The Warlord Factor in Peace Enforcement Operations: in Search of Strategy. Lessons from Somalia

By
Irene Vinogradova

Submitted to
Central European University
Department of International Relations and European Studies

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Supervisor: Professor Erin Kristin Jenne

Word Count:
14,543

Budapest, Hungary
2011

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ABSTRACT

As intended to resolve the most difficult for regulation violent conflicts, peace enforcement operations often deal with warlordism-complicated conflicts. For performing effectively in such conditions, interveners have to manage the warlords through development of appropriate strategy. I argue that for this end the proper analysis of each principal actor's goals he pursues while spoiling the peace process is needed, as well as assessment of their importance for him to define the extent of his commitment to their achievement. It means that the strategy should consist of different combinations of various tactics (both military and non-military) tailored to a particular warlord. The case-study of two peace enforcement operation in Somalia suggests the following generalization that for short-term success in managing warlords the strategy should contain combination of deterrence tactics, diplomatic efforts to communicate it without conducting actual military actions, and legitimization of some warlords while marginalizing less important, however, for having a longer effect the civil society institutions should be empowered also to create a sort of 'checks and balances' system for gradual marginalization of the rest warlords and resurrection of normalcy.

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Introduction

Conflicts have been accompanied the development of humankind throughout the history, but only after two world wars did it become clear that conflict prevention or, at least, regulation should be regarded as the common goal for all. In the aftermath of World War II only the means for inter-state conflict management were developed. However, civil wars had become ever more common (according to Wiseman's data, from 1945 to 1976, 85% of conflicts were on the territory of one state only and were internally oriented[1]), meanwhile, the tools for management of intra-state conflicts were largely absent. Consequently, the newly created international institutions, for example, the UN, were preoccupied with the elaboration of such tools.

Peace enforcement operations - armed interventions pursuant to the UN mandate authorizing the coercive use of military power to compel compliance with UN sanctions or resolutions[2] - became one such tool, implemented in cases of violent conflicts especially difficult to regulate, when belligerent parties cannot agree on the third party intervention and are also unable or unwilling to resolve the conflict on their own either. In such conditions heavily armed contingent under the auspices of some international organization is intended to implement all the necessary measures to stop the violence, even at the expense of limitation of the use of force or impartiality, and presence of these two reservations distinguishes peace enforcement operations from peacekeeping[3]. Peace enforcement operations often considered effective because it ends violence relatively quickly (from week to few months); however, it does not work in all cases.

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[1] H. Wiseman. 1987. 'The United Nations and International Peacekeeping: A comparative Analysis' in *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security,* Martinus Nijnoff, 265

[2] Peter Viggo Jakobsen. National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War? *Journal of peace research,* Vol.33, №2б. 205

[3] Previously one of the remarkable and visible differences was the mandate containing reference to the authorization of mission's actions under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, however, the United Nations tries to diminish it and at the moment peacekeeping operations have this reference in the mandate as well. Nevertheless, on the operational level the difference still exists, for example, in the rules of engagement.

There are many factors contributing to the success/failure of peace enforcement operations. For instance, the number of soldiers in the contingent in relation to the size of belligerents' troops, amount of resources available for conducting an operation, causes of conflict, external actors involved, sanctions, loyalty of military staff, composition of contingent, cooperation with INGOs and local NGOs have been shown to impact the effectiveness of such interventions. However, the most important determinant of success is the extent to which the intervention can counteract the drivers of the conflict on the ground.

Warlordism is one of the key factors that prolongs conflict and that prevents successful peace enforcement. This is because warlords profit from instability and conflict, and they therefore attempt to maintain the state of war, partly by spoiling efforts to achieve conflict resolution. Consequently, most peace enforcement missions are only effective insofar as they succeed in managing warlordism in the conflict.

Literature review

Peace enforcement operations

Peace enforcement operations were developed upon the introduction of this concept by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in the report of the UN Secretary-General "Agenda for peace" (1992), implicitly distinguishing them from more traditional peace-keeping operations. Paragraph 44 of the 1992 *Agenda* states that peace enforcement is intended to "respond to outright aggression, imminent or actual" – the task which "exceeds the mission of peacekeeping". To this end, the personnel of the peace mission contingent should be "more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces" in order to be able to complete the mandate, however, as well as peacekeeping it is "under the command of the Secretary-General" and could be authorized

only by the Security Council of the United Nations organization[4]. Despite its apparently recent origins, however, the practice of peace enforcement operations can be traced back to 1950 (UN intervention into the Korean War is widely recognized by most scholars as the first example)[5].

In general, according to the practice of peace enforcement operations, they represent forcible military interventions by one or more state into a third country with the express objective of maintaining or restoring international, regional or local peace and security by ending violent conflict within that country.[6] Their conduct entails the physical interposition of armed forces to separate ongoing combatants to create a cease-fire that does not exist.[7] However, peace enforcement could also presuppose collective measures, ranging from diplomatic boycott through economic pressure to military sanctions, to enforce the peace[8], although for the purpose of this research the first meaning will be used.

As to the similarity and differences of peace enforcement operations with the pre-existent military operations, usually it is compared with full-fledged enforcement and peacekeeping[9]. There are three main parameters according to which they could be distinguished: consent, use of force and partiality. The peacekeeping operation requires the consent of the belligerents, who had already signed a cease-fire agreement, for being deployed, impartiality in the

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[4] An Agenda for Peace, A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 1992, http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html (Accessed June 1, 2011)

[5] Boulden, J. 2001. Peace enforcement: the United Nations experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia. Praeger Publishers.12; Thakur, R. From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The UN Operation in Somalia, *The Journal of Modern African Studies* (1994), 32: 388; Kunz, J.L. Legality of the Security Council Resolutions of June 25 and 27, 1950, *The American Journal of International Law,* Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jan., 1951), 137

[6] Coleman K.P. 2006. *International Organizations and Peace Enforcement. The Politics of International Legitimacy.* Cambridge. 4

[7] Snow, D.M. February 1993. *Peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement: the U.S. role in the new international order.* Final report. U.S. Army War College. 7

[8] Osman, M.A. 2002. *The United Nations and peace enforcement : wars, terrorism and democracy.* Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 32

[9] For comparison with other types of operations see Mockaitis, T.R. *From Counterinsurgency to Peace Enforcement: New Names for Old Games,* http://www.heer.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/01_11pop_03_mock.pdf (Accessed June 1, 2011); Butler M.J. 2009. *International conflict management: an introduction.* Routledge.

conduct of operation and usage of force only for self-defense. Its main task has to do more than with separation of warring parties by playing the role of a buffer than with installation In comparison with it, peace enforcement is more independent, because the consent of the parties is not necessary although desirable precondition of launching of such operation, which is also authorized to use force beyond self-defense, however, it demands impartiality as well. As to the enforcement, it does require neither consent of the parties, nor impartiality, plus, the full use of force is authorized.[10]

Both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations are authorized by the United Nations Security Council through the adoption of the resolution containing its mandate, but the former one considered to be the tool for conflict management described in the Chapter VI of the UN Charter (peaceful settlement of disputes), meanwhile the latter is referred to as the one from the Chapter VII (actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression). However, it is no longer the case, because the UN now uses the reference to the Chapter VII of the UN Charter for peacekeeping operations as well to make them more flexible because the conflictual environment could change dramatically in any period, and it gives peacekeepers more freedom for action, thus, generally speaking, the difference between these two types of operations diminished.[11] Although for the purpose of my research peace enforcement is more appropriate taking into account the violent character of warlord's action, its results also could be applied to peacekeeping operations.

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[10] Boulden, J. 2001. *Peace enforcement: the United Nations experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia*. Praeger Publishers. 3

[11] McDonald, G. 2001. Peace enforcement: the Middle ground. PhD dissertation. Geneva University, http://www.unige.ch/cyberdocuments/theses2001/McDonaldG/these.html(Accessed June 1, 2011)

Effective peace enforcement: factors of success

Although the notion of efficacy of peace enforcement operations in general has not been extensively-developed in the literature except the piece written by Goodwin[12], where he explains how one should measure success through the assessment of degree to which law, order, public safety and services were restored as political, economic and social stability were re-instituted, the factors of success were more broadly analyzed. For example, Alberts and Hayes[13] defined the following ones: force structure appropriate for the mission (right composition of military and civil personnel, depending on the prescribed mandate), personnel with appropriate experience and training, intelligence about the situation and potential adversaries which presupposes the presence of experts in the conflict and country (-es) politics and intelligence service representatives, clear mandate, capacity for planning and coordination, logistics support, developed communications systems (especially crucial in case of multilateral operations), and effective capability for civil-military relationships between peace enforcers, belligerents and victims of the conflict. As one of the most crucial ones they distinguished the quality of Control and Command (C2), including personnel arrangements, procedures, systems, and facilities.

Jaïr van der Lijn identifies a few more factors of success: timely deployment, sufficiently long duration, sense of security of the parties that peace enforcers have enough capability to protect any of the belligerent parties (needed for the facilitation of disarmament process), and internal and external coordination (within operational structure of command, institution conducting operation and respective governments as well as with other institutions).[14] AS to

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[12] Goodwin, W.P. 1995. Measures of effectiveness: the transition from peace-enforcement to peacekeeping. Final Report. Naval War College.

