

THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV CONFLICT REFLECTED IN THE PRESS OF COLD WAR AUSTRIA, 1948-1950

By
Charlotte Thausing

Submitted to
Central European University
Department of History

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master

Supervisor: Professor Marsha Siefert
2nd Reader: Professor Alfred Rieber

Budapest, Hungary
2011

Copyright in the text of this thesis rests with the Author. Copies by any process, either in full or part, may be made only in accordance with the instructions given by the Author and lodged in the Central European Library. Details may be obtained from the librarian. This page must form a part of any such copies made. Further copies made in accordance with such instructions may not be made without the written permission of the Author

ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to describe the representation of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute in the Austrian press. The analysis is based on articles published in three different newspapers, each with their own political view, readership and purpose. The Soviet-Yugoslav dispute had a great impact on the ongoing State Treaty discussions, which brought about Austria's freedom.

In the first stages of the discussions Yugoslavia demanded the territory of southern Carinthia. The newspapers used for this analysis all had a different attitude towards this claim, which they represented in their articles. With the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform the whole political situation in Austria changed and so did the perception of the press.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all I want to thank my parents Elisabeth and Johannes Thausing for providing me the opportunity to study here in Budapest.

I also would like to make a special reference to Prof. Marsha Siefert, who assisted and encouraged me until the final hour.

I especially want to dedicate this thesis to my brave sister Valerie Thausing and our new family member Anatol Leonidas, the most cheerful surprise of this year.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iv
INTRODUCTION	1
1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM	2
1.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT & HISTORIOGRAPHY	2
1.2 METHODOLOGY AND PRIMARY SOURCES	11
2. NEGOTIATING ON AUSTRIA: THE FIRST DISAGREEMENTS	16
2.1 THE QUESTION OF GERMAN ASSETS	17
2.2 THE DANUBE QUESTION	20
2.3 THE CARINTHIAN QUESTION	21
3. THE COMINFORM RESOLUTION: THE YUGOSLAV EXPULSION, JUNE 29TH 1948	27
3.1 THE DANUBE CONFERENCE, AUGUST 1948	29
3.2 A SPARK OF HOPE FOR A STATE TREATY	30
3.3 YUGOSLAVIA TOWARD THE WEST	38
CONCLUSION	49
BIBLIOGRAPHY	53

INTRODUCTION

This present thesis aims to analyse the split between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union as reflected in the Austrian press. For this purpose I used three different kinds of newspaper and examined the articles referring to the developments occurring with the split. How the press reflected the new circumstances in Austria and its changing relationship with Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was also part of my analysis.

As its neighbouring state Germany, the four Allied countries – France, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union – occupied Austria. However, in contrast to Germany, Austria gained the chance to forge a State Treaty within the first post-war years. Due to the Moscow Declaration of 1943, Austria was perceived as a victim of Nazi aggression and was therefore liberated by the allies.

But as soon as the discussions for a State Treaty started, some hindering factors arose. The Soviets started to make claims for German assets and further property within the Austrian State. In 1947, the Yugoslavs joined the Soviets in claiming for reparation costs. The most crucial demand was nevertheless the claim for the southern Carinthian territory. Because of this, the State Treaty discussions were deferred for another 2 years.

The opening chapter deals with the historical context of the analysis. It also refers to the present historiography linked to the State Treaty discussions and the so-called Carinthian question. The last part of the opening chapter explicates the used methodology and the primary sources.

In the second chapter I will refer to the press interpretations concerning the raised problems and issues during the State Treaty discussion before the Cominform resolution in June 1948.

This chapter aims to clarify the attitude of the press before this biasing event.

The third chapter is the most essential part of this thesis. It starts with the Cominform resolution of the expulsion of Yugoslavia and how this event was presented in the press. The next issue is the Danube conference, which took place a week after the resolution. It is therefore interesting to analyse the Soviet attitude towards Yugoslavia within this conference.

With the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform the Austrians immediately raised hope for a State Treaty. The ongoing discussions, changing attitudes and circumstances will be elaborated in this part.

The last part of the chapter is the Yugoslav turn towards the West. This distinctive step affected once again the State Treaty discussions and, as the Soviets sensed a threat due to the growing Yugoslav influence, they started to look for every opportunity for their troops to remain in Austria.

1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1.1 Historical Context & Historiography

In March 1945 the Red Army crossed the Austrian borders and started liberating the country, including the capital city Vienna, weeks before the Western allies reached it. They managed to install a new provisional government and therefore had momentous influence on Austrian policy-making for the first post-war years.

During the war Austria's resistance groups had already tight connections with Moscow, which certainly was the centre of communist exile. Together with the socialist émigrés in Sweden under the leadership of Bruno Kreisky, the Austrian communists in Moscow designed a concept for the reconstruction of Austria. Most significant for these Austrian resistance groups and refugees was the 'Moscow Declaration', which was presented on November 1st, 1943. It refers to the Memorandum by the British Foreign Office diplomat Geoffrey W. Harrison, in which he postulated the re-establishment of an independent Austria and its integration into a central-eastern European federation.¹ He also accentuated the undeniable responsibility of Austria for participating in the war on the side of Nazi-Germany. The Memorandum encouraged the Austrian resistance against the Nazis and the struggle for an independent Austria.

As the Red Army marched into Austrian territory it did not consider itself as conqueror, but as liberator. In pamphlets the Soviets assured the Austrian population that their only target would be the German occupiers.²

In Vienna the army was welcomed with joy and cheers. In the beginning of April the *Pravda* appealed to the Austrians to assist the Russian troops. On the 14th of April the Russians managed to liberate the whole city of Vienna. As the SS-soldiers drew back, Radio Moscow pronounced

¹ Anton Pelinka/ Rolf Steininger (Ed.), *Österreich und die Sieger. 40 Jahre 2. Republik - 30 Jahre Staatsvertrag*. (Wien: Braumüller 1986) p.111f

² Anton Pelinka/ Rolf Steininger (Ed.), *Österreich und die Sieger. 40 Jahre 2. Republik - 30 Jahre Staatsvertrag*. (Wien: Braumüller 1986) p.114

that the Viennese population, through their successful fight against the Nazis, had recovered their honour. By the end of April Vienna had a new provisional government and a their first president of the Second Republic, Dr. Karl Renner.³

The socialist Renner and the Soviet Union had been in contact even before the Soviets entered Austria. With the Nazi appearance in Vienna, Renner was forced to move to his hometown, to Gloggnitz. In March 1945 he appeared again in public, asking the Austrian inhabitants of his hometown to welcome the Russian troops, which would arrive in the following month. Stalin informed him about their arrival already at the beginning of the month. In this telegram Stalin assured Renner that the Russians would not annex Austria, but would aspire to defeat the fascist occupants. Right after the Soviets brought Renner back to Vienna he wrote the proclamation of an independent Austria.⁴

The transformation of Renner from a citizen to president of Austria began to take shape on the 1st of April. Stalin quickly recognised the value of Renner, an old Socialist of nearly seventy-five years. Already in 1918 Renner was a prominent figure in Austrian politics, his ability to adapt and to shift in the political winds was his trademark. The Soviets confirmed to him that, as announced in the Yalta Declaration, they would only advocate an independent Austria. Renner, not willing to become a puppet of the Soviet Union, summoned a democratically elected *Nationalrat* (parliament) and created the first post-war coalition. The new provisional government consisted of the Social Democrats, with five ministries, the conservative *Volkspartei*, with four ministries, and the Communists, with only two ministries.

The Communists and the Socialists welcomed the entrance of the Red Army, as they saw it as an opportunity to expand their political power.⁵

³ Anton Pelinka/ Rolf Steininger (Ed.), *Österreich und die Sieger. 40 Jahre 2. Republik - 30 Jahre Staatsvertrag*. (Wien: Braumüller 1986) p. 115

⁴ *ibidem* p. 117

⁵ Harry Piotrowski, The Soviet Union and the Renner Government of Austria, April-November 1945. In: *Central European History*, Vol. 20, No. 3/4 (Sep. - Dec., 1987), 252- 256

With the appointment of Renner as president, the Soviets followed a strategy they exerted elsewhere in Eastern Europe. As in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria the Soviets did not attempt to rule through military governments but through local politicians who enjoyed at least minimal sovereignty. In Austria, instead of establishing a formal military government, the Red Army transmitted its orders to city and its district levels. Accordingly, the Soviets tried to install a 'Soviet-friendly' government without overturning the existing political order.⁶ The West, fearing the growth of communist power and Soviet influence hesitated at the beginning to accept the Renner government.⁷ The Western powers feared that Renner would turn into a puppet of the Kremlin, found so frequently among other countries occupied by the Soviet Union. Renner's proclamation of 27th April marked the final decision and wrecked all Western ambitions to install a new formal government. But as Renner urged elections for the Parliament, which automatically diluted the Communist influence, the Western powers realised that he was no figurehead for a Soviet puppet regime. On 20th October they also recognised his government and expanded it to their zones.⁸

In the decades following the end of the war the world began to drift into two opposing blocs. Europe witnessed a permanent struggle of power between the satellites under Soviet predominance and the Western powers - and occupied Austria provided the ground on which the two could confront each other. Seeking freedom Austria tried to accommodate the aspirations of both. The Western powers strongly advocated the restoration of the independence of Austria trying to reconstruct its economic independence, while the U.S.S.R. searched for various reasons to maintain its troops and to squeeze out as much resources as possible. Their discordance had a great impact on the State Treaty discussions, which started in January 1947.⁹ Among the most

⁶ Harry Piotrowski, 'The Soviet Union and the Renner Government of Austria, April-November 1945. In: *Central European History*, Vol. 20, No. 3/4 (Sep. - Dec., 1987) 258

⁷ Harry Piotrowski, 'The Soviet Union and the Renner Government of Austria, April-November 1945. In: *Central European History*, Vol. 20, No. 3/4 (Sep. - Dec., 1987), 263

⁸ Sven Allard, *Russia and the Austrian State Treaty. A case study of Soviet policy in Europe*. (University Park, Pa. [u.a.]: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press.) p.98

⁹ Ghita Ionescu, 'The Austrian State Treaty and Neutrality in Eastern Europe. In: *International Journal*, Vol. 23, No.3 (Summer, 1968), p.409

difficult issues were those related to the Yugoslav question, the Carinthian border dispute and relations with Tito. The Carinthian border dispute was very determining factor in the developing relationship between Austria, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and therefore needs a detailed attention.


The Yugoslav claim for southern Carinthia referred to historical, ethnical, and geographical facts, which should justify a border adjustment. As the Moscow Declaration of October 1943 Yugoslavia stressed the fact that Austria assisted Nazi Germany that, after seizing the Slovene territory, tried to 'cleanse' Carinthia of Slovene culture and language.¹⁰ The Yugoslavs claimed that even after the liberation of Austria, the Carinthian Slovenes would suffer from suppression policy by the Austrian government and the British occupation force.¹¹ After expulsion from the Cominform in June 1948 they returned to the fact of suppression¹², but this time by the Soviet occupation force.¹³

¹⁰ Thomas M. Barker, *The Slovenes of Carinthia. A national minority problem*. (New York [u.a.]: League of CSA, 1960) p.244

¹¹ Tito's speech in Ljubljana May 27, 1945. In: Thomas M. Barker, *The Slovenes of Carinthia. A national minority problem*. (New York [u.a.]: League of CSA, 1960) p.392

¹² The new situation just provided another option for the Yugoslavs to defend the territorial claim and therefore this argument is apparently far-fetched and unproved. Through the interviews I gained during my research, I received the information that most of the Carinthian Slovenes were not aware about this border-debate. Only a small number of radical nationalist Slovenes, principally members of the OF, aspired the integration into Yugoslavia. But even in this case, members a splinter groups of the OF were loyal to Austria. The Carinthians feared the harsh agricultural methods of Tito, in particular the German-Slovenes on the borderland, who were cruelly deprived from their properties after the war and lost all their belongings. Interview with a Carinthian Slovene woman, Katharina Petschnig on 19th April 2011

¹³ Harry Piotrowski, The Soviet Union and the Renner Government of Austria, April-November 1945. In: *Central European History*, Vol. 20, No. 3/4 (Sep. - Dec., 1987), 249



In: K. R. S., Slovene Carinthia: The Austro-Yugoslav Frontier Question. In: *The World Today*, Vol. 3, No. 9 (Sep., 1947) 391

This present thesis emphasises in particular the Foreign Relations between the Austrian Government, the Soviet Union and the Western allies. It uses chiefly Austrian newspapers to examine the affects of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute on Austrian politics and its illustration in the news. It will not refer on the Yugoslav-Austrian relationship after the Second World War, since there is already a well-elaborated study by Petar Dragisic, but it will focus on Austria's relevance in the dispute between the Soviets and the Yugoslavs, and in which way the press justifies and presents the position of Austria.

In the following pages of this opening chapter I will review the relevant historiography and then describe the newspapers and methodology I am using for my analysis.

Historical and social science studies about Austria under allied occupation, the Second Republic, the State Treaty discussions and Austria during the Cold War thematically expanded throughout the last years. Many issues such as zoning, the occupation methods, the motives, practices and influence of the allied forces were of high significance in the new research.

Especially around the year 2005, since it was the 50-year-anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty, appeared great number of publications on Second Republic of Austria. The aim was to call attention to the fallouts of the Second World War and to stress Austria's position in the East-West-struggle during the Cold War. Additionally, the last decade provided further improvement and through the availability of new sources, so open questions could be resolved and new could be posed. Documents on diplomatic correspondence and political decisions, provided by foreign institutions, such as Foreign Offices, allowed deepening research. Apart from recent works there are some individual important publications written before the fall of the Iron Curtain.

Audrey Kurth Cronin in *Great Power Struggles over Austria*¹⁴ describes the events leading up to the Austrian State Treaty, in the course of eight years. This work intends to explain the East-West relations and Austria's position in Cold War Europe. Austria's neutral status in Central Europe stands as a protruding exception to the bilateral division of Europe after the war. It precisely portrays the years of negotiations for a State Treaty and the Soviet behaviour during the discussions, their altering attitude, considering Austria's freedom more as commerce than as principle, and their obstructionism. Since the Soviet archives still remained closed for Western researcher, she only had access to the Western historical documents, which becomes clear through the orientation of the book. Cronin represents a pro-Western attitude by emphasising the Western goodwill and its strategic steps during the State Treaty discussions.

Harry Piotrowski specialises in foreign affairs since World War II, the power struggles between East and West and its enormous consequences threatening the whole world.

