Why Hasn't ASEAN Constructed A Firm Security Structure?
Regional Integration Dilemmas in Southeast Asia and Factors Contributing to a Lack of Security Community in the ASEAN Organization

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Abstract

Since its inception in 1967, the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has attempted to create a regional organization aimed at economic, political, and security cooperation. In a contemporary world constructed by the trends of regionalism, organizations such as the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU) have come to epitomize the most advanced versions of supranational, regional actors.

Although NAFTA and the EU have influenced the creation and adoption of particular institutional norms that have lead to more formalized structures of regional cooperation, ASEAN still lacks some fundamental aspects of regulation and reform that would effectively allow it to increase its functional ability. The impact of norm diffusion, regional styles of governments, and institutional implementations have hurt ASEAN in many sectors, especially in regard to security.

One of the most pronounced difficulties that ASEAN has includes its lacking of a bona-fied security community which possesses the stability of comparable regional organizations or supranational bodies. ASEAN's desire to achieve a pluralistic security community standard has not gone unnoticed, formal announcement on the official agenda have highlighted this concern. A plethora of institutional implementations that include inter-regional dialogue have also increased the attractiveness of such an option. The non-interference doctrine, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) are just a few examples of institutional 'talk shops' that have encouraged inter-regional discourse throughout the region. Regardless, there are many weak aspects of these institutions, and coupled with other historical and social factors they have proven detrimental to the concept of an ASEAN security

community, rendering ASEAN partially impotent in its capabilities to discourage regional

conflict, crime and tension.

Acknowledgements

I wish to express in my sincerest capacity thanks to all professors of the IRES department for their guidance and knowledge regarding all subjects of my studies. My peers deserve recognition as well, for I feel privileged to have researched along side the most insightful and dedicated International Relations candidates that any M.A. program in the world has to offer.

Exceptional gratitude must be awarded to my thesis advisor, Dr. Youngmi Kim for all of her direction, patience, and poise while in the classroom as a professor and as a thesis advisor. My understanding of the Southeast Asian region and regionalism as a concept would not have progressed in such due fashion without her assistance.

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

(ASEAN)…   the Association for Southeast Asian Nations

(AICHR)……Asian Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights

(ARF)… …... ASEAN Regional Forum

(APEC)……. Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation

(EU)……….. European Union

(OSCE)……. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(TAC)……… Treaty of Amity and Cooperation

(SEANWFZ)..Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone

(ZOPFAN)…. Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality

Introduction

The Asia-Pacific Region is categorized into many different structures of political and economic consistency depending on the examined time period. Once a region hallmarked by colonial rule and exogenous influence, the Asia-Pacific realm began to assume a more unified stance during the creation of ASEAN in 1967 when Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia all signed the Bangkok Declaration which established ASEAN as a regional entity.[1] Although ASEAN came to fruition via the support of its five initial member states, it was designed in essence to captivate other relevant countries in the region and usher in a new era of South East Asian cooperation.[2] Since the signing of the Bangkok Declaration, five additional countries have entered the organization as permanent member states in an attempt to construct a more conjoined region based on the concept of "political alignment".[3] With ASEAN countries not just being limited to the ASEAN organization in itself, a multitude of related economic, political, and security forums, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have been constructed based on the interest of ASEAN and other relevant actors who have significant interests in the region.[4]

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[1] The Association for Southeast Asian Countries, "Members" <http://www.asean.org>

[2] Amitav Acharya and Evelyn Goh, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Competition, Congruence, and Transformation. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), xv.

[3] Amitav Acharya and Evelyn Goh, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Competition, Congruence, and Transformation. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007),xv.

[4] John Ravenhill, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Chapter 6 APEC and Security, Mission Creep or Mission Impossible (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007).

Security organizations within ASEAN began proliferating in the early 1990's, with one of their major focuses being to create a stronger regional cooperation based on mutual support.[5] In addition the continued interaction with global powers on an economic basis, and the adoption of the ASEAN doctrine of non-interference in regard to domestic intervention are both clearly emphasized elements of the regional integration efforts in Asia-Pacific. The ASEAN Regional Forum, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Shangri-La Dialogue of defense ministers, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have all been highly influential organizations that were designed to enable the region to adopt a more viable security posture.[6] However, due to varying membership in the forums which often coincides with a conflict of interests regarding the organization's members, ASEAN's security apparatus has been severely limited. Such an entangled web of nations and initiatives has created an uncoordinated ASEAN security umbrella at best, despite the expected outcome of the constructed initiative described previously.[7] The prerogative of this thesis will be to examine the essential factors and modes of causation that have left an already unsteady ASEAN without a firm security community, despite its efforts to establish a firm security bulwark.

Research Question: What is impeding the regional process of security community construction within ASEAN? Are there inherent historical and social factors to blame or do contemporary implications provide insight into ASEAN's weak security paradigm

Relevance and Value of the Thesis Topic

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[5] Johan Saravanamuttu. "Wither The ASEAN Security Community? International Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, vol .1 (2005): 1-2

[6] Johan Saravanamuttu. "Wither The ASEAN Security Community? International Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, vol .1 (2005): 1-2

[7] Amitav Acharya and Evelyn Goh, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Competition, Congruence, and Transformation. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 19-20.

ASEAN has presented itself as one of the world's foremost regional organizations and in doing so has drawn much attention from various comparative integration experts and study groups. While most comparative data relies on the trends of functionalism and the overall implementation of formalized institutions as a very general concept, less information deals with the specific pillars of integration. By identifying key factors associated with the single aspect of comparative integration, such as an organization's security structure, adequate knowledge can be acquired to help explain why and how a region needs to be securitized and what it needs to do to accomplish its prescribed goals.

Addressing the Gap

When discussing security and regional integration techniques, geographic hotspots such as Europe, North America, and perhaps even South America are among the areas most frequently discussed and analyzed. The leading nations in global politics originate from these mentioned continents, therefore attracting great attention and interest from scholars and students alike throughout the world. It is quite necessary to study these areas from a comparative point of view, and especially in reference to security apparatuses applied throughout these countries.[8] However not as much thought has been given to the evolution of the ASEAN organization, which still carries a fairly significant amount of clout in global affairs.[9]

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[8] Amitav Acharya and Evelyn Goh, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Competition, Congruence, and Transformation. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 6-7.
[9] Amitav Acharya and Evelyn Goh, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Competition, Congruence, and Transformation. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 6-7.

More light needs to be shed to explain why this is firm security precedent hasn't been set yet in Southeast Asia, and what its implications are for the future. Are local politics, the economic climate, external forces, or simply culture clashes to blame for this issue? Is there something else that has been completely overlooked at a leading factor in this development process? All of these are core questions that need to be acutely addressed and more importantly evaluated based on their projected influence. By properly assessing the criteria that will be uncovered in the thesis, I aim to construct a relevant model that could be used a guideline in security integration efforts in the region.

Associated Value of the Thesis

The ASEAN security apparatus is particularly relevant due to its potential for increasing business viability and standard of living in the region. Regional organizations with strong security structures typically encourage domestic growth and foreign investment due to consumer confidence that goes hand in hand with a stabilized region. However, should a regional organization lack certain security protocols, investors may be more reluctant to fund critical infrastructure projects, which could result in economic stagnation, and eventually market regression. In turn, political collapse may ensue, which would lead to an unpredictable or even rogue state that is capable of acting aggressively, funding illegitimate organizations, or harboring terrorists.[10]

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[10] Johan Saravanamuttu, "Wither The ASEAN Security Community? Some Reflections, International Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, vol .1 (2005): 1-24

Regional integration efforts related to security could help reverse this trend while ushering in a new era of prosperity and social cooperation in a targeted area, therefore the value of this thesis topic is quite apparent. Should ASEAN decide to implement a more coherent and active security regimen that would lead them to function effectively as a security community, then they would certainly encounter economic growth and achieve more centralized forms of legitimate governance in the region. The key step is to identify why ASEAN's security apparatus is so weak, and how certain initiatives could be set into place to resolve this pertinent issue.

