virtually any other Church in Europe was taking up since the middle of the nineteenth century. The closest neighbor, the Catholic Church in Croatia, was one of the possible sources of 'inspiration' and an example to draw lessons from. Education, always an important issue for a religious community with

[283] Djoko Slijepčević, *Istorija Srpske Crkve*, Vol. 3, 17.
[284] "Naša reč," *Svetosavlje* No. 1 (1932): 2.

aspirations to public visibility, became even more important during the years of the dictatorship.

Dealing with the Neighbors

The other big concern for the Orthodox Church in the first Yugoslavia apart from the advancing secularization was the rivalry with other religious institutions. Here, two major enemies of the Serbian Orthodox Church were the Roman Catholic Church, the second biggest religious community in the country, and neo-Protestant sects, popular among other areas in northern parts of Serbia. Given the political environment of the dictatorship period and the fact that national feelings were more often than not channeled through religious institutions, this competition between the two major religious communities of the Kingdom adopted a certain political aspect.

The Serbian Church usually paid lip-service to the cause of improving relationship with the Roman Catholics and underlined its peaceful and friendly attitude. At the same time, *Glasnik*, a venue for all official Church statements, always made it clear, that the Roman Catholic Church is not the true church and that it is not a friendly Church either. In its self-representation the Serbian Church was always on the defensive: "His Holiness Patriarch Varnava sensed the Judah's kiss [of the Croatian Catholics], but did not ever start the battle against the Roman Catholics. We [the Church] are in the position of defense against foreign/barbaric invasion and spiritual invasive tendencies of Rome".[285] This kind of rhetoric and clear statements about SPC facing more important challenges than inter-church struggle and that the Serbian Church will not get involved into unworthy business of mutual accusations[286] did not prevent *Glasnik Srpske Patrijarsije* from going as far as to call Croatian Roman Catholics "the third rider of Apocalypse" because of their "nationalist

[285] Dionisije, Jeromonah, „Velike stvari u sitnim vermenima," *Glasnik Srpske Pravolsavne Patrijaršije* No. 24 (1932): 379.
[286] See e.g. „Crkvena aktuelna pitanja," *Glasnik Srpske Pravolsavne Patrijaršije* No. 35 (1932): 550-552.

separatism".[287] The other two riders were bearers of materialism and bolshevism, both products of a-religious liberalism. The Orthodox Church accused Roman Catholic of using religion as an important means in creating a separate Croatian national identity, and ultimately damaging the Yugoslav state. This argument was supposed to be the last and ultimate proof of the evil intentions of the Roman Catholic Church in Yugoslavia, who, according to the Serbian Church authors, had never supported the common state. The fact that the 'founding fathers" of Yugoslavism Franjo Rački and Josip Strossmayer were not just Catholics, but high ranking members of the episcopate, was consciously overlooked by the majority of Serbian Orthodox clergy.

The Catholic Church in its turn, returned a very similar accusation towards its Orthodox counterpart, and emphasized ethnic dimension of many, presumably strictly religious activities of the Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia. Celebrations of St. Sava were a constant source of discontent for the Roman Catholics. In 1935 Ante Bauer, Archbishop of Zagreb, made a special clarification statement in *Katolički list* about the non-participation of Yugoslav Catholics in the festivities organized by the Orthodox Church during the year of St. Sava. But already in 1933, i.e. before the nation-wide celebrations of St. Sava, Catholic authorities in religiously mixed areas of Savska Banovina complained that Catholic Croatian children were made to recite not just Orthodox, but also explicitly Serbian poems as a part of St. Sava festivities at school.[288] Both religious institutions in their own way saw the national question as a problem. Be it related to the Yugoslav state or otherwise. The fact was that nationalism was taken into account by all parties. The way a particular nationalism (Yugoslav, Serbian, or Croatian) was understood, described and assessed obviously differed, and depended on the speaker's position.

[287] "Tri konjaka iz apokalipse," *Glasnik Srpske Pravolsavne Patrijaršije* No. 8 (1933): 121-123.
[288] J.A.B., "Katolička djeca i svetosavska zabava," *Katolički list* No. 11 (1933): 129-130.

Given the previous history of inter-religious relations in the Balkans it is not surprising that it was the Catholic Church that was elevated to the level of 'the other' by the Orthodox clergy. The second, somewhat less expected competitor in the religious field who also pushed the Serbian Church to pay more attention to mass mobilization of its community of believers and to the more efficient internal organization of the Church was a neo-Protestant sect of Nazarenes. The growth of neo-Protestant sects and movements at the turn of the nineteenth century and in the first decades of the twentieth century was a pan-European phenomenon which did not bypass the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The importance of the Nazarenes in the story of building a truly national Serbian Church is said to be quite significant, although their impact was indirect. The major input of the Nazarenes was that it heavily influenced an original Serbian grass-root religious movement known under the name of *bogomoljački pokret.*[289]

The movement was known already during WWI, when its members were active in hospitals and at the front. It started though much earlier, in the nineteenth century in the then Austro-Hungarian Vojvodina through the interaction with and as a reaction against a wide-spread neo-Protestant sect of the Nazarenes. Metropolitan Dimitrije talked in 1918 about the resemblance of Bogomoljci to the Nazarenes, and mentioned how first everybody in the army was suspicious towards them, but it soon turned out that they were "very honest people and flawless solders".[290] That was not enough however to convince the clergy of the good intentions of the Devotionalists. In 1925 *Hriščanski život* published a lengthy article by one of the founders of the movement in the defense of it.[291] Milan Bozoljac attmpted to explain in it the basic goals and rules of the movement, which was said to be a movement of strictly 'moral-religious character' with no political program and no intention to acquire one. Their

[289] The name is normally translated into English either as 'the movement of God Worshipers' which is a literal translation, or as 'the Devotionalists' movement'.
[290] Metropolitan Dimitrjie cited in Slijepčević, Istorija Srspke Pravoslavne crkve, vol. 2, 575.
[291] Milan Bozoljac, "Bogomoljac – sveštenički skupštini," *Hrišćanski život* (1925): 397-400.

main aim was to raise the level of piety which became very low after the devastating 'Wars of Liberation'. Bozoljac's main concern was to convince parish clergy that the movement was not a sect (like the Nazarenes or Adventists) but belonged to the body of the Serbian Orthodox Church, had the blessing of the Patriarch and therefore was to be supported by the clergy.

The movement consisted of numerous local organizations that saw their aim in the moral resumption of the nation through their faith in God and evangelical work.[292] In the early-1920s there were over 100 000 members in the local branches of the movement in Vojvodina, Serbia proper and north-eastern Bosnia.[293] The movement of the God Worshipers/Devotionalists came into the focus of the Church hierarchs' interest and attention only in the late-1920s. In 1931 in a regular meeting of the Assembly of Hierarchs special attention was paid to the movement; a missionaries' course was set up together with the missionary fund. All in order so as not to let the Nazarenes win the poorly educated population who searched for spiritual experiences, and thus could be easily won by the other side, i.e. any of the Protestant sects. In Kragujevac there existed Narodna Hrišćanska zajednica; it was to serve as an overarching structure for the disperesed movement. By the early-1930s though the movement was already taken care of by one of the leading Church public figures of the interwar period, archbishiop of Žića, Nikolaj Velimirović. He supervised the movement closely and published two popular periodicals *Mali Misionar* and *Veliki Misionar*.

In as early as 1921, in an article called "Do not push them away", Velimirović urged the parish clergy to have a friendlier stance towards the movement which was at that time lacking any sort of organization and structure. He wrote admiringly about this grass-root,

[292] Monah (A monk), "Pokret Bogomoljca," *Glasnik Srpske Pravoslvane Patrijaršije* No. 16 (1922): 258.
[293] Dragan Subotić, *Episkop Nikolaj i Pravoslavni bogomoljački pokret* (Belgrade: Nova Iskra, 1996). Bogomoljci themselves estimated their numbers to be 300 to 400 thousand people. Milan Bozoljac, "Bogomoljac – svešteničkoj skupštini," *Hrišćanski život* (1925): 400.

sincere, and naïve religious movement that had emerged from the Serbian countryside. At the same time the archbishop would have preferred the movement to exist rather in the urban spaces than in the rural areas, as it was more likely that the country-side would imitate the town, instead of the other way around.[294] Velimirović clearly searched for something or someone who could unite the Orthodox national elite and infuse Orthodoxy into the secular intellectual circles, hence his concern for the capacity to influence and engage. It does nonetheless present an interesting point given the general 'common-people' oriented rhetoric of Velimirović and his close associates. Slijepčević noted at one point in the mid-1930s that "the city degenerates and kills all great movements that are born among the people. And in our country it was from the common people that all great movements and great men have come. The salvation of the country will also come from the people".[295] Thus, already in the 1920s Velimirović and people around him were pursuing the cause of building Orthodox national elite without referring to the issues of nation or church-state relations. That was a fairly sincere attempt at changing the dynamic of social secularization via the support of a religious mass-movement.

The Devotionalists' movement presents an interesting example of how a spiritual religious movement was turned into a movement of people with a very clear national, if not nationalist agenda. It thus creates a curious case of a shift from religious to political mobilization of the population. At the beginning *bogomoljci* underlined the need to develop the Church's social work, to increase the level of popular piety, etc, that was what occupied the members of the movement in the 1920s and early-1930s. By the middle of the 1930s though, the situation had changed, the movement had already acquired a certain degree of organization and its spiritual leaders developed a more articulate political program. It still remains unclear whether members of the Evangelical movement lead by Velimirović joined

[294] Nikolaj Velimirović, "Ne odbacujte ih. Jedna napomena sveštenicima," *Glasnik Srpske Pravoslvane Patrijaršije* No. 17 (1921): 273.
[295] Djoko Slijepčević, "Inteligencija i narod," *Hrišćanska Misao* No. 1 (1936): 2.

Dimitrije Ljotić's *Zbor* (a fascist-type Serbian political movement that was marginal in the 1930s but became rather prominent during the Nazi occupation of Yugoslavia) in substantial numbers at the end of the 1930s; nonetheless, there is no doubt that the membership of *Bogomoljci* and *Zbor* considerably overlapped. Among those with 'dual membership' were Dimitrije Najdanović and Djoko Slijepčević, both of whom actively contributed to *Svetosavlje* in the early-1930s as well as to other theological journals.

In the borderlands and religiously mixed areas the issue of conversions played a role. An Orthodox journal in Sarajevo called the attention of its readers to the fact that "it was natural for the Balkan peoples to be Orthodox and unnatural to be anything else".[296] The argument presented by the author was simple and simultaneously all encompassing. It was natural for the Serbs, as well as other Balkan Slavs to be Christians of the East Orthodox rite, because without Christianity they do not have history. Consequently, "an Orthodox person, who converts to Islam, abandons the history of his people; and the one who converts to another Christian confession – falsifies his nation's history".[297] This position exemplifies the fear of possible conversions to only to Islam, but also to Protestantism, e.g. to the sect of the Nazarenes. By tying religious identity to the national identity, the Orthodox clergy sought to keep their community intact.

Bosnia also gave birth to the Brotherhood of St. Sava, society established in Sarajevo whose main goal was to "waken up East Orthodox Christian consciousness" and works towards the improvement of social relations and addressing inequality.[298] Their position was thus very close to the early phases of the *bogomoljacki* movement. Given the attention that the journal of the society devoted to the Adventists and particularly to the Nazarenes, it seems safe to argue that the presence of neo-Protestant sects was one of their main concerns. The society of St. Sava differed from Bogomoljci in numbers and scale on the one hand, and

[296] N.E.O., „Sta je prirodno za nas," *Bratstvo* (1929): 52.
[297] Ibid.
[298] Dr. Savo Ljubibratić, "Bratstvo Sv. Save," *Bratstvo* (1925): 1-6.

in the more nation-oriented discourse on the other. The latter can be explained by their location in a religiously heterogeneous environment. Personal factors also played an important role in establishing and securing the public position of the Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia. Patriarch Varnava was elected in 1930 to replace Dimitrije, and in comparison to him was more active in promoting 'the Orthodox cause'. He made a 'tour' in Bosnia and Dalmatia including Dubrovnik, which was closely followed and reported in the press.

Curiously, attention to national issues revealed itself also in international cooperation, which ranged from world-wide ecumenism to more limited Orthodox regional alliances. The general effort to counter both global and local enemies led the Church authorities to an understanding that a mobilization of all available resources is a prerequisite for success in this endeavor. There was a series of initiatives to organize a sort of mobilization campaign of the Orthodox community on national and international levels throughout the entire interwar period. These attempts varied from a genuine ecumenical movement of the early-1920s inspired by the Anglican Church to a plan of unification of Orthodox churches in the Balkans to a strictly ethno-national mobilization of the late-1930s. In the early-1930s, Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović participated in the Pan-Orthodox Conference held at Vatopedi Monastery on the Holy Mountain of Athos. The next year he led an official delegation of the Serbian Orthodox Church to Bulgaria, where it visited Sofia and Rila Monastery. In 1933 the Serbian Church took part in a Balkan regional conference, and in 1936 in the Orthodox theological Congress in Athens.

Miloš Parenta suggested in 1927 that a common Synod of autocephalous Orthodox Churches could be of a great help in mobilizing public opinion and making it appreciate the significance of religion in general to the everyday life. He thought that disorganization of national churches and "apathy of a great part of our World towards religious affairs" to be

two primary internal threats to Orthodoxy.[299] In May 1933 a conference of Balkan Orthodox Churches took place in Bucharest under the presidency of Rumanian Patriarch Miron. The conference was a part of the global structure of the *World Alliance for International Peace through the Churches*. The agenda of the meeting of Romanian, Greek, Bulgarian and Yugoslav delegations was to discuss social issues that each of the churches faces in its own national context and to devise a strategy for international cooperation on a regional level. Substantial energy was spent on discussing in detail the ways to counter materialism, atheism, and communism. The threat they posed to the churches was the main reason behind this international cooperation. It is symptomatic that, as Radmila Radić had underlined the "representatives of the Serbian Church in the 1930s were more afraid of Communism than of fascism, as the consequences of Communism were more clear for the Church, while they could hardly imagine at that time what kind of evils fascism will bring".[300] This could partially explain the inclination of a fraction of the clergy to support the genuinely fascist and/or fascist-like political movements, such as in the case of the Romanian Iron Guard.

Rumanian religious philosopher and publicist Nichifor Crainic while talking about the problem during the open discussion "insisted on the necessity for the Church not to stay static, but to act in a dynamic way" in order to cleanse the national education of communist influences.[301] He also called for the re-Christianization of the society via intensive social work and especially via getting engaged with the youth.[302] The final resolution of the Conference and its recommendations to the participating national churches went in the same direction. The resolution specifically underlined that each individual church should remain independent of any political party, but at the same time should cooperate with the state

[299] Miloš Parenta, "Opasnosti za pravoslavlje," *Glasnik Srpske Pravolsavne Patrijaršije* No. 12 (1927): 180.
[300] Radić, *Život u vremenima*, 154.
[301] *Rapport de la Conference Regionale Balkanique Sociale et Internationale tenue a Bucarest du 14 au 19 mai 1933 sous les auspices de L'Alliance universelle pour l'amitie internationale par les Eglise et du Conseil Oecumenigue du Christianisme pratique*, 20. Collection of the Library of the Serbian Patriarchate.
[302] Ibid., 20-21.

For the narrower national context one of the mobilization strategies suggested by some was to start an 'Orthodox league' which would bring Orthodox Christianity to the fore in public sphere;[303] others suggested along similar lines to pay more attention to 'Orthodox activism'. The Devotionalists' movement in this sense fitted nicely into this loose program of mobilization and creating 'Orthodox public opinion'. All these undertakings took as a starting point a presumption that a more active position of the Church is necessary; something that did not derive from a traditional Orthodox worldview which valued stability over change and passivity over rapid actions, for the later could ruin harmony and tradition.

The rhetoric and intensity of these propositions evolved towards Radićalization, and reached a fairly military style by 1935. Dimitrije Najdanović saw the role of the Orthodox Church in the building of the free Yugoslavism to be just "a prologue to Serbian Orthodox messianism, whose first aim is the spiritual liberation of its brothers from European cultural influences, from the vain, deadly 'kulturträger' and western spleen, fiction and lies."[304] Applied to the sphere of national politics such a statement could be easily understood as a call for Serbian cultural domination and hegemony. Thus, although denying any political commitment of the Church and opposing the need for it, Najdanović argued for a national belief system in which "Orthodox values' would be dominant. Despite his (and others') claim that Serbian Church is not taking part in politics, Najdanović made a strong case in favor of "Orthodox activism". Among other things he maintained that the "superiority of Orthodox thought, if it is not materialized into a force, a movement, a blow" will turn into something abstract and in vain.[305] We can see therefore an open 'call for action' coming from Church activists like Dimitrije Najdanović taking place in the middle of the 1930s.

[303] S., "Mi odveć mnogo čuvamo, a malo osvajamo," *Glasnik Srpske Pravolsavne Patrijaršije* No. 37 (1932): 582-583.
[304] Dimitrije Najdanović, "Jugoslovenstvo i crkve," *Hrišćanska Misao* No. 7 (1935): 3.
[305] Dimitrije Najdanović, "Udruženim snagama," *Hrišćanska misao* No. 1 (1935): 5.

Although many of these calls emphasized the value ancient tradition (which Orthodoxy unlike Roman Catholicism or Protestantism was said to have preserved), they did form a new phenomenon in the Orthodox world which had never been strong in missionary work. Coupled with the new developments in the relationship between Church and nation these attempts at mobilization eventually led to the radically new level of political involvement of the Church.

To sum up, the Serbian Orthodox clergy shared the feeling of their colleagues in Europe about rather meek prospects of the Church. The need for some kind of action was registered and generally accepted by the clergy. At the same time, because of the particular lay out of the Yugoslav political field, religion was increasingly recognized to be closely associated with nationality. Even if this recognition led to policies hostile to churches, it encouraged the representatives of religious communities to talk as spokesmen of their respective national communities. Attempts at theological justification will follow. In 1934 *Pravoslavlje*, one of the many theological journals published an article by D.J. Vasić, a priest, under the title "Orthodoxy and Our National Future". Vasić formulated the question that was bothering many of his colleagues:

> Now, after the great wars of liberation, and after national unity has been achieved, in this new situation, we the Orthodox people, are facing a new question: Will Orthodoxy exercise an impact upon the building of our future culture and to what extent? Will our people continue to go on their way through history beneath the wing of Orthodoxy? Will Orthodoxy be a factor as important for the national future, as it used to be for the national past?[306]

Vasić's phrasing of the problem as he saw it, is illustrative of the way how concern for the nation and national progress was united with and grew out of the concern for the state of societal development. The Serbian Orthodox Church had no doubts as to whether it was necessary to preserve Orthodoxy as a central marker of Serbian national identity; nor did it intend to drop its own national character for the sake of state unity. For example, the Church rejected with indignation the idea that the Serbian Orthodox Church should omit the word

[306] D.J. Vasić, "Pravoslavlje i naša narodna budućnost," *Pravoslavlje* No. 1 (1934): 8.

'Serbian' from its name, as it infringed upon the Yugoslav unity, the promotion of which was thought to be the ultimate goal of the official state ideology. In rejecting this possibility Dimitrije Najdanović built the defensive argument on the already well-established narrative of the sacrifices the Serbian nation (and the Serbian Orthodox Church) had made for the common cause of Yugoslavism. The usual substitution of the martyrdom of the Serbian nation by the martyrdom of the Serbian Church is present in his argument: "Any of its [the Serbian nation's] sacrifice is in the first place the sacrifice of the Orthodox Church, which has created and nurtured Serbdom, preserved it, and filled it with the morality of Piedmont self-sacrifice."[307] Najdanović pays lip-service to the official understanding of Yugoslavism, saying that it is about "the cultural synthesis of the healthiest elements of the experience, capacities and the spirit of the three peoples [Serbs, Croats and Slovenes], the apotheosis of their virtues".[308] At the same time he makes it quite clear, without stating it directly, that Orthodox culture is superior to other cultures, and that it is the Orthodox Church who should lead the national struggle.[309]

In regards to the political discourse of the Serbian Orthodox Church in this period, one of the most fundamental structural changes was the gradual shift of emphasis from the Yugoslav *state* to the *ideology* of Yugoslavism as a challenge and threat to the Orthodox Church. Once it was an ideology that had to be dealt with, a natural response was to create an alternative ideology that could be used to the advantage of the Church, and simultaneously undermine integral Yugoslavism of the King.

The irony of the situation was that although the government was very much inclined towards secularization policies, the overall impression about the character of the Yugoslav state was its Orthodoxy. The fact that the dynasty was Serbian Orthodox, politics were dominated by the Serbian element, and the Serbian Church started to have a more active

[307] Dimitrije Najdanović, "Jugoslovenstvo i crkve," *Hrišćanska Misao* No. 7 (1935): 2.
[308] Ibid.
[309] Dimitrije Najdanović, "Udruženim snagama,"*Hrišćanska misao* No. 1 (1935): 4-5.

position, all these factors contributed to the image of the state and the regime as Orthodox. In the eyes of non-Orthodox parts of the political establishment, especially if it already was in the opposition to the government, that was yet another reason to work towards the undermining of the existent political regime and the state-structure.

King Aleksandar himself was aware of the complications that aroused from the fact that he himself belonged to the Orthodox faith. Ivan Mestrovic cited in his memoirs the King to say that his position in the matters of inter-religious relationship was delicate not only because of the fact the both churches gained political strength and had conflicting agendas, but also because of him being Orthodox.[310]

The Serbian Church in its turn contributed to the strengthening of the link between religion and nation. A number of new Orthodox churches were constructed in the 1920s and 1930s throughout the country. It was not only a question of building a Church in a certain area (with bigger or smaller Orthodox population), but also the question of architectural style. The Neo-Byzantine, or Serbo-Byzantine style was dominant in the 1920s and early-1930s in both Church and secular architecture. St. Mark's cathedral in central Belgrade designed by the Krstić brothers is one of the most telling examples of this style. The building is an enlarged copy of a fourteenth century church in the Gračanica monastery.

[310] Ivan Meštrović, *Uspomene na politicke ljude i dogadjaje* (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1993), 218.

Chapter IV

Climax and Catastrophe

This last chapter of this dissertation surveys the period from the death of Aleksandar Karadjordjević to the dissolution of the state under the attack of Nazi Germany. The structure of this chapter differs from the previous two chapters: the general political contextualization and the institutional background story are not separate narratives. This decision is justified by the simple fact that Church institutional history in this period became an organic part of the political life. The second part of the chapter attempts to describe and explain intellectual constructions behind this merger. There seems to be need for a term which would adequately describe both the reality of political life of the Church and theories behind it. To this end I suggest to use the concept "*Political Orthodoxism*".

