INTEREST GROUPS AND CIVIL SOCIETY THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX OF THE WORLD ALLIANCE FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION (CIVICUS)

by

Ivan Pisarev

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Department of Political Science

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Principal supervisor: Carsten Schneider

Second supervisor: Alex Fischer

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Abstract

In my thesis, I analyze interest groups as a medium of lobbying and advocacy, which I distinguish based on the type of interest, private or public, that they represent. I review three theoretical frameworks of explanation of interest group politics, including pluralism, collective action theory and corporatism. I provide statistical analysis of three types of participation ("active membership", "passive membership" and "not belonging") on ten different types of the voluntary organizations from the data collected within the fifth wave of the World Values Survey, to see how they are impacted by the four dimensions ("structure", "environment", "values" and "impact") of the quality of the civil society from the data collected by the World Alliance for Citizen Participation (CIVICUS) within the Civil Society Index project. In the final part of my work I propose an Identity axis model that can be used as one of the explanations of functioning of interest groups.

Key words: interest groups, lobbying, advocacy, pluralism, collective action theory, corporatism, World Values Survey, CIVICUS Civil Society Index, Identity Axis model.

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Introduction

The political science scholarship of interest groups appears in the beginning of the twenties century, when the first book on the topic was written by Arthur Bentley (1908). After Bentley's first book many publications of a theoretical and empirical nature related to the topic of interest group politics were published with Truman (1958) and Olson (1971) being very important contributors, making the field of interest group politics one of the most prominent areas of contemporary political science.

Interest groups are the medium of interest representation, which constitutes my main research topic. Interest representation is very much similar to a two-faced Janus. Its dualism is causing a lot of ambiguity among academics and confusion among the general public. Both ambiguity and confusion are caused by the very nature of interest representation, which happens to exist in two forms, known as "advocacy" for the representation of public interests and "lobbying" for the representation of private interests.

Among the most influential theories and concepts that have been used by scholars to explain interest group politics are the following ones: Group theory, Pluralism, Corporatism, Collective action theory, Marxism, Realism, Multiculturalism, Feminism, Social Identity theory, and Constructivism, however only three of them will be analyzed in my thesis due to their very important contribution to understanding of interest representation.

My thesis contains four chapters, where I look at different dimensions of functioning of interest groups. My research question is *what characteristics of a civil society impact membership in organizations of my interest the most?*

The first chapter discusses different definitions and understandings of terminology relevant to my study, including interest representation, lobbying, advocacy and interest groups. All of these terms can be considered somewhat vague as they do not have universal agree-upon understanding neither in the academic literature nor in habitual understanding. These terms have gone through an evolution of their understanding by both scholars and the public. This is especially typical for the term "interest groups" as it still remains a matter of a highly disputed nature. Debates over the terminology, analyzed in this chapter, still continue to persist among the audiences that are involved into the interest group politics, including policymakers, academics, civil society practitioners and others. In this chapter, among the variety of definitions and understandings I choose the ones that seem to be the most appropriate for the analysis in further chapters of the thesis.

The first chapter also shows how lobbying and advocacy is regulated in different counties, two prime examples being the U.S. and the European Union. Currently the general practice among most of the states of the world is not to regulate lobbying and advocacy as there are only a dozen of countries that regulate their practice, however, the number of counties that introduces policies

on regulation is increasing, and this increase is becoming especially apparent in the recent decade. From the chapter, which speaks about different understandings of interest groups and terms related to them, I proceed to theoretical discussion in the second chapter.

The purpose of the second chapter is to identify a more plausible theoretical framework of my thesis. This chapter outlines the theoretic field in which the interest groups are studied, looking in details at three major theoretical approaches towards understanding of interest groups, including Pluralism, Collective action theory and Corporatism. These three approaches look at interest representation from different angles. While pluralism looks at it from the angle of inclusiveness of all interests into the interest group politics, collective action theory focuses predominantly at those groups membership in which is rational and should provide material benefits; corporatism on the other hand approaches the group politics from point of view of industrial or labor relations and focuses on such groups as trade unions. This chapter discusses all of these approaches separately, providing a designed subchapter to each of the theories, shows the evolution of thought within each theory, introduces major contributors to theory development and the criticism each of these theories confronted. Which of these three theories prove to be more plausible in explanation of interest groups' functioning among other things will be analyzed in the third chapter of the thesis.

In the third chapter of my thesis I hypothesize that there is an impact of the elements of the civil society on the membership of the voluntary organizations. I use two datasets to test this

hypothesis. I look at the influence of the four dimensions that characterize civil society ("structure", "environment", "values" and "impact") in accordance with the measurements of the Civil Society Index, created by the World Alliance for Citizen Participation, on the three levels of participation ("active membership", "passive membership" and "not belonging") in ten types of voluntary organizations, data for which was collected during the fifth wave of the World Values Survey. To test the hypothesis I use statistic methods of multivariate regression and factor analysis.

In the fourth chapter I am looking at interest groups politics from a point of view of an *Identity Axis model* that I propose. The idea behind the model is to visualize the identity of an average person with regard to her involvement into a group politics. This model is developed in the light of the pluralist perspective and includes participation in different groups that might exist in a society. The model features an axis with overlapping group memberships. This model is only applicable in the context of advocacy because it looks at interest representation from the perspective of representation of public interest.

The thesis is organized with this order of chapters because in the first chapter I introduce the more general field of interest representation by looking at how different scholars and practitioners approach the field. The second chapter provides a theory and literature overview of the matter of my interest, while the third chapter narrows down the topic to a narrower sub-field, the sub-field of membership of interest groups, the data on which is retrieved from the two statistic datasets that have collected information on different types of groups and levels of

participation within them. The last chapter generalizes the information provided in previous chapters in the form of a model that can be used to measure participation in different groups.

The field of interest group politics and interest representation attracted my academic interest because essentially those are groups, whose activities are the underlying foundation of politics. Those are groups that cooperate, compete or struggle with each other with the purpose of promotion of their interests. Plurality of interest groups in a society tends to reflect its complexity and allows different interests to be articulated and to be represented in a society. There historically has been, there are currently are, and there will be different social cleavages, which have caused a great diversity of people within a society, and this diversity manifests itself in groups. Those are groups that allow individuals promote their interests, as only within the groups people of similar interests can easier and more effectively promote their goals.

Chapter I. Basic knowledge, ideas and elements of interest representation

1.1. Defining interest representation, lobbying and advocacy, and interest groups

1.1.1. Defining interest representation

Interest representation, which is the basis of interest group politics, is very similar to a two-faced Janus. Its dualism is causing a lot of ambiguity among academics and confusion among the general public. Both ambiguity and confusion are caused by the very nature of interest representation, which happens to exist in two forms, known as "advocacy" and "lobbying".

Most of the people in the general public if asked about lobbying and advocacy would not be able to explain the essential differences between these two terms but might simplistically referrer to lobbying as to something that is "bad" and advocacy as to something that is "good". This notion comes out of an everyday life experience, when the media gives emotionally strong connotations of lobbying and provides a generally positive view on advocacy. This distinctive feature is making lobbying and advocacy oppose in the public discourse. However, it should be noted that advocacy is not simply a politically correct euphemism for lobbying, as some commentators in the media remark (Iyer 2010), (Hall 2004). Lobbying and advocacy are like two twin siblings, who both come out of the cradle of interest representation. Interest representation is called lobbying, when it comes to representation of private interests, and is called advocacy when it comes to representation of public interests (Andrews and Edwards 2004, 481). Throughout my

entire thesis I am going to adhere to this distinction between lobbying and advocacy based on the kind of interest, private or public, they represent.

Even though there are competing views on the two elements of the interest representation, there is agreement among scholars and researchers on its (1) complexity (Nownes 2006, 4), (2) public and academic confusion (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 174), and (3) inadequate perception as being somewhat illegal (Graziano 2001, 1). Along with many scholars of interest representation Luigi Graziano notes that "not infrequently confused with corruption lobbying practices have long been the source of misunderstanding and pre-justice" (Graziano 2001, 1). Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech point out, that "the word lobbying has seldom been used twice the same way by those studying the topic" (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 33). Schmitter in his corporatist approach to understanding of group politics suggests to use the term "interest intermediation" instead of "interest representation" (Schmitter et al. 1997, 13), which could be understood in a way that groups do not necessarily need to represent their interests, but need to intermediate them.

This vagueness presents a great methodological and conceptual challenge for many researchers in general and for me and for my thesis in particular, since it is difficult to communicate the same language across different publications on the topic of interest representation, as the terminology used for its communication is developed, but is used differently by different authors and at different instances.

While "interest representation" itself might sound quite self-explanatory even to the ear of people who are not related to political science, there is still a need to adequately define the difference between its two components, lobbying and advocacy, these two similar, yet differently used terms. The next two sub-chapters will be dealing with this task.

1.1.2. Defining lobbying

The scope of definitions of lobbying and advocacy becomes wider, as more literature becomes available in the area of interest representation studies. One can find all possible definitions, grouping them from narrow to wide, from very generic to institution-specific, from critical to acclaiming, from academic to the ones that could be used by general public, from objective to conspiracy-theoretic, and many others depending on the authors' personal bias on the issue.

Most of scholars agree that the term lobbying entered political vocabulary in the US under the presidency of Ulysses Grant (in office between 1869-1877) (Thomas 2004, 151) and some sources claim that it was first used in the Parliament of Great Britain (Jason Clemens 2010) as early as 1840. These are the two versions of origins of the term "lobbying" that migrate from publication to publication, from article to article that deal with the interest representation.

Collins Dictionary among other meanings gives the following definitions of lobbying: "(1) to attempt to influence (legislators, etc) in the formulation of policy; (2) to act in the manner of a lobbyist; (3) to apply pressure or influence for the passage of a bill, etc." (Collins 2011)

Stuart Thomson and Steve John in their book called "Public Affairs in Practice" see lobbying as "any action to influence the actions of the institutions of government. That means it covers all parts of central and local government and other public bodies [...]. Its scope includes legislation, regulatory and policy decisions, and negotiations on public sector or grants." (Thomson, John, and Mitchell 2007, 3) Luigi Graziano defines lobbying as "the various techniques and resources that enable the political representation of organized interests." (Graziano 2001, 1) The Institute of Public Relations (IPR), an authoritative institution on matters of lobbying, offers the following definition: "Lobbying is defined as the specific efforts to influence public decision-making either by pressing for change in policy or seeking to prevent such change. It consists of representations to [and/or policy relevant discussion with] any public office holder on any aspect of policy, or any measure implementing that policy, or any matter being considered, or which is likely to be considered by a public body". (IPR 1994, 1)

When it comes to definitions of lobbying in legislation, it becomes rather interesting to see how legal conditions affect definitions, and how these definitions differ from other, non-legal ones. For example, in "A Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995" the interest of American legislators goes beyond just an academic understanding, and the understanding of lobbying they provide in the Act is quite formal, which allows it to properly utilized for legal purposes. There is no single of definition of lobbying in the Act, however the term "lobbying" falls under two categories: lobbying activities and lobbying contact. The Act states the following: 'The term ''lobbying activities'' means lobbying contacts and efforts in support of such contacts, including preparation and planning activities, research and other background work that is intended, at the time it is performed, for use in contacts, and coordination with the lobbying activities of others".

(LDA-1995 1995) And ‘The term ‘‘lobbying contact’’ means “any oral or written communication (including an electronic communication) to a covered executive branch official or a covered legislative branch official that is made on behalf of a client […]” (LDA-1995 1995).

According to the National Conference of State Legislatures each of the American states currently employs its own definition of lobbying (NCSL 2010), which is not surprising considering that the United States is a federal state. Interestingly enough, in 1954 the state of Georgia gave the most radical definition of lobbying declaring it a crime. Not surprisingly such scholar as Belle Zeller reported (1954, 233) that no lobbyists were registered in this state. (Gray and Lowery 2002, 394)

In his book “Total lobbying: What lobbyists want (and how they try to get it)” Anthony Nownes further outlines three major types of lobbying: (1) public policy lobbying, (2) land use lobbying, (3) procurement lobbying. (Nownes 2006, 4) This list is probably not ultimate and other types of lobbying can be identified.

Even though “lobbying” is a term attracts much of negative connotations and controversies associated with it, it still remains “a central and legitimate part of the democratic process in all political systems.” (Chari, Murphy, and HOGAN 2007, 422) And this is the understanding, from which I will depart in my thesis.

