Rethinking Legitimacy: Grassroots Climate Change Movements

By

Marta Irena Lis

Submitted to
Central European University
Department of Public Policy

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Public Policy

Supervisor: Professor Alex Fischer

Budapest, Hungary

2011

ABSTRACT

With increasing threat of climate change, grassroots climate change movements mushroom worldwide and demand a say in global policy making. Hence, there is a constant need to distinguish the movements that can be legitimate partners in climate change talks form the negligible ones. The puzzle one has to face is how to measure grassroots climate change movement's legitimacy – a concept rooted in the political science realm. Thus, the study develops a legitimacy assessment framework a tool to evaluate legitimacy of grassroots climate change movements as well as presents a case study of its application to 350.org.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Recently, climate change has became an increasingly urgent policy issue (Giddens 2009). Myriads of grassroots climate change movements and initiatives have begun to mushroom all over the world. Year 2009 and the United Nations Climate Conference COP15 in Copenhagen, has seen one of the greatest ever mobilizations of people demanding „fair" and „scientifically justified" climate treaty for the world. Thousands of participants from around the globe, united either in their local communities or through Internet's social websites, organized their own campaigns to influence decision makers to take political steps to limit carbon emissions. It was clearly visible then, in Copenhagen in 2009, that the debate on climate change has been shaped mainly by social movements (Jamison 2010) while political elites were reluctant to address the problem and the negotiations proved to be a fiasco. Jamison claims that climate change movements create a "social context, a space within the broader political culture" (Jamison 2010, 2) and thus open the international floor for environmental education, academic discussion on consequences of climate change and knowledge-making. This context was undoubtedly created in Copenhagen in December 2009 shortly before, during and after the COP15, called by some "the birth of a Global Climate Justice movement" (Vinthagen 2009) and "the biggest climate demonstration in the world history" with 100 000 participants on December 12th (Vinthagen 2009).

The protesters represented numerous climate movements, but were they really advocates of the masses that care about reversing the climate change or just a bunch of excited activists? How can one draw the movements that should be treated as serious stakeholders and listened to, that "make sense" or "have a right to be an do something in society" (Edwards 2000,20) in this case - significantly shape the world's climate policymaking, out of the ocean of negligible ones? The criterion to decide upon is legitimacy. This superficially simple term, however, creates much difficulty in its application. While it originates from the political science context and is more

1

easily applicable to research states actors, elected by particular constituencies they are accountable to, the utilization of legitimacy for climate change movements, especially grassroots – with vague organizational, management and recruitment structure – is far more challenging. Indeed, addressing the legitimacy of a state and its authorities implies considering such issues as "justice, correct procedure, representation, effectiveness and charisma" (Junne 2001,191) – criteria characteristic for hierarchical, top-down structures of states and substantially different from network-like grassroots initiatives.

The goal of this study is to face this challenge and address the puzzle, how to evaluate grassroots climate change movements legitimacy. This research bears some important practical implications. Not only is its goal to create one operational framework for grassroots climate change movements' legitimacy analysis that can be used by researchers; it also aims to provide the movements with a tool, specific arguments that may help them dismiss accusations against their legitimacy as important climate-policy-making stakeholders.

The issue of social movements itself has occupied minds of numerous researchers for several decades now. Many have focused on the structure of a movement and the way it has developed (Tilly2004, Della Porta 1999, Giugni et al.1999, Haunss 2007, Della Porta 2007) others dealt with institutionalization of social movements or political opportunity structures (Kitschelt 1986) essential to its emergence. The establishment of climate change movements can be traced back to the 1960's and 1970's when the global justice movement blossomed, the demand for "climate justice" was first raised and climate change identified as a problem that needs to be dealt within the political arena (Della Porta 2007, Jamison 2010, Engler 2009, Chwala 2009). Klein (2000) has labeled the global justice movement a "movement of movements" because of its scope and extremely broad field of interest.

Despite vast literature on social movements, little has been said so far on the issue of social movements' legitimacy, yet the concept is crucial to understand whether such movements can be regarded important policy actors. One reason for this partial negligence could be limited

2

understanding of 'politics' in relation to social movements. This 'politics' is often perceived very narrowly as real influence on a government's decisions and ,therefore, various actions that are not so spectacular but nevertheless contribute to a change in international agenda and lay grounds for a policy change are neglected (Wapner 2009, 226). As Wapner (2009) rightly notes, such behavior has considerable repercussions for social movements research as it restricts the research only to movements' influence on states, ignoring the fact that they are transnational political actors in the "world civic politics" (Wapner 2009, 227). Furthermore, as more and more 'global policy actors' and networks, as opposed to states, enter the policy-making arena (Stone 2008), there is a need to rethink the legitimacy granting principles, as the rules that could be applied successfully to the state actors, cannot specify legitimacy of transnational networks. Moreover, the rapidly developing communication technology makes it necessary to constantly scrutinize changes in the battle for legitimacy. Regularly updated communication means and devices provide unprecedented opportunities to secure legitimacy for initiatives stemming from the bottom of societies.

Having this all in mind, my research explores so far insufficiently investigated field of climate change movement's legitimacy and introduces a legitimacy assessment framework, a tool that allows to evaluate climate change movements in this respect. It is an important problem to address as frequently the greatest criticism and a prerequisite not to take social movements' claims seriously is their alleged lack of legitimacy. Hence the research has also some practical aspirations namely showing than climate change movements can indeed fulfill some necessary requirements to perceive them as legitimate and thus invite to the arena of policymaking. As Van Rooy summarizes it "the debate has a real impact on the way the world is governed" (2004, 3).

Chapter 1 takes a closer look at literature and assesses its usefulness for grassroots climate change movements' legitimacy debate as well as defines what is understood here as their legitimacy.

Chapter 2 introduces the Legitimacy Assessment Framework (LAF) – a tool comprising both input- and output-side legitimacy indicators together with their operationalizations. Moreover, it outlines the research methodology, indicates its caveats and ways to mitigate them.

Chapter 3 offers a practical application of the framework to legitimacy assessment of 350.org – a grassroots climate change movement that gained their momentum during the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Summit. The goal here, besides legitimacy evaluation, is to explore how the tool deals with the research and its advantages and drawbacks.

8

CHAPTER 1

STRUGGLING TO DEFINE LEGITIMACY

Alison Van Rooy describes non-governmental organizations as "elephants of international relations" (2004,1) - a zoological comparison, I believe, also applicable to international, grassroots climate change movements – "we deal with them because they are like elephants in your living room; you cannot *but* deal with them" (Van Rooy 2004,1, emphasis original). Furthermore, they act frequently as "800-pound gorillas" that are there to remind governments and policy makers to make *good* decisions (Van Rooy 2004,1). From this perspective, understanding the legitimacy of climate change movements seems crucial, especially in the face of urgent decisions that need to be made to mitigate the consequences of global warming. Nevertheless, in the policy making arena the problem of defining legitimacy is getting increasingly complex, especially if one needs to deal with emerging Global Civil Society and, by definition vaguely structured, grassroots movements. In this respect, distinguishing the movements that should be regarded as *elephants* and gorillas from little "ants" – is far more challenging. One should not be misled to perceive this issue only as a matter of size. The criterion upon which eligible partners to be included in policy making should be chosen is legitimacy. In this regard, it is not necessarily the size that confers legitimacy. Although legitimacy itself does not guarantee success, without it any achievement of grassroots movements "can be questioned and power eroded" (CIVICUS 2010, 11). These two dimensions of legitimacy – the fact that it is so debatable and so crucial (Van Rooy 2004, CIVICUS 2010) at the same time, makes it fundamental to make attempts to face the challenge of defining it.

The goal of this chapter is, therefore, before I move to proposing a legitimacy assessment framework, to review the understanding of legitimacy and its possible sources that can be found in the literature. It is essential as there is no single article that mentions all the important

legitimacy dimension in one place. Therefore, this review will act as a base of the tool that I will construct in Chapter 2. What I am looking at here are possible indicators that can be used to assess legitimacy of grassroots climate change movements that authors pointed out. The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, it outlines the debate about social movements illegitimacy. Secondly, it guides through various opinions on legitimacy and its possible bases. Finally, it makes clear what are the relationships between legitimacy and representation, accountability and transparency.