[13] Alberts, Hayes, *Command arrangements for peace operations*. CCRP: Publication Series, www.dodccrp.org/files/**Alberts_**Arrangements.pdf (Accessed June 1, 2011)

[14] Van der Lijn, J. "If only There Were a Blueprint! Factors for Success and Failure of UN Peace-Building Operations", http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2009/20090218_joup_lijn3.pdf (Accessed June 1, 2011)

the last factor, in his "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali warned that a lack of political will, and following from this the lack of finances at the United Nations to implement the tasks assigned to it, is 'dangerous'[15], approving the importance of internal and external coordination factor of peace enforcement operation.

Management of warlords as factor of success of peace enforcement operation

However, warlordism has not been dealt with systematically in the literature as a key conflict dynamic that must be managed before peace enforcement can succeed.-this, in spite of the fact that it was a key determinant for success of peace enforcement operations throughout the post-WWII period. In the 18 missions from 1950 to 2006,[16] warlords were active in 9, having a significant negative impact on their effectiveness. Nevertheless, there is literature, devoted to different aspects of warlordism that could help in understanding this phenomenon and, consequently, assist in identifying ways of eliminating or at least diminishing its influence on the outcome of peace operation. Some of the works on the topic attempt to classify warlords[17] , or attempt to locate groups of factors that drive their behavior. For example, William Reno looks at warlords as exclusively pragmatic actors[18]; other authors tend to search for either ideological base in warlord's actions or at least benefits such base could bring, like new opportunists or legitimized position in the society.[19] Moreover, there are few works regarding strategies of dealing with warlords, for example Lezhnev's piece

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[15] Secretary-General, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations, UN doc. A/50/60 - S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/080/95/PDF/N9508095.pdf?OpenElement (Accessed June 1, 2011)

[16] Coleman K.P. 2006. I*nternational Organizations and Peace Enforcement. The Politics of International Legitimacy*. Cambridge. 8

[17] Giustozzy. A. *Respectable Warlords? The Politics of State-Building in Post-Taliban Afghanistan*, Development Research Centre LSE, Working Paper №33 (September 2003)

[18] Reno, W. *Mafia troubles, warlord crises* from Mark R. Beissinger, Crawford Young. 2002. *Beyond state crisis?: postcolonial Africa and post-Soviet Eurasia in comparative perspective.* Woodrow Wilson Central Press

[19] Weinstein, J.M. 2007. *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. Cambridge

"Crafting warlords: strategies to deal with warlords in collapsing states." However, it tackles the issue outside of conflict context and the book in general is warlords-centered, focusing more on the dynamics of warlordism and less of their impact on peace operations and potential to change the outcome of missions. Another work touching upon the same issue is "Spoiler problems in peace processes" written by Stedman. It addresses the behavior of spoilers – leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.[20] It therefore addresses the driving factors of warlord actions and outlines possible strategies for dealing with them according to spoiler's motivation. However, the phenomenon of spoilers is wider than that of warlords. Consequently, the appropriateness and efficacy of the suggested strategies should be tailored to the specificities of peace enforcement operations. Thus, the assessment of the role of warlords in peace enforcement operations and techniques of dealing with them represents a gap that will constitute my research question.

Research question and importance

Taking into account the gap in the existing literature, my research project will address the following question: "What is the impact of warlords on the success/failure of peace enforcement operation? Which strategies diminish their influence and contribute to the success of the overall operation?" These questions will be answered by assessment of strategies implemented by the contingent of UNITAF and UNOSOM II peace enforcement operations, because these two cases represent different ways of warlord's treatment which most probably became the key of their outcomes (UNITAF is considered to be successful and

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[20] Stedman, S.J., Spoiler Problems in Peace processes. *International Security,* Vol. 22, №2 (Fall 1997), 5

UNOSOM II is widely viewed as a failure).[21] The results of the research will contribute to the practice of conduct of peace enforcement operations in the context of warlordism identifying strategies that have shown to facilitate successful peace enforcement in cases of violent conflict.

Argument

In the 18 missions from 1950 to 2006,[22] warlords were active in 9 either as principal (Liberia, Tajikistan, Sierra Leone) or as subsidiary (for instance, Bosnia) actors, having a significant negative impact on their effectiveness through spoiling of peace efforts in general by not complying with signed agreements and demands of international community, or contributing to the instability of situation by organization of mass-scale sporadic fights. In warlordism-complicated conflicts peace enforcement operations could be effective insofar as they succeed in managing warlords. Consequently, by usage of appropriate strategy their influence could be diminished or even overcome, thus, contributing to the establishment of cease-fire and secure environment in the troubled country – the main task for peace enforcement operation.

In the process of research I identified six tactics which could be used for creation of such strategy: the usage of deterrence effect for threatening warlords and manipulating their behavior, coercive measures, marginalization of warlord, empowerment of civil society institutions and structures, legitimization of warlords for making them responsible for their country and the most widely used component – diplomatic efforts. For being effective, the strategy should combine both military and non-military components and should be developed

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[21] Cousens, E.M., Kumar, C., Wermester, K. 2001. *Peacebuilding as politics: cultivating peace in fragile societies*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. 65; Nalbandov, R. 2009. *Foreign interventions in ethnic conflicts*. Ashgate Publishing Limited.125; Rutherford, K.. 2008. *Humanitarianism under fire: the US and UN intervention in Somalia*, Kumarian Press. 122

[22] Coleman K.P. 2006. In*ternational Organizations and Peace Enforcement. The Politics of International Legitimacy*. Cambridge. 8

in relation to the warlord's personality, in particular, his aims (for instance, economic gains, power or glory) and extent to which he wants to achieve them (could be limited, total or greedy type of spoiler).

The analysis of case-studies suggests that the most effective strategy for short-term management of warlords contains such components as deterrence, diplomatic efforts and legitimization of warlords; however, it works only if peace enforcers showed considerable qualitative and quantitative superiority in terms of military forces, created a respected image and expressed impartiality in the duration of operation. For having more long-term effect, civilian population should be brought in the sphere of high politics through involving it into organization of local power structures which will enable civilians to exercise some sort of control over warlords' actions, but for this outcome peace enforcers should maintain secure environment and keep the right balance between empowerment of warlords and local population for a long period of time to have a socialization effect. Otherwise the results could be easily nullified after peace enforcers' withdrawal.

Research and design

As to the methodological approach, the process-tracing method of George[23] is the most suitable for the qualitative research I undertake as it allows to draw generalizations from the analysis of small number of cases. Moreover, I will use a comparative approach for analysis of these cases, specifically, the method of differences, and take two examples of peace enforcement operations with more or less similar value of controlled variables like the clearness of mandate, usage of force, amount of available resources, intervener, and different

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[23] George, A.L.,Bennett, A.. 2004. *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences.* Belfer Center for Science and International Affaires

outcome[24]. Through comparison of two similar cases using the process-tracing technique to identify causal pathway between the independent and dependent variables in a single case over time, I intend to identify the impact of different strategies of combating warlordism on the success of the mission itself. The argument is that effective strategies for dealing with warlords in the context of conflict resolution processes are critical to the success of such missions, particularly at the stage of military operations. Causal mechanism-oriented process-tracing is the most appropriate technique for the purpose of my research as it allows me to identify the causal chain which links dependent and independent variables, and test the causal mechanisms found during research process on specific case study (-ies). Consequently, this technique will allow me to determine the extent to which the actions of UNITAF and UNOSOM II operations' personnel aimed at neutralizing Somali warlords played a vital role in the outcome of peace enforcement operation.

Example of two UN peace enforcement operations in Somalia conducted one after another (first in 1992-1993, and second in 1993-1995) by the USA seems to be the most appropriate comparative case design for such an enterprise because most contextual variables mentioned above are more-or-less constant between the two cases; in contrast, the outcome or dependent variable (level of success) differs between the two cases, as does the key independent variable (strategy of coping with the warlords). If to take the completion of the mandate as a criterion of success of the operation, the first peace enforcement operation in Somalia, UNITAF, could be considered effective, meanwhile the second one, UNOSOM II, was not completed and therefore effectively failed. Consequently, through the comparative analysis of selected cases I will be able to determine the causal relations between the success of peace enforcement operation and warlord's treatment strategy and assess the extent to which these different

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[24] Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. *Guide to methods for students of political science.* Cornell University; Ragin, Charles C. 1987. *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies.* Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press.

strategies adopted in the two missions were critical to this variable level of success between the two missions.

Thesis outline

The thesis consists of three chapters: one theoretical chapter and two case-studies. The first chapter contains description of warlord and his characteristics, motivation behind the attempts to spoil peace process enforced by special mission, and possible strategies of dealing with warlords intended to eliminate or at least decrease their influence on the course of operation. The following two chapters represent investigation of such strategies and possible errors in their implementation in order to learn the lessons and avoid making the same mistakes, plus, evaluate their importance for the overall outcome of each operation, namely, UNITAF and UNOSOM II. The research is based on two peace enforcement operations conducted in Somalia, the case of success and the case of failure.

Chapter I. The warlord factor in peace enforcement operations: with whom to deal and how

This chapter represents the theoretical framework through which case studies will be analyzed. First of all, the phenomenon of warlordism will be defined in order to identify the warlords that were active in the both case studies. In the course of evaluation, the motivation of the Somali warlords for spoiling peace initiatives in the two cases will be analyzed, as will the strategies used by the interveners for coping with these obstacles to peace. The aim is to identify the strategy or set of strategies that is likely to be most effective in coping with these barriers to successful conflict management.

