CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY

Exit or Voice?
Migrant Responses to the Rise of Right-Wing Radicalism in the Netherlands

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Abstract

This study examines the responses of Islamic migrants to the rise of right-wing radicalism in the Netherlands. Through an analysis of transnational social capital spanning the countries of origin and destination and political attachment to the destination country, this study demonstrates that migrants' ties to their country of origin impact their political behavior in their destination country either positively or negatively in a contentious political situation. Qualitative interviews with first and second generation Turkish and Moroccan migrants show that first generation migrant possess a low political attachment to the Netherlands, and a low level of transnational social capital, resulting in disenfranchisement of the Netherlands. Second generation Moroccan migrants hold high levels of political attachment, yet low levels of transnational social capital. Challenged by the radical right, they become more active by conventional forms of political action. Second generation Turks keep high levels of both transnational social capital and political attachment, and use the opportunity to voice their concerns via conventional political methods as well, but their claims include a threat to emigrate from the Netherlands. Following these observations, this study shows how rational cost-benefit decision-making strategies of residence become politicized and how, in effect, transnational social capital can have a participatory effect on destination country politics.

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CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Tables

Figures

Introduction

If a country's demography shapes its destiny, its people's participation in democracy holds its future. European demographics as well as the democracies of its nation-states have seen major shifts since the dawn of World War II. The influx of immigrants have had a significant impact on both: not only have European demographics fundamentally transformed, the quality of its democracies is – if one follows the assumption that a better democracy is one in which all of its citizens participate – under pressure. While numerous migrant communities have resided in their countries of destination for multiple decades and matured to second and third generations, migrant populations still find themselves generally and structurally at the lower end of the socio-economic scale, are overrepresented in criminality rates and underrepresented in politics. Inter-generationally, these positional disadvantages are on the wane, yet recent waves of Islamic terrorism in the USA and Europe fuel critiques addressed at migrant integration at large. Challenged vociferously by national radical right and anti-immigrant parties, Islamic minority groups have been at the center of contention in many Northern European countries alike.

Being subject to both adversity and marginalization, the ways Muslim migrants[1] politically mobilize in Northern Europe present a series of poignant questions. Has the rise of the radical right led to an increase of political participation among Islamic (first and second generation) migrants? Does political contention over migration and integration lead to social mobilization among migrants? Can the radical right spread emancipatory effects? Or does growing right-wing populism result in stronger sentiments of exclusion among migrants and,

[1] This study, when using the term 'migrant', refers to first and second generation migrants and the terms migrants and ethnic minorities are used interchangeably, unless noted differently. It does so out of purposes of clarification and consistency. This usage does not follow any assumptions regarding when migrants obtain citizenship of their country of destination. Hence, more precisely, when referring to migrants, this study refers to individuals from a migrant background.

accordingly, a loss of political trust and participation? Could it accumulate into a reinvigoration of migrants' transnational networks or actual emigration?

To address this amalgam of questions, this study focuses on one country specifically; namely, the Netherlands, and looks at two of its largest Muslim communities; namely, the Turkish and Moroccan population groups. 5.6 per cent of the Dutch population is from non-western, Islamic descent (Central Bureau for Statistics, 2011). Radical right-wing parties have, albeit some very volatilely, gained popularity over the past two decades. Most recently, the *Party for Freedom* (PVV) gained an electoral stronghold by becoming the country's third largest party, only short of the number of votes for the country's first. This multicultural democracy has previously enacted liberal migration and integration policies (in contrast with, for instance, Germany and France), yet the rising popularity of the PVV leads to a more stringent climate[2]. Moreover, following the notion that despite contemporary trends that recognize a weakening of the nation-state's reach in an 'era of globalization', these states continue to possess a power to determine both integration policies and political opportunity structures, it is justified to observe this phenomenon at a national, rather than international, level. This demarcation is also poignant for the standpoints of anti-immigrant parties that challenge established understandings of nationhood, nationality and citizenship[3]. To structure these developments and the questions they raise, the following overarching research question will be leading in this thesis: What are the types of behavior of first and second generation migrants in response to the rise of right-wing radicalism in the Netherlands and under which conditions are these performed?

[2] I follow Fennema (1997) in his conceptualization of radical right-wing parties. Compared across countries, parties identified as 'radical' are largely varied in terms of ideology and structure. The common denominator, Fennema observes, is their anti-migrant stance.

[3] This study operates on several basic normative assumptions. That is, democracy is a better form of government than any other form of government. The constituency's participation in the political sphere strengthens the quality of a democracy. Accordingly, in a multicultural democracy, different population groups should participate to the best possible extent and at least equally.

Current research approaches migrant political participation in the Netherlands and beyond from a social capital perspective and found evidence for political trust to 'spill-over' from social trust, an asset nurtured through participation in civic associations (Almond and Verba 1963, Fennema and Tillie 1999, 2001, 2008, Jacobs and Tillie 2004, Putnam 2007). In short: if migrants possess a more active civic life, they are more active in politics as well. The conditions of this mechanism have been left relatively unspecified. This study suggests several of them. If anti-immigrant groups successfully advocate a politics of exclusion – whether in terms of rhetoric or through enacted policy-proposals - as long as this is hard felt, they can, arguably, contribute to a crumbling of political trust, especially among migrants. Alternatively, through the rise of the radical right, ethnic minorities might feel more inclined to become politically active. These relations specify conditions under which the social capital mechanism becomes obsolete and delineate some of the political and sociological implications of a rising radical right. This study serves the agenda of mapping these ramifications.

The methodology of this study is a mixture of positivist and constructivist tenets. I employ two sets of parameters: one based on behavior and institutions, the other drawn from the realm of ideas. Examining political behavior (e.g. voting turnouts) solely would not suffice, for the perceptions of citizenship, sentiments of inclusion and exclusion and a potential, concomitant threat of the radical right can themselves be strong motivations for becoming active or refraining from activism. Second, perceptions of inclusion and exclusion and changing ideas of citizenship and nationality are actual consequences as well. Institutions refer to the increase in organizations (whether formal or informal) that lubricate political participation (e.g. voting and protesting). Ideas and institutions are measured along two dimensions: political attachment and transnational social capital. Political attachment refers to the importance one ascribes to being politically involved in the Netherlands. Transnational social capital refers to the social resources that are

provided through the ties one maintains with her country of origin. I demonstrate that the variation among aggregate scores on both dimensions shows a pattern that is consistent with the ethnic minority groups' political behavior. In general, migrants from an Islamic background react significantly upon the rise of the radical right. These types of reactions are categorized into four modes: (1) one can remain silent and become disenfranchised, (2) one can voice her concerns and become politically active, (3) one participates and threatens to leave the country and (4) one exits the country.

The following chapter presents an overview of the challenge that the radical right poses and how migrants perceive this. I argue that before starting this study, the challenge and its reception should be established. If migrants do not attach much value to the radical right, or perceive it as solely a bird of passage, the theoretical and pragmatic interest of this study would be nullified. Yet, I demonstrate that the right-wing has a substantial social bearing on migrant communities and has had a disruptive impact on Dutch politics. After this chapter, I discuss how previous scholarship has approached the socio-political impact and activity of migrant communities and which hypotheses can be derived from a combination of these fields. The current body of literature accumulates into the two primary concepts this study is based on: political attachment and transnational social capital. This section therefore functions as a vantage point for the remainder of this study and, accordingly, defines these concepts. Succeeding this theoretical outline, chapter 3 presents the process of data generation through qualitative interviews with key figures and representatives of the Turkish and Moroccan communities as well as the indicators used to measure political attachment and transnational social capital.

Subsequently, I bring my findings to the fore. Chapter 4 discusses how the first generation migrants react upon the rise of right-wing radicalism. It aims to specify the kind of political behavior of first generation migrants and the conditions under which this has come about.

Political behavior is patterned and much dependent on the low political attachment and low transnational social capital first generation migrants possess. In chapter 5 and 6 I discuss the types of political behavior of respectively the second generation Moroccans and second generation Turks. While both Turkish and Moroccan migrants are more politically active and have, accordingly, higher political attachment, they are so in different ways. The second generation Turks avail themselves of posing exit as a threat, whereas Moroccans become active without posing this threat. These chapters show the participatory effects of transnational social capital on the one hand and the challenging impact of right-wing radicalism on the other.

In general, levels of political attachment (high or low) and transnational social capital (high or low) are used to analyze the typology of responses among migrants to right-wing radicalism. This study shows they have a configured causality. This finding comes with several implications and limitations, which are discussed prior to the conclusion. The conclusion sums up the main results and provides recommendations for future research agendas.

1. Contention and challenge: rise and reception of the radical right

1.1 Introduction

The first task of this study is to establish to what extent the radical right is perceived as a political movement of concern for Islamic ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. To do so, I present two sides of the same coin. First, upon defining and identifying the radical right-wing movement in the Netherlands, I discuss through an historical overview of the political organizations two elements via which its rise can be evaluated: (1) electoral support and (2) impact on agenda-setting. Earlier studies touch upon these fields extensively (e.g. Norris 2005, Van der Burg and Fennema 2007, Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007, Van der Brug et al. 2009)[4]. Second, I discuss the ways these elements are perceived by ethnic minorities. I elaborate who the migrant communities are and how they perceive the challenge posed by the radical right. Assessing the rise of right-wing radicalism is based on previous literature in terms of analysis and for factual information. The latter part of this chapter is rooted in material drawn from the interviews carried out for this study[5]. This chapter demonstrates the politically disruptive impact of the radical right in the Netherlands and the challenge it poses to migrant communities.

[4] A third item consists of an analysis of the direct impact of the radical right on integration and immigration policies. However, this would be beyond the scope of this study.

[5] In the interviews I included several questions on integration, but refrained from inquiring directly about one's evaluation of right-wing radicalism. My aim is not to determine whether migrants perceive right-wing radicalism as negative (or for that matter, positive), but instead what they perceive its impact to be. The precise methodology is discussed in chapter 3. For the reason of clarity of my argument I opted to present first the challenge of the radical right, as a background to the remainder of this project, prior to discussing how I have approached data generation for this project.

1.2 The rise of the radical right

In May 2002, one week before the general elections, Pim Fortuyn, leader of the populist party *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* (lit.: List Pim Fortuyn, LPF), was killed by an extreme lift-wing activist for his political ideas on the role of Islam in Dutch society. In the national elections that were organized shortly after his death, the LPF became the country's second largest party, gaining 26 seats out of 150, while running in the national elections for the very first time – a result unprecedented in Dutch politics. The government that was formed thereupon did not last long, though: it collapsed after eight-six days of rule only. In the subsequent elections the LPF gained eight seats but the parliamentary party broke down from internal strife. Nowadays, it has left the national political scene altogether. While the LPF is a clear case of a 'flash party' (Norris 2005: 7), since the elections of 2002, people speak of a 'Fortuyn-revolt' (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). Since the LPF, immigration, integration and the Islam are highly placed on the political agenda. And since the LPF, populist, right-wing politicians stepped up in Dutch politics.

To come to a better understanding of this phenomenon, the radical right is in need of a more precise definition. However, affiliated organizations and individuals cannot be captured by one similar set of characteristics. In an attempt to define their common denominators, Fennema (1997) observed that everyone designated as radical right (whether they are opposed or in favor of a free market system, whether they refer back to fascist ideology or do not, whether they have a strong social agenda or not) share a prevalent anti-migrant stance. The phenomenon of right-wing radicalism is therefore not entirely novel in Dutch politics, yet radical ideas could only be found at the very extreme ends of the political spectrum among marginal parties, which were often the offspring of neo-fascist movements. Only in the past decade did it move to the center.

The first radical right party that addresses migration and integration was the *Centrum Partij* (lit.: Centre Party, CP) lead by Hans Janmaat, which actively sought to limit the influx of migrants. They obtained one seat during the elections of 1982, no seats in 1986 and again one seat in 1989, after the party took up the name *Centrum Democraten* (lit.: Centre Democrats, CD). Janmaat perceived migration essentially as an economic debacle, rather than a cultural or judicial one. However, over time the party adopted an anti-Islam stance and argued that Dutch citizens have superiority in politics and policy-making (Fermin 1997). Janmaat was ostracized three times between 1995 and 1997 and the CD was officially banned in 1998 for inciting hatred and racism. Following from this consequences, integration became a taboo, while the main political parties addressed migration and integration policies largely through their preoccupation with the arrival of asylum-seekers in the 1990s (Van der Brug et al. 2009).