1.1 ILLEGITIMACY

Before we move on to defining legitimacy, let us briefly summarize the criticism pointing out its shortage among social movements. Indeed, instead of trying to advocate legitimacy of social movements, frequently, researchers and political actors choose to underline their illegitimacy (Edwards 2000). Hurd (in Adam et al. 2011,3) seems to go even further and questions any attempt to research legitimacy as "only a normative belief". Graner points out to the fact that social movements are not properly institutionalized and therefore "are not recognized as recurrent, widely diffused, and legitimate in society" (Garner 1997, 1). Moreover, they lack proper accountability and transparency. A recurring argument against social movements' legitimacy is their *democratic deficit* – the fact that their members are not legally elected representatives of the society, non-transparent decision-making procedures and lack of clarity to whom a movement is accountable to. Bond points out to yet another area of criticism, stressing the issue of representation or underrepresentation of a movement's constituencies,

"Is it safe to grant the mandate to change the world to unelected organizations which operate under the banner of democracy, but which answer only to their directors, fundholders or members, and are far less transparent than political parties?" (Bond in Van Rooy 2004, 2).

Assuming Bond skepticism is well-placed, it is important to mention Della Porta and Tarrow's comment – a hint how to mitigate it - that cooperation with international organizations equips movements in the capital they lack (besides funding) – "symbolic resource" i.e. "recognition of

their legitimacy" (2005, 6) that could make them an equal policy partner as opposed to "anarchists' travelling circus that goes from summit to summit" (Blair in Van Rooy 2004,3). Such a situation is particularly common when the mission of a movement is not massively popular in a domestic context, but still can get sufficient recognition internationally by gathering activists supporting the same goal. Legitimacy is seen as a *resource* that movements mobilize in order to achieve their objectives. From this perspective legitimacy needs to be gained in order for a social movement to succeed. Without legitimacy a social movement can be only perceived as a cohort of passionate activists enjoying contestation as a form of spending their spare time and would not be treated as a serious policy actor aiming to pursue serious goals.

1.2 LEGITIMACY DEFINITIONS

Vast literature on legitimacy frequently provides its indicators and sources only in political science context, usually referring to states and bureaucracies. Nevertheless, it seems crucial to review it, at least in general, and evaluate which of them will be applicable to grassroots climate change movements as well.

1.2.1 SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY

While discussing legitimacy one cannot avoid mentioning Max Weber as one of its pioneers. Weber distinguishes three sources of legitimacy of a "social order", "tradition, faith, enactment" (1978, 36). Firstly, it can be ascribed at the basis of routine and history (tradition); secondly, it may stem from affection, emotions or religious beliefs ("faith" or "value oriented faith" – focused on the "absolute"); and finally, "positive enactment that is believed to be legal" (1978, 36). Moreover, Weber defines legitimacy as "the probability that to a relevant degree the appropriate attitudes will exist, and the corresponding practical conduct ensue" (1978, 214). Legitimacy is a fundament of three types of authority proposed by Weber, "*rational, traditional and charismatic*" (1978, 215) and as such "confirms the position of the persons claiming authority and that it helps to determine the choice of means of its exercise" (1978, 214). Therefore, according

to him, any claims to legitimacy are "based" on "rational grounds" and thus, following of rules and legal procedures, "traditional grounds" or "established beliefs", and finally – charismatic ones – based on the individual character of a leader (Weber 1978, 215).

As regards legitimacy of grassroots climate change movements, out of the three types proposed by Weber the charismatic one seems the most applicable as they frequently have a respectable leader that is its *primus motor*. The rational one, on the other hand, appears less relevant as grassroots climate change movements are seldom institutionally structured. The traditional type of legitimacy, can however, be applicable to some extent but only after necessary adjustments. It not so much a matter of religion or traditional beliefs, but a movement with a meaningful history can claim greater legitimacy.

Charisma and a movement's history cannot be however, regarded sufficient and satisfactory indicators of legitimacy. One cannot forget, that climate change movements hold a specific goal they wish to reach. Hence it is crucial to differentiate the *legitimacy of the goals* - referring to whether the goal pursued by a movement is socially desired (Adam et al.2011). Useem and Zald (1982, 280), on the other hand point out to the importance of *legitimacy of numbers* or *legitimacy of means*. The first underlines the ability to mobilize as large group of committed supporters as possible – which translates directly into more legitimacy. The latter accentuates the capability to convince the movement's constituency of being the right channel to voice their concerns and apply appropriate means to do so (Useem and Zald 1982, 280). Furthering Useem and Zald's argument we could also distinguish the *legitimacy of outcomes* - an important source of legitimacy, nevertheless, for grassroots climate change movements and other social movements – very difficult to grasp. This base for gaining legitimacy seems to be the most questioned because, by nature, idealistic social movements, find it difficult to deliver the promised results (Coicaud and Heiskanen 2001). Additionally, the policy change demanded by social movements is a long-term endeavor and the real effect, be it success or failure, can be only assessed in the long-run.

Nevertheless, all the four categories, legitimacy of the goals, numbers, means and outcomes are applicable to assess grassroots climate change movements' legitimacy.

1.2.2 INPUT VERSUS OUTPUT LEGITIMACY

An important contribution to the legitimacy debate – that can help while creating a legitimacy assessment framework - is made by Scharpf (1999) and his *input-* and *output- oriented legitimacy* typology. Legitimacy, as a concept is dimensional rather that given (Scharpf 1999). Therefore, the input side comprises all the mechanisms needed to "translate the will of the people" (Adam et al. 2011, 4) into visible results measured by such indicators as "effectiveness" and "efficiency" (Scharpf 1999). Hence, the input and output side of legitimacy are inherently linked (Adam et al. 2011). As Scharpf states "legitimacy cannot be considered an all-or-nothing proposition. Input-oriented authenticity cannot mean spontaneous and unanimous approval, nor can output-oriented effectiveness be equated with omnipotence" (Scharpf 199, 26). Moreover, Scharpf makes other important observations. The necessary and sufficient condition for input-oriented legitimacy is for him "perception of range of *common interests* that is sufficiently broad and stable to justify institutional arrangements for collective action" (Scharpf 1999, 11). As a result "thick organismic identity" of constituencies is not essential for attaining input-oriented legitimacy meaning that lack of " primary or exclusive loyalty of members" does not constitute an obstacle in this respect (Scharpf 1999, 11). Hence, the output-oriented legitimacy also allows coexistence even conflicting "collective identities" (Scharpf 1999, 11). His argument has important implications for my study for several reasons. Firstly, it provides a practical advice always to research jointly input and output legitimacy – an approach I am going to adopt in Chapter 2. Secondly, he underlines a multi-stakeholder dimension of input legitimacy – a very important point while researching grassroots climate change movements whose constituencies are very heterogeneous and consist of both NGOs, individual activists, politicians etc.

Furthermore, a very useful approach to legitimacy assessment, on its input side, is its collective aspect accentuated by various authors (Scharpf 1999, Johnson 2004). Legitimacy is defined here as a *collective support by members* (Berger and Ridgeway in Johnson 2004) or "the degree of cultural support for an organization" (Meyer and Scott 1983, 201). Therefore, if a movement wants to prove its legitimacy, it has to provide some evidence of public approval (Melchett in Van Rooy 2004,71). Hence, the level of public support constitutes yet another useful indicator for grassroots climate change movements' legitimacy assessment.

1.2.3 PERCEPTION OF LEGITIMACY

While discussing input- and output legitimacy and its possible indicators, it is crucial mention Suchman's work (1995) who makes an important contribution to this debate. He defines legitimacy as "a *generalized perception* or an assumption that actions of an entity are desirable, proper and appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions" (Suchman 1995, 574, italics - ML). He accentuates that legitimacy is viewed as inherently collective process that should at least be *perceived* as consensus (as a real consensus has the same power of influence as the imagined one). This opinion seems to support a much earlier argument, raised by Max Weber (1978, 213), who also mentioned a "belief in legitimacy".

The above remark has some important implications – legitimacy as perception is a purely *subjective concept* and thus, a movement legitimate to some individual can be entirely illegitimate to others. Apart from providing the main argument for criticism for those denying legitimacy of social movements, it is may also have a reverse effect. Since legitimacy is a matter of perception, is "in the eye of beholder" (Adam et al. 2011) it can also be shaped and influenced. Moreover, if one adds the perception dimension to the previously stated possible legitimacy indicators i.e. charisma, history, numbers, means, goals, outcomes etc. we can reach a conclusion that in each and every of these dimensions perception plays a crucial role. Therefore, it is far less important whether a grassroots climate change movement's history, leader, mission is *really* legitimate (a

factual state that is almost impossible to prove), but whether it is *seen* as legitimate. Hence, a climate change movement "is" legitimate if it is perceived as such. Subsequently, any research focusing on climate change movements' legitimacy has to take account of this dimension.

