

The Dynamic of Security Processes Outside the Western, Liberal Environment: Is Securitization Theory Context Dependent?

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ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that the Copenhagen securitization theory, as the analytical tool for grasping the dynamic of security processes, has the same applicability in any socio-political context. In order to support this claim the two questions will be addressed: why one does security and what is done by security. The first question deals with the motivation behind the securitization speech act. The second question refers to the role of extraordinary (emergency) measures within the securitization framework. By dealing with these issues this thesis engages in the conceptual reconstruction of the securitization theoretical framework with the purpose of making the assumption that the securitization theory can be applied for the security analysis regardless of the political environment. For determining if the securitization process can take place in non-democratic setting, the above-presented theoretical assertions are tested on the empirical case of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The theses conclude with the argument that by putting an emphasis on the emergency measures as a norm for determining the success of the securitization, the Copenhagen theory of securitization can be universally applied.

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INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War and the shift in the structure of the international system, that followed, brought significant changes to international relations and its scholarship. The international relations scholarship, once dominated by the power politics approach that reflected the relations among the Cold War power-holders, became opened to and influenced by a new line of thought. Thus, the traditional, power based way of interpreting the international environment became the subject of broad questioning and criticism. The scholars from the newly emerged constructivist line of thought engaged in a wide debate with the traditionalist, realist and neorealist, scholars over the changing nature of international relations. Drawing from Alexander Wendt's article *Anarchy is what state make of it: the social construction of power politics*, the scholars argue that instead of the distribution of power the "distribution of knowledge"¹ is what effects states' behaviour. According to them, ideas, norms and identities create collective meanings that "constitute the structure which organises our actions"². Thus, power politics and the self-help mechanism are not consequences of the anarchical international system, but the consequence of the social construction that emerges under that system.³ Furthermore, the critiques of the traditionalist scholarship emphasize that the changes that came forth with the end of the Cold War politics had an unprecedented effect on the nature of international relations. The state and military dominated perspective of international relations changed and such a change had to be followed by the re-conceptualisation of old concepts and the development of new ones that would reflect the new trends of contemporary world politics. Therefore, according to the

¹ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organizations* 46, no. 2 (1992): 397.

² Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it," 397.

³ *Ibid.*, 395.

critiques, in order to make an effort towards understanding and interpreting international relations, the scholars within the international relations scholarship should step away from the traditionalist approach and engage in the re-conceptualisation and redefinition of the basic concepts of the discipline.

The same constructivist line of thought became a part of the security studies scholarship, with the emergence of the constructivist and critical security studies. The new security theories were developed as a challenger to the traditional, realist and neo-realist, theories that until 1990s dominated the field of security studies. According to the challengers, the traditional meaning of the concept of security as a security of the state from external, military threats, had to be re-conceptualised in order to embrace security dynamics in the new environment.⁴ The concept of security had to be diverged from military and from what Berry Buzan and Richard Little had marked as the “Westphalian straitjacket”. According to Buzan and Little, the “Westphalian straitjacket” refers to the core concept of traditional security studies that assigns the state as the only referent object of security.⁵ Drawn by such incentives, critically orientated scholars engaged in the redefinition of the meaning of security in order to include non-state and non-military aspects of the threat through the significant part of their work. However, these new tendencies have attracted a critical reply from the part of traditional security study scholars. Consequently, the debate about the meaning of security has entered the security studies and even today it makes an important part of scholarship. Hence, as Michael Williams points out, the security studies scholarship in

⁴ Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995): 5.

⁵ Berry Buzan and Richard Little, “Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to do About It,” *Millennium* 30, no. 1 (2001): 25.

the last decade of the twentieth century became one of the most dynamics fields in the discipline of international relations.⁶

The most significant contribution to the constructivist and critical side of the security studies debate has been made by the scholars within the Copenhagen Conflict and Peace Research Institute (COPRI), later on known as the Copenhagen School. The Copenhagen scholars, through their extensive work have engaged in the re-conceptualisation of the old key concepts and the development of the new concepts for the security scholarship on the basis of the European security agenda from mid-1980s onwards. Drawing from the European security dynamics, which diverged from dealing only with the narrow military issues, the Copenhagen School has engaged in the development of the new concepts in order to be able to follow such empirical changes.⁷ The new concepts were developed with the purpose of broadening and deepening the security agenda in order to include non-military and non-state perspective of potential threats. However, with the development of the concept of security sectors, the security agenda was opened for threats coming from just four non-military sectors. Therefore, the new concept of security addressed not just military threats but also threats coming from sectors such as economy, environment, politics and society. As a consequence, the nature of the security agenda and the very meaning of security were brought to question. Furthermore, as the Copenhagen scholars emphasize in their work, the new definition of security redefines not just the possible nature of existential threats but also the nature of threatened objects. The legitimate referent object of the new concept of security is not just a state, but also society, collective identity, culture, economic integration, popular migration, survival of the species and the survival of the human civilization.⁸ Thus, as Jef

⁶ Michael C. Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 4 (2003): 511.

⁷ Jef Huysmans, "Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe," *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 4 (1998): 482-486.

⁸ Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies," 513.

Huysmans in his article *Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe* points out, the Copenhagen School constitutes “the most thorough and continuous exploration of the significance and the implications of widening the security agenda for security studies”⁹. Nevertheless, these incentives have been motivated not just by the new developments in the European security but also by the desire to make an original contribution to the security studies scholarship.¹⁰

In order to make an original contribution to the scholarship, the Copenhagen scholars from mid-1990s have made an attempt to distance themselves from the link between the European security agenda and their conceptual work. For that purpose the scholars have engaged in developing more general concepts that can serve as universal tools for interpreting and understanding security dynamics regardless of region.¹¹ The outcome of such engagement is Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde’s 1998 book *Security: A new framework for analysis*. In this book the scholars introduced the concept of security sectors not as a concept that emerged from European security dynamic but as a concept that can be “universally applied to classify a possible diversity of security problems”¹². Furthermore, with the new book, scholars did not just define the new security concepts, but they have also developed a new theoretical framework for the universal analysis of contemporary security processes. The important part of that framework is the concept of securitization. The concept of securitization implies that security moves from being a fact of perception to the fact of utterance. By calling something a security issue, it necessarily becomes one.¹³ Therefore, the concept of security becomes a self-referential, intersubjective and socially constructed practice. Defined in such a way and applied within the securitization theory, the concept of

⁹ Huysmans, “Revisiting Copenhagen,” 480.

¹⁰ Ibid., 482.

¹¹ Ibid., 489-490.

¹² Huysmans, “Revisiting Copenhagen,” 490.

¹³ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998): 26.

security is presented as an act of utterance that takes an issue beyond the realm of normal politics and upholds the support of audience for the extraordinary measures that eliminate the issue of threat to referent object.¹⁴ Furthermore, by addressing the questions: “who can do security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects”¹⁵, the securitization theory offers an analytical tool for understanding how security threats emerge in the contemporary world. Thus, as Ian Manners rightfully points out, the concept of securitization has introduced the notion of dynamics into the field of security studies.¹⁶ An analysis of security with the securitization framework becomes an examination of the process through which an issue moves from the realm of normal politics, where it could be dealt with communal governance, to the realm of securitization where it is presented as an existential threat that requires the implementation of emergency measures.

Nevertheless, not all scholars within the security studies scholarship agree that the theoretical framework for the analysis of security processes developed within the Copenhagen School can be universally applied. The critiques argue that the theoretical framework has been developed as a result of specific European security experience and therefore lacks the ability to become a general framework for security analysis. According to Claire Wilkinson’s article *The Copenhagen School in Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe*, the theoretical framework provided by the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory “does not currently possess the theoretical vocabulary”¹⁷ to describe the security dynamic outside the Western liberal environment. Developed on the assumptions that the European understanding of state, identity and security are universal, the

¹⁴ Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, *Security*, 23-26.

¹⁵ Ibid., 27.

¹⁶ Ian Manners, “European (security) Union: From the Existential Threat to Ontological Security,” under http://www.diiis.dk/graphics/copri_publications/copri_publications/publications/workingpapers.htm (accessed 02. 05. 2011).

¹⁷ Claire Wilkinson, “The Copenhagen School in Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe,” *Security Dialog* 38, no. 5 (2007): 22.

Copenhagen School has limited itself to empirical security research only within liberal world.¹⁸ A similar criticism of the Copenhagen School theoretical background can be found in the works of scholars that research the security dynamics in third world countries.¹⁹ Nevertheless, that criticism did not pass without reply. Counter to critiques, Jef Huysmans argues that the Copenhagen School may have been developed on the European experience but there is no reason why one should characterize their general concepts: securitization, sectoral security and security complex, as particularly European.²⁰ Moreover, Juha Vuori in his article *Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders* poses an argument that the securitization theory can be used for the study of security politics in non-democratic regimes as well as in democratic ones, which are more favoured by the scholars. According to Vuori, any political order is founded on core values and protection of those values is the main concern of the state's security politics. Thus, securitization as a "way of identifying and defining threats to those core values and their protection"²¹ can take place in any political environment. As a consequence of critiques addressed to the securitization theory and the replies to the critiques, within the security studies scholarship there is still an ongoing debate. The question that has been raised is: whether the securitization theory can be applied in any political order. In other words, it is questioned whether the securitization theory is context dependent.