Theoretical Framework and Method

In order to dissect the actions of ASEAN and come to an affirmed conclusion regarding the makeup of its security structure, the theoretical context of the situation must be properly addressed as a point of reference. There have been a few key theories in the field of International Relations associated with the security tendencies of ASEAN, the two foremost being a realist-institutionalism and constructivism in the sense of state-centric orientation.[11] While realist-institutionalism addresses the necessity of states to best protect their interest by forming particular institutions geared to serve their own individual priorities, constructivism in concern to ASEAN refers to historical and social occurrences as the main determinants in regional policy creation[12]. Although I am not refuting the claims made by realists, institutionalists, or major

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[11] Johan Saravanamuttu, "Wither The ASEAN Security Community? Some Reflections, International Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, vol .1 (2005): 6

[12] Amitav Acharya and Evelyn Goh, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Competition, Congruence, and Transformation. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 6-7.

proponents of functionalism, the most adequate theory that should be implemented in order to achieve my stated goals is "state-centric constructivism".[13]

My aim to apply a qualitative method of case study that utilizes interpretive methods of data collection, and ethnographic research that will enable me to fully comprehend why ASEAN countries behave in their usual political and economic fashion. By utilizing a "state-centric" constructivist approach, I aim to pinpoint major intersections of historical significance and social development in order to explain the trends of the ASEAN security structure.[14] A constructivist-applied approach will allow this thesis to take into account a wide array of circumstances that have contributed to the type of security approaches that have been witnessed with ASEAN, instead of labeling certain actions as inevitable repercussions of human nature. By focusing on history and the cultural legacy as determinants for the security institutions that will be analyzed throughout the prose, a more suitable paradigm can be achieved that will highlight the insufficiencies of the ASEAN security structure.

Major Scholars and a Review of Pertinent Literary Concepts

A fairly extensive amount of literature has been devoted to the ASEAN security structure and the concept of forming a security community in the region. Most modern scholarly reports of ASEAN focus on the integration efforts of the member states and their cooperative techniques, in addition to yielding constructivist and realist explanations as to why and how ASEAN countries

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[13] Johan Saravanamuttu, "Wither The ASEAN Security Community? Some Reflections."
International Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, vol .1 (2005)
[14] Johan Saravanamuttu, "Wither The ASEAN Security Community? Some Reflections."
International Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, vol .1 (2005): 1-24

interpret each other and the rest of the world. Amitav Acharya and Evelyn Goh, both leading

scholars in ASEAN relations, have chosen to acknowledge that certain social norms, institutional

regulations, cultural heritage, and external colonial influence have proven to be decisive factors

in dictating ASEAN's unsteady security stance.[15] Goh also mentions the rise of new institutions

pose challenges to existing norms of ASEAN interaction. In addition the increasing

formalization of regional cooperation, and the creation of special purpose security approaches

are listed as pivotal elements of the recent security development in the region.[16] When assessing

the "ASEAN Security Community" Acharya is somewhat skeptical of the governments of

member states, but for all intensive purposes tries to locate mechanisms that could function with

more vigor to create a substantial security framework. Acharya specifically discusses the

responsibilities of the ASEAN 'Security Community' which includes transnational challenges

related to syndicate crime organizations and terrorist activities, democratization in the region,

and managing ties with great powers just to name a few.[17] Acharya also keenly acknowledges the

ASEAN mandate which provides a strong basis for the non-interference doctrine, which

prohibits the meddling in domestic affairs among sovereign member states, regardless of the

given context or despite a volatile conflict.[18]

Types of what can be considered as "competitive interaction" between ASEAN members

also presents a set of dilemmas for a solidified security structure, mainly through economic

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[15] Amitav Acharya and Evelyn Goh, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Competition, Congruence, and Transformation. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007)

[16] Amitav Acharya and Evelyn Goh, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Competition, Congruence, and Transformation. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007)

[17] Amitav Acharya, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific. Chapter 1, Regional Institutions and Security in the Asia-Pacific: Evolution, Adaptation and Prospects for Transformation (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 19-23.

[18] Amitav Acharya, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific. Chapter 7, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 267-273.

inconsistencies and regional competition.[19] As Shaun Narine points out, recent financial crises such at the Asian economic crisis of 1997-1998 have severely impaired regional security due to each member state having to safeguard its own personal interest with little concern given to multi-lateral relations.[20] C.P.F. Luhulima, a Senior Research Associate at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Indonesia also argues that a more stable economic environment would help to "facilitate" a more robust political structure in the region, which in turn would enhance the fragile security structure in ASEAN[21]. Taking into account regional stability as a point of focus for progressive security measures, Luhulima also contests that there must be some economic incentive in order for regional cooperation to evolve and adopt a more formalized security standard.[22]

John Ravenhill, a leading expert on ASEAN relations, is also keen to comment on regionalism in East Asia. By citing sources of poorly modeled "institutional features" Ravenhill concludes that any type of viable security community has been nullified.[23] In addition, Ravenhill cites the role of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) plays in South East Asia and

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[19] Shaun Narine, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia Pacific. Chapter 9, Economic Security and Regional Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Evaluating the Economic Security Nexus (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 195- 201.

[20] Shaun Narine, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia Pacific. Chapter 9, Economic Security and Regional Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Evaluating the Economic Security Nexus (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 195- 201.

[21] C.P.F Luhulima,. "Scope of ASEAN's Security Framework for the 21st Century." Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Institute, no. 6 (April 2000): 1-8

[22] . C.P.F Luhulima,. "Scope of ASEAN's Security Framework for the 21st Century." Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Institute, no. 6 (April 2000): 6

[23] John Ravenhill, "East Asian regionalism: Much ado about nothing?" Australian National University Working Paper, no.3 (2008): 4

ASEAN in particular.[24] Ravenhill discusses that APEC is a strong advocates against any type of regional security structure. A few different plausible explanations are given for the phenomenon, one being that some government leaders feel that a security community would hamper trade instead of improving it, and secondly that western governments in APEC are applying pressure on simultaneously acting ASEAN countries not to implement security features for fear of losing the upper hand in trade relations.[25]

As the prospect of an ASEAN security is a major part of the security literature related to Southeast Asian political and economic institutions, the concept of such is critical to the thesis. By properly labeling the qualities of a security communities, we can better understand how ASEAN can be classified, and what some of its weaknesses are.

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[24] John Ravenhill, "East Asian regionalism: Much ado about nothing?" Australian National
  University Working Paper, no.3 (2008): 5

[25] Ravenhill, John. "East Asian regionalism: Much ado about nothing?" Australian National
  University Working Paper, no.2 (2008): 6

Chapter 1: A Common Security

ASEAN's status as a security community is contentious to say the least, which is one of the primary reasons why I am conducting this thesis. However, before delving into aspects that suggest whether or not ASEAN does in fact hold some type of security community properties, the definition, interpretations, and examples of security communities must be accurately identified.

1.1.   A Qualification: What is a Security Community?

Karl Deutsch, came to coin the term "security community" through extensive analysis of the post-World War Two environment.[26] According to Deutsch, a security community consists of a "group of people who have been integrated" via the means of a unified community embedded in a hierarchical system controlled by governing institutions.[27] Deutsch continues by adding that it is essential for the "community" in question to have strong enough cohesion in order to guarantee for an extended period of time that there will be no change in ideology among the population. Without his prescribed "we feeling" Deutsch contends that certain "considerations, loyalties, trust, and responsiveness" in a policy making process will not come to fruition.[28] Although Deutsch's ideas regarding security communities began proliferating in the mid-1950's

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[26] Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area; International Organizations in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1957)

[27] Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area; International Organizations in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1957)

[28] Emanuel Alder and Barnett, Michael, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1998)

the viability of such a concept was not completely realized until the eradication of the bi-polar world in 1991 and the revision of realist doctrine.[29]

When taking into account the theoretical aspects of International Relations, the concept of a security community poses a great threat to the ideals of realism. Realism dictates that states in the international system behave in an anarchical manner, and that some deal of security competition typically yields sustained military conflict throughout this system, with the duration of each conflict varying depending on the objectives and capability of the actors involved.[30] However, security communities function in a contradictory way to these assumptions about the realist tendencies of states. A security community would regard the use of absolute military force against each other as unacceptable on all levels, and would most likely forgo any military buildup in the anticipation of an attack from another member of the community.[31] Security communities that are clearly visible in modernity include the United States of America and Canada, the European Union, and specifically the Nordic countries.[32]

However, there are two major types of security communities. Amalgamated security communities are essentially created when two or more independent states form a union and introduce a new governing body.[33] Although these are rare and often marked with failure, as can be seen in the case example of Norway and Sweden attempting to form a unified government between 1814 and 1905, there are some successful models to be studied such as the thirteen colonies transitioning to the United States of America.[34] Pluralistic security communities are the