1.1.3. Defining advocacy

The word advocacy initially derives from Latin "advocare", which translates into English as "coming to the aid of someone". (Reid 2000, 3) Collins Dictionary gives only one definition of advocacy as an “active support, especially of a cause.” (Collins 2011) Craig Jenkins in his “Non-profit Organizations and Policy Advocacy” defines advocacy as “any attempt to influence the decisions of an institutional elite on behalf of a collective interest’ (Jenkins 1987, 297), therefore, “an advocate” would be the “one who pleads the cause of another, is a voice for another”. (Caroll 1996, 215)

Even though scholars are aware of the origins of the term “lobbying”, referring either to the “British” or to the “American” versions of its appearance, there is still very little research done on the historic period that gave birth to the term “advocacy” in the way we understand it now. Many scholars agree that this term might have emerged in the middle of nineteenth century, when anti-slavery, women suffrage and labor rights causes were first promoted (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 2). There is an evidence in Kenneth Crawford’s book “Pressure Boys” (Crawford and Gale 1939) that in a historical period as early as almost 70 years ago, under an administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, there was no differentiation between “lobbying” and “advocacy”, and all of the interest group politics was simply labeled as “lobbying”. Crawford blends together both "the most powerful and best heeled food and drug lobbyists" and “lobbyists of the left” by calling them both “lobbyists”. Interestingly enough, the latter ones he describes as “able, sincere, and idealistic, but for all that, amateurs - no match for the lobbyists of business and industry”. (Zeller 1940, 135) There is no word of “advocacy” involved in Crawford’s text,

but rather "social lobby" is mentioned. Presumably, it took another 20 years to develop a new vocabulary for interest groups politics. Kenneth T. Andrews and Bob Edwards in their article on advocacy organizations in the American political process bring some more clarity of the use of the term "advocacy" as they speak of an "advocacy explosion" in the post-1960s period (Andrews and Edwards 2004, 479).

Issues of advocacy are quite diverse and differ depending on a region of the world, but the most common causes of advocacy internationally include environment protection, civil rights, sustainable development and conservation, women's rights and feminism, immigrant's rights, abortion, animals' rights, consumer protection, rights of indigenous nations, rights of lesbian, gay, and transgender (LGBT) people, and multiple others.

High-profile topics of advocacy vary depending on a country, what is typical for Australia (ozone layer and other environmental issues, issues of indigenous population) may differ from Canada (legal rights of gay couples, multiculturalism policies, campaigning finance), EU (pro/contra integration issues, institutional arrangements of the EU, migration, wars outside of Europe), Russia (police reform, civil society, NGO mobilization), or US (abortion, gun control, immigration, wars outside of the US).

Dara Z. Stolovitch outlines 4 general categories of advocacy issues: (1) universal issues, (2) majority issues, (3) disadvantaged-subgroup issues, and (4) advantaged-subgroup issues. (Strolovitch 2006, 89) To this definition of categories of advocacy issues one may add that the number of issues of advocacy is possibly unlimited, as at different stages of a development of a

society humankind faces new challenges and as over time human society gets more complex. On top of the categories of advocacy by the issues that are promoted, one can also outline several approaches to classification of both lobbying and advocacy based on certain criteria, which will be discussed in the next part of the thesis.

1.1.4. Classifications of lobbying and advocacy

Lobbying and advocacy exists in multiple forms, which makes their understanding more complicated. To help with understanding of both forms of interest representation it is reasonable to look at different ways of how they could be classified. By generalizing certain features of lobbying and advocacy it is possible to classify them in the following ways:

By levels of interest representation:

The following levels of interest representation deal with government and the public: local, state, national, and regional and global. (Reid 2000, 4) While a mainstream of scholarship of interest representation focuses on the national level lobbying and advocacy, there is also a straight of scholarship that addresses state level representation with scholars like Belle Zeller (1954), Sarah Morehouse (1981), Ronald Hrebenar and Clive Thomas (1992, 1993) being major contributors to the sub-field. Regional dimension of scholarship of lobbying and advocacy is relatively new as it appeared with the emergence of institutions of power within the EU and it continues to expand with the progress of Europeanization (more about it in the next sub-chapter). The literature on the global level is virtually non-existent, but apparently it will continue to develop with further global integration as it happened in the case of scholarship of lobbying and advocacy on the regional level.

By institutions, to which the interests are represented:

The classic understanding of lobbying and advocacy is an attempt to influence the (1) legislative branch of government, (2) executive to a larger extent and (3) juridical branches to a smaller extent. The legislative branch has the greatest amount of reasons for being lobbied and advocated at because it introduces new legislation, or amends the old one, because of a budgetary spending and procurement benefits.

By actors that represent interests:

'Oh behalf of' are the main three words that matter in advocacy and lobbying. Advocacy groups usually make an attempt to influence the government on behalf of some segment of a broader society, while business-interest lobbyists are acting 'on behalf' of their clients. While lobbyists generally look for the support of decision-makers directly, advocacy groups seek for the political support of a public through mobilization to change the discourse and afterward change legislation.

Unlike a narrow-issue representation of private interests by the means of lobbying, advocacy always requires a broad social basis and support. Quite often the notion of advocacy is all about the change of public discourse from anti- to pro-'something' position on certain issues or causes, which along with a change of public attitudes towards these problems finally changes the laws of a major social significance for the better or worth of the whole society.

When it comes to comparison of lobbying and advocacy the actors of both seem to have very asymmetrical positions: economic giants like Microsoft seem to be political dwarfs; and vice-versa: political interest groups like National Rifle Association in the United States (American pro-gun lobby) have a politically significant membership base, but do not have that much of financial resources compared to business corporations.

The fact that lobbying and advocacy are not distinguished and separate in consciousness of regulators, practitioners, researchers and the public could only tell of one thing: the phenomenon is still developing and is far from getting into its final rigid forms of existence, as its boundaries are still blurred.

What distinguishes understanding of interest representation (both lobbying and advocacy) is that it is very politicized; it is heavily politically loaded compared to other phenomenon studied by social sciences, and this has a negative impact both on its scholarly and public understanding. It only takes an article or two in a newspaper or a magazine to understand that societal judgment of this phenomenon is such that everything that involves lobbying is placed is a shady or grey area of public morality. The public understanding of the word "lobbyist" thus often might be similar to the word "politician" with given pejorative connotations to the bearer of its status. The situation with the understanding of both elements that constitute interest representation is not unique in this regard, as the medium of the lobbying and advocacy – interest groups – shares this common trait with them, as the next part of my thesis shows.

1.1.5. Defining interest groups

Like in the case of lobbying and advocacy, there is no general consensus among scholars about the definition of interest groups. Silke Friedrich argues that "some authors use the term broadly for any subset of voters who have similar socio-demographic characteristics, or similar beliefs, interests and policy preferences [, and others] define special interest groups as organizations that engage in political activities on behalf of their members. (Friedrich 2011, 37) Baumgartner and Leech point out that the research on interest groups remains in the area of "confusion" in the literature. (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 43)

"Interest groups" is a generic term used to name a phenomenon also known as "interests", "organized interests", "special interests", "special organized interests", "lobbies", "lobby groups", "advocacy groups", "voluntary associations", etc. Interest groups, different in their nature, are a basis for interest representation, which constitutes both lobbying and advocacy. There is no lobbying and advocacy, unless there are interest groups. Interest groups are communicators of an influence of a public cause or private interest, and advocacy and lobbying are the medium of such communication. Across the literature that is established in the field, there is no one single accepted term attached to the agency of group representation and no one single definition of this phenomenon of public life. However, in my thesis I will be using the term "interest groups" as it is the one that is most frequently used in both the academic literature and the public debate.

Encyclopedia Britannica defines interest groups as "any association of individuals or organizations, usually formally organized, that, on the basis of one or more shared concerns,

attempts to influence public policy in its favor." (Britannica 2011) Similarly to Britannica, Andrews and Edwards describe them as "voluntary associations independent of the political system that attempt to influence the government." (Andrews and Edwards 2004, 481)

James Madison, one of the earliest political philosophers who made an attempt to distinguish groups from the other political phenomenon in the Federalist paper no.10 calls them "factions". In his understanding a faction is "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." (Hesse and Johnson 1995, 31)

Within over a century-long tradition of scholarship of interest groups starting with Bentley (Bentley 1908) there has been a historical evolution of terminology referring to them, for their early scholars, as noted in the article by Kenneth Andrews and Bob Edwards (Andrews and Edwards 2004, 481), called them "special groups" (Dickinson 1930, 287) or "pressure groups" (Truman 1958), (Milbrath 1976). However, such terminology is no longer in frequent use among scholars, but is occasionally used in public discourse.

There are two major types of interest groups, public and private. Public interest groups promote a certain kind of cause with the significance and importance for an entire society, while private interest groups represent businesses or their associations with the goal of increasing their commercial benefits or promoting their industrial interests.

According to Chari et al, interest groups "may include those with economic interests (corporations), professional interests (trade unions or representatives of a professional society) and civil society interests (such as environmental groups). (Chari, Murphy, and HOGAN 2007, 422) There is a social understanding that most of the interest groups that are engaged in interest representation are business corporations, however this is not exactly so, for as Berry suggests, it does not seem that business interests are as dominant as they are thought to be. (Berry 1999, 6)

Another societal misunderstanding related to groups is that they are thought to be always active. Nownes negates this notion by saying "Clearly, groups and their lobbyists are, for most issues most of the time, relatively inactive. By relatively inactive, we mean that they are not active participants. Monitoring, because it is relatively inexpensive, is very common. Active advocacy, however, is much less common." (Nownes and Freeman 1998, 109) Even Olson builds his understanding of group politics on a presumption of activity of groups. To this Gray ironically notes that "Organizations never die in an Olsonian world; they just keep on piling up and undermining the economy. Anyone who has ever tried to keep a group alive knows that is far from reality." (Gray and Lowery 2002, 392)

Speaking of what keeps group together Streeck and Schmitter suggest that "[…] chiefs, notables, leaders, etc. desire the esteem of their followers, while the latter seek a sense of belonging to and participating in the group as such. Together they satisfy their mutual needs for a shared affective existence and a distinctive collective identity." (Streeck and Schmitter 1985, viii)

William Brown outlines three main characteristics of this kind of groups, as they:

(1) are voluntary associations of joiners […] either formal ones who sign up or informal supporters who routinely show up to assist their organization;

(2) have joiners who share common characteristics that define each organization's reason for existing;

(3) all have a public policy focus as […] they actively attempt to influence government, openly and with their members' consent (Browne 1998, 12).

While I strongly agree with the first two characteristics of interest groups suggested by Burstein, the last of the mentioned features is arguable, however, as not all interest groups attempt to influence government, even though some surely do. This could be exemplified by a variety of charity, orphan-support, sports, veteran, animal-protection and many other kinds of groups whose interests and activities are non-political in their nature and who do not try to influence the government per se.

Silke Friedrich speaks of the major function of interest groups' activities as to "inform policy makers, the public and their members." (Friedrich 2011, 37) Friedrich explains this notion by pointing to the fact that interest groups can be an important source of information for the policy-makers as they have the expertise on the issue they advocate, which the policy-makers do not.

Interest groups also can, but not always do play a role in the elections. Their role here becomes to provide recourses to parties and candidates. (Friedrich 2011, 37) At this point interest groups can become targets of severe criticism as by doing that they are claimed to buy access to politicians. In the United States the practice of electoral campaign contributions is regulated by

legislation on the Political Action Committees (PACs), a type of interest groups that focus on raising funds for parties and candidates during elections.

Streeck and Schmitter speak of criticism of interest groups by political scientists as they are regarded as a threat to liberal democracy, parliamentary rule and stale sovereignty as they colonize the state regulatory agencies (through so called "agency capture"). Economists, they point out see them as cartels and their actions as a major cause of inefficient, suboptimal resource allocation. (Streeck and Schmitter 1985, 4) While interest groups cause much criticism and many controversies among the academics and the public, one way to deal with these criticism and controversies is to regulate the activities of the interest groups, which is already done in some countries and is not done in many others. The next sub-chapter addresses this issue and shows how lobbying and advocacy can in fact be regulated.

1.2. Regulation of lobbying and advocacy

There are not so many countries in the world that regulate the practice of lobbying and advocacy. The need for lobbying regulation derives from "concerns over the democratic deficit, the openness and transparency of government, equality of access to public affairs, and the perceived need to manage information flows to and from governments" ((Chari, Murphy, and HOGAN 2007, 422) cited from (Greenwood and Thomas 1998)). The legislation on the issue of regulation varies from single articles in the codes of conduct of members of parliament and a simple registration of lobbyists in the parliament to fully dedicated laws that regulate lobbying and advocacy in a very detailed manner.