1.1. Definition of warlord

There are several scholars who have offered definition of warlordism and, consequently, warlords; however, none has been adopted as the standard in the literature. Most of these contain the broad criterion of being a leader of a private army[25] or being able to control territory and exploit its resources while keeping weak central authority at bay[26]. I review these definitional criteria in order to look at the issue from various perspectives because authors analyzing warlords had different stances. Moreover, I dwell on to some criteria for distinguishing warlords from insurgents or mafia, actors with generally similar characteristics.

One of the most well-known scholars of warlords is William Reno, the author of considerable scholarship on this topic. He defines **warlords** *as leaders of predatory armed groups that seek power for their personal enrichment without regard for the broader interests*

[25] Giustozzy. A. *Respectable Warlords? The Politics of State-Building in Post-Taliban Afghanistan*, Development Research Centre LSE, Working Paper №33 (September 2003), 2
[26] Duffield, Mark. 'Post-modern conflict: Warlords, post-adjustment states and private protection', *Civil Wars,* 1: 1 (1998), 81

of any significant community[27]. Reno considers warlords as political economy actors with non-state form of political authority operating in the context of conflict and using military activity predominantly for financial purposes like extraction and sale of natural resources or seizing lootable goods and gaining more status or power over other people. He states that they function like syndicates in the sense of pursuing the private interests of members and are not organized specifically to provide public goods from which individuals cannot be excluded.[28] However, according to one of his latest pieces, "Illicit markets, violence, warlords, and governance: West African cases", this does not mean that warlords do not offer public goods for attracting supporters; moreover, some warlords use this tool for gaining legitimacy in post-conflict environments.

Giustozzi considers such behavior as a feature of a sophisticated type of warlords. He explains that the more sophisticated type of warlord may develop some form of partial legitimacy and transform his dominion into a 'protostate', that is a structure featuring some sort of civilian administration and providing at least some services, such as education, policing, electricity and other goods, such as public transport. The least sophisticated warlords, especially in remote and isolated areas, may never go beyond purely military organizations, living off the region they control by extracting rents and providing the local inhabitants with little in exchange, except possibly security from competing warlords and bandits[29].

Mark Duffield, who is also a proponent of theory according to which warlords represent economic actors, defines **warlordism** *as the appearance of local strongmen able to control an area and exploit its resources while, at the same time, keeping a weak central authority at*

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[27]Reno, William. Illicit markets, violence, warlords, and governance: West African cases. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, Volume 52, Number 3 (2009), 313

[28] Reno, William. *Mafia troubles, warlord crises* from Mark R. Beissinger, Crawford Young. 2002. *Beyond state crisis?: postcolonial Africa and post-Soviet Eurasia in comparative perspective.* Woodrow Wilson Central Press, 106

[29] Giustozzy. A. *Respectable Warlords? The Politics of State-Building in Post-Taliban Afghanistan*, Development Research Centre LSE, Working Paper №33 (September 2003), 2

bay[30]--this corresponds to Giustozzi's sophisticated type of warlord. In his work, "Post-modern conflict: warlords, post-adjustment states and private protection," the author regards warlords as actors who "think globally, but act locally"[31] staying extra-legal and forming in some cases not only a shadow economy, but a 'state within state' while using globalization processes for personal enrichment through international illegal trade.

Nevertheless, there are authors, who approach the question of defining warlord in a more complex way, for example, Lezhnev employs the following definition:

Warlords are defined here as being driven overwhelmingly by personal power, glory, and monetary gain; are ready to sacrifice property, land and thousands of lives through brutal means for that power; have low levels of education, some military experience, and are intensely dissatisfied with their societal position; and have high levels of organizational capacity in terms of both human and natural resources[32].

It shows the whole complex of motivation of warlord's actions (not only monetary gain, but also power and glory) and the background they usually have which makes them likely to act in a way described above. This definition contains some characteristics of warlords, and Marten's research adds only two more of them: warlords' actions are based on self-interest, not ideology, they are quite pragmatic actors in this respect, and the source of their authority is charisma bestowing favors and recognition of supporters and patronage ties to the followers which help warlords to maintain militias[33].

The research of John Macinlay adds to this general picture of warlordism only minor details concerning differences between warlords and mafia and insurgents. If to compare warlordism and the way mafia operates, the latter usually enjoys the freedom to move guaranteed by the society where the members of mafia group are living as citizens;

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[30]Duffield, Mark. 'Post-modern conflict: Warlords, post-adjustment states and private protection', *Civil Wars,* 1: 1 (1998), 81

[31] Ibid. 81

[32] Lezhnev, Sasha. 2005. *Crafting peace. Strategies to deal with warlords in collapsing states*. Lexington books. 73

[33] Marten, K. 2006. Warlordism in comparative perspective. *International security*, Vol.31, №3. 48

meanwhile, warlords have to rely on their military capacity to do the same; however, their trading techniques are quite similar. As to insurgents, they have political agenda, therefore, population is an important resource for them, and warlords have no other purpose apart from economic profit, consequently, they treat population 'in a rapine and predatory manner'. Nevertheless, the way they function in terms of usage of military actions is similar[34].

To sum up, warlords have few basic characteristics that distinguish them from other actors: the leadership in military unit – militia, position 'beyond law' due to the context of conflict and opposition to the central authority (mainly because of economic reasons), prevailing economic interests, realization of which is reached through territorial acquisition, which do not exclude other major interests like desire of personal power and glory, and charismatic character of authority supported by maintenance of follower's loyalty through financial means, including so called booty futures[35] This phenomenon is deeply rooted into the clan and tribal society due to the weakness of the central government and adjustment to the division of society.

1.2. Warlord's motivation to spoil peace efforts and methods of the realization of this plan

The main assumption is that warlords are more interested in war than in peace due to all the benefits that the conflict environment brings to them, for instance, the ability to be in control of a 'personal army', change of societal position, access to the resources through looting mechanisms, gaining control over resource-reach territory, the possibility of becoming well-known not only among local population, but also internationally in case of violent actions against peace mission representatives because of the high possibility of media

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[34] Macinlay, John. "Defining warlords" in *Peacekeeping and conflict resolution* edited by Tom Woodhouse, Oliver Ramsbotham, Frank Cass, 48-63, Publishers. 2000.
[35] Booty futures are usually referred to as sales of future resource exploitation rights to international companies

coverage. I will explain below in detail the warlord motivation for interrupting the peace process and possible ways how this could be done.

One of the most important driving factors of warlords' behavior is monetary gain, because in the context of conflict there is a 'window of opportunity' for people of low societal position, lack of education, and some military experience to improve their status and financial state through organization of paramilitary group involved in looting, human trafficking and the fight for resource-rich territory. The conflict environment benefits them, while peace processes contributes to the opposite by prohibiting booty, conducting disarmament and establishing control over the territory to pass it to the legitimate government – the actions which deprive warlords of the source of income and personal power, the second important motivating factor, by limiting their ability to attract and maintain supporters.

The desire of warlords to hamper peace process may be intensified by their fear of loosing the new-acquired superior role because their personal power is based on warlords' ability to provide followers with what they need, i.e. financial resources, which they are better able to provide in the context of conflict accompanied with lack of order than in a normally functioning state with a permanent bureaucracy and judicial system. In spite of the fact that for warlords there is a possibility to enter the transitional government due to the fact that they exercise control over some territory (concession from the side of humanitarian intervenors) or possess some sort of legitimacy, they may not become part of the post-conflict establishment, or they may lose power in democratic elections as they are less able to operate their clientelistic networks in a post-conflict state.

The third most important driving factor contributing to incentives to spoil peace process is the desire to become well-known or famous. One of the ways to achieve glory is to become a 'national savior' in the course of a violent civil war. Even when external actors intervene to

create peace, this involvement usually involves the use of force, which can be represented by local leaders as a foreign invasion that must be opposed.

How do they turn the local population against the peace enforcers? This could be done through the provocation of clashes involving atrocities among civilians to spoil the image of peace mission and thus gain more supporters who will not allow peace enforcement operation to accomplish its goals (the case of Somalia in 1993, Aidid's tactics). A second tactic is to attack the peace mission contingent to force them to leave the country (used in Rwanda and Afghanistan) which could be used as a part of the aforementioned strategy of spoiling the reputation of the peace enforcers. A third, less sophisticated strategy which does not officially contrapose warlords and peace enforcers, consists of non-obedience to the UN resolutions and breaches of negotiated cease-fire agreements and other accords and presupposes fighting on the ground with the governmental forces or troops belonging to other warlords.

Diagnosis of the motivation behind warlord's behavior is a very important step in designing a strategy for neutralizing the warlord and thus boosting the efficacy of peace enforcement operations. The analysis of methods of spoiling the peace process could be helpful in diagnosing the driving factors which should be addressed for making warlords more cooperative.

1.3. Strategies of dealing with warlords

The authors addressing this issue distinguish a number of different, even contradictory strategies varying from the cooperative strategy characterized by the usage of legitimization and empowerment of warlords to coercive measures and deterrence. In general, they could be divided into two groups: non-military and military. The former contains such tactics as legitimization and delegation of authority to the warlords as the ones possessing power, marginalization, diplomatic efforts and empowerment of civil society institutions. As to the

latter, it refers to deterrence effect and coercive measures. The composition of few tactics forms the overall strategy of managing the warlord factor. Below I will explain briefly each tactics, its pros and cons.

