Assembling Fragmented Citizenship

Bulgarian Muslim Migrants at the Margins of Two States

By

Neda Deneva

Submitted to

Central European University

Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Supervisors:

Professor Ayse Caglar

Professor Daniel Monterescu

Budapest, Hungary

2012

Statement

I hereby state that this dissertation contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions. The thesis contains no material previously written and/or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgment is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

Budapest, March 31, 2012

Abstract

This dissertation addresses everyday relations and imaginings of the state/s of Bulgarian Muslim migrants in Spain. More specifically, I look at the simultaneous normative and institutional incorporation in two polities and how this affects their enactment and re-configuration of citizenship. Living transnational lives, migrants have to deal on a daily basis on one hand with various state created and imposed categories (member of a cultural minority, citizen, migrant, regular/irregular worker, unemployed etc). On the other hand, they also stumble upon different institutions, norms, and have to handle numerous crisis situations. Drawing on extended ethnographic fieldwork in a Bulgarian Muslim migrants' community both in Bulgaria and in Spain, I look at the ways migrants experience and negotiate this embeddedness on the margins of two states through their everyday practices and interactions with the state. As a culturally and economically marginalized minority population Bulgarian Muslims have developed a specific relationship with the Bulgarian state, which was translated and complemented through yet another ambiguous (semi-marginal) position they have taken up in Spain as migrant, EU-citizens and Muslims at the same time. Taking this as a starting point I embark on a more specific discussion of three fields where migrants interact with one or more states and supra state institutions. In the first part I look at the interplay between state imposed categories and self-identification on individual and group level. The second part is devoted to the idea of the worker-citizen and explores the idea of the deserving state. Here I explore the working practices and regulations on one hand, and the way people interpret and use unemployment as a security strategy or as a critique towards the state. In the third part, I look at the private sphere of kin relations and ritual which sustain and are transformed by the felixibilized migrants' lives. I suggest that migrants assemble the different parts of their lives and the various levels of

reference, institutional or personal, by relying on the trope that "live is always elsewhere". I use the idea of assembling fragmented citizenship to describe the way people make sense of their lives and the way they improvise and negotiate their actions within manifold normative and institutional frameworks.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Every August a group of Bulgarian Muslim migrants visit their home village in Bulgaria in what has become a ritual of return and performance of success and wealth. They come back with their new, expensive and fancy cars with Spanish registration numbers, and park them along their unusually large, colourful, clearly Spanish style imitation houses. At the end of the month, they go back to a small town in Spain, where they work (both legally and illegally) in construction (men) and domestic aid (women). More than a quarter of 2000 inhabitants of the village of Pletena, have been living and working in Spain over the last 5-6 years. Migration has become the main source of income in this village, as in many other Bulgarian Muslim villages in the region. The migrants say they "belong" to the village, envisage their future lives there, and invest in renovating their houses, while at the same time they send their children to Spanish kindergartens and schools and are considering property investments in Spain.

Setting the Scene

Beyond the usual aspects of a transnational life, stretching over two localities/two states, entangled in various institutions and actors spanning over a transnational social field, and finally, holding different status positions in the two social milieus, there is something which makes the Bulgarian Muslim migration more unusual than it seems. It is their specific position of semi-insiders/semi-outsiders in their place of origin, where they have developed a long ambivalent relationship with the Bulgarian nation state, which is transformed in yet another ambiguous position in their place of settlement, where there are simultaneously labour migrants, Muslims

and members of the European Union. With this dissertation I explore the interactions and crossing points between official state-proposed, imposed, institutionalized categorizations and the everyday enactments, appropriations, re-interpretations and evasions of such categorizations by Bulgarian Muslims in migration context. I explore their experience on the margins of two states, and within the supra-state framework of the European Union. I look at how they negotiate their position in and between two contexts and what are the spaces of empowerment and disempowerment opened up by migration.

In Bulgaria the Bulgarian Muslims do not exist as an official minority group and are defined both by the state produced categorizations and by the two other major groups (Bulgarians and Turks) through double negation of being "ethnically" Bulgarian but not Christians and Muslims, but not Turks. This turns the Bulgarian Muslims in a social group defined by its existence on the margins of other groups. For that reason they have always been *almost* part of the Bulgarian nation, without having the option of another *kin* nation, thus being left on the margins, never completely inside, nor outside. This has resulted in a complexly constructed social identity (generated as an interplay between self-identifications and social and state categorizations, Brubaker and Cooper 2000, Jenkins 1996), which is relational, often situationally dependent and creates great divergences in terms of self-identifications and self-representations among the Bulgarian Muslims in different settings. The non-affirmative categorizations are accompanied by the long history of state-imposed assimilation politics over the last century, which tossed them between perceptions as the "self" of the nation, which needs to be assimilated back (and christianized/bulgarianized), and the "other" of the nation which has to be excluded and differentiated (tukisized) (Brunnbauer 2001).

This is complemented by the lack of ways for political participation and group claim-making both during socialism and after 1989. Moreover, the impoverishment and underdevelopment of the Rhodopi mountain region, caused by the post-socialist neoliberal economic transformations, further contributed not only to the Bulgarian Muslims social marginalization, but to their economically disadvantaged position. (Tomova 2000). Finally, the marginal experience has spatial expression as well, with many of the Bulgarian Muslims being concentrated in or near the border regions with Greece. All these have turned the Bulgarian Muslims into a social group defined by its existence on the margins of other groups through their "ethnic marginality" with no internal coherence or a clearly expressed sense of belonging together or commonality. In this sense, their groupness (Brubaker 2004) is historically contingent and politically contestable.

Consequently, mass migration can be analyzed not only as an attempt to manage with the economic hardship, but also to escape from the social and economic marginalization and disenfranchisement. Ironically, Spain while offering better economic conditions (higher and more secure income), places the Bulgarian Muslims in yet another marginal and ambivalent position. Immigrants, even though legal, are not part of the nation, and do not have the right for a minority status. They are conceived as the stranger in Simmel's definition, who "who comes today and stays tomorrow" (1950:402) which positions them as immanent elements of the social space, thus making them significant for its construction (Isin 2002:30).

Moreover, the fact that they are Muslims evokes slogans of terrorism and fundamentalism, and might as well subsume them to the large group of North African immigrants, which are considered the most problematic immigrant population for Spain. Like in many other European countries, in Spain there is a xenophobic attitude which is particularly directed towards Muslim migrants (ECRI 2003). However, Bulgarian Muslims are not Muslims *in* Europe, but Muslims *of*

Europe, who have to cope with the process of both migration and EU integration.[1] Thus being EU citizens, immigrants and Muslims at the same time, differentiates Bulgarian Muslims from other categories of population in Spain in different ways: from other Bulgarian immigrants (for being Muslim), from Ecuadorian and other out of Europe immigrants (for being EU citizens and Muslim), from North African immigrants (for being European Muslims), and from all local Spanish population (for being both immigrants and Muslim). However, all these differentiations are potential and can be enacted, utilized or downplayed in different degrees. Therefore, the extent to which Bulgarian Muslims enact those different aspects of their potential social identity, is to be explored empirically.

Using the case of the migrating Bulgarian Muslims, I tackle the overarching problem of the repositioning of group identities of economically and culturally dominated minorities in a globalizing world. I approach this issue by specifically looking at how the simultaneous relationship with two states influences and defines these transformations through diverse pathways of inclusion and exclusion in both contexts. I interrogate the spaces of empowerment and disempowerment created by migration and describe the disharmonies, contradictions and misfits which occur in the transnational existence of the marginalized social group of the Bulgarian Muslims More particularly, I approach this issue through examining the ambivalent position of Bulgarian Muslim migrants vis-à-vis the Bulgarian and the Spanish state, analytically approaching the state both as an embodiment of an idea, and in its particular institutional faces and practices. More specifically I try to show how Bulgarian Muslim migrants experience and negotiate their position on the margins of two states. And consequently, what empowering and

---

[1] With Bulgaria's accession in EU over 1 million Muslims (Turks, Bulgarian Muslims, and Roma), who are Bulgarian citizens, became European Muslims. This is adds the largest number of "indigenous" Muslim population (as opposed to first, second, third generation of migrants) to the EU population, by now.

disempowering spaces are opened by migration for them and what mechanisms and strategies they deploy in relation to their re-positioning vis-à-vis two states

The relationship with the state is approached from two perspectives: 1. the categorization which states impose through different definitions, but also silences and gaps directed *to* the Bulgarian Muslims both as citizens in Bulgaria and as immigrants in Spain, and 2. the everyday practices and interactions with the state/s and the conceptualizations of the state *by* Bulgarian Muslim migrants. In this sense the relationship with the state will be the interface, created through the intersection of categorisations/definitions, practices/interactions and imaginings/discourses. Thus, I examine the question starting from the concept of social citizenship, which points to the discrepancies between social practices of incorporation and legal rights. It further directs the research focus to the institutional practices and experiences of governance and to the incorporative forms of daily participation in the social life of a locality (Glick Schilller and Caglar 2008).

My initial claim is that the Bulgarian Muslims from the Rhodopi mountain region have developed a specific relationship of detachment and a tactic of circumventing the state, thereby not expecting or relying for support, development or creation of opportunity structures on any of the two states. Thus a disenfranchised, disempowered group like the Bulgarian Muslims finds self-empowerment through migration which also results in self-reliance and "self-made man" rhetoric on the migrants' part. However, by imposing certain categories (either by labelling them, or by silencing their difference), and adopting particular policies, the two states continue to influence the Bulgarian Muslim migrants' everyday experiences, and ultimately their self-identification and sense of group belonging. Hence, their existence on the margins of the state/s

which migration reinforces through the attachment in two social contexts, both of which not willing to offer a place in the centre.

Moreover, if Bulgarian Muslim migrants indeed imagine the state as a limited almost absent set of institutions which do not respond to its members' needs, and subsequently if they see themselves as managing their own lives, this opens up a venue for researching the particular ways in which the neoliberal logic works in requiring populations to be free, self-managing, and self-enterprising individuals. In this manner, my research further investigates ethnographically the enacted ways in which "neoliberal technologies reorganize connections among the governing, the self-governed, and political spaces" (Ong 2006:14).

Second, I suggest that Bulgarian Muslims migratory experience transforms their relationship with other Bulgarian Muslims at home and the very idea what is to be a Bulgarian Muslim. Because of migration into a different social context where they are not recognizable and socially labelled in the same way as at home, many Bulgarian Muslims start to downplay their cultural specificity and their Muslim identities in order to stress their Europeanness. However, this furthermore contributes to the broader process of fracture and fragmentation of their "community" in Bulgaria. Being categorized in a different ways by the receiving state and the social milieu, thus creating a potentially different relational setting for their self-identification, but also developing a feeling of independence and empowerment from the home state (both practically and ideologically) thus might result in a more profound transformations of the sense of belonging not only for the migrants themselves, but also for those who are tightly interconnected with them and are part of the same social field at home.

Finally, adopting a constructivist approach to ethnicity and identity, thought in relational, processual, and dynamic terms (Brubaker 2004), I look at the state as one of the actors recognizing or imposing identity on specific groups and minorities, while at the same time being the institution against such minorities potentially raise claims for their specificity. At the same time, I will look at the enactments and possible contestation of such imposed categories. Therefore I will examine the relationships and conceptualizations of the state to show how lack of expectations and reliance on the state might result in lack of creating a sense of ethnic or cultural clear cut difference and further implementation of identity politics.

Theoretically, I frame this research within three analytical fields. First, the analysis of transnational migration as constituting a transnational social field opens up the discussion of simultaneous entanglement and responses to the constraints and demands of two or more states and includes various actors and institutions both in the place of origin and place of settlement of migrants (Basch *et al.* 1994*,* Glick-Schiller and Basch 1995, Levitt 2001). A second field is related to non-normative aspects of citizenship, especially social citizenship, which points to the discrepancies between social practices and claims for participation on one hand, and legal norms and definitions on the other (Glick Schiller and Caglar 2008, Isin 2002, Ong 1999). A third analytical field is the anthropological approaches to the state, which reformulate the state as an object of study to demonstrate how the state can be studied ethnographically, thus opening up a space for looking from the perspective "from below" of how people conceptualize and relate to the state (Das and Poole 2004, Gupta and Sharma 2006, Hansen and Stepputat 2001, Trouillot 2001). Finally, I will use social geographers who challenge the tendency of naturalization of state space and call the attention to the restructuring of territorially demarcated forms of state power

CEU eTD Collection

13

and the recent decentering of nationally scaled forms of state activity (Brenner 2004, Brenner *et al.* 2003, Jessop 1999).

Methodology

The ethnographic material for this study is based on a year long fieldwork in 2007-2008 and subsequent shorter visits between 2008 and 2010. I have approached a translocal vibrant and constantly changing migrant community through a translocal method, sharing my time over the course of twelve months between Brushlyan, a village in the Southwestern part of Bulgaria and the small town of Tafalla in the northern Spanish province of Navarra. I have returned both to Spain and to Bulgaria for shorter periods of time several times since then. In both localities I have lived with a family – in Spain with two different young families with children, and in Bulgaria – with an elderly couple who has three migrant children. Over different periods of time members of the extended family have joined the people I live in. In Spain, we shared the flat with the younger brother of the wife, and with her father for a up to three months periods. In Bulgaria the two sons and their families returned home for the summer vacation. In addition, I have spent time and talked to many other kin members both in Bulgaria and in Spain. In this way I have tried to construct an extended field site (Olwig 2002), dividing my research in geographic space and following closely three kin networks, comprising of both horizontal and vertical links of cousins, siblings and their spouses, and parents, in-laws, aunts etc.

My main focus is the micro level of migration and care regimes (cf. Lutz 2010). I look at care arrangements in their daily manifestations and the way people talk and make sense of their practices. In this sense, my research is mostly a study of 'transnationalism from below' (Baldassar 2007). As Wilding (2007) suggests, the ethnographic focus is particularly insightful

14

for documenting the many ways in which migration transforms the everyday life of people. Combining research of discourses and practices, my methods included life stories, extended semi-structured interviews, and informal conversations during multiple visits, walks, chats in public spaces. In addition, I have participated in social and family events, but also in everyday activities like accompanying women to pick up grandchildren from school, doing weekly shopping with them, having Sunday morning coffee with the family, or being in the park with the children and their attendants. Thus, through participant observation I had the opportunity to witness both moments of tension of crisis, and practices which are mundane and routine. The aspect of "being there" balanced to a certain extent the limitations and possible biases posed by the fact that I was a young unmarried woman from the ethnic majority, coming from Sofia, the capital city.

The Chapters

The structure of the dissertation is divided in three main parts, which come after Chapter 1, in which I delineate the main theoretical debates in which I position this study. The first part is focused on diverging state categorizations imposed and internalized or circumvented by Bulgarian Muslims, and individual self-identifications which evolve in the context of migration. The second part deals in more details with how migrants construct themselves as citizens through work and by this develop expectations from the different states. The last part is devoted to the private sphere of kin relations and ritual constructions of the village community. The three parts deal with three levels of citizenship and relationship with the state: interactions through categories, contractual relations through work, and mechanisms of belonging and membership.

Chapter Two, *The Order of Plural Names: Naming, Re-naming, and Self-naming practices in crafting simultaneous lifeworlds* introduces the social context and everyday routines of the community of migrants. The emphasis is on the way they use different names (Bulgarian or Muslim, nicknames, or kin positions) in different contexts and thus create different orders of identification and livelihood. I explore how migration changes or reinforces certain ideas of positionings vis-à-vis institutions and the other significant social others. Then I move to the question of group identity and of what kind of community do the migrants form – a village, a regional, an ethnic or religious, a national etc. I argue that they have established a strong village community which has clear boundaries not only vis-à-vis the Spanish and the Bulgarians, but also vis-à-vis Bulgarian Muslims from other villages. I end with a discussion of the choice of the group name – Bulgarian Muslims, which is also a transition to the next historical chapter.

In Chapter Three, *The History of a Group in Flux*, I present a critical historical overview of the debates on who are the Bulgarian Muslims as a political state devised category and as a category of academic analysis, which are tightly intertwined. It discusses the nature of Bulgarian nationalism and the waves of assimilation policies against the Bulgarian Muslims, concluding with the present political situation in Bulgaria and the role which Bulgarian Muslims have in it. The chapter is built on secondary historical and ethnographic sources.

Part Two deals with institutional participation and citizenship practices. The main goal of Chapter Four, *The Worker-Citizen,* is to deconstruct the category of migrant work by shaking the dichotomy of irregularity versus regularity and then re-construct it through exploring how people manoeuvre between different positions and statuses. There is a continuum of possible positions visible in the multiplicity of contracts that workers (regular or irregular) are being offered and by the actual practices that accompany working with or without a contract. The dichotomy is

16

complicated even more by the flexible moves from one position to another and back (from a non-contract, into temporary contract, into unemployment, into self-employment etc.) and the way people manipulate or are being trapped within this flexibility. At the same time, I look at how work is invested with meaning by the migrants. The different acts related to employment affect the symbolic interpretations of the possibilities of work in migration and the way this is translated into concepts of precariousness or security. This in turn feeds into the way migrants address questions of inequality and marginalization vis-à-vis the Spanish. The issue of (in)equality is more broadly linked with discourses on citizenship and the various meanings people invest it with. Thus, the two aspects I seek to explore throughout the chapter are: 1. what are the actual everyday acts of participation and claims to rights that are reflected in the practices of work and 2. how do people relate implicitly or explicitly their work positions to their position as members of a community and as citizens. Ultimately, by contrasting the Spanish and the Bulgarian labour contexts with their opportunities and traps, I suggest that migrants enjoy a certain type of practical citizenship in Spain, which they lack in their formal citizenship in Bulgaria.

In Chapter Five, *Unemployment: Security through Insecurity and the Discourse of the Deserving State*, I discuss uses and interpretations of unemployment. I will show the different ways of approaching and acting upon unemployment in Bulgaria and in Spain as a social status signifying lack of employment and as a practical status which allows access to social benefits. I will look into the ways people interpret the meaning of unemployment and how it can be used as a critique towards the state. At the same time, I will show the ways in which it can be used as a resource and a security strategy. Unemployment benefits are closely linked with the theme of taxes and social contributions. I will look at the connections between regular employment, tax paying, and the subsequent unemployment benefits and the way migrants interpret these connections in a

17

framework of rights, responsibilities and deservedness. I argue that in Spain migrants develop a rhetoric of the 'good citizens' who have deserved their rights through fulfilling certain obligations. And this rhetoric comes is most salient in the sphere of unemployment and tax paying.

Part Three deals with kin and community transformations. The focus of Chapter Six, *Transnational Ageing Carers and the Transformations of Kinship and Citizenship*, are the "transnational ageing carers", a group of elderly migrants who are in constant movement between social contexts, families, and states. I look into the ruptures in the structure of care arrangements, kin expectations and family relations, which migration triggers. I suggest that transnational care motivated mobility affects the ageing carer's sensibilities of home and belonging I argue that these transformations, albeit subtle, lead to reformulation of the fabric and meaning of the family and kin relations. Moreover, it also leads to a disruption in social and economic citizenship of the ageing carers both in Bulgaria and in Spain. I argue that these two lines of transformations, of kinship and citizenship, result in new forms of gender and intergenerational inequalities. Furthermore, their intersection leads to a move from welfare to wellbeing, which affects not only the present arrangements between migrants, but also defines future insecurities.

In Chapter Seven, *Phantasmic Devices: Wedding Videos and a Virtual Community in the Making,* through an analysis of the uses of wedding videos here I explore one of the ways to be an active member of a community in more than one place and time. I argue that through an extension of the wedding ritual through the device of the wedding video, migrants create a common social space between Bulgaria and Spain, rather than two oppositional points. I explore the circulation and uses of wedding videos as a tool for building a new type of imagined community between the migrants and those who stay behind. Moreover, I look at the particular

mechanisms of creating temporal and spatial bridges between home and abroad, respectively between the past of home and the present of migrancy. On the other hand, I discuss the transformations in the meaning and the essence of the ritual as a result of its postponed re-enactment and re-consumption. The emphasis in the analysis is on the visual medium as a tool for creating a new type of community dual participation. I focus on the relevance of knowledge and familiarity, achieved through the wedding video devices, which allows for further participatory claims.

In the conclusion I develop the idea of migrants assembling fragmented citizenship, as my main contribution in citizenship, migration and state theories.

Chapter 1: Theorizing the State and Citizenship

The subject of this study is Bulgarian Muslims migration to Spain in the early period of Bulgaria's EU accession (2007/2008). In this period their migration is already simultaneously transnational and inter-European (inter-EU). This makes them embedded in two political, institutional and cultural contexts, while at the same time part of one common space of the EU. As Bulgarian Muslims in Bulgaria they have been exposed to different types and levels of exclusion – cultural discrimination and limited rights of self-identification (before 1989), economic and social rights discrimination in the present, a certain level of political disenfranchisement, and subtle marginalization from the majority and the state expressed in emblematic acts of violence and anti-Muslim public discourses. As Bulgarian migrants to Spain, they have been excluded in rather different ways by virtue of being semi-members, denizens, irregular workers etc., while at the same time they have enjoyed a level of empowerment and an improvement of their livelihood (mostly economically speaking, but also in terms of independence from identity struggles). While they do not have full citizenship rights in Spain, they hold EU citizenship, which opens for them economic and institutional opportunities that third-county nationals do not have access to. This practical aspect of EU citizenship is combined with a symbolic transformation of the space of belonging. Bulgarian Muslims migrants are now *of* Europe, rather than simply *in* Europe, just as Bulgaria is part of a common European space rather than an external to it. This has introduced transformations of the way migrants think of their own lives, of their positions, and of their future, which in itself informs their actions and claims in the present.

I approach these dual transformations through examining migrants' relationship with the state and the processes of its reconfiguration. I look into three aspects of this relationship: 1. the different state crafted norms and categorization framing migrants' lives in two polities; 2. the interactions and practices that migrants are engaged in with state institutions and through regulations of their positions as different types of members; and 3. migrants' imaginings of the state and of their position in it. In this sense, the relationship with the state is the interface which aims to reconcile a top-down analysis of state policies and structures and the view "from below" of how people enact, react to or circumvent such structures.

In developing this argument I draw on three intellectual fields: discussions of transnational migration, the analysis of the state, and the concept of citizenship. In what follows I first discuss transnational migration as constituting a transnational social field. This opens questions of simultaneous entanglement and responses to the constraints and demands of two or more states and includes various actors and institutions both in the place of origin and place of settlement of migrants. Next, I review the anthropological approaches to the state, which reformulate the state as an object of study to demonstrate how it can be studied ethnographically, thus opening up a space for looking from the perspective "from below" of how people conceptualize and relate to the state. Social geographers formulate their critique towards state analysis at a different level, challenge the tendency of naturalization of state space and call the attention to the restructuring of territorially demarcated forms of state power and the recent decentring of nationally scaled forms of state activity. In the last section, I focus the attention on non-normative and non-legal approaches to citizenship. Here I discuss the disjuncture of the bundles of citizenship rights into separate realms of civil, political, social, cultural right, which can function independently from each other. I suggest that his points to the discrepancies between social practices and claims for

participation on one hand, and legal norms and definitions on the other. Then, I look into recent neoliberal transformations of citizenship, like marketization and contractualization, which substitute the idea of citizenship as "the right to have rights". I focus particularly on the consequences for social citizenship. Finally, I develop the concept of fragmented citizenship as a way of explaining the practices of migrants within the European Union with reference to my case.

1.1. Conceptualizing transnational migration

1.1.1. On simultaneity and transnational social fields

The transnational lens on migration allows for a conceptualization of the links and networks established between the place of origin and the place of settlement of migrants. The classic by now definition of transnational migration is "the process by which transmigrants, through their daily activities, forge and sustain multi-stranded social, economic and political relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement, and through which they create transnational social fields that cross national borders" (Basch *et al.* 1994:6).The further refinement of the concept of 'transnational social field' as a set of multiple interlocking networks of social relations highlights the inclusion of those individuals that have never moved or crossed borders themselves but who are linked to the migrants through a complicated web of interdependencies and influences. Thus it includes multiple actors and institutions with different kinds of power and locations of power who interact across borders (Glick Schiller 2005).

The term transnational social field/space is helpful to describe the kind of bridging – material and symbolic – of people, attachments and material constructions. At the same time, migration is a

factor which influences all other spheres of life, like kin relations, everyday routines, but also imaginations and the way people position themselves vis-à-vis various entities, whether it is the state, welfare, or different types of communities. Through the concept of field I aim to describe the inclusiveness of various levels and actors in people's lives. Here, it is important to note that the field is not a static snapshot. On the contrary, it is dynamic and constantly changing with including or excluding different institutions, norms, or actors as significant or irrelevant. For example, at the level of actors, those at home linked with the migrants can become migrants themselves at any given point. In this sense almost everyone is a potential migrants, rather than a passive position placed in the "home" realm only indirectly participating in the migration process.

If migration is about the temporal and spatial spreading of everyday life and social relations, but also about institutional and formal incorporation in more than one unity. Hence, conceptualizing migration as establishing a transnational social field draws the attention to the simultaneity of transmigrant connections to two or more states (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). It calls for an investigation of the ways in which transmigrants become the fabric of everyday life in their places of origin and of settlement, and the overlapping, though different, participatory claims and strategies which are deployed simultaneously in two institutional and social contexts.[2] Thus, it opens up further venues for empirical ethnographic research of the different modes and degrees of incorporation and for examination of the conditions which favour certain modes over others.[3]

Through moving away from the assimilationist perspective on migration, the transnational lens not only calls for a re-interpretation of the necessary uprootedness of migrants from their places

---

[2] For an example of political participation and claim making of Kurds and Turks directed to Germany and to Turkey, see Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003a

[3] For examples of different modes of incorporation see Glick-Schiller *et al.* (2006) on non-ethnic incorporation in small-scale cities.

of origin, but also provides an analytical strategy of transcending a compartmentalized view of society, rooted in what Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) called "methodological nationalism", which assumed that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world. The authors argue that the nation-state building processes have shaped the way immigration has been perceived and the way immigration policies have been developed. Moreover, the tendency of anthropology to study cultures as unitary and organically related to, and fixed within, territories, reproduced the image of the social world as divided into bounded, culturally specific units typical of nationalist thinking. Further on, the anthropology of ethnic groups within modernizing or industrial nation-states tended to describe them as culturally different from the "majority" population because of their different historical origin, including their history of migration, rather than see these differences as a consequence of the politicization of ethnicity in the context of nation-state building itself. In relation to the study of migration, the authors argue that the shift towards a study of "transnational communities" was more a consequence of an epistemic move away from methodological nationalism than of the appearance of new objects of observation.

1.1.2. The state as an actor in migration flows

Nevertheless, many migration theoretizations which analyse the role of the state often treat it as a monolithic homogenous whole, and state territory as a homogenous entity vis-à-vis state policies (Calgar 2006). The "role of the state" is looked at from a policy level perspective, in which the state is an actor of shaping migration flows, and often the only actor. This is relevant both for discussions of receiving countries' immigration and social policies, and of sending countries acts for remittances encouragement, political participation and lobbying (Levitt and De la Dehesa 2003, Massey 1999, Osteergard-Nielsen 2003b). Likewise, debates of citizenship issues, civic

and political participation and "dual loyalties" spanning over two or more countries look at the state from a strictly normative perspective (Bauböck 2003).

Nevertheless, works on the role of the state draw the attention to the importance of analyzing not only the receiving states immigration policies and opportunity structures they create, but also the role of the sending states. Instead of looking at sending states as "pawns rather than players" Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003b) suggests to shift the research focus to sending countries' willingness and ability to formulate and implement policies towards their citizens abroad. In addition, this view further points to the different pathways though which sending states influence directly or indirectly migrants' activism and political participation, by re-inventing themselves and adapting their strategies and policies to the new migration conditions (Fouron and Glick Schiller 2001, Levitt 2001, Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003, Smith and Guarnizo 1998). Moreover, as Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003a) demonstrates with her analysis of Kurdish and Turkish guest-workers and the factors influencing their political mobilization, it is crucial to take into consideration the interplay between institutional contexts and events in the sending and the receiving state, thus including in the concept of transnational social field not only individual or informal interactions and networks, but also state practices.

Even though there have been attempts to go beyond the analysis of the state as a homogenous entity (e.g. Caglar 2006 on the importance of scales) and to consider the interplay between the sending and the receiving states as part of a transnational social field, the relationship between migrants and both the sending and the receiving state has not been thoroughly analysed at the intersection of interactions, practices, conceptualizations and categorizations. It is this question that my study tries to shed light at.

1.1.3. Migration as a normal part of social relations

For most migration scholars the main subject of study is migration *per se*, which leads to insistence on interdisciplinarity which would allow overcoming of compartmentalised and reductionist approaches. Here I take the opposite approach by thinking of migration as a context in which life unfolds. In this way, my focus is not on migration as such, but on the aspects in people's lives that get transformed by migration. Thus, migration in a person's life is just one aspect of among many. In this sense, I am not trying to explain migration, but rather use it as an explanatory tool for other social phenomena. In this way, I suggest to weave the topic of migration into the life worlds of ordinary people. Stephen Castels argues that claims of academic neutrality mask a sedentary bias, which thinks migration as an exception (2010:1568). Instead, he suggests to postulate that migration is a normal part of social relations, which should allow us to analyse migration no in isolation, but as a part of "complex and varied process of societal change". While Castels (2010) criticizes interdisciplinarity for being additive rather than integrative, I would suggest that the way to overcome this is in fact to focus on social phenomena that include migration as a part of them, rather than try to study all sides and aspects of migration. So, the overarching synthesis should come from the approach which integrates migration as part of social life

1.2. Anthropological and geographical approaches to the state

1.2.1. The state as a process, as a practice, and as an idea

Philip Abrams ([1977] 1988) explains the difficulty of studying the state through contesting the idea of one realm, consisting of different facets or levels. The state, he says, does not exist as a

reality, it is a mask, which prevents from seeing the political practice as it is. He distinguishes between the state-system, which is a nexus of practice and institutional structure centred in government; and the state-idea, which is projected, purveyed and variously believed in different societies at different times. However, it is wrong to suppose that there is a third unifying realm, entity, which is over and above the state-system and the state-idea. Thus, the difficulty in studying the state, according to Abrams, resides in the fact that the state—as unified political subject or structure—does not exist; it is a collective illusion, the reification of an idea that masks real power relations under the guise of public interest. Here, I suggest to study the state through interactions with its citizens, and through their interpretations and visions. In this sense, I will follow Abrams' insistence and will not try to construct one realm, but stay at two levels simultaneously – the state as a system, and the state as an idea.

A research which attempts to address citizenship in a non-normative way, but on the level of the actual state policies and the people's responses to them necessitates a different approach towards the state then the one discussed in terms states, as actors, producing policy and legislation. There is a need to deconstruct the idea of entity and homogeneity for analytical purposes in order to grasp the *relationship with the state*, i.e. the everyday interactions and practices, and the conceptualizations and discourses of states by the people. One way to overcome the entity vision of the state and to bridge the gap between large scale discussion of the relationship between new migration processes and state transformations, and the level of everyday transnational practices, is to adopt an anthropological perspective and thinking how the state can be studied through ethnography. This in its turn leads to a redefinition of the very concept of the state. Here, I will not engage with discussions of state-definitions, but instead will borrow an analytical toolkit from these debates. Trouillot (2001) argues for a research strategy which goes beyond "governmental

27

or national institutions to focuses on the multiple sites in which states processes and practices are recognizable through their effects" (2001:126). Hence, the state according to him appears to be an open field with multiple boundaries and no institutional fixity.

The anthropological approach to the state is one way of "denaturalizing" the state through studying stateness as historical and contingent construction. According to Hansen and Stepputat (2001) ethnography is best equipped to bring into view the gap between discourses of state power (such as discourses of territorial integrity, rights, entitlements, citizenship) and social states such as exclusion, marginalization, resistance and separatism. It further raises the question of the limits of government: where does the state begin and where does it end? Gupta and Sharma further argue that we should deconstruct "the illusion of cohesion and unitariness created by states" and instead think of the state as always contested and fragile and analyse the cultural processes through which "the state" is instantiated and experienced (2006:11). Therefore they propose to study the state as a "multilayered, contradictory, translocal ensemble of institutions, practices, and people in a globalized context" (2006:6). This could be done through examining how the micro-politics of state works, how state authority and government operate in people's daily lives, and how the state comes to be imagined, encountered, and re-imagined by the population. They invite researchers to focus on two aspects, which are mutually constitutive and interdependent – mundane bureaucratic procedures (i.e. how is the state enacted on everyday level) and the discourses and representations of the state in public culture (i.e. how is the state imagined).

Another anthropological approach which aims to deconstruct traditional theoretical notions of the state is that of Veena Das and Deborah Pool (2004) in their edited book *Anthropology in the Margins of the State*. Following other scholars such as Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, or Aihwa Ong, they chose to focus not on analysing state norms, but state exceptions. By doing this,

they look at at how practices and politics at territorial and social margins shape the practices that constitute the "state". Central to their approach is the relationship between the modern state and its margins whether constituted spatially (peripheries), through writing practices (documents and identities), or in the space between bodies, law, and discipline (the bio-political state). The margins are not inert, but rather creative, both economically and politically, legally and illegally, and the state is continually being redefined in response to the imaginaries nourished in the margins and projected onto the state. Moreover, although the margins are defined by state efforts to control populations, the manipulations that people make of state institutions may at times "reconfigure the state as a margin to the citizen body". In this way the study of the margins of the states allows an entry into complex local ideas of justice, of the good state, and of proper citizenship.

1.2.2. Beyond the territorial trap and the container theory of society

Along the same lines a growing number of social theorists are seeking to move beyond the "container theory of society" in which states are viewed as the self-enclosed geographical containers of socioeconomic and politico-cultural relations (Beck 2000, Brenner 2004, Castells 1996). Social geographers argue against the 'territorial trap' (Agnew 1995) created by conventional assumptions about state sovereignty and against a state-centric approach which naturalizes national state territoriality, and treats states as fixed, self-enclosed geographical containers of social, economic, political and cultural relations (Brenner et al. 2003). Neil Brenner (2004) demonstrates how the spatial transformation of statehood in contemporary Europe under globalized capitalism has reoriented state institutions and policies toward subnational regions, which in turn has produced new forms of urban governance and uneven development. Those structural changes which transform places of migrants' departure and settlement are particularly

important for the processes of incorporation and development of particular transnational practices, as Ayse Caglar (2006) shows. She insists on linking transnational migration analysis with discussions of neoliberal developments, with a special emphasis on the use of the concept of scale, which designates the uneven character of globalization. The author concludes that "unless we link the opportunity structures available to migrants to the scalar positioning of their locality, we fail to approach migrant practices, collective patterns of organization and strategies of participation in conjunction with the transformations of the contemporary welfare state." (2006:13)

These different perspectives which aim at de-naturalizing the nation-state, but also at transforming the way the state is being studied, are instrumental for the conceptualization of the relationship with the state. In order to establish the link between the state and the individual, however, I embark on a journey in the large domain of citizenship studies. Citizenship is one of the possible interfaces which express the interaction between people and states. Bulgarian Muslims operate with this concept not only in their actions, but also in their explicit discourses. What this duality and belonging/non-belonging does to them is at the core of my argument.

1.3. Conceptualizing citizenship

1.3.1. Fragmented citizenship

The concept of citizenship works at two levels in my analysis – as an analytical tool to enter the ethnographic material, and as a descriptive statement which allows me to make an argument. At the first level, I use citizenship broadly and flexibly as a way of analyzing intersections between the migrants and the two states at various points which, I argue, are manifested in the everyday

acts and conceptualizations of people as members of various polities and communities. In this sense, I develop the concept of everyday citizenship. At the same time, at a different level, I wish to use a narrower and more substantive notion of citizenship, which describes the content and consequences of these practices in the particular context of inter-EU migration. At this level, the idea of neoliberal citizenship guides me through my argument. I argue that in order to address the question of the changing nature (neoliberalization) of state-subject relationship in migration context, we need to approach it not just through normative and institutional analysis of state regulations, but also and indispensably so through the lens of everyday acts and practices of citizenship.

Everyday citizenship as an analytical concept allows me to open up a venue for researching a set of practices related to everyday relations with the state at multiple interaction points. Here, citizenship is taken as describing every interaction and intersection with state institutions, state categorizations and labels, and the ensuing exclusion and inclusion that Bulgarian Muslim migrants experience in both states. In this way, citizenship is not thought of in its narrow and static sense of a status, but in an active, constantly manifesting itself activity which opens up certain spaces of empowerment, while closing others. In this sense, citizenship is the (recurring) act of becoming a member and a participant in a polity/community through different paths, which in turn offers certain rights and entitlements, and the further possibility of making claims.

This membership is not necessarily based on a bundle of rights. As a number of scholars have shown (e.g. Benhabib 2004, Caglar 2009, Glick-Schiller and Caglar 2008, Isin and Nielsen 2008) there is a potentiality of decoupling of political, social, and civic rights. This has lead to a conceptualization of various possible attributes attached to citizenship as social, cultural, intimate, economic etc. which do not necessarily come all together in a certain moment of time or

space. Transnational migration highlights these potentialities additionally by introducing the possibility of membership which is activated across more than one nation-state.

This means, that their membership might possibly be reconfigured in every act that they take vis-à-vis the state. Whether it is by changing their passport name, or by changing their worker status, or by supplementing the welfare support with drawing family members into a care network, or by the constant circumventing of the other nation-state of which they are full citizens de jure, the migrants constantly re-enact their position as members, socially, economically, politically etc. Rather than talking of the different attributes of their citizenship which are constantly in flux, I focus on the separate acts which allow or limit their access to rights and entitlements. In this way I choose to replace the static conceptualization (through various attributes) of citizenship as something given and fixed in a certain moment of time with a more processual one, which looks at each and every separate act derived from and constructing a certain type of citizenship, as manifested in everyday people's lives. The concept of everyday citizenship, then, opens up a way to take into consideration the temporality and the changing nature of citizenship which migrants face in their flexibilized lives.

According to Aihwa Ong (2003) everyday citizenship is "the effect of multiple rationalities (biopolitical, class, ethno-racial, gender) that directly and indirectly prescribes techniques for living for independent subjects who learn to govern themselves". In her analysis she examines citizenship not in terms of legal status, but in tersm of social olicies and practices which go beyond the state and shape people's attitudes, aspirations and choices in regards to belonging. (2003:15). At this point, everyday citizenship serves my analysis as a methodological justification of the way I have chosen to study how people are empowered or disempowered by a

certain position vis-à-vis the state. This is rooted in a wider discussion which goes beyond citizenship debates into the question of how do we study the state.

In analysing the way citizenship works in the European Union Thomas Faist (2001) talks of "nested membership". He defines citizenship as constituted of two dimensions - status of citizens, and ties between citizens Therefore, he argues that citizenship "forms a continuing series of institutionalized ties among citizens." (Faist 2001:40). This evokes the idea of the social contracts in which citizenship refers to an institutionalized and generalized reciprocity and a diffuse solidarity in a political community. As Habermas (1998) also asserts access to status usually implies belonging to a political community. Focusing only on the aspect of stauts, means to ignore the role of generalized redistribution and solidarity, and thus the aspect of ties.

This poses the question – what kind of ties and with whom. Through taxes and social security, migrant create ties with the local citizens, in my case with the Spanish citizens, which are mediated through the state. But in the migrants understanding, as I will show in Chapters IV and V, it is not about reciprocity and redistribution between them and the other citizens or rather members in this system, but it is about direct reciprocity between them and the state as an abstract actor. At the same time, through their practice of being regular workers and tax payers, they in fact become members of the generalized reciprocal community, even if they do not think of it like this. In this sense, they conceptualize the vertical ties in Spain, the ties they establish with institutions and the state as an overarching actor.

Faist tries to explain such contradictions through the concept of "nested membership" By this he means that "membership of the EU has multiple sites and there is an interactive system of politics, policies and social rights between sub-state, state, inter-state and supra-state levels. The

web of governance networks allows for enshrining a few new rights at the supra-state level, interconnecting them with old ones, and – above all – re-adapting social rights and institutions in existing welfare states." Thus, the crucial characteristic of nested membership is that it implies multiple levels. Both for citizens and for the political actors. Member states, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, different lobby groups and associations all operate at different levels. For the citizens, nested membership is a form of federative membership, continues Faist, which works at several levels of governance. While Faist describes how EU citizenship works institutionally and formally – between different levels of institutions and actors, my analytical lens is turned to the way the reality that this concept captures works on the ground level of mobilizations, enactments and practices

1.3.2. Neoliberal effects: marketization and contractualization of citizenship

In recent decades welfare systems have been undergoing transformations in almost all advanced industrial countries with privatization and retrenchment of public services, marketization of healthcare, new contractual relations on insurance principle. All this has reconfigured the relationships and the distribution of responsibilities between states, markets, families and individuals for the provision of security (Kingfisher 2002, Pierson 2006). While these processes take different shapes in different parts of the world, Nikolas Rose (1996) suggests they pose similar questions about the new strategies of governing, which have at their centre discrete and autonomous actors, rather than society as a whole. With the welfare state being a major embodiment of social citizenship, the issue at stake then is how can we transform social rights by individualizing social problems without destabilizing the basis for citizenship and social membership, as Giovanni Procacci (2001) points out. This question is part of a wider process of decoupling of political, civil and social aspects of citizenship (Benhabib 2007), which has

resulted in new forms of inclusion and exclusion. On one hand, 'contractualization' and 'marketization' (Somers 2008) of citizenship threatens to transform growing numbers of rights-bearing citizens into socially excluded and internally rightless and stateless persons (Somers 2008). At the same time, migration opens the possibility for some migrants to enjoy social rights without having formal citizenship and before having political or even civil rights in a peculiar reordering of T. H. Marshall's (1965) model of the evolution of citizenship rights (Glick Schiller and Caglar 2008; Guiraudon 2001). These phenomena reveal a disjuncture between formal status and substantive citizenship rights which becomes particularly salient in migrants' acts of claim making (Benhabib 2004, Soysal 1994, Isin 1998).

T.H. Marshall (1965) seminal work on social citizenship demonstrated a linear progressive model of development of citizenship rights, which he drew from the British case. Marshall was criticized from many sides. Michael Mann (1987), for example, questioned the complementarity of the three sets of rights, by pointing out that certain political regimes, like totalitarian fascism and socialism, provided social rights while limiting civil and political rights. In this way social rights masked or even substituted the other two sets of rights for state's subjects. In a similar vein, Jürgen Habermas maintains that instead of enhancing civic participation, individual right and social security may in fact result in a privatist retreat from citizenship and turn citizens from active members in a political community into clients (1994:31).

Habermas' fear of depolitization of citizens through enhancing social rights is taken into a more extreme direction by defenders of the neoliberal approach to citizenship. Peter Saunders (1993) criticizes Marshall's model of necessary complementarity social, civil and political rights, by arguing that privatized consumption of social rights which replaces welfare provisions in fact enhances the active citizenship participation. Malcolm Harrison further claims that *privatised*

forms of social provision amount to an alternative form of modern citizenship." (1991:212).

According to Saunders the stark inequalities of the 19th century, for which the instutitons of social citizenship was necessary, are overcome. Now most citizens in the developed world can afford to buy services based on market mechanisms and thus receive better quality. At the same time, the people who would not be able to afford and purchase social rights are a much narrower starta and they are targetable, i.e. they should be treated with special policies. In this way both Saunders and Harrison in fact undermine social rights as universal rights and suggest they should be privatized and marketable. Another fervent critic of social right and welfare, coming from the right, is Lawrence M. Mead (1983) who adds to these arguments the aspect of moral choices. He argues that social entitlements in fact deepen social exclusion by building a barrier for welfare recipients which is internalised and hinders them from actively improving their lives. In this way the welfare state of the 1980's in fact keeps them in a "state of exemption", which does not allow them full citizenship.