[29] Emanuel Alder and Barnett, Michael, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1998)
[30] Emanuel Alder and Barnett, Michael, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1998)
[31] Emanuel Alder and Barnett, Michael, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1998)
[32] Emanuel Alder and Barnett, Michael, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1998)
[33] Emanuel Alder and Barnett, Michael, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1998)
[34] Andrej Tusicisny, "Security Communities and Their Values: Taking Masses Seriously."
International Political Science Review, no.4, vol.28: 425-430

second type identified by scholars, which entails the retention of state sovereignty through some type of "integrative device".[35] The current relationship between EU member states are a keen example of such a pluralistic security community, which many scholars is far easier to maintain than an amalgamated one.[36]

There have been additional considerations given to the concept of security communities, such as the way in which a given security is expected to evolve over time. According to security literature, this evolution of a security community contains a three step process, which begins with a "nascent" security community, followed by a transition to an "ascendant" security community, and finally culminates as a "mature" security community.[37] A security community that is classified as "nascent" typically meets the necessity of a "peaceful transition" in a particular region, with an ascendant community being a transition phase to a "mature" community which is generally composed within a supranational framework that meets "collective security" needs.[38] Although a "mature security community" is typically achieved the final stage of interstate cooperation and at the height of effective political dialogue, "mature" communities can still be viewed as "loosely" or "tightly" coupled communities depending on their overall level of integration.[39]

ASEAN is certainly yearning to meet the credentials of a pluralistic security community that would eventually ascertain a "mature" bearing in reference to its cohesion, but there are a series

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[35] Emanuel Alder and Barnett, Michael, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1998)
[36] Laurie Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities." European Journal of International Relations, no. 2, vol. 12 (2006): 277
[37] Emanuel Alder and Barnett, Michael, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1998)
[38] Emanuel Alder and Barnett, Michael, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1998)
[39] Andrej Tusicisny, "Security Communities and Their Values: Taking Masses Seriously." International Political Science Review, no.4, vol.28: 430

of steps that need to be taken in this process.[40] A running debate has been ensuing amongst

scholars for the better part of two decades as to whether or not ASEAN qualifies as any type of

security community, and if it does, what category it should actually fall in.[41] Naysayers of an

alleged ASEAN security community typically focus on the national priorities of its members

states as the culprit in the lack of integration process.[42] However there are a variety of social

factors, such as domestic instability, which may play a key role in preventing the development of

a proper security community within the ASEAN paradigm.[43]

1.2 Major Setbacks to ASEAN's Security Community

The concept of a security community also directly correlates to the notions of political and

domestic stability within a given region. Adler and Barnett, two contemporary scholars who have

hallmarked the most recent work in relation to security community, argue that instability within

communities on any level is the first "impediment" to a security community.[44] Although they do

not suggest this as an ultimatum, by specifying that political instability might just be a temporary

dilemma in trying to achieve a security community, one can see the crucial relationship that the

two items have.[45] Although ASEAN claims to have security community viability, not all

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[40] Donald K. Emmerson, "Security, Community, and Democracy in Southeast Asia: Analyzing ASEAN." Japanese
    Journal of Political Science, no.2, vol. 6 (2005): 165

[41] Donald K. Emmerson., "Will The Real ASEAN Please Stand Up? Security, Community, and Democracy in
    Southeast Asia." Stanford University Working Paper, (2005): 1-3

[42] N. Ganesan, " Rethinking ASEAN as a Security Community in Southeast Asia." Asian Affairs, no.4, vol. 21
    (Winter 1995): 210-212

[43] N. Ganesan, " Rethinking ASEAN as a Security Community in Southeast Asia." Asian Affairs, no.4, vol. 21
    (Winter 1995): 220-226

[44]. Emanuel Alder and Barnett, Michael, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1998)

[45] Emanuel Alder and Barnett, Michael, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1998)

ASEAN member states boast political regimes that promote democratic and stable rule.[46] Myanmar is a prime example of this type of political instability, as the country is governed by a military junta that lacks necessary political credentials and legitimate governing techniques.[47] By exposing the risk of violence and potential border spillovers of conflict via sustained internal strife, one can see how the prospect of an ASEAN security community is badly damaged by political instability and social unrest.[48]

Domestic Instability

As mentioned by Laurie Nathan in the European Journal of International Relations, domestic stability is first a reason for a security community in respect to ASEAN due to the general welfare of the population.[49] If a population of people are not relatively secure, despite the official stance and claimed political stance by their respective government, then we can hardly categorize them as being part of a security community.[50] Nathan calls for "credible terminology" when assessing the ASEAN situation when attempting to accurately analyze the situation in Southeast Asia in order to accurately recommend alternatives that would allow ASEAN to assume security community status more hastily.[51] Instead of countries attempting to

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[46] John Garofano, "Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security Community for Asia?" Asian Survey, no. 3, vol. 42 (May/June 2002): 502-505

[47] Jurgen Haacke, "Enhanced Interaction with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with its Diplomatic and Security Culture?" Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, no.2, vol. 27 (August 2005) 188- 189

[48] John Garofano, "Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security Community for Asia?" Asian Survey, no. 3, vol. 42 (May/June 2002): 519-521

[49] Laurie Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities." European Journal of International Relations, no.2, vol.12 (2006): 283

[50] Laurie Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities." European Journal of International Relations, no.2, vol.12 (2006): 275-277

[51] Laurie Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities." European Journal of International Relations, no.2, vol.12 (2006): 283

form a security community through the adoption of an "interstate cooperation" they should first focus domestically at an "intrastate" level in order for due progress to ensue.[52]

An extremely important reason for stating that domestic stability is a necessary condition for a security community is due to the inherent link between intrastate and interstate conflicts.[53] As mentioned generally in the opening paragraph to this section, medium to large scale domestic violence can spread from within the sovereign borders of a state to neighboring entities very quickly without stern management.[54] Such instances can include ethnic clashes, sectarian violence, and rebel movements against formalized governments.[55]

ASEAN member states have avoided a large scale conflict with one another for over forty years, and this achievement is generally attribute to what has been coined as the "ASEAN way".[56] The "ASEAN way" is a represented as a general understanding between the governments of interest in Southeast Asia that serves as a safeguard against conflict while creating a loose diplomatic forum for bilateral relations.[57] Unfortunately, the "ASEAN way" has a multitude of effects on regional governments due some of its key policy measures, some of

[52] Laurie Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities." European Journal of International Relations, no.2, vol.12 (2006): 280

[53] Laurie Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities." European Journal of International Relations, no.2, vol.12 (2006): 278-290

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[54] Laurie Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities." European Journal of International Relations, no.2, vol.12 (2006): 280-281

[55] Laurie Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities." European Journal of International Relations, no.2, vol.12 (2006): 282

[56] Laurie Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities." European Journal of International Relations, no.2, vol.12 (2006): 283

[57] Jurgen Haacke, "Enhanced Interaction with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with its Diplomatic and Security Culture?" Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, no.2, vol .27 (August 2005): 188- 192

which directly contribute to the circumstance of domestic instability.[58] The ASEAN non-interference doctrine initially applauded due to its role as a promoter of ASEAN "peaceful norms" and national sovereignty while simultaneously supporting regional integration, has certainly created quite an entanglement on the domestic front.[59] Because of the non-interference clause, ASEAN as a whole has been completely prevented from addressing crucial human rights' abuse issues and domestic violence on a general level that poses threats to large amounts of citizens, especially minority groups.[60] The non-interference doctrine mainly arose due to the initial aims of ASEAN regionalism, which was constituted by a mutual feeling of vulnerability toward internal political opposition, especially communist insurgency. The general idea was that states would still be able to heighten regime security, but at the expense of their 'constituents'. This concept applied to both legitimate and authoritarian regimes alike that were exhausting every resource necessary to preserve their power of governance.[61] Amitav Acharya argues that a security community founded on this concept meets no criteria mentioned by Deutsch in his research, therefore invalidating the region from a security community perspective.[62] At the inter-governmental level of ASEAN domestic instability has severely limited multilateral discussion in many sectors, perhaps most apparently the defense sector, where nearly no multilateral

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[58] John Garofano, "Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security Community for Asia?" Asian Survey, no.3, vol. 42 (May/June 2002): 502-504

[59] Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order (New York: Routledge, 2009)

[60] Laurie Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities." European Journal of International Relations, no.2, vol.12 (2006): 284

[61] Laurie Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities." European Journal of International Relations, no.2, vol.12 (2006): 275-299