This taboo was rooted in a more fundamental form of cooperation between the main political parties. The 1980s and 1990s in the Netherlands were largely characterized by a multicultural integration model, in which different cultural and religious outlooks were equally supported. The 1983 *Minderhedennota* (lit.: minority bill) adopted multiculturalism as an official minority policy and was sponsored by a cross-party consensus (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). While the center-left wanted to promote diversity, the center-right acquiesced in it. The spread of radical right ideas, like the CP/ CD did, were suppressed more heavily in the Netherlands than elsewhere in Europe. Anti-migration notions, until the past decade, therefore never entered the main political stage. Moreover, immigration was equally non-existent in party programs. Under influence of the polder model that sprung from a system of denominational

pillarization[6], polarization had been kept at a low. Ruling parties tried to ignore integration, through which they would be able to maintain the existing coalition and the status-quo of left-right relations. The article *The multicultural drama* published by Paul Scheffer in 2000 brought the integration problematic back to the fore and caused a large commotion. Furthermore, after 9/11, which was perceived to pose an immediate security threat for the Netherlands and the political assassination on Theo van Gogh by Mohammed Bouyeri, a Moroccan-Dutch fundamentalist Islamist, on November 2, 2004, ignoring integration and immigration became wholly untenable.

Furthermore, the societal problems created through the policies of the purple coalition arguably gave room for populism to enter the political stage. The cooperation between the conservative-liberals and social democrats of the 1990s resulted in an extremely successful economic program and the continuation of multiculturalist policies, in which the government sponsored Islamic schools, separate Muslim housing, Islamic mass media (radio and television), the import of imams from abroad and distinct welfare arrangements for minorities, and established a separate consultation system with 'minority community leaders' (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). Yet, at the same time, the purple coalition created enormous private wealth, but at the expense of other public services: waiting lists in hospitals grew sharply from limited budgets, despite multicultural policies, immigrants were located in poor neighborhoods and schools throughout the country were centralized to cut costs, creating alienation among pupils and teachers. Against this backdrop, Fortuyn profiled himself to tackle the "ruins" of the purple coalition. Furthermore, Fortuyn argued that the state-sponsorship of Islamic organizations across

[6] Pillarization refers to a societal structure in which each religious group formed their own separate voluntary associations, which were strongly interlocked at the elite level, resulting in a system that accommodates for the distribution of strategic trust through elite collaboration. Each religious group constituted their own 'pillar'.

the welfare-spectrum was counter-productive, for he saw the Islam as repressive and incompatible with Western democratic values (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007).

The LPF ended the taboo on integration, a break that carried large-scale consequences for ruling parties. While the LPF showed to be a typical example of a flash party and while her influence as a political party on Dutch governance remained small, her impact on the policies of existing political parties proved to be tremendous. Not only right-wing, but also left-wing parties openly started to discuss integration and immigration policies and integrate these domains into their political programs. Nonetheless, the most concrete 'policy-solutions' continued to be offered by the radical right. The established political elite are accused of refraining from acknowledging the 'real problems'. The electoral base for the LPF, and later the *Partij voor de* Vrijheid (lit.: Freedom Party) led by Geert Wilders and currently supporting a minority-coalition, consists mainly of citizens who fear immigration to the extent that they are willing to support a radical right party as long as it is democratic and established provide no alternative (Van der Burg and Fennema 2007). For his critique on the Islam, Wilders was expelled from the conservative-liberals as an MP and cancelled his membership in 2004. He founded his own party, the *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (lit.: Freedom Party, PVV).

According to Wilders, the Islam constitutes a threat to Western Christian-Judaic culture and is incompatible with our systems of democracy. While differentiating for fundamentalists, he argues that a moderate Islam does not exist (Wilders 2007). In 2008, Wilders produced a short movie, *Fitna*, in which he made several bold statements on the Islam, for example comparing the *Quran* with Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. As result of this movie, calling the Moroccan youth violent, pleas for banning the *Quran* and several other public statements, Wilders is currently charged by a public prosecutor for five counts of inciting hatred and discrimination. After the national elections of 2010 and the landslide victory of the PVV – becoming the country's third largest

party, gaining twenty-four seats out of 150 – they became the main powerbroker in coalition-negotiations, eventually giving support to the coalition, without taking part in it, simulating the Danish model. Next to its anti-immigration and anti-Islamist stance, the PVV advances a strong socialist policy and to a large degree, despite its support to the coalition, opposes many austerity measures.

In conclusion, the radical right has moved from the margins to the center and has forced mainstream political parties to include integration and migration in their party programs. Multicultural policies of before are openly discussed. It might perhaps be too soon to talk about a reversion from multiculturalism to assimilation, but the radical right cannot be disregarded from Dutch politics any longer.

1.3 Waking up from the European dream

Islamic migrants, as I show in this section, perceive the impact of the radical right as substantial and a challenge to not only the political status-quo, but also to their position in society and interethnic relations. It would come to no surprise that the radical right would not be looked upon very positively by Islamic migrants. Yet I aim to show more precisely how they evaluate the impact of right-wing radicalism. First, I give an account of who Islamic migrants are in the Netherlands. Second, I argue that while the radical right is considered to not be a permanent player in Dutch politics ('they will fade away'), immediate societal consequences are regarded as pervasive. Therefore, this section establishes, grounds and substantiates this study's research question.

Historically a relatively homogenous and unilingual nation, the Netherlands consists of 16.6 million inhabitants of which one out of five is from migrant descent. Eleven per cent of the

Dutch population is from non-western origin, a number that has steadily grown over the past decades. Nine per cent is from a western background[7]. Of the total group of individuals from a migrant background, approximately half of them is born in the Netherlands and belongs to the so-called second generation. Approximately two-thirds of the total of 1.9 million non-western migrants comes from four countries of origin: Turkey (approximately 384.000 inhabitants), Morocco (349.000), Surinam (342.000) and a smaller group from the Antilles or Aruba (138.000). Half of the Turks and a little more than half of the Moroccans are from the second generation (Central Bureau for Statistics 2010). The Turkish and Moroccan groups are fairly young still: the average age is respectively twenty-nine and twenty-seven years. The third generation is small and still very young, approximately 60.000 children under the age of fifteen is from a non-western descent.

The process of migration from Turkey and Morocco to the Netherlands shares several distinct similarities. In general, both migration waves unfolded themselves through a cycle of what is called chain migration (Haug 2008). A migration chain assumes that social networks create a multiplier effect, a way through which pioneers pave ways for subsequent migrants through interpersonal, transnational relations which provide a foundation for disseminating information and facilitating adjustment to the location one migrates to. After pioneer migration, labor migration follows, trailed by family migration.

The first generation of Moroccan migrants came to the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s. Most of them were in their early 20s and male. They became 'guest workers' upon embarking on Dutch shores and took up low-skilled labor of which there no (sufficient) ready-takers among the native born. Recruitment of guest workers was officially regulated between the

[7]A non-western migrant is defined by the Central Bureau of Statistics as someone of whom at least one parent is born in Africa, Latin-America or Asia (including Turkey) except for Indonesia and Japan (Central Bureau for Statistics).

Moroccan and Dutch governments in 1969, yet stopped as a result from the Oil Crisis in 1973. Labor migration policies were based on the expectation that after several years of employment in the Netherlands against a relatively high salary compared to Moroccan standards, guest-workers would return to Morocco or Turkey. However, as a consequence to the 1970s stagnating economic growth in Morocco and in Turkey as well as ensuing political instability on the one hand and a more restrictive migration policy in the Netherlands on the other, most migrants stayed. Thereupon, migration from Morocco to the Netherlands subsumed primarily through family reunification and family formation. In the 1970s, a large share of migrants had their family settle in the Netherlands: from approximately 1974 onwards, the proportionality of male and female migrants became equal, while after 1975, the share of female Moroccan migrants accumulated to a little over 50%. Since the second half of the 1980s, family reunification became steadily replaced by family formation: partners were attracted from Morocco and Turkey, rather than found in the Netherlands. Up and till today, this pattern persists.

Considering that the Islamic, non-western 'migrant' communities consist for approximately half of Dutch-born individuals, it is of interest how migrant communities perceive the radical right. A changing political and societal climate is a heartfelt theme among most interviewees. Many, even among the second generation, refer to the early years of migration to the Netherlands and the ways newly arrived guest workers were welcomed in Dutch society, generally perceived as accepting. These experiences are contrasted with the ways migrants are looked upon now, they state. A religious instructor from Morocco who decided to continue to reside in the Netherlands reflects on this development by taking the traditional clothing, a *djelleba*, he wears as an example. Interviewee M1A[8],

[8] Because most interviewees required to remain anonymous, I refer to them by means of abbreviations. In chapter 3 I explain the references to the interviewees in more depth.

> People in your neighborhood have become less friendly these days. When I arrived here, my neighbors would come by, out of curiosity. I think it has to do with what I am wearing. Previously, I would get honest and sincere questions about what I wear. Even on the streets. Now, I get strange or dirty looks mostly.

Interviewee M2A tells: "A friend of mine walked home from the mosque in the dark, wearing his praying clothes, and got almost hit by a car. The driver cursed at him, calling him a stupid Muslim walking in the way." In a more general sense, interviewees mention that the ways individuals relate to one another has changed. Interviewee T1A tells that "society has become tougher. People don't trust each other anymore: relations have become acutely bitter. There is only black and white. You are a foreigner, or Dutch, but nothing exists in between." Interviewee M2A,

> Next to this community job, I work at an office. Most of my colleagues are born in the Netherlands and they treat me like I belong to them, but they speak pejoratively about foreigners. I explain that my parents are from Morocco and ask them why they say these things. They tell me that I am not 'like most Moroccans', I am like 'them'.

Inquiring about the reasons why relations between different people from different backgrounds have toughened, a plethora of possible explanations is mentioned. The political climate is often mentioned, in which the PVV is regarded as a crucial factor. Interviewee M1B notes, "The PVV uses fear for migrants for their own electoral success; they exploit it and in return cause these tensions."

Most interviewees indicate that personal liberties are currently restrained, by either politics encouraged by the radical right or by societal tensions that follow from them. Interviewee M1A dresses conservatively and refrains from practicing his beliefs only in the private sphere. In discussing this, he points towards the liberal outlook upon which the Netherlands has been founded. Another contentious topic is the *halal* slaughtering of animals. Prohibiting butchering

without anesthetics is framed as an animal right issue by politicians, but interpreted by Muslims (and Jews), as a way to limit their cultural practices.

The assimilation thesis, as discussed more exhaustively in Chapter 2, has been evoked in various forms by several interviewees. There are no differences between Moroccans and Turks in discussing this issues, yet is more strongly emphasized by the first generation than the second generation. Interviewee T1B explains,

> Parents are afraid that their offspring fully 'Dutchifies' and westernizes; they prefer to maintain their own culture. It is your own culture that you keep returning to. While you can adapt to Dutch practices outside of home, at home you return to your own way of doing things.

To prevent this from happening, interviewee T1B explains that parents become stricter on ensuring that children learn the 'proper cultural practices' at home, "at schools and in public they do not have the opportunity to preserve this. And yes, this is becoming more difficult nowadays." Interviewees indicate that they are not able to say everything they wish. Interviewee M2C, "While we say we live in a free country, many topics are actually taboo. It is difficult to talk about discrimination, the native Dutch population does often not even signal it."

First generation interviewees admit that they had different expectations from Europe. Interviewee T1B, "It appeared as a dream to come and live here. It used to be very fashionable in Turkey to go to Europe or to have family in Europe. But this has changed so much." Interviewee M1A, "It is not because it is very difficult to move to Europe, but because we still are not accepted here fully that people do not want to come anymore." Interviewee M1B, "You come to Europe thinking of finding a good job, but you end up as a cleaner. What is more, you do not get accepted in society. This has become much worse over time."

When asked how these societal tensions will develop, most interviewees maintain an optimistic outlook. Interviewee T1A, "The PVV will not last very long in the current

government, and their electoral support will fade away, as happened to other populists before them." Interviewee M1A, "It cannot last very long, people know, or should know, better."

In conclusion, the contentious situation extends from politics to society. This poses the question how migrants react upon the rise of right-wing radicalism more sharply. Perceiving the radical right as a challenger to the political and societal status-quo, do Islamic migrants accept this challenge and if so, how?

2. Theorizing contention and migrant political mobilization

2.1 Introduction

In European policy-making circles and academia migration and integration have surfaced and grown quickly as a contentious political topic over the past two decades. The consequences of large-scale labor migration were expected to remain within states' economic spheres but the needs, claims and social consequences of labor migrants extended far beyond that (Koopmans et al. 2005). Urban youth riots, influxes of asylum seekers and the emergence of radical-right, xenophobic movements provide but a few examples in which nationhood and citizenship find reinvigorated attention of political significance. At the heart of these debates lay claims that new ethnic minorities challenge state sovereignty, the functioning of political systems and the constituents of the European cultural identity of the traditional European nation-states (Faist 2000). The body of scholarship that accumulated to capture these developments can be categorized roughly into three distinct strands of research, while all of them are related to normative perspectives derived from political theory. Figure 1 depicts the landscape of literature that examines migrant political mobilization. It is not fully complete, because it focuses primarily on the European context[9].

[9] Additionally, one could argue that a project like this should theoretically focus on the rise of radical right wing parties. I justify the limited theoretical background regarding this aspect, for I approach the topic from the opposite direction. My point of view is that of ethnic minorities from a migrant background, for which theorizing the rise of the radical right would fall within a novel scope. I have, however, presented a more elaborate historical overview of the radical right in the Netherlands in the previous chapter.