Margaret Somers, on the other hand, argues against market fundamentalism and highlights the grave effects it could have on civil society. She argues that the market logic displaces "civil society's ethic of inclusion, membership, solidarity, and egalitarianism." Further, she says: "As the relationship between the citizen and the state turns into a contractual one, citizens are converted into quantities and qualities of human capital, while families and communities are increasingly viewed as sources of social capital. Their worth, value, and inclusion, are accordingly determined by contractual success or failures in relationship to utility. Those without marketable skills or those whose jobs are no longer available become incapable of engaging in contractual relations, which in turn marks them as morally unworthy"(Somers 2008:41). Market fundamentilsm and market-driven governance are turning right-bearing citizens into "socially

excluded and internally rightless and stateless persons". This erosion of right is happening through what Somers calls *contractualization of citizenship* – reorganization of the relationship between the citizens and the state, which moves from universal non contractual rights and obligations to a market exchange following the principle and practice of *quid pro quo*. "Contractualizing citizenship distorts the meaning of citizenship form that of shared fate among equals to that of conditional privilege. The growing moral authority of both market and contract makes social inclusion and moral worth no longer inherent rights but rather earned privileges that are wholly conditional upon the abitlity to exchange something of equal value. This is the model by which the structurally unemployed become *contractual malfeasants*." (Somers 2008:3)

While Somers focuses exclusive on the tendencies in the United States, Aihwa Ong (1999, 2006) analyses the transformations of welfare provision in the wider context of the changing way the neoliberal states are functioning. By doing this, Ong brings together two concepts – neoliberalism and exception. She shows how components which used to be tied to citizenship (rights, entitlements, territoriality) are now becoming disarticulated and then rearticulated anew following an economic logic which postulates protecting only certain categories of subjects. This neoliberal exception means that the state operates through calculative practices which work against universal rights, but instead filter and prefer certain citizens over other. Meanwhile, other segments of subjects are exempted from the citizenry. This process leads to blurring between local and foreign population, while at the same time deepens inequalities. People who are defined as lacking in "neoliberal potential" are categorized and might be treated as less worthy citizens. This is expecailyl true for low-skill workers, whether from the local population or migrants. They become an exception to neoliberal mechanisms and are framed as excludable population in transit, in between zones of economic growth.

Ong (2006) traces how neoliberalism as a new mode of political optimization is reconfiguring relationships between governing and the governed, power and knowledge, and sovereignty and territoriality. She argues that an interactive mode of citizenship is emerging, that organizes people – and distributes rights and benefits to them – according to their marketable skills rather than according to their membership within nation-states. She argues for going beyond the politico=legal (normative) concept of citizenship, to account for the ways contemporary flows of capital and of migrants have interacted with sovereignty and rights discourses in complex ways to disentangle claims once knotted together in single territorialized mass. Ong suggests exploring the disarticulation and rearticulation of citizenship which are linked to the dynamic conditions of mobile neoliberal technologies of governing and self-governing. She further points to the particular ways in which the neoliberal logic works in requiring populations to be free, self-managing, and self-enterprising individuals in different spheres of everyday life. Such a view on Bulgarian Muslim migrants can open up the perspective to probe into what Ong defines as "the neoliberal subject, who is not a citizen with claims on the state, but a self-enterprising citizen-subject who is obligated to become an "entrepreneur of himself or herself.""

PART I: Circumventing Categories, Inventing Identities. Between the State and the Self

Chapter 2: The Order of Plural Names: Naming, Re-naming, and Self-naming Practices in Crafting simultaneous Lifeworlds

In this chapter I discuss the everyday social lives of migrants, lives that spread between two places, two countries, and two social contexts. Using the lens of the specific question of plural naming practices I aim to outline the parallel and simultaneous lifeworlds that migrants construct and inhabit. I would like to suggest that splitting the self through multiple presentations which are situationally dependent is a manifestation of a deeper demarcation of the different spheres that migrants switch in between. These different spheres are overlapping and at the same time are clearly demarcated. In this sense, the choice of a certain name or designation for a particular situation refers to a choice of a certain aspect or category of the self – worker, villager, relative, friend. Discussing naming practices I look at the ways in which the name is a social and legal identity which creates a link, a face for state institutions and in this sense is one marker of a person as a citizen. In order to illustrate these very abstract terms, I will start with my own confusion with the practice of multiple naming.

I arrived to Tafalla after a short stay in Bulgaria where I gathered some contacts from migrants' relatives. In the first days in Spain I was mostly walking around with Rumi, my 30 year old landlady. I was accompanying her in her daily routines – picking up the children from school, shopping, spending the afternoon in the little park, hanging out with other migrants at the central square on a Sunday morning, visiting relatives, receiving guests. When walking on the cobbled

small streets of Tafalla, we were constantly being greeted by acquaintances. Sometimes we would stop for a short conversation, but more often we would just wave and continue. Rumi was presenting me to everyone and explaining afterwards who is who. Always, until the very end of my stay there, hesitating a bit before pronouncing the name of the person, a Bulgarian name I also went by myself several times to the central square already in the first days to meet up with people that I was already introduced to and to hang out with them. Interviews were out of the question at this early stage, because people were worried I might be a journalist and expose them in the media. But they talked to me and we discussed various general topics. My head was bursting with the many names and faces I was so suddenly exposed to. Most of the names sounded Bulgarian, but not very typical for my ears. I would later realise, that most of the Bulgarian names were specifically chosen as to avoid any Christian connotations.

One day I had coffee at the main square with a middle aged man that Rumi introduced me to the previous day. He told me his name was Nikolay. When I tried to explain later whom I met, Rumi was puzzled and it took some time until she understood me. Then she said: "I keep forgetting his other name is Nikolay. Cause according to "our" names, he is actually Ibrahim." The next day I met with him again and he asked me to deliver a message to Rumi. When I told her what Ibrahim asked me to, she looked with a confused face at me. "Who's Ibrahim? How does he look like?" I explained it is Nikolay. And she said: "Oh, of course, I wouldn't get it at first. He's my uncle, I call him uncle. Well, in fact I call him *mizho*, which is our way of saying uncle." Fine, I thought, so that is *mizho* Ibrahim then. Next time we talked and I mentioned *mizho* Ibrahim, again a puzzled face, which almost drove me into desperation. It turned out, no one really calls him Ibrahim, but instead people use the diminutive, which is Brinda. And Rumi, who is his niece,

refs to him as *mizho* Brinda. I was in the end encouraged to also call him that way, by extension of my living arrangements and friendship with Rumi.

Mizho Brinda had at least four ways of presenting himself and being addressed. He was Nikolay for the outsiders of the community, like the Spanish people and me, initially. Nikolay was also the name that was written on his passport. His Muslim name was Ibrahim. The way people from the village would call him was Brinda or by his nickname, the Rod referring to his boy figure. For Rumi and her family, he was mizho Brinda (brother of her father). But of course, for other kin members he was referred to with the local versions of kin statuses: father, grandfather, another uncle (brother of the mother), etc. This plurality of ways of presentation and designation was not exceptional, but rather the rule among most Bulgarian Muslim migrants. Most people had a Bulgarian name, a Muslim name, a nickname or a diminutive from the Muslim name, a regional Muslim kin status, depending on the relation, and a Bulgarian kin status, as a clarification for the outsiders, like me.

People use one name or another depending on the social context and on the other actors present. All names and designations are activated on a daily bases in different situations. In this sense, the naming practices are situational and the identities towards which they refer are multiple and shifting. In the next section I will first discuss the way people use alternatively their Bulgarian and their Muslim names. I will look at the situations in which they activate one or the other and at the interpretations that they themselves give to this practice. Next, I will explore the circles of intimacy that become apparent through the different names or kin names that people use. The multiplicity of naming options has a complex structure which demonstrates the compartmentalization of the self in different spheres of social life. I would like to suggest that this apparent fragmentation is in fact a coping strategy for reconstructing a coherent life in

42

migrancy. This fragmentation is reflected in the everyday moves and socializing practices of migrants in Tafalla. I argue that the naming practices construct social boundaries and delineate spheres of interaction for migrants which encode circles of intimacy. Finally, I link the practice of double naming with the wider context of Bulgarian Muslims as a minority and point to the historical roots which are discussed at length in the next chapter. Here I motivate my choice of a collective name and identify the difficulties even impossibility of pinpointing one single group name for a group in constant flux.

2. 1. The two personal names in Bulgaria: shifting between Bulgarian and Muslim identity

The main duality that I would like to discuss in this part is between the two types of personal names which most people have – a Bulgarian and a Muslim. What Rumi called 'our' name is the Muslims name, that everyone in the village community (and I dare argue in the wider Bulgarian Muslim community) receives by birth.[4] The other name is a Bulgarian name that is employed for outsiders like me, the other Bulgarians, the Spanish, or the different institutions. Most migrants activate both names on a daily basis depending on the social context and the situation. In this section I explore these different contexts of name uses and the meanings and interpretations that people have developed in order to explain the duality of their naming. I suggest that the uses of the names depend on the context and change with migration. I also explore how choosing one name over the other in a certain situation alludes not only to deeper self-identification statements, but also to complex positioning within religious, ethinc, village communities on the one hand, and as citizen and members of different political communities (like states or the EU) on the other.

---

[4] A note on the ritual with which a child is named.

I will first discuss the nature of the Muslim and the Bulgarian name before I proceed to an analysis of the shifting usage.

2.1.1. The Muslim names: religious identification, belonging to an ethnic community, or something else

The Muslim name is received by birth through a religious ritual. Everyone has a Muslim name, even if they choose to never use it in public. Therefore, even those who have chosen to use only their Bulgarian names in all social situations, still have a given Muslim name. People from Brushlyan call these names "our" names or "Turkish" names. Some names are indeed Turkish, other have an Arabic origin. But for the local imagination the Turkish language accommodates these names which sound different than the common Bulgarian names. When asked why they call it Turkish and not Muslim or even Pomak, people would usually, say, that this is the traditional way of referring to these names, this is how their grandparents called them. Categorizing the Muslim names as Turkish is not an identification with the Turkish minority in Bulgaria or with any other sort of Turkishness. It is more of a descriptive and apparently traditional historical way of opposing Bulgarian (as Christian) versus Turkish (as Muslim), rather than an ethnic or cultural approximation.[5] In practice, there is a differentiation between the commonly used Muslim names among Bulgarian Muslims and among Turks, even if there is some overlap. Some younger people would avoid the Turkish reference altogether, and talk of their names as Muslim, or Arabic.

I chose to call these names Muslim, rather than use the emic notion of my respondents, for analytical purposes and for more clarity. At one level, the Muslim name refers to the link of the

[5] The Turkish minority, as mentioned above, is the largest Muslim minority in Bulgaria. In addition, Bulgarian Muslims are politically represented by DPS, which nominally is a non-ethnic party, but is comprised, especially at the higher political echelons solely by Turkish members. Since the Bulgarian Turks are an official minority unlike the Bulgarian Muslims, for my respondents the reference to the Turkishness of the names was a way to explain to me the opposition.

person to Islam and to all related religious rituals. So, even the people who do not activate their Muslim names in public, and restrain from them even within their families, still have one use is at least for participation in basic religious rituals. A person goes through a naming ceremony after birth, through circumcision (if male), gets married (signs a *nikah*), participates in prayers and gets buried with a Muslim name. A person cannot call himself Muslim, unless he/she has a proper Muslim name. This opens the question of religiousness and the meaning of being a Muslim for the Brushlyani people which will be discussed at a later point in this chapter. For now, I will just say that Muslimness is part of people's self-identification and differentiation from others, and the Muslim name is a prerequisite for that.

There are two levels of using a name – in social interactions and in official documents. At the level of social interaction the choice of name is reflected in a series of smaller or wider circles of intimacy. Some people chose to use heir Muslim name in every situation. At the other end of the spectrum are the people who never use their Muslim name or have only their parents or spouse referring to them like this. In between are the nuclear family, the wider kin, the village community, the ethnic and religious community (confined within the region), the circle of friends which might be outside the minority community, the wider horizon of Bulgarian citizens, and finally, the Spanish sitizens (or any other foreigner). Thinking of these circles of intimacy, I would suggest that the Muslim name works as an expression of more private, intimate self versus the Bulgarian name which is used in the public sphere. There are different patterns of how and when people choose to present themselves with their Muslim name, depending on whether they live in a migration context, and depending on their age and status, on their religiosity, and on their personal preferences.

Before 1989, after a series of violent assimilation campaigns, no one was allowed to register officially with a non-Bulgarian name. The most massive re-naming campaign against Bulgarian Muslims happened in 1972-1974. Since then, everybody in Brushlyan adopted an official Bulgarian name and all the children born after that were registered with a Bulgarian name. At the same time, most people continued using in their daily interactions the Muslim names. When communicating with official institutions or when travelling outside the village and going into a Bulgarian context, people would present themselves with their Bulgarian names. This inconvenience affected only some of the people, because many villagers, especially the elderly ones did not travel outside the village too often, and some of them, never. Thus, before 1989 there was a split between the official, documented identity, and the personal one, reflected in the two names. This is discussed in more details in the historical chapter. After 1989 this practice changed to a certain extent, but did not disappear completely. While most people reverted to their Muslim names as a gesture of independence from the coercive acts of the communist state, others, especially younger ones, decided to keep their Bulgarian names in their documents, while still using their Muslim names in social interactions.

Some people, like Yassen, a 37 year old driver, did this because they did not want to bother with the administrative hustle. Yassen had a professional driving license, and a vocational school diploma, in addition to the passport. He told, for him changing the documents seemed too complicated. He kept using his Muslim name in the village. But he presented himself with a Bulgarian one every time he travelled. Others, like Rumi, my landlady, wanted to study in University, in the regional centre, Blagoevgrad. Rumi did not want to be treated differently because she is from a minority, so she insisted she keeps her Bulgarian name officially. She studied *zadochno* for four years and got used to presenting herself as Rumi to her classmates. In

this period she already decided to keep her Bulgarian name also for her Bruslyani social interactions. Her family accepted her decision, so even her parents and brothers started referring to her with her Bulgarian name. The only people who kept using her Muslim name were one of her aunts, and her grandparents. Her husband, Yavor, was a similar case. He never reverted to his Muslim name. And he was known in the village with his Bulgarian name. His mother and his wife! though stuck to the Muslim name. Yavor's grandfather was the village mayor in the period of the name changes and he was responsible for the administrative name change of many men in the village. He tried to keep the peace and avoid violent clashes by personally deciding for many of the men, who had escaped in the mountains as a protest. The grandfather believed in the usefulness of Bulgarian assimilation, and Yavor followed suit.

The Muslim name is not a secret or regarded as shameful by any of the people who decided to stick to their Bulgarian names even in most social interactions. They did not hide their name, neither did they mind that certain close people used it in public. Rumi or Yavor's mother would call him or refer to him as Amet in public within the village community freely and everyone knew whom they mean. Still, he would never present himself as Amet to anyone. His Muslim name is confined within the very close kin circle and is treated almost as a kin name. The other end of the spectrum is represented by Aynur who had a Bulgarian name ascribed when she was born, but since she changed it in 1991, she never used it again. She had her Muslim name on all her documents and she would always present herself as Aynur on all occasions. Between these two ends of the spectrum, there is a multitude of people who shift between their Bulgarian and their Muslim name depending on the context and the circle of intimacy.

The elderly people, irrespective of their migration status, prefer to use their Muslim name in most settings. They have experienced the imposition of a different name, not a name given by birth,

but imposed by the state with force. The Bulgarian name for them is distant, foreign and non-signifying anything related to them. And still, some of them would use the Bulgarian name when presenting themselves to an outsider. I often experienced this, as someone coming from the majority and from the capital. Elderly people used their Bulgarian name on the first meeting as a more formal and official way of presenting themselves. An indicative example is my first meeting with Yassen's mother. We met at the street in front of their house in Brushlyan. I already knew Yassen from Spain and he wanted to present me to his mother. She was waiting for us at the front door, while we were climbing the steep street leading to their house. When I reached her, she pulled her hand and said in a hesitating tone: "I'm Albena." But Yassen interrupted her: "It's all right, you can use your real name. Neda's one of ours already." Then his mother sighed with relief saying her Muslim name, Zaira, smiling and giving me a hug.

Later on, in their kitchen, she told me in great details about the different assimilating campaigns that happened in the village since she was a child in the 1950's. "I suffered from this name change. The clothes change was also not good, but taking my name away, erasing it from the passport, this I suffered the most for. I never learned to like this Albena name. It doesn't sound bad, but… it just means nothing to me. It's not given to my by parents, it doesn't connect me to Allah. What's the use of it. So now, after the change [1989] I only have Zaira." Still, she was willing to present herself to me with this non-meaningful Bulgarian name. She explained this with uncertainty, and desire to protect herself: "Before someone could rat on you to the police if you didn't use your Bulgarian name officially. It's a habit, when I see a stranger." Later on, she added: "People are mean sometimes when I go to Gotse Delchev, to the hospital. I have the feeling they give me this nasty looks, because they know I'm Muslim. So, whenever I can, I use the Bulgarian name. Not always, because my real name is on my ID, but whenever I can."

Avoiding the Muslim name in fear of discrimination or harm is a common reason given by people. In a way, for most villagers it has become a rule of thumb to use the Bulgarian name, when meeting someone for the first time or in an official situation. The name then, can serve as an identity disclosure or as a veil over the difference perceived as harmful. While the state has terminated the official assimilation attempts after 1989, some of the media and the public discourses coming from the majority have been openly hostile against Muslims in general, and Bulgarian Muslims in particular. Some media reports and attacks are directed against alleged radical Islam 'enemies' in the face of certain local political leaders and imams. Others echo extreme right and nationalistic appeals for a pure and Christian nation and call for violent solutions. Other less threatening public opinions, especially among people who do not live in a region with populated by Bulgarian Muslims, are limited to discussions of backwardness, low hygiene, and lack of education. Such and similar negative stereotypes contribute to fears of discrimination form the majority and reinforce the desire for cultural and ethnic anonymity. In this sense, the use of the Bulgarian name is caused on one hand by the historical memory and by the present perceived discrimination and existing negative stereotypes in the wider Bulgarian society.

The fine balance between using a Muslim and a Bulgarian name reflects not just a personal strategy for avoiding harmful and marginalizing attitude from the majority. It is related to the more general question of group identification and group constitution. Through the personal name people confirm or avoid belonging and ultimately difference.The constant shifting between one name and the other works in the broader context of the question who are the Bulgarian Muslims as a group, as a minority, as an ethnicity which I will go back to in the last section of this chapter.

2.1.2. Bulgarian names, legal identities

The name that people choose to put on their documents is the identity that they choose to demonstrate to the state. Having a Bulgarian or a Muslim name on the documents is a statement in citizenship terms and a positioning vis-à-vis the state. Being officially registered with a Muslim name is a statement of distinction – ethnic, religious, cultural, or simply a minority qualification. It is a solid statement of difference, beyond everyday situations of presentation. Conversely, choosing to have a Bulgarian name on the documents might mean a sign of homgenization with the majority, or, which is in fact more often the case, a more intense fear of perceived discrimination. Most of the Brushlyani people who chose to have a Bulgarian name on their documents justify this with the desire to be treated indiscriminatively in administrative terms, to be unnoticeable for the institutions. To have the right to choose when to disclose their difference and when to conform to a common denominator like Bulgarian citizenship. The Bulgarian name on the documents then is not necessarily a move towards Bulgarianness, but a move towards equal treatment, which is guaranteed at the price of losing officially one trait of difference.

Unlike the Muslim name, the Bulgarian name has a more public and distant status. For the elderly people it was a violently imposed name, during the several assimilation waves, most intensively in the 1970s. I discuss the historical aspect of the issue in more details in the next chapter. Younger people, born after 1972 were given a Bulgarian name along with the Muslim one upon birth, and until 1989 they were registered officially with the Bulgarian name. After 1989 the situation got more complicated. The majority of people changed administratively their names back to the Muslim names at first. The administrative procedure for changing a name was made

more complicated for all affected by the Revival process, that is for the Turkish and the Bulgarian Muslim population. So in the 1990's most people had Muslim names on their documents. This did not necessarily mean that they presented themselves with the Muslim names outside the village. As Yassen's mother, Zaira, explained to me, many people still used their old Bulgarian names in a Bulgarian context when a document was not needed.

Historically, after the mass renaming campaign in 1972, the Bulgarian name was the code which people used to present themselves to the state and to the institutions. Through the Bulgarian name they were categorized as citizens. They were refused civil rights unless they conformed to the Bulgarian name. Even though this situation has been changed, having a Bulgarian name remained as a guarantee for citizenship status for many. While the Muslim name is regarded as a condition for access to religious inclusion, the Bulgarian name was and still is to a certain extent a condition for civil inclusion within the institutional realm of the state. Through the Bulgarian name people split at one more level their public and private persona. This way of employing the Bulgarian name constructed an anonymous, indistinctive public self, which evolves at the level of citizenship and rights. This is opposed Muslim name which sticks to the private intimate self, which expresses itself in everyday personal situations. This private self is unique.

The opposition Bulgarian-Muslim name is also an opposition of secular versus religious position. The Bulgarian name as a connection to the citizen status signifies also a vertical position within the state structure. The Muslim name is what places people in the framework of religious life and connects them to the transcendental. One provides institutional security though state laws, rights and obligations. The other provides ontological placement in the world and vis-à-vis God. Finally, the Bulgarian name provides incorporation in a community of citizens, while the Muslim

name symbolises an ethnic and cultural community. These exaggerated oppositions do not apply neatly in practice to any particular individuals, but express patterns of action and interpretation.

The opposition between Bulgarian and Muslim name and the link with group identity serves as an explanation for one the type and destination migration as a life choice that Brushlyani people have taken. While transnational migration is extremely massive in the whole region, internal migration is very low. When people do migrate internally, it is usually short term, exclusively for work and male only. There are isolated cases of families who have relocated internally after 1989. The popular explanation for this, which I was told many times involved this name duality. Hasan, a migrant in Spain for ten years already, had previous experience as an internal migrant. He went to Sofia for a while, as a construction worker, in the late 1990's. He went with another five workers form the village. They would stay and work there for 20 days there, ain a row, with no free days, and come back for ten days each month.

> "We lives together in a sort of a dormitory in Sofia and it was somewhat isolated. We would go on Friday afternoon to the mosque and meet other people, other Muslims, from the region, there. But at work, with the other workers, the Bulgarians, we used our Bulgairan names. Even though the boss knew we're form the Rhodope mountain and we're Muslims. And everywhere I went, I presented myself with the Bulgarian name. I felt that otherwise people will give me bad looks, and will treat me differently, in a nasty way, if they knew that I'm Muslim. So I was hiding it all the time…. I didn't like it. I want to be what I am in my own country and not hide as a criminal. Being a Muslim is not crime…. So, in the end, I gave up on this. I couldn't live apart from my wife anymore, and taking her there and both of us hiding where we're from, this just didn't feel right."

For Hasan migrating to Sofia more permanently and with his family meant making a compromise with him being a Muslim. He did not want to give up his Muslimness, so he chose to leave Bulgaria, instead of move to another bigger city. Whether this is the most important reason for migrating abroad is irrelevant here. What is important is the feeling of imposed (and self-imposed) identity suppression, that is embodies in the choice of name used for everyday interactions. This statement not only expresses the views of many other Brushlyani people I talked to, but also confirms my previous research conclusions from another Bulgarian Muslim village in the region (Deneva 2005).

The duality of the personal name prior to transnational migration then is seen as partly imposed from outside. While the state is not regulating personal names anymore, people still feel the urge to switch between Bulgarian and Muslim names in situations in which they feel their Muslimness might be a reason for discrimination The fine balance between the contexts in which people use one name or the other varies individually. There are very few cases of people who use exclusively only one of the two names. The very old people in the village who do not leave it and do not meet strangers stick to their Muslim names on all occasion. The other extreme are the very few families that migrated internally in Bulgaria, to Sofia for example, and chose to use exclusively their Bulgarian names. They still keep their Muslim names though, and a parent or another relative uses them, when they go back to the village. This situation gets different shades with the introduction of transnational migration. This is what the next section is devoted to.

2.2. Bulgarians for the Spanish, Muslim for the Bulgarians

The public-private divide between the Bulgarian and the Muslim name becomes more enhanced in Spain, where the migrant community is mixed within the same space (urban and working) with other communities – ethnic, religious, cultural etc. The majority of the migrants then shift between their different names on a daily basis, depending on the immediate social context in which they operate. The Muslim name is confined within the community of co-villagers and in this way has also a linguistic marker. Switching to Spanish meant for most people also using the other name. In this way, sometimes even within the same temporal and geographic site people might operate with two different names.

A telling example is the space of the little park, where many of the migrant women take their children after school. Sometimes they might exchange a few words with another mother, or a colleague who is also there with a child. While talking to each other with the other Brushlyani women then, they use their Muslim names, but when they turn to a Spanish (or any other) colleague or a neighbour, they will engage in the conversation with their Bulgarian name. Similar thing could be observed on a Sunday morning when everybody goes to the central square to have coffee. Typically, both Brushlyani and local Taffalans would gather there around 10 am and stay until 12.30 am. They do not mix with each other, but even stay in separate part of the square. And have their coffee in separate places. Again, if a Brushlyani man see a colleague there, they would engage in a short conversation in Spanish, and the man will be addressed with his Bulgarian name. Turning around and switching to Bulgarian, he would be already in his Muslim name self for his co-villagers.

The linguistic divide is particularly sensitive for children. My landlords' 5-year-old son was presented to me as Christian by his father before I arrived. When we first met, I asked him what's his name. His mum answered for him – Christian. But he himself said at the same time, Ismetko. She smiled, and said: "That's our name, but you can call him as you wish." Then I asked him how he would like me to call him, and he answered: "Well, Ismetko, obviously, since you speak Bulgarian." Another case happened in the Bulgarian language classes, that children have once a week. The teacher asked children to first write their names in Latin letters and then in Cyrillic letters. One boy wrote his Bulgarian name in Latin letters, and his Muslim name in Cyrillic letters. When the teacher asked him what is the reason for this discrepancy, he explained: "Well, in Spanish, I'm Andrey, but in Bulgarian I'm Mehmed, right?" So, children are rigorously taught to present themselves in public (kindergarten or school) with their Bulgarian names, while they are allowed to use the other name at home. The linguistic explanation was apparently the easiest way to settle clear rules of the situations corresponding to one name or the other. In order to make it easier for children some more recent parents chose to give only one name to their children, which sounds more universal and can pass for Spanish too, like Martin, Daniel, or Andres. These children still received a Muslim name upon birth, but it was a very private name, which only the parents knew and no one really used. Whether this will remain a tendency by which more and more people will stop using their Muslim names, remains to be seen.

The linguistic and social divide as symbolized by the name switching also has an administrative expression. It is a rather widespread practice for pre-migrants to change administratively their names back to their Bulgarian version prior to the first migration trip. Name change is a complicated and difficult procedure, which requires going to the local court with witnesses, and a

substantial fee. An yet, a big majority of the migrants had gone through this and reverted to their Bulgarian names from before 1989. Names, which were thought of as imposed and impersonal at that time. Suddenly, these names became a matter of personal choice, of a self-imposition. These public and distant, even hated by some, names, started being used as an instrument. But an instrument for what? When I asked them why bother going through such a complicated, length and expensive administrative procedure, the usual explanation was that they that they wanted to avoid discrimination of the type they felt in Bulgaria when interacting with people from the majority.

Goran, a 34-year-old migrant, who had changes his name from Alil in 2003, just before he embarked on his first trip to Spain, told me: "I want to be treated like the rest of the Bulgarians, I don't want people to know that I'm Muslim, judging from my name, unless I decide to tell them myself. Some of my colleagues know I'm Muslim, but the people in the bank, or in the UGT [the labour union] do not, and I don't see why they should." He further told me that when he worked shortly on a construction site in Blagoevgrad, even if he presented himself as Goran, people would still know he is a *Pomak* and he felt they treated him as a second class, backward and stupid. "Here, they don't know anything about Bulgaria, so, when I tell them a Bulgarian name, they don't ask questions. But think about it! If I present myself as Alil, they will immediately raise an eyebrow. They have enough problems with other Muslims here, with the Africans. I've heard about this from my cousin who came here before me, so I decided to change my name officially." Other people have followed suite, and now this is almost a *sine qua non* for the very decision to migrate among young people.

The re-introduction of the Bulgarian name into the legal identities of Bulgarian Muslims should not be misinterpreted as an act of identification with the Bulgarian majority. Instead, I suggest to

treat it as an act of instrumentalization of a legal name by dividing the legal and the personal name in two realms. The fact that people chose to change their names by their own will also is a step towards removing the traumatic aspect of the Bulgarian name. Thus, the Bulgarian name is interpreted not as an act of state violence on the person, but as an empowering act of choosing how to be seen by the public. In this case the public consists of the Spanish citizens (and by extention the other non-Bulgarian migrants in Spain). The instrumentalization of the name then liberates it from the painful connotations of discrimination and forcible assimilation. It does serve, in fact, an anti-discrimination purpose, a self-regulated protection from envisaged discrimination, which makes it powerful in a positive way. Moreover, while in Bulgaria simply changing the name might not be enough to conceal the difference as it was pointed above, in Spain there is no cultural referent to the geographic area, hence, the name is enough for a re-invention of a new identity - the identity of a Bulgarian citizen.

The Bulgarian name then provides migrant with anonymity and sameness. Sameness with the rest of the Bulgarians. Along these lines is the statement of Goran: "In Spain I'm like you, Neda, just a Bulgarian citizen." In this sense, Spain offers the Bulgarian Muslim migrants the opportunity to reinvent themselves, to "start from scratch" and acquire uniformity with the rest of the Bulgarians. Reinvention through an act of homogenization with the majority and through concealment of cultural difference is thought of as empowering and liberating. But when this same act is performed in a Bulgarian context, it is thought of as "giving up on what we are", as another men told me. As I mentioned before, this was given as the main reason of why Brushlyani (and other Bulgarian Muslims from the region) do not migrate internally, and prefer transnational migration. Leaving the confines of the Bulgarian state then contributes to perceiving the act of anonimization as agentic, rather than as discriminating. It is this act of choice which is

57

not imposed from outside, that act of personal self re-naming that migrants see as empowering and dignifying. And in this sense their shifting between different variations of identity is not thought of as problematic or traumatic, but as instrumental for their wellbeing.

This naming reinvention is also accompanied by concealing from the Spanish all other signs of their Muslimness, such as clothes, celebration of holidays etc. While for men and for younger women clothes are not a differentiating factor, for elderly people they certainly are. When older women who normally wear their traditional Muslim clothes in Bulgaria come to Spain, they change to trousers and remove their headscarves. "When I decided to go to Spain to help my son with his children, I applied for a new passport with the Bulgarian name, and I bought a pair of trousers," a 60-year-old migrant told me. So, Bulgarian Muslims in Spain are not recognizable as different from the majority of the Bulgarian citizens. The celebrations of the Muslim holidays is also concealed and kept within the circle of the kin. While in Bulgaria Bulgarian Muslims would traditionally share their celebrations with their Christian neighbours, here in Spain, the festivity is kept low key for the outside gaze. Nevertheless, holidays and fasting periods are kept strictly. A few of the men even go to the mosque in the nearby Pamplona on big holidays and when a child is sick, people go for prayers to the imam.[6]

What Bulgarian Muslims in Tafalla say *en passant* when talking about their situation in Spain is usually related to the rights they have as Bulgarian **and** EU citizens. They like to juxtapose themselves vis-à-vis other migrants from Latin America or Northern Africa, and point out their own privileged position. At the same time, when referring to their position in Bulgaria, the following quote is more than representative of the general attitude: "In Bulgaria the other

---

[6] Another interesting detail is that there is an imam from the village who is also a labour migrant in Tafalla, working in a bakery. Even though he is not a full-time Imam at present, he is performing an intermediary service between the imam in Pamplona and the Bulgarian Muslims, and also serves for all kinds of smaller spiritual needs of the migrants in Tafalla.

Bulgarians know we are Pomaks, they know we are Muslims and they don't treat us as equals. Here we are as everybody else. There is no difference between you and me here," a 33-year old woman explained. In this sense, it is the importance of equality and of shared European citizenship status that makes their life in Spain more dignified than the one in Bulgaria. Formal citizenship accompanied with the cultural knowledge which is followed by perceived discrimination provides less equality than semi-membership status that they have in Spain.

The official position which Bulgarian Muslim migrants have been assigned by the Spanish state at present is of EU citizens with fewer rights than citizens of older EU countries. In this sense, they are still immigrants who do not have full citizenship rights and need to go through certain procedures for obtaining a work permit, could be discriminated in the labour market on the bases of lack of working documents and risk immediate dismissal if caught working without documents. However, both Spanish institutions and Spanish citizens do not have the knowledge of the specifics of Bulgarian Muslims and in this sense they treat them indiscriminatorily like the rest of the Bulgarian citizens. Bulgarian Muslims are not seen as different either administratively or socially. In this way, they are granted a kind of "sameness" which they cannot fully enjoy in Bulgaria. Through the anonimizing name (an oxymoron), then, migrants insert themselves in a position of full-fledged citizens. Through the name, they changes their legal position vis-à-vis the state (Scott et al. 2002).

Even though the Spanish state places them in the marginal position of immigrants with no full rights, it empowers them in the sense of granting them anonymity and an opportunity for re-invention. At the same time, the Bulgarian state categorizes them as citizens with equal rights, but the social context and the economic conditions marginalize and condemn them to a status of difference they do not necessarily yearn for. Consequently, while sustaining and reproducing the

village community migrants more and more differentiate themselves from the group of other Bulgarian Muslims through this duality. In this sense, their position of Muslims *of* Europe is not acted out explicitly.

Furthermore, the migratory experience of Bulgarian Muslims transforms their relationship with other Bulgarian Muslims at home and the very idea of what it is to be a Bulgarian Muslim. Due to migration into a different social context where they are not recognizable and socially labelled in the same way as at home, many Bulgarian Muslims start to downplay their cultural specificity and their Muslim identities in order to stress their Europeanness. However, this contributes to the broader process of fracture and fragmentation of their "community" in Bulgaria. Being categorized in different ways by the receiving state and the social milieu there creates a potentially different relational setting for their self-identification. At the same time this also developed the feeling of independence and empowerment from the home state (both practically and ideologically). However, this process might have more profound transformations of the sense of belonging not only for the migrants themselves, but also for those who are tightly interconnected with them and are part of the same social field at home.

2.3. The kin position and the nickname: on circles of intimacy

The duality of the two personal names might seem distressing, and in fact it did for me in the first months of my fieldwork. For me the idea of using two alternative personal names simultaneously seemed painful, not matter whether this reality was imposed forcibly by an external agent like the state, or it was a personal choice to avoid perceived. marginalization. It seemed like splitting the self. Coming from a highly individualized social environment, with a very small kin (an aunt, an uncle and two cousins), my conception of the relation between the name and the self is one of

equality and in-dividuality (Strathern1988). The name represents the self. Splitting the name would mean to split the self. Taking the name away from someone from their official legal identity would mean to erase the self in a way. This is of course partly true for my Bulgarian Muslim informants. Especially referring to the Revival period and the previous violent name-changing campaigns. But they seemed quite at ease with this juggling between two names on an everyday basis in Spain. In order to understand this easiness, I had to dig deeper in their naming, designating and addressing practices.

Slowly, following the early example of *mizho Brinda's* multiple designations, I started to reveal a complex system of different ways of addressing and designating people according to different orders of relatedness, kin relations within the village community, and finally, seniority. The personal name was only one way of addressing a person. The more I participated in communal events, random encounters, joint Sunday mornings at the square and numerous house visits, rather than just tête-à-têtes, the more it became clear that the alternative ways to address or refer to someone are in fact prevalent within the community. While for me, as a stranger, people would use the personal name to clarify whom they talk about, among each other they would very rarely use it. This often resulted in funny misunderstandings, when it turned out that the person talking to me in fact does not know someone's Bulgarian name for example. Moreover, while the Bulgarian name was a name used by the Spanish (and by extension, it was also acceptable for me to use it), people would never use it to refer to each other. So when someone did utter it in order to explain to me who is who, they would always do it in a lower voice and with a bit of embarrassment and discomfort.

The two orders of personal names, then, are complemented by other systems of reference: the kin position, the nickname, and the generic respectfulness towards elderly people. Nicknames are a

substitute for the personal name among people of the same cohort (i.e. seniority status). The nicknames are usually given in puberty or shortly after by friends, classmates, but elderly relatives. In this sense, the nickname expresses a trait of the character outside the realm of the kin, which is one aspect of someone's personality. (cf. Leave 1979, Sheper-Huges 1992, Watson 1986). Another way of referring to someone is by a mixture between a nickname and a genitive of the kin or paternal name pointing which kin this person belongs to. Among relatives, the most common way of reference is a relational kin position. This leads to simultaneous uses in the same conversation of different kin positions referring to the same person, depending on the link this person has with the speaker. Somebody's aunt, can be a sister-in-law etc. The kin position is not something static, but exclusively relational. Finally, there is a generic way of addressing elderly people, *abba* and *ago* (for old lady and grandmother, and for old man and grandfather, respectively). Addressing (or referring to) someone elderly (i.e. from the generation of grandparents, which means above 40-45) by name is highly inappropriate, even rude. [7] IN this way elderly people's names become despeakable, a situation similar to what Caroline Humphrey (2006) describes of Mongolia.

My aim here is not to analyse all the way people refer to each other, and the switches between situations. I use these different orders of naming to point a trait of the naming practices of Bulgarian Muslims. The personal name is just one way to address a person, and certainly not the most widespread one. Ultimately it is mainly parents who address their children by name, and spouses between each other. The rest of relations are either coloured by a kin relation, by a kin descriptive term (whose child or spouse) or by a nickname. Whether this is a result of the violent

---

[7] As a stranger, I was allowed all sorts of transgressions. So, I would at first call my landlady in Brushlyan Fatma when explaining where I live to other people. One of my younger friends when telling me a story of her, called her: 'the woman that you call Fatma". Even though she told me it is acceptable for me to call her that way, the young girl herself could not utter the elderly lady's name bluntly, but had to specify. *Abba* Alilovica (by her husband name), or just *abba* is the appropriate way to refer to her, I was told.

re-naming as an escaping strategy, or the re-naming campaigns never really managed to transform people's identity because of these multiple orders of naming, I do not dare to determine. I will only suggest that there might be a connection between the two. The strategy of avoiding the name altogether (Bulgarian or Muslim) by using kin positions or nicknames can be explained as a mechanism of "name displacement" (Keane 1997), a way to 'trick' the imposing state.

Bringing this into the present, the dual naming strategy and the constant shifting between names becomes more intelligible. People address each other with multiple designations. The closer the circle of intimacy, the more the kin relation substitutes the personal name. The name, then, might be as well instrumental, without destroying the whole self. (cf. Bodenhorn and vom Bruck 2006). For the Spanish state people have a Bulgarian sounding name. This is a guarantee for their legal identity as Bulgarian citizens. The Muslim name is a token for their religious belonging and guarantees them a transcendental connection. The nickname is closer to the particular village community, the circle of friends and acquaintances. The nickname has a strictly local meaning. Finally, the kin relation expresses a private relation. There is a move from public to private, which can be traced through these different ways of reference. They all co-exist in the same person, and allow a fragmented, yet cohesive identity.

2.4. Why Bulgarian Muslims? Segmented identification or the non-politics of identity

The personal name complication mirrors a naming complication of a higher order of abstraction. How are we supposed to call these people as a group, segment, cluster? Are they simply part of a religious minority, speaking the language of the majority? Are they a legally unrecognized ethnic minority? Are they a culturally specific group? Can we at all call them a group? All these question have no clear cut or final answer. On the contrary, the more one tries to pinpoint an explicit definition, the more elusive it becomes.

There are many widespread names that refer to the Bulgarian speaking Muslims who live in the Rhodope Mountain and partly in the region of Teteven: Bulgarian-Mohamedans, Bulgarian Muslims, simply Muslims, Ahryani, Pomaks, even Turks. According to Evgenia Ivanova who analyses a recent sociological qualitative and quantitative study, the impossibility to come up with a common label and group these people is geeting deeper and deeper. She suggests, instead, talking of segments, which are geographically concentrated and divided. Her analysis confirms my own micro study. People in my village answered to the blunt question: What are you? Inevitably with "We're Muslims". This goes along with Ivanova's analysis of the data. In her dataset people who live to the West, near Gotse Delchev typically call themselves Pomaks, the region around Satovcha, where my village is situated, use simply Muslims, next to the East there are many examples of Turksih self-identifiaction, and finally, those who live in the Eastern part of the Rhodope Mountains where the majority of the population is Turkish, refer to themselves as Bulgarians.

Pomaks is the most well known in the English and German discourse. Nevertheless, I have decided against it, even though it would have made me part of an academic community. The main reason is that my respondents never called themselves Pomaks in front of me. Only rarely they would use Pomak as a derogative term. Not being entrepreneurial for example, allowing others to cheat you, or being backward all together would be called a "*pomaska rabota*" ("Pomak business"). At the same time, the idea of other, external people calling them Pomaks was regarded as offensive. I would assume that it makes a difference whether the researcher going into a minority group comes from the majority of the same state, or comes as a more neutral outsider. This might explain why foreign researchers use Pomaks as the self-designation group name, while Bulgarian researchers diverge greatly on this issue. In my case, it is clear that I would not describe my informants with a label that they find offensive.

Nevertheless, while Ivanova's conclusion that in the region of Brushlyan people predominantly identify themselves as "just" Muslims, I have decided against calling them that way too. Even if this is the emic answer, it might have opened way too many misconceptions. Muslim is a generic religious label, which applies to several categories in Bulgaria: the Turks, the Muslim Roma, the tiny goup of Tatars, and finally to my respondents. I have chosen to use the designation Bulgarian Muslim for three reasons: First, because it represents a critical discussion of the both aspects of identity and (self-) determination – being Muslim, but not Turkish, and being Bulgarian, but not Christian. In addition, it does not contain the possible pejorative or insulting overtones, which the other concepts might have for certain people. Finally, it points to the officially recognized categories with which they are being labelled by state institutions, which allows a commentary on such categorizations.

'Bulgarian' does not point to their ethnic belonging, but rather to their citizenship status. Bulgarian citizenship is the category under which they related to the Bulgarian state, as well as to the Spanish state. From the more particular ethnographic perspective, when my respondents would call themselves Bulgarian (which they did occasionally when identifying themselves in one context or another), they always referred to their being part of the Bulgarian state in their position of citizens. This is further connected with their identification as European citizens (on the basis of their Bulgarianness), discussed in the last section of this chapter.

In this sense the category Bulgarian Muslims is wide and unspecific enough not to impose a group label, while at the same time, if thought of as pointing to a citizenship status, rather than to ethnic belonging, it can be a critique of ethnicity as a necessary category of identification and categorization. The category is particularly useful for describing the group of migrants who indeed activate and enact their citizenship status as a main identification strategy, while keeping their religious difference of being Muslims part of their private sphere

Chapter 3: The History of a Group in Flux

The overall theme of this chapter is the process of grouping and degrouping of the Bulgarian Muslims over the last century, as a result of the intertwining and shifting efforts of different state regimes, local elites, and the Bulgarian Muslims themselves. There is hardly any other Balkan Muslim population with more contested and constantly problematized identity, torn between imposed categories and self-identification projects. In fact, even grouping them into one narrative might be misleading, according to Mary Neuburger (2000:181). And indeed, at present the Bulgarian Muslims (also often referred to as Pomaks) would be characterized most precisely as a cluster of people with flexible group boundaries and shifting situational self-identification.[8] At the same time, their groupness is actual to the extent that they have been subjected to various external state-crafted categorizations and policies. In addition, both the public discourse and the academic community have continuously grouped them into one category, albeit with uneasiness and with no consensus of how to name them. This conceptual and practical conundrum shapes to a great extent the ambiguous position that Bulgarian Muslims hold vis-à-vis the state and the other social and cultural groups today. For that reason, I will trace the dense, winding and often contradictory roots of the process of non-ethnification and non-politisization of their identity.

The main part of the Bulgarian Muslims lives in the Rhodope mountain, near the border with Greece.[9] Their number is estimated roughly to about 200 000, which is approximately 3% of the

---

[8] Even identifying their number poses conceptual difficulties for the statisticians and the calculations are made on the basis of expert estimates. Since in the census there is no official category of Pomak or Bulgarian Muslim an estimate is being made on the basis of comparing categories of religion and ethnic identity (cross tabulating the number of Muslims with the number of Turks and Roma) in order to obtain the residual category of neither Turks, nor Christians (or others). This census operation is quite telling for the interplay of categorization and self-identification of Bulgarian Muslims.

[9] Outside Bulgaria population similar to the Bulgarian Muslims, i.e. Slavic speaking Muslims in Greece, Macedonia, Albania, and Turkey. Their status and name varies from country to country, and depends on the different nation-state politics towards minorities. (Brunnbauer 1998; Georgieva 2001).