His article, published in 1987, *The Soviet Union and the Renner Government of Austria, April-November 1945*,¹⁵ refers to the Soviet foreign policy and their tactics interfering in Austrian politics. After

¹⁴ Audrey Kurth Cronin, *Great power politics and the struggle over Austria, 1945-1955*. (Ithaca/ London: Cornell University Press, 1986)

¹⁵ Harry Piotrowski, *The Soviet Union and the Renner Government of Austria, April-November 1945*. In: *Central European History*, Vol. 20, No. 3/4 (Sep. - Dec., 1987), pp. 246-279

creating the provisional government, the Soviets intended to use its president, the Socialist Karl Renner, as their instrument to transform the Austrians into energetic and convinced Communists. Piotrowski also refers to the Soviet foreign policy and bargaining tactics concerning the State Treaty discussions.

A very important recent study is the work of the contemporary Gerald Stourzh, who experienced Austria under occupation, *Um Einheit und Freiheit*.¹⁶ In this book Stourzh works on Austrian political and diplomatic history in the 19th and 20th century. He portrays the collapse of the Habsburg-Monarchy, the post-war Austria, the history of the Austrian State Treaty and the new national awakening of Austria. The centrepiece on his work is the development of the State Treaty, the required qualifications and the long-winded negotiations between the Allies. He focuses on the Trieste question, the delays of the negotiations due to the Cold War, Austria becoming a secret ally of the Western Allies and most important, on the Yugoslav position within the State Treaty discussion and her changing attitude toward the border decision after the resolution in 1948.

Another study on Austria under occupation is the compilation *Österreich unter alliierter Besatzung 1945-1955*¹⁷, in which seventeen historians from Austria, Great Britain and the United States participated. They focus on how the years of occupation implied for the Cold War, how they affected the domestic politics in Austria and which consequences the decade of occupation implicated on Austria's history. They also refer to in the policymaking of the four allies in their occupation zones, and individual aspects of each zone.

Günter Bischof published in 1999 a scholarly book, which contains a dissenting perspective on Austria under occupation.¹⁸ In his highly debated book, *Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-55: The Leverage of the Weak*, Bischof treats Austria not only as a liberated, but also as a

¹⁶ Stourzh, Gerald. *Um Einheit und Freiheit. Staatsvertrag, Neutralität und das Ende der Ost-West-Besetzung Österreichs. 1945-1955*. (Vienna, Granz: Böhlau 1998)

¹⁷ Alfred Ableitinger/ Siegfried Beer/ Eduard G. Staudinger (Ed.), *Österreich unter alliierter Besatzung 1945-1955*. (Wien: Böhlau 1998)

¹⁸ Günter Bischof, *Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-55: The Leverage of the Weak*. (New York: St. Martin's Press 1999)

seized country. Lots of official versions of the past stressed the myths about Austria as a victim and a nation, which also resisted the Nazi aggression. Historians ignored that many Austrians actually committed Nazi war-crimes until the huge scandal about Kurt Waldheim.¹⁹ While the Soviets tried to represent themselves as liberators of overwhelmed Austria²⁰ the Western forces, knowing that Austria actually had fought on the side of Germany, did not intent to contradict this statement. With the growing tensions with the Eastern bloc, and since Austria was in a sensitive geo-strategic position, the Western allies preferred to secure Austria for the West than to attribute its war-guilt. The Soviets on the other hand, saw Austria as an investment, squeezing out as much reparation costs as possible, while the West helped to reconstruct the Austrian economy. Bischof's work is an interesting complement to the research on post-war Austria and its role in the Cold War.

Wolfgang Mueller specialises on Soviet-Austrian relations until 1955, Soviet foreign policy and their political intention in Austria. He wrote a dissertation on the Soviets' political goals and their attempt to 'sovietize' Austria.²¹ On 29th March 1945 the Red Army entered Austrian territory and stayed for ten years an occupation Ally in the north-eastern parts of Austria. This work describes their aims and notions with post-war Austria, their political goals and especially their role in constructing the Second Republic. It describes the tactics and strategies of the Soviets together with the Austrian Communist Party to transform Austrian politics.

Two years after the publication of his thesis, Mueller published an article on Stalin's foreign policy in the journal for *Cold War History*.²² In this article Mueller evaluates newly discovered documents from Russian archives on Soviet planning and policy in and on Austria after the Second World War. He argues that Austria had a high priority for the Soviets, especially

¹⁹ The Waldheim Affair began 1986 with his candidature for presidency; Waldheim omitted in his biographical data his 'brown past' and furthermore, he feigned ignorance of the atrocities against partisans and Jews. In: <http://www.ajc.org/site/apps/nl/content3.asp?c=ijIT12PHKoG&b=848899&ct=1054691> 01.05.2011

²⁰ The 1943 Moscow Declaration designated Austria as a victim rather than an enemy state

²¹ Wolfgang Mueller, *Die politische Mission der sowjetischen Besatzungsmacht in Österreich 1945 - 1955* (Wien, Univ., Diss., 2004)

²² Mueller, Wolfgang. "Stalin and Austria: New Evidence on Soviet Policy in a Secondary Theatre of the Cold War, 1938-53/55", In: *Cold War History*, Volume 6, Issue 1 February 2006

after the war to gain predominance in policy making towards the other Allies. He describes their intervention in Austrian politics by installing a Soviet-friendly provisional government under Karl Renner, restoring Austria's independence and decreasing the Allies', in the first instance the British' influence. He also interprets to the Soviet aim to influence the negotiations on the Austrian State Treaty. This article is useful particularly to demonstrate the Soviets' influence in politics at the first stage of post-war Austria.

Beside the abundance of works concerning the history of occupied Austria, some studies delved into the subject of the Carinthian border dispute. Already as soon as Austria received its State Treaty researchers began to examine the history of the Carinthian Slovenes.

Thomas M. Barker published in 1960 his research on the Slovenes in Carinthia through the *Studia Slovenica*, an Institute founded in 1957 in Washington DC in order to keep the archival material of Slovene refugees from Austria and Italy. His work traces back until the medieval Carinthia and its first settlements. Barker illustrates the Yugoslav failure within the State treaty discussions to persuade the Western forces to adjust the borders. He emphasises the weak position and suppression of the minority and his compassion for the Slovenes, as the Western forces interfered into something, which originally had been an internal Austrian affair.²³

The Serbian historian Petar Dragisic also investigated in his dissertation the subject of the Carinthian border discussion. His research '*Österreichisch-jugoslawische Beziehungen 1945 – 1955*' deals with the relationship between Yugoslavia and Austria from end of Second World War until the completion of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955. Dragisic explicates the borderline dispute between Austria and the Slovenes, concerning the Yugoslav claim after the war, to diplomatic affairs relating the State Treaty discussions, the propaganda war between Austria and Yugoslavia and the aftermath of the Cominform-resolution, which forced Yugoslavia to reconcile with Austria.

²³ Thomas M. Barker, *The Slovenes of Carinthia. A national minority problem*. (New York [u.a.]: League of CSA, 1960) p.297

The recent article, written by the British historian Robert Knight, refers to the Carinthian border discussion in the course of the end of the war till 1949, when the allies decided to put the Yugoslav claim into the drawer. In the article *Ethnicity and Identity in the Cold War: The Carinthian border dispute*²⁴ he describes the relations and the dispute between the Yugoslavs and the West concerning the determination of the Austrian frontiers. He deals with the attitude of the Soviets before and after the split with Yugoslavia. This article provides information concerning negotiations, discussions and diplomatic correspondence on the border finalization between Austria and Yugoslavia.

1.2 Methodology and Primary Sources

This thesis is based on newspapers articles, published in the Vienna, Austria during the period 1948 to 1950. The articles were published by three different newspapers, each with its own character, purpose and message. The criterion for the selection of the individual newspaper is based on its political attitude. All three were daily papers, which were founded after the Second World War. As they were published in Vienna they had direct access to the telegram and news-agencies and therefore information was more easily available for them.

The daily *„Neues Österreich – Organ der demokratischen Vereinigung“*, was published right after the Declaration of the establishment of the Provisional Government by Austrian president Karl Renner, on 27rd of April . It was originated by the three founding parties of the Second Republic, the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), the Socialist Party of Austria (SPÖ) and the Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ). The KPÖ decisively had the biggest influence on the issues, as the two main editors were outstanding members of the party. One was an important journalist, writer and politician, Ernst Fischer, and his colleague, Franz Honner, who fought among the Tito partisans in the last stage of the war. Paradoxically, the two represented opposing attitudes.

²⁴ Knight, Robert. "Ethnicity and Identity in the Cold War: The Carinthian Border Dispute, 1945- 1949", In: *The International History Review*, XXII. 2: June 2000, pp. 253-504

Fischer, in comparison to Honner, was an utter anti-Titoist and a pure Stalinist²⁵ who expressed his attitude in his play *Der große Verrat*, and eventually in the newspaper. In this play he denounced Tito as an 'agent of the west' and expressed his doubts that Yugoslavia would find its own path to Socialism.²⁶

The main intention of *Neues Österreich* was to emphasise democratic values in Austria. with the outcome of the Cold War it aimed to address every party and refrained from patronising any bloc. The articles in *Neues Österreich*, which concerned the diplomatic affairs, contained a great deal of correspondences, letter exchanges, discussions on meetings and speeches of important personages. Due to this detailed accounts of the diplomatic correspondence and its impartial attitude, it is a useful and objective source for this analysis. Nevertheless, it is necessary to mention that this organ emphasised the necessity of a free and independent Austria, which shaped the character of the articles.

The second eminent and important newspaper, '*Die Presse. Morgenblatt*', was re-introduced as a daily newspaper after the war, mid October 1948, and therefore only provided information after the Soviet-Yugoslav split. After the war *Die Presse* became under the control of Ernst Molden. Molden belonged in the last years of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to the so-called 'Belvedere Circle', headed by Archduke Francis Ferdinand. When he became the editor, *Die Presse* was hailed as the leading newspaper in Central Europe and was considered the most liberal in Austria.²⁷ The audience of *Die Presse*, as the paper itself, possess liberal-conservative attitudes.

As a conservative organ, it evidently denounced the State Treaty solutions, since it was seeking for an independent democratic Austria. Especially with regards to the Carinthian border conflict, it stressed the patriotic attitudes of the Carinthian people and provided justifications to maintain the pre-1938 borders. It emphasised the loyalty, of the Southern-Carinthians and the

²⁵ Bernhard Fetz, *Ernst Fischer: Texte und Materialien*. (Vienna: Sonderzahl, 2000) p.134

²⁶ Bernhard Fetz, *Ernst Fischer: Texte und Materialien*. (Vienna: Sonderzahl, 2000) p.154

²⁷ Klemens Von Klemperer, *Voyage through the twentieth century: A historian's recollections and reflections*. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009) p.25

western negativity towards the Yugoslav claim. Therefore it must be analysed critically because it emphasised Western attitudes and that contained details of the State Treaty.

The third newspaper used for this analysis is the *Österreichische Zeitung*, which was published by the Red Army in April 1945. In August 1945 it became officially an organ of the Russian occupation force. This newspaper cannot be used as an objective source, since it was a propaganda tool of the Soviets with an aim to influence public opinion. However, it is important to explore how the Soviet occupation force's reaction to the split with Yugoslavia and how it was reflected in the Red Army organ's newspaper especially because the editors were increasingly disenchanted and aggressive towards Tito's growing relations with the West. Concerning the State Treaty discussions *Österreichische Zeitung* reversed the information provided in the Austrian press and blamed the Western forces for its delay.

Besides the eulogies to Stalin and his politics, this paper emphasised the 'successful' developments in Eastern Europe (as in Bulgaria or Albania) and stressed the disastrous outcome during the Greek Revolution. For the Western powers and Tito, even though he was previously praised as a faithful friend and ally, he was often described as an Imperialist Capitalist, Fascist, and exploiter.

Methodology

My analysis relies on the interpretation and representation of events before and after the Cominform resolution in June 1948 as reflected in the Austrian press. For this analysis it is relevant to explain the characteristics of a newspaper.

Newspapers exist in various kinds; the most frequent are the broadsheet newspaper, middle-range tabloids, and tabloids. Besides these there exists also less read newspapers such as local community news and newspapers of a particular political group. However, this analyses is based on daily broadsheet papers, each with a differing political disposition.

Apart from the daily events, newspapers consist of a range of comments, facts, items, analysis, entertainment and personal statements.²⁸ For an appropriate analysis it is also important to mention that each newspaper has its own readership, advertisers, its own ownership and the political party advocated by them. The press functions as a tool and delivers a certain amount of information to its readership, which does not always have access to other sources of information, and hence is not able to judge the content of the newspaper. Therefore the press controls the information provided to its readers.²⁹

The owners of a newspaper have the power to influence the content of the paper, its political stance and editorial perspective. In this present thesis the three newspapers evince varying ownerships. As mentioned above, the paper *Neues Österreich* was founded by the three leading parties of the Government of the Second Republic and is therefore devoted to the leading figures of the parties, which were the editors. In contrast to this paper *Die Presse* was a conservative-liberal paper and after the war was re-established by a private sponsor, Ernst Molden. The *Österreichische Zeitung* was founded by the Red Army and functioned therefore as a propaganda tool of the Soviets.³⁰

For my analysis, I focused not only on the content of the text but also on the word usage in the headings. The headings in a newspaper should not only deliver information, also catch the readers' attention. Headings have specific vocabulary and structure, and most papers enforce requirements to use short words.

Among the three analysed newspapers the *Österreichische Zeitung* applied the most striking word usage, such as *Terror gegen Slovenen*, *Niederträchtiger Verrat*, *Tito-Clique terrorisiert griechische Flüchtlinge*, *die Saboteure des Staatsvertrags*, *Sowjetnote entlarvt die Heuchelei der jugoslawischen Regierung*, etc., whereas *Die Presse* used most frequently names of prominent ministers, delegates and other personalities in their headings.

²⁸ Danuta Reah, *The language of newspapers*. (New York: Routledge, 2002) p.2

²⁹ Danuta Reah, *The language of newspapers*. (New York: Routledge, 2002) p.5

³⁰ Danuta Reah, *The language of newspapers*. (New York: Routledge, 2002) p.15

For my analysis, it is also important to identify and categorise the content of the information and the relevance of articles provided by the news. Each paper stressed, emphasised or ignored certain facts, events or problems. While the *Österreichische Zeitung* delivered full-page information about the suppression policy against the Carinthia Slovenes, *Die Presse* only referred to this fact when radical Slovenes, aspiring to join Yugoslavia, were forcibly arrested.³¹

Another important factor for a press-analysis is the source of the information. In some sections the newspapers reprinted and translated articles from other, mostly foreign, newspapers. *Österreichische Zeitung* certainly received its information from the *Телеграфное агентство Советского Союза* (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union-TASS) and the *Pravda*, which was a leading newspaper of the Soviet Union. Occasionally it refers to the *Austria Presse Agentur* (APA).