Following the two ongoing debates within the security scholarship, about the meaning of security and the empirical applicability of the securitisation framework, this thesis aims to

¹⁸ Wilkinson, "The Copenhagen School in Tour in Kyrgyzstan," 5.

¹⁹ Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

²⁰ Jef Huysmans, "Revisiting Copenhagen," 483.

²¹ Juha A. Vuori, "Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders," *European Journal of International Relation* 14, no. 1 (2008): 69.

provide support for the scholars who argue that the framework of the securitization theory can be applied for the analyses of security processes regardless of the political environment. By dealing with the questions “who can do security and in the name of what”²² securitization theory provides an explanation of how security threats emerge. Furthermore, by making a distinction between securitizing move and securitization, the theory emphasises the role of audience, which gives consent and legitimacy to the construction of security.²³ Drawing on the role of audience as the one legitimizing the breaking of the rules of normal politics, critics of the securitization theory claim that such security framework is limited to liberal democracies and thus could not be applied within non-democratic political regimes. According to them, non-democratic political regimes do not need support, consent and legitimacy of the audience. Furthermore, the distinction between the realm of normal and extraordinary politics, which is essential for the determining if the process of securitization took place, is impossible to be made in non-democratic environment.

However, this does not mean that the securitization theory could not be further developed in order to provide a more universal framework for security analysis. By addressing the questions: why one does security and what is being done with security, this thesis engages in the conceptual reconstruction of the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory and thus moves the theory from the dependence on the democratic nature of the political regime. The question why one does security relates to the very essence of the concept of security that has not been changed with the broadening and deepening of the security agenda. The concept of security above all implies survival of the referent object. Although the nature of the referent object that needs to survive can vary, depending on the context, the meaning of security as a survival stays the same. Thus, survival is what

²² Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, *Security*, 45.

²³ Matt McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 4 (2008): 546.

motivates the speech act that constitutes existential threat and moves an issue from normal to extraordinary politics. The difference between normal and extraordinary politics, which is essential part of the securitization theory, can be determined by the question what is being done with security. The question relates to the extraordinary measures, taken for the purpose of securing survival, as criteria for the definition of the realm of special politics in the environment where the process of taking decisions is not transparent enough. In order to provide support for the argument that the process of constructing an issue as security has the same dynamics in democratic and non-democratic regimes, this thesis analyses the 1962 Cuban Missile Crises as an empirical case study. The thesis will examine how the measures taken by the United States, the Bay of Pigs invasion and the embargo posed against Cuba, were interpreted by the Cuban political establishment as existential security threats with the purpose of justifying the implementation of the emergency measures through the acquirement of the Soviet nuclear missiles.

Therefore, the main arguments of thesis will be developed through three chapters. The first chapter will be dedicated to the presentation of the securitization theoretical framework posed by Copenhagen scholars. In the second chapter, the securitization framework will be further developed with the purpose of acquiring a more general tool for security analysis. The third chapter focuses on the empirical analysis of the Cuban Missile Crises, as the case study for the developed framework. The thesis ends with the conclusion that securitization theory, as the analytical tool for grasping the dynamic of security processes, has the same applicability in democratic and non-democratic regimes.

CHAPTER 1: THE SECURITIZATION THEORY: COPENHAGEN'S NOTION OF DYNAMIC IN THE SECURITY STUDIES SCHOLARSHIP

1.1 The Copenhagen Theoretical Contribution

In order to make a genuine contribution to the newly emerged branch of security studies, the scholars within the Copenhagen Conflict and Peace Research Institute have engaged in the 1990s debate about “conceptual reflections on the concept of security”²⁴. Although, as Ole Weaver rightfully points out, the notions for and attempts to reconceptualise the meaning of security have become a common phenomenon within security studies scholarship, the Copenhagen scholars have posed a valuable reply to this academic challenge.²⁵ Drawing from the developments in the European security agenda that took place during the 1990s, the scholars have contributed to the discipline with the formulation of the concept of sectoral security and the securitization theory. Nevertheless, these new developments have not been just a result of the scholars’ willingness to make a genuine contribution to the security scholarship. According to Jef Huysmans, the Copenhagen scholars have formulated the concept of sectoral security and the theory of securitization with the purpose of developing a universal tool for the analysis of the dynamic of security processes in the post-Cold War era²⁶.

The (traditional) meaning of the concept of security has been challenged first by the incentives for broadening and deepening security agenda, which came with the concept of sectoral security. Even though regarded as a Copenhagen contribution to the security scholarship, the concept of the sectors of security was developed by Barry Buzan in his 1983

²⁴ Ole Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.) *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995): 46.

²⁵ Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 46.

²⁶ Huysmans, “Revisiting Copenhagen,” 482.

book *People, State and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*.²⁷ The book, by reflecting on the “narrowly founded”²⁸ concept of national security, outlines five security sectors within which potential threats to national security may emerge. According to Buzan, the national security agenda can be challenged not just by the threat and vulnerabilities that come from the military sector but also by the ones that emerge from the political, societal, economic and environmental sectors. Nevertheless, these sectors do not function in isolation; they are interconnected and thus constitute a multisectoral security agenda.²⁹ Hence, as Ole Waever in the chapter *Securitization and Desecuritization* asserts, the concept of sectoral security has introduced non-military threats into the national security agenda and thus led to the formulation of the wider concept of security.³⁰

Although Buzan’s concept of the security sectors contributed to the widening of the security agenda, further developments of the concept within the Copenhagen theoretical framework have resulted in the conceptualisation of a general tool for the analysis of contemporary security dynamics. The concept of the security sectors developed in the 1983 opens the security agenda for non-military threats, but still closes the nature of the target of potential threats for any other object except the state. However, as Huysmans rightfully notes, in the book *Identity, Migrations and The New security Agenda in Europe*, which is a result of Buzan and Waever’s joint work, the concept of security sectors is presented not as a tool for identifying threats outside the military sector, but as a concept which has its own meaning. The newly defined concept of sectoral security identifies a peculiar security dynamic that takes place within a sector and implies a linkage between threat and the constitution of the threatened objects. This connection is best presented through the example of the societal

²⁷ The revised edition of the book was published in 1991 under the title *People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*.

²⁸ Barry Buzan, *People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991): 14.

²⁹ Buzan, *People, State and Fear*, 112-134.

³⁰ Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 47-48.

sector, where the relation between the emerging threats and the constitution of society and identity is emphasised by the Copenhagen scholars.³¹ Furthermore, the more embracing concept of sectoral security introduced the new referent objects that are affected by sectoral security dynamic. Beside the state, which is defined as the referent object of the military and political sectors, the economic, societal and environmental sectors bring issues such as bankruptcy, collective identity, culture, economic integration, popular migration, the survival of the species and the survival of the human civilization to the security agenda.³² Thus, Michael Williams' article *Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics* rightfully concludes security for the Copenhagen School can be viewed as the compression of all five sectors that have different referent objects and different threat agendas.³³

However, the most valuable Copenhagen's contribution to the critical security scholarship, and security scholarship in general, has been made with the development of the concept of securitization. The concept has been developed and formally introduced in the security studies by Ole Waever in the chapter *Securitization and Desecuritization*, which makes an important part of Ronnie Lipchutz's book *On Security*. The chapter, through the reflection upon the concept of security, poses the argument that "with the help of language theory, we can regard security as a speech act"³⁴. With this argument Waever moves security from being an act of perception, an interpretation of security according to Jahn et al., to security as a speech act.³⁵ The definition of security as a speech act steps away from dealing with the debate about objective and subjective nature of the security threat. For Waever, security does not speak of threats that are more real than others; the utterance of security

³¹ Huysmans, "Revisiting Copenhagen," 489-490.

³² Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, *Security*, 22-23.

³³ Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies," 513.

³⁴ Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization," 55.

³⁵ Huysmans, "Revisiting Copenhagen," 491-492.

itself is the primary reality.³⁶ The concept of security as a speech act has been formulated from the assumptions that had been developed in John L. Austin's speech act theory and in his concept of performative utterance. The performative utterance implies that "by saying something, something is being done"³⁷. Consequentially, the application of the preformative utterance in the security studies has led to the conclusion that by calling something security that something becomes security. Thus, security becomes a self-referential concept. Defined in such a way, the concept of security makes an essential part of the process of securitization. According to Weaver, the securitization process starts with utterance, when by saying security "a state representative moves a particular development into a special area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it"³⁸. In other words, the concept of securitization implies that by uttering security, an issue becomes a threat and also a part of the process that ends with the legitimate use of extraordinary measures for the purpose of securing survival of the threatened object.

Nevertheless, further theoretical development of the concept of securitization came later on with Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde's book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, after which the concept entered in the language of security scholarship as the securitization theory. The new book, in a more systematic way, re-introduced the concept of security as a speech act, which was still a fundamental part of the securitization process. The re-defined securitization process starts with the securitizing actor who delivers the security speech act to the significant audience. The delivered speech act

³⁶ Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization," 55.