Bulgarian population (Koinova 1999; Konstantinov 1997; Tomova 2000). There are few uncontested facts about their history. It is clear however, that they are indigenous population which was Islamized during the Ottoman rule on the Balkans. They have never had the status of an official minority. This is a result of the 'uncomfortable' position they have occupied in the Bulgarian nation-state project. The modern Bulgarian nation-state was established in 1878 as a project of a "pure nation" without minorities (ethnic, religious, or language), which is in line with the kind of romantic nationalism based on shared language, Bulgarian, and shared religion, Orthodox Christianity. (Konstantinov 1997) The Bulgarian Muslims did not fit in this project and were instead tossed between perceptions as the "self" of the nation, who needs to be assimilated back (and christianized/bulgarianized), and the "other" of the nation, who has to be excluded and differentiated (tukisized) (Brunnbauer 2001). As a result, they have been located in a position of "ethnic marginality", continuously being excluded both by the Bulgarian majority, for not being Christian, and by the Turkish minority, for not speaking Turkish (Karagiannis 1997, 2009)[10]. Thus the Bulgarian Muslims have been defined through double negation, but have not adopted a positive affirmative self-identification category for themselves. This has lead to a relational self-identification, which is flexible and situational, activated in interaction with other ethnic and religious categories and often aiming at blending, rather than emphasizing distinctiveness.

Drawing on ethnographic and historical sources I aim to construct a multi-sided picture of the way Bulgarian Muslims came to be what they are today. For that reason, I trace the different policies and discourses that the state has introduced and implemented in different periods, by analyzing on one hand the domestic political institutions and the effect of ethnic hierarchies, and on the other hand, the role of the foreign geopolitical and economic influence. At the same time, I

---

[10] Karagiannis develops the concept of ethnic marginality as "a lack of clarity of ethnic affiliation, i.e., an uncertainty and indistinctiveness of assignment between the familiar and ethnically foreign. (1999:8)

sketch out the way Bulgarian Muslims responded to and re-worked the state intentions. First, I look at the early Bulgarian nationalism and the Christianization campaign of 1912-1913. Then I discuss the internal Bulgarian Muslim elite's movement *Rodina*, which had assimilation and Bulgarization aims. The next four sections are devoted to the socialist period, drawing different aspects into the picture – the ambiguities of the early socialist regime, the efforts for transforming the everyday life, the violent re-naming campaign and the forms of resistance, and finally, the role of the socialist drive to modernization. Finally, I conclude with the post-1989 period, a time of recognition of human rights and a move towards neoliberalization of the economy and the state

My main argument is that the state's conception of and respective policies towards the Bulgarian Muslims have followed two distinct and parallel logics, which have intersected at the level of people's lives. This, in its turn, has resulted in two tendencies. First, the ethnic and cultural identity of Bulgarian Muslims remained non-politicized and non-codified. In this sense, their ethnicity is still in the process of making and unmaking, which has deep historical reasons. Second, not only was their marginalized position reinforced throughout all periods, but they have also developed a position of mistrust and detachment from the state. This process continues to this date in the context of the neoliberal idea of the "self-enterprising citizen-subject" (Ong 2006:14) and has further implications for the way Bulgarian Muslims act vis-a-vis the state under conditions of migration. I borrow the notion of 'internal orientalism' from Louisa Schein (2000) to explain the processes of exclusion and minoritization of Bulgarian Muslims, which are based on the presupposed and actively confirmed othering coming from the dominant majority and the state. Moreover, the economic and political disempowerment of Bulgarian Muslims can be traced also through a spatial marginalization which reflects the construction of the geography of the national identity (Jansson 2003). The tendency of internal orientalism in the pre-1989 period

develops simultaneously with socialist modernization and claims of even development, which reflects a parallel state logic which applies indiscriminatively to the whole population. These two logics intersect at the level of people's lives and create contradictions in their position vis-à-vis the state. It is these contradictions that I aim to trace in what follows.

3.1. Christianization campaigns of 1912-1913: new territories and political inabilities to conceptualize the nation

The existence of large clusters of Muslims on the Balkans is an outcome of the five centuries Ottoman rule in the region, which not only brought along Islam, but also abolished all state frontiers and enhanced population movement and interpenetration of various groups within a vast territory. Historiography has not reached agreement on whether the presence of Muslim population can be explained through colonization or conversion. The large body of literature that traces the gradual process of Islamization of the local Balkan Christian population in the Ottoman tax registers from the sixteenth century on is the most convincing in academic terms. (see (Kiel 1998; Radushev 2005; Antonina Zhelyazkova 1990). However, a parallel discourse built on pseudo-historical mystifications and ideological fiction and film works insists on the rapid violent mass conversion of the population in the late seventeenth century. The outcome of the argument would have been of little significance for the present study were it not for the fact that the position of the state vis-à-vis the Bulgarian Muslims has been predominantly legitimized on the basis of this historical interpretation.

Both explanations, albeit conflicting, concur on one point: the converts were part of the already consolidated Bulgarian ethnic group and by virtue of their conversion their 'Bulgarianness' was weakened or lost (Todorova 1998). In the realm of the Ottoman Empire, however, ethnicity had little importance as opposed to religion. The *millet* administrative division was not ethnic or territorial but primarily based on confession, which had both economic (tax relief) and military (conscription) consequences. In that way, the system dissolved ethnicity into confession (Antoninna Zhelyazkova 1997:32-33) and created very clear power distinctions based on religious difference. Turk and Muslim were interchangeably used as synonyms, just as Bulgarian and Christian Signified the same for the local population (Mutafchieva 1994:19).[11] This had repercussions in the everyday culture, generating the stereotypical negative image of the Muslim as the threatening Other who is 'backward and uncivilized, fanatic, hostile and aggressive' (Elchinova 2001:54).[12]

The consolidation of the Bulgarian nation state in 1878 caused massive population exchange and migration which continued until the first decades of the twentieth century with constant remapping of the territory and of the population within it. The position of the Bulgarian Muslims in this first period was further problematized by the fact that the Bulgarian nation-state treated them as indistinguishable from the larger Muslim group and lumped them together with the group of the Turks in all censuses in the late nineteenth century – in 1880, 1885, 1888 (Todorova 1998:476). This move was one of the ways the state would handle the conceptual dissonance that

---

[11]The primacy of the religious belonging is not necessarily specific for the Pax Ottomana. In Western Europe almost until mid nineteenth century the language and ethnic criteria remained politically irrelevant as opposed to the religious belonging and the social status (e.g. Anderson 1983; Armstrong 1982; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1992)

[12]The negative stereotypes concerning the Bulgarian Muslims were further solidified in this period by the presumed role they had in the bloody suppression of the *April uprising* in 1876. Additional note on the historical debate of the role that Bulgarian Muslims played in this event.

71

the Bulgarian Muslims caused for the established language-based nationalism.[13] The Turkification impulse soon came to an end with the First Balkan War in 1912-1913 and with the new geo-political issues at stake in which the Bulgarian Muslims were to play a significant, albeit passive, role.

In 1912 Bulgarian troops marched deep into Ottoman Thrace and parts of Macedonia and Greece thus including for the first time into the territory of the Bulgarian state the compact Bulgarian Muslim population of the Rhodope mountain. The newly annexed Muslim population numbered between 100 0000 and 200 000 people according to different estimations (Büchsenschütz 2000; Neuburger 2000; Velinov 2001), a fact that called for immediate state attention. The state saw as its main task not only to tame the new borderlands, but also to solve the serious conceptual problem that the new population created for the nation-state. While until then the smaller number of Bulgarian Muslims in the country were shoved towards blending with the Turkish minority (identification that was to a great extent their own choice too), the stake suddenly rose significantly. Proving that this population is purely Bulgarian was a question of proving that the territory is also purely Bulgarian.

Based on the logic of the religious-language nationalism, the first step towards incorporation of the new citizens was a mass forced Christianization campaign, the so called *Krastilka*. It was carried out by the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in collaboration with the army and local police. The initiative was supported by the head of the state – Tsar Ferdingnad and by the government. People were forcefully baptized *en masse* at the central squares of villages and towns and given a new Christian name (Radushev 2005). In addition to the new religion and the new Christian

[13]Maria Todorova argues that in this early period of nation-building in the Balkans the Christian populations began speaking among themselves the language of nationalism, whereas their attitudes toward the Muslims remained in the realm of the undifferentiated religious communities *millet* discourse. This is what she calls "a case of overlapping and conflicting institutional legacies."(Todorova 1998:478)

name, Bulgarian Muslims had to replace certain items of their attire – the fez, the turban and the "veil" – with Bulgarian hats and scarves (Neuburger 2004). Merging together belief, name and the external semiotic codes of identification would be the main state strategy for incorporation and assimilation for the next almost 80 years. For several months in 1912 and 1913 more than 150 000 Bulgarian Muslims in the Rhodope mountain were Christianized and renamed. The public did not hear much of this, while the archives of the Orthodox Church and the official report to the government present a "voluntary and cheerful", even "desired" conversion back to the Bulgarian roots and to the lost Christian faith (Georgiev and Trifonov 1995).

As a result of the Second Balkan War in 1913 Bulgaria lost much of the newly occupied territory, although it did manage to expand considerably.[14] This however, put an end to the Christianization campaign. Already in July 1913 the new government of Vasil Radoslavov restored the minority status of the Bulgarian Muslims and allowed them to revert to Islam and to their Turco-Arabic names. The reasons behind the government decision were two-fold. Domestically, the liberal coalition of Radoslavov managed to win the election owing to the votes of the Bulgarian Muslims based on the promise of restoring their freedom of religion and their old names. Internationally, Bulgaria was pressed to guarantee the rights of freedom of religion and cultural autonomy of its Muslims. According to Velinov (2001:86-87) in this period the Bulgarian Muslims were instrumentalized as a token for international territorial and peace negotiations with Greece and Turkey, while at the same time were regarded as a risk factor for the unity of the state. In this sense, in this first period the battle over who and whose the Bulgarian Muslims are is a geopolitical battle for territories more than anything else.

---

[14] Note on the protests against land division into two states which would lead to irrevocable changes in the livelihood of the population of the region, which is relying on the "Greek" pastures in the winter and on the "Bulgarian" mountains in the summer. The delegations were insisting the border should pass either near Maritsa (Central Bulgaria), or include Aegean Thrace (Northern Greece). The result is that the interruption of the landscape had indeed changed the means of living turning them from stock breeders into land cultivators.

Left unbothered for a while by the church and the state, the Bulgarian Muslims continued being a burning question for the academics, who posited their Buglarianness drawing on pre-war ethnographic and historical evidence. Meanwhile, an almost unnoticed campaign, supported by the academia, lead to a great number of geographic name changes, replacing the "foreign" place names with "original" Bulgarian ones (Neuburger 2000). The Bulgarization of the exteriors of Bulgarian Muslims' life was soon followed by a group name transformation. While in the census of 1905 the category Pomak appeared for the first time (as an alternative to Turk for the Bulgarian Muslims), in the 1930's the ethnographer Stoyu Shishkov (1936) was already advocating and replacing it with the term "Bulgarian-Mohammedans".[15] Shishkov's attempts to prove the essential Bulgarianness in rites and language of the Bulgarian Muslims crystallized in the next assimilation, which this time started as a grassroots movement.

3.2. Assimilation inside-out. The organization "Rodina" and the grassroots movement for Bulgarization

The change of the government in 1934 lead to new structural transformations in the political system of the state, which had implications for the policies regarding the Bulgarian Muslims. The strong centralized state power established control over its citizens with the support of the army, the unified administration, and the educational reforms. In this phase of state nationalism, as described by Hobsbawm (1992), the main task of the government was to transform the population into a nation, based on shared language. In this context, Bulgarian Muslims became a

---

[15] Shishkov portrayed the Bulgarian Muslims as speaking the 'most pure dialect of old-Slavic'. He also insisted that all aspects of Bulgarian Muslims' culture that concise with those of the Bulgarian Christians are real and organic proof for their nativeness, while everything else is foreign imposed under the Ottoman rule.

demographic resource for the development of the nation. Their 'nationalization' was a question of marking the symbolic geography of the national space.

While the first attempt to erase the Bulgarian Muslim difference and incorporate them into the Bulgarian nation was imposed from above, the next campaign started as an internal movement among the Bulgarian Muslim elite. In 1937 the organization *Rodina* (Motherland)*, a Bulgarian-Mohammedan cultural-educational and charitable association* was founded in a small town in the Western Rhodope mountain by a group of educated Bulgarian Muslims with strongly manifested Bulgarian identification. The main goals of the organization were: 'to work for the mutual cooperation and support between Bulgarian Mohammedans and Bulgarian Christians in the Rhodope Mountain'; 'to facilitate the awakening and developing of a national (*narodnostno*) self-consciousness in the Bulgarian Mohammedans; 'to cultivate love towards the motherland', as well as 'to protect them from any external propaganda and foreign influences' (quoted in (Gruev 2003a:236). In other words, the organization wanted to foster Bulgarian ethnic consciousness and eradicate any Turkish leanings among the Bulgarian Muslims. The main motivation was de-marginalization of the group and hence upward group mobility which according to the *Rodina* activists was only possible through complete incorporation in the Bulgarian nation. (Todorova 1998:477)

Following the language-based concept of the nation-state already promoted in the public discourse, *Rodina* attempted to bridge the existing religious difference through language unity and to replace the previous predominantly religious identity with ethnic/national consciousness. After the unsuccessful outcome of the 1912-1913 Christianization, the religious difference remained intact this time. The assimilation attempt was carried out on two levels: eliminating any linguistic Turkish or Arabic signs (i.e. worship language and names), and modifying the

75

traditional costume from "foreign" (i.e. Ottoman/Turkish) to Bulgarian one. In the course of

seven years the organization managed to introduce Bulgarian language worship in the mosques,

to translate the Koran in Bulgarian, and to promote the creation of wider local elite by enrolling

Bulgarian Muslims into secondary and higher education establishments. At the same time,

already in 1938 actions for 'de-fezzing' of the men and in 1940 for 'de-veiling' of the women

spread all around the Rhodope mountains. They were followed by a further step of interference in

the private life – encouragement to cease the practice of circumcision. Moreover, in 1942 *Rodina*

embarked on a new name-changing campaign offering lists of names which were considered

Bulgarian, but not Christian.[16] By September 1944, when the campaign was terminated by the

new communist government, two thirds (around 60 000 of the Bulgarian Muslim population in

the Central and Western Rhodope mountain had changed their names. (Konstantinov 1992a)

Even though *Rodina's* efforts started off as peaceful voluntary inside-out assimilation attempts, it

soon became clear the political regime had a very similar agenda and was willing to support any

of the proposed activities. Some historians even argue that in fact *Rodina* was not consolidated as

a spontaneous grassroots organization of the local elite, but was initiated and supported since the

onset by certain political circles and the government apparatus (see (Gruev 2003a; Velinov

2000). While the *Rodina* members changed their attire and their names publicly to make a

statement for the rest of the population which was expected to follow suit, the general enthusiasm

was very low. The appeal to throw the *fez* and replace it with a hat[17] failed completely, which

prompted the initiation of a rather forceful campaign backed up by the police. A similar line of

action was followed in the re-naming campaign, which was welcomed only by *Rodina* members.

---

[16]This move created a new type of name segregation between Bulgarian Christians and Bulgarian Muslims, which I will discuss at length in the next chapter on the meaning of the name.

[17]The importance of the hat – link with the communists' campaign for changing the 'bourgeois' hat with a cap (*casket*)

Backed by the government with a law for mandatory name change for the "Bulgarian Mohammedans" voted in 1942 the subsequent actions resembled very much the fast operation in 1912-1913. In the meantime, the regime made sure that all imams and local political representatives gradually become exclusively *Rodina* members (Gruev and Kalyonski 2008). In addition to that, a plenitude of ethnographic and journalistic works proving the Bulgarianness of the Bulgarian Muslims, written by the organization members, were published and widely disseminated. At the same time, the regime used *Rodina* and its links to the local communities, however ambivalent, to support all key wartime legislation, such as the "Law for the purity of the nation" which prohibited mixed marriages between Bulgarians and foreigners, including those between Bulgarian Muslims and Turks, heretofore very common (Neuburger 2000:188)

Rodina's claim of non-distinctiveness of the Bulgarian Muslims from the majority, a trope that kept reoccurring in all the later enforced or voluntary 'identity reforms', in fact prompted a plenitude of transformations in the Bulgarian Muslims livelihood. According to Neuburger (2000:189) the constellations of reforms 'sought to reweave the fabric of Bulgarian Muslims life and hence reshape the geography of Bulgarian Muslims districts in the Bulgarian image. *Rodina's* aspiration towards Bulgarianness as a way out of marginalization and poverty in fact created a symbolic dichotomy between the modernized and advanced Bulgarians and the backward Muslims. Everything that was 'Bulgarian' came to be a synonym of modern and developed, while everything that was 'Muslim' (or Turkish) was a signifier for the old Ottoman legacy. An outcome of this symbolic move was also the newly imposed group name *Bulgarian Mohammedans*,[18] which replaced the previous *Pomaks* (suggesting distinct ethnic identity) and completely refuted the option *Turks* as self-identification. Finally, the internal elite aspirations for

---

[18] This move resembles contemporary African American or Arab American denominations, which point to an inclusive identification rather than to alterity (REF)

blending with the majority as a way for vertical mobility rather than attempting to politicize a distinct ethnic identity set the tone for the future role that they played in the complicated relations between the minority, the majority, and the state.

3.3 Early socialist ambiguities

The socialist period was marked by the apparent inconsistent approach of the state towards the Bulgarian Muslims. There were several waves of assimilation campaigns which targeted different aspects of the Bulgarian Muslims difference. These campaigns were as a whole ostensibly successful by the end of the socialist period, but at the same time were met with various forms of resistance. At the same time, the homogenization efforts and the often violent measures were accompanied by a general 'modernization and progress' set of policies. The interplay of two state logics, restriction and interference on one hand, and development and privileges on the other, that existed parallel to each other, intersected at the level of people's lives and were experienced as confusing and inconsistent. This has repercussions in the way Bulgarian Muslims re-evaluate the past from today's perspective. The socialist period is discussed through four complementary perspectives: the early period of ambiguous policies, the transformation of the everyday life, the violent massive assimilation actions and forms of resistance, and finally, the modernization and de-peasantization efforts of the state.

The coup from the 9th of September 1944 with which the communist party came to power set a new era in the state politics towards the Bulgarian Muslims, but with important continuities. The new affinity with the Soviet Union implied a certain harmonization with the practice on the

'national question'. The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) translated the Soviet model in relation to the Muslim minorities by trying to bring Bulgarian Muslims and Turks into the party structures and at the same time offer Turks resources for their own 'national' development. Bulgarian Muslims on the other hand were not considered a minority population, but an integral part of the nation, albeit with special needs because of its 'backward' state (Eminov 1990). As Neuburger points out, "in the course of the Communist period, it became increasingly clear that Bulgarian Communism was not about moving beyond nationalism… instead nationalism would become the tool with which Communism would pave Bulgaria's new 'road to modernization'. (Neuburger 2000:190) In other words, the attempts to build a homogenous nation composed of non-distinct population continued. However, the steps of the state in the period between 1944 and 1970 were faltering and often inconsistent.

In the early post-WW II years the Bulgarian Muslim population was again treated as a political resource. In order to win its support, the ruling BCP completely discarded the 'integration' course of the previous regime and quickly restored the withdrawn rights of free choice of name, traditional attire, and confessional language. In exchange, the Bulgarian Muslims did indeed vote in its majority (over 90 percent) for the Bulgarian Communist Party. A fact, which, according to Gruev and Kalyonski, can be further explained by the very low literacy in the region and the traditional government support vote of Bulgarian Muslims (Gruev and Kalyonski 2008), but nevertheless might be also interpreted as a reinforcement of the political clientelism practice. The organization *Rodina* and its members were denounced as 'Fascist' by virtue of their association with the pre-war regime. Interestingly enough, the leaders of *Rodina* proved to be rather chameleon-like politically in their immediate conversion to a pro-Communist position. The party,

however, did not allow them to enter the power structures even in the 1970's and 1980's when 'the spirit and form' of *Rodina* campaigns would be resurrected.

The external factors, especially the international position of Greece, played a great role in the early policies of the state. As in the period after the First World War, Greece sent a Pomak delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in order to support its territorial pleas for Bulgaria[19]. While the initial acts of the state aimed at proving to the international community that all human and minority rights are being observed, soon the border Bulgarian Muslims population started to be perceived as unreliable. The creation of numerous illegal groups of Bulgarian Muslims assisting the border crossing contributed immensely for this new perception of the Bulgarian Muslims as 'unfaithful' to the Bulgarian nation-state. The state responded by a twofold action. First, in 1948-1950 over 10 000 Bulgarian Muslims were relocated by force from the border lands to the interior territories, a practice rather similar to the Soviet model of dealing with 'problematic population' (see (Gruev and Kalyonski 2008).[20] In the meantime, the industrialization of the new socialist state included opening of a great number of (uranium) mines in the Rhodope region which triggered an opposite wave of immigration in the region of Bulgarian workers and experts. Thus, not only the economic, but also the demographic structure of the region was transformed. What is more, these restructuring of the economic and social landscape of the region were part of the larger process of transforming the Rhodope peasantry into a new working class and 'builders of socialism' (Konstantinov 1992a).

---

[19] Note on the economic significance of the territory for stock breading. (Gruev 260-261)

[20] The population relocations in fact created enclaves of Bulgarian Muslims in several areas in the Central and Northern Bulgaria, which kept their kin network with the community in the Rhodope mountain and remained relatively isolated from the rest of the Christian population in the region. (see more in (Konstantinov 1992a).

The second aspect of 'taming' the border population was the creation and special regulation of the borderzone. The socialist border with Greece, i.e. the border between the Socialist world and the West, was "an embodiment of the state and the nation politically, economically and symbolically" (Mihaylova 2003:49). A borderzone going 25 kilometres inside the country was created. After the relocation of 'dangerous and suspicious families', the rest of the population was geographically bound to the zone and immobilized, thus being isolated both from the outside and the inside of the state. Entering and leaving the border area was only possible with special one-time permission documents.[21] This strategy caused further withdrawal into the immediate village community among the Bulgarian Muslims. Along with imposing restraint and control, however, the border population also received rewards and small privileges for remaining in the region and for being loyal to the state. In different periods until 1989, the border population received additional 'border money', exemption from taxes, sometimes bills for electricity and water, and higher salaries. In addition, in the massively produced propaganda literature on border theme, ordered by the regime, the frontier was described as the encompassing line of the motherhood flesh which had to be protected by its sons. (Mihaylova 2003:50) The "sons" were the border guards who were necessarily Bulgarians from the majority, but the Muslim population was forced to join special units 'voluntarily' as support, thus being kept on the margins, neither in, nor outside the nation-state. The border policies are an epitome of the experienced 'politics of the stick and the carrot'. While the 'politics of the stick' constantly reminded Bulgarian Muslims of their partial belonging to the nation, the 'politics of the carrot' balanced this by binding them tightly to the state. (Creed 1998:273)

---

[21]The movement of the population was restricted not only to the interior territory, but also along the border line. Going from one border municipality to another was only possible through the internal land, with the special documents.

Another aspect of taming the minorities, while at the same time keeping the power divide, were the notorious Construction Corps in the army, which were created in 1920, but continued to function even after 1989, and thus link and demonstrate a continuity between the state policies in the different periods. After the First World War the government introduced labour duty for the whole population to help reconstruct the state's losses during the war. This was institutionalized through creating the Construction Corps, which was an alternative for army conscription. There was a particular link with ethnicity, based on the conception that the 'unreliable' ethnic element of the country should not be allowed to participate in the guard of the national security. This was reflected in Law for General Military Service regulating who will be conscripted for the Construction Corps: 1. people with restricted abilities for military service; 2. persons with proven anti-social or anti-national activities (i.e. people who have received sentences for criminal or political offences); 3. representatives of ethnic minorities; 4. others. Under the fourth brief category would fall all those considered potentially unloyal to the Communist party. Thus, the Corps in fact had ethnically discriminatory and at the same time punitive character. (Konstantinov 1992b:93) Bulgarian Muslims were conscripted to the Construction Corps along with the Roma and Turks. This demonstrates the contradictions in the various acts of the state, that was alternating homogenization campaigns with such divisions which underlined the difference of the group. The policy not only had ethnic isolationist effect, but also distorted the composition of the police and army units, where it used to be almost impossible to find officers from a minority group. The message of the Construction Corps, as Konstantinov underlines, is that not only certain minorities are officially treated as unreliable and used for cheap labour, but also that merging together minorities with criminal and political offenders "de facto equalizes minority Islamic status with that of a criminal" (1992b:84). However, a side effect of the Construction Corps was the transformations in the employment and practical skills of the

minority groups. They were responsible for major construction works like building railway lines, roads, mines and water reservoirs. Most young men received professional qualification as construction workers, drivers, crane- and tractor-operators, engineers etc, which in many cases turned into the main source of income later on. In this sense, the Construction corpse were a proffesionalization unit as well. This counternarrative translates the discriminatory state as in fact caring and securing a means of living.

Parallel to these transformations was the continuing group categorization confusion. A curious moment in the inconsistent state vision was the census from 1946. The Bulgarian Workers Party advanced the Comintern thesis of the 'Macedonian nation' as an official state doctrine which turned the census in a political question[22]. The imposed from above required percentage for the category 'Macedonian' resulted in forcible enlisting of one third of the Western Rhodope mountain Bulgarian Muslim population as Macedonians. In the other regions they were allowed to register as Pomaks. The category 'Macedonian' contributed to the 'terminological pluralism' already confusing the population in the region and, as Gruev argues, was one more hindrance to the formation of a clear self-identification (Gruev 2003a:252). What is more, it demonstrates the arbitrariness in the categorization strategies of the state vis-à-vis the Bulgarian Muslims.

3.4. Transformation of the everyday: state interference in the intimate sphere

The first part of homogenization and modernization efforts of the state spread over the everyday practices of the Bulgarian Muslims. After a period of relative tolerance towards the external

[22]Note on the thesis of the 'Macedonian nation' thesis.

distinctiveness of Bulgarian Muslims the state resorted back to the earlier assimilation campaigns strategies. The first re-dressing attempts of the communist regime have already started in 1958 for the celebrations of the 9th of September, the new communist national holiday, but were abandoned a few weeks after. According to Gruev (2003b) this has set the trend of the ambivalent state practice to alternate brutal mass assimilation campaigns with temporary partial retreats, which created a feeling of constant confusion and hope that each action is final. Moreover, each time the state pressure loosened the bans were ignored and the old practices were re-introduced. This only resulted in even more ruthless subsequent actions, which distanced the Bulgarian Muslims population from the state and at the same time instead of blending them with the majority, in fact lead to self-isolation and withdrawal into the community.

The re-dressing forceful reforms continued in the following years and were euphemistically called 'cultural revolution'. They were framed as modernization efforts of the state, coming along with other assets like mass education and industrialization. In this context, the change of the attire was formulated as a 'care' act, rather than violation of the individual or group identity markers/everyday practices. The re-dressing policies of the early 1960's, particularly in 1956 and then between 1960 and 1964, were implemented with unseen fervour and involved violent measures. This time the main goal was the women's attire. Various bans on public spaces access were imposed on women who refused to remove their veils or change the traditional *shalvari* with skirts. Access to shops, inter-village public transport, administration and health institutions was only allowed to 'modern' dressed women. The campaign was implemented also by pressuring men through arresting them for not having bought dresses for their wives. There were also local committees formed to inspect the evening gatherings of women. Sudden check-ups would be made in people's gardens and houses. In this sense, the invasion of the personal space

was full. At the same time, for those who conformed voluntarily and peacefully, there were small incentives – public celebrations, a village truck, money for building a school (see more in Gruev and Kalyonski 2008).

The meaning of the attire for the conservative rural Bulgarian Muslim population in this period was highly symbolic. Each element signified certain social position in terms of confession, social status, family status, and age. In this sense, transforming certain or all aspects of the attire was not only an act of homogenization with the majority, but also an act of breaking the symbolic fabric of the traditional small community and weaving it anew as a socialist unified nation, where each individual is equal and identical with the others. Nonetheless, the state project did not succeed as in so many other aspect of creating the 'socialist individual'. In its efforts to eliminate the external semiotic codes of difference – the veil, the yashmak (headscarf) , the *shalvares*, the local version of *niqab* (a traditional black or brown robe worn open over the other clothes), the state stimulated unconsciously a new form of unification apparel which differentiated the members of the group from the majority. Thus the *niqab* was replaced unanimously with a dark raincoat or a blue or brown working robe (usually worn by factory workers) and the *shalvares* were substituted by trousers or sweatpants, the and instead of *yashmak* women started wearing white kerchiefs. Men replaced the *fez* and the *turban* with berets (cap). By the 1970's this has become the new 'uniform' for the Muslim population reinforced by the lack of choice in the village shops. In their 'new clothes' the Bulgarian Muslims kept differing from the rest of the population and looking alike among themselves. Thus, as Gruev and Kalyonski (2008:34) formulate it, 'a new socialist widespread Muslim costume was created, which endured throughout the socialist period without much transformations. [23]

---

[23] In fact, most of its components were kept even after 1989, when the bans on the dress code were lifted. The wide spread costume (especially among the elderly) remained pretty much the same, with the exception of the re-introduction of *shalvari* instead of trousers.

Transforming the material/physical culture as a step towards modernization was used as justification also for the abolishment of the circumcision practice. In 1959 the Ministry of Health issued an order prohibiting circumcision to be made outside the hospitals and by non-medical personnel. The 'patients' were supposed to also be hospitalized for 2-3 days after the 'operation'. In this way the state turned the initiation ritual of circumcision into a purely physical and medical act, stripping all religious and social meaning from it.[24] This was the first step towards the full criminalization of the practice. The last (already illegal) public and mass circumcision happened in 1964 with more than 50 000 people participating in it according to the State Security Service[25] archives. A probably highly exaggerated number, which however demonstrates the transformation of the act into a common shared event for the whole Rhodope mountain region. In this sense, the threat of the collective identity once more resulted in a more tight consolidation of a community. This event was interrupted by the police forces[26] and became a turning point in the position of the state towards the circumcision. From the mid 1960's on the courts started to sentence not only the non-medical religious circumcisers, but also the parents of the circumcised children for slight or medium physical injury. What followed were kindergarten and school check-ups of boys whose fathers were fined or even fired from their jobs if the child was circumcised. The state literally entered the private/intimate life of the individual trying to make everyone conform to the same socialist ideal even in the bodily practices. Moreover, as Neuburger (2004:113) argues, the circumcision as a creation of physical difference was also interpreted as a "disfigurement and infection of the 'Bulgarian' body – and by extension the Bulgarian nation – that was at stake".

---

[24] In addition, the medical personnel were exclusively non-Muslim. As Gruev and Kalyonski have noted, this means complete elimination of the initiation act fro the religious Muslims due to its transition into hands that are 'clean' from a medical point of view, but 'unclean' from a religious point of view (Gruev and Kalyonski 2008:37).

[25] State Security Service is the direct translation for the Secret Service during the Socialist regime

[26] The reason for the interruption was the claim that there was a Turkish flag waved at the ceremony.

The anti-circumcision campaign was part of the general anti-Islam, and by extension anti-religious movement, which also included the closing down and even demolition of mosques in a later period, ban on public religious rituals like *mevlut* and *Kurban* celebrations. The state even managed to change everyday practices like the weekly market day, moving it from Friday to Saturday in order to larger gatherings on the day for prayer. These anti-religious reforms started a decade after the massive attack against the Orthodox Christians. In other words, the policies regarding the Bulgarian Muslims were not always specifically developed just for them, but did come in particular periods of time, which indeed intensified the sense of separateness and difference. Nevertheless, the attempts to eradicate religious practices were not only framed as a move towards modernization, but also as a way to consolidate the nation in its unity and homogeneity.

3.5. Forms of violence, forms of resistance

By the 1960's Bulgarian Muslim names, as markers of both personal and cultural identity, had again become the target of intense state-directed name-changing reforms. The campaign was at first rather unsystematic partly because of the differing voices in the ruling Communist party and partly because of the regime's inability to implement it on the local level. The measures were introduced in different villages in different periods with varying degrees of force and resistance throughout the 1960's. But the most large-scale and all-encompassing campaign took place only in 1971-1974. The earlier campaigns were to a large extent theoretically 'voluntary' and were directed mostly at giving new-born babies strictly Bulgarian names and changing the names of the young students in school. Besides that, the emphasis was mainly on local party functionaries,

agricultural cooperatives (TKZS) leaders, and teachers. Each renaming act was made public and celebrated and accompanied by enhancement of the system of small privileges. (Gruev and Kalyonski 2008). The elites' choice to conform was a repetition of the earlier attempts of *Rodina* members to blend with the dominant majority through self-assimilation. However, this time the extent to which they were forced into conformity and brought into the work of the state was unprecedented. (Neuburger 2000:191) The elite members were not only the educated and administratively well positioned figures, they were also opinion leaders, whose actions did influence the formation of new public inclinations and set a certain trend in regard to the name-changing issue. (Gruev and Kalyonski 2008:48-49)

A major turning point in the first large-scale re-naming campaign was the case of the village of Ribnovo in 1964. Already in 1962 the party took decision to expand the 'persuasion methods' by involving the army and the police, thus turning the so called voluntary renaming into an open act of coercion. Trucks of administrators, border guards and other military personnel were sent to the villages in the Western Rhodope region. Nevertheless, the abrupt and mass action met various degrees of resistance in a number of villages. Most dramatic was the case of Ribnovo, a big village, high in the mountain, stereotyped as a highly 'conservative and religious to the extent of fanatism, and Turkophile'. (see (Gruev and Kalyonski 2008:52). The whole population of the village had gathered at the square and attacked the task force with axes, stones and wooden clubs and managed to force them out of the village. A police officer and a soldier were wounded and kept hostage for a while. The Christian teachers and their families were forced out of the village. A Turkish flag was hung on the mosque minaret. All connections with the rest of the country were cut and the bridge on the main road was blown. The culmination was the declaration of the "Independent Republic of Ribnovo".

The news of the Ribnovo upheaval spread quickly and other villages joined the actions against the re-naming operation. A large group of women had thrown stones at the re-naming unit, after asked to turn over the old passport in order to be issues new ones with Bulgarian names. In addition to the local violent initiatives, a delegation of men managed to leave the region and go to Sofia with a protest note to the central authorities and the Turkish embassy. (Neuburger 2004) Thus, the resistance of the population of one village had become an organized movement of the whole Bulgarian Muslim population, thus once more enhancing the groupness of the Bulgarian Muslims who consolidated themselves as a community through solidarity and resistance. The upheaval wave was cut by a party decision to reverse the re-naming process for the time being. A party delegation was sent to Ribnovo. The villagers were assured that there will be no consequences and that they can keep their old names. The local committee methods were criticized and presented as a misunderstanding. '*Renaming is a matter of own consciousness and good will,*" and not a forced act, was the main message of the party representative. (ЦДАр ф. 1Бр оп. 6, а.е. 5454, л.26-27 Gruev and Kalyonski 2008:54). Thus, one event became the turning point and stopped the re-naming campaign of 1962-1964.

The next mass campaign was implemented only eight years later, in 1972. In 1970 BCP took a decision to continue "improving the social conditions, clearing the class and party consciousness, and developing patriotic education among the Bulgarian Muslims", while at the same time embarking on another name-changing campaign. (Büchsenschütz 2000). This time the campaign was supported by media publications and mass propaganda actions. In addition, wide spread 'soft measures' for persuasion of hesitating individuals were brought through the workplace where the failure to present a new passport resulted in loss of jobs and all the accompanying social benefits (Neuburger 2000). Nevertheless, the few cases of protests and upheaval were suppressed with

harsher acts of violence, many arrests and even several death sentences. A protest processions to Sofia was brutally dispersed with 2 people killed and 50 injured.[27] In the village of Madan, where for several days thousands of men and women gathered on the square. In Barutin the biggest part of the men, most of whom worked in the uranium mine, refused to be re-named, and were therefore collectively taken directly from the mine to the nearby town where they were severely beaten and forced to rename. Those who refused were sent to jail or interned. The protests in the village were bloodily dispersed with the support of tanks. Similar events happened in several other villages in the Western Rhodope, where there were attempts for active resistance. The culmination which also came to be the epilogue of the violent operations took place in the village of Kornitsa. Prepared better than in the earlier case of Ribnovo, the authorities developed a strategic deployment of forces to crash the expected organized resistance of the village. There were several people killed and many were arrested. With this incident the most violent and massive renaming campaign had come to an end in 1974.[28]

As these stories of protests and open confrontation demonstrate, there was a lot of active resistance as a response to the massive and violent campaign. As much as it is justified and comprehensible, the organized active collective uprising of the 'weak' against the hegemonic attempts of the state proved to be an unsuccessful strategy for changing the general direction of state actions. There were, however, other forms of hidden resistance throughout the period, which were more subtle, while at the same time more enduring. One line was the development of so-called 'vernacular academic attempts' to re-invent the history and origin of the group. The state

---

[27] See the Amnesty International Report: Bulgaria, p. 27, RFE Bulgarian Situation Report 5, 21.2.1973, p. 4 and 7 as quoted in (Büchsenschütz 2000:57)

[28] Hundreds of people were arrested and kept in jail for many years without a sentence. More than five hundred of the arrested were sent into the re-opened labour camp Belene on an island in the Danube. Belene was built in the very early years of the socialist period in order to accommodate the numerous political prisoners. It was closed down in 1956 only to be reopened in the 1970's for the Bulgarian Muslims, and then once more in 1984 for the Turks.

education policies have managed to create wider local elite which in this period produced parallel clandestine versions of the history which were one more way for grouping and creating an individual historical path for the Bulgarian Muslims (Konstantinov 1997:56).

Another course of opposing the name-change in particular were the various strategies for uses and dis-uses of the old and new names, an aspect which will be discussed at length in the next chapter. An even more discreet form of interplay between the imposed changes and the traditional practices can be seen in the adjustment of Muslims rites into the socialist secular system of holidays. For example the *kurban*, the ritual slaughtering of a ram- traditionally at the end of the Ramazan period, but also on other occasions, was strictly forbidden and hindered in all possible ways.[29] A way of circumventing the ban was attuning the occasions with the socialist festivities and secretly warning everyone that the meat is consecrated (Karamihova 2003:93). In this way, the link between this world and the transcendent which the *kurban* holds was preserved, albeit in a slightly modified way. The creation of a new dress code discussed earlier, which ostensibly conformed to the new regulations, but in fact recreated the old traditional parameters and status distinctions of the community, is another way of hidden resistance. (cf Neuburger 2000b). These examples aimed at fleshing out the complicated interplay of violence and pressure for conformity which the state imposed on the Bulgarian Muslims in order to homogenize them with the rest of the nation and the corresponding forms of resisting to these attempts. The outcome of these counter-movements was a consolidation of a group which did not necessarily exist as such in the earlier periods. In this sense, the nation-state project, especially in the socialist period, created a minority group by trying to eradicate and deny its distinctiveness.[30]

---

[29] including through numbering the cattle in the agricultural cooperative

[30] In 1984 the state initiated another assimilation campaign against the Turks this time. It got the name Revival process. Even though it was primarily directed against Turks, there were some re-namings taking place among Bulgarian Muslims again. Just to reassure its positions, but also in an attempt to erase the possible remnants of Turco-Arabic names, some people's Bulgarian names were changed into even 'more Bulgarian' ones. In a way, this

3.6. A parallel logic: socialist modernization and 'even development'

Socialist modernization processes spread over the whole nation, including its margins. Among the Bulgarian Muslims the main objective of the modernization process was framed as 'de-peasentization' and 'civilization'. (Mihaylova 2003) The whole Rhodope mountain region, which was predominantly rural and rather poor, was subjected to rapid development measures. Industrialisation was one side of this process. Uranium and ore mines were developed in the whole region, factories and workshops of various sizes were established in almost every village, dams and water reservoirs were built. The land was nationalized and grouped in larger collective farms, TKZS (*Trudovo Kooperativno Zemedelso Stopansvo*). Thus most people had full time 'state' jobs as miners, drivers or factory workers, or were employed in the administration. Very few people remained full time farmers, even though tobacco was massively cultivated in the region.[31] With all these measures, the socialist state was striving to transform the peasant into a member of the working class. Indeed, through collectivization the link with the own land (and stock) was broken, and with introduction of state jobs the pace of life and time management had changed. In this way the state managed to disengage local Bulgarian Muslims identity from a pure farmer identity and simultaneously proclaimed agriculture as a retrograde activity, slowing the socialist progress (Creed 1998:273). In this sense, in this period the socialist state managed to

secondary re-naming wave reminded the Bulgarian Muslims more of their (religious) similarities with the Turks, rather than homogenize them more with the rest of the Bulgarians. With its assimilation strategies the Bulgarian state in fact constructed a community of shared suffering, which encompassed both Bulgarian Muslims and Turks standing against the majority, which was identified with the state not only because of the power positions in the administration, but also because many of its members supported the assimilation campaigns, and participated in them.

[31]Tobacco cultivation was in fact considered as overtime work for the weekends, holidays and before and after work (sometimes all night long) and was considered a second category and a 'woman's job' (Mihaylova 2006:58). It also brought extra money, which considerably raised the living standards of the Bulgarian Muslim and Turkish population

transform the main means of living and the actual everyday working patterns of the people living in the region (Gruev and Kalyonski 2008).

The 1960's brought another aspect of the modernization process - the raising of the living standards and educational level. New roads and tunnels were built all through the mountain terrain. Central sewerage system was constructed and reliable supply of water and electricity was secured. In addition, the state invested in building bigger and better equipped administrative and school buildings in the villages. The private houses also transformed immensely under the influence of the 'model projects' of the socialist architecture. The one-two-room houses expanded to two- or three-storeys buildings, with the cattle-shed separated from the actual living space, while the toilets became part of the house. All these transformations were not at all specific for the Bulgarian Muslims, but they did come one generation later. Thus the aim of even development was achieved even in these considered as extremely 'backward' regions. Finally, the level of education rised significantly from the 1930's when the biggest part of the Bulgarian Muslim population in the region was still illiterate. With state subsidies, special school and university quotas for the border population, and additional incentives (higher benefits and salaries) and scholarships the state managed to raise the percentage of people with secondary education substantially. The social benefits, non-existent before 1944, and tightly associated with the 'state jobs' included free healthcare, high pensions, long paid leaves etc. All these aspects are particularly important for the present conceptions of what is a 'good state', what is a 'caring state', and what are the attributes of 'citizenship', which are discussed in later ethnographic chapter.

Even though the modernization processes were common for the whole territory and population, the divide with the dominant majority was still present in the distribution of power. The key

positions of power, such as leaders of the municipal party organizations, heads of the co-operative farm (TKZS), and higher administrative positions in the city halls were allocated only to Bulgarian Christians[32]. Even in the late socialism period, when a small but faithful Bulgarian Muslim elite was formed, the top positions of local power still remained inaccessible. In this way the actual everyday interaction with the state was distributed along an "us-them" which was expressed in the understanding that "they" had an "intimate and advantageous relationship to the state, while "we" remained subject to its power." (Mihaylova 2003:49) As in the case of managing the border, the Bulgarian Muslims were put in the position of assistants. Interestingly enough, according to one of the etymologies of *Pomaks*, the alternative group name, means 'helpers' (of the Ottoman state in controlling the Christians). A quote from the ethnographic material of Dimitrina Mihaylova illustrates this tension: „*We are Pomaks, that is Helpers, we have always been left helping the states, never allowed to lead.*" (2003:51). In this sense, the continuing re-creation of marginality was silently present even in the state attempts for modernization, development and de-peasantization.