Chari, Hogan and Murphy refer to regulation of lobbying as to the "rules, which interest groups must follow when pursuing lobbying activity, including registering with the state before contact can be made with any public official." (Chari, Murphy, and HOGAN 2007, 422) The principal justification of regulation of lobbying activities is that it offers several advantages to the political system. These include "increased accountability and transparency, as well as diminishing loopholes in the system, which would otherwise allow for corrupt behavior." (Chari, Murphy, and HOGAN 2007, 422)

In their book "Regulating lobbying: a global comparison" (2010) Chari et al. argue that the practice of regulation of lobbying is more typical for liberal democracies and claim that the norm of most of the countries in the world is not to regulate this practice. The most extensive practice of regulation of lobbying exists in the United States (since 1935) and in the European Union (since 1996), however among the countries that also regulate it are Germany (since 1951), Canada (since 1989), Israel (1994), Georgia (since 1998), Hungary (since 2006), Lithuania (since 2001), Italy (since 2002 on the regional level in Regione Toscana), Poland (since 2005), Australia (since 2008), France (since 2009) and Mexico (since 2011). (Chari, Murphy, and HOGAN 2007) (Friedrich 2011) Even though the number of countries that regulate lobbying is not very large, it is still increasing, and this increase becomes more apparent in the last decade.

The United States, the country with the longest experience of regulation of interest representation, currently regulates it with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA), which requires registration and reporting of the information to the Senate Office of Public Records

every six month. According to the act, "a lobbyist is any individual who (1) receives compensation of USD 5,000 or more per six- month period, or makes expenditures of USD 20,000 or more per six-month period for lobbying, (2) who makes more than one lobbying contact, and (3) who spends 20 percent or more of his or her time over a six-month period on lobbying activities for an organization or a particular client" (Friedrich 2011, 38)

As was already mentioned earlier in this chapter, in the United States the practice of regulation of interest groups also includes their participation in the election campaigns in the form of Political Action Committees. They are usually organized to raise funds and recourses to support the party or the candidate. PACs both can contribute money and receive it from individual donors, however the are restricted to $5000 in giving to the candidates per elections, the same amount of money they can give and receive to/from other PACs per annum. The amount of money they can contribute to a party per year is limited to $15 000. (Friedrich 2011, 38)

LDA differentiates between the two types of registrants: (1) lobbying firms, whose representatives are hired by other organizations to promote their interests (so called "hired guns"), which are required to report on their lobbying revenues, and (2) in-house lobbyists, who represent only the interests of organizations, where they are employed (self-filling organizations), which are required to declare their spending on the in-house lobbying. (Friedrich 2011, 38)

In the European Union the system of regulation of interest representation was evolving around its major institutions. In 1996 the European Parliament adopts a system of mandatory lobbyist

registration, which registers all groups and their representatives, who receive a special entry pass to access the building of the Parliament. In 2008 the European Commission adopts a voluntary system of lobbyist registration in the database. This measure is intended to make the Commission more transparent and to allow the Commission find partners for the legislation development. (Friedrich 2011, 43)

What differs the European Union from other polities is that many national interest groups now prefer to represent their interests in Brussels. This process received a name of "Europeanization" of interest group activity. Annette Toeller estimates that from 40 to 80% of German legislation is now influenced by a European impulse. (Toeller 2010, 8) The explanation behind the Europeanization of group politics is that groups tend to come to where the decisions are made and the policy is enacted.

Silke Friedrich analyses the origins of the groups in the EU and concludes that larger states dominate the scene: "43.7 percent of all registered special interest groups are based in Germany, France or the UK. The Benelux groups benefit from their geographical proximity to the EU capital Brussels. With 14.7 percent of all registered special interest groups in the EU, these countries are overrepresented given their relative size. Organizations from Eastern Europe so far seem hesitant to enter the Brussels scene. Only 4.5 percent of organizations registered to lobby in the EU are from new EU states." (Friedrich 2011, 44)

Even though lobbying and advocacy are regulated to a different degree in different countries, there is no one single best system of its regulation. The United States have the longest history of

existence of a system of regulation of lobbying (since 1935), which some countries consider replicating. Yet, some authors (Woll 2006) (Friedrich 2011) suggest, that before these countries adopt new legislation on lobbying, it is important to evaluate how applicable the norms on lobbying regulation existing in the US and in other countries are to their own institutional arrangements and political system.

To summarize this chapter, one should say that interest representation, lobbying, advocacy and interest groups are fuzzy concepts due to the existence of multiple understandings of these phenomena of public life. The intent of this chapter was to clarify their definitions and understanding. While definitions and understanding might be widely debated by the members of the academia and the wider community, there should be a narrower scope of interpretations of these terms when it comes to the legal regulation of lobbying and advocacy. So far, only about a dozen of countries regulate them, but there is an obvious trend in the increase of countries that want to introduce regulatory practices, as the last sub-chapter of this chapter shows. To get a more clear understanding of interest representation it would be important not only to define them, but also to look at them from different theoretical perspectives, which I do in the following chapter.

Chapter II. Interest representation in the light of different political philosophies and concepts

This chapter of my work describes theoretical approaches towards understanding of interest representation and sheds light on the evolution of views on this topic since the first publications in the field were made. What makes the studies of evolution of political thought on interest groups ambiguous yet interesting, is the fact that quite often each author who has tried to explain something about them would rove from one political philosophy to the other without being classified as a representative of just one of them. This allows to consider them to be scholars of different, sometimes even competing political philosophies. Some outsiders of political science have also made their significant contributions to the field of interest groups. Allan Cigler makes a very meaningful observation on this issue, when he says: "Theoretical and methodological diversity is the hallmark of the interest group subfield." (Cigler 1991, 126)

It was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that groups were first discussed and described. Even though Plato and Aristotle have first described groups as the forms of cooperation of people to achieve their common goals, it was not until the pioneering publications of Bentley (1908) and his followers like Truman (1958), who developed an original Group theory, that a serious scholarship of interest representation started. Group theory later changed its name and found its further development within the school of "pluralism" (Gray and Lowery 2002, 395), and pluralism until now remains as one of the most prominent theories that explain interest representation and group politics. It was only when pluralism started to be associated

with interest representation, the Federalist papers written more than two centuries ago by James Madison in 1787 (Madison 1981) were revised and much of the interest politics in the United States was explained in pluralist terms. Schattschneider criticized pluralism from a realist perspective (1960), which also advanced the studies of groups. In a decade after that, Olson (1971) offered his economic explanation of functioning of interest groups through the theory of Collective action. Some short time after Olson, Schmitter (1979) brought to light the corporatist approach that helps explain the functioning of the peak associations in a society. However, in addition to these theoretical approaches, other approaches such as Marxism, Realism, Institutionalism, Multiculturalism, Feminism, Social Identity theory, and Constructivism have also touched upon the sub-field as they also deal with groups in their understanding of society and politics.

In Arthur Bentley's definition of groups, which in my opinion is valid even now, considering that it was given a century ago and considering how much new material was discovered and how many new observations were made about the groups with the progress of social sciences, they are "(a) an activity that (b) reflects or responds to some particular interests (c) over which there is conflict. The particular form the activity takes depends in part on (d) a 'habit background,' i.e., customary and conventional 'rules of the game' that give meaning to practices and vary from context to context." (LaVaque-Manty 2006, 7) It is perhaps because of the complex structure of interest groups representation that different aspects of it attract scholars, which belong to different political philosophies: while (a) fits well into Collective action theory, (b) - into pluralism, (c)- into realism, (d) goes well with institutionalism.

In this chapter of my thesis I analyze major theoretical approaches towards understanding of interest representation, which all play their important roles in the understanding of interest groups, for as Schattschneider has put it "political research is never better than the theory of politics on which it is based." (Schattschneider 1960, 133) Among many different theoretical approaches that are visible in the field, in details I will look at pluralism, collective action theory and corporatism.

2.1. Pluralism

The domain, where the scholarship of interest group originated and one of the domains where interest group politics was historically discussed the most is pluralism, which is both a descriptive and a normative philosophy of a democratic development of a society. John Gunnell speaks of a relation between pluralism and democracy, when he notes that "democracy could be defined in terms of pluralism and the process of group conflict and compromise." (Gunnell 1996, 253) One might also note that pluralism has been the dominant ideology of democracy in twentieth-century political science.

Pluralism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon of public life, as it has many understandings and interpretations. There are among others "cultural", "economic", "epistemological", "legal", "methodological", "religious", "scientific" forms of pluralism to name the main ones, however the one form of pluralism I have the greatest interest in my thesis is the *pluralism of interest groups*.

There are two branches of pluralist thought in political science. The first one, which most of the pluralists focus on is approaching the government as the *arena*, where different groups aspire to get into power positions, while the second one looks at groups that are involved in the balancing process that operates outside of government, in which government acts as an *umpire* rather than a participant by establishing rules for conflict resolution. (Connolly, Chambers, and Carver 2008, 18) The second understanding of pluralism, which involves interaction of different interest groups, lies in the center of interest of my thesis.

Historically according to Allan Cigler, pluralism [of interest groups] emerged "[…] in the immediate post-World War II era. [Then] pluralism was the dominant view among students of interest groups." (Cigler 1991, 101) However, even before that pluralism of interest groups was approached by James Madison and started its theoretical development in the form of Group theory with its leading authors such as Bentley (1908) and Truman (1958).

One of the earliest pluralist thinkers was James Madison, who has established a so-called Madisonian model of democracy in the United States based on pluralist principles. Representative government, Madison claimed, would refine and consolidate interests, but the principal achievement would be the proliferation of parties and interests. (Gunnell 1996, 255) Madison at his time challenged the idea of social homogeneity. In his view associations of individuals should have a greater political influence on a society and should neither be limited nor controlled by the government. According to Philippe C. Schmitter, it is Madison's idea that "if interests could not be simplified or homogenized it was better to let them multiply than to suppress them." (Schmitter 2005, 4) Madison gives definition of what today we would call an

"interest group", but then was called "a faction of a society", which was made out of "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the right of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." (Madison 1981) In the Federalist paper #10 Madison warned not only "to guard the society against the oppression of rulers; but to guard one part of society against the injustice of the other part." (Madison 1981)

Arthur Bentley, an author and proponent of a Group theory, first introduced scholarly understanding of interest groups over a century ago. With his "Process of Government" first published in 1908, a book, which has recently celebrated its 100th anniversary, Bentley introduces the notion of groups in a political process in a way we now understand them. In his idea it is groups', not individuals' interests that matter in politics. Bentley does not reduce group activities to the aggregation of personal interests of separate individuals. To Bentley groups define everything in politics: "The great task in the study of any form of social life is the analysis of these groups. When the groups are adequately stated, everything is stated." (cited from page 208 of the 2008 printing of the (Bentley 1908)) Bentley offers a holistic approach in his concept, which was later criticized by both proponents (Truman 1958) and opponents (Schattschneider 1960) of his idea as he tends to think that his idea of groups explains everything in politics.

On the issue of formation of groups Bentley notices that it is the "underlying interest", which causes them. Mika LaVaque-Manty interprets this idea of Bentley the following way: "A collection of people can acquire an interest because someone else treats the collection in some particular way, often using some particular attribute as the relevant marker." (LaVaque-Manty

2006, 8) In this approach no group can speak for "everyone's common interest" in a society for if the interests had not been articulated and differentiated, there would be no reason to speak about them. LaVaque-Manty confirms Bentley's thought by saying that what is making a group political are shared attributes, which "are meaningful insofar as they become the markers of some underlying interest." (LaVaque-Manty 2006, 8) Even though Bentley is a holist in his understanding of the significance of groups for politics, he and later Truman are far from being holists on the issue of shared universal interests of the entire population, as they reject an existence of a common interest of all the people, which was later challenged by many scholars of a collective good.

In the beginning of the 1940s the attitudes towards groups were changing as the scholars were starting to see "the pressure groups" not as a societal evil, but rather as "the modern expression of democracy by the people and for the people." (Dillon 1942, 481) The whole paradigm started to change, which attracted more attention to groups in political science.