³⁷ Rita Taureck, "Securitization Theory – The Story So Far: Theoretical Inheritance and What it Means to a Post-Structural Realist," Paper presented at the 4th annual CEEISA convention University of Tartu, (25-27 June 2006): 6.

³⁸ Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization," 55.

constructs an issue as an existential threat and upholds the needed legitimacy for the break of rules of normal politics and for the execution of emergency measures.³⁹

Although the role of securitizing actor in the process of presenting an issue as security threat had not changed, the new securitization theory has put an emphasis on the leading role of the audience by making difference between the securitization move and securitization. For the new approach to securitization process the security speech acts, where an issue is presented as an existential threat to the referent object, constitutes the securitization move, but the audience is the instance that decides about successful securitization by approving the security nature of the presented issue. By doing so, the audience is the one that legitimizes the breaking of the rules of normal politics and the enforcement of the extraordinary measures.⁴⁰ As a consequence, the role of audience moves the concept of security from being just a self-referential practice to being an inter-subjectively constructed practice. Therefore, Jef Huysmans rightfully points out that the main difference between Waever's previous work on the concept of securitization and the new securitization theory is the inter-subjective character of the security that "ultimately rests neither with the object nor with the subjects, but among the subjects"⁴¹.

The other contribution to the formulation of the securitization theory, which came with the book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, was the introduction of the facilitating conditions that may lead to a successful speech act. Drawing from Austin's theory of the performative utterance and concept of facilitating conditions, the Copenhagen scholars have formulated internal and external conditions that enable a successful security speech act. According to scholars, in order to have a favourable speech act facilitating conditions have to

³⁹ Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, *Security*, 24-25.

⁴⁰ Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, *Security*, 25.

⁴¹ Ibid., 31.

be “a combination of language and society”⁴². As emphasised in the book, the three conciliations have to be mate in order to have an effective performative utterance. The successful speech act has to follow the grammar of security, has to be delivered by the securitizing actor who is in a position of authority and has to refer to threats that are generally accepted as hostile.⁴³ Thus, the conditions provide incentives that lead the securitization move to a successful securitization and as such make a valuable part of securitization process. Consequently, as Holger Stritzel points out, the definition of facilitating conditions contributed to the development of a more comprehensive theory of securitization.⁴⁴

In addition, the formulation of the facilitating conditions for a successful security speech act enabled the development of a “specific framework for analysing securitization empirically”⁴⁵, and thus contributed to the security studies research agenda. Hence, the Copenhagen’s theory of securitization provided security studies with the analytical framework for the empirical study of the discursively constructed security threats. As a consequence, the securitization framework has been broadly applied by various security scholars for the study of security in various areas. Even though Waever developed the concept of securitization by relying on the security developments in Eastern Europe after the Cold War, the securitization framework has been used in Alan Collin’s article *Securitization, Frankenstein’s Monster and Malaysian Education* for studying the policy of education, in Ayse Ceyhan and Anastassia Tsoukala’s article *The Securitization of Migration in Western Societies* for studying immigrations, in Paul Roe’s article *Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization* for analysing minority rights.⁴⁶ Furthermore, as Matt

⁴² Ibid., 32.

⁴³ Ibid., 33.

⁴⁴ Holger Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond,” *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 3 (2007): 364.

⁴⁵ Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization,” 364.

⁴⁶ Alan Colli, “Securitization, Frankenstein’s Monster and Malaysian Education,” *The Pacific review* 18, no. 4 (2005): 567-588; Ayse Ceyhan, Anastassia Tsoukala, “The Securitization of Migration in Western Societies,”

McDonald points out, due to the developments in the international relations after 9/11, the securitization framework has been used to describe the US-led 'war on terror',⁴⁷.

However, taking in consideration the research question of this thesis, the following section will address only the work of scholars who have engaged in the critical reconceptualisation of the securitization framework with the purpose of developing a more comprehensive theory. With that being said, a special emphasis will be put on the empirical research that have used the mentioned framework to study security developments in non-democratic environment.

1.2 A Critical Reply on the Copenhagen's Securitization Theory

Although, the theoretical developments that Copenhagen scholars presented in their 1998 book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* contributed to the formulation of the more comprehensive securitization theory, opponents as well as supporters of the concept of securitization have posed valuable critical reply. The scholars' criticism was directed at the under-theorised role of audience in the securitization process, the lack of emphasis on the context within which the securitization process takes place and most importantly the 'Westernized' nature of the main concepts of the securitization theory. Furthermore, the critiques assert that such theoretical shortcomings have lead to inevitable consequences

Alternatives 27, (Special Issue, 2002): 21-39; Paul Roe, "Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization," *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 3 (2004): 279-294. See: Mat MacDonald, "Constructing Insecurity: Australian Security Discourse and Policy Since 2001," *International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2005): 297-320; Gwendolyn Sasse, "Securitization and Minority Rights: Exploring the Conceptual Foundations of Politics towards Migrations and Minority Rights in Europe," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 43, no. 4 (2005): 673-693.

⁴⁷ Matt McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security," 563; See: Morten Kelstrup, "Globalisation and Social Insecurity", in Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung (ed.) *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research* (London: Routledge, 2004); Rita Abrahamsen, "Blair's Africa: The Politics of Securitization and Fear," *Alternatives* 30, (2005): 55-80.

regarding empirical research that have been done with the securitization theoretical framework.

The new comprehensive theoretical framework of the securitization theory was formulated on the three essential elements: the security speech act, the role of securitizing actor in delivering such a speech act and the audience as the final instance of securitization process that rejects or accepts the delivered speech act. That securitization framework was conceptualised with the purpose of introducing a universal tool by which security analysts could track indicators of securitization and thus analyse the dynamics of security processes.⁴⁸ However, as Stritzel rightfully notes, the very theoretical framework was suffering from inconsistencies. The confusion came with the newly introduced role of audience, which was conflicting the concept of security as a speech act.⁴⁹ The concept of securitization that had been developed in Waever's chapter *Securitization and Desecuritization* defined security as a speech act. By delivering a security speech act the securitizing actor moves an issue to the realm of special politics.⁵⁰ Thus, security and securitization process could be considered as a self-referential practice. Yet, the new comprehensive framework on securitization that has been developed in 1998 book introduces the audience in the securitization process. The audience becomes an essential part in the process of constructing security threat, the instance that takes the securitization move to successful securitization. Consequently, the concept of security as a speech act is transferred from the securitizing actor to the significant audience. Therefore, security becomes the subject of negotiations between the two instances, the securitizing actor and the audience.⁵¹ As such, security and securitization shifts from being exclusively defined by a speech act and becomes intersubjective practice. Put differently, the

⁴⁸ Rita Taureck, "Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 9, no. 1 (2006): 56.

⁴⁹ Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization," 362.

⁵⁰ Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization," 55.

⁵¹ Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization," 363.

new theoretical framework moved the concept of securitization to the theory of securitization and thus moved security from a selfreferential to an intersubjective practice.

Considering that the new securitization framework defined security as an intersubjective practice, the critics have questioned the illocutionary nature of the security speech act. Based on reformative utterance, the Copenhagen Scholars have defined the security speech act as illocutionary act. By uttering security, security is being done.⁵² However, Thierry Balzacq poses the claim in his article *The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context*, that the Copenhagen scholars have used the wrong form of a speech act. Drawing from Austin's speech act theory, Balzacq argues that the securitization process as an intersubjective practice is better captured by a perlocutionary speech act.⁵³ The perlocutionary speech act is based on the logic that with the meaningful utterance, which is supported by a certain force, a particular action is enabled⁵⁴. By delivering a security speech act, the securitizing actor makes an effort to uphold the approval of the audience (perlocutionary effect) so that security could be done. Therefore, the perlocutionary speech act rightfully describes the dynamics of the securitization process, the role of the audience and thus the distinction between the securitization move and successful securitization.

The role of audience and the nature of the speech act were not the only issues that the critics appeal to while debating on the securitization theory. The critics argue that the securitization theory is theoretically narrow not just concerning the nature of the speech act but also concerning the importance of context. By putting a much of an emphasis on the role of linguistics in the process of constructing security, the theory has undermined the

⁵² Taureck, "Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies," 8.

⁵³ Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context," *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 2 (2005): 175-176.

⁵⁴ Taureck, "Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies," 7.

importance of context within which securitization takes place.⁵⁵ The preformative nature of the speech makes an important part of the process that constructs an issue as a security threat, but that does not imply that the socio-political context does not have an impact on the way in which such a threat is constructed. Although the Copenhagen scholars have tried to address the issue of context with the concept of securitization facilitating conditions, with the role of conditions that are historically related to the threat and the position of authority that is associated with the securitizing actor, the role of context in the securitization process is still being neglected.