3.7. Human rights and neoliberal predicaments: the post-1989 walk into 'the age of migration'

The time after the collapse of state socialism was marked by two diverging paths of the transformed relationship between the Bulgarian Muslims and the state. While the new 'democratic' state quickly terminated all legal repressive campaigns and measures against its minorities, the economic hardships related to the falling apart of the socialist centralized

---

[32] Bulgarian Christians as a designation for the majority population is in fact an incorrect term for this period, due to the communist regime's atheistic stance, but is used here for the sake of clarity.

economy and the gradual development of a neoliberal governance placed them in yet another

marginalized position. The legislation was changed as to grant ethnic, religious, cultural and

linguistic freedom to all citizens. However, the Constitution treats ethnic and religious

minorities on an individual, not on a collective basis, which leads to certain restrictions

(Koinova 1999:148).[33] The change in the legislation opened once more the Bulgarian

Muslims identity for redefinition. Shortly after 1989 Bulgarian Muslims massively returned

their Turco-Arabic names, there was a wave of re-introduction of traditional clothes[34],

mosques were rebuilt and re-opened and religious practices restored. However, they did not

seriously attempt to receive an ethnic minority status[35] and remained categorized by the state

only through their religious difference from the majority, which obscured their cultural

differences, and stimulated an even more ethnically marginal position.[36] Moreover, structural

discrimination against members of the Muslim minorities continued (Bates 1994; Eminov

2007), as did widespread prejudice and negative stereotypes (Pilbrow 1997).

The state did not only withdraw from people's lives by terminating its direct interference in the

identity construction and everyday practices of its citizens, it also practically abandoned the

whole region. The agricultural cooperatives were liquidated and the land was restituted in a

controversial way, the large industrial enterprises (especially in textile, mining and armaments)

were closed down, the border zone was opened and the special privileges terminated. The

---

[33] For example, the formation of political parties along ethnic or religious lines is prohibited, which has serious implications for the political representativeness of minorities' interests.

[34] The fervour to wear the traditional *shalvari* and different styles of kerchiefs from the early years soon decreased and it is mainly elderly women that keep wearing the traditional attire. The only exception is the village of Ribnovo where there are almost no women in non-traditional clothes.

[35]There were some early attempts to infuse the Bulgarian Muslims cultural identity with political relevance. For example, Kamen Burov, the mayor of an Eastern Rhodope Bulgarian Muslims village, attempted to emancipate the designation "Pomaks" from its negative connotations and to impose it to the whole Bulgarian Muslims population as an official ethnic term. He established a party and sought for popular support, however, his attempts remained unsuccessful. (see more in Todorova 1998)

[36] In the censuses from 1992 and 2001 he category Pomak did not exist, as it was pointed above, thus leaving the Bulgarian Muslims once more as a residual category in the statistics.

Bulgarian Muslims, who according to Konstantinov (1997) have developed a specific peasant-worker economy managing to extract maximum efficiency out of the generally inefficient co-operative farm system, were hit the hardest by the postsocialist restructurings. The unemployment rate in the region reached over 60 per cent during the 1990's, which was 3 to 4 times higher than the average for the country (Tomova 2000:224-225). In the subsequent period the uneven development of the region got more and more striking. The only employment left was tobacco cultivation, previously mechanized and considered as side occupation. Apart from that, new private Greek owned small sewing workshops were opened in almost every village, operating under enslaving conditions.[37] Most of the Rhodope region population worked without any social security hardly managing to make ends meet (Todorova 1998:491-492). By 2003-2004 the textile sweatshops decreased in number, replaced by fewer but fairer factories offering better conditions (but also employing less people). In addition, tobacco purchase prices kept going down, while the production state quotas allocated per family decreased rapidly. This made the sector become not only less profitable, but also insufficient for family sustaining. As a result of these harsh economic conditions and the complete negligence of the region by the state, labour migration has become the main means of living for the largest part of Bulgarian Muslims in the Rhodopi mountain.

The new economic conditions condemned the population of the Rhodope mountain region to poverty, re-peasantisation and a new type of marginalization, which also lead to a rhetoric of loneliness, devastation and abandonedness (Tomova 2000). The so developed 'poetics of suffering' (Herzfeld 1985) was an expression of the tensions between the socialist and the post-socialist cultural style, but also of the dissatisfaction with the state which neglected the region

---

[37] More on the early working conditions and the transformation of tobacco production will be said in chapter IV, devoted on labour market and employment strategies.

and allowed its transformation into an impoverished periphery (Mihaylova 2006:54). The 'transition' period was considered as a route into backwardness and loss of the modernization assets of socialism. Tobacco is an expression of these tensions. Ever since the 1950's the state has been the sole owner and manager of the tobacco industry. Although, recently part of this sector was privatised, the state keeps regulating the prices and the quotas. In this sense, as Mihaylova argues "for Bulgarian Muslims tobacco embodies their relationship with the state, and it is the very last link that people perceive to be alive today" (2006:61). While during the socialist period, tobacco was considered as another small privilege ensuring extra income, in the 1990's it came to be associated only with poverty and social suffering. This is an expression of the general discontent with the negligent state, which has further developed in high migration rates and other actions of circumventing this very state - issues to be discussed in the following chapters.

3.8. A "group" in flux

The historical long dureé presented in this chapter aimed to show the complex relationship that Bulgarian Muslims have developed with the state over the last one hundred years. The state acted towards Bulgarian Muslims following two parallel logics. On one hand, it aimed at disambiguating them by trying to negate their difference. On the other hand, these attempts to eliminate their distinctiveness were combined with modernization efforts and the development of an encompassing social security system. The two logics worked simultaneously and did not contradict each other on state level, while at the same time, they were experienced as a politics of the stick and the carrot by the local population. The first logic was embedded in the nation state project. Bulgarian Muslims' inbetweenness in terms of ethnic and national categories was a threat

to the order of the nation state. The state policies placed them in a position of an inferior Other, neither fitting within the nation, nor anywhere outside it. Thus, Bulgarian Muslims were turned into an ultimate stranger in Bauman's terms (1993), present, yet unfamiliar; a threat to the order of familiar and manageable categories. Following Bauman, I would suggest that this state logic of dealing with the Bulgarian Muslims as an unqualifiable and hence dangerous non-category, is part of the order making efforts of modernity. In this sense, the effort for disambiguation of the Bulgarian Muslims from 'strangers' into the clear categories of 'us' or 'them' was ultimately an attempt of restoring the order of the nation state. As a result, the Bulgarian Muslims remain being trapped in an immanently ambivalent position, that allows them only a relational categorical position which is both external (the way other 'hard' groups define them) and internal (how they define themselves).

On the other hand, the parallel logic of socialist modernization included Bulgarian Muslims in the common national project of developing and improving the material life of the population – from social services, through education, to employment for everyone. In addition, in different periods the Bulgarian Muslims were used as political resource, border support, and economic supplier, which privileged them in comparison to the rest of the population. These two state logics have intersected in people's lives as a pseudo politics of the stick and the carrot. The constant alternation of rewards and punitive state acts resulted in a creation a docile population, but also generated various internal hierarchies. What was particularly crucial was the conformist role of the local elite, which on several occasions translated their desire for de-marginalization and upward mobility into blending with the majority terms. In this way, the Bulgarian Muslims did not craft a clear and coherent group identity and the question of their ethnicity remains open unto this day. In this sense, as much as this is a chapter about the history of the state-minority

relations, it is also about the different conceptions of who the Bulgarian Muslims are.

PART II: Institutional Participation and Citizenship Practices

Chapter 4: The Worker-Citizen

I will start with a story, a story about time. On a late autumn Sunday afternoon in the early days of my fieldwork I found myself in front of the pensioner's club in Tafalla. A young man preparing himself to enter waved at me and invited me in. He was a construction worker and I have just met him drinking coffee on the central square, along with many other Bulgarians gathering there on a Sunday morning. We went in the pensioner's club, only to discover that all tables were full not with Spanish pensioners, but with other young migrant workers. There were at least fifty men playing cards or just watching. I was the only woman. Nobody seemed too passionate about the game, nobody was consuming anything. The club was only used for its many free tables. My guide explained this is the usual way to spend a Sunday afternoon for them, migrant men from Brushlyan, even if one did not have a particular interest in cards. He told me he finds it boring, but still keeps coming regularly. *"Youth is about work, Spain is about work. Free time is lost time. Free time is for the pensioners,"* he concluded joining one of the teams of players. Free time for most migrants was indeed puzzling, even loathed, a sign of failure for those without work, creating a sense of emptiness, rather than enjoyment and rest.

Many of the men in the pensioners club were construction workers or drivers in factories. On top of the regular 40 hours per week, they were working an extra hour on a week day and would get home only after 8 pm, have dinner and go to bed. On Saturdays, they worked another half a day. These were the officially recognized and allowed extra working hours. Saturday afternoon was devoted to the weekly food shopping with the family in a large supermarket or to a trip to the nearby Pamplona with its shopping mall and large outdoor market. The social gatherings and guest visits were usually done on Saturday night. On Sunday mornings the whole migrant

community gathered on the main square for coffee and socializing. Women and children would go home afterwards, go to the park, if the weather permits is, or pay a visit to a relative. For men, however, this was a conceived as time of idleness. Quite a few of them complained that they would have preferred to work more, if they were allowed to. *"I don't need more than a day off. By Sunday afternoon I'm already impatient, knowing I'm wasting my time, instead of earning money"*, another of the card players told me on a different occasion. Playing cards in the pensioner's club, then, was not conceived as a deserved rest from a hard work week, but as an imposed waste of time. The time of migration is the time of work. And it is work with its different faces that is central for this chapter, just as it is central in migrants' lives.

Acquiring social citizenship rights through work. Employment is one of the avenues of social citizenship, along with social security (health), housing and? Through work people get access to citizenship. Discuss the importance of EU citizenship in the realm of work: I show the complexities in their acts opened up by their position of recent EU citizens

In this chapter I explore how migrants constitute themselves as rights bearing members of a community through the practices of work. I do this by following their manoeuvres between regimes of regularity and irregularity, between formal entitlements and informal networks, and between various institutionally crafted categories of labour. I discuss in details different work trajectories and the strategies deployed to move from one position to another. Moreover, I look at the institutional conditions that enable or constrain migrants' working lives. At the same time, I am interested in how migrants inscribe meaning into their work practices. While employment is conceived mainly as a money making enterprise, it is also interpreted in a wider framework of membership and inclusion, inequality and difference. This becomes apparent in the reappearing comparisons with other migrants and with the Spanish citizens, but also with the employment

conditions in Bulgaria. These comparisons often develop into a discussion of citizenship status and the related to it entitlements or lack thereof. Thus, I examine two interrelated aspects: 1. what are the actual everyday acts of participation and claims to rights that are reflected in the practices of work and 2. how do people relate implicitly or explicitly their work positions to their position as members of a community and as citizens.

Looking at these two aspects, I suggest we need to deconstruct the dichotomy of irregularity/regularity in order to understand the complexity of migrant work. There is a continuum of possible positions which is evident in the multiplicity of contracts and agreements that migrant workers (regular or irregular) are offered and that are actualized in their work practices. The dichotomy is complicated even more by the flexible moves back and forth from one position to another: from a no-contract, through different types of temporary contracts, into unemployment or self-employment etc. This flexibility is simultaneously enabling and constraining, allowing some people to manipulate their trajectories, but leaving others trapped in precariousness. Ultimately, I show that migrants enjoy a certain type of practical citizenship in Spain, which they lack in their formal citizenship in Bulgaria. The practice of work transforms workers into citizesn, in this sense, we can talk of practical citizenship

This chapter was first conceived as a story of a husband and wife, Yavor and Rumi, and their diverging and complementing work trajectories, which can only be understood if thought as part of one family project. However, the more I delved into the ethnography, the more I realised that employment is mostly a male domain. While many of the women in Spain do work, their employment is considered a subsidiary activity to their role of mothers and wives. This means that most of them work part-time, or have long non-working periods caring for their young children. Women never go to Spain by themselves as a work force. They accompany their

103

husbands, or if unmarried, are there with their parents. It is men who are the triggers of migration and it is men who are responsible for the security (financial and social) of their families through work. Therefore, I will focus on male employment in this chapter, analysing female employment through the lens of security and family reproduction in the next two chapters. Nevertheless, women, children and elderly people are still silently present in this chapter as elements of the family project, which characterizes Bulgarian Muslim migration. Thus, the work choices, moves and decisions that most male migrants take are informed and motivated by the active (or envisioned) presence of other family members in Spain.

What types of work do migrants engage with, what strategies for finding employment do they employ, what kind of contracts and relations with employers do they enter, and how is all this interpreted by migrants - these are the main questions addressed here. In what follows I start with a brief description of the labour market context in Bulgaria and Spain at the time of my research, with a particular focus on the two localities of Brushlyan and Tafalla and their regional specificities. The second part is devoted to Yavor, an example of a male migrant's success story. Along the way, I complement or contrast his trajectory with diversions into other examples, in order to show the richness of migrant workers' experience. The third part deals with the meaning of regularisation after Bulgaria's accession into the European Union and the reconceptualization of migration triggered by this. Here I also discuss the changing mechanisms of dealing with irregularity. In the last part I analyse the specific category of drivers as an epitome of adaptability and flexibility. In conclusion, I tease out the frameworks of comparison that migrant workers spell out and the way these are connected with citizenship discussions.

4.1. Working in Brushlyan and Tafalla – a labour market overview of two localities.

4.1.1. On sewing clothes and cutting stones: employment opportunities in a Rhodope mountain village

At the time of my research, the Rhodopi mountain region did not offer many employment opportunities. As it was already discussed in the previous chapter (HISTORY) the postsocialist period of the 1990's witnessed rapid deindustrialization, disintegration of agricultural cooperatives (TKZS) and restitution of scattered and often unwanted pieces of land. All this lead to mass unemployment and impoverishment of the local rural population. There was a symbolic move away from the secure full-time state jobs in factories or in the administration, into the insecure and poorly paid work in private small enterprises or agriculture. For a limited period of time tobacco turned from a side job for the women into the main occupation and source of income. By the mid 2000's, however, tobacco cultivation was already on decline. So, when I arrived in Brushlyan in 2006 employment was limited to two major highly gendered paths: sewing workshops for the women and stone cutting for the fit men. A small number of people were engaged in the administration or worked as teachers in the nursery or the primary school. In addition to that, there were two small woodcutting and saw-mill enterprises, employing no more than 20 men altogether. The several small cafes and bars, as well as the local shops, employed highschool students or family members of the owners. Finally, tobacco was still cultivated by a small number of people, but it had again become a side job as before.

Female employment was regarded on the whole as more reliable and providing security, even if was much less lucrative than male employment. There were three sewing workshops in the village, owned by Greek entrepreneurs, and one larger in the nearby village, sewing lingerie for a French company. The conditions in all workshops were similar. All women were employed with permanent contracts (*trudov dogovor*), which included social benefits and counted towards the length of service. They worked for the minimum wage at that time (125 €), with the French workshop paying slightly better. The conditions were bad and the extra hours and shifts in cases of urgent orders were exhausting. Nevertheless, since this was the only mass employment for women in the region, the conditions were not negotiable. A new sewing workshop was opened while I was in the village in January 2008 and immediately employed about 50 new women. At the time this not only signified an improvement of the economic context, but also emphasized the security of female employment, albeit poorly paid. The work of women was not regarded as a significant income generator, but rather as a mechanism for providing security. Not only did women have health insurance, maternity leave, and future pension benefits, but their contracts and regular income allowed them to take small bank loans. In this sense, their employment provided a sort of security and reliability not only to themselves, but their whole families.

Young men, in contrast, had a more lucrative occupation, which however was partly seasonal and irregular (with no contracts or benefits included). The typical male employment over the last several years (after 2005) has been stone cutting/tiling and production of "Gneiss" stone tiles. Stone cutting has gone through several transformations over the last 5 years. Initially most men worked independently selling their produce of tile stones to a buyer company. They had to go into the mountain where the large pieces of stones were dug out by tractors and organize the transportation to the gathering points. In 2007 these practices have developed into a more

organized business, with small companies/firms hiring wage workers, using machines to break the stones into smaller pieces and transporting them to the main road, closer to the villages. In addition to the wage workers, there was still a small number of men who worked independently and sold their produce rather than their work. Most workers had no contracts, thus were responsible for their social benefits. Most of them were either registered as unemployed, or as self-employed with a minimum wage. The second category was responsible for paying the minimum health insurance fee if they wanted to be included in the national health system.

Similarly to the situation of women in the sewing workshops, in principle, there was enough employment for all men who could endure the hard work. Overall, the payment was high for the region and even for the country, sometimes reaching up to 1500 leva (700 euro) during the active summer season. Nevertheless, this employment was insecure on the long-run, with the constant changing regulations for stone concessions. In addition, because of its hard physical labour nature, it was suitable only for younger men, under 45 years old. Workers did not have contracts or social benefits. And it was partly seasonal, due to its open-air character. Therefore, stone cutting was not considered a desired employment and was taken only as a last resort, albeit quite too often.[38] It was not unemployment then, which drove people to migrate to Spain, but rather the unfavourable conditions that employment offered.

4.1.2. Labour migration to Spain: a brief overview

Over the last 10 years the status of Bulgarian immigrants in Spain and the different procedures for legalization and regularization have gone through several changes due to Bulgaria's

---

[38] An anecdotic story that I heard several times from different people went like this: An old man from the village saw a group of workers cutting stones and asked: "Boys, what have you done wrong? Stealing? Murder? What is it that you're punished for with these stones?" A man replied they have done nothing wrong, they were just working and getting paid for it. The old man shook his head in dismay: "In my times, it was only prisoners who would work on stones." And indeed, the stones business was regarded as hard work, even as a sort of undeserved punishment.

transformation into an accession country after 2001 and into an EU country after 2007. Before 2001, Bulgarian citizens needed an entry visa that was usually for a single entry, for a short period of time and was rather complicated to get. Between 2001 and 2007, a three months visa-free-stay in any Schengen country was introduced. This new regulation led to the intensification of migration flows to Spain. Thus the change in status – from unwanted immigrants into future EU citizens immediately resulted in the change of practices. Consequently, Bulgaria's accession into EU in 2007, made it much easier for migrants to enter other EU countries (and Spain in particular), spend unlimited time there (as opposed to the previous 3 months limit), and acquire work contracts from employers (which was much harder to arrange before, even with the explicit desire of the employer to legalize the employee). Bulgarian citizens became EU citizens, even though they still do not have full rights in Spain.[39] Spain applied a transition period of 2 years for Bulgarian (and Romanian) citizens, in which labour market access requires authorisation and registration, although it is not subject to any restrictions. These kinds of regulations place the Bulgarian Muslim migrants in a much more favourable position in comparison to other non-EU migrants, while at the same time still applying certain categories of non-citizens with restricted rights, which differentiates and inferiorizes them in comparison to other EU citizens from the older member states.

The different types of migrants' employment in Spain are mostly gender-specific, just as in Bulgaria. Men work in construction, as factory workers (there is a VW assemblage factory for example), drivers (of international lorries, or internal smaller trucks), and very few in agriculture. Women mostly work either in domestic services (cleaning houses or taking care of children or elderly people), or in hotels and restaurants (cleaning staff or in the kitchen). Net payment for the

---

[39] For example, there is a two years transitional period which restricts free movement of workers from Bulgaria to Spain for the purpose of taking up a job, thus requiring from Bulgarians to still obtain a work permit in order to take a job.

workers does not depend on their legal status. If the worker is regularized, i.e. with a work permit, the employer is obliged to pay the extra amount of money for social security and life insurance, when required. Extra hours, beyond the *nomina* (40 hours per week) however are paid differently depending on the legal status. Vacation days are also differently paid according to the status or the arrangement with the employer. With the extra hours included a full-time employed man would usually get between 1500 and 2000 euro per month.[40] Women earn less money, both because the type of jobs they have pay less per hour and because most of them work part-time. Thus, the few women who work full time in a restaurant or in a supermarket, or combine several types of employment, reach up to 1000 euro per month. The average income, however, does not exceed 600 euro.[41]

Regularization usually depends on the type of employment. Thus, certain jobs which are more exposed to check-ups and fines require regularized workers, while other jobs on the contrary are more suitable for irregular worker. Overall, construction and factory employment requires a legal status of the workers because of the visibility, the higher risk factor and the tighter control. The fines for hiring irregular workers, which are imposed on employers, are between 25 000 and 35 000 euro per worker. Therefore, most employers in these areas prefer to hire legalized migrants or to provide the required documents for them to acquire a work permit. In comparison, in agriculture or in domestic services most workers are hired without contracts and social benefits and are paid their daily wage cash. Thus, while some of the men do manage to get a regular

---

[40] In general, a construction worker gets 7-8 euro per hour, with 15 euro (if with legal status) for extra hours. Most construction workers work Saturdays till 1 pm as well and often take 1 or 2 extra hours each day of the week. Thus, they manage to get about 400 euros above the *nomina* (which is 1100). Drivers are better paid, with about 2000 euro or more per month. Finally, factory worker usually work on shifts, and have approximately similar salaries as the construction workers.

[41] Women are paid no more than 6 euro per hour for 40 hours per week type of job or for a regular domestic services job for one client (which might be 4 hours per day, everyday for the same person). They get 10 euros per hour, if the job is up to 20 hours per week. This means that cleaning three houses each 2 days per week is more profitable than cleaning only one every day.

employment, most women do not. This means, then that the gendered tendency of regularized work and security observed in Bulgaria is turned around in Spain, whereby women hold the more precarious jobs. This aspect, along with other details specific for female employment will be discussed in the following chapter.

4.2. From ideal type to an ideal: Yavor's path to an autonom

In the rest of the chapter I explore the various shades and nuances of male migrants' work experiences in Spain through the individual stories of several migrants. I start with the story of Yavor and his path to a successful self-employed construction entrepreneur. He was 34 years old and had spent five years in Spain when we first met. Being the first migrant in Spain I got to know, him and his family remained a close contact throughout my whole research. His wife Rumi had joined him in Spain two years earlier and after a meandering path between unemployment and several precarious job positions, she was a house wife and a full-time mother of two young children when I arrived in their house. Yavor's experience as a labour migrant starts quite typically, but gradually develops into a success story which turns him into an exceptional example of success.

I first met Yavor in Bulgaria on my trip to Brushlyan in 2006. The two girls I asked to introduce me to someone who lived and worked in Spain pointed at him, agreeing: "Yavor is the best example of a Spanish migrant you can find." And luckily he had just parked his eccentrically coloured Seat with Spanish registration in front of the most popular café in the village. As we were sipping from our coffee, Yavor started introducing me to the turns and twists of his migrant life. His story begins before his first visit to Spain, in Burshlyan, as the grandson of one of the

most powerful people in the village during communism. His grandfather was the mayor of the village for many years, respected by some, but secretly loathed by more for his role in the re-naming campaigns of 1972.[42] Their extended kin is one of the two largest and most influential ones. Their family house is a four storeys building on the main road in the beginning of the village. Unlike most kids, he went to a vocational high school specializing as an electrician in a small town on the other side of the mountains. Nevertheless, this strong start did not help him with making a successful career in Bulgaria. After coming back from the mandatory military service, he started working in a shoe factory in the nearby village. The factory was closed soon after and he became a bartender in the café opposite his house. He worked there for a year and a half without a contract or social benefits covered, which was the usual situation for most of the workers in this period. In the meantime, he got married to Rumi and they had their first son.

4.2.1. Funfairs and the importance of being 'civilized'

Even when working without a single free day, the money he made and the money his wife earned from the sewing factory was still hardly enough to cover their everyday expenses. With no prospects for a more lucrative job at the time and with his son growing, he decided to try his luck as a migrant. So he joined the first wave of migrants towards Spain, soon after Bulgaria became an accession country and the visa regime for Schengen countries drastically loosened. With the opportunity of entering any EU country for up to three months at a time, many Bulgarians poured into various countries in search of a job. The Rhodope region villages sent their men predominantly to Spain and Portugal for irregular often short term unskilled labour. [43] One of these men was Yavor. He joined his best man who was working in Galicia as a day-labourer on

---

[42] Both Yavor and Rumi kept their Bulgarian names and very few close kin referred to them with their Muslim names. Their reflections on the duality of the name are discussed in Chapter III.

[43] The story of who is the firs migrant from Brushlyan and how did it happen that all of them ended up in Tafalla was already told in the previous chapter.

funfairs. With his help Yavor started also working as an irregular worker, assembling swings and roundabouts day and night from city to city in Galicia. He remembers this period as a rather bleak moment of his life, not only in terms of work, but also in terms of everyday social contacts.

These swings were the most tiring work I've ever done. Get up early in the morning, assemble the swings, supervise whether all is working fine all day while there are people, until 4-5 am, go to bed for a couple of hours, get up again, clean for the following day, again stay up until early morning, disassemble all the next day, and hop on the van to the next town. No time for fun, no time to have a chat, no time for anything. And what fun, what conversations? Even if I knew the language, these Spanish workers were like monkeys. They didn't take showers ever and looked at me with dismay when I was pouring water on myself with the hose. We didn't have a bathroom of course. And they were not only dirty, but uncivilized as well. I was the only one eating with a fork and knife. The boss' wife even said once: Look at Yavor - he, the Bulgarian, knows better how to eat and behave properly, and he takes a shower every day."

Yavor's account of the harsh routine of a seasonal irregular worker shifts straight into a discussion of his ill-mannered 'uncivilized' Spanish colleagues. This type of comparisons came up in many of our subsequent conversations with Yavor, in which he often took pride in his superiority of manners and abilities. For example, he claimed that his Spanish colleagues in the construction company where he worked later on, had only primary education and were hardly literate. He constantly astonished them with his ability to make mental calculations without using a calculator and with the fact that he learned Spanish so well. I heard many remarks along these lines from other migrants too, which were usually used as a point of reference for the unequal position they have in comparison to the Spanish workers. As many researchers (see Calavtia for REF) have demonstrated, low-skill migrants usually only have access to the jobs that local

citizens do not want. These jobs were perceived by the migrants as suitable for the lowest strata of Spanish citizens – unskilled, uneducated, mannerless. Yavor's words demonstrate this well: "*If I was Spanish, I would have never been forced to work in such a place with my high school diploma and the vocation that I have.*" Hence, there is a clear awareness of the unequal status he has due to his migrant's position, and to his citizenship difference.

4.2.2. Spain, vol. 2 – moving away from irregularity

Yavor worked at the fun fairs for six months and returned to Bulgaria with some saved money. Still without real prospects for a more lucrative job in the village, after he spent his savings from Spain, he decided to go back again, to join his brother and three cousins who were in Tafalla. In 2004, the place had already attracted a small community from Brushlyan, comprised mostly of men who left their families at home. The more migrants established themselves there, the more attractive the place became for new migrants. Yavor moved in with his brother and another eleven men in a three bedroom apartment. His sister-in-law, one of the few women in Tafalla at that time, was keeping the household for 13 men, along with her part time job as a domestic maid. One of Yavor's cousins arranged for him a low-skilled construction job without a contract with the same employer. They were pulling down old houses in the region and transporting the material to other construction sites. In 2005, Spain granted amnesty to 700,000 illegal migrant workers. Yavor's employer wanted to transfer Yavor to larger outdoors projects, where he only used workers with proper contracts and insurance, so he applied for regularisation documents. In that way, Yavor got a work permit, along with a number of other migrants from Brushlyan. He told me the story in 2007, while still working for the same employer:

My employer really likes me. I was working very hard, and was constantly learning new things. And I wasn't lazy. Most of us are not lazy, unlike the Spanish. That's why he applied for my documents. But not everyone was so lucky. Some employers are trickier. They want workers with no contracts to control them and lay them off when it suits them. Even now, when it's so easy to make the documents for a Bulgarian, some of them still refuse to do it. Especially if it's not construction, but something less risky and with lower fines, like the chicken factory. But my employer trusted me and I became one of his favourite workers. After more than three years working together, we were never in a fight, he was never discontent with me. So I had to earn my position as a legal worker, you see.

As Yavor noted, not everyone was so lucky. While many Bulgarians got indeed regularised in this campaign, many other remained without documents and kept working irregularly until 2007 when the regulations changed. Regularisation depended partly on the type of employment. Construction workers on larger open sites, especially those involved in risky activities, were regularised, while those who worked for smaller building companies making internal renovations, or those who worked in small factories and workshops often remained irregular. All the women engaged in domestic services and part-time restaurants services did not receive work permits either. However, the route to regularisation depended on other conditions as well. Applicants had to prove they have resided in Spain before August 2004 and that they have been working continuously since then. Residence status was to be proved through *empadronamiento*, address registration with the local authorities, which many migrants were reluctant to do fearing penalty for trespassing the three months period of legal stay. At the same time, employers had to be willing to admit they have been hiring illegal workers and to pay backdated tax and social security contributions on the workers they legalised. This situation allowed many employers to blackmail or force workers into precarious positions. (cf. Calavita)

Soon after Yavor received his work permit, he called his wife and son to join him in Spain. The sense of stability, which his status as a regularised worker gave him, urged him to attempt to reunite his whole family in Spain. Even if his salary remained almost the same, the work permit not only granted him security of employability, but also opened up further opportunities for his family (like residence status and further on, health insurance and other benefits). His younger brother arrived to Tafalla about the same time as Rumi. The same big flat formerly inhabited by 14 people, now became the home of the three brothers and their wives. This arrangement turned out to be rather challenging, and the two other brothers soon moved out.[44] Thus, in addition to supporting his wife and son, Yavor started paying the whole rent and only occasionally renting out one of the rooms to different relatives. These moves signified a stabilisation of his position in Spain and an attempt to 'normalize' his migrant experience by including his family in it. They also meant that his initial plan for very short term labour migration, has changed. Soon after that, Yavor recalls he was even able to put money on the side for investing in the building of a new house in Brushlyan, which would require at least five years of saving, if not more, according to his calculations.

For more than four years Yavor worked in the same construction firm learning different skills. When we met, he was working mostly indoors, in refurbishing or finishing tasks like plastering, tiling, painting, laying electricity installation etc. For a while he was also a driver responsible for deliveries between different sites and storehouses. He worked nine hours per day Mondays through Fridays and another four hours on Saturdays, thus making the full number of permitted extra hours. His base salary was 1100 euro after taxes, and another 550-600 euro depending on

---

[44] Rumi told me that sharing one kitchen, one bathroom and one living room among three separate households was extremely challenging for all of them. She further explained that back in the village in Bulgaria even when young families share the house with relatives, each household has a separate kitchen. "*A woman needs her own stove*" was her conclusion.

the extra hours, making up to 1700 euro per month. In addition, he received two extra salaries, in August and in December. He also had 45 working days holidays and his health insurance covered his wife and children as well. His regime and earnings were the standard among the other regularised migrants from Brushlyan who were employed with full-time contracts in construction.

4.2.3. The big move – becoming the ideal

Yavor's boss sometimes 'sub-contracted' him to another construction manager in Tafalla, for the same day wage. However, during my stay Yavor arranged several private commissions with him, taking the whole weekend and a couple of days leave from his official employer. This not only secured him additional non-taxable income, but also made him acutely aware of the percentage that he loses off his actual wage to his regular employer. This realisation overlapped with his desire for achieving more than being just a worker, and became the impetus for a major turning point in his career, which took place in the beginning of 2008. When I arrived back to the field at the end of February, Yavor was feverishly talking of becoming self-employed (*autonom*). This was a big move, which very few people had made, and he was scared and insecure. Day after day he was discussing with his wife and other relatives the possible benefits and risks involved. The requirements he needed to fulfil were many, including a serious financial investment into a van (*furgoneta*), and various sets of instruments, which required a new loan from the bank. Finally he had the decisive conversation with his boss, who not only agreed to let him go, but also suggested to support him.

At the end of March Yavor interrupted prematurely his *fijo* contract and applied for an *autonom* status. He continued working informally for the sub-contractor for a month, while arranging his

documents. Throughout the whole process he was supported with advice about the forms and procedures by the local office of the *Union General de Trabajadores* (UGT). He was a member of the UGT for two years already and was using them for different kinds of legal and administrative support, not only for himself, but also for various issues concerning his relatives and friends (brothers-in-law, cousins, uncles, parents-in-law, and even me).[45] He was advised to ask his employer to discontinue his contract one-sidedly and claim unemployment benefits (*paro*). Only after that he applied for self-employment, thus moving from unemployed to self-employed. This elaborate procedure allowed him to receive the whole sum of unemployment benefits he was entitled to at once, which amounted to about 10,000 €. As an *autonom* in the construction sphere he was eligible for taking commissions as a subcontractor. It was his sole responsibility to finish the contracted work, by himself or by hiring other workers. He could hire up to six employees with different types of contracts, and pay the employer's percent of their social security benefits. He also had to pay different type of taxes, plus his own social security, and to give a financial and tax report every three months. In addition to that, he had to use his own instruments (or hire them from someone) and to transport the workers with his own van. It was this last requirement that caused a small crisis just after he got his *autonom* papers.

We were just discussing over coffee in Rumi's kitchen that Yavor was searching for a van, when he stormed in and announced that he had just learned he has to buy it by the end of the day or he will lose the *paro* money. It was 10.30 am. By the evening he had managed to take a loan, find a van in Pamplona, make the transfer, arrange the insurance, and register it on his name. At 7.30 pm he called and offered a tour of the village with their new acquisition. Later he explained in details all the tricks and networks that he used in order to succeed. He first went to the bank with

---

[45] When I first arrived to Tafalla he insisted to help me and his father-in-law who had just arrived, with our address registrations. He took us to UGT first for filling the forms and then later to the city council. Even though this was obviously an issue not directly concerning him, nor related to work, the employees in UGT were happy to help.

which he had a lease for his other car. Last time he applied for a loan, he was collecting the documents for more than three days. This time, they asked for someone owning a flat to guarantee for his 17,000 € loan. He gave up on this bank and went in another one, where one of the managers was his sub-contractor's brother. The loan was arranged for less than an hour, with no guarantors or extra documents required. In the meantime, one of his wife's cousins in Pamplona, an auto mechanic, was frantically searching for a good priced second hand van. He called him, while in the bank, with a ready offer. While driving to Pamplona, Yavor called his insurance agent and gave him the details for the van in order to prepare the insurance policy. They arranged that the payment for this will be made post factum a couple of days later. Yavor had always paid his instalments on time, and brought a number of clients to his agent, hence the favour. In the meantime, the cousin made sure the contract is waiting for him in Pamplona. The insurance policy was faxed there. Yavor signed everything on the spot, and drove immediately back to the Tafalla UGT office, picking the original insurance policy on the way. From there at 5 pm sharp he faxed all the documents to the office responsible for the unemployment benefits. Only then, he drove back to Pamplona to pick up the new van. "*If one thing had gone wrong, I would have lost the money. Without the help of all these people, I wouldn't have managed. But that's because in all these years here, I worked for the connections. I showed them I am a responsible worker, I was never late with payments. And the cousin, he knows his way in Pamplona, he has his own connections there. It's all about connections after all. Just like in Bulgaria,"* Yavor concluded in the end of the day.

Yavor became self-employed just when the financial crisis was starting to hit Spain. He kept working as before for his sub-contractor, receiving the whole wage, rather than a percentage, but paying different benefits and taxes. His previous employer lent him several sets of instruments to

start with. And he had also assured him he was always ready to take him back as an employee. However, instead of getting less work because of the crisis, he started taking commissions from his initial employer too and in May, he already needed additional help in order to manage with all the work. While I was still there, he started hiring his wife's unemployed brother occasionally for a daily wage. In these first months it was not clear whether becoming self-employed was worth it at all with all the new expenses and the fear of decreasing work. This summer, he did not advance at all with the construction of his big house in Bulgaria. Yet, eventually he did not fail as an *autonom* and he became a success story often being given as an example of the few who managed to be more than ordinary workers.

4.2.4. Migrant employers – model citizens, exploiters, or a safety net?

I kept inquiring regularly about their lives over these two years, always expecting he might say the crisis crushed his entrepreneurial spirit and he had to go back to being a wage labourer or give up Spain all together. His answer in our skype conversations was always: *It's going fine. Slowly, but fine.* or *It's more difficult now, but not impossible yet."* In fact, only two of the people I knew came back to Bulgaria due to the crisis and lack of jobs. The rest, either kept their old jobs, or were temporarily laid off and relied on *paro* money and on their relatives, until eventually they found something else. When I met Yavor and Rumi again in Brushlyan in the summer of 2010 he was still self-employed, with two to three workers on temporal contracts, working predominantly for the same two contractors, with whom he kept his good relations. He was mostly doing small finishing jobs or renovations. He told me he did not hire workers with *fin de obra* contracts, which in principle would have been the most convenient and riskless for him as an employer, because his commissions were very small taking up to two weeks. That is why he signed mostly temporary one to three months contracts, first with his younger brother-in-law,

119

later with another worker. Then, in the last year, he needed a more experienced worker, and in the meantime his older brother-in-law got laid off, so he hired him with a one-year contract. Just when the contract was close to expiring in July and Yavor was not sure he had enough commissions to sign a new contract, his brother-in-law announced he intended to take a position as a driver for the VW factory. At present he was again working by himself, with the intention to sign a temporary contract with someone who did not have a regular job at the moment.

Keeping all the regulations very strictly, only working with regularised workers with whom he signed the required type of contracts was something that Yavor did not have a chance of avoiding. First of all, his contractors did not want to risk a fine. But also, to use Yavor's words again: *It's not like I like paying taxes and social benefits for my workers. But to be honest, I don't really know whom to bribe. This is not Brushlyan, where the policeman is a cousin and he owes you a favour anyway. It's not even Gotse Delchev where you know how much to put in an envelop for the favour. I'm sure the Spanish know their ways. They wouldn't have hired so many irregulars otherwise. But I don't know their tricks, and if there is a check-up, I won't be able to afford the fine afterwards. And in the end, these rules are not that bad. They made this country to become what it is now."* Keeping all the rules and being a 'model citizen' was something that Yavor underlined on different occasions. He often made comparisons between the different ways in which things worked in Spain and in Bulgaria when it came to observing the rules. In this sense, while in Bulgaria there will always be an alternative way of doing things based on the intricate local knowledge of the complicated system of bribes, favours and turning a blind eye, in Spain the knowledge coming from the position of the insider was lacking. This resulted in a much stricter complying with the regulations, which inevitably affected his rhetoric and subsequently his attitude. The order in Spain was idealized and connected to prosperity, while

Bulgaria was deprecated as backwards, savage, and hence poor. Paradoxically, the lack of local knowledge which would have allowed flexibility and manoeuvring within the system, contributed to developing an imposed 'model citizen' behaviour, which was coupled with the respective rhetoric.

Nevertheless, flexibility made its way in this case through a different door. While officially following the regulations, by using short-term contracts Yavor was in fact appointing workers in highly precarious conditions. However, he only kept workers who did not have other more stable offers, in this way turning into a buffer for those who were in immediate need of a job. With his large pool of acquaintances from Brushlyan he did not risk remaining without workers in a case of emergency. Once, last year, he even had to summon from Bulgaria one of his cousins, who came for a month and a half. The worker who had been contracted to do the job found a more secure and long-term position and Yavor let him go. In this sense, the flexibility of work is not only expressed in the worker's practices, but also in the intermediate migrant employer's actions, who reacts in accordance to the needs of the worker. To wrap up Yavor's story with a quote on flexibility from our last conversation about migration, the situation in Spain, and the financial crisis:

> *You know why we, the Bulgarians, manage fine in these more difficult times, unlike many of the Spanish? We are ready to work everything, to change the job, to adjust to whatever the employer needs now. Look at me, I studied to be an electrician. In Bulgaria, I worked in a factory, in a bar. Then in Spain as the lowest labourer at the funfairs. But then, it was construction work that was available here. So, I started learning more and more new things, from the other workers, depending on what was needed to be done on the construction site. When did I dream in my life that I will be able to raise a whole house with my own hands, to*

do the plastering, the tiling, the masonry, the roofs… But I had to, so I learned. The Spanish will never do this. They're stuck in one position and don't want to move from it. That's why we are appreciated here, all of us. Look how many people came back to Bulgaria, took professional driving licences and came back to work as drivers now... But you see what is searched for and you adjust yourself accordingly.

With this third line of comparison with the Spanish, the perfect example of the neoliberal logic of the self-managing, self-enterprising individual who flexibly adjusts to the needs of the market. I will close Yavor's story. Before we parted, he took me to see his house, which had grown with another two storeys in the last two years. The next day, they left back to Spain with their kids in the van full of salami, cheese, waffles, clothes, and another three passengers.

Yavor's story starts off as an example of the typical labour migrant from Brushlyan, but the more it gets to the present, the less typical it becomes. He shared the faith of most irregular unskilled workers, he was representative of the segment of migrants who work in construction and got regularised. His wage and extra hours as a construction worker with a contract have been what most migrants strive for. But his entrepreneurial move into self-employment and the fact that he actually managed to sustain his position as such, is something that turned him from an ideal type into an ideal for most migrants. What conditioned his trajectory and made him unique was a blend of his urge for a higher status engrained in his family history, the networks and contacts he established and mobilized on different occasions, and the practical and symbolic opportunities opened up by regularization and the subsequent change of status as an EU citizen. However, his trajectory could have developed in a much less favourable way on each of the turning points, as it was already hinted. These other paths of irregularity, of failure, or of precarious regular jobs

122

construct, along with Yavor's case, the picture of the spaces of empowerment and disempowerment that work opens up for the migrants.

There are several threads in this story which need to be unwound. First, what are the divergences from the ideal type in the transition from irregularity to regularity and the different practical dimensions that this transition brings about? In other words, what are the strategies that migrants deploy to cope with irregularity and with less favourable contracts and working conditions. Second, and tightly related to this, is the interplay between the normative opportunities opened up by a change in the status and the mobilization of informal mechanisms. A third thread that needs more attention is the flexibilization of labour and the adaptability of workers. Here, the different types of male employment imply different opportunities and different strategies. Finally, what does the shift from a non-EU migrant to a EU citizen entail both practically and symbolically in the realm of work? It is these issues that will be addressed next by drawing other cases into the world of male employment.

4.3. The paradoxes of irregularity and regularisation

As it was already pointed out, many of the migrants did not get the chance to get a regular status, i.e. to acquire a work permit in the 2005 amnesty campaign. Some of the older migrants had managed to regularise in earlier campaigns, but they were very few. The rest either did not find an employer who would agree to apply for their work permit, or did not fulfil the conditions and remained irregular workers at least until 2007. With Bulgaria's EU accession, the regulations changed, but as I have mentioned above, workers still needed an application from an employer for a work permit. Even though it was much easier to receive the status, this did not lead to overall regularisation. Applying for a work permit meant that the employer is able to offer a job

with a contract to the respective candidate. It also included obligation to pay social security taxes for at least six months. Thus, on the one hand, some smaller scale employers were reluctant to regularise too many new workers, fearing that they might not be able to offer enough job positions for a longer period and to cover the social security taxes.

4.3.1. Reconceptualizing migration from the vantage point of the new citizens of Europe

Migrants deployed different strategies in order to get regularised and to sign a contract with their employers. For some, it was enough to just ask, while for others it meant finding a new employer. A third course of action was to seek for a fake employer who applied for regularising a worker, without actually intending to hire him *de facto*. Such cases were rather popular among the migrants and by early autumn of 2007 it was well known which employers are willing to do it. While the worker did not pay anything for the ordinary regularisation procedure, there were substantial costs included in this alternative way. Usually, the worker covered the taxes for the procedure and also the first six months social security benefits, which are included in the conditions for issuing a work permit. A contract was signed on paper and the employer had the right to 'lay off' the worker after these first six months with no fines. Many migrants invested in this option, while continuing to work for their old employers with no contract. Some, then, changed the employer to sign a contract with a new one. Others managed to persuade their old employers to change their status into regular workers.

Yavor's brother-in-law, Alil was one of these migrants who had to trick his employer into signing a contract. He had worked for him for two years, but the employer refused to apply for a work permit. Alil managed to find a 'fake' employer who agreed regularise him for a fee. With the

ready documents, Alil went back to his own employer and presented him with a fait accompli, forcing him to sign a contract. The day when this happened, Alil came to visit his sister very excited from the victory. "*Working without a contract here, without benefits, without length of service, that's like working in Bulgaria,*" he said. "*In Bulgaria most people in construction are like this. I've done that too – here in Spain, and at home. But now, that I know my rights, I'm not going to give in to some greedy boss, who doesn't want to pay my benefits. We've come here for something better, not to live like monkeys, like the last peasants. Now I will finally feel normal, equal, with rights. Even if my salary will be the same. It's a principle thing.*" His salary was indeed the same, but the social benefits did make a difference. What is more, Alils' regularisation in fact helped him with finding a different employment.

