REPARATIVE POSSIBILITIES:
QUEER RELATIONALITY AS QUEER FUTURITY

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QUEERNESS IS NOT yet here. Queerness is an ideality. Put another way, we are not yet queer. We may never touch queerness, but we can feel it as the warm illumination of a horizon imbued with potentiality. We have never been queer, yet queerness exists for us as an ideality that can be distilled from the past and used to imagine a future. The future is queerness's domain.

(Muñoz, 2009, p. 1)

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I would like to express gratitude to my supervisor Eszter Timár, who made me realize that queer theory and politics are poetic and magical issues, along with my new 'dorm' and 'city' friends, who gave me the opportunity to feel that queerness is a way of life, and not only a subject in the readers. As last, but not least, big thanks to my dear Matija, who was a big support when struggling with various queer dilemmas, as well as when trying to make English my second language.

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the opportunity to claim queer relationality, based on the correspondence with Eve Sedgwick's concepts of paranoid and reparative practices in queer and cultural politics. In other words, I will explore how negotiating with paranoid heteronormative narratives was developing in the field of queer politics from the inception of this field in the 1980s. In this regard, I will present queer subjects' social positions as effects shaming or misrecognized interpellative performatives, with which queer subjects (counter)identify or disidentify. As well, though affects, such as shame, I will illuminate the possibility of repairing and queering of paranoid heteronormative practices and knowledge production. In this regard, in contrast to Elizabeth Freeman's chrononormative linearity of time, queer chronotemporality will provide the possibility of creating queer narratives, and Muñoz's mode of disidentification sphere of counterpublics. Finally, I will observe how reparative possibilities and queer performativity correspond with embodied queer agencies in performances of artists Keith Boadwee, who queers the Cartesian subject and Ron Athey, who through his masochism expression, queers Christian iconography.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Within the frame of queer and identity politics, and performance and cultural politics, in my thesis I will present how identities are intertwined within the broader realm of discourse dynamics, whereby I advocate affective turn and reparative practices as new directions while claiming queer agency. My initial aim is to examine conceptual transformation of paranoid towards reparative practices, in order to observe whether in the queer politics there is an opportunity to claim queer agency within the realm of queer relationality, which would not directly be dependent on relations with heteronormative surroundings and narratives, as that was the case during queer theory's inceptions. In this regard, I will initially map out theoretical relationship between Judith Butler and Eve Sedgwick, and recent scholars such as José Muñoz and Elizabeth Freeman, which will be helpful to better understand the political developments within queer politics in the last twenty years. Additionally, I will present queer performances of artists Keith Boadwee and Ron Athey, in order to observe how theoretical relationships within the frame of queer politics inform the field of performance and cultural politics.

On the one hand, I will present queer agency on the level of identity and queer politics, observed through the lens of dynamics of power relations, where I will advocate positive, life-affirming political thought, observed though the lens of reparative possibilities. On the other hand, I am interested how theoretical relationships in queer politics inform artistic queer expression within the field of performance and cultural politics, based on several selected performances. Due to queer subjects' embeddedness and dependence on the social, where they interact with other subjects, I would like to make clear that my attempts are not to completely diminish correlation with, as I will term it, paranoid relationality, because this would reinforce binary knowledge production, against which I argue. In contrast, I will

present how queer and paranoid relationality inform each other. In this regard, I am interested how queer subjects function within their own discourse, without being dependent on heteronormative narratives. Thus, if queer subjects are referring to the past, I am of the opinion that this referring can be more productive if the past is queered.

In order to situate my assumptions within the existing literature of queer and identity politics, in Chapter II, I will introduce the initial goals of queer politics in the 1980s and 1990s. I will contextualize queer politics' emergence in the form of commenting on disciplinary institutions and their homophobia directed towards sexual minorities during the HIV and AIDS crisis. In this regard, Foucault's notions of power dynamics will be of great help when examining how identities are mutually intertwined and how they face the dynamics of power relations. This will lead me to Butler's discursive subject formation, through which I will elaborate how heteronormativity is imposed as the most 'natural' or original identity, excluding homosexual as copy. In other words, through Butler's binary original vs. copy, I will depict relationality among heteronormative, gay and lesbian, and queer subjects' identities. In the context of relationality, shaming interpellation, as a paraphrase of Althusser's ideological subject formation, will help me to observe how dominant discourse conditions queer subjects' social positions, whereby the subjection conditions their agency. Since interpellation is a performative statement, and identities citational practices, I will elaborate concept of performativity in the fashion of Austinian proper and improper performative utterances, and Derridian fashion of citationality. Through Derrida's citationality I will intricate that citations, presented by Austin as 'parasites' in proper performatives, are constitutional part of performatives, and that they also have the effects of doing, as well as Austin's proper performatives. In other words, queer 'parasites' are constitutional part of performatives from the start, whereby queer performativity is an effect of Derridian critique of Austinian 'anomalous' performatives.

Since performativity and citations, in my opinion cannot totally capture subject's embeddedness in the social, in Chapter III, I will propose broadening of subject's dependence on discourse with affective turn in queer politics, which reconciles subject's linguistic fragmentation and corporeality. In this regard, I will describe Butler and Sedgwick's notions of shame, in order to observe how this affect, as a constitutional part of queer subject's identity, influences directions in queer politics. I will advocate Sedgwick's relational shame, and Crimp's queer responsibility concept, by which AIDS related deaths and issues from the 1980s should not be forgotten or silenced. In contrast, in the case of gay and lesbian politics shame is substituted with pride, silenced within the concept of moralism, as proposed within mainstream homophobic surroundings. In this regard, in order to distant queer politics from homophobic and paranoid practices, I will propose Sedgwick's reparative practices which do not rely on origins and causes when seeking definitions homosexuality or homophobia, but rather offer transformation towards more productive and positive knowledge production. Even though I will exemplify negative knowledge production with Freud's description of homosexuality and male masochism as paranoid and gender inappropriate, proposed within strict binary pleasure and pain, this does not mean that his paranoid practices cannot be repaired.

Another reparative and productive practice, which would favor queer agency's direction towards the future, is Muñoz's disidentification, presented in Chapter IV. By the mode of disidentification, queer subjects are positively directed towards the future, by responsibly and productively using shame, misrecognizing themselves with dominant discourse's interpellative utterances at the same time. In this regard, by misrecognition though failed interpellation, queer collectivity neither assimilates nor strictly opposes the dominant regime, but rather work on a strategy of transformation, which results with creation of queer counterpublics. In addition, I will present queer relationality and collectivity within the form

of Muñoz's queer utopianism, based on queer collectivity's hope for the future and rejection of heteronormative narratives, which will also clarify why antirelationalily, when considering queer agency, cannot be an option. This will lead me to embrace the concept of queer chronotemporality, which enables creation of queer historical narratives, opposed to Elizabeth Freeman's concept of chrononormativity, which reflects heteronormative narratives and institutional organization of one's life.

In Chapter V, I will observe how my assumptions regarding queer relationality correspond with embodied queer subjects on the examples of selected queer performances. In this context, I present performance artists Keith Boadwee and Ron Athey, in order to explore reparative possibilities in their performances. I have chosen these performance artists because their artistic expression is correlated with the Cartesian, Modern absolute subject and Christianity, as two privileged heteronormative exemplars in the Western knowledge production, which as I will argue, are suitable for queering and repairing. The example of Keith Boadwee reflects relations with Jackson Pollock, who is, following Amelia Jones' concept of Pollockian performative, presented as the embodiment of the Cartesian modern subject. In contrast, Athey's masochistic expression corresponds with Freud's paranoid gender inappropriate masochism practices, and is correlated with Reik's moral masochism observed through Christianity and the martyrdom of Jesus Christ, as the figure with which Athey identifies. Although these performance artists are embodied queer subjects, I will observe if they reflect possibility of queer relationality, based on negotiation with paranoid practices in positive, self-defining purposes. Thereby, I will also challenge direct correlation with heteronormative surroundings as inevitable factor while stating relational queer agency. The possibility of queer relationality, concerned with queer collective, will as such potentially provide queer theory and politics with great queerness for the future, based on repaired past and present.

CHAPTER 2: QUEER AND IDENTITY POLITICS: DYNAMICS OF POWER RELATIONS

Queer theory's foundations were established when the critique of disciplinary institutions emerged as an answer to omnipresent homophobia that struck sexual minorities during the AIDS crisis. Since, as Crimp (2003) argues, "the discourse of AIDS is driven by terribly moralistic attitude towards sex" (p. 85), resulting with the exclusion of sexual minorities, they and their advocates tried to change the heterosexist machinery and prejudicial attitudes towards them. The aim was to illuminate that sexuality, by which sexual minorities were excluded and sent to "nonexistence and silence" (Foucault, 1988, p. 5), is a matter of historical occasions and culturally designated categories, imposed as essential. In this regard, heterosexist ideology was revealed as a forcefully imposed demand. Foucault's discourse on power dynamics is useful to observe how discourses of modern sexuality were constructed, while his theory provides the fruitful foundational ground for the emergence of queer theory.[1] It reveals how disciplinary institutions and relations produce knowledge about licit forms of sexuality, while their power practice was seen in the prohibition of its 'illicit' forms. Queer theory, which initially analyzed and commented on heterosexism and homophobia, which "may be read in almost any document of our culture" (Warner, 1993, p. xiii), also works in opposition to the post-Stonewall gay and lesbian liberation movement, with had political goals that were concentrated predominantly on the White, middle class, gay community and politics of inclusion. Therefore, queer, as a theory "of a more thorough resistance to regimes

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[1]In order to point out the counter-effects of power institutions' initial aims to regulate population's sexuality, Foucault returns to era of Victorian bourgeoisie. In order that people would practice only procreative sex acts, sexuality became the issue of, for example religious, medical and pedagogical institutions, which had the aim of regulating it. Those institutions produced knowledge about licit form of sexuality, while their power practice was seen in the prohibiting its illicit forms (e.g. masturbation, homosexuality, etc.), by pathologizing it. Thus, by distinguishing licit from illicit, and by articulating the both forms, power institutions themselves offered the possibility of the new discourse on sexuality. Proclaiming what should be repressed, the result of policing the sexuality resulted with counter-effects (i.e. masturbation became the form of sex act practiced by children, homosexuals gain the label by which they will recognize themselves as such). Therefore, while regulating population's sexuality in the age of Victorians, Foucault proposes 'repressive hypothesis', by which he explains how discourse on sex was opt to be repressed, when the result was the opposite – it was constantly articulated or being thought of.