Following the problem of context within securitization theory, Stritzel in the article *Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond*, offers a “less-linguistic and more social/structure understanding of securitization”⁵⁶. Stritzel emphasises that within the security studies scholarship there are two competitive readings of the securitization theory. Based on the role of the context in the securitization process, the distinction could be made between an internalist and externalist reading. According to Stritzel, internalist reading asserts the socio-linguistic dimension of the context. The emphasis here is put on the performative role of the speech act that in order to be successful has to follow the grammar of security. An externalist reading, supported by Stritzel, claims that a successful securitization speech act is not just utterance that is in accordance with the grammar of security, but it is also a speech act which is “embedded in broader social and linguistic structure”⁵⁷. Thus, the reading frames the speech act’s arguments in relation with a broader linguistic context and links the securitization process to the social and political structures that constitute the securitizing actor and enable a successful securitizing process. Nevertheless, the compatibility between the existing discourses and the power position of securitizing actor contributes even more to

⁵⁵ Matt McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” 570-572.

⁵⁶ Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization,” 373.

⁵⁷ Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization,” 367.

the success of the securitization process. Put differently, the compatibility between socio-linguistic and socio-political dimensions of the context leads to a successful securitization.⁵⁸

The different perspective on the problem of context has been introduced by Juha Vuori in the article *Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders*. According to the article, due to the nature of the securitization framework, the framework has been mostly applied for the study of security in a democratic political context. Consequently, such tendencies have led to the conclusion that “the theory of securitization is only applicable to democratic political systems”⁵⁹. Nevertheless, as Vuori points out, this bias needs to be overcome, because even states that do not have democracy have security issues.⁶⁰ Hence, in order to strengthen the theory of securitization, the presented theoretical framework needs to be applied also outside the liberal democratic context.

As mentioned in Vuori’s article, one of the reasons why the securitization theory has been almost exclusively used for the study of security dynamic in democratic environment was the issue of extraordinary (special) politics. According to the securitization theory, the securitization process takes an issue from the normal to extraordinary realm of politics. Even though Copenhagen scholars have not defined these realms, within the security scholarship the understanding of normal politics has been connected to democracy and thus the realm of extraordinary politics has been described as “non-democratic decision-making”⁶¹. Due to such perspectives on normal and extraordinary politics, the scholars have been arguing that non-democratic political systems do not have normal politics to begin with, and thus applying the securitization theory in this environment does not make much sense. However, Vuori

⁵⁸ Ibid., 367-370.

⁵⁹ Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization,” 68.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 68-69.

⁶¹ Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization,” 69.

challenges that argument with the claim that within any society there are ‘rules of the game’ that constitute the realm of normal politics, and with the breaking of those rules the issue necessarily moves to the realm of extraordinary politics.⁶²

The issue of context in the securitization framework has not been explored just for the sake of furthered theoretical developments of the securitization concept, but also because of possible implications that the presented framework could have on the security research agenda. The critics of the securitization theory argue that the concepts upon which the theory is being founded have been developed from the historical experience of the Western and European countries. The concepts such as state, security, threat, identity, society emerged from European historical developments. Moreover, the critics point out that the speech act form of the securitizing move excludes other forms by which the meaning of security can be communicated.⁶³ Thus, due to the European nature of the Copenhagen School, the concept that have been formulated as a universal tool for the analysis of security processes cannot be applied with the same accuracy outside the Western, liberal environment.

The best overview of the presented argument on the European nature of the Copenhagen’s theoretical work can be found in Claire Wilkinson article *The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Usable Outside Europe?*. According to Wilkinson, the Copenhagen’s securitization framework did not manage to step away from the assumption that the concept of security has overall state and military nature. Defined in such a way, the very framework lacks the ability of grasping all the particularities of the security dynamics outside Europe, where the emphasis is not on the state and military nature of the threats. Furthermore, Wilkinson points out that in order to conceptualise one universal tool for security analysis, the Copenhagen scholars have outlined securitization as a

⁶² Ibid., 69.

⁶³ McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” 570.

“unidirectional and entirely linear process”⁶⁴ that leads to a certain visible outcome. Thus, by the virtue of theoretical Eurocentrism and the emphasis on the needed outcome, the theory of securitization “does not take in consideration the specific nature of local socio-political context”⁶⁵. By doing so, the theory limits its potential applicability in any other environment besides Western. Hence, if and when applied outside European or Western settings, the framework offers a simplified analysis of security processes. As an empirical support for the presented arguments, Wilkinson applies the securitization framework on the analysis of the governmental overthrow in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005.⁶⁶ Consequently, the empirical research ends with the conclusion that the securitization framework suffers from internal inconsistencies that have to be overcome with further theoretical developments. In other words, in order to have a general tool for security analysis, the Copenhagen scholars have to engage in the further development of the theoretical framework that has the ability to describe the complex relationship between speech act and emergency action.⁶⁷

Following Wilkinson’s recommendation and drawing from the above presented critiques, this thesis continues with the re-conceptualisation of the securitization theory. In order to provide support for the argument that the securitization theory can be used as an analytical tool for studying the dynamic of security processes regardless of political context, the thesis challenges the alleged problem of non-democratic context by dealing with the purpose behind security within the securitization theory, the role of audience as the one giving legitimacy to extraordinary politics, and with the problematic distinction between the realm of normal and extraordinary politics.

⁶⁴ Wilkinson, “The Copenhagen School in Tour in Kyrgyzstan,” 11.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 5.

⁶⁶ Wilkinson, “The Copenhagen School in Tour in Kyrgyzstan,” 5-8.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 22.

CHAPTER 2: LOOKING BEYOND DEMOCRATIC ENVIRONMENT

2.1 *Rethinking the Securitization Theory*

The Copenhagen scholars have made a significant contribution to the security studies scholarship with the development of the concept of sectoral security and securitization theory. The concept of sectoral security has broadened and deepened the contemporary security agenda, while the securitization theory has been formulated as a general tool for analyzing the dynamic of security processes. These contributions have been developed as a result of the need for the conceptualization of universal analytical tools for contemporary security analysis. Nevertheless, when it comes to the universal value of the Copenhagen contributions, not all scholars agree.

The critics have posed an argument that due to internal inconsistencies and conceptual constraints, the theoretical framework of the Copenhagen School could not be generally applied. From their perspective, although the concept of sectoral security was introduced as a contribution to the deepening and broadening of the contemporary security agenda, the concept of security within the Copenhagen theoretical framework has not stepped away from the state-centricity. Furthermore, critics assert that the main concepts upon which theoretical framework was formulated have been developed as a result of European historical experience, and thus the theoretical framework could not be applied with the same accuracy outside the European-liberal environment. Clair Wilkinson in her work on the possibility of applying the securitization theory outside the European and Western settings draws on these critiques. In addition Wilkinson argues that the securitization theory cannot be viewed as a general analytical tool because of its narrow theoretical grasp. The securitization theory has been conceptualised as a linear process that, if successful, may lead to a certain outcome. Yet, Wilkinson highlights that that kind of conceptualization does not take into account all

finesses of the local socio-political context within which securitization may take place, which may play an important role in security processes but at the same time question the linear nature of the securitization process.⁶⁸

However, considering the extensive work that the Copenhagen scholars have done on the issue of the broadening and deepening of the security agenda, the argument that their theoretical framework is still state-centric could be questioned. As Copenhagen scholars have argued in 1998 book, with the theoretical development of the concept of sectoral security the non-state perspective of the threatened object has been introduced. According to the sectoral approach to security, the referent objects of the potential security threats may as well be found at the sub-state and supra-state level. Yet, due to its nature as the limited collective, which embraces more than a small group of people and less than all humankind, the state level is regarded as the most suitable and durable referent object.⁶⁹ In addition, as Olav Knudsen in the article *Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization* points out, the state is the major collective unit processing the notion of threat and at the same time the unit that gives shape to communal identity and culture. Furthermore, when it comes to providing security for the large collective units, the state is the most efficient instrument of protection, which has the power well beyond the power of any other organization.⁷⁰ That being said, it would be wrong to completely neglect state from security studies. Nevertheless, that does not mean that the security agenda is closed for other objects of the potential threats. The Copenhagen School clearly states that state is the ideal but not the only referent object of security.

It is true that the Copenhagen scholars have developed the concepts of security sectors and securitization as a response to the new challenges in the security agenda of post-Cold

⁶⁸ Wilkinson, "The Copenhagen School in Tour in Kyrgyzstan," 42.

⁶⁹ Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, *Security*, 36.

⁷⁰ Olav F. Knudsen, "Post-Copenhagen Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization," *Security Dialogue* 32, no. 3 (2001): 363.

War Europe. However, considering the further theoretical developments of the concepts during the 1990s, it would not be justifiable to claim that the theoretical framework posed by the Copenhagen School could not be properly applied outside the emerging European-liberal environment. On the contrary, drawing from the fact that Waever developed the concept of security as a speech act from the historical experience of Eastern Europe after the Cold War, it is even possible to argue that the concept of securitization is more applicable in non-liberal settings.⁷¹ Additionally, further theoretical developments of the Copenhagen concepts were motivated by the incentive to conceptualise not Western, liberal but a universal tool for security analysis. Considering that motivation, it could be argued that the role of socio-political context within the securitization framework was intentionally undermined. By not taking into account all finesses of the socio-political context within which securitization takes place, the theory of securitization was able to conceptualise a theoretical framework which could be tested on a wide range of cases. Hence, the securitization theory was conceptualized as an analytical tool for outlining the security dynamics as a linear process, which does not take into consideration specific socio-political developments in any given environment. In other words, if the aim was to create a comprehensive tool for security analysis that has the ability to be generally applied, the Copenhagen Scholars have done their deed.