Political Orthodoxism as a category is on the one hand broader than 'clerical fascism' or even 'clerical nationalism', and on the other hand is of a different nature. It does not limit the political participation of the active members of the East Christian religious community to a particular ideological option, and instead points at the fact of political involvement in general. In such capacity, it may be a useful tool to describe and make sense of different ideological trajectories of the Serbian Orthodox clergy in the late-1930s and 1940s.

In the years 1935-1941 the political involvement of the Serbian Church was undeniable; the conflict potential rose over the years; and its contribution when judged from the point of view of state stability and security was often controversial. This political participation was by no means limited to the conflict over the agreement with the Vatican; nor was this conflict the climax of the participation. Although the clash of 1937 is perhaps the

most known, and hence the most written about, instance of direct involvement of the Serbian Orthodox Church in politics; I would argue that it only made a certain already existing dynamic publicly visible.

Political Orthodoxism is not an innocent concept. First and foremost it calls for a parallel with *Political Catholicism*. However tempting it might be to draw parallels between the two phenomena one has to be clear that they relate to each other more as a metaphor, rather than structurally similar. The same applies to the relationship between "*Catholic action*" and "*Orthodox action*". *Political Orthodoxism* was by all means an expression of the Church's attempt to come to terms with the modern world in all its complexity, and in this sense it resembles the developments in Western Christianity, be it the Roman Catholic Church, or missionary and ecumenical activities of the Protestants. The second reason why this term requires cautious use lies in its previous use in (and for) the Romanian context, where it stands for a specific ideological constellation of the interwar period.

In Romania, Nichifor Crainic, a religious thinker with a theological background, editor of the important journal *Gindirea*; and Lucian Blaga, a poet and philosopher, worked toward the creation of a theory which would answer the challenges posed for Romanian society by Modernity. Their *Orthodoxism* was primarily a literary and cultural phenomenon, but it had significance for the Romanian context political following as well. Crainic was closely associated with the Romanian fascist movement, the Iron Guard. Crainic propagated spiritualized traditionalism with Orthodoxy as its foundation; and Blaga was fascinated by the Romanian mythologized folk culture. Both deemed necessary spiritual revival of the Romanian nation, the intellectual and cultural elite of which, they argued, followed wrong, mostly French models, and thus betrayed the essence of the national character.[311]

[311] Keith Hitchins, "Gindirea: Nationalism in a Spiritual Guise," in *Social Change in Romania: 1860-1940: A Debaye on Development in a European Nation*, ed. Kenneth Jowitt (Berkley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1978), 140-173.

Institutional Clash

After the Assassination: Myth and Political Reality

The assassination of King Alexander in 1934 opened up a chapter of instability for the Yugoslav state, but also cleared the way for the new political players on the scene. While the state was paralyzed by the news of the assassination and rallied behind the legacy of the fallen monarch, behind-the-curtain arrangements were conducted in order to secure the (post)dictatorial transition of power. The issue of the utmost importance was the office of the head of the state. The King's eldest son, Petar, was an infant, and the Constitution provided for a Regency to be set up. It however remained silent on the composition of such a body. The scrutiny of the King's papers resulted in finding a hastily written last will, which suggested that the regents should be Prince Paul, the late King's cousin, Radenko Stanković, and Ivo Perović. However, the dispute which occurred over the authenticity of the document between Prime Minister Nikola Uzunović and General Petar Živković was a clear symptom of the weakness of the system established by the dictatorship.[312]

The church-state relationship was also thoroughly affected with the transition as the idea that the clergy should be represented in the Regency was also brought up in the discussions. However, although Prince Paul was confirmed as Regent and this possibility remained distant, the burial of King Aleksandar was yet another opportunity for the Orthodox Church to confirm its importance for the stability of the shaken state. Envisaged as the spectacle of the popular unity, the King's body was transported all across the country, with the people paying their respects along the way. The peak of the procession was the burial ceremony in Oplenac Church in Topola, attended by the cream of European statesmen of the

[312] Miloš Misović, *Zatamnjena istorija. Tajna testamenta kralja Aleksandra I smrt patrijarha Varnave* (Belgrade, 1994).

time, showing solidarity. Footage of the assassination and the burial were widely screened in Yugoslav cinemas, showing *inter alia* the Orthodox priests taking a prominent part in the ceremony. The official documentary in fact ended with the waving of censers in the Church. The representatives of other congregations naturally attended, but the King was buried in accordance with Orthodox rite. At the same time, the Orthodox priests were very vocal all over the country in sermons dedicated to King Aleksandar, who posthumously became not only the "Chivalrous King Unificator" but also the "King-Martyr".

The Orthodox Church contributed a great deal to the creation of the image of the King-Martyr and had always, regardless of its actual opinion on the destiny of the Yugoslav state, held Aleksandar Karadjordjević and his memory in high esteem. In the years following his death Aleksandar's martyrdom was at times elevated almost to the level of martyrdom of Prince Lazar, one of the foundational mythical figures for Serbian national and religious imaginary. On the fifth anniversary of Aleksandar's assassination, a contributor to *Hrišćanska Misao* wrote: "October 9th is forever the day of our pain. But it is also the day of our glory. Suffering is catharsis."[313] Suffering and catharsis are, of course, in the eyes of Christian Church, fundamental religious experiences. On the national level, "catharsis was made into the first principle of history". Thus, Aleksandar, although not a saint, was symbolically put in the same cohort of medieval Serbian rulers, most of who also figured as important saints and patrons. In October 1939 the Serbian Church organized and held an amazing number of ceremonies to commemorate the heroic death of the King. Liturgies, services, etc., took place all over the country: from Oplenac and Belgrade to the smallest villages in the country side. It is symptomatic that in plentiful eulogies of the Orthodox clergy (that were often wholly or partially republished and thus made available to the broader public) Aleksandar Karadjordjević was praised not only for his achievements regarding the

[313] "Deveti Oktobar," *Hrišćanska Misao* No. 9 (1939): 122.

'liberation and unification", but also for being a truthful son of the Orthodox Church. The bishop of Nis, Jovan, held the speech in the Oplenac Church and said, among other things, the following: "Our Church lost its prime faithful son, who loved his Church and religion and adhered to national traditions, but he also did not underrate other religions and Churches in his Fatherland, and on the contrary [he] respected them and protected, defended and helped them all equally".[314] In a post-Concordat context such a statement could be read as a criticism of the current government and the Church's lamentations over the death of the previous monarch were to some extent a reprimand of Cvetkovic and Prince Paul who were juxtaposed to the idealized image of the deceased Aleksandar.

The transitional period, covered by the alleged last words of Aleksandar "Guard Yugoslavia" (initially transmitted as "Guard Yugoslavia and friendship with France") was filled with uncertainties. With the support of General Petar Živković, the King's trusted man in the military, Prince Paul succeeded to remove Nikola Uzunović and establish himself as an unofficial head of the Regency. He inherited many of the problems of the Aleksandar period, worsened by the increased internal pressure to liberalize the regime set up by Aleksandar. The second important problem was that the gradual liberalization reintroduced the old problems, the greatest one being the unsolved Croatian issue. The newly established government of Bogoljub Jevtić showed no progress in this respect, and even at the manipulated elections of May 1935 pro-governmental block (headed by Jevtić) got about 60% of votes, while the united opposition block, headed by Maček, who was released from prison just a few months before the elections, in December 1934, received 37%. Although Jevtić's block technically won the elections, Prince Paul decided that a different person should head the Cabinet in order to raise its popularity, and in 1935 Milan Stojadinović led the government. He would stay in this position until early-1939.

[314] "Parastosi Blaženopičivšem Kralju Akeksandru I Ujedinitelju o petogodišnjici smrti," *Glasnik Srpske Pravolsavne Patrijaršije* No. 23-24 (1939): 563.

Although Prince Paul repeatedly claimed that it was not in his powers to change the Constitution, he considered revising it and bringing back parliamentary democracy and probably decentralization. In 1936 Prince Paul sought advice on this matter from Yugoslavia's four leading constitutional experts and was told that the proposed changes could indeed be made under the existing legislature.[315] Stojadinović, the new Prime Minister, was also in favor of a certain liberalization of the regime and he, importantly, was not a firm supporter of integral Yugoslavism. In his memoirs he wrote that he believed in the existence of separate Croat, Slovene and Serbian nations.[316] He also had aspirations to be seen as a Serb political leader, similar to places Maček, Korošec and Spaho occupied in their respective national public's minds.[317] Not a unitarist, Stojadinović nonetheless was in favor of state centralism. All in all, during the years of his premiership he failed to unite Serbian political elite, for it was unlike Croatian or Slovenian ones, very diverse; he did not manage to solve the Croatian issue either.

Constitution unchanged, some important transformations did take place within the society. Most importantly for religious communities, censorship was, if not lifted, significantly liberalized. The latter almost immediately resulted in the growth of the number of periodicals (some short lived, others with a more lucky destiny) that took critical stances towards the state and the regime, and invested a lot of time and effort on discussing issues of contemporary social and political life. Among the most influential and intellectually important publications were *Hrišćanska Misao: Casopis za Hrišćanska i drustvena pitanja* [Christian Thought: A Journal for Christian and Social Issues] published between 1935 and 1941 and *Svetosavlje: organ studenata Pravoslavnog bogoslovskog fakulteta* [Svetosavlje: Publication of the Students of the Orthodox Theology Department] published between 1932 and 1941. The origin and the audience of the later journal are obvious from its title; it lived

[315] Djokić, *Elusive Compromise*, 115.
[316] Stojadinovic, *Ni rat, ni pakt*, 533.
[317] Djokić, *Elusive Compromise*, 117.

through an interesting evolution and became much more Radićal and national oriented (if not nationalist) around 1937. *Hrišćanska Misao* was edited by Dj. Slijepčević who was close to Dožić and Velimirović; the journal envisaged its audience to be comprised of educated theologians (lay and clerics), whose interests surpassed narrow dogmatic issues. The journal and its editor, probably unconsciously, approached Church History and related matters in a manner similar to that of today's church historians, who call for transgression of the narrow disciplinary boundaries of Church History and incorporation of broader social, cultural, and political themes into analysis. Many of the new publishing initiatives formed a platform for a more open and radical discussion, which was not possible before the death of Aleksandar. Ironically, the Serbian Church that was among those forces who rallied behind the figure of the late King and contributed to the creation of an almost mythical figure of a political martyr, profited from Aleksandar's untimely death and the end of the forceful imposition of the ideology of integral Yugoslavism that came with it.

1935-37: The Concordat Crisis

One of the important, yet not so obvious facets of the settlement of internal tensions in the country lay in the foreign affairs, in regulating the relations between Yugoslavia and the Holy See. This issue was dragging from the very establishment of the new state. The agreement that Kingdom of Serbia signed in 1914, was in effect for entire country, but did not reflect the realities of the post-1918 setting. Although the first draft of the agreement was ready already in 1922, the negotiations with the Vatican started only in 1925 but proved to be incapable to resolve the difference over the issue of the use of Slavonic language; at the same time the proposed agreement was met with criticism by many domestic politicians, including the influential Croatian leader Stjepan Radić. The talks were suspended to be resumed only after the imposition of personal dictatorship by Aleksandar. In 1933, at the King's own

initiative the issue was put back on the agenda, more so as the question was connected to the relations with Italy. Complex negotiations were under way, but the King's assassination caused a delay of the contract which was already largely charted out. One could speculate if Alexander would have faced similar challenges his successors met in an attempt to promote the Concordat and secure political support for its adoption. This issue had fallen on the shoulders of the Regency and the newly appointed Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović.

In 1935, when Stojadinović contacted the Serbian Church regarding to signing of the agreement, the latter voiced serious disagreements without making them public yet. The 38 articles of the Concordat fixed the position of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia as equal to all other 'recognized religions' of the country; the bishops after entering their positions were supposed to take an oath to the King. The state in its turn secured financial help for the Catholic Church to the same (in relative terms) extent as for other religious communities; the Catholic Church received financial compensation for the lands taken away from the Church during the Agrarian reform; and finally religious education in schools was made compulsory under the supervision of a respective religious institution. When in late-1936 the text of the agreement was finally submitted to the parliament for its ratification, the debate was made public and almost immediately became very heated.

The Serbian Orthodox Church vehemently opposed the proposed agreement with the Holy See as it saw the Concordat to elevate the Catholic Church to a superior position in the state. Patriarch Varnava summarized the objections to the settlement in an open letter to the Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović which was published in the official periodical of the Church.[318] He primarily disagreed with the violation of the Constitutional principle of equality of all religions in the state; pointed out the fact that according to the Concordat the state surrendered part of its powers to the exterritorial institution, i.e. the Roman Catholic

[318] Patrijarh Varnava, "Gospodinu D-ru Milanu Stojadinovicu Pretsedniku Ministarskog Saveta," *Glasnik Srpske Pravoslavne Patrijaršije* No. 15 (1937): 449-452.

Church; and finally remarked on the financial imbalance against state interests that the acceptance of the agreement will have led to.

A comprehensive account of the discussions and debates among the hierarchs of the Orthodox Church and their relationship to the fragile balance of powers in the country still remains to be written. It is nevertheless clear even today, that the Serbian Church's unwillingness to accept the Concordat was indeed used by those, opposing the Stojadinović government. One could speculate indefinitely about the oppositional forces who wanted to change the regency to Queen Marija, General Vojislav Tomić and Patriarch Varnava (as was allegedly written in Aleksandar's "real" testament) and whether Varnava and his closest associates were conscious actors in this struggle or were manipulated.[319]

Either way, on July 19, 1937 the parliament started the ratification discussions and on the same day the Orthodox Church organized mass-liturgy in the center of the capital for the improvement of the health of the Patriarch who fell ill. Belgrade city authorities prohibited the passing of the procession through the city center, clashes with the police took place and the demonstration increasingly gave the impression of being anti-Stojadinović. One of the priests leading the demonstrations, Bishop Simeon, got wounded and had to be taken to hospital. The talk of the injuries that he suffered was greatly exaggerated in the press; the publications were often accompanied by a series of heartbreaking photographs. Mainly due to this fact, the event was labeled and is remembered till today as the "Bloody liturgy". Some of the oppositional forces joined the street processions, among them the supporters of Ljotić, Živković and even the Communists, all of who hoped to gain ground in this time of universal chaos and unrest. Major oppositional parties, however, did not openly side with the Serbian Church in July 1937, although the Democrats had criticized the Concordat already in 1936.

[319] Radić, *Država i vjerske zajednice*, 36-38. Miloš Misović, *Zatamnjena istorija. Tajna testamenta kralja Aleksandra I smrt patrijarha Varnave* (Belgrade, 1994). As the Churhc archives in Belgrade are virtually unavailable to researches, this issues remains under-researched.

When on July 23 the Parliament voted in favor of the Concordat, the Assembly of Hierarchs of the Serbian Orthodox Church pronounced an anathema against everybody who voted for it. The same night Patriarch Varnava died. The ungrounded rumors that the Patriarch was poisoned spread in Belgrade and across the Serbian part of the country; that added fuel to the already unstable situation and further clashes took place outside the capital. The British newspaper *The Times*, which in general followed very closely the conflict between the Yugoslav government and the Serbian Orthodox Church, reported that a proclamation prepared by the Serbian Church on the occasion of the Patriarch funeral was banned by the authorities since it compared the head of the Church with Aleksandar Karadjordjević both of who "died for their cause, at the time they were most needed by their people"[320]. Under public pressure Stojadinović had to back up and withdraw the Concordat from the Parliament. The crisis showed that the government despite its somewhat brutal ways of dealing with the demonstration of public protest was not very strong; and that made the opposition hopeful. By October 1937 the agreement between the Croats and the Serbs was reached, and the Bloc of the National Agreement was formed. Its members called for the restoration of a democratic regime and a solution to the Croatian problem.

In the latter part of 1937 both, the Serbian Church and the Regent, tried to overcome the conflict and to find ways for cooperation. Ultimately, "the Concordat project" of Prince Paul and Milan Stojadinović failed, the document was withdrawn from Parliament; and the Serbian Church post factum assured the State that its protest was not directed against the secular power per se, but personally against the Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović. Interestingly, the status of the Catholic Church remained unclear. Prince Paul and Stojadinović regarded the agreement with the Holy See to be important for the improvement

[320] Djokić, *Elusive Compromise*, 155. An interest of the English public in the Church affairs in Yugoslavia partially comes from the fact that in the second half of the 1930s the contacts between the Serbian Church and the Anglican Church intensified, and mutual visits were paid. The representatives of the two Churches were discussing Ecumenical options and the issues of European security.

of relationship with Italy internationally, and the solution of the "Croatian question" domestically. Maček, who was aware of Stojadinović's plan to win over some of the Croatian sympathizers through the signing of the Concordat, never supported it. Djokić reasonably argues that the Croatian leader did not see the Croatian question in religious terms and "believed that religion had no place in politics". He quotes Maček stating that the Croats "are a catholic, not a clerical nation".[321] Ever since the crisis, Stojadinović was gradually pushed aside, with Dragiša Cvetković emerging as the person entrusted with power and Prince Paul's confidence. Despite the victory in December 1938 elections Stojadinović's government fell in February 1939.

The crisis had clearly demonstrated that political instability of interwar Yugoslavia was due not only to the Croatian question and the Serbo-Croatian rivalry. The events of the summer of 1937 had shown that the relationship between the Serb-dominated government, the Crown (Serbian dynasty of Karadjordjević) and Serbian political elite became (should we assume that it was not so from the very beginning) equally challenging. The problematic nature of this relationship is usually associated with the rise of Serbian nationalism and increasing discontent with the idea of integral Yugoslavism promoted by the late King and by the state structures that he had imposed over the country. Dejan Djokić in his recent research on the political history of Interwar Yugoslavia suggests that the Serbo-Croatian divide was as important as intra-ethnic dividing lines, and that the period can (and should) be seen as the time of a number of attempts to work towards an agreement between the two biggest ethnic groups of the country, not as their constant fight. He argues that the centralist solution adopted in 1918 and continuously supported by Aleksandar and the Regency share the responsibility for the instability of the interwar state.[322]

[321] Djokić, *Elusive Compromise*, 157.
[322] Djokić, *Elusive Compromise*; Dejan Djokic, "National Mobilisation in the 1930s: The 'Serb Question' in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia," in *New Perspectives on Yugoslavia: Key Issues and Controversies*, eds. Dejan Djokić and James Ker-Lindsay (New York: Routledge, 2010), 62-81.

It is important to trace how the boundaries between religious and lay spheres got blurred and how the Serbian Church (successfully) tried to win the public over to its side. Discussion and polemics about the Concordat are less interesting in what concerns the actual content of the agreement with Vatican, but are of importance in regards to first, which articles of the document were picked up for criticism, and second, in terms of the style used and rhetoric employed. These debates, and opinions articulated in them, are interesting precisely because of their additional meanings of which the authors were not necessarily aware. It is not the Concordat *per se* that is under scrutiny here, but the discursive field that was formed in the years 1935-1937 around it and some political implications of the debate.

The reasons for why the position of the Serbian Orthodox Church towards the new Concordat was so hostile are almost impossible to grasp from the debates and critique alone. The opposition of the Church came from its inability to accept and internalize the system of church-state separation. In the Serbian Church's political imaginary the Church, the nation and the state formed an indivisible whole. All other arguments were complimentary, but deserve attention nonetheless. They demonstrate how the Orthodox clergy attempted to score points in a *political* struggle against the government and how it became possible for the anti-Stojadinović opposition to use this discussion for their own ends.

The Serbian Orthodox Church put a lot of effort and energy into making the Concordat issue as publicly visible as possible, it published an incredible number of brochures as well as articles in the press; some important overviews published in other periodicals were reproduced in Church run publications, etc. A recurrent argument against the proposed Agreement used by both secular and religious speakers referred to the ban on public discussion of the Concordat, including publications in the press. The authors suggested that the government had already expected negative reactions to its initiative and thus tried to avoid potential complications: a populist though nevertheless effective strike at the Yugoslav

Cabinet. By drawing attention to the issue of political censorship, the Orthodox clergy made the point that appealed to the democratic opposition to the Stojadinović regime.

The second point taken very often by the Serbian Church concerned the agreement's possible negative impact on the state, i.e. the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Here the Serbian Church presented itself as a defender of the state (not of the Serbian nation). The Serbian clergy who opposed the Concordat argued that it would damage religious peace in the country, and insisted that such was its main reason for the disagreement.[323] There was a lot of talk coming from the Serbian side about the possible threat to religious balance in the multi-confessional country, a threat to peace and stability. One of the assumed dangers was seen in Roman Catholic missionary activities, which according to the new Concordat were to be allowed without restraint throughout Yugoslavia. It seems that the fear of Catholic proselytism was one of the main driving forces behind the Serbian Church's opposition to the deal with the Holy See. The way this fear was presented to the public is not very surprising: the emphasis was laid on state unity. The Serbian clergy drew upon opinions of legal experts who pointed at the possible conflicts between the Concordat and the Yugoslav Constitution.[324] The Serbian Church seconded secularists' appeal to the 'sovereignty of the state authority' and the supremacy of the rule of law, for it believed that in the given circumstances that was the best strategy to employ.