Figure 1. Embedding of study in current scholarship

To understand the ways migrants accept the challenge of the radical right, this study combines different components of these fields in a novel theoretical framework to account for the transnational dynamic in migrant communities. It does so, first, by drawing on political theorists who strive to stipulate the moral duties for nation-states regarding the reception and political incorporation of refugees and economic migrants. Normative accounts embolden and frame migration research[10]. Second, it relates to scholarship on minority political participation, which discusses how migrants become politically active (e.g. Vogel, 2008, Joppke 1996, Fennema and Tillie 2001). Further, it borrows from research on transnational communities and networks examine the impact of migrants' transnational networks on homeland-orientation and destination

[10] For the scope of this study, I, however, do not center on the intricacies of multiculturalism in political theory. For elaborate accounts, please refer to among others Kymlicka (1995, 2001, 2007), Miller (2007) and Walzer (1983, 1997).

country integration (e.g. Faist 2000). Lastly, this study takes its main model from social movement theory, which addressess claim-making and mobilization in contentious politics (e.g. Hirschman 1986, Koopmans et al. 2005).

This thesis' approach is derived from contrasting these fields' basic tenets with one another. I take from these theories different building blocks to analyze migrant political participation in their destination country. This framework recognizes the contentious political situation as well as the inherent transnational character of migrant communities. Thereby it is able to contrast political participation with aspirations to emigrate, following from the political climate (if any). I subsequently discuss how these variegated strands relate to political mobilization and migration flows.

2.2 Minority political participation

Bringing outsiders into the circle of insiders is a never finalized or linear process. Theories account for the dynamic nature of cultural adaptation and syncretism. In doing so, they focus on political institutions (i.e. immigration and integration policies) on the one hand and the mechanisms that cause and stimulate political participation on the other. Regarding the former, two diametrically opposed ideal-types compete with another – assimilation and ethnic pluralism – while the latter is based on social capital theories. Below I give a brief overview of both strands.

2.2.1 Assimilation versus ethnic pluralism

Theories on migrant incorporation present two-ideal type categories for analyzing this process: assimilation on the one hand and ethnic pluralism on the other. Migration literature perceives migrant political participation to derive from and in feed back into the integration policies of the destination country. The relationship is circular and endogenous: while migrants

derive their identity (and thereby, the argumentation goes, the ways they become active in politics and the frames, claims and demands they voice) from the destination country, migrant political incorporation and collective identity ascriptions in turn reinforce these.

Rooted in the Chicago school of sociology, which sought to understand integration of European immigrants into American society, assimilation suggests that migrant identity step by step merges into the core culture of the destination country (e.g. Alba 1997). The multiculturalism thesis, on the other hand, suggests that migrants carry with them the culture of their country of origin, which has created deep-rooted and enduring shared histories, values and traditions persisting over time and space (e.g. Taylor 1992)[11]. Multiculturalism pertains to emancipatory and culturally libertarian positions, yet also adheres to pre-defined group identities (Joppke 1996). Multiculturalism leads to the seeking of equal rights and recognition for ethnic, racial, religious or sexually defined groups (Joppke 1996). Assimilation results in the integration of minorities in the mainstream, 'native' culture. While assimilation as a policy-ideal has generally gotten out of vogue by most Western democracies and granting liberties for constructing a multicultural polity remains highly controversial, both typologies have not only been evoked as political goals, but also as explanatory categories for migrant incorporation[12].

The two approaches allow me to categorize the kind of integration policies that are adhered to and how they are perceived by migrants. Following these theories, I incorporate in my study a section on the perceptions of migrants on integration since the rise of right-wing

[11] These studies are deeply rooted in Benedict Anderson's appraised concept of 'imagined communities' (1983). Studies on transnational networks seek to identify how migrant communities are able to sustain regular, frequent and meaningful contacts (Durkheim 1964) for enduring community imagination without geographical propinquity, an element elaborated on below.

[12] Empirical studies tested these claims. See for example Alba and Nee (2003) who identified a series of mechanisms through which minorities integrate into American society, Iglehart and Welzerl (2005), who compared religious outlooks between and within country's populations, and for example observed that German Catholics share a larger set of distinct values with German Muslims than with Polish Catholics, and Acemoğlu and Robinson (2006) who found evidence for being distanced from one's country of origin strengthens one's awareness of her national, regional and/ or religious identities.

radicalism. I use assimilation and multiculturalism to understand how migrants experience personal liberties and practicing multicultural traditions in a more stringent and contentious political situation[13]. I do not aim to categorize the integration process in the Netherlands according to either one dimension, because they both assume that culture can be contained.

2.2.2 Social capital and the spill-over effect

Social capital theories provide a convincing mechanism for understanding how migrants become politically active in their destination countries. Social capital is a recent concept that is coming increasingly in vogue in social sciences today (Castiglione, Van Deth and Wolleb 2008). Stemming from sociology and social theory, it found its way to political science through the innovative study of Robert Putnam on democracy in Italy (Putnam 1993). Most briefly defined as 'capital acquired through social relations' (Lin 2001: 19), social capital is essentially an investment in existing social relations with expected returns (Lin 2001). Social capital finds its origin in a social structure: it is a capital asset for the individual built upon 'social structural resources' (Coleman 1994: 302). It consists of the strength, depth and broadness of the network and connections of an individual and, based on mutual reciprocity, overcomes collective action problem. It presupposes acts of short-term altruism but includes the expectation that over the long run, the favour will be returned (Putnam 1993). Social capital consequently accrues to a community from individual investments (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Conversely, even if one indicates to be trustful to others, a structure of organizations at the community or society level should be available to channel these values[14].

[13] This topic has been brought to the fore in the interviews for this study. I discuss how integration is perceived among migrants in chapter 4.

[14] Voluntary membership to societal and political organizations provides this basis for social trust (Almond and Verba 1963). Voluntary membership implies always the option of exit conferring a natural force to voice. As support cannot be taken for granted, associations are forced to build upon trust. Accordingly, it is not the civic culture itself

Literature concerned with political participation of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands precisely examines those organizational structures that give leeway to political participation (e.g. Jacobs and Tillie 2004, Fennema and Tillie 1999, Fennema and Tillie 2001, Van Heelsum 2001). Civic community organizations evolve around three common denominators: interest (which constitutes a form of calculated, strategic trust), a shared identity, also known as loyalty, and shared values (Fennema and Tillie 2001). The relation between civic community and political participation is linear: 'the denser the network of associations of a particular ethnic group, the more political trust they will have and the more they will participate politically,' (Jacobs and Tillie 2004: 420). Civic community organizations have been found more profound and well organized among Turks and less so among Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans, which corresponds with their respective levels of political participation (Fennema and Tillie 2001).

In this study I seek to understand the impact of political contention on political participation, which can function as an alternative to civic involvement by operating independently from the spill-over of social capital. It also examines transnational social capital, by seeking to understand if civic involvement across boundaries impacts domestic political behavior, a notion the subsequent section further substantiates.

2.3 Transnational networks and the global social space

From theories on transnational communities and networks I take the idea that migrants' transnational ties impact migrants' behavior in the destination country. First of all, transnational communities can stimulate migrants to return or to convince others to migrate. Simultaneously, transnational communities are ascribed the potential to challenge the reach and sovereignty of

that creates political participation; it is the spillover from civic culture to political participation that is channeled by social capital (Putnam 1993).

nation-states: migrants derive political claim-making from their destination country and employ this in their country of origin. Current scholarship on transnational communities brings together social capital and migration studies.

The newest generation of migration scholarship acknowledges that transnational communities are formed at multiple levels[15]. Transnational communities can mediate macro socio-economic forces for individual members of the community. Social network theories come closest to an understanding of the role of transnational communities in migration patterns (Faist 2000). He therefore perceives migrants to be 'embedded in and constituted by relationships and relationality,' (Faist 2000: 59).

While Faist identifies how transnational social networks work, other scholars demonstrate how transnational social networks impact the workings of the nation-state[16]. For example, Koopmans et al. (2005) observe that a strong homeland-orientation is detrimental for migrants' proper integration in the destination-country: "Most observers agree that a strong homeland orientation among migrants is detrimental to their integration into the country of settlement, and homeland-directed activism often takes violent forms," (Koopmans et al. 2005: 142).

I borrow the notion that migrant transnational ties impact political behavior in the destination country. I add to this that transnational ties are not only used to affect politics in the country of origin via the destination country, but that they can be applied to engage in politics in the destination country for the sake of the politics of the destination country.

[15] Earlier cost-benefit models primarily addressed individual motivations have developed within elaborate rational choice frameworks commonly denoted in terms of 'push' and 'pull' factors (e.g. Chiswick 2000) but have been criticized for their overly economistic approach, in which individual attributes such as interests and identities are not fully given. Research centering on structural factors, such as so-called migration systems approaches, has been equally plentiful (e.g. Hoffmann-Nowotny 1973, Boyd 1989).

[16] In a case-study on Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Canada, Wong (2006) identified a series of characteristics that determine the outlook of the transnational business circuits. These are networks of production and distribution, retail chains and import and export. Wong (2006) demonstrates that a nation-state can support transnationalization through multiculturalism, but at the same time limit integration and conflict with encouragements for transnational communities, through restrictions on citizenship policies.

2.4 Social movements theory: Exit, voice and loyalty

For understanding the impact of contention, I base my theoretical model on the dynamic jig-saw relation between the concepts of 'exit' and 'voice' as proposed by Albert Hirschman (1986). Hirschman acknowledges the interrelatedness of individual decisions to exit an organization whose performances vary or to voice her concerns concerning the organization's track record[17]. Hirschman proposes a seesaw mechanism that stipulates that participation ('voice') is dependent on the availability of exit options[18]. If it is easier to exit, one is less likely to use voice, and instead becomes affiliated with another organization. Yet if loyalty to the organization is high, one is more likely to remain a member for a longer period of time.

In this study, I understand the rise of right-wing radicalism to constitute a contentious political situation that contributes to a deterioration of the political climate in the Netherlands, especially for migrants. I assume the rise of right-wing radicalism in a multicultural democracy therefore as analogous to a perceived worsening of an organization for its members. I substantiate this assumption in chapter 3. For now, interpreting the rise of the radical right as deterioration for some population groups, I use the exit, voice and loyalty scheme to understand migrant behavior.

To account for the consequences of transnational ties on political participation, the exit-voice model broadens the perspective of political integration and participation at a national level. Dependent on the situation, one uses either exit or voice. Loyalty being closely related to trust, however, can function as a mitigating factor that postpones the turn towards exit and activates voice. Yet migrants easily belong to multiple nations (or for that matter, communities), which can

[17] I take the rise of right-wing radicalism as analogous to deterioration in an organization's (in this case, the government) performances. In chapter 4 I substantiate this claim by outlining the perceptions of migrants on the rise of right-wing radicalism.

[18] The framework of exit, voice and loyalty has been extensively applied to topics varying from firm-customer relations, political parties, marriage, trade unions and migration (Hirschman 1986).

render the exit-option of the country of settlement more attractive or feasible when the situation in that country worsens. In a similar vein, loyalty starts to play a pivotal role in a migrants' decision where to reside. Further, the credible threat of exit can transfer new powers on to voice. This is a distinct process as the size of migrant communities must be large enough for voice to gain power. While social capital theories can account for a mechanism that increases political participation at the national or perhaps even local level, the exit-voice-loyalty framework is able to place it in a transnational context. The transnational relations depend on exactly the same mechanism as identified for integration at the national (country-of-settlement) level: that is, social capital: transnational ties make it easier if not possible to exit. I therefore define transnational social capital as the resources and values that accrue from social networks that connect multiple nation-states with each other.

Exiting or not depends on a series of factors, of which economic cost-benefits might be one, but of which loyalty might be another. Loyalty can neutralize the tendency to exit (Hirschman 1986), precisely because of its paradoxical character: "…loyalty is at its most functional when it looks most irrational, when loyalty means strong attachment to an organization that does not seem to warrant such attachment because it is so much like another that is also available," (Hirschman 1986: 81). Assuming that the countries this study pertains to have become less differentiated among each other in terms of economic opportunities and this differentiation is small in terms of cultural belonging as well (for migrants can, arguably, mediate between or belong to multiple cultures), loyalty to either one country can be decisive in one's decision to stay or not. Furthermore, "the effectiveness of voice is strengthened by the possibility of exit," (Hirschman 1986: 83), meaning that when countries become residential substitutes for one another, migrants can increase their political bargaining power by being able to pose a credible threat to leave. For these reasons, I use the concept of loyalty to refer to ties with the destination

country but tailor it explicitly to a political context. Henceforth I refer to political attachment, which I define more precisely in the following section[19].