Die Presse received its information mainly from the British press agency *Reuters Group Limited* (REUTER), the Austrian agency (APA) and the *Agence France-Presse* (AFP).

Die Presse as well as *Neues Österreich* quoted articles published in the foreign press to emphasise an issue or to reflect comments of foreign voices, e.g. from the Yugoslav paper *Borba* and *Glas*, the British paper *The Manchester Guardian*, or the New York communist paper *The Daily Worker*. For this approach it is important to distinguish for which reason the newspaper delivered the information of the foreign news, such as whether it wanted to emphasise its own statement or if it wanted to stress the incredibility of the news.

Equipped with the full range of newspaper articles referring to the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute and the Carinthian frontier question, I intend to analyse how these events were reflected

³¹ 'Tartarenmeldung in Kärnten' *Die Presse*, February 3, 1949

in Austria in the years between 1948 and 1950. I will focus on how the press reacted to the crucial events, which information it provided and the purpose of its statement.

I further intend to examine in which way the split between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union affected the political circumstances in Austria through the information delivered by the three mentioned newspapers.

2. NEGOTIATING ON AUSTRIA: THE FIRST DISAGREEMENTS

At the opening of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in March 1947 there was still a certain amount of optimism in Europe, particularly in Austria, concerning a fast finalization of a treaty for Austrian independence. This optimism was manifested in the opening statement of the Soviet foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, declaring that there would be a definitive completion of the treaty in the course of the Moscow Conference. Even the Russian attitude towards the Yugoslav demands appeared more incurious than it had been at the London Conference the year before. Molotov remained apathetic, only referring to former questions; he certainly did not champion the Yugoslav cause. Great Britain and the United States still maintained their attitudes presented at the Potsdam Conference,³² where the Western powers renounced Austrian reparations. France in contrast, showed a little uncertainty and suggested that the Yugoslav claims for reparations should be satisfied by reducing comparable Austrian claims for reparations from Yugoslavia. The Soviets patronised the French suggestion, but they did not pursue it. The clincher to support the Yugoslav demands was principally caused by Western

³² The problem of the German assets was the main focus in Potsdam in July/ August 1945 concerning the Austrian State Treaty. Ultimately, the conference concluded that Austria does not have to pay reparation costs. In: Gerald Stourzh, *Um Einheit und Freiheit. Staatsvertrag, Neutralität und das Ende der Ost-West-Besetzung Österreichs, 1945-1955*. (Vienna/ Graz: Böhlau 1998)

scepticism concerning the Soviet attitude and their refusal to accept the Soviet request for German assets.³³

On the question of German assets it soon became apparent that both Eastern and Western positions had stiffened and that the chance for an agreement became more and more unlikely. The uncompromising Russian stance, instead of reaching a settlement, drove the three Western powers closer together in a determination to resist Russian demands. As attitudes of the Soviet Union and the Western powers became increasingly polarised, the Austrian delegates tried desperately to keep the Moscow Conference from failing. Through the cumulative fear that the Soviet occupation forces would remain, they pressured the Western powers to keep the negotiations in progress. But the United States did not tolerate Soviet appeasement and the conference became more and more a matter of East-West contest. This contest finally condemned the Moscow Conference to failure even before it began.³⁴ The following year the delegates met again to discuss the major questions once more, such as the German assets, the reappearing question of Trieste and the everlasting problem of the Yugoslav claim.

Within the conference appeared an East-West struggle, which would have an affect on the upcoming treaty discussions. After the war the Soviets intention was mainly to maintain their influence on the Austrian politics and decision-making. But as soon as the Western forces showed antipathy to their aspiration, the Soviets decided to oppose the Western position in any possible issue.

2.1 The Question of German Assets

The first point raising contention between the Soviets and the West was the question of German property within Austria and Austrian holdings, which were to be partitioned among the allies.

³³ Audrey Kurth Cronin, *Great power politics and the struggle over Austria, 1945-1955*. (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1986) 1986 p.45f

³⁴ Audrey Kurth Cronin, *Great power politics and the struggle over Austria, 1945-1955*. (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1986) 1986 p.46f

In January 1948 the Soviets announced their first draft concerning the allocation of the German assets in Austria, which was supposed to be the starting point for the following conference, scheduled for the upcoming month in London. The first issue to be negotiated was the extraction and distribution of raw oil in Upper Austria, which partly was in the Soviet sector. The Soviets demanded 66 per cent of the current delivery capacity, additionally another 66 per cent of the drilling of the oil company in the *Zistersdorfer Becken*. The second point was the property, which had to be remitted over a lasting period of time. To this category belonged the monopoly of the *Donau-Dampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft*³⁵ (DDSG), the navigation of the Danube in the countries downstream of Vienna, and a large part of the plants and steamers navigating along the Danube, held by the DDSG. The third category concerning the German assets in Austria were certain lump sums, which had to be paid in the form of raw materials or products, produced in Austria.³⁶ As soon as of the debate on the Soviets arose their requirements concerning the German assets, the Austrian press, especially *Neues Österreich*, reported the essential facts.

At the Conference in London the Soviets presented their new proposal. Apart from the former listed demands the Soviets pressed for an additional transfer fee of 200 million U.S. Dollars, convertible in any other currency. This sum had to be paid within the two following years instead of ten, as was designated in the Cherrière-Plan³⁷. In the final stage of the London Conference the Western powers came to a temporary agreement with the Soviet demands. The Soviet Union agreed, besides receiving a share of the monopoly of the DDSG, to reduce the debts from 200 Million to 175 Million U.S. Dollars.³⁸ Thus, the negotiations about the exploitation rights, the oil drilling and paragraph 35 – the partition of German properties within the occupation zones – were set aside.

The Austrian News Agencies in Vienna covered the battle over Austria. At the beginning of April *Neues Österreich* referred to an article published in the 'Times', which clarifies that an

³⁵ Danube Steamboat Shipping Company

³⁶ 'Deutsches Eigentum wieder zur Debatte', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, January 25, 1948

³⁷ 'Die wesentlichen Forderungen der Russen', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, January 27, 1948

³⁸ 'Alle Vier machen Zugeständnisse' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, 19 March, 1948

independent Austria would be in the interest of the whole of Europe. The independence question should be solved in a democratic manner without any pressure from the occupying troops. The Western forces should attempt to find a compromise with the Russians to achieve a finalisation as soon as possible. The main concern, addressed in this request, was the Danube question and the Soviet claims for the DDSG, which were still unsettled³⁹. The *Österreichische Zeitung*, in response to the disagreements at the London Conference, blamed the Western forces for the delay of a freedom treaty. It declared the continual occurring drawbacks and eternal denials as a suspension tactic of the Western forces, looking for false pretences to complicate the resolution of the question of the German assets.⁴⁰ With this statement the Soviets did not deviate so far from the truth. After the Communist putsch in February 1948 in neighbouring Czechoslovakia, despite the absence of Soviet troops, the Western powers hesitated to make a treaty that would oblige them to withdraw their troops from Austria. At the beginning of April, the Western officials tried on some various pretexts to break off the negotiations, nonetheless blaming the Soviet Union for its failure.⁴¹

The press aimed to highlight Austria's position as idle contributor in the discussions concerning the matter of the German property. Austria had to collaborate with the allies by providing important information and material but was not allowed to participate. The German assets played an important role concerning the Soviet attitude towards the Yugoslav demand, as the Soviet Union made its decision basically dependent on the Western accommodation. With the changing political situation the question of German assets re-emerged several times until it was finally solved the State Treaty in 1955.

³⁹ "“Times”: Ein freies Österreich im Interesse Europas', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, April 8, 1948

⁴⁰ 'Neue Verzögerungstaktik der Westmächte in London' *Österreichische Zeitung. Zeitung der Sowjetarmee für die Bevölkerung Österreichs*, April 9, 1948

⁴¹ Robert Knight, Ethnicity and Identity in the Cold War: The Carinthian Border Dispute, 1945-1949. In: *The International History Review*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 2000) 283

2.2 The Danube Question

According to Cattell's 1960 analysis, the Western powers feared a Soviet predominance in the control of the Danube. Right after the war the United States had sought to include in the peace treaties with Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria guarantees of freedom of commerce and equality of all states in the navigation of the Danube under general international control. The United Kingdom basically supported the American position but recommended a new drafting of a specific convention for the Danube. The Soviets refused to accept the proposals presented when the allies met in the summer of 1946.⁴²

In autumn 1946, from November 4th to December 12th, the four allies met again in New York to discuss the Danubian question, in particular to respond to the requests regarding the navigation of the Danube and the DDSG. At this meeting it was decided the Danubian Conference should take place six months after the Danubian states had signed a peace treaty. Due to the emerging difficulties and disagreements between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, Great Britain and the United States demanded a deferment of the conference, which actually should have taken place within the London discussions in March 1948. Austria was not designated as a participant of the conference at that time.⁴³ By the middle of June the Soviet Union, in response to a note of the Western allies, declared its acquiescence to summon a meeting concerning the Danubian question. It furthermore accepted Austria as an attendant at the conference, but refused its participation. As reported in *Neues Österreich*, the Soviets insisted on their previous position that Austria was only allowed to take part in the discussions after the State Treaty was concluded. They furthermore required instead of London, Belgrade as a venue, as it was a capital city by the Danube.⁴⁴ The Soviet's actual intention to summon the conference to Belgrade was connected with the head office of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform). Further they knew they had the advantage at this conference. While, at this time

⁴² David T. Cattell, The Politics of the Danube Commission under Soviet Control. In: *American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Oct., 1960) 380

⁴³ 'Vertagung der Donaukonferenz', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, March 18, 1948

⁴⁴ 'Österreich zur Donaukonferenz beigezogen. Sowjetische Antwort auf amerikanische Note . Belgrad als Tagungsort abgelehnt' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, June 16, 1948

the Western Powers could only express their reluctance, the Soviet Union was in the position to legalise its monopoly over the Danube. The Soviets were not only the inviting, but also the dominating power. Two opposite proposals, the American and the Soviet, had been submitted and through the obviously higher number of attendants of the Eastern bloc within the invited states it became clear which draft would be preferred.⁴⁵

On the 20th June the *Österreichische Zeitung* eventually joined the debate, reporting that the Foreign Office in Moscow announced, the government of France, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States had decided to hold the conference Belgrade, the provisional appointed day was the 30th July.⁴⁶ As the Eastern states were the superior number in the conference, the Soviet obviously gained the advantage. However, at the end of June affected the prevailing circumstance and changed the whole setting of the upcoming conference.

2.3 The Carinthian Question

The Yugoslav claim for the southern part of Carinthia deferred the conclusion for the Austrian State Treaty for many years. It was the most contentious issue at the beginning of treaty discussions, which involved Austria as an active participant advocating its concern.

After the Yugoslavs officially presented their requests at the London Conference on 22. January 1947 the Carinthian Question was present in every discussion. In the London Conference of February and March 1948 the Yugoslavs sent Aleš Bebler as their Foreign Minister to present the Yugoslav claim. According Barker's analysis of 1960, the Russian's attitude on the border issue at this conference appeared ambiguous. As the border question was an aspect of the State Treaty the Soviets thought with an open issue they could blackmail the

⁴⁵ Josef L. Kunz, The Danube Regime and the Belgrade Conference. In: *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Jan., 1949) 109

⁴⁶ 'Donaukonferenz in Belgrad' *Österreichische Zeitung, Zeitung der Sowjetarmee für die Bevölkerung Österreichs*, June 20 1948

Western forces. Moscow's Foreign Minister Molotov did not want to risk a treaty, which would stem the Soviet Union to shape Austria into a Soviet subjected satellite.⁴⁷

Likewise, the Red Army manifested its Yugoslav support in the *Österreichische Zeitung*, whilst the debates on the border question proceeded. The paper found it incomprehensible why the claimed territory should not acquiesce to a border relocation. As early as January 1948 the *Österreichische Zeitung* accentuated the friendship of Austria with the Yugoslav people and their Marshal Josip Broz Tito. This especially emphasises the Yugoslav goodwill for peace and communication and the outstanding conditions under which the Austrian prisoners of war had to work in Yugoslavia. Moreover, it criticised Austria's ignorance towards the treatment of war criminals and its comprehension for the Yugoslav educational methods in the working camps, whose main task was the elimination of 'fascist activities'.⁴⁸ Over the course of its January issues, it stressed that the Yugoslavs should be proud of their nationality and their people. After three years occupation, the partisans, fighting in solidarity with the Soviet Army, managed a heroic offensive against the German intruders and should now prevent their freedom and independence.⁴⁹ *Österreichische Zeitung* also praised the economic reforms of the new regime, which should through 'elimination of capitalism and construction of socialism' ensure a brighter future for the Yugoslav people. Tito's main task would be, according to the *Österreichische Zeitung*, to maintain Yugoslavia's independence from the foreign capitalists, since it was until the Second World War a 'half-colony' of the Western Capitalist states⁵⁰.