With the reiteration of the critique that came from the secular camp the Serbian Church concealed the fact, that this critique was directed against the Orthodox Church as much as it was directed against the Catholic institutions. Ribar called for the "depoliticization of the clergy" of all confessions, not only the Catholics. A very similar position was articulated by

[323] "Oko konkordata," *Glansik Srpske Pravoslavne Patrijaršije* No. 1-2 (1937): 2-4.
[324] Ivan Ribar, "Konkordat," *Glasnik* No. 1-2 (1937): 10-13. Dr. Ivan Ribar (1881-1968), Belgrade based lawyer of Croatian decent, a future prominent member of the Communist party of Yugoslavia. Ribar served as the president of the Parliamentary assembly in 1920-1922. He belonged to the secular political Left (Left wing of the Democratic Party), thus his strong opposition to the Concordat which, in his view, gave too much power to the Catholic Church at the expense of the state.

a Slovenian secularist author of Yugoslavist orientation who accused the government of conceding too many things to the Vatican, and that would result in a creation of "a state within the state".[325] The anonymous author of the brochure claimed that no other state signed a Concordat so favorable towards the Holy See. Together with Ribar he was very much concerned about clericalism in politics and the fact that schools might become religious again; a clear step backwards in the eyes of a secular politician. "We will return back to the dark Middle Ages", he writes "should we accept the Concordat".[326] His fear that the Yugoslav oriented 'Sokol' movement will have to compete with and defend itself against the *Catholic action* youth organizations demonstrates that it was the entire Yugoslav project that seemed to be at stake here.[327]

One has to say, that the Croatian clergy also did not exactly embrace the proposed agreement either, although for different reasons. A part of Croatian Catholic hierarchy was unhappy with the division of dioceses (some of the Croatian dioceses were to be under the rule of the Archbishop of Ljubljana), and a feeling that the Roman Catholic Church concedes too much to the demands of the state was also present, although not widespread. On the other hand, Vlatko Maček, the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, was reported to say that among Croatian peasants the Concordat is met with certain distrust, as it gives priority in matters regarding land disputes to the Catholic Church.[328]

Needless to say, that Catholic archbishops led by the Archbishop of Zagreb Dr. Antun Bauer denied that there was any possibility of religious unrest to appear because of the Concordat, and contrary to that emphasized that it is the opposition of the Serbian clerics which could "provoke the unwanted religious struggle". The argument, thus, reached a dead-lock, when both Churches accused each other of endangering state unity and stability and

[325] "Nekoliko objasnenja o konkordatu," *Glasnik Srpske Pravoslavne Patrijaršije* No.5-6 (1937): 149-150.
[326] Ibid.
[327] If exaggerated this fear was not completely groundless, as just a few month earlier Antun Bauer, the Archbishop of Zagreb reported considerable growth of *Catholic action* clubs and societies in Croatia.
[328] "Zar se zbog ovogo borio šumadijski narod?" *Glasnik Srpske Pravoslavne Patrijaršije* No.1-2 (1937): 7-28.

were oblivious of any other arguments and opinions. The obvious impasse of mutual accusations did not prevent Orthodox clergy from continuing its campaign against the Concordat; and as time went by the intonation and the rhetoric became more and more violent and uncompromising.

Apart from the habitual (for the Serbian Orthodox Church) allusions to the sacrifices of the "long-suffering Church" for the common state there were also more Radical statements. Thus, the Montenegrin clergy (as reported by *Glasnik*) compared the Concordat to the Turkish invasion, and claimed that Montenegrin clergy and people had never in their entire history yielded to the enemy, and they would not do so now.[329] The reasons not to accept the agreement with Vatican were listed as all the same: alleged danger to religious peace in the country, and concerns for the sovereignty of the state. In contrast to a more balanced voices of central Church authorities, clergy from the margins of the Orthodox territories openly stated that they opposed the Concordat in order to secure "centuries-old, historical position of the Serbian national Church in the Yugoslav state".[330] The last phrase is very telling. Probably even without realizing it (as it went against the official line of the Patriarchate) Montenegrin hierarchy stated very openly what it really wanted: a superior privileged position for the Serbian Orthodox Church. It is especially interesting, as just a few paragraphs above this emotional statement the authors claim that the Concordat not only violates Serbo-Orthodox[331] religious interests, but is as well endangering the safety of the Yugoslav nation. And that was the main line of the official hierarchy. The Serbian Patriarch Varnava, in one of his wrathful speeches against the Concordat, stated the following:

[329] "Oštar protest protiv konkordata: Glas sevštenstva i naroda crnogorsko-primirskog," *Glasnik Srpske Pravoslavne Patrijaršije* No. 3-4 (1937): 107.
[330] Ibid.
[331] The original uses 'srspkopravoslavni' which literally translates as 'Serbo-orthodox' and was not a term used commonly at that time. It is an instance of a full equation of categories of religious and national. A noteworthy fact, as the authors came from Montenegro and not Serbia. Macedonian national/ethnic identity does not feature in the entire discussion on any occasion.

> We are accused of bringing politics into the church! We do not bring in politics into the church, but those who have lost reason, patriotism and respect bring poison to the entire national organism … Who else will tell the truth to the people if not the national saint [St. Sava's] church?[332]

A clear populist touch in Varnava's speech demonstrates that the Church in its official institutional capacity aimed at attracting not only the believers, but the entire national community, i.e. *the people*. Rhetorically though, it was the Archbishop Nikolaj Velimirović who authored the most Radićal and most powerful speeches. It seems that he employed all his talent of a writer and public speaker, everything to make the Concordat project fail:

> Rise three fingers Orthodox Serbs! This popular rebellion does not undermine, it will fortify our homeland. Down with all antinational elements: parasites and bloodsuckers, capitalists, godless and communists! The Serbian faith is awakened because it is hurt. Serbian national consciousness is awakened because it resists the attack from all internationalists and those who build bridges for the pope of Rome and his Church – the oldest international, the oldest fascism, the oldest dictatorship in Europe![333]

Velimirović uses here the same set of references, as in his texts relating to *Svetosavlje*, but with a clear populist touch to them. It is necessary to underline that in the Archbishop's value system 'international' was a qualification as bad as 'fascist'.

To sum it up, the Serbian Orthodox Church chose to defend its position on the one hand, by using populist arguments and through the self-presentation of itself as a defender of Yugoslav state unity. The traditional national argument was played down, but nevertheless surfaced in publications and voices 'from the margins', as well as in the speeches of Velimirović. On the other hand, the Serbian Church tried to selectively use secularists' criticism of the Concordat and thus demonstrated its ability to maneuver on the political scene and choose allies from the ranks of former enemies, when needed. The Church at the same time created an opportunity for the political actors opposing the government of Milan Stojadinović to use the momentum in their favor. The combined efforts of the Orthodox

[332] Patriarch Varnava cited in Miloš Mišović, *Srpska crkva i konkordatska kriza* (Belgrade: Sloboda, 1983), 61.
[333] Velimirović, quoted in Vjekoslav Perica, *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States*, 18.

Church and secular democratic opposition led to the withdrawal of the Concordat from the Parliament, and eventually to the fall of the government and the Prime Minister.

1939-1941: The Break Up

Given the perilous developments for Yugoslavia in European international politics in the late 1930s, one could reasonably expect the Church hierarchy to concentrate its effort on strengthening the state, and thus diminishing potential danger for itself, the state and the nation. This, however, was not exactly the case. It may seem for an outside observer that there was no pressing need for the Serbian Church in the late 1930s to insist on the re-drawing of the church-state relationship. Nevertheless, the Church continuously pressured the state to re-examine the foundations of the church-state relationship; in the context of this argument, the eventual victory in the struggle over the Concordat made the Church even more eager to reach its goal: a status which would guarantee Serbian Church's privileged position in the state and favorable conditions for East Orthodox Christianity and its institutions on the national level. One has to admit that the clergy and lay supporters of the Orthodox Church often employed innovative arguments and were in general very capable of having an informed discussion. Here is an example.

In its first double issue (No. 1-2) of 1939 *Glasnik Srpske Pravoslavne Patrijršije* the official bi-weekly periodical of the Serbian Orthodox Church published a text entitled *President of the United States of America Mr. Roosevelt about freedom of religion*. The text was a translation of a short excerpt from the opening part of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's rather lengthy speech from January 4, 1939 before Congress. The most powerful passage from it reads as follows:

> There comes a time in the affairs of men when they must prepare to defend, not their homes alone, but the tenets of faith and humanity on which their churches, their governments and their

> very civilization are founded. The defense of religion, of democracy and of good faith among nations is all the same fight. To save one we must now make up our minds to save all.[334]

The short translation was followed by an article which explained the current crisis of the Serbian Church by the lack of an appropriate church-state relationship in Yugoslavia. Read together, these two texts clearly suggest that there was a pressing need for the reformulation of the terms of existence for the Serbian Church. To give their demand more credibility, and also to secure itself against potential criticism and accusations in anti-democratic and anti-modern views, the Church drew on the authority of the American president.

In fact, Roosevelt in his rather lengthy speech from January 4 1939 concentrated on the issues of American (non)involvement in the inevitable War in Europe, supremacy of democracy over dictatorship, and multiple ways American democracy could be strengthened. True, he started his address by stating that religion, together with democracy and "international good faith" constitutes three "institutions indispensable to America" and that all three of them have to be protected. It is clear though, from the rest of his speech, that the danger comes from "storms from abroad", and most precisely from Nazi Germany. Taken out of their original context, in the way they were presented to the reading public by *Glasnik* Roosevelt's words were suggested to have a rather different meaning; they were to be seen as yet another proof of the indispensability of religion for the stability and world peace. This, in a Yugoslav context, meant more political power and privileges for the Church, and governmental recognition of its value.

The persistence of the Serbian Orthodox Church (or at least the zeal expressed by some of its higher clergy) to continue political dispute with the government encountered criticism from the secular actors, as well as from within the Church. A fraction of the Serbian Orthodox clergy (and lay activists) who, already back in the 1920s supported the idea of social work as exemplified by the *bogomoljci* movement, continued to voice their concerns

[334] Franklin D. Roosevelt, *Annual Message to the Congress*, the Capitol, January 4, 1939.

about the (too) deep political involvement of the Orthodox Church and too little attention paid to the real problems of parishes, parishioners and priests. An autonomous author (most likely affiliated with the Agrarian Party in Montenegro) saw the reasons for the current crisis of the Serbian Church precisely in its too active political position, as well as in its unwillingness to drop the fight around the Concordat, which, in the eyes of the author came dangerously close to a "fight to annihilation" [*borba do istrage*][335]. At the same time, the absence of reasonable rules of church-state relations were acknowledged as a profound problem. The impossibility to come to an agreement, according to the article, came from the same source: the desire of the Serbian Church to secure for itself a hegemonic position in the new state and to become a "powerful political factor". Additionally, there was no understanding within the Church itself as to whether it would prefer strict separation from the state or not.[336]

In the short but very intensive period of 1939-1941 the relationship between the Serbian Orthodox Church, now headed by the former Montenegrin Metropolitan Gavrilo Dozic, and the Yugoslav Government of Dragisa Cvetković and Prince Paul became increasingly strenuous and strained. Prince Paul complained he feels that all Serbs are against him, and that the Patriarch "whom he had brought to power" and the Serbian Church in general do not support him.[337] Indeed, the higher clergy more and more often voiced its discontent with the current governmental policies; they were mostly concerned with the division of the Serbs (as a national and religious community) into several entities. Given that in the previous two decades a lot of Church efforts were directed towards the creation and maintenance of a *single* Serbian national-religious community, their concerns are easy to understand.

[335] The use of the word "istraga" here is interesting, as it immediately brings to mind one of the most revered pieces of Serbian literature – "The Mountain Wreath" by Njegos. The main protagonist of the poem talks about "istraga poturica", which comes close to ethnic cleansing or lustration of collaborators with the Turks.
[336] "Pravoslavna crkva pred problemima," *Glasnik Srpske Pravoslavne Patrijaršije* No. 1-2 (1939): 22-23.
[337] Quoted in Radić, *Država i verske zajednice*, Vol. 1, 41.

According to the agreement singed between Maček and the Prime Minister Dragisa Cvetkovic in 1939, known under its Serbo-Croatian name *Sporazum*, the Croatian *banovina* was created, it included predominantly Croatian lands and had a considerable degree of autonomy. Under the agreement, the central government in Belgrade controlled defense, internal security, foreign affairs, trade, and transport; but an elected *Sabor* and an appointee (*ban*) by the King were to be in charge of the Croatian internal matters. There was talk and rumors about giving the Croatian part even more powers, up to creating a separate currency, *kuna*. As it happened many times before, the reactions to the change were very much the reactions to rumors as well.

Irinej Djordjevic, Nikolaj Velimirović and some others were among the most vocal critics of the *Sporazum* and were closest to going into open conflict with the government. Disagreements over Sporazum and the fate of the country, and an old unresolved issue of whether Orthodox clergy could and should take part in political life led to fierce debates at the meetings of the Assembly of the Hierarchs. Orthodox priests took an active part in a short-lived but exemplary *Pan-Serb movement*, and were particularly active in Bosnia. The movement was created as a response to the formation of the Croatian *banovina* in 1939 and the inclusion in it territories with predominantly Serbian population, and called for the secession of the areas perceived as Serbian from the banovina. This movement known after its motto "Serbs, rally together!" lost popularity by the middle of 1940, once its supporters realized the new political arrangement were there to stay. However, this was not the first known attempt to establish a Pan-Serb organization.

A few years before the Sporazum, in early 1937, an organization called the "Serbian Cultural Club" [*Srpski Kulturni Klub, SKK*] was formed in Belgrade. It set for itself the task to define and defend Serbian interests in Yugoslavia. From the seventy founding members of the Serbian Cultural Club twenty three were professors at Belgrade University and other

educational centers, including five people who had been rectors of Belgrade University during the Interwar period: Slobodan Jovanović, Pavle Popović, Vladimir Čorović, Dragoslav Jovanović, and Petar Mićić.[338] Among other members were high-ranking state functionaries, representatives of industrial and banking corporations, military generals and a number of well-known artists, architects, engineers, etc. Archimandrite Justin Popović joined the Club few years after its foundation. There was no system dictating political opinions of the Club members: they belonged to a variety of political parties and held a range of political views. The idea to create such society belonged to Slobodan Jovanović, a famous Serbian historian, intellectual and politician. According to his student and a long standing opposition politician Dragoljub Jovanović, he believed that after the creation of Yugoslavia some of the key Serbian institutions were abandoned; among those Jovanović listed Sarajevo based 'Prosveta', Matica Srpska, and church-school autonomies in the Prečanski region. Belgrade emerged as the only center of all national activity. The Serbs elsewhere were left unprotected, as they were neglected. Their best representatives were not members of a single government.[339]

The Serbian Cultural Club was conceived as a meeting place and a forum for those who were interested in Serbian national culture, and according to Jovanović's initial plan the organization had no immediate political goals.[340] Nevertheless, already in the very first months of its existence the Club was presenting itself and functioning as a platform for the negotiations between different Serbian political parties, as they were all concerned with the Serbian national question. Eventually it turned into an organization where Serbian national interests and demands were defined and formulated.[341]

[338] Nebojša A. Popović, *Slobodan Jovanović i Jugoslovenska država* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2003), 212.
[339] Dragoljub Jovanović, *Politicke Uspomene*, cited it Nebojsa A. Popovic, *Slobodan Jovanović i Jugoslovenska država*, 213.
[340] Ibid., 214.
[341] Ibid.

The SKK saw its aim as reworking Yugoslavism from an abstract ideology hostile towards Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian national character into an organic unity of all national forces who would at the same time feel their uniqueness and interconnectedness. This idyllic goal was supposed to be achieved though the gradual constructive work of the respective national elites. Jovanović underlined the difference between the state and national ideologies of Yugoslavism, and therefore saw no contradiction between the claim to work towards the creation of the new Yugoslav identity, and the fact that the two immediate tasks of the Club were to preserve Serbdom and Yugoslav state unity.[342] Translated into the language of real-life policies it meant, first of all, opposition to the increasingly aggressive Croatian nationalism. Orthodox clergy that participated in both the movement and the Club did so in their capacity of enthusiast of the nationalist movement, not as religious workers. In fact, there was a contradiction between the Church's understanding of the religion-nation link and the SKK's idea that Bosnian Muslims belong to Serbia.

Since the middle of 1940 however, the most pressing issue was not the administrative structure of the country, but whether or not Yugoslavia will join the Axis Powers and sign the Tripartite act. The stronger the pressure on the Yugoslav government from the side of Nazi Germany became the more powerful opposition this idea met in the public. The Serbian anti-Pact opposition assembled around young Petar Karadjordjević, the heir to the throne. Among various military, political and public figures who opposed the agreement with Germany the Serbian Orthodox Church figured prominently. The Patriarch repeatedly addressed the Prince-Regent not to sign the Pact; from a number of higher clerics Irinej Djordjevic and Nikolaj Velimirović were the most articulated critics of this policy. Despite Prince Paul's and Cvetkovic's attempts to convince the public (and the Church) of the necessity to join the Axis Powers, as that would secure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, they did

[342] See: Slobodan Jovanović, *Jugoslovenska misao u prošlosti i budućnosti. Predavanje održano u Srpskom kulturnom klubu na dan 4. decembra 1939. godine* (Belgrade: Sloboda, 1939).

not find the support. Two days after Yugoslavia joined Germany, Italy and Japan, on March 27, 1941 a coup d'etat led by the General Dusan Simovic and supported by the British brought down the Regency and brought to power then 17 years old Petar II Kardjordjevic, the last King of Yugoslavia.

On the morning of the same day, Patriarch Gavrilo in an address to the nation which was radio-broadcasted all over the country (excluding Zagreb) supported the coup and praised the brave and courageous Yugoslav people who once again in a difficult choice opted for "the Kingdom of Heaven, i.e. kingdom of God's truth and justice, national unity and freedom".[343] He appealed to the old tradition of martyrdom and past sufferings which had enriched and strengthened the nation spiritually. Curiously enough, later on the Serbian Church was criticized for taking part (by providing moral support and legitimizing the new regime with its authority) in the coup and acting politically in general. That is, it was criticized for the actions the Catholic Church was accused of not making.

"Political Orthodoxism" in Interwar Yugoslavia

Escalation of the conflict between the Yugoslav government and the Serbian Orthodox Church and the increasing tension in the international relations together with some internal subjective factors led the Serbian religious elite to reflect more thoroughly on the theory and nature of politics and religion in general, and on the question of religion's role and place in public politics. Dimitrije Najdanovic, one of the leading theoreticians of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the 1930s, advocated the necessity of Church's involvement in political life and, in fact, the impossibility of church's political impartiality. That represented a sharp difference with the attitude to politics articulated by the Church (although not unanimously)

[343] Quoted in Radić, *Država i verske zajednice*, 44. Patriarch included the text of his speech in his memoirs Dožić, *Memoari*, 251-253.

in the previous decade, when the clergy denied the Church's political involvement and emphasized their social work and cultural relevance. Previously, the level of the political participation of the Serbian Church that was impossible to deny and/or ignore was legitimized by the very nature of church-state relations in the Orthodox European realm. The differences between Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox models have been already discussed with various degrees of sophistication in the 1920s, and the differences in them served to explain and justify the Orthodox Church's public presence and visibility. However, in the mid-1930s, Najdanović attempted to discuss the problem in abstract terms, without drawing examples from the context of contemporary Yugoslav politics; he thus elevated the discussion to a new intellectual and analytical level. Apparently, Najdanović argumentation went in line with the official Church's position; as in the discussions about the Concordat, Patriarch Varnava defended the right of Orthodox priests to take part in political life.[344]

Najdanović's argument was built on several initial presuppositions. The first one was that the World is the Whole, and it may be differentiated into spheres, but never divided. The second was that ideas are superior to any material substance, and so are political ideas. Hence, any fight between political movements is only a reflection of a more fundamental struggle between ideas. Christianity is seen as one of the core ideas, thus, naturally it was bound to take part in this earthly fight. This is in essence similar to *Rerum Novarum*, in which the Pope called for the Catholics to defend their worldview and political opinion based on their religious beliefs. His third starting notion was very similar to what today is called 'political' or 'secular religion'. He argued that contemporary political ideas (i.e. Marxism, social democracy, or liberalism, etc.) are at the end of the day the same as religions in their pathos and dogmatism. This made Najdanovic think that political struggle is not a struggle

[344] Patrijarh Varnava, "Gospodinu D-ru Milanu Stojadinoviću Pretsedniku Ministarskog Saveta," *Glasnik Srpske Pravoslavne Patrijaršije* No. 15 (1937): 450.

per se, but ultimately a "war for religion"[345], and the issue at stake was whether Christianity or some other 'religion' would win. One could say that Najdanovic attempted to explain the essence of the Church's fight against secularization. In these circumstances it was necessary, according to Najdanović and many of his fellows, to create and/or support such a force in society that would promote Christian values and Christian worldview. Najdanović used Carl Schmitt's notion of 'political theology' in support of his theory of Christianity's involvement in politics. Naturally, one of the most important aspects of this never ending 'war for religion' was the church-state relationship, in which the Church's task was to support such a regime and in such a way that it would secure Christianity as the basis for social and political order.

Such was the understanding that the Serbian Church had of contemporary politics and its role in it. These notions formed the theoretical backbone of the actions and steps the Church took in the political life of Yugoslavia. Even when a question under scrutiny was of a pure institutional or administrative nature, the Church never let these theories go. This vision of the 'war for religion' also lay behind the discussions of the national question. The next sub-chapters will show how the national question was used by the Church circles in order to form/create the basis on which it could rely; and how religious mobilization was attempted through the appeal to the national feeling. Use/manipulation 'the other way around' was also possible. During the Concordat crisis political opposition made use of the crowd, mobilized by the Serbian Church; the bogomoljci movement, a well established religious movement that emphasized social work, was co-opted by a political movement with religious rhetoric (Zbor).

Although most of the Church narratives about politics and nationalism operated within the narrow Serbian/Yugoslav discursive field, I would argue that the final, ultimate

[345] Dimitrije Najdanović, "Prolegomena religiozne politike," *Hrišćanska misao* No. 5 (1936): 69.

goal of the Church was not the national cause (as it may seem from the analysis of political events), but the victory over secular-minded (political) forces. When seen from this angle, national issue/nationalism is only a part, though a very important one, of a much larger meta-debate on the role and place of religion in modern society.

The Fatal Triangle: Church, State, Nation

In order to better grasp the reasons behind the Church's moves it is necessary to pause here and reflect in greater detail on the views that the Serbian Church held and promoted on the *relationship between the church, the state, and the nation*. Modern nationalism as a political ideology and as an inevitable and noticable phenomenon of political and social life drew attention of the Orthodox Churches already in the nineteenth century.[346] There was nevertheless no Orthodox grand theory of nationalism that would unite diverse Orthodox Churches of Europe and their clergy on this issue. The Serbian Orthodox Church, as described in previous chapters, was either pre-occupied with other issues, or was restricted by the circumstances to create a comprehensive theory on this matter. It was only towards the end of the 1930s that Serbian Orthodox intellectuals came to see nation and nationalism as objects of theoretical/conceptual inquiry from an Orthodox point of view. Some of the impulses for these theoretical considerations came from the Russian émigré community who settled in Belgrade in the early 1920s; another source of inspiration, although limited in its scale, was the theological thought of neighboring Orthodox countries, namely Bulgaria and Romania.

Stefan Tsankov, a prominent Bulgarian theologian and the head of the Theology department at Sofia University, was among those few Orthodox religious thinkers outside

[346] Nationalism was generally criticized quite harshly, as long as it was associated with secularism and materialism. The stance of the hierarchy of a given national Orthodox Church towards nationalism was very contextual and heavily depended on the political situation. From the late-nineteenth century onwards, when most of the Orthodox churches in Europe found themselves in independent nation-states, the issue of nationalism was tied to the question of church-state relations. This makes the dynamic of the debate different from the on that took place in the Catholic realm.