Tactics of legitimization and delegation of authority to the warlords is relatively easy for implementation and it could bring cease-fire and more or less secure state relatively quickly, because these actors already possess power and exercise control over the country or region of the country through usage of their military capacities, bribery or some other tools. Consequently, they need only international recognition which will contribute to their popularization within the state, and support in the restoration of governmental institutions. However, for this end there should be consent among the warlords about their spheres of responsibility and amount of power they will have in newly constituted hierarchy, otherwise the rivalry will bring all the efforts to naught. This tactics carries with it two significant risks. The first is that it deals with the warlord (-s) only, and does not necessarily account for the disarmament and reintegration of the militias loyal to a particular warlord.[36] Second, it has the potential of furthering the culture of warlordism, and exclusion of other elements of civil society, such as traditional clan or tribal chiefs, religious leaders, professional groups such as doctors and teachers, the merchant class, and women's groups.[37]

Marginalization tactics implies both absence of cooperation between peace enforcers and warlords (if implemented from the beginning of operation) and deprivation of warlord from being active in political and economic activity (as punishment tactics). Used in the first meaning, it could lead to misunderstandings about such matters as ground rules affecting security (including disarmament efforts), security incidents, and rumors, thus, increasing the

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[36] Shoffner, Wilson. 2008. Afghanistan: Moving Beyond Warlordism. Report, Naval War College. 12

[37] Natsios, A.S. 1996. Commander's Guidance: A Challenge of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies. *Parameters*, Summer 1996, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/96summer/natsios.htm (Accessed June 1, 2011)

threat to the peace contingent and humanitarian workers.[38] However, this disadvantage could be overcome in case of close cooperation with local population or high qualification of intelligence forces. If used as punishment technique, it is more fruitful, because warlords are pragmatic actors who pursue self-interest; thus, they are likely to comply with demands of international community when deprived of their basis of support or aim they attempt to achieve.

Coercive measures tactics is intended mostly to unseat certain intransigent warlords hampering the peace process by violent actions, thus, preventing peace enforcement operation from being effective. It involves robust measures such as particular kinds of targeted sanctions, international tribunals, specialized disarmament programs, and/or military force to directly minimize the power of warlords. [39] As to the last option, it usually entails physical elimination of target object, but there is a risk of spoiling the image of peace mission by such actions, as well as in case of few unsuccessful attempts, especially if they involved victims among civilian population.

The next strategy uses deterrence effect for dealing with warlords. It works in a following way: warlords are deterred if they do not wish to suffer a great damage as a result of an aggressive action (deterrence by punishment) due to rationality of their behavior. [40] Deterrence effect is based on fear, and in the context of conflict it could be overcome through numerical tests of military capacity of deterrent and its public defeat by any party. Plus, in peace enforcement operation it could mean constant fights like in Afghanistan, which demands human and financial resources, creates an image of enemy, not a savior, and could be hardly called effective. Consequently, for this tactics to be successful it should not only

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[38] Ibid.

[39] Lezhnev, S. 2005. Crafting peace. Strategies to deal with warlords in collapsing states. Lexington books. xii

[40] Keel, R. 2005. Rational Choice and Deterrence Theory. Sociology of deviant behavior, http://www.umsl.edu/~keelr/200/ratchoc.html (Accessed in June 1, 2011)

show the superiority of peace enforcement troops, but also effectively communicate it to all potential challengers.

Empowerment of civil society institutions tactics is aimed at weakening of warlords' control over the country through creation, maintenance and strengthening of local authorities, for instance, regional committees, councils, religious organizations. It presupposes whittling away warlords' authority step-by-step, through specialized economic development programs, focused reintegration schemes, and democratization policies.[41] However, its implementation demands more or less secure environment; consequently, it is usually a supplementary tactics.

Diplomatic tactics entails implementation of various negotiation techniques, usually tailored to a particular warlord. It proved to be effective, when backed up by some military tactics, as warlords are violent actors by nature, albeit pragmatic.

Combination of different tactics constitutes overall strategy of dealing with warlords, which should take into account the motivation of warlord to spoil peace efforts and, thus, grasp the goal he pursues, and the extent to which the achievement of the aim is important for him, how far he could go to complete it. According to Stedman[42], there are three main types of spoilers classified due to their perseverance in pursuing main goal: limited, total and greedy. At the one end of the spectrum are limited spoilers ready for negotiations for achievement of the aim, at the other – total spoilers whose goals are not subject to change, the greedy spoiler lies between them, because his goals expand or contract based on calculations of cost and risk.[43] The following negotiations techniques could be proceeded for spoiler's management: inducement technique (positive measures to address the grievances of factions who obstruct peace), socialization (combination of 'carrots and sticks' for ensuring the acceptable behavior of parties committed to peace) and coercion (variations include 'departing train' technique assuring the illegitimately acting spoiler that the peace process will

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[41] Lezhnev, S. 2005. Crafting peace. Strategies to deal with warlords in collapsing states. Lexington books. xii
[42] Stedman, S.J., Spoiler Problems in Peace processes. *International Security,* Vol. 22, №2 (Fall 1997), 10
[43] Ibid, 10-11

go irrevocably forward, regardless of whether the spoiler joins or not, and ''withdrawal' technique threatening the spoiler interested in international presence to withdraw international support and peace contingent). However, the technique, as well as the general strategy, should match the type of spoiler to contribute to the success of peace enforcement operation, otherwise inappropriate accommodation could lead to the exacerbation of problems caused by warlords.

The application of the aforementioned strategies could be tracked in case of two Somali peace enforcement operations in course of which intervenors had to try different ways of dealing with warlords to facilitate peace process. Consequently, I will assess these attempts to find out the conditions where strategies worked, some mistakes in their implementation and possible pitfalls. However, first I will give a context of these operations by description of the character of the environment in which peace enforcers had to operate.

Chapter II. Lessons of Somalia: UNITAF - the story of success?

2.1. Background information on pre-operation environment

Somalia experienced three military interventions in the 1990-s, the period when Siad Barre, governor of the country since 1969, was forced to flee by representatives of the opposition in the course of civil war which lasted from 1989 to 1991. Insurgent movement United Somali Congress overthrown Siad Barre and one of its leaders, Muhammad Ali Mahdi, was chosen as an interim president by one of the factions (29 January 1991), meanwhile, the rival faction with General Mohamed Farah Aidid did not recognize this move. At the third congress of UNC in Mogadishu in July 1991 it elects General Aidid as its chairman. Consequently, in November they start fighting for the capital, Mogadishu, which in the end was divided between them (Aidid occupied southern part with airport and port, meanwhile Mahdi – the northern) and in spite of further ceasefire agreements, throughout the whole period of UN operations in Somalia they continued to compete for the leadership in the country. This rivalry was exacerbated by the fact that in general warlords had either pro-Mahdi orientation or pro-Aidid or in rare cases – pro-Barre (Morgan's faction, for example), consequently, practically the whole country was involved in this competition. The absence of legitimate successor and lawless environment which has been forming since late 80-s due to disappointment by the government and insurgent political factions formation contributed to the emergence of warlords competing for survival and enrichment along clan and sub-clan

lines[44]. After the *coup d'état* former rebels had to find another mission, and most of them transformed into warlords and their militias. The famine of 1992 further exacerbated the situation triggering inter-clan competition for food resources.

The international community formed a humanitarian mission in Somalia through UN special organs and NGOs to cope with the civilian crisis; however, the aid delivery was mostly looted and did not reach its intended recipients. This fact forced the Security Council to take measures to secure humanitarian aid delivery, and Secretary-General through his envoys persuaded the main warlords (leaders of so-called 'political factions' – organized paramilitary groups), religious leaders[45] and elders[46] to agree on a presence of unarmed observers (July 1992) to facilitate the delivery of aid. Nevertheless, the warlords breached the agreement and in November urged UNOSOM personnel to leave Somalia or otherwise be killed. Since the contingent did not comply with warlord's demands, it was attacked and soon withdrew. In the wake of this withdrawal, the US-led UNITAF peace enforcement operation was launched for mostly security purposes like the establishment of law and order on the territory of Southern Somalia in eight zones mostly suffered from famine (Mogadishu, Bardera, Baidoa, Oddur, Belet Weyne, Jalalaqsi and Kismayo) and protection of humanitarian aid delivery. This operation was supposed to ensure reestablishment of secure environment in

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[44] In general in Somalia there are six clans – Darod, Hawiye, Dir, Isaaq and Mirifle/Rahanweyne. However, these lineages were too large to function as effective political entities. Sub-lineages nominally descending from the descendants of these six main clan families were more important both traditionally and today. The different lineages had traditional leaders with titles like Suldaan, Malak, Ugaas, Garaad, or Boqor. Every clan has its own homeland; however, at the time before civil war the population was mixed. When it started, some clans and sub-clans were forced to move, because they were somehow involved in the political games, for instance, representatives of sub-clan Majerten of clan Darod were suppressed by Barre for the attempt of *coup d'etat* (although Barre was from the same clan) on late 70-s – beginning of 80-s, representatives of Darod clan were in danger during the civil war due to Barre's clan ties and their privileged position in the government (occupied the most positions), and Abgal and Habr Gedir sub-clan of Hawiye clan representatives were oppressed by the government due to their oppositional activity and hostility against Darod clan//Hansen, S.J. Warlords and peace strategies: the case of Somalia. *The Journal of Conflict Studies.* Fall 2003. 57

[45] Main religion of Somalia is Sunni Islam, however, the religious leaders here are not very active in political affairs and in the conflict there was no Islamic factor.