The massive striving for regularisation was not only an expression of migrants' attempts to acquire better positioning at the labour market. It was coupled with a re-assessment of the whole migration endeavour and more specifically, a sudden amplification in the requirements and expectations from work conditions. In this sense, the change in the structural opportunities and the discourse on rights were tightly connected. While when talking of the time before 2007 migrants usually estimated their position in the labour market as a result of a chance, now this was already re-conceptualized as a right. And what is more, these rights started being contrasted with what they have left behind in Bulgaria. Thus the newly acquired status of European citizens transformed the symbolic self-positioning of migrants. At the same time, the same status also hindered in practice the empowerment of many who did not manage to get regularised immediately. Many employers, especially in bigger construction companies, in international factories and in the transportation business, refused to hire irregular workers from Bulgaria, who in principle could acquire a regular status and were not willing to work in exploitive conditions.

This left many recent migrants in a limbo between the possible, but not yet actual, regularization and the closed pool of irregular jobs. In this sense, the change of status into EU citizens (in a transitional stage) reinforced certain aspects of discrimination on the labour market.

Being trapped in between statuses evoked discussions of different types of expectations and requirements that migrants suddenly started expressing after the nominal change of status. Amet, a 33 year old man who arrived at the end of 2006 and has been trying since to find a job with a contract, illustrated the frustration of many: *"Before* [2007] *it was clear, you come, you work illegally, you get paid less than the Spanish workers, you can be kicked out any moment, but still you make much more money than in Bulgaria [...] Now, I still can't work legally, because I can't find anyone to make the documents for me, but I also can't work illegally. They know I won't work under the nasty conditions from before, so they don't even bother to hire me without a contract."* (cf Pumares on Moroccan migrants who tried to find legal work with their new permits after the legalization programme in 1991, but this many times turned out to be impossible, quoted in Calavita 2005:101)

Amet summarizes the sentiments of this category of more recent migrants who came with a new understanding and higher requirements for life in migrancy. The paradox does not simply demonstrate the ambiguities related to the change of status, but in fact signals a re-evaluation of the meaning of migration. This was already visible in Yavor's aspirations to achieve more by becoming an *autonom*. But the category of these unsuccessful migrants also demonstrates the possibility of return and through that, the re-positioning of the place of origin in their conceptual landscape. The reconceptualization of Bulgaria as a possible place for immediate return also means its inclusion in the same symbolic space. Thus Bulgaria became part of the European

Union not only on the normative and institutional level, but in the individual imaginaries of migrants who envisaged their lives equally well in both places.

4.3.2. The buffer jobs

However much the occurrence of those trapped in the limbo of temporary irregularity indicated an important tendency of reconceptualization, their number was not significant. Most of the migrants, who did not have a stable job, were in fact manoeuvring between statuses and types of jobs with great ease. There were tricks and ways to go around the work permit system, and buffer temporary jobs which softened the hardship of the initial lack of regularised employment. One strategy was to find a 'fake' employer with whom to apply for work permit documents. There was no strictly established system for this and it mostly worked through networks and acquaintances, but it was nevertheless effective for many of the migrants I met. Another strategy, often overlapping with the first one, was to take a poorly paid short-term job, which secured the living minimum, while waiting for regularisation or a better offer. It was mainly the more recent migrants who deployed these strategies. The change in regularisation and residence conditions in 2007 triggered a new wave of intense migration. Usually young men arrived to 'try their luck' with a little bit of savings and relying on the support network of kith and kin. In this sense, the new migrants were able to manipulate these different strategies using the knowledge, connections, and image, created by those who had already established themselves in Spain.

Illustrative for the combination of mechanisms deployed is the case of mizho Ismet, a 55-year-old men, who had been in Spain for 7 months. He had his son and daughter, and three of his nephews already settled down in Spain. His daughter had recommended him in a chicken slaughterhouse, where he was working already for half a year with no documents. The conditions and money was

not satisfying, therefore he wanted to start working as a truck driver, using his training and experience from Bulgaria. However, he did not manage to find a truck company employer willing to regularise him, only employers willing to hire him, in case he managed to arrange his work permit by himself. Stuck in this position, he complained to his landlord who owned one of the bakeries in Tafalla. It was the landlord who offered mizho Ismet to help him and apply for a work permit as a 'fake' employer. Even though it was a rather costly operation and mizho Ismet had to borrow some of the money from his nephew, it all ended up well. Three months after receiving the work permit he was working as an international lorry driver and making three times the money he used to make in the chicken factory. Without his landlord support, however, this would not have been possible, mizho Ismet emphasized to me.

The chicken slaughterhouse for which mizho Ismet worked was a very prominent buffer employment for many other migrants in Tafalla. Almost all members of mizho Ismet's family had worked for the factory for shorter or longer periods of time, as have other Brushlyan recent migrants too. In fact, when he quit, his place was taken by his brother, who had recently arrived to Spain. The factory owner had very few workers with contracts, mainly in the administration. All the others were irregular. According to the workers, he knew the 'important people' responsible for the possible check ups and had a way of solving the issue.[46] The conditions in the slaughterhouse were relatively good, according to most migrants. The working hours were from 4 am to 2 pm four days a week for 700-800 euro per month. Many of them had part-time jobs in the afternoon and/or for the remaining two days. Even though in this way, some of them managed to reach the construction worker's *nomina*, the slaughterhouse job remained undesirable not only

---

[46] Only once, one of mizho Ismet's nephews told me, was there an actual check-up. All the workers were asked to hide in the heat chamber and remained locked there for a few hours, while the committee was checking the premises and the documents of the few regular workers who remained at their spots. The day after all the workers received a premium of half a salary for their 'cooperation'.

because it was worse paid, but also due to the very tiring working hours. At the same time, this was regarded as a secure job, with a stable monthly income, *"always paid on time, by the 5th every month, unlike in Bulgaria"*, as mizho Ismet underlined. It was also reliable in the sense of offering employment almost all the time to new migrants, because of the high fluctuation of the working force, which had turned it into a transition stage in many migrants' trajectories.

Another type of temporary buffer job was in seasonal agricultural employment. Grapes picking was the autumn occupation for many who had no job. Because of the extreme flexibility of engagement in terms of hours and days, many migrants with jobs also used it as additional source of income, either in their free hours, or over the weekend and during public holidays. Aneta, a young woman who has been working in the chicken slaughterhouse for a couple of months, managed to make additional 350 euro for a week of working on the grapes field during four afternoons and two whole days. In this way Aneta managed to make half her monthly salary in the factory. Mizho Ismet's brother also went for two days, right after he arrived at the end of September. He made 60 euro, with which he could '*buy his coffee and feel a bit independent'*, but refused to go for a third day, because it was too tiring for him. Agricultural work was never considered a reliable employment and none of the migrants would have been content with it as a major job, but it was nevertheless considered as a good source of additional money, desired by many.[47] The mechanism for finding a job was always through recommendation by another migrant and payment was always informal, but strict, per kilogram of grapes. It was called '*the loose safety net'* by many migrants for this quality of securing additional and emergency income to migrants, but being seasonal and short term.

---

[47] This attitude towards agricultural and seasonal job as a whole points to the specificity of Navarra with its opportunities for construction and industrial employment which distinguish this locality from other parts of Spain (in the South, for example) where agriculture is the main employment.

Very short-term construction appointments were a third type of buffer jobs, taken by men in the first months after arrival, or in between other more secure jobs. Such appointments lasted from one day up to a month. As in agriculture, the mechanism for getting such employment was using networks, which were predominantly kin based. Before becoming an *autonom,* Yavor used to call his brother-in-law sometimes when going to sites where he had more work than he could manage. Many men combined daily agricultural job with such temporary construction appointments, until finding more long term jobs. Others, like the 45 year-old-mizho Dhevat, have been asked by their employers to go on unemployment benefits until the construction firm gets a new commission, and would make some extra money, on top of the benefits, by working on such short-term appointments. In a way, what Yavor was offering as an employer, even tough only to regularised workers, was also a similar type of a buffer job.

Even though this kind of employment relied on the vulnerability of the workers with no documents and/or with no permanent job and reinforced the flexibilization of migrant labour, it worked at the same time as a sort of safety net, which allowed many migrants to start their migrant life or remain in Spain in moments of employment crisis. Moreover, all three types of buffer jobs used the rather large pool of migrants interconnected to each other through kin or strong friendship ties. In this way, the big village community established in Tafalla offered not only flexible, but also easily accessible, reliable and controllable labour force. The relatives did not recommend their 'lazy' cousins, and controlled those who got a job, so that the name of the kin does not get dirty. Thus, I was present at a scene in which Yavor and his older brother-in-law were both scolding his younger brother-in-law, Hassan for being not diligent enough and making bad impression to the employer where they have recommended him. *"If you lose your job, if he doesn't call you tomorrow, that's not just your problem, it's a problem for all of us. He [the*

employer] would never trust us again for anyone," Yavor was saying, while Hassan was looking down. The result was that Hassan did not go on doing small jobs for this employer and chose to search for alternative employment in a factory, in order to run away from the kin control. But most other migrants were not that rebellious and were subdued by the pressure of relatives. In this sense, the kin network was used by both sides as opening opportunities, and as imposing control.

4.3.3. Precarious regularity

The buffer jobs were mostly taken by irregular workers, but also by workers with contracts, who got laid off. The precariousness of irregular labour overlapped with the insecurity which certain types of regularity went along with. Being a regular worker did not necessarily secure a stable job or a long term contract, as it was pointed out earlier. A particular type of temporary contracts was very popular among the construction workers. Instead of signing a contract first for one year, and then for another three years, as it used to be the case earlier, over the last year employers started preferring the *fin de obra* contract, until completion of the project, which in principle had to be renews for each new project. However, after the contract's expiration many migrants continued working for the same employer without a renewal.[48] They kept receiving the same salary and social benefits, but the employer could lay them off in any given moment, which made the security of the job very low. At the same time, these contracts offered certain benefits that the irregular workers did not enjoy and in this way created a different level of insecurity and hence, inequality.

Mizho Djevat, a 50 years old construction workers who was working for a Spanish *autonom* together with his two sons, was working on such expired contract and had just gotten laid off,

---

[48] In principle, the procedure to renew the contract was easy and fast, and the employer did not face huge fines, which is why so often the re-signing did not take place for very long period of time.

when we met in early 2008. His employer explained he had no new commissions and asked his 5 workers to go into *paro* and ask for unemployment benefits for a while. By signing the initial contract and having their social benefits paid, mizho Djevat and his sons had the needed length of service to ask for up to an year of *paro*, which allowed them to all stay in Spain, while waiting for new employment. And even though their subsequent strategy was to use the buffer jobs, just as the irregulars migrants did, they kept receiving 90 percent of their base salary through the unemployment benefits. Another example for this dialectic of regularity and inequality was Kemal, a driver, who went to Bulgaria for a month, but got delayed waiting for his new passport, and came back to Spain a week later than arranged with his boss. The boss used the opportunity to fire him, even though he did not warn him about this, when Kemal called earlier to arrange the delay. Kemal was smoking angrily telling me how it was obvious that there was not enough work for the three drivers who worked in the firm, and his employer was just looking for an excuse. But his temporary contract had just expired, and in principle, the boss did not break any laws by not renewing it. Just as mizho Djevat, Kemal had immediately filed his documents for *paro* and was hoping to quickly find a new job.

Two years later, when I enquired about mizho Djevat, it turned out he never found new stable employment and kept travelling between Bulgaria and Spain, using his unemployment benefits, and working very short term construction jobs with no contract, considering to finally move back to Bulgaria. One of his sons had managed to find a factory job, while the other had completely given up on Spain and had moved to Cyprus to join his recent wife's family. Kemal, on the other hand, found a new job as a driver within two months and kept working for the same firm ever since. These two examples aimed to demonstrate the flexibility with which migrant workers are being moved from one category to another and the different possible ways their trajectories might

develop as a result of that. But also to show the complicated interrelation between regularity and irregularity, security and insecurity and ultimately to raise again the question of the different nuances of marginality and inequality.

4.3.4. The other side of regularity

Working with a contract, however, was not necessarily something that made migrants content. Some of the men working in firms with predominantly Spanish employees complained that the Spanish do not want to work extra hours and on Saturdays. Djamal, a 29-year-old construction worker who only got regularised in September 2007 when he moved to a new construction firm, was hoping to finally enjoy all the benefits from working with a contract. To his greatest disappointment, his new Spanish colleagues did not want to do the extra hours, hence the whole team worked the regular 40 hours per week.

The Spanish are so lazy, it's unbelievable. But for most migrants that's good. Because the bosses prefer to hire them instead of the Spanish, and have more work done. They don't care about the extra money they pay, they just want the work to be done faster. But look at me – what a mischance. I called my wife to come join me here with our little son, when I got the documents. And since then, it's been worse. I only get the 'nomina', the 1200 euro per month. And there is no way I can make additional money, because of these lazy colleagues of mine. And you know, what's the most stupid thing? I was better off without documents. I got less money for the extra hours, and no insurance, that's true. But still, it added up and I was making 100-200 euro more per month. And then, you start asking yourself – why get the documents, why get legal.

Djamal's frustration points to an often discussed problem about the meaning and practice of being regularised and equal. When he was employed as an irregular worker with no contract or

social security, he felt different than his few Spanish colleagues, which urged him to search for a new employer who will offer him equal conditions, he told me. And indeed, the new employer offered equal conditions and assisted him with the work permit. Ironically, the equal conditions turned out to include a drawback. Ismet, another construction worker with a similar problem complained to me that the contract and documents mean nothing to him, just trouble. He had worked without a contract or social security in Bulgaria before coming to Spain in 2006 and continued the same way in Spain until his boss insisted on regularising him right after Bulgaria's accession into the EU and moved him into the team of contract workers, most of whom were Spanish. Similar to Djamal's case, he stopped working extra-hours. "*But I came here for the money, not for the contract,*" Ismet said angrily. Interestingly enough, the employer did not give Ismet an opportunity to reject the offer and remain working without a contract. Thus, even though most of the men's strategies were directed at obtaining a work permit as a way to finding a secure job, some were in fact disappointed from the benefits that came along. These disappointments, I will argue, are indicative for their more general reflections on the meaning of equality. Whom do the migrants want to be equal with and in what aspects? What's the meaning of equality and to what extent is it desired?

4.4. The adaptable worker: on resourcefulness and flexibility

I will use the group of professional lorry drivers as the axis for this section in order to discuss the particular aspect of flexibility, underlined by Yavor as the best quality of Bulgarian workers. By doing this, however, I will also highlight the link with the newly opened structural opportunities. The adaptability and inventiveness of migrant workers is characteristic for all groups, as it was

suggested in the pervious examples. Nevertheless, the lorry drivers are a very clear case of self-instigated upward mobility, which also included a certain level of independence from other workers on one hand, and from the tight network of the kin and the community, on the other. At the same time, their high adaptability led to disruption in their social and family life and also revealed the flip side of flexible labour.

Being employed as a driver was a very recent, but highly desired path for several reasons. The substantial salary, higher than in other employment branches, was the most often quoted rationale. International lorry drivers could reach up to 3000 euro per month, I was told, while the regional and internal factory drivers or the construction truck drivers received up to 2000 euro per month[49]. In addition to the higher salary, most drivers were working with contracts and were part of the social security system, adding to their length of service as well. The relative independence from other workers was also appreciated as a great advantage. However, becoming a driver in Spain was a very recent career move for migrants, only after EU accession in 2007. The reason was that until then any type of driving licence had to be legalised within six months after first entering the country. The legalisation procedure was complicated, included a test, especially for the professional categories, and was rather costly, but it was also linked with a regularisation status.[50] After EU accession however, Bulgarian driving licences became valid all over Europe, which allowed many migrants holding a professional one to immediately apply for new jobs.

This very concrete new opportunity opened up by EU accession was further exploited by people who did not have a professional driving license before. Thus, a very substantive number of men arranged longer vacations during the summer and went back to Bulgaria to complete the

---

[49] Even the lower wage is still with about 400 euro higher than the wage of construction workers doing extra hours
[50] There was another possibility of having a EU valid driving licence issued in Bulgaria through some procedure, but apparently none of the migrants had inquired about it, so this option remained unexploited.

professional driving course and get a new category on their now valid all over EU driving licenses. In fact, during my fieldwork I hardly knew a man without a professional driving licence, either acquired before migration, or very recent. Not all of them, however, pursued a driving career right away. But this suddenly became an indispensable asset for everyone with serious intentions to succeed in migration.

Alil was one of those adaptable workers. He has been working in construction in Spain for three years, living there with his wife and young son, when he learned about the change in the regulations. In April 2007 he was one of the first to ask for a one month leave to go back and take the professional drivers' course. He had a work permit from before, so when he came back, he immediately started searching for a new job and by December he was working on a construction site as a concrete-mixer truck driver. He told me, he prefers being a driver, not only because of the better payment, but also because he found it a lighter and easier job, in comparison to construction.

The international lorry drivers were even more in demand and systematically hired. Kemal, the driver who got laid off because he was one week late coming back from Bulgaria, was driving international big lorries between northern Spain and southern France. His new employer had told him that it is almost impossible to find a Spanish driver willing to drive outside Spain, therefore he mostly hired migrants. Interestingly enough, this is one of the few occupations in which migrants, just on the basis of their type of occupation managed to earn more than the Spanish, who only drove during the day and within Navarra. Kemal was driving in a team with his father-in-law, in shifts of 48 hours, with a short break for sleeping in Bordeaux. They only spend the weekends at home in Tafalla with their wives. But the money that they made was worth the sacrifice, Kemal told me. In addition to that, he felt his status has risen in comparison to the

construction site drivers or the regional ones, because of the higher payment (and the bigger lorry). And his father-in-law even told me, he actually preferred this kind of working schedule, because this is what he was used to as an interregional driver in Bulgaria until the early 1990's , which in a way replicated his life style from then. Thus, the international drivers were 'migrants in migration', by taking this specific type of shift migration jobs, which the Spanish did not want.

Another aspect that differentiated drivers from other occupations was the relative general autonomy. Even though recommendations and kin support was important here as in all other employment spheres, drivers also found job completely independently through news paper adds. Quite untypical for the rest of the migrants, this fact alludes to a certain level of formalization of the work and separation from the sphere of the community and the kin. Rumen, another young man who sat the test for professional drivers just before arriving to Spain in the spring of 2007, got regularised as a construction worker and started searching for a driver job in the newspaper adds, while waiting for the approval of his documents. He went to two interviews and got a job as an international lorry driver. Even before he received his official work permit, he was already working for the same employer as an internal driver in his factory without documents. "*Finding a job through an ad, that's what I call the normal wayt,*" Rumen was telling me, sitting in his newly rented flat, "*not like most people here – through someone they know, which is always and uncle or a cousin. And then you get trapped in favours from which you can never get out. Most people here live just like they lived in Brushlyan. But not me…I'll be independent like this and won't owe anything to anyone.*"

As we were chatting in their kitchen where we have gathered for his daughter fifth birthday his phone rang. It was his employer asking him to present himself at the garage immediately and drive overnight to France to pick up some delayed shipment. Rumen made a very sour face, but

137

stood up and left the house within half an hour, even though he had asked explicitly to have the day off to celebrate with his daughter. Other drivers also complained from the disruption in their social and family life due to the long shifts and unexpected calls like the one Rumen got. International lorry drivers would often spend the whole week driving and had only half of the weekend to meet with the rest of their family and friends. The drivers working in factories or on construction sites often had night shifts. While driving was considered a high status occupation, it did interfere with the idea of migration as a family project exactly in this emotional sense.

There were also other structural drawbacks, beyond the social emotional disruptions. The precarious regularity related to the temporary contracts was very tangible with people having their contracts terminated or discontinued unexpectedly quite often. Also, some of the drivers were asked to become self-employed, which did not affect their salaries, but granted them even less security, than the contracted workers had. The short truck drivers' strike in early summer of 2008 was an example for this instability. While none of the migrant drivers took part in the strike, they had to remain idle, because of the blocked roads. This caused serious decrease in their wages for the month, with their employers either terminating temporarily their contracts, or simply not paying for the days in which they did not work. This event draws attention to the more general dependency of lorry drivers on economic downfalls, which became apparent in the subsequent deepening economic crisis, as a result of which many drivers had to change their job temporarily. Thus, the short term contracts and the self-employment mean that employers can transfer unexpected costs caused by the crises or the strike, for example, to the workers by simply discontinuing their work agreements (see for a similar discussion Calavta, chapter 5).

With this example I will close the theme of male employment. Without claiming to have covered all possible aspects, I have tried to highlight the main points characterizing the decisions,

trajectories, strategies of people, and the enabling and disabling sides of the context which conditioned the work experience of male migrants from Brushlyan. Yavor, the successful *autonom* aiming for more than his Spanish colleagues; Djamal, the regularized worker suffering from his new acquired 'equality'; Alil, who tricked his employer into signing a contract only to become a driver later on; mizho Ismet, maneuvering between buffer jobs, Rumen, the international lorry driver with higher status but disrupted social life, and finally mizho Dhevat, who got laid off and never managed to get a good employment after - all these stories do not just offer glimpses into the complexity of migrant labour, but illuminate a complicated web of structures and actions. The structures of regularity, types of contracts, enabling regulations related to EU accession are all framed by the state and its institutions. At the same time, the flexibility of the workers and the inventive mechanisms that they deploy manoeuvring in between the state categories demonstrate a space of creativity and agentic powers, limited but still active. Moreover, this interplay between institutional definitions and individual acts, traceable in the stories I have told, reveals a complex picture of the migrant, who is neither just a pawn of structural forces, nor the sole conductor of his own life. The question of citizenship, as acts of participation and equality, then, can be translated into everyday employment moves and decisions, and the motivations behind them.

4.5. Frames of comparison: the changing significant others in labour

This last question brings us back to the issue of comparison. The accusation of the Spanish being lazy kept coming up in various conversations from discussing the working hours of the institutions, through the wide-spread siesta and the number of public holidays, to the refusal to do

extra-hours. However, the underlying implications of these accusations were connected to broader issues of money and life aspirations, leading ultimately to the question of what is the fundamental goal of being a migrant and what are the acceptable conditions for remaining a migrant. Here, as it is often the case, the comparison revealed much more about the migrants themselves than about the Spanish. In a conversation about strategies of saving and spending money, related also to the reluctance of the Spanish to work extra-hours, Yavor explained to me, he only came to Spain to make enough money to build a house for himself and his sons, to save some and invest in a small business at home some day. *"I want more than them [the Spanish construction workers]. They just want to cover their everyday expenses, cover their car lease. They don't want anything else from life. And I want to be something more than a simple worker some day. I want to have something bigger and to do something better. That's why I need to work twice as hard as them and earn twice as much money,"* he concluded. Once the opportunity of having wide spread work permits and legal contracts became feasible after 2007, the meaning of equality was redefined from 'being like the Spanish' into 'being able to achieve what we came for'. In this sense, the European citizenship opened up new spaces of empowerment not only practically, but also symbolically.

What has become an easy move from irregularity to regularity opened new practical aspects of possible discontent. The examples of Djamal and Ismet above demonstrated the importance of finding a reliable employer who will be willing to offer a secure position and financial benefits. Another whole area for negotiation, however, were the different types of contracts. Yavor explained that he started with a temporary contract (*temporal)* for a trial period of six months and then another six months, after which he signed a fixed-term contract (*fijo*) for a 3 years period. *Contrato de fijo* was regarded as the best possible contract among migrants, and they erroneously

140

translated it to me as the equivalent of a permanent contract.[51] Yavor took pride in the fact that his employer liked him and trusted him enough to sign a *fijo* with him and gave this as an example of their good relationship. And indeed, very few of the migrants I spoke to were appointed on such contracts. The myriad of possible short-term contracts reinforced the precariousness of migrant labour and made the *fijo* seem as the promised land of security and prosperity, turning the actual permanent contract into an option no one had ever heard of. Moreover, the holders of *fijo* contracts were regarded as particularly successful and were secretly envied. Rumen, a middle-aged construction worker with a worse type of temporary contract (*fin de obra*), which had in fact expired some months ago, said with bitterness: "*I don't know how Yavor managed to get this contract, and I don't see how he is better than me. To start with, I am more experienced…Pure luck, that's what he has, nothing more.*" Thus, the fixed-term contract became a hidden bone of contention within the migrant community. The various possible contracts and the flexibility with which migrants moved between different types will be described separately.

---

[51] While in fact it is a contract for a fixed period of time, no longer than three years.

Chapter 5: Unemployment: Security through Insecurity and the Discourse of the Deserving state

In October 2011 in response to the deepening crisis in Greece the Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov said, "Bulgaria won't pay Greece's bills."[52] To this, he added that "It is not logical for the disciplined countries to pay for the richer non-disciplined ones".[53] These statements triggered a debate over the European Union principles of solidarity. The PM gave a clear message that only those who have deserved it by proper behaviour should rely on help by way of solidarity. In a similar vein, a few months later there was a political outburst in regard to the mandatory health insurance. The Public Health minister, Stefan Konstantinov, suggested applying more serious sanctions to those who did not pay all their contributions, that would involve material fines, including confiscating the debtor's property.[54] A year earlier the Prime Minister commented that this practice should be criminalized and offenders should be sent to jail.[55] What reverberates in these public statements on issues as diverse as state financial support for Greece and healthcare contributions in Bulgaria is a wider political discourse which substitutes the principle of solidarity and redistribution with a direct reciprocity principle that distinguishes between different categories of disciplined and undisciplined citizens (or countries), which respectively turns them into deserving or undeserving. This discourse trickles down to the way "ordinary" people like my informants conceptualize what is good citizenship and what are

---

[52] http://bta.bg/bg/c/IN/id/226325
[53] http://www.blitz.bg/news/article/125674
[54] http://www.24chasa.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=1144470
[55] http://www.trud.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=632229

the proper relations with the state, a view which is based on an individualized contractual principle which qualifies citizens as deserving or undeserving.

This process of reformulating the basis for citizenship is framed in a global tendency of reconfiguring the relationship and the distribution of responsibilities between states, markets, families and individuals for solving social problems (Kingfisher 2002, Pierson 2006). One such issue is how is social security provided and by whom. In recent decades welfare systems have been undergoing transformations in almost all advanced industrial countries with privatization and retrenchment of public services, marketization of healthcare, and new insurance based contractual relations. While these processes take different shapes in different parts of the world, Nikolas Rose (1996) suggests they pose similar questions about the new strategies of governing, which have at their centre discrete and autonomous actors, rather than society as a whole. With the welfare state being a major embodiment of social citizenship, the issue at stake then is how can we transform social rights by individualizing social problems without destabilizing the basis for citizenship and social membership, as Giovanni Procacci (2001) points out. This question is part of a wider process of decoupling of political, civil and social aspects of citizenship (Benhabib 2007), which has resulted in new forms of inclusion and exclusion. On one hand, 'contractualization' and 'marketization' of citizenship threatens to transform growing numbers of rights-bearing citizens into socially excluded and internally rightless and stateless persons (Somers 2008). At the same time, migration opens the possibility for some migrants to enjoy social rights without having formal citizenship and before having political or even civil rights in a peculiar reordering of T. H. Marshall's (1965) model of the evolution of citizenship rights (Glick Schiller and Caglar 2008; Guiraudon 2001). These phenomena reveal a disjuncture between

143

formal status and substantive citizenship rights which becomes particularly salient in migrants'
acts of claim making (Benhabib 2004, Soysal 1994, Isin 1998).

Social security is the site where these processes of reconfigured responsibilities, new
opportunities, and reformulated conceptualizations come to the fore. In this chapter I use the case
of unemployment to unpack the tensions and openings between formal status and substantive
rights and the way these statuses and rights are enacted, while at the same time I look at the
discussions that unemployment triggers of what does it mean to be a good citizen and what is the
proper relationship with the state. The link between social security and social citizenship is a
straightforward one: A paragraph on the link between social security and social citizenship. Not
too long, because the main discussion is in the theoretical chapter.

This chapter is framed within a broad understanding of social citizenship as the „the moral and
performative dimensions of membership which define the meanings and practices of belonging to
society." (Holsten and Appadurai 1999:4). Following Isin et al (2008) I focus on the process-
oriented character of citizenship. I approach social citizenship both as a set of rights and
entitlements (i.e. status), and as the enactment and lived experience of these rights and
entitlements (i.e. practice), which are in a dialectical relationship (Lister 1998).

I approach unemployment at three analytical levels: as a status, as a practice and as a discourse. I
explore the institutional openings and closures that my informants experience as migrants,
workers, and members of the European Union by looking at the particular conditions for
receiving unemployment benefits in Spain. At a second level I analyse how migrants enact this
status and how do they mobilize the entitlements coming along with the status in Spain, and the
lack thereof in Bulgaria. These practices of unemployment then trigger discourses which go

beyond concrete status conditions and strategies of achieving it to describe the emerging idea of a deserving citizen, of proper relations with the state, and of the good state. Therefore, I look both at people's practical manoeuvres and the way they make sense and interpret their actions in the larger framework of interacting with the state. Thus I analyse social security as a site where people position themselves in different ways vis-à-vis the state by using different social benefits, by paying taxes and welfare contributions, by registering in different statuses (like maternity, unemployment, sick leave etc), and even by circumventing welfare by informal support mechanisms etc. By doing this they also craft conceptualisations of the good state as caring and responsible by comparing the actual practices of the Bulgarian and the Spanish state and their institutions. At the same time they develop a view of themselves as claim makers and entitled (or disentitled) members of a community of citizens, which is divided between Bulgaria and Spain. The discourse of the caring and responsible state develops along with ideas of deservedness, rights and obligations. These conceptualisations are often contradictory and interwoven with tensions. Thus, the two themes that I follow throughout the chapter are what are the conceptualisations of the good state and the good citizen, and how these conceptualizations are linked with concrete practices and interactions with welfare institutions and social security policies.

By exploring two ways of being unemployed – in Brushlyan and in Tafalla – I show how people accommodate and act upon this status in different institutional contexts. Unemployment is a site where people interact with the state through making use of social security. Migrants in Spain and workers in Bulgaria develop different strategies of manipulating what the state offers them and they interpret in different ways what the state owes them. This respectively triggers different views on the state as caring or negligent. It also opens the discussion of rights and entitlements

coupled with obligations which regular employment involves in terms of contributions and taxes. In this sense, unemployment is a site where we can clearly see the process of claim making towards the state, both from people with and without formal citizenship status. Moreover Spain and Bulgaria do not operate as purely separate spaces, in which people develop different institutionally contextualized views of the state and of themselves. On the contrary, opinions, view and experiences are constantly flowing back and forth between migrants and non-migrants. Thus comparisons of the two states inform people's views and underlie various imaginings of the ideal state.

5.1. Spain: the security of unemployment and how to be a deserving citizen.

Unemployment is often understood understand as a negative experience of having no job and of being endangered of having little or no means of living. But the status of being unemployed only becomes institutionally meaningful if coupled with its opposite – being employed. These two statuses exist in the framework of regularised and institutionalised work. Being employed is not the same thing as working, as being unemployed does not equal not working. Work can involve irregular and non-contractual activities, including care work for example. From a policy perspective employment and unemployment, on the other hand, are categories that attach the person to a web of institutionally devised rules and regulations of the labour market and of the welfare state. Being unemployed then means to be registered as such in the respective agency, and to be liable to some form of unemployment benefits. The link between unemployment and regularity becomes particularly salient in the context of migration. Migrants who have just

146

arrived to Spain and are without jobs do not qualify as unemployed, neither do those who were working irregularly and lost their jobs. At the same time, people registered as unemployed might continue to work on the side, either in Bulgaria or in Spain. For this reason, in the following section I explore unemployment not as a state of being without work, but as a position vis-à-vis the (welfare) state.

5.1.1. Boril – between two institutional context and three jobs

Towards the end of my fieldwork in Spain I was sharing a flat with a migrant family in Pamplona. The previous tenant of the flat came to visit for a few days. Boril, as he presented himself to me[56], was sitting in the living room going through his post, showing me proudly monthly phone bills for 300 euro. He has arrived from Bulgaria with a minibus and he was searching for a small car to buy and drive back. The car was ordered by a friend of his in Bulgaria. He was supposed to buy the car and drive back to Bulgaria, delivering it to his friend and making some profit. He had bought four other second hand cars during his stay in Spain and had already sent them to Bulgaria with a car truck. At first I thought this is his fulltime business, as it was the case with many small entrepreneurs delivering second hand cars from Germany and other Western European countries. But it was not. Since he left Spain four months ago he had lived and worked in Bulgaria as a Ministry[57] civil servant on a permanent contract. Simultaneously, however, he was registered as unemployed in Spain and was receiving *el paro*, (unemployment benefits). This was the reason he was in Spain. Every three months he had to sign in the unemployment register office that he is not employed yet in order to continue

---

[56] Boril was his Bulgarian name which he used talking to me, but also under which he was known in Spain and in Sofia. Within the Brushlyanian community he was known with his Muslim name. I respect here his desire to be referred to by me with his Bulgaria name.

[57] I will not refer to the exact Ministry for anonymity reasons.

receiving his benefits. And so, the second hand car business was really a side job for him to 'not waste his time travelling back and forth for nothing'.

Boril was one of the pioneer migrants from Brushlyan. He arrived in Spain in 2000 and got regularised soon after in the campaign of 2001. He had been working regularly on different types of contracts for almost 7 years starting in Tafalla and moving later to Pamplona. For this period he had accumulated 23 months of unemployment benefits. Regularized workers with contracts who pay taxes and social security contributions accumulate 3.5 months of unemployment benefits for each year of service. The maximum period for which one can be on the dole and based on prior salary is two years. So when Boril approached the seven year period beyond which he would not receive any extra benefits, he decided to interrupt his stay in Spain, to register as unemployed and return to Bulgaria. He asked his employer to lay him off, in a way in which he would be eligible for the unemployment benefits, which equalled 90 per cent of his base salary (*nomina*) or about 1200 euro. He took his wife and two teenage daughters with him and settled in Sofia, where he used to live before. Using his old contacts he managed to get a job in the Ministry unit where he used to work before. His wife remained registered as residing permanently in Spain while living in Sofia with Boril.

Boril thought of this move in the language of deservedness . "Well, you see, Neda, I have worked hard for seven years in Spain, and I had paid all the taxes and the social contributions. When you are 'legal' you have no choice, you pay everything, they just take it from your salary. And it's a lot, it was 500 euro every month. So now I registered as unemployed and I'm taking this money back, cause the state owes it to me." For Boril being on the dole meant taking back what he deserved as a diligent worker and taxpayer. Unemployment then was not a precarious status for which the system of social security provided a safety net. Unemployment for Boril was a way to

"get even", as he phrased it, with the state. In this sense, unemployment was deliberately chosen and mobilized as a resource. This was the case with many other migrants who were registered as unemployed in Spain. Combining this with a state job in Bulgaria did not seem a contradiction in terms. "These are different states, so it's not like I'm taking the benefits and the salary from the same place. And anyway, from Spain I get what I deserved and in Bulgaria I get my salary for my work. Nothing is a present here," he smiled. Social security in the sense of unemployment benefits has to be deserved first and capitalized afterwards. This view was shared among many of the migrants in Spain and it had further implications for their conceptualizations of their relations with the state, as I will shortly discuss.

In his ability to manipulate two state systems and combine three types of income across borders Boril was both an exception and the rule. Indeed, there was no other migrant who managed to be simultaneously on the dole in Spain and with a state contract in Bulgaria, while having informal business on the side. He was also one of the very few people from Brushlyan who migrated internally to Sofia prior migrating to Spain. But at the same time mobilizing unemployment as a resource was a common practice among migrants. Boril's entrepreneurial spirit was regarded as something which most people aspired to, both in the migrant community and back in the village. An exception as he might be, Boril was generally thought of as a example of a successful migrant. "Ah, Boril, he knows how to use the system. But he's also hardworking and follows the rules. And then he takes what he deserves. That's what we should all learn – how to pay when we have to pay, but then take what we're entitled to," my host in Pamplona told me framing this in the language of rights and obligations. In this sense, Boril was regarded not just a model migrant, but also as a model citizen. Being employed as a regular worker, paying taxes and social

contributions meant he had fulfilled his obligations towards the Spanish state, which then gave him the right to use the unemployment benefits.

5.1.2. Capitalizing unemployment – a safety net and an alternative source of income

Long term planned unemployment was a wide spread phenomenon among the older/pioneer migrants who got regularised in the early campaigns and had accumulated at least a year of unemployment benefits. This was not really regarded by them as unemployment, but rather as an alternative form of income and security. In fact, no one ever referred to this state as unemployment. Instead people used the Spanish word for benefits – *el paro.* As opposed to the Bulgarian *bezraboten* (workless), which they used for someone who has lost their job unwillingly, *el paro* was used to emphasise the aspect of receiving benefits. So *bezraboten* was considered as a passive condition in which one finds himself*,* while being on *paro* is a choice and involves active decision making. Boril expressed it with the following words: "I was never in trouble with my job, my boss liked me, and I could have still been working there if I wanted to. I wasn't laid off. I chose to be laid off in order to get the paro." In this sense, being unemployed in the case of these older migrants is not a fate, it is a choice to enter a different status vis-à-vis the state.

The status of being unemployed allowed migrants to capitalize what they have invested in the Spanish state. The contractual nature of the relationship with the state is conceived as reciprocal, but also temporary. Migrants have 'invested' in the state by paying taxes and contributions and expect something in return. But this was additionally framed in a language of future insecurities coming from their partial citizenship status and the temporariness of their migration plans. When

I asked him whether any of his Spanish colleagues use their potential unemployment benefits in a similar way, Boril responded: "The Spanish doesn't do this. He works all his life, and only uses the paro if he really gets fired. But he's at home here. And he'll be taken care of in one way or another by the state, whether when he gets sick, or when he retires. We are here for a short time, who knows for how long there will be work for us and whether we'll ever get pensions. Now it's good for us, also with being in EU, but who knows how long this will last. If I don't take this money back now, I'll just lose it." For Boril, then, not being a Spanish citizen meant he cannot enjoy the imagined long-term security and the promise of a future care, which the state provides for its own citizens. Hence, he felt the need to periodically cash in his benefits as a sort of dual enactment of conceived contract with the state.

The realization of their partial membership in Spain was a recurrent theme among migrants, even among the long-term well established ones and it was one reason for them to long for a return. The *paro* was an opportunity to take a break from migrant life and try a life back in Bulgaria - a trial return migration with the safety net of unemployment money. There were several examples of migrants who returned to Bulgaria to settle down in their houses in Brushlyan. Like Boril, they took their whole families and found a job, typically in construction in the region. Those who had previous construction experience from Spain often managed to get a master builder (*maystor*), rather than an unskilled worker (*obsht rabotnik*), which secured them a higher pay. Thus, combining the *paro* money (usually about 1000 euro) with a net salary of another 600 to 700 euro (1200-1500 leva for a master builder) they got a monthly income way above the average for Bulgaria.[58] Unlike Boril, none of the migrants worked regularly. In this way, they received the net

---

[58] The construction jobs were mostly in the region of Bansko, a fast-expanding ski-resort about 80 km away from Brushlyan. Whereas these jobs provided very good income, they could not grant a long-term security in any way. First, the resort had only a limited spread out capacity. Return migrants came back for the peak in construction, but slowly the jobs got less and less. In addition, the financial crisis started affecting Bulgaria, and especially the construction industry, as well. The flourishing life – combing unemployment benefits and wages – did not last long.

wage without tax or social security deductions. In addition, as all other migrants, the returnees had invested in village houses or town apartments, where now they could comfortably live.

Planned unemployment is a family project, just as employment is, even if it is triggered by men. It was indeed men who were in a position to claim unemployment benefits, but they took their spouses and children with them to Bulgaria, securing financial support to the whole family through their benefits and work. Grown up children who have been working in Spain, were sometimes left there to live independently. The most usual scenario for women was to give up their often part-time irregular jobs in Spain and start working in one of the sewing shops in Brushlyan. Living in their own renovated houses and having jobs which paid well created a sense of stability in their lives in Bulgaria which they lacked prior migration. Mehmed, a friend of Boril, who had been on *paro* for 6 months and had settled back in Bulgaria explained this feeling as a sign for accomplishing the migration project. They have gathered enough money to build a house for their son, and to expand and refurnish their own house, they still had savings, and they both had jobs back in the village, where they also had relatives and friends. Their two sons were married and had been working in Spain. He saw a return to Spain only in case his sons needed them for grandchildren care assistance or if he lost his job in Bulgaria. For him the *paro* was the closure of his relationship with Spain. "It's true that the job in Spain paid better, but life was worse there. And now we don't need to save money, we need money just for the everyday expenses. And we don't need much. We have lived modestly before, we will do it again. "

The fact that a tentative return to Bulgaria was even considered, let alone realized (accomplished), signifies a turning point in migrants' conceptualizations of Bulgaria The EU accession in 2007 was discussed as a symbolic sign for the improvement of the situation. What

By 2010 many of the return migrants were back in the village, considering local stone tiling jobs.

seemed as a land of no opportunities has become a feasible place for return. "Europe wouldn't have taken us, if the situation hadn't improved. That's why I want to see how it is now. Whether we can really make money and have a normal life back here. If yes, then we're not going back to Spain," Mehmed said. Bulgaria has become part of the same European space, which until then was referred to as the West, i.e. the developed, prosperous world. Europe did not only mean an upgrade in Bulgaria's status, but it also provided a common space for weaving life projects. The freedom of mobility and labour which the newly acquired European citizenship granted them, suddenly made migrants much more flexible in their future plans of (temporary) return. In the case of the voluntarily unemployed these plans were carried out. And even though they were not such a substantial number, their act of settling back home was taken as a prognosis by other migrants. By being pioneers in Spain they have paved the way for migration. Now, they were maybe paving the way for return migration, other migrants were saying.

The theme of Europe was consequential not just on a conceptual level. The practical opportunities which the new EU citizenship granted to Bulgarian migrants stimulated a new way of acting upon space, both in geographic and in economic and political sense. The borderless freedom of movement, the cheaper and easier travelling, and the lack of residence control allowed returnees to be simultaneously incorporated in Spain and in Bulgaria. (REFERENCE) These semi-return migrants kept being part of the Spanish social security system not just through the unemployment benefits, but through all that their status entailed – access to free healthcare, opportunities for trainings, chances for finding a new job in Spain, keeping a social network of professional contacts. At the same time, they were incorporated in the Bulgarian labour market, albeit informally, and have quickly reconstructed their social network of relatives and friends which supported them through all stages of settling back. In this sense, simultaneous

153

incorporation provided two modes of security - the formal welfare social security in Spain and the informal security of kith and kin in Bulgaria. The accomplished migration project of Mehmed, then, was not as accomplished and permanent. The door to Spain was kept open wider than he cared to admit.

Through entering the seemingly insecure status of unemployed, migrants are in fact weaving a safety net. Paradoxically, then, unemployment is utilized not just as an alternative form of income, but also as a security strategy.[59] In Bulgaria, however, they remain outside the welfare system. By virtue of working irregularly, they were not paying taxes or social contributions. This placed them in a position of invisibility vis-à-vis the Bulgarian state. One of the reasons for working irregularly they were afraid of being caught for violating the unemployment regulations in Spain, which required them to announce any additional income or indeed employment they might have. Another reason, however, was more conceptually grounded in how they felt about the way the Bulgarian state was treating them. Even Mehmed, who saw his migration experience as coming to an end, had a bitter view. I was accompanying him on his weekly commute back to the village from his construction job in the nearby ski resort. We were driving through the centre of Gotse Deltchev when he pointed to the municipality building and said angrily:

"These people there, this whole institution – they're useless. The state here is nothing. There is no state in the whole region here. We've been abandoned for years. The Spanish state is taking care of us with the paro, and the healthcare, and the UGT. And what does Bulgaria for me? Nothing! Why pay taxes, if I won't get anything in return, anything – no proper healthcare, no proper pension, no jobs, no security [from crimes]. And that's absurd, if you think about it – we're at home here, and guests there. But who takes more care of us? That's why we went to Spain in the

---

[59] With the emerging financial crisis at the end of my fieldwork, the cases of people going into such voluntary unemployment and returning to Bulgaria started growing.

154

first place, because no one cares for us here… So I'll stay registered in Spain for as long as I can and will work here just for the money. The taxes that I could pay, they will vanish, just vanish…"

Mehmed's words expressed the bitterness of many other migrants and non-migrants alike. The Buglarian state is viewed by him as non caring, non reliable and not worth to be invested in through contributions and taxes. In this sense, he has no trust in the possible contract with the state, because he sees no reciprocity, as he does with the Spanish state. Working irregularly then was not just out of fear for being caught. It was more a sort of resistance/silent protest against the non-caring Bulgarian state.[60] There is a contradiction in Mehmed's views and actions which points to the tensions that many migrants experience. On one hand, he thought of his return as permanent because of the new opportunities in terms of jobs and proper pay – something which he associated with Bulgaria's EU accession. But also because he thought of Bulgaria as his home and was trying to reconstruct his life there after seven years of migrancy. On the other hand, he had no hope or trust in the Bulgarian state per se and wanted to remain connected to the Spanish state as long as possible. In this sense he was circumventing the Bulgarian state upon his return, just as he did when he left. This time, however, with the safety net of the Spanish state. So, while he hoped his return is permanent, he remained in a way dependent on his migrant status.