Russia who reflected on the matter. Tsankov's theory is interesting in its attempt to re-evaluate and rewrite the Byzantine tradition of Symphonia through the inclusion of nationalism as a category into the system. In his words, "in the Orthodox Church *nation is accepted and cherished as a historical given*".[347] Once the category *nation* is in, *nationalism* becomes an important factor which structures the attitude of the Church towards the state and secular authorities. As technically nationalism in the form of 'filetism' was condemned by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1872, Tsankov introduced the distinction between 'good' and 'bad' nationalisms. It was the bad version that got condemned in the nineteenth century. Meanwhile, 'good' Christian nationalism is very much acceptable and even desirable. The Church, of course remains to be supra-national and universal in its nature, but it does not exist in isolation from people, and people are organized into nations. Tsankov presents nation as an intermediary link between family and humankind. This nation could and should be supported by the Orthodox Church, as it forms the 'body' of the Church. Should there be a conflict between the two, it is the task of the Church to persist and to bring the 'body' (i.e. the nation) into harmony with the spirit (i.e. Church and Christianity).[348] Tsankov's reconsideration of the attitude towards nation and modern nationalism is important as it created a theoretical if not theological justification for the national and by extension political involvement of Orthodox churches.

There was, as a matter of fact, very little international discussion among the representatives of Orthodox churches outside the Ecumenical movement of the relationship between Orthodox theology and modern nationalism. In the First Orthodox Theological Conference, which was held in Athens in 1936, Georgiy Florovsky, one of the greatest Orthodox theologians of the twentieth century and an internationally established scholar, famously proclaimed Orthodox theology's need to return to the Fathers and to be released

[347] Stefan Cankov, "Crkva i nacija na pravoslavnom istoku," *Hrišćanska Misao* No. 3 (1936): 36. Emphasis in the original.
[348] Stefan Cankov, "Crkva i nacija na pravoslavnom istoku," 36-38.

from its "Babylonian captivity" to Western theology. This attitude was adopted by many theologians of the Russian Diaspora and later gained ardent supporters in Greece, Serbia, and Romania. This theological movement, known as "Neo-Patristic", "became the hallmark of Orthodox theology in the 20th century, and for many its primary task, to such a degree that this celebrated 'return to the Fathers' and the effort to "de-westernize" Orthodox theology overshadowed all other theological questions, as well as all the challenges the modern world had posed —and continues to pose— to Orthodox theology"[349]. As a result of this strong tendency each Orthodox national Church adjusted its position in accordance with the specific political environment; i.e. the discussion was largely limited to the national context. For the Serbian Orthodox Church the questions that structured the discussion were: institutional position of the Serbian Church in Yugoslavia, i.e. the church-state relationship; and increasingly, the emerging 'Serbian question'.

Despite all the qualifications it is possible and indeed helpful to discern some *core ideas* of the Serbian Orthodox intellectuals about the church, the state and the nation. The following analysis deals with the more abstract, one could even argue conceptual understandings of the triple church-state-nation relationship. It is, of course, a purely analytical separation of arguments and a reconstruction of a discourse which existed rather as a background, shared understanding for a group of authors. With rare exceptions theoretical/conceptual claims are spread over a number of texts that dealt primarily with very concrete social-political issues.

The Serbian Church from the very inception of Yugoslavia had an understanding of church-state relations that was potentially troublesome from the perspective of a secular multinational and religiously heterogeneous state. The Concordat crisis of 1937 and

[349] Pantelis Kalaitzidis, *Between the 'Return to the Fathers' and the need for a Modern Orthodox Theology: The Theological Agenda of the Volos Academy*, paper presented at the WOCATI-ETE/WCC International Congress Volos Academy for Theological Studies, Volos, Greece, June 5, 2008 available at http://www.oikoumene.org/fileadmin/files/wcc-main/documents/p5/ete/wocati/WOCATI_2008_-_Volos-Presentation_Pantelis.pdf (last accessed March 2011).

subsequent conflicts of the SPC with the government (those went on until 1941) discussed above had a clear political background and were indeed used politically. Nevertheless, the intellectual/theological component in the reasoning of the Church (that is normally overlooked by historians of political life, as well as by lay students of Church history)[350] was equally important and deserves attention. As the Serbian Church emerged out of the Concordat crisis as a victor, the theoretical reasoning behind its political and/or politicized arguments gains even more prominence.

The crisis over the agreement with the Holy See radicalized the atmosphere significantly, and in these circumstances even the seemingly mild rhetorical disagreements between government and the SPC reflected a much deeper rift in the church-state relationship. From the SPC point of view, church-state relations should be organized according to the nature of both, church and state. While, the latter did not attract much attention of the clerics, the former was very much in the focus. 'Church', in the eyes of the Orthodox clergy was not so much the sum of the clergy and institutions, as it was a community of believers, which in case of the Serbian Orthodox Church meant *national community*. This essential statement lies in the core of the conflict between the church and the government, religious and secular authorities. The clergy translated the Evangelical idea of Church as a community of believers in national terms and kept it as an axiom for much of its further thinking and reasoning.[351] The first conceptual disagreement between the clergy and secular authorities derived from this position. For the secular power (i.e. the government) saw the Church and treated it first and foremost as an *institution*. Such was the logic of a modern secular state. In this respect the government did not have any preferential treatment

[350] Radmila Radić, the leading authority on the history of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the twentieth century, underlines the importance for the development of politics of the Orthodox Church its first-time experience of being in a multi-religious state; she nevertheless overlooks some aspects of the clergy's theological reasoning, e.g. complex relationship with modernity, secular state, etc.

[351] See e.g. the Speech of the Patriarch Gavrilo at the occasion of his enthronement in Peć, Gl*asnik Srpske Pravoslavne Patrijaršije* No. 20-21 (1938): 522.

and behaved towards all religious communities in a more or less equal manner. This is not to say, that there was no religious inequality in the first Yugoslavia; but this explains why the government was eager to sign the Concordat with the Vatican, or why earlier it rushed to pass the law on the Serbian Orthodox Church: they regulated the institutional aspect of religious life, the aspect most important for a modern secular state.

The second problematic aspect was the way the "Church is a community" argument was translated into secular political terms. To put it shortly, a community of Orthodox believers in the eyes of the Serbian Church overlapped fully with the national Serbian community, i.e. the nation in order to create *a national-ecclesiastical body* [narodno-crkveno telo].[352] This position was the most annoying for the opponents and the most cherished by the supporters, for it obviously gave the Church an almost infinite number of possibilities for political mobilization, and thus made institution of the Serbian Orthodox Church into a powerful social and political actor.

The consequences and implications of the equation of the community of believers with the national community were many. It is true that the ways the clergy used, or rather, applied this principle to life considerably changed with time. The time from the death of Aleksandar Karadjordjević to the occupation of the country by the Axis Powers was the period of the radicalization of discourse and also practice.

One of the examples of this radicalization was the rhetorical difference that can be observed between the enthronement speeches of Patriarchs in 1924 and 1937. In 1937 Gavrilo Dožić attempted to create, maintain and underline the continuity between the medieval Serbian Church and patriarchate and the contemporary structures. Thus, a more historically sensitive rhetoric of re-establishment of the institute of Patriarchate that was present in 1924 was by 1937 replaced by the rhetoric of an uninterrupted line between St.

[352] "Sumorne teze u obliku apela Crkvi," *Hrišćanska Misao* No. 10 (Nov. 1939): 137

Sava and the Serbian Orthodox Church of the 1930s. In his public enthronement speech the Patriarch seemed to be oblivious to the existing religious and national differences in the country; as the heterogeneity and diversity of the state was not even hinted at. This constitutes an important change in the official SPC discourse that occurred in only a little more than a decade. The alteration becomes even more striking when the official state rhetoric is taken into account. Milan Simonović, Yugoslav Minister of Justice, who represented the government at the ceremony in his speech underlined that the Serbs constitute *a part* of the Yugoslav nation, and specifically talked about the long tradition of tolerance of the Serbian Church towards other religions. The Minister emphasized the primacy of state over religion and religious difference, and thus articulated a fundamental disagreement between a government secular point of view and that of the Serbian Church.

An additional factor which contributed to the intensification of political agenda of the Church that should not be overlooked was the increasingly strong fear of communism. It was not for the first time, that communism was condemned by the Orthodox hierarchs and intellectuals for its materialism, lack of morals and brutality. Even if the fear of communism was exaggerated for the Serbian context of the late 1930s, it did leave an important imprint on the minds of public intellectuals of a more conservative type. It was in this context of fear and discontent with the state that arguably did not do enough to protect the church and the people from the communist evil that the editor of *Hrišćanska Misao* wrote: "It is a mistake/misapprehension [for the Church] to rely exclusively on the state. *The state means nothing outside the nation and the church. It exists, really, as their function*. This must be taken into account in every reflection on the Communist wave".[353]

This gradual radicalization of the political implications of the Orthodox understanding of the relationship between church, nation, and state, contributed to a tragic (for everybody)

[353] "Sumorne teze u obliku apela Crkvi," *Hrišćanska Misao* No. 10 (Nov. 1939): 137. Emphasis is mine.

result. In the Church's (and some like minded secular intellectuals') opinion the nation, hence the state, could not survive without Orthodoxy and the Church as the main guardian of Orthodox Christianity. What the Church had not envisaged though was a situation when the state did indeed disappear; as it happened in 1941. The Church, as it became clear soon afterwards, was bound if not to disappear with it, but to bare severe losses. Thus, the circle was completed.

The National-Religious Synthesis but not Symphonia*?*

A number of events and processes came together in the mid-1930s somewhat coincidentally. The end of the royal dictatorship in 1934 and the willingness of the new government to let go, at least to a degree, of the ideology of integral Yugoslavism; grand-scale celebrations of St. Sava in 1935; rapid growth of publishing activities of the Church (students of theology, clerics and accompanying intellectuals). All of that led to the rising visibility of religious symbols, rhetoric and Orthodoxy in general in the public but also political sphere. Naturally, the Serbian Orthodox Church who stood behind this process gained prominence, as well as enemies.

The climax of the publishing activities of the Serbian Church and of lay authors on the issues related to the Serbian Orthodoxy most probably occurred in 1935. That year (from 12/25 January 1935 to 14/27 January 1936) was announced by the Serbian Orthodox Church to be "The Year of Saint Sava", the so-called S*vetosavska godina*.[354] The Kingdom of Yugoslavia celebrated and commemorated the 700th anniversary of the death of Saint Sava, the founder of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the patron saint of the Serbian nation.[355]

[354] *Glasnik Srpske Pravoslavne Patrijaršije* No. 40-41 (1934): 593-594.

[355] Born in 1169 St. Sava (prior to becoming a monk on Mount Athos in Greece he was called Rastko) was the third and youngest son of Nemanja, the founder of the first medieval Serbian dynasty. Among many great deeds Sava is remembered and praised for are the establishment of a Serbian monastery on Athos, and most of all the activities in securing a state of autonomy (autocephaly) for the Serbian Church whose first archbishop he became when he returned from Athos to Serbia. Upon his death he was canonized together with his father, Nemanja, and remains to the present day to be one of the most respected, praised and loved saints in Serbia. In

Throughout the year, various events were organized by the state authorities, the Serbian Orthodox Church as well as by different societies, clubs, etc. Festivities and celebrations were to be held in all schools, in the army, and a 'publications program' was envisaged by the Church from the very beginning. The press was flooded with the texts of better or worse quality devoted to the life and deeds of St. Sava. Numerous academic and publicist texts reflected on the intellectual and spiritual heritage of the main national saint. Given the amazing multitude of texts that addressed topics related to St. Sava, it is not surprising that the unanimity regarding *what* exactly Sava should be remembered and praised for in the first place was lacking.

Vjekoslav Perica argued that "historically the most relevant church-led myth-making in Yugoslavia began with a sequence of grand religious festivals and commemorations held between 1939 and 1941. These events expressed the ethnic churches' disillusionment with the Yugoslav idea and state, and called for a better future to be achieved, the clergy believed, by returning to ethnic roots and identities".[356] I would argue that in fact the Church 'campaign' started earlier; and its first visible results could be observed right after the end of the royal dictatorship, during the *Svetosavska godina* of 1935. Actually, there was a broader regional context of the national celebrations that at the time were taking place in other parts of Europe as well. Cynthia J. Paces drew attention to the fact that even in secularized and progressive Czechoslovakia "religious symbolism dominated nationalist commemorations in this era. Two of the three largest state celebrations in the first decade of Czechoslovak statehood commemorated medieval religious leaders," [357] i.e. Jan Hus and Saint Wenceslas. The Hus celebrations were problematic from the perspective of the Roman Catholic Church,

---

the late sixteenth century the relics of St Sava were burned by Sinan Pasha on Vraćar hill in Belgrade, where now stands the St. Sava Cathedral.

[356] Vjekoslav Perica, "The Sanctification of Enmity," in *Myths and Boundaries in Southeastern Europe*, ed. Pål Kolstø, 135.

[357] Cynthia J. Paces, "Religious Heroes for a Secular State: Commemorating Jan Hus and saint Wenceslas in 1920s Czechoslovakia," in *Staging the Past*, eds. Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield, 209.

and both seen together are not innocent in the context of a multinational state. Paces acknowledges that among other reasons for picking up these two religious figures for a nationalist secular celebration were the romantic roots of the nationalist movement; and suggests that "perhaps the appeal was the spirituality, passion, and magic that the era's liberal rationality otherwise stifled".[358]

Despite the fact that St. Sava was one of the central characters of Serbian oral culture, religious tradition and national epic, his cult in its present form can be traced back only to the early-nineteenth century. Bojan Aleksov has rightly noted that in Serbian nationalism, the cult of St. Sava had the function of "representing and reproducing powerful images of a national Golden Age, of national reconciliation and unification, and of martyrdom for the Church and the nation".[359] It is characteristic that St. Sava's name was borrowed by a Serbian ideology/religio-philosophical trend of thought – *Svetosavlje* – which represents one of most curious, yet not totally unique, responses to the challenges of Yugoslavism, the Yugoslav state, secularization, as well as West European modernist and anti-modernist influences.

The defining manifesto of the *Svetosavlje* ideology, "Nationalism of St. Sava", was delivered by Nikolaj Velimirović in 1935 as a lecture at Kolarčev University during a week dedicated to Orthodox Christianity. In this lecture, which was published later the same year as a separate brochure, Velimirović discussed how St. Sava had created the Serbian Church, the Serbian nation and thus basically laid the foundations of the entire Serbian national culture.

The main argument is as follows: since Sava was the founder of the Serbian national Church, he was also the creator of Serbian nationalism.[360] By 'Serbian nationalism' the

[358] Paces, "Religious Heroes," 232.
[359] Bojan Aleksov, "Nationalism in Construction: The Memorial Church of St. Sava on Vracar Hill in Belgrade," *Balkanologie* 7, No. 2 (December 2003): 47.
[360] Nikolaj Velimirović, "Nacionalizam Svetoga Save", in *Srpska konzervativna misao*, ed. Mirko Djorđević (Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2003), 60. The first publication of the text is Episkop

archbishop meant the ultimate results of the activities of Sava in building the Serbian nation. This nationalism of Sava encompasses the national Church, the national dynasty, the national state, national education, national culture, and national assertion. The national Church forms the basis and the center of the nationalism of Sava. The Church acts as a spirit that resuscitates the entire national organism, by illuminating it, inspiring it, and uniting it by one faith, one hope and one love.[361] Hence, it is the national Church, embodied in the person of St. Sava, that is given all the credit for the creation, maintenance, and survival of the Serbian nation. Naturally, the definition of the national Church is of utmost importance for this argument.

The national church, in Velimirović's interpretation, was

> an independent church organization with the central authority coming from the nation /people and directed to the nation/ people, with the national clergy, national language and national traditional expression of its faith. In opposition to such a national church stands a non-national or international church, with its center outside the nation, with the clergy coming from everywhere, with a foreign language and with the unified, uniform expression of its faith. What is more natural and wholesome? With no doubt, it is the national church.[362]

Clearly, Velimirović contrasts here the Serbian Orthodox Church (or as a matter of fact any Orthodox Church) to the Roman Catholic Church, which is more centralized and trans-national. The hostile attitude towards the Catholic Church was not unique to Velimirović's thinking. The animosity towards the Catholic Church, which in the Yugoslav context primarily meant the Catholic Church in Croatia, was shared by a vast majority of clergy and common people in Serbia. These hostile feelings reached their climax in the period of 1935-1937 during the so-called Concordat crisis.

Problematic as it may seem from today's perspective, the emphasis on the role of the Orthodox Church in nation-building since the very beginning of the existence of both the nation and the Church was a generally accepted claim in Serbian historiography, philosophy,

---

Nikolaj, *Nacionalizam svetoga Save, predavanje održano na KNU 1935* (Belgrade Izdanje Arhiepiskopije beogradsko-karlovačke, 1935).
[361] Ibid., 58.
[362] Ibid., 58.

etc., in the nineteenth and early-twentieth century. The debate between the proponents of the 'Orthodox' view and those who preferred a secular/modern path to development for Serbia mostly focused on the questions directed towards the future, not the past. As already stated above, the point of disagreement was the level of influence exercised by the Church.

To nobody's surprise Velimirović persistently argued for the closest possible ties between the nation and Orthodoxy, which also implied the existence of the intimate connection between the state and the Church. In the same 1935 lecture the archbishop remarked that the fact that in many European nations the Church was separated from the state represented evidence of the crisis he saw Europe going through. He called this decision of European intellectual and political leaders an 'action of desperation'.[363] Those representatives of the Serbain elite who saw these European developments as positive were, according to Velimirović, severly mistaken, as that was not progress, but rather nothing other than despair.[364] This line of reasoning led Velimirović to make his most criticized statement:

> Hence we see in these Western states an unbridgable gap between the intelligentia that is at pain because it does not believe in anything and the people that want to uphold its faith. Thus, respect should be paid to the today's German leader who being a simple craftsman and a person from the people saw that nationalism without faith is an anomaly, a cold and unsecured mechanism.[365]

Despite its common and frequent usage, *Svetosavlje* remained to be a rather loosely defined concept throughout the entire interwar period, although the ideas that it stood for were always clearly recognizable. In 1937 Danilo R. Medan in an article with the promising title *The Contours of St. Sava's Ideology and its Meaning in the Past and Today* made an attempt to sketch the main points of this peculiar ideology. The easily understandable part is the claim that *Svetosavlje* as an ideology was created by St. Sava through his life and teaching; and that ever since it has had the most profound impact upon Serbian nation. According to its proponents, this ideology was inspired by and based upon the principles of

[363] Ibid., 63.
[364] Ibid., 63.
[365] Ibid., 63.

Eastern Christianity. *Svetosavlje* was considered to be "the beginning and the base of the national culture, which has been developing on the foundations of Orthodoxy", Medan continues by saying that "All our cultural and educational currents are inspired by St. Sava's ideas."[366] Therefore, Serbian national culture and national character are Orthodox in their nature.

Being a very complex ideology Svetosavlje had many different aspects: sometimes a pan-Slavic idea (in its Orthodox form) was also seen as a part of this ideology. The more difficult and confusing part of Svetosavlje is its relationship with the Serbian national idea, and as a matter of fact, any national idea in general. Despite the explicit statement about the Orthodox foundations of *Svetosavlje* it was said to have 'mission and character for all of the Humanity', i.e. it was suppose to transcend national boundaries. Klaus Buchenau remarks that in this regard *Svetosavlje* resembles the integral Yugoslavism of King Aleksandar, as it also had claims of supra-national character, while keeping traditional Serbian iconography.[367] By the proponents of *Svetosavlje* St. Sava was seen as the first Serbian nationalist, but not a chauvinistic or intolerant one. "Through *Svetosavlje* the Serbian racial element sank into Slavic element, and the latter into an evangelical or all-human one. In this way the unique and harmonious entity was created, in which component parts still keep their racial characteristics".[368] This Pan-Slavic element is reminiscent of Nikola Pasic's earlier use of sobornost and Slavdom in order to locate the Serbs in the civilizational opposition to the Croats.

The year of St. Sava with its abundance of publications triggered the appearance of several distinct narratives of the life and deeds of St. Sava; these narratives partly reflected different stances towards the Orthodox Church and religion in general that were present both

[366] Danilo R. Medan, "Konture Svetosavske ideologije i njen značaj u prošlosti i sadašnjosti," *Svetosavlje* No. 1 (1937): 88.
[367] Buchenau, "*Pravoslavlje* und *Svetosavlje*: Nationales und Universales in der serbischen Orthodoxie," 214.
[368] Medan, "Konture Svetosavske ideologije," 89.

in the narrow Serbian debate and the wider Yugoslav context. This is not to say that opinions on this matter had never been heard before, but prior to 1935 they were rather a number of loosely connected individual statements than a clear pattern of thought which became well represented in the public sphere. This is one of the telling illustrations to the meta-discussion on the public role of religion.

The basic opposition in the interpretations of Sava's historical and cultural significance occurred between those who saw him as primarily a statesman and those who emphasized his activities as a religious figure. Since both opinions had firm ground to be based upon, the stumbling block was the question of what St. Sava's main virtues were. Some of the Serbian clergy were unhappy with the fact that Sava was increasingly seen as a political figure, and a national hero i.e. secular character, at the expense of downplaying his Christianity. This basically meant a discursive argument over the question of what is more important: the foundation of the Serbian Orthodox Church by Sava and his efforts to bring it to independence from the Greek hierarchs, or the Christian virtues he was representing and promoting by his life and deeds?