Nevertheless, one important question remains unanswered, namely who should perceive a movement legitimate? Should it be stakeholders, governments, other important policy actors? Recalling the earlier stated arguments about collective aspect of legitimacy (Meyer and Scott 1983, Johnson 2004) we can conclude that a social movement is legitimate when it is *collectively perceived* as such. Moreover, I argue that despite the collective perception of its supporters, a movement's legitimacy can be also scientifically assessed by researchers using specially defined criteria and proxy indicators that will be developed in the Chapter 2 in the legitimacy assessment framework.

1.2.4 WHAT IS LEGITIMACY?

As we can see there are many possible sources of legitimacy, there is also a perception dimension that should be added to all of them. Nevertheless, for the sake of the argument and this research it seems insufficient just to state that a movement is legitimate if it is perceived as legitimate because such a definition could not go far beyond a simple tautology. Therefore, in this research I will use the following definition of legitimacy of Civil Society Organizations (CSO) proposed by Edwards, "Legitimacy is a sense that an organization is lawful, admissible and justified in its chosen course of action and therefore has the right to be and do something in society" (Edwards in CIVICUS 2010, 11). CIVICUS, the World Alliance for Civic Participation, gives a simplified version of the above definition in their guidelines, "an organization is legitimate if it makes sense, has respectable people, competence and knowledge of the topic" (CVICUS 2010, 12). Although, one can generally agree with the above definitions, a researcher should go further and scrutinize what it actually means that a movement or organization "makes sense" or "has a right to do something". Hence, in the struggle to operationalize legitimacy Brown (2000) is helpful with his typology of potential bases for legitimacy as seen for a Civil Society

Organization. He distinguishes the following, "compliance with regulations, association with other legitimate actors, demonstrated performance and expertise, political representation of constituents, embodiment of key values and close-fit with widely held cognitive expectations" (Brown 2000, 11). These criteria make it easier to understand now what is hidden behind the term *legitimacy.*

1.2.5 LEGITIMACY AND REPRESENTATION

Although the above guidelines shed some light on how to research and assess a movement's legitimacy, one important caveat needs to be raised relating to the "political representation" criterion. Indeed, legitimacy is sometimes mixed with representation. Therefore, it is important to make the distinction between these two terms. While legitimacy refers to "justification of actions", representation takes into account the interests of a particular group in the process of political decision-making and only few CSO claim to represent their members formally like trade unions. Nevertheless, as Rao and Naido (2004) put it "[t]his does not, however, diminish the legitimate right of CSO to bring citizens concerns into the public sphere". Indeed, as noted by Van Rooy (2004, 138), "Representation becomes an issue when garnering votes is the only legitimate way to entering the global arena; when voicing an opinion, votes matter less". Edwards and Zadek (2002), on the other hand point out to the circumstances at which representation constitutes an important criterion for legitimacy. They claim that while for voicing a concern, and thus exercising only a human right, representation is not a prerequisite; "negotiating a treaty" constitutes circumstances when "legitimacy through representation is essential" (13). As regards grassroots climate change movements especially in the view of Copenhagen Summit which main focus was actually negotiation of a new climate treaty, representation seems to have an important role. Therefore, although it should not be mixed with legitimacy, I suggest to treat is as an important, not sufficient though, indicator to be analyzed together with others.

1.2.6 LEGITIMACY VERSUS TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Apart from representation, there are two more terms frequently confused with legitimacy that need to be clarified, transparency and accountability. Similarly to representation, I will treat them as one of the many, necessary but not sufficient though, legitimacy indicators. How should one understand their connection to legitimacy? How are they interrelated? Following the CIVICUS (2010) guidelines, I will perceive legitimacy as a more general, overarching concept, as opposed to the transparency and accountability that should be exercised on a daily basis. Thus, while legitimacy is a *goal* that a movements wants to achieve, transparency and accountability are *means* of doing so. Recalling the Scharpf's (1999) distinction between output and input legitimacy, transparency and accountability could be found on both the input and output side as a movement can be accounted for both the procedures and outcomes (efficiency and effectiveness).

Accountability itself constitutes a serious problem for social movements as it is not clear they should be accountable to. For movements with some organizational structure, upward accountability - reporting to direct supervisors is understood *per se*; downward accountability - "to the people", on the other hand, is usually neglected despite its desirability (Van Rooy 2004, 73). Indeed, CSO frequently feel more accountable their donors rather than the constituencies they serve (Edwards and Hulme 1997). CIVICUS defines an organization as accountable on the basis of *possession of* "processes and tools of reporting, engagement, management and governance in place and in daily practice and/or it honors and follows sectoral codes" (2010, 12).

Transparency, on the other hand, refers to clear reporting on the funding and expenses, as well as the goals and means employed and dissemination of such information to the public. As noted by CIVICUS, "A transparent organization is understandable and clear to its own people, to its supporters, beneficiaries and stakeholders" (2010,10).

There is a linear connection between transparency, accountability and legitimacy as starting from transparency of what is being done and how a movement can achieve greater accountability and, as a result, be perceived more legitimate (CIVICUS 2010). A similar approach

is advised by Edwards and Hulme (in Van Rooy 2004, 75) who propose a joint transparency-accountability approach focusing on indicators to be incorporated in the legitimacy assessment framework,

"(1) a statement of goals, (2) transparency of decision-making and relationships, (3) honest reporting of what resources have been used and what has been achieved, (4) an appraisal process for the overseeing of authority(ies) to judge whether results are satisfactory, and (5) concrete mechanisms for holding to account (i.e. rewarding or penalizing) those responsible for performance (Edwards and Hulme in Van Rooy 2004, 75)".

All in all, both transparency and accountability are important aspects of legitimacy and as such should not be neglected in legitimacy research.

1.3 CONCLUSIONS

The chapter has shown that legitimacy is a complex issue and that there are many possible indicators that should be considered while assessing it. At the same time, the literature on legitimacy is disparate with no single volume providing extensive legitimacy assessment framework. Suchmans's (1995) observation that legitimacy is in fact a matter of perception seems to be remarkably fruitful in this respect. Indeed, as much as legitimacy is in the eye of the beholder, so is illegitimacy. Such a reasoning bears some practical implications – the borderline between legitimacy and illegitimacy is, in truth, a thin one. And therefore, at least theoretically, a change in a movements' perception can contribute a lot to its participation in a policy debate. In the following chapter I will analyze all the legitimacy indicators that can be useful in assessing a movements' legitimacy. Its goal is twofold, first to offer climate change movements researchers a ready-made tool that can be employed to legitimacy evaluation in all its aspects, secondly – it is for the grassroots movements themselves to provide them with arguments that can help mitigate claims of their illegitimacy.

CHAPTER 2

LEGITIMACY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

As shown in the previous chapter, various authors hold different views on legitimacy and its understanding. As a result, the definitions, possible sources and indicators of legitimacy are disparate and there is no comprehensive literature that assembles and analyzes them within one framework. "Legitimacy rules are moving targets, difficult to describe and pin down on a piece of paper" as noted by Alison Van Rooy (2004,63). Nevertheless, this chapter aims to face this challenge and pinpoint several legitimacy indicators that can be used to assess grassroots climate change movements' legitimacy. As mentioned in the previous chapter, input and output legitimacy are complementary and cannot be analyzed in separation (Scharpf 1999). Therefore, the goal is to create a legitimacy assessment framework (LAF) that has a practical dimension and takes into account both *input* and *output* legitimacy measures. The framework consists of numerous legitimacy sources, bases and characteristics that are mentioned in literature and Civil Society Organizations research, collected in one place. Hence, it is a complex tool and all its parts should be analyzed as a whole in order to get a real picture of a grassroots climate change movements' legitimacy. The framework will be used in Chapter 3 to assess legitimacy of a chosen grassroots climate change movement.

The chapter is structured in a way that helps to understand better how to assess particular dimensions of legitimacy using Scharpf's (1999) typology – on both the *input* and *output* side. It will enumerate the relevant legitimacy indicators and provide their operationalizations – in a form of proxy indicators. Consequently, the research methodology will be outlined. Finally, I focus on research's limitations and ways to mitigate them.

2.1 INPUT LEGITIMACY INDICATORS

As the input-side legitimacy indicators are prevalent and often serve as a precondition for a grassroots climate change movement creation, let us begin with them. At the same time it is essential to bear in mind Suchman's (1995) contribution to the legitimacy debate – the *perception* dimension. Nevertheless, saying simply that "legitimacy is in the eye of beholder" (Adam et al. 2011) does not constitute an argument that helps in practical analysis of the grassroots climate change movements' legitimacy. To achieve as objective as possible an assessment of legitimacy one needs to go further than that and create measures that will take this perception dimension into account, but nevertheless remain unbiased by a researcher's own opinions, therefore, allowing legitimacy comparison between different movements. Hence, I claim here that legitimacy is not only purely subjective concept which understanding is dependent on the assessors' view, but can to a certain extent be evaluated based on several criteria outlined below. The perception dimension proposed by Suchman (1999) is not neglected but instead constitutes an important element of the research methodology that is discussed at the end of the chapter.