The Bentlean tradition of pressure groups was continued by Truman (Truman 1958) who was able to modify it in such a way that it would become more relevant to reality by replacing the concept of "pressure groups" with a concept of "interest groups", a name currently used in regards to this most important unit of an analysis in interest politics. To him, the term "interest group" refers to any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes." (Truman 1958, 33)

Bentley and Truman in their works differ in the matters they focus on: Bentley seems to be more theoretical, while Truman shows himself to be more empirical in the study of groups. As it has been intelligently observed by LaVaque-Manty: "However inappropriate the analogy might seem, we can think of Truman as a Lenin to Bentley's Marx in the following sense. Where the general theorist leaves important questions of practical application unanswered, the practical theorist—for Truman is both a theorist and an empiricist—addresses those questions." (LaVaque-Manty 2006, 11)

On the account of addressing more detailed questions, Truman divides groups into more simplistic categories of analysis by introducing the idea of "organized" and "potential" interest groups (Truman 1958, 502). This division is particularly important from the two standpoints: (1) to define the stage of development of groups, which at a certain point come to a need to organize, and (2) from a standpoint of distinguishing between those groups, which mobilize and which do not. However with the later discoveries on the issue of groups the term "potential" was replaced with the term "latent" as it clearer defines the organizational status of groups. Truman goes deeper by distinguishing such sociological characteristics as race, sex, and demographic and other features as collections of people, which can be at different cases seen as those, which might emerge as interest groups, which he names as "categoric groups". (Truman 1958)

Few years before Truman's book (1958) on groups was politics published, Earl Latham in his book "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory" (1952) looks at emerging empirical evidence of pluralist development of groups in a society, and it was that very book, where he has proposed to divide the entire body of pluralist thinkers into "philosophic" and "analytical"

subgroups. He defines the differences between the two in this fashion: philosophical pluralists "described the group basis of society and then either erected Utopia upon this foundation or employed the insight to rationalize prejudged social and economic reforms. They intermingled wish and fact, and may indeed have been led to the second by the intensity of the first. Some support for this view is supplied by the evidence that writers like Laski, once pluralists, abandoned the doctrine and worked with more authoritarian modes of social reform, ignoring the fact when it seemed no longer to suit the hope. […] The philosophic pluralists accepted the group basis of society, but failed to investigate its forms, mutations, and permutations in a scientific spirit" (Latham 1952, 380). In Latham's thinking those would be "analytical" pluralists, who would resolve the problem of excessiveness of philosophical pluralists' normative approach, for they are "investigators since they deal with the plurality of observed group forms, but they are concerned less with prejudged programs of social and economic reform than with the accurate investigation and description of the many phenomena connected with the activities of groups in society". (Latham 1952, 380) To Latham, analytical pluralists are the people who deal with the structure and the process of formation of groups as they appear.

The economist Mancur Olson, unlike other scholars mentioned above looks at pluralism as a political philosophy, which deals with interest groups only tangentially. He notes that pluralism "is the political philosophy which argues that private association of all kinds, and especially labor unions, churches, and cooperatives, should have a larger constitutional role in society, and that the state should not have an unlimited control over the plurality of the private associations." (Olson 1971, 11) In his understanding pluralism "tends to create a mood favorable to pressure groups (even though that is not its principle purpose) primarily because it emphasizes the

spontaneity, the liberty, and the voluntary quality of the private association in contrast with the compulsory, coercive character of the state." (Olson 1971, 112) To illustrate this Olson sites Francis Coker's notion that "the pluralist regards these [voluntary associations]… as implying respect for the independence and imitative of 'spontaneous' economic, professional, and local groups which correspond to 'natural' unities of interest and function." (Olson 1971, 112)

One of the later major contributors to the field of pluralist thought is William E. Connelly. According to Samuel A. Chambers and Terry Carver, Connolly's work "utterly transformed the terrain by helping to re-signify pluralism: from a conservative theory of order based on the status quo into a radical theory of democratic contestation based on progressive political vision." (Connolly, Chambers, and Carver 2008, 4). In a different book, Connelly himself speaks of pluralism in a similar fashion:

> […] reflection on the politics of identity and difference eventually points to a rethinking of democratic theory. For if democracy is a medium through which difference can establish space for itself as alter-identity, it is also a means by which the dogmatization of identity can be politically legitimized. The point of critical reflection here is to introduce another competitor onto the field of contestation covered by the names "democracy" and "democratic theory", to modify the established terms of debate so that certain virtues of democracy underappreciated in alternative conceptions can be brought to the foreground. (Connolly 2002, x)

In addition to his arguments on pluralism, Connolly also argues for a new model of democracy, which he refers to as "an agonistic democracy". This model is based on the concept of pluralism of identities and groups. It is possible to notice some similarities between "agonistic democracy" and "deliberative democracy" advocated by Habermas and Rawls. However, what is important for interest groups politics scholars is that Connolly relates his vision of democracy to identity. For him an "agonistic democracy" is "[…] a practice that affirms the indispensability of identity

to life, disturbs the dogmatization of identity, and folds care for the protean diversity of human life into the strife and interdependence of identity\difference." (Connolly 2002, x)

In the field of pluralism several dimensions can be identified: (1) pluralism as scientific view of politics, (2) pluralism, or plurality of groups, as a state of affairs in a society, and (3) pluralization, as multiplication of groups. Connolly looks at the first two dimensions, but on top of that he also strives at the third one as a goal. Samuel Chambers and Terrell Carver, who co-authored "William E. Connolly: Democracy, Pluralism and Political Theory" (2008) together with Connolly himself, in the introduction to the book point out to Connolly's vision of pluralization in the following words: "Not since James Madison's Federalist no.10 has an American political thinker made such an important argument for what Madison called 'the multiplication of factions'". (Connolly, Chambers, and Carver 2008, 4) This implies a very important argument: the more interest groups in the society there are, the better.

Pluralism in Connolly's vision creates "a balance of power among overlapping economic, religious, ethnic, and geographical groupings. Each "group" has some voice in shaping socially binding decisions: each constrains and is constrained through the processes of mutual group adjustment; and all major groups share a broad system of beliefs and values which encourages conflict to proceed within established channels and allows initial disagreements to dissolve into compromise solutions." (Connolly, Chambers, and Carver 2008, 15) In Connolly's vision individual's active participation in group's life, according to Connolly, lets her develop among other things a sense of purpose, which makes her a fully developed personality. An access to multitude of these groups allows her develop a diversity of interests. Thus, society in its entirety benefits from pluralism as multiple groups assure that most important conflicts are address at the

government arena for a debate and resolution. Involvement of individuals into groups provides them with a stake in a society and helps establish the loyalties that are required for a stable regime with the least amount of coercion. If this kind of stability were promoted in the long run, then the public policy outcomes would tend to reflect the balance of powers of groups within a society.

No matter how positive to a society the benefits of pluralist approaches to democracy might seem, this political philosophy has been criticized for its limitations. The most famous of the critiques is the well-known classical "elitist" Schattschneiderian argument against pluralism. Schattschneider's major concern was that interest representation system in a pluralist society is arranged in such a way that those who are organized tend to be better off, as the higher segments of a society are the ones represented the most in politics. Schattschneider expressed this notion in his very famous statement: "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent." (Schattschneider 1960, 35) In his book "Identity\ difference: Democratic negotiations of political paradox" (2002) Connolly is also critical of this "strong upper-class accent", but he provides his own solution to the problem: "Drives to expand diversity in the domains of gender, faith, ethnicity, and sexual affiliation can also be stymied by claiming that these are luxuries only the affluent care about. To lift up the bottom economic tier would be to diminish the force of these arguments." (Connolly 2002, xxv) On the next page of his book he adds, "I contend that programs with the best chance to reduce economic inequality are those that support the economic security of the large middle class." (Connolly 2002, xxiv) Thus, it could be inferred that by lifting up the economic well-being of a social groups more of them can be integrated into the pluralist politics and more of them can gain the "pluralist" accent.

However, even though pluralism has faults it is criticized for in the literature, it still remains the core framework of scholarly interest group politics discussions. In my thesis I will refer to pluralism both as a political concept (Chapter II) and as a state of existence of the plurality of groups (Chapter IV).

2.2. Collective action theory

1960s marked a new period of studies of interest groups as it was probably the most fruitful time for emergence of new ideas related to them: quite a few influential and well-established books and articles, which are now considered classical in the field, were published then. It was not until 1965 however that a new breakthrough theory emerged in the field of studies of groups with the first publication (1965) of Mancur Olson's book "The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups" (Olson 1971), which provided political scientists with a new understanding of functioning of interest groups. Collective action theory offered by Olson has produces such a strong impact on studies of politics that the President of American Political Science Association Elinor Ostrom in her presidential speech in 1997 called it "the central subject of political science." (Ostrom 1998, 1)

"The logic of collective action" (1971) surprisingly came from a field of economy, it was written by an economist, who has was involved in the studies in the field of Collective choice theory, and who is now considered to be one of the founding fathers of Public choice approach in economics. Due to the authorship of this book Olson is usually credited to be one of the leading authors in the literature on interest representation in political science.

Olson's fundamental work occupies an important place on the bookshelves of few generations of political scientists as it theoretically approaches the functioning of large and small groups from the point of view of incentives they could offer to their membership. Olson offers a descriptive definition of groups based on the idea of the purpose of the groups, which is to promote the common interests of its members, individuals who join together, when they cannot achieve their goals alone; therefore rational individuals who are capable of furthering their interests more effectively on their own, will not tend to organize into groups to advance their individual interests. Olson book's central argument however is that "rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests" (Olson 1971, : 2) as they would prefer to free ride.

Olson establishes an idea that individuals are voluntarily attracted to the organization by the two types of incentives and benefits: collective and individual. The idea of benefits was known in political science before Olson, and according to William Baumol, it was probably Henrich von Storch, who was the first to vaguely distinguish collective and individual benefits, which he has written about in his instruction to the Russian Tsar's family as early as the beginning of the XIX century (Baumol 1965, 140). However it was not until Olson's publication that benefits became an important point of political analysis related to groups. Public goods are non-excludable and non-rivalrous, that is why individuals are so difficult to involve into the collective action, as they will get an access to these non-excludable and non-rivalrous goods anyways even if do not participate in the collective actions to gain these goods. Thus, the solution to this is to provide the group membership with selective incentives that will encourage a more active participation. By selective incentives one might mean such goods as "travel discounts, informative

publications, inexpensive insurance, and the liken [that] go only to members, […or in professional societies it can also be] a condition of employment or occupational advancement." (Cigler 1991, 106)

In the first chapter of his book, dedicated to a theory of groups and organizations, Olson quotes scholars as early as Aristotle to support his notion of groups: "Men journey together with a view to a particular advantage, and by way of providing some particular thing needed for the purposes of life, and similarly the political association seems to have come together originally, and to continue in existence, for the sake of the general advantages it brings" (Olson 1971, 6). Little has changed in the nature of associations since Aristotle described about it 2500 years ago, and even though we now theoretically understand much more about groups and interests, which form them, there is still much of terra incognita left about their explanation in political science. Olson however makes a very significant contribution to political science by bringing the understanding of interest representation to a new level of analysis.

In his book Olson operates with an idea of behavior of rational individuals in the groups. According to the author, small and large groups approach participation of their membership in the group activities from two different angles. While small groups have high involvement of their membership in the group activities, because every member's actions count and are significant for the group, large groups always have to overcome the free rider problem, which arises from insignificance of each members' role in the collective effort to promote their cause. This notion has been illustrated by Hjalmar and Hudson Rosens' book, "The Union Member Speaks": "Over 90 per cent will not attend meeting or participate in union affairs; yet over 90 per

cent will vote to force themselves to belong to the union and make considerable dues payments to it." (Rosen and Rosen 1955, : 82). This may explain why some groups do not prefer to mobilize their membership for a cause they promote, as the costs of mobilization may be too high.

Among the ideas researchers may get from Olson's book is that other then individual incentives, coercion and compulsion could be used as the means to overcome the free rider problem. He uses examples of coercion and compulsion in regards to trade unions (open vs. closed shops), which constitute a fraction of a society, and, to overall system of a State, which serves the authority function in a society. Olson outlines several areas, where the compulsion and coercion are necessary: (1) elections, (2) taxation, (3) army conscription, and (4) trade unions.

Olson sees the main function of the government in provision of a common good to all citizens. And in this regard an idea of taxation of citizens that is implemented with coercion is the only method in which the government can support public goods like that of a national defense and public education seems to be consistent with reality.

Since "The Logic of a Collective Action" has been published in 1965 it has attracted criticism. For example, Marwell and Oliver on the matter of providing selective incentives, which bare additional costs note "paying for selective incentives is also a collective action in that it will provide a benefit to everyone interested in the collective good, not just to the people who pay for incentives." (Marwell and Oliver 1993, 8) It becomes especially difficult, once the groups continues to attract new membership, thus allowing the free-rider problem to persist and repeat

itself indefinitely with each individual member joining the group boosting the need for a common action to bare the costs to provide individual incentives to each new member.