Apart from the Serbian Orthodox Church many secular intellectuals, artists and writers contributed to the glorification of Sava as a national hero and his commemoration in the mid-1930s. Miloš Crnjanski, one of the leading Serbian writers and poets of the Interwar period published a book in 1934 under the simple title *Saint Sava*, in which he told the story of Sava's life and praised his diplomatic success in the field of strengthening the Serbian medieval state.[369] The critical reaction of the Serbian Church followed almost immediately: already in early 1935 Dj. Slijepčević published a detailed and critical review of Crnjanski's work in *Hriščanska Misao*. Among other things Slijepčević was very displeased by the author's emphasis on Sava's nationalism rather than his religious piety. Slijepčević

[369] Miloš Crnjanski, *Sveti Sava* (Belgrade, 1934).

underlined Sava's ability to combine work on the creation of the national state with his being the 'spiritual reviver' of the nation and above all Christ's missionary."[370]

Yet another contributor to *Hriščanska Misao* argued along the same lines, this time in a response to a polemical article published in the Zagreb based *Nova Evropa*. There is no doubt that Milutin Devrnja's harsh response to Stedimlija's text had many supporters among not just Serbian clergy, but also the general public. Devrnja strongly opposed claims of *Nova Evropa*'s journalist that St. Sava was a powerful statesman, genius diplomat, and politician, but had no connection with the true Christianity.[371] Apparently views similar to Crnjanski's and *Nova Evropa*'s disturbed the clergy so much, that a few months later Devrnja published an article "On the True Understanding of the Personality of St. Sava" in which he continued to argue against over-emphasizing of Sava's political and state successes at the expense of forgetting his spiritual experiences as a monk in Hilandar and his being "a great Man of God, and of great religious and moral character".[372]

Thus the Orthodox Church, or at least parts of its clergy, sincerely tried to bring to light religious and moral arguments in the discussion about St. Sava. One of the conclusions they drew from the debate was that the Church had no more time to waste and that it should act in order to help the people and fight the corrupting de-Christianizing and secularizing influences that resulted, for example, in the misinterpretation of the character of St. Sava. The solution to this problem was seen in better self-organization of the Church, establishing and supporting local societies, etc. At roughly the same time, the Serbian Church became more interested in and supportive of the grass-root movement of the God Worshipers, which was emphasizing exactly these issues.

In terms of political and cultural nationalism Najdanović and Velimirović may be seen as the most radical proponents of the *Svetosavlje* idea. The journal supervised by them

[370] Djoko Slijepčević, Review on Crnjainski's *"Sveti Sava", HrišćanskaMisao* No.1 (1935): 14.
[371] Milutin P. Devrnja, "Sava M. Stedimlija o Sv. Savi," *HrišćanskaMisao* No. 2 (1935): 12.
[372] Milutin P. Devrnja, "Za istinsko shvatanje ličnosti Sv. Save," *HrišćanskaMisao* No. 5-6 (1935): 20.

gradually grew to be more nationally exclusive, and politically involved. Some of the most curious ideas presented on the pages of the journal are those related to the issue of the irreligiosity of the Serbian intellectual elite, as well as to the problem of the shrinking of the Church intellectual elite. One of the contributors remarked that in Serbia intelligentsia learns about Orthodoxy from the national songs and poems and through reading Dostoyevsky, which "is enough to inspire, but is not enough to incorporate"[373] intellectuals into the religious community. In general the journal was arguing for more active participation of the Orthodox intellectuals in the ideological struggle in Serbia and Yugoslavia on the one hand, and against anti-church ideologies such as fascism and communism on the other.

The formulation of the *Svetosavlje* ideology clearly shows that nationalism as an ideology and practice is not limited to the sphere of professional politics and secular high culture. It also demonstrates how a nation can acquire characteristics of a sacred entity, and how the discursive boundaries between national and religious communities can be effaced. In this sense, the Serbian case fits a larger pattern of European development during the interwar period, when many national states developed similar close ties between nation and religion, or nation and confession.

On June 28, 1939 throughout the Kingdom, and especially in Serbia, *Vidovdan*[374] the 550th anniversary of the Kosovo Battle was celebrated on a really magnificent scale. Some historians described it as "massive outbursts of ethnic nationalist euphoria".[375] The national institutions (army, Church, schools, sokols, etc.) were all involved in the festivities. The festivals had at the same time religious, national and military character; a powerful blend of mobilization techniques.

[373] Priest Jovan (Rapajić), "without title" *Svetosavlje* No. 1 (1937): 41.
[374] Vidovdan [Serb.] – the day of St. Vitus, June 28 – the day on which in 1389 the famous Kosovo battle took place. Central national holiday in the Interwar period in Yugoslavia.
[375] Perica, *Balkan Idols*, 20.

Celebrations in Kosovo were by far the largest in the country, with the Patriarch Gavrilo, Prime Minister Cvetkovic, military Minister Milutin Nedic and representatives of the Parliament and the Senate all present in the Ravanica monastery which symbolically was central to the whole festivities process. An aero-club "Nasa Krila" from Pristina took part as well by means of presenting an impressive avia performance in the sky above the Kosovo field. Military parades and performances by Sokol groups accompanied religious services and rituals, official speeches, and wreath-laying ceremonies. Ravanica monastery in Fruska Gora in Vojvodina, where the relics of the Kosovo hero Prince Lazar were kept and displayed to the public in an icon-case, also held grand scale celebrations. Pilgrims from all over the country and even as far away as Sandzak attended the festivities in Vojvodina. General Plecničar acted as a representative of the royal family at the ceremonies.

The commemorations of 1939 are often presented as the most representative example of the nationalist lineage of the Serbian Orthodox Church on the one hand, and as a clear sign of the failure of the Yugoslav national political project on the other. Such an approach seems to be a rather teleological one; instead I would suggest analyzing the events of 1939 as a part of a longer sequence of symbolic acts. The *svetosavska godina* of 1935 could be a meaningful starting point. At the same time, the Catholic Church in Croatia devised a parallel to the Serbian Orthodox line of celebrations devoted to the 'Thirteen centuries of Christianity in the Croat People'. Imagined as a series of events that should last for nine years, it started off in 1937 with Archbishop Stepinac's pilgrimage to Jerusalem and Palestine. This constellation took the form of a symbolic competition between the two Churches; and is very often read as a competition between the two nations. Without negating such an interpretation, I argue that the process had a more complex nature and deeper roots.

The late-1930s were characterized not only by the manifestations of power and glory of the Serbian Orthodox Church, but also by an increased attention paid to the way they were

presented and reported to the general public, especially to those who did not see the events with their own eyes. In this sense, the official Church publication organ – *Glasnik Srpske Patrijarsje* – is equally important and interesting, as it almost overnight was transformed from a journal, strictly organized in rubrics and rather formal in content, into an illustrated magazine with a lot of pictures and comparatively little text. In 1937 the journal started to publish excessive illustrations to its articles, mostly photographs that capture various moments of grand-scale celebrations that featured high clergy and state representatives. One has to admit, that the editorial board of *Glasnik* did its best to present the development in the Church realm and elsewhere in a manner most favorable to the Orthodox cause.

An impressive part of the issue 10-11, May 1939 was devoted to laying the foundation (literally) of the Cathedral of St. Sava in Belgrade. The photographs (in the order of appearance) depicted the view of the imagined "Future church of St. Sava on the Vračar Hill in Belgrade"; "Clergy and monks in a solemn procession" – an impressive scene of hundreds of people walking in a Belgrade street; "Clergy in vestments in a magnificent liturgy" – also on the streets of Belgrade; "Clergy and monks in a imposing/remarkable manifestation of Orthodoxy" – rows of Orthodox priests going through a square in an orderly, almost military fashion; "His Holiness Patriarch of Serbia Dr. Gavrilo with Hierarchs in a procession", and six more including masses of people attending the ceremony, the Patriarch signing papers and sanctifying the foundations. The ceremony and the procession were by all means unprecedented in their scale and organization. It must have been an overwhelming scene and experience for participants and observers, an experience that pushed to the margins memories of the preceding long and painful debates.

Although the idea to build a church on Vračar Hill had appeared in the nineteenth century, it was only in 1935 that the construction works on the memorial church actually began. It took the Serbian Church many decades to come even to this starting point; projects,

discussions, committees concerning the construction of the Church on Vracar Hill in Belgrade took a long time and displayed a range of opposing opinions and visions.[376] "The idea behind Belgrade's most ambitiously conceived architectural project was clearly to replicate the most exceptional magnificence and grandeur of the church [St. Sofia Cathedral] in Constantinople. The size and design were combined to anticipate the Serbian Church's success in overcoming the deep polarization of the Serbian society and to show that Serbs could unite and grow with their Orthodox Church".[377]

The debates in the Committee who oversaw the future construction works would most probably have lingered on indefinitely (the opposition to the neo-Byzantine style pushed by the Serbian Church was very strong, and the supporters of a more modern approach in style but ultimately also in ideology were many), if King Aleksandar had not had lifted his veto and granted the permission for the beginning of the works in 1935. Another serious obstacle was lack of active public interest and consequently lack of funds. A report from 1938 explained this inertia by "poverty, poor performance of the fund raising committees … disputes among political parties which prevented any common actions. The Church itself was not spared from these disputes".[378]

Given the background story of disputes and difficulties, the grandeur of the festivities becomes even more impressive, if not excessive. One could claim that the events of the period after the death of King Aleksandar found their logical conclusion and came to a climax in year 1939. But the narrative becomes ever more tragic should we remember the marginalized moves, people and opinions. From this perspective the climax of 1939 demonstrates that the alternative previously available options, however weak they were, by now not even imaginable, were gone.

[376] For a detailed history of the Cathedral see Bojan Aleksov, "Nationalism in Construction: The Memorial Church of St. Sava on Vracar Hill in Belgrade".
[377] Bojan Aleksov, "Nationalism in Construction," 13.
[378] *Izvestaj Drustva za podizanje hrama Sv. Save u Beogradu – na Vracaru za 1938. godinnu*, quoted in Aleksov, "Nationalism in Construction," 15.

A question remains whether there was a way (at least hypothetically) for the Serbian Church to remain politically visible, but without retorting to national mobilization. Since today we know that the Church chose to answer this question negatively, it is even more interesting and important to look at the failed alternatives.

The main mystery of the *bogomoljci* movement revolves around the question of whether its members did or did not join the fascist-like political movement of Dimitrije Ljotić "Zbor". An interesting and intriguing question as it is, it's not of the utmost importance here.[379] Some leading ideologues of the Serbian Church active in the second half of the 1930s were very close to Ljotić (Najdanovic, Slijepčević and others); the same people belonged to the circle of the Archbishop Nikolaj Velimirović under whose protection and guidance the movement developed. The important problem rather lies in the diversity of opinions articulated by the members (leaders) of the movement and most importantly *about* the movement and its purpose. Even if less 'hot' politically and especially from today's historiographic perspective, this is the angle that would allow me to see the alternatives to the 'national' political option of the Serbian Church.

By the mid-1930s the movement represented an impressive social network, some parts of which were led by the priests, while some were self-regulated. Zivan Marinković, an insider to the movement in the early-1930s, i.e. during the period when he served as the editor of *Hrišćanska Zajednica* called attention to the possibilities this movement provides. So, the dilemma was: what to use it for? For Marinković, as well as for many movement members, it [the movement] was the basis for an *Orthodox action* whose internal aims would be the strengthening of the religio-moral consciousness [of people] and external – the protection of the people and its soul from foreign influences and lies.[380] To little surprise the aims of the movement and the imagined *Actio Orthodoxa* were the same as they had been

[379] Bojan Aleksov, *Religious Dissent*, 175.
[380] Zivan Marinković, "Za aktivniju socijalnu delatnost nase Crkve," *Hrišćanska Misao* No.1 (1939): 6.

imagined a decade or two earlier, when the movement only started to gain force. What is surprising though is Marinković's justification of *why* these were important. In his opinion, the main problem of the Serbian Church was that its clergy was not taking part actively enough in social life. Since in social life, he wrote, "more and more exits the patriarchal-national framework and enters international [life]" the connection between clergy and the community of believers becomes even more fragile. Marinković followed the logic and the argument of Bulgakov's sophiology which by that time had already been rejected and condemned by Florensky and other Orthodox theologians. The way to bridge this emerging gap Marinković saw in the intensification of social work done by the Church, and here the possibilities of the *bogomoljci* were indefinite. He focused mainly on the possibilities to organize and support charity and help for the poor and disadvantaged. The Devotionalists criticized clergy and engaged in spriritualist practices that were in turn harshly criticized by the official Church. Apparently Marinković's attempts to bring the clergy to engage in social work were not very successful, for he calls in a quite frustrated manner for the Church to finally catch up with the World:

> New conditions and circumstances have been guiding the Church to move its activities from the national field to its own, [the field of] pastoral work. Meanwhile, our clergy especially the older one, primarily in Serbia and Southern Serbia, who is used, in accordance with the acquired tradition, to work in the national field and with a cross in one hand and a gun in another to lead people in the struggle 'for the Holy cross and Golden freedom' [za krst casni i slobodu zlatnu], today can not deal with new conditions, nor can it see the need for reorientation in pastoral work, the need for return into their own sphere of work.[381]

On a lower level and far less sophisticated, a discussion that occurred in Russian theological (primarily émigré) circles was duplicated in Serbia. The Neo-Patristic trend which took over in the grand-debate in Serbia took the form of non-engaging, both critically and actively, with the immediate problems of Modernity.

We thus see that an understanding of 'Orthodox Action' very different from the one proposed by Najdanović was put forward. There were other marginal voices, mostly of those

[381] Zivan Marinković, "Za aktivniju socijalnu delatnost nase Crkve," *Hrišćanska Misao* No. 2 (1939): 25.

from below, the parish priests. At a conference in Nis, an attending priest argued that the times of the national work were gone, and the task of the priest in the current conditions was to work in the socio-religious field. To this purpose the movement of the God Worshipers seemed to be useful.[382]

It seems that Marinković had several sources of inspiration, a very important and not obvious one came from contemporary Bulgaria; another was the generalized experience of Western lay activism. The Bulgarian experience was relevant for him insofar it concerned the reorganization of the Church and the establishment of a special administrative unit for "internal missionary work", an innovation that took place in Bulgaria in 1933. The Bulgarian Church was challenged by the spiritualist movement *Good Samaritan*, which combined two elements: royalist nationalism and religious mysticism. The political position of Good Samaritan was rather conservative and derived from the specific context of interwar Bulgaria. Their narrative of Bulgaria as the "New Israel" was a type of post-WWI nationalist revisionism.[383] The movement worked closely with some of the most famous seers of the time, and in this capacity, as Valtchinova argued, rejected the official Church as the only institution with the authority to establish communication with God and established itself as an alternative "religious expert". It was this claim that provoked the Bulgarian Church into harsh criticism and eventual subjugation of the movement. Valtchinova claims that "in a sense, the *Good Samaritan* acted as a missionary church, in the face of an Orthodox Church that has never developed missionary policies aimed at what the Post-Reformation Roman Catholic Church called inner conversion".[384] The establishment of the special unit for missionary work was to fill this gap. Interest in spiritualism was not limited to the Serbian and Bulgarian contexts. In Romania, members of the group around the *Gindirea* journal "were attracted to

[382] Lj. A. [Ljubomir Antic], "Reorganizacija rada pravoslavne narodne Hrišćanske zajednice u Nišskoj eparhiji," *Glasnik Srpske Pravoslavne Patrijaršije* No. 18 (1939): 416.
[383] Galina Valtchinova, *Balkanski yasnovitki i prorotchitsi ot XX vek* (Sofia, 2006), 254-255.
[384] Valtchinova, *Balkanski yasnovitki*, 392.

the speculative thought, mystical and religious experiences, and the primitive spirituality of folklore, and they were anxious to communicate their ideas in a modern idiom".[385]

"Western experiences" are more difficult to decipher, and could include a multitude of individual phenomenon ranging from pastoral work in Protestant sects to lay youth organizations of the Roman Catholic Church. To make sure, the goal Marinković had in mind was not the isolation of the Church in its narrow internal world, not to make it invisible for public, but on the contrary, to reverse the increasingly strong belief that the Church is not necessary for a modern person. His contribution was one to the struggle against secularization and de-Christianization of the World. It remained largely unheard.

While themes discussed and questions faced by the Serbian Orthodox Church remained more or less the same throughout the whole interwar period the emphasis in the period after the dictatorship was on the national question. Additionally the years before WWII were characterized by an open conflict between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Yugoslav government. Overall, one could argue that in the second half of the 1930s the Serbian Orthodox Church continued to fight against its main enemy, modernity and secularization, and as a collateral damage the state turned out to be under its fire. In the intellectual Orthodox milieu in this period the idea of fusion between Orthodoxy and Serbdom prevailed and other options that were more cautious about such mixture were marginalized. This development by no means strengthened the Yugoslav political project, and only added fuel to the disagreement with the government who was trying to save the common state in one form or another by accommodating Croatian demands. The change in the ideological/political profile of the *bogomoljci* movement from social work to national right-wing is a telling example. The reasons for this evolution were many, external as well as internal: weakness of the Yugoslav state; strengthening of Croat and Serb nationalisms, both

[385] Hithins, "Gindirea: Nationalism in Spiritual Guise," 147.

were eager to use religion for self-legitimating and as a means of mobilization. Overall, as the debate over the profile of the God Worshipers' movement proves that the 'national turn' of the Serbian Orthodox Church was neither pre-determined theologically, nor inevitable. It happened due to a number of events taking place in domestic and international politics, due to the personal changes in the hierarchy, and as a logical continuation of one of the previous trends.

Epilogue

The time frame of the dissertation is limited by March 1941, when after the *coup d'état* King Petar was proclaimed to be the new ruler of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia instead of his uncle Prince Regent Paul. During the following four years of the Second World War and the Civil War the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia ceased to exist. The new socialist Yugoslavia of Marshall Tito, once more, opened up a new page in the region's history. But the story of the political life of the Serbian Orthodox Church did not end in March 1941 with the *coup d'état*, change of government and rebuttal of the Tri-Party act; nor did it end in April 1941, when the Yugoslav army signed the capitulation and the country was divided into occupation zones by the Axis powers. During wartime the Serbian Church was active, as always, in the transformed political setting of the country occupied by the Axis powers. As a matter of fact, the events of the war, and the role of the Yugoslav churches in them, to this day form the core of the fierce public and private debates that divide the public in Serbia and other Yugoslav successor states.[386]

The high representatives of the Serbian clergy who supported and arguably actively participated in the *coup d'état*, opposed the German occupation of the country and supported the Serbian national cause. As such they were targeted by the German authorities as a source of potential disturbance and opposition within the country. The leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Gavrilo Dožić, and bishops Nikolaj Velimirović, and Irinej Djordjević were under special surveillance by the German authorities as important participants of the coup.

[386] Bette Denich, "Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic Revival of Genocide," *American Ethnologist* 21, No. 2 (May, 1994): 367-390; Stef Jansen, "The Violence of Memories: Local Narratives of the Past after Ethnic Cleansing in Croatia," *Rethinking History* 6, No. 1 (2002): 77–94.

The German authorities viewed the Serbian Orthodox clergy with suspicion not only because of its nationalism and historical allegiance to the Serbian national cause, but also due to the presumed sympathies toward the Anglican Church, and consequently, England. The latter view was based on the record of cooperation between the Serbian Church and Anglican Church during the previous war and in the 1920s. This observation was accurate concerning Velimirović who before the invasion was considered by the German intelligence service to be a potential ally. This hope came from his public statement of support and even admiration of Adolf Hitler in the mid-1930s. Lower Orthodox clergy suffered as much as other groups of the civilian population, and even more, in the course of the intra-Yugoslav struggle between the Croatian Ustaša, communist Partisans and Serbian Chetniks. The tragic fate of the Orthodox population and clergy in the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH), which resembled that of the Jewish population in Germany, has been discussed elsewhere on many occasions.[387] Vjekoslav Perica quotes the following numbers of victims and material damage: 217 priests and 3 bishops killed, 334 priests expelled to Serbia, 350-400 Orthodox churches destroyed.[388] This was, in a nutshell, the narrative presented to the general public and promoted by the Serbian Orthodox Church and its political supporters.

There are, however, many sides to the story. Many problematic nuances are omitted from the narrative, as they contradict the image of the suffering and heroic Orthodox Church. While under house arrest, Patriarch Gavrilo, reportedly, performed the important function of intermediary between the forces of Draža Mihajlović, Dimitrije Ljotić and the quisling government of Milan Nedić. The lower clergy supported and joined all possible military and

[387] Mark Biondich, "Religion and Nation in Wartime Croatia: Reflections on the Ustaša Policy of Forced Religious Conversions, 1941-1942," *Slavonic and East European Review* 83, No. 1 (Jan2005): 71-116; Jozo Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2001); Aleksa Djilas, *The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919-1953* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
[388] Perica, *Balkan Idols*, 24.

paramilitary groups that operated in a given region, ranging from extreme nationalists to communists.

Position of the Serbian Orthodox Church during the Occupation

With the collapse of the common Yugoslav state in April 1941 (which arguably happened with the help of the Serbian clergy who did not support Prince Paul and his foreign policy) the Serbian Orthodox Church found itself in a situation of instability and danger. As the country was divided into occupation zones, and the Independent State of Croatia was established, the Serbian Patriarchate lost control over a considerable part of its structures that now fell under the jurisdiction of others. Out of twenty one eparchies that the Serbian Church had in the beginning of 1941, only six remained under its direct control.[389] The united Serbian Patriarchate was divided into eight entities located in different occupation zones and the NDH. Thus, the Church had enjoyed its unity, which it had longed for so badly, only for twenty years. In this sense, one could argue, that the Serbian Church ultimately lost the battle it seemed to have been winning in the two interwar decades.

In 1942 the so-called "Orthodox Church in Croatia" was established on the territory of the NDH. It has been argued, that the German and Ustaša authorities expected the Serbian Orthodox Church to acknowledge and accept the new Church as legitimate. However, that did not happen. The official Serbian Orthodox Church never accepted the new institution and urged other Orthodox Churches, including the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, to follow suit. After several unsuccessful attempts to find a Serbian hierarch to be the head of the new Church, a Russian archbishop in exile, Germogen (Maksimov) who at the time resided in a

[389] Radić, *Država i verske zajednice*, 47.

monastery on the Croatian territories, became the head of the Croatian Orthodox Church.[390] Germogen failed to secure any significant support for his Church from other Orthodox institutions. He was arrested, tried and executed in May 1945 by Yugoslav partisans.

Meanwhile, the Serbian Patriarchate continued to exist, although its freedom and authority were substantially limited. After the first bombing of Belgrade in April 1941, the Serbian Patriarch left the capital first for the Rakovica monastery, then for Zića and finally went to Montenegrin Ostrog. While in Montenegro, Gavrilo refused the offer of the King and the government to leave the country with them. A few days later the Patriarch was arrested, and moved first to Sarajevo, then to Belgrade. Fairly soon the occupying authorities realized that harsh treatment of the Patriarch will only contribute to his image as the leader of the oppressed nation. Given these considerations and the intervention of the collaborating Serbian politicians, Gavrilo was moved back to the Rakovica monastery near Belgrade, where he stayed until 1943. Nikolaj Velimirović, the second most influential person in the Church, was interned in the Vojlovica monastery. In 1943 he was joined there by the Patriarch, who was moved to that monastery after the information of his planned liberation by the forces of Draža Mihajlović reached the Germans.