Neues Österreich used more details regarding the border issue in the London discussions. In the discussions Nikolaj Koktomov, the Soviet deputy, emphasised that in principle it was the Austrian forces, fighting beside the Germans, which destroyed Yugoslavia. If the Yugoslavs had a new memorandum to present, he requested a hearing. With this request he invited the Yugoslavs

⁴⁷ Thomas M. Barker, *The Slovenes of Carinthia. A national minority problem*. (New York: League of CSA 1960) p.253f

⁴⁸ 'Freundschaft mit dem Jugoslawischen Volke', *Österreichische Zeitung. Zeitung der Sowjetarmee für die Bevölkerung Österreichs*, January 13, 1948

⁴⁹ 'Jugoslawien Heute', *Österreichische Zeitung. Zeitung der Sowjetarmee für die Bevölkerung Österreichs*, January 30, 1948

⁵⁰ 'Jugoslawien Heute', *Österreichische Zeitung. Zeitung der Sowjetarmee für die Bevölkerung Österreichs*, January 30, 1948

to participate on the debate of the border issue. For further procedure they should submit new proposals and set a date on which the Yugoslav delegate could be heard. In April 1948 both, Austria and Yugoslavia, should advocate their claims.⁵¹ To be prepared for this task the Austrians sent their 'experts of the Carinthian border discussion' to London, which were the Carinthian governor, Ferdinand Wedenig, and the councillor, Alois Karisch.⁵² In the following weeks *Neues Österreich* justified the Austrian privilege to maintain its legal borders. After the Yugoslavs submitted their new Memorandum, demanding 150 million U.S. dollars and a territory of approximately 600 square metres⁵³. The Federal Chancellor Leopold Figl announced that under no circumstances was Austria willing to cede any square meter.⁵⁴ In response to the reproach of war guilt, Austria's Foreign Minister Dr. Gruber emphasised that both Austrians and Slovenes in Carinthia were forced to participate in the war. Furthermore, in the contrast to the Yugoslavs, after the war the Austrians did not deprive the Slovenes of their country, but rather lived with them in peace.⁵⁵ An inquiry-response duel followed in the newspapers until the end of May, which ended successfully for Austria, as Great Britain finally officially rejected the Yugoslav claim.⁵⁶ In consequence to Gruber's accomplishments, *Neues Österreich* published a letter, on behalf of the whole County of Carinthia, thanking Dr. Gruber for his support and commitment, and encouraging him to continue representing Carinthia's interests.⁵⁷

Regarding the Yugoslav complaint that the Slovene population in Carinthia would suffer from suppression *Neues Österreich* clarifies that until 1938 Carinthia provided various cultural and cooperative societies for Slovenes to maintain their national character, which were again

⁵¹ 'Österreich kann Waffen für seine Wehrmacht im Ausland kaufen. Die österreichische und jugoslawische Regierung zur Stellungnahme in der Grenzfrage eingeladen', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, April 16, 1948

⁵² 'Die Experten für Kärntner Grenzfragen', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, April 25, 1948

⁵³ 'Das jugoslawische Memorandum' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, April 27 1948

⁵⁴ 'Figl: Gebietsabtrennungen unter keinen Umständen.' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, April 27, 1948

⁵⁵ 'Dr. Gruber vor den Sonderbeauftragten. Weder Geld noch Land' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, April 29, 1948

⁵⁶ 'Großbritanniens Entscheidung. Die Ablehnung der jugoslawischen Forderungen endgültig.' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, May 11, 1948

⁵⁷ 'Kärnten dankt Dr. Gruber' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, May 13, 1948

accessible since the British liberation. Schools had been upgraded to meet both languages, and it is only the 'terrorising' *Osvobodilna Fronta* – Liberation Front (OF), which puts pressure on the Carinthian population.⁵⁸ In 1947 the ruffian behaviour of the OF became a big issue in the Austrian news. The following year voices of anti-Slovene newspapers began to raise the question of the fate of the pro-German Slovenes, kidnapped by Communist Partisans in 1945. The Austrian Foreign Office was requested to start an inquiry, which degenerated into a horror story of mass murders of these people, immediately accepted as the truth.⁵⁹

In contrast to the allegations of *Neues Österreich*, *Österreichische Zeitung* referred to oppressive measures against the Slovene minority by the Carinthian clergy and the British occupation force. In an article published in June 1948, it detailed various treatments of inequality, although at the beginning of May, the Carinthian governor, Ferdinand Wedenig, promised an equalization of Carinthian Slovenes. Aiming to attract attention, the *Österreichische Zeitung* characterised the treatment of the allied forces and the Carinthian population as 'terror' against the Slovenes. British officers alleged to have arrested Slovenes for attending meetings of anti-fascist organisations and brought them to the military court. Generally, Slovene organisations and public events, even church services in Slovene, were forbidden, or postulated to be performed in German language.⁶⁰

On the 24th May, to the Austrian disappointment, the treaty negotiations finally broke down. The United States, as leader of the Western powers, decided to leave the stage, as the finalisation for a freedom treaty was not predictable. The American representative, Samuel Reber, noticed that, if the Soviets would not change their attitude, further discussions on a State Treaty would be superfluous and therefore quit the negotiations. *Neues Österreich* implied, as long as the Western powers would not assent to the Soviet demands, the transfer fee of 175 million U.S.

⁵⁸ 'Der Standpunkt der Regierung unverändert. Österreich wird keiner Gebietsabtrennung zustimmen' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, April 28 1948

⁵⁹ Thomas M. Barker, *The Slovenes of Carinthia. A national minority problem*. (New York: League of CSA 1960) p.280

⁶⁰ 'Terror gegen Kärnter Slovenen', *Österreichische Zeitung. Zeitung der Sowjetarmee für die Bevölkerung Österreichs*, June 11, 1948

dollars, a share in the oil drilling and the monopoly of the DDSG, the Soviet Union would continue to support the Yugoslav claims.⁶¹

Beside the Carinthian question, the issue of Trieste was another territorial claim at the Conference in February and March 1948, put forward by the Yugoslav government. In comparison to the Carinthian issue, the Soviet Union indirectly supported the Yugoslav claims to Trieste. In 1945 the Soviets forced Tito, who insisted on the annexation of the city, to withdraw his troops from Trieste. But this instruction was rather connected with the intention to avoid complications with the Western powers than with an objection to an annexation. The Soviet support for the Trieste claim became clear at the meeting in London in May 1946, when the Trieste issue was first raised by Stalin in person. Already at the beginning of the Trieste discussion in 1945, the *Österreichische Zeitung* emphasised the 'kinship' between Yugoslavia and Italy. In this article it reports that Yugoslavia intended to establish a new basis for the relationship to its neighbouring countries, especially to Italy. With this new relationship the Italian people should be able to force back all reactionary forces, suppressing the right for freedom. It further stated that the Western forces would spread rumours that Yugoslavia deployed troops on the borders, waiting for the instruction to invade Trieste. According to the *Österreichische Zeitung*, this was a tactic of the Western powers intending to mislead Italy and persuading it to object an annexation with Yugoslavia. But the paper was certain that neither the Marshal plans, nor any American force would change the Italian's mind to live in peace among the Yugoslav peoples⁶². But to the Soviet's disappointment Trieste presented a declaration that encouraged the Italian people to vote for Trieste's independence and its return to Italy.⁶³ The turning point occurred at the London Conference in March 1948, when the Yugoslavs followed the joint declaration by the Western powers in favour of the return to Italy of the Free Territory

⁶¹ 'Sonderbeauftragter Reber teil mit: Die Beratungen des Staatsvertrags auf unbestimmte Zeit unterbrochen' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, May 25, 1948

⁶² 'Marshall Tito über das Verhältnis Jugoslawiens zu Italien.' *Österreichische Zeitung. Zeitung der Sowjetarmee für die Bevölkerung Österreich*, March 28 1945

⁶³ 'Triest demonstriert für die Rückgabe zu Italien. Ein Appell an die italienischen Wähler' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, April 15, 1948

of Trieste.⁶⁴ As reported in *Neues Österreich*, the Soviet Union opposed the Western decision and put in a veto immediately after the decision that Trieste should be returned to Italy.⁶⁵

The problem of Trieste reappeared again in 1950, when the Soviets started to apply, as they did so often during the State Treaty debates, their delaying tactics, to avert a departure of their troops from Austria. With the apprehension that Nazism would reappear in Austria the Soviets demanded a trustful force before concluding a State Treaty. They claimed that the British and the Americans would support an Italian Fascist regime try to turn the city of Trieste into their base. Their actual concern was that the Western powers would gain a Mediterranean port with direct access to central Europe, and therefore would threaten the Soviet performance in the East.⁶⁶

The 1948 treaty negotiations broke down as the Western powers realised the threat of the Austrian government if they would withdrawal the occupying forces. In addition it was the Soviet support for the Yugoslav claims which prevented a satisfactory treaty and thus was ultimately responsible for the breakdown of the talks. In June, a few weeks after the negotiations in London failed the Soviets instituted a blockade of the city of Berlin. They could not compete with the attraction of American wealth and therefore used another resource to turn Eastern Europe into a fortress- military power and intimidation. Beside sealing-off the Western powers, the Soviets found another adversary, which was their closest ally during wartime. Similar to the Berlin blockade, the public expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform enlarged the extent of the Cold War.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Grant Mkrtychevich Adibekov, *The Cominform: minutes of the three conferences. 1994 1947/1948/1949*. Vol. 24 (Milano: Feltrinelli Editore) p. 493

⁶⁵ 'Die Sowjetunion lehnt Verhandlungen über Triest ab. Neue Note der britischen Regierung in Verbreitung' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, April 15, 1948

⁶⁶ Audrey Kurth Cronin, *Great power politics and the struggle over Austria, 1945-1955*. (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1986) p.101f

⁶⁷ Audrey Kurth Cronin, *Great power politics and the struggle over Austria, 1945-1955*. (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1986) p.66f

3. THE COMINFORM RESOLUTION: THE YUGOSLAV EXPULSION, JUNE 29TH 1948

The split between the Soviet Union and the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was the first series of internal conflicts, which profoundly shook the Eastern bloc. The unexpected schism and the subsequent division of the Soviet bloc immediately attracted the world's attention and was continuously reported in the press. Except for the information published during the conflict by the different propaganda machines, the facts on the origins of this confrontation and its transformation into an open crisis were strictly speaking unknown. Under the Stalin, the Soviet side falsely accused the Yugoslav leadership of betraying Marxism-Leninism, pursuing anti-Soviet policies and supporting 'imperialism'.⁶⁸ The same information was printed in *Österreichische Zeitung* when the dispute escalated into the split of the Eastern bloc.

The most frequent descriptions found in the Soviet press was of the 'Tito-Clique of Fascism', that was dedicated as a political gang consisting of nationalist, clerical and fascist elements, that hired spies and assassins, and resembled a Gestapo-regime that consisted of direct agents of imperialism. There were a lot more illustrations of this kind about Tito and his regime. The information by *Neues Österreich* refers to the data available in the Eastern bloc and was consequently coined by phrases and slogans which were common in the current Cominform propaganda: The Tito-Communists would slander the Soviet Union, they would follow a counterrevolutionary stream of Trotskyism and a hostile attitude towards the Soviet Communist Party. Furthermore Tito enacted laws, such as the socialisation of small enterprises that followed capitalist orientation. He would overestimate his national power and he should be aware that there were sufficient devotees loyal to Marxism-Leninism, who would return the Yugoslav politics back on to the track of internationalism.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Kevin McDermott/ Matthew Stibbe, *Revolution and resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule*. (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2006) p.17

⁶⁹ 'Die Kommunistische Partei der CSR teilt mit: Jugoslawien aus der Kominform ausgeschlossen', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, June 29, 1948

The news of the expulsion struck Belgrade as a shock and was totally unexpected. However, an article from the Yugoslav news *Borba* reprinted in *Neues Österreich*, mentions that an initiation of a struggle was already predictable in the weeks before the incident because neither Molotov nor Stalin congratulated Tito on his birthday.⁷⁰ Even the British national daily newspaper *The Manchester Guardian* mentioned the crisis about Tito days before the expulsion. As translated in *The Guardian* Tito would try to detach Yugoslavia from Moscow, and this aspiration also had been one of the main points discussed in the Warsaw Conference, called some days before the resolution on June 23rd, 24th to examine questions arising from the London Separate Conference of 1948. The crisis emerged recently, because in the months before the Soviets effectively postulated Belgrade as venue for the Danube conference. Concerned by the Yugoslav expulsion, *The Manchester Guardian* added, Tito would not lose any influence in the Eastern bloc because he was supported by the Yugoslav Army and was celebrated as a national hero.⁷¹ This prediction was published in an article the day after the expulsion. As expressed in *Neues Österreich*, the organ of the Serbian National Front *Glas* reported that the youth of Belgrade declared in a loyalty message that their commitment and trust was for Tito.⁷² The Communist Party of Yugoslavia, aware of the support from its national side, denied the allegations and sent a letter to all European Communist Parties that it demanded a debate before they would give credit to these accusations.⁷³

It was the U.S. that immediately reacted to the expulsion. As pronounced in *Neues Österreich*, Washington recommended that Yugoslavia should receive back its gold stocks that were kept in the United States and worth up to 30 Million Dollars.⁷⁴ Tito's acceptance to this proposal is considered as his first step towards the West, which became apparent with the

⁷⁰ 'In Belgrade: Wie eine Bombe' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, June 29, 1948

⁷¹ '«Manchester» Guardian meldet: Krise um Tito' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, June 27, 1948

⁷² 'Die Jugend bekennt sich zu Tito' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, June 30, 1948

⁷³ 'Belgrad weist Anklagen der Kominform zurück. Tito setzt sich zur Wehr' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, June 30, 1948

⁷⁴ 'Tito vor der Entscheidung: Ausgleich mit der Kominform oder Westkurs', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, July 1, 1948

accomplishment of an arrangement between Tito and the United States. The Soviet Union certainly rejected this collaboration. Additionally, Albania started to safeguard its borders between Greece and Yugoslavia to avert 'hostile invaders' from Yugoslavia.⁷⁵ It also banished Yugoslav specialists from the country and cut off its friendship with Yugoslavia, including the economic agreements.⁷⁶ Through this news coverage the Austrian press demonstrates its

These actions were just the start of a long-lasting conflict that affecting the political scene in the Eastern Bloc.

3.1 The Danube Conference, August 1948

At the beginning of August 1949 the so-called Danube Conference in Belgrade aimed to solve the Danube navigation problem. The countries participating were the four Western allies Great Britain, The United States and France, and the Eastern bloc - with the overwhelming majority - the Soviet Union, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania. As Jan Yindirch argued in his contemporary analysis, the most crucial question appearing at the beginning of the conference was the Yugoslav attitude towards the Soviet claim for the Danube navigation. After the resolution of the Cominform it seemed plausible for the Western forces that Yugoslavia would choose a new course, as it had to face an economic problem 'of considerable magnitude'.⁷⁷

After the first meeting of the Danube Conference *Die Presse* reported of ferocious assaults against the Western forces and Austria. As soon as the conference started, Soviet delegate Andrey Vyshinsky, complained to the Western ignorance of Austria's war guilt. *Die Presse* reported that all states of the Eastern bloc, Yugoslavia included, insisted that Austria should be excluded from the constituent body at the conference. But according to *Die Presse* Austria, should have every right to vote since it was a Danube state. The British and the American delegate

⁷⁵ 'USA geben jugoslawische Goldbestände frei', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, July

⁷⁶ 'Albanien bricht mit Tito', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, July 4, 1948

⁷⁷ Jan Yindrich, *Tito v Stalin - The Battle of the Marshals*. (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1950) p.46

assisted Austria's claim for suffrage and stated that the Paris Agreement did not mention any exclusion from the Danube Conference, as claimed by the Eastern bloc. Yugoslavia, still persisting on their territorial claims, stated that Austria should not be so confident and emphasised that Austria was fighting beside Nazi Germany during the war.⁷⁸

The *Österreichische Zeitung* emphasised that a new regulation of the Danube navigation would be a contravention of the inviolability of the rights of the Danube-peoples. Furthermore it claimed that the presence of Austria had only been realised on the initiative of the Western forces and an obligation of the Eastern bloc; therefore to permit Austria a right to vote was out of question. Besides, Austria would only have the right to vote after the State Treaty was finalised, as arranged by the Western forces and the Soviet Union two years before.⁷⁹

As presented in the Austrian press, the Cominform resolution did not have such an impact in the Danube Conference in Belgrade. Yugoslavia was still decisively assisting the Eastern bloc and the Soviet proposals, whereas the Soviets only aspired to maintain their navigation rights and their properties along the Danube.