[46] One of the peculiarities of Somali society structure is the mix of clan features with tribal ones. For instance, in every place (village, town or city) each clan has council of elders with clan leader at the top, who govern the local affaires. During the civil war the role of most of them was diminished, consequently, one of the tasks of international community was to restore them and return their significance//Lewis, I.M. 1999. *A pastoral democracy. A study of pastoralism and politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa.* Hamburg: LIT

the Southern Somalia, for UNOSOM II, follow-up operation, to be involved mainly in peace building process and negotiations with main warlords about conditions of peace restoration. However, in spite of the UNITAF successes, when it was finished and UNOSOM II operation launched, it became clear that UNITAF had failed to assure long-lasting security, and UNOSOM II became involved in the warlords' struggles both politically and militarily, and in the end did not complete its mission. Thus, for the purpose of this research the strategies of dealing with warlords are needed to be analyzed to determine more and less successful ones as well as errors made during their implementation, and assess their influence on the overall outcome of the operation.

2.2. UNITAF operation

Authorized by the United Nations Security Council resolution 794, US-led peace enforcement operation UNITAF (American code-name 'Operation Restore Hope') had to use 'all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations' for restoring 'peace, stability and law and order with a view to facilitating the process of a political settlement <...> in Somalia'[47]. It set a new precedent for the United Nations, because it was the first time when the UN authorized a group of member states to use military force not under the United Nations command for humanitarian ends in an internal conflict, albeit one with serious ramifications for the regional peace and security because of the huge influx of Somali refugees, many of them armed, into neighboring countries. However, the resolution reflects limitations of usage of such precedent by recognizing 'the

[47] Resolution of the United Nations Security Council 794 (1992) S/RES/794 (1992) , 3 December 1992, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/772/11/PDF/N9277211.pdf?OpenElement(Accessed June 1, 2011)

unique character of the situation in Somalia'[48] which refers to the evaporation of all Somali governing authority, something that leaves the Council scant alternative but to take action without Somali consent.

The USA agreed to take the leading role in the operation which meant not only providing the mission with military contingent, but also command of the whole operation, performed through Central Command (CENTCOM) in cooperation with the United Nations6 and huge financial donations.[49] As to the command, this double control and participation of foreign contingents[50] were intended to exclude the possibility to have the second Gulf war in Somalia and to provide the operation with international, more legitimate character. However, it was a potential source of troubles due to misunderstanding with the UN in some questions and its generally slow bureaucratic mechanism, not allowing acting operatively enough in the situations when its guidance was needed.

The American plan of the operation included an establishment of eight safe zones in Southern Somalia (Mogadishu, Bardera, Baidoa, Oddur, Belet Weyne, Jalalaqsi and Kismayo, later on the ninth humanitarian relief sector appeared in Merca) and protection of the movement of aid workers between the zones. The realization of the plan was divided into four phases. Firstly, the deployment of forces in Mogadishu and taking control over port, airport and main roads should be completed (in practice – December 9-16, 1992). The second step

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[48] Ibid, preamble

[49] American contribution in 1992 is estimated in the cost of $92.9 million, in 1993 - $1,124.8 million//Peace Operations: U.S. Costs in Support of Haiti, Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda (Letter Report, 03/06/96, GAO/NSIAD-96-38), http://www.fas.org/man/gao/ns96038.htm (Accessed June 1, 2011)

[50] In UNITAF operation approximately 21,000 US military personnel was involved and 9,995 non-US forces (January 7, 1993), including contingents from France, Italy, United Kingdom , Belgium, Germany, Canada, New Zealand, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, Egypt and Botswana//S/25126, letter dated 19 January 1993 from the United States to the President of the Security Council transmitting a report on the progress made by UNITAF, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/033/73/IMG/N9303373.pdf?OpenElement (Accessed June 1, 2011)

presupposed the establishment of Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS), which took eleven days for being made. The third phase was the most time-consuming and broad, because it demanded securitization of territory and stabilization of the environment (December 29, 1992 – February 17, 1993). The fourth represented the final step – transition to UNOSOM II operation. General Hoar's plan was said by officials to cover a 30-to-60-day period, to be finished before Clinton assumed presidential office[51], however, actually it was completed only in May 1993 because the UN was unwilling and unable to assume responsibility over the operation earlier.

The strategy of dealing with the main obstacle – warlords and their militias who hampered the delivery of humanitarian aid – was determined mostly *ad hoc*. The underlying principle was to threaten warlords to make them more collaborative but do not use a force for this outcome in order to avoid direct confrontation which could spoil the peaceful image of the operation in general and the United Nations in particular. Thus, the strategy included both military and peaceful means, *inter alia* deterrence effect using the fear of qualitatively and quantitatively superior forces of peace mission contingent (38 000 troops concentrated mainly in area between Webi Shabeelle and Webi Jubba rivers), combined with diplomatic efforts and strategy of empowerment of civil society institutions, for instance, preparatory negotiations with 'faction leaders' (the most important warlords, others were addresses as gangs and bandits), elders and representatives of local population intended to explain the goals of operation before deployment of UNITAF forces in the city, establishment of councils with warlords to discuss progress, problems and other questions concerning operation (worked in Mogadishu on the permanent basis and some other humanitarian relief sectors) and more broadly inclusive regional councils containing representatives of different social

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[51]Gordon, M.R. Mission to Somalia: UN backs a Somalia force as Bush vows a sweeft exit. Pentagon sees a longer stay. December 4, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/04/world/mission-somalia-un-backs-somalia-force-bush-vows-swift-exit-pentagon-sees-longer.html?scp=3&sq=somalia&st=nyt&pagewanted=2 (Accessed June 1, 2011)

layers. These acts were intended to revive Somali civil society to enforce the stability reached, because deterrence brings only short-term relief. The effectiveness of this strategy combining will be assessed below.

In the operation UNITAF, the following periods of time are of crucial importance for the purpose of this research as they contain so-called threshold points: 9-16 December 1992 (deployment of forces), 4-15 January 1993 (preparatory meeting for the conference on national reconciliation), the end of February 1993 (atrocities in Kismayo provoked uprising in Mogadishu) and 13-26 March 1993 (conference on national reconciliation), because they represent the implementation of warlord strategy and its effect. Taking into account that 'political factions' were divided into three groups according to their preferences of the country's leader (pro-Mahdi, pro-Aidid and pro-Barre orientation), I will mainly look at the reaction of these persons (in the case of pro-Barre orientation – at his son-in-law Morgan) at certain events and assess how the UNITAF's strategy influenced the behavior of these warlords, bearing in mind general aims and motivations of each of them, about which I will say in the paragraph below.

Muhammed Ali Mahdi has a business background and he became warlord mainly due to economic reasons (however, safety was an important factor as well), consequently, his motivation has to do more with economic considerations than with anything else. As a businessperson he tends to be more flexible, especially if he sees economic benefits for such behavior. According to Stedman's classification of spoilers, he could play both the role of greedy and limited spoiler, depending on the period of time in question. Mohamed Farah Aidid has a military background, consequently, he is used to hierarchical order, established due to the implementation of force and power potential the person has, and he tends to be cooperative only with those higher in the hierarchical ladder. He is power-seeker; it is the main motivation behind his behavior. Aidid could be classified as a greedy spoiler, although

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in the UNOSOM II period he seems to become a total spoiler. The characteristic of Mohammed Said Hersi Morgan is similar to that of Aidid, however, he was less powerful, and, thus, was not that ambitious in the period of both operations. He could be classified as a limited spoiler, whose main aim was to reunite his sub-clan and eventually his clan and establish control over its initial territories in Southern Somalia. Taking into account these driving factors of main warlords' behavior, I will assess the implementation of the aforementioned strategy and its effect on them.

The first period was vital for the whole course of operation because the further development of the operation depended on the way Somalis reacted to the initial deployment of UNITAF. Consequently, the international community was trying to act especially delicately, mainly through negotiations, to persuade warlords to cooperate with UNITAF as its mission is purely humanitarian, but at the same time to leave no doubts that in case of direct military confrontation the attacking force will be defeated. Robert B. Oakley, the US special representative in Somalia, was sent ahead a military contingent to conduct separate negotiations with major warlords in Mogadishu – Muhammad Ali Mahdi and Mohamed Farah Aidid, controlling northern and southern parts of the city respectively, in order to ensure the unchallenged arrival of US forces on Somali shores. After explanation of humanitarian goals of the operation and description of possible consequences of non-cooperation ('sticks and carrots') delivered by Oakley, each leader promised to use his radio station and political clan organization to urge everyone to stay at least a kilometer away from the port and airport on the day of UNITAF deployment. Moreover, Somalis who listened to the broadcast said that General Aidid's tone was unusually upbeat and he encouraged Somalis to welcome the American forces as "friends",[52] most probably, seeing in this operation a chance to show to

[52] Perlez, J. Mission to Somalia; *US forces arrive in Somalia on mission to aid the starving.* December 9, 1992, *New York Times,* http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/09/world/mission-to-somalia-us-forces-arrive-in-somalia-on-mission-to-aid-the-starving.html?scp=6&sq=somalia&st=nyt&pagewanted=2(Accessed June 1, 2011)

the local population through interaction with Americans foreign backup, which could help him to gain more power and obtain political status – his main goal. Thus, the deployment went smoothly, and the military objective of securing the airport and the port was quickly attained on 9 December.