Following the presented debate about the universal nature of the Copenhagen theoretical framework and its possible applicability outside the European-liberal environment, this thesis aims to strengthen the position of scholars who argue that the securitization framework could be applied to a wide range of cases. By addressing the issues of the (essential) meaning of security and the (extraordinary) consequences that come after the enforcement of security, within the frame of the securitization theory, this thesis intends to back up the notion of the universal value of the theory. The main arguments are developed

⁷¹ Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization," 54-57.

through the answers to the questions: why one does security and what is being done with security? While dealing with these questions, a special emphasis will be placed on the non-democratic, non-liberal political context within which the securitization process may take place.

2.2 *Why One Does Security?*

With new developments in the European security agenda in the post-Cold War period, the Copenhagen School has engaged in the conceptualization of analytical tools that would provide accurate explanation of the new changes in the agenda. In their conceptual efforts, the Copenhagen scholars have been led by the desire to develop analytical concepts that would alienate the interpretation of the dynamic of security processes from the traditional, state and military-centric understanding of security. The scholars argued that new analytical tools for security analysis had to be developed in order for scholars to be able to empirically study the new concept of security. As a result of these incentives the scholars have developed the concept of sectoral security, which introduced non-military and non-state perspective of potential threats, and the securitization theory that was conceptualized as a universal tool for analysing security dynamics in the contemporary world. The aim of the theory was to analyse the “attribution of the security problems to specific sources”⁷² through the questions: “who can “do” or “speak” security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effect?”⁷³

The development of the concept of sectoral security and the securitization theory were not the only consequences of the Copenhagen theoretical efforts. By conceptualizing these new analytical tools for the empirical analyses of the new security dynamics, the Copenhagen

⁷² Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, *Security*, 44.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 27.

scholars have taken part in the debate about the question: What does the concept of security actually stand for? The reflections upon this question became so common in the security studies scholarship that David Baldwin described the debate as a “cottage industry”⁷⁴ that deals with the redefinition of the traditional meaning of security. In order to distance the meaning of the concept of security from the (traditional) notion of survival, the Copenhagen scholars have argued that “the meaning of the concept lies in its usage and is not something we can define analytically or philosophically according to what would be ‘best’”⁷⁵. Consequently, the scholars have come to the conclusion that “security is what actors make of it”⁷⁶. Put differently, the Copenhagen scholars moved the concept of security from being a given concept to being an issue of practice. Drawing on this assumption, Waever developed the concept of securitization within which security is defined as a speech act.⁷⁷ By delivering a speech act the securitizing actor constructs an issue as a security issue. The concept of securitization was later developed into the theory of securitization, which has emerged as “a unified analytical framework that accounts for the manner in which security is contextually produced and practically deployed by relevant actors.”⁷⁸

However, the above presented argument - that with the development of the securitization theory, which defined security as a speech act, and the concepts of sectoral security that led to the broadening and deepening of the security agenda, the Copenhagen scholars moved from the traditional understanding of security - has been challenged by the critics. As Felix Ciuta in his critical evaluation of the securitization theory in the article *Security and the problem of context: hermeneutical critique of securitization theory* points

⁷⁴ David Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 1 (1997): 5.

⁷⁵ Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, *Security*

⁷⁶ Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 48.

⁷⁷ Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 55.

⁷⁸ Felix Ciuta, “Security and the problem of context: a hermeneutical critique of securitization theory,” *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 1 (2009): 306.

out, the theoretical framework of the securitization theory has not yet departed the concept of security from the (traditional) notion of survival. The Copenhagen scholars were still relying on the logic of survival while making an effort to define security as an intersubjective and socially constructed practice. As noticed by Ciuta, in the 1998 Copenhagen book security is described as a “survival in the face of existential threat, but what constitutes an existential threat is not the same across different sectors”⁷⁹. Therefore, Ciuta rightfully claims that for the Copenhagen School the intersubjective construction of security is divided in the area where it can and cannot happen. Within the securitization framework this division is presented in a way that the construction of security has been reduced to the “successful production of the ‘label security’”⁸⁰, but the label itself (the meaning of security) is excluded from the construction.⁸¹ In addition, Jef Huysmans in the article *Security! What Do You Mean? : From Concept to Thick Signifier* argues that the broadening and deepening of the security agenda has led to adding adjectives to the noun ‘security’, but has failed to deal with the meaning of the noun itself.⁸² With that being said, it is possible to support Ciuta’s argument that the Copenhagen efforts to move security from the traditional interpretations of the concept have led to the reinforcement of the claim that “security always means survival in the face of existential threat”⁸³.

Although, Ciuta, while critically evaluating the securitization theory, makes an argument that the concept of security should be conceptualised without making a reference to the notion of survival, it is hard to think of a way in which one would define security outside the implication to survival. Furthermore, the very link between security and survival, made within the securitization framework, could be seen as a contribution to the general empirical

⁷⁹ Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, *Security*, 27.

⁸⁰ Felix Ciuta, “Security and the problem of context,” 309.

⁸¹ Ibid., 306-309.

⁸² Jef Huysmans, “Security! What Do You Mean? : From Concept to Thick Signifier,” *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 2 (1998): 227.

⁸³ Felix Ciuta, “Security and the problem of context,” 397.

applicability of the framework. With that being said, this thesis argues that, by retaining the notion of survival within their theoretical framework, the Copenhagen scholars have addressed the basic question: why one does security in the first place? The answer to this question, in a more or less opened manner, is pointed out in the 1998 Copenhagen book: “the fear that other party will not let us survive as a subject is the fundamental motivation”⁸⁴ for the security (speech) act. By emphasising that survival is what motivates the security speech act through which an issue is constructed as an existential threat, the general applicability of the securitization theory is strengthened even more. The concern about the survival of the referent object may be a common thing that motivates the security speech act, and thus the securitization process, in any political context.

Even though it could be argued that the securitization framework is not dependent on the context within which the securitization process may take place, the same cannot be claimed for the nature of the referent (threatened) object. As pointed out by the Copenhagen scholars the “securitizing actor can attempt to construct anything as a referent object”⁸⁵; although, depending on the context, some referent objects are more likely to be successfully securitized than others. Therefore, when applying the securitization theoretical framework for the analysis of a specific empirical case, and in order to be able to present valuable answers to the questions: “who can “do” or “speak” security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effect?”⁸⁶, security analysts should look more thoroughly into the socio-political context within which securitization takes place. Juha Vuori’s article *Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders* is a good reference point on this issue.

⁸⁴ Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, *Security*, 26.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 36.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 27.

While making an argument that the securitization theoretical framework should be applied for the empirical analysis of the security dynamic even in non-democratic political systems, because “also states that have no democracy have security issues”⁸⁷, Vuori deals with the illocutionary logic of the securitization speech act, the function of securitization, the role of the audience, and the distinction between normal and special (extraordinary) politics within the non-democratic socio-political context. Later on, these discussions about the securitization process in non-democratic political systems were tested on two empirical cases from the security agenda of the People’s Republic of China.

Drawing on the results of the theoretical discussion and the empirical analysis, Vuori concludes that considering that securitization speech acts can have various political functions, the securitization framework can be a useful tool for studying non-democratic political systems.⁸⁸

In order to determine whether the theory of securitization is context dependent, Vuori analyses the illocutionary logic of the securitization speech act. According to Vuori, only by making a deeper inquiry into the logic of illocutionary speech act it can be argued that the securitization theory applies universally.⁸⁹ He thus goes back to basic assumptions of J. L. Austin and John Searle’s speech act theory. The speech act theory asserts that all human languages share the same “constitutive rules that lie beneath the conventional semantic structures of different languages”⁹⁰. In other words, different languages are just culturally dependent conventional realizations of the universal and identical underlying rules.⁹¹ By this logic, the illocutionary speech act, although contingent upon historical and cultural factors must rely on these universal rules. Moreover, if securitization is conceptualized as an instance

⁸⁷ Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization,” 69.

⁸⁸ Ibid. 93.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 65.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 73.

⁹¹ Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization,” 73.

of illocutionary speech act, it should also be contingent upon these universal rules. Consequently, Vuori concludes, “If security issues are constructed through a process of speech act, they should be constructed through the same mechanism in all societies”⁹². Perhaps this universality beneath the illocutionary speech act can also account for the fact that regardless of context it is hard to separate security language from the language of survival.