3.2 A spark of hope for a State Treaty

Austria also took advantage of the dispute. The Austrian press emphasised the need for a treaty and independence for Austria. *Neues Österreich* significantly had contributed to highlight the efforts and diligence of the Austrian governing bodies and delegates and pictured the benefits for the Austrian population.

Immediately after the announcement of the Cominform resolution the Austrian Chancellor Leopold Figl announced in a Swiss newspaper a new challenge for an Austrian State

⁷⁸ 'Donaukonferenz lehnt Stimmrecht für Österreich ab', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, August 1, 1948

⁷⁹ 'Die Rechte der Donauvölker müssen wieder hergestellt werden', *Österreichische Zeitung*, August 3, 1948

Treaty. He also accentuated once more that he was under no circumstances willing to cede any square meter of Carinthia to Yugoslavia.⁸⁰

In September, *Neues Österreich* publishes a speech by president Karl Renner, in which he emphasised his wish for an everlasting working friendship between Austria and Yugoslavia, as well as a productive cultural and economic relationship.⁸¹ In various articles, *Neues Österreich* emphasised Renner's popularity among the Carinthian population, which was expressed during his visit to Carinthia, where he was enthusiastically welcomed by the people, singing national songs in both languages, Slovene and German.⁸² The Austrians, being aware that Yugoslavia had lost its greatest support referring to territorial claims, gained new hope for a State Treaty, which was expressed in a passage in *Neues Österreich*, resurrecting the rumours of upcoming treaty discussions.⁸³ *Neues Österreich*, in response to this euphoria warned the optimistic Austrians that Yugoslavia was still confident enough to hold on to its claim. Referring to the Yugoslav newspaper *Borba*, it mentioned that Yugoslavia was by no means willing to give up its territorial claim.⁸⁴ In a resolution that was presented on the 28th anniversary of the Carinthian plebiscite⁸⁵, the Slovenes of Maribor showed their reluctance concerning the Austrian position and encouraged Tito to continue his campaign for southern Carinthia.⁸⁶

In the fall of 1948 the relationship between Stalin and Tito became strained and they started a correspondence-war accusing each other, which was occasionally published in the Austrian press. In these accusations 'Tito and his clique' supposedly established organisations

⁸⁰ 'Österreichs Kampf um den Staatsvertrag. Bundeskanzler Figl spricht zur Schweizer Presse' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, July 3, 1948

⁸¹ 'Der jugoslawische Nachbar, *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, September 14, 1948

⁸² 'Bundespräsident Renner in Kärnten', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, September 14, 1948/ 'Dr. Renner in Wolfsberg, *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, September 15, 1948

⁸³ 'Der Staatsvertrag' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, September 10, 1948

⁸⁴ 'Jugoslawien gibt seine Ansprüche auf Kärnten nicht auf', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, Oktober 10, 1948

⁸⁵ The 1920 Carinthian plebiscite determined the final border of southern of Austria after the ruin of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In: M. A. Chaudhary, Gautam Chaudhary, *Global encyclopaedia of political geography*. (New Deli: Global Vision Publishing Ho, 2009) p.34

⁸⁶ 'Anschlußkungebung in Slowenien', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, September 10, 1948

abroad and at home, to avert a unification of the communist parties.⁸⁷ In response to this accusation Tito announced the Yugoslav departure from the Soviet Bloc and their solo path to Socialism.⁸⁸

The Soviets subsequently decided to modify their attitude towards the Yugoslav claim. In November during the Debate for Foreign Affairs, they officially announced that they have never had identified themselves with the Yugoslav territorial claim.⁸⁹

With this significant change, Austria sensed that an immediate finalisation of its State Treaty was eminent. Right after the Soviet resolution the Austrian government sent the conclusion of the failed 1948 London Conference to Moscow. In this conclusion the Soviet delegate Koktomov declared that an Austrian State Treaty would only come into force with a border adjustment in favour of Yugoslavia. Concerning their new attitude, Austria invited the Soviet Union to adjust the requirements for further treaty discussions. *Neues Österreich* mentioned that presumably Karl Gruber already discussed the border issue on the Danube Conference in August with the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Vyshinsky. The Austrian minister confidently announced in the same article that, if the Soviet Union would stop supporting the Yugoslav claim, an Austrian State Treaty would be completed within 14 days and that by March of the upcoming year Austria, would be a free country again.⁹⁰

At the beginning of December, the Western delegates accepted the Austrian request to resume the State Treaty discussions. At this point, they realised that if the Soviet Union would to remove its troops from Austria that it would have to do the same in Hungary and Romania. Due to this circumstance, it seemed doubtful for the Western forces if the Soviets would really accept a State Treaty.⁹¹ The decisive point appeared through the events in December 1948.

⁸⁷ 'Beschuldigungen gegen Tito', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, October 28, 1948

⁸⁸ 'Marschall Tito antwortet Moskau', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, November 12, 1948

⁸⁹ 'Debatte über Außenpolitik', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, November 5, 1948

⁹⁰ 'Dr. Gruber: Ein kleines Wort von Sowjetischer Seite und der Staatsvertrag ist fertig', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, November 6, 1948

⁹¹ 'Der Westen ist verhandlungsbereit', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, December 9, 1948

Due to the Cominform Blockade against Yugoslavia, Tito was forced to accept a commercial agreement with the West. Yugoslavia lacked raw materials and agricultural machines to overcome its economic stagnation since its Eastern neighbours refused to negotiate.⁹² In many articles *Die Presse* stressed its sympathy for Yugoslavia and its westward turn. Especially Great Britain, which signed the trade treaty with Yugoslavia, expressed its interest in Tito's conversion and his rejection of the Soviet Union.⁹³ The Soviet Union feeling betrayed reacted with sanctions against Tito and cut off all its raw material supplies.⁹⁴ The Soviets characterised the Yugoslav trade connections with the capitalist states as a 'conversion into the Imperialist camp'⁹⁵. When even Poland reduced its trade relations with Yugoslavia, Tito reacted with a direct attack and declared his definite disengagement from the Soviet Bloc.⁹⁶ After this official declaration, the Soviet Union forthwith accepted State Treaty discussions to be set up for 7th February 1949⁹⁷

The allies gathered in London on February 1949.⁹⁸ The Austrian press reported all kinds of negotiations over Austria's independence, which lasted until the May 10th. The most controversial question in these meetings, and accordingly in the press, was once again the Soviet attitude towards the Yugoslav territorial claim. To the great surprise of the Western powers, the Soviets' attitude remained unchanged during the first stages of the London discussions. The Soviet delegate Vasily Zarubin asked for another hearing of the Yugoslavs before the Soviets would accept another position. The Western forces clearly expressed their objection towards border displacement of southern Austria.⁹⁹

⁹² 'Handelsvertrag durch Kominformzwist', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, December 25, 1948

⁹³ 'Wachsende Sympathie für Tito' *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, January 5, 1949

⁹⁴ 'sanktionen Moskaus gegen Tito' *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, January 1, 1949

⁹⁵ 'Neue Kampagne gegen Tito?', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, January 16 1949

⁹⁶ 'Offener Kampf Kominform – Belgrad', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, January 22, 1949

⁹⁷ 'Moskau akzeptiert den 7. Februar', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, January 21, 1949

⁹⁸ Gerald Stourzh, *Um Einheit und Freiheit. Staatsvertrag, Neutralität und das Ende der Ost-West-Besetzung Österreichs. 1945-1955*. (Vienna, Granz: Böhlau 1998) p.145

⁹⁹ 'Sarubin wünscht Jugoslawien nochmals zu hören', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, February 10, 1948

Once the conference started, *Die Presse* expressed the concerns and fears of the Carinthian people and sent a telegram to Gruber, that stated he should quote the following will of the Carinthians:

*'Der Kärntner Landestag verfolgt mit Aufmerksamkeit die Verhandlungen über den österreichischen Staatsvertrag. ... er erklärt im Bewußtsein seiner Verantwortung, gestützt mit dem Willen der erdrückenden Mehrheit der Kärntner Bevölkerung, mit **Stimmeinigkeit**, daß die heutigen Grenzen unverändert erhalten bleiben sollen.'*¹⁰⁰

Die Presse also accentuated the inviolability of the Carinthian borders, most clearly stated by the statement of the British foreign secretary Lord William Watson Handerson, who stressed that the Carinthian borders should not be modified due to economic reasons.¹⁰¹

Thanks to Zarubin's request for another hearing, the Yugoslav foreign minister Aleš Bebler presented a new proposal that was unanimously criticised by the Austrian press right after it's presentation. *Neues Österreich* wrote, it was not only a contravention of the Austrian constitution, but also of any ethnical foundation.¹⁰² The new program consisted four points: a border-adjustment in favour of Yugoslavia, political and economical autonomy for Southern Carinthia, 'substantial' reparations to Yugoslavia and privileges for the Slovene and Croatian minorities outside of the autonomous territory.¹⁰³ The Yugoslav proposal for a formation of an autonomous zone within Carinthia was instantaneously rejected by the Austrian government, since there were no compact Slovene settlements in this area.¹⁰⁴ The American delegate Samuel Reber supported the Austrian objection and likewise rejected the point of border adjustments. However, he agreed to integrate the points concerning the cession of Austrian assets within Yugoslavia to Yugoslavia and the minority rights into the Austrian State Treaty.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁰ 'Der Wille des Kärntner Volkes', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, February 11, 1949

¹⁰¹ 'Henderson über den Staatsvertrag', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, February 6, 1949

¹⁰² 'Feststellung von österreichischer Seite – Autonome slowenische Zone unannehmbar', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, February 18, 1949

¹⁰³ Gerald Stourzh, *Um Einheit und Freiheit. Staatsvertrag, Neutralität und das Ende der Ost-West-Besetzung Österreichs. 1945-1955*. (Vienna, Granz: Böhlau 1998) p.147

¹⁰⁴ 'Feststellung von österreichischer Seite – Autonome slowenische Zone unannehmbar', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, February 18, 1949

¹⁰⁵ Gerald Stourzh, *Um Einheit und Freiheit. Staatsvertrag, Neutralität und das Ende der Ost-West-Besetzung Österreichs. 1945-1955*. (Vienna, Granz: Böhlau 1998) p.147f

Through the middle of March 1949 the Austrian press provides, contained overtones of desperation and pessimism, concerning the occurring events of the strained meetings in London. Since the Soviets were still supporting the Yugoslav claim ‘in principle’, a conclusion of a State Treaty seemed unlikely for the Austrians. Especially the mysterious Soviet statement ‘in principle’ was disputed^d and questioned by the press¹⁰⁶. At the beginning of March, the Yugoslav delegate Bebler presented another proposal that included seven points, which did not really deviate from the former. Besides the border-shift of Southern Carinthia and the liabilities of war, the new proposal demanded for citizenship displaced persons (DPs), prohibition of anti-United Nations propaganda, preservation of rivers and water ways leading to Yugoslavia, a waiver of Austrian ownership within Yugoslavia, and restitution of all masterpieces and cultural objects, which had been looted during the war.

Die Presse published Gruber reaction to these demands, who comforted the Austrian people that Yugoslavia would not be able to maintain its demands, since its strongest ally, the Soviet Union, no longer seemed convinced.¹⁰⁷ He pronounced that Austria would for a certainty receive its State Treaty, even without the Yugoslav acceptance. It would only depend on Soviet’s confirmation.¹⁰⁸ From the Yugoslav proposal, Great Britain only accepted to integrate advanced minority rights and stated that only the Soviets’ agreement would hinder the completion of the State Treaty discussion.¹⁰⁹

The Soviet delegate Zarubin, still doubtful about the treatment of the Carinthian Slovenes, referred to the *Osvobodilna Fronta*’s (OF) statistics, which showed evidence of suppression.¹¹⁰ Responding to his statement, *Neues Österreich* and *Die Presse* demonstrate the OF’s harm in Austria. In a speech published by *Neues Österreich*, the Carinthian governor, Ferdinand

¹⁰⁶ 'Jugoslawien besteht auf dem Prinzip', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, February 25, 1949

¹⁰⁷ 'Zusätzliche Forderungen Beblers', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, March 8, 1949

¹⁰⁸ 'Gruber: Staatsvertrag – mit oder ohne Belgrad', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, March 11, 1949

¹⁰⁹ 'Erweiterter Minderheitenschutz wird geörtert', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, March 12, 1949

¹¹⁰ 'Sarubin beruft sich auf OF-Statistiken', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, March 17, 1949

Wedenig, condemned the OF¹¹¹, and in April its existence as an organisation was no longer tolerated¹¹². In July the OF even lost its right to publish its organ.¹¹³ Austria by all means tried to remove any contrary evidence for its State Treaty; and to some extent the radical Slovene organs experienced this procedure.

Ultimately, the delegates could not reach a common agreement during the discussions in London. In May the Western delegates demanded for a deferral of the conference, as the Soviet Union was still showing reluctance for a State Treaty.¹¹⁴

The discussion on the reparation costs in some points resulted in a common interest. The Soviet delegate Zarubin pointed out that Austria could not evade the responsibility that it had fought on the side of Nazi-Germany. He also mentioned that the Soviet Union indeed relinquished their demand for reparation costs at the Potsdam Conference, however this would not exclude the reparation costs for Yugoslavia.¹¹⁵ Concerning the German assets in the Western zones, the Western forces decided to cede them, without any transfer fee, to Austria, thus gladly welcomed by the Austrian chancellor Leopold Figl.¹¹⁶ The Austrian reparation fee would contribute to the Soviet decision in July August 1949, when it came to another change of the Soviet attitude towards the Yugoslav claim over southern Carinthia.

During the London discussions of 1949 the Soviets raised again question of Trieste demanding a new governor for the city. Already in March 1948 the Soviets rejected the candidacy, which led to the decision of the Western allies that the territory of Trieste should be returned to Italian sovereignty and should function as an independent state. However, after the break with Yugoslavia the Soviets demanded a new Soviet-friendly governor ruling Trieste.