of the normal" (Warner, 1993, p. xxvi) illuminates and opts to change the oppression without being fond of any stable and potentially naturalized identities, distancing itself from any kind of definitions. This, as Warner argues, can result with the prevailing of one perspective over another, which is dangerous, since it provides the fruitful ground for an oppositional hegemony, such as homonormativity.[2]

Queer theory and politics are analyzing and commenting on identity politics, while at the same time embracing forms of non-identity, in order to avoid naturalization. The goal is to present heterosexist society as one certain kind social formation, which became powerful only because it has imposed itself as 'natural' through time, but is in fact constructed historically and socially. Therefore, since Western societies and heterosexism are usually synonymous, queer politics opposes and resists everything that is being normalized, and at the same time reflects the imposition of heterosexual normativity, revealing it as problematic, since it is compulsory. While doing so, queer politics does not orient only towards one's sexual identity, but is eager to grasp individual's freedom on all subordinated levels, within the present social system in general. Therefore, for Warner, one's self-definition through the, for example gay and lesbian politics, is restrictive and insufficient, since it does not cover a wider range of subordinated identities (gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, etc.). The aim within queer politics is to question any kind of hierarchy and binarism, and functions against inclusiveness into the normative social order, in order to avoid conformism, which can be found in gay and lesbian politics. Having in mind that queer theory and politics has the goal to avoid the uniformity of identities and that it embraces the form of various identities according to which everybody

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[2]When defining homonormativity, I use Duggan's definition, who describes homonormativity as phenomenon that "creates a depoliticizing effect on queer communities as it rhetorically remaps and recodes freedom and liberation in the terms of inequality in return for domestic privacy and the freedom to consume" (as cited in Manalansan IV, 2005, p. 142). In other words, homonormativity proposes inclusion into heteronormative order as a political paradigm.

could practice their 'difference', I am eager to observe if concept of queer can function as queer relational agency, without any references to (hetero)normativity.

While conducting my research which merges queer and identity politics with the performance and cultural politics, at this point I am informed by discursive subject formation within the poststructuralism tradition, whereas subjects and their material viability depend on the dynamic of power relations. I observe the bodies as identities' embodiment through Butler's claim that the materiality of the body is an effect of discourse, power relations and reiteration of the norms, which gives the body its meaning. Butler does not suggest that there is no such thing as the materiality of the body, but that bodies gain a meaning through entrance into the discourse, whereas subject's performance does not precede the acts of gender performativity, which I will elaborate more in detail in below subchapters. She implies that "cultural norm…governs the materialization of bodies" (Butler 1993, p. 3), which will be especially noticeable on the examples of performances in Chapter V, where I will present the collision of queer and identity politics with performance and cultural politics. In this regard, after the initial introduction of what I consider queer theory and politics, and identity politics, I will use Butler's explanation of identity politics through the binary copy vs. original, which gives me the opportunity to depict what I consider by the term relationality between heteronormative, and gay and lesbian subjects' identity characteristics. The binary original vs. copy illuminates that identity categories are very limited and that they "operate in the service of oppressive, exclusionary, regulatory regimes" (Fuss, as quoted in Butler, 2004, p. 119). Therefore, the question is what this binary has to offer when stating queer relationality.

2.1   Defining Relationality: Original versus Copy

Following Butler (1993), subjects are the effects of norms, whereby these norms precede a subject's existence or constitution and are "forcibly materialized through time" (p. 1). Having this in mind, the term 'relationality' used here, is observed through Butler's binary copy vs. original, which also influences homosexual subject's viability, but at the same time reveals that there are no original identities. Within the frame of the binary copy vs. original, or in other words, homosexuality vs. heterosexuality, Butler claims that heterosexuality considers homosexuality as a copy because it needs the derivation to confirm itself as naturalized and privileged – an original status. However, the logics of homosexuality reveal construction or imitative status of so-called original heterosexuality: "Lesbian [and gay] identities do not imitate heterosexual identities; rather, they panic them by confounding the original-to-copy/heterosexual-to-lesbian[-and gay] line of causation, thereby exposing heterosexual claims to originality as illusory" (Fuss, as cited in Butler, 2004, p. 119). In this sense, if heterosexuality can be imitated or copied, it is revealed as a convincing reiteration of its own norms, which can be imitated. It aims to perform its own original, which is for Butler impossible (since the original does not exist). Therefore, she argues that neither heterosexuality, nor homosexuality can be considered in the context of the original, but rather as complementary pairs, which define each other. In this regard, it seems that gay, lesbian and queer narratives are always based on the exchange with heteronormative surroundings, which affects their viability, and reveals relationality between them on the broader scale of dynamics of power relations. After I introduced what I considered within the concept of relationality with heteronormative surroundings, I will further observe how this concept corresponds with the notion of agency.

2.2   Defining Agency: Performativity of the Body

In order to present the notion of agency, Butler (1993) uses Althusser's term interpellation, by which ideology transforms individuals into concrete subjects by hailing them into their social positions, in order to explain the "exclusionary matrix by which subjects are formed" (p. 3). [3] Butler exemplifies this through the interpellation that takes place during the act of the birth. When the doctor announces the sex of the baby, by saying the claim "It's a girl/boy" he is hailing the person into his or her social position; this is necessary in order to be said that a person is a fully constituted subject. In this context, the doctor is an authority whose power is seen in creating the sexed subject. This proves Butler's (1993) claim that discourse "precedes and enables… 'I' and form[s] in language the constraining trajectory of its will", whereas "the discursive condition of social recognition *precedes and conditions* the formation of the subject" (pp. 225-226). In this regard, subjects are being hailed into the field of discourse primarily as sexed subjects, whose heterosexuality is presupposed. This also means that the body does not have an existence outside the discourse, and that it is discursively conditioned, whereas "gender is not a performance that a prior subject elects to do, but gender is *performative* in the sense that it constitutes as an effect the very subject it appears to express", while "performance constitutes the appearance of a 'subject' as its effects" (Butler, 2004, p. 130).

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[3] According to Althusser, a subject is constituted through a process of hailing or interpellation by an ideology's authorities. Constituted subjects freely subject themselves to authority, in order they could recognize themselves as "free and autonomous beings with unique subjectivities" by performing "the rituals of ideological recognition" (Althusser, 1989, p. 53, 59). After successful interpellation, subjects' consciousness is being produced by their practice of certain rituals in certain ISAs (e.g. school, church, etc.). While doing so, they become subjects of mutual consciousness, forming their identities through social relations between them. In other words, ideology needs its subjects to confirm itself its own authority, while subjects need ideology in order they could become viable.

In Austinian[4] sense, by the doctor's utterance "It's a boy/girl", it can also be concluded that interpellation is a performative statement and that the language has an important role by materializing the body. The doctor is not simply reporting or describing what he sees, but by uttering "It's a boy/girl", he performs an act. He is assigning sex and gender to the body, which cannot have an existence outside the discourse – and this is why Butler asserts that sex is not something one has, but becomes, and is continuously performing. The perception and description of the body by hailing is therefore a performative statement, and the language that seems to describe the body actually constitutes it. However, how do these interpellative performative utterances that define one's identity and discursive viability correspond with queer agency?

In the context of reiteration of the norms, Butler (1993) approaches the claiming of queer agency through Foucault's concept of subjectivation which reveals that dynamics of power relations are quite productive:

> The paradox of subjectivation…is precisely that the subject who would resist… norms is itself enabled, if not produced, by such norms. Although this constitutive constraint does not foreclose the possibility of agency, it does locate agency as a reiterative or rearticulatory practice, immanent to power, and not a relation of external opposition to power. (p. 15)

In this regard, it seems that subjected queer agency's potential to be articulated is already enabled through its subordination position in relation to dominant heteronormative discourse. As well, it follows that queer subjects use heterosexist discourse as "both an

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[4]Austin's (1962) performative utterance indicates that the performing of an action is not just saying something, but doing as well (pp. 6-7). Furthermore, utterances can be felicitous, proper or happy, and infelicitous, improper or unhappy. The former are valid if they are adapted to the context of the situation in which they are uttered, while the latter do not fit the context and therefore are not valid, or in other words present performative utterances that went wrong (Austin, cited in Loxley, 2007a, p. 9). This is why Austin presents improper performatives as copies or "*parasitic* on normal or ordinary use", which only quote or cite proper performatives. They do not have the effect of performing as action, but are failures, unlike proper performatives, which are "conventional in nature", with results of performing an action (Loxley, 27a, 73-4). However, as I will depict below, Derrida deconstructed Austinian performatives, by claiming that citationality or quoting, presented by Austin as copying the proper performative, is what constitutes the performative from the start.

instrument and an effect of power" as well as "a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy" (Foucault, quoted in Butler, 2004, p. 121). In this regard, articulated queer agency reveals the hegemonic status of heterosexuality, since bodies that do not materialize the heterosexual norm are hailed into the discourse through shaming interpellation. However, at the same time, as I will indicate below, queer subjects use the same interpellative utterances for their positive self-identification.

2.3   Shaming Interpellation and Queer Performativity

Subjects who do not follow the heterosexual norms are being hailed into the discourse through "shaming interpellation" (Butler, 1993, p. 226). This "interpellation of pathologized sexuality" (Butler, 1993, p. 223) confirms the boundaries of sexual legitimacy, as presented above through the binary original vs. copy. Interpellated as, for example 'queers', these subjects recognize themselves as such and use the "homophobic strategy of abjection" (Butler, 1993, p. 233) for their positive self-identification, which they use to claim their agency. They reiterate the same norms by which they were abjected/shamed: "the subject who is 'queered' into the public discourse through homophobic interpellations of various kinds takes up or cites that very term as the discursive basis for an opposition" (Butler, 1993, p. 232). Having this in mind, it follows that the viability of queer subjects is marked by resignification of the norms, or in context of performative utterances, by "an interpellative performance that has been converted from an insult into a linguistic sign of affirmation and resistance" (Butler, 1993, p. 233). In this regard, this resignification also states something about Austinian proper and improper performatives. If utterances can be resignified, and as such have the effect in constituting a subject, this means that imitative status of proper

performatives have also performative effects, as well that their imitative status of merely quoting or citing the proper performative should be reconsidered. This was initially argued by Derrida, who asserted that improper performative, described by Austin as failure, is condition of possibility of performatives and that all signs have the ability to travel out of initial context, due to the power of citationality and recontextualization. Additionally, as I will indicate below, an effect of a Derridian critique of Austinian 'parasite' performatives as invalid also reflects fruitful terrain for theory of queer performativity.