Marwell and Oliver also criticize Olson's idea of superiority of smaller groups in regards to their higher effectiveness and ability to provide incentives, and individual choices individuals make while choosing a group to join by saying: "People join groups involved in collective pursuits not only out of perceived common interests, but also because they regard the groups or individuals organizing the action as in some sense efficacious. [...] For most people, however, the most prominent and convincing evidence of a group's efficacy is probably the group's size and command over resources. [...] In this simple fashion, the decisions of individuals who come into contact with a group or its organizer are clearly interdependent with the decision of others." (Marwell and Oliver 1993, 10)

Unlike the pluralists, Olson's interest group system does not foresee the representation of virtually all interests, (Cigler 1991, 106) as it takes into account mostly economic reasons of joining the groups. Cigler summarizes the critique of Olson's theory in this regard by putting it this way:

> "As an economist, Olson was most concerned with material benefits, tangible rewards of participation, such as income or services that have monetary value. But solidary incentives, the socially derived, intangible rewards created by the act of association - such as fun, camaraderie, status, or prestige - are also significant, as are expressive or purposive rewards derived from advancing a particular cause or ideology ((Clark and Wilson 1961); (Salisbury 1969); (Gamson 1975); (Wilson 1973)). […] It has been argued that intangible factors such as a sense of fairness, duty, and moral obligation override "rational" economic calculations by individuals and cause them not to "free ride" (Hardin 1982). In addition, some persons "care about the rightness of their actions, regardless of what others do and regardless of individual or collective practical effect" (Nagel 1987, 33-34). Others have argued that individuals have in effect two utility curves, one reflecting their self-interest, and another that "incorporates a taste for having other people better off" (Margolis 1984, 21)." (Cigler 1991, 106)

Provision of selective incentives is in the core of Olson's understanding of effective participation of individuals in the group activities, otherwise if not provided with these incentives, Olson claims, these individuals will tend to free ride. Thus the problem becomes *where to find the means that can be used to provide these incentives within a group to lower the burden of costs of their provision*. Hayes probably was the first scholar to give his solution to the free-rider problem in Olson's Collective action theory. In his vision, "because often the only groups finding it rational to overcome the free rider problem... are those seeking governmental largess." (Hayes 1981, 99)

Walker also found an approach to solve the free-rider problem on economic merits, as he points out in his book "The origins and maintenance of interest groups in America": "patrons of political action play a crucial role in initiation and maintenance of groups" (Walker 1983, 402). Thus, he offers an idea that finding a patron or a sponsor to an institutionalized and organized interest group would allow overcoming the free-rider problem on the merits of "costs" in the costs-benefit analysis of "rational economic individuals".

Some parts of Olson's book are no longer as relevant to reality as others now: for example, he dedicates the whole third chapter of his writing to the trade unions, but many political scientists would agree that they have lost their prominence in recent decades with the decline of corporatism practices; or it could be mentioned that over the years since Olson wrote his book there has been an evolutionary development of terminology about groups, which are now more neutrally referred to as "interest groups" compared to aggressive and ambiguous term "pressure

groups" used in the time, when the book was written. However, what is valuable to the political scientists who study interest groups is his ideas that explain much of how groups would function to overcome one of classical problems of game theory, the free-rider problem.

2.3. Corporatism

Corporatism in political science is traditionally looked at as a form of organization of political and economic interests in a society, in which much of a power is given to unions, associations, guilds and other forms of assemblies that represent interests of its membership in professional, economic, social and cultural, agricultural and industrial, spheres. Corporatism could be called a historical form of organization of social order, as the earliest forms of corporatist associations were guilds in middle ages, which united people based on their vocation (Streeck and Schmitter 1985). Some examples of a corporatist states were the free cities of Danzig, Frankfurt and Hamburg with guilds of these cities exercising much of an authority in public life. City of London is another example of a corporatist organization of social order, for historically liveries have enjoyed a great deal of influence over the city politics as only liverymen could participate in the elections of the Lord Mayor of London.

Corporatism is not something absolutely new to the contemporary political science either. Streeck and Schmitter in their book "Private Interest government" claim that throughout history the concepts of both "corporatism" and "neo-corporatism" attracted "much of attention of among social scientists." (Streeck and Schmitter 1985, vii) Such philosophers, economists and scholars of politics as Keynes, Hegel, Fuchte, Schlegel, von Ketteler, von Vogelsang, La Tour de Pin, de Mun, von Gierke, Spann, Durkheim have all written about some form of corporatist social order.

(Streeck and Schmitter 1985, 8) Keynes advocating the idea of such social order notes that it should be found "somewhere between the individual and the modern state." (Streeck and Schmitter 1985, 10) Historically, medieval guilds were the form of such order that the humankind was already familiar with and Keynes builds his arguments on such form of organizations. In Keynesian vision, the key actors are organizations with a shared interest, which can exist in the form of professional, sectoral or class associations. This kind of order exists as an interaction between these associations with mutually recognized status, that are independent of each other and that can achieve compromises between each other in the forms of pacts that would enable corporate social order. While primary interactions here are the interactions between the associations, the secondary interactions are the interactions between the associations and their members, between the associations and the actors from the outside that can enforce observation of pacts between associations, and the actors, whose interests are affected by the externalities of such pacts. (Streeck and Schmitter 1985, 10)

Corporatism has historically been organized as a form of representation, but not based on a territorial principle, but rather on a professional one. The idea of corporatism is adjustable to democratic and authoritarian polities, feudalist and capitalist societies, republics and monarchies alike. *Corporatism* vs. *territorial representation* is a dichotomy similar a dichotomy of a *federalist* vs. *unitary* state, as both of these dichotomies are just the ways of organization of governance. At different times corporatist ideas have enjoyed support of different political ideologies and social groups from medieval bourgeoisie and Catholics popes to national leaders such as French president Charles de Gaulle and Italian fascist leader Benito Mussolini alike. Even American liberalism is rooted in corporatism, according to Theodore Lowi, however Lowi

himself rejects the relativity of corporatism to the contemporary politics, for "its history as a concept gives it several unwanted connotations, such as conservative Catholicism or Italian fascism, that keep it from being quite suitable." (Lowi 1967, 12)

Speaking of history of scholarly understanding of corporatism, John Gunnell gives an example of Alexis de Tocqueville's vision of corporatism, when he speaks about it in the following way: "Tocqueville's model was based in part on the communes, guilds, and professional corporations of medieval society, which he saw both as a check on central government and as enclaves of freedom and proto-republican life which could, in the modern era, take the form of the "voluntary association of the citizens." (Gunnell 1996, 255). This character of professional associations is also visible in contemporary understanding of corporatist associations as V.O. Key says "almost every line of industrial and commercial activity has its association." (Key 1958, 96) J.A.C. Grant exaggerates this opinion by pointing to the notion that "The modern professional associations or guilds are moreover coming to resemble "miniature governments" as they have all the types of power normally exercised by government" (Grant 1942, 324)

When it comes to comparison of medieval organization of interest representation with the one existing now, one could point out to many similarities as the guilds themselves were the competing interest groups. French corporatist Joseph Paul-Boncour makes an interesting observation on guilds and their 'grass-root' function of occupational groups as we would call similar entities of modern world today: "the history of professional or occupational associations showed that in all ages and countries such groups had arisen spontaneously and had in time become a decisive force in their industry or occupation." (Paul-Boncour 1901) This is very

similar to what Allan J. Cigler and Burnett A. Loomis write about contemporary interest groups, when they say that "in the face of a common problem or threat, spontaneous organization for political purposes will take place." (Cigler 1991, 105)

Contemporary understanding of corporatism started to emerge in political science in the middle of the 1970s, it received a label of "neo-corporatism" and was much discussed as such in the 1970s and the 1980s, when the corporatist practices of organization of relation between the government, capital and the associations of workers were apparent. Philippe C. Schmitter became one of the most dominant figures in the field of scholarship of corporatism.

According to Schmitter, the development of the corporatist practices "[…] has not been guided by some recognizable, overarching principle or justified by a comprehensive ideology. It rather consists of disparate, uneven and pragmatic responses to particular dysfunctions and conflicts." (Streeck and Schmitter 1985, 8) Usually, contemporary understanding of corporatism practices refers to a situation of relations between labor, capital and the government (the government here helps mediate the talk between the labor and the capital). In most cases these relations are tripartite, however they can also be bipartite. (Schmitter et al. 1997, 14)

Scholarship of corporatism, or "corporatist approach" in political economy and political science on the other hand first appears as subspecies of an institutionalism. (Schmitter et al. 1997, 2) The neo-corporatist debate starts in the 1970s, when scholars were more interested in looking at corporatism from the structural perspective and shifts to the policy perspective due to the de-regulation trend in 1980s, when corporatism started to come in decline at the point where the role

of the state involvement started to decrease. This was about the time when interests started more actively to lobby and advocate their causes in the parliaments because neo-corporatism was already coming to decline. (Liebert 1995, 407) The central claim of this approach is that economic, social or political behavior cannot be understood only based on the choices and preferences of individuals. (Schmitter et al. 1997, 2) This approach is based on the functioning of agents that are self-organized and semi-public collectives. These are "peak associations" that represent different sectors of economy and society.

In their book, "Community, market, state and associations?" (1985), Streeck and Schmitter identify corporatism as a phenomenon that refers to the two "different but interrelated dimensions of interest politics […]: [1] the way in which group interests in a society are organized and [2] the way they are integrated into the policy process so as to make for better accommodation of interest conflicts." (Streeck and Schmitter 1985, vii) In their scholarship the authors briefly call the first one - "an organizational structure" perspective, and the second one – "a structure in action" perspective. In their study preceding the publication of their book (1985), Streeck and Schmitter use the first, "the organizational structure" perspective, to look at "under what conditions business as a collective actor is able to organize itself into comprehensive, encompassing, hierarchically ordered, monopolistic, etc. organizations which are capable of exercising control over their members while at the same time representing their interests *vis-à-vis* other social categories and in the polity at large". (Streeck and Schmitter 1985, vii) And they use the second, "the structure in action", perspective to look at "social and political forms, functions and dysfunctions of collective self-government, self-regulation, or self-control by interest groups in specific policy areas". (Streeck and Schmitter 1985, viii)

Streeck and Schmitter discuss different "logics" of social order in a society, which originate from different institutional bases: the community, the market and the state. In addition to these three they add another one – associations, which also make their contribution to the social order (associations help establish the corporatism). The authors speak about the emergence of systems of bargained interest accommodation that came about in the 1960s and the 1970s and argue that these systems cannot be reduced only to the logic of the community, market and the state alone, or even to a mix of them, but also require the logic of associations to be taken into consideration as well. The authors claim that different social orders have separate logics of collective action:

> In a community order, actor preferences and choices are *interdependent* based on shared norms and jointly produced satisfaction. In a market order, the actions of competitors arc supposed to be *independent* since no one singular action can have a determinant and predictable effect upon the eventual allocation of satisfactions. In a state order, the actors are *dependent* upon hierarchical co-ordination, which makes their choices heteronomously determined and asymmetrically predictable according to the structure of legitimate authority and coercive capability. In a corporative associative order, actors arc *contingently* or *strategically interdependent* in the sense that actions of organized collectivities can have a predictable and determinant effect (positive or negative) on the satisfaction of other collectivities' interests, and this induces them to search for relatively stable pacts. (Streeck and Schmitter 1985, 10)

Thus, it can be argued that while explaining the logics of collective action of the three classical social orders Streeck and Schmitter conclude that a corporative associative order also has its own separate logic. For this, according to the authors, associations need to have a capacity and a monopoly to represent the interest of the membership (i.e. class, sector, or profession) and to control the behavior of this membership.

From this stance it would be reasonable to differentiate corporatism and pluralism by saying that corporative associative order can only exists if associations have this monopoly. If the plurality

of organizations representing the interests of membership is introduced, then it becomes a disabling condition of existence of corporatism, for without a monopoly on representation of interests associations no longer have a control over their membership and become no longer effective, as other organizations representing the interests of the members will compete with them on the market for membership.