¹¹¹ 'Wedenig antwortet Gruber. Die OF hat in Österreich sogar die Freiheit zum Hochverrat', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, March 18, 1949

¹¹² '«OF» als Verein nicht zugelassen', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, April 6, 1949

¹¹³ 'KPÖ verbietet Druck von OF-Zeitungen', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, July 8, 1949

¹¹⁴ 'Konferenz über den Staatsvertrag vertagt', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, May 11, 1949

¹¹⁵ 'Das Ergebnis der gestrigen Sitzung in London', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, February 15, 1949

¹¹⁶ Gerald Stourzh, *Um Einheit und Freiheit. Staatsvertrag, Neutralität und das Ende der Ost-West-Besetzung Österreichs. 1945-1955*. (Vienna, Granz: Böhlau 1998) p.148

Responding to this request, *Neues Österreich* stressed the pro-Western attitude of the people of Trieste, who had welcomed the former Western decision of 1948. The Soviets argued that the Western forces refused the Soviet proposal for their own purpose. The West feared that new Soviet-friendly government could enforce the withdrawal of their troops.¹¹⁷ *Die Presse* questioned the Soviets' sudden requirement of re-nominating a new governor. It assumed that this new attitude was connected with the break with Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia would have better prospects to expand its territory if the new Soviet-friendly government accomplished a new redistribution of Trieste. Allegedly, the borderland of Trieste inhabited more Yugoslavs than Italians, thus Yugoslavia would have a better prospect to expand its territory than in the Italian Peace Treaty of 1947. *Die Presse* credulously assumed that with this step, the Soviets tried to settle its controversies with Yugoslavia.¹¹⁸

Due to the Soviet opposition the question of Trieste remained unsolved for the next years and would play an important role at the beginning of 1950, concerning the withdrawal of the troops from Austria. They based their argument on the presumption that the Western forces would secretly rearm Austria and Trieste and therefore needed to maintain a military presence themselves.¹¹⁹

The London Conference of 1949 remained, as the conference of the previous year, without any conclusion. When it seemed that a State Treaty would never be achieved the events in June saw the decisive move.

¹¹⁷ 'Triest wieder auf der Tagesordnung', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, February 19, 1949

¹¹⁸ 'Österreich-Verhandlung führt zu Südost-Debatte', *Die Presse*, February 20, 1949

¹¹⁹ Günter Bischof, *Austria in the first Cold War, 1945-55: The leverage of the weak* (London: Macmillan, 1999) p.119

3.3 Yugoslavia toward the West



In: *Österreichische Zeitung*, August 21, 1949

The first Yugoslav move westward was the trade agreement with Great Britain in the winter of 1948 to avert an economic collapse. During the first stages of the State Treaty discussions in 1949, Tito's Western course became more and more apparent. *Die Presse* characterises the Yugoslav acceptance for a trade treaty with Great Britain as the first *rust perforation* of the Iron Curtain and expresses optimism for a rapid accomplishment of a peace treaty.¹²⁰ By end of February it published an article in which it emphasised the progressive circumstances between the West and Yugoslavia. It indicated that, if Belgrade would really choose the Western course, it would not only find a substitute for its loss of the Eastern European trade, but would also benefit from the commercial agreements with the West. This would integrate Yugoslav enterprises with the Western European system. *Die Presse* accentuated that, before negotiating with the West, Tito had to discontinue his support¹²¹ of the Greek rebels.¹²² Yugoslavia in

¹²⁰ 'Belgrads Westwendung', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, January 4, 1949

¹²¹ According to the Soviet Encyclopedia of 1952 gave Tito by breakin off with the Democratic Army of Greece, the Greek 'monarcho-fascists' (governmental army) the chance of victory. In: Ole Langwitz Smith, *Studies in the history of the Greek Civil War, 1945-1949*. (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1987) p. 297

¹²² 'Belgrad wird sich entscheiden müssen' *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, February 22, 1949

respond to this offer, stated that it would meet the Western requirement if the Western forces agreed with the Yugoslav demands in the State Treaty discussion. *Die Presse* expresses its concern that, if Yugoslavia would really cease to support the Greek Communists, it would be Austria that would have to pay the price.¹²³ Great Britain, which was exceedingly pursuing the repression of the Greek rebels, put pressure on Yugoslavia to choose its direction.¹²⁴ Tito chose the Western path, which became apparent in the summer of 1949.

In June 1949, *Die Presse* mentioned the 'exposure' of the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Laszlo Rajk, who supposedly was a 'spy of the imperial forces' and 'exhibited national-Trotskyite tendencies'.¹²⁵ The same day it reported that, in exchange of a transfer fee of 150 Million U.S. Dollars, the Soviet Union was willing to drop the Yugoslav support.¹²⁶ When it came to Rajk's arrest on June 14th, Moscow finally decided to 'betray Yugoslavia'. The delegates, without informing the Yugoslav ambassador, secretly met in Paris to discuss the Yugoslav issue. Deeply shaken about this betrayal, Belgrade responded that such a move would be dishonourable from a people, who fought on the same side during war.¹²⁷ In the same section *Die Presse* refers to an article published by *The Manchester Guardian*, which assumed that the State Treaty discussions would turn into a Cominform-war and admonished the Western forces to pay attention to the Yugoslav situation. It suggested that if Yugoslavia would solve the Greek problem and end the conflict between Belgrade and Athens, the Western forces would create an ultimate policy for economic support. *The Guardian* feared that Yugoslavia would not sustain the pressure by the Cominform without the help of the Western forces.¹²⁸

At the beginning of July the Soviet delegate Zarubin presented the Soviet proposal for minority rights, which would solve the Yugoslav allegation of Slovene suppression. This proposal would become the 7th Article of the Austrian State Treaty and included five points recognising

¹²³ 'Der Preis für Jugoslawien', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, February 24, 1949

¹²⁴ 'Bevins Aussprache mit Bebler', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, February 22, 1949

¹²⁵ Ungarns Außenminister als Trotzist entlarvt', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, June 16, 1949

¹²⁶ 'Große Chancen für den Staatsvertrag', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, June 16, 1949

¹²⁷ 'Belgrad: Der Kreml verrät Jugoslawien', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, June 19, 1949

¹²⁸ 'Finanzhilfe gegen Kominformkrieg', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, June 19, 1949

the rights of linguistic minorities (Croatian and Slovenian speakers) in Carinthia, Burgenland, and Styria.¹²⁹ The discussion on the Yugoslav claim resulted in the still unsolved question of German assets, the legal title to the steam navigation company *DDSG* and the control of the waterways, passing through Yugoslavia. The Soviets kept on pressing on their demand for the rights of all affiliates of the *DDSG* and the oil fields in Zistersdorf.¹³⁰

The ultimate solution of the Carinthian question followed in mid-August, when the dispute between Moscow and Belgrade resulted in an open fight in which the Soviet Union announced in *Die Presse*, stating that ‘the current Yugoslav government is not anymore considered as friend or associate partner, but as adversary’.¹³¹

It is interesting that *Die Presse* used exactly the same citation and the exact same date as the Red Army paper *Österreichische Zeitung*, which proves that both papers received the same translated information by the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS). The only difference in this case, how the two represented the information. They clearly deviated from each other, which becomes clear in this example.

¹²⁹ 'Moskauer Entwurf für die Minderheitenrechte', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, July 5, 1949

¹³⁰ 'Moskau will auch Konzerneigentum der DDSG', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, August 4, 1949

¹³¹ 'Endgültiger Bruch Moskau mit Tito', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, August 13, 1949

„Alle diese Umstände“, heißt es zum Schluß in der Note, „veranlaßten die Sowjetunion zu der Schlußfolgerung, daß die jugoslawische Regierung ihre Bündnisverpflichtungen gegenüber der Sowjetunion verletzt; daß die jugoslawische Regierung oder die führenden Persönlichkeiten dieser Regierung durch gewisse starke Fäden mit dem Lager der ausländischen Kapitalisten verbunden sind; daß die jugoslawische Regierung sich immer mehr mit den imperialistischen Kreisen gegen die Sowjetunion zusammenschließt und sich mit ihnen zu einem Block verbündet; daß die Sowjetregierung die Ansprüche der jugoslawischen Regierung, insbesondere jene, die von der jugoslawischen Regierung selbst zurückgezogen wurden, obgleich sie dies vor den Völkern Jugoslawiens verheimlicht, nicht länger unterstützen kann.“

Was die letzte Tagung der Außenminister in Paris betreffe, so sei der Sowjetregierung klar geworden, daß die jugoslawische Regierung in der Frage Slowenisch-Kärntens ein Doppelspiel treibe. „Mögen die Völker Jugoslawiens wissen, daß die Sowjetregierung die gegenwärtige Regierung Jugoslawiens nicht als Freund und Bundesgenossen, sondern als Widersacher und Gegner der Sowjetunion betrachtet.“

In: Die Presse, August 13, 1949

Sowjetregierung betrachtet gegenwärtige jugoslawische Regierung nicht als Bundesgenossen

6. Die jugoslawische Regierung bringt in ihrer Note ihre Entrüstung darüber zum Ausdruck, daß es der sowjetische Außenminister in Paris ablehnte, Vertreter der jugoslawischen Regierung zu empfangen. Doch es besteht gar kein Grund zur Entrüstung. Die jugoslawische Regierung verfolgte mit der Entsendung ihrer Vertreter die Absicht, bei den Völkern Jugoslawiens den falschen Eindruck zu erwecken, daß sie mit der Sowjetunion weiterhin freundschaftliche Beziehungen unterhalte.

Der jugoslawische Vertreter wurde vom sowjetischen Außenminister deshalb nicht empfangen, damit dieser Betrug entlarvt und gezeigt werde, daß die Sowjetregierung nicht beabsichtigt, der jugoslawischen Regierung bei der Irreführung ihres Volkes zu helfen. Mögen die Völker Jugoslawiens wissen, daß die Sowjetregierung die gegenwärtige Regierung Jugoslawiens nicht als Freund und Bundesgenossen, sondern als Widersacher und Gegner der Sowjetunion betrachtet.“

In: Österreichische Zeitung, August 13, 1949

The defining incident for the Soviets had already occurred the previous month in South-Eastern Europe. During the entire Greek Civil War, the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE) had been the strongest political force until late July. The DSE, due to support of the Cominform - Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania, had been optimistic to gain the final victory of the civil war. Yugoslavia's decision to stop providing assistance had a great effect on the political developments in South-Eastern Europe.¹³² This step marked the beginning of a second, more intense phase in the Cominform campaign against Tito. Various articles appeared in August, manifesting Tito as the worst and most devious enemy of the communist camp. The *Österreichische Zeitung* declared the Tito-Clique as terrorists, who were persecuting and betraying the Greek Communists, who had managed to escape the 'monarcho-fascists'¹³³ and fled to Yugoslavia. The Tito-Clique supposedly would force the Greek refugees to work in iron and copper plants, whose production would be delivered to the Americans, who would produce weapons for the 'monarcho-fascist' troops.¹³⁴ The *Österreichische Zeitung* referred to insults and reproaches against the Soviet Union, Tito allegedly announced at the beginning of August in the Austrian press. In this article the Yugoslav leadership, deeply disappointed about the Soviet drawback from the Yugoslav claim, described the Soviet Union as traitor and slanderer, even though the Soviets did not make any decision by then. But this step was, for the *Österreichische Zeitung*, again an evidence of incapacity of Yugoslavia.¹³⁵

After the tension in Greece lessened, *Die Presse* made aware that the situation in Yugoslavia was still turbulent. It reported of incidents on the Greek-Albanian border where Greek 'monarcho-fascists' repeatedly attempted an invasion. The Albanian Foreign Minister appealed to the United Nations, demanding for protection on the borders. Furthermore, the

¹³² Philip Carabott/ Thanasis D. Sfikas, *The Greek Civil War: essays on a conflict of exceptionalism and silences*. (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2004) p.69


¹³³ By *monarcho-fascists* the *Österreichische Zeitung* refers to the Democratic Army of Greece

¹³⁴ 'Tito-Clique terrorisiert griechische Flüchtlinge', *Österreichische Zeitung*, August 5, 1949

¹³⁵ 'Geheimverhandlungen hinter dem Rücken der Sowjetunion', August 13, 1949

Soviet news agency TASS claimed that Yugoslavia would penetrate the borders near the Vitsi-mountains where it would strafe Greek partisans.¹³⁶

Österreichische Zeitung mentions that the victory of the 'monarcho-fascists' would have never been occurred without the assistance of Tito's army. It reported in another article that Yugoslav agents asked Athens to get rid of communist elements in the territory between Thessaloniki and Yugoslavia, so the Yugoslav government could receive support and goods from America. Furthermore, *Österreichische Zeitung* argued that Tito would not solely hunt Greek Communist partisans. Tito's secret police under Rankovic would persecute and arrest high officers of the Communist Party. They would torture them and put them to death.¹³⁷



In: *Österreichische Zeitung*, August 18, 1949

¹³⁶ 'Albanien rückt in den Brennpunkt', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, August 18, 1949

¹³⁷ 'Titos Dolchstoß gegen die griechischen Freiheitskämpfer', *Österreichische Zeitung*, August 23, 1949



Die Marionette der Wall Street

In: *Österreichische Zeitung*, August 23, 1949

At the beginning of October, the first show trial of the Soviet purges in Eastern Europe began, and the Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Rajk was the first to fall victim. The *Österreichische Zeitung* alleges that Rajk was already for a longer time spam working in the Tito-Clique, functioning as agent for the Anglo-American imperialists. Like Yugoslavia he followed the Churchill-strategy implementing imperialism on the Balkans in order to weaken the Soviet position.¹³⁸

After an admission of guilt Tito referred to the trial in *Die Presse* that Rajk was sent to Moscow was trained for the trial. He added that he did not want to experience, under which methods the Soviets persuaded those people to confess.¹³⁹

In a diplomatic conference in London, the Western forces expressed their concern about Tito and Yugoslavia. They knew that the Soviets would not be able to get rid of Tito due to his popularity, but there was possibility of war.¹⁴⁰ Tito confirmed their concern and added that if the Soviets would really plan an invasion in Yugoslavia that he would immediately address the UN. He further warned the Western forces that this invasion would not be a Cominform-Yugoslav

¹³⁸ 'Pläne der Imperialisten in Ungarn zusammengebrochen', *Österreichische Zeitung*, September 18, 1949

¹³⁹ 'Tito spricht zu seinen Offizieren', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, October 5, 1949