2.1.1 LEADERSHIP

As pointed out earlier by Weber (1978) – a charismatic leader can be one of the sources of legitimacy. This feature of a leader is undoubtedly salient for a movement creation, nevertheless, charisma is insufficient criterion of a legitimate movement leadership. What is more substantial is competence, the level of professionalism and expertise a leader can demonstrate especially in the field of climate change. Furthermore, it is significant how much they are respected in the scientific and media world, what is their contribution to the field and the extent to which they are valued by scholarly and professional environment.

Hypothesis: The higher the expertise and professionalism of the leader, the higher a grassroots climate change movement's legitimacy.

Proxy indicators: measured in relation to the movement's mission, 1) leader's education and academic titles; 2) leader's working experience; 3) leader's publications (scholarly and media); 4) participation in conferences/media debates/research/advocacy institutions

2.1.2 THE GOAL

The goal of a movement, specified in its mission, is one of important units of analysis while assessing legitimacy. It is also its most visible characteristic. Most of the climate change movements aim to mitigate climate change, nevertheless, in a thorough study it is essential to look at the specific goals a movement has set forward. Hence, legitimacy evaluation in this respect needs to be twofold. Firstly, one should look at the mission of the movement – to what degree it pursues public goods that are of public (in this case global) interest and importance. Secondly, specific short-term goals need to be scrutinized as they constitute an important indicator for legitimacy as well.

Hypothesis1: The more important and universal the movement's mission, the higher its overall legitimacy.

Proxy indicators: 1) referrals of the mission to public (global) goods; 2) universality of the values on which the mission is grounded; 3) accentuation of the benefits for larger society; 4) confirmation of the goal's importance in international agreements/political agendas;

Hypothesis2: The more specific and practice-oriented the short-term goals, the higher the legitimacy.

Proxy indicators: 1) relevance of the goal to up-to-date international agendas; 2) specific goals set to target these agendas

2.1.3 REPRESENTATION

The criterion of representation refers partially to the collective support of a movement pointed out earlier (Scharpf 1999, Johnson 2004) not in terms of numbers, but rather in extent to

21

which interests of various groups are represented. Moreover, as climate change is by definition a global concern, any movement aspiring to be perceived a legitimate policy actor (for example by policy makers) should to certain extent satisfy the representation condition, thus, aiming to reach out to different constituencies, not only spatially, geographically differentiated but also include voices of diverse social layers and political views. A movement that has managed to achieve this can increase its legitimacy.

Hypothesis: The greater the representation of diverse constituencies, the greater the grassroots climate change movement's legitimacy.

Proxy indicators: 1) clarity of whom a movement represents; 2) support of diverse continents and countries; 3) gender representation; 4) diverse religions support; 5) support of the most vulnerable due to the climate change; 5) support of people of different political views

2.1.4 LEGITIMACY OF NUMBERS

Legitimacy of numbers is particularly crucial due to the fact that views of minorities – understood as scarce in number of supporters - are frequently perceived as illegitimate. Great number of supporters, on the other hand, is often regarded the most tangible and a sufficient condition for legitimacy, a source of considerable influence and "automatic credibility" (Van Rooy 2004, 64). Legitimacy of numbers (Useem and Zald 1987,280) is related to the representation principle, nonetheless, it is crucial to remember that a greater number of supporters does not necessarily imply increased representation.

In order to assess the legitimacy of numbers I use the typology proposed by Van Rooy (2004, 63) who distinguishes between the *volume, breadth* and *depth* of the membership.

2.1.4.1 The volume of membership

The volume of membership (Van Rooy 2004, 63) evaluates how many countries, individuals and organizational supporters (i.e. NGOs) are involved in a movement. In the case of

grassroots social movements it is also crucial to research whether there are any alliances with other movements pursuing similar goals.

Hypothesis: The larger the volume of membership, the bigger the legitimacy (a movement able to demonstrate larger number of supporters is more legitimate).

Proxy indicators: 1) number of countries involved as a share of all the countries; 2) number of supporters via social media; 3) number of supporting organizations and NGOs; 4) number of activities organized

2.1.4.2 Breadth, quality of membership (Van Rooy 2004, 64)

For a grassroots climate change movement not only is it important to have large number of supporters, but also *quality* supporters that represent ideally all the world. For this, as advised by Van Rooy (2004, 64) it is essential to ensure the global North-South balance. Moreover, comprehensiveness of membership should also take into account those who are potentially most vulnerable to climate change - as indicated by Slim "[a]n organization's most tangible form of legitimacy probably comes in the form of direct support of the people it seeks to help" (in Van Rooy 2004,64). Furthermore, what is necessary is proportionality of involvement of people from different continents, gender, religions, occupations and in case of NGOs – differentiated spectrum of their interests. Additionally, this criterion encompasses involvement of important figures from the show business, science and political scene. The difference between this criterion and the *representation* one is that the focus is put here on the actual numbers of diverse supporters not only their mere presence among the movements' protagonists.

Hypothesis: The higher the variance among supporters and their quality, the greater the legitimacy.

Proxy indicators: 1) variety of the types of bodies supporting the movement; 2) number political supporters; 3) outreach to religious communities; 4) outreach to environmental NGOs; 5)

outreach to famous people supporting the movement; 6) existence and the quality of a special support committee

2.1.4.3 Depth of membership – the commitment of members (Van Rooy 2004,68).

Neither the number nor the quality of different members involved can ensure full legitimacy without the protagonists' commitment. It is frequent that people support a movement on one-off basis, an activity easy via online tools. Beire (in Van Rooy 2004, 69) calls them "astroturf" and Van Rooy (2004,7) "pocketbook members" to underline that they cannot be considered committed supporters. Ideally, a movement wants to engage all types of people, including, the above mentioned. Nevertheless, constant engagement of movements' protagonists is crucial to increase their legitimacy. Such real involvement, therefore, includes fundraising and donations for the movement, spreading the mission of the movement as well as promotion of the cause in the media.

Hypothesis: The greater the involvement of the members and their commitment to the cause, the greater the movement's legitimacy.

Proxy indicators: 1) involvement of the same actors over time; 2) support exercised via different channels (including social media); 3) number and variety of private donations for the movement's activities, 4) number of active supporters (taking part in movement campaigns) in relation to "pocketbook members"

2.1.5 LEGITIMACY OF MEANS

The legitimacy of means criterion proposed by Useem and Zald (1995) refers to the mechanisms a movement employs to achieve its goals. Thus, as regards grassroots climate change movements, one can expect that they will have internal, sustainable, environmentally friendly policy and will exercise the principles they aim for on everyday basis. Furthermore, as indicated by Edwards (in CIVICUS 2010), a legitimate movement has to be "lawful" in a sense that it does

not operate against the law. As a result, in order to evaluate this dimension of legitimacy one has to scrutinize the movement policies and strategies in their relation to the movement's goal.

Hypothesis: The more coherent with the goal the strategies employed by a movement, the greater its legitimacy.

Proxy indicators: 1) the match between the movement's mission and strategy; 2) consistence of the internal policies with the goal – limiting the environmental impact and CO_2 emission; 3) legality of the movement's operations

2.1.6 EXPERTISE

Yet another form of increasing a movement's claims to legitimacy is its expertise and the know-how. This is significant especially in the field of climate change where conflicting data, predictions and forecasts are frequent. Expertise based on information accuracy and validity (Van Rooy 2004, 87) plays an important role in distinguishing the movements that should be taken seriously – and hence legitimate - and the remaining ones.

Hypothesis: The higher the expertise of a climate change movement, the greater its legitimacy.

Proxy indicators: 1) involvement of climate change experts within the movement; 2) the extent to which the scientific date constitute the grounds for the movement's mission; 3) using the scientific arguments in the movement's advocacy activities; 4) involvement of the movement in the training activities for the wider public; 5) publishing opinion/expert papers on climate change issues; 6) participation in climate change conferences, talks and debates

2.1.7 THE MOVEMENT'S HISTORY

A proven track record in the fight against climate change can account for higher legitimacy. If a movement proved to be successful in the past, their future activities may be perceived as more predictable, serious and, thus, enjoy higher public trust and support. Furthermore, a long-term commitment to one goal demonstrates its importance for the society

and for the movement. Additionally, as Van Rooy puts it, the history is a part of "experiential evidence" (2004,92) when several years of experience allow a movement "to speak legitimately" on the climate change issue (Van Rooy 2004, 92). "Experiential evidence" is something different, though, from expertise as it comes from the legitimacy of the grassroots rather than scientific world (Van Rooy 2004, 92).