Subordination and discipline of the members of the associations in the corporatist environment obviously become an important issue for the members would need to renounce their individual preferences and choices to act individually or as members of other groups to promote their interest. Associations in the corporatist environment manage to coerce their members by providing them with long-term obligations that are negotiated for them by the associations they belong to, thus, according to Streeck and Schmitter (1985, 13) *satisfying the interests* of these members. Individuals and firms rely on these organizations to structure their expectations on each other's behavior and to resolve the conflict between each other. These organizations are suboptimal however, but they are allow members to save resources considerably (e.g. on search and information costs, or they also provide a psychologically reassuring familiarity to their members) (Schmitter et al. 1997, 2)

What differs corporatist approach from the pluralist approach is that in corporatism associations need to have a monopoly in the sector they represent, as to be effective they need to have a policy concentration to represent interests of their members. To concentrate the policy associations need to be monopolistically structured, hierarchically ordered, officially recognized, and to clearly delimit the sector they represent. (Schmitter et al. 1997, 5)

In his article, "The Corporatist Sisyphus: Past, Present and Future" (1997), Schmitter provides examples of corporatist organizations in different parts of Europe, speaking of such peak associations as the General Union of Workers (UGT) in Portugal, General Labor Federation of Belgium (FGTB), Foundation of Labor (Stichting van de Arbeid) in the Netherlands, and others. Most typical interests these organizations promote are the following ones: working time reduction, introduction of a minimum income, tax reductions for low income-earners, employment and welfare special employment contracts for young people, reduction of social security expenditures, etc. He points out to the fact that to be more successful these associations need to hire "specialized personnel", which helps to deal with "legitimations and task expansion". Corporatism for Schmitter comes about in a strict sense, when these "intermediaries" become involved and when they become empowered as monopolies to represent collective interests of an encompassing group they represent." (Schmitter et al. 1997, 3-4) Different counties deal differently with the corporatism-style associations, in some of them they are even outlawed by anti-trust laws (Streeck and Schmitter 1985, 14)

Streeck and Schmitter do not see associations only in the positive light, they agree with the criticism against them, when critics point out to the fact that associative action can be dysfunctional towards other institutional bases of social order, however, they argue in a similar vein about dysfunctionality of other institutional bases against each other and say that at the same time these bases need each other for their respective functioning as there are problems of social order that some of them can deal better with than the other. (Streeck and Schmitter 1985, 5)

On top of the competition between such different institutional bases as the community, the market, and the state, there is also competition inside of them, as none of them if free of the intrinsic conflict. They internally feature different conflicts, which become a source of continual or episodic tension. Communities may feature such conflicts as the relationship between the "native" and the "foreign" members, markets deals with the conflicts between the buyers and the seller, and the state is prone to have the conflicts between the rulers and the ruled. All of these conflicts, according to Streeck and Schmitter, can be mitigated through socialization, a more optimal allocation of resources and the use of the mutually recognized procedures. However, the major challenge to the existence of these three orders comes not from the conflicts within them, but from the exogenous conflict that happen with other orders:

> The sharpest and most potentially destructive conflicts are generated when the principles, actors, media of exchange, resources, motives, decision rules, and lines of cleavage from the different "orders" compete with each other for the allegiance of specific groups, for the control of scarce resources, for the incorporation of new issues, for the definition of rules regulating exchanges between them, and so forth. Politics with, or within, the respective orders is one thing; politics between them quite another matter. (Streeck and Schmitter 1985, 7)

Streeck and Schmitter add to this by saying that these three orders depend on each other and are affected by each other's unresolved problems and externalities. The authors exemplify by saying that the community cannot exist without the state that would enforce laws, and they cannot function without the market, as their economic life is always dependent on some form of exchange. On the opposite, the market cannot exist without trust, esteem, consent, etc. provided within the community and the policing of the contract provided by the state. The state on their hand is dependent of electoral support and voluntary compliance generated within the community and the financial means for the existence of the system provided by the market.

Thus, modern societies become more enmeshed by these three orders. However, in order to overcome the conflict between the orders the modern "enmeshed" societies have generated institutions of new type to cope with the conflicts between the different orders. Even though it is difficult to agree with Streeck and Schmitter on the issue of the "novelty" of associations as they discuss them in relation to the "new" institutions (at associations have already existed in the form of guilds), the argument they propose about associations as a form of mediation of conflict between the three classical orders, seems plausible. In their vision in advanced industrial societies associations become the fourth, additional basis of order.

Within the domain of neo-corporatism Schmitter proposes a theory of development of corporatist practices in temporal cycles. In his article, "Corporatism is Dead? Long live Corporatism!" (Schmitter 1989), he notes that corporatism has a historical tendency to disappear and to reappear. Schmitter complaints that pluralist practices are difficult to analyze as "at the very moment that academics started using the concept to analyze trends in advanced capitalist societies, the practice had already peaked and it continued to decline during the 1980s. Then, just as many observers had announced its demise, corporatism has risen again […] in the 1990s." (Schmitter et al. 1997, 1) Speaking of this disappearances and reappearance of corporatism, Schmitter asks rhetorically "Are students of European politics and society forever going to be condemned like Sisyphus to dragging this concept-cum-practice into their work, only to see it come crashing down later?" (Schmitter et al. 1997, 2)

As Schmitter continues thinking about this theory on the development of corporatism, he hypothesizes that this happens roughly on a twenty-five cycle (Schmitter et al. 1997, 24). With

the ups and downs of the corporatist cycles, Schmitter argues of reappearance of corporatist practices in the 1990s. However, this reappearance in the 1990s was not very evident for a number of reasons. Schmitter's own reasoning is the following. First of all, the governments advanced a more "pluralistic" approach in dealing with the labor and the capital associations. A multitude of these organizations no longer had corporatism-style monopoly on representation of the entire sector they would originate from and thus could not concentrate policy in their hands. Second, the practice of replacement of tripartite agreements with the bipartite ones also made its negative contribution to the poor reappearance of corporatist practices in the 1990s. Third, the displacement of labor force from traditional manufacturing, which concentrates much of association of membership in one single place, to services sector, which lack this concentration, produced an impact on recruitment of association membership. (Schmitter et al. 1997, 27) On top of that it could also be said that the character of economy was changing: as the business was globalizing and relocating its productions site to other countries, the governments started to loose an effective control of business.

Summarizing the sub-chapter on corporatism, one could say that the scholarship of corporatism in its neo-corporatism version can tell much about the functioning of groups, or associations as Streeck and Schmitter call them, during the 1970s and the 1980s in many European countries. However, in comparison to the 1980s, when the explosion of pluralist-style interest groups have started to take place in these countries, the practice of corporatism no longer seemed to be democratic enough as compared to the pluralist model of organization of a social order, a great variety of which can better represent the interests of the people. As Streeck and Schmitter put it themselves, "'factionalism' of this kind is not easy to suppress in a democratic society; a state

which would try to do so would have to be so autonomous that it would in effect cease lo be democratic." (Streeck and Schmitter 1985, 23) One can also observe that the United States and Europe have different history of politics of groups. Europe did not have the experience of the United States of the 1960s with the human rights movement that laid the foundation of a great expansion of interest groups, which advocate all sorts of causes in the pluralist manner. Most of groups in Europe were organized in the form of associations of labor. Thus, it could be argued, that corporatism is more of the European practice, while pluralism is more of an American one.

To conclude this theoretical chapter, I should say that among the three theoretical approaches discussed here, the explanation of interest group politics offered by pluralism seems to be the most plausible to me. This is due to an inclusiveness of a greater variety of interest groups into politics in pluralism as compared to Collective action theory and corporatism, which postulate a smaller variety of organizations, focusing only on peak associations (corporatism), and limited number of interests, which exist in the form of economic or rational interests (Collective action theory). This is why pluralism becomes the conceptual framework of my thesis. Departing from this, I proceed to the next chapter of my thesis, which analyses empirical data on interest groups (or voluntary organizations as they are called there). I do so by narrowing down the scope of my interest from a general field of analysis of interest groups to a more specific sub-field of membership in these groups, on which data is available.

Chapter III. Empirical analysis of the groups

In this chapter of my thesis I provide a statistical analysis of groups based on the information that is contained in two major statistical data collections: the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS 2005-2008) and the data collected by the World Alliance for Citizen Participation on the Civil Society Index (CIVICUS 2011).

The World Values Surveys grew out of a study launched by the European Values Survey group in 1981, and in all of its waves it has been focusing on a broader range of variation than has ever before been available for analyzing the impact of the values and beliefs of mass publics on political and social life. (Inglehart 2000, 4-5). The Survey provides information on individual beliefs about politics, the economy, religious, social and ethical topics, personal finances, familial and social relationships, happiness and life satisfaction. The World Values Survey is a compilation of surveys conducted in more than 80 countries representing about 85 per cent of the world's population. (Bruni and Stanca 2006, 18) Within each country, samples are selected randomly "from all administrative regional units after stratification by region and degree of urbanization" (Inglehart et al., 2000, p. 7). It includes five wave of studying: (1) 1981-1984 wave, (2) 1989-1993 wave, (3) 1994-1999 wave, (4) 1999-2004 wave, (5) 2005-2008 wave.

The CIVICUS Civil Society Index, as claimed by authors, "is the result of rigorous self-examination by civil society actors around the world." (Heinrich 2007, 1) Civil society around the world is measured by: "thousands of organizations and stakeholders that contributed to the CSI have engaged in a 360-degree participatory assessment of civil society, that included not

only quantitative indicators, but also qualitative appraisals that are often neglected in evaluations of civil society. [Civil Society Index studies] factors such as civic engagement, democracy, corruption, social capital, gender equity, and civil society's role in policy. […] The result is arguably the most encompassing picture of civil society ever produced." (Heinrich 2007, 1) Srilatha Batliwala, Civil Society Research Fellow at Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations at Harvard University, gives the following description of CIVICUS's Civil Society Index: "At a time when scholars of civil society are unable to agree on a common set of parameters for the measurement of this increasingly complex terrain, CIVICUS's Civil Society Index offers a far more diverse, and therefore compelling, assessment tool." (Heinrich 2007, 1) The Civil Society Index currently has data for the quality of civil society for 49 counties that have participated in the study.

To conceptualize the state of civil society, according to Belyaeva et al, "the Civil Society Index examines civil society along four main dimensions:

- The **structure** of civil society (e.g. number of members, extent of giving and volunteering, number and features of umbrella organizations and civil society infrastructure, human and financial resources);
- The external **environment** in which civil society exists and functions (e.g. legislative, political, cultural and economic context, the relationship between civil society and the State, as well as the private sector);
- The **values** practiced and promoted within the civil society arena (e.g. democracy, tolerance or protection of the environment) and

- The **impact** of activities pursued by civil society actors (e.g. public policy impact, empowerment of people, meeting societal needs).

Each of these main dimensions is divided into a set of sub-dimensions that contain a total of 74 indicators." (Belyaeva 2008, 12)

Among many other questions asked in the World Values Survey 10 questions (V24 through V33) (WVS 2005, 139-158) were related to the participation in the different types of voluntary organizations. Three levels of participation were identified: active, inactive and not belonging to any organization. Questions were addressed in the following questionnaire:

Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization? *(Read out and code one answer for each organization):*

	Active member	Inactive member	Don't belong
V24. Church or religious organization	2	1	0
V25. Sport or recreational organization	2	1	0
V26. Art, music or educational organization	2	1	0
V27. Labor Union	2	1	0
V28. Political party	2	1	0
V29. Environmental organization	2	1	0
V30. Professional association	2	1	0

V31. Humanitarian or charitable organization	2	1	0
V32. Consumer organization	2	1	0
V33. Any other (write in):	2	1	0

(WVS 2005, 383)

Out of 57 countries, where the fifth wave of the World Values Survey was conducted, in 54 respondents were asked questions about participation in voluntary organizations (including France, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, United States, Canada, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, Australia, Norway, Sweden, Argentina, Finland, South Korea, Poland, Switzerland, Brazil, Chile, India, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, China, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, Russian Federation, Peru, Uruguay, Ghana, Moldova, Georgia, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, Colombia, Serbia, New Zealand, Egypt, Morocco, Iran, Jordan, Cyprus, Trinidad and Tobago, Andorra, Malaysia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mali, Rwanda, Zambia, and Germany). The data with the answers to the questionnaire is missing for Iraq, Guatemala and Hong Kong.

CIVICUS Civil Society Index currently provides information for 49 countries (including Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Jamaica, Lebanon, Macedonia, Mongolia, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Scotland, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, South Korea, Taiwan, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Vietnam, Wales).

The number of matches of countries between the World Values Survey and CIVICUS Civil Society Index datasets in my analysis is 24 for questions V24 through V31, and less then that for V32 and V33 due to the information missing for some of the counties.

In my thesis, I hypothesize that components of the civil society (structure, environment, values and impact) have an impact on the membership in different types of voluntary organizations. To test this hypothesis I undertook statistical analysis in two stages.

In the beginning of the analysis, I used a method of multivariate regression to identify which of the four civil society factors (structure, environment, values or impact) have a greater influence on the three levels of organization participation (active membership, passive membership or not belonging) in all ten types of voluntary organizations.

Bellow are the formulas for all three levels of participation:

$$Y_{1\ (\text{active membership})} = X_{1\ (\text{structure})} + X_{2\ (\text{environment})} + X_{3\ (\text{values})} + X_{4\ (\text{impact})} + e$$

$$Y_{2\ (\text{passive membership})} = X_{1\ (\text{structure})} + X_{2\ (\text{environment})} + X_{3\ (\text{values})} + X_{4\ (\text{impact})} + e$$

$$Y_{3\ (\text{not belonging})} = X_{1\ (\text{structure})} + X_{2\ (\text{environment})} + X_{3\ (\text{values})} + X_{4\ (\text{impact})} + e$$

The results of the application method showed the following:

1) Regressions of data for questions V24, V25, V26, and V31 show significance (between 90%-95% confidence interval).

2) Significance if found only in the active (Y_1) membership and is not observed in passive membership (Y_2) and those who do not belong to any voluntary organization (Y_3).

3) In the active membership analysis, only "Structure" (V24, V25, V26, V31), "Environment" (V24) and "Impact" (V24) shows significance leaving the "Values" out.