Even though, by emphasising the role of illocutionary logic within the securitization theory, Vuori makes a valid contribution to the general applicability of the theory, for the purpose of this thesis his reflections upon the characteristics of non-democratic regimes and the functions of security have an equal value. According to Vuori, security and thus securitization can serve not only for the breaking free of rules but also for other purposes that can vary on the context. By appealing to the role of security as a strong legitimate, Vuori points out that security in non-democratic political settings may be used for the reproduction of the political order, the maintenance of the discipline and the establishment of the control in the society.⁹³ Faced with the lack of legitimacy on their side, the very existence of non-democratic political regimes is constantly challenged. As a consequence, for those kinds of political systems security and securitization serves as a political tool for the reproduction of the ruling regimes. With this being said, it is possible to argue that in most cases the underlying motivation for the security speech act within non-democratic political context may be found in the need for the survival of the very regime. Nevertheless, in order to secure the survival of the regime, the ruling political elites are most likely to use the security speech act which presents the community at large as the referent object that is faced with an existential threat. As an empirical example of this reasoning, one could analyse security

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid., 69.

processes within Eastern European countries before the democratic changes and even the process of the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

However, although non-democratic regimes do not need the support of audience in the same way as democratic regimes, Vuori makes an argument that the audience still occupies a significant place within the securitization process even in non-democratic settings. As Vuori rightfully points out, non-democratic regimes may not have the same political legitimacy as democratic regimes, but that does not imply that they function without any kind of public consent.⁹⁴ That being said, Matti Wibeg is just in asserting that “all types of governments need legitimacy exercised through the minimum of both persuasion and coercion in order to survive”⁹⁵. In addition to this, and with the reference on the role of security as a legitimator, it is possible to claim that the securitization in non-democratic political regimes is the only way by which political regimes can uphold some kind of public support.

Following the presented argument and drawing from Thierry Balzacq’s distinction between moral support, which comes from the general public, and formal support that can be described as an institutional support for the specific governmental policies, presented in Paul Roe’s article *Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK’s Decision to Invade Iraq*, it could be argued that legitimacy in non-democratic regimes relies more on the moral than on the formal support of the audience.⁹⁶ Due to the non-democratic nature of the political regime, the authority of the ruling political elites does not come from the formally obtained support of the general public through the election process. Thus, with the lack of legitimate support - which could additionally be defined as the time-limited political mandate that government upholds from the general public through the election

⁹⁴ Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization,” 69.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Paul Roe, “Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK’s Decision to Invade Iraq,” *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 6 (2008): 620.

process - it is possible to argue that the moral public consent and thus moral legitimacy for the survival of non-democratic regimes becomes more valuable. Put differently, the moral support of the audience becomes an important aspect that keeps the non-democratic regime in power.

Furthermore, in non-democratic regimes the audience, as community at large, may not be the instance that decides upon the security nature of the presented issue but it is still the instance that has to legitimize in some way the existential measures that were taken in order to deal with this issue. As Vuori rightfully points out, through the classification of securitization processes in the non-democratic political context, “sometimes actions already taken in secret or in public are legitimated through a security argument”⁹⁷. With this type of securitization, the audience, as the “evaluators of political legitimacy”⁹⁸, is the instance that accepts extraordinary measures as necessary. Therefore, the securitizing actor does not have to obtain any support from the audience in order to be able to break free of the rules of normal politics, but still he has to obtain its consent for the measures that were taken after the break happened. This being said, it is possible to claim that even in a non-democratic context, the extraordinary measures have to be backed up in some way by the consent of the general public.

Even though Vuori deals with the concept of extraordinary measures in order to be able to determine the role of the audience as the one giving the consent to the securitization process even in the non-democratic context, the concept itself has an additional, equally important role. Vuori is right to argue that the audience through the acceptance of extraordinary measures gives legitimacy to the construction of security by the securitizing actor, and thus to the non-democratic political regime. Nevertheless, I argue that the concept

⁹⁷ Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization,” 83.

⁹⁸ Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization,” 85.

of extraordinary measures has one more important role that provides help for security analysts in determining if the process of securitization took place within a non-democratic political context. This role is to establish the difference between the realms of normal and extraordinary politics.

2.3. *What is Being Done with Security?*

The Western and European nature of the fundamental concepts of the securitization theory was not the only issue that the critiques of the theory have posed as an obstacle for applying the theory in a non-Western and non-democratic environment. As Vuori points out, the critics have argued that due to the nature of non-democratic political regimes it is impossible to establish the difference between the realm of normal and extraordinary politics, and thus to determine if securitization took place. The reason for this claim could be found in the assumption that normal politics, within the securitization framework, automatically implies democracy and democratic rules.⁹⁹ Continuing from this assumption, securitization becomes the breaking free of democratic rules or the failure of democracy as a norm of normal politics. Consequently, the realm of extraordinary politics is being distinguished from the realm of normal politics by the non-democratic rules of decision-making. Thus, by conceptualising the securitization framework in this way its applicability in the context that could not be described as democratic becomes absurd.

However, as Vuori points out, the arguments about democracy being a norm of the normal politics could be put to question. According to Vuori, securitization implies breaking free of rules and the nature of such rules is not pre-defined as democratic. Any society is founded on some kind of rules that are results of the socio-political developments, and which provide functioning of societies as such. Those rules constitute the realm of normal politics

⁹⁹ Vuori, "Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization," 68.

and thus their breaking could be determined as stepping in the realm of extraordinary politics.¹⁰⁰ With that being said, Vuori comes to the conclusion that the Copenhagen concept of securitization through breaking free of rules could be applied in any environment regardless of the socio-political context.

Even though Vuori's argument makes a valid contribution to the applicability of the securitization theory in the non-democratic political context, the presented distinction between the realms of normal and extraordinary politics could be approached from a different angle. By making a claim that the realm of extraordinary politics in non-democratic regimes is constituted by breaking free from the 'rules of the game', Vuori emphasises that securitization even in a non-democratic setting is about the process of making decision. Yet, within a non-democratic environment that claim could be contested considering that in the non-democratic political context it is not always possible to determine what the 'rules of the game' are and most importantly it is not possible to determine what are the rules by which the decision-making process is conducted. Consequently, breaking free of rules in such context does not contribute much to the distinction between the realm of normal and extraordinary politics.

The difference between the realm of normal and extraordinary politics in non-democratic political context is even harder to establish considering that due to the lack of formal support non-democratic political regimes are using security as a legitimizing means. In order to secure their survival the ruling political elites usually contaminate the realm of normal politics with potential security threats for the community at large. Consequently, the realm of extraordinary politics becomes difficult to define in the environment where normal politics is constantly dealing with potential extraordinary threats. Nevertheless, that does not

¹⁰⁰ Vuori, "Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization," 69.

lead to the conclusion that due to the lack of means by which the realm of extraordinary politics could be defined securitization cannot take place within the non-democratic political context. By applying Waever's distinction between insecurity and security, the presented problem could be dealt with. As Waever points out, "security and insecurity do not constitute a binary opposition. Security signifies a situation marked by the presence of security problem and some measures taken in response. Insecurity is a situation with a security problem and no response."¹⁰¹ Thus, for non-democratic regimes the realm of normal politics could be described as insecurity and the realm of extraordinary politics, where the specific security measures are being enforced, as security.

While keeping this distinction in mind, it is possible to claim that the difference between the realm of normal and extraordinary politics, within the socio-political context that lacks the transparency of the decision-making process, could be determined with the answer to the question: what is being done with security as a speech act? Contrary to Vuori, for whom 'breaking free of rules' constitutes the realm of extraordinary politics, I argue that the very (extraordinary) security measures that have been taken in order to deal with the existential threat are what makes the necessary distinction between normal and extraordinary politics within the securitization framework.

By questioning Vuori's the claim that securitization is about the process of making decisions, this thesis challenges the role of extraordinary (emergency) measures within the Copenhagen securitization framework. According to the Copenhagen scholars, in order to have the case of securitization emergency measures do not have to be enforced. What is enough for securitization to take place is the bare acceptance of the existential threat that provides the legitimate support for the platform from which those measures could be

¹⁰¹ Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization," 56.

introduced. Drawing from that logic, the Copenhagen scholars conclude that the success of securitization process is defined as a legitimate break of the rules.¹⁰²

However, the above-presented reasoning does not take into account the cases where securitization may take place without breaking ‘the rules of the game’. Put differently, extraordinary measures, such as war, increase of armament, mass expulsion, arms race, organized mass murders of the population, can be put in force even without the necessity to break free of the rules. Consequently, the only criterion that indicates that the process of securitization happened in those circumstances is the enforced emergency measures. Therefore, in order to determine if the securitization process occurred, the security analyst should not take into consideration the decision-making process and ‘rules of the game’, but the existential measures that have been imposed with the purpose of securing the survival of the referent object.

This being said and keeping in mind the presented argument on the motives behind the security speech act, this thesis moves to the empirical case study. In order to provide support for the claim that the securitization framework, as a universal tool for the analysis of the security dynamics, could be applied in any socio-political context the, 1962 Cuban Missile Crises will be examined with the purpose of determining whether the securitization in Cuba during the crises happened in the first place.

2.4 Methodology

In order to determine if the process of securitization took place during the 1960s events in Cuba, this thesis will apply methods of process tracing and the discourse analysis on the available materials on this topic. Considering lack of the empirical date, especially

¹⁰² Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, *Security*, 25.

date that concerns the role of the Cuban government in 1962 events, the analysis of the events will be even more challenging.