Previous studies have not examined migrant mobilization in response to the rise of right-wing radicalism into great detail. Furthermore, migrant mobilization in general has not been approached from a transnational perspective. Theories on social capital do not automatically factor in the global or transnational nature of migrant communities. In fact, previous studies on social capital have primarily examined the way social capital has manifested itself in a given community in a given country. Combining earlier theorems, their findings and lacunas, I take from all these strands the concepts of transnational social and political attachment. I hypothesize that the dynamic relation between both determines the political behavior of migrants during contention. Below I define into more detail these concepts and their dimensions and present the series of hypotheses that follow from this discussion.

2.5 Concepts

2.5.1 Transnational social capital

Transnational social capital refers to sustained, cross-border ties between both individuals and civic organizations, that can be little or highly institutionalized, and that generate a surplus of social resources through these forms of interaction. Transnational social capital conducts and sustains the circulation of people and the cross-border exchange of combinations of (monetary)

[19] A broader field of literature conceptualizes issues as political trust, political participation and (within migration literature) political incorporation (e.g. Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009 on political incorporation, Gamson 1968 on political trust). While this scholarship can provide more elaborate accounts on the intricacies, theoretical underpinnings and methodological considerations for measuring concepts related to political involvement/ inclusion/ trust/ incorporation/ etcetera, I focus on political attachment specifically, because when derived from the Hirschmanian conception of loyalty, it is able to account for a trade-off between exit and voice.

goods, resources, networks of organizations, ideas, symbols and cultural practices[20]. Besides social capital, various forms of capital find their way, are used and exert their effects, such as economic capital and human capital. I understand transnational social capital to lubricate these other forms of capital. Resources inherent to social and symbolic ties, which are fostered through the networks and organizations in multiple states, accumulate into social capital, denoting a dynamic process[21]. I refer to 'transnational' social capital rather than 'global' social capital, for I understand the ties to span between across different countries, rather than being maintained at a supra-national level.

2.5.2 Political attachment

Political attachment is conceptually based on loyalty. I interpret Hirschman on loyalty to define political attachment and understand the concept to entail the extent to which members are willing to 'trade off the certainty of exit against the uncertainties of an improvement' in the deteriorated political situation (Hirschman 1986: 77). Political attachment places a stronger emphasis on perceptions of political incorporation, rather than the factual integration process, as conventional accounts do (e.g. Shefter 1986, who takes political incorporation as the ways in which new social forces enter the political system). Assuming that migrants are incorporated in one way or another in the political sphere of their new countries, through which political participation is fostered, this study perceives political attachment to refer to the ways migrants perceive inclusion into the political system and how they act upon this perception.

[20] This notion has been originally developed in the context of transnational social spaces by Smith and Guarnizo (1998). Different from the application to transnational social spaces, transnational social capital generates by this sustained exchange of practices, goods and ideas a social surplus that aggrandizes choice opportunities.

[21] When discussing transnational ties, I do not refer to more traditional repertoires of political orientation towards ones homeland, as have been previously identified by Faist (2000). Homeland orientation understood in this regard implies that migrants maintain political affiliations with their country of origin and act upon these by trying to impact political decision-making in their country of origin by means of their position in their destination country, especially characteristic to diaspora communities.

2.6 Hypotheses

The theoretical combinations discussed above give rise to a new set of hypotheses that works with earlier studies to further understand the challenges of migrant integration and political participation in the Netherlands. The following central research question will be guiding in this study: how ought we to understand the reactions of migrant and Muslim communities to the rise of immigration and the Islam as contentious topics on the Dutch political agenda?

1. Under which conditions do migrants raise their concerns through conventional modes of informal and formal political participation while continuing to reside in the Netherlands?
2. Under which conditions do migrants remain silent and abort their residence in the Netherlands?
3. Under which conditions do migrants remain silent while continuing to reside in the Netherlands?
4. Under which conditions do migrants raise their concerns through conventional modes of informal and political participation while posing the threat to terminate their residence in the Netherlands?

The hypotheses that follow juxtapose two concepts. These concepts and their resulting hypotheses are presented in table 1.2. First, it includes involvement in politics, which I have named 'political attachment'. Taking the concept of political attachment to be broader than political participation, this allows me to construct less restrictive hypotheses: one might feel Dutch and by its affiliation with the Dutch nation feel attached to Dutch politics as well, as this is part and parcel of the nation, yet one should not necessarily be politically active (although I do

not expect a major discrepancy between senses of political attachment and political participation). I contrast political attachment with the availability of transnational capital. Herewith I refer to those social structures in place that maintain and foster the relations between one's country of origin and country of settlement[22].

Table 1. Hypotheses summary

		Transnational Social Capital	
		High	*Low*
Political Attachment	*High*	Voice and exit-as-threat	Voice
	Low	Exit	Disenfranchisement

The first hypothesis aims to reveal what it needs to *Voice:*

> *H1* suggests that ethnic minorities who are highly politically attached but who possess a lower level of transnational capital show higher levels of political participation, without making use of their transnational networks.

[22] In addition to these more general characteristics, I expect several other factors to play a role as well. Those are primarily education level, gender and age. The latter category reflects differences between generations. I address these issues in the data I gather by creating room to ask questions about these issues. However, I do not seek to understand more structurally their possible independent effects, as the primary aim of this study is to find out the interplay between right-wing populists on one hand and ethnic minorities from a migrant background on the other in a transnational context.

The second hypothesis discusses behavior to *Exit:*

> *H2* proposes that those who indicate to show a low level of political attachment, but a high transnational capital, are more prone to exit the country of settlement by emigration to their country of origin.

The third hypothesis includes the possibility of *Disenfranchisement:*

> *H3* expects those who indicate to have a low attachment to Dutch politics and who possess a low level of relations in their country of origin to neither exit nor voice, but instead to be alienated from both societies. As a consequence, these groups might be strongly inward looking and possess a high level of social capital in the Netherlands but that does not 'spill over'.

Finally, the fourth hypothesis stipulates under which conditions one turns to using *Voice by posing exit-as-threat.*

> *H4* suggests that those who indicate to possess a high level of political attachment to the destination country while maintaining a high level of transnational capital in their country of origin become politically active in times of adversity and specifically use exit as a threat to substantiate voice.

3. Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This study combines positivist measurements with a constructivist epistemology. Observations for several quantitative indicators are combined with a series of qualitative interviews, which I conducted in April 2011 in the larger cities of the Netherlands. I understand in-depth interviews as a well-suited method to uncover how individuals intentionally attempt to shape and transform their environment (Almond and Genco 1977). Therefore, they serve the purpose of analyzing the reasons why migrants become politically active, and under which conditions. I follow Rathburn (2008) in his notion on consensus among interviewees: when interviewees maintain a consensual position on certain ideational elements, this is indicative for a shared understanding of a phenomenon and provides insight in causal relations as understood by the interviewees[23].

3.2 Sampling

Sampling for this project's agenda occurs at three levels: the case of the Netherlands, two distinct Dutch ethnic communities of a migrant background and a set of 40 potential interviewees were invited to participate in this study. This sampling strategy leads to a research design that supports a strongly detailed account for a small number of cases.

[23] King, Keohane and Verba (1994) warn for the risk of creating tautological explanations, especially when evoking explanatory (or independent) variables as 'culture', 'motivation' or 'national interest', for they cannot be measured independently from dependent variables (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). How interviewees perceive these relations to work are therefore the basis for the causal inferences in this study.

This study is based on a single-case design, which I justify to be most appropriate at this stage[24]. Migrant political participation in relation to their transnational ties has been relatively understudied, and that data on migrant transnational communities is more qualitatively available than quantitatively, a case-study forms at this point the most appropriate set-up. While there are different understandings of what a case-study should be varying from strong positivist recommendations to very interpretative positions (Vennesson in Della Porta and Keating 2008), I take a more intermediate standpoint and consider the purpose of this case-study to be to generate hypotheses for future research on multiple cases in variegated contexts. Second, the Netherlands form an ideal-type of a multicultural democracy (Joppke 2007). This case-study therefore also functions as a 'typical case' (Gerring 2008: 648) and can give insight in at least the broader phenomenon of migrant political participation in other multicultural democracies.

The second phase in the design of this study's sample results in a focus on the two largest Islamic migrant communities in the Netherlands. By centering on specific groups rather than the full array of the migrant population, I am able to garner relatively more depth in my analysis as it allows me to interview a larger number of representatives per ethnic minority. Transnational migrant communities are generally constructed by means of ethnic and/ or national identities, instead of other constitutive elements[25]. The Turkish and Moroccan communities share a comparable migration history and similar demographic characteristics. Both communities are among the largest in the Netherlands and share similar religious outlooks. Furthermore, analyzing

[24] Earlier studies recommend to employ a comparative approach (Koopmans and Statham 2000), preferably across countries. I therefore compare communities, but considering the scope of this project a cross-country comparison would not be feasible.

[25] The boundaries of the communities I selected are shaped by ethnicity and a shared collective identity that relates back to the nation vested in one's country of origin. While this might strike one as obvious, it is not necessarily so. An alternative collectivity to these ethnic communities could be rooted in a shared migrant identity based on common migrant and integration experiences and mutual religious understandings (the majority of both population groups belongs to the Sunni branch of Islam), which could bridge Turkish and Moroccan communities. However, religion does not function as a common denominator nor suffice joint migration experiences for superseding an ethnicity-specific collective history through nationality and ethnicity.

integration of migrants from the Antilles and Surinam, the other two larger minority groups, evokes more prominent post-colonial dynamics because of the Dutch overseas history in these countries. This variable could have distorting effects, for integration and migration policies for Surinamese and Antillean migrants have differed traditionally. As a background factor, I consider it an advantage that I speak rudimentary Turkish and am largely familiar with Turkish cultural practices. As a final note, I have limited the Turkish community to labor migrants and their families, but do not focus on Turkish nationals who sought (political) refuge in the Netherlands, such as the Kurdish-Turks in the 1990s. Appendix I provides a more detailed description of the demographic outlook of the Turkish and Moroccan migrant communities in the Netherlands and their migration histories.

I selected interviewees based on their membership in the Turkish or Moroccan communities as well as a professional involvement in community-related organizations. Referring to community organizations, I understand these as groups that operate on the basis of and find legitimacy by identifying themselves with a certain ethnicity or nationality (e.g. the Turkish Labor Organization). Professions of interviewees ranged from Dutch language instructors, trainers who give workshops and lectures on migration and integration related issues, board members of religious (migrant) organizations and mosques and full-time professionals involved in interest and lobby organizations on behalf of these communities. I included organizations that operate on both a local as well as national level, local referring to the larger cities[26].

I purposely excluded politicians from the sample. In the set-up of this research, their political (and personal) agendas contain the risk of conflicting with representing a group of individuals. Furthermore, being a member of a certain community does not render one

[26] The Hague, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Utrecht and Eindhoven

automatically its representative. I selected a balanced number of Turkish and Moroccan representatives and aimed to reach a similar equality for first and second generation migrants.

Upon creating a database of 40 potential interviewees, I conducted interviews with 14 participants[27]. Rejections to invitations were framed in terms of being occupied or not interested in discussing this topic. Of the conducted interviews, four were not used in the analysis of this study, for they concerned initial, more exploratory conversations that aided in the design of the semi-structured interview protocol or gave a broader perspective on the topic, but were not directly relevant for the study.

Most interviewees requested to remain fully anonymous and also to not disclose information on the organizations they are affiliated with. For this reason and for the purpose of consistency, I do not make any references to organizational information. I do disclose several basic background facts. Table 2.1 presented below lists interviewees and their profiles.

Table 2. Interviewee profiles

Ethnicity	**Generation**	**Gender**	**Profession and Location**	**Referred to as**
Moroccan	First	Male	Representative religious organization, Utrecht	M1A
Moroccan	First	Male	Representative interest organization, Utrecht	M1B
Moroccan	First	Female	Coordinator self-help group, Amsterdam	M2A
Moroccan	Second	Male	Representative religious organization	M2B
Moroccan	Second	Male	Instructor citizenship courses, The Hague	M2C
Turkish	First	Male	Representative interest organization, Utrecht	T1A
Turkish	First	Male	Instructor citizenship courses	T1B
Turkish	Second	Male	Instructor citizenship courses	T2A
Turkish	Second	Male	Religious instructor, Rotterdam	T2B
Turkish	Second	Female	Instructor citizenship courses, Utrecht	T3C

[27] When inviting organizations to participate, I did not refer to the political climate of the Netherlands, for I feared this could deter individuals from participating.

3.3 Interview design and data analysis

In the interviews, I have asked participants to reflect on developments within their communities. As such, I have treated my interviewees as speaking on behalf of the community. This approach generates generic responses: by representing a larger group of individuals, community leaders leave aside details easily, implying a need for careful data interpretation. Furthermore, while I have interviewed representatives I do not expect to be able to draw a full generalization to all migrant and ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands. This study functions primarily to identify the mechanisms that motivate individuals from a migrant background to become politically active in a contentious political arena. The complete interview protocol is attached in Appendix I. Subsequently, I discuss the three main parameters, perceptions on integration (as already discussed in chapter 1), political attachment and transnational social capital.

