EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

A comparative analysis of anti-corruption movements in India and Indonesia

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Abstract

This paper examines the broad determinants of emergence of 'national' social movements. Particularly, it investigates the factors that facilitate the emergence of a movement in a given nation, and contrariwise compel its pulverization and non-existence in another nation, despite the similitude of their sociocultural, political and economic contexts. This is done using the methodology of comparative analysis, explicating the contrasting emergence of the national anti-corruption movements in the countries of India and Indonesia, using the 'most similar' research design. . The main findings of the investigation result in an affirmation of its hypothesis conjecturing the central role of certain 'nation-specific' factors for explaining the differential emergence of social movements in the two nations. The paper identifies a high degree of political consciousness, unity in leadership, active and committed role of civil society organizations, access to resources, and social alliances cutting across class cleavages, as some key 'nation-specific' factors.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The effervescence of social movements as a conceptual phenomenon has palpably manifest itself in not just their extensive use as a tool of political expression, but also in the diverse expansion in the study and research of the subject over the last century (della Porta and Diani, 1999; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996). Inevitably, this has contributed to the development of a wide array of theoretical explanations underpinning social movements over the years – eminent ones constituting the theory of collective action, resource mobilization theory, theory of political opportunity structure, and the theory of new social movements. While the contributions of these theories have been overwhelmingly insightful in understanding the emergence and dynamics of social movements, they are limited in yielding a thorough comprehension of the concept due to the lack of theoretical consensus on factors influencing the very emergence of social movements.

This paper is an attempt to establish a linkage between the varying research strands, therein addressing the 'gap' of a comprehensive perspective for the identification of factors determining the emergence of movements. In doing so, the paper aims to generate a wholesome 'synthesis' of factors nurtured by an assortment of social movement theories, for explaining the rise of social movements. Essentially, the key question this paper aims to research is – 'what are the determinants of rise of national social movements?'. In consonance with this investigation, the paper also examines the factors that contrast the emergence of movements in one nation with their pulverization in another, despite the similitude of their sociocultural, political and economic contexts. This is done using the methodology of comparative analysis, explicating the contrasting emergence of the movements in the two

3

countries using the 'most similar' research design. Precisely, the differential emergence of the movements is then reasoned on the basis of the specificity of several contextual factors (political consciousness, access to resources, and repression of movements), which are exported from the assorted social movement theories and are ascribed as 'nation-specific' in this paper. It is important to note here that the paper focuses on the phenomenon of 'national' social movements, and hence local level grassroots movements and uprisings are not contained in its scope. The assessment of the theoretical propositions is supported by examining the phenomenon of the national 'anti-corruption movement' in Indonesia and India – contrasting its emergence in the former with its pulverization in the latter for nearly four decades, albeit the seemingly conducive factors for its eruption.

The rationale for drawing a comparative between these two countries lies in their broad similitude of cultural and historical heritage, sharp economic growth and liberalisation policies, presence of vast second economies, fragmented democracy and proliferation of civil society (Ferguson, 2011). Besides, in light of the constricted focus of the anti-corruption movement being researched in this paper, the two countries match favourably with regard to the prevalent levels of corruption and the onerous efforts of these nations for corruption control (Khan, 1998; Transparency International, 2011). Furthermore, the comparative analysis of the two countries provides an interesting connect between the existing literature on the three decades long anti-corruption crusade in Indonesia and the recent eruption of the same in India after decades of repression and non-existence. In researching so, the study adds value to the comparative social movement literature. In addition, anti-corruption movements offer a subject worthy of research, owing to the thus far investigation of corruption issues being limited to its causes, consequences and remedies. The paper thus puts forth a relatively

less explored area of research, focusing on factors embarking mass unrest which result from corruption and aspiration for corruption control.

The paper thus treats the 'emergence of movements' as the key dependent variable and explores the explanatory factors for the cases of India and Indonesia that differ on the dependent variable. In doing so, it builds the hypothesis that the differential emergence of social movements in two countries emanates from an array of nation-specific factors, regardless of the similarities of their structural contexts and external factors influencing them in the same capacity.

Using the empirical evidence of anti-corruption movements in India and Indonesia, the paper validates the hypothesis with its key findings. These propound that absence of certain conditioning variables and precipitating factors hindered the evolution of a national anti-corruption movement in India, unlike Indonesia. In the latter, a high level of political consciousness devout to attain bureaucratic accountability and transparency was ensconced in the broader struggle for democratization in the country, which served as an effective facet for mobilizing the population. Further, unity in leadership, active and committed role of civil society organizations, access to material and non-material resources and social alliances cutting across class cleavages, were identified as some crucial 'nation-specific' factors determining the emergence of the anti-corruption movement in Indonesia.

For the purpose of systematic investigation, the paper is divided into four chapters. The first chapter builds a critical review of the vast literature that expatiates on the emergence of social movements. It embarks with a chronological assessment of the propositions of social movement theories, and concludes with the implications of these propositions for the research

focus of this paper. The second chapter elaborates the research design and methodology of the comparative investigation, with a brief mention of its rationale and limitations. The third chapter builds empirical insights vis-à-vis a description of the chain of events that culminate into an anti-corruption movement in Indonesia, and contrastingly lead to its non-emergence in India until 2011. The fourth chapter is devoted to a comparative examination of the anti-corruption endeavors in India and Indonesia, reflecting on the factors accounting for the prime difference for a movement's emergence and pulverization. Finally, the paper concludes with the factorial assessments of emergence of social movements, the limitations of the paper and areas for future research.

2. Literature review

The unprecedented proliferation of social movements and their vast influence in politics since the 1960s has undoubtedly made them a key area of research (della Porta and Diani, 1999; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996). Inevitably, the rationalization for the emergence of social movements has been a core element of exploration in the vast body of literature that has that has evolved in an attempt to theorize the phenomenon. This chapter is an extension of several such attempts to demystify the potential grounds and *raison d'être* for the rise of social movements. However, taking cognizance of the fact that the literature on social movements is largely eclectic, this chapter consciously delineates its connotations, implications and scope in reference to its relevance in this paper. For a coherent examination of the issue then, this chapter holds the objective of a comprehensive review of the theoretical background on the rise of social movements to subsequently allow a cross-national comparison of the same, and an evaluation of its contributions to the vast body of literature. It embarks with the presentation of a chronological overview of five core theories that elucidate the rise of social movements – structural strain theory, resource mobilization theory, theory of political opportunity structure, and theory of new social movements. These are ensconced under three main paradigms: social psychological paradigm, structural strain paradigm, and the post-Fordist and modern paradigm. After evaluating the contributions and inadequacies of each, the chapter considers the implications of the existing theoretical propositions and sets the tone for the research questions pursued in this paper.

The emergence of social movements has been an evolutionary process rather than a dramatic innovation, as societal actors have always indulged in some sort of collective behavior and

protests throughout history. The origins of the social movement theory can be said to have derived chiefly from the influences of five major theories, which assemble under the realm of three paradigms: social psychological paradigm, structural strain and Marxist paradigm, and the post-Fordist and modern paradigm.