In absence of the Patriarch, and other high-profile Serbian hierarchs, metropolitan Josif Cvijović who stayed in Belgrade effectively led the Serbian Church. The Metropolitan Josif and the members of the Synod who remained free, with the unofficial approval and encouragement of the Patriarch, tried to maintain the basic structure and function of the Church. In order to survive, the Synod had to cooperate with the government of Milan Nedić, who generally supported Church appeals against the persecution of the Orthodox population and Clergy in NDH and the demolishing of Church properties. The German authorities were aware of the importance of the Church in Serbian society. An SS officer reported the

[390] M.V. Shkarovskiy, "Sozdaniye i deyatel'nost Khorvatskoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi v gody Vtoroy mirovoy voyny," *Vestnik Tserkovnoy Istorii* 3, No. 7 (2007): 238.

following: "The Orthodox Church has always been the backbone of the Serbian nation. It has always had great influence on the population of this country. For this reason, it is necessary that the Church is involved in the work for the renewal of the state. But it is unclear, to the German side yet, as to in what way the Church could be most useful".[391] The attempts of the Germans to receive a written statement of the support and loyalty from the interned Patriarch and Velimirović continuously failed, which did not improve the overall attitude of the occupants towards the Orthodox clergy. Milan Nedić argued for a more careful handling of the problem and argued that it would be very hard to convince the Serbian people to join the anti-Communist struggle on the side of the Germans, if their two main national symbols, the King and the Church, are under German attack. As a result of this, from October 1941 the position of the Serbian Church was somewhat eased.

In 1944 Patriarch Gavrilo and Archbishop Velimirović were moved from Serbia to Austria and then to the infamous Dachau concentration camp in Germany, where they spent several month as 'honorary guests'. Velimirović later on, upon his arrival to the USA, would claim that he spent two full years in the camp.[392] After the intervention of Dimitrije Ljotić, a pro-German politician and a student of Velimirović, they were released from the camp and relocated to Vienna and afterwards to Slovenian Gorica. In April 1945 Ljotić, who stayed in Slovenia from late-1944 in order to prepare for a massive military operation, died in a car-accident. Velimirović and Dožić, after attending Ljotić's funeral, went to Austrian Kitzbühel, although they thought they were going to go Switzerland. There they met the American troops who liberated the region. Both hierarchs left the place in July 1945. After months of staying in different European cities, a disappointing visit to London, and a refusal of the Greek government to issue a visa, the Patriarch decided to return to Yugoslavia. He entered the country in November 1946. Gavrilo Dožić died on May, 7 1950 in Belgrade.

[391] Radic, *Život u vremenima*, 255.
[392] Radic, *Život u vremenima*, 286.

Ideological Options and Reflection of the Pre-war Orthodox Projects in Wartime Serbian Political Ideologies

The issue of the support given by the churches to the wartime governments and regimes and consequently the degree of the responsibility that these religious institutions bare for the actions of these governments has been researched considerably better for the Croatian case than for the Serbian. The support lent by the Catholic Church to the Ustaša regime, and especially the role of the Archbishop Aloizije Stepinac, who was beatified in 1998, has been described, documented and analyzed in quite some detail. However, the abundance of research does not imply the unity of opinion. It ranges from the accusation of the Catholic Church of actively supporting the genocide, to the denial of any compromising political involvement of the Church.[393] The question to what extent the Serbian Orthodox Church supported the collaborationist forces and partook in war actions and crimes is not entirely disregarded, but for obvious reasons attracts less attention from the Serbian academia. For the sake of the argument and due to the constrictions of space, I will omit the discussion of the active or passive participation of the Orthodox clergy in military, etc., actions, and focus on the issues of ideologies, rhetoric and symbolic use of religion.

[393] Yugoslav socialist historiography, by and large, argued that the Vatican and the Croatian Catholic clergy actively supported the massacre of Orthodox Serbs and Jews during WWII. The responsibility is particularly ascribed to the Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac, who, in this account, actively supported the Pavelić regime. A very similar narrative is retained in Serbian historiography. However, more recently Mark Biondich argued for a more nuanced judgment, and claims that the archbishop's position was not so straightforward. While Stepinac clearly supported the cause of independent Croatian statehood, he loathed the racism of the new regime, and the deportation of Jews and Serbs seriously worried him. Biondich claims that the support of the Catholic clergy and intellectuals towards the Ustaša state was a logical result of the whole previous development of the Catholic movement in Croatia and the problems of interwar Yugoslavia. "Despite their reservations, most Catholic intellectuals undeniably preferred a Catholic Croatian State to a Great Serbian Yugoslavia. From 1941 to 1945 the Catholic movement largely committed itself to Croatian statehood." Mark Biondich, "Radical Catholicism and Fascism in Croatia, 1918-1945," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, No. 2 (2007): 393. Apologetic view of the Catholic Church is presented by Jure Kristo, *Katolička crkva u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj*, 2 Vols. (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 1998).

The ideological profile of the Serbian Orthodox clergy as a whole, of course, does not exist. However, a significant number of clerics had active or passive sympathies towards the Royalist Chetniks, with who they shared ideas of Serbian nationalism, loyalty to the King, etc. Patriarch Dožić declared in 1943 that he would until the very end, in good and evil, stand by Mihajlović.[394] At the same time numerous churchmen were cautious not to provoke the aggression or hostility of the occupation forces, who on many occasions were openly anti-Orthodox, and tried to maintain the balance between the cooperation with the government of Milan Nedić and the guerilla fighters of Mihajlović. Čedomir Marjanović served as the Minister of Justice in the Nedić government, and according to some testimonies, was shot in Belgrade in 1944.[395] The Synod of the Serbian Church provided financial help to Mihajlović; and two (in 1943 and 1944) liturgies were held in the Belgrade to commemorate the fallen Chetniks.[396] Serbian clerics took part in the Ravna Gora congress in 1944, but when the Chetnik commanders started to actively mobilize the priests to join them, they did not recruit a lot of cooperators.

In a short programmatic statement of *Homogeneous Serbia*, which was published in June 1941, Stevan Moljević presented a political and social vision of post-war Serbia and Yugoslavia, the way Draža Mihajlović and his associates imagined it. This royalist and openly nationalist program called for the Serbian hegemony in post-war intra-Yugoslav and international Balkan arrangement. Freedom of religion, together with the freedom of press and freedom of thought were guaranteed, as long as they were not 'abused'. The program also stated that only that Church can be recognized in Serbia, which is internationally

[394] Radić, *Život u vremenima*, 275.
[395] Urs von Arx, "Episkop Nikolaj Velimirović (1880-1956) i njegoce studije u Bernu u okviru starokatoličkih i srpsko-pravoslavnih odnosa", in Bogoljub Šijaković, ed., *Srspka teologija u dvadesetom veku: Istrazivacki problemi i rezultati* (Belgrade: Pravoslavni bogoslovski fakultet, 2007), 20.
[396] Radić, *Država i verske zajednice*, 83.

independent, and whose head is residing in the country.[397] Thus, the main rhetorical argument employed by the Serbian Church against the Concordat in 1937 is replicated here. Also, in quite a curious manner, another political regulation, this time from the period of the Royal dictatorship, is reproduced: no political party can be based on religious principle. This part is especially curious, as it is obviously directed against potential political organizations of the Muslim Bosniaks, who in Moljević's plan did not get any political autonomy and the Catholic Church. At the same time, the ban on open political activities of the churches in effect concerned the Serbian Orthodox Church as well. Moljević, most probably supposed that the Serbian Orthodox Church could not have an independent political agenda. This is just an example of how political 'sympathies' and alleged ideological proximity may, in effect, be just a superficial thing.

Paradoxically, Serbian nationalists of the wartime (but also of preceding decades) despite their declared loyalty to Orthodoxy and the Orthodox Church were *de facto* rather willing to employ the symbolic capital of the Church to their own political ends. Their claims to "Orthodoxy", therefore, should be always contextualized and taken critically. The same could be said about another famous example of the affirmed Christian character of a political movement and ideology - Zbor of Dimitrije Ljotić and his incorporation and use of the Orthodox rhetoric and symbols. The case of Zbor is particularly interesting due to the documented close intellectual affinity between Dimitrije Ljotić, the charismatic leader of the proto-fascist movement, and Nikolaj Velimirović.

Ljotić's political movement failed miserably in the Yugoslav elections of 1935 and most probably would have remained marginal, if it was not for the support that he received from the German authorities and the government of Milan Nedić. Ljotić's political ideology combined elements of the Italian, Mussolini type corporatism, organic thought, Serbian

[397] Stevan Moljević, "Homogena Srbija" (June 1941), in Dragan Sotirović and Branko Jovanović, *Srbija i Ravna Gora* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004), 194.

nationalism, anti-Semitism and diffused Orthodox spirituality.[398] Most famously, Nikolaj Velimirović in his speech at Ljotić's funeral referred to him as "a politician with the cross", who always adhered to the interests and values of Orthodoxy. Zbor's motto was "With faith in God and the victory of Zbor". On multiple occasions Ljotić wrote that there is no other life outside 'the life and the truth of Christ'; there was no other way to reach salvation for an individual – or a nation – outside Christ and the Orthodox Church.[399] The relationship between Velimirović and Ljotić could be described most accurately as one of spiritual guidance; Ljotić publicly referred to the Archbishop as his mentor and Velimirović never denied the connection. Another Orthodox hierarch when asked if Velimirović was Lotić's follower [Ljotićevac] answered that it was the other way around, i.e. Ljotić was the follower of father Nikolaj.

Dimitrije Najdanović, a close associate of Velimirović was also an active supporter of Ljotić. He was arrested in 1940 while partaking in the activities of the outlawed Zbor, and was released only after the intervention of Velimirović with the government. In 1944, Najdanović wrote a fierce critique of the Chetnik actions and their political agenda. Among other things, Najdanović accused Draža Mihajlović and his fellows of betraying Serbian interests and instead following the Judeo-Masonic conspiracy plan. He also held them responsible for the sufferings of the Serbian nation after the *coup d'état* in March 1941.[400]

Velimirović, an exceptional theologian and thinker in many ways, was one of the few Serbian hierarchs, whose political contribution came also from the wartime period. In 1944 while being interned as 'an honorary guest' in the concentration camp Dachau, Velimirović wrote his most controversial book, *Speeches to the Serbian People through the Dungeon*

[398] For a more detailed analysis see my article "Between 'Clerical Fascism' and Political Orthodoxy: Orthodox Christianity and Nationalism in Interwar Serbia," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, No. 2 (2007): 247-258.
[399] Dimitrije Ljotić, "Pismo drugovima," in Dimitrije Ljotić, *Zatomljena misao: O političkim idejama Dimitrija Ljotića*, ed. Dragan Subotić (Belgarde, Klio, 1994).
[400] Dimitrije Najdanović, *Ravna Gora: Zablude i samounistenje*, ed. Zeljko Z. Jelić (Belgrade: Slobodna knjiga, 2002). The text was originally published in Belgrade in 1944.

Window.[401] The book was published for the first time in 1985 in Great Britain, but according to the testimonies of Velimirović's closer circle, it was written during his imprisonment. In contrast to the Patriarch, who was a firm anti-fascist, Velimirović's attitude to National-Socialism was not straightforwardly negative and in the late 1930s he wrote in favor of the actions taken by Germany's new ruler. His flirting with the Nazi ideology was most visible in his anti-Semitic and racist views. *Through the Dungeon Window,* written at the same time the Holocaust was taking place, is full of references to the Jews who have tried and murdered Christ, "inspired by the stinking breath of Satan". This continues Velimirović earlier anti-Semitic statements of Jews as Christ-killers and enemies of Christianity that can be found in other writings: *New Sermons under the Mountain, Ohrid Prologue, and Indian Letters.* As early as in the late-1920s Velimirović's allegorical sermon *The Story of the Wolf and the Lamb* "provoked a bitter reaction from the Belgrade Rabbi Dr. Isaac Alkalai" when it was first published in 1928.[402]

His wartime and post-war texts continue other themes he picked up in the late-1930s, develop, and radicalize them. Velimirović wrote of the reasons for the collapse of the Yugoslav state. He explained the collapse of the state by the 'sin of the people', and that sin was the rejection of God in the name of the false, godless culture and civilization, which Velimirović compared to the biblical dry wells that cannot keep the water.[403] Thus, his anti-modernism is presented here in its most articulated form.

Immigration and the After-life of Ideas

[401] Nikolaj Velimirović, *Govori Srpskom narodu kroz tamnički prozor* (Belgrade: Svetosavska književna zajednica, 1995).
[402] Byford, *Denial and Repression of Antisemitism,* 43.
[403] Velimirović, *Govori Srpskom narodu*, 5.

The end of WWII and Tito's coming to power signified the end of an epoch for the Serbian Orthodox Church, as well as for other religious institutions in Yugoslavia and other countries of what soon became those of the Warsaw Pact. A group of the Orthodox clergy left the country and spent the rest of their lives in exile, in Europe, the USA, and elsewhere. Velimirović spent the last years of his life in the USA; he never went back to Yugoslavia after he left Slovenia in the spring of 1945. In his first years in America, he was taking part in dissident émigré anti-communist activities. But later on, "disenchanted with the divisions within the Serbian diaspora in North America and aware of his diminishing influence in the homeland, Velimirović soon withdrew from public life and retreated to the Russian St. Tikhon Monastery in South Canaan, Pennsylania."[404] He died on March 18, 1956 at the age of 76. In 1991, Velimirović's remains were transported and reburied in a chapel in his native village of Lelić in Central Serbia.

Slijepčević and a number of the members of Zbor ended up in Germany. Slijepčević left the country during the war but had to spend a few years interned in Italy and Germany. He settled down in Switzerland, doing research at the familiar Old Catholic Department of the University of Bern. In 1954 he moved to Munich, where he worked at the Institute for South Eastern Europe. There he reportedly kept in touch with an émigré publishing house Iskra which specialized on the memoirs of the former Zbor members, and other anti-Communist publications. He died in 1992 in Cologne. Najdanović eventually settled in England (1948-1960) where he served as a priest and then moved to Canada (1960) and the USA (1967). He contributed to the publishing activities of the Serbian diaspora in America and Germany.[405] He died in 1986 in the USA.

Velimirović's writings were banned in socialist Yugoslavia, and the author himself was accused of being a traitor and a collaborator with the occupants. Nevertheless, many

[404] Byford, *Denial and Repression of Antisemitism*, 56.
[405] Dimitrije Najdanović, *Blaženi i blaženstva: misao oboženja* (München: Štamparija Iskra, 1965), Dimitrije Najdanović, *Tri srpska velikana* (München: Svečanik-Verlag, 1975);

texts existed underground, were published either with no name or under false names in the country, as well as smuggled in from abroad.[406] Velimirović continued to write and publish in the USA, his main focus was on the thesis of the exceptionality of the Serbian people, "the Serbian nation as a Theodul" which is also the name of his most popular (to the date) book.

His ideas were further developed by his disciple and a younger colleague Justin Popović who is considered to be the second greatest Serbian theologian of the twentieth century. Popović stayed in the country after the end of the Second World War, but because of his previous record of anti-communist views and activities his public career was not allowed by the authorities. He spent more than three decades in the Ćelije Monastery under the surveillance of the police. Although he was not allowed to teach and his public appearances were very limited, he was allowed to actively participate in the organization of the Serbian Orthodox Church under the Communist regime.

In contrast to Velimirović, and despite the years that he spent in England, Popović was far more anti-western and anti-ecumenical from the very outset of his career. He was greatly influenced by Russian conservative religious thought while he studied in the Theological Academy in St. Petersburg, and by the philosophy of Dostoevsky on whose work Popović wrote his doctoral thesis.[407] In this sense he resembles, much more than his teacher, the Romanian philosopher Nichifor Crainic was also fascinated by Dostoevsky's spirituality.

Forbidden and persecuted in socialist Yugoslavia, religious philosophy and the Orthodox worldview in a rather conservative and exclusivist form was re-born in the late-1980s and especially after the disintegration of the state. The resurgence of the idea and concept *svetosavlje* that one can observe in Serbia in the last fifteen years is clearly the result of work of a group of students of Justin Popovic: Atanasije Jevtić, Amfilohije Radović, Irinej Bulović, etc. Through his well established connections in the Greek Orthodox Church,

[406] Klaus Buchenau, „Svetosavlje und Pravoslavlje," 216.
[407] Justin Popović, *Filosofija i religija F.M. Dostojevskoga* (Sremski Karlovci: Srpska manastirska stamparija, 1923).

Popovic was able to send his best students to Greece, where many of them fell under the influence of radical Greek neo-Orthodox current and Christos Yannaras, who shared Popović's strong anti-Westernism.[408]

Much of the original complexity of the Serbian religious political thought of the 1930s got lost, as the emphasis now is made exclusively on anti-Communism, anti-Westernism and Serbian ethno-nationalism. Those aspects of the original teaching as it was created by Velimirović, Najdanović and others in the interwar decades were preserved and developed further that answered contemporary challenges. In this sense, the story replicated itself, and *svetosavlje* of the 2000s is as much the product of its political and international context as the original intellectual product was. Nikolaj Velimirović and Justin Popović were canonized as Orthodox saints, respectively in 2003 and 2010.

[408] Klaus Buchenau, „Svetosavlje und Pravoslavlje," 222; Makrides and Uffelmann, "Studying Eastern Orthodox Anti-Westernism," 116-117.

Conclusion

This dissertation analyzed the agenda and position of the Serbian Orthodox Church in relation to the sphere of politics in the interwar period. The examination of Church narratives and discourses has demonstrated that there were several issues that the Church was concerned with the most. They can be summarized in a following way: the church-state relationship; secularization; communism, fascism, liberalism and other modern political ideologies; and finally the national question and nationalism. The reflection on these topics and their different combinations form the main contents of political thought of the Serbian clergy and religious thinkers. All problems listed above belong to what may be labeled 'political modernity'. I have argued that the Orthodox political project was a result of the Church's attempts to cope with the challenges posed by it. Serbian religious thinkers were busy denying and rejecting certain parts of modernity; most of them, certainly, did not like what they saw. Nevertheless, by engaging with modernity, the Serbian Church often unconsciously and almost always unwillingly entered into modernity and became part of it. Even the most anti-modernist, anti-democratic and anti-Western views of the Serbian Orthodox clerics are an inherent part of European twentieth century modernity.

The dissertation traced how the Orthodox Church, its best minds and rank-and-file members, related to the world around and how their attitude changed and transformed together with the world. In 1918 the Serbian Church embraced and supported the new multinational Yugoslav state; in March 1941 the Patriarch and some important hierarchs supported the coup which eventually led to the dissolution of the state. The task was thus to see what kind of impulses and decisions taken during the interwar decades led to this dramatic change. Naturally, the final outcome was to a considerable extent defined by the challenges, through the interaction between the Serbian Church and other actors. One of the

main themes, that in a way organized the entire narrative of this dissertation, was the question of the balance between the internal intellectual development in the Serbian Orthodox Church and surrounding milieus on the one hand, and the "external" influences of the immediate political context, other religious communities, etc., on the other. While being aware of the fact that there is no definitive answer to the question, I still consider it vital to ponder over it in order to understand better the dynamics and evolution of the Serbian Orthodox Church's political agenda. Two radically opposite answers to the question (and the infinite multitude that falls in between) would have very different implications for the questions of far greater scope.

Should one presume that it was rather (or even exclusively) the internal intellectual resources that eventually made possible the creation of a radical Orthodox political project, which embraced exclusive nationalism, intolerance, racism, was anti-liberal and anti-democratic, etc., it would be only one step away from the claim that Eastern Orthodox Christianity is prone to anti-modernism in its most awful forms. A thesis is not as radical and straightforward as the claim famously put forward by Samuel Huntington, but indicates a similar direction. At the same time, should one come to the conclusion that the impact of the political events, presence of conservative émigré groups, interaction with and reactions to the actions of other religious communities inside and outside the country, etc., i.e. something external, was at least as essential for the outcome as the internal intellectual resources of the Church, the overall picture presents itself in a different way. The current thesis continuously argued for the importance of political context and tried to underline whenever possible the interaction of the Serbian Church with other actors.

In mathematics the triangle is the strongest of all geometrical shapes. However, in the mathematics of historical development the triangle of *church-state-nation* that existed and persisted so strongly in the minds and public discourse of the Serbian Orthodox clergy

proved to be enduring but not impregnable. There is a question that haunts every historian: "How should one approach historical phenomena in such a way that the result of the inquiry is not distorting facts but instead tells us something important about the past?" If we take away any of the three points from the triangle, the shape will not be anymore. Coming back to the question posed in the *Introduction*, is the tie between nationality and religion in Serbia a natural one? The answer is 'no'. It is not natural, or predetermined by the essence of Eastern Christianity. It was contested at the time of its creation from different perspectives, and it should be treated as such. The equation, to maintain the use of mathematical vocabulary, will not have an answer until the third component, the state, is properly introduced. With the introduction of the third angle, a new dimension in research and analysis opens up: it brings in the context: political, international, social and cultural.

Adequate and accurate inclusion of context into analysis was an important part of the research, but not very surprising. The second essential and less obvious consideration which proved to be critical is taking into account the religious aspect of the story, i.e. not limiting the analysis to the institutional and social history of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The inclusion of theological/philosophical dimension in the research project brings a whole range of interesting issues related to the broader and deeper history of East Orthodox Christianity. The theological component required a whole new context of its own: the early ecumenical movement, the disagreements with the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul, the intellectual presence of Russian émigré circles, etc. Unfortunately, many of them were only briefly touched upon.

The end of WWI meant a thorough transformation of the political context, and the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was just one of the outcomes. The Serbian elite, and the Serbian clergy who conceived of itself as an important part of the national elite, suddenly had to operate in a new multinational and religiously heterogeneous

state. The same was true for the neighboring countries as well. For instance, "after the Great War, Romanian intellectuals were faced with the task of organizing the enlarged Romania created by the Treaty of Versailles, and they were thus impelled to reexamine old values and seek new definitions of Romanian spirituality".[409] There were, naturally, differences in perceptions between the victors and losers in the War, but even within the victors' camp the challenges were many.

Given the complexity of the new political constellation and a degree of the initial post-war chaos, it is not very surprising that up until the mid-1920s the Serbian Church was not very actively involved in the national politics. The aims of the Church more or less coincided with those of the newly born state, or at least this is what both parties believed at the time. Both were excited about the new state and supported and promoted the idea of the 'liberation and unification' despite the obvious discrepancy with the reality.

The decade from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s was the time of the 'work behind the scene', a time of debates within the Church. Thus, the second radical change in the political context that came with the introduction of the Royal Dictatorship in 1929 occurred while the Serbian Orthodox clergy were in the process of setting an agenda for themselves. The new system of governance meant that suddenly the churches and religious symbols became even more laden with political significance, as they constituted one of the few ways to assert national identity, different from the integral Yugoslav one.