3.3.1 Perceptions on integration

Measurements for perceptions on the rise of the radical right, of which I have presented a first overview of the results in chapter 1 already, require an approach that is 'concrete and indirect' (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 210). A question along the lines of '*What do you think about anti-Islam parties in Europe?*' is prone to yield a negative response. It would be precarious to assume that the rise of the radical right indeed has had a lasting effect on perceptions of the socio-political climate by migrant groups. Therefore, the first task of the interviews was to establish to what extent and in which ways migrant communities perceive the radical right to impact the Dutch political arena. I have dedicated a series of questions to perceptions on integration and individual liberties.

Integration as a theme in the interviews is indicative to the position interviewees ascribe to their community in relation to the Dutch society by reflecting the responsibilities attributed to the government on the one hand and migrant communities on the other. Attitudes to integration furthermore expose perceptions on collective identities and which opportunities and constraints migrants experience in enacting 'non-native' ways of life. Especially in the case of religion, opinions on integration ultimately postulate views on what belongs in the public domain and what should be relegated to the private. Lastly, by asking about views on integration, one is able to retrieve information on barriers to integration. Perceptions on integration are analyzed in terms of two categories: (1) interpersonal and interethnic relations and (2) assimilation versus multiculturalism.

3.3.2 Political attachment

Political attachment as discussed in the previous chapter is looked at in this study along three dimensions: (1) political participation and activities, (2) self-reported attitudes towards the political system and (3) self-reported attitudes to Dutch nationality and citizenship. I choose to distinguish between the latter two, as this allows for the possibility that one does not participate in politics and is not interested in doing so (perhaps for the mere fact that one believes the political system functions well), but can feel a strong attachment to Dutch citizenship. Furthermore, it includes the possibility of alternatives. For each dimension, I have classified the communities and their generations. These classifications are general for interview questions were open-ended and not written as a survey, yet provide a first abstract comparative base. Table 3, given below, presents these classifications.

Table 3. Dimensions and classifications for political attachment

Dimension	Classification	
Political participation	Low	High
Self-reported attitudes towards the political system	Negative	Positive
Self-reported attitudes towards nationhood and citizenship	Negative	Positive

3.3.3 Transnational social capital

I measured transnational social capital along three dimensions: (1) the nature of the connections and ties between the ethnic community in the Netherlands and its country of origin, (2) perceptions of the feasibility to return to the country of origin and (3) aspirations regarding the country of origin. Ties between individuals and their communities in the Netherlands and the country of origin were examined in terms of intensity, frequency and coverage, meaning, which domains they touch upon. This method is not an elaborate measurement for social capital, which dwells more generally on social network analysis. It only provides insight in the perceptions one has regarding her (parents') country of origin. Therefore, I include perceptions on the feasibility to return as well as the aspirations one has if one would return. As for political attachment, each community and per community, each generation, was ranked according to their scores on these dimensions pertaining to transnational social capital.

Table 4. Dimensions and classifications for transnational social capital

Dimension	Classification	
Nature of ties between the Netherlands and country of origin	Weak	Strong
Perceptions to opportunities to return	Negative	Positive
Aspirations regarding country of origin	Negative	Positive

Interviews were conducted in Dutch. They were not recorded, for all interviewees expressed discomfort with this practice. One interviewee explained that in the past, journalists misused information gathered in conversations with for instance orthodox religious leaders that

have been recorded without adherence to the practice of informed consent. Data analysis occurred on the basis of notes. As interviews were semi-structured, the process of so-called scoring occurred afterwards by means of extracting quotes from the interviews. Running the risk of losing contextual information, I have scored quotes multiple times in case the context in which they were mentioned would substantiate a double scoring. The most meaningful quotes are included in the subsequent chapters.

4. Disenfranchisement

In the following chapter I will look at political attachment and transnational social capital amongst first generation migrants. On the eve of labor migrant recruitment in the early 1960s, expectations about labor migration to the Netherlands were shared by policy-makers and Moroccan and Turkish migrants alike. Guest workers were anticipated to reside in the Netherlands for several years to remit a large share of their income for securing a stable economic position in their home country. However, the prospect to return never materialized. Restrictive immigration policies enacted in the wake of the 1973 Oil Crisis[28]combined with the impact of the Crisis on labor migrants' countries of origin[29]created a 'now or never' opportunity to reside 'on the safe side', in Europe (De Haas 2003). As return-options were no longer wanted, the social and political contexts of migration and integration gained a radically novel outlook. The impact of this annulment, I argue, is not only observed in economic cost-benefit-calculations pertaining to residential decision-strategies. It extrapolates to migrant political behavior in the destination country. I demonstrate that the disappearance of return options has gone hand in hand with a low level of political attachment to the Netherlands. I argue that low levels of both political attachment and transnational social capital lead to disenfranchisement among members of this group.

[28] Heralded by stagnating economic growth, unemployment in Europe rose and the demand for unskilled labor dropped. As a consequence, most of Europe closed its borders for migrants.

[29] The Oil Crisis had an even stronger sway on the fragile economies of especially Morocco . Furthermore, both Turkey and Morocco entered into an increased period of political instability. Morocco saw two failed *coup d'états* against King Hassan II in 1971 and 1972 while the Turkish military amid growing societal unrest enacted a successful coup in 1971.

4.1 Low political attachment

Paradoxically, recruitment stops encouraged migrants to settle in European countries permanently rather than temporarily (Fargues 2004). One would expect this process to encourage migrants to integrate swiftly, for a higher level of integration renders one's position in the destination country more secure and productive. The option to return from a perspective of bettering socio-economic living standards was less advantageous. However, first generation migrants did not disregard their aspirations to return altogether. A process of rapid societal integration did not occur among the first generation Turkish and Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands. A rational-choice framework that accounts solely for household strategies to improve income and education opportunities cannot capture dynamics of integration and more specifically, the focus of this study, political attachment. These factors which seem like externalities to migration processes are fostered by, on the one hand, the governmental integration policy regime and, on the other, perceptions of integrating among migrants themselves, dependent on their aspirations to return.

Governmental integration policies were developed in the mid-1970s while debates concerning integration started in the course of the '1980s. The initial judicial instruments under which labor migrants were attracted to the Netherlands were designed in such a way that temporary residency was encouraged, in which migrants were asked to extend residence permits every other year (Entzinger 1984). This slowed down a projected rapid integration trajectory. Subsequently, the proposition underpinning integration policies was double-tiered and built upon the assumptions that, eventually, guest workers would return (Trappenburg 2003). Migrants were encouraged to integrate, while they could maintain their idiosyncratic cultural outlook. Interviewee T1A recalls the implications of this program, "The government followed a policy in

which labor migrants could integrate with conservation of their own identity. This has been partially successful. For example, traditional folkdance outfits were subsidized, but language courses were not financially supported." Interviewee M1B echoes this sentiment, "The elderly people of today, who came here in 1960s and 70s, never have had the opportunity to fully integrate. People who live here now for 30 or even 40 years sometimes do not speak a word of Dutch." Up and till today, the majority of the first generation has little command of the Dutch language and a mere fifteen per cent of Turkish migrants and twenty per cent of Moroccan migrants say to feel at home in the Netherlands (Central Bureau for Statistics 2010).

However, a picture of labor migrants as pawns within the Dutch welfare system fully subjected to opportunities and constraints structured for them is not wholly accurate. Within, for example, acquiring language skills, civic initiatives arose. In cooperation with native Dutch inhabitants, ad hoc study groups were initiated (Trappenburg 2003) or migrants would organize language classes themselves. Continuing his account of subsidy distributions, interviewee T1A mentions, "We applied for funding for folkdance costumes, but when the budget was not fully spent – which was often the case – a couple of hundreds of guilders could be spent on matters we thought to be more urgent, such as language classes."[30] Nonetheless, these instances were more an exception than common practice.

This being said, political attachment among migrant groups remains low. While integration has not been sufficiently or adequately supported in especially the first three decades

[30] In the mid 2000s, cultural subsidies have gotten increasingly under pressure. Migrant integration is approached from an individualistic perspective, rather than group-targeted strategies. Governmental policies aim to develop equal positions at the labor market and in education (Trappenburg 2003) yet are geared more towards making discrepancies between children and adolescents from a native and non-native background as small as possible. However, Trappenburg (2003) still concludes that despite the eradication of ethnicity-oriented policies, the fundaments of integration policies have not moved fully towards a French republican, secular design of integration. For instance, primary and secondary religious schools are governmentally supported. To emphasize this, former mayor of Amsterdam, Job Cohen, announced in his 2002 New Year's address that integration is to occur best through religion (Cohen 2002). Hence, although ethnicity-targeted policies are slowly replaced by individualistic policies, religion-oriented policies continue to persist.

of labor migration to the Netherlands, migrants have not gathered higher levels of political attachment. When it comes to political participation of the first generation of migrants, several interviewees remark that a relatively small number of individuals are interested in being active in Dutch politics. “First generation migrants have never become really involved in Dutch politics,” tells interviewee T1A. This sentiment is shared by others. Interviewee M1B, “We do not know much about politics. I cannot tell who goes voting or not. People are not really interested.” An interviewee active as a religious instructor in one of the larger cities in the Netherlands, interviewee M1A, mentions that one should not overstate how Muslims, especially more orthodox believers, perceive politics in general. He explains how political events to what he calls ‘true’ Muslims should not matter, “Many Muslims maintain an ideological outlook on life. Therefore, they are not so much concerned with politics. The psyche and the soul are what matters for the creator, everything external is important for the people. One’s belief in God is stronger than some expressions of some people.” The extent to which this interpretation of the relation between religion and politics applies to first generation Muslims is difficult to assess.

4.2 Low transnational social capital

While political attachment is low among first generation migrants, the image of their former home countries remains positive if not idealized. Interviewee T1B tells that, “The group of first generation migrants stays permanently in the Netherlands. Returning is no longer an option. But still, we continue to cherish a utopia-image from Turkey.” A representative of one of the main Turkish interest groups underscores this notion, and adds, “Turkey remains a dream-world to go to. Part of being a migrant is to want to return. This moment arrives when someone’s future is secured.” Interviewee M1A does not deviate from this view yet adds that returning is hard. “Many would be happier to stay in Morocco. But it is not that easy to return. We are migrants

after all: if we could have stayed, we would have stayed." Moroccan and Turkish migrants perceive the social climate to be better in Morocco and in Turkey than in the Netherlands. Interviewee M1B, "People are more forthcoming and welcoming at home." Interviewee T1, "We do not feel to belong here, really. We often stay, because our children grew up in the Netherlands." Next to the desire to reside among relatives, one is reluctant to leave the social and economic provisions Europe offers. Interviewee T1B explains the effects of this specific geographical distribution of resources, opportunities and families, "The first generation shuttles back and forth. They bought a house in Turkey, are homesick and want to return. Yet, their children and grandchildren live in the Netherlands. What is more, they have gotten used to the medical provisions in the Netherlands."[31]

Although first generation migrants say to want to stay in the Netherlands, their residential behavior cannot be explained in terms of either 'staying put' or 'leaving'. First generation migrants blur the distinction between migrants and returning migrants. They form a pendulum group that combines multi-local households by travelling back and forth between country of destination and country of origin while residing in both for longer periods of time. Thereby, transnational kinship ties are continuously reinforced. However, the very nature of these transnational relations does not render it more likely for one to return permanently. The strong focus on economic opportunities as given by most interviewees demonstrates that the decision to leave a country is predominantly motivated by a cost-benefit perspective. The primary motivation for migrants is to improve her and her family's economic position and opportunities in life. In

[31]As a fundamental requirement, modern communications methods and inexpensive air travel are ascribed a pivotal role in establishing and maintaining transnational ties. Interviewee T1B reflects on the impact of communication and air travel development: "When people used to migrate, their connections with Turkey broke to some extent. Modern communication methods allow one to maintain these bonds. People are better informed and contacts remain warm. Herewith, the relation with Turkey is naturally kept."

this regard, interviewee M1C noted, “Returning to Morocco is not really an option, it is a developing country. It is much better to live here. You have to understand that there is no such a thing as a ‘paradise’ to go to for labor migrants.” Another interviewee remarked that the living conditions in Morocco starkly differ from the Netherlands, to the extent that he feared it would be very difficult to make a living in Morocco.

Shuttling between countries of origin and destination shows how transnationalization has become a lifestyle. To migrate has never been an irrevocable and definite decision that broke ties with the country of origin, nor has to emigrate been an equally definite decision. These regular flows of persons construct a truly transnational space, in which migrants design a way of life that allows them to continue to better their position in both social as well as economic aspects. The transnational contacts between families create a form of social capital that channels reciprocity and obligation. Frequent contacts across countries bridge not only countries and communities by combating the risks of losing intimacy in contacts posed by geographical distances (Durkheim 1964). I follow Faist (2000) that it is social capital that fulfills this bridging function.