Migrants refer to the Spanish state as a caring state, but are aware of their partial membership in Spain. At the same time in Bulgaria they circumvent the state and do not rely on it about anything, so, institutionally they do not relate to the state. But there, they feel at home, so, they are members not in a citizenship community, but in a village, kith and kin, etc. Long-term paro is an extreme manifestation of these membership tensions. Conclude with a discussion on simultaneous incorporation – vertical in Spain, horizontal in Bulgaria

---

[60] Reistance or a coping strategy and a way to adapt to the situation???

5.1.3. On formal and informal security: the role of the employers

Planned unemployment was not activated just by established migrants with maximum benefits right, but also by more recent migrants who only take it for a short-term. The short-term planned unemployment resembles the long-term one as a strategy, but is different as a life-project. Young male migrants who have been working regularly for more than a year and have rights to unemployment benefits deliberately step into unemployment. This is an active move and a choice, rather than a passive fall into precariousness, as in the previous examples. The *paro* is mobilized as an alternative form of income for a short term break fro regular employment, which is described in terms of reciprocal relationship with the Spanish state, similar to the way Boril talked of his right to take back what he has invested. But unlike the long-term reliance on *paro* this mode of unemployment does not revolve around the idea of a trial long-term return. Instead it allows temporary intermissions in migration life for fulfilling short practical tasks or duties in Bulgaria: repairing the village house roof, taking a professional driving licence, or preparing and attending a son's wedding. These intermissions end with migrants returning to Spain and resuming the same job.

Enver, my landlord's elder brother, was considering changing his job at the *Fagor* factory in Tafalla and wanted to use some of his accumulated months in *paro* while searching for a new job.

> "I've worked there for three years and a half. I didn't get a raise, I hate the shifts, and I hate these machines. And in the meantime, the construction workers, like my brother, are making much more money than me. So, now, my contract had to be renewed in February, and I decided not to wait anymore. I asked my boss to 'fire' me, he knows how, so that I was eligible for the *paro*. I have the right to receive this money for about a year, but I just want to use 2-3

months until I find something else. And in the meantime, the house in Brushlyan needs repairing, the roof is leaking. We are all in Spain now [the three brothers] and in the summer we're all busy with other things. But why pay someone else for the job, if I can do it myself and get the *paro*, that I anyways should use up at some point if I don't want to lose it. So, now I'm going and when I come back in a month I'll be searching for a new job. But if I don't find anything, I'll just go back to my boss and ask him to rehire me," concluded Enver with a calm tone.

Three months later Enver was back in the *Fagor* factory at the same position. After he returned from Bulgaria, he tried two other jobs – in construction and in another factory in Pamplona – but did not like either of them.[61] He wrapped up his experience with the following words: "If I have to be honest, Neda, I just needed a break. So I took it. This paro is perfect for that. But in the end, all the other options for a job weren't really good. And my boss is a nice fellow and we know each other well. He does this for other people too. They need a longer vacation, they have some business to attend to, but he doesn't make them quit or go in unpaid leave, he arranges the paro for them, and takes them back afterwards."

And indeed, many employers were willing to negotiate such longer leaves through *paro*, often upon the condition that the worker finds a replacement. This was facilitated by the temporary contracts that migrants usually signed, which had to be renewed every year, or terminated for a certain period. In this way employers in fact keep the workers they are satisfied with on the long run, without signing permanent contracts with them. And in addition they also exercise a form of control over the short replacements based on the recommendations and the network of migrants.

---

[61] Russi first worked for his brother Yavor on a construction site, but this was a short term job which did not guarantee security. Then he replaced informally one of his cousins as a truck driver in a VW factory in Pamplona while the cousin was on vacation. He could have applied for a driver job there, but he did not want to commute to Pamplona everyday.

This scheme creates a complicated web of favours which transcends the formal opportunities opened by the welfare system in terms of unemployment. Even though short term planned unemployment is made possible through formal participation in the welfare system, it can only be realized through personal informal connections. Without an employer willing to arrange the short term unemployment for the worker and then to rehire him, this scheme would not have been possible. This creates a feeling of informal indebtedness towards such employers. At the same time, the network of migrants who recommend each other for short term replacements is also a *sine qua non*. In this sense, short term planned unemployment highlights the intertwinement between formal and informal ways of creating security.

5.1.4. Precarity of labour – workers kept in reserve.

The more conventional type of unemployment is also to be found among migrants, even if in smaller numbers. That is, people who have been laid off against their desire or their contracts have not been renewed upon the decision of the employer. In 2007/2008 such cases were rare and often short term decisions for managing a concrete critical event on the part of the employer, rather than a tendency. For example, a small scale construction employer had difficulties obtaining his new permit, therefore he asked his workers to step into *paro* for two months, until he manages the situation. Another example was an *autonom* who did not have enough work for his six workers and had to lay them off until he got a new commission. Since they were on contracts of the type *fin de obra*, all he had to do was discontinue their contracts. Even if not numerous these cases point to a mechanism of controlling workers through keeping them as a reserve. This is made possible by the regular status of the workers and their incorporation in the

welfare system, but would not have been possible without the flexible and temporary contracts that they are employed under.

In June 2008 lorry drivers blocked the roads for several days protesting over diesel prices. Long fuel lines and a shopping panic spread around Spain. The car industry was particularly affected relying on parts supply from other regions which lead to partial suspending of factory operations. One of the affected factories was the VW branch in Pamplona, where Djeka worked on the assembly line. She had a three months temporary contract, which had to be renewed at the end of the month. Together with her Romanian colleagues with similar temporary contracts, Djeka was warned that would the strike disrupt production, her contract will be terminated earlier and she will sent back to the *empressa* (the unemployment office). In the meantime, her husband Alil who worked in another car factory on a *fijo* contract was forced to take his paid leave earlier, even though he had already planned his vacation to Bulgaria for August. Other workers were warned that if the strike were to continue longer, they would be forced to take unpaid leave and eventually be sent on paro. The only workers who remained on a skeleton schedule were the Spanish workers, supervisors and administration, who were on permanent contracts, Djeka and Alil told me, with resentment in their voices.

The strike lasted effectively five days, after which goods supplying went back to normal. Alil had to take two days of vacation and Djeka's contract was not terminated eventually, but she was not paid for the five days in which the factory was idle. While this development was not the worse that they expected, the tension that it triggered was great. It was as if the strike had suddenly unlocked a series of questions and uncertainties, that were kept suppressed. Working with a contract stopped being equivalent to security. The opportunity of getting *paro* transformed from getting even with the state into a threat. Alil kept walking through the flat, rubbing his beard and

saying repeatedly: "We're doomed, all the migrants are doomed. We'll be fired and that would be the end of it. They will only take care of their own." Djeka's worries were more concrete. "If they send me on *paro* now, I'll exhaust the two months that I have the right to, and then I'll have no more security if something similar happens again. And what if they don't renew my contract after this turmoil. This whole insurance thing [she means the social contributions and unemployment benefits] is bullshit. It only makes you think that you have security and you can use it whenever it suits you, like Boril does. But in fact, nothing is certain and I'll have no income and no money to pay the rent, if I get kicked out because of the strike."

Other migrants were affected in similar ways by the strike. The flexibility of their contracts put most migrant workers in a precarious position and allowed employers to shift risks and expenses onto workers. At the same time, the safety net of the welfare security allowed them to keep the workers on hold as a reserve. And indeed, the few acquaintances that experienced such involuntary and short term unemployment waited to be rehired by the same employer, instead of searching for a new job. "If I have to go on *paro*, I'll wait to see if they rehire me. Where will I search for a new job, new contract? It is much more difficult. The strike will be over eventually and I think there is a chance they rehire me," Djeka told me in one of the conversations in these tense days. A construction worker who was on the dole while waiting for his employer to find new commissions reasoned along similar lines: "It is not good to get only 90 per cent of the *nomina*, no extra hours or anything, and no security that you'll get back to work. But if you had good experience with your boss, you wait patiently. If you don't have the *paro*, what would you do? Search for another job immediately. And with the *paro,* you're part of the system and you still have some security, so you wait." In this case, then, the opportunity to be on *paro* was

interpreted on one hand as providing security, but on the other hand as a taming strategy for preventing migrants from searching for other jobs.

"Being part of the system" was something many migrants referred to in regard to unemployment benefits, and to being a regularised worker in general, as the previous chapter also demonstrated. The "system" here refers to a general institutionalised framework which provides security through state means, rather than through personal connections. Unemployment then, in all three variations, was considered in terms of practical security. What is more, being registered as unemployed is in fact a sign for inclusion and participation in the welfare system. Whether migrant workers use it as a strategy for simultaneous incorporation and a safety net for a trial return migration, or they use it to deal with some small tasks which require time off, or when it is an actual safety net for losing their jobs, the eligibility for unemployment benefits is a social right, which makes migrants equal to their Spanish colleagues. The state treats them indiscriminately, as long as they are regular workers with contracts. Even though many migrants felt their partial membership compared to the Spanish citizens, they still talked about their relationship with the Spanish state in terms of fairness.

5.1.5. The other side of the contract – the good citizens.

Being "part of the system" has two meanings. On one hand, it signifies having equal benefits rights to the Spanish citizens. Through granting institutional social security, the *paro* signifies incorporation in a community of citizens with equal social rights which do not depend on a formal citizenship status. In this sense, using unemployment benefits is an act of citizenship (Isin and Nielsen 2008) through which migrants construct themselves as claimants of rights. On the other hand, in order to become "part of the system" migrants need the entry point of regular

employment, which provides access to entitlements at the price of paying taxes and contributions. Thus paying taxes is also an act of citizenship which grants inclusion. While these acts are not a direct expression of political will (like voting, protesting or resisting), they nevertheless locate migrants within a community of citizens on equal terms with the Spanish citizens.[62] In this sense, migrants' social citizenship is acquired through regular employment, but it is activated through paying taxes and through receiving benefits.

Even though all regular migrants paid taxes, their understanding of the procedure was limited. Most of them got assistance from UGT for filling the income tax form. One day I was listening to a conversation between two young men at the parking lot in front of Liddle. They were discussing whether they should include their kids' school lunch fee in their income tax form. I wanted to know more, so Ilhan, the younger of the two explained to me: "During the year you get some money taken from your salary, and then at the end you fill this form and say all the expenses that you had during the year - rent and other things. And you also fill in the percent of your salary that you have been putting towards saving. Then they calculate and they tell you how much the state will give you back. Now, I have a 2 percent saving rate, so I only got 200 euro last year back. But it was still saved money, so we bought a camera and a new phone for my wife with it." The other man continued "Mine was 12 percent, but somehow you don't really feel it, you get used to it every month. And it's like putting money in a bank. After I filled the return form, I got back quite a sum – about 1000 euro. Which was really helpful for some renovations on the house in Brushlyan." I listened carefully and suggested that this is like in Bulgaria where one pays a certain percent of his salary for income tax in advance and then after filling the tax return form receives back what was overpaid. But they both were looking at me

---

[62] By using the comparison with Spanish citizens here I do not mean to suggest that all Spanish citizens are positioned equally within the state space.

162

rather puzzled and did not seem to understand what am I talking about. Finally the older one smiled and concluded: "I wouldn't know what you are describing, I've never filled such a thing in Bulgaria."

This short discussion points to two issues. First, taxes were treated as a sort of a saving account, which then the state returns in one way or another, either through reciprocal payment of benefits, or through direct cash return. Second, paying taxes and contributions was something that migrant men started doing for the first time when they got regularized in Spain. For them paying taxes then was directly linked to the experience of regularized work in Spain. Similarly to Yavor who was hiring workers regularly partly because he knew no way to circumvent this, Ilhan was paying taxes because he lacked the local knowledge how to avoid it and not because he believed in a just state mechanism and in the principle of redistribution. Nonetheless, even if the act was involuntary, it was subsequently framed as part of a relationship with the state. Answering my inquisitive questions about the tax declaration in Bulgaria, Ilhan said: "You see, Neda, no one ever pays taxes in Bulgaria. Everyone tries to hide something, and spend all the money straightaway. But that's why things will never get better. Look here, how the civilized people do it, and look at their state. Everyone pays and then the state cares for everyone, when they need it."

Through a process of rationalization and self-justification of his actions Ilhan was juxtaposing himself to the people in Bulgaria, constructing himself as a "good citizen" as opposed to the uncivilized and irresponsible bad citizens. This was further translated into a corresponding opposition of the good and the bed state. Now there is a contradiction in Ihan's opinions on tax paying which was typical for many of my informants. Tax paying was simultaneously a "saving account", it was unavoidable because of the lack of local knowledge, and at the same time, it turned migrants into "good citizens" in comparison to those who do not pay taxes in Bulgaria.

Even though tax paying was not an intentional act towards becoming a "good citizen", it was conceived as such.

Migrants use formal insecurity to create informal security of a different temporal and spatial order. By mobilizing the recourses of unemployment benefits as a reciprocal investment in the state which they withdraw when they need it, they reinterpret the meaning of unemployment itself and turn it into a strategy for a potential secure future somewhere else. By this, in fact they create an insecurity of a new order. Withdrawing their unemployment benefits, they in fact deprive themselves wilfully from the safety net against the actual risk of unemployment. They create a security here-and-now in an entrepreneurial way by manipulating diverse resources from different contexts. But in the long duree of their lives this move in fact opens the possibility of a more large scale insecurity, which is not just individual, but systematic.

This can be interpreted in the framework of general lack of trust in the social institutions of the state, but also, and maybe more importantly in the case of Spain, in the realization of their partial membership. In the process of enacting unemployment in such a way, migrants develop the idea of the deserving citizen, and along with it, the image of the state as caring of this deserving citizen. The deserving citizen is a disciplined side of a reciprocal bilateral contract with the state. Then, a paradox occurs: the Spanish state acts as a strong welfare state in the discussed period, which is visible in this case in the generous unemployment benefits and the little institutional control exercised on how they spend them. But this generous and encompassing welfare state triggers a strong neoliberal view of citizenship, in which the relationship with the state is limited to a reciprocal individual contract, in which the state can ultimately be replaced by any other institution – a bank or a private insurance company for example.

164

***

5.2. Bulgaria: unemployment as a fate and as a critique

While in English (or in Spanish) "work", "job" and "employment" are different concepts, in Bulgarian the word for all three is the same – *rabota*. Respectively, the word for being unemployed is a derivative – *bezraboten* – and literally means 'workless'. This overlapping of terms often leads to linguistic puns: "He counts as unemployed (workless), but he's working his fingers to the bone ("Bezraboten se vodi, ama se skusva ot rabota"). This is what the villagers would jokingly say for a man, working in stone tiling while being registered as unemployed. But the joke has a bitter taste referring to the paradoxical situation in which everyone in the village was working hard in one way or another, but the share of jobless and unemployed men and people working irregularly reached up to 70 percent, according to local estimations. As opposed to migrants' experience where unemployment is an effect of regularisation and incorporation in the welfare system granting security and income, in Bulgaria unemployment is a wider category used to describe insecurity, low wages, and little social services, while simultaneously involving hard work off the record. The contradiction in terms that the joke describes is a contradiction between the official state categories of employment in which people position themselves and the practice of work. As such, it is in fact a critique of the dire economic and social situation of the whole region that drives people into complicated schemes of simultaneous relying on and avoiding the state.

I was sitting with Amet on a chilly winter afternoon in one of the small smoky Brushlyan cafes. He was still with his working clothes, just returned from the main road where he and his brother were tiling stones. In the winter, he explained, they work much less, because of the weather

conditions. Tiling takes place in the open air, just next to the road where the trucks bring the big stones from the nearby slope. During the summer workers spend at least ten hours per day using the good weather. In the winter, if it is not snowing or raining, they only get 3 to 4 hours per day. Amet and his brother do not work for wages. They do not have an employer and they are not bound by contract with anyone. They buy stones, cut them into tiles and sell them to the entrepreneurs. There is no security in this arrangement, but until now there was always a buyer for their produce. He tells me they earn up to 1500 leva (750 euro) per person in the summer months, but in the coldest winter months they sometimes make nothing. In principle they should have been registered as self-employed and paid taxes and social security contributions on the basis of the income they make every month. Instead, he tells me, they are both registered as unemployed and the transactions they make are informal.

The conditions for being registered as unemployed remain unclear to me from my conversation with Amet. The legislation regulating social security, including unemployment, has been changed many times since the early 1990's. Amet only has a limited and instrumental knowledge of his own status at the time of our conversation. He knows he has to register in the regional municipality office in Gotse Delchev once a year and then pay the minimum health insurance contribution every month. Until two years ago he was not registered anywhere. In terms of status vis-à-vis the state he existed neither as a worker, nor as an unemployed. Before he started selling his tiles directly he worked as a waged labourer for the same person. He had no contract and he received his money cash. Prior to the stone tile business he was working random jobs, none of which regular. His registration as unemployed, he tells me, does not provide any cash benefits, but allows him to be part of the health care system by paying the minimum instalment. Through his unemployment status Amet has become part of the welfare system for the first time.

5.2.1. Categories of unemployment and joblessness

The categories of unemployment and joblessness are in fact more complicated than Amet presents it to me. People refer to being "registered as unemployed" to most men in the village, who are working with no permanent contract. What is more, when talking of unemployment in the region in general, villagers and local experts alike, mean all people without regular contracts, i.e. all people with no secure income and limited access to social benefits. Thus, local administration's estimations of unemployment rates are about 20 percent on average, strongly skewed towards men of all ages, among which the rate reaches up to 70-80 percent. At the same time, the official unemployment rate for the municipality is about 7 percent for 2008, which is lower than the average for the region and for the country. (SOURCE) This number, however, reflects only a limited category of non-working people, who have registered as such in the unemployment office (*Buro po truda*), and fulfil a set of conditions.[63] According to a local municipality expert, unemployed people rarely register, because the conditions are too difficult to fulfil, and what they get in exchange is not worth it. "People have to travel up to 35 km at least once a month to sign in the unemployment office. If they are offered a qualification course, they cannot refuse to enrol, so they have to travel every day. This is very expensive and the benefits are rather low, about 100-140 leva[64], so when you put the numbers together, it's simply not worth it. And these courses won't help them find a good job. There are simply no such jobs in the region. All the men have no other choice, but to break their backs with the stones," the young woman in the municipality tells me with a resigned tone.

---

[63] The conditions are to be actively searching for a job, to accept an offered job, even if below the qualifications, to accept public work in some cases, to accept and enrol in qualification and professional courses, and to sign every month in an unemployment office as far as 35 km away. The maximum period for receiving unemployment benefits calculated on the basis of the previous salary is 12 months (for more than 25 years of service!). After that people move into the category of long-term unemployed and start receiving social aid. (SOURCE, Агенция по заетостта или нои).

[64] The minimum unemployment compensation for 2008 is between100 and 200 leva (50-100 euro) (REF)

In addition to the officially unemployed, there are other categories for people who do not work, or more precisely, for people who do not declare any income. For example, "persons on social aid", and "self-insured persons who have not been active" (*samoosiguryavashti se lica, koito ne sa uprazhnyavali deynost*). Amet and most of his co-workers fall into the last category. As such they have to register once a year as self-insured and non-active and confirm they have no income. In this way, they are relieved from all social contributions and taxes, except for health insurance which is 16.80 leva per month (8.60 euro)[65]. Another, even more general and obscure category in which they fit is "persons who are not subject to health insurance on any other grounds" (*lica nepodlezhashti na zdravno osiguryavane na drugo osnovanie po ZOO*) which only refers to their health insurance status. While their position can be subsumed to a category of voluntary unemployment, it is described by the official statistical data through the lens of social insurance rather than through employment. In this way they are not a concern for the State Agency of Employment (*Agencia po zaetostta)* and become visible (and significant) only in the data of the National insurance institute (*Nationalen osiguritelen institute*) by virtue of their insurance status. Thus through complicated and long statistical categories lack of employment remains hidden.

5.2.2. The fate of a region.

Now, let me go back to Amet and the contradictory and overlapping categories operating in his case. He works irregularly, he is registered as self-insured non-active person, he says he is registered as unemployed, and the rest of the villagers and the local administration refer to people like him as actually unemployed. Where does this discrepancy come from? I would like to suggest that the answer is to be found in the varying meanings and interpretations that different

---

[65] This amount is calculated on the basis of the Minimum welfare income (*minimalen osiguritelen dohod)*. It is considered managable even in the village and everybody is willing to pay it.

actors (whether state institutions, statisticians, local administration or village residents) invest in unemployment. From the point of view of the state unemployment rates are measured through the number of those officially registered and fulfilling the conditions. Thus, in a self-celebratory manner, the Agency of employment announces a steady decrease in the unemployment rates in the last years for the region of Gotse Delchev. Not only that this rate does not reflect the actual number of people unable to find employment, but it is also criticized as an administrative, rather than a real tendency.[66] At the same time, local population describes as unemployment the general lack of secure jobs or access to welfare. While young men do work and have some income, this work is insecure, it is low-skilled hard manual labour, and it provides no access to social benefits. In this case then, we can see how state devised statistical categories masque local experience and concerns of lack of secure employment and access to welfare.

Amet is considered neither a hero, nor a villain for tricking the state. He is just one of the many men in Brushlyan working hard to make ends meet. Finding ways to avoid taxes and additional social contributions is regarded as a matter of survival. He has no savings and he cannot accommodate unplanned emergencies or additional spending for house renovations. His income might be higher than the average for the region, but this involves extreme insecurity both in terms of regular income and in terms of future welfare, like pension for example. "You can't rely on this work. You never know what will happen next. They might stop buying the stones, or even worse, stop digging the stones at all. You might injure yourself or just get older and stop being able to do it. It's ok for young people, but what will I do when I grow older? I probably won't even get a proper pension." His worry reflects not only his own uncertain future, but the future of the stone tiling business as it is. The mayor, who also owns a stone tiling company, explained that

---

[66] The numbers were criticized as reflecting the artificial administrative decrease in unemployment rates which was caused by deregistering many people for not fulfilling the conditions (like signing every month, or attending a class), rather than by people actually finding jobs. (add reference from www.dnevnik.bg from desktop)

the business has been flourishing in the last 5-6 years (since 2004), in a highly unregulated manner, which might change any time.[67] Moreover, the recent *decent* wages that Amet and the rest of the young men are making now cannot erase the long period of living in insecurity on the verge of economic and social survival. Tricking the state through hidden employment then, is not about cheating or being cunning, it is a coping strategy, informed by a past fraught with difficulties, poverty, real unemployment, and uncertainty, and by equally uncertain future.

Just like the migrants, Amet treats unemployment as a bilateral contract of reciprocity with the state, but in a negative sense. "The state doesn't give me anything, so I don't give anything back. Does it secure any job for mbe? Does it repair the roads? Does it build the water pipes in Brushlyan? No. So, why should I pay anything back? That's why I register as unemployed." His views are shared by many men working in stone tiling, whether as waged labourers or as self-employed. The mayor and the local administration pretend they are unaware of the many cases like Amet's. "Clearly, we are obliged to pay taxes and register as who knows what – self-employed maybe. If there is a check up, we'll get a solid fine. But they know we're hardly managing to meet both ends here and they just don't check us. If we pay taxes and social contributions and all this we'll just not manage to get by with what we make. And that's clear for everyone. It won't last forever, this situation, but until we can, we'll keep going that way," Amet says with an apologetic face before I managed to ask anything. And indeed, the mayor tells me a few days later that he does not want to know whether the workers work regularly and he will not advise any inspector to go after them: "We'll just lose them. With the high unemployment in the whole region, there are no other jobs for them. They won't have any incentive to stay here, and then really the whole village will have to move to Spain!", he adds with a grim face.

---

[67] The concessions for digging stones form the mountain slopes are not clearly regulated and can be reconsidered at any point, which will change the face of the business altogether, the mayor added.

Being unemployed then means two things for Brushlyani people. On one hand, it is a code for insecurity. "Since all the factories closed down, there has been no work here, no work at all. All men are unemployed, all women work for these small wages, it's like they're unemployed too. Young people are doomed," an old lady tells. Unemployment is a blaming word. Blaming the state which deserted them, blaming employers who are not wiling to employ workers with contracts or pay higher wages. Unemployment is a way to describe entrapment and lack of choice which the structural conditions condemn them to. In this sense, unemployment is used as a proxy to describe the *fate* of the whole region.[68] At the same time, being registered as unemployed (even if in actual terms this is not even the case) signifies a pragmatical *status* vis-à-vis the state, which allows people an entry into the welfare system. In the sense of a status unemployment is stripped of its existential meaning and only refers to the formal meaning of a concrete administrative category. Through the act of registering as not employed the two meanings come to coexist. It is in this act that people objectify their relationship and their image of the state

5.2.3. The constant comparison

 The fear of migration resonating in the mayor's voice reveals a permanent frame of comparison in which both migrants and non-migrants live. "Is it worth it to migrate?", "Is it worth it to stay in Spain?", "Is it worth it to return?" In a context in which half of the population are migrants such questions are pestering everyone: the trial return migrants, the not-yet-settled migrants, the people who boast with their good lives in Brushlyan, the successful migrants. In the course of determining the "worth" people enter in endless discussions of the nature of the two states and of

---

[68] This sense of abandonment by the state has shaped people's experience s of post-socialist transformations in other contexts as well. (see Pine 1998:116, Mihaylova 2006). However, as Rebecca Kay (REF, chapter eight) points out, this picture of withdrawal should not be extrapolated beyond the level of experience. There is no question that a lot of what was previously provided by the state has been lost or has become less reliable, Kay argues referring to Russia, but the state has taken on new responsibilities in order to deal with unprecedented numbers of vulnerable citizens, which the picture of total withdrawal fails to capture. (see also Thelen and Read 2997:9, Thomson 2002)

their own position in them. And unemployment (along with healthcare, which will be discussed next) is an entry point into such discussions. When Amet tells me the state is not providing any security for him, he immediately adds: "Look at the "Spanish" [the migrants in Spain] that return here with their huge unemployment benefits, after just a few years of working there. How can we compare the two states at all? Here no one cares for us, there… the foreign state gives them money just because they gave their labour to its employers." In his words echoes the indignation of Mehmed, the return migrant, who was opposing the two states in a similar manner.

Two images of the state crystallise in these comparisons. These images are constructed through the lens of security and responsibility that the state provides. Through the category of unemployment we can see Spain depicted as a state that cares even for those who are not citizens, by virtue of their contract. The same concept of unemployment reveals an opposite image of Bulgaria – a state that has deserted the region and the people there, by which it has broken its side of the the contract with its citizens and acts in a negligent way. Both Amet and Mehmed articulate this opposition as paradoxical – Bulgaria neglects its own citizens, while Spain cares for migrants even if they only have partial membership there. In this sense, the idealization of Spain as a caring state is used as a critique against Bulgaria.

5.3. The deserving citizens and the deserving state

In this chapter I have discussed unemployment as a strategy for creating security through insecurity. I have demonstrated the discrepancies and overlaps between formal and informal security. Through the lens of the way people interpret social security, I have shown how the conceptualizations of the good citizen have been reconfigured towards the sphere of

deservedness. In Bulgaria unemployment is used as a trope in order to develop a critique towards the Bulgarian state. Ultimately, the contract with the state is perceived and enacted as a a bilateral reciprocal individualized relationship. The critique towards the Bulgarian state develops through comparison with the Spanish state. Thus, the two states are contrasted along the lines of deservedness. But here it is not the citizens who are deserving or not, but the state. Through their contract with the state citizens start having claims towards the state and categorize it as deserving their taxes and proper obligations, or not.

PART III: Kin and Ritual Constructions of a Community

Chapter 6: Transnational ageing carers and the transformations of kinship and citizenship

In spring 2008 Fatme, a woman in her 50s, arrived in Tafalla to take care of her 9-year-old grandson while her daughter worked shifts in a restaurant. Fatme had taken two-month's unpaid leave from a sewing workshop in Bulgaria. Just days after her arrival in Tafalla, Fatme had decided to go to Portugal where her son lived. She looked worried and wondered what to do, while her daughter and son-in-law were rather silent, repeating: *"It's your choice, you have the right to go, it's up to you, we can't decide anything for you."* The son wanted her to help and care for his two teenagers, even though neither really required supervision. He had found her a temporary job in an orchard but the conditions were onerous. Less than a week later Fatme arrived back in Tafalla, because she could not bear the work conditions and realized she is not really needed for care purposes in Portugal. She traveled back the 1000 kilometers only to discover that her daughter had lost her job because she could not find a career for her son and hence no longer needed child care assistance. A week later Fatme resumed her work in the village sewing workshop. Throughout the whole affair she was referred to as the "problematic grandmother" by her relatives.

In the attempt to fulfill her care obligations Fatme is torn between several locations of her transnationally dispersed kin. In this chapter I use the case of ageing migrants like her to look at the ruptures in the lives of ageing people who are in constant movement between contexts, families, and states. These *transnational ageing carers*, as I will refer to them henceforth, include

grandparents who move between their place of origin (which they often call their home) and the places where their children and grandchildren reside (which might be in different houses, different towns, or different countries). Conversely, they may also be middle-aged people based in the destination country who have left their ageing parents at home and consequently have to travel between places to fulfil their care duty towards the older generation. Often, these people are trying to juggle their obligations towards parents and grandchildren at once. These ageing people are the epitome of transnational living, sometimes moving up to five times per year, spending every two months in a different location, in their attempts to fulfil various care obligations.

In what follows I explore how care-triggered migration leads to two interrelated lines of transformations – in kinship and in citizenship. First, I look at the changes in gender and intergenerational kin relations. This involves people's understanding of family composition and family roles, of authority and masculinity, and of duty and shame, all of which are affected in different ways for the different actors in the care network. By looking into these questions, I seek to understand the new models of family relations that emerge and the way these new models affect kin solidarity and reciprocity Second, I focus on reconfigurations of social and economic citizenship. The different categories of migrants – younger or older generation, carers or workers, regularly or irregularly employed – experience different shifts in their citizenship positions. I look at the interdependencies created in this process of gains and disruptions. Ultimately, I argue that transformations in kinship and citizenship generate new forms of inequalities between individuals and generations. What I seek to understand here is how the different actors in this care network experience and reconcile the tensions that arise from these two types of transformations.

6.1. Intersecting migration, age, and care

Migration in later life, albeit a less popular subject of study than youth and mid-life migration, has been approached from different angles. There is a general distinction between older people who migrate for the first time and former labour migrants who have "aged in place" (Warnes and Williams 2006). The way people experience moving at an advanced age is one way to approach the issue (Blakemore 1999, Evergeti and Zontini 2006). The cases vary from UK migrants retiring to Southern European countries (King et al. 2000) to elderly Pakistani women joining their husbands and grown up children in the UK (Gardner 2002). Another direction explores the structural disadvantages (especially in terms of welfare) ageing migrants might face either upon return migration or by staying in the host country (Ackers and Dwyer 2002; Yahirun 2009). Elderly migrants are sometimes categorized as a social problem (Torres 2006), and policy is designed in such a way as to diminish rather than enhance their social security (Ackers 2004; Dwyer and Papadimitriou 2006). As a result, there is a category of circulating migrants, who split their time between countries, trying to reconcile welfare difficulties (Bolzman et al. 2006; Ganga 2006). These approaches raise the pertinent question of being trapped in between or outside welfare systems and the way this affects ageing migrants' social citizenship. None of these studies, however, engages with the type of short-term circulating migration starting at a later age and the implications this has for their own citizenship status.

While most migration studies deal with a very limited category of ageing people in terms of social class or social age (be it British retirees in Spain or elderly grandparents left behind in Bangladesh), there is an analytical tendency to place all ageing people together in one large

homogenous group of "the elderly", "the aged", or "the ageing". At the same time, social psychology and social gerontology have underlined the need to distinguish between different stages of later life and have developed a more refined set of categories (Karp et al. 1982; Warnes 1992). The transition between middle age and old age is contextually sensitive and socially constructed (Gubrium et al. 1994; Hazan 1992; Laz 1998). Moreover, old age itself has stages. One is an ageing person with grandchildren and elderly parents, and the next is a person in need of care. I use the concept *social age group* as a tool for distinguishing the nuances in the expectations, obligations and care patterns among different groups of ageing people. Thus, social age in this case is defined through a position in a care network. I will refer to these two stages of old age as the *young-old* and the *old-old*, loosely based on Neugarten's (1974, 1996) definition[69]. The transnational ageing carers fall in the category of the *young-old*, who need to provide care in two directions – to their parents and to their grandchildren (a kind of a shifted sandwich generation)[70]. In this sense, social age groups overlap with generations bound by care commitments [71].

To understand the case of the transnational ageing carers we need to look at the global transformation of care regimes in relation to migration and age. One way of approaching this is through the category of left-behind parents of younger migrants and the tensions that arise from renegotiated care arrangements and intergenerational reciprocity (Baldassar 2007; Baldock 2000; 2003; Mazzucato 2008; Pyle 2006; van der Geest et al. 2004). Coming from a different

---

[69] Based on research in the urban USA, Neugarten defines the *young old* (55-74 years old) and the *old old* (75 and older). This is too rigid when applied to other contexts, as in the case of the Bulgarian Muslim migrants a much lower age limit would make someone an *old-old*. Thus, the division should take a social constructionist perspective of age rather than a biological understanding.

[70] The term sandwich generation usually denotes middle-aged women who simultaneously work and provide care for both their still-dependent children and their ageing parents. The case here differs since the in-between generation provides care for grandchildren.

[71] "Generation" in this text refers to the narrow sense of a position within a family, which changes over a lifetime from grandchild to grandparent. It does not refer to other meanings like birth cohort, political cohort, or second generation in migration.

perspective, Hochschild (2003) develops the concept of care-drain to describe the phenomenon of immigrant young women providing care in wealthier countries while leaving behind their own families and children. This care gap is usually filled by other female kin, creating a global care-chain (Chamberlain 1997; Lutz 2007; Parrenas 2001). Ageing people can be part of different ends of the care chain. They can be in need of care at home, or cared for by migrants (Andall 2000), demonstrating the difference between caring and care-giving (Baldassar and Baldock 2000). Alternatively, they can be carers themselves for children left behind (Olwig 1999) or for children and older people in the receiving country. What is absent from this range of possibilities, however, is the category of ageing migrants moving between geographic and institutional localities to provide care for different members of their own families. By doing this they move the care-chain itself thus creating new types of tensions in their own lives, and in their relations with the dispersed kin.

Transformations in global care regimes then are tightly related to the globalization of kinship. The concepts of transnational family (Bryson and Vuorela 2002), transnational domestic sphere (Gardner and Grillo 2002), global kin networks (Olwig 2002) or global householding (Peterson 2010) emphasize that families are not discreet geographically or state bound entities, but can be maintained across time and distance. This involves, however, (re)negotiation of commitments, reciprocity and duty, and of practical mechanisms and strategies that are deployed for the reproduction of the family. In Nakano Glenn's (1992) broad definition reproductive labour includes activities that maintain people both on a daily basis and intergenerationally, such as caring for children and adults, preserving community and family ties, and performing household tasks. So not only care-giving, but care-work in general is seen as a form of reproductive labour, as it involves maintaining other people's families and thus contributes to the globalization of

179

social reproduction (Misra et al. 2006; Pérez Orozco 2009). The transnationalization of families then is framed not only by care chains, but also by reproduction chains (cf. Kofman 2012)

Using these conceptual intersections of migration, age, and care I analyse the way migrants make sense and negotiate the disruptions in their citizenship, kinship positions, and their flexibilized lives in general. In this context the broad concepts of kinship and citizenship need to be defined. By kin relations I will refer to all extended family relations, both patrilineal and matrilineal, which are constructed as relatedness by people themselves. The emphasis here is on kinship relations evolving around care obligations and care, but ultimately what is at stake in a temporal perspective is the question of kin reciprocity. What I am interested in then is a set of rules, but also the process of reformulating these rules. In this sense kinship is considered here as processual and dynamic (cf. Carsten 1997). On the other hand, I use the concept of citizenship in a much narrower meaning. In a wider sense I embrace a definition of social citizenship as both rights and entitlements (status) and as their enactment and lived experience (practice), which define the meaning and practices of belonging to society (Holsten and Appadurai 1999; Lister 1998). In this chapter, however, I discuss a very particular and limited manifestation of social citizenship, which is its substantive aspect understood as access and use of welfare entitlements. Hence, I explore how through their moves across borders and states elderly migrants experience inclusion or exclusion from concrete welfare entitlements in Bulgaria, which has further implications for their future.

In what follows I first present the accepted and expected ideal care arrangements in the Bulgarian Muslim village community prior to migration. The last part is devoted to four ethnographic cases which highlight the particular ruptures and transformations in the care arrangements that had been established locally in the village, before transnational migration became common. At the

same time these cases are indicative of the impact that care-triggered migration has on ageing carers' social citizenship. I focus on four different aspects of kin relations – duty and shame, care for free and care for money, choosing between grandchildren and parents, and finally, transformations of masculinity. I conclude with a discussion of the way the family fabric is being transformed by the straining of the ideal care regimes and suggest what the future implications of these transformations might be.

6.2. Why do ageing carers migrate?

Migration as a strategy for achieving economic and social citizenship does not affect all migrants alike. There is a discrepancy between the experience of the young and the elderly migrants. The majority of migrants are young families, while elderly people have started to migrate only recently. At first most men worked as illegal migrants in the sphere of construction, but by 2007 the majority of them already had work permits and were employed under some form of contract which included social benefits. This was not the case with young women, who came to Spain in their capacity as mothers and wives joining their husbands. The majority of them have precarious part-time employment mostly in domestic service and in restaurant/hotel jobs. Not only are these jobs more poorly paid, but they are also irregular, with no contracts or social security. In this sense, migration turned around the social citizenship positions of men and women. While men's main employment in Brushlyan is stone-tiling, which is seasonal, non-contractual and with no social benefits, women largely work in the village sewing workshops with permanent contracts. The decision to migrate deprives women of the security of their, albeit very poorly paid, employment positions, by emphasizing their role in reproducing the family. Ironically, while women do not work full time, their working hours and shifts often extend beyond nursery and

181

school opening hours, which makes it impossible to actually work and have young children without any additional help. Thus, the intergenerational imbalance was causing various informal difficulties, especially with regard to care. Therefore, young migrants started inviting their parents, the *young-old*, to Spain for limited periods of time in order to help with child-rearing and household activities. This second wave of migration of ageing carers aims at restoring the kin support network, which allows the reproduction of the family on Spanish territory.

Whereas migration of young people was considered more permanent from the outset, the transnational ageing carers initiated their mobility as temporary and strictly care-oriented, even though this has often developed into a more long-term practice. The particular migration trajectories take different scenarios. More typically it is women who arrive first for short periods of time to solve a particular care crisis. After a few visits, their husbands might also join, trying to find a temporary job through their children's contacts. This sometimes turns into a long-term solution with both elderly parents moving permanently to Spain. Alternatively, they keep coming for short periods every few months to provide temporary care relief. Another trajectory is when elderly men join the younger generation searching for a job and bring over their wives, once they have settled. In both scenarios, the elderly migrants are a subsidiary group, being in Spain as temporary or permanent assistants to their children. They are thought of and think of themselves as having reached the end of their active lives in terms of career, home building and raising children. Their life plans are not directed towards their own development anymore, but are instead adjusted to their children, arranging plans and movements accordingly. These movements aim at reconstituting the care support network, but at the same time they disrupt in different degrees elderly people's employment and social security in Bulgaria.

Elderly women in Bulgaria, like young ones, are also employed in sewing workshops on a mass scale. In addition, they used to grow tobacco for subsidiary income and often owned a cow for dairy products. Young people's migration first led to a decline in tobacco growing, which became impossible without the assistance of young women. Subsequent care migration further hinders elderly women's economic activities, both by making it impossible to breed any stock, and, more importantly, by endangering their position in the sewing factories. Taking long unpaid leaves or quitting their job affects not only their income, but more importantly, it disrupts their social benefits and future welfare security. Unlike younger women, however, their migration to Spain does not include either employment plans, or possible subsidiary social benefits through their husbands' contracts. Similarly, elderly men who move between Spain and Bulgaria as part of a care scheme experience losses in their social citizenship status in Bulgaria, although not to such an extent. Like younger men, their employment in Bulgaria is precarious – stone tiling, wood cutting, with temporary contracts, if any, and no proper welfare benefits for healthcare, unemployment or pension. By giving up these jobs, however, they risk falling out of a network of colleagues and possible employers, which provided their only security in Bulgaria. In Spain, they remain outside the regularised labour market, even if they take a part-time or hourly job, mostly depending on their sons for these connections. Being normatively a European citizen does not balance these economic and social benefits losses, since EU citizenship bestows social rights on mobile individuals not universally, but conditionally, privileging those in paid (regularised) work (Ackers 2004). As a result, the transnational ageing carers fall into a highly precarious position, losing social citizenship entitlements in Bulgaria, while not gaining anything institutionally in Spain.

6.3. Ideal care regimes

Migration moves of elderly people are not designed to enhance their economic or social citizenship status, but aim to reproduce the family relations existing prior to migration within the confined space of the village and through this to reproduce the family itself. The reproduction of the family is realized through strict care regimes based on reciprocity. Thus, the wellbeing of one part of the family chain guarantees the future wellbeing of the other. The care regimes prior to migration that I delineate below are based on migrants' conceptions and discourses, rather than on observed practices. In this sense, they are the ideal version of actual care relations and are the yardstick against which people measure the ruptures that migration brings about in the fabric of the family. Ideal care regimes then refer to an ideal family, which migration endangers [72].

The norm in the village of Brushlyan is to maintain the patrilocal tradition. Typically, the youngest son remains to live with his wife in the house of his parents, which he will later inherit. Living in the same house, grandparents provide assistance with the upbringing of the children, while at a later age, the daughter-in-law takes over the responsibility of caring for them. In theory, there is no intersection between the care obligations of different kin, but in practice, especially in the case of childcare, often both grandmothers are willing to help. This is facilitated immensely by cohabitation in the same small-scale village space. Moreover, this also allows combining care obligations and employment, tobacco growing and stock breeding. Migration of different family members, then, introduces a challenge to this support scheme.

---

[72] Migration is not the only but the most dramatic and abrupt trigger of ruptures and transformations in family relations. Spatial distance creates new challenges to ideal care regimes, which cannot be overcome the way they are in the confined space of village life.

In the case of caring for the *old-old,* ideally there were two possible scenarios: either people who have migrated and have elderly relatives at home were not the ones responsible for taking care of them or, if the responsibility for care rested with the migrant son, then his wife, the daughter-in-law, stayed behind. If she had already joined her husband and an emergency arose, for example the elderly person suddenly became ill and incapable of taking care of him/herself, then the daughter-in-law would return and remain in Bulgaria for as long as she was needed there. The mechanism of staying behind or temporary return seemed a widespread practice. The other care obligation of the *young-old* was to take care of the grandchildren with migrant parents. Again, there were two mechanisms for fulfilling this. In some cases the children were taken to Spain by their parents, along with the man's mother who would come in the sole capacity of a care provider. The other strategy was to leave the children behind to the care of the grandparents. This was common for the initial stage of migration. Alternatively, children who lived in Spain for some time would be sent back when approaching school age in order to be schooled in Bulgaria. This strategy was framed as a desire for "proper education" and for learning to read and write in Bulgarian. In all these cases the respective grandmother usually quit her job for a certain period of time in order to devote all her time to the grandchildren, whether in Spain or in Bulgaria.

In the above described practices it seems that migration does not violate the traditional care mechanisms. So, if for example the son responsible for caring has migrated with his family, it will be his wife coming back to fulfil her caring duties, even if there were other daughters-in-law living in the village. Similarly, even if the mother of the daughter is already in Spain, it would still be the mother of the son arriving specially from Bulgaria to assist with caring for the grandchildren. Thus, while the daily family life or the employment pattern of the responsible carer is being disrupted, the kin safety net keeps functioning in the same way as prior to

migration. Nevertheless, by scrutinizing individual cases it becomes apparent that the neat structure is in fact starting to go through certain transformations. This will now be illustrated by four ethnographic cases.