[62] Amitav Acharya and Evelyn Goh, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Competition, Congruence, and Transformation. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007)

collaboration has been witnessed since the mid to late 1990's, when turmoil became widespread in key ASEAN member states.[63]

Indonesia can serve as a prime example of such an occurrence that was caused by the non-interference doctrine, as the fall of President Suharto in 1998 induced a sense of national panic that was followed by temporarily anarchical state.[64] Had ASEAN member states intervened in an already deteriorating political situation in Indonesia, one could assume that President Suharto's demise from power may not have been so abrupt, and even if it had, national order could have been restored in a more timely fashion. There are many other examples of regional instability and domestic quarrel, a keen example was the protest in Jakarta during 2005 when a sovereignty dispute of East Ambalat was taking place between Malaysia and Indonesia.[65] Domestic protest grew so intense in Indonesia that there were common chants of great animosity against the Malaysian government and sometimes the ASEAN grouping itself.[66] A third and more common example of domestic instability can be cited via the military regime in Myanmar which has committed mass atrocities against minorities that are considered to be fifth columns or "enemies of the state". The regime has also stripped the country of virtually any revenue while awarding exclusive business and political rights to supporters of the inhumane, authoritarian regime. Due to the most recent developments in Myanmar, the Indonesian Minister of Foreign

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[63] Laurie Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities." European Journal of International Relations, no.2, vol.12 (2006): 284

[64] Laurie Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities." European Journal of International Relations, no.2, vol.12 (2006): 283-285

[65] Jurgen Haacke. "Enhanced Interaction with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with its Diplomatic and Security Culture?" Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, no.2, vol. 27 (August 2005): 195

[66] Jurgen Haacke. "Enhanced Interaction with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with its Diplomatic and Security Culture?" Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, no.2, vol. 27 (August 2005): 195

Affairs passed a new plan of action for the ASEAN security community in 2004. The proposal

suggested forming a type of quick response "regional peacekeeping force" that would be used

exclusively in deployments for domestic conflicts in targeted problem states.[67] This most recent

security proposal came about in light of the notion that internal conflicts may eventually

proliferate and engulf the entire region in which they are situated in, however no such force has

been utilized or even created.[68]

As seen in this section, domestic stability is one of the crucial factors in any regional

integration process and is certainly pivotal in the development of a security community. As long

as internal conflicts persist within ASEAN members, the potential for constructing a pluralistic

security community on any level of functionality remains quite low, despite any policies aimed

at enhancing the security situation in the region. However, ASEAN has begun to take some

instrumental steps in implementing a security community standard through more intensive

communication techniques, and the employment of more insightful policy. [69]

1.3   Security Community Moves: The ARF as a Key Institution

Since the inception of ASEAN, there have been a number of policy measures and political

forums designed to promote regional awareness in Southeast Asia and amongst ASEAN

members. the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) came about in 1971, followed

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[67] Laurie Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities." European Journal of International Relations, no.2, vol.12 (2006): 285

[68] Laurie Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities." European Journal of International Relations, no.2, vol.12 (2006): 286

[69] John Garofano, "Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security Community for Asia?" Asian Survey, no.3, vol. 42 (May/June 2002): 502

by the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 1976, which was subsequently followed

decades later by the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) that was amended

in 1995.[70] All of these treaties were considered to be instrumental in unifying ASEAN countries

behind a common security structure, and provided a paradigm for state behavior in the region.[71]

Since nearly all of these measures were unprecedented in the region until they were actually

amended into ASEAN by-law, they were considered to be breakthroughs that would provide a

basis for a security community in the near future. ASEAN also introduced a human rights charter

into their constitution, which effectively created the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on

Human Rights (AICHR).[72] Despite these gains, the Asian economic crisis that lasted from 1997

to 1998 took a tremendous toll on all governments in the region, and the majority of progress

made was lost due a lack of financial capability by member states. The only influential forum

which remained in good standing and generally intact was the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).[73]

The ARF was conceived in 1993 and was primarily utilized to deal with the transition

from the bipolar atmosphere of the cold war to a new era of relative hegemony stemming from

the west.[74] Whether or not the ARF is actually effective in its role as an influential "talk shop"

amongst ASEAN leading members and other nations within the region is debatable and an

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[70] ASEAN 2004-2005 Annual Report. "ASEAN Security Community," 14-21

[71] John Garofano, "Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security Community for Asia?" Asian
Survey, no.3, vol. 42 (May/June 2002): 503
[72] John Garofano, "Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security Community for Asia?" Asian
Survey, no.3, vol. 42 (May/June 2002): 503-504

[73] John Garofano, "Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security Community for Asia?" Asian
Survey, no.3, vol. 42 (May/June 2002): 505

[74] John Garofano, "Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security Community for Asia?" Asian
Survey, no.3, vol. 42 (May/June 2002): 505

important point of contention.[75] A plethora of ARF summits are held each year, with meetings occurring at least once a month. The main effort of the ARF is to concentrate on rapid societal and economic changes that are greatly affecting the way security procedure is applied within the region.[76] Not surprisingly, the declarations of the ARF are reminiscent of an organization that is trying to install a security community via integrative means.

Staunch proponents of the ARF contend that increased interaction through effective political, social, and economic dialogue will achieve a heightened sense of "community" in the region, and that this aspect alone will contribute heavily to a security community with ASEAN.[77] Constructivist ideology plays a huge role when taking the ARF into consideration as an effective forum that has the potential to lead to a security community. From a constructivist standpoint, "identity" can determine the nature of regional security.[78] When I discuss "identity" in this context I am referring to what is described as a grouping of "relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about an organization or self". According to this constructivist trend, the ARF dictates a very specific self-awareness to the ASEAN organization, and this self-awareness certainly promotes the concept of a regional security community.[79] A comparison can be drawn to the European Union as Alex Wendt theorized, stating essentially that decades of cooperation amongst Western European states during the Cold War transformed the collective

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[75] Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order (New York: Routledge, 2009)

[76] John Garofano, "Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security Community for Asia?" Asian Survey, no.3, vol. 42 (May/June 2002): 507

[77] Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order (New York: Routledge, 2009)

[78] Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order (New York: Routledge, 2009)

[79] Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order (New York: Routledge, 2009)

European identity, which lead to the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) and the eventual mature pluralistic security community that it is currently viable.[80]

Notable scholars and constructivist alike seem to point to the ASEAN/ARF relationship as a key element in the security community process. Amitav Acharya is a leading advocate of this argument, and claims that the ARF culture is of the utmost importance to the formation of any security community in the region. Although the ARF can be seen as an important utensil for the creation of a security community in ASEAN, there are a variety of variables that must persist in order for this "transition" process to uphold its momentum.[81] These variables can quite simply be categorized into four main sections, which consist of "processes and motivating factors", a sense of "consciousness", the "impact" that the forum actually has on the ASEAN organization itself and overall "outcomes". "Processes and motivating factors" include the depth of interaction and transactions that occur and how far reaching they are in their influence over regional governments and organization in general. "Consciousness" refers to the universal understanding of a community within ASEAN states that propagates trust and shared visions of progress. The "impact" that is mentioned in reference to the ARF is mainly concerned with pertinent regional issues being discussed in key governmental policy groups and within the public realm, instead of being sidelined to marginalized agencies and relatively uninfluential non-government organizations. As one may guess the "outcomes" of the ARF simply refers to a final process that

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[80] John Garofano, "Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security Community for Asia?" Asian Survey, no.3, vol. 42 (May/June 2002): 508

[81] John Garofano, "Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security Community for Asia?" Asian Survey, no.3, vol. 42 (May/June 2002): 508

encompasses a greatly noticed decrease in tensions in the ASEAN zone, and the effective implementation of a security community.[82]

By unifying policy makers, scholars, and political advocates of all sorts, the ARF has begun to steer ASEAN in the proper direction to develop an efficient security community. However, the ARF is still not capable of providing enough headway to effectively develop the region into any type of functional pluralistic security community. Through examining inherent factors related to ASEAN's lack of progression, such as historical determinants and a wide variety of social variables, the problem of ASEAN insecurity can be more readily ascertained.[83]

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[82] John Garofano, "Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security Community for Asia?" Asian Survey, no.3, vol. 42 (May/June 2002): 508-521

[83] Garofano, John. "Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security Community for Asia?" Asian Survey, May/June 2002, vol. 42, no. 3; (pp 514-521).