However, transnational kinship ties do not provide sufficient opportunities to return permanently. Therefore I have ranked the first generation migrants low in terms of transnational social capital. Second, as an upshot to this multi-local residential strategy one refrains from developing high levels of political attachment. Interviewee T1A mentions the counterfactual, “Why would one now continue to learn or improve their Dutch? They have been able to get around without while working in the Netherlands, build up a family and live their lives as pensioners.” Interviewee M1A elaborates on the consequences of not making a, what he calls, ‘real choice’, “Our generation has to make a decision. We cannot think of returning one day, because it blocks them from making good use of the provisions for elderly people in the Netherlands. If they do not decide to age here, but still consider going back, they are

disadvantaged, because they will not allow themselves to participate properly." Nonetheless, this 'real choice' is not really made.

4.3 To leave is to return

Following these observations, I conclude that first generation Turkish and Moroccan migrants have less political attachment and less transnational social capital which leads them to disenfranchise from Dutch society. Although the causality for the relation between transnational social capital and political attachment cannot be identified in this study, both dimensions are at interplay with one another. In a combined fashion, they provide a better understanding of the self-ascribed political position of first generation migrants. Concomitant to transnationalizing, first generation migrants continue to dream of returning to their country of origin while they are distancing them from their destination country. Although transnational social capital is available by means of transnational kinship communities, it provides them no compatible alternative that stimulates them to settle for a uni-local residential strategy. As such, the 'exit-option' is illusionary; as their sociological denotation implies, for pendulum migrants to leave, they are required to return. This return is defined by minimal standards: only residence matters. Yet, while true exit is deceiving, it is sufficient to exit from society, both in the country of origin and in the country of destination.

5. Voice, but no exit

Following Moroccan law, children born to Moroccan parents in another country cannot relinquish their Moroccan nationality. When they are born in the Netherlands, they concomitantly possess two passports. A recent study, which sought to identify relations between social integration and migrant nationality, observed that thirty per cent of the Moroccan-Dutch second generation said to have a Dutch passport only (Dagevos 2008)[32]. The study interpreted this unlikely statistic as an element demonstrative to the ties between Moroccan second generation migrants and the Netherlands: three out of ten of Moroccan-Dutch adolescents do not attach that much significance to their Moroccan nationality anymore.

As I demonstrate as well, Moroccan second generation migrants are highly politically attached to the Netherlands. At the same time they maintain fewer ties with their country of origin. Transnationally, they are in a weak position as they have a limited transnational network, little economic opportunities abroad and poor conceptions of these opportunities. In response to right-wing radicalism, second generation Moroccans therefore use the opportunity of increasing political activism, in many cases not despite but because of the negatively regarded political climate. Being in a weaker position than Turkish migrants (for there is no realistic return-option), they resort to voice, rather than silence. I argue in this chapter that low transnational social capital but high political attachment leads to voice, but no exit among second generation Moroccans.

[32] This study has been issued following claims postulated by radical and conservative right-wing parties and supported by a significant majority of the electorate (approximately sixty-two per cent (Central Bureau for Statistics 2010)) that one's possession of a double nationality would lead to inevitable conflicts of interests and loyalty and concomitantly hinders integration. The analysis of Dagevos (2008) shows however that but a few indicators used to measure integration are impacted by having a double nationality or only a non-Dutch nationality, such as knowledge of the Dutch language and feeling at home in the Netherlands. The study presents mixed results at best and runs counter public discourse conflating a double nationality and the success of integration. Considering the high political trust of Moroccans, it is unlikely that those reporting not to have a Moroccan nationality did so out of discomfort with mainstream discourse.

5.1 High political attachment

Demographically seen, second generation Moroccan migrants are at this point in time adolescents who are entering or about to enter the labor market. They are exemplary to the general notion that their parents' migrant experience casts a partial shadow over their opportunities in the 'destination country'. Born to a (mostly unskilled) parentage of whom one or both came from Morocco, they do starkly outperform the first generation in terms of educational achievements, mastering the Dutch language and an improved socio-economic position more generally. Nonetheless, they are not on par with the native Dutch majority population yet regarding these factors. Especially troublesome, they are as a population group overrepresented among criminality rates[33].

Political attachment is at high levels compared to the first generation. Second generation Moroccans show higher levels of formal political behavior, maintain higher levels of trust in Dutch politics and a large majority indicates to 'feel Dutch'. This collective identity is frequently touched upon in interviews with Moroccan second generation interviewees. For example, interviewee M2A explains, "the idea that we are Moroccan is not correct: we are first of all Dutch. The Netherlands is the country we grew up in, Morocco is where our parents lived. It can be frustrating at times to be referred to as 'Moroccans' continuously, because this is not accurate." The position of second generation Moroccans has not been left uncontested in the media and politics, especially regarding the high levels of criminality. Interviewee M2B, "The position of Moroccans is generally good, but there are a few who ruin this image, also because the media focuses strongly and only on criminality."

[33] Current statistics stipulate that approximately one out of ten Moroccan youngsters has been involved in a criminal act at least once in his lifetime (Van Tilburg 2009).

Compared to the first generation respondents, the second generation reflects more extensively on the rise of right-wing radicalism. Interviewee M2C explains the stakes involved for his generation in this development, "Initially, I was thinking that I cannot do much with the claims of the PVV. They are blatantly false. I am, and many of us are, as Dutch as anyone else. Yet everything we do is nowadays looked at through a microscope. This causes a lot of frustration. But if you want this to change, walking away is the easiest thing to do." Interviewee M2B reflects on the broader repercussions among second generation Moroccans,"Many of us were not really interested in politics before, but we felt challenged. Some of us desire to return to Morocco, and a few did, to better the country. I felt compelled to get involved, as through this way, I am able to make a difference – and this applies to many of us." Interviewee M2A echoes this, "the need for representation is high. People are not very much involved in Moroccan politics, but many young people have started to step in political discussions and debates on Dutch politics."

The role of formal organizations is considered pivotal among the interviewees, but they should not be directed towards one group specifically. While interviewee M2A points to the need for representation, the idea of a Muslim or migrant political party is mentioned among several interviewees. Interviewee M2B explains,

> We have already seen the establishment and failure of a Muslim party. I think it did not work because most new parties have a hard time gaining support because voters prefer seniority – even, or perhaps especially, young voters. Also, it does not make sense to represent Muslims or migrants, it would be better to represent, for example, the weaker off in society as an ideology.

Interviewee M2A underscores the notion against group-differentiation, "The PvdA [*Partij voor de Arbeid*, lit.: Labour Party] has this very friendly 'multiculti' thing. They select party leaders because of their origins and create a United Colors of Benetton add." Nonetheless, interviewee

MDB does not perceive a stark disconnect between conventional political parties and the young Moroccan-Dutch electorate. Interviewee M2C echoes his sentiment yet also adds that it remains important to be heard via other forms of (informal) politics to continue to establish a positive image of migrants and Muslims, "Protests and demonstrations have been of massive importance, even though many of them have been smaller in the Netherlands than in other European countries. They have created awareness, which until then was lacking among many young Moroccans. It meant to us that we have a say in this."

Second generation Moroccans do not take their position in Dutch politics and society for granted. An often mentioned event pertains to a statement relatively recently issued by the current prime minister of the Netherlands. Interviewee M2A recalls, "The statement of the prime minister was a very big problem. He said: 'We will give the Netherlands back to the Dutch.' Then, who are we? Where do we belong? And who are the Dutch? And what exactly should be returned?" Prior to the statement, the PVV said to strive for 'giving the Netherlands back to the Dutch' and campaigned on this slogan. Interviewee M2A, "when Wilders said this, it caused a stir. Yet again, it is one of the many things he says, so we thought that this would pass." In this regard, interviewees differ when it comes to their take on the temporary or more permanent character of the PVV and other radical right movements. While some propose sociological forecasts of integration to take 'one generation', others suggest that the PVV will evaporate over time. The immediate effects, as discussed in the previous chapter, are, however, not downplayed by any degree.

The 'turn to voice' of the second generation Moroccans is reflected by quantitative data on political participation. In general, quantitative studies on voting turn-out, political trust, 'feeling Dutch' are carried out, but not on a national level. Instead, exit polls factoring in ethnicity have been ad hoc organized in a varying selection of the municipality elections in the

larger cities, in which only Amsterdam and Rotterdam have been closely followed over time. Studies on political trust focused on different concepts and indicators over time, rendering the results difficult to compare[34]. Bearing in mind consistency, I therefore use the voting turn-outs as approximated by exit-polls for the city of Amsterdam as an indicator for political behavior of the Turkish and Moroccan communities to examine whether these findings on turn-out could substantiate, even though they are but an approximation facing severe limitations, or contradict the above-given overview of observations. I repeat this as well for the second generation Turkish-Dutch in the following chapter.

When looking at voting turn-outs for the municipality of Amsterdam over time[35], as figure 4 shows, the turn-out for the Moroccan population has increased since the last two elections. The initial study did account for developments over time, but not for intergenerational differences. However, other studies (e.g. Koenen 2010, Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 2008, 2010) have differentiated for differences between generations (but not for developments over time). The turn-out for second generation voters is significantly higher for all ethnic groups than for first generation voters. As an inference from these observations, figure 4 functions as an approximation for the turn-out of second generation Moroccans, yet the values are expectantly higher.

[34] Compare Tillie with Van der Heijden and Van Heelsum (2010)

[35] I present results pertaining to Amsterdam, because the (cosmopolitan) population of the city is more representative to the total migrant population than population compositions of other cities. Of all cities, Amsterdam has originally attracted the most diverse group of Turkish and Moroccan migrants, from lower to higher levels of education and from a large variety of cities and villages in Turkey and Morocco. In Rotterdam, for example, migrants with similar backgrounds reside because of its industrial character, profiled by its harbor. Exit polls or turn-out surveys accounting for ethnicity have not been conducted in the rural areas of the Netherlands. Therefore I opt to examine the results for Amsterdam. As the table demonstrates, while being at a high in the early 1990s, political participation of Turkish migrants has decreased over time while political participation of Moroccan migrants has increased.



Source: Van der Heijden and Van Heelsum 2010

Figure 2. Voting turn-out over time at the municipality elections of Amsterdam for the Moroccan population

Figure 2 shows that voting turn-out over time has increased for the second generation Moroccan-Dutch. Moroccans have become especially active since the 2002 Fortuyn-revolt. Despite the limitations surrounding these data, they do not to the very least disregard the observations from the interviews for this study. Furthermore, earlier studies on social capital among Moroccan community organizations found that Moroccans are much less organized in terms of self-help and civic associations than Turks, hindering social trust to spill over into political trust (Fennema and Tillie 2001). Provided that civic involvement has not grown over time, this inference would constitute another argument that the challenge of the radical right is accepted by second generation Moroccan migrants.

5.2 Low transnational social capital

The observations on political attachment establish that the Moroccan youth has turned to voice. Simultaneously, their ties with Morocco are limited. Like the first generation, transnational social capital manifests itself for second generation Moroccans primarily among kinship relations. For the Moroccan community this has not accumulated into the development of an extensive or vibrant transnational business community. Second generation Moroccans do not emigrate because they do not have a more extensive array of positive pull factors.

First of all, cost-benefit analyses are at the core of decisions to return or not. Interviewee M2C, "Morocco is a developing country. In that respect, it is much better to live in the Netherlands. We have more opportunities here, a better life. There is no extreme poverty in the Netherlands, people are well-educated." This economical approach is amplified by perceptions of being received in Morocco. Interviewees consensually indicate that while migrating to Europe yielded a high social status in the past, migrants to who went to Europe are not accepted when returning to Morocco. Interviewee M2B, "Even if you go on vacation to Morocco, you are not seen as Moroccan, but as European. You do not fit in. While relatives live in Morocco, people in general would not help you very much. In extreme cases, they call you a traitor, for not having stayed in Morocco."[36] Interviewee M2A, "Europe is no longer perceived as a paradise. Too many migrants experienced a very cold shower when they came here. It was difficult to find a job, to send money back home. Those who stayed in Morocco wonder why our parents have left." Many

[36] An aspect to this experience could, hypothetically, relate to the larger language barriers Dutch-Moroccans experience than Dutch-Turkish individuals when returning to their country of origin. Approximately ninety-three per cent of the Moroccans in the Netherlands speak Berber, a dialect largely coming from the Rif. The remaining seven per cent speaks Arabic. Approximately sixty-eight per cent of the Dutch-Moroccans are Riffian. Within Berber, several dialects exist. In Morocco, however, a little less than thirty per cent of the total population speaks Berber and these groups reside generally in the rural areas. By not speaking the majority language, this renders a return-option already more difficult. Despite the large ethnic diversity in Turkey, all Turks speak standard Turkish introduced in the early years of the Republic. This variance within the groups studied for this study should be examined into further detail.

second generation Moroccans visit Morocco frequently, for example during summer vacations. Yet, this does not imply they seek to return. Interviewee M2B,

> When you are on holidays, life is much nicer and easier. Of course Morocco is a better country to live in then. But we also know that this is only so during the holidays. Besides, how can we tell we really know the country? In the best situation, we have visited every year for a month. If you're about twenty-four now, that means you have been in Morocco for two years only.