Derrida comments on the Austinian concept of infelicitous or improper performative, presented by Austin as "quotations or citations of original performatives, mimicking the form, but lacking the…substance of that which they cite" (as cited in Loxley, 2007b, p. 74). This means that Austin's proper performatives depend on the unitary, fixed context in order to be effective. Derridian critique consists of reconsidering citationality, which is in the core of Austinian (1962) improper performatives, which 'parasites' the original performative:

> A performative utterance will, for example, be *in a peculiar way* hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage…or spoken in soliloquy. This implies in any and every utterance – a sea-change in special circumstances. Language in such circumstances is used not seriously, but in ways *parasitic* upon its normal use – ways which fall utter the doctrine of the *etiolations* of language. (p. 22)

Citationality, as Derrida argues, is necessary for the communication in general, and sign in its core must be repeatable in order it would be an element of communication. In this regard, citationality is characteristic of all signs, since they had to be repeated in order they could gain the status as elements of communication. As well, citation also always implies difference between uttered signs: "Each letter 'a' might well be recognizable as the same as any *other* letter 'a', but sameness also implies their difference from each other" (Derrida, as cited in Loxley, 2007b, p. 78). Therefore, the difference is constitutive of a sign, and it can never be said that a sign has original status, since it can be part of various linguistic or social contexts. It can be quoted infinitely, and this is why citations of a sign in different contexts

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constitute a sign's difference. This implies that citationality is constitutional part of original, whereby difference of a sign is its characteristic from the start, and that there is no such thing as unitary and fixed meaning. In this regard, Austinian 'failure' or 'parasites' must be reconsidered as initial parts of performatives, in order performatives could happen in the first place (Derrida as cited in Loxley, 2007b, p. 78-9). In other words, if successful performatives are based on citations, then "etiolating parasite actually characterises or constitutes the vigorous host" (Derrida, as cited in Loxley, 2007b, p. 74). Therefore, for Derrida the failure of the a sign is actually necessary for a sign's constitution.

Therefore, following the logic of Derridian citationality and difference as initial constitutive of the performative, it seems that queer performativity is also a part of Austinian 'parasite' which constitutes the performative from the start. Thus, if having in mind Derridian concept, it seems that performative has been from its start "infected with queerness" (Sedgwick & Parker, 1995, p. 5). In other words, this logic confirms that capability of citation "also ensures that its use in particular context carries the trace of the other contexts in which it features" (Derrida, as cited in Loxley, 2007b, p. 78). Therefore, interpellated as 'queers', queer subjects recognize themselves as such, and by citing these same utterances, they at the same time use them for their positive self-determination. If having in mind binary original vs. copy, and well that identities are based on citationality of the norms, it follows that there cannot be strictly fixed boundary when stating heterosexual or homosexual identities, since this would reinforce Austinian proper performatives which exclude citations. Identities are observed as effects of norms' citation, whereby "any consolidation of identity requires some set of differentiations and exclusions" (Butler, 2004: 126), which means that the claiming of stable identities is quite limited option. This concerns both heterosexual as well as homosexual identities, whereby it also illuminates mutual relationality and dependence between them.

It seems that this recontextualization and citing of interpellative performatives by which queer subjects have been shamed, directly relates them with the heteronormative surroundings and proves an inevitable relationality between them. This means also that in this case, queer relationality is not possible because queer subject's agency inevitably depends on relations with the heteronormative surrounding, which constitutes it at the same time. In this regard, it seems that linguistic fragmentation when describing identities and the meaning of bodies as citations of the norms is also quite limited, since queer agency is always affected by linguistic citations in direct relation to heteronormativity. This is why in the next chapter, along with queer performativity, I will propose affective turn in queer theory, in order to extend linguistic fragmentation that gives the body its meaning with corporeal perception of the body based on affects.

CHAPTER 3: AFFECTIVE TURN AND REPARATIVE PRACTICES

It seems that affects, which I will further depict within the frame of affective turn in queer theory and politics also have an important role while claiming queer agency. Pellegrini and Puar (2009) state that in the neoliberal praxis critical theory turned into the direction of incorporating concepts like affects, emotions and feelings when "comprehending subject-formation and political oppositionality" within queer agendas and politics (p. 37). Affective turn is occupied with "[a]ffect [which] may anchor claims about the materiality of the bodies and physiological processes that are not contained or representable by language or cognition alone" (Pellegrini & Puar, 2009, p. 37). In this regard, it seems that next to the poststructuralist subject's linguistic fragmentation, affect system offers direction which goes beyond language when claiming embodiment, allowing "the body to be an open system…[with] the potential of becoming" (Pellegrini & Puar, 2009, p. 37). This position provisionary merges corporeality and linguistic fragmentation, whereby at the same it broadens the debate into new directions when describing subjects' social embodiment. This also means that experience goes beyond language possibilities and depends on corporeality, whereby affective turn has potential for new queer narratives. In this regard, I will further describe Butler and Sedgwick's notion of shame, in order to observe how affects can influence queer and identity politics and how this go along with the concept of queer relationality, which embraces responsibility towards other queer subjects.

The affect of shame, used within the frame of queer politics in recent years, goes along with the assumption that affects are "simultaneously vital to the conditions of possibility of identity politics yet indicative of their limitations" (Pellegrini & Puar, 2009, p. 37). I comprehend the affect of shame as a constitutional element of queer subject's identity, which

as such influences their agency, while I observe it though its political possibilities. If observed

through the shaming interpellation, following Butler (1993), shame is:

> …produced as the stigma not only of AIDS, but also of queerness, where the latter is
> understood through homophobic causalities as the 'cause' and 'manifestation' of the
> illness, theatrical rage is part of the public resistance to that interpellation of shame. (p.
> 233)

By Butler's definition of queer shame, it seems that this affect has a negative

connotation, since it is caused by homophobic surroundings, which aims to shame queer

subjects. Therefore, the reaction of queer subjects is 'theatrical rage', which I perceive as a

filtrate though which shame is additionally changed with some other affects, like for example

pride. In contrast, Sedgwick depicts the affect of shame as a factor that offers new kinds of

queer subjects' directions within the frame of queer and identity politics.

Sedgwick (2003a) suggests transformation of shame for positive purposes, whereas

transformation of "habitual shame…opens…new doors for thinking about identity politics"

(p. 62), and is not changed with the affect of pride. The difference between Butler and

Sedgwick's notion of shame concerns the consequences of the ways in which shame is used

in queer subject's expression and political purposes. Sedgwick (2003a) comments on the

notion of shame within identity politics, whereas "getting rid of individual or group

shame…[may have] powerful effects – but they can't work in the way they say they work" (p.

62). She proposes shame that is not suppose to be overcome or supplemented with affects

such as, for example, pride,[5] because "shame is what makes us queer, both in the sense of

having queer identity and in the sense that queerness is in a volatile relation to identity"

(Sedgwick, cited in Crimp, 2009, p. 70). In this regard, Sedgwick's shame is used as a 'tool'

for any further expression or action, which is inherent to a queer subject. In this regard, for

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[5]Gay Pride is used as an example. The political agency at this event substitutes the affect of shame with the
affect of pride.

Sedgwick (2003a) shame is "simply the first, and remains a permanent, structuring fact of identity: one that…has its own, powerfully productive and powerfully social metamorphic possibilities" (pp. 63-64). It offers possibilities for expressing individual identity and desires, but it also reflects new directions within the relationally queer community. In other words, Sedgwick's (2003a) shame is a "character…of…the highly individual histories by which…[it] has instituted far more durable, structural changes in one's relational and interpretative strategies toward both self and others" (p. 62). As such, shame reflects a positive direction for queer politics in the future. In my opinion, this reflects possibilities for overcoming relationality with heteronormative surroundings, and opens the door for stating queer relationality. In this regard, I will exemplify shame as relational strategy towards others within Crimp's notion of queer responsibility.

Crimp's concept of queer responsibility exemplifies different approaches to affect of shame used within gay and lesbian politics, and queer politics. It is related with sexual minorities' dealing with the direct exposure to AIDS related deaths in the 1980s. Crimp refers to psychosocial mechanisms with which sexual minorities were coping. These mechanisms were correlated with the phenomena of mourning and melancholia, as a reflection of the effects of coping with homophobic normative surroundings and/or emotions of loss, fear and shame. Soon after the development of protease inhibitors in the mid 1990s, mainstream heterosexist discourse started promoting the idea of AIDS as a "manageable illness" (Crimp, 2003, p. 88) and proclaiming that the AIDS crisis is over. The agenda was, as Crimp argues, mainstream silencing of AIDS, hidden under the veil of homophobia, and moralism which aimed to justify silence. Gay and lesbian politics also embraced this moralism, which was a result of shame if being correlated with AIDS issues. On psychosocial level, the result of being affected with AIDS shame was melancholia, which does not allow sexual minorities affected with AIDS to interpolate into heteronormative tropes, such as marriage, family, etc.

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Opposite to gay and lesbian politics' moralism, Crimp supports politicized melancholia, by which the epidemic and AIDS related deaths should not be forgotten, erased or should have the negative effects on sexual minorities' present or future life. In this regard, within queer politics silence or inclusion into the heteronormative trope or internalization of shame as negative affect, is not the part of political tactics. Crimp terms these tactics as queer responsibility, by which false moralism or silence is not an option when dealing with AIDS related issues. In this regard, normative moralism shames and silences gay and lesbian subjects and this indicates that this kind of shame is not productive.

Crimp's concept of queer responsibility, as well as Sedgwick's dissatisfaction with the affect of pride remind that shame is displaced within identity politics: "The sad thing about the contemporary politics of gay and lesbian pride is that it…sees shame as conventional indignity rather than the affective substrate necessary to the transformation of one's distinctiveness into a queer kind of dignity" (Crimp, 2009, p. 72). In other words, Crimp and Sedgwick's suggestion of shame goes along with queer community's tactics within the concept of queer relationality, which are distanced from mainstream paranoia, and are based on transformation of shame in positive purposes. In this regard, in the next subchapter I would like to suggest Sedgwick's reparative practices, which demonstrate that paranoia presented, for example by Freud as a disease of homosexual subjects, could be recontextualized in positive purposes. In this regard, I consider conceptual transformation from paranoid to reparative practices as fruitful terrain for positive outcomes for queerness in the future, whereby the affective turn, as described here, plays a significant role.