Chapter 2: Institutions, Procedural Norms and History as a Catalyst

The history of the ASEAN region during the 20th century has played a great role in its institutional development, and has led it to adopt a set of prescribed norms that affect policy making and modes of interaction in the region[84]. By examining historical occurrences, we can better understand why ASEAN has encountered such pronounced dilemmas in establishing a firm security community. Without highlighting key elements of political and structural importance, it would be nearly impossible to identify and dissect any aspect of norm diffusion in the region, and make any type of educated assessment as to what standards need to be upheld or demolished in order to encourage a basic pluralistic security community.

2.1 The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and Its Motivating Factors

In 1967, when the first five ASEAN countries established the regional organization that was dedicated stable standards of existence, one of the foremost initiatives was to construct a relative guideline related to regional security, which came to be known as The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.[85] In the second Article of the Treaty, the text articulated four essential principles that were supposed to serve as a guiding mechanism for ASEAN members. These principles were dictated as follows, (1) that all nations shall have respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, (2) that all nations shall engage in non-interference in the

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[84] Nikolas Busse, "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security." The Pacific Review, no.1, vol.12 (1999): 39

[85] Nikolas Busse, "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security." The Pacific Review, no.1, vol.12 (1999): 46

internal affairs of one another, (3) that settlements of disputes would be through peaceful means, (4) that there would be a general renunciation of the threat or use of force.[86]

Perhaps the most fascinating, and contradictory point to the four 'behavioral norms' of ASEAN members listed in the previous paragraph, is that they were self-defeating in terms of actually creating any type of viable security community.[87] Due to the principles tilted toward non-intervention at any cost, any violent uprising or instance of domestic instability threatening the entire region could exist uncontested, which had the potential to threaten and destabilize the entire region.[88] ASEAN in fact implemented no sound measure to collectively handle a detrimental scenario that contained the potential to pit nations within the same organization against one another. Furthermore, the presence of a foreign military contingent in ASEAN countries could potentially exist with little resistance from member states according to the protocol of The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Essentially, the "behavioral norms" of ASEAN were geared directly to the continuation of state sovereignty, not the establishment of a cohesive security region.[89] Many scholars speculate that this is due to the past colonial and imperial experiences of countries in the region, therefore they viewed their sovereignty as the key factor in gaining equal representation within a regional framework, however impractical such a notion may be when taking into account the necessities of a security community.[90]

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[86] Nikolas Busse, "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security." The Pacific Review, no.1, vol.12 (1999): 46

[87] Nikolas Busse, "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security." The Pacific Review, no.1, vol.12 (1999): 46-48

[88] Acharya, Amitav. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." International Organization, 2004, vol. 58, issue 2; (pp 239-240).

[89] Nikolas Busse, "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security." The Pacific Review, no.1, vol.12 (1999): 47

[90] Fawcett, Louise. "Exploring regional domains: a comparative history of regionalism." International Affairs, 2004, vol.80, no.3; (pp 429-430).

The exceptional influence of history towards ASEAN regionalism and their concept of constructing a functional security community becomes even more obvious when utilizing comparative techniques.[91] For example, Western European states desired to create an effective region based on the ideals of security community after the apocalyptic effects of the Second World War. In contrast to ASEAN actions, European nations questioned the concept of state sovereignty, blaming the elements of the nation-state as the main factor behind any regional destabilization phenomenon.[92] The European Community instead saw a purely supranational organization as the only force that could counter the previous occurrences in the early and mid-20th century, inducing a notion of "transcending" the nation state instead of "preserving" it as ASEAN has.[93]

2.2 Procedural Norms

Procedural norms also have to be taken into account when analyzing the contributions to an alleged ASEAN security community. Most of these procedural norms in question are typically attributed to what Amitav Acharya designates "The ASEAN Way."[94] They relate to methods in which conflicts should be managed within the Association itself .[95] Some of these non-productive norms are: seeking agreement and harmony, the principle of sensitivity, non-

[91] Fawcett, Louise. "Exploring regional domains: a comparative history of regionalism." International Affairs, 2004, vol.80, no.3; (pp 429).

[92] Nikolas Busse, "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security." The Pacific Review, no.1, vol.12 (1999): 47

[93] Nikolas Busse, "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security." The Pacific Review, no.1, vol.12 (1999): 48

[94] Nikolas Busse, "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security." The Pacific Review, no.1, vol.12 (1999): 47

[95] Shaun, Narine,. "40 Years of ASEAN: a historical review." The Pacific Review, no.4, vo.21 (2008): 414

confrontation and agreeability, private and elite diplomacy, and politeness.[96] These mentioned

stances of conduct are more a lack of initiative instead of base for interaction. One can easily see

by examining these criterions that a "carblanche" style of "anything goes within your country"

governance is strictly adhered to by the organization. Not a single official procedural norm with

the ASEAN organization indicates a specific objective, or policy recommendation aimed at

addressing any problem or quarrel within or between nations of the organization.[97] Not even the

preservation of territorial integrity is addressed by these norms, and in essence these norms

create a free-for-all style of administration for the Southeast Asian region, which is certainly not

conducive to any type of imagined security community.[98]

In order to grasp why these ASEAN nations have promoted such ineffective and blind

procedural norms, it is crucial to look at the political makeup and culture of the member states.

As established by Nikolas Busse, politics in Southeast Asia has typically been over-personalized,

and relatively "informal".[99] Most of the pre-colonial political regimes overlapped in areas of

influence and confirmed support, which were composed of "deity-kings" with no standing

armies or fixed boundaries of rule.[100] The survival of these political system relied solely on the

management of power-relationships with other rulers in the region, which can correlate to the

type of political and security structure that is witnessed in ASEAN today. Another crucial point

to mention is that Southeast Asia never underwent an intellectual and political transformation

such as the Enlightenment or the implementation of a firm judicial structure such as the one

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[96] Nikolas Busse, "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security." The Pacific Review, no.1, vol.12 (1999): 47
[97] "ASEAN's Failure: The Limits of Politeness." The Economist, 28 February 1998, pp 43.

[98] Vinod K. Aggarwal, "Reconciling Institutions: Nested, Horizontal, Overlapping, and Independent Institutions."
    Princeton University Report (February 1995): 15-17

[99] Nikolas Busse, "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security." The Pacific Review, no.1, vol.12 (1999): pp 39

[100] Nikolas Busse, "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security." The Pacific Review, no.1, vol.12 (1999): 48

propagated by the Roman Empire. Therefore there was a lack of judicial insight and formal governance. Of course after de-colonialization "formal political institutions" did come to fruition, but the majority of states in Southeast Asia that are now ASEAN nations were ruled by confined, elite members of society. Since this system operated on patronage, any criticism of an individual or institution would have brought into jeopardy the very basis of power in a region. This "social etiquette" transcended into ASEAN policy, which was eventually confirmed by The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, leading ASEAN astray from any real means of constructing a security community and truly unified region.

2.3 ASEAN Norm Validity from 1978-1991: The Vietnam-Cambodia Conflict and The Absence of Security Norms

The conflict that began in 1978 between Vietnam and Cambodia proved to be one of the foremost examples of ASEAN norm validity falling into questionable doubt. When responding to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, ASEAN's norms played a major role in dictating their policy and alignment regarding the conflict.[101] In the midst of this regional struggle, ASEAN had the option to assume three major courses of action.[102]

First, ASEAN could ignore the conflict altogether, allowing each belligerent to handle its affairs independently until a joint resolution or "absolute victory" by either side was achieved. This initial option was deemed as insufficient, mainly because it violated certain ASEAN norms, such as the renunciation of the use of force which is emphasized in The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.[103] Secondly, ASEAN could form a type of military alliance against Vietnam,

[101] Vinod K. Aggarwal, "Reconciling Institutions: Nested, Horizontal, Overlapping, and Independent Institutions." Princeton University Report, (February 1995): 3-4
[102] Nikolas Busse, "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security." The Pacific Review, no.1, vol.12 (1999): 48
[103] Nikolas Busse, "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security." The Pacific Review, no.1, vol.12 (1999): 48

however this proved unacceptable due to its anticipated level of provocation, having the potential to worsen the conflict through an enhanced Vietnamese response which could spread throughout the militarily weak ASEAN zone.[104] In addition, the second option of forming an anti-Vietnamese alliance was contrary to the ASEAN norm of non-confrontational social behavior that hallmarked its diplomatic processes which lead to the third option.[105][106] Taking into account the gravity of the situation while also upholding its assumed norms, ASEAN proposed launching a staunch diplomatic and political campaign against Vietnam, hoping to end the conflict through constructive dialogue and the threat of making Vietnam a political pariah in the region. The third option was most appealing since it avoided a "confrontational" atmosphere while applying "cohesion" and "outstanding unity" throughout the organization.[107]