2.1. Social psychological paradigm

The first period in social movement theory and research was marked by the social psychological paradigms, with a primacy of the symbolic interactionism approach proposed by Herbert Blumer (1969). The approach advanced the understanding of collective behavior as a collective enterprise to establish a new social order through symbolic representations, for pathological or pragmatic purposes (Garner and Tenuto, 1997). While on one hand, this paradigm was characterized by ideological and individual propensities, the mass society theory equally contributed to its formation, as is visible in the works of Harold Laswell and William Kornhauser (1959). According to this, modern society is characterized by alienation and anomie resulting from the disintegration of the social fabric and a weakening of the normative order, which spawns feelings of aggression resulting from thwarted expectations, therein making individuals more susceptible to ideological appeals in an anti-institutionalist framework (della Porta and Diani, 1999). Collective behavior in such instances often culminates in political extremism comprising individuals with little intellectual, professional or political resources (Kornhauser, 1959; Porta and Diani, 1999). The rise of Nazism and the American Civil War are fine exemplars of such crisis behavior.

8

2.2. Structural strain paradigm

The second major period in social movement theory, mainly identifiable in the 1960s, shifted the focus from earlier theories to the structural strain paradigm – also incorporating the rational choice and resource mobilization theories. The *structural paradigm* shifted attention from the individual as the unit of analysis to its encompassing social structure, based on the belief that collective action through the instrument of social movements was imperative to bring about institutional change (Merton, 1938). It explained the emergence of movements as a pressure faced by its actors, which is insinuated owing to a strain caused by the incongruity between culturally defined goals and the institutionalized means available to achieve these goals (Merton, 1938). This was elucidated with different structural strain models, such as the macro-strain model, which emphasized the anger and frustration of individuals for rebellion; and the relative deprivation model, which attributed the emergence of a movement to a certain kind of deficit relative to a reference group (Garner and Tenuto, 1997).

In tandem, the *structural-functionalist approach* explained the emergence of social movements as the inability of the homeostatic rebalancing mechanisms in society, depicting the failure of institutions and social control mechanisms to generate social cohesion on one hand, and the societal response to such crisis through a shared ideology and collective solidarity on the other hand (della Porta and Diani, 1999). A prominent theory in this regard is the *theory of collective behavior*, propounded by Neil Smelser. His six-stage model explains the emanation of a movement as dependent on structural conduciveness (configuration of social structure that facilitates or constrains the emergence of collective behavior); structural strain (a source of tension or problem in the society); growth and spread of generalized beliefs of social actors; leadership and communication; precipitating factors; and mobilization (Smelser, 1962).

The structural strain theories, however, attracted much criticism on the grounds that structural strain, tensions and conflicts, alone do not suffice to explain the emergence of social movements; it is equally important to consider the conditions that facilitate the transposition of discontent to mobilization. These conditions were elucidated in *the resource mobilization theory*, through the capacities manifest in the acquisition of resources or the strategies adorned by social movements (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; della Porta and Diani, 1999). Resources could be material, such as – money, work, concrete benefits and services; or alternatively, non-material, such as – ethical engagement, faith, friendship, authority, elite sponsorship, media support and favorable public opinion (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; della Porta and Diani, 1999). Besides, the strategies implicating "the manner in which movements organize discontent, create solidarity networks, reduce the costs of action, share incentives among members and achieve external consensus" (Porta and Diani, 1999, p. 15), constitute fundamental determinants of their successful emergence and sustenance. Different types and relative proportions of resources and strategies determine the force of an emerging movement and its following effectiveness.

Further, in explaining the emanation of movements, the resource mobilization theory marked a transition from its predecessive theories concentrated on ideologies, discourses and individuals, to a focus on social movement organizations guided by means-rationality, that is the conscious and purposive matching of organizational forms and strategies to the desired goals (Zald and Ash, 1966). It explained the emergence, difference and effectiveness of movements based on their pursuit of narrow goals, bureaucratic structure and disruptive methods. This implied that "large organizations with formal structures are more likely to be co-opted, whereas small and centrally controlled movements exhibit preemptive outcomes,

10

that is, benefits without acceptance" (Garner and Tenuto, 1997, p. 23, Zald and Ash, 1966; Curtis and Zurcher, 1974).

Mayer Zald (1966), Anthony Oberschall (1973) and Charles Tilly (1978) also contributed to the development of the resource mobilization theory. They envisaged social movements as rational, purposeful and organized actions that emanate from a cost-benefit analysis of participation in movements with special regard to resource mobilization by movement actors that is deemed crucial for its development. In consonance with this perception, proponents of this theory discard the claims of earlier theories of collective behaviour as an expression for isolated and displaced individuals as "a surrogate to their social marginalization" (della Porta and Diani, 1999, p. 15). Rather, they explain that mobilization also entails the strengthening of existing vertical and horizontal solidarity links, thus integrating diverse collectivities. This elucidates the fact that recruits of a movement usually comprise participants and activists from former well-organized and integrated movements. "Socially isolated and uprooted individuals hence tend to under-represent a movement, at least until it becomes substantial" (Oberschall, 1973, p. 135).

Despite its extensive contributions, the resource mobilization theory attracted criticism for overlooking the structural origins of protest, and for taking insufficient cognizance of the external environment of social movements – more specifically the political and institutional milieu within which the movements operate (della Porta and Diani, 1999). The *political opportunity structure theory* is of special mention in this regard, which determines the emergence and endurance of a movement based on the interaction of movement actors with individuals occupying pivotal positions in the polity (Tilly, 1978). Sidney Tarrow (1983) in his empirical research of protest cycles in Italy, proffered several variables signifying this

11

relationship and regulating the agenda-setting and decision-making processes of movements. These constitute "the degree of openness or closure of formal political access, the degree of stability or instability of political alignments, the availability and strategic posture of potential allies" (Tarrow, 1983, p. 28), and "political conflicts between and within elites" (Tarrow, 1989, p. 35). Besides, the very forms of political institutions in society, the behaviour of incumbent elites, and the level of social control and repression of the movement, were listed as equally important factors (Tarrow, 1994). The movement, in this sense, was seen as comprising organizational entrepreneurs, thus seizing opportunities to mobilize and routinize resources as rational actors, including support from elites. Such entrepreneurship was anticipated to lead to professionalization of movement organizations unlike the contrary approach of their short-run operation within the framework of indigenous protest mobilizations and political opportunity structures (Mayer, 1991).

Berger and Luckmann (1966) point out that for political opportunity structure to prevail as a key factor for the emergence of social movements, its social construction must concur with its objective existence. This means that for a protest to emerge, activists must undergo a process of 'cognitive liberation' to affirm their belief about structural availability, which they not only hold responsible for a problematic status quo, but within which or through which they foresee potential to bring about a change (Diani, 1996; Gamson and Meyer, 1996; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996).

The theory is also useful to understand that movements are often shaped by other contemporaneous or historical movements possessing similar ideological trends, thus generating cooperation and coalitions amongst them. In addition, their affluence may also be determined by counter-movements, which may induce competition between their parallel

existences. More importantly, the interaction of these movements over time with state actors, non-state elites, media and counter-movements generates cycles of protest, collective action and political change, often leading to a reduction of remonstrations and resources of movements, with the simultaneous intensification of social control endeavours (Garner and Tenuto, 1997).