3.1   New Epistemology: From Paranoid towards Reparative Critical Practices

Having in mind Austinian performatives described in Chapter II, whereas language does not simply neutrally describes something, but rather constructs, according to Sedgwick, knowledge itself also has performative effects. In this regard, she argues that performative effects of knowledge produced in theories of, for example, Nietzsche, Marx and Freud are based on negative affects of paranoia. These scholar's theories which marked intellectual thought of the twentieth century and influenced the development of critical theory, seem to be "understood as a mandatory injunction rather than a possibility among other possibilities" (Sedgwick, 2003b, p. 125). In this regard, not only they produce "symmetrical epistemologies" (Sedgwick, 2003b, p. 126), but are structurally paranoid when explaining human interactions, because their "methodological centrality of suspicion…has involved a concomitant privileging of the concept of paranoia" (p. 125). In this regard, these theories are also described as "hermeneutics of suspicion" (Ricoeur, as cited in Sedgwick, 2003b, p. 124). Even though, as Sedgwick argues, the aim of these symmetrical epistemologies is demystification and exposure of human relations, their structures are based on paranoid characteristics. This is especially noticeable in Freud's, as Sedgwick (2003b) describes it, "homophobia-centered understanding of paranoia" (p. 146), which illuminates "not how homosexuality works, but how homophobia and heterosexism work" (p. 126).

In Freud's (2003b) psychoanalysis, homosexuals are pathologized as paranoid, whereby paranoia is considered a homosexual disease (cited in Sedgwick, p. 126). As well, if following Freud's logic of homosexuality as paranoid, male masochism can also be described as such. In Freud's interpretation, these both phenomena overlap with heteronormative order. This is noticeable if taken into account that for Freud (1988) female masochism corresponds with 'normal' female subjectivity (as cited in Silverman, p. 36), and only male one is

pathologized, since it was regarded as emasculating. In this regard, male masochism is a result of unsuccessful overcome Oedipus complex, whereby the "male subject…cannot avow his masochism without calling into question his identification with the masculine position, and aligning himself with femininity" (Freud, as cited in Silverman, p. 36). In other words, male masochist has given up his desire to be a father and has identified himself with the mother (Freud, as cited in Silverman, p. 42). In contrast, Theodor Reik, Freud's student, distanced himself from 'paternal law' when describing male masochism, and turned to Christianity and the martyrdom of crucified Jesus Christ, as the figure with which masochist's identifies.   I will elaborate this more in detail in Chapter V, when interpreting queer performances by Ron Athey.

It seems that Freud's psychoanalysis is occupied with questioning with origins of homosexuality, when to reshape this kind of methodological approach, Sedgwick proposes a relational detachment from paranoid towards reparative critical practices. However, in order to avoid binary paranoid vs. non-paranoid knowledge, Sedgwick (2003b) asserts that "to practice other than paranoid forms of knowing does *not,* in itself, entail a denial of the reality or gravity of enmity or oppression" (p. 128). In other words, Sedgwick proposes new epistemology of knowledge, which reconfigures the old one. Reparative reading is a paraphrase of "reparative strategies of the depressive position" (p. 137), presented by psychoanalysis of Melanie Klein[6], used in order to present how paranoia can serve the reparative turn in critical theory. Sedgwick's reading of Klein's reparative strategies offers a new direction in queer politics, whereby negative affects are utilized in more productive ways.

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[6]Klein uses the term 'positions' in order to depict stages of infant's normal development of ego and its relation to the object. In this context, she distinguishes paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions as opposed to normative, stable position (personality type). Paranoid position is characterized as "a position of terrible alertness to the dangers posed by the hateful and envious part-objects that one defensively projects into" (Klein, as cited in Sedgwick, 2003b, p. 128). In contrast, depressive position is ambivalent, "anxiety-mitigating achievement…the position from which it is possible in turn to use one's own resources to assemble or 'repair' the murderous part-objects into something like a whole" (Klein, as cited in Sedgwick, 2003b, p. 128). The outcome is object's offer of "nourishment and comfort in return" (Sedgwick, 2003b, p. 128), with the ultimate outcome of the reparative process, its synonym – love.

However, even though Sedgwick (2003b) suggest reparative turn, she finds paranoid reflexes also very productive, because they "are often necessary for nonparanoid knowing and utterances" (p. 129) to take place. In other words, Sedgwick (2003b) asserts hope, by which queer theory would be informed with the possibility that "the future may be different from the present…as that the past, in turn, could have happened differently from the way it actually did" (p. 146).

Sedgwick also merges Klein's theory with Silvan Tomkins' affect system[7], in which paranoia is both as affective and cognitive predisposition. The goal in Tomkins' (2003b) affect system is "seeking to minimize negative affect and that of seeking to maximize positive affect" (as cited in Sedgwick, p. 136). As such, Tomkins' affects combined with methodological binarisms of critical theory's anti-essentialism challenge binary "habits and procedures" (Sedgwick & Frank, 1995, p. 2). In this regard, it seems that above Freudian description of homosexuality and male masochism are correlated with binarism and exclusiveness of affects, since "Freud subsumes pleasure seeking and pain avoidance together under the…'pleasure principle', as though the two motives could not themselves radically differ'" (Sedgwick, 2003b, p. 137). As well, his theory is subsumed within "Oedipal regularity and repetitiveness" (Sedgwick, 2003b, p. 147), which means that desirable heteronormative order's masculinity and femininity, as well as perception of affects, are as characteristics passed on from one generation to the other, with the illusion of their fixed status. As such, according to logics of performatives described in Chapter II, passing on is part of habitual performances, which, as I will elaborate in Chapter V, can be queered. In this

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[7]From the psychological and biological perspective, Tomkins (1995) suggests organization of affects into categories, whereas affect system is "the primary motivational system in human beings" (p. 34). This means that affect system, based on effects that are directly correlated with corporeality, can provide something more when considering identities only as effects of linguistic fragmentation. Every affect is followed by facial response, which is an effect of "the receptor, analyzer, storage, and motor mechanisms within the organism and to a broad spectrum of environmental opportunities, challenges, and demands from without" (Tomkins, 1995, p. 37). In his classification, Tomkins distinguishes eight primary affects: interest-excitement, enjoyment-joy, surprise-startle, distress-anguish, fear-terror, shame-humiliation, contempt-disgust, and anger-rage (pp. 74).

regard, affect system and reparative practices, as I will indicate in the next subchapter, can provide positive forms of knowledge, which avoids binary concepts, with promise of more productive queerness in the future, rather than relying on causes and consequences of the "suspicious hermeneutics" (Sedgwick, 2003b, p. 124) replacing them with reparative practices.

3.2   Paranoid Relationality

The aim of reparative practices is not to seek for the origins or causes of homosexuality or homophobia, but rather to change the analytical approach, which would be directed towards positive outcomes for queerness in future, whereby past can be also used in more positive, rather than paranoid terms. In this regard, my proposed definition of relationality through Butler's binary original vs. copy presented in Chapter II is also, in my opinion, paranoid, especially if re-reading it through Sedgwick's reparative practice and affective turn that neglects binarism. This is why I am going to term it paranoid relationality. However, even though paranoid, Butler's theory illuminates Sedgwick's (2003b) claim that "the reading practices that become most available and fruitful in antihomophobic work would often turn have been paranoid ones" (127), whereby paranoid can be very productive because it is often necessary for production of non-paranoid knowledge. In this regard, even though I advocate queer relationality in contrast to paranoid relationality, I would like to state that my aim is not to diminish Butler's theory as useless when concerning queer agency, but quite the opposite. I found Butler's theory, as attached to inception of queer theory, valuable when presenting theoretical ground that had allowed queer tendencies to become possible. It also has to be taken into account that negotiation with heteronormative discourse was inevitable in the time of the HIV and AIDS crisis, because it helped to reveal heterosexism's hegemony and challenged the naturalization of privileged heteronormative identities. In this regard, by

proposing queer relationality, my aim is to illuminate this concept as a queer possibility, whereby the past, even though paranoid, is observed as stable ground for current and future queer knowledge production, which is as such enabled by reparative practices.

By seeking for queer relationality, my aim is to distance queer knowledge production from binaries, which are presented by Sedgwick and Frank (1995) as problematic: "The bipolar, transitive relations of subjects and objects, self to other, and active to passive…are dominant organizing tropes to the extent that their dismantling as such is framed as both an urgent and interminable task" (p. 1). They dismantle binarism by proposing affect theory, which escapes binaries, within the frame of Tomkins' primary affect classification, by which he proposes "*more than two*, but also…*finitely many* values or dimensions" (Sedgwick & Frank, 1995, p. 14). In this sense, the strength of affects, as "inertial friction of a biologism", is noticeable if describing them as elements which re-inhabit the space between two and finitely (Sedgwick & Frank, 1995, p. 15). This approach would distance queer theory from extreme constructivism and naturalization of identities, whereas "[c]ognitive and affective" (Sedgwick & Frank, 1995, p. 21) are proposed as modes which would provide more productive and reparative future within queer politics. Therefore, in my opinion, reparative practices are very valuable new methodological approach, which, on the one hand illuminates productiveness of paranoid practices, and on the other hand promises new knowledge production. In contrast to paranoid relationality, I will further present Muñoz's disidentification as a political act by which queer subjects neither strictly oppose, nor affirm to repressive regimes, but rather use them in order to create their own truth and sense of selves. Therefore, I will present disidentification as a reparative mode, which resists binarism, and use paranoid to 'repair' queer community within the concept of queer relationality.

CHAPTER 4: DISIDENTIFICATION AS QUEER FUTURITY

Muñoz's proposed mode of disidentification is an act of transgression and creation, by which minority subjects articulate the truth about the hegemony of dominant culture, but most importantly about themselves at the same time.[8] In this regard, Muñoz (1999) suggests, and what I will depict in Chapter V on the examples of several performances, that "disidentificatory performances [both politically and culturally] strive to envision and activate new social relations…[as] the blueprint for minoritarian counterpublic spheres" (p. 5). In order disidentification to be a cultural practice which would be oriented towards positive affects, queer subjects need a community sharing, a consensus, which is in stake while advocating queer relationality. I this regard, counterpublics, where these practices are taking place are important. By defining counterpublics, I refer to Jennifer Moon (2009), who defines the term as a locus which corresponds with "a celebration of exclusion and marginality; it is the conscious development of print and visual cultures, private institutions and occupied public spaces, and personal styles, affects, and politics that collectively seek to modify or subvert heteronorms" (p. 361). However, disidentification does not propose counterpublics as separate or closed spheres, it is a "survival strategy…that works within and outside the dominant public sphere simultaneously" (Muñoz, 1999, p. 5). In this regard, Muñoz proposes a re-reading of existing political and cultural theory in order for queer subjects to gain the opportunity to express themselves, without ultimately relying on normative or stereotyped identities. As such, in my opinion, disidentification is based on positive affects and refusal of

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[8]Muñoz refers to French linguist Michel Pêcheux (1999), who broadens Althusser's theory on ideological subject formation. Pêcheux presents paradigm of disidentification as one of the three possible modes of subject construction. First is a good subject, who is identified with ideological forms without rebelling, therefore he or she presents the mode of identification. Second is a bad subject, who refuses to identify with dominant ideology and is a rebel (as representation of counter-identification), and the third mode is disidentification, by which a subject neither assimilates nor strictly opposes the dominant ideology, but rather works on a strategy of "transformation of cultural logic", by which he opts to change the ideology from within (as cited in Muñoz, 1999, pp. 11-12).

binaries such as "subversive versus the hegemonic, resistance versus power" (Sedgwick & Frank, 1995, p. 16), and it is correlated with the concept of failed interpellation and queer performativity, which is opposed to Butler's shaming interpellation, presented in Chapter II.