¹⁴⁰ 'Diplomatenkonferenz über Jugoslawien', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, October 8, 1949

war, but a third world war.¹⁴¹ The Western forces decided to set Yugoslavia as candidate for the United Nations Security Council. Kardelj, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, stated in *Die Presse* that the Soviet Union would protest against their election into the council. The Soviets regarded every country in Eastern Europe that was not subjugated under the Soviet Union, as non-eligible.¹⁴² On October the 20th Yugoslavia was elected into the Security Council. Right at the start of the general meeting, the Soviets protested against the election of Yugoslavia. Their Foreign Minister Vyshinsky spoke of a conspiracy, between the United States and Yugoslavia. The U.S. would use the dispute between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union for their own political purposes.¹⁴³

The same day, the Yugoslav paper *Borba* reported that Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania would establish barriers, trenches and military bases along the Yugoslav border. It spoke about a 'campaign of war-mongers', set up by the Soviet leadership to suppress imperialism in Yugoslavia.¹⁴⁴ Tito declared in *Die Presse* that although Yugoslavia would be in a secure position to defend its freedom, it would need moral assistance of all democratic people.¹⁴⁵

The reaction of the Soviet Union was the initiation of the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Permanent Committee of the World Peace Congress. *Österreichische Zeitung* publishes a declaration in which the Committee of the World Peace Congress announced that Yugoslavia became a tool of the imperialist war-mongers and therefore had to abandon all relations to the Yugoslav leadership.¹⁴⁶

To strengthen the Yugoslav position, the British affirmed to send engines and gasoline for civil aircrafts to Yugoslavia. Furthermore the Western forces decided to impede shipping of 'strategic goods', products for warfare, to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴¹ '«Tito: Angriff auf uns bedeutet Weltkrieg!», *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, October 19, 1949

¹⁴² 'Kardelj: Versuchte Ausdehnung des Vetorechtes', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, October 20, 1949

¹⁴³ 'Jugoslawien in den Sicherheitrat gewählt', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, October 21, 1949

¹⁴⁴ '«Borba»: Kriegshetze gegen Jugoslawien', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, October 21, 1949

¹⁴⁵ 'Tito über die Wahl in den Sicherheitsrat', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, October 23, 1949

¹⁴⁶ 'Friedenskongress bricht Beziehungen zu Kriegshetzer Tito ab', *Österreichische Zeitung*, November 4, 1949

¹⁴⁷ 'Angelsächsische Flughäfen für Jugoslawien frei', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, November 5, 1949

Tito, more confident through Western support, announced the termination of the assistance-pact with Albania. The Yugoslav report declared that the Albanian government had disobeyed the pact and combated against the liberty and integrity of Yugoslavia.¹⁴⁸ His move affected the procedures of the Yugoslav delegate Bebler, who had the self-confidence to insult the Soviet Union in front of the UN- commission. The Soviet Union intended, through economic blockades, intimidate Yugoslavia and spread anti-Yugoslav propaganda, in order to overthrow the government and sovereignty of the Yugoslav state.¹⁴⁹

In the following month, *Die Presse* reported of a secret meeting in which a member of the French Communist Party, who was also a representative in the Cominform, announced the Soviets intention to overthrow Tito. He told of an army revolt in which volunteers of all satellite states would participate. The fight would not only be directed again Yugoslavia, it would also affect the politics of the United States. The freedom partisans of the Cominform in the west should try by all means to combat the American war policy in Eastern Europe.¹⁵⁰

Due to these new circumstances, the Soviets showed no aspiration to withdraw their troops from Austria. At the beginning of December, they unexpectedly submitted a new article, which became notorious as the so-called pea-debts, *Erbsenschulden*.

On December the 4th *Die Presse* reported that the State Treaty discussions were again obstructed, and that the 'dead end' was once again apparent through the Soviets' reluctance. This time, it was not the Yugoslav objection or any kind of property claim, it was the nearly completed Article 48¹⁵¹ concerning Austria's post-war debts. In the previous discussions the Article 48 never raised major difficulties. *Die Presse* expressed its frustration, since it seemed that a mutual compromise between the Soviet and Austrian Governments diverged.¹⁵² It was clear that a

¹⁴⁸ 'Tito eröffnet diplomatische Gegenoffensive', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, November 13, 1949

¹⁴⁹ 'Schwerer Zusammenstoß Bebler-Wyschinski', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, November 25, 1949

¹⁵⁰ 'Moskau plant Armeerevolte in Jugoslawien', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, December 2, 1949

¹⁵¹ Article 48 became Article 28 in final treaty

¹⁵² 'Staatsvertragsabschluß wieder blockiert', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, December 4, 1949

withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Austria would lead the Soviets into the position to justify their need to keep troops in Hungary and Romania.

Therefore, the Soviet delegate Zarubin put forth an article, a sub-article to the Article 48. This new Article 48 (b) contained post-war debts to be paid by Austria, including the money loans and goods received since the end of the war in 1945. Austria and the Soviet Union agreed to handle this problematic matter outside of the State Treaty discussion. However they did this, with the intention to reduce the number of outstanding articles. Thus, to finalise the discussion as soon as possible, the Western forces declared that they would prefer to include the new article in the Treaty discussion. With this unjust decision, the Soviets found another way to make the treaty discussion more favourable to them.¹⁵³ They came up with an excessive number, which Austria was unable to pay. These enormous debts referred to the post-war aid delivered by the Soviets.

As Eastern Austria fell in 1945 under the Soviet occupation, Vienna and its industrial complex was cut off from food provisions. The population faced starvation and therefore had to turn to the Red Army soliciting for help. The Soviets graciously provided for May Day 1945 the so-called 'Stalin Gift', which was proclaimed in front of the Town Hall of Vienna. This gift, apart from the small rations of meat requisitioned from the Austrian peasants, contained enormous quantities of legumes – peas.¹⁵⁴

Due to this generous contribution Austria had to face a bill of unknown proportions. In an article, *Die Presse* participated in the pea-debt discussion. It argued, if the Viennese population had known that the 'Stalin Gift' was an object of value and not a gracious donation by the Soviets, it would have altered their devotion to the Soviets. *Die Presse* ironically raised the question how much the quantity of those peas would have cost (plus the extra weight of the worms)? Zarubin asked for four million U.S. dollars. Confidently, *Die Presse* announced that, due

¹⁵³ '«Stalin-Hilfe 1945» als neues Hindernis', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, December 7, 1949

¹⁵⁴ K. R. S., The Situation in Austria: The Peace Treaty and Internal Politics. In: *The World Today*, Vol. 6, No. 10 (Oct., 1950) 443

to the never-ending tactics of the Soviets that the Western patience would rupture soon, and that they would favour an independent Austria.¹⁵⁵

Die Presse was proven wrong by mid-December, when the State Treaty negotiations were once more discontinued. Meanwhile the Western news agencies thought that the Soviet attitude in the treaty discussion was ludicrous. *The Manchester Guardian* reported that again the Austrian State Treaty discussion *got stuck in sludge*, but since the negotiations lasted already three years, it had been too bored to be surprised. The Soviets demonstrated that Austria's liberty was just an object of value for them.¹⁵⁶

At the beginning of 1950 negotiations concerning the pea-debts occurred solely between Moscow and Vienna, simply because Russia had still not replied to the Austrian proposals of December the 5th. These negotiations proceeded for some months, as the Soviet Government consistently refused to make a decision on Austrian offers for arrangement. In March 1950, Gruber sent a note to all four allies demanding occupation decampment and waiver of occupation costs.¹⁵⁷

Since the claim for *Erbsenschulden* was beginning to lose its effect, Zarubin on April the 26th produced another cause for suspension: De-nazification. Zarubin claimed that the 'Anglo-American Imperialists' would encourage the activity of fascist elements in Austria. He further attacked the Austrian Government, charging that it would not accomplish the laws and regulations dealing with de-nazification and demilitarisation of Austria.¹⁵⁸

During the 1950's the division in Europe became more and more apparent and Austria, as an exception, played an important role. As the tensions intensified between East and West and the Cold War confrontations began to affect Europe, Soviet negotiators were no longer

¹⁵⁵ 'Vier Millionen Dollar Für Stalin-Hilfe?', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, December 8, 1949

¹⁵⁶ 'Sabotage am Staatsvertrag', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, December 17, 1949

¹⁵⁷ 'Österreich fordert Besatzungsabbau', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, March 9, 1950

¹⁵⁸ K. R. S., The Situation in Austria: The Peace Treaty and Internal Politics. In: *The World Today*, Vol. 6, No. 10 (Oct., 1950) 444

interested in a treaty. The Soviets started to use every reason to maintain their troops when finally the Western powers decided to secure independence for Austria.

Austria found itself as a mediating actor of the Cold War, a venue of conspiracy, espionage and great power politics of East and West.

CONCLUSION

In this analysis I focused on the impact of the Soviet-Yugoslav split on the Austrian newspapers and more generally, on the political situation and development in Austria. Through the investigation of three particular newspapers it became clear that the split had an immense effect on both, economic and political events.

Right after the Second World War Austria was divided into four zones, under protection of the allied forces. Austria recovered from the war and so did the press. The period after the war witnessed the appearance and re-emergence of several newspapers, all of them with an individual message and a specific purpose.

Die Presse, *Neues Österreich* and *Österreichische Zeitung* were sharing the same intention: to shape the reader's opinion.

When it came to the first crucial delaying factor within the State Treaty discussions, the press demonstrated their opposing attitudes. *Neues Österreich*, concerned with the liberty of Austria, particularised each step of the discussions. Especially when it came to the Yugoslav claim to the southern part of Carinthia it stressed the fact that the borders had to be inviolable. It reported every meeting, agreement and conversation between the delegates and emphasised the Carinthians' loyalty towards Austria. On the contrary, *Österreichische Zeitung* barely provided information about the ongoing discussions. If this was the case, they published only for the purpose to spread anti-Western propaganda, claiming the Western forces would exert delaying tactics. It further stressed the fact that the Slovenes in Carinthia would suffer from suppression policy by the Austrians and praised the economic conditions in Yugoslavia. At the beginning of

the year of the Cominform resolution it even highlighted the efficient relationship with Tito and the benefits for the Carinthian Slovenes if they would be part of Yugoslavia.

Due to the Yugoslav claim the Western delegates postponed the State Treaty discussion. When it came to the split between Stalin and Tito *Neues Österreich* immediately reacted and expressed its optimism for ongoing treaty discussions. It emphasised the Western aspiration to reach an end to the discussions as soon as possible and published various letters and statements, negating the border adjustment. As an organ founded by the parties of the provisional government, *Neues Österreich* praised the efforts of the president Karl Renner, and the Austrian ministers at the conferences advocating the State Treaty.

Die Presse provided the most valuable information of the treaty discussions. Nearly everyday it reported the solutions and decisions made by the delegates. It obviously expressed its patriotic conservative attitude, by characterising every deferment or failure within the discussion as a fatal issue. *Die Presse* became more accepting of Tito with his increasing inclination towards the West.

The *Österreichische Zeitung* remained unbiased for half a year after the Cominform resolution. It announced the translated resolution of the Cominform, published by the *Pravda*, nearly a week after the resolution of the Cominform was made. Until Tito's decision to cease supporting the Communist rebels in Greece, the *Österreichische Zeitung* left the dispute between Stalin and Tito unspoken.

Due to the strained relationship between Moscow and Yugoslavia, the Austrian ministers tried to revive the State Treaty discussions. Until the end of the year 1948 the deputies attempted to fix a date, however the Soviet Union was obviously still standoffish and did not endeavour to participate in the discussions. In winter 1948 Tito made the determining step though accepting an economic agreement with the west, which affected the Soviet's disposition to attend the discussions.

The Treaty discussions opened in spring 1949, but already in the first few sessions a hindering factor appeared averting the conclusion. To the Western surprise the Soviets still supported the Yugoslav claims¹⁵⁹.

Die Presse, concerned about Tito, highlighted of the sanctions of Moscow against Yugoslavia and its economic condition. With each step towards the Western aspiration *Die Presse* won favour for Tito. Especially when it came to the trade agreements with London and the U.S. and the discontinuation of support towards the Greek rebels, *Die Presse* accentuated Tito's conversion. When he declared his independence from the Eastern bloc the Soviets, intending to prevent the same aspiration in other satellites, started to arrest political leaders and to exchange them with Soviet-loyal ones, which later reached the extent of a purge. Before the communist failure in the Greek Civil War the Soviets still supported the Yugoslav claim 'in principle'.¹⁶⁰ Soviets accused Tito of the communist breakdown in Greece and started insulting him officially; furthermore, they convinced the states of the Eastern bloc to discontinue their trade agreements with Yugoslavia. The most important step was the final drop of the Yugoslav claim at the treaty discussions in August 1949. The Western allies solved the border dispute with two articles treating the minority protection of Slovenes and Croats in Austria. What followed was a public slander between Tito and Stalin accusing each other of being traitors and war-mongers.

The *Österreichische Zeitung* provided a great deal of these insults. Until July 1949 Tito was only described as traitor, Imperialist, Capitalist, Fascist or monger.

After the exclusion of Tito from the Eastern bloc followed military revolt against Yugoslavia. To prevent an open warfare the Western forces accepted Yugoslavia as a member of the Security Council of the United Nations.

Die Presse was most excited about this decision, publishing speeches of the relieved Yugoslav leader, who officially proclaimed his wish for better relations with the west.

¹⁵⁹ Explanation to their attitude is explicated in the thesis, there are various theories.

¹⁶⁰ This statement '*im Prinzip*' was discussed for many days in the news

As the Carinthian border dispute was not a stemming factor anymore the Western delegates started to discuss the point concerning the withdrawal of the troops. The Soviets were aware that if they withdrew from Austria there would be no reason to remain in Central Europe, which would foster the growing of Tito's influence. Consequently, they presented a request for post-war debts of huge sums, the so-called *Erbsenschulden*¹⁶¹.

The State Treaty conclusion had to wait for another five years to be finalised. The split of Tito and Stalin affected the Soviet decision-making concerning their foreign policy in Austria. When it came to Tito's conversion to the west, Austria found itself amidst the Cold War struggles between east and west.

The problem of the split between Stalin and Tito and its consequences, as it clearly had a great impact on the political situation of Austria and its relationship to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, was well covered in the Austrian newspaper. Each press tried to cope with the new circumstances in its own way. Through using a particular language and by defining the relevance of the facts, it expressed its preference to certain events, persons and solutions.

This work accomplishes the analysis of the interpretation of a particular event shaping a country's political sphere and the attitude of the press.