Although ASEAN chose the most politically suitable option for its normative stance in the context of its perceived policy structure, its ability to help bring back a sense of stability to the region through any means of proactive security implementation was an utter failure. The insistence on the use of private and informal modes of communication to help bring an end to the conflict and prevent further threats to regional actors was only significant as a symbolic action by ASEAN. It was not until the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, which was solely influenced by the competing superpowers in the region, China and Russia, that any cease fire resolution was actually reached.[108] ASEAN had proven itself ineffective to address, disrupt or even contain a full scale conflict within its own region of operation, and the implications of this scenario have

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[104] "Thailand Challenges ASEAN 'Non-Interference' Policy." Agence France Presse, 13 June 1998.
[105] Tobias Nischalke, "Does ASEAN measure up? Post-Cold War diplomacy and the idea of regional community." The Pacific Review, no.1 (2001): 89-92
[106] Nikolas Busse, "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security." The Pacific Review, no.1, vol.12 (1999): 49
[107] Nikolas Busse, "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security." The Pacific Review, no.1, vol.12 (1999): 49
[108] Nikolas Busse, "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security." The Pacific Review, no.1, vol.12 (1999): 49

proven long-lasting and substantially consistent.[109] Such actions by ASEAN countries, which

have since included Vietnam and Cambodia as members of the organization, epitomize the

attitude of a region that cannot build a security community due to its lack of initiative and

unwillingness to halt violence and large scale unrest in its tracks.[110] Without intervention and the

tangible support of a joint resolution, ASEAN will only hamper itself in its efforts to become a

pluralistic security community.[111]

2.4 Diffusion and Localization

Another vital element of ASEAN's structure that relates to the creation of a security

community is "norm diffusion", and the effect of "localization".[112] Norm diffusion in the context

of the ASEAN security community contends with which perspectives and concepts that matter

and are most influential in the region.[113] Based on the constructivist approach that is being

applied to the notion of ASEAN security within this thesis, norm diffusion and localization

emphasizes a type of transition in which "positive" international norms persist over "negative"

concepts and policy implementation.[114] Unfortunately in most cases of regionalism, and certainly

within the context of ASEAN, local norms directly influence the acceptance and restricting of

"foreign" norms to fit within Southeast Asian society. In relation to any concept of an ASEAN

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[109] "ASEAN's Failure: The Limits of Politeness." The Economist, 28 February 1998: 43.

[110] Anwar Ibrahim, "Crisis Prevention," Newsweek (International), 21 July 1997: 29.

[111] Tobias, Nischalke, "Does ASEAN measure up? Post-Cold War diplomacy and the idea of regional community." The Pacific Review, no.1 (2001): 91

[112] Amitav Acharya. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." International Organization, issue 2, vol. 58 (2004): 239

[113] Amitav Acharya. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." International Organization, issue 2, vol. 58 (2004): 239-275

[114] Amitav Acharya. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." International Organization, issue 2, vol. 58 (2004): 239-245

"security community" there must be a cohesion of norms within a framework of "congruence" in order for member states to adopt similar points of view and move forward in the securitization process.[115] Whether or not any progress has actually been made in reference to norm diffusion and localization is contentious, and will be examined in the upcoming section.

2.5 Localization as an Essential Enabler of Norm Diffusion

In the case of building a unified ASEAN security community, localization is key to its ability to create a universal base of beliefs that would allow ASEAN countries to share a common mindset. The matter of localization that is being discussed relates to ASEAN countries giving up elements of their sovereignty, and abandoning their exclusive system of private and informal diplomatic procedure that does not allow the organization to function as a true supranational organization that is capable of maintaining conflicts within its own borders and is not limited to its own guiding principles of "turning a blind eye" to crucial eruptions of unrest or conflict.[116] Of course it is not a simple procedure to introduce new norms to a region and to localize them in a post-haste fashion.[117] The availability of localization within the concept of norm diffusion rest squarely on its perceived "positive impact" on relevant populations, and also how much authority the government yields that is potentially implementing them.[118] The strength of pre-existing norms also have to be taken into account for the ASEAN community, such as

[115] Amitav Acharya. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." International Organization, issue 2, vol. 58 (2004): 239-240

[116] Amitav Acharya. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." International Organization, issue 2, vol. 58 (2004): 240

[117] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, After the Cold War: International institutions and state strategies in Europe, 1989-1991 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 386.

[118] Amitav Acharya. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." International Organization, issue 2, vol. 58 (2004): 239

cultural traditions and societal practices, and they have to be adaptable on some level to the

"alien" or "foreign" norms that are being localized in the region.[119] Without such a process, the

eventual creation of a pluralistic security community is not probable based on the inability for

ASEAN states to adopt new practices that span across the organization.

In reference to the potential of localization within ASEAN countries that could help

produce a pluralistic security community; the process must be ongoing, not stagnant. As

described by Acharya, the localization of norm diffusion in Southeast Asia must be an

"everyday" and "evolutionary" occurrence that "upgrades" the level of cohesion that is directly

related to political and security advancement.[120] Without the constant introduction and adoption

of foreign concepts of supranational governance and the security standards that go along with it,

ASEAN will continue to suffer from the syndrome of ineffective security. Of course this

mentioned localization can include previous norms by simply reshaping them to fit the current

needs of an ASEAN security community which would allow the region to make great strides of

progression. The key areas of localization that ASEAN needs to focus on according to relevant

literature highlights pivotal institutional changes and the ways in which policy measures are

introduced. By addressing institutional deviation, which includes the delegated tasks of certain

forums and the expansion of membership responsibilities, a more rigid outline of functional

responsibility can be achieved.[121] In addition, the policy making apparatus requires more

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[119] Amitav Acharya. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." International Organization, issue 2, vol. 58 (2004): 240

[120] Amitav Acharya. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." International Organization, issue 2, vol. 58 (2004): 241

[121] Tobias Nischalke, "Does ASEAN measure up? Post-Cold War diplomacy and the idea of regional community." The Pacific Review, no.1, vol. 15 (2001): 106-107

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transparency that is not limited to diplomacy or formalized voting techniques but also modifications to the current legal systems in each ASEAN member nation.[122]

2.6 ASEAN and "Flexible Engagement": Norm Diffusion and Localization Slighted By ASEAN

In 1997 Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan sought to address the "principle of non-intervention" since he recognized the clause as being a key obstacle in resolving essential domestic conflicts with regional consequences.[123] In a statement within an official Thai government document released to the press Foreign Minister Pitsuwan stated that, ".....Many domestic affairs have obvious external or transnational dimensions, adversely affecting neighbors, the region, and the regions' relations with others. In such cases the affected countries should be able to express their opinions and concerns in an open, frank and constructive manner, which is not, and should not be, considered "interference" in fellow-members' domestic affairs."[124] This statement of grave concern came to produce Pitsuwan's concept of "flexible engagement" with the aim to produce more integrated and effective governmental discussions that would lead to a less opaque ASEAN model.[125] By addressing the security woes of instability via flexible engagement, it can be gauged just how influential such a concept could be to the production of an ASEAN pluralistic security community.

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[122] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand 1998.

[123] Amitav Acharya. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." International Organization, issue 2, vol. 58 (2004): 250

[124] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand 1998.

[125] Amitav Acharya. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." International Organization, issue 2, vol. 58 (2004): 251

By emphasizing the importance of flexible engagement, Pitsuwan aimed to nullify key

security challenges to ASEAN such as narcotics, illegal migrants, racial tension, and

environmental hazards.[126] By providing a collective framework of action, Pitsuwan proposed an

idea that he thought would lead ASEAN away from the "ineffective" non-interference doctrine

and towards a tighter knit security community.[127] There was no doubt that from Pitsuwan's angle

of interpretation regarding the non-interference doctrine that no greater adversary posed the

ASEAN community. He cited the oppressive military junta in Myanmar, which he clearly

addressed as Burma, and claimed that ASEAN states had lost their sense of "accountability".[128]

Pitsuwan hoped that due to the general internal abandonment and disagreement regarding

ASEAN's Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality that the non-interference doctrine would also

be dismissed as obsolete and inconclusive due to obvious security priorities.[129] However,

Pitsuwan's proposal was met with significant opposition throughout the region as Singapore's

Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar commented, "ASEAN countries' consistent adherence to this

principle of non-interference is the key reason why no military conflict has broken out between

any two member countries since the founding of ASEAN."[130] Other governmental officials

within ASEAN were also skeptical of Pitsuwan's suggestion of flexible engagement, and argued

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[126] "Thailand Challenges ASEAN 'Non-Interference' Policy." Agence France Presse, 13 June 1998.