As should have been expected, the implementation of deterrence tactics in the conflict environment could not go without a challenge to the superiority of the newcomers and bloodshed. However, in this situation the most important consideration is to have a proportionate response, which, on the one hand, could prevent warlords from attempting further attacks, and, on the other hand, would not prejudice the civilian population against the mission. On December 10th and 12th members of the warlord's militia tried to attack UNITAF forces[53] in order to test the degree of force which could be implemented in case of misbehavior and breach of secure environment and were defeated. Peace enforcers wounded some of the assaulters, but did not allow the violence to spread; their response was limited to the attackers *per se*, not the group to which they belong ('political faction' or movement). Thus, the warlords understood the implausibility of such actions, became more collaborative and did not make attempts to challenge UNITAF's authority for a while, excluding insignificant incidents.

Meanwhile the diplomatic component of the strategy was successfully implemented as well, resulting in a 'Seven Point Agreement'[54] between Ali Mahdi and Aidid (December 11, 1992) worked out on their own, albeit in the presence of Ismat Kittani and Robert Oakley, UN

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[53] In the first clash of its kind since troops landed in Somalia, two Marine Corps helicopter gunships destroyed three armed Somali vehicles on December 12 in Mogadishu after the American aircraft were fired on. The action, the first significant exchange of heavy fire between Western troops and armed Somalis, comes two days after two Somalis were killed and seven wounded when their truck barreled through a checkpoint and was fired on by French and American troops//Shmitt, E. *Mission to Somalia; U.S. Helicopters Destroy Vehicles In Somali Clash.* December 12, 1992, *New York Times,* http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/13/world/mission-to-somalia-us-helicopters-destroy-vehicles-in-somali-clash.html?scp=12&sq=somalia&st=nyt&pagewanted=1 (Accessed June 1, 2011)

[54] See Hirsch, J.L., Oakley, R.B. 1995. *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope. Reflections on peacemaking and peacekeeping.* United States Institute of Peace Press. 183

and US representatives. It is not only the agreement containing points about the cessation of hostility, break of artificial lines in Mogadishu dividing the city for a year, and control of forces and technicals by the joint committee, which is important, but also the fact of the meeting of two main rivals who were challenging each other's right to be a ruler of Somalia on the grounds of overthrowing dictator Siad Barre for almost a year already. Moreover, the agenda forced them to meet for the first time since the outbreak of the civil war. Thus, the diplomatic efforts undertaken by Oakley are quite valuable in respect to the creation of cooperative and reconciliatory atmosphere.

However, the feature of Somali peacemaking is the reluctance to realize agreed accords, at least within a short period (generally it was noticed that Somalians have a tendency to reassess accords a few times before they become binding)[55] or by own desire. Usually it was the act of showing cooperativeness or a sign that the agreed points could be implemented under certain circumstances, discussed in the following meetings with Oakley who then was choosing between 'sticks' and 'carrots' approaches. Consequently, UNITAF had to select the most feasible elements of agreements and provide material assistance, persuasion, pressure and the threat of force for making warlords implement them, depending on the type of person and his motivation[56].

Another diplomatic success is the usage of 'negotiators first' technique, allowing less casualties and closer relations with Somalians, because the mediator explains the goals of the mission and its peaceful humanitarian intentions, thus persuading the local population to cooperate with UNITAF contingent when it arrives for the completion of the tasks. Due to this tool civilians become more friendly and likely to participate in the peace mission's initiatives like formation of joint security committee consisting of senior military leaders who had frequent meetings with Americans to discuss urgent security questions, for instance,

[55] Ibid, 99
[56] Ibid, 57

removal of heavy weapons outside of the city,[57] as well as more general ones in order to avoid misunderstanding and establish firm personal relations (worked in Mogadishu) or more broadly inclusive regional councils containing elders, religious leaders, representatives of different NGOs and activists (contribute to the long-term strategy of restoration of civil society institutions which could deprive warlords of power, when strong enough). At this stage warlords tended to tolerate such attempts to empower local population due to the fear of retaliation in the case of non-cooperation.

The next period is important due to a conference where all warlords with significant size of subordinates were gathered, consequently, the presence at such a meeting automatically meant recognition of the importance of such a paramilitary group which was immediately called a 'political faction'[58] (although most warlords could hardly be said to be interested in politics) and its legitimization which could be considered 'carrots' from the part of the international community. The event was called the preparatory meeting for the National Reconciliation conference and took place on January 4-15 1993. In general, it reunited 15 leaders of 'political factions' attracted by the 'departing train' technique (they knew about the benefits of participating in the meeting and also were aware that it will take place even without some of them, thus, it was better to join), meanwhile all the rest warlords were called bandits and gangs and were recognized to be out of political processes in Somalia.

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[57] The question with disarmament in general was very sharp because the UN called for complete disarmament of warlords and local population; whereas the US American command insisted that its role is to safeguard food convoys. Military officials have said they will disarm Somalis only if they appear to be posing a threat to the forces, which on practice meant getting rid primarily of heavy weaponry, including 'technicals' – armed jeeps through its confiscation, storage in special sites or just replacing outside HRS. However, even this approach proved to increase atrocities because such actions destroy military hierarchy established during war time, because everybody had AK47, and only powerful militias and warlords had 'technicals', consequently, their confiscation equalize Somalis in terms of power, and this triggers aggressive reaction, making the US less and less active in disarmament.

[58] This move brought to the overall strategy of dealing with warlords one more component – legitimization and empowerment of paramilitary groups' leaders due to the absence of other candidates on the role of authority. It was intended to impose the sense of responsibility on warlords for them to change their long-term goals through usage of the socialization technique.

Besides the identification of the most significant warlords, the meeting showed the importance of the mediator's image in the eyes of the participants. For example, the fact that the United States has no colonial legacy in Africa assured Somalians of the neutrality of UNITAF mission, meanwhile the United Nations were suspected of restorating trusteeship in Somalia due to the colonial past of its key members. The background of the Secretary-General played a role as well in the negative attitude towards the UN (geographical proximity of the country of his origin). This attitude of the warlords towards the United Nations was expressed through stone-throwing demonstrations which besieged the UN compound in Mogadishu on January 4 and prevented Boutros Boutros-Ghali from having press-conference in the Somali capital.[59] Although these demonstrations were, most probably, organized by Aidid who favored the United States in the question of help in the process of rebuilding the nation due to its superpower status, presupposed financial resources and highest rank in the hierarchical ladder (amid provokes both greed and respect from Aidid's part), they attracted support of other Somalis and, thus, challenged the role of the UN in general and in the preparatory meeting in particular, because Secretary General was its chair. Nevertheless, the tactics of ignorance of these events combined with negotiations undertaken by Oakley in case of General Aidid refusing to participate in the conference, proved to be effective.

The third important period shows how easily the effect of deterrence could be overrun and suggests that it is point of no return – once overcome, fear is no longer that strong. Consequently, the emphasis should be made not that much on restoring it, but on search of alternative ways of dealing with warlords, for instance, UNITAF chose the empowerment of local population, in particular, existing authority structures based on clan structure of Somali society and its religion. I will describe below the threshold point of the whole UNITAF

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[59] Mitchel, A. *Angry Crowd of Somalis Disrupts Visit to Mogadishu by U.N. Chief.* January 4, 1993. http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/04/world/angry-crowd-of-somalis-disrupts-visit-to-mogadishu-by-un-chief.html?scp=25&sq=somalia&st=nyt (Accessed June 1, 2011)

operation marked by serious confrontations with both paramilitary groups and civilian population, provoked by disinformation about the failure of peace enforcers to cope with warlords and eventually the defeat of peace contingent which has led to the lost of fear of UNITAF military capacities and mass hostile demonstrations accompanied by clashes.

The breakdown of deterrence was shown in a series of confrontations between Siad Barre's son-in-law, General Morgan, and Aidid's ally, Colonel Jess, for the control of Kismayo which led to skirmishes with UNITAF forces. The peace mission contingent forced representatives of Morgan's Somali National Front to withdraw into the bush in late January explaining its violent actions by the violation of Addis Ababa cease-fire agreement by SNF. However, the atrocities did not end until late February when Morgan's men slipped into Kismayo, recovered Jess's Somali Patriotic Movement's hidden weapons and attacked his officials, forcing them to flee. UNITAF issued an ultimatum to Morgan to withdraw to Doble at the Kenyan border (former location of his forces) and to Jess to canton his men and arms near Jilib, and both complied. However, these actions were misinterpreted by journalists who erroneously reported that Morgan had completely taken Kismayo,[60] which meant the failure of UNITAF to restore order there and implied the possibility to overrun stronger US and Belgian forces, and anti-UNITAF demonstrations commenced, leading to the attacks on Nigerian units as they were believed to be the weakest in the peace mission contingent. The Nigerians beat off the attack with small number of casualties (two wounded) with the help of good intelligence and US Marines and defended one of the most important transport junctions, so-called Fourth kilometer, but the incident itself had severe psychological impact on UN key agencies, NGOs, UNOSOM headquarters and press, who started to prepare for evacuation.