For this mixture of motivations, it is not a straightforward option among second generation Moroccans to return to their parents' country of origin. On a tangent, interviewee M2A remarks that, "several young, highly educated Moroccans have moved to Morocco to contribute to the development of the country. Yet, this number is small. They are pioneers only."

In a more general sense, it followed from the interviews that second generation Moroccans do not often take concrete steps to move to another country, when they cannot return to Morocco. In this regard, interviewees refer back to their ties with the Netherlands. Interviewee M2A, "We are happy to live here, simply satisfied. I would not want to leave, this is where I have been raised." Interviewee M2B elaborates on a similar sentiment, "One's roots are not necessarily between countries, but between the roots of different generations. The first generation has real roots in the country of origin. The second generation has only family roots. Moreover, it is important to distinguish between longing for one's roots and nationalism."

5.3 The challenge and the reply

While socio-economic positions have improved across generations, transnational social capital carries over to the next migrant generation. Second generation Moroccans maintain similar transnational ties as first generation migrants and transnational kinship communities continue to persist. The second generation shuttles back and forth as well, when visiting relatives

during vacations. However, this shuttling does not constitute pendulum behavior, for second generation Moroccans continue to reside in the Netherlands. This transnational fundament of the second generation creates the challenge they currently face.

While the second generation Moroccan background is transnational in character, this does not imply that they live 'between' cultures, as some earlier authors interpreting migrant communities and so-called hyphenated identities observed (e.g. Stein 1981). The source of contention stems from a different kind of tension. The identity second generation Moroccans ascribe to diverges from the collective identity that is ascribed to them. While they emphasize to be Dutch, the radical right emphasizes them to be Moroccan. The earlier discussion on assimilation or multiculturalism does not provide guidance in this matter, for the confrontation the second generation Moroccans faces does not center on holding or losing their culture. Rather, it deals with responding to allegations and ascriptions of cultural practices and collective identities.

Yet instead of distancing themselves from Dutch society, they vigorously become more active. The turn to voice is paradoxical. On the one hand, it appears to be the best strategy to follow, but on the other, it is the only alternative available. Unlike (migrant) communities with stronger transnational ties, they are not endowed with the luxury of choosing where to live. Going to vote, participating in public debates and protesting decisions constitute the liberal-enlightened call to arms that is responded to by the second generation Moroccans even despite, or perhaps because of, the contentious political situation and the rise of the radical right. It becomes of interest to observe the developments of loyalty of the Moroccan second generation over time. At this point, it seems that the more the radical right points towards the exclusiveness of the Dutch identity, the stronger the urge to demonstrate to belong to that identity.

6. Voice and exit-as-threat

When they were visiting relatives in Turkey in July 2007, a group of young Turkish-Dutch college graduates were notified about the upcoming elections in Turkey. Carrying both a Turkish and a Dutch nationality, they casted their votes at a voting booth on the beaches of Antalya. Several years later, in June 2010, the Dutch general elections were held. They went to vote for the Dutch government in Rotterdam. While only going to Turkey during summer vacations, this group of young Turkish-Dutchmen portrays behavior characteristic to the second generation Turkish migrants. Growing up in the Netherlands, they continue to maintain strong relations with Turkey simultaneously. As this section demonstrates, second generation Turks possess high political attachment to the Netherlands and high transnational social capital between Turkey and the Netherlands. In effect, these factors encourage multiple residential strategies and, especially among the higher educated, strengthen their position in the Netherlands. In this chapter I explain this argument.

6.1 High political attachment

Like the Moroccan second generation, the Turkish second generations has taken in comparison to the previous generation a large step forward regarding integration in general. Interviewee T2C quickly states, “I have been born here and I grew up here. I know the language perfectly and I know the culture. In fact, this is my language and my culture. Tell me, why would I be less Dutch than you?” The interviewees show that attitudes of political attachment are positive among second generation Turkish migrants. This group consensually brings optimistic perceptions of Dutch citizenship in general to the fore, in which they mention to feel first and foremost Dutch. Interviewee T2B explains that although second generation migrants have been

socialized at home in a Turkish culture, they, "have grown up in the Dutch culture and society outside of home. We are used to the Dutch structure and the Dutch way of doing things." He explains that the parents of migrant children perceive these issues differently, because they, "do not speak the language, came here to work and to provide us a better future." Yet, while this argument seems straightforward, self-reported attitudes to Dutch nationhood are more ambivalent. "It seems easy, because we have lived in the Netherlands all our lives. However, because of current developments, especially in politics, we are confronted with apparently being different." Interviewee T2A compares this perception with the difference between being disabled and being handicapped,

> When you are disabled, it is because your environment disables access. When you are handicapped, this is so because you do not have the physical ability to do something. When you are discriminated against, it is as if you are disabled. Only we notice our different background when others point towards this.

Interviewees do not echo conclusions of other studies that claim this migrant generation to live 'between cultures' (Faist 2000), rather, they maintain a more optimistic understanding of citizenship. The Dutch political constellation and content of Dutch nationality is not perceived as posing a challenge of mutual exclusivity to maintaining parts of one's cultural outlook she has been raised in at home. The consensus among interviewees also indicates that attitudes towards citizenship are not conflated with perceptions of the rise of the radical right or more stringent interpersonal relations within society.

Furthermore, interviewees T2A, T2B and T2C reflected positively on political participation by second generation Turks. Traditionally, the Turkish population has been more politically active than other ethnic groups, at some instances of formal participation outstripping

the majority native Dutch population (e.g. Fennema and Tillie 2001)[37]. Among the Turkish communities involved in politics especially the second generation is active (Koenen 2010). Interviewees share these observations. Interviewee T2C explains the importance of politics for Turkish-Dutch citizens as a development that shows the improvement of the Turkish community in the Netherlands.

> Turks do well in Dutch politics. We find it important to vote and there are a large number of representatives of Turkish origin. We have developed rapidly. Look at Nebahat Albayrak, for example. Her mother could not even write or read when she came to the Netherlands and Albayrak became deputy minister.

The number Turkish candidates from the second generation elected for the provinces this year as well as the municipality elections in 2010 reached proportionality with the share of Turkish second generation migrants compared to the total population in the Netherlands[38].

When looking at more quantitative data, they show the comparatively high levels of the Turkish-Dutch electorate. Figure 6.1 depicts the development over time of turn-out for this group compared to Moroccan-Dutch and native Dutch voters. As explained in chapter 5, this graph includes both the first and second generation (the original study did not control for age structure). As the second generation has higher turn-outs, as other studies have shown, one can expect the results to be higher for the second-generation Turks. Compared to Moroccan voters, the Turkish community has a higher turn-out and for some years they have outstripped the native Dutch voters. Unlike Moroccan voters, however, there is no increase in turn-out of Turkish voters

[37] The local elections of Rotterdam and Amsterdam in 1994 attracted one-and-a-half times as many Turkish voters as native Dutch voters. Explanations for this turn-out have not been analyzed theoretically (Van der Heijden and Van Heelsum 2010).

[38] As a tangent to Turkish civic and political development, interviewee T1B does note that young Turks in the Netherlands are still maturing as a generation. The nature of civil society organizations withholds Turkish adolescents from becoming involved in their administrative or managerial bodies. Interviewee T2A, "The second generation has more opportunities for political and societal emancipation. They often perform much better than the first generation. In civil society organizations, however, they still perform worse. This has to do with the fact that Turkish civil society boards are conservative and do not want youngsters to be involved, yet."

during the last two elections. These elections took place after the so-called Fortuyn-revolt[39]. The data gathered from the interviews show that the Moroccan second generation feel challenged by the rise of right-wing radicalism, whereas more conclusive inferences cannot be drawn from this data. This can explain why turn-out of the Turkish voters has not increased. However, quantitative data are incomplete, and this graph includes both first and second generation migrants. Therefore, I cannot draw inferences from this graph regarding the second generation Turkish population and base my conclusions solely on the observations from the interviews.



Source: Van der Heijden and Van Heelsum 2010

Figure 3. Voting turn-out over time at the municipality elections of Amsterdam for the Turkish population

Figure 3 shows that the turn-out over for the Turkish population has decreased a little, but has been high among the Turkish population compared to other ethnicities. The higher level of

[39] I elaborate on this notion in appendix II.

political participation among Turks compared to other ethnicities has been explained because of their higher levels of civic involvement (Fennema and Tillie 2001). This could now, potentially, explain why their turn-out is still higher, but did not continue to grow. This study suggests, however, that the Turks feel less directly challenged compared to the Moroccans. This lack of a challenge can be caused by the easy availability of an exit-option, which is asymmetrical for the Turkish and Moroccan second generation.

6.2 High transnational social capital

When it comes to the precise content of political claim-making, interviewee T2A recalls the high amount of media attention given to the alleged development that young, highly-educated second generation Turks are planning to emigrate from the Netherlands, as a consequence of recent political developments. It is not entirely clear to what extent the second generation Turkish migrants are seriously considering to leave, interviewee T2C mentions, but 'it is clear that we are exploring other opportunities.' Interviewee T2B says to not know precisely how many young Turks migrate, ''because this is not studied very carefully', but when they emigrate, he explains, 'they often chose to go to Turkey'. Interviewee T2D knows more precise numbers, "Approximately one-and-a-half percent of second generation Turks emigrated last year. A majority left for Turkey, others stayed in Europe." While the precision of these data is unknown, interviewees do not disagree about considerations to emigrate, which are voiced in public debates.

However, these motivations are two-sided. They are also related to the rise of right-wing radicalism. Interviewee T2B states, "Young people react in three ways to the current political climate: fundamentalism and radicalism, they leave the Netherlands or they remain silent." When asking how many second generation migrants left the Netherlands, he explained many consider

emigrating. A deliberation, however, does not constitute a decision. Interviewee T2B, “Turkey is becoming more interesting, not only because of the country’s economic growth, but also because the Dutch political climate. Yes, we think of migrating. But no, I do not precisely whether many of us. I would rather say that people talk about it.” The Turkish-Dutch interviewees did not point as vociferously to a feeling of being politically challenged as the Moroccan-Dutch interviewees did. I therefore consider the claim of interviewee T2B to refer to the threat of leaving, rather than the actual act of exiting.

To be able to exit or to render this option feasible, the emergence of a transnational business community is a fundamental asset to support and conduct the kind of ties high levels of transnational social capital generate. Economic cost-benefit analysis cannot capture all motivations. When migrants are presented with economic opportunities in another country, they do not base their decision to emigrate on these opportunities solely. Reasons of acquired economic positions and opportunities are not evoked to explain why one would want to stay. Interviewee T2A, “People still decide to stay, because they know the Dutch system best. Even despite Turkey’s growing economy.” Accordingly, this argument works the other way as well. Interviewee T2A, “When people decide to leave, they often leave for Turkey, because that is the country they know.” Interviewee T2C, “When second generation Turkish-Dutch go to Turkey, they are immediately accepted in Turkey. They are helped by Turks and considered as one of them.”

Second generation Turks have the luxury of choice. Not only do second generation migrants consider to emigrate, because of the vibrant transnational business community they go to Turkey, “Turkish-Dutch youngsters are very much wanted. Highly educated youngsters will therefore explore to see what they can find.” Interviewee T2A explains that Turkish-Dutch recent graduates actively recruited by Turkish companies located in Turkey,

> Turkish youngsters with a Dutch background are very much looked for in Turkey. A large share of the European call centers is located in Istanbul. It is extremely handy to have people who speak at least Turkish and Dutch, and often, because of the emphasis the Dutch education system puts on learning languages, a few other languages as well.

Next to the pro-active recruitment policies and attitudes of several of the services-industries, an interest in another country and especially Turkey is a two-way road. Young Turkish-Dutch individuals show an interest in Turkey as well. “We want to explore opportunities. It is becoming more difficult to find a job in the Netherlands. Besides, the climate in the Netherlands is changing. People are becoming harsher. This makes a difference as well.” Another Turkish interviewee notes that, “It is less and less popular to move from Turkey to Europe. Instead, people are more interested in gaining from the growth Turkey is experiencing.” However, turning towards these transnational ties does not have to be permanent, an interviewee notes. Interviewee T2A, “Many call centers are business successes, they refer to a mixture of cultural and economic factors. “We, Turks, are more business-oriented [than Moroccans]. We are real traders.” Interviewee T2A points to the history of the Ottoman Empire, “The success of Turkish businesses is because the Ottoman Empire thrived on trade as well. It is part of our nature.” Inquiring whether second generation Turks permanently emigrate, interviewee T2A says, “that is often very unsure. We might leave for a couple of years and return afterwards. We might meet someone in Turkey and decide to stay there. Or they might shuttle back and forth between both countries. Our options are open.”