Political opportunity theorists, however, have been criticized for exhibiting a strong bend towards 'political reductionism', and ignoring the larger cultural context within which social movements in the modern times have taken shape (Melucci, 1996; Rochon, 1998).

Similar to the resource mobilization and political opportunity structure theories, the Marxist paradigm reaffirmed this thrust on movement organizations, however it purported the influence of existing structure not merely as movement environments but as their underlying cause (Garner and Tenuto, 1997). For this very reason, the Marxist approach considered movements not only means-rational in their relationship to the environment, but also ends-rational in their endeavor to reform them. Piven and Cloward (1977) in this context drew attention to the primacy of spontaneity, unpredictability and bottom-up mobilization of movements, unlike the resource mobilization theorists who attribute substantial weight to the movement organizations for a movement's emergence and success.

2.3. Post-Fordist and modern paradigm

The third period in social movement theory, commencing late 1960s and early 1970s, was characterized by new challenges for the assimilation of social movements in the structure of society, especially in face of a new and evolving political, social and economic landscape. The phenomena of advanced capitalism, post-Fordism, modernity, service and information

economy instigated changes in collective identities and brought forth a new type of activism (Garner and Tenuto, 1997; della Porta and Diani, 1999). Globalization, technology and media further acted as push factors for the expansion of these identities and the weakening of state control, which led to the culmination of a new variety of movements. Known as the 'new social movements', first observed in Europe, these movements were fundamentally of a Leftist and anti-statist nature, were loosely organized and anti-hierarchical in structure, had libertarian appeals, and mobilized around new issues such as environment, equal treatment of LGBTs, representation of the marginalized, corruption control and so on (Edelman, 2001; Garner and Tenuto, 1997). They drew support from segments of population who were more probable to be estranged from their occupational fixtures, such as alienated youth, the new middle class and the new working class. Although the decentralized operation of these movements paved way for flexibility, their rather amorphous form and anti-statist stand posed obstacles in their strategies for social transformation (Edelman, 2001).

Contrary to the earlier conceptions of social movements as irrational and reactive phenomena, this theory explained the emergence of social movements as an extension of conventional forms of political action, wherein actors engage in a rational manner for effective mobilization of resources, thus transforming into social entrepreneurs (della Porta and Diani, 1999).

To sum up, the reasons for emergence of social movements are discernible in the evolution of all these theories, particularly displaying an evolving shift from the study of their unexpected dynamics and empirical analysis of collective behavior, to the structural assessment of movements and their planned organizational strategies. This transition is represented chiefly by the progression from the theory of collective action to the theory of new social movements.

Although the above-discussed theories have made important contributions to the study of social movements, they are not flawless. In presenting myriad and incongruent conceptions, causes and characteristics of social movements, these theories have their own inadequacies, as discussed in this chapter. The aim of this paper is then to offer an alternative methodology for the investigation of 'emergence of social movements', by synthesising and filtering into it the several tenets of existing social movement theories. In the subsequent chapters, the paper tests the promising potential of this methodology by exploring the extent to which these factors have been manifested in the emergence of the national anti-corruption movements in India and Indonesia in general. At the same time, this dissertation also seeks to explore if the anti-corruption movements in India and Indonesia can be utilized to explicate the broad determinants of the emergence (or alternatively pulverization) of social movements, or are these movements intrinsically characteristic of the social, political and economic conditions in these countries, not appropriate for a capacious generalization.

3. Research design and methodology

This paper intends to address the shortcomings of the existing social movement theories by avoiding conceptual jargons and creating a more generic and comprehensive understanding of social movements, rather than perceiving the factors for their emergence in watertight and highly compartmentalized theoretical frameworks. To create a more balanced perspective then, this paper holds the objective of amalgamating these theories, therein generating a synthesis for a prudent investigation of the *raison d'être* for rise of social movements. In consonance, the paper also seeks to explore the differential emergence of a movement across nations, with particular reference to distinct time periods, despite the movements being similar in their objective(s) and nature.

The resolution of these investigations is manifested in the use of the method of comparative analysis, which is an established methodology in social movement research since the 1960s (Tilly, 1986; Tarrow, 1989). The use of the methodology is justified for its capacity to go beyond descriptive statistical measures, and instead examining the impact of national political and historical characteristics of the countries under analysis in explaining the emergence of movements (della Porta, 2002). It hence establishes the crucial significance of path dependence to explicate both the spatial and temporal contexts of movements (Rucht, 1994), which is in congruence of the focus of this paper.

The comparative method employed in the paper investigates two countries – India and Indonesia – preferring the small number of cases to comprehensively examine the macro-political phenomenon of social movements. In doing so, it uses the 'most-similar' research

design to compare the phenomenon of anti-corruption movements in these countries. The comparison is particularly relevant considering India and Indonesia's similarity on various parameters. Both the countries share a historical and cultural heritage, with special influences of the Hindu culture on the fusion culture of Indonesia. In conjunction, both are analogous on account of their colonial legacy, and more recently a sharp economic growth in line with an ardent approach for liberalization. Both countries are clamorous, have a fragmented democracy with concealed interests, and a growing civic culture and active civil society (Ferguson, 2011). As per the 2010 World Development Indicators of the World Bank, the GDP of the two countries strikes a comparable match, with India having a GDP of US$ 1,832,222 and ranking ninth globally, and Indonesia having a GDP of US$ 706, 558 and raking eighteenth[i] (The World Bank, 2010). Similarly, their per capita income[ii] falls within the same bracket, with Indonesia ranking 118 at US$ 4,293 and India ranking 124 at US$ 3586. Even in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI) estimates of 2011, the two nations are comparable – Indonesia ranking 124 with an HDI of 0.617, and India ranking 134 with an HDI of 0.547. Further, in the context of this essay, public administration is frail and inefficient in both countries, which has made corruption endemic in their sociopolitical framework through patron-client flows (Khan, 1998). Both countries rank low on the Corruption Perceptions Index 2011 of Transparency International, with India ranking 95 and scoring 3.1 on a scale of 0-10, and Indonesia ranking 100 and scoring 3 (Transparency International, 2011). Inevitably, under these circumstances both countries have displayed onerous efforts in mitigating corruption in the last few decades, which is examined in the ensuing chapter.

The design "maximizes the variance of the dependent variable and minimizes the variance of the control variables" (Lijphart, 1975, p. 164). This implies that general similarities of the two

countries under analysis are irrelevant in explaining the differential evolution of their anti-corruption movement, and hence, to allow better understanding of this difference, focus is set on other explanatory variables that are different. These variables ascribe specificity to various contextual factors (political, social, economic and historical) in the two countries, which can consequently be considered as 'nation-specific' factors in explaining the contrasting emergence of movements. In other words, 'nation-specific' factors outline the social, political, and cultural conditions of each exclusive country, and determine the precise nature of the societal response to other structural and external factors influencing each country. For instance, these may refer to the social perceptions of regime legitimacy and regime effectiveness in fulfilling societal expectations, ingrained in the levels of political consciousness of the population. Further, these may include the degree of unity or fragmentation in leadership, social alliances and cleavages within the society (class, ethnic or political), knowledge of the symbolic and organizational resources in society, alternative centers of power and a history of prior struggles. In this way, nation-specific factors are effective to explain the rise of social movements in some countries, and their absence in others, despite similar structural and external variables at work. However, these factors are not to be misconstrued as idiosyncratic to each country, rather they offer comparable indicators on a broader scale, than just being restrictive within a narrow national framework (Nørgaard and Sampson, 1984, p. 774).