Simultaneously with the radical changes in political environment taking place, the Serbian Church was in the midst of developing a strategy for improving its position within the state and society. The Dictatorship came as a challenge and as a blessing at the same time. The challenge, obviously came from the imposition of integral Yugoslavism; the blessing from the new possibilities for mobilization of the population. Some of the Church leaders saw

[409] Keith Hitchins, "*Gîndirea*: Nationalism in a Spiritual Disguise", in Kenneth Jowitt ed., *Social Change in Romania, 1860-1940: A Debate on Development in a European Nation* (Berkley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1978), 140.

an opportunity to win people over by appealing to their national feelings. In the circumstances of a vacuum of national rhetoric, this strategy was very effective. Moreover, it felt familiar to the Church to appeal and emphasize the national aspect of East Orthodox Christianity. This combination of factors led to a gradual marginalization and rejection of those streams within the Church that did not accentuate the national dimension. The original idea of evangelical and social work of *bogomoljci* was increasingly more often replaced by national and nationalist rhetoric of Nikolaj Velimirović. The initiatives of the ecumenical dialogue transformed into regional cooperation of the Orthodox churches against secularism, liberalism and communism. Weak attempts to include the values of the political left did not develop into anything significant.

Even a quick look at other Orthodox countries in the region will be sufficient to see that the developments in Orthodox social thought were not an exclusively Serbian affair. In Greece the Church opted to take over grass-root initiatives and to control them, rather than to suppress and eliminate them completely. The Greek *Union of Cooperating Christian Corporations* (Zoe) cut across all strata of society and was running over two thousand Sunday schools. Although primarily concerned with social work and the issues of piety and morals, it became associated with the Greek political right, as was a rather typical trend for other analogues movements elsewhere. In Bulgaria Church authorities effectively eliminated (incorporated into the Church structures) a similar movement *Good Samaritan*, and thus (unwillingly) prevented the development of a far-right/nationalist political project on the basis (or with a significant support) of a religious movement. However, one has to keep in mind that Bulgaria at the time was an authoritarian right-wing dictatorship and the Church was not in conflict with the secular authorities. Thus, the incorporation of a religious movement in the Church structures had, in a way, to a similar result, a right-wing political agenda supported by the Church. In this sense, the shift towards the political right, in the

particular Serbian case, in the form of right-wing nationalism, fits a broad European and a narrower regional pattern. In terms of ideological orientation, a characteristic trait of the interwar decades in virtually all European cultures was the tendency of many church establishments as well as individual religious thinkers and/or circles to gradually shift to the right rather than to the left on the political spectrum. The phenomenon could be partially explained by the overall dominance of the (extreme) right in East Central Europe, especially in the 1930s be it in the form of a fascist movement in power or an authoritarian regime. The fear of the Bolshevik Revolution also should not be underestimated. Anti-communism was an important element, if the not the backbone, of the political climate throughout Europe. In the Serbian Church these feelings were essential. After the Russian Revolution the Kingdom of Yugoslavia received and accommodated a great portion of the Russian emigration, the Serbian Church thought of itself as the new leader of the Orthodox World, the "fourth Rome", if you wish.

The period from the mid-1930s to the break up of the country in 1941 was characterized by the escalation of tensions between the federalists, mostly Croatian, and the central government in Belgrade. Against the background of a political conflict, which took on more and more the form of a Serbo-Croatian conflict, the renewed strategy of the Serbian Church, put together in the previous decade, contributed to cementing the association of the Church and East Christianity with Serbian nationalism and Serbian national interests. In the latter part of the 1930s a phenomenon referred to here as *Political Orthodoxism* took form. It signifies the new type and level of political involvement of the Serbian Church. The primary difference with the preceding period was the formulation of a number of theoretical justifications for both, open political participation, and association with the national cause of the Church. The Serbian Church (following the path and drawing upon the experiences of other European Churches) put together its own response to political Modernity.

It is important to underline, that there is a fundamental difference between having a national narrative, which the Serbian Church (like many other churches) had since the nineteenth century, and having an elaborated theological and conceptual understanding of nation as a modern social and political phenomenon. The latter was generally speaking missing from the Serbian religious scene up until the late-1930s. The celebrations of St. Sava in 1935 present a result and a certain summary of previous developments. During the year of festivities devoted to the glorification of the main Serbian saint and a patron of the nation, the ideology of *Svetosavlje* was articulated and presented to the general public. This festival of Orthodoxy and Serbian national hero was just one in the line of similar celebrations within the country, and in the region broadly speaking. The commemoration of the Croatian statehood and 1000th anniversary of the Coronation of King Tomislav in 1925, festivities of St. Wenceslas in Czechoslovakia, and finally the grandiose celebrations of the Kosovo battle in 1939 in Yugoslavia constitute a series of events worth consideration in a comparative perspective. The Concordat crisis of the 1937, very often seen as a singular event in the history of church-state relations, originated from the very same logic of the Church taking an open political stance and entering the confrontation with the government.

In 1941 the Serbian Church sided with the Serbian national cause and against the state. This was a logical result of the developments of the preceding twenty years. It may seem counter intuitive, though, if one interprets the history of the East Orthodox Christianity in the twentieth century through the lenses of the medieval dogmatic teaching. *Symphonia*, the symbiotic relationship between ecclesiastical and secular authorities, is strongly associated with Orthodoxy even today. One of the keys to the comprehension of the Serbian paradoxical (in a sense) case lies in the analysis of how 'Church' was understood by the Serbian religious thinkers. I argue that it is less about *Symphonia* and the Byzantine tradition of the balance of power and the church-state relationship, and more about the

conceptualization of community. This is why *sobornost* and *Church* are such important concepts. Orthodox political theories in the region engaged in the discussion of community and were focused on the nation as a community, on the one hand, and on the issue of communal piety and spirituality (as in the religious movements mentioned above), on the other. The use of *sobornost* by the Serbian religious thinkers that served as an important justification of the bond between religious and national communities was only one of the possibilities. Alternative understandings of 'church' and its role in society, intellectually present but not commonly accepted, could have led to very different political results.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Journals and Newspapers

Bogoslovlje: Organ Pravoslavnog bogoslovskog fakulteta u Beogradu (Belgrade), 1926-1940

Bratstvo: List za vjersko i narodno prosvjećivanje (Sarajevo), 1925-1941

Glasnik: Zvanični list Ujedinjene Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve/ Glasnik: Zvanični list Srpske Pravoslavne Patrijaršije (Belgrade), 1920-1941

Hrišćanska misao: Časopis za hrišćanska i društvena pitanja (Belgrade), 1935-1941

Hrišćanski Vesnik (Belgrade), 1896-1900, 1906-1908, 1911-1914.

Hrišćanski život: mesečni časopis za hriščansku kulturu i crkveni život (Sremski Karlovci, Belgrade, Prizren), 1922-1927

Hrišćansko delo: Časopis za hrišćansku kulturu i crkveni život (Skopje), 1935-1941

Katolički list (Zagreb), 1933-1937

Nova Evropa (Zagreb), 1927-1930

Put: Časopis za hrišćansku kulturu (Belgrade), 1933-1934

Srpski Književni glasnik (Belgrade), 1927

Svetosavlje: Organ studenata Pravoslavnog bogoslovskog faulteta (Belgrade), 1932-1941

Vesnik Srspke Crkve (Belgrade), 1898-1914, 1921-1933

Vesnik: Crkveno-politički i društveni list (Belgrade), 1919-1930

Memoirs

Dožić, Gavrilo. *Memoari Patrijarha Srpskog Gavrila*. Belgrade: Sfairos, 1990.

Ilić, Aleksa. *Moji doživljai.* Belgrade, 1931.

Meštrović, Ivan. *Uspomene na politicke ljude i dogadjaje*. Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1993 (first published in Buenos Aires in 1963).

Pribićević, Svetozar. *Diktatura kralja Aleksandra*. Belgrade: Prosveta, 1953 (first published as *La dictature du roi Alexander*, Paris 1933).

Stojadinović, Milan. *Ni Rat Ni Pakt: Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata*. Belgrade: Glas, 2002 (first published in 1963).

Other Sources

Crkveno zakonodavstvo Srpske pravoslavne crkve. Vol. 3. Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1933.

Crnjanski, Miloš. *Sveti Sava*. Belgrade, 1934.

Djordjević, Mirko, ed. *Srpska konzervativna misao*. Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2003.

Jovanović, Slobodan. *Jugoslovenska misao u prošlosti i budućnosti. Predavanje održano u Srpskom kulturnom klubu na dan 4. decembra 1939. godine*. Belgrade: Sloboda, 1939.

Katić, *Narodna crkva sa gledišta narodnih potreba*. N.p. 1921.

Krestić, Vasilije and Radoš Ljušić, eds. *Programi i statuti Srpskih političkih stranaka do 1918. g*. Belgrade: Književne novine, 1991.

Ljotić, Dimitrije. *Zatomljena misao: O političkim idejama Dimitrija Ljotića*, edited by Dragan Subotić. Belgarde, Klio, 1994.

Leontev, Konstantin Nikolaevich. *Vostok, Rossiia i Slavianstvo: filosofskaia i politicheskaia publitsistika: dukhovnaia proza (1872-1891)*. Moscow: Respublika, 1996.

Marjanović, Čedomir. *Izbacivanje veronauke iz naših gimnazija*. Belgrade: Štamparija "Sv. Sava", 1921.

------. *Socjializam: Kritički pregled najosnovnijih tačaka socijalističkog učenja*. Belgrade: Državna štamparija Kraljevine Srbije, 1907.

Mojsej, episkop. *Crkveno pitanje u Srbiji*. Belgrade: Štamparija Pere Todorovića, 1895.

Najdanović, Dimitrije. *Blaženi i blaženstva: misao oboženja*. München: Štamparija Iskra, 1965.

------. *Filosofija istorije Imanuela Hermana Fihtea i drugi spisi iz filosofije, bogoslovlja i književnosti*. Edited by Željko Z. Jelić. Belgrade: Jasen: Fond istine o Srbima, 2003.

------. *Tri srpska velikana*. München: Svečanik-Verlag, 1975.

------. *Ravna Gora: Zablude i samounistenje*, edited by Zeljko Z. Jelić. Belgrade: Slobodna knjiga, 2002.

Novak, Viktor ed., *Antologija jugoslovenske misli i narodnog jedinstva: 1390-1930*. Belgrade: Štampa državne štamparije, 1930.

Popović, Justin. *Filosofija i religija F.M. Dostojevskoga*. Sremski Karlovci: Srpska manastirska stamparija, 1923.

Rapport de la Conference Regionale Balkanique Sociale et Internationale tenue a Bucarest du 14 au 19 mai 1933 sous les auspices de L'Alliance universelle pour l'amitie internationale par les Eglise et du Conseil Oecumenigue du Christianisme pratique. Collection of the Library of the Serbian Patriarchate.

Tekstovi projekta zakona o Konkordatu i odgovarajućih stavova iz zakonodavstva Srpske Pravolsavne Crkve. Uporedjeni i objašnjeni od P.N. Belgrade: Izdanje "Samouprave", 1937.

Velimirović, Nikolaj. *Govori Srpskom narodu kroz tamnički prozor*. Belgrade: Svetosavska književna zajednica, 1995.

------. *Nacionalizam svetoga Save, predavanje održano na KNU 1935*. Belgrade: Izdanje Arhiepiskopije beogradsko-karlovačke, 1935.

Zapisnici sa sednica ministarskog saveta kraljevine Jugoslavije, 1929-1931. Belgrade, 2002.

Secondary Literature

Aleksov, Bojan. "History Taught Us Not to Fear Anything from the East and Everything from the West. A Historical Perspective on Serbian Occidentalism." In *Prowestliche und antiwestliche Diskurse in den Balkanländern/ Südosteuropa*, eds. Schubert, G. and S. Sundhaussen, 31-46. München: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 2008.

------, "Nationalism in Construction: The Memorial Church of St. Sava on Vracar Hill in Belgrade," *Balkanologie* 7, No. 2 (December 2003): 47-72.

------. *Religious Dissent between the Modern and the National. Nazarenes in Hungary and Serbia 1850-1914*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006.

Allcock, John B. *Explaining Yugoslavia*. London: C. Hurst, 2000.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 2006.

Arjomand, Said Amir, ed. *The Political dimensions of religion*. Albany: State University of New York Press, c1993.

Arx, Urs von. "Episkop Nikolaj Velimirović (1880-1956) i njegove studije u Bernu u okviru starokatoličkih i srpsko-pravoslavnih odnosa." In *Srspka teologija u dvadesetom veku: Istrazivacki problemi i rezultati* Bogoljub Šijaković, edited by Bogoljub Šijaković, 7-27. Belgrade: Pravoslavni bogoslovski fakultet, 2007.

Asad, Talal. *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003.

------. "Religion, Nation-State, Secularism." In *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia*, edited by Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann, 178-196. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Augustinos, Gerasimos, ed. *Diverse Paths to Modernity in Southeastern Europe: Essays in National Development.* New York: Greenwood Press, 1991.

Bakić, Jovo. *Ideologije jugoslovenstva izmedu srpskog i hrvatskog nacionalizma 1918-1941: sociološko-istorijska studija.* Zrenjanin: Gradska narodna biblioteka "Žarko Zrenjanin", 2004.

Bakic-Hayden, Milica. "National Memory and Narrative Memory: The Case of Kosovo." In *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory*, edited by Maria Todorova, 25-41. New York: New York University Press, 2004.

Banac, Ivo, John G. Ackerman, and Roman Szporluk, eds. *Nation and Ideology: Essays in Honor of Wayne S. Vucinich.* Boulder: East European Monographs, 1981.

Banac, Ivo and Katherine Verdery, ed. *National Character and National Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe.* New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1995.

Bauchman, Tom and Martin Conway, eds. *Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918-1965*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, c1996.

Bellamy, Alex J. "The Catholic Church and Croatia's Two Transitions." *Religion, State and Society* 30, No. 1, (2002): 45-61.

Bergen, Doris L. "Christianity and Germanness: Mutually Reinforcing, Reciprocally Undermining?" In *Religion und Nation, Nation und Religion: Beiträge zu einer unbewältigten Geschichte*, edited by Geyer, Michael and Hartmut Lehmann, 76-98. Göttingen, 2004.

Berglund, Bruce R. and Brian Porter-Szűcs, eds. *Christianity and Modernity in Eastern Europe*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010.

Berend, Ivan T. *Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II*. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1998.

Bhabha, Homi K., ed. *Nation and Narration.* London: Routledge, 1990.

Bigović, Radovan. *Crkva i društvo*. Belgrade: Chilandar Fund at the Theological Faculty of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and Paris: St Nicholas Community, 2000.

------. *Od svečoveka do bogočoveka: Hrišćanska filosofija vladike Nikolaja Velimirovića*. Belgrade: Društvo Raška škola, 1998.

Biondich, Mark. "The Historical Legacy: The Evolution of Interwar Yugoslav Politics, 1918-1941." In *State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia's Disintegration,* edited by Lenard J. Cohen and Jasna Dragović-Soso, 43-54. West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 2008.

------. "Radical Catholicism and Fascism in Croatia, 1918-1945," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, No. 2 (2007): 383-399.

------. “Religion and Nation in Wartime Croatia: Reflections on the Ustaša Policy of Forced Religious Conversions, 1941-1942.” *Slavonic and East European Review* 83, No. 1 (Jan2005): 71-116.

Blaschke, Olaf. “Das 19. Jahrhundert: Ein Zweites Konfessionelles Zeitalter?“ *Geschichte und Gesellschaft : Zeitschrift für historische Sozialwissenschaft* 26 (2000): 38-75.

Blinkton, Martin. *Fascism and the Right in Europe, 1919-1945*. Harlow: Pearson Education, 2000.

Boia, Lucian. *Romania: Borderland of Europe*. London: Reaktion Books, 2001.

Bozóki, András and Miklós Sükösd. *Anarchism in Hungary: Theory, History, Legacies*. Boulder: Social Science Monographs; New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.

Brady, Thomas A. Jr. “Confessionalization – The Career of a Concept.” In *Confessionalization in Europe: 1555 – 1700. Essays in Honor and Memory of Bodo Nischan*, edited by John M. Headley, 1-20. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004.

Bremer, Thomas. *Ekklesiale Struktur und Ekklesiologie in der Serbischen Orthodoxen Kirche im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*. Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1992.

Broughton, David and Hans-Martien ten Napel, eds. *Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Bruce, Steve. *Politics and Religion.* Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003.

------, ed. *Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis.* Oxford, 1992.

Brunnbauer. Ulf, ed. *(Re)Writing History: Historiography in Southeast Europe after Socialism.* Münster: Lit, 2004.

Buchenau, Klaus. “Just as Real-Life Brothers: Serb-Russian Contacts in the Ecclesiastical Academy of Kiev (1850–1914) and in Orthodox Schools of Interwar Yugoslavia (1920–1941).” *Tokovi Istorije* 3-4, (2005): 54-66.

------. *Kämpfende Kirchen: Jugoslawiens religiöse Hypothek.* Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2006.

------. *Orthodoxie und Katholizismus in Jugoslawien, 1945-1991: Ein serbisch-kroatischer Vergleich*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2004.

------. “‘*Svetosavlje* und *Pravoslavlje*: Nationales und Universales in der serbischen Orthodoxie.“ In *Nationalisierung der Religion und Sakralisierung der Nation in Ostmittel-, Südost- und Osteuropa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed.* Martin Schulze Wessel, 203-232. Stuttgart: Steiner, 2006.

Bucur, Maria and Nancy M. Wingfield, eds. *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present*. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2001.

Bulatovic, Marko. "Struggling with Yugoslavism: Dilemmas of Interwar Serb Political Thought." In *Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of Twentieth-century Southeastern Europe*, edited by John Lampe and Mark Mazower, 254-276. Budapest: CEU Press, 2003.

Bulgakov, S.N. *Sochineniya*. 2 Vols. Moscow: Nauka, 1993.

Burrin, P. "Political Religion: The Relevance of a Concept." *History and Memory*, 9 (1997): 321-349.

Byford, Jovan. *Denial and Repression of Anti-Semitism: Post-Communist Remembrance of the Serbian Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović*. Budapest, New York: CEU Press, 2008.

Casanova, José. *Public Religions in the Modern World*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

------. "The Problem of Religion and the Anxieties of European Secular Democracy." In *Religion and Democracy in Contemporary Europe*, edited by Gabriel Motzkin and Yochi Fischer, 63-74. London: Alliance Publishing, Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2008.

Chadwick, Owen. *The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Cisarž, Branko A. *Jedan vek periodične štampe Srpske pravoslavne crkve: bibliografijski opis časopisa i listova sa pregledom-sadržajem svih radova objavljenih u njima od 1868-1970*. 2 vols. Belgrade: Sveti arhijerejski sinod Srpske pravoslavne crkve, 1986.

Conway, Martin. *Catholic Politics in Europe: 1918-1945*. London: Routledge, 1997

Craciun, Maria and Ovidiu Ghitta, eds. *Ethnicity and Religion in Central and Eastern Europe*. Cluj: Cluj University Press, 1995.

Crampton, R. J. *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*. London: Routledge, 1994.

------. *A Short History of Modern Bulgaria*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Cristi, Marcela. *From Civil to Political Religion: The Intersection of Culture, Religion and Politics*. Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2001.

Cox, Jeffrey. "Master Narratives of Long Term Religious Change." In *The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe*, ed. McLeod, David Hugh and Werner Ustorf, 201-218. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Cunningham, Mary B. and Elizabeth Theokritoff, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Orthodox Christian Theology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Ćorović, Vladimir *Istorija Srba*, (4th edition). Niš: Zograf, 2001.

------. *Istorija Srpskog naroda.* 3 vols. Cetinje: Svetigora, Podgorica: Oktoih: Jumedijamont, 2009.

Čolović, Ivan. *The Politics of Symbol in Serbia: Essays in Political Anthropology*. London: Hurst, 2002.

Čubrilović, Vasa. *Istorija Političke misli u Srbiji XIX veka*. Belgrade: Prosveta, 1958.

------. "Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva pod Turcima od XV do XIX veka." In Vasa Čubrilović, *Odabrani istorijski radovi*. Belgrade: Narodna Knjiga, 1983.

Day, Graham and Andrew Thompson, eds. *Theorizing Nationalism.* Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Danopoulos, Constantine P. "Religion, civil society, and democracy in Orthodox Greece." *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 6, Number 1, (April 2004): 43-55.

Daskalov, Roumen. *The Making of a Nation in the Balkans*. Budapest: CEU Press, 2003.

Dimić, Ljubodrag. *Istorija Srpske državnosti*. Vol. 3 Srbija u Jugoslaviji. Novi Sad: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti. Ogranak, 2001.

------. *Kulturna politika u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji, 1918-1941*. Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 1996.

Dimitrova, Nina. *Religiya i natsionalizam: Idei za religiyata v mezhduvoenniya period v Bulgaria*. Sofia, 2006.

Djokić, Dejan. *Elusive Compromise: A History of Interwar Yugoslavia.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

------, "National Mobilisation in the 1930s: The 'Serb Question' in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia." In *New Perspectives on Yugoslavia: Key Issues and Controversies*, edited by Dejan Djokić and James Ker-Lindsay, 62-81. New York: Routledge, 2010.

------, ed. *Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918-1992*. London: C. Hurst, 2003.

Djurović, Bogdan, ed. *Religija - crkva – nacija*. Niš: JUNIR; Subotica: Otvoreni univerzitet, 1996.

Dobrivojević, Ivana. *Državna represija u doba diktature kralja Aleksandra, 1929-1935.* Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006.

------. "Izmedju kralja i naroda nema posrednika: dinastička propaganda u vreme šestojanuarskog režima." *Tokovi istorije*, 4 (2006): 159 – 182.

Dogan, Mattei. "Accelerated Decline of Religious Beliefs in Europe." *Comparative Sociology*, 1, No. 2 (2002):127-149.

Eatwell, Roger and A.W. Wright. *Contemporary Political Ideologies*. London: Pinter, 1999.

Eatwell, Roger and Noël O'Sullivan, eds. *The Nature of the Right: European and American Politics and Political Thought since 1789.* London: Pinter Publishers, 1989.

Eatwell, Roger. "Reflections on Fascism and Religion." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 4/3, (2003): 145-166.

Eisenstadt, S. N. "Multiple Modernities." *Daedalus* 129, No. 1 (Winter, 2000):1-29.

Ekmečić, Milorad. *Srbija izmedju srednje Evrope i Evrope*. Belgrade, 1992.

------. *Stavaranje Jugoslavije*, Vol. 1-2. Belgrade, 1989.