Interviewees explain how the Turkish business community plays an important part in maneuvering between the two countries. Transnational social capital manifests itself in one specific set of transnational ties. Not only are kinship communities transnational, business communities evolved over transnational connections as well, bridging the two countries. Upon inquiring whether, indeed, as the news media projects, young, highly educated second generation

migrants prefer to opt for living abroad, and preferably their parents' country of origin. Interviewee T2A, "Turkish young people will go to see what else is around for them. They are on par in terms of education with the native Dutch and have good opportunities in Turkey." Another interviewee explains how this has come about:

> Turks are more entrepreneurial than Moroccans. This development is first and foremost economical. At first, there were small greengrocers and *shoarma*restaurants. Then, the Turkish-Dutch business community developed into retail sellers, often mediating between Turkey and the Netherlands. Now, this has developed to a strong presence in the service sector. The Turkish community has delivered the first captains of industry in the Netherlands.

The Turkish business community often embodies a mediating role between Turkey and the Netherlands. Their activities take place between these two countries, rather than other countries. Knowing of multiple cultures and speaking both languages is clearly seen as an advantage. When inquiring about the reasons Turkish interviewees ascribe to their

On a speculative note, transnational kinship ties can aid the formation of transnational business communities/ relations. Ownership patterns of Turkish companies have high concentrations of family-ownership (Demirtag and Serter 2003). This facet, however, did not come to the fore in the interviews. Furthermore, the Turkish community is, more than other ethnic groups, strongly inward-looking. Surveying indicators as contacts with people from other ethnicities, marriage within/ outside one's ethnic group and use of media, the most recent *Integration reports* found Turks to be most oriented towards their own ethnicity (Central Bureau for Statistics 2008, 2010). This can be facilitated via the opportunities generated by frequent transnational ties. However, as the discussion on political attachment to the Netherlands show, transnational relations do not carry the potential to isolate the Turkish ethnicity from Dutch society.

6.3 Best of both worlds?

This section demonstrated how high political attachment and high transnational ties can go hand in hand. Transnational social capital, in fact, has participatory effects on 'domestic' political attachment. The exit-strategy generates the opportunity to choose between countries and it creates the possibility to pose a credible threat in one country or the other. Yet, not only economic opportunities are decisive for these decisions: loyalty plays a crucial role. It allows second generation Turks to become more (consciously) politically active in the Netherlands. However, contrary to the Moroccan second generation, Turkish-Dutch adolescents feels less 'challenged', as interviewee M2D phrased it, to become active. The divergence between the Moroccan and Turkish communities become even clearer when we consider the underlying mechanism behind political participation. Whereas the Moroccan second generation is triggered by the radical right directly, the Turkish second generation finds emancipatory resources in the transnational communities that are constructed through business ties and reinforced via kinship networks. For they are politically attached to the Netherlands, the availability of an exit-option confers even greater powers onto voice. Before they leave, they first try to change.

As a side-note, one should remark that the results for Turkish migrants are less clear-cut than for the Moroccan second generation. The fact that they do not perceive a challenge as strongly as the Moroccans do in response to the radical right, can indicate as well that rather, the Turkish second generation considers to exit. The interviews for this study have been carried out with highly-educated young Turks. One could thus hypothesize that education-differences can be decisive in the options between 'exit' or 'voice and exit-as-threat'.

Conclusions

This study demonstrates the impact of transnational social capital and political attachment on the responses of migrant communities in the Netherlands to the rise of right-wing radicalism. The project sought to understand whether the rise of right-wing radicalism spurred migrants to (long for) return to their country of origin, whether they felt challenged to become politically active or whether the radical right was of no effect. For that purpose, I operationalized the concepts of transnational social capital and political attachment. Referring to the social resources that transnational networks create and one's perceptions of political involvement in and loyalty to the destination country, I hypothesized a dynamic relation between transnational social capital and political attachment.

Through an analysis of the political behavior of Turkish and Moroccan first and second generation migrants, I conclude that transnational social capital and political attachment are mutually related and co-jointly constituent of the kind of migrants' political behavior during contention. Through the exit-option that transnational social capital is able to provide, it yields a participatory effect for migrants who are highly politically attached to the Netherlands. However, while these migrants indeed use voice rather than exit, it does so in an idiosyncratic way. When raising their voice, they evoke exit. Exit-strategies can be (and are) used as a threat. Those who have little access to transnational social capital but who are politically attached, avail themselves of voice. Those who have low levels of transnational social capital and political attachment, however, do not activate political claim-making or mobilization. Neither do they emigrate, but instead, they become disenfranchised from their destination country. Table 5 summarizes the positions of each group according to the dimensions. I subsequently elaborate on each of these.

Thereafter, I outline the potential implications of these findings, their limitations and suggestions for future studies.

Table 5. Hypotheses findings

Political Attachment	**Transnational Social Capital**	
	High	*Low*
High	Second generation Turkish	Second generation Moroccan
Low		First generation Moroccan First generation Turkish

The first generation Turkish and Moroccan migrants possess low levels of both political attachment and transnational social capital. Transnational ties are primarily vested in kinship communities that cross boundaries, but do not spill over into business communities, rendering it difficult to fully return to one's country of origin. Simultaneously, they feel less challenged to become politically active in the Netherlands. Integration has been structurally hampered since their migration to the Netherlands. This group thereby becomes disenfranchised from, especially, Dutch politics. They become a pendulum-group, moving back and forth to these two countries.

These dynamics are different for the second generation. The second generation Moroccans possesses, contrary to their parents, high levels of political attachment. Transnational social capital is still at a lower end. It is less feasible for this group to return to their country of origin. However, they are challenged and become politically active exactly for that reason. In becoming politically active, they might dwell on their migrant background, but the Moroccan-

Dutch do not pose claims in which they argue to leave. In effect, a lack of exit bestows extraordinary power on the opportunities for voice.

Second generation Turks have access to high levels of transnational social capital and are highly politically attached. Like the Moroccan second generation, they exert to voice. However, their political behavior manifests itself in drawing on an exit-option yet using this opportunity as a threat primarily. By providing an exit-option, transnational ties and a double nationality yields a participatory effect, for it enforces the position of young, highly educated Turkish-Dutch individuals. This study did not identify groups among the sample who had high levels of transnational social capital but low levels of political attachment. This being said, it does not imply that these 'black swans' do not exist, especially for the Turkish second generation.

While contested in public discourse, this study shows how transnational communities and double nationalities can have a participatory effect on political behavior. Furthermore, despite the fact that the radical right creates a contentious situation that questions the position, identity and practices of migrants, second generation migrants become more engaged in politics. Therefore, this study suggests a hitherto unexpected finding for migrant political participation. In addition to being determined by social capital of ethnic communities at the national level, political participation among migrants is very much constituted by the political climate. In general, this study further shows how cost-benefit decision-making is combined with perceptions of social inclusion and belonging. In effect, the second generation of both communities is becoming more active over time not only because they are better educated, but precisely because of their migrant background.

This being said, this study contains several limitations. First, the sample-size is small, evoking problems of generalizability, a matter that could be easily remedied by future, larger-scale studies but that implies for now that observations have to be interpreted carefully.

Second, the measurements of the dimensions have been rough and preliminary. They do not reveal more precisely how much transnational social capital and how much political attachment is required for what kind of behavior. This study can therefore not say anything about factors that change the behavior of migrants, i.e. at which point they move from one 'box' to the other. I recommend future studies to focus on developing more precise indicators and measurements. These should pave the way for a more rigorous understanding of domestic political dynamics following from transnational communities.

Third, while the rise of the radical right has challenged migrant populations, the effects of age, education and urban-rural differences should be studied more precisely to account better for these kinds of structures. Second generation migrants advance because of higher education levels in comparison to the first generation. Consequently, one could argue that this can explain the increase in political participation. Yet while education certainly forms a factor that cannot be underestimated in this process, I argue that the transnational dimension constructs the context of one's choices. As I have demonstrated, Moroccan and Turkish second generation migrants do not act upon the rise of right-wing populism in a similar manner. Whereas the former participates in a plethora of public forums and feels challenged, the other poses especially the threat to leave. A second recommendation to remedy this would consist of between-group comparison, for example through a cross-country comparative study among migrant populations on the political mobilization processes and the role of transnational communities.

Lastly, this study has not touched upon broader theoretical understandings of nationhood and citizenship. It raises questions whether the continuation of transnational ties creates forms of transnational or post-national citizenship. If this is so, what does this kind of citizenship entail? If individuals base their decision to live somewhere primarily on economic opportunities, what are the repercussions for citizenship conceptions? What does a mobile population mean to a national

democracy? What does it imply for international governmental bodies? To what extent do transnational communities have participatory effects and at what point do they tip over into easy ways out? Are residential strategies ultimately a result of global supply and demand?

As a vantage point to future research, this thesis has shown how a country's demography relates to its democracy. It has shown how migrants by the very nature of their transnational communities impact domestic politics. It has shown that political participation is ultimately rooted in loyalty. To rephrase the very beginning of this thesis: if a country's destiny is shaped by its demography, its people's loyalty to its democracy holds its future.

Appendix I: Interview protocol

Introduction

How did you, or your family, arrive in the Netherlands?

What has been your first experience with the Netherlands? (Or, what was your father's / mother's / first experience with the Netherlands?)

Note: I did not use answers to these questions for the data analysis, but they served to get a better understanding of the background of my interviewees and to introduce the topic.

General

Europe was once considered as a highly attractive location to move to by many Moroccans/ Turks. Does this view of Europe as a 'paradise' still hold among Moroccans/ Turks?

(If necessary: Why not? / Why do you? How much do Moroccans/ Turks know about Europe? What stories do Moroccan/ Turkish migrants tell to their families and friends in Morocco/ Turkey?)

Alternatively, is Morocco/ Turkey also considered as the true paradise among Moroccans/ Turks migrants living in the Netherlands?

(If necessary: How does one regard Morocco/ Turks? Are people who did not migrate better off?)

Transnational social capital

What are the chances of getting a job in Morocco/ Turkey with a Dutch diploma? Can this be realized?

Does one see a future for oneself in Morocco/ Turkey?

Does one feel an obligation to return to Morocco/ Turkey? Making an effort for the country?

Regarding burial, where would you been burred?

Can you tell me something on homeownership and savings accounts?

What contacts are maintained the best within your community; e.g. those with relatives or also contacts with friends, acquaintances, former colleagues?

Is one politically engaged or socially involved with Morocco/ Turkey?

Does one frequently discuss the Moroccan/ Turkish political situation in the Netherlands?

Which Moroccan/ Turkish traditions can be adhered to easier/ more difficult in the Netherlands?

With respect to success, can you tell me how success is defined for young Moroccans/ Turkish in the Netherlands? Is this different from what success is for young Turks/ Moroccans in Turkey/ Morocco?

Exit

What are the (first) experiences of Moroccans/ Turks who return to Morocco/ Turksy, upon their arrival in Morocco/ Turkey?

What are the most recurring reasons for considering a permanent return to Morocco/ Turkey?

Alternatively, why would he (or she) choose for a permanent stay in the Netherlands?

Do you think there is any discrepancy in reasons considering returning to one's country of origin between Moroccans and Turks?

Can you describe your ideal? And how can this be achieved?

Exit, specifically for Moroccan interviewees:

Statistics demonstrate multiple waves of return migration at the 1980's and 1990's among Moroccans. How you can you explain this pattern?

Nevertheless, the number of return migration among Moroccans is lowest among all migrants in Europe? How can you explain this?

How do you see the future for migrants in the Netherlands?

Political attachment

On November 2, 2004, Theo van Gogh was assassinated. How did you experience that day?

How important were the elections of last summer compared to other elections?

How is the current cabinet perceived in the Moroccan/ Turkish community?

How do you evaluate interest groups, like your own organization and those of colleagues? Should there be a migrant party?

Representation of migrants in politics is quickly advancing. Nonetheless, this is still at a low in numerous municipalities, several provinces, the first chamber and the cabinet. What should migrants and Muslims do to be better involved in Dutch politics?

Should the Dutch government play a role?

The Moroccan government sends imams and teachers to the Netherlands, provides for Arabic lessons and education in the Moroccan culture for Moroccan children. How do you perceive the role of the Moroccan government in integration of Moroccans in the Netherlands?

There are many differences in political participation between ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. What are the main causes according to you?

Current migration policies make it increasingly difficult to settle in the Netherlands. And the current policies aim for better integration of migrants. How do you perceive these changes?

To what extent do Moroccans/ Turks feel Dutch? To what extent do they feel Moroccan/ Turkish?

Political activities and integration

How do you perceive the political involvement of among Moroccans/ Turks?

How do you describe the reactions to the rise of right-wing populism by Muslim- and migrant population groups?

Is the rise of right-wing populism mentioned as a reason to return to one's country of origin? Are Dutch politics often discussed in daily life? Has this changed recently?

Are more political activities organized since the rise of Wilders' Party for Freedom? Does the Moroccan community feel challenged?

Example of an organization-specific question:

I read the letter of the National Council on Minorities to the prime minister following his remark to 'return the Netherlands to the Dutch!' You call upon him and his cabinet to signal that ethnic minorities are full-fledged Dutch citizens. What have been the responses to this letter?

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