For the purpose of identifying the chain of events, before and during the Cuban Missile Crises, I will use the process tracing analysis. This analysis will be orientated on examining data collected from the available official documents, scholarly work on the topic of the Cuban missile crisis, correspondence of the Cuban government and documents that concern this issue from the United States' and the Soviet Union's government. The aim of applying process tracing analysis is to point out the causal link between concrete steps taken by the Cuban government at that time, and to connect these steps to the process of constructing insecurity. In other words, with the process tracing method it would be possible to identify the dynamic of the securitization process and the success of the securitization move.

In addition, and in order to identify the relation between the Cuban political government and the Cuban community, the official available statements for the domestic public, published by the newspaper agencies or the governmental institutions, will be examined using discourse analysis. The method of discourse analysis, as the most efficient method for ascertaining the construction of insecurity, will help me to identify how was the issue of the United States' threat constructed as existential threat for the Cuban political elite and community, as the audiences that were to justify the placement of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles on the Cuban soil.

CHAPTER 3: THE OCTOBER CRISES

3.1 Historical Background

The Cuban Missile Crisis, or the Caribbean Crises, or the October Crisis, depending on the interpretation of involved actors¹⁰³, was one of the most dangerous confrontations in the Cold War era. According to the historian Arthur Schlesinger the crises was not only the most dangerous confrontation of the Cold War, it was also “the most dangerous moment in human history”¹⁰⁴. The two Cold War superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were deciding about the possibility of the Third (nuclear) World War. The crises began on the ‘Black Saturday’ October 16, 1962 when the United States’ government was presented with photographic evidence, discovered by U-2 spy plain, of the medium-range ballistic missiles site in Cuba.¹⁰⁵ This discovery was followed by the United States’ navy “blockade against all ships that were carrying ‘offensive military’ cargoes to Cuba”¹⁰⁶, the transportation of the Soviet nuclear warheads closer to the missile sites, the shot down of the United States U-2 spy plane and firing at the United States aircrafts that were flying-low over Cuba, the submarine incident, and the finalization of the plan for all-out invasion of Cuba. Considering the gravity of the situation Michael Dobbs is right to claim that any of these incidents could have resulted in a nuclear confrontation.¹⁰⁷ Yet, after the thirteen days of ‘standing on the brink of nuclear war’ the United States and Soviet Union’s governments reached a settlement. The Soviet nuclear missiles were removed from Cuba and in return the

¹⁰³ In the United States the crisis is known as the Cuban missile crisis, in the Soviet Union as The Caribbean crises, and in Cuba as the October crises.

¹⁰⁴ Michael Dobbs, *One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War* (New York: Random House, Inc., 2008): xiii.

¹⁰⁵ Aleksandr Fursenko, and Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev’s Cold War* (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2006): 465.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 475.

¹⁰⁷ Dobbs, *One Minute to Midnight*, xiv.

United States agreed to withdraw its nuclear missiles from Turkey and to pledge that the sovereignty of Cuba would not be threatened by a possible invasion.¹⁰⁸

This unprecedented Cold War confrontation soon became the subject of a wide range of scholarly work. The scholars, especially those interested in international relations, analysed the Cuban missile case as an ideal case of the Cold War politics. As Jutta Weldes and Mark Laffey in their article *Decolonizing the Cuban Missile Crisis* point out, in academia the Cuban missile crisis was viewed as a perfect case for studying decision-making process, nuclear proliferation, politics of deterrence and crises management. In addition to this, Laffey Weldes rightfully notes that - although a wide range of scholarly work has been done on this topic - the crisis has been presented from the perspective of the two Cold War superpowers. The role of the third party, the Cuban government, has been mostly neglected.¹⁰⁹ “Simply put, Cuba didn’t mater in the Cuban missile crisis.”¹¹⁰ Therefore, Laffey and Weldes in their article argue that scholars, while analysing the events of the October 1962, should pay greater attention to the role of Cuba in confrontation that is known as the Cuban missile Crisis.¹¹¹

With above being said, this thesis follows the recommendations mad by Laffey and Weldes. Considering that there would be no Cuban missile crisis without involvement of the Cuban government, this thesis will try to offer a third possible perspective of the 1962 confrontation. The role of the Cuban government will be analysed through the theoretical framework of securitization theory. The purpose of this analysis is to examine whether the theory of securitization could be applied for studying security processes in non-democratic socio-political context. Although, due to the lack of empirical data available, the case of Cuba may not be ideal for the testing of the theory this very obstacle is a valuable challenge for the

¹⁰⁸ Johan Swift, “The Cuban Missile Crises,” *History Review*, (March, 2007): 10-11.

¹⁰⁹ Mark Laffey, and Jutta Weldes, “Decolonizing the Cuban Missile Crisis,” *International Study Quarterly* 52, (2008): 555.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

applicability of the securitization theory in the non-democratic political settings, which are known for being not so transparent.

Therefore, this thesis will analysis if the securitization process took place in Cuba during the 1962 events. For that purpose special attention will be place on the role of emergency (extraordinary) measures and the motivation behind those security measures. In addition to that, and with the reference to Vuori's classification of securitization processes in the non-democratic political context, this thesis will try to determine what kind of securitization may have happened in Cuba during the October crisis.

3.2 Becoming a Communist

In January 1959 a new revolutionary regime was established in Cuba after the overthrow of the Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista by the 26th of July revolutionary movement led by Fidel Castro. The United State, although being an ally of the overthrown dictator, supported the revolution and the newly established government.¹¹² In return, only four months after the revolution, Fidel Castro visited the United State as a guest of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. During the visit Castro emphasised that the Cuban revolution was not communist revolution, and that the new government was not communist.¹¹³ Yet, the American government had some scepticism concerning this issue. As Richard Roy Rubottom, the assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs in charged for Castro's visit, concludes Castro was an enigma.¹¹⁴

However, the relations between Cuba and the United States moved in different direction during the 1960s. The Cuban revolutionary government, faced with internal

¹¹² Swift, "The Cuban Missile Crises," 6.

¹¹³ Aleksandr Fursenko, and Timothy Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1958-1964* (London: Pimilico, 1999): 5-6.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 19.

economic challenges and high rate of poverty and in order to maintain the position of power, enforced the nationalization of all foreign-owned private properties.¹¹⁵ As a response to this measure the United States' government imposed economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba. Thus, the quotas on the sugar imported from Cuba to the United States were placed. By doing so the United States deprived the Cuban government from the main source of external income.¹¹⁶ As Fursenko and Naftali note, Cuba has not been able to meet its domestic needs even before the embargo was placed, and this measure contributed even more to the deterioration of the economic situation.¹¹⁷ In addition, the United States' government decided to protect its interest in Cuba even with military means. The 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, which was planned during the Eisenhower and carried out during the Kennedy's administration, is good example of this strategy.¹¹⁸ Yet, the Cuban revolutionary regime managed to stay in power, and further more it managed to gain a powerful ally.

Even though the Bay of Pigs invasion secured public support for the Castro's regime, the following economic crises produced public discontent. The dissatisfying economic situation and unpopular social measures, which were result of the bad economic policy, the Cuban revolutionary regime. The public support for the ruling political elite was in decline. The situation aggravated even more when Castro in December 1961 publicly declared himself to be a communist "who intended to lead Cuba through a socialist revolution"¹¹⁹. This statement caused division in within the Cuban political establishment and society. Not all that supported revolutionary government were for the new path of communism. As Khrushchev pointed out Castro's statement had "the immediate effect of widening the gap between himself and the people who were against Socialism, and it narrowed the circle of

¹¹⁵ Swift, "The Cuban Missile Crises," 6.

¹¹⁶ Fursenko, and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, 162.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Swift, "The Cuban Missile Crises," 7.

¹¹⁹ Fursenko, and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, 161.

those he could count on for support”¹²⁰ Therefore, it could be argued that the legitimacy of the Castro’s government, which was founded on the 1956 national revolutionary heritage, was facing serious challenges. The domestic power position had to be consolidated by appealing to the days of revolution and the potential imperialist threat. In the 1961 radio interview about the currency reform, the Cuban Prime Minister Castro, while discussing the security of the country, clearly describes the United States as a potential source of sabotages and funds for counterrevolutionary, terrorist organizations.¹²¹ With this being said, it could be claimed that the Cuban Prime Minister used the potential threat from the United States as a political tool for giving legitimacy to the changes that its regime was enforcing.

Nevertheless, the possibility of the potential threat from the United States was not just used as an instrument for consolidation of the revolutionary, now communist, regime in Cuba. The possibility of the new invasion of Cuba by the United States was used for enhancing the newly formed alliance between Cuba and the Soviet Union. Under the pretext of possible invasion, the Cuban government managed to facilitate the sales of arms from the Warsaw Pact countries and to receive a ten-year credit arrangement.¹²² As Fursenko and Naftali point out, “a KGB report on Cuban perception of the American threat arrived on April 20, and a day later the Kremlin decreed the necessity ‘to render urgent assistance to the Cuban government’”¹²³. However, the Soviet assistance did not end just with military and economic arrangements. In order to protect the Cuban revolution and prevent possible invasion, in May 1962 the delegation of the Soviet Union arrived to Cuba with unprecedented offer. The Cuban government was presented with the new plan of the defence that relied on

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Fidel Castro, “On Currency Reform,” Havana, Revolution, August 9, 1961. under <http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1961/19610809.html> (Accessed: 24. 05. 2011)

¹²² Fursenko, and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, 46.