This example shows the short-term effect of deterrence strategy, because it is effective as long as the second party believes in the strength of the first and is threatened by this, however,

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[60] Hirsch, J.L., Oakley, R.B. 1995. *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope. Reflections on peacemaking and peacekeeping.* United States Institute of Peace Press. 77

this fear could easily evaporate in the case of non-retaliation. In this case UNITAF strategy was to force media to prove the given information wrong and try to avoid atrocities – the task which could have been facilitated by the police forces if they were reconstructed at that moment, consequently, the international community started to work in this direction, knowing that after such incident the fear of deterrence cannot be reproduced in the same scale.

Another component of the strategy – strengthening of civil society authorities – was proven partly successful, because the creation of regional councils involving elders and local leaders empowered them and contributed to the rebuilding of civil society, and weakened Aidid's SNA-appointed entities left from the civil war. The last point contributed to the dissatisfaction of Aidid who was losing power due to such maneuver of peace enforcers and compelled him to organize anti-UNITAF demonstrations and hostile actions against it. However, these demonstrations burned themselves out soon showing that in general Somalians are on the side of peace mission, not warlords, and they will not be easily dragged into renewed conflict.

The logical continuation of this policy of gradual marginalization of warlords through development of civil society and its empowerment is the involvement of the local population. A humanitarian conference and then the conference on national reconciliation in March 13-26, 1993 – the first experience of this kind in Somalia with broad cross-section representation from all regions of the country, including clan elders, religious leaders, women's groups as well as fifteen 'political factions' (190 Somalis in total), took place. The choice of venue for holding them was emblematic and intended to show the continuity between the one in January which contained only warlords and these meetings signifying that ordinary Somalians also have the right to determine the future of the country they are living in. However, I indicated this period as containing a threshold due to highlighting both the shift of emphasis from

warlords to civil society and the turning point of Aidid's behavior from cooperation out of fear to cooperation out of experiment, which I will explain below.

The second conference was an apogee of diplomatic efforts aimed at national reconciliation and reestablishment of normalcy; however, it was marred by renewed fighting in Kismayo between Morgan and Jess and Aidid's posturing in an attempt to improve his power position or at least show supremacy.[61] Such behavior from his part could be explained by his desire to test the reaction of the United Nations representatives and co-fellows in order to understand the degree of his importance for them and, thus, the 'limit of misbehaving'. Since it was tolerated, although they could have decided to continue the conference without Aidid, he realized his manipulative capacity, which was used by him further, in the course of UNOSOM II operation, and the wrong mode of response to it eventually has led this peace operation to failure. Consequently, the chosen inducement technique in this case proved to be inappropriate in the long run.

The final accords contained the elements for a legal framework for the future development of the country. These agreements[62] were welcomed by non-factional members; however, most warlords were reluctant to implement them, especially the part about disarmament, because it meant gradual reformation of the environment, which contributed to the achievement of some goals by them (monetary gain, power or glory) and, thus, the loss of status. Moreover, the international community refused to force 'faction leaders' to this outcome. Consequently, this period cannot be seen as successful, because in spite of the fact of having important national broadly inclusive conferences, without willingness of the US and the United Nations to use

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[61] Aidid suspected anti-SNA move which could be undertaken by UNITAF Quick Reaction Force and went to Kismayo with investigating team to determine what had happened, by this preventing conference from going forward. As to the improvement of position, he proposed the political system with five major factions (SNA included) to rule the country, nevertheless, he went along with the final agreement about seventy-four-member Transitional National Council.

[62] See *The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996*, Blue Books Series, Volume VIII, NY, 1996. 264

the deterrence effect non-military components of the strategy became non-backed up and, thus, the agreements – less likely to be implemented.

To sum up, the results of the research have shown that the actions of UNITAF in terms of warlords' treatment constituted sophisticated strategy including usage of deterrence effect well-fixed due to weaponry superiority and excellently trained troops acting only against attackers in case of challenging their superiority, diplomatic efforts, consisting mainly of thoroughly thought negotiation techniques tailored to the particular warlord (mostly coercive, 'departing train' and in few cases inducement), and empowerment of civilian population through creation of regional and local councils rearranging the administrative functions from warlords' groups to their responsibility. The first component of the strategy – usage of deterrence effect – is generally unproductive unless it is combined with some other tactics, for instance, with diplomatic efforts and other non-military tools, then the strategy becomes more successful.

As to the concrete case of UNITAF, the chosen strategy was proved to be effective in the first two periods of operation, however, even then Oakley and top leaders of the operation made a mistake – they used only coercive negotiation tactics such as 'departing train' or just pressure, but avoided soft ones, 'carrots'. They could have tried to use one in case of General Morgan whose aim was to reunite his men with their families in Kismayo and return their property seized by Jess, in particular, they could have tried to negotiate with Jess about this matter and thus avoid the third period of UNITAF, which temporarily spoiled its image. Nevertheless, this negotiation tactics could be used only with limited spoilers like Morgan, meanwhile with greedy type it could lead to disaster, like what happened with Aidid, who has realized in the fourth period of operation his importance for the international community which at that time hoped to bind warlords by signed agreements and thus waited for his return from the investigation in Kismayo back to the conference on national reconciliation by this

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showing its need in Aidid as a signatory. Consequently, in general the strategy should be carefully chosen in correlation to the warlord's type and motivations in order to determine the most suitable approach to address his main needs and simultaneously to not allow him to act beyond certain limits, and to this end thorough diagnostics should be conducted. Otherwise the success of peace enforcement operation could be undermined by unexpected violent actions of warlords.

Chapter III. Lessons of Somalia: UNOSOM II - the case of failure?

Given the situation in Somalia in early 1993, the operation required enforcement powers authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter – an endeavor which the Organization had never before undertaken, at least, if seen from the legal perspective. This proposal was conditioned by the fact that UNITAF had established only a relatively secure environment due to the refusal to conduct full-scale disarmament, plus, its efforts were limited to a small part of the country – Southern Somalia. Consequently, the mandate of UNOSOM II stated in the resolution 814[63] included operational clauses devoted to monitoring and enforcing, if necessary, the cessation of hostilities, disarmament, securitization of airports and ports, as well as contained peacebuilding tasks like assistance to refugees and internally displaced people to return home, and it covered the whole territory of Somalia. However, the available resources were lower than that of UNITAF, for example, a force of 28,000 troops (8,000 of them – American logistic and support personnel, plus, a Quick Reaction Force controlled by CENTCOM) which is a 10,000 smaller contingent in comparison with UNITAF, plus, there were uncertainties about the timing of deployment of each unit and participation of some countries in the operation in general, like India which did not want to be involved in military operations in the Muslim country to avoid unnecessary accusations from Pakistan and provocations of their local population. Thus, the strategies of dealing with warlords – the main spoilers of the UN peace efforts – should have been more diversified.

However, this was not the case. The strategies of dealing with warlords were defined by newly appointed representative of the UN - Admiral Jonathan Howe - in cooperation with Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Force Commander Lieutenant-General Çevik Bir

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[63] See Resolution of the United Nations Security Council 814 (1993), S/RES/814, 26 March 1993, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/226/18/IMG/N9322618.pdf?OpenElement (Accessed June 1, 2011)

and the US deputy commander General Montgomery, who were proponents of the military approach because of the shared assumption that it is the only effective way to drastically change the situation since warlords tended not to comply with signed agreements. Consequently, the main strategy used by UNOSOM II was marginalization of warlords in different ways (from soft political to manhunt), and only after mass-scale confrontations on October 3, 1993, was the approach changed to more cooperative - realized through diplomatic engagement – the tool which showed good results during the preceding operation – UNITAF. I will define below the main time periods containing the changes of strategies, and will analyze the errors in their implementation which have led to the failure of military part of the UNOSOM II.

In general, the whole operation UNOSOM II could be divided into three periods according to the implemented warlord strategy and its effect, which are as follows: deployment of UNOSOM II forces and first political clashes with Aidid which led to the marginalization tactics towards him and the Somali National Alliance group (May, 4 – June 1993), the period of military confrontation marked by coercive strategy transforming to manhunt specifically applied to Aidid's faction responsible for the death of few peace enforcers as retaliation (June 5- October 4 1993), and the turning point in the approach to the issue of dealing with warlords and change of the strategy from the usage of military measures to diplomatic ones due to the ineffectiveness of the first approach (October 1993 – March 1995).

The first indicated periods was marked by the deployment of UNOSOM II forces and shows how the biased perception of the intervenor could influence the very first stage of operation and, in its turn, provoke a negative reaction in response, which could contaminate the whole course of actions. The possible strategy of dealing with this problem is delicate negotiations with every leader of the 'political factions' in a manner sensitive to the warlord's

motivations, but taking into account the type he could be assigned to according to the classification of Stedman, and local population to explain the tasks of the mission and benefits they could get out of it. However, personnel of UNOSOM II have chosen another mode of actions. The two-fold strategy developed by them presupposed the holding of UN conference for this end and political marginalization of those warlords disposed against UN-led peace mission. However, personal characteristics possessed by potential spoilers were not taken into account, and, thus, possible risks were not considered.