<u>Hypothesis</u>: A proven track record in addressing climate change contributes to greater legitimacy of climate change movements.

<u>Proxy indicators:</u> 1) prior participation in climate change activities; 2) prior grassroots experience preferably on international, political level; 3) prior successful campaigns defined as tangible policy results or media coverage in variety of titles

2.1.8 NETWORKS – ASSOCIATION WITH OTHER LEGITIMATE ACTORS

As noted by Della Porta and Tarrow (2005,6) social movements that have deficiencies in legitimacy can associate with other organizations that enjoy higher legitimacy and, thus, be perceived as more legitimate. In this respect the more extensive the network of *important* and *respected* actors of a movement – the better. This criterion is very much related to the "quality of membership", nevertheless its analysis should have a different focus. One should be interested here in what types of legitimate networks a movement belongs to eg., scientific, political networks, climate change research, education groups or joint civil society platforms etc.

<u>Hypothesis</u>: The more extensive the network with other legitimate actors, the greater the legitimacy of a climate change movement.

<u>Proxy indicators:</u> 1) variety of types of networks a movement reach outs to; 2) association with NGOs dealing with environment and climate change; 3) accreditation to participate in climate change talks on international level; 4) association and cooperation with international organizations

2.1.9 Transparency

Transparency of a movement operations, as indicated in the earlier chapter, is an important component of legitimacy. The following proxy indicators for transparency are adapted from CIVICUS (2010).

Hypothesis: The greater transparency, the greater a climate change movement legitimacy.

Proxy indicators: clear, open communication on the movement's, 1) mission and goals; 2) members and supporters; 3) means and outcomes; 4) funding, fundraising and expenditure; 5) scientific expertise (CIVICUS 2010) as well as 6) clear decision-making; 7) various contact and inquiry possibilities; 8) open information sharing on the movement's website

2.1.10 Accountability

Accountability, as discussed on Chapter 1 as well, together with transparency is a significant legitimacy indicator.

Hypothesis: The greater the accountability, the greater legitimacy of a movement.

Proxy indicators: 1) clear decision-making body and structure with outline of responsibilities and duties; 2) mechanisms for "stakeholders' feedback" (CIVICUS 2010, 3) possibilities of supporters' engagement in altering the movement's mission, goals or means; 4) mechanisms of dealing with complaints and criticism; 5) reporting on organization's achievement/failures and funding

2.1.11 Financial, institutional austerity (Van Rooy 2004, 106)

Financial austerity can be referred to as "financial asceticism of activists involved" (106) in order to make sure that a movement's real goal is to fight climate change rather than earn money for their key supporters and staff. Additionally, the stress is placed on ensuring that the money from donations is spent on the mission of a movement.

Hypothesis: The greater the financial austerity of movements' cadre due to predominant spending of donations on the movements activities related to climate change mitigation, the greater their legitimacy

Proxy indicators: 1) evidence of small number of paid staff; 2) evidence of employing only the needed number of personnel, 3) financial statements as a proof of the predominant expenditure on the statutory goals

2.2 OUTPUT LEGITIMACY INDICATORS

On the other side of the legitimacy continuum as proposed by Scharpf (1999) there is output legitimacy with its two most significant indicators – efficiency and effectiveness. These two are, however, very difficult to achieve by grassroots climate change movements because the effects of their efforts can only be seen in the long-run. Yet another reason that compounds this difficulty are the ambiguities in defining success. Certainly for movements discussed here, mitigating climate change could be perceived as visible success. Unfortunately, such achievements are rarely feasible in the short-run. Moreover, while the output legitimacy is more important for the movements' protagonists, it is based on the input legitimacy indicators that movements will most likely be judged by the policy makers.

Nevertheless, it seems crucial for the complexity of LAF to point out several proxy indicators for movement "success" that can serve as a benchmark a movement can be challenged upon. One should, however, bear in mind that any attempt to construct a matrix of success measurement and thus having to deal with highly problematic indicators' selection cannot fully capture complexity of grassroots climate change movements operations. Furthermore, one must understand that performance assessment measures employed by different movements may "differ in their contribution to legitimacy" (Adam et al. 2011) as perceived by different stakeholders.

2.2.1 EFFICIENCY

Efficiency relates to cost-effective use of time and resources in the pursue of the goal of climate change movements.

Hypothesis: The greater the efficiency, the greater the legitimacy of climate change movements.

Proxy indicators: 1) timely and proper (in compliance with the goals) organization of advocacy events; 2) proper movement's management and dissemination; (in compliance with the mission and means); 3) high output per staff member – number of recruited supporters/NGOs in the region by the responsible person; 4) low costs/benefits ratio

2.2.2 EFFECTIVENESS

The question that needs to be answered while evaluating effectiveness is to what extent a movement can effectively meet its goals and deliver expected results.

Hypothesis: The higher the effectiveness, the higher the legitimacy of a movement.

Proxy indicators: 1) number of policy makers persuaded; 2) the extent of international media coverage during events; 3) number of official policy documents a movement or its message was included in; 4) high number or importance of international climate conferences attended as a consultative body; 5) number of supporters recruited within a given time frame; 6) the achievement of promised goals; 7) the speed of information on climate change dissemination worldwide

2.3 MEASUREMENT

A four-point scale will be used to evaluate particular proxy indicators with four being the highest and one – the lowest grade. The scale should be understood and applied as follows:

Scale	The degree of compliance,	Comments,
4	Strong	The scale measures the compliance with the proxy indicator, in case when a criterion is not applicable to a movement researched – one should evaluate it as "zero" and not include in further calculations.
3	Moderate	
2	Weak	
1	Very week or no	
0	No data	

The procedure of evaluating legitimacy within the framework proposed here involves the following steps,

1) Evaluation of particular proxy indicators for each of the main indicators on both input and output side

2) Calculating the average for each of the main indicators

3) Filling in the LAF matrix - presented in chapter 3 - to get general overview of a movement legitimacy

4) Including comments that may help in interpretation of the results

2.4 METHODOLOGY

Following Suchman's (1999) comments on the legitimacy perception, and acknowledging the fact that the perception of grassroots climate change movements is shaped predominantly by their communication tools (website and social media) as well as traditional media, I take the above mentioned as a unit for analysis for the LAF. Hence, the research of a movements legitimacy should include scrutinizing both the website of the movement together with all its communication channels (i.e. Facebook, Twitter, Wiki etc.) as well as its media coverage within a chosen time frame. In addition to the quantitative approach suggested here, the research should be accompanied by qualitative data with the focus on limitations in assessing particular proxy

indicators for legitimacy. As a result, a combination of these two complementary techniques will enable us to give the final assessment of a movement legitimacy.

2.5 CAVEATS

The framework, despite the attention devoted to its construction, may be impossible to use for several grassroots climate change movements that lack even a temporary management structure. If this is a case, however, one should try to identify the criteria from the LAF that could be nevertheless applied and based on them conduct legitimacy assessment regardless of initial limitations. Any attempt to challenge to evaluate the legitimacy of climate change movements is more beneficial than simply neglecting the problem from the onset. Yet another weakness of LAF stems from the obvious difficulties in evaluating a movement's success – through effectiveness and efficiency. In both of this indicators one needs to judge upon vague categories as "high number of" that are relative. What is "high number" for one movement may be negligible for the other. Nevertheless, LAF gives certain flexibility in this respect and can be used for both global and local movements – it just needs a case-specific benchmark the movements achievements could be measured upon.

2.6 CONCLUSIONS

The chapter has developed a tool for legitimacy assessment the Legitimacy Assessment Framework. It consists of several main indicators and proxy indicators essential to evaluate legitimacy of a grassroots climate change movement. The following chapter will focus on the practice of applying framework for analysis of one of such movements – 350.org. Its goal will be, despite 350.org's legitimacy evaluation, to further analyze the benefits and limitations of LAF and to create guidelines for its future use.

CHAPTER 3

LEGITIMACY ASSESSMENT OF 350.ORG

The previous chapter introduced the Legitimacy Assessment Framework and outlined the methodology of its application. The goal of this chapter is to evaluate the legitimacy of 350.org – a grassroots climate change movement as well as the framework itself.