Future research may include Slovene newspaper articles in order to gain a wider perspective. Especially interesting to analyse would be the organ of the *Osvobodilna Fronta* (OF), as it was prohibited during the conflict of the border adjustment. The OF is particularly important as it was the only party in Carinthia, which advocated an integration into Yugoslavia. Apart from that, the Carinthian governor ordered a liquidation of the organisation when it seemed as the only prejudicing factor for the finalisation of the Austrian State Treaty.

¹⁶¹ Food donations by Stalin in May 1945, which was generally restricted on peas, to prevent Vienna from starving.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources:

Negotiating on Austria: The First Disagreements

Methodology

- 'Tartarenmeldung in Kärnten' *Die Presse*, February 3, 1949

The Question of German Assets

- 'Deutsches Eigentum wieder zur Debatte', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, January 25, 1948
- 'Die wesentlichen Forderungen der Russen', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, January 27, 1948
- 'Alle Vier machen Zugeständnisse' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, 19 March, 1948
- "“Times”: Ein freies Österreich im Interesse Europas', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, April 8, 1948
- 'Neue Verzögerungstaktik der Westmächte in London' *Österreichische Zeitung. Zeitung der Sowjetarmee für die Bevölkerung Österreichs*, April 9, 1948

The Danube Question

- 'Vertagung der Donaukonferenz', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, March 18, 1948
- 'Österreich zur Donaukonferenz beigezogen. Sowjetische Antwort auf amerikanische Note . Belgrad als Tagungsort abgelehnt' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, June 16, 1948
- Josef L. Kunz, 'The Danube Regime and the Belgrade Conference. In: *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Jan., 1949) 109
- 'Donaukonferenz in Belgrad' *Österreichische Zeitung. Zeitung der Sowjetarmee für die Bevölkerung Österreichs*, June 20 1948

The Carinthian Question

- 'Freundschaft mit dem Jugoslawischen Volke', *Österreichische Zeitung*. Zeitung der Sowjetarmee für die Bevölkerung Österreichs, January 13, 1948
- 'Jugoslawien Heute', *Österreichische Zeitung*. Zeitung der Sowjetarmee für die Bevölkerung Österreichs, January 30, 1948
- 'Jugoslawien Heute', *Österreichische Zeitung*. Zeitung der Sowjetarmee für die Bevölkerung Österreichs, January 30, 1948
- 'Österreich kann Waffen für seine Wehrmacht im Ausland kaufen. Die österreichische und jugoslawische Regierung zur Stellungnahme in der Grenzfrage eingeladen', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, April 16, 1948
- 'Die Experten für Kärntner Grenzfragen', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, April 25, 1948
- 'Das jugoslawische Memorandum' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, April 27 1948
- 'Figl: Gebietsabtrennungen unter keinen Umständen.' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, April 27, 1948
- 'Dr. Gruber vor den Sonderbeauftragten. Weder Geld noch Land' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, April 29, 1948
- 'Großbritanniens Entscheidung. Die Ablehnung der jugoslawischen Forderungen endgültig.' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, May 11, 1948
- 'Kärnten dankt Dr. Gruber' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, May 13, 1948
- 'Der Standpunkt der Regierung unverändert. Österreich wird keiner Gebietsabtrennung zustimmen' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, April 28 1948
- 'Terror gegen Kärnter Slovenen', *Österreichische Zeitung*. Zeitung der Sowjetarmee für die Bevölkerung Österreichs, June 11, 1948
- 'Sonderbeauftragter Reber teil mit: Die Beratungen des Staatsvertrags auf unbestimmte Zeit unterbrochen' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, May 25, 1948
- 'Marshall Tito über das Verhältnis Jugoslawiens zu Italien.' *Österreichische Zeitung*. Zeitung der Sowjetarmee für die Bevölkerung Österreich, March 28 1945
- 'Triest demonstriert für die Rückgabe zu Italien. Ein Appell an die italienischen Wähler' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, April 15, 1948

- 'Die Sowjetunion lehnt Verhandlungen über Triest ab. Neue Note der britischen Regierung in Verbreitung' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, April 15, 1948

The Cominform Resolution: The Yugoslav Expulsion, June 29th 1948

- 'Die Kommunistische Partei der CSR teilt mit: Jugoslawien aus der Kominform ausgeschlossen', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, June 29, 1948
- 'In Belgrade: Wie eine Bombe' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, June 29, 1948
- '«Manchester» Guardian meldet: Krise um Tito' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, June 27, 1948
- 'Die Jugend bekennt sich zu Tito' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, June 30, 1948
- 'Belgrad weist Anklagen der Kominform zurück. Tito setzt sich zur Wehr' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, June 30, 1948
- 'Tito vor der Entscheidung: Ausgleich mit der Kominform oder Westkurs', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, July 1, 1948
- 'USA geben jugoslawische Goldbestände frei', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, July
- 'Albanien bricht mit Tito', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, July 4, 1948

The Danube Conference, August 1948

- 'Donaukonferenz lehnt Stimmrecht für Österreich ab', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, August 1, 1948
- 'Die Rechte der Donauvölker müssen wieder hergestellt werden', *Österreichische Zeitung*, August 3, 1948

A Spark of Hope for a State Treaty

- 'Österreichs Kampf um den Staatsvertrag. Bundeskanzler Figl spricht zur Schweizer Presse' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, July 3, 1948

- Der jugoslawische Nachbar, *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, September 14, 1948
- 'Bundespräsident Renner in Kärnten', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, September 14, 1948
- 'Dr. Renner in Wolfsberg', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, September 15, 1948
- 'Der Staatsvertrag' *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, September 10, 1948
- 'Jugoslawien gibt seine Ansprüche auf Kärnten nicht auf', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, Oktober 10, 1948
- 'Anschlußkungebung in Slowenien', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, September 10, 1948
- 'Beschuldigungen gegen Tito', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, October 28, 1948
- 'Marschall Tito antwortet Moskau', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, November 12, 1948
- 'Debatte über Außenpolitik', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, November 5, 1948
- 'Dr. Gruber: Ein kleines Wort von Sowjetischer Siete und der Staatsvertrag ist fertig', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, November 6, 1948
- 'Der Westen ist verhandlungsbereit', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, December 9, 1948
- 'Handelsvertrag durch Kominformzwist', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, December 25, 1948
- 'Wachsende Symphatie für Tito' *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, January 5, 1949
- 'Sanktionen Moskaus gegen Tito' *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, January 1, 1949
- 'Neue Kampagne gegen Tito?', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, January 16 1949
- 'Offener Kampf Kominform – Belgrad', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, January 22, 1949
- 'Moskau akzeptert den 7. Februar', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, January 21, 1949
- 'Sarubin wünscht Jugoslawien nochmals zu hören', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, February 10, 1948
- 'Der Wille des Kärntner Volkes', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, February 11, 1949
- 'Henderson über den Staatsvertrag', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, February 6, 1949

- 'Feststellung von österreichischer Seite – Autonome slowenische Zone unannehmbar', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, February 18, 1949
- 'Jugoslawien besteht auf dem Prinzip', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, February 25, 1949
- 'Zusätzliche Forderungen Beblers', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, March 8, 1949
- 'Gruber: Staatsvertrag – mit oder ohne Belgrad', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, March 11, 1949
- 'Erweiterter Minderheitenschutz wird geörtert', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, March 12, 1949
- 'Sarubin beruft sich auf OF-Statistiken', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, March 17, 1949
- 'Wedenig antwortet Gruber. Die OF hat in Österreich sogar die Freiheit zum Hochverrat', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, March 18, 1949
- '«OF» als Verein nicht zugelassen', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, April 6, 1949
- 'KPÖ verbietet Druck von OF-Zeitungen', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, July 8, 1949
- 'Konferenz über den Staatsvertrag vertagt', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, May 11, 1949
- 'Das Ergebnis der gestrigen Sitzung in London', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, February 15, 1949
- 'Triest wieder auf der Tagesordnung', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, February 19, 1949
- 'Österreich-Verhandlung führt zu Südost-Debatte', *Die Presse*, February 20, 1949

Yugoslavia Toward the West

- 'Belgrads Westwendung', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, January 4, 1949
- 'Belgrad wird sich entscheiden müssen' *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, February 22, 1949
- 'Der Preis für Jugoslawien', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, February 24, 1949
- 'Bevins Aussprache mit Bebler', *Neues Österreich. Organ der demokratischen Einigung*, February 22, 1949
- Ungarns Außenminister als 'Trotzkist entlarvt', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, June 16, 1949
- 'Große Chancen für den Staatsvertrag', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, June 16, 1949
- 'Belgrad: Der Kreml verrät Jugoslawien', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, June 19, 1949

- 'Finanzhilfe gegen Kominformkrieg', *Die Presse Morgenblatt* , June 19, 1949
- 'Moskauer Entwurf für die Minderheitenrechte', *Die Presse Morgenblatt* , July 5, 1949
- 'Moskau will auch Konzerneigentum der DDSG', *Die Presse Morgenblatt* , August 4, 1949
- 'Endgültiger Bruch Moskau mit Tito', *Die Presse Morgenblatt* , August 13, 1949
- 'Tito-Clique terrorisiert griechische Flüchtlinge', *Österreichische Zeitung*, August 5, 1949
- 'Geheimverhandlungen hinter dem Rücken der Sowjetunion', August 13, 1949
- 'Albanien rückt in den Brennpunkt', *Die Presse Morgenblatt* , August 18, 1949
- 'Titos Dolchstoß gegen die griechischen Freiheitskämpfer', *Österreichische Zeitung*, August 23, 1949
- 'Pläne der Imperialisten in Ungarn zusammengebrochen', *Österreichische Zeitung*, September 18, 1949
- 'Tito spricht zu seinen Offizieren', *Die Presse Morgenblatt* , October 5, 1949
- 'Diplomatenkonferenz über Jugoslawien', *Die Presse Morgenblatt* , October 8, 1949
- '«Tito: Angriff auf uns bedeutet Weltkrieg!»,', *Die Presse Morgenblatt* , October 19, 1949
- 'Kardelj: Versuchte Ausdehnung des Vetorechtes', *Die Presse Morgenblatt* , October 20, 1949
- 'Jugoslawien in den Sicherheitrat gewählt', *Die Presse Morgenblatt* , October 21, 1949
- '«Borba»: Kriegshetze gegen Jugoslawien', *Die Presse Morgenblatt* , October 21, 1949
- 'Tito über die Wahl in den Sicherheitsrat', *Die Presse Morgenblatt* , October 23, 1949
- 'Friedenskongress bricht Beziehungen zu Kriegshetzer Tito ab', *Österreichische Zeitung*, November 4, 1949
- 'Angelsächsische Flughäfen für Jugoslawien frei', *Die Presse Morgenblatt* , November 5, 1949
- 'Tito eröffnet diplomatische Gegenoffensive', *Die Presse Morgenblatt* , November 13, 1949
- 'Schwerer Zusammenstoß Bebler-Wyschinski', *Die Presse Morgenblatt* , November 25, 1949
- 'Moskau plant Armeerevolte in Jugoslawien', *Die Presse Morgenblatt* , December 2, 1949
- 'Staatsvertragsabschluß wieder blockiert', *Die Presse Morgenblatt* , December 4, 1949
- '«Stalin-Hilfe 1945» als neues Hindernis', *Die Presse Morgenblatt* , December 7, 1949
- 'Vier Millionen Dollar Für Stalin-Hilfe?', *Die Presse Morgenblatt* , December 8, 1949

- 'Sabotage am Staatsvertrag', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, December 17, 1949
- 'Österreich fordert Besatzungsabbau', *Die Presse Morgenblatt*, March 9, 1950

Secondary Literature

- Ableitinger Alfred / Beer Siegfried / Staudinger Eduard G. (Ed.), *Österreich unter alliierter Besatzung 1945-1955*. (Wien: Böhlau 1998)
- Adibekov Grant Mkrtychevich, *The Cominform: minutes of the three conferences. 1944 1947/1948/1949*. Vol. 24 (Milano: Feltrinelli Editore)
- Allard Sven, *Russia and the Austrian State Treaty. A case study of Soviet policy in Europe*. (University Park, Pa. [u.a.]: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press.)
- Barker Thomas M., *The Slovenes of Carinthia. A national minority problem*. (New York: League of CSA 1960)
- Bischof Günter, *Austria in the first Cold War, 1945-55 : the leverage of the weak* (London: Macmillan, 1999)
- Carabott Philip / Sfikas Thanasis D., *The Greek Civil War: essays on a conflict of exceptionalism and silences*. (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2004)
- Cattell David T., *The Politics of the Danube Commission under Soviet Control*. In: *American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Oct., 1960)
- Chaudhary M. A. / Chaudhary Gautam, *Global encyclopaedia of political geography*. (New Deli: Global Vision Publishing Ho, 2009)
- Cronin Audrey Kurth, *Great power politics and the struggle over Austria, 1945-1955*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986)
- Fetz Bernhard, *Ernst Fischer: Texte und Materialien*. (Vienna: Sonderzahl, 2000)
- K. R. S., *The Situation in Austria: The Peace Treaty and Internal Politics*. In: *The World Today*, Vol. 6, No. 10 (Oct., 1950)
- Knight Robert, *Ethnicity and Identity in the Cold War: The Carinthian Border Dispute, 1945-1949*. In: *The International History Review*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 2000)
- Langwitz Smith Ole, *Studies in the history of the Greek Civil War, 1945-1949* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1987)

- McDermott Kevin / Stibbe Matthew, *Revolution and resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule*. (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2006)
- Mueller Wolfgang, *Die politische Mission der sowjetischen Besatzungsmacht in Österreich 1945 – 1955*. (Wien, Univ., Diss., 2004)
- Mueller, Wolfgang. “Stalin and Austria: New Evidence on Soviet Policy in a Secondary Theatre of the Cold War, 1938-53/55”, In: *Cold War History*, Volume 6, Issue 1 February 2006
- Piotrowski Harry, The Soviet Union and the Renner Government of Austria, April-November 1945. In: *Central European History*, Vol. 20, No. 3/4 (Sep. - Dec., 1987), pp. 246-279
- Reah Danuta, *The language of newspapers*. (New York: Routledge, 2002)
- Stourzh Gerald, *Um Einheit und Freiheit. Staatsvertrag, Neutralität und das Ende der Ost -West-Besetzung Österreichs. 1945-1955*. (Vienna, Granz: Böhlau 1998)
- Von Klemperer Klemens, *Voyage through the twentieth century: A historian's recollections and reflections*. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009)
- Yindrich Jan, *Tito v Stalin - The Battle of the Marshals*. (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1950)

Electronic Sources

<http://www.ajc.org/site/apps/nl/content3.asp?c=ijITI2PHKoG&b=848899&ct=1054691> 01.05.2011