This paper examines these factors in detail and puts forward the empirical attributes of anti-corruption movements necessary to test their theoretical significance in comparing the differential emergence of movements. Here, nation-specific factors constitute as the independent variable(s) and the emergence of movements implies the dependent variable. Anticipating the copious amount of the independent variables and the multi-pronged nature of

18

the 'cause-effect' phenomenon being enquired, this paper essentially adopts an exploratory research design. However, focus on nation-specific factors does not entail that these are the sole determinants of movements. Structural and external factors are also key causal factors for the rise of movements. But since the focus of this paper is to draw a comparative study of the divergent nature and peculiar emergence of social movements, this paper focuses on nation-specific factors.

While the thrust here is on emergence of movements, it is pertinent to note that its exposition is actualized through the physical and moral fiber of the movement itself. In other words, its revelation takes place through four key aspects of the movement: mobilization, movement structure, context structure, and strategies. As represented in Figure 1, these, on one hand, stand as representations of the movement, and hence its manifestations. On the other hand, they also share a relationship of mutual influence, having back-and-forth linkages with the character of the movement itself and its various causal factors. These, hence, are not mere expressions based on which a movement can be operationalized; rather they signify essential dynamics that reinforce the vigor associated with the emergence and sustenance of a movement.

Figure 1. Determinants and manifestations of social movements

19

Here, *mobilization* implies the preparation and implementation of protest actions, which necessitates resources such as people, money, knowledge, frames and skills to process and distribute information, and influencing people. *Movement structure* entails the organizational mechanisms for utilization of movement's resources – for information dissemination, mobilization, counterfeiting a collective identity or meeting the personal interests of movement leaders. The facilitation of mobilization and movement structure takes places within a larger environment, which essentially constitutes the *context structure* of the movement. This, however, is not to be misconstrued with the political opportunity structure, as the latter comprises only one component of it. The social and cultural contexts are equally integral parts of the context structure, which determine the values, political consciousness and support of people for the movement based on the structure and organization of society. *Strategies* compose different actions for mobilization, such as protests, hunger strikes, press conferences and so on (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996).

Gauging the emergence of anti-corruption movements through these manifestations, the paper develops the correct level of generalizability of nation-specific factors having potential applicability in other countries as well, besides structural and external factors. Nonetheless, the methodology poses few limitations, which have been attempted to mitigate to a certain extent. First and foremost, the paper takes cognizance that the small number of cases being compared does not allow systematic control of the relationships between variables. However, the research design utilizes this very same reasoning to justify the qualitative investigation of the two countries, without losing their thick description. Second, binary comparison may evolve low level of generalizability of the hypothesis, which may necessitate validation through similar comparative research between other countries in future. Third, comparison of most-similar cases poses the risk of over-determination or inclusion of too many independent

variables (della Porta, 2002, p. 303). This is justified on the basis of the exploratory nature of the study, wherein any "contextual variables cannot be kept constant" (Dogan and Pelassy, 1990, p. 16).

It is important to note that the paper makes use of relevant books and journal articles for the purpose of literature review, and the description and assessment of the anti-corruption movement in Indonesia. However, due to the recent emergence of the anti-corruption movement in India (dated April 2011), there is dearth of scholarly sources investigating the phenomenon. For this reason, this paper relies on scrutiny of newspaper articles and blogs to analyze the case of India.

4. Deconstructing the emergence of social movements

4.1 National anti-corruption movement in Indonesia

The history of the national anti-corruption movement in Indonesia can be traced back to the mid-1960s, which emerged as a critical response to the corruption flagrant under the Soeharto regime (Butt, 2011). What initially emerged as a timid concern by a handful civil society organizations and citizens transformed into a flamboyant upsurge by the early 1970s, most notably in form of student demonstrations and criticism by the press (Setiyono and McLeod, 2010).

The unrest embarked with the miniscule and inconspicuous impact of corruption control efforts by the then President Soeharto, which spawned a rage among vast sections of society – culminated prominently in student activism and protests. A shorthand response to this by the government surfaced as a tranquilizer via the establishment of a new anti-corruption committee that included a number of student activists. Nonetheless, the government efforts proved ineffectual as the committee lay unpurposed – without a clear mandate, short of funds, and sporadic – having no significant role of student activists in the operations of the government (Setiyono and McLeod, 2010).

As a corollary, the movement's mandate and outreach concretized, with the proliferation incorporating several academicians, retired military representatives and politicians. The aim of the movement was to draw public attention to the rampant corruption within Indonesia's public sector and the role of Soeharto's family in the abundant grand malfeasances (Quah, 2006). An organized initiative in this regard was the "Petition of Fifty" *(Petisi 50)* – a group

22

of significant movement actors reckoned through its petition criticizing the profound corruption in the government. The group, however, soon faced harsh repression from the government. Similarly, a spate of protests and petitions that soon followed as an integral element of the anti-corruption movement were either suppressed by the state, or were successfully coopted to not let the looming movement have any curtailing effects on the powers of the authoritarian regime of Soeharto (Setiyono and McLeod, 2010).

From early 1990s onwards, the proliferation of the movement became significant, with the involvement of numerous civil society organizations (CSOs), student organizations, and with a wider awareness and political consciousness among citizens in general about the endemic corruption in the government. Apart from the growth of CSOs such as Pijar (*Pusat Informaci dan Jaringan Aksi untuk Reformasi*, the Information Centre and Action Network for Reform), Aldera (*Aliansi Demokrasi Rakyat*, the People's Democratic Alliance), and SMID (*Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi*, Indonesian Student Solidarity for Democracy), the movement witnessed a deep engagement of academicians in raising awareness about Soeharto's business monopolies and involvement in bountiful frauds. Professor Amein Rais is of prominent mention in this regard – who gave the anti-corruption movement in Indonesia its *reformasi* (reform) slogan – "abolish KKN (*korupsi, kolusi dan nepotisme*, corruption, collusion and nepotism) (van Klinken, 2008).

The actions of the movement intensified in the late 1990s with a strong insistence on *reformasi*, as the Asian financial crisis brought severe criticism to Soeharto. The aim of the movement remained steady and focused – to bring Soeharto's regime to an end and to arrest the corrupt behavior of public sector officials (Setiyono and McLeod, 2010). Hence the movement did not digress in pinpointing any particular institutional or individual cases of

corruption. However, after the regime collapse in May 1998, Indonesia witnessed an inundation of individual corruption cases brought to light by the anti-corruption movement actors, targeting Soeharto, his family and business cronies on the top; and government officials such as mayors, *bupatis* (district heads) and members of parliament at the local and national governance levels – to demand justice for their corrupt behavior in local government projects, government procurement, and illicit levies on public services (van Klinken, 2008). Demonstrations against KKN were held at national, provincial, and local government and village levels – at state owned enterprises, state institutions and professional associations. The proliferation of the movement, targeting corruption of all kinds and at all levels infiltrated all sections of society, involving CSOs, citizens and the press. Members of the Association of Indonesian Journalists (*Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia*), for instance, signed a petition and conducted demonstrations demanding the resignation of their own head and secretary owing to corruption charges, which led to the establishment of the PWI *reformasi* (Hamilton-Hart, 2008).