¹²³ Ibid., 46.

the placement of the Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles on the Cuban soil. Unexpectedly, the Cubans accepted this extraordinary offer within two days.¹²⁴

Drawing on the above-presented chain of events, it is possible to argue that the securitization process in Cuba could have taken place. Starting from 1961, with the economic crisis and the Bay of Pigs invasion, the possible threat from the United States to the revolutionary Cuba has become a part of the everyday politics. According to the Cuban political establishment, the danger the United States' sabotages was not affecting just security of the country, but also the country's economy, agriculture, currency reform and social politics.¹²⁵ The potential threats from the United States soon enough became a political tool for the consolidation (legitimization) of the regime itself. Even more, this "fear that other party will not let us survive"¹²⁶ led the Cuban government to the acceptance of the Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles, even though the consequences of that extraordinary measure could have been devastating not just for the regime but also for the Cuban population.

Yet, the critics could pose an argument that, due to the lack of insight in the decision-making process in the Cuban government, it is not possible to describe the Cubans decision to accept the Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles as a case of securitization. From their point of view, considering the non-democratic nature of the Cuban regime it is not possible to determine that the decision to accept missiles was in fact a case of 'breaking the rules of the game'. By relying on this logic, critics too quickly jump to the conclusion that securitization did not happened without taking in consideration the role of extraordinary measures. The very extraordinary measures – in the Cuban case the acceptance and placement of the Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles – could be the reference point for determining if the securitization process took place within a non-democratic political context. With that being

¹²⁴ Ibid., 178-183.

¹²⁵ Castro, "On Currency Reform," Havana, Revolution, August 9, 1961. under <http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1961/19610809.html> (Accessed: 24. 05. 2011)

¹²⁶ Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, *Security*, 26.

said, this thesis argues that securitization in Cuba could have happened. In order to provide additional evidence for this argument, Vuori's classification of securitization processes in the non-democratic political context will be applied to the Cuban case.

3.3 What Kind of Securitization?

Based on the role of audience as the final legitimator, even in non-democratic political context, Vuori - in the article *Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders* - makes a classification of the securitization processes. By emphasising that securitization cannot take place without some kind of support from the audience and drawing on the illocutionary force of security speech acts, Vuori develop distinction between four types of securitization: securitization for raising an issue on the security agenda, securitization for deterrence, securitization for legitimating past acts, and securitization for the control.¹²⁷ Therefore, based on this classification, and considering the chain of the events in 1962 Cuba and the role of audience viewed as general public in these events, this thesis argues that the security dynamics that led to the placement of the Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles on the Cuban soil could be described as a securitization for legitimating past event.

As Fursenko and Naftali note, the Cuban government kept the new type of the Soviet assistance in secret from the Cuban public. The Cuban leadership only after accepting the Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles planed to launch a campaign in order to gain public support for this measure.¹²⁸ Yet, with the photographs of the missile sites that were taken by the United States' U-2 spy plain and the navy blockade that followed, the existence of the Soviet missiles had to be justified to the Cuban public without hesitations. Thus, on the

¹²⁷ Vuori, "Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization," 75-75.

¹²⁸ Aleksandr Fursenko, and Timothy Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, 220.

October 24, 1962 Castro official interview on the October crisis was broadcasted on all television and radio stations in Cuba. In the interview Castro made a claim that the established navy blockade of the Cuban island was just another step in the United States' imperialistic politics towards the revolutionary Cuba. As he emphasised, "all these measures do not surprise us. Measures of this type and others which we have had to endure are things which were logically to be expected from a type of government which is as reactionary and as lacking in respect of other peoples and other nations as is the U.S. Government."¹²⁹ In addition to this Castro warned the United States government would turn to even more radical measures in order to deal with the Cuban revolution. While describing the United States actions against Cuba, he concluded that "it has been the story of an uninterrupted chain of failure leading the imperialists, who have not resigned themselves, who will not resign themselves, despite the fact that they have no choice but to resign themselves--a series of more adventurous, more aggressive, and more dangerous steps for the sole purpose of destroying the Cuban revolution."¹³⁰ Therefore, in order to deal with this kind of threat and protect the revolutionary heritage, the Cuban government had to rely on the support of the Soviet Union. Castro explained the acquisition of the ballistic missiles through the hostile intentions of the United States. He argued that "if the U.S. Government did not harbor any aggressive intentions toward our country it would not be interested in the quantity, quality, or type of our weapons."¹³¹

Drawing on the above-presented intentions and actions of the Cuban political establishment, and with the reference to the Vuori's classification of the securitization processes, it is possible to claim that the decision of the Cuban government to accept the Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles had to be at some point backed up by the Cuban

¹²⁹ Fidel Castro, "23 October Interview," Havana, October 24, 1962. under: <http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1962/19621024.html> (Accessed: 24. 05. 2011)

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

public. Yet, the decision when the public support is going to be asked for was made by the events in October 1962. Faced with the charges from the United States government for possessing dangerous 'offensive weapon', the Cuban political establishment had to explain the acquirement of the Soviet missiles. The Cuban public had to be convinced that the regime's decision to place ballistic missiles in Cuban soil was necessary measure against the threats that were coming from the United States. With that being said, and considering that the Cuban revolutionary regime is still in power, it is possible to argue that the securitizing move made by the Cuban government for the purpose of legitimizing past actions (acquirement of the ballistic missiles) was in fact a successful securitization. Thus, this thesis concludes that the Copenhagen securitization theory could be used as a general analytical tool for studying the dynamic of security processes regardless of the socio-political context.

CONCLUSION

In order to make a genuine contribution to the security studies scholarship the scholars within the Copenhagen Conflict and Peace Institute, later on known as the Copenhagen School, have developed the concept of sectoral security and the securitization theory. These developments were conceptualised as universal tools for the analysis of the contemporary security processes. Yet, not all scholars agreed upon the universal value of the Copenhagen contributions. The critics have argued that the Copenhagen theoretical developments were internally inconsistent, conceptualised on the Western, European historical experience and thus applicable only within the European, liberal settings. In addition, Clair Wilkinson claims that the Copenhagen theory of securitization could not be viewed as a general analytical tool considering the undermined role of the socio-political context in its theoretical framework.¹³² This criticism did not pass without reply. The scholars argued that the fact that Copenhagen developments have been developed from the European experience was not a good enough reason to characterised them as particularly European.¹³³ Moreover, Juha Vuori posed a claim that, due to its illocutionary logic, the securitization theory could be applied not just for studying the security dynamic in democratic political context but also in non-democratic ones.¹³⁴ As a result of this critiques and replies, within the security studies scholarship the debate was opened upon the question: whether the Copenhagen securitization theory is context dependent?

Following arguments made by both sides of the debate, this thesis aims to support scholars who argue that the securitization theory is not context dependent. By dealing with the issues of the motivation behind the security speech act the consequences of the

¹³² Wilkinson, "The Copenhagen School in Tour in Kyrgyzstan," 22.

¹³³ Jef Huysmans, "Revisiting Copenhagen," 483.

¹³⁴ Vuori, "Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization," 69.

securitization process it is possible to strengthen the assumption about the general applicability of the securitization theory even more. Considering that the motivation behind the security can be described as survival of the threatened (referent) object, it could be argued that this motivation is the same in any socio-political settings. Consequently, the need to survive in the face of existential threat is what moves an issue from normal to extraordinary politics. In addition, this thesis questions the Copenhagen assumption that 'breaking free of rules' is a sufficient criterion for determining the difference between the realm of normal and extraordinary politics, and thus the success of the securitization process. The Copenhagen scholars argue that for the success of securitization process it is enough to determine that 'the rules of the game' were broken, without referring to the emergency (extraordinary) measures. Yet, this reasoning does not take into account the possible cases where the emergency measures were put in force according to the established rules. The possible solution for this problem could be seen in moving the focus of the securitization theoretical framework from the way security decisions are made (decision-making process) to the question what actually is done by security. Therefore, this thesis suggests that the very extraordinary measures can serve as a norm for defining the realm of normal and extraordinary politics, and thus for determining the success of securitization, not just in non-democratic but also in Western, liberal regimes.

In order to test these theoretical assertions the case of the Cuban missile crisis was analysed with the purpose of determining if securitization in Cuba during the events in October 1962 took place. During the analysis, the emphasis was put on the role of the Cuban political establishment which in order to secure its survival from the possible threats resorted to extraordinary means. The fear of the United States' invasion led the Cuban government to accept the placement of the Soviet ballistic missiles on the Cuban soil. During the United States navy blockade, these measures were revealed to the Cuban public with the purpose of

upholding the support and legitimacy in the face of possible invasion. With that being said, and with the reference to Vuori's classification of the securitization processes in non-democratic political context and the role of extraordinary measures, it is possible to argue that the securitization process took place in Cuba during the Cuban missile crises. Consequently, this thesis ends with the conclusion that the securitization theory, as the analytical tool for grasping the dynamic of security processes, has the same applicability in any socio-political context.

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