Consequently, the reaction of General Aidid, power-seeking warlord but as a result of the marginalization tactics, deprived of power, became unexpectedly negative, and it involved casualties among the peace contingent. Using the reduction of patrols in Mogadishu, Aidid managed to slip the heavy weaponry back to the city and launch a series of attacks on UNOSOM II personnel, spreading the information about these actions beforehand via his radio station. This provoked the United Nations to close Radio Mogadishu. Pakistani forces completing this order after inspection were encircled by hostile crowd, and only additional operational units ended the fight, in the result of which twenty-four people were dead – the biggest number of atrocities for one attack at that point[64]. Such hostile actions provoked unproportionate response from the United Nations. Condemning the attacks on the UNOSOM II personnel and accusing SNA for committing these acts, Security Council authorized 'to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for these armed attacks'[65], basically, changing the tactics of dealing with some warlords from political marginalization to coercive measures, while with the rest the communication was limited to attempts to bring them to cease-fire, although the international community could have chosen a more peaceful option

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[64] This incident was investigated few times in order to find out whether the attack was planned or happened because Pakistanis provoked the crowd to start fighting, and it was concluded that SNA and Aidid committed these crimes deliberately, most probably for frightening UNOSOM II.
[65] Resolution of the United Nations Security Council 837 (1993), S/RES/837, 6 June 1993, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/332/32/IMG/N9333232.pdf?OpenElement (Accessed June 1, 2011)

like Aidid's exile in some African country (suggested by Ethiopia and Eritrea) or pending a full investigation of what had happened.

The aforementioned measures could be called the expansion of the political marginalization strategy to the military sphere, because it required physical elimination of designated targets that did not comply with their marginal status, meanwhile for others it should be seen as a threatening example inspiring fear, thus preventing confrontation. For this end, the military capacities should be developed enough to effectively dispose those warlords in a short period of time and do not hurt civilian population in the course of these actions, because otherwise it could spoil the image of the whole peace mission, plus, bring the sympathy on the warlords' side which means new followers and backup from the part of civil society.

UNOSOM, because it was under-equipped, was unable to act in the way required. In this particular case UNOSOM II did not have such capacity due to the lack of equipment and absence of intelligence forces. Due to the last point on July 12, 1993, instead of attack on high-level SNA leaders in order to eliminate the SNA command center the operation took lives of many elders and political leaders holding a meeting (although some middle-ranked member of this group presented)[66]. This outcome attracted a lot of followers to the SNA in general due to people's sympathy to losses of its members and to the manhunt for Aidid (there was issued a warrant promising rewards for his capture). The Bloody Monday killing of more than 50 traditional clan elders, religious leaders, and others in July 1993 with armor-piercing missiles 'did more than any single act to stir up local support for Aideed'.[67] It is only one of the examples of implementation of this strategy , which in general resulted in the detention of more than seven hundred Somalians supported or thought to support Aidid, and mounting Somali death toll due to use of helicopter gunships against targets in heavily populated areas

[66] Hirsch, J.L., Oakley, R.B. 1995. *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope. Reflections on peacemaking and peacekeeping.* United States Institute of Peace Press. 121
[67] Lezhnev, S. 2005. *Crafting peace. Strategies to deal with warlords in collapsing states.* Lexington books. 80

of south Mogadishu. In combination with reduce of humanitarian activity, it was seen as a hostility towards Somali population, and disappointment by UNOSOM II became widely spread, albeit there was also an array of warlords called Group of Twelve[68] supporting UNOSOM.

Having recognized the inefficacy of 'sticks approach'[69] due to the problems with its implementation only after the disastrous incident known as "Battle for Mogadishu"[70], the alternative strategy was decided to be used. The diplomatic measures proved to work successfully during UNITAF operation that is why it was concluded to use them for fixing the situation. For Aidid this change in the politics became a 'window of opportunity' to enter the politics again – the goal he was pursuing all this time. Consequently, he was cooperative in the raised by Oakley issues, like the release of prisoners and ceasefire, hoping to restore good relations with the US and use this in the future campaign intended to make him the ruler of Somalia. Although firstly the progress in national reconciliation achieved through strengthening of regional and local councils and the traditional role of elders and religious leaders[71] seems to be irreversible, at the end it turned out that without limitations imposed on Aidid and other non-cooperative warlords by deterrence effect this strategy does not work

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[68] Group of pro-UNOSOM II oriented warlords with Ali Mahdi in the top coming out against peace efforts spoilers, mainly Aidid. It was not very active in practical actions.

[69] Actually, it was the USA who changed the view on Somali problem after suffering comparatively great losses in the operation on October 3, 1993, which pushed Clinton to make a statement about withdrawal of American troops (the date was debated, but at the end it was defined as March 31, 1994). This move encouraged other counties to bandwagon in this decision with the US. Thus, the United Nations had to follow the same line, although Secretary-General wanted to pursue the coercive strategy// Hirsch, J.L., Oakley, R.B. 1995. *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope. Reflections on peacemaking and peacekeeping.* United States Institute of Peace Press. 128, 141

[70] It is also known as "Black Hawk Down". The operation was intended to eliminate SNA leadership meeting in the hotel "Olimpia", where Aidid also could have visited. However, it turned out to be a sort of ambush, because the hotel was encircled by Somalis who prevented Marines from coming out and shot the supporting helicopter. The following hours there were few attempts to rescue them, in before the dawn Marines succeeded in going out of the hotel and running to the meeting point. On the way they were defending from the Somali convoys, gangs and hostile civilians. At the end, as a result of this operation 18 Marines and from 300 to 700 Somalis were killed and one American officer captured. The next day, the famous video with Somalis carrying body of American soldier through the streets of Mogadishu was shot, contributing to the US decision to withdraw the troops, following negative reaction of Congress and ordinary Americans.

[71] For instance, see details about the initiative of the imam of the Herab – the most powerful and respected authority of the Hawiye clan// Hirsch, J.L., Oakley, R.B. 1995. *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope. Reflections on peacemaking and peacekeeping.* United States Institute of Peace Press. 142

well. The supposedly coercive diplomacy in this case transforms to the strategy of inducement or empty talks, because there is no longer motivation to consider the results of agreements binding, which could possibly work with limited spoilers if they are satisfied with conditions of the accord and are not challenged directly by other actors, but not with greedy, let alone total spoilers like Aidid.

To conclude, the case have showed few more possible tactics of dealing with warlords and suggested the situations where each of them could be implemented and what are the potential pitfalls. As to the first one, political marginalization, it could be used against spoilers whose main motivation is not connected with politics, because otherwise, how the case of Aidid has shown, its implementation could lead to the disastrous consequences. Thus, before launching it for dealing with warlord, his personal characteristics and motivations should be assessed. The second tactics presupposes the usage of coercive measures, meaning direct confrontation with concrete warlord (-s) in case of his non-compliance with agreed accords, threat to military contingent and security in general. In practice, it requires physical elimination of the target, but the point is to conduct it in a way which does not affect civilian population, because otherwise it could lead to the opposite results like strengthening of the warlords and his faction and spoiling the image of intervener. In general, the case of UNOSOM II operation proved the necessity of combination of military and non-military approaches in order to deal with warlords effectively, and careful selection of appropriate tactics for treatment of a particular warlord as each of them have peculiar aims desired to be achieved, capacities and perception of possible means for that. Although, it makes the overall strategy complicated, at the end it contributes to the outcome of the operation in a positive way. If the developed strategy manages effectively all principle actors, it proceeds with increase of stability, cessation of hostility and resurrection of order in the target country.

Conclusion

Peace enforcement operations represent a widely used tool for conflict management, allowing to handle even especially violent conflicts, including those complicated by the presence of warlords as principal or subsidiary actors. However, the impact of warlords on the success or failure of these operations was never assessed, although it is considered to be negative. Taking into account the nature of this phenomenon – warlordism – this assumption is fairly reasonable. Warlords are leaders of predatory armed groups that seek power for their personal enrichment without regard for the broader interests of any significant community, strongman who are able to control an area and exploit its resources while, at the same time, keeping a weak central authority at bay. They are ready to sacrifice property, land and thousands of lives through brutal means for the power they are getting through the conflictual environment, consequently, in their interests to support the state of war by any means.

However, there are tactics which could be used for managing warlords if combined in an appropriate strategy. These are as follows: legitimization and delegation of authority to the warlords as the ones possessing power, marginalization, diplomatic efforts and empowerment of civil society institutions, deterrence effect, and coercive measures. For being developed in an effective strategy, they should be tailored to a particular actor and take into account his goals and motivations behind actions as well as commitment to the achievement of set aims, thus, careful diagnosis should be made before launching a strategy. If diagnosed in a wrong way, the chosen way of dealing with a warlord could become a disaster, as it has happened in Somalia.

The case-studies suggest a number of lessons to learn. For instance, the deterrence effect could be increased in efficacy in case of combination with diplomatic efforts, if mediator communicates the threat to the principal actors during negotiations. However, once overrun, deterrence is difficult to restore, it is point of no return. Another lesson is as follows:

the personality of mediator *per se* as well as the image of intervener is of crucial importance for the outcome of the operation. If the intervener has already conducted a failed operation in the country, warlords will not respect its return and will do anything possible to overcome peace efforts. In case of choice of any tactics, the victims among civilian population should be minimized; otherwise, warlords automatically gain substantial public support from that part. In general, the long-term result of the effective warlords' management could be achieved if civilian population will be empowered to participate in high politics at the level of local authority for creation of system of 'checks and balances', however, this tactics demands considerable efforts.

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