Falina, Maria. "Between 'Clerical Fascism' and Political Orthodoxy: Orthodox Christianity and Nationalism in Interwar Serbia." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, No. 2 (2007): 247-258.

Fleck, Hans-Georg, ed. *Liberalizam i Katolicizam u Hrvatkskoj*. Vol. 2. Zagreb: Zaklada Friedrich Naumann, 1999.

Friedman, Francine. *The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996.

Gaut, Greg. "Can a Christian be a Nationalist? Vladimir Solov'ev's Critique of Nationalism." *Slavic Review* 57, No. 1 (Spring 1998): 77-94.

Gardašević, Blagota. "Organizaciono ustrojstvo i zakonodavstvo pravoslavne crkve između dva svetska rata." In *Sprska Pravoslavna Crkva 1920-1970: Spomenica o 50 -godíšnjici vaspostavljanja Srpske Patriašije*, 37-64. Belgrade: Sveti arhijerejski sinod Srpske pravoslavne crkve, 1971.

Gašparić, Jure. *Diktatura kralja Aleksandra in politika Slovenske ljudske stranke v letih 1929-1935*. Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2007.

Gentile, Emilio. "Fascism as Political Religion", *Journal of Contemporary History* 25, No. 2-3, (1990): 229-251.

------. "Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion: Definitions and Critical Reflections on Criticism of an Interpretation." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 5, No. 3 (Dec2004): 326-375.

------. "Political Religion: A Concept and its Critics – A Critical Survey." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 6, No.1 (June 2005): 19-32

------. "The Sacralization of Politics: Definitions, Interpretations and Reflections on the Question of Secular Religion and Totalitarianism." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 1/1, (2000): 18-55.

Georgescu, Vlad. *The Romanians: A History*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, c1991.

Georgiadou, Vassiliki. "Greek Orthodoxy and the Politics of Nationalism." *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 9 No. 2 (1995): 295-316.

Geyer, Michael and Hartmut Lehmann, eds. *Religion und Nation, Nation und Religion: Beiträge zu einer unbewältigten Geschichte.* Göttingen: Wallstein, 2004.

Gligorijević, Branislav. "Russkya pravoslavnaya tserkov' v period mezhdu dvumya mirovymi voinami." In *Russkaya Emigratsiya v Yugoslavii*, edited by A. Arsenyev, 109-117. Moscow: Indrik, 1996.

Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm. *Die Wiederkehr der Götter. Religion in der modernen Kultur.* München: C. H. Beck Verlag, 2004.

Graham, Malbone W. Jr. "The Dictatorship in Yugoslavia." *The American Political Science Review* 23 No. 2 (May, 1929): 449-459.

Griffin, Roger. *The Nature of Fascism*. London: Pinter, 1991.

------, "*The Palingenetic Political Communitiy: Rethinking Legitimation of Totalitarian Regimes in Interwar Europe*." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 2 No. 2 (2002): 24-43.

Hanson, Eric O. *The Catholic Church in World Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.

Hastings, Adrian. *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Hosking, Geoffrey A. *Church, Nation and State in Russia and Ukraine*. London: Macmillan, 1991.

Hughes, Stuart H. *Consciousness & Society: The reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890-1930*. Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1988.

Ilić,Predrag. *Srpska pravoslavna crkva i tajna Dahaua: mit i istina o zatočeništvu patrijarha Gavrila i episkopa Nikolaja u koncentracionom logoru Dahauu*. Belgrade: P. Ilić, 2006.

Jelavich, Barbara. *History of the Balkans*. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Jelavich, Charles and Barbara Jelavich. *The Establishment of the Balkan National State:, 1804-1920*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, c1983.

Johnson, Matthew Raphael. "Nation, State and the Incarnation in the Political Writings of Vladimir Solov'yev: The Transfiguration of Politics." *Religion, State and Society* 30, No. 4 (2002): 347-355.

Jowitt, Kennet, ed. *Social Change in Romania, 1860-1940: A debate on development in a European nation*. Berkley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1978.

Judah, Tim. *The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997.

Hitchins, Keith. *Rumania: 1866-1947*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.

Kann, Robert A. and Zdenek V. David. *The Peoples of the Eastern Habsburg Lands, 1526-1918.* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1984.

Kent, John. "Religion and Nationalism." In *Religion in Europe: Contemporary Perspectives*, edited by Gill, Sean, Gavin D'Costa and Ursula King, 170-. Kampen: Kok Pharos Publishing House, 1995.

Kitromilides, Paschalis M. *Enlightenment, Nationalism and Orthodoxy: Studies in the Culture and Political Thought of Southeastern Europe*. Aldershot, Hampshire: Variorum, 1994.

------. *An Orthodox Commonwealth: Symbolic Legacies and Cultural Encounters in Southeastern Europe*. Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2007.

Knox, Zoe Katrina. *Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia after Communism*. London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005.

Kolstø, Pål, ed. *Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe.* London: Hurst, 2005.

Koselleck, Reinhart. "Social History and Begriffsgeschichte." In *History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives*, edited by Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans, and Frank van Vree, 23-35. Amsterdam University Press, 1998.

Kosik, V. I. *Konstantin Leontev: razmyshleniia na slavianskuiu temu*. Moskva: Zertsalo, 1997.

Kostiashov, Iurii. *Serbi v Avstriiskoi monarkhii v XVIII veke.* Kaliningrad, 1997.

Kristo, Jure. *Katolička crkva u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj*, 2 Vols. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 1998.

Lampe, John R. *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 (2nd edition).

Lampe, John and Mark Mazower, ed. *Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of Twentieth-century Southeastern Europe*. Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2003.

Lehmann, Hartmut. "Die Säkularisierung der Religion und die Sakralisierung der Nation im 20. Jahrhundert. Varianten einer komplementären Relation." In Maner, Hans-Christian and Martin Schulze Wessel, eds. *Religion im Nationalstaat zwischen den Weltkriegen 1918–1939,* 13–27. Stuttgart: Steiner, 2002.

------. “History of Twentieth-Century Christianity as a Challenge for Historians.” In Hartmut Lehmann, *Transformationen der Religion in der Neuzeit: Beispiele aus der Geschichte des Protestantismus*, 207-220. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2007.

Leustean, Lucian N. “Orthodoxy and political myths in Balkan national identities.” *National Identities* 10, No. 4 (December 2008): 421-432.

Litavrin, G. and R. Grishina, eds. *Chelovek na Balkanah v epohu krizisov i etnopoliticheskih stolknoveniy XX v.* St. Petersburg: Aleteyia, 2002.

Makridies, Vasilios “Aspects of Greek-Orthodox Fundamentalism.” *Orthodoxes Forum* 5, No. 49 (1991): 49-72.

Makridies, Vasilios N. and Dirk Uffelmann. “Studying Eastern Orthodox Anti-Westernsim: The Need for a Comparative Research Agenda.” In Jonathan Sutton and Wil van den Bercken, eds. *Orthodox Christianity and Contemporary Europe: Selected Papers of the International Conference Held at the University of Leeds, England in June 2001*, 87-120. Leuven: Peeters, 2003,

Maner, Hans-Christian. *Multikonfessionalität und neue Staatlichkeit. Orthodoxe, griechisch-katholische und römisch-katholische Kirche in Siebenbürgen und Altrumänien zwischen den Weltkriegen: 1918-1940*. Stuttgart: Steiner, 2007.

Maner, Hans-Christian and Martin Schulze-Wessel, eds. *Religion im Nationalstaat zwischen den Weltkriegen 1918-1939: Polen, Tschechoslowakei, Ungarn, Rumänien.* Stuttgart: Steiner, 2002.

Martin, David. *On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory.* Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005.

Matić, Milan B. *Ravnogorska ideja i štampi i propagandi četničkog pokreta u Srbiji 1941-1944*. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1995.

Matijević, Zlatko. “Pokušaj ustavopravnog definiranja položaja Katoličke crkve u Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca: 1918-1921.“ In *Liberalizam i Katolicizam u Hrvatkskoj*. II Dio, edited by Hans-Georg Fleck, 11-25. Zagreb: Zaklada Friedrich Naumann, 1999.

Mavrogordatos, George Th. “Orthodoxy and Nationalism in the Greek Case.” In *Church and State in Contemporary Europe: The Chimera of Neutrality*, edited by John Madeley, T.S. and Zsolt Enyedi, 117-136. London: Frank Cass, 2003.

Mazower, Mark. *The Balkans*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000.

McLeod, Hugh and Werner Ustorf, eds. *The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-2000.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Meininger, Thomas A. *The Formation of a Nationalist Bulgarian Intelligentsia, 1835-1878.* New York: Garland Publishing, 1987.

Metzger, Franziska *Religion, Geschichte, Nation: Katholische Geschichtsschreibung in der Schweiz im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert - kommunikationstheoretische Perspektiven.* Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2010.

Michel, Patrick. *Politics and Religion in Eastern Europe: Catholicism in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia*. Oxford: Polity Press, 1991.

Milosavljevic, Olivera, *U tradiciji nacionalizma ili stereotipi srpskih intelektualaca XX veka o "nama" i "drugima"*. Belgrade: Helsinski odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2002.

Milosević, Zoran. *Crkva i politika: pravoslavlje i drustvene reforme*. Belgrade: Institut za politicke studije, 2002.

Mishkova, Diana. *Modernization and Political Elites in the Balkans before World War I*. Minneapolis: Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota, 1994.

------. *Prisposobiavane na svobodata: modernost v Srbiia i Ruminiia prez XIX vek*. Sofia: Paradigma, 2001.

------. "The Interesting Anomaly of Balkan Liberalism." In *Liberty and the Search for Identity: Liberal Nationalisms and the Heritage of the Empires*, ed. Ivan Zoltan Denes, 399-456. Budapest: CEU Press, 2006.

Mišović, Miloš. *Srpska Crkva i konkordatska kriza*. Belgrade: Sloboda, 1983.

Mitrović, Andrej. *Serbia's Great War, 1914-1918*. West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 2007.

Mojzes,Paul. *Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans*. New York: Continuum, 1994.

Moro, Renato. "Religion and Politics in the Time of Secularization: The Sacralization of Politics and Politicization of Religion." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 6, No.1, (June 2005): 71-86.

Mosse, George L. *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich*. New York: Howard Fertig, 1975.

Mylonas, Christos. *Serbian Orthodox Fundamentals: The Quest for an Eternal Identity*. Budapest: CEU Press, 2003.

Naimark, Norman M. and Holly Case, ed. *Yugoslavia and Its Historians: Understanding the Balkan Wars of the 1990s*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003.

Newman, John Paul. "Forging a United Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes: The Legacy of the First World War and the 'invalid question'." In *New Perspectives on Yugoslavia: Key Issues and Controversies*, edited by Dejan Djokić and James Ker-Lindsay, 46-61. New York: Routledge, 2010.

Nielsen, Christian Axboe. “One State, One Nation, One King: The Dictatorship of King Aleksandar and His Yugoslav Project, 1929-1935.” PhD diss., Columbia University, New York, 2002.

Parežanin, Ratko. *Drugi svetski rat i Dimitrije V. Ljotić*. Belgrade: A.Ž. Jelić, c1971, 2001.

Pavlowitch, Stevan K. *A History of the Balkans, 1804-1945*. London: Longman, 1999.

------. *Serbia: The History behind the Name*. London: Hurst & Co., 2002.

Pelikan, Jaroslav. *Christian Doctrine and Modern Culture since 1700*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

------. *The Spirit of Eastern Christendom, 600-1700*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993

Perica, Vjekoslav. *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002

------. “The Most Catholic Country in Europe? Church, State, and Society in Contemporary Croatia.” *Religion, State and Society*, 34, No. 4 (December 2006): 311-346.

------. “The Sanctification of Enmity. Churches and Construction of Founding Myths of Serbia and Croatia.” In Myths and Boundaries in Southeastern Europe, edited by Pål Kolstø, 130-157. London.: C. Hurst & Co, 2005.

Perkins, Mary Anne. *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative since 1789*. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2004.

------. *Nation and Word, 1770-1850: Religious and Metaphysical Language in European National Consciousness*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999.

Perović, Latinka. *Srpski socijalisti 19. veka: Prilog istroii socijalističke misli*. Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1995.

Petrović, Ljubomir, “Percepcije i Teorije Represije Kraljevine SHS 1918–1929.” *Istorija 20. veka*, 2 (2006): 27-50.

------. “U Potrazi za izmišljenom stvarnošću: Jugoslovenski identitet u casopisu ‘Jugosloven’ 1931-1932.” *Istorija 20. veka* 1 (2007): 37-56.

Petrovic, Michael B. *A History of Modern Serbia: 1804-1918*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976

Pocock, J. G. A. “The Concept of a Language and the Métier d' Historien: Some Considerations on Practice.” In *The Languages of Political Theory in Early-modern Europe*, edited by Anthony Pagden, 19-38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Pollack, Detlef. “Modifications in the religious Field of Central and Eastern Europe.” *European Societies* 3, No. 2 (2001): 135-165.

Pollack, Detlef and Gert Pickel. *The Vitality of Religion-Church Integration and Politics in Eastern and Western Europe in Comparison*. Frankfurt(Oder): Frankfurter Institut für Transformationsstudien, 2000.

Popov, Nebojša, ed. *The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis*. Budapest: CEU Press, 2000.

Popović, Nebojša A. *Slobodan Jovanović i Jugoslovenska država*. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2003.

Pribichevich, Stoyan. "Yugoslavia in the Balkans and Central Europe." *International Affairs* 21, No. 4 (Oct., 1945): 448-458.

Prlenda, Sandra. "Young, Religious and Radićal: The Croat Catholic Youth Organizations, 1922-1945." In *Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of Twentieth-Century Southeastern Europe*, edited by John Lampe and Mark Mazower, 82-109. Budapest, New York: CEU Press, 2004.

Radić, Radmila. *Država i verske zajednice: 1945-1970*. Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2002.

------. *Hilandar u državnoj politici kraljevine Srbije i Jugoslavije 1896-1970*. Belgrade, 1998.

------. *Narodna verovanja, religija i spiritizam u srpskom društvu 19. i u prvoj polovini 20. veka*. Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2009.

------. "Religion in a Multinational State: The Case of Yugoslavia." In *Yugoslavism: History of a Failed Idea*: *1918-1992*, edited by Dejan Djokić, PAGES. London: C. Hurst, 2003.

------. *Život u vremenima: Gavrilo Dožić, 1881-1950*. Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2006.

------. "The Church and the 'Serbian Question'." In *The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis*, ed. Nebojša Popov, 247-273. Budapest: CEU Press, 2000.

Ramet, Pedro, ed. *Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, c1988.

Ramet, Sabrina P. *Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture, and Religion in Yugoslavia*. Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1992.

Reinhard, Wolfgang. "Reformation, Counter-Reformation, and the Early Modern State: A Reassessment." *The Catholic Historical Review* LXXV, No.3 (July 1989): 383-404.

Riis, Carsten. *Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria*. Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs; New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.

Roudometof, Victor. *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans*. Series: Contributions to the study of world history; no. 89. Westport, CT; London: Greenwood Press, 2001.

Ruff , Mark Edward. "The Postmodern Challenge to the Secularization Thesis: A Critical Assessment." *SZRKG* (2005): 385-401.

Samerski, Stefan, ed. *Die Renaissance der Nationalpatrone: Erinnerungskulturen in Ostmitteleuropa im 20./21. Jahrhundert.* Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2007.

Schmitt, Carl. *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988.

Schulze Wessel, Martin, ed. *Nationalisierung der Religion und Sakralisierung der Nation im östlichen Europ.* Stuttgart: Steiner, 2006.

------, "Rechgläubigkeit und Gemeinschaft: Ekklesiologische und politische Bedeutungen des 'sobornost' Begriffs in Rußland." In *Baupläne der sichtbaren Kirche: Sprachliche Konzepte religiöser Vergemeinschaftung in Europa*, edited by Lucian Hölscher, 196-211. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2007.

Seton-Watson, Hugh. *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918-1941*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986.

Shemyakin, A. L. *Ideologiya Nikoly Pashitcha: Formirovaniye i evolyuciya, 1868-1981*. Moskva: Indrik, 1998.

Shkarovskiy, M.V. "Sozdaniye i deyatel'nost Khorvatskoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi v gody Vtoroy mirovoy voyny." *Vestnik Tserkovnoy Istorii* 3, No. 7 (2007): 221-262.

Šijaković, Bogoljub, ed. *Srspka teologija u dvadesetom veku: Istrazivacki problemi i rezultati*. Belgrade: Pravoslavni bogoslovski fakultet, 2007.

Šijaković, Bogoljub and Akelksandar Raković. *Univerzitet i srpska teologija: Istroijski i prosvetni kontekst osnivanja Pravoslavnog bogoslovskog fakulteta u Beogradu*. Belgrade: Pravoslavni bogoslovski fakultet, 2010.

Simić, Bojan. „Organizacija državne propagande na Balkanu tokom tridesetih godina XX veka: analiza slučaja Jugoslavije i Bugarske". *Tokovi Istorije*, 3 (2007): 132-146.

Slijepčević, Djoko. *Istorija Sprske Pravoslavne Crkve*, Vol. 1-3. Belgrade, 1991.

Smith, Anthony D. *Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Smith, Helmut Walser. *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology, Politics, 1870-1914*. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Stavrakakis, Yannis. "Religious Populism and Political Culture." *South European Society and Politics* 7, No. 3 (2003): 29-52.

Stöckl, Kristina. "The lesson of the revolution in Russian émigré theology and contemporary Orthodox thought." *Religion, State and Society* 4 (2007): 285-300.

------. "Modernity and Its Critique in Twentieth Century Russian Orthodox Thought." *Studies in East European Thought* 58, No. 4 (2007): 243-269.

Stojanović, Dubravka. *Srbija i Demokratija, 1903-1914: Istorijska Studija o "Zlatnom dobu srpske demokratije"*. Belgrade: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju, Čigoja, 2003.

Stokes, Gale. "Church and Class in Early Balkan Nationalism." *East European Quarterly* 13 (1979): 259-270.

------. *Legitimacy trough Liberalism: Vladimir Jovanovic and the Transformation of Serbian Politics.* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975.

------. *Politics as Development: The Emergence of Political Parties in Nineteenth-century Serbia*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1990.

Subotić, Dragan. *Episkop Nikolaj i Pravoslavni bogomoljački pokret*. Belgrade: Nova Iskra, 1996.

------. "Kleronacionalizam i pravoslavlje." *Marksistička misao* 1 (1987): 189-202.

Sugar, Peter F. *East European Nationalism, Politics and Religion*. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1999.

------. *Nationalism and Religion in the Balkans since the Nineteenth Century*. Seattle, WA: Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies. University of Washigton, 1996.

Suny, Ronald Grigor and Michael D. Kennedy, eds. *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002.

Šviker, J.H. *Politička istorija srba u Ugarskoj*. Novi Sad: Matica srpska, 1998.

Tal, Uriel. *Religion, Politics and Ideology in the Third Reich: Selected Essays*. London: Frank Cass, 2003.

Tchurkina I.V., ed. *Rol' religii v formirovanii yuzhnoslavyanskikh naciy*. Moscow: URSS, 1999.

Todorova, Maria. *Imagining the Balkans*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Tomasevich, Jozo. *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2001.

Trgovčević, Ljubinka. "The Enlightenment and the Beginnings of Modern Serbian Culture," *Balcanica* 37 (2006): 103-111.

------. *Naučnici Srbije i stvaranje jugoslovenske države: 1914-1920*. Belgrade: Narodna knjiga; Srpska književna zadruga, 1987.

Trencsenyi, Balazs, Dragos Petrescu and others, eds. *Nation-Building and Contested Identities: Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies*. Budapest, Iasi, 2001.

Turnock, David. *Eastern Europe: An Historical Geography, 1815-1945*. London: Routledge, 1989.

Valtchinova, Galina. *Balkanski yasnovitki i prorotchitsi ot XX vek.* Sofia, 2006.

Veer, Peter van der and Hartmut Lehmann, ed., *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Velikonja, Mitja. *Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina.* College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003.

Rajko Veselinović, "Ujedinjenje pokrainskih crkva i vaspostavljenje Srspke Patrijaršije." In *Sprska Pravoslavna Crkva 1920-1970: Spomenica o 50-godíšnjici vaspostavljanja Srpske Patriašije,* 13-35. Belgrade: Sveti arhijerejski sinod Srpske pravoslavne crkve, 1971.

Voegelin, E. *Political Religions*. Lewiston, NY, 1986.

Vucinich, Wayne. Review article of "Istorija Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve" by Djoko Slijepcević, *Slavic Review* 48, No. 3 (Autumn, 1989): 526.

Vukomanović, Milan. *Homo viator: religija i novo doba.* Belgrade: Čigoja štampa, 2008.

------. "Religious freedoms in Yugoslavia and the Relations between Religious Communities and the State." *Religion in Eastern Europe* 22, No. 1 (February 2002): 38-44.

------. "Srpska pravoslavna crkva izmedju tradicionalizma, konzervatizma i fundamentalizma." In *Istorija i sećanje*, edited byOlga Manojlović Pintar, 175-190. Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2006.

Vulpius, Ricarda. *Nationalisierung der Religion. Russifizierungspolitik und ukrainische Nationsbildung: 1860-1920*.Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2005.

Wachtel, Andrew B. *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998.

Warhola, James W. (James Walter). *Russian Orthodoxy and Political Culture Transformation*. Carl Beck papers in Russian and East European studies; no. 1006.
Pittsburgh: Center for Russian & East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1993.

Wheeler, Brett R. "Modernist Reenchantments I: From Liberalism to Aestheticized Politics." *The German Quarterly* 74, No. 3 (Summer, 2001): 223-236.

Woods, Roger. “The Radical Right: The ‘Conservative Revolutionaries’ in Germany.” In *The Nature of the Right: European and American Politics and Political Thought since 1789,* edited by Roger Eatwell, Noël O’Sullivan, 124-145. London: Pinter Publishers, 1989.

Wolff, R.J. and J.K. Hoensch, eds. *Catholics, the State and the European Radical Right 1919-1945*. Boudler: Colo, 1987.

Wortman, Richard S. *Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy*. Princeton 1995, 2000.

Živojinović, Dragoljub R. *Varvarstvo u ime Hristovo: prilozi za Magnum Crimen*. Belgrade: Nova knjiga, 1988.

Žutić, Nikola. *Kraljevina Jugoslavija i Vatikan: odnos jugoslovenske države i rimske crkve, 1918-1935.* Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 1994.

------. *Rimokatolička crkva i hrvatstvo od ilirske ideje do velikohrvatske realizacije, 1453-1941*. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1997.