350.org's mission is to "solve global climate crisis" (350.org). The core and main message of the movement is 350 ppm – the upper safe limit of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere that earth has to return to. 350.org was established by an environmental scientist and the author of one of the first books on global warming "The End of Nature", Bill McKibben. It has supporters and volunteers in 188 countries. 350.org's most meaningful campaign was 24.10.2009, International Day of Climate Action, named by CNN the "the most widespread day of action on global warming in world's history" (350.org) with a goal to include 350 ppm in the climate treaty discussed during Copenhagen Summit. Since then 350.org organizes one worldwide event a year and constantly develops its network of supporters.

3.1 CASE SELECTION AND THE UNIT OF ANALYZIS

The reasons why the 350.org movement has been selected for the research are manifold. Most importantly, it is a representative case for the grassroots climate change movements that mushroomed before the UN Climate Summit in Copenhagen 2009. Secondly, it is a grassroots initiative not supported by any institutional bodies or NGOs in its incubation period. Thirdly, it has quickly spread throughout the world, and transformed into a movement that authored one of the most recognized climate change campaigns in the history, in 2009, getting onto New York Times front page during its momentum. Although it gained certain recognition that other movements may not enjoy, its explicit features can only valuably contribute to the research that aims at evaluating the LAF tool as well.

The unit of analysis are the 350.org's activities in 2009 and 2010 as presented via following communication channels, the official movement's website http,//www.350.org, their Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and Wiki accounts http,//www.facebook.com/350.org, http,//wiki.350.org, http,//twitter.com/#!/350, http,//www.youtube.com/user/350org as well as the leader – Bill McKibben's personal website, http,//www.billmckibben.com.

To evaluate 350.org's legitimacy a content analysis of the above, with focus on the message communicated regarding all the LAF criteria was conducted.

3.2 THE RESEARCH OUTCOMES

To answer the question whether 350.org is legitimate and for the clarity of analysis I constructed a matrix with all the LAF criteria, that is provided in Table 1 at the end of this chapter. The table serves yet another function and is a ready-to-use tool for further research.

The overall results for 350.org are positive and the movement can be perceived as a legitimate policy actor due to high results in several legitimacy dimensions. It obtains impressive results for the legitimacy of the leader, goal, means, expertise, history and networks (in the Table 1categories 1,2,5,6,7,8 respectively), all of them being on the input side. As predicted, the outcomes of the output legitimacy indicators – effectiveness and efficiency evaluation (categories 12 and 13) are more ambiguous.

On the one hand, if benchmarked on other climate change movements, predominantly smaller and not so widespread, the results of 350.org look grand – achieving worldwide media coverage and getting with the message many corners of the globe only within a year's time is quite an achievement. If measured according to the previously set goals' attainment, however, the results are far from the supporters' expectations. In Copenhagen in 2009 due to a decision dead-lock no climate treaty was signed, let alone it including the 350 ppm threshold. Moreover, the Global Work Party in 2010 did not persuade international policy makers to "get to work" and "cut carbon emissions"(350.org). In this view, the widespread publicity gained by 350.org seems

only an interim target met. Hence, one could conclude that lack of spectacular policy outcomes, mainly due to high requirements towards local and international policy makers, disqualifies 350.org as a serious partner in the policy debate.

Low output legitimacy results (categories 12 and 13) do not, however, undermine the high scores on the input side. The contrary is true. While output indicators may be of higher importance for 350.org protagonists, the input ones are the basis on which a movement's legitimacy will be assessed by policy makers. Therefore, input indicators' strengths should be placed over output weaknesses. In this respect, the grounds to include 350.org in the climate change policy making are firm. High level of the expertise of the leader (category 1), together with critical global importance and recognition (category 2a), the means coherent with the 350.org mission (category 5), significant experience in climate change advocacy (category 6) and outreach to numerous networks (category 8) account for that. Moreover, the representation criterion (category 3) is fairly satisfied as despite the predominant support coming from North America, 350.org, nevertheless reaches out to all continents, genders and religions. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the numbers (category 4), although not as strong as the previous dimensions, shows that 350.org could be an important policy partner. The campaigns it organizes enjoy significant support, that jointly with the online "pocketbook members" account for a significant constituency.

The weakest parts of the evaluation, however, were transparency, accountability and financial austerity (categories 9,10, 11 respectively). The last category is difficult to research mainly due to the lack of transparency in funding of the movement. 350.org provides neither financial statements, nor list of donors and information on the campaign budget. Moreover, it is not clear who is paid staff and how the decision-making process goes. The same caveats refer to accountability (category 10). While there are numerous possibilities to give feedback on the events organized and means the movement pursues, its goals, the mechanism of dealing with complaints, despite diverse contact possibilities (eg. through social media) is not clear.

The overall assessment, nevertheless, is positive and 350.org, according to the majority of the criteria, can be regarded as a legitimate participant in the climate change policy debate.

3.3 THE TOOL ASSESSMENT

The framework provides a useful tool to face the challenge of assessing a grassroots climate change legitimacy. The detailed proxy indicators indeed facilitate the assessment and point out numerous important components of legitimacy. In this view, the framework can be used by movements themselves to show their strengths i.e. arguments for being regarded legitimate policy actors, as well as to self-assess weaknesses, areas of criticism, to be mitigated in the future and thus increase a movements' legitimacy. Moreover, standardized criteria allow comparisons of movements that have different claims for legitimacy but similar size.

Nevertheless, some problematic areas have been identified. Depending on movement analyzed, it may be difficult to study all the indicators due to its smaller scale or early stage of development. Hence, there is a possibility that out of four proxies one has data only on two. In such cases, however, one should try to diagnose as many as possible and based on the main eleven input indicators develop proxies that are applicable to the movements of a given scope and size. Moreover, especially while assessing output indicators, lack of data makes them impossible to evaluate. Therefore, effectiveness indicators should also be always analyzed based on feasibility criteria and taking into account precise movement targets and "political opportunity structures" (Kitschelt 1986). In sum, all the thirteen criteria of legitimacy in the framework are important and complementary. Thus, one should make sure that, as far as possible, all of them are included in analyzis both by researchers and movements themselves.

			Table 1	LEGITIMACY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK		
	Legitimacy indicators		**Proxy indicators**	**Assessment on the 1-4 scale**	**Comments**	**Average grade for the indicator**
Input legitimacy	1.Leadership	Bill McKibben	1) education & academic titles	4	Environmentalist, Guggenheim and Lyndhurst, American Academy of Arts and Sciences fellow, Schumann Distinguished Scholar at Middlebury College, several college honorary degrees	4
			2)working experience	4	Environmentalist and writer on climate, ecology –related issues	
			3)publications	4	Numerous books and scholarly articles; "The End of Nature", "Eaarth- Making a Life on a Tough New Planet", "Fight Global Warming Now", "Enough" etc.	
			4) participation in debates/research/advocacy bodies	4	More than ten appearances on talks and conferences monthly, earlier created the "Step it up'07' campaign – anti global warming demonstrations,	
	2. Goal "To solve the climate crisis" – by reducing the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere to 350 ppm.	a) Universality of the mission CEU eTD Collection	1) referrals to public/global goods	4	Security of the earth, surviving of humanity, safety for all the people,	4
			2) universality of values constituting the mission	4	Safe and secure future for earth and,thus, all the humanity	
			3) accentuation of benefits for larger society	4	Global benefits for all in the long-run,	
			4) support of the mission in international agreements	4	Climate change defined as one of the main global challenges in international documents	
		b) Specificity and practice-orientation	1) relevance to up-to-date international agendas	4	Focus on organizing events and advocacy during or directed towards UN Climate Conferences,	

					or country-specific problems eg. in USA	
			2) specificity of the goals to target these agendas	4	Precise goals set for the Copenhagen (2009) and Cancun (2010) UN Climate Summits	
	3. Representation		1) clarity of whom a movement represents	4	Yes, in principle all the people	3.84
			2)support of diverse continents and countries	4	188 out of 196 countries	
			3) gender balance	4	No discrimination in this respect	
			4)support of diverse religions	4	Yes, special "department" dealing with faith communities, support of various Protestant, Muslin, Catholic, Buddhist, Jewish communities, prayer brochures and climate-oriented religious events	
			5) support of the vulnerable due to the climate change	3	Yes, certain level of participation of communities from endangered regions but if all is not clear	
			6) support of people of different political views	4	Yes, united under the goal of fighting climate change, not a political organization	
Input legitimacy	4.Numbers	Volume of membership	1) number of countries supporting as a share of all countries	4	188 out of 196 countries	3.4
			2) number of supporters via social media	3	1147,753 Facebook "fans" of the official site; numerous local Facebook groups, Africa,5, Asia, 18, Europe 16, Latin America 17, Middle-East 7, Canada, 9, US, 44, Oceania 6 and 4 other (as of 01.06.2011 www.wiki.350.org), 19,300 followers on Twitter (01.06.2011), 140,688 views of official Youtube channel (03.06.2011)	
			3) number of organizations NGOs supporting	4	321 – a partial list from the official website (01.06.2011)	
			4) number of activities organized	4	On October 24.2009 –	