4.1   Failed Interpellation and Queer Performativity

Muñoz's (1999) failed interpellation, in contrast to Butler's shaming interpellation, is based on "tactical misrecognition" (p. 169). Subjects who misrecognize themselves with ideology's hailing, as Muñoz (1999) defines them 'identities-in-difference', have the ability to "disidentify with the mass public and instead, though disidentification, contribute to the function of a counterpublic" (p. 7). At the same time, since queer subjects, according to disidentification, refute to conform with fixed social position, it seems that they also refute the queer shame, used as a heterosexist tool of abjection. They rather use it for positive purposes, as proposed by Sedgwick and Crimp in Chapter III. Therefore, disidentification proposed through failed interpellation also reflects Sedgwick's (2003a) "transformational grammar of [performative utterance] 'Shame on you'…[which is for her] most intimately related to queerness" (p. 61). Thus, by disidentifying with the heteronormative meaning of this utterance, they, as Crimp (2009) suggests, linguistically and performatively use it in positive purposes, advocating shame as a part of their identities (p. 70). It is used by minoritarian subjects as "a response to state and global power apparatus that employ systems of racial, sexual, and national subjugation" which are "brutal and painful", with nevertheless positive outcomes of "actual making of worlds" (Muñoz, 1999, pp. 161-2, 200). In this context, queer subjects subordinated by dominant regimes, work on reformation of their social positions, rather than counteridentifying with them, since the counteridentification can be counterproductive and end lead into counterdetermination, "a structure that validates the

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dominant ideology by reinforcing its dominance through the controlled symmetry of 'counterdetermination'" (Muñoz, 1999, p. 11).

In order not to slip into counterdetermination, as that is, in my opinion, the case with Butler's shaming interpellation depicted in Chapter II, Muñoz (1999) suggests that disidentification "understands that counterdiscourses, like discourse, can always fluctuate for different ideological ends and [that] a politicized agent must have the ability to adapt and shift quickly as power does with discourse" (p. 19). It also follows that disidentified subjects work on transformation of the system by referring to their disidentified queerness, which as fluid identity depends on self-creation, presented as "reformatting of self within the social…[and thereby] resists[ing] the binary of identification or counteridentification" (Muñoz, 1999, p. 97). As well, disidentificated subject is based on maximization of positive affects and reparative critical practices. As such, in my opinion, disidentification, observed through reparative practices and affective turn reflects potential for queer relationality, which is not dependent on assimilation or opposition, or on any kind of binarism. As such, the concept of queer relationality, on the one hand resists relationality within Butler's binary original vs. copy, when on the other hand it uses paranoid practices in reparative purposes. Since my attempts are not to argue against relationality, but rather strengthen it within the concept of queer relationality, as a tactic used by queer collectivity when creating counterpublics, after analyzing how queer relationality negotiates with paranoid relationality, in the next subchapter, I am interested in relationship between queer relationality and queer collectivity. I will use Muñoz's concept of queer utopianism and collectivity, which will help me to support my arguments on queer relationality as very plausible possibility within the frame of queer politics.

4.2 Queer Relationality: Utopianism and Collectivity

While stating queer relationality, I follow Muñoz's (2009) critique of "antirelational thesis" (p. 11). He uses the concept to illuminate attempts of queer theory and politics directed towards "singularity and negativity" (Muñoz, 2009, p. 10), which privileges one identity characteristics at the expense of some others. In this regard, Muñoz's (2009) critiques antirelational thesis because it is "distancing…queerness from what some theories seem to think of as the contamination of race, gender, or other particularities that taint the purity of sexuality as a singular trope of difference" (p. 11). As an alternative, Muñoz offers the concept of queer utopianism, by which queer singularity is avoided.

Muñoz's queer utopianism is based on Bloch's concept of 'concrete utopias', which are "relational to historically situated struggles, [directed towards] a collectivity that is actualized or potential" (as cited in Muñoz, 2009, p. 3). By this, queer collectivity, observed through the lens of concrete utopia is situated in social realm, and corresponds with Muñoz's disidentified subjects' counterpublics. Even though Muñoz (2009) is aware that concept of utopia, which he proposes as collective queer turn towards the future can be "daydreamlike", he uses it as a concept for "hopes of a collective, an emergent group, or even the solitary oddball who is the one who dreams for many" (p.3). As well, within the concept of hope and utopia, he proposes "affective structures" (Muñoz, 2009, p. 9), which can be anticipatory approaches for queer collectivity, while hoping and working to achieve queer futurity. In this context, queer relationality is observed as an "essential need for an understanding of queerness as collectivity" (Muñoz, 2009, p. 11) with its urges for positive outlooks in the future, with the possibilities of queering the past at the same time. Queer futurity, in Muñoz's (2009) words, is "essentially about the rejection of a here and now and an insistence or potentiality or concrete possibility for another world" (p. 1), which is as such articulated in

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Sedgwick's reparative practices, which Muñoz (2009) terms as "reparative hermeneutics" (p. 12). Therefore, the hope proposed by queer utopianism, is deeply connected with disregarding the heteronormative place and time, which I will elaborate further with Freeman's concept of chrononormativity, opposing to it the concept of queer chronotemporality, which goes along with creating counterpublics.

4.3   Queer Narratives: Chrononormativity and Chronotemporality

When elaborating chrononormativity, Freeman (2010) has in mind linear time order, which, organized through "[s]chedules, calendars, time zones" (p. 3) reinforces heteronormative narratives "such as marriage, accumulation of health and wealth for the future, reproduction, childrearing, and death and its attendant rituals" (p. 4). The idea of heteronormative linearity goes along with institutional organization of one's live, whereby, within the concept of social relationality, it also organizes heteronormative subjects' "bodily tempos and routines, which in turn organize the value and meaning of life" (Freeman, 2010, p. 3). Through this relationality "people are bound to one another, engrouped, made to feel coherently collective, through particular orchestrations of time" (Freeman, 2010, p. 3). It is connected with hetero-, but also with homonormative tropes, whereby, in my opinion, heteronormative 'orchestrations of time' can be queered, and presented through the lens of queer chronotemporality, term which is derived from the concept of queer temporality.

Queer temporality, the concept of re-writing or queering the past and the present, offers "possibilities for relationality or community in queer temporal reimaginings as a way out of …both hetero- and… homonormative temporal schemas" (Muñoz, cited in Freeman et al., 2007, p. 187). In further elaboration of the term queer temporality, I will refer to Freccero's (2007, pp. 485-494) concept of queer temporality, as well as Freeman's (et al.,

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2007, pp. 177-195) roundtable discussion on the same concept. In both sources, this concept is situated in relation to history, examining legitimacy of linearity and possibilities for non-linearity. Freccero's (2007) initial argument is that anything can be queer, or in other words, theoretically all concepts can be queered (p. 487). This is, in my opinion, justified if having in mind that every performative, based on Derrida's citationality, can be reconsidered through queer performativity, which as such refutes fixed and naturalized chrononormative narratives. According to this, queer subjects have legitimacy of creating their own narratives, when at the same time pointing out the illegitimacy of heteronormativity as universal historical narrative. As Ferguson argues, "disidentifying with hegemonic texts of history does not mean the absolute dismissal of history" (quoted in Freeman et al., 2007, p. 185), but rather pointing out its defragmentation and instability. This also means that queer temporality, contextualized within Sedgwick's affective turn, embraces "affective contact between marginalized people now and then" (Dinshaw, quoted in Freeman et al., 2007, p. 185), with possibilities to acknowledge that "the future may be different from the present..[with] ethically crucial possibilities as that the past…could have happened differently from the way it actually did" (Sedgwick, 2003b, p. 146). In other words, the aim is to illuminate "queer experience [that] gets transmitted from one generation to the next, [as] a process that exceeds, in innovative ways, the heterosexual kinship" (Halberstam, quoted in Freeman et al., 2007: 183). The claim of queering linear narratives also goes in addition to Warner's argument mentioned in Chapter II, who presents heteronormativity only as one possible culture among others, which imposed itself as the most natural, while in fact, it seems that queer culture, observed through queer temporality, "coexist synchronically in any given historical formation" (Foucault, cited in Freccero, 2007, p. 486).

By presenting the concept of non-linear, chronotemporal queer narratives, in my opinion, I have justified the overarching concept of queer relationality as legitimate queer

possibility. In the following chapter, I am going to analyze how reparative possibilities are used as a performing strategy in the field of performance and cultural politics, I will trace theoretical relationships, presented throughout Chapters II-IV. Selected queer performances will provide me with opportunity to observe how queer subjects use reparative strategies in order to celebrate their queerness, creating at the same time counterpublics.

CHAPTER 5: QUEER EMBODIMENT IN PERFORMANCE AND CULTURAL POLITICS

Since I am informed by reparative practices and affective turn, within the broader scheme of discursive subject formation, I will utilize performance and cultural politics[9], in order to observe how embodiment of queer agency as rooted in the social, works in these fields. Embodiment presents, as Diamond (1996) argues, "the body's social text" which "promotes a heightened awareness of cultural difference, or historical specificity, or sexual preference, or racial and gender boundaries and transgression" (p. 4). Performance and cultural politics correspond with queer and identity politics, whereas queer performativity, based on citationality and resignification of the norms, as discussed in Chapters II and IV, influence the queer subject's embodiment. Subject in this regard, both in the field of queer and identity politics, and performance and cultural politics, is observed as "decentred by language and unconscious desire," which has made "performance and performativity crucial critical tropes" (Diamond, 1996, p. 4).[10] In this context, the performing subject is an effect of linguistic fragmentation within poststructuralism tradition, opposed to Cartesian subjectivity, which neglects the importance of the body's corporeality, the most important factor in performance and cultural politics.

Cartesian disembodied subject is not situated in the social context: "The repression of the body marks a refusal of Modernism to acknowledge that all cultural practices and objects are embedded in society, since it is the body that inexorably links the subject to her or his social environment" (Warr & Jones, 2000, p. 20). As a response to Modernism's

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[9]I use the term performance and cultural politics as overarching term for performance art, and studies, cultural politics, and body art, since in my opinion this term as such most appropriately illuminates its intertwining with queer and identity politics.