Despite its growing momentum and mobilization, the movement until the downfall of Soeharto has been typified in the literature as "spontaneous" and "lacking sufficient evidence to substantiate allegations of corruption", thus preventing any legal course of action against the targeted (Setiyono and McLeod, 2010, p. 351). Moreover, notwithstanding its mounting thrust and impetus, the movement largely remained "fragmented, lacking effective coordination and a common vision" (Setiyono and McLeod, 2010, p. 351). This soon got rectified in the period that followed the regime collapse. In order to prevent the possible resurgence of an undemocratic government, and to endure the confrontation of the extensive corruption, the anti-corruption movement actors seized the opportunity provided by the political status quo to strengthen the movement. This was realized through the consolidation

and fresh absorption of several civil society actors, including labor organizations, women's organizations, professional organizations, lawyers, academics, informal associations and ordinary citizens. This constituted a crucial phase of the national anti-corruption movement, wherein a concrete formal structure shaped the movement, creating alliances and networks of expert organizations and individuals for generating awareness and promoting solidarity; sharing information, experiences, strategies; undertaking anti-corruption training, workshops and research; serving as watchdog and policy advocacy organizations; and for providing logistical and moral support. This assigned a more systematic character to the anti-corruption movement, as specialized knowledge helped it maintain a more concerted focus (Setiyono and McLeod, 2010). Approximately 500 CSOs bloomed across the country, and the prominent ones included ICW (Indonesia Corruption Watch), MTI (*Masyarakat Transparansi Indonesia*, Indonesian Society for Transparency), IPW (Indonesia Procurement Watch), KP2KKN (*Komite Penyelidikan dan Pemberantasan Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme*, Committee for Investigation and Eradication of Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism), LBH (*Lembaga Bantuan Hukum*, Legal Aid Foundation), FPSB (*Forum Peduli Sumatera Barat*, the Concerned Forum of West Sumatra), and BCW (Bali Corruption Watch). These together formed influential networks such as the FPPI (Indonesian Youth Front Struggle), and GeRAK (*Gerakan Rakyat Anti Korupsi*, People's Movement Against Corruption). These CSOs and networks, using the bottom-up approach created a strong pressure from below for the government to establish a robust institutional and legal framework, with appropriate amendments in the Constitution guaranteeing accountability and corruption control. The strategies of the movement constituted vigorous street demonstrations, public criticism, campaigns through the media, public discussion forums, and research activities (Hamilton-Hart, 2010; Setiyono and McLeod, 2010; van Klinken, 2008).

The anti-corruption movement in Indonesia also received sufficient assistance from foreign donor agencies as part of their good governance mandate, whereby they supported the institutionalization of the movement's activities (McGibbon, 2006).

Prominent stepping-stones in the movement's persistent drive for institutionalization came into force with the formation of PGRI (Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia) in May 2001, with the support of UNDP; and KPK (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, Corruption Eradication Commission) in September 2003, through an alliance of CSOs called AKAK (*Advokasi untuk Komisi Anti-Korupsi*, Advocacy for a Corruption Eradication Commission). The PGRI funded the movement's projects for exposition of corruption cases through systematic evidence and research. The AKAK on the other hand, evolved as the thus far most comprehensive authority for corruption control – covering investigations and prosecutions. By 2009, the movement succeeded in getting five other corruption control institutions established by the government – the Center for Financial Transactions Reporting and Analysis, the National Ombudsman's Commission, the Judicial Commission, the Attorney General's Commission, and the Indonesian Police Commission. In 2006, the movement actors also persuaded the government to ratify the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), to induce an ethical responsibility for the Indonesian government in the global fight against corruption (Butt, 2011).

To sum up, the persistent, organized and unified efforts of the Indonesian anti-corruption movement – manifested in its four decades long battle against corruption – were successful, at least partially so, in compelling its government to adopt effective corruption control mechanisms. What instilled this movement and its persistence is analyzed in the next chapter.

4.2. National anti-corruption movement in India

The national anti-corruption movement in India became discernible with a series of protests and demonstrations across the country starting April 2011, to exert pressure on the government for the enactment of a stringent anti-corruption law (Joshi, 2011). The movement commenced with an indefinite hunger strike by social activist Anna Hazare, advocating the institution of an independent investigation agency – the *Jan Lokpal* or Citizens' Ombudsman (comprising prominent civil society representatives) to tackle the widespread political corruption in the country (The Telegraph, 2011). This was envisaged as the *Jan Lokpal* Bill 2011[iii], drafted and proposed by Hazare to the Indian government, in collaboration with the civil society organization leading this movement, namely 'India Against Corruption', and its founder Arvind Kejriwal (India Against Corruption, n.d.). Inspired by Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption, and the Office of the Ombudsman in Scandinavian countries, the Bill proposes *suo motu* action to redress grievances of citizens, protect whistleblowers, and make investigations and prosecutions exclusive of government control or approval (Pande, 2011; The Telegraph, 2011).

The movement caught instant attention of the media and drew countless supporters. Hundreds of thousands of people demonstrated their support for the movement, by taking active part in public protests and demonstrations, joining Hazare in his fast, and networking and communicating through print and social media (Chavan, 2011). Besides, it attracted unwarranted support of other notable social activists, celebrities, spiritual leaders, non-government organizations and student organizations (Joshi, 2011). What sparked off as a hunger strike in the national capital of New Delhi soon proliferated into a nation-wide movement, extending protests in cities on Mumbai, Kolkatta, Chennai, Amdavad, Bengaluru, Guwahati, Shillong, Aizwal and many more (TOI, 2011a). The movement, under the

27

leadership of Hazare did not encourage any political allegiances, and hence did not permit the affiliation of selective politicians with the movement despite their willingness to take part in the protests (India Against Corruption, n.d.).

It is key to note here that this year old movement has had a long cultivated breeding ground of brief events and piecemeal efforts by activists, which despite their own significance never possessed the momentum to culminate into a unified national level anti-corruption movement. The incipient occurrence in this historical chain of events was the introduction of the *Lokpal* or the Ombudsman Bill by activist and lawyer Shanti Bhushan in 1968. The Bill, however, lapsed with the dissolution of the Lower House of the Parliament in 1969, post which it was reintroduced in 1971, 1977, 1985, 1989, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2005, and 2008. Having successfully failed in each attempt, the Bill resurfaced in the Parliament in 2011, facing massive opposition by Hazare's team and the larger anti-corruption movement that instead proposed an Ombudsman independent of the government, constituting a panel of civil society representatives (Pande, 2011).