				International Day of Climate Action – 5,200 actions in 181 countries organized; 10.10.10 – over 7000 "work parties" organized worldwide to show policy makers they should "get to work"
Breadth of membership (quality of members and supporters)	1) variety of types of supporters		4	Faith communities, artists, photographers, business, youth, science, schools, NGOs, writers etc.
	2) outreach to political supporters		3	During the Climate conferences and the advocacy work, one of the main priorities of the movement
	3) outreach to faith communities		4	Yes, faith "department" dealing with increasing the support of religious communities
	4) outreach to environmental groups supporting		4	Yes, main collaborators on the local scale
	5) outreach to famous people supporting		3	There are numerous supporting but this is not broadly publicized by the movement,
	6) existence and quality of special support committee		3	"350 messengers" – of various backgrounds, scientific, religious, artistic, famous NGO, distinguished but not world-wide famous
Depth of membership (degree of involvement)	1) involvement of the same actors over time		4	The movement manages to keep high motivation for the cause among its supporters,
	2) support expressed via diverse channels (including social media)		4	Events supporting the cause registered on the official website, numerous local Facebook groups, Twitter account, Wiki site, Youtube sharing of the logo and banners on numerous private websites and blogs all over the world

		3) number and source-variety of private donations	0	No data available on the donations
		4) number of active supporters vs. "pocketbook members"	3	147,753 Facebook fans, 19,300 Twitter followers compared to 4,500 tweets (01.06.11), and 5,2000 events worldwide organized 24.10.09, More of the support expressed online, but the movement perceives this as the core activity – spreading the 350 ppm number all over the world
5.Means		1) the match between goals and strategies to achieve them	4	350.org persuades policy makers to cut carbon emissions by acting as an example, educating also the supporters to limit their carbon production
		2) consistency of internal policies with the goal	4	Policies to minimize environmental impact, compensation fees for plane flights, promotion of local food and resources
		3)legality of the movement's operations	4	The movement operates with the law
6.Expertise		1) involvement of climate change experts within the movement	4	Based on science and using experts' scientific knowledge
		2) influence of the scientific data on the movement's mission	4	The core of the movement is science behind 350 ppm
		3) usage of the scientific arguments in advocacy	4	In every activity
		4) involvement in training activities	4	Yes, creating a network of multipliers and campaign organizers worldwide
		5) publishing opinion/expert papers on climate change	4	Yes, numerous articles and policy papers written by the leader and supporters
		6) participation in talks/debates/conferences on climate change	4	Yes, on local and international level, UN summits, US energy policy debates,

The "4" values in the rightmost column appear for the 5.Means section and the 6.Expertise section.

	7. History		1) prior participation in climate change activities	4	Step it up 2007 - an event organized in the US convinced politicians (including senator Barack Obama) to sing the call to cut carbon by 80% by 2050.	4
			2) prior grassroots experience	4	Step it up 2007 and smaller events organized worldwide	
			3) prior successful campaigns (with tangible policy results or media coverage)	4	Step it up 2007, the International Day of Climate Action 2009 (5,2000 events worldwide), Global Work Party 2010 (7000 events worldwide),	
Input legitimacy	8. Networks		1) variety of types of networks a movement reach outs to	4	Faith communities, artists, NGOs, students, youth, scientists, business, cyclists, policy- makers, other environmental movements etc.	4
			2) association with NGOs dealing with climate change	4	Most of the organizations supporting are of environmental profile	
			3)accreditation to participate in international climate change talks	4	Participated in the most important UN Climate summits in Copenhagen 2009 and Cancun 2010	
			4) cooperation with international and intergovernmental organizations	4	UN	
	9.Transparency	clear, open communication on the movement's,	1) mission and goals	4	Yes, detailed	3.14
			2) members and supporters	3	Partial list of supporters on the official website	
			3) means and outcomes	4	Results presented openly via all the communication channels	
			4)funding, fundraising and expenditure	1	No information available on the sources of funding on the official website, no expenditures and fundraising reports	
			5) scientific expertise	4	The base for the movements' creation, great openness about it,	

		6)decision-making process	2	Not clear despite the "organizational structure" available on the website,	
		7)various contact/inquiry possibilities	4	Via the website and all the social media tools where 350.org is present	
		8) open access to information through www and online tools	2	Depending on what information is searched for, eg. data on funding is unavailable, difficult to find sound numeric data on the events organized in particular countries	
10. Accountability		1) clear decision-making body, structure and responsibilities and duties	3	Bill McKibben and the core team of workers' duties partially described on the website – the responsibilities divided by world regions or field of expertise	3
		2) mechanisms for "stakeholder's feedback"	4	Chance to give feedback on every event via social media tools	
		3) possibilities of supporters' involvement in altering the movement's mission, goals or means	4	As above	
		4) mechanisms of dealing with complaints	2	not clear, despite the "contact us" and feedback sections	
		5) reporting on movement successes/failures	4	Yes, according to the planned goals	
		6) reporting on funding	1	Not clear, almost no accountability in this respect	
11. Financial austerity	CEU eTD Collection	1) evidence of small number of paid staff	2	Not clear who belongs to the paid staff and if they are only people listed on the website as "the team"	2
		2) evidence of employing only the necessary personnel	2	Mentioned repeatedly that the movement is based on the help of volunteers,	
		3) financial statements as a proof of predominant expenditure on statutory goals	0	No financial statements	

	12. Efficiency		1) timely and proper (in compliance with the goals) organization of advocacy events	4	All the campaigns so far organized thoroughly and timely, in compliance with the goals and policy agendas	Impossible to assess as there is no data on the two proxies.
			2) proper movement's management (in compliance with the mission and means)	4	The movement develops searching for new means of expression	
			3) high output per staff member – number of recruited supporters/NGOs in the region by the responsible person	0	No precise data, a possibility to calculate the ratio but not clear whether only one person was responsible for the particular region	
			4) low costs/ benefits ratio	0	No data on finance	
Output legitimacy	13. Effectiveness	CEU eTD Collection	1) high number of policy makers persuaded;	0	No data	3.5 – needs to be evaluated on case-to-case basis, targets-wise
			2) great extent of international media coverage during events;	4	Especially during major events, 24.10.2010 – many front-page articles including New York Times, international and national TV stations	
			3) high number of official policy documents the movements or its message was included in	3	So far (2011) the number 350 ppm is quite widespread around the world and included in some policy documents – especially the ones of international organizations	
			4) high number or importance of international climate conferences attended as a consultative body;	4	The most important ones since the movement creation COP 14 in Poznań 2008, COP 15 in Copenhagen 2009 and COP 16 in Cancun, additionally smaller conferences are attended by 350.org representatives	
			5) high number of supporters recruited within a given time frame (2009-2010)	4	Several thousand supporters worldwide recruited in 2009 organized 5,200 events on 24.10.2009.	
			6) the achievement of promised goals;	2	The goals set for the Copenhagen	

					Summit - to have the 350 ppm included in the Climate Treaty turned out to be too optimistic, nevertheless smaller campaign goals are met	
			7) high speed of information on climate change dissemination worldwide;	4	Within a year 2009 350.org became an important player in the climate advocacy arena	

CONCLUSIONS

The need to address climate change issue is growing in importance. Consequently, many grassroots climate change movements demand their say during international conferences and there is a need to decide which of them are legitimate to participate in global climate policy making. Who are the "gorillas" and "ants" (Van Rooy 2004) on the global civil society scene? We have seen that legitimacy itself is not an easy concept to apply to grassroots climate change movements. Numerous legitimacy definitions and sources found in literature, however, enabled us to create a legitimacy assessment framework that account for both input and output legitimacy. Furthermore, for all the main indicators, proxies were developed together with the methodology of legitimacy assessment. The study leaves climate change researchers with a ready-to-use tool that with the necessary adjustments can be applied to an analyzis of other movements.

The framework created proved useful to operationalize and assess the legitimacy of 350.org – one of the most promising grassroots movements of recent years that has a chance to become a policy actor in this respect. Hence, the LAF can serve yet another purpose and provide movements with the arguments they lack to prove their legitimacy and be treated seriously. Indeed, 350.org has the expertise, certain level of representation and experience to speak for the rights of all the people to live a safe future. Additionally, several weaknesses were indicated during the study that 350.org could mitigate so they are seen more legitimate.