[10]Performativity and performance in performance and cultural politics are similar to Butler's proposed difference between performativity and performance. Performance is something that a subject does, "not a singular 'act' or event, but a ritualized production", when in contrast, performativity is process through which subject emerges by citing the norms, based on "citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names" (Butler, 1993, pp. 2, 95).

disembodiment, in the field of performance and cultural politics bodies are observed as "elusive marker[s] of the subject`s place in the social" (Jones, 1998, p. 13). As well, bodies are perceived as effects of subject's performativity, which influences embodiment and its meaning as social engagement. In this regard, Cartesian universal, transcendent and disembodied subject is recontextualized as dislocated and decentered (Jones, 1998, p. 1). A well, within feminist critique this subject is revealed as white, heterosexual Western male who practices his dominance at the expense of the others, as I will depict in the following subchapter. However, since here is the accent on embodiment and corporeality, next to the poststructuralist linguistic fragmentation that effects subject's materiality, affective turn is also important when concerning the performing subject. In this regard, affective turn has potential for new queer narratives, which oppose chrononormativity. Therefore, in order that queer subjects would express their identities through performances, my primary assumption is that they use "their bodies to dismantle the parameters of…norms and disrupt accepted signifiers of identity" (Warr and Jones, 2000, p. 13). I perceive performance and cultural politics as very fruitful terrain to observe how identities in general refute any stable coherency or being, and how they advocate never-ending becoming.

5.1   Queer Agency in Performance and Cultural Politics

Queer agency as described throughout Chapters II-IV is based on queer performativity, reparative practices and affective turn. In the following chapter, I am eager to observe how the same notions work within the field of performance and cultural politics. In this regard, I have in mind Diamond's (1996) thesis that performance "embeds traces of other performances, [but] it also produces experiences whose interpretation only partially depends on previous

experience" (p. 2), which gives the field of performance and cultural politics queer potential. This also illuminates Sedgwick and Parker's (1995) thesis that every performative "has…been from its inception already infected with queerness" (p. 5).

If taken into account that queer performativity is, as I argued, an effect of Austinian infelicitous performatives, presented by Derrida as a constitutional part of the performative from the start, this means that a performative is always eligible for queering or for resignification. In Butler's (1998) words: "the reiteration of norms, which compels the subject to sustain itself in relation to particular bodily standards through specific identifications, also opens up the possibility for *dis*identifications" (as cited in Jones, p. 49). In this statement, I would like to highlight the importance of 'bodily standards', which are important elements in performances, since the artist's body is the medium for performance. Bodily standards are presentations of socially embedded meanings, whereas as such they are disrupted by disidentification and transformational affects. In this regard, a disidentified subject, situated within the social "is not a flier who escapes the atmospheric force field of ideology" and neither is a "figure who can effortlessly come out on top every time", which means that sometimes "identification is insufficient". (Muñoz, 1999, pp. 161-2). It must be also taken into account that, as Muñoz argues, that not every queer performance reflects disidentification, which means that it can slip into the realm counter-identification, critiqued by Muñoz. It must also be taken into account that not every artist wants to be disidentified, but rather uses other strategies while performing. Having this in mind, in the following part of my thesis, several performances will serve me to depict queer subjects' artistic expression. I will explore the possibility of converting Butler's paranoid relationality with reparative practices, in order to observe if I can claim relationally queer expression. I use the following table, which presents my theoretical scheme of paranoid and queer relationality, which will inform me while interpreting performances:

QUEER AND IDENTITY POLITICS / PERFORMANCE AND CULTURAL POLITCS	
Paranoid Relationality	**Queer Relationality**
Original vs. Copy (shaming interpellation)	Disidentification (failed interpellation)
Paranoid (symmetrical epistemologies)	Paranoid + Reparative (new epistemology)
Constructivism + chrononormativity	Constructivism + chronotemporality
PERFORMANCE ARTISTS	
Keith Boadwee	Ron Athey

Table 1. Scheme of paranoid relationality and queer relationality –
intersections between queer and identity politics, performance and cultural politics

I approach notions presented in the table in a twofold aspect. On the one hand, I perceive them as tropes, which influence queer agency on the level of identity and queer politics, observed through the lens of dynamics of power relations. On the other hand, I am interested in how these notions influence artistic expression within the field of performance and cultural politics. In this regard, I will interpret the examples of performances by Keith Boadwee and Ron Athey. I will first present performance by Keith Boadwee, which I will interpret though artistic expression of heteronormative figure Jackson Pollock, since Boadwee's artistic expression depends on Pollock's performativity.

5.2   Keith Boadwee: Pollockian Performative

To present the possibility of queering the normative masculine identities and mutual dependency between them, I am going to use Keith Boadwee's[11] performance captured

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[11] Keith Boadwee (1961), "[h]is work deconstructs the traditional macho identity of the action painter through videos and photographs of his painting practice" (Warr & Jones, 2000, p. 288).

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though documented photographs "Purple Squirt" and "Red Strip", which were part of his exhibition held in Ace Gallery, Los Angeles in 1995.[12] I will question if his queer expression is a part of reparative practices within the concepts of disidentification and queer relationality. In doing so, I will juxtapose Boadwee's performances to heteronormative figure of Jackson Pollock[13], since his performativity was Boadwee's initial motivation for performance. I am guided by Jones' concept of Pollockian performative, which was additionally adopted by a younger generation of artists, such as Boadwee.

In Jones' (1998) terms, Pollockian performative is an effect of Pollock's media presentations, which presented him as embodiment of normative masculinity (p. 53-58). After the World War II, the media depicted him as "quintessentially and normatively masculine in the terms of American culture" (Jones, 1998, p. 67). For example, in Life magazine in 1949, in the article "Jackson Pollock: Is He the Greatest Living Painter in the United States?" (Figures 1 & 2, p. 36-7) Pollock was presented with "arms and legs crossed in a hostile and aggressive closure of the body against spectatorial curiosity and desire, in dark worker's clothing, smoking a cigarette and leaning nonchalantly against one of his drip paintings" (Jones, 1998, p. 67). As such, on the one hand, he is considered to be postmodern because he reveals his body while performing though action painting and therefore he opposes the Cartesian logic by which the presence of a subject`s body must be hidden "to ensure his transcendence as disembodied and divinely inspired" (Jones, 1998, p. 62). On the other hand, he presents the Cartesian universal masculinity, which is characterized by his "whiteness, heterosexuality, and class implication attached to…privileged subject position in modernism" (Jones, 1998, p. 93). Therefore, in Jones' (1998) opinion, he is an "ambivalent

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[12]"At Ace Contemporary Exhibitions, the largest gallery contains the result: 50 abstract canvases, ranging in size from 2-by-3-feet to 6-feet-square, saturated with gallons of paint in a rainbow of colors and an impressive variety of splatters, stains, stripes and runs. Four giant photos and two videos show the artist hard at work in his studio" (Pagel, 1995, para. 2).

[13]Jackson Pollock (1912-1956), "most influential American artist of his generation, he pioneered action and gesture in painting…[through] 'drip' painting technique (Warr & Jones, 2000, p. 293).

figure" (p. 61), because even though presented as postmodern, he is nevertheless modern at the same time. In other words, even though Pollock is observed through the lens of fixed heterosexual male identity, and as such a reflection of the modern male subject, at the same time he reflects Butler's reiteration of the norms, which Jones terms as Pollockian performative. She asserts that Pollock's art represents "the origin of performativity of postmodernism; and a performance, too", while after "the period of 1960 or so…performativity becomes the dominant mode in the articulation of the self" (p. 61). Therefore, observed through the lens of dynamics of power relations, as presented in Chapter II, his coherent heterosexual identity cannot be defined as coherent and stable, but rather as effect of performativity. In this regard, I am going to analyze Boadwee's performance, in order to observe how his art corresponds with Pollockian performative.

Figure 1. J. Pollock in Life Magazine, August 8, 1949,
photograph (Newman, 1949)

Figure 2. J. Pollock in Life Magazine, August 8, 1949,
photograph (Holmes, 1949)

5.2.1   Reparative Possibility I: Pollockian Performative as Queer Performative

Documented footage of 1995's Keith Boadwee's exhibition, "Purple Squirt" and "Red Strip" (1995) (Figures 3 & 4, p. 40), was a part his performance held in Ace Gallery, Los Angeles in 1995, as a response to the film *Jackson Pollock,* screened in the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 1951. Boadwee uses the technique of action painting with the help of an enema. He embodies queer identity though the exposure of his anus, whereas he is at the same time queering the Pollockian masculine performative. In "Purple Squirt," which I

am interpreting here, with his legs widespread over the canvas, Boadwee ejects streams of paint out of his anus. By this action, he becomes completely unveiled, while his body becomes the "locus of the self and the site where the public domain meets the private, where the social is negotiated, produced and made sense of" (Warr and Jones, 2000: 20-1). His performance is a response to a "*heterosexual imperative* securing the privilege of normative masculinity in Western culture" (Jones, 1998: 100), as this was the case in Pollock's media representation. As such, Boadwee presents the hidden threat to performances of normative masculinity, especially if it is taken into account that in the heteronormative discourse the anus is impenetrable, where man's penis penetrating into woman's vagina is paradigm of heterosexual intercourse. The examples of Boadwee show how queer identity challenges "normative subjectivity and its privileges", in a way that it demonstrates that "whiteness, maleness and heterosexuality" are no longer undisrupted paradigms (Jones, 1998: 103). Even though Boadwee's spurting anus becomes his social statement, the question is if resignification of Pollockian performative is sufficient to present Boadwee's performance as relationally queer and reparative practice.

By queering the normative masculinity, Boadwee at the same time reflects intertwinedness between the binary original vs. copy. In other words, Boadwee's expression depends on binary original vs. copy because by revealing the imitative status of heteronormative masculine norm, his queerness is explicitly related to this norm. Therefore, Boadwee's "project exposes the interdependency of queer subjectivity…on the normative codes of masculinity Pollock represents" (Jones, 1998, p. 100). If Boadwee depends on binaries, this means that by presenting his queer self-identification he also presents dynamics of power relations. Even though he reveals that heterosexual identity is citational (as well as homosexual), and by this he disrupts the binary, in my opinion he cannot be considered as disidentified subject, because at the same time his expression depends on the binary which he

disrupts. In other words, since Boadwee's motivation for the performance is Pollockian normativity, it seems that his performance cannot be interpreted without the relation to heteronormative masculinity.