The issue of corruption had been building up as a significant concern in the country during these years. Since independence in 1947 until 1980s, governance of India was dominated by socialist-inspired economic policies, which led to slow economic growth, unemployment and poverty (OECD, 2007). This accompanied by a system of *License Raj*[iv] or bureaucratic control by the government bred a favorable ground for corruption, rooting it deep in the public sector functioning (Khalid, 2012; Knowledge@Wharton, 2007). Moreover, the criminalization of politics (implicating criminals benefiting from the patronage of politicians, and their subsequent election in local / state level government agencies or the Parliament) and kleptocracy brought to light by the Vohra Report of 1993 gave an alarming note to the

28

mounting corruption, red tape and an inundating reluctance of public officials to act in conformance with the needs of the citizens (Vohra, 1993).

The Right to Information (RTI) Act of 2005 brought partial relief to the growing problems, by promoting free and open access to information, therein guaranteeing transparency, accountability and good governance. This, however, emanated from a grassroots movement in the state of Rajasthan led by activist Aruna Roy and the organization *Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan*. After successful advocacy and legislation there, the Act was introduced by governments in several other states, eventually giving rise to a national RTI Act. Anna Hazare led the grassroots movement in the state of Maharashtra to exert pressure on the government to pass the Maharashtra RTI Act (Mander, 1991).

In 2011, Hazare resumed his activism to aim at some persistence in the fragmented struggle of the civil society towards corruption. Although the movement revolved around corruption control through the *Jan Lokpal*, its focus and fortitude primarily emerged from the precipitating events of revelations of the five biggest scams of the nation between 2008 and 2011. These included the Commonwealth Games scam[v], the Radia tapes controversy[vi], 2G spectrum scam[vii], and the disclosure of whistleblower Rudolf Elmer's "black money" list[viii] and "Cash-for-votes" scandal [ix] by Wikileaks (Khalid, 2012). The movement gained mobilization and momentum due to the sheer lack of faith of the citizens in the existing state anti-corruption mechanisms, such as the Central Vigilance Commission and the Central Bureau of Investigation[x]. The gross lack of anti-corruption staff in these agencies[xi] and their control by the central government had long been deterring speedy and transparent investigations and prosecutions, which the movement sought to resolve through the institution of the *Jan Lokpal* (The Telegraph, 2011).

Following the historical legacy of Hazare's contribution in the independence struggle of India along with several other prominent compatriots, the movement essentially adopted the Gandhian strategy of non-violent civil resistance. This incorporated demonstrations, marches, rallies, hunger strikes, and the active use of social media for generating awareness and a communication network. It comprised active support of citizens and resisted affiliations with political parties to prevent politicization of their agenda. Nevertheless, the movement gathered massive support from the political parties such as the *Bhartiya Janta Party* and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (Khalid, 2012).

To appease the masses, the government responded to the movement demands but in a staggered fashion. Talks were held with Hazare and the movement leaders to constitute a new drafting committee for the Bill with equal representation of government and civil society representatives (IBNLive, 2012). However, the two sides did not concur and the repetitive attempts proved to be futile. The only prominent step taken by the government was the complete ratification of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption on 13th May 2011 (TOI, 2011b). Following this, spiritual leader Swami Ramdev started another hunger strike, generating a nation-wide protest on June 2011 for advocating the repatriation of black money from the Swiss Bank and other foreign banks (BBC News, 2011). The protest was repressed by the government through violent and undemocratic means, ending with the deportation of Swami Ramdev outside the national capital, which served as the hub of the movement (Venkatesan, 2012). On 16th August 2011, Hazare was arrested by the government for protesting against prohibitionary orders. This was followed by the '*jail bharo*' agitation, wherein movement actors voluntarily participated in arrests and filling up jails, to commemorate solidarity and perseverance of the movement (Dhawan, 2011). The violent

30

repression used by the government on peaceful protestors was heavily condemned by citizens and political parties all over the nation (Dhawan, 2011). Soon after the release of Hazare, a spate of similar protests and hunger strikes followed throughout 2011 and 2012, keeping the movement steady with its aims (IBNLive, 2012; NDTV, 2012).

The fate of the movement, however, cannot be determined yet as it is still wavering in between its stages of mobilization and precipitating factors, coupled with other reasons that induce spontaneity.

5. Comparative analysis and evaluation

This chapter dwells on the various theoretical perspectives on social movements to deconstruct the emergence of anti-corruption movements in India and Indonesia. Undeniably, structural factors analogous in both the countries (such as proliferation of civil society, dissatisfaction of people with the political state of affairs, and lack of political will to control corruption) as well as external influences (such as the impact of Asian crisis, and international pressure to curb corruption) are integral in extending a generic explanation of the rise of movements. However, 'nation-specific' factors ascertain the differential emergence of these movements, across temporal and spatial dimensions. A detailed analysis of these factors is the primary objective of this chapter. While the factors discussed in the following paragraphs may not be exhaustive to determine the emergence and pulverization of anti-corruption movements in the two countries, they nevertheless are an amalgamative representation of the key theories of emergence of movements, thus presenting forth a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon.

Further, to develop a holistic analysis of the 'nation-specific' factors, this chapter bifurcates the research problem of the contrasting emergence and pulverization of social movements into a set of three sub-questions. These are:

(i) What factors contributed to the emergence of the national-anti corruption movement in Indonesia?

(ii) What factors hindered the development of a national anti-corruption movement in India (prior to the prominent anti-corruption crusade of 2011), in contrast with the burgeoning anti-corruption movement in Indonesia since the 1970s?

(iii)   What factors have instigated the anti-corruption movement in India now? Are these

factors similar to the ones observed in Indonesia?

Responses to these questions are hereby examined independently, as well as in conjunction with each other due to their close affiliation, and operation as reverse justifications.

To begin with an examination of the Indonesian case, it can very well be deciphered from its history that the Indonesian political landscape was characterized by centralization and the authoritarian regime of President Soeharto for nearly three decades from 1967 to 1998. The endemic corruption, collusion, nepotism and suppression of civil liberties under his 'New Order' regime cultivated an increasingly forceful movement and struggle for democracy in the country, which led to Soeharto's regime collapse in May 1998. Encompassed within this overarching movement for democratization, the anti-corruption protests – targeting Soeharto's illegitimate amassment of wealth and promotion of other fraud in the country – constituted only one facet of the struggle for transparency and accountability. The regime change hence gave the anti-corruption movement in Indonesia a more explosive character than in India, as the latter exhibited only complexities of a democratic order – a goal Indonesia was aspiring to achieve.

The enormous centralization and suppression of civil liberties under Soeharto's administration can hence be perceived to have instilled a discontent in society, with a sheer conflict between societal expectations and the inability of Soeharto's government in meeting them. Although Indonesian politics was not devoid of criminalization and cooptation of political opponents of Soeharto, the pressing problems of authoritarianism and human rights violation effectively forged a ground for several protests, uprisings from all sections of

society. This stands in conformance with the tenets of the mass society theory and the theory of collective action, absorbed within the broader structural strain paradigm that propounds the dissatisfaction of societal expectations.

Hence, it can be discerned that the political unrest with regime illegitimacy in Indonesia led to the development of a concrete 'anti-corruption' and democratic ideology among its population, which coalesced them despite differences of ethnicity, religion and region. The conflict between society and state was so overwhelming that the ideological differences and factions in society were homogenized into a common struggle against the regime. This attitude of the masses towards the political system in Indonesia held a crucial role in the emergence and endurance of the anti-corruption movement.