4) There is much of unexplained variance across the table, as the R-squared is not very high across the regressions with observed significance.

The fact that "structure" shows the highest significance should not be surprising, as "structure", according to "CSI Methodology and conceptual framework" guidelines (CIVICUS 2005, 19), is partially responsible for the membership. It features such sub-dimensions as number of members, extent of giving and volunteering, number and features of umbrella organizations and civil society infrastructure, human and financial resources. Thus, it cannot be considered that inferences made on the relation between "active membership" and "structure" are tautological, as membership is accountable for about only 1/4 of the content of "structure" dimension. Another reason why such kind of inferences cannot be made is that World Values Survey and Civil Society Index have collected data on membership differently. While World Values Survey reported their figures based on the interviews of respondents, Civil Society Index used a more complex approach, that included: (1) the population survey, (2) the organizational survey, (3) the external perception survey, (4) case studies, and (5) regional focus group discussions. It can also be said that any assessment of the civil society would be incomplete if membership were evaluated as its integral part; that is why membership would manifest itself in one way or another in any index that would attempt to measure civil society.

What is surprising however is that "Structure", which is responsible for the measurement of relations of people within the voluntary organization, shows significance for church and religious organizations (V24), sports and recreational organizations (V25), art, music or educational organizations (V26) and humanitarian and charitable organizations (V31). This is probably due to the fact that people join these organizations because they care about other members; the relations between people in these organizations are *more* important than other factors. "Structure" is not significant for such voluntary organizations as labor unions (V27), political parties (V28), environmental organizations (V29), professional associations (V30), consumer organizations (V32), where relations between members are formal and people might care less about the personal relations they can establish with other members of these organizations. The situation with "any other voluntary organizations" (V33) is difficult to explain as it contains a mix of all sorts of organizations that were not included in the questionnaire, thus it is difficult to make any generalizations based on the data provided for this question.

Since the independent variables are only statistically significant on "active membership" level of participation in voluntary associations, on the next stage of the analysis I am trying to identify what underlying factors might influence this kind of membership. To do so, I conduct factor analysis with the analysis output shown in tables 1 and 2.

Table 1. Factor loadings of voluntary organizations' membership

	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
Component	**Total**	**% of the variance**	**Cumulative %**	**Total**	**% of the variance**	**Cumulative %**
1	5.524	61.373	61.373	5.524	61.373	61.373
2	1.111	12.348	73.721	1.111	12.348	73.721
3	0.92	10.225	83.946			
4	0.578	6.418	90.364			
5	0.429	4.772	95.136			
6	0.238	2.646	97.782			
7	0.103	1.143	98,925			
8	0.053	0.592	99.517			
9	0.043	0.483	100			

The factor analysis reveals two components. The Eigenvalue for the first one is 5.6, which explains 62.5% of variance and the second one is 1.1, which is explains 12.6% of the variance. Based on the technical requirements of this method, I keep only the first component as relevant for the analysis because the Eigenvalue is higher than 2 only for it alone. Consequently I consider only one strong component and do not give the second component any substantial interpretation.

By looking at the table, one can say that all variables have very high factor loading on the first component. This suggests that there is one dimension underlying the active membership in all of these various organizations, which could be called "civicness" or "activeness".

Table 2. Component Matrix of civicness for different types of voluntary organizations

V4	0.92
V5	0.803
V6	0.721
V7	0.772
V8	0.938
V9	0.925
V2	0.688
V3	0.755

Thus, one can conclude that there is no substantive difference between being an active member in all different types of organizations as active membership in all of them is influenced only by one factor. From a theoretical perspective, this can be interpreted in a way that pluralism is a more plausible theoretical foundation of functioning of voluntary associations, as pluralism is accountable for membership in all types of organizations, while corporatism argues in favor of only vocational associations and collective action theory argues in favor of only membership that is based on a concern for material benefits and tangible rewards that have monetary value. The analysis shows that this is not exactly so, and active membership is vibrant across all types of organizations irrelevantly of the benefits and rewards it can bring. Departing from this pluralist assumption, the next stage of the thesis analysis would be to generalize and to create a model that would help visualize the membership in different organizations, which I do in Chapter IV.

Chapter IV. The Identity Axis model

4.1. Description of Identity Axis model

In this thesis, I intend to propose an *Identity axis model* (shortly: "I am"), which could be utilized to measure the number of groups an average person participates in and the quality of this participation in interest group politics in a given society. In the light of the "lobbying" and the "advocacy" distinction, discussed in the section 1.1.1 of my thesis (based on the kind of interest, private or public, they represent), it can only refer to individual engagement in interest group politics in the form of "advocacy", and cannot refer to associations or corporations that engage in "lobbying".

The Identity axis model is a macro-level politics model since it looks at the average number of groups an average person participates in a given society. The Axis contains overlapping circles that signify the individual membership in certain social groups. The Axis is not bound only to those groups that are displayed in *Figure 1* below. Even though The Identity Axis is a macro model and looks at the average number of groups an average person in a given society participates in, it is unique for every individual, because every individual has her own set of overlapping circles that are relevant to her (that is the reason why the top left circle is called "other n+ groups' membership", which means that there is no upper end to the Axis). In this regard Ulrich Preuss suggests that "the formation and the coherence of a social group rests on individual's decision to participate in the group." (Preuss 1992, 162)

Figure 1. Identity axis model



The Identity axis model represents an axis on top of which a number of memberships in different groups is overlaid. The model is composed of three types of groups, membership in which differs by a degree of a difficulty to leave or join them. The overlapping circles on the bottom of the *Identity Axis* are the most stable (the membership in these groups usually does not change) as they incorporate what Truman (Truman 1958) has called 'categoric groups' for they include such elements as "age", "gender", "race/ethnicity", or such demographic categories which are often used as the base for surveying in sociological studies.

The membership in the circles on the top of the *Identity Axis* is more flexible (the membership in these groups can change) as it incorporates what I would like to call *"opinional groups"* for they include those elements about which people can change their opinions during of their lifetime. Bartels calls affiliations with such groups "preferences" or "attitudes" in his chapter of a book called "Democracy with attitudes" (MacKuen and Rabinowitz 2003). In a similar vein, Franklin speaks in regards to something similar to overlapping circles on both sides of the Identity Axis, when in "Decline of cleavages" (Franklin 1992), he discusses the idea of social structure. He says, "…we have distinguished throughout this book between core variables that were strictly socio-demographic and core variables that were in some sense attitudinal." (Franklin 1992, 12) This is the distinction between the bottom and the top parts of the Axis. While the membership in "age", "gender" and "race/ethnicity" groups at the bottom of the axis forms the core socio-economic variables that are based on the social structure, membership in the groups on the top, including membership in "opinional" groups is "attitudinal".

Between the top and the bottom circles there are three overlapping circles ("profession", "marital status" and "religion") that signify membership in groups that in terms of joining/leaving the group is neither as flexible as in the circles at the top, nor is as inflexible as in the circles at the bottom of the axis. This implies that a person can change her profession, marital status or religion, but it just does not happen so easily. It surely is easier to change a marital status than say a gender, but it is more difficult than to change a membership in the environmental group.

The reason why the membership in structural elements on the bottom of the Axis is so inflexible is because no matter who and what the person wants to be, she is still always attached to these structural elements of society, almost without being able to alter her membership in them.

When it comes to politics, these elements Franklin says form "the cleavage politics" (in the understanding of "a cleavage" by Lipset and Rokkan (Lipset and Rokkan 1967)), while the elements on the top of the Axis form "the issues politics". In his writing Franklin speaks of the decline of "cleavage" politics in some Western-European countries, which is based on the social structure elements, starting the 1960s and the rise of the opposing "issues" politics starting the 1980s. Franklin's distinction between the cleavage and the issues politics in application to the Identity Axis model means that the upper part of the axis (elements that form the issues politics) becomes more important than the lower one (elements that form the cleavage politics – "cleavage politics" strictly in the Lipset and Rokkan's understanding, when this politics is based on the attitudes and not on social structure; here the word "cleavage" is not referred to vaguely meaning any sort social tension or conflict and is not understood simply as a division of opinions over a certain issue of politics as it exists in the general public discourse).

In a similar fashion, Connolly speaks of identity as a bio-cultural phenomenon, when he says: "It mixes nature and culture into corporeal sensibilities." (Connolly 2002, xvii) Speaking of Connolly's understanding it could be said that this combination is reflected in the bottom and the top parts of the Identity Axis model: the "natural" half on the bottom and the "cultural" half on the top. I agree with Connolly, who speaking of the elements of people's individual identity, metaphorically notes that a true identity is not "something like clothing you put on and take off

at will"; to him " a deep identity must make contact with the essence of the soul" (Connolly 2002, xvi) Tajfel's Social Identity theory argument here would add that within one person's identity there are those elements that dominate in a given moment of time: one person can be a party official at the party meeting, be a loving father at home, or a highly professional university employee in his professional setting.

The fact that a membership in a group on the bottom and the middle of axis might be attributed to a person formally, because she belongs to it due to a certain characteristic such as age, gender, race, ethnicity, profession, marital status or religion, does not mean that she somehow participates in the interest groups that deal with these issues. Participation in such interest groups, as the analysis of chapter 3 shows, for the most part exists in the form of "passive membership" or in the form of "not belonging". Truman (1958) describes membership in such groups as "latent". However, membership in such groups can become active "in the face of a common problem or threat, [and] spontaneous organization for political purposes will take place." (Cigler 1991, 105) The fact that a person belongs to a certain ethnicity or race does not tell anything politically unless a problem or threat to her and other people with the same ethnicity or race appears. This was very evident in the United States in the 1960s, when many of the interest groups were formed based on the membership in this social group. Gender might not mean much as long as there is gender equality in a society, but if there is no complete equality, people would tend to organize into interest groups to advocate for it, which could be exemplified by a multitude of women's organizations that exist in contemporary societies. Similarly, age might not mean much politically, but in the fact of a common problem or threat people based on belonging to different age groups can form interest groups. An example could be problems that

arise due to budgetary redistributions on spending, when the government decides to allocate more resources on pensions (spending on the older group of people) and less on education (spending on the younger groups of people), which might result in organization of student organizations that would advocate the cause of young people and greater resource allocation for education. In much the same way, a marital status might not mean much in politics, unless some kind of disturbances are created in a society that deal with this kind of issues. An example could be greater taxation imposed on non-married individuals, like it was done in Lithuania from 1973 to 1991, when so called "bachelor's tax" was introduced "so that those who do not grow children themselves would help others grow them, as the number of children was small in Lithuania." (Ieva Urbonaite 2006) This could become political if interest group that unites people with such attribution were created. Or another example, gay couples who still cannot get married in most countries of the world. It's the marital status that they want to be able to acquire, like any heterosexual couples, which drives much of LGBT organizations to advocate for a social change. Professional groups also play a very important role in a society, which is extensively discussed in the second chapter of my thesis. Religious organizations probably require the least exemplification, as their role is very visible both in politics and general in the society. Theoretically the *Identity axis model* is based on several basic pillars, which are described below.

4.2. The pillars of the model

4.2.1. Identity

One of the explanations of interest group politics is the constructivist idea of identity. "An identity is established in relation to a series of differences that have become socially recognized.

These differences are essential to its being. If they did not coexist as differences, it would not exist in its distinctness and solidity… Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty." (Connolly 2002, 64)

According to Soren Holmberg (Holmberg 2007, 558), Henri Tajfel, the founding father of Social Identity Theory, on the other hand, defines social identity as "that part of an individual's self concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to the membership." (Tajfel, 1978).

Connolly argues that identity is relational and collective. To illustrate this, he gives the following example: "My personal identity is defined through the collective constituencies with which I identify or am identified by others (as white, male, American, a sports fan, and so on); it is further specified by comparison to a variety of things I am not. Identity, then, is always connected to a series of differences that help it be what it is." (Connolly 2002, xiv)

Each of the circles of Identity axis model features aggregations of people that might exist as "latent" social groups, but might as well emerge as "active" interest groups with their own agendas. Those would be groups, which can mobilize people for a collective action in the times of "*social disturbances"*. (Powell and Steinberg 2006, 314) Or, as Cigler explains it, "From the pluralist perspective, individuals can recognize the existence of common needs and develop a group identity or consciousness." (Cigler 1991, 105)

The degree of multiplicity of circles of the Axis may provide us with information on the level of development of issue politics in a given country, or even suggest something about a level of development of a local civic society, or maturity of a pluralist society and its complexity (what

specifically this information might show would be the matter of further empirical analysis). The number of circles in the Identity axis model in a pluralist society is potentially infinite (this *infinity* is indicated as *n+ number of groups*), yet the number of *organized* groups an individual might belong to at a given period of time is finite, due to constraint of such resources as time and money.