However, even though his expression negotiates with paranoid relationality, by which he presents how heterosexual hegemony and privileged heterosexual male identity works, it can be noticed that he uses paranoia in reparative purposes, or in Sedgwick's words, he uses paranoid knowledge in order to present reparative, unparanoid possibility of his practice. In this regard, shame that was caused to him by homophobic heterosexism is recontextualized for healing purposes, which is noticeable if having in mind the exposure of his anus as representation of his 'deviant' desire and identity. As well, even though Boadwee cannot be described as disidentified subject, queering of the Pollockian performative reflects queer narrative, as a consequence of queer chronotemporality, depicted in Chapter IV. This illuminates the possibility of queering the Modernist subject, such as Pollockian, as well as the power of queer performativity, based on Derrida's citationality, which I described in Chapter II. In other words, if Pollockian performativity is available for queering, it seems that queer performativity was always a part of Modernism, since after all, Pollock is exemplar of Cartesian subject. Therefore, even though on the one hand, this performance has a great potential for queer relationality, Boadwee does not achieve it completely because of the initial dependence on relationality within binaries. On the other hand, having in mind assumption that queer subjects create counterpublics in relation to publics, this is also partially an argument which goes in favor to Boadwee's expression as partially relationally queer. Thus, the lack of queer relational expression in this example depends on queer politics development, since Boadwee's embodiment took place during "a crucial shift since the early 1990s from 'gay' to 'queer' in conceptualizing a body" (Jones, 2006, p. 164), which also presents correlations between queer and identity politics, and performance and cultural politics. In this

regard, in the next subchapter, I am going to refer to the performance art of Ron Athey, in order to observe if his artistic expression allows the interpretation within the modes of disidentification and queer relationality.

Figure 3. K. Boadwee (1995a), "Purple Squirt"   Figure 4. K. Boadwee (1995b), "Red Strip"

5.3   Ron Athey: Christian Masochism Performative

Performance and body artist Ron Athey[14] uses self-mutilating techniques as constitutional elements of his "flamboyant fetishization of suffering" (Jones, 1998, p. 229). His artistic expression corresponds with HIV and AIDS crisis, which were one of the main issues to be discussed within the frame of queer and identity politics in the 1980s and 1990s. Here, I am interested in how Athey is influenced with these issues, and how his expression is

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[14]"Los Angeles-based…[artist], a former heroin addict who is HIV positive and radically queer" (Jones, 2009, p. 49)

correlated with queer and identity politics. I have in mind that "[o]ne of the primary focuses of A.I.D.S. representation in the arts during the 1980s was...an attempt to prevent the disappearance in mind and memory of those who had suffered and died" (Richards, 2003, The Representation of A.I.D.S. section). As well, I follow Jones' (1998) thesis that "[a]n understanding of the body in pain is crucial in the age of AIDS and other autoimmune diseases that ravage the body and destroy its capacity for self-healing" (p. 230). The same as in example of Boadwee, I will question if Athey's queer expression can be interpret within the modes of disidentification and queer relationality.[15]

Athey is significant for me for the two reasons. On the one hand, in his performances he responds to omnipresent HIV and AIDS related homophobia and government's indifference to these issues, while on the other hand, he is queering religious iconography and indicating the reparative possibility of paranoid psychoanalysis, described as such by Sedgwick in Chapter III.[16] Athey's whole opus, starting from the AIDS crisis in the 1980s onwards, has the characteristics of negotiation between religious iconography and ritualism intertwined with HIV and AIDS issues, and Christian masochism discourse as well. In this regard, I will present him as a figure which queers the Christian masochism performative. In order to explain the structure of Christian masochism, I am going to use Reik's concept of moral masochism, where Christian iconography has crucial role.

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[15]In this context, while discussing Ron Athey's significance in performance and cultural politics, I will be informed by Jones' notion of the dehabituated subject in pain, Richards' study of Athey's work, who observes it through breaking the 'paranoid' binaries in the age of AIDS crisis, Reik's concept of Christian masochism and Moore's historical overview of masochism.

[16]Athey's use of Christian iconography is related with his childhood, whereas Athey depicts his family as religiously perverse ("Biography," n.d.). His grandmother and aunts who thought that Athey was born with a calling raised him. Athey comments: "I was raised by my grandmother and aunt and was influenced through their involvement with a Pentecostal church – it was at that time the calling of my life. I was training to be a preacher and my whole life centered around speaking in tongues, faith healing, and dances in spirit" (Athey, n.d.).

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Reik's moral masochism has, in contrast to Freud's interpretation of this phenomenon, different base. In Freud's (1988) interpretation of "morally masochistic male subject has given up on the desire to be a father, and may in fact have turned away from the paternal ego-ideal to be the maternal one" (as cited in Silverman, p. 42). In contrast, Reik, Freud's student, proposes two concepts, which influence masochist's actions. One is "impersonation" or mimicry of some behavior used as a prototype, and the second is "demonstrativeness", by which masochist needs spectators in order to achieve his identification fantasies (Reik, cited in Silverman, 1988, p. 43). In this regard, Reik does not observe male masochism as related to paternal or maternal identifications, but shifts his interests into the discourse of classic Christianity, where concepts of impersonation and demonstrativeness come together. He refers to saints and martyrs[17] who were sacrificed because of their religious beliefs. In examples of saints and martyrs, spectators are "structurally necessary, although… [they] may be either earthly or heavenly" (Reik, cited in Silverman, 1988, p. 43), whereby the ultimate fantasy of identification is crucified Christ with crown of thorns and bloody wounds. (Reik, as cited in Silverman, 1988, p. 43-4). In this regard, Christian masochist impersonates and tends to identify with Christ's suffering by self-mutilating himself or herself. However, as Reik (1988) argues, Christian masochism is incompatible with "phallic pretensions of masculinity" because it presents "negation of all phallic values" and is emasculating (as cited in Silverman, 1988, p. 44).

Both Reik and Freud's male masochisms are also ultimately gendered. As such, it fits the frame of late nineteen and the first half of the twentieth century's psychiatric discourse, which pathologized male masochism as "gender-inappropriate perversion" (Moore, 2009, p. 140). Thereby, masochism was considered "as the natural sexuality of women, regarding its

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[17]Martyr is "one who voluntarily suffers death rather than deny his religion by words or deeds; such action is afforded special, institutionalized recognition in most major religions of the world. The term may also refer to anyone who sacrifices his life or something of great value for the sake of principle" (Martyr [religion]).

manifestation in men's fantasies as aberrant, effeminate, and degenerate, while sadistic women were considered as "perverse…in the attempt to manipulate others…a kind of monstrosity" (Moore, 2009, pp. 138, 139, 142). This, defined as gender inappropriate perversion, was also reflecting "social anxieties about masculinity in middle-class life and confirming visions of national threat and racial degeneration…[and an interruption of the] natural gender order in which men dominated women" (Moore, 2009, p. 139). In this context, 'effeminized' men were "perverting normative masculinity by abdicating …[their] penetrative agency and relocating …[their] pleasure in bodily zones other than penis, which was considered the only legitimate organ of male pleasure" (Moore, 2009: 138).

Due to Athey's self-mutilating masochism expression, which is referencing martyrs and Christianity, I argue that Athey is queering the Christian masochism performative, whereby his expression also indicates reparative possibilities of homophobic and paranoid psychoanalysis, as well paranoia caused by HIV and AIDS issues. St. Sebastian (1999-2000) and Judas Cradle (2004-05) will help me to argue that Athey is not only queering Christian masochism performative, but that he also does it in a way that reflects queer relationality.

5.3.1   *Reparative Possibility II: Christian Masochism Performative as Radical Queer Performative*

The self-mutilated body is situated at the center of Athey's performances, and his performances are by Jones (2006) described as "radical[ly] queering new ways of thinking about bodies" (p. 159). Athey's masochistic expression is peculiar, not only because he overcomes normative binaries of pleasure and pain, masculine and feminine positions, as I will indicate below, but because he does it referencing AIDS discourse and Christian iconography. He queers Christian masochism performative, which is possible if having in

mind citationality and queer performativity depicted in Chapter II. References to the trope of Christian masochism are noticeable in Athey's performances St. Sebastian (1999-2000) and Judas Cradle (2004-05).

In St. Sebastian (1999-2000)[18], Athey explicitly articulates the figure of St. Sebastian, who is by Jones (2006) described as a "male masochist…son of a wealthy Roman family who was martyred for helping persecuted Christians" (p. 167). Athey impersonates this figure because, as Richards (2003) argues, St. Sebastian embodies the sufferer and outsider who "represents his resistance to relinquishing his faith…who would not give up his god" (The Representation of A.I.D.S. section). Therefore, this gesture is, in Athey's case, correlated with HIV-positive and AIDS suffering people who were treated like martyred saints during the AIDS crisis. On the one hand, they were excluded by mainstream homophobic discourse or even within gay circles, while on the other hand their illness and difference "marks and separates them and perhaps even gives them an iconic status in a sub-cultural context" (Richards, 2003, The Representation of A.I.D.S. section). Athey comments: "I put an arrow through me as a metaphor for Saint Sebastian to represent HIV positive people…as being outcasts within gay culture" (Athey, n. d.).

In this piece, with his eclectic performance style is, Athey is disidentified with "traditional representations of masculinity, pain, and pleasure as well as people living with A.I.D.S. or H.I.V. infection" (Richards, 2003, Ron Athey, A.I.D.S. and the Politics of Pain section). As well, Athey's symbolism of a wounded martyred saint is also relationally queer. This follows from Jones' (1998) claim that illness "force[d] the subject [Athey] to

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[18]Along with the photography of Athey as St. Sebastian (Opie, 2010) (Figure 6, p. 45), I have used excerpt from performance "St. Sebastian" (1999), uploaded on Youtube by Ron Athey (2010) (Figure 7, p. 46). This performance was presented alongside performances "Solar Anus" and "Suicide" in Paris (1999) and in Santa Monica and Bologna (2000) (Athey, 2010). I have also attached the painting "St. Sebastian" by Rubens (1618), baroque painter, in order to present how Christian martyr and saint St. Sebastian was depicted in the era which 'preceded' possibilities of queering (Figure 5, p. 45).

recognize…his existence in relation not only to an other [AIDS and HIV infected subjects] but also to the tortured self" (p. 230), since after all, by self-mutilating himself, he is a subject and object (his body) at the same time. By not identifying with a pathologized position of emasculating masochist (Moore), Athey has the possibility of altering pleasure, pain and shame and the normative conception of AIDS and HIV related paranoia. The same is noticeable in performance "Judas Cradle".