The precipitating factor for the anti-corruption movement and the wider democratization struggle was provided by the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, which hit Indonesia the hardest among all Asian countries due to its crony capitalism, poor financial management systems and Soeharto's vested interests. Skepticism about Soeharto's performance legitimacy gained an all-time high, which strengthened the anti-corruption movement and led it to contribute to his resignation in 1998, followed by several corruption control strategies adopted by the new government.

This situation was disparate in India, wherein potential associational threats were not only co-opted via their inclusion in local governance and project management, but which successfully faced their own demise due to the conflicting views of the political system and leadership of the movement. On one hand the grassroots movement having the potentiality of converging into a national anti-corruption movement shared similar distaste for the status quo political set

34

up. On the other hand, this was counteracted by associational forms that generated popular support for the existing political system and party leadership, on the thrust of criminal strategies and party patronage (Kothari, 1990). In conjunction, India had historically nurtured cleavages and factions along ethnic, religion, region, language and class dimensions, owing to its enormous diversity. This undoubtedly contributed to the emergence of micro grassroots and subaltern movements, but prevented national cohesion around anti-corruption issues.

Similarly, leadership was also fragmented, incompetent and weak and movement activities relied on individualistic efforts. Vested interests of leaders superseded the national interest of corruption control, which prevented the coalescence of masses, thus disrupting the momentum of mobilization and eventually obscuring it completely. Also, the lack of collaboration between movement protagonists (mainly middle class) and intellectuals demonstrating oppositional viewpoints made the anti-corruption movement appear having little commitment in India (Khalid, 2012), as opposed to Indonesia wherein intellectuals helped to mediate the experiences of students and other segments of ordinary citizens, and put forward their 'anti-corruption' demands in the broader context of democracy. This unity of mobilization was indeed a crucial factor for the resonating character of the anti-corruption movement in Indonesia, and the contrasting lack of a national overtone in India. In the latter, mobilization revolved a lot around sporadic collaboration, which is indicative of not only an incoherent ideology, but also mistrust between people. As a result, India severely lacked a unified social foundation, which was manifested in the reduced levels of political consciousness among its population, unlike Indonesia.

This leads to the deduction that the inability of the homeostatic rebalancing systems, as explained by the structuralist-functionalist approach, held only partial truth in the Indian case,

35

which hindered the emergence of its anti-corruption movement. Although the existing institutional set up failed to generate social cohesion, it was not accompanied by a collective solidarity based on a shared ideology. Concurrence of these conditions was evident in Indonesia, which thus fostered a strong anti-corruption movement there. Further, the movement in Indonesia was capacitated in most material and non-material resources that are manifested in the resource mobilization theory and the theory of political opportunity structure.

A crucial aspect of the enduring vacuum all throughout the last forty years in Indian national anti-corruption movement history can also be attributed to the ambiguous nature of its civil society and the unpredictability of state-civil society interactions. Gordon White (1996) expresses scepticism about the ennoblement of the democratic character of civil society using the empirical evidence of China, and this holds much truth in the Indian case as well. Civil society formations are imperative for mass mobilization around the anti-corruption movement. However, these often fail to recruit actors and assume a 'compromised' character upon being state-fostered or state-dependent for funds (Jenkins and Goetz, 1999). This reliance of civil society organizations on the state was a common feature in India, giving rise to patron-client relationships between the two entities (Khan, 1998). Not only did this inhibit the integration of civil society into a nation-wide movement, it also assigned the movement a 'dysfunctional' character wherever it showed bleak signs of emergence.

In addition, the absence of a national anti-corruption movement in India can also be ascribed to the sheer lack of a civil society formation of a national character that exhibited a clear stake and mandate of an anti-corruption struggle. This chiefly concerns the mobilisation aspect of the movement, which grossly failed due to several reasons. First, this occurred due to the

36

fragmented response of anti-corruption activists and civil society organizations (Jenkins and Goetz, 1999). This resulted in the emergence of several small scale or short-duration grassroots anti-corruption movements, preventing their convergence at the national level. This is prominently exemplified by the MKSS' Right to Information movement in the state of Rajasthan (Mander and Joshi, 1991; Venkatesu, 2006). Similarly, local responses in form of micro movements emerged in other states as well to counter the national crises of corruption (Kothari, 1984). Second, the movement got precluded largely on account of the amateur nature of civil society organizations, which have been inept in generating public support and awareness about the endemic corruption, and in gathering substantive evidence of public sector frauds and scams to confront the authorities (Jenkins and Goetz, 1999). While the inexperience of the organizations or potential movement actors may only partially be true due to their poor track record in fighting corruption, the third reason for their inadequate commitment stems from their unwillingness and reluctance to engage in confrontation with the government. Klitgaard's (1991) conviction, affirmed by Transparency International (1998) reveals that this is precisely due to the vested interests of civil society organisations of ensuring uninterrupted government funding, as well as the interests of citizens to endure a system of corruption that is conducive to their well-being. This hinders the convergence of public concern into a movement and its subsequent institutionalization. In the case of Indonesia, the movement objectives and ideology were not marred by these individual interests.

The emergence of a transparent national anti-corruption movement also faltered owing to the sheer lack of mobilization, especially concerning key associational forms that usually set the tone of a movement and sustain it to promote the interests of the masses. Of special concern here are the suppressed student associations and labor unions, which primarily operated in

37

India during the last quarter of the twenty first century under the direct control of criminal gangs and mafia, which in turn had serious political patronage (Jenkins and Goetz, 1999). The country more or less governed as a tripartite oligopoly including the state, private-sector tycoons, and mafia-linked syndicates, encumbering the efforts of civil society actors aimed towards building an anti-corruption movement. This indeed provided a favorable environment for the social and economic marginalization of any potential movement (Jenkins and Goetz, 1999), its leaders and civil society organizations – both in terms of material and non-material resources. In other instances, where anti-corruption issues assumed an evolving tone, the state used massive repression as means of social control (Kothari, 1990). The ethical space of politics was ruptured by corruption, crime and violence, which not only led to criminalisation of politics[xii] (Chisti, 2004; Vohra Committee Report, 1993), but also the transformation of its democratic essence into a mere mechanical electoral system dependent on muscle and money power (Kothari, 1990; Kumar, 2012). The manifestation of such corruption and crime was exemplified in cases of grand corruption in the 1980s and 1990s, such as the 'Bofors' scam, '*Hawala*', and 'Fodder' scam (Kothari, 1990). However, the cases were submerged with the repression of the revelations made by the media, thus preventing any uprisings. The ramifications of such unjust social control included the diffusion of frustration and dissatisfaction from movements in general, which aggravated the unwillingness of people to participate in events that could have been constructing as an emerging anti-corruption movement. The levels of political consciousness were hence too immature to transform into a strong anti-corruption ideology.

Further, movements that did emerge at the grassroots level were strongly presided by an ascriptive identity, with reigning influences of local level mobilization revolving around provenances of state, region, class or ethnicity. While these movements advocating

transparency and accountability did endorse patronage and populism, they prevented themselves from transforming into a national anti-corruption movement due to their ascriptive identities. Moreover, these movements got nurtured and appeased by the state due to their potential as electoral constituencies. The subsumption of these groups and movement actors into electoral politics and kleptocracy in the disguise of legal provisions to their associational entities not only conciliated them, but also warded off the threat of national collective action around corruption issues. Allotment of public-works projects to ascriptive entities is a case in point.