6.4. Transformations and disruptions: the young-old in a state of flux

6.4.1. Duty and shame

Alil lives with his wife and son, sharing a flat with his wife's parents in Spain. The grandmother helps with their 3-year-old son when both parents are at work during the week: she picks him up from the school bus and stays with him until her daughter, the mother, returns from work. Alil's wife's only free day is on Wednesday, which leaves their son in need of alternative care over the weekend. However, her mother only takes care of him during the week leaving this duty to Alil over the weekend. For Alil this means to do things that other men would not do: he takes his son to the park and hangs out with mothers and grandmothers there, he goes to visit his sister and nephews in the early afternoon, just as the rest of the *women* with children do, instead of playing cards on Sunday afternoons in the pensioner's club with the other men, or hanging out in the main square café. This undermined his masculinity and his male friends and relatives pity him. When I asked why his mother-in-law did not take care of her grandson over the weekends as well, he explained: "Well, she's busy, she visits her son in Pamplona, or she just has other things to do. She is not obliged to help us after all."

This disruption of traditional gender roles and intergenerational relations only takes place in Spain. When Alil and his wife return to Bulgaria on vacation they all stay in his parents' house.

Alil's masculine authority is only challenged in Spain, and therefore is considered as temporary and easier to accept, even though he has been in Spain for five years now and does not plan to move back to Bulgaria in the near future. The temporary nature of his position leads to a series of complicated semi-transformations of his relations with the rest of the relatives. By helping with their son during the week, his mother-in-law in fact helps her daughter, rather than the family as a whole. By leaving the son to Alil's care over the weekend she underlines the exclusiveness of her help. The longer I stayed in Tafalla, the more I realised that Alil's case was not unique. For various reasons, many men end up living with their parents-in-law in Spain. This leads to a mixing of power relations in which male authority and status roles get confused. Moreover, it creates a complicated web of mutual help and reciprocity issues which did not exist prior to migration.

Over the summer, however, the care scheme required readjustment. Alil's parents-in-law take their vacation in July, while Alil and his wife have their holidays in August. The grandparents are not willing to change their vacation plans, even though they could, while Alil's wife is not allowed to take her vacation earlier than August. Not only do they remain without assistance, but the nursery also does not work in July. This creates a dire need for a full time carer for their son. For two years, the solution was to summon the other grandmother, Alil's mother Zaira, who would stay with them for a month. This eventually led to a disruption both in her daily practices and support mechanisms at home, and in her employment status. She stopped growing tobacco over the summer, sold her cow, and had to take unpaid leave from the sewing factory. This deprived her and her husband of alternative sources of income and food, affected them financially due to receiving one less monthly salary, and disrupted her length of service accumulation for retirement. In addition, she shared with me that she felt uncomfortable in Spain and did not

manage to get used to the everyday routines in Tafalla. But even though being a transnational ageing carer disrupts Zaira's life on several levels, this is regarded as her duty and is considered to be the norm. At the same time Alil's mother-in-law's support during the year is thought of as a favour.

The situation got even more complicated the second summer when Zaira was in Spain. Her daughter, who also lives in Tafalla with her family was pregnant for a second time. She was due in September, so after Alil left for Bulgaria, Zaira decided to stay with her daughter until she gave birth. She moved to her daughter's place and helped with her elder son, but when Alil came back from vacation, she felt obliged to continue helping with his son as well, even though the other grandmother was also already back. For Zaira this meant running from one part of the town to the other four times a day. When I asked why the other grandmother, the mother of the wife, did not take the child to nursery as she usually does, Zaira explained: "Oh, no, how could she, if I am here. It doesn't matter that I live in another house, I am obliged to help my son. What would other people say, if I only helped my daughter? But then, how could I have left my daughter without help. Her own mother-in-law is in Bulgaria… It was difficult; I lost ten kilos from all this running back and forth. But that's what migration does to all of us. It makes our lives more difficult in so many ways."

6.4.2. Care for money, care for free

Ayse, who lives in Spain with her husband, daughter and son-in-law, is a similar example. Her son is also in Spain, but lives in Pamplona. She accompanied her daughter's children to Spain in order to take care of them. The arrangement was that the daughter would pay for her accommodation and food and give her pocket money. However, once Ayse's son who lived in

Pamplona learned that, he decided to bring his two daughters to Spain as well and to leave them in his mother's care. He could not take them to Pamplona, because his and his wife's working schedules did not correspond with the nursery hours. Thus, Ayse's household suddenly increased with four little girls. She was living with her daughter who paid her to take care of her children, but at the same time taking care of her son's children for free in the same household. Like Zaira, Ayse explained that it is her duty to look after her son's children, while taking care of her daughter's children is a favour. This, of course, would not have happened had the daughter's mother-in-law been able to fulfil her own duty to provide child care. But she was ill in Bulgaria and unable to travel.

By coming to Spain more permanently, Ayse changed her status in terms of both her social and her economic security. She had to quit her job in the sewing workshop in Brushlyan and thus she stopped paying any social security contributions. By leaving Bulgaria, Ayse fell out of state produced welfare categories – employed, self-employed, unemployed or on social aid. She did not have the needed length of service for retirement, and depending on when and whether she goes back to Bulgaria, she will either have to make up for the years she had missed in Spain, or 'buy' them through a substantial contribution tax[73]. And even in this case, her pension will probably remain the minimum one, which for the time being is below the poverty line for the country[74]. At the same time, by not being officially employed in Spain, she did not figure in any of the welfare state categories and thus had no right for social insurance there either.

---

[73] Women in Ayse's position would usually have pension slightly higher than the minimum. But it also involves free healthcare, which is especially important when it comes to serious interventions like operations which cost up to 4000 euro at present

[74] At present the minimum pension is 136 leva per month (about 70 euro), and the poverty line for Bulgaria for 2010 is estimated at 211 leva per month (105 euro).
(http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2010/02/11/856711_minimalnata_pensiia_moje_da_se_povishi/)

Ayse also had to discontinue her other daily practices like growing tobacco, having a cow and chickens, and growing vegetables in the garden of her house. Apart from the additional financial insecurity that these changes triggered, this also disrupted her habitual daily routines. In between preparing and picking up the children from nursery, she complained: "If only I had a little garden here, to sow some potatoes, some peppers, tomatoes… this would have helped. Never would I have thought that I wouldn't be able to grow at least some of my food. I am stuck in this house all day long, with my only walks to the school and to the park. And soon the girls will grow, and they won't need me here anymore. I'll have to return home – no job, no pension, no garden, no cow… But it's all for the children." Being a transnational ageing carer, then, involves interrupting the entitlements which are related to social citizenship at home, but are not available in Spain due to the unfavourable position of migrant carers. It also means discontinuing other forms of security like stock breeding, tobacco growing or having a garden. At the same time, it also triggers emotional frustration, which is balanced with a feeling of fulfilled duty.

Ayse's sole task in Spain is to maintain the reproduction of her children's families at the expense of any kind of security she had at home. This leaves her facing a future where she will not rely on any state support, but only on the reciprocity arrangement with her son and daughter. In this sense, there is a move from welfare to kinfare, in which Ayse has to circumvent the state remaining dependent solely on her kin[75]. But kinfare, in this case, might turn out to be very unclear. The simultaneous care she provides both for her son's and for her daughter's children blurs the kin reciprocity scheme. The financial compensation by the daughter is regarded as almost symbolic. In addition, it does not neutralize the new emotional attachments created by

---

[75] Zaira's husband quit his logging job in Bulgaria too, which has also deprived him of social benefits at home. And even though he does not work in Spain with a contract yet, he has chances of finding a regularised job through the migrants' network. Thus, there is an apparent gender divide which puts elderly migrant women in a much more precarious position.

these arrangements, which put Ayse in a closer relationship with her daughter's family than with her son's. This opens new insecurities in terms of reciprocity. "In principle it should be my son supporting us in the future, but I grew very close to my daughter's whole family, and also what I'm doing for them here cannot be compensated just by the small money they give me. And then my son might say – "I don't have to do it, I don't owe you anything". And then if my daughter doesn't want me too, I'll be left with no one to care for me", Ayse tells me with a worried face.

In both Ayse's and Zaira's stories the main motivation is a combination of duty and shame, expressed in the *"what would other people say"* phrase. Thus reciprocity and public shame are the two leading social forces behind kin relations. This also entails a well-established concept of what it means to be a "proper mother/grandmother/daughter-in-law" or "proper man". Variation from the model leads to disharmony. However, with migration relationships become more flexible: grandmothers start taking care of their daughters' children, men start living with their wives' parents. While things are not completely transformed and the "old" habits and manners are still influential, new agreements come into force to address new situations. Thus, even though the care arrangements are transformed, these transformations are inevitably cast away as temporary or shameful, or are partially circumvented through complicated adjustments. Nevertheless, the flexibilization of kin relations due to migration and the simultaneous citizenship transformations, which encapsulate ageing women into the kin safety net, pose a paradox. Elderly people increasingly choose to rely on their kin for future security, not only in terms of care, but also in terms of general support, including healthcare and pension, while at the same time the reciprocity regime gets loosened and more complex.

6.4.3. Choosing between parents and children

The other end of the care chain is the care of the *old-old*. The case of Dordana provides an example of a subtle change in the prescribed care arrangements. Her husband is the youngest brother of three boys, and the penultimate child of five children altogether. So, following the tradition, he will be the one to inherit the parents' house and also the one responsible for caring for them. His two elder brothers are also in Spain with their wives and children, while his two sisters live in Brushlyan. Dordana was living in Spain with her husband and her two young sons (19 and 24) for over a year, taking care of the household and working part-time in a restaurant. In the summer of 2007, while on vacation in Bulgaria, her elder son got married and took his wife to Spain. In the meantime, Dordana's father-in-law became very ill and could no longer live on his own. His other two sons were in Spain and he was living all by himself. The solution was that Dordana would stay behind. She immediately started working in one of the sewing workshops in the village, while her sons and husband continued living in Spain. The two sisters of her husband, though not living far away, did not offer any assistance. They belonged to other kin now with other care arrangements. Thus, as a *young-old* carer, Dordana had to choose her father-in-law over her husband and sons for a certain period of time.

About a year later the situation changed. Dordana's new daughter-in-law became pregnant. This led to a minor crisis. If all family members were in the same physical place, it would have been easy for Dordana to combine helping her daughter-in-law with taking care of her ageing father-in-law. However, the distance triggered the need for change, which engendered complications in the extended family relations. Since the young wife was about to give birth in Spain, Dordana decided to go back at the last moment and to leave her father-in-law in the care of his own

daughters. This was settled with a lot of reluctance and arguments. I was told by various family members that to offer money in exchange for care was out of the question and would ruin the concept of a family. But at the same time it was not very clear to the members of the dispute how they could solve the imbalance in the care arrangements. When I asked why the mother of the young bride did not go to Spain for a while to assist with the baby, everybody told me that she had her son's son to take care of and that, anyway, it would be highly inappropriate. In this sense, not all transformations in the care arrangements are possible. The relation between Dordana and the young daughter-in-law had yet to be established, and could not be violated, while the agreement between the ageing brothers and sisters over the care of their father turned out to be less rigid.

The case of Dordana demonstrates a typical transnational grandmother who has to divide her care between the elderly left behind and the new grandchildren. In this way, she becomes a person without a permanent abode, without permanent employment or a permanent everyday routine. As in the other two cases, her care-motivated mobility to and fro hampers her social and citizenship status in both locations. While she managed to work in both places, the economic benefits of these jobs were minimal and social welfare was nonexistent. In both places she worked with no contracts and no social benefits, knowing that each job was temporary and dependent upon where she will be needed next in the care chain. While her husband enjoyed relative stability in Spain, she experienced a highly flexible life full of insecurities. This gender imbalance is typical for the case of the ageing migrants with care being regarded as mostly a female duty.

6.4.4. Transnational grandfathers

Care migration among Bulgarian Muslims is predominantly female, as in the above examples, but with the growing demand for carers in Spain, a new category has emerged – transnational grandfathers. They are *young-old* men who travel to Spain for short periods of time with to assist their daughters with child care. They are supposed to fill the care gaps when the respective grandmother (mother of the son) is hindered. Paradoxically, grandfathers' performing care tasks in Spain for their daughters is considered as less shameful than situations in which the 'wrong' grandmother is doing the care work. Men are rarely involved in care work at home and so their coming to Spain is qualified as extraordinary, a one-off crisis solution, rather than an actual break in the ideal care regime. This is how Zaira's husband, Mehmed, arrived in Tafalla in early October to help with childcare, so that his daughter could work as a replacement in a restaurant for a couple of months. She herself did not formulate his visit as care assistance, but rather said that he is there as a guest to see Spain, and would maybe help a bit, if he had the desire to do it. She only managed to work in the restaurant for a week before her younger son got the flu and she had to quit and stay home with him. In the meantime, her father continued living with them for another two months, in case she managed to find a new job. She did not, and he was back in Bulgaria before New Year's.

Transnational grandfathers' migration is initially care motivated, but rarely ends up as such, as the example of Mehmed suggests. Instead, all the grandfathers I knew in Tafalla had taken up some temporary employment in agriculture or construction. Mehmed worked for a few days in agriculture picking grapes. Then he replaced his younger son who took a vacation from his construction job for two weeks, and worked with his son-in-law, again in construction, for

194

another month. Even when a grandfather manages to help with childcare, it is often minor tasks like picking up the children from school. As a result, the daughters remain in the main care-taking position, without an opportunity to take a more demanding job. Most people mobilize the concept of shame to explain these moves between care and employment. For women the concept of shame comes from failing to fulfil their care obligations, while men experience shame as a result by stepping out of their traditional male role. By taking care of grandchildren, they not only take up a female obligation, but also give up their role as bread-winners. Through his short-term jobs Mehmed managed to make his own 'money for coffee and cigarettes' and to pay for his fare back. In this way he felt independent. Before that he did not feel comfortable going out to meet with his co-villagers, because he had to ask his daughter for money. Clearly, his temporary job reinstates him in the 'proper' position, somewhat normalizing his kin relations.

Money, however, is not the only problem in this arrangement. Living with a daughter also means living with a son-in-law, who acts as the head of the household. While a father has authority over his son, his son-in-law is out of his reach. Transnational grandfathers are long-term guests who have no say in the family matters. This downgraded status is always experienced as traumatic. Moreover, younger men adapt easily to life abroad and gain new life skills that are not transmitted to the older generations. This leaves the elderly in a dependent position[76]. Ageing men experience this as disturbing, especially if they depend not on their own sons but on their sons-in-law. "It confuses me, I do not feel knowledgeable enough, experienced enough to advise them. They [the younger ones] have to advise me. This is not normal. And if only it was my own sons telling me what to do. But that is not the case. Not that I dislike my son-in-law, but it simply seems wrong," said Mehmed, expressing the view of many other men in a similar situation.

---

[76] see Gardner (2002) for a similar pattern of undermined male authority among Bengali elders in London.

195

Care migration affects grandfathers' lives at home as well. Mehmed had sacrificed his stable and well paid job as a forester to come to Spain, where he held a series of dubious jobs. He did not save much money from his trip, and he did not plan to come back for a longer stay in search of a better job. His two-month trip, however, has cost him the money for his social security contribution, including the employer's share, amounting to 300 leva (150 euro) altogether (with his monthly salary being a little over 500 leva). Since he did not want to have his welfare rights interrupted because of his absence, he arranged with his employer to pay all the taxes, as if he was working. What he earned in Spain, he paid for social security in Bulgaria. Luckily, he managed to go back to his old job. But not everyone was so lucky, and many grandfathers found themselves jobless upon their return. Moreover, these short visits to Spain became a routine for quite a few grandfathers. In this way, even if they managed to keep their jobs in Bulgaria, they had to constantly invest substantial amounts of money in order to have their social citizenship rights uninterrupted. As in the case of the grandmothers then, grandfathers sacrificed their own stability in terms of social and economic security, in order to attempt to help their children in Spain. Even though for most of them it did not work out as planned, the consequences were all the same.

6.5. New inequalities, new insecurities

Care arrangements are kept within the boundaries of the extended family and follow a complex scheme of reciprocity and obligations. Through cases of transnational ageing carers I have tried to demonstrate how migration strains these strict regimes of care demanding creativity and new adjustments. This, however, often involves violation and ruptures in the kin relations. New care

regimes are emerging, often as a response to a moment of crisis and conceived as a temporary solution. A son-in-law temporarily becomes part of his wife's family, a daughter agrees to care for her ageing father, a grandmother assists her daughter with childcare, a grandfather shares care and authority with his son-in-law, a woman struggles to choose between a dying father-in-law and a new-born grandchild – all these cases represent a rupture in the family fabric and a new care mechanism. In this sense, the very existence of the transnational ageing carers as a category of practice is simultaneously defined by and instrumental for these transformations.

Along with triggering a reformulation of gender and intergenerational relations in the family, transnational migration also generates transformations in the realm of social citizenship entitlements. The transnational care practices of the *young-old* are facilitated by a certain regime of EU mobility and enable their children's economic advancement. At the same time this disrupts their own social citizenship both in Bulgaria and in Spain. Losing employment, welfare entitlements, and additional sources of income in Bulgaria is reinforced by the disadvantageous position of non-working individuals that they occupy in Spain. Transnationality, then, affects their social citizenship status, while allowing their children to acquire a better position. Moreover, this intense mobility also triggers a disrupted sense of home and belonging.

The lives of the transnational ageing carers are flexibilized by their role in the reproduction of the family in the migration context, which requires them to provide care for two different generations dispersed in two or more localities. What is at stake, however, is not only their present, but also their future. While the young migrants are considered the active kernel which organizes the movement of others, the *young-old* migrants are the subsidiary group which adjusts to the kernel. They regard themselves as having passed the peak of their active lives and now live and arrange their lives according to their children's needs. In the context of migration, however, this opens

new forms of insecurities (whether related to lack of experience in the new context, redefinition of masculinity, or unstable spatial and temporal routines). In this sense migration upsets not only the present, but conditions future anxieties and possible transformations.

Moreover, there is an interdependence of the ways citizenship is transformed for the different generations. Younger people are able to advance both their economic wellbeing and their social citizenship through migration, but only with the support of the ageing carers who, however, lose their few stable guarantees in terms of employment and social security. The emphasis on family reproduction through care signifies a move from welfare to kinfare, in which kin reciprocity substitutes state support. Ageing women fall into a particularly precarious position being the main providers of care in between localities and states and risking any stability they might have had in Bulgaria for the sake of fulfilling their care duties. Future full dependency on the younger generation along with the uncertainties of their present everyday lives creates new forms of gender and intergenerational inequalities. Transformations in kinship then are tightly intertwined with transformations in citizenship not only in the present, but also in the future of the transnational ageing carers.

Chapter 7: Phantasmic Devices: Wedding Videos and a Virtual Community in the Making

"Have you watched our wedding video? No? I'll play it for you now, while we are talking, then!"

"Have you seen my daughter's wedding? Wait, I'll show you, so that you know better how she looks like when you go to Spain."

"Have they showed you already last month's wedding of Selim and Sebi at home? You should see it by all means. Sit, we'll watch it again, the DVD's with us right now."

I would hear one of these lines at almost every visit I paid either to migrants' homes in Spain or to their relatives' in Bulgaria. What followed was a screening of a wedding video of the ritual in real time, lasting from three to seven hours with a regular rewinding for emphasis on a certain moment. At first I thought watching wedding videos is just a background encouraging the flow of conversation and making the atmosphere more informal. But the more time I spent in the field, the clearer it got to me that this is not a sporadic practice occurring specially for me as an outsider, but a wide spread significant social phenomenon. Wedding videos were omnipresent in every house and were screened on all kinds of occasions – from a ritualistic re-experiencing of the wedding by the kin, through a nostalgic virtual revival of home, to a gossip mechanism for being up-to-date with village affairs. In this chapter I analyse the practices of production and circulation of wedding videos and their role for building a new type of imagined (virtualized) community between migrants and those connected with them in a transnational social field.

My analysis will be two-fold. First, I aim to demonstrate how the wedding video has become an agent in the process of transnationalizing the village community. I explore the new mechanisms of establishing temporal and spatial bridges between 'home' and 'abroad', and between past and present. I argue that the practices related to the production and uses of wedding videos generate a phantasmic image of home and an experience of an imagined virtual community. This virtual community expands over space and time and sustains a feeling of belonging and membership. A second line of analysis examines what are the transformations of in the meaning and texture of the ritual as a consequence of its mediatisation which allows repeated consumption and re-enactment in a different temporal and spatial context. In other words how do migration practices of a relatively closed rural community affect the structure of the highly formalized wedding ritual by introducing a new dimension to it. I would suggest that the mediazation of the ritual allows its profound transnationalization, which brings a new aspect of ritualization of the migration space. Here I will not focus on the performance of the wedding as such and what it means for the wedding couple and the two kins becoming related, but instead I will look at the way the mediated ritual allows a group of people to perform as a community. What is more, I argue that this community, by being virtual and imagined, is also idealised as to represent the phantasm of wholeness and order, which are associated with home, and thus to stitch the ruptures caused by migration.

Analyses of video recordings of life cycle rituals (religious and status initiations, weddings, funerals etc.) can be traced in several analytical fields – visual anthropology, anthropology of media, ritual studies etc. The main focus in visual anthropology studies is on the photographs or the ethnographic film as an evidence for social and cultural processes. Images are either thought of as a research method of gathering data, or as a way of representing certain aspect of the

researched groups of people. The more critical approaches discuss the contradictory nature of these images in regard to their objectivity and representativeness (e.g. Banks 2001; Grimshaw 2001; MacDougall 1998; Pink 2001). The question of authorship and knowledge productions is also scrutinized which has resulted in an already established tradition in cooperation in the films and image productions between the ethnographer and the subjects of his study (see Aufderheide 1995; Carelli 1988; Prins 1997; Ruby 1991; Terence Turner 1992). But even though more than ten years ago Morphy and Banks (1997) insisted on a wider understanding of visual anthropology including all visual systems and visual culture, most research remains focused on the production of images by the active intention of the ethnographer, and not as a result of a spontaneous internal production and use of visual system like the wedding videos discussed here.

Anthropology of media pays more attention precisely on the uses of visual media (for a detailed overview see Ginsburg, Abu-Lughod, and Larkin 2002). The topics vary from cultural activism and the role of media for empowering minorities (Asch et al. 1991; Ginsburg 1991, 1997; McLagan 2002; Philipsen and Markussen 1995; Weatherford 1990), through newspapers, radio, television and cinema role for creating national self-consciousness (Anderson 1991; Abu-Lughod 2002; Hamilton 2002; Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 1994; Spitulnik 1998Sreberny-Mohammadi et al. 1997), to the changing conditions of cultural productions ((Dornfeld 2002; Faraday 2000; Ganti 2002; Himpele 2002; Marcus 1997). In their intersection with migrations studies, media analyses are predominantly focused on how are minorities epresented in meida, the role of the migrants audience for the formation of media policies, and well as the influence of private and public media for the cultural and social minority integrations (Aksoy and Robins 2000; Caglar 2001;Cunningam and Sinclair 2000; Karim 1998; Kosnick 2000; Vertovec 2000).

201

However, there is no extensive ethnographic study of exchange of pictures or videos as a medium for private visual communication between home and abroad. The wedding videos analyzed here are produced by the village inhabitants for themselves and for the migrants from the village. They are not directed at any wider public outside the village community. What is more, the wedding video does not aim to record the specifics or the representativeness of the ritual as a cultural, religious or ethnic identity marker of the group. (REF with examples of the contrary). On the contrary, the goal seems quite straightforward – it is recorded in order to be watched later on again and again both by people who were present at the wedding and who were not, but who are all directly related to the ritual. Studies which focus on the private use of media, and more particularly on photography, focus on the social function of pictures, especially in relation to their role for the construction and the integration of the family (see studies on family photography of Marian Hirsh (1997) and Annette Kuhn (2002). Along similar lines, already in the 1960's Bourdieu (1990) have looked into the practice of taking family photographs and analyzed their role for keeping the "cult of unity" of the family, as well as the ritualization of taking photographs itself. Yet, the static reproduction which photographs can offer defers from the dynamic image of the video recording. The analysis of videos are very few and are usually a marginal note along other main topics. Thus, in her article on the visual production of locality through photographs among Turkish migrants in Germany, Barbara Wolbert (2001) also points out shortly the role of videos of important rituals like weddings or circumcision ceremonies. Her analysis is focused on the uses of migrant wedding videos in Turkey and their meaning for the reproduction of the family and for the creation of virtual neighbourhoods. Along these lines my aim here is to further deepen the analysis of the private videos in three aspects: as a medium for supporting social networks in migration context; as a mechanism for creating an imagined family

and village community; and finally, as an element which contributes for the transformation of the ritual space.

A paragraph on wedding videos as devices in Latour and Callon's sense: Here I think of the video not simply as a neutral instrument, but rather as an agent, part of the interactions and constructions. The materiality of the video is social and active.

In what follows, I first summarize the typical wedding ritual, which can be observed in most of the wedding videos. Then, I discuss the several types of videos and the variations in their use depending on the practices of watching. In the last part, I point out the transformations in the substance and in the essence of the ritual and of its distinct practices due to its virtualization and reproduction under migration conditions.

7.1. The wedding ritual

7.1.1. The ritual stages

The weddings in Brushlyan take place in the winter. From November to April every weekend there is a wedding, sometimes two. Everyone gets married in the village, even the migrants. *"The summer is the work season, the winter is the weddings season,"* say people in the village. And indeed, even though most migrants have their long holidays in July and August, even migrant weddings necessarily take place in the winter, often close to New Year's. The wedding in Brushlyan is a much more public event in comparison to other main rites of passage and important events (like birth, circumcision, death etc.). While other turning points in the life cycle are being conducted in the narrow family circle, the wedding is the event in which the whole

village participates. Following Bourdieu (1990) I would argue that there is a strong co-dependence between the centrality of an event and its video recording (photographing in Bourdieu's case). The image capturing of certain events and not of others marks the distinction between the public and the private. Therefore, rituals considered as more private and confined to the narrow family remain unrecorded, and hence single events, never re-used or re-enacted in contrast to the public event which continues to be re-used in the future through the visual traces.

In addition to the distinction between public and private ritual, the wedding itself comprises of two stages - a private, religious ritual, and a public, more secular ceremony. The first stage is referred to as *getting married (zhenene)*, the second one is the actual *wedding (svatba)*. Only the second stage is video recorded. In the first stage, only very close family members are participating, as well as the Imam, who is leading the event. While it resembles the secular or Christian engagement in a way, it also signifies a practical change in the status of the couple, because at his point the girl moves in with the boy. This is the social validation of the new bond. After the couple is already *married*, begins the planning of the second stage – the *wedding*. The event is centred around the civil marriage procedure in the town-hall and the celebrations in which usually the whole village takes part. It is this public ritual that is being recorded in details and then reproduced and used over and over again. The ritual has several turning points: taking the groom from his house, a procession with him and his relatives to the house of the bride, picking up the bride, endowing the bride's parents with gifts, displaying the dowry publicly, a second procession with both kin to the main square, ring dances (*hora)* at the square, civil marriage in the town-hall, again dances at the square, and finally, two shifts of guests in the restaurant, in between which there is one more round of dances at the square.

There are no special invitations for the wedding guests, because it is assumed that everyone from the village, who is over 18 and not mourning, will be present. It is a rule that there should be at least one representative per family. Guests usually do not bring presents, but are expected 'pay' for the feast. This in itself is turned into a rite. After several dances in the restaurant the bride sets off on a 'greeting tour' (called the *'tax collector tour'*), in which she passes by every single guests to receive congratulations and a note of ten or twenty leva (five or ten euro), depending on the gender. The money is collected by a bride's maid in a large plastic bag.[77] After the lunch is over, there are more unstructured dances in the centre of the restaurant. This is the moment, in which every songs is a special request with a greeting line from a relative or a friend (for which the orchestra is compensated additionally by the guests per song). There is a strict order starting with the witnesses and the parents and moving to more distant relatives, finishing with friends. This is an especially alluding point for discovering the migrant links of the young couple.

This wedding ritual structure is repeated at every wedding. The possible variations depend on the financial situation of the family, and whether there are any migration influences. The particular migration variations (in case there is a member of the family who is a migrant) can be traced in several directions: the types of presents, the dressed of the bride and the witnesses, in the currency of the notes attached to the bride and groom clothes, in the amount and type of dowry, and the type of orchestra invited. The differences are usually quite subtle and do not lead to alterations of the style and procedure of the ritual. The most visible differentiation comes from the currency and amount of money given to the couple. At a non-migrant wedding the amount of

---

[77] Men pay double the sum that women pay, because of alcohol consumption. Women traditionally do not drink at all in the village, while men do. The sum paid is roughly calculated on the bases of the lunch meal offered (soup, two meatballs with chips, and a piece of cake, plus drinks. The amount gathered is used to pay for the party and supposedly to have twenty per cent on top, which is spent on further furnishing.

money usually would be 50 or 100 leva (the equivalent of 25 and 50 euro) for each of the two, at a migrant wedding, this would be 50 or 100 euro notes. The emphasis here is not only the double amount, but also the fact that the money is in foreign currency. Thus, migration is clearly fixed as a affluence marker, even though wealth is not necessarily linked to migration. These variations, albeit subtle, are closely inspected later on when the video record is being watched. As a result the transformations are being activated to a great extent through their verbalisation.

7.1.2. Making the wedding videos

Over the last fifteen years every wedding in Brushlyan has been filmed on video, which has become part of the wedding ritual itself. The wedding videos are produced exclusively by the head master of the village school. This has elevated his status to one of the most influential people in Brushlyan to a far greater extent than his position as a head master.[78] A wedding video would cost about 350 euro at the time of the research – a substantial sum of money for the village standards. Nevertheless, this was an indispensable part of every wedding's budget, which did not depend on the financial situation of the families. The head master in his role of a cameraman follows every step of the wedding processions, enters in the house of the bride for the special internal close kin celebration and drinking in the morning, and later on, tracks all the guests during the ring dances at the square, and then all the main turning points in the restaurant. In addition to this, there is a special filming tour, recording every single guest greeting the newly wed while in the restaurant.

---

[78] This is very similar to what Turner has suggested about the Kayapo, where being a cameraman and having access to visual media technology are forms of cultural capital and ultimately a question of power relations within a community (Terence Turner 1992:7).

There are two types of videos produced over the years – the old videotapes and the new DVD's.[79] The old videos are a full real time recording of the whole wedding day starting at the groom's house and ending with the last dances at the main square after the two shifts of guests in the restaurant. They often last up to seven hours and are comprised of several videotapes. The first one always opens up with thematic panoramic view of the village from afar in winter and summer. This is followed by a staged walk by the soon to be wed, most often in the nearby meadows, finishing with a drink in the most popular road restaurant. This adds to the particularly nostalgic note of the old wedding video tapes. The new ones, recorded on DVD, are cut and edited and are relatively shorter, lasting between three and four hours, again with very long uninterrupted shots of processions and dances.

The two types of technical production of the videos reflect two aspects of their consumption and of their meaning. The old videotapes brought to Spain contain exclusively own wedding recordings from the past. The same videos are watched in Bulgaria by close family members, usually the parents of the couple. In contrast, the new DVD's show new weddings, which are often watched by relatively distant acquaintances both in Spain and in Bulgaria. This differentiation also defines the practices of watching and experiencing the videos. While the old ones assume a more private use, mostly directed towards creating temporal links between past and present, which overlap with building spatial visual bridges between "the home" and "abroad", the new DVD's are much more publicly shared and play a stronger social cohesive role. The old videos are considered as more intimate and aim at re-creating the unity of the

---

[79] This differentiation is to a great extent conventional in order to get more clarity. The different technical carrier signifies a different moment in time of the production of the video, hence of the wedding itself, which in its turn points to a different attitude towards the wedding video. There is more to this however. The VHS videos were multiplied in s few copies distributed among the relatives, while the DVD videos being much more easily reproducible, are multiplies and distributed in much greater numbers both in Brushlyan, and among the migrants, even when the wedding is not of close relatives. In this sense, the technical parameters of the video contribute to the practical transformations of its use.

family. The new ones serve as a medium for participation in key village events both by close relatives and by the wider village community. In the next section I will demonstrate these two aspects of the use of wedding videos.

7.2. The social use of wedding videos: meanings and transformations

7.2.1. The old wedding videos: practices of reinforcing the cult of the family unity

According to the site and audience, the old wedding videos can be divided in two types. The first type are the videos brought by migrants to Spain of their own wedding. The second type are the children's weddings watched by elderly family members in Bulgaria. This division also reflects the generational split in the two sites.[80]

Although migrants arrive to Spain with a relatively small number of personal belongings, the wedding video tape is a crucial object among them. The old wedding videos are being played usually by the women migrants who work part time or on shifts and thus spend more time at home by themselves. Often, the occasion to play the video for me, was a distant question about their relatives or something connected to the village. Badie, 34 years old migrant, who joined her husband in Spain in 2004, worked in shifts in the central restaurant. I remember meeting her for the first time in her house one afternoon. I was not sure whether I had met her husband. She

---

[80] Even though the group of the ageing people, who come to Spain for shorter visits, is growing constantly, in general there is a clear tendency of age division among migrants. The ageing would normally come to Spain if asked by their younger relatives to help them with caring for children. This short term stays are recently more and more often developing into long term relocations Nevertheless, the major part of migrants in Spain are still the younger generations.

immediately took out the wedding video from under the TV set (the only video tape there!) and played it, instead of simply showing me a picture:

> *"Watch carefully now. This is a real Bruslyan wedding. We have really good wedding in our village, such big celebrations, the dances at the square… You'll see me, how I used to look eight ears ago. I was a bit chubbier then, but now I have lost quite some weight. I know how to live like the Spanish do, I eat healthier… And you'll see my parents, my brothers, the cousins. Actually, the whole family gathered at one place. Now that I think about it, we haven't gathered all of us, like this, since then."*

We started watching and gradually Badie introduced me to all the important moments of the wedding ritual, forwarding the tape just as much as to skip to the next one. She showed me her parents' house and the house of her husband's family, where they used to live in Bulgaria. Then she indicated her family members, the wedding witnesses, and all the rest of her wide kin relatives. She paid special attention to the outfits and commented on how did people change since then, who had died, who has moved up in their career etc.

Badie's example demonstrates a typical exploitation of wedding videos. One of the possible uses of the video is as a document and evidence of people (including oneself) from the past and of particular practices and images from the village. The recording replaces the photo album, as well as the physical presence. Moreover, reproducing the ritual in real time opens up the opportunity to re-experience it in every minute detail. When I asked Badie how come she knows where to find the exact place of each episode on the three videotapes, she told me:

> *"Well, I play the tape quite often. Here in Spain, when I feel sad for home and start missing my parents too much, I play it to see the village, the views, the steep streets, our house. And it makes me feel a bit better."*

209

Re-experiencing the ritual then is a strategy to cure nostalgia. It is not only relatives and close friends who had remained in Bulgaria, that are being remembered in such a way, but also more distant village acquaintances. Watching and commenting becomes a mechanism for normalizing the traumatic experience the ruptures in the social fabric. At the same time, the video follows not only the presence of the people, but also the landscape of the village, pausing at key sites. Thus, the practice of re-watching and re-experiencing creates not only temporal, but also spatial bridges between home and abroad. In this sense, Loewenthal's (1985) metaphor of the past as a foreign country is reversed. Here, the temporality and spatiality overlap in such a way that the past becomes equivalent with the space of home.

The own wedding videos are watched not only by women in the privacy of their homes, but also by groups of relatives on family and festive occasions. On Ramadan Bairam a large group of relatives gathered to celebrate in the home of my landlord in Tafalla. At some point they decided to play the ten-year-old wedding video of one of his brothers. At first everyone kept chatting about recent everyday issues from their life in Spain, casting only sporadic glances towards the screen. Gradually though, everyone started watching closely and the whole conversation turned to the wedding video. One line of comments was related to what happened over the last years in the village, who built a new house, which places have changed, which streets were paved. Another line of discussion was the people seen on the main square dancing: who had changed in what way, what happened to each and one of them, who married whom, who migrated to Spain, who's successful, who failed. The conversation quickly moved to more political topics, when the video reached the point of the civil marriage ritual in the town-hall, which was led by the mayor at that time. This particular part of the ritual also bears evidence to whom is the mayor at the particular year, which opens up wider commentaries on the recent political developments in the

210

village and the success or failure of the particular mayor and his/her successors. Finally, a huge scandal erupted between two cousins over the present mayor and his decision to buy a new scanner for the medical centre rather than improve the sewerage system, and someone had to stop the video causing such a heated debate.

In this way, the use of wedding videos creates a sense of continuity and participation in an imagined village community, which albeit spread over space, keep being informed of and connected to each other. The diversion of the conversation from the past event to the present political situation in the village generates an even more intense feeling of participation. The personal function of the video as a document for an important event intertwines with the social function of the recording as an archive of the community life and of the village as landscape and consequently as a visually produced locality to use the term of Wolbert (2001)

On another occasion, the brother of the groom whose wedding we have been watching said:

> *When I watch this wedding, when I watch our village, I know that one day I'll go back. I'll never feel Spain as close as the small streets of Brushlyan. Now they paved the main street already, we are building new houses. You must have seen them when you went there. There are street lamps almost everywhere. Now, the new mayor has to work on the water supply a bit and it will be heaven, this village of ours. Here in Spain, this is not life, renting a place, being a foreigner. We are here just for a short while. For the wedding of my sons, we'll be back in Brushlyan, you'll see.*

This quote is rather symptomatic of the more general opposition between home and abroad/normal and abnormal life, which is constantly present in the migrant discourse. The initial wedding of the parents at home and the final wedding of the sons, again planned at home, are the

211

two points in time which will bracket the temporary unstable and negative migrant experience and will restore the normality of being, which migration has disrupted. In contrast to the Turkish wedding videos described by Wolbert (2001), which take place in Germany, here the direction is one-way. The wedding is in Bulgaria, just as the home and the community are perceived in Bulgaria, even though many of the migrants have been living in Spain for about eight years and the small village community have long ceased to be concentrated spatially in Brushlyan. Celebrating the wedding ritual in Bulgaria itself is a sign that Brushlyan is thought of as the home par excellence, which is the place for the significant events, while Spain is perceived as a temporary experience, which only deserves the time of the mundane practice. The feast and the ritual only happen at home.

Watching wedding videos at the other end of the field, by parents in Bulgaria, is used in a slightly different way. The videos are used as a cure for their sadness induced by the physical absence of the children. My landlords, Ismet and Ayse, would usually play one of the wedding videos of their three children, all in Spain, after the usual Sunday night phone call. Even though parents at home have plenty of photos of their children hanging on the walls, the videos offer a moving image, which seems closer to the authentic image. "*When I look at Sabrie, dancing at the central square, it's as if she's still here,*" is what Ayse is telling me, while watching her daughter's wedding with tears in her eyes. And even though there are video recordings from other events in their children lives in Spain (celebrations of Bayram, birthdays, good bye parties for someone leaving back to Bulgaria) the weddings are what is periodically being played as a true signifier for the reality of the children. The significance of the wedding as the most important and festive event in the life cycle reinforces the feeling of co-experiencing the children's lives who are far away. As in the other cases, what can be observed here is what Bourdieu (1990) calls the "cult of

the family unity". Thus the recording of the feast has not only a documentary and preservation function, but also accentuates the integrity of the family, which is regarded as especially important under conditions of migration. The video, which contains all family members, does not only represent the wedding ritual, but in itself becomes a ritual of the family cult.

7.2.2. The new wedding DVD's: sustaining a transnational village community

Technologically the new wedding DVD's are much more easily multiplied and distributed among a wider audience immediately and simultaneously, which had deeper implications for their uses and functions. During my stay in Tafalla all the weddings which took place in the village in the meantime were disseminated among a wide circle of people in Spain within days. Two types of watching practices can be distinguished here: showing the own wedding to close relatives in Spain and watching distant acquaintances wedding by migrants.

The own wedding videos are usually played for close kin members who did not manage to go back to Bulgaria for the event.[81] The young couple gathers the relatives on both sides who are in Spain and plays the video in a celebratory and festive manner. Watching the video becomes a celebration in itself. There is a lot of food and drinks in the home of the new couple, music usually played at weddings plays along, the relatives bring small presents and often give money to the young couple. The video is watched without any skipping, and the celebration afterwards might last until early morning. In this sense, this is a continuation of the wedding celebration,

---

[81] These are wedding in which at least one of the two has established themselves in Spain formerly or right after the wedding. It is very common that the boy goes back to Bulgaria over the summer and "get marries" to his long-term girlfirned. She then would join him in Spain, and at New Year's they would go back to Bulgaria for the big wedding. Another very wide spread practice is that the young couple decides to migrate right after the wedding. In both cases usually there are rather close relatives in Spain who do not manage to go back to Bulgaria to be present at the wedding.

postponed in time and space. In this way the absence of the important kin members is compensated through the repetition and re-enactment of the ritual. The detailed recording serves as a tool to re-create a close to the original type of experience. Even though the guests cannot dance the typical *horo* dances in the living room, they sing along and clap with hands while watching.

The ritual watching of the videos explain also the length of the videos and the plenitude of and real-time episodes, which cannot be attributed to technical limitations, but on different filming conventions.[82] Documenting every moment of the ceremony is significant part of the quality of the recording, as it is demonstrated by Gillespi (1995) in her analysis of religious rituals in South East Asia, and by Barbara Wolbert (2001, 2008) on the uses of Turkish wedding videos. The subsequent show of the video becomes a ritual event, close to the original one. Moreover, video film is a strategy of enhancement of status and prestige

Lili is a 22-year-old woman, who had lived in Spain with her parents since she graduated from high school. Her husband was her high school boyfriend with whom she kept in touch over the summers. After they got married, he arrived with her to Spain and moved in with her parents there. Her uncle and his two sons, as well as several other more distant cousins did not have the opportunity to go back to Bulgaria for the wedding. Therefore, on the third night of their arrival to Spain, everyone was invited to watch the wedding video. Lili commented on the event, while running back and froth from the kitchen bringing out all kinds of Bulgarian food (brought especially):

---

[82] For a detailed discussion of the use of real time filming see Charles Gore (1997) on televised ritual in Benin and Sheila (1992) on African Cinema.

It was so sad that we couldn't be all of us in Brushlyan for my wedding. I almost felt

that some part of my body is missing. Now that we have the rest of my family here with

us, watching with us, sharing it with us, only now do I have the feeling that it is real,

that I indeed got married. It was unfinished somehow before this evening here. And

you know, my relatives here, they didn't know my husband that well. They haven't seen

him in a suit, leading the horo, dancing with me. How can they just look at him with

his ordinary everyday clothes and know that we got married. But now, after tonight,

after watching the video they will accept him as my husband, I know!"

The wedding ritual is completed only after every important kin member has participated in watching the wedding video. In this sense, the wedding video is the final stroke which validates the official marriage ritual. The digital repetition of the ritual widens the opportunities for participation and experience of the ritual. The physical absence is compensated by a repeated and detailed visual sharing post factum. The divided family is being reconstructed through the postponement and extension of the ritual. As with the old wedding videos, but to a far greater extent, the repeated use serves for the restoration , albeit partial, of the damaged family fabric, which migration has caused. The cult of the family unity is reflected in Lili's words. The wedding does not become fully real, until every important kin member has seen it. The aspect of extending the ritual as to include all the essential participants leads to a level of transnationalization of the community and a sustenance of a transnational social field, which cannot be reached through other media of participation.

What is more, this extension of the ritual which adds one more stage in the actual ritual, before it is completed, creates in fact a longer period of liminality, which was not part of the original wedding ritual. Unlike the period between the '*getting married*' and the '*wedding*', this is a new

aspect of breaking the ritual into more parts. Thus, the period of time between the wedding in Bulgaria, and the final chords of the vide recording in Spain, is an extension of the transition between two states. Not accepting the husband, until the relatives have seen him in full wedding attire signifies the need for accreditation of all family members, before the final transformation (into officially married). Lasting sometime up to two weeks, this period bears the traits of indeterminacy and ambiguity, typical for the liminality period, discussed by Turner (1969). Thus migration brings out a new aspect into the traditional wedding, which changes the texture of the ritual in spatial and temporal terms – from a two step, into a three step transition.