Figure 5. "St. Sebastian,"
painting (Rubens, 1618)

Figure 6. R. Athey as St. Sebastian,
photograph (Opie, 2000)

Figure 7. Still from Athey's (2010) performance "St. Sebastian"

In "Judas Cradle" (2004-05)[19] (Figures 9, 10, 11, p. 47-8), a performance by Ron Athey and Juliana Snapper, Athey embodies a sufferer who self-mutilates himself on judas cradle (Figure 8, p. 47). This medieval torture device was "used to extract confessions; it consists of a pyramid onto which the victim is lowered such that it penetrates her or his nether regions" (Jones, 2006, p. 161). During the performance, Athey impales himself onto a judas cradle, "sharp three-foot-high wooden pyramid" (Jones, 2006, pp. 161). Through the bodily perspective, Jones (2006) describes the performance in terms of producing a "dehabituated body that sloughs off the shackles of the naturalizing gestures and patterns through which our bodies are encouraged to perform in normative ways" (p. 159). In this regard, Jones defines 'dehabituation' of the body through Athey's "narrating the impossibility of the hetero-body and the hetero-matrix" (Jones, 2006, p. 168), which is noticeable in his presentation of anal self-mutilation. By impaling himself on judas cradle, Athey expands masochistic flagellation, which as presented by Moore (2009), was in the late nineteen and early twentieth century's psychiatry marked as common male masochistic pleasure, in which "the buttocks…[took] the

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[19]Here I use Jones' (2006) summaries of the performances that were held in Kodeljevo Castle in Luna Park in Ljubljana, Slovenia, in 2004, and in Contact Theatre, Manchester in 2005 (159-169).

role of the primary erotic zone…associated with humiliation, shame, infantilism, and femininity" (p. 139).

If having in mind that masochism is in heteronormative discourse presented as an emasculating pathology, which reflects submissive and effeminized gender deviation, in contrast to women's masochism, observed as reflection of her desirable, normative role, it seems that Athey distances himself from this hierarchical social order. In other words, he 'breaks' the logics of binaries such as pleasure vs. pain, powerful vs. powerlessness, dominant vs. submissive, masculine vs. feminine, which are not needed for his viability, but are rather used in a productive and positive way, in Tomkins' form from two to finitely many (Chapter III). As in Boadwee's example, Athey's anus also presents a certain social statement correlated with presenting his radical queerness. The difference is that he does not remain within the binary expression, but rather 'breaks' the normative hierarchies and binaries. In this regard, Athey does not coexist within normative pleasure vs. pain binary, or accents the imitative status of heteronormativity, as that was the case with Boadwee, but rather celebrates his radical queerness.

Figure 8. Judas cradle, medieval torture device, ("Judas cradle, medieval," 2010)

Figure 9. R. Athey and J. Snapper, "Judas Cradle," photograph (Vasón, 2004-05a)

Figure 10/11. R. Athey impaling himself in "Judas Cradle,"
photograph (Vasón, 2004-05b)

By embodying the figure of martyr St. Sebastian and impaling himself on judas cradle, Athey responds not only to AIDS and HIV crisis and its victims, but also to his fundamentalist Pentecostal up-bringing, whereas in much of his work he refers to "the insane beliefs and outrageous behaviors of his family's religious perversity" ("Biography," n.d.). He recontextualizes the figures of Christian iconography giving them new contemporary meanings, which also illuminate new representation of the HIV-positive body, embodying thereby "a sort of post-modern secularised saint" (Richards, 203, Making a Mark section). In this regard, if following Sedgwick's logic that every performative is queer from its inception, it follows that Athey is queering the Christian masochism performative. By this, he proves the power of queer performative at the same time. As well, his performances can be interpreted as a form of healing from trauma, which is used in reparative purposes. Since he enjoys and accepts "performative violence…cheerfully or even ecstatically" (Warr & Jones, 2000, p. 32) it seems that he is using paranoid past, self-mutilation and affect of shame in positive, pleasurable purposes. Thus, he brings forward his personal trauma and correlates it with discourse of AIDS and HIV crisis, and at the same time he creates new queer narrative. By

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this, though his bodily experience he refutes chrononormativity, whereas his narrative does not depend on heteronormative time and place.

Athey's shame is also observed in correlation to his HIV-positive body. He faces being HIV-positive by bringing his affected blood into the scene, not hiding it, but rather presenting it through self-exposure, as a constitutional part of his body, performance and self. Because of this, his performances embrace Crimp's queer responsibility, whereas the infected body is not a subject to be hidden, but rather perceived as a constitutional part of identity. In other words, he "presents an uncensored version of…the 'reality' of sickness…[and] uses performance to collectively raise and appease his personal demons but in a way that confronts the audience with his 'real' HIV positive body" (Richards, 2003, The Representation of A.I.D.S. section).

In refusing to accept false moralism, but rather using the queer shame in more productive way, it seems that Athey is not adapting to the social position of HIV-positive queer subjects, nor counter-identifying with this position, but rather disidentifying with it. Intentionally disidentified with his social position, he transforms his wounds, pain and shame into queer responsibility. At the same time, as Richardson (2003) argues, he "effectively performs in a territory that is…largely unmapped, but through his public occupation…he opens it up for definition and interpretation, so that the boundary shifts and the limit to be transgressed is relocated once more" (Ron Athey, A.I.D.S. and the Politics of Pain section). In this regard, he is bringing his shame and pain-based expression into the public space, creating at the same time queer counterpublics.

Athey's artistic expression is primarily relational towards HIV and AIDS sufferers, and he is productively using paranoid knowledge from the past, by repairing it. Therefore, Athey's wounding is also political, meaning that it makes his "body read[able] for others and thus

opens up complex circuits of intersubjective desire that have the potential to transform the way we inhabit the world" (Jones, 2009, p. 45), which makes his expression relationally queer. Disidentified with normative perceptions of pain and shame, he exceeds binary frames and represents queer relationality, whereby he is turned towards other HIV-positive people, as queer collectivity. By this, Athey is directed towards the future, by creatively using the figures from the past (both the HIV-positive and AIDS infected people as well as Christian martyr saints), bypassing any kind of normativity, and using his queerness in a productive way.

In contrast, it turned out that Boadwee's ultimate relation to normative masculinity is not sufficient to confirm his disidentification, which confirms Muñoz's claim that disidentified subject is not a "figure who can effortlessly come out on top every time" (Muñoz, 1999, p. 162). However, even though Boadwee is not disidentified subject, his expression is promising as well as Athey's. They both use shame in reparative purposes. Additionally, Boadwee's recontextualization of the Pollockian performative and Athey's recontextualization of Christian masochism performative are equally significant because they illuminate the power of queer performativity, which reminds that queerness has its own Modernity, presence and promising future.

"Queerness time is time of ecstasy. Ecstasy is queerness's way"

(Muñoz, 2009, p. 187).

In conducting my research, I have correlated queer and identity politics with the performance and cultural politics, since both fields are based on concepts of performance and performativity, informed by discursive subject formation, affective turn and reparative practices. By mapping out the important moments of queer politics' developments in the last twenty years, my aim was to examine whether there is an opportunity to claim queer relationality, not completely dependent on relationality with heteronormativity, but rather based on reparative possibilities of paranoid heteronormative practices. Even though I conclude that concept of queer relationality is plausible queer possibility, it is not immune or completely distanced from, what I termed paranoid relationality, because such a claim would in my opinion, only reinforce binaries, against which I was arguing. In this regard, I used concepts of affective turn, reparative practices and chronotemporality, in order to observe how paranoid relationality would be reshaped and repaired to favor relationally queer agency. These are also the reasons why I could not have claimed that queer autonomy, which was my initial idea, is plausible. I came to the conclusion that complete diminishing of relationality is questionable, because this would be contrary not only to the claim of inevitable situating of queer subjects in the social, but also to the critique of the autonomous, and disembodied Cartesian subject. Therefore, claiming autonomy would reinforce individualism, which is contrary to queer collectivity and queer subjects' embeddedness in the social. This is why I embraced the concept of queer relationality, which situates subjects within queer collective, and due to the reparative practices, promises productive future.

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Even though I presented Butler's binary original vs. copy, which reflects relationality with normative identities, as paranoid, in order not to be too exclusive or to fall into the pitfall of binarism, I realized that paranoid relationality could also be repaired and used in positive, more productive purposes. In order to strengthen my arguments that would serve queer relationality, I used Muñoz's disidentification, which is related with creating new social relations and productive counterpublics, whereby his concept of queer utopianism corresponds with queer collectivity, situated in the social realm. In this regard, I have pointed out a possibility of creating queer narratives based on the concept of queer chronotemporality, according to which the past can be creatively and productively recontextualized, which was also noticeable on the examples of selected performances.

The examples of two performance artists provided me with conclusion that new social relations, which overcome or broaden heteronormative narratives, are possible. Based on performances by Keith Boadwee and Ron Athey it turned out that both the Cartesian modern subject, as well as Christian iconography can be queered. Both Boadwee's recontextualization of the Pollockian performative and Athey's recontextualization of the Christian masochism performative are equally significant because they illuminate the power of queer performativity and queer chronotemporality. Boadwee's expression does not fully reflect queer relationality, because his performance cannot be interpreted without direct relation to normative masculinity, when at the same time his performance reflects reparative potential, because it is based on productive transformation of shame. In contrast, the effect of Athey's radical queer embodiment completely challenged paranoid relationality, with the result of achieved relationally queer expression, which is queer responsible at the same time.

By proposing queer relationality, my aim was to illuminate queer politics' possibilities to use the past and present for queerness that would be effective in the future as well. By

favoring queer relationality, in order to remain in the frame of queer possibilities and not definite conclusions, I would also like to mention some other queer possibilities that should be subjects of future researches and debates, which would potentially resolve the problem of queer autonomy, which I was not able to do in this research. On the one hand, this could be researched within the direction of affective turn, but also with further questioning of concepts such as subjectivity and desire, opposed to identity and various identifications, which are as I depicted here, quite limited and exclusionary practices. On the other hand, Muñoz's (2009) queer possibility presented as "collective temporal distortion", which advocates "step[ping] out of the rigid conceptualization that is a straight present" (p. 185) is also relevant for the future debates. In this regard, when hoping for queer futurity, debate could be broaden in form of intertwining concepts of queer utopia and anti-utopia. 'Queer utopians', such as Muñoz, advocate utopia as a productive strategy for queerness in the future, based on queer collectivity's diversity and relationality. In contrast, 'anti-utopians' embrace, as Muñoz (2009) argues, antirelational approach which advocates singularity and "purity of sexuality as a singular trope of difference" (pp. 10-11). In this moment, I consider queer relational and utopian possibility highly legitimate, since it is based on productive queerness, based on current and past queer narratives, while at the same time it might eventually also embrace the idea of queer autonomy in the future.

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