[127] Amitav Acharya. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." International Organization, issue 2, vol. 58 (2004): 251

[128] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand 1998.

[129] Amitav Acharya. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." International Organization, issue 2, vol. 58 (2004): 252-253

[130] Amitav Acharya. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." International Organization, issue 2, vol. 58 (2004): 251

that previously created ordinances and norms were more than capable of dealing with any security challenges that may persist in the region.[131]

Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier in reference to norm diffusion, any localization effort depends greatly on influential and governing personalities in the region of their proposal, and this certainly proved true for ASEAN's reluctance to accept the standard of flexible engagement. The concept of flexible engagement did not succeed in establishing any new institutions or precedents for dealing with critical security matters in the ASEAN realm. The founding members of ASEAN which includes Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines all suggested that, "Implementing the norm of flexible engagement in place of the non-interference doctrine is the surest and quickest way to ruin…ASEAN."[132] Instead the normative procedure of ignoring security dilemmas and stemming the progression of an actual pluralistic ASEAN security community ensued.

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[131] Tobias Nischalke, "Does ASEAN measure up? Post-Cold War diplomacy and the idea of regional community." The Pacific Review, 2001, no.1, vol. 15, (2001): 107

[132] Amitav Acharya. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." International Organization, issue 2, vol. 58 (2004): 252

Chapter 3: APEC Picking up ASEAN's Slack; A Paradigm to Follow?

ASEAN's lack of security community has drawn great attention from external governments who have considerable economic interests in the region.[133] Trade organizations that also operate within the Southeast Asian area that are composed of ASEAN and non-ASEAN members alike have also taken notice to a plethora of security problems, many originating from a lack of ASEAN wherewithal. The Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which is composed of some twenty-one Pacific brim countries, is one such organization that has highlighted the need for a visible security apparatus and moreover a functioning security community within the ASEAN states.[134] Without such a security framework, many APEC countries feel that the economic environment in which they conduct business in could be vulnerable to a multitude of security threats including terrorism, and cross-border conflict. Any such occurrences could generate great losses in revenue, and could help facilitate general instability within the region.[135]

Although ASEAN countries participate as full members of the APEC organization, many have been reluctant to accept any security measures proposed by the economic forum, discrediting them as key instruments that would be used to unravel the ASEAN community.[136]

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[133] John Ravenhill, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Chapter 6 APEC and Security, Mission Creep or Mission Impossible." (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007.)

[134] John Ravenhill, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Chapter 6 APEC and Security, Mission Creep or Mission Impossible (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007.)

[135] Sopiee Noordin, "Should APEC Address Security Issues?" in C. Fred Bergsten, ed., "Whither APEC? The Progress to Date and Agenda for the Future." Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, (1997): 209

[136] Sopiee, Noordin, "Should APEC Address Security Issues?" in C. Fred Bergsten, ed., "Whither APEC? The Progress to Date and Agenda for the Future." Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997): 210

Taking into consideration the opinions of key political and academic personalities, one can quickly come to the conclusion that there is a contradiction of concepts. For example, Noordin Sopiee who is the former Chairman of Malaysia's Institute of Strategic and International Studies commented on the situation by saying, "There are few things more likely to damage and even destroy APEC than to put security on the agenda."[137] However, the APEC Business Advisory Council issued an official statement concluding that, "Security and trade facilitation are not in competition. Both are vital and both can and must be advanced in harmony."[138] Condoleezza Rice, the previous U.S. Secretary of State followed up that assertion by saying, "Today, there is a clear consensus that prosperity requires security, and behind that principle lays evidence of a pragmatic cooperation to get the job done."[139]

3.1 APEC Before 9/11

APEC was never designed to confront security issues in the Southeast Asian region; instead its main ambition was to concentrate on inter-state economic interactions that would boost the region financially.[140] It was speculated that any progress that APEC helped to induce within the targeted area would help with security woes, especially in reference to ASEAN countries, and that facilitated economic prosperity would help eradicate key instances of instability and criminal activity.[141] Furthermore, APEC had a wide-reaching agenda which

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[137] Sopiee, Noordin, "Should APEC Address Security Issues?" in C. Fred Bergsten, ed., "Whither APEC? The Progress to Date and Agenda for the Future." Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997): 210

[138] APEC Business Advisory Council. "Sharing Development to Reinforce Global Security: 2002 ABAC Report to APEC Economic Leaders, August 10, 2002: 9

[139] Rice, Condoleezza. "Our Asia Strategy." Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2003.

[140] John Ravenhill, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Chapter 6 APEC and Security, Mission Creep or Mission Impossible (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 141.

[141] John Ravenhill, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Chapter 6 APEC and Security, Mission Creep or Mission Impossible (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 141.

included many countries that were not within the ASEAN framework, causing concern for ASEAN member states.[142] ASEAN generally felt that countries such as the United States, Mexico, Peru, and Chile had no business dictating the security atmosphere of Southeast Asia, even if it meant contributing to a solid pluralistic security community within ASEAN.[143] Even if ASEAN countries were to accept a miniscule security proposal from its fellow APEC members, such policies were thought to have the potential to directly interfere with their norms of community building and non-interference in their zone of sovereignty[144].

ASEAN officials openly contended that enhanced trade and economic cooperation via the APEC grouping supported security measures in Southeast Asia, and that this would be more than enough to sustain any concept of a security community along with the norms that had already been set into place by ASEAN.[145] It must be clarified however that there were APEC summits geared toward security before September 11, 2001, but they were responsive in nature rather than proactive in any respect, and were fairly unrelated to ASEAN interests. One such example was the Auckland meeting in 1999, which was held to initiate discussion regarding the "accidental" U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade[146]. Another occurrence of a security summit included the APEC Energy Working Group, which met nearly twenty times from 1996 to

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[142] Sopiee, Noordin, "Should APEC Address Security Issues?" in C. Fred Bergsten, ed., "Whither APEC? The Progress to Date and Agenda for the Future." Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997): 209

[143] John Ravenhill, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Chapter 6 APEC and Security, Mission Creep or Mission Impossible (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007)

[144] David Macduff, "APEC After Shanghai." International Journal, no. 3, vol. 57 (Summer 2002): 439-440

[145] "Not So Pacific." The Economist, October 23, 2003.

[146] APEC. "The Auckland Challenge: APEC Economic Leaders' Declaration." Auckland, New Zealand, September 13, 1999. <http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/leaders_declarations/1999.html>

2000.[147] Many politicians also choose to highlight the concept that many non-ASEAN powers were not interested in promoting security in the form of any policy measure or the assistance to help ASEAN form a security community pre-9/11, as it was thought that any opening of the agenda would allow ASEAN countries to pursue their own security interest at the cost of other entities.[148]

3.2 The Post-9/11 Environment: Countering Terrorism within APEC and ASEAN Cohesion

In the ensuing months after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, APEC temporarily adopted a clear shift in policy measures related to security efforts in the region.[149] [150] In 2001 APEC held a Leaders' Meeting that focused solely on the terrorist threat stemming from the Southeast Asian region.[151] Taking into consideration the dramatic events that unfolded months earlier, this was not a surprising occurrence and deviation from the previous stance indicated on APEC's agenda. Several key factors were addressed throughout the course of these meetings that lasted in the mentioned capacity through 2003.[152] First, and perhaps most crucially, the recognition that terrorist threats in the region could have on the economic situation of the member countries was addressed. The concept of financial stability and security being two differing entities was completely discredited. Second, any type of pre-emptive anti-terrorist

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[147] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Economic Analytical Unit, Government of Australia, Costs of Terrorism and the Benefits of Working Together. (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, October 2003)

[148] John Ravenhill, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Chapter 6 APEC and Security, Mission Creep or Mission Impossible (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 144-145.

[149] John Ravenhill, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Chapter 6 APEC and Security, Mission Creep or Mission Impossible (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 146.