The framework proposed here is just a starting point in the debate over grassroots climate change movements' legitimacy. Further studies should try to develop and apply the LAF to a comparison of different movements competing to be included in the policy making. Moreover, it is important to aim towards a high level of specificity of assessment, and therefore, more indicators of legitimacy, could be developed.

All in all, the outcome of the study is that grassroots climate change movements' legitimacy can be evaluated based on specific criteria. Moreover, the assessment, if carried out by

the movements themselves, can give them arguments they can use to advocate for their greater

recognition in the global climate policy arena.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

350.org. http://www.350.org/ accessed 07.06.2011

Adam, Zinaida, Dora Deak, Marta Lis and Gorana Misic. *The Legitimacy of International Humanitarian Organizations: IFRC, IOM, FAO.* Term paper: International Policy Practice. Budapest: Central European University.

Brown, L. David.2008. *Creating Credibility. Legitimacy and Credibility for Transnational Civil Society.* USA: Kumarian Press

CIVICUS 2010. *Turning Principles into Practice. A Guide to Legitimacy, Transparency and Accountability.* http://www.civicus.org/news-and-resources/reports-and-publications/255-turning-principles-into-practice-a-guide-to-legitimacy-transparency-and-accountability Accessed 30.01.2011.

Coicaud, Jean-Marc and Veijo Heiskanen, eds.2001. *The Legitimacy of International Organizations.* New York: United NationsUniversity Press.

Chwala, Ambika. 2009. Climate Justice Movements Gather Strenght. *State of the World 2009.* Earthscan.

Della Porta, Donatella and Mario Diani. 1999. Social Movements. An Introduction. Blackwell Publishing.

Della Porta, Donatella and Sidney Tarrow. 2005. Transnational Protest and Global Activism. USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.

Della Porta Donatella, ed. 2007. *The Global Justice Movement: Transnational and Cross-national Perspectives.* Paradigm Publishers.

Edwards, Michael. 2000. *NGO rights and responsibilities: A new deal for global governance.* London: The Foreign Policy Centre.

Edwards, Michael and David Hulme. 1997. *NGO's, States and Donors: Too Close for Comfort?* Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Edwards, Michael and Simon Zadek. 2002. Governing the Provision of Global Public Goods: The Role and Legitimacy of Non-State Actors. In: Kaul, Inge,ed. 2003. *Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Engler, Mark. 2009. *The Climate Justice Movement Breaks Through.* http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/climate-action/the-climate-justice-movement-breaks-through accessed 20.01.2011.

Giddens, Anthony. 2009. *The Politics of Climate Change.* Cambridge: Polity.

Haunss, Sebastian. 2007. *Challenging Legitimacy: Repertoires of Contention, Political, Claims-Making, and Collective Action Frames.* In: A. Hurrelman, Steffen Schneider and Jens Steffek, eds. *Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics.*

Johnson, C., T. J. Dowd, and C. L. Ridgeway. 2006. Legitimacy as a social process. *Annual Review of Sociology* (32) 53-78.

Jamison, Andrew. 2010. Climate Change Knowledge and Social Movement Theory. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change.* (4)1, 811-823

Johnson, Cathryn, ed. 2004. *Legitimacy Process in Organizations.* Research in the Sociology of Organizations volume 22. Elsevier Science & Technology Books.

Junne, G.C.A., ed. 2001. *International organizations in a period of globalization: New (problems of) legitimacy*. Edited by J.-M. a. V. H. Coicaud, *The Legitimacy of International Organizations*. New York: The United Nations University

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1986. Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies. *British Journal of Political Science,*16.

Klein, Naomi. 2000. *No Logo: No Space, No Choice, No Jobs*. USA: Picador.

Meyer John W. and Scott W. Richard. 1983. *Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality*. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Rao, Aruna and Kumi Naidoo. The Evolving Politics of Global Civil Society Legitimacy. www.civicus.org/new/media/LTA_conceptoflta1.2.doc Accessed 30.01.2011.

Scharpf, Fritz Wilhelm. 1999. *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?* Oxford: University Press.

Suchman, Mark C. 1995. Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches. *Academy of Management Rewiev* (20)3, 571-610.

Stone, Diane. 2008. Global Public Policy, Transnational Policy Communities, and Their Networks. *The Policy Studies Journal* 36 (1):19-38.

Tilly, Charles. 2004. Social Movements 1768-2004. United States: Paradigm Publishers LLC.

Useem, Bert and Mayer N. Zald. 1982. From Pressure Groups to Social Movement : Efforts to Promote Use of Nuclear Power. *Social Problems,* 30 (2).

Weber, Max. 1978. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Van Rooy, Alison. 2004. *The Global Legitimacy Game*. Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan.

Vinthagen, Stellan. 2009. *The Birth of a Global Climate Justice Movement*. http://resistancestudies.org/?p=418 accessed 20.01.2011.

APPENDICES

THESIS PROJECT REPORT

The Copenhagen UN Climate Summit in 2009 showed clearly increasing claims of grassroots climate change movements to participate in the global climate policy debate. As a result, there is a need to decide which of the movements are legitimate to be included in the policymaking. Nevertheless, the concept of legitimacy is a complicated one, associated mainly with states and bureaucratic structures and difficult to apply to less-structured climate change movements. The legitimacy of a state and its authorities implies considering such issues as "justice, correct procedure, representation, effectiveness and charisma" (Junne 2001, 191), deciding what makes grassroots climate change movements legitimate representatives of people's interests causes more problems.

Unfortunately, vast social movement literature did not touch upon the issue of grassroots climate change movements sufficiently. Instead, it focused more on the structure their structure (Tilly2004, Della Porta 1999, Giugni et al.1999, Haunss 2007; Della Porta 2007) or political opportunity structures (Kitschelt 1986) essential to their emergence.

Social movements studies, as advised by Haunss should focus more on "legitimization" rather than legitimacy as it is more a process than a state (2007,172). The process of gaining legitimacy for social movements, according to Useem and Zald (1987,280) is twofold: it can be either "legitimacy of numbers" or "legitimacy of means". The first one underlines the ability to mobilize as large a group of committed supporters of a movement as possible – which translates directly into more legitimacy. The latter stresses the capability to convince the movement's "constituency" of being an "appropriate vehicle to achieve its goals" (Useem and Zald 1987, 280). While the above definitions, usually present in the literature on organizations stress the importance of collective support, an important point in the debate is made by Suchman who

defines legitimacy as "a generalized perception or an assumption that actions of an entity are desirable, proper and appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions" (Suchman 1995, 574).

The research

Having this all in mind, the research explored grassroots climate change movements' legitimacy, an important problem to address as frequently the greatest criticism and a prerequisite not to take social movement's claims seriously is their alleged lack of legitimacy.

Conceptualization:

Legitimacy will be understood here following Edwards: "an organization is legitimate if it makes sense, has respectable people, competence and knowledge of the topic (organizational curriculum vitae)" (Edwards in CIVICUS 2010, 11).

Operationalization:

Brown helps with operationalize legitimacy as "compliance with regulations, association with other legitimate actors, demonstrated performance and expertise, political representation of constituents, embodiment of key values and close-fit with widely held cognitive expectations" (Brown 2000, 11).

Research question:

Are grassroots climate change movements legitimate policy actors and why?

How is the process of legitimization of grassroots climate change movements shaped?

Hypotheses:

H1: Climate change movements are perceived as legitimate by their stakeholders --- they are legitimate

H0: Climate change movements are not perceived as legitimate by their stakeholders ---they are not legitimate

Methodology:

Chosen climate change movements' stakeholders will undergo a online-based, quantitative survey

THESIS PROPOSAL

The issue of legitimacy of grassroots climate change movements has not been sufficiently addressed. Nevertheless, as more and more 'global policy actors' and networks, as opposed to states, enter the policy-making arena (Stone 2008), there is a need to rethink the legitimacy granting principles, as the rules that could be applied successfully to the state actors, cannot specify legitimacy of transnational networks.

My study focuses on the determinants of legitimization in contemporary grassroots climate change movements that mushroomed before the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in December 2009. My research question is: Why should grassroots climate change movements be treated as legitimate policy actors?

Working theory: the movements' legitimacy depends on the strength of networks, their connectedness and professional and participatory resources (Diani and Della Porta 1999).

Reference list:

Della Porta, Donatella and Mario Diani. 1999. Social Movements. An Introduction.: Blackwell Publishing.

Stone, Diane. 2008. Global Public Policy, Transnational Policy Communities, and Their Networks. *The Policy Studies Journal* 36 (1):19-38.