It seems natural that the circles of the Identity axis are overlapping for such is the nature of the identity of each individual: an individual might be a doctor and a person of a certain age, might be of an Asian ancestry, might have a pro-gun and pro-choice positions and a volunteer for a certain party or charity.

As the Identity axis model includes both the cleavage and issue dimensions of politics, it should come as no surprise that interest groups can mobilize their members as an electorate in both. People with certain public preferences or attitudes, or people that occupy a certain fixed place within a social structure, can be mobilized, and this mobilization can be transformed into votes during elections. Such are the behaviors of minorities in political systems, including for example, such minorities as the Russian-speakers in Ukraine or Block Quebecois voters in Canada, who can be mobilized as the electorate to vote as one group to become a more influential power in national politics. This opinion can be criticized for being not completely valid, as it would be incorrect to think of the entire aggregation of minority voters as of one body, members of which would vote in the same pattern because there is a diversity of parties a member of minority might choose from to vote for. This individual member of a minority might simply choose not to vote on a cleavage, but on an issue pattern. However, one should treat this criticism carefully as at

every American Presidential election one hears about “black voters”, “Hispanics voters”, etc. In a similar fashion “issues” groups can be mobilized in electoral campaigns, which is done in the United States in the form of organization of Political Actions Committees (described in the first chapter of my thesis), which can mobilize both the electorate and the financial recourses required by the parties and the candidates.

Understanding of identity can also help explain, why members of one group can act violently against the members of other groups. On this, William E. Connolly notes that “It is the proclivity to marginalize or demonize difference to sanctify the identity you confess. (Connolly 2002, xv) This can be an explanation of behavior of people at wars. One of very important stages of the preparation to a war is the demonization of the collective image of an enemy (as a member of other group). The history of wars is an evidence that it is more morally “justified” to commit violence against a member of other group rather then of one’s own. The moral in this case works in such a way that it becomes applicable only to the members of one’s own group, and not to the members of the other group. This is what is referred to as “demonization” and “dehumanization” in the contemporary philosophic debates that deal with “othering” (or categorizing people with an identity different of one’s own as “other”).

Social identity theory of Henri Tajfel helps explain this through the paradigm of categorization of people into those who are members of “in-groups” and who are members of “out-groups”. Categorization here fosters one’s identity, but makes this individual an adversary of groups of “others”, that are members of a lesser favorable group, which might result in a conflict. (Tajfel and Turner 1979)

Homogenization of different groups into one seems to be one of the most stable scenarios of existence of a polity. If the country is divided into regional, linguistic, religious or cultural groupings, and if these groupings do not overlap (and thus are "non-congruent" (Lijphart 1999, 195)), there is then a certain potential for conflict. In case of collapse of a single identity the process of disintegration starts to take place. The failure to provide united group identity brings to the forefront the domination of groups with unique characteristics as it happened in the case of former Yugoslavia. With the loss of this single group identity integration dynamics no longer takes place. However, democracy is not about homogeneity. Complete homogeneity is about totalitarianism. Pluralist society does not require any form of homogeneity as it consist of a multitude of groups, where individual group members share parts of their identity with others.

4.2.2. Discourse

The idea of *discourse* in post-modernism seems to be a mirror reflection of the idea of *scope of conflict* in realism, at least they seem to be very similar. When one speaks of a public discourse, she focuses on the process of communication of opposing opinions, however when one speaks of a scope of conflict in realist terms, she sees how different opinions might emerge as social forces and how they might balance or take over each other. The function of lobbyists and advocacy activists is: first, to change the discourse by providing information to the community and the decision-makers, and only after that, second, to help enact the legislation on the topic of interest. If the first stage, the stage of a public discourse, is bypassed, and the lobbyist or advocacy activist is trying to intervene straight into the second stage, this usually becomes an indication of

a corrupt nature of the interaction between the lobbyist or advocacy activist with a public official, which might manifest itself in a form of bribery or other forms of corruption.

Political interest might emerge in any group, categoric or opinional, as soon as the group membership realizes that to change a certain condition that is imposed on a group and that is disadvantageous to the group membership, it might need to change the public discourse on the issue of this group's existence and after that to amend the legislation, which would make the situation change. Government therefore becomes the place where different groups contest their opinions or craft their discourse. Dickinson speaks of this in the following manner: "The legislature is really a forum for interest groups, and government in general should be conceived as an 'arbitrator'". (Dickinson 1930, 287) Further actions taken by legislature at any level of authority are the institutionalization of discourse. Similarly, the procedure goes in the courts, where the jury is crafting the discourse trying to answer the question if the suspected individual is guilty or not, while it is the judge's function to pass a sentence, in other words also to institutionalize the discourse. Not surprisingly, Themis is the personification of independence of group bias and opinions for she is blind of them, yet just, as she is holding scales and cornucopia, which signify equal treatment of all members of a society based on an idea of justice.

4.2.3. Distinction between loyalty and mobility

Pluralism encourages individuals to be members of as many groups as one would wish to be (Connolly's idea of pluralization of interests), and also to be mobile in migration between the groups. Based on Olson's assumption on privileged groups, one could draw a conclusion that the

smaller the group the greater the loyalty of an individual to it, and inversely, the bigger the group the greater chances of members to migrate away from it.

In a pluralist society people are free to choose mobility within different professions, political and religions affiliations, and family statuses, etc. In this kind of society they are free to be socially mobile by moving from one group to the opposing other, however they are "freer" to do so in the top section of the Identity Axis as it allows greater mobility. On the bottom side among categoric groups of the Identity Axis it is almost impossible to migrate away from these elements of the social.

Interestingly enough, between the top and the bottom sections of the Identity Axis there are three other groupings ("the marital status", "the religion" and "the profession"), which in a traditional understanding of Lipset and Rokkan (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) are the elements of the social structure (therefore they should belong to the bottom side of the Identity axis). However, they demonstrate properties of the elements of the top section of the Identity axis in their ability to provide mobility, because not often, but people may change their profession, family status or religion.

Another interesting point in the relation between loyalty and mobility is that in human society mobility between some groups is encouraged, while mobility with others is condemned, which helps stimulate group loyalty. Members of a society, usually discommend such a bitterly regarded sentiment as betrayal as uncoordinated, non-agreed upon by the audience mobility of

individual from one group to the other. The feeling of betrayal is the stronger the more polarized the relationships are between the groups between which the mobility occurs.

On the other hand, we can see how the relation between loyalty and mobility is different in the family setting. Traditionally in the history of human society mobility within a family group has been two-sided. Regarding marriage there have always been two opposing attitudes towards mobility from one family to the other: condemnation (for the sake of loyalty) and encouragement (for the sake of mobility). While mobility directed outside of the *nuclear* family, when one of the spouses would leave the nuclear family, is often condemned, mobility among members of different *extended* families would be encouraged, for this kind of mobility would help form new nuclear families to continue the family lines.

4.3. Further development of the model

When looking at it from a statistical perspective, the Model (that could also be called an Index in this case) would tell us about both the quantity and the quality of interest group participation.

The Identity axis model features three main variables:

- the length of an axis (meaning, how many groups a person in a given country participates in on average),
- the quality of group participation (meaning the degree of participation, which can be measured on the scale from 1 to 5)

- the flexibility of an axis (meaning, how easy or difficult it is for an individual to alter her position in life on a certain political issue - to leave one group and to come the other, adversary one).

All three of these indicators can be measured statistically. They can be scaled in numeric terms. The longer the Axis (meaning, the greater is the number of overlapping circles/groups there are in one's identity), the greater the scope of issues politics in a country and thus the greater the development of a civil society there. Because the Identity Axis is a macro-level model comparisons between different countries would become possible, for example, say, an average American might have a longer Identity Axis than an average North Korean.

What matters however, is not only the measure of quantity (say an American would participate in 4.2 groups on the average, while an average North Korean would participate in 1.8 groups), but also the measure of quality of participation, which could be assigned as the following:

"1" being "I associate myself with the cause, when I think about it, but never attend the organization's meetings and never contribute financially",

"2" being "I strongly support the cause, when I watch/listen/read the news, but never attend the organization's meetings and never contribute financially",

"3" being "I sometimes come to meetings of this organization in my community or sometimes contribute financially",

"4" being "I participate actively in the life of an organization, but do not contribute money" or "I do not participate actively in the life of an organization, but I contribute money",

"5" being "I both participate actively and donate money".

The flexibility of an Axis can be measured as:

"1" being "it is impossible to leave one group for the other",

"2" being "it is difficult to leave the group, but possible",

"3" being "it is not difficult to leave the group".

Conclusion

From the very beginning of existence of a human society, people organized into groups as common habitation allowed the community to endure, which otherwise would not be possible considering that individual humans would have lesser chances for survival in the conditions of the wild nature. Historically, humans have been collective creatures and this feature of human character is preserved until now as it is only in the groups that individual persons can socialize and feel more comfortable.

Over time, groups started to become more formal and organized. One could see that with example of guilds in the middle ages. In a contemporary society, groups play an important role in politics, however, surely not all of them are political. An explosion of their numbers across the globe has started in the 1960s with the American human rights movement. Since then interest groups became an important part of a political landscape in most of the pluralistic polities of the world. Since the time when interest groups started to be a prominent social actor, the debates about what they are and what they do never stopped. Even now in a society there is much of confusion and controversy about such forms of their activities as lobbying and advocacy. All of this, along with the regulation of lobbying and advocacy was discussed in greater details in the first chapter of this thesis.

Similarly to the practical development of interest groups in the 1960s interest group politics scholarship has also gone through major theoretical development starting around the same decade (even though Arthur Bentley already wrote his seminal book on groups in 1908) with the

pluralism thought of Truman (1958), Collective action theory approach of Olson (1971), corporatist ideas of Schmitter (1989), constructivist-pluralist approaches of Connolly (2002), etc. All these approaches have been analyzed in the second chapter of my thesis.

With more clear vision of interest groups' theoretical understanding, established in the first two chapters, I followed to the next stage of analysis in my thesis by looking at empirical data on a more narrow area of functioning of interest groups, their membership. In this part of a thesis I hypothesized that there is an impact of the elements of the civil society on the membership of the voluntary organizations. To test the hypothesis I used CIVICUS Civil Society Index data on the four dimensions of quality of civil society and the data provided by the World Values Survey (the fifth wave). I ran regressions in which I saw how such Civil Society Index-defined properties of the civil society ("structure", "environment", "values" and "impact") influence the membership in ten types of voluntary organizations. I found that among the three levels of participation ("active membership", "passive membership" and "not belonging") civil society components show statistical significance only for the active membership among (1) church or religious organizations, (2) sports or recreational organizations, (3) art, music or educational organizations, and (4) human rights or charitable organizations. Among different properties of civil society only "environment" is present in all four mentioned types of groups. I explain it with the fact that "environment" among the four dimensions of a civil society is the one that is responsible for membership in the voluntary organizations. This is probably due to the fact that people join these organizations because they care about other members; the relations between people in these organizations are *more* important than other factors.

Because out of three levels of participation only "active membership" is significant, on the next stage of the analysis I chose to identify those factors that can be considered accountable for such membership. Factor analysis revealed only one component with the Eigenvalue higher than 2. I chose to call it "civicness" or "activeness" and I concluded that there is no substantive difference between being an active member in all different types of organizations, as active membership in all of them is influenced only by one factor.

As the statistical analysis shows that active membership is present in all types of voluntary organizations irrelevantly of the materials benefits and rewards that members can gain from membership, I conclude that pluralism is the most plausible explanation of functioning of interest groups among the three theories that I have reviewed in my thesis. This is due to all-inclusiveness of interests in the pluralist framework. If the collective action theory were right, that would imply that only membership in those organizations where members can get material benefits would be strong, but it is not, as there is an evidence to the contrary in all types of voluntary associations. If the corporatism were right that would imply that only active membership in the professional organizations would be strong, which is also not true, because as was told in the explanation for collective action theory, active membership is strong in all types of voluntary organizations.

To make generalizations about the membership in organizations described in my thesis, in the last chapter of my thesis I proposed an Identity Axis model, which can be used for a better understanding of membership in different interest groups. This model distinguishes between

lobbying and advocacy based on the kind or interest, private or public, is promoted, and deals with the latter one. The Identity axis model represents an axis on top of which a number of memberships in different groups are overlaid. The model is composed of three types of groups, membership in which differs by a degree of the difficulty to leave or join them. The model is built on several preconditions, which are described as pillars in the last chapter.

Finally, for the future research in the field of interest groups I propose some further empirical approaches using this model. Collection and analysis of a statistical data would provide the much needed information that would characterize the quality aspect of interest group participation, as there is little evidence of scholarship across the literature on this element of interest group politics, as currently there is more data available on the quantitative aspect of functioning of interest groups.

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