[150] David Macduff, "APEC After Shanghai." International Journal, no. 3, vol. 57 (Summer 2002): 439-442

[151] John Ravenhill, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Chapter 6 APEC and Security, Mission Creep or Mission Impossible (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 149.

[152] John Ravenhill, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Chapter 6 APEC and Security, Mission Creep or Mission Impossible (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 150.

agenda by states in Southeast Asia was promoted with the backdrop of commonality of interests being a uniting force in the region.[153] APEC was finally beginning to recognize that a lack of security community, information sharing and any insightful security policy in the region could result in huge damages linked to the loss of infrastructure, business, and tourism.[154]

Surprisingly, ASEAN countries appeared to be united in their effort to assist one another in each other's domestic affairs, but only when combating "designated" terrorist groups.[155] Although this was a relatively basic move from the norm of non-interference, it probably did signal the initial process in what was hoped to be an evolution of a security community in the region that utilized the benefits of inter-agency and inter-government coordination. Perhaps the most significant regional organizational progress in the APEC and ASEAN groupings in included the Counter-Terrorism Task Force.[156] This task force was instituted in light of recognition that terrorist activities could greatly challenge both ASEAN and APEC economic activities in the area, and through the admission that both groups previously did not have the structure to respond to a terrorist threat adequately.[157]

Human security also became a prime issue of consideration in the post-9/11 environment, and many leaders in APEC hoped the ideas would make a transition to ASEAN in order to

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[153] John Ravenhill, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Chapter 6 APEC and Security, Mission Creep or Mission Impossible (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 150.

[154] Sopiee Noordin, "Should APEC Address Security Issues?" in C. Fred Bergsten, ed., "Whither APEC? The Progress to Date and Agenda for the Future." Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, (1997): 210

[155] David Macduff, "APEC After Shanghai." International Journal, no. 3, vol. 57 (Summer 2002): 440

[156] John Ravenhill, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Chapter 6 APEC and Security, Mission Creep or Mission Impossible (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 149.

[157] John Ravenhill, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Chapter 6 APEC and Security, Mission Creep or Mission Impossible (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 149.

develop their lack of human right's initiatives.[158] Public health facilities became a key focal

point, with the call for hospitals and medical facilities throughout the region to increase their

ability to combat infectious disease that could either be "naturally occurring" or related to

instances of chemical weapon or biological weapon attacks.[159] The official forum that proposed

this policy, the "Leaders' Statement on Health Security" acknowledged that there was a

considerable amount of resentment towards this policy, especially within ASEAN countries who

did not feel compelled to interfere with one another's health care apparatus. However, the forum

specifically cited outbreaks such as SARS as how an infectious ailment could easily spread

throughout the whole region and claim the lives of citizens and financial viability of key

institutions that provided the basis for effective governance.[160]

The post-9/11 environment revitalized what many perceived to be a hopeless cause of

regionalization within APEC and especially ASEAN. While many hopeful onlookers of a

security community within ASEAN view APEC's actions as "road-paving" phenomenon, it is

still fairly unclear as to whether this will incite institutional changes within the regional

organization, or if non-ASEAN powers simply have considerable influence in APEC and assume

the will power and influence to shape it as they please.[161] The new counterterrorism agenda that

has been adopted by the domestic governments of many ASEAN states does seem to be

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[158] APEC. "2003 Leaders' Declaration: APEC Leaders' Statement on Health Security." APEC Secretariat.
    <http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/leaders_declarations/2003/2003_StmtHealthSecurity.html>

[159] APEC. "2003 Leaders' Declaration: APEC Leaders' Statement on Health Security." APEC Secretariat.
    <http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/leaders_declarations/2003/2003_StmtHealthSecurity.html>

[160] APEC. "2003 Leaders' Declaration: APEC Leaders' Statement on Health Security." APEC Secretariat.
    <http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/leaders_declarations/2003/2003_StmtHealthSecurity.html>

[161] John Ravenhill, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Chapter 6 APEC and Security, Mission
    Creep or Mission Impossible (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 153.

promising in respect to security development in the future, however little such progress or

amendments to the agreement have been implemented since its inception.[162]

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[162] John Ravenhill, Reassessing Security Cooperation In The Asia-Pacific: Chapter 6 APEC and Security, Mission Creep or Mission Impossible (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 155.

Conclusion

Based on the body of text within this thesis, is there any hope for an ASEAN security community? Are there persistent dilemmas within the organization itself that prevent the construction and implementation of any type of security apparatus? Does the historical heritage of Southeast Asia and the way in which normative trends affect varying populations to blame? Why haven't key forums within ASEAN established any precedent for further cooperation? I have pinpointed what I perceive to be the key factors that have delayed concrete progress in delaying any such ASEAN security community.

First, it must be established that in the near or even distant future, there is no hope for an ASEAN security community in the sense of an amalgamated cooperation. Such instances are rare, and highly visible cleavages with the Southeast Asian region will certainly prevent any such community from existing. However, based on the evidence obtained through research, I do feel that it is likely that a pluralistic security community could be achieved, but only with the proper insight and a code of mutual compliance and even intervention. The most pronounced difficulties that ASEAN has encountered while trying to establish is security paradigm stems from the historical precedence of governance in the region accompanied by what I would described as relatively "undeveloped" norm progression and a lack of localization. Due to Southeast Asia's past as a region typically made subservient by great powers and there rule, such as the Chinese patronage system and European colonialism, they highly value any retention of state sovereignty. In addition, communist uprising's and rebel movements throughout the twentieth century have also not contributed to a sense of stability in the region that would allow any government in question to govern with ease. However what ASEAN members do not comprehend is that by

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dismantling their domestic systems of ultra-authority and through delegating responsibilities to a regional body such as ASEAN itself such instances of instability could be easily combated and moreover nullified. This Westphalia state sovereignty that seems to hallmark the tendencies of all ASEAN governments is certainly a negative and counterproductive aspect in reference to regional integration and security community solidification. This norm of complete domestic control and non-interference must be adjusted accordingly to supranational needs. ASEAN cannot possibly hope to attain the recognition and functional ability of a security community in any sense if member states are not willing to forgo some of their sovereign power and influence domestically. If they do not, then quite simply any institution aimed at encouraging a pluralistic security community will meet stern resistance from its own inability to function as it should.

The ASEAN Regional Forum and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation have both shown promising effects if only they were allowed to pursue their ambitions of security standard implementation. The ASEAN Regional Forum has provided a critical talk shop that has great relevance to a multitude of relevant security issues with the region, and ASEAN countries themselves. As mentioned by prominent scholars, the ASEAN Regional Forum certainly instigates the concept of an ASEAN identity by focusing keenly on the aspect of a coexisting community. Such precedence for a community can only lend credence and support to the idea of a pluralistic security community, therefore legitimizing the forum as a key institution linked to a transition in security thinking. Also as mentioned in the text, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation has provided a base for dialogue relating to counterterrorism measures that would increase economic viability in the region while simultaneously eradicating risk of revenue loss. A key aspect of any security community deals with internal radical threats such as terrorism,

while ascertaining the ability to dismantle such forces through mutual assistance and a small degree of intervention in other's affairs when it is a crucial necessity.

Although necessary institutions have been set into place to assist ASEAN in achieving its security community goals, these institutions will not bare fruit because of the norms preventing them from doing so. The only way to influence the adoption of these norms is from the elite class of administrators, which includes businessmen, politicians, and academics alike. Localization prescribes the influence of key actors in society as a major motivating force behind any process of norm diffusion, which is certainly poses the greatest threat to any potential ASEAN security community. As long as any given ASEAN domestic population remains disenfranchised with foreign normative thinking, then there is no hope to make any progression through the transnational adoption of effective legislation and institutions. A top-down process of norm integration must take place in order for ASEAN to even begin thinking about a security community in the near future. Any resistance to regional thinking on the basis of suspicious thinking aroused by past history must be stamped out immediately. Of course it is not unreasonable to think that certain leaders of ASEAN countries, such as the ruling junta in Myanmar (Burma) do not wish to engage in such progressive thinking because it may decrease their power or even lead their population against them in an abrupt uprising. Perhaps an uprising is exactly what ASEAN needs. An uprising in reference to norm progression and an uprising in effective political leadership that includes public discussion relating to pertinent issues instead of backdoor and corrupt diplomatic dealings is exactly what ASEAN needs. Without the transition of normative thinking that can only be initialized by the governing elite, any prospect of an ASEAN pluralistic security community is farfetched and unattainable.

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