It can thus be discerned that collective action did not encourage mobilization concerted around the focused objective of corruption control, rather government patronage and state-fostered development of key civic associations catalyzed vested interests of both parties. This transformed movement-led antagonisms into actions of 'thickening' civil society, the latter being kept at bay by the government through a pattern of functional interest and sectional advantages.

This dualism of social order and democracy aggrandized corruption, criminalization and intimidation of the masses, thus creating paradoxes of movement mobilization and populist politics. First, the growing dissatisfaction and despair implied greater belief in populism and participation. This is turn called for greater social order to marginalized organized entities, for which the state resorted to repression and criminalization of politics. Eventually, this translated participation into greater dependence of the masses on the government for entering the economic and political processes, leading to a system of 'clienthood' and legitimization of centralized governance disguised in the set up of democracy (Kothari, 1984; Kumar, 2012).

The above-mentioned reasons do not indicate that India did not witness any organized protests. The key contradistinction is that in India these movements were pulverized and successfully prevented from transforming into a national character, by resorting to several constitutional and extra-constitutional mechanisms. Members were dispersed and protests were rapidly brought under control, which perpetrated an environment of social apathy and social schizophrenia. Consequently, over the years, the unsatisfactory acquiescence of societal expectations transformed into passive forms of dissatisfaction, which manifested in alternative forms of expression. These included sporadic consumer protests, strikes at workplaces, persistent complaining, and overall a reluctant attitude towards corruption control due to the strong internalization of corruption in the systemic functioning (Nørgaard and Sampson, 1984).

Nevertheless, the effective addressal of these weak links was facilitated by the massive mobilization conducted by the national level civil society organization 'India Against Corruption', using the precipitating factor of the revelation of the grand scams in the country between 2007 and 2011 involving embezzlement of public funds worth billions of dollars. This inevitably instigated mass awareness and support through the tools of the press and social media, and led to the emergence of a national anti-corruption movement. The factors for this emergence more or less converge with the factors responsible for the rise of the anti-corruption movement in Indonesia, with the exception of regime illegitimacy. This however, appears in the form of a placating masquerade of democracy in India.

6. Conclusion

This paper examined the determinants of emergence of national social movements, by investigating the phenomenon of national anti-corruption movements in a comparative framework. It set out to investigate the factors that facilitate the emergence of a movement in a given nation, and contrariwise compel its pulverization and non-existence in another nation. The research was backed by the contrasting empirical evidences of Indonesia and India, wherein the causal factors for the rise of a full-fledged national movement in Indonesia were examined to resonate the lack of a parallel movement in India, despite the seemingly conducive similarities of the two nations.

In building a well-cogitated study, the paper examined the diverse theoretical positions shaping the social movement literature. However, to avoid the colossal eclecticism discernible therein, the paper sought to a comprehensive understanding of the factorial determinants of social movements by constructing a synthesis of the distinguished social movement theories. Simultaneously, the differing effect of these factors on the dependent variable of 'emergence of social movements' was explicated through the adoption of a 'most similar' comparative research design. Herein the common characteristics between the two nations were omitted as operative independent variables, and the diverging effects on the dependent variable were rationalized owing to the peculiarity of other operative variables, which in the paper have been deemed as 'nation-specific'. The investigation of the anti-corruption movements in the two countries based on this methodology confirmed the working hypothesis of this paper, which posited that the differential emergence of social movements in two countries emanates from an array of nation-specific factors, regardless of the similarities of their structural contexts and external factors influencing them in the same capacity. This was validated by a

41

twofold analysis of the anti-corruption movements – first, through an assessment of the capacitating and trigger variables determining the eruption of these movements in Indonesia; and second, through the inhibiting factors restraining the movement in India. Parallel to this, the paper also rationalized the bases for why the movement emerged in India in 2011 – nearly four decades after it started to gain momentum in Indonesia. Hereby, a high degree of political consciousness, unity in leadership, active and committed role of civil society organisations, access to material and non-material resources and social alliances cutting across class cleavages, were identified as some of the crucial nation-specific factors.

The paper, however, is not without limitations. In no capacity does it make any claim of presenting an exhaustive list of 'nation-specific' factors that explain the differential emergence of movements in two countries. The paper takes cognizance of the fact that there may exist several alternative explanations constituting these broad 'nation-specific' determinants, which have not been explored herein, due to its limited scope. Some of these include (i) the effects of communalization of politics; (ii) urban-rural dichotomy influencing the momentum and mobilization of movements; (iii) path dependence, indicative of a dominant history of prior social movements in a nation; and (iv) the aggregated force of grassroots movements preventing the need for the rise of a national anti-corruption movement. Further, the paper cannot be considered conclusive in its findings about the emergence and pulverization of the anti-corruption movement in India considering its recent eruption and contemporaneous nature. The movement may call for a deeper analysis in the future to make more positive assertions about its emergence and sustainability, which currently seems to be wavering between the short cycles of mobilization and state repression. Last but not the least, despite the scope of capacious generalization offered by the paper for ascertaining the factors responsible for the rise of movements, these cannot be considered universal and may need

validation through similar comparative research using other country cases. Nonetheless, the

paper provides a good starting point for that.

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[i] For more details, see http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries

[ii] For more details, see http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2

[iii] More information on the *Jan Lokpal* Bill can be obtained from http://www.prsindia.org/administrator/uploads/media/Lokpal/DraftJanLokpalBill.pdf

[iv] For information on License Raj, refer to http://www.forbes.com/2007/08/15/wipro-tata-corruption-ent-law-cx_kw_0814whartonindia.html

[v] More information on the Commonwealth Games scam, can be obtained from http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/corruption-scandal-hits-2010-games-organisers-deny-charges-40991

[vi] For information on Radia tapes controversy, refer to http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/radia-agent-of-foreign-intelligence-agencies-says-govt-affidavit/1/122879.html

[vii] More information on the 2G spectrum scam can be obtained at http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/02/02/idINIndia-54593820110202

[viii] More information on the "black money" scandal can be obtained at http://daily.bhaskar.com/article/NAT-TOP-swiss-connection-will-the-black-money-debate-finally-lead-to-action-1783255.html

[ix] More information on 'Cash-for-votes' scandal can be obtained at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12769214

[x] 66 per cent of the requests for prosecution sanctions related to public sector corruption were pending with the central government at the end of 2010. And that the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) sanctioned criminal prosecution in only six per cent of the cases, and 94 per cent were let go by imposing minor penalties. Further, 9,927 corruption cases investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) were pending with the courts at the end of 2010 (Source: The Telegraph, 2011).

[xi] The CVC has a staff strength of 200 to 250 employees. By international standards, India needs 28,500 anti-corruption staff in CVC to check corruption of 5,700,000 employees (Source: The Telegraph, 2011).

[xii] In 1996, the country's Election Commission found that over 70 parliamentarians and more than 100 elected representatives in state assemblies had an alleged "criminal background" (Source: Chisti, 2004).

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