Another aspect of this practice of watching is the transformations in the meaning of the ritual which come along. The migrant relatives put different emphasis in the flow of the event than the usual main turning points. Through relatives that were present at the wedding, they have sent special greetings in the form of songs ordered from the band. The greeting my landlord required from the band on behalf of his two sons who were in Spain was: *"Hot greetings from the cousins Ismet and Mehmed, from far away Spain."* This moment was then awaited with eagerness, while the respective cousins were watching the wedding already in Spain. They re-winded and played this spot several times and commented on the particular phrasing and the chosen song. I will come back to this modification of the important points of the ritual in a moment.

The second use of the new wedding DVD's is by wider audience. Once a wedding DVD is brought to Spain by a recently wed couple, several copies are being circulated among the wider community of migrants. They do not watch it in the same ritual way as the close kin, but watch it with certainty nonetheless. Here the idea of restoring the family unity is brought to the level of the community. Watching is accompanied by comments on various participants in the wedding and their recent live development. Those who were recently in Bulgaria, inspired by the images,

216

share the latest news and gossip. In this way, one of the most important aspects of being part of a wedding in the village - the gossiping - is being delayed and recreated from afar. At this level, the watching substitutes the participation. As a result, the videos reinforce the idea of an imagined village community, which includes the migrants. The weddings and the celebrations which go along are an occasion for a recurring experience of the whole village community sharing certain events every week. The wedding video grants an opening into this experience. As in the case of the old video, it disrupts the flow of mundane time by inserting the festivity time of the home into the realm of migration.

This imagined village community, however, is an idealized version of the community as such, which covers all the rupture and social distances caused by migration on one hand, and all the existing conflicts and power relation in the village itself, on the other hand. In such a way, watching the videos covers and even smoothes in a bizarre way the unevenness of the social horizon in the village and creates an idealized version of the village social life and of home.

At the same time, this particular aspect creates an even stronger feeling of absence about those who are in Spain and cannot participate. Similarly, for the migrants the idea that there is an occasion for celebration every weekend, which they cannot attend, emphasizes the feeling of rupture between life at home and life abroad. The fear of falling out from the broader village community while becoming confined in the limited migrant community is palpable and is being verbalized exactly in moments of watching a random wedding video. The video here serves to recreate the idea of integrity at the level of the community. Atidje's words may exemplify this point:

217

These videos help me at least a bit to imagine life in the village. I haven't been at a wedding since I arrived here four years ago. I feel as if I am completely uprooted that way. When I watch a video, even if it's of someone I don't even know that well, I feel as if I am back. The same songs, the same dances, the same streets. Plus, some people I wouldn't have even recognized on the street, if I hadn't followed all the videos lately."

In her comment, we may read an additional aspect in the process of imagining the community. Both the own wedding and the more distant wedding videos are being used to recreate the feeling of unity by weaving a specific type of more flexible connections between the members of this transnational field. In this sense, the videos as a technological medium support the virtualization of the ideal community. With the absence of any well developed internet fora or virtual social network, the wedding videos are the only means of virtual links between the migrants and the inhabitants of Brushlyan.

There is a subtle transformation in the way videos are used and in their meaning which goes along with the technological aspect of their production. The old videos are produced for the married couple and their closest relatives. The new videos are directed to the whole community, transterritorially and temporally spread. The aim of the video is not only to remind people of an event, but to signify for the actuality of the event. In this sense, the new videos become evidence, not only a reference. At the same time, the ritual is not only being watched after the fact by those who were absent. It is newly experienced, re-enacted, and only thus finally completed. This re-enactment of the wedding becomes the actual closure, without which the ritual is not perceived as finished. Thus the video is not just a sign of the wedding, it has become part of the wedding itself.

7.3. The extended ritual: when the invisible becomes visible

The public and multi-fold use of wedding videos transforms the dynamics between the visible and the invisible in the ritual. Being present at the wedding permits direct participation in the ritual, partaking in the dance, in meeting people, in consuming the food and drinks and in this sense, sharing the physical and sensory participation. On the other hand, the purely visual insight into the wedding post factum offers a different kind of entrance into the ritual. The camera offers a different point of view to the event both for those who experience the wedding for the first time through the video and for those who re-watch it, after being part of it. Observing the ritual through the camera enables access to moments otherwise invisible for most of the guests present. Such moments would be the procession to the bride's house and to the main square, the dowry display and the ram exchange. These points albeit public, are not shared with the whole village community as opposed to the dances at the main square and the restaurant feast afterwards. Another more concealed moment, inaccessible for direct observation by the wide audience, is the gift giving by the witnesses and the parents in the restaurant. The speeches and the central dance floor opening dances are also to be directly observed only by those who sit nearby or directly participate. Thus, the wedding video provides an all-encompassing view from above, which opens up the opportunity to look into these otherwise hidden and invisible moments.

It is this simultaneous closeness and distance generated by the mediation of an event through its video recording, that Pink (1998) has described in her analysis of televised bullfights. She argues that live and televised bullfights do not fit the ritual/spectacle dichotomy, on the contrary, they become an interweaving of media and ritual agendas, constituting each other (Pink 1998:133). In

a similar way, the personal participation in the wedding with its limited view is intertwined with the total view of the spectator, which penetrates in every corner, but is only present virtually. However, what makes this different from the mass television records of rituals, is the interactivity and creativity of the spectators in the more private video reproduction of the ritual. The spectators are not just passive viewers, but participators who control and direct the process of watching, which has becme a second order ritual experience. The repeated watching activates the event again, but in a different way by introducing new accents. Rewinding, fast-forwarding, choosing certain points to go back to and watch over and over again, while skipping others, creates a different version of the ritual. The moments that gain importance by being commented upon and re-watched, are not necessarily the main turning points of the ritual as conceived by the main participants in it. While the town-hall civil marriage ritual and the speeches in the restaurant might be regarded as the most central ones by the family and the local village community, the relatives or the other migrants in Spain often emphasize different points. Consequently, watching the wedding is not simply a passive reproduction, but becomes an active part of the ritual, which opens it to new interpretations.

This reveals another difference with public rituals shown on television. The level of intimacy in watching the private wedding videos, in which if not the married couple itself, then at least many of the guests are friends or relatives of the viewers, introduces an additional aspect of indexing and referencing in the process of watching. The special camera tour, documenting each and every guest and their greetings to the newly wed offers a very precise statistics of the wedding guests, of their presence, their table position, their clothes and their codified (for the camera) behaviour. The viewers exhilarate when they see a kin member and do not miss to note if someone is missing. There is a need of visual reference of the existence of village members, exactly because

this is what cannot be reproduced through memories or gossip, while away from home. Moreover, the aspect of indexicality is complemented by the subtle transformation of the behaviour of the ones who are recorded. While in the older videos the guests were directing their congratulations to the new couple, in the new ones, the greetings are addressed to the whole village and the migrant community, which will follow every gestures and word later on. The constant visibility awareness changes the behaviour of the guests and they become much more formal or witty in the new videos

An example for the change in status of a mini-event within the wedding was the case with one of the latest wedding DVD's brought to Spain during my stay there. Both the bride and the groom were very young, under 20, just out of high-school, hence most of their peers and friends from school were in Bulgaria, while the migrants in Spain were mostly older than them. However, their wedding video became quite popular because of one particular case. As seen in American movies, the cutting of the wedding cake is usually accompanied with the groom and bride feeding each other, and subsequently spreading cream on their faces. In this case, however, the fun game became a bit aggressive with both of them slapping each other with huge pieces of the wedding cake and giving each other rather angry looks. For the regular wedding participant, this small incident would have remained invisible due to the position of the main wedding table. The video recording and subsequent wide circulation of the DVD made this instance visible and public not only for the whole village community in Bulgaria, but also for the migrants in Spain. This particular DVD became quite popular, travelling from house to house with a small note on it, pointing to the exact minute in which the incident is taking place. The event was watched, re-watched, and discussed for more than ten days among the migrant community.

221

The inappropriate slaps in the face opened the floor for all kind of comments as to the personalities of the newly wed, which consequently spread to more general discussion of the two kin sides. Someone remembered that one of the grandmothers was particularly bossy when she was young. At the same time, an older women shared with me, that she did not approve these new inventions in the wedding ritual. This small event, not at all central for the main wedding ritual, would have remained unnoticed for the direct participants. Through the multiplication and the distribution of the DVD however, it turned into the most discussed and commonly shared moment which evoked comments about several generations of people and even about the transformation of the wedding ritual over time. Thus the emphasis is shifted and a new parallel version of the event is created by the postponed secondary consumption.

7.4. Transnationalization of the ritual and ritualization of the migrant space

The visual recycling of the event leads to transformations of its substance. From a ritual here and now, for which participation is *sine qua non*, is turns in an extended and interrupted process of self-reproduction, which is taking place in more than one place in more than one time. Thus the ritual deterritorialzes, and the time of its total completion unfolds as to include both the physical participants and the migrants. The links between what happens in the village and the absent who are in Spain, already are thought of as part of the practice itself, which consequently allows to call this a transnational ritual.

Following Victor Turner (1969) then, I have argued that the ritual process is an active thing. It is not an invariable restatement of a static or even cyclic state of affairs, but equally capable of making and marking shift in a situation. The extension of the ritual expresses the change in the overall migrant situation by adjusting to it while at the same time it also normalizes the otherwise ambivalent migrant existence. Moreover, as Moore and Myerhoff argue ritual is a declaration of order against indeterminacy, therefore indeterminacy is always present in the background of any analysis of ritual (1977:17). Migration is a threat to order, it creates absence, distance and fragmentation, and as such generates a rupture in the neatly conceptualized community fabric. The wedding ritual, extended and re-enacted, restores the idea of order. In this sense, the ritualization of the migrant space, albeit partial, is also an act of normalizing the abnormality of the migration experience.

Conclusion: Assembling Fragmented Citizenship

The citizenship discourse masks the problematic side of their flexibilized lives. The actual privileges Bulgarian Muslim migrants gained over other migrants, with whom until then they thought were equal or at least similar, the actual opening of empowerment covered completely the disadvantages and the hidden exploitation that their position allows. The Spanish state with its flexibilized work conditions, with the fixed contracts which are regarded as heaven by migrants, but are the most wide spread contract among the Spanish themselves too, offers them a good way out emotionally for the way they think of their future. If their lives are flexible enough, if the conditions under which they are working are ok for the moment, but don't necessarily promise a further development or any kind of security, then the planned future in Bulgaria seems more tangible and real. The citizenship rhetoric adopted by the migrants has two openings in this way. On one hand the empowered talk of EU citizens, who have the right to be equal (even though they are not just yet) in Spain. But also, the EU talk, which allows them to imagine Bulgaria as part of this common citizen space.

The type of dual everyday citizenship that they practice is complementary. In Bulgaria they have formal citizenship which in principle gives them full access to membership. In practice, they have substantive membership in Spain, but continue to feel outsiders. But because Bulgaria is already internal to the commons symbolic EU space; they compensate what they don't get in Spain, with the idea of what they are in Bulgaria. At the same time, avoiding public discrimination, and state neglect by circumventing Bulgaria, they solve their absences by getting what they need in Spain.

224

However, this creates an illusion, that "live is elsewhere", live is always elsewhere typical of all kinds of migration, possibly. This divides not only the everyday live, but the dreams, prospects and imaginations of a possible better future. In this way, I argue, their possibility for critique is tamed. Then, those who stay behind start being described as faulty for their own state and for being poor. Thus the discourse of the neoliberal state which they themselves were trying to escape by migration, gets under their skin unnoticeably and they incorporate it at this point in their discourse.

Then, what happens to migrants within EU? They have equal rights and duties as EU citizens, but they are citizens or non-citizens also at the level of states. So they compartmentalize different aspects of citizenship in different spatial and institutional settings, while being all members of one overarching institutional and political community. This compartmentalization is structure enabled, but at the same time it is activated and enacted and stitched together by the acts and practices of the migrants themselves like a jigsaw which has an overall picture encoded in the pieces, but these pieces have to be put together by the active will of the person who orders it. This is what I call *fragmented citizenship*. And it is in its assemblage that migrants manage to make sense of their dispersed and ruptured lives.

Bibliography

Abrams, Philip. 1988. "Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977)." *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1 (1): 58–89.

Abu-Lughod, Lila. 2002. "Egyptian Melodrama - Technology Od the Modern Subject?" In , ed. Faye D Ginsburg, Lila Abu-Lughod, and Brian Larkin, 115–133. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ackers, Louise. 2004. "Citizenship, Migration and the Valuation of Care in the European Union." *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 30 (2): 373–396.

Ackers, Louise, and Peter Dwyer. 2002. *Senior Citizenship? Retirement, Migration and Welfare in the European Union*. Bristol: Policy Press.

Aksoy, Asu, and Kevin Robins. 2000. "Thinking Across Spaces: Transnational Television from Turkey." *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 3 (3): 343.

Andall, Jacqueline. 2000. *Gender, Migration and Domestic Service: The Politics of Black Women in Italy*. Interdisciplinary Research Series in Ethnic, Gender, and Class Relations. Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate.

Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Rev. and extended ed., 2nd ed. London: Verso.

Anon. 2004. *Anthropology in the Margins of the State*. School of American Research Advanced Seminar Series. Santa Fe: School of American Research Press.

Armstrong, John Alexander. 1982. *Nations Before Nationalism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Asch, Timothy, Jesus Ignacio Cardozo, Hortensia Cabellero, and Jose Bortoli. 1991. "The Story We Now Want to Hear Is Not Ours to Tell: Relinquishing Control Over Representation:

Toward Sharing Visual Communication Skills with The Yanomami." *Visual Anthropology Review* 7 (2): 102–106. doi:10.1525/var.1991.7.2.102.

Aufderheide, Patricia. 1995. "The Video in the Villages Project: Vldeomaking with and by Brazilian Indians." *Visual Anthropology Review* 11 (2): 83–93. doi:10.1525/var.1995.11.2.83.

Baldassar, Loretta. 2007. "Transnational Families and Aged Care: The Mobility of Care and the Migrancy of Ageing." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33 (2): 275–297.

Baldassar, Loretta, and Cora Baldock. 2000. "Linking Migration and Family Studies: Transnational Migrants and the Care of Ageing Parents." In *Theoretical and Methodological Issues in Migration Research. Interdisciplinary, Intergrenerational and International Perspectives*, ed. Biko Agozino, 61–91. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Baldock, Cora Vellekoop. 2000. "Migrants and Their Parents." *Journal of Family Issues* 21 (2): 205 –224.

———. 2003. "Long-distance Migrants and Family Support: A Dutch Case Study." *Health Sociology Review* 12 (1): 45–54.

Banks, Marcus. 2001. *Visual Methods in Social Research*. London: Sage Publications.

Banks, Marcus, and Howard Morphy. 1997. "Introduction: Rethinking Visual Anthropology." In *Rethinking Visual Anthropology*, ed. Marcus Banks and Howard Morphy. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Basch, Linda G, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc. 1994. *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States*. Langhorne, Pa: Gordon and Breach.

Bates, Daniel G. 1994. "What's in a Name? Minorities, Identity, and Politics in Bulgaria." *Identities* 1 (2): 201–225.

Bauböck, Rainer. 2003. "Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism." *International Migration Review* 37 (3): 700–723.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 1993. *Modernity and Ambivalence*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Beck, Ulrich. 2002. "The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology in the Second Age of Modernity." In *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context and Practice*, ed. Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen. New York: Oxford University Press.

Benhabib, Seyla. 2004. *The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2007. "Twilight of Sovereignty or the Emergence of Cosmopolitan Norms? Rethinking Citizenship in Volatile Times." *Citizenship Studies* 11 (1): 19–36.

Blagoeva, Evgenia. 2001. "За Имената и Преименуванията На Българите Мюсюлмани (1912-2000) [On the Names and Renaming of the Bulgarian Muslims (1991-2000)]." *Bulgariska Ethnologia* 2: 126–148.

Blakemore, Ken. 1999. "International Migration in Later Life: Social Care and Policy Implications." *Ageing & Society* 19 (06): 761–774.

Bodenhorn, Barbara, and Gabriele Vom Bruck. 2006. "'Entagled in Histories': An Introduction to the Anthropology of Names and Naming." In *The Anthropology of Names and Naming*, ed. Gabriele Vom Bruck and Barbara Bodenhorn, 1–30. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bolzman, Claudio, Rosita Fibbi, and Marie Vial. 2006. "What To Do After Retirement? Elderly Migrants and the Question of Return." *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 32 (8): 1359–1375.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. *Photography: A Middle-Brow Art*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Brenner, Neil. 2004. *New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood*.
Oxford New York: Oxford University Press.

Brenner, Neil, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones, and Gordon Macleod. 2003a. "Introduction: State Space
in Question." In *State/Space: A Reader*, ed. Neil Brenner, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones, and
Gordon Macleod, 1–26. Oxford: Blackwell Pub.

Brenner, Neil, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones, and Gordon Macleod, eds. 2003b. *State/Space: A
Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell Pub.

Brubaker, Rogers. 2004. *Ethnicity Without Groups*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Brubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper. 2000. "Beyond 'Identity'." *Theory and Society* 29 (1)
(February): 1–47.

Brunnbauer, Ulf. 1998. "Histories and Identities: Nation-state and Minority Discourses The Case
of the Bulgarian Pomaks." *In and Out of the Collective: Papers on Former Soviet Bloc
Rural Communities* 1 (February). http://www-
gewi.kfunigraz.ac.at/csbsc/ulf/pomak_identities.htm.

———. 2001. "The Perception of Muslims in Bulgaria and Greece: Between the 'Self' and the
'Other'." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 21 (1): 39–61.
doi:10.1080/13602000120050541.

Bryceson, Deborah Fahy, and Ulla Vuorela, eds. 2002. *The Transnational Family: New
European Frontiers and Global Networks*. Cross-cultural Perspectives on Women. Oxford:
Berg.

Büchsenschütz, Ulrich. 2000. *Малцинствената Политика в България. Политиката На БКП
Към Евреи, Роми, Помаци и Турци (1944-1989) [Minority Politics in Bulgaria. The
Politics of BCP Towards Jews, Roma, Pomaks and Turks]*. Sofia: IMIR.

Caglar, Ayse. 2001. "Medien, Werbeindustrie Und Kosmopolitentum." *Ethnoscripts* 1: 25–38.

———. 2006. "Hometown Associations, the Rescaling of State Spatiality and Migrant Grassroots Transnationalism." *Global Networks* 6 (1): 1–22.

———. 2009. *European Citizenship, the Third-Country Nationals and Ruptures*. WP 5.2. Enacting European Citizenship, FP7-SSH-2007 -1- 217504-ENACT. Milton Keynes: Open University.

Carelli, Vincent. 1988. "Video in the Villages." *Commission on Visual Anthropology Bulletin*: pp. 10–15.

Carsten, Janet. 1997. *The Heat of the Hearth: The Process of Kinship in a Malay Fishing Community*. Oxford Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Castells, Manuel. 1996. *The Rise of the Network Society*. Information Age (Castells, Manuel) 1. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Castles, Stephen. 2010. "Understanding Global Migration: a Social Transformation Perspective." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36 (10): 1565–1586.

Chamberlain, Mary. 1997. *Narratives of Exile and Return*. Warwick University Caribbean Studies. London: Macmillan Caribbean.

Creed, Gerald W. 1998. *Domesticating Revolution: From Socialist Reform to Ambivalent Transition in a Bulgarian Village*. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Cunningam, Stuart, and John Sinclair, eds. 2000. *Floating Lives: The Media and Asian Diasporas*. St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press.

Deneva, Neda. 2005. *Internal and International Migration in a Bulgarian Muslimvillage: Patterns of Differences and Similarities*. CEU Sociology Department Master Theses 2005/25. Budapest: Central European University.

———. 2008. "On the Margins of Two States: Flexible Self-identification Strategies of Bulgarian Muslims in Spain." *Www.migrationonline.cz*. http://aa.ecn.cz/img_upload/6334c0c7298d6b396d213ccd19be5999/NDeneva_PomaksInSpain.pdf.

———. 2010. "Bulgares Musulmans En Espagne: La Stratégie Du Double Nom Pour Contourner La Catégorie." *Migrations Société* 22 (128): 131–144.

Dornfeld, Barry. 2002. "Putting American Public Television in Its Place." In *Media Worlds: Anthropology on New Terrain*, 247–263. Berkely, CA: University of California Press.

Dwyer, Peter, and Dimitris Papadimitriou. 2006. "The Social Security Rights of Older International Migrants in the European Union." *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 32 (8): 1301–1319.

Elchinova, Magdalena. 2001. "Ethnic Discourse and Group Presentation in Modern Bulgarian Society." *Development and Society* 30 (1): 51–78.

Eminov, Ali. 2007. "Social Construction of Identities: Pomaks in Bulgaria." *Jemie*.

Evergeti, V., and E. Zontini. 2006. "Introduction: Some Critical Reflections on Social Capital, Migration and Transnational Families." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 29 (6): 1025–1039.

Faist, Thomas. 2001. "Social Citizenship in the European Union: Nested Membership." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 39 (1): 37–58.

Faraday, George. 2000. *Revolt of the Filmmakers: The Struggle for Artistic Autonomy and the Fall of the Soviet Film Industry*. Post-Communist Cultural Studies. State College: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Ganga, Deianira. 2006. "From Potential Returnees into Settlers: Nottingham's Older Italians." *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 32 (8): 1395–1413.

Ganti, Tejaswini. 2002. "'And yet My Heart Is Still Indian': The Bombay Film Industry and the (H) Indianization of Hollywood»." In *Media Worlds: Anthropology on New Terrain*, ed. Faye D Ginsburg, Lila Abu-Lughod, and Brian Larkin, 281–300. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Gardner, Katy. 2002. *Age, Narrative and Migration: The Life Course and Life Histories of Bengali Elders in London*. Oxford: Berg Publishers.

Gardner, Katy, and Ralph Grillo. 2002. "Transnational Households and Ritual: An Overview." *Global Networks* 2 (3): 179–190.

van der Geest, Sjaak, Anke Mul, and Hans Vermeulen. 2004. "Linkages Between Migration and the Care of Frail Older People: Observations from Greece, Ghana and The Netherlands." *Ageing & Society* 24 (3): 431–450.

Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Georgiev, Velichko, and Stayko Trifonov. 1995. *Покръстването На Българите Мохамедани 1912-1913 : Документи [The Christianization of the Bulgarian Mohammedans 1912-1013: Documents]*. Sofia: Academichno Izdatelstvo Marin Drinov.

Georgieva, Tsvetana. 2001. "Pomaks: Muslim Bulgarians." *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations* 12 (3): 303–316.

Gillespie, Marie. 1995. *Television, Ethnicity, and Cultural Change*. Comedia (Routledge, London). London: Routledge.

Ginsburg, F. 1991. "Indigenous Media: Faustian Contract or Global Village?" *Cultural Anthropology* 6 (1): 92–112.

———. 1997. "From Little Things, Big Things Grow: Indigenous Media and Cultural Activism." Ed. R. Fox and O. Starn. *Between Resistance and Revolution: Cultural Politics and Social Protest*: 118–44.

Ginsburg, Faye D, Lila Abu-Lughod, and Brian Larkin, eds. 2002. *Media Worlds: Anthropology on New Terrain*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Glenn, Evelyn Nakano. 1992. "From Servitude to Service Work: Historical Continuities in the Racial Division of Paid Reproductive Labor." *Signs* 18 (1): 1–43.

Glick Schiller, Nina. 2005. "Transborder Citizenship: An Outcome of Legal Pluralism Within Transnational Social Fields." In *Mobile People, Mobile Law: Expanding Legal Relations in a Contracting World*, ed. Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, and Anne Griffiths, 27–49. Hants, UK: Ashgate.

Glick Schiller, Nina, and Ayse Caglar. 2008. "'And Ye Shall Possess It, and Dwell Therein': Social Citizenship, Global Christianity, and Non-ethnic Immigrant Incorporation"." In *Citizenship. Political Engagement, and Belonging: Immigrants in Europe and the United States*, ed. Deborah Reed-Danahay and Caroline Brettell, 203–225. Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Gore, Charles. 1997. "Ritual, Performance and Media in Urban Contemporary Shrine Configurations in Benin City, Nigeria." In *Ritual, Performance, Media*, ed. Felicia Hughes-Freeland, 66–84. Routledge.

Grimshaw, Anna. 2001. *The Ethnographer's Eye: Ways of Seeing in Anthropology*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Gruev, Mihail. 2003a. *Между Петолъчката и Полумесеца. Българите Мюсюлмани и Политическият Режим (1944-1959) [Between the Red Star and the Crescent. The Bulgarian Muslims and the Political Regime (1944-1959)]*. Sofia: IK Kota.

———. 2003b. "Българите Мюсюлмани и Политическият Режим 1944-1948 г [The Bulgarian Muslims and the Political Regime of 1944-1948]." *Gofishnik Na SU Sv. Kl. Ohridski. Istoricheski Fakultet* 93-95: 235–291.

Gruev, Mihail, and Aleksei Kalyonski. 2008. *Възродителният Процес. Мюсюлманските Общности и Комунистическият Режим [The Revivial Process. The Muslims Communities and the Communist Regime]*. Sofia: Ciela. about:blank.

Gubrium, Jaber F., James A. Holstein, and David R. Buckholdt. 1994. *Constructing the Life Course*. Dix Hills, NY: General Hall.

Guiraudon, Virginie. 2001. "The Marshallian Triptych Reordered. The Role of Courts and Bureaucracies in Furthering Migrant' Social Rights." In *Immigration and Welfare. Challenging the Borders of the Welfare State.*, ed. Michael Bommes and Andrew Geddes. Vol. 1. London and New York: Routledge.

Gupta, Akhil, and Aradhana Sharma. 2006. "Introduction: Rethinking Theories of the State in an Age of Globalization." In *The Anthropology of the State*, ed. Akhil Gupta and Aradhana Sharma, 1–41. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Habermas, Jurgen. 1994. "Citizenship and National Identity." In *The Condition of Citizenship*, ed. Bart Van Steenbergen. Theory, Culture & Society. London: SAGE Publications.

———. 1998. "The European Nation-state: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship." Trans. C. Cronin. *Public Culture* 10 (2): 397–416.

Hamilton, Annette. 2002. "The National Picture: Thai Media and Cultural Identity." In *Media Worlds: Anthropology on New Terrain*, ed. Faye D Ginsburg, Lila Abu-Lughod, and Brian Larkin, 152–170. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hansen, Thomas Blom, and Finn Stepputat. 2001. "Introduction: States of Imagination." In *States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State*, ed. Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, 1–38. Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press.

Harrison, ML. 1991. "Citizenship, Consumption and Rights: a Comment on BS Turner's Theory of Citizenship." *Sociology* 25 (2): 209–213.

Hazan, Haim. 1992. *Managing Change in Old Age : the Control of Meaning in an Institutional Setting*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Herzfeld, Michael. 1985. *The Poetics of Manhood: Contest and Identity in a Cretanmountain Village*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Himpele, Jeff D. 2002. "Complicity and Media Ethnography in the Bolivian Public Sphere." In *Media Worlds: Anthropology on New Terrain.*, ed. Faye D Ginsburg, Lila Abu-Lughod, and Brian Larkin, 301–319. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Hirsch, Marianne. 1997. *Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Hobsbawm, Eric J. 1992. *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. 2nd Canto ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hochschild, Arlie Russell. 2003. *The Commercialization of Intimate Life: Notes from Home and Work*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Holston, James, and Arjun Appadurai. 1999. "Introduction." In *Cities and Citizenship*, ed. James Holston, 1–17. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Humphrey, Caroline. 2006. "On Being Named and Not Named. Authority, Persons, and Their Names in Mongolia." In *The Anthropology of Names and Naming*, ed. Gabriele Vom Bruck and Barbara Bodenhorn, 158–176. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Isin, Engin F. 2002. *Being Political: Genealogies of Citizenship*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Isin, Engin F., and Greg M. Nielsen, eds. 2008. *Acts of Citizenship*. London, New York: Zed Books.

Jansson, David R. 2003. "Internal Orientalism in America: W.J. Cash's The Mind of the South and the Spatial Construction of American National Identity." *Political Geography* 22 (3) (March): 293–316. doi:10.1016/S0962-6298(02)00098-7.

Jenkins, Richard. 1996. *Social Identity*. Key Ideas. New York: Routledge.

Karagiannis, Evangelos. 1997. *Zur Ethnizitaet Der Pomaken Bulgariens*. Spektrum, Berliner Reihe Zur Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft Und Politik in Entwicklungslaender; 51. Muenster: LIT Verlag.

———. 1999. "An Introduction to the Pomak Issue in Bulgaria." *In and Out of the Collective: Papers on Rural Communities in the Former Soviet Bloc. Virtual Journal* 2. www.ethno.unizh.ch/pdf/Karagiannis/Introduction_Pomak_Issue_Bulgaria.pdf.

———. 2009. "Sieben Thesen Zu Den Pomaken Bulgariens." In *Christen Und Muslime: Interethnische Koexistenz in Südosteuropäischen Periphergebieten*, ed. T. Kahl and C. Lienau, 249–259. Muenster: LIT Verlag. https://www.zora.uzh.ch/26312/.

Karamihova, Margarita. 2003. *Истории От Миналото Към Бъдещето. Устна История, Предания и Обичаи На Етнически Малцинства в България [Stoires Fom the Past to the Present. Oral History, Legends and Rites of the Ethnic Minorities in Bulgaira]*. Sofia: Fondatsia "Balkanski kolezhi."

Karim, Karim H. 1998. *"From Ethnic Media to Global Media: Transnational Communication Networks Among Diasporic Communities" WPTC-99-02*. University of Oxford. Transnational Communities Programme.

Karp, David A., William C. Yoels, and Jeffrey Michael Clair. 1982. *Experiencing the Life Cycle: A Social Psychology of Aging*. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publisher.

Keane, Webb. 1997. *Signs of Recognition: Powers and Hazards of Representation in an Indonesian Society*. Berkeley, CA: Univ of California Press.

Kiel, Machiel. 1998. "Разпространение На Исляма в Българското Село През Османската Епоха (XV-XVIII В.): Колонизация и Ислямизация. [Spreading of Islam in the Bulgarian Village During the Ottoman Period (15th-18th Century): Colonisation and Islamisation]." In *Musulmanskata Kultura Po Bulgarksite Zemi. Izsledvania*, ed. Rositsa Gradeva and Svetlana Ivanova, 82–. Sofia: IMIR.

King, Russell, Tony Warnes, and Allan Williams. 2000. *Sunset Lives: British Retirement Migration to the Mediterranean*. Berg Publishers.

Kingfisher, Catherine. 2002. *Western Welfare in Decline: Globalization and Women's Poverty*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Kofman, Eleonore. 2012. "Rethinking Care Through Social Reproduction: Articulating Circuits of Migration." *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society* 19 (1) (March 1): 142–162.

Koinova, Maria. 1999. "Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Bulgaria." *South-East Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs* (2): 147–158.

Konstantinov, Yulian. 1992a. "An Account of Pomak Conversions in Bulgaria (1912-1990)." In *Minderheitenfragen in Südosteuropa*, ed. Gerhard Seewann, 343–359. Muenchen: Suedost-Institut, R. Oldeburg Verlag.

———. 1992b. "Nation-State" and 'Minority' Types of Discourse–Problems of Communication Between the Majority and the Islamic Minorities in Contemporary Bulgaria." *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Sciences* 5 (3): 75–89.

———. 1997. "Strategies for Sustaining a Vulnerable Identity." In *Muslim Identity and the Balkan State*, ed. Hugh Poulton and Suha Taji-Farouki, 33–53. London: C. Hurst.

Kosnick, Kira. 2000. "Building Bridges: Media for Migrants and the Public-service Mission in Germany." *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 3 (3): 319–342.

Kuhn, Annette. 2002. *Family Secrets: Acts of Memory and Imagination*. London and New York: Verso.

Lave, J. 1979. "Cycles and Trends in Krikat´ı Naming Practices." In *Dialectical Societies: The Gê and Bororo of Central Brazil*, ed. D. Maybury-Lewis and J. Bamberger. Vol. 1. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ Press.

Laz, Cheryl. 1998. "Act Your Age." *Sociological Forum* 13 (1): 85–113.

Levitt, Peggy. 2001. *The Transnational Villagers*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Levitt, Peggy, and Nina Glick Schiller. 2004. "Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society." *International Migration Review* 38 (3): 1002–1039.

Levitt, Peggy, and Rafael De La Dehesa. 2003. "Transnational Migration and the Redefinition of the State: Variations and Explanations." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 26 (4): 587–611.

Lister, Ruth. 1998. "Citizenship on the Margins: Citizenship, Social Work and Social Action." *European Journal of Social Work* 1 (1): 5–18.

Lowenthal, David. 1985. *The Past Is a Foreign Country*. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press.

Lutz, Helma. 2010. "Gender in the Migratory Process." *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 36 (10): 1647–1663.

Lutz, Helma, ed. 2007. *Migration and Domestic Work: A European Perspective on a Global Theme*. Studies in Migration and Diaspora. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.

MacDougall, David. 1998. *Transcultural Cinema*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Mann, Michael. 1987. "Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship." *Sociology* 21 (3): 339–354.

Marcus, George E., ed. 1997. *Cultural Producers in Perilous States: Editing Events, Documenting Change*. Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press.

Marshall, T. H. 1965. *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development*. Anchor Books A432. Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday.

Massey, David. 1999. "International Migration at the Dawn of the Twenty-first Century: The Role of the State." *Population and Development Review* 25 (2): 303–322.

Mazzucato, Valentina. 2008. "Transnational Reciprocity: Ghanaian Migrants and the Care of Their Parents Back Home." In *Generations in Africa: Connections and Conflicts*, ed. Erdmute Alber, Sjaak Van Der Geest, and Susan R. Whyte, 111–133. Münster, Germany: Lit Verlag.

McLagan, Meg. 2002. "Spectacles of Difference: Cultural Activism and the Mass Mediation of Tibet." In , 90–111. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Mead, Lawrence M. 1986. *Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship*. New York: Free Press.

Mihaylova, Dimitrina. 2003. "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Pomak Identities at the Border Between Bulgaria and Greece." *Focaal. The European Journal of Anthropology* (41): 45–57.

———. 2006. "Social Suffering and Political Protest: Mapping Emotions and Power Among Pomaks in Postsocialist Bulgaria." In *Postsocialism: Politics and Emotions in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Maruška Svašek, 53–73. Berghahn Books.

Misra, J., J. Woodring, and S. N Merz. 2006. "The Globalization of Care Work: Neoliberal Economic Restructuring and Migration Policy." *Globalizations* 3 (3): 317–332.

Moore, Sally Falk. 1975. "Epilogue: Uncertainty in Situations: Indeterminacies in Culture." In *Symbol and Politics in Communal Ideology: Cases and Questions*, 210–239. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.

Mutafchieva, Vera. 1994. "Образът На Турците [The Image of the Turks]." In *Vruzki Na*

      Suvmestimost i Nesuvmestimost Mezhdu Christiani i Musulmani v Bulgaria, ed. Petar-Emil

      Mitev, 5–35. Sofia.

Neuburger, Mary. 2000a. "Pomak Borderlands: Muslims on the Edge of the Nation."

      Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity 28 (1): 181–198.

      doi:10.1080/00905990050002506.

———. 2000b. "Veils, Shalvari, and Matters of Dress: Unravelling the Fabric of Women's Lives

      in Communist Bulgaria'." In *Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-*

      War Eastern Europe, ed. Susan E. Reid and David Crowley, 169–188. Oxford: Berg.

———. 2004. *The Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiationof Nationhood in*

      Modern Bulgaria. 1st ed. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.

Neugarten, Bernice L. 1974. "Age Groups in American Society and the Rise of the Young-Old."

      The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 415 (1): 187–198.

———. 1996. *The Meanings of Age: Selected Papers*. 1st ed. Chicago, IL: University Of

      Chicago Press.

Olwig, Karen Fog. 1999. "Narratives of the Children Left Behind: Home and Identity in

      Globalised Caribbean Families." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 25 (2): 267–284.

———. 2002. "A Wedding in the Family: Home Making in a Global Kin Network." *Global*

      Networks 2 (3): 205–218.

Ong, Aihwa. 1999. *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality*. Durham, N.C:

      Duke University Press.

———. 2003. *Buddha Is Hiding: Refugees, Citizenship, the New America*. California Series in

      Public Anthropology 5. Berkeley: University of California Press.

———. 2006a. *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship Andsovereignty*. Durham,

    N.C.: Duke University Press.

———. 2006b. *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship Andsovereignty*. Durham

    [N.C.]: Duke University Press.

Østergaard-Nielsen, Eva. 2003a. *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions,*

    Policies, and Transnational Relations. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

———. 2003b. *Transnational Politics: Turks and Kurds in Germany*. Transnationalism.

    Routledge Research in Transnationalism 8. London: Routledge.

Parrenas, Rhacel. 2001. *Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration and Domestic Work*.

    Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.

Pérez Orozco, Amaia. 2009. "Global Perspectives on the Social Organization of Care in Times of

    Crisis: Assessing the Situation." In *Gender, Migration and Development Series*. Working

    Paper 5. Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: INSTRAW.

Peterson, V. Spike. 2010. "Global Householding Amid Global Crises." *Politics & Gender* 6 (2):

    271–281.

Petty, Sheila. 1992. "African Cinema and (Re)education: Using Recent African Feature Films."

    Issue: A Journal of Opinion 20 (2): 26–30.

Philipsen, Hans Henrik, and Brigitte Markussen, eds. 1995. *Advocacy and Indigenous Film-*

    Making. Left Coast Press, Inc.

Pierson, Christopher. 1994. *Beyond the Welfare State?: The New Political Economy of Welfare*.

    Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Pilbrow, Tim. 1997. "The Nation and Its Margins: Negotiating A National Identity in Post-1989

    Bulgaria." *The Anthropology of East Europe Review* 15 (2). Newsletter of the East

European Anthropology Group.

http://condor.depaul.edu/~rrotenbe/aeer/aeer15_2.html#Pilbrow.

Pine, Frances. 2002. "Retreat to the Household? Gendered Domains in Postsocialist Poland." In
Postsocialism: Ideals, Ideologies and Practice in Eurasia, ed. Chris M. Hann, 95–113.
London: Routledge.

Pink, Sarah. 1998. "From Ritual Sacrifice to Media Commodity. Anthropological and Media
Constructions of the Spanish Bulfight and the Rise of Women Performers." In *Ritual,
Performance, Media*, ed. Felicia Hughes-Freeland, 121–140. London and New York:
Routledge.

———. 2001. *Doing Visual Ethnography: Images, Media, and Representation in Research*.
London: Sage Publications.

Prins, Harold E. L. 1997. "The Paradox of Primitivism: Native Rights and the Problem of
Imagery in Cultural Survival Films." *Visual Anthropology-quarterly-* 9 (304): 243–266.

Procacci, Giovanna. 2001. "Poor Citizens: Social Citizenship Versus Individualization of
Welfare." In *Citizenship, Markets and the State*, ed. Colin Crouch, Klaus Eder, and Damien
Tambini, 49–68. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pyle, Jean. 2006. "Globalization and the Increase in Transnational Care Work: The Flip Side."
Globalizations 3 (3): 297–315.

Radushev, Evgenii. 2005. *Помаците : Християнство и Ислям в Западните Родопи с
Долината На Р. Места, XV-30-те Г. На XVIII В. [Pomaks: Christianity and Islam in
the Western Rhodope Mountain with the Mesta Valley, 15th-18th Century]*. Vol. I. II vols.
Sofia: NBKM.

Rose, Nikolas. 1996. "The Death of the Social? Re-figuring the Territory of Government."
Economy and Society 25 (3): 327–356.

Ruby, Jay. 1991. "Speaking For, Speaking About, Speaking With, or Speaking Alongside-An
Anthropological and Documentary Dilemma." *Visual Anthropology Review* 7 (2): 50–67.

Saunders, Peter. 1993. "Citizenship in a Liberal Society." In *Citizenship and Social Theory*, ed.
Bryan S Turner. Politics and Culture (London, England). London: SAGE Publications.

Schein, Louisa. 2000. *Minority Rules: The Miao and the Feminine in China's Cultural Politics*.
Duke University Press.

Scheper-Hughes, Nancy. 1992. *Death Without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil*.
Berkeley: University of California Press.

Scott, James C., John Tehranian, and Jeremy Mathias. 2002. "The Production of Legal Identities
Proper to States: The Case of the Permanent Family Surname." *Comparative Studies in
Society and History* 44 (01): 4–44. doi:10.1017/S0010417502000026.

Shishkov, Stoyu. 1936. *Българо-мохамеданите (Помаци) : Исторически-земеписен и
Народоучен Преглед с Образи [The Bulgarian Mohammedans (Pomaks)]*. Sofia: Sibia.

Simmel, Georg. 1908. "The Stranger." In *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, ed. Kurt H. Wolff.
New York, NY: Free Press.

Somers, Margaret. 2008. *Genealogies of Citizenship: Knowledge, Markets, and the Right to Have
Rights*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu. 1994. *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership
in Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sreberny-Mohammadi, A., and Annabelle Mohammadi. 1994. *Small Media, Big Revolution:
Communication, Culture, and the Iranian Revolution*. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.

Sreberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle, Dwayne Winseck, Jim McKenna, and Oliver Boyd-Barrett, eds. 1997. *Media in Global Context: Reader*. Foundations in Media. London: Edward Arnold.

Strathern, Marilyn. 1988. *The Gender of the Gift: Problems with Women and Problemswith Society in Melanesia*. Studies in Melanesian Anthropology 6. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Todorova, M. 1998. "Identity (trans) Formation Among Bulgarian Muslims. U: Crawford Beverly and Ronnie D." *Lipschutz (ur.) The Myth of'Ethnic Conflict': Politics, Economics, And'cultural'violence, Berkeley: University of California, Research Series* 98.

Todorova, Maria. 1998. "Identity (trans) Formation Among Bulgarian Muslims." In *The Myth of "Ethnic Conflict": Politics, Economics, and "Cultural" Violence*, ed. Beverly Crawford and Ronnie D. Lipschitz, 471–510. University of California INternational and Area Studies Digital Collection.

Tomova, Ilona. 2000. "Социална Промяна и Етнорелигиозни Отношения [Social Change and Ethnoreligious Relations]." In *Susedstvo Na Religioznite Obshnosti v Bulgaria*, ed. Georgi Fotev, 171–269. Sofia: Institut po Sociologia. BAN.

Torres, Sandra. 2006. "Elderly Immigrants in Sweden: 'Otherness' Under Construction." *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 32 (8): 1341–1358.

Trouillot, Michel‐Rolph. 2001. "The Anthropology of the State in the Age of Globalization: Close Encounters of the Deceptive Kind." *Current Anthropology* 42 (1) (February 1): 125–138.

Turner, Terence. 1992. "Defiant Images: The Kayapo Appropriation of Video." *Anthropology Today* 8 (6) (December): 5–16. doi:10.2307/2783265.

Turner, Victor Witter. 1969. *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure*. Cornell
  Paperbacks. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.

Velinov, Alexander. 2000. "Аспекти На Българската Политика Спрямо
  Българомохамеданите (1912-1944) [Aspects of the Bulgarian Politics Towards the
  Bulgrian-Mohammedans (1912-1944)]." *Istoricheski Pregled* LVI (1-2): 134–150.

———. 2001. "Religiöse Identität Im Zeitalter Des Nationalismus". PhD Dissertation,
  Köln,Universität, Philosophische Fakultät. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?
  idn=964992671&dok_var=d1&dok_ext=pdf&filename=964992671.pdf.

Vertovec, Steven. 2000. *"Fostering Cosmopolitanisms: A Conceptual Survey and a Media
  Experiment in Berlin" WPTC-2K-06*. Working Paper. Transnational Communities
  Programme. Oxford, UK: Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology.

Warnes, Anthony. 1992. "Migration and the Life-Course." In *Migration Processes and Patterns:
  Research Progress and Prospects*, ed. Anthony Fielding and Anthony Champion, 1:175–
  187. London: Belhaven Press.

Warnes, Anthony M., and Allan Williams. 2006. "Older Migrants in Europe: A New Focus for
  Migration Studies." *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 32 (8): 1257–1281.

Watson, Rubie S. 1986. "The Named and the Nameless: Gender and Person in Chinese Society."
  American Ethnologist 13 (4): 619–631.

Weatherford, E. 1990. "Native Visions: The Growth of Indigenous Media." *Aperture* 1 (119): 58.

Wilding, R. 2007. "Transnational Ethnographies and Anthropological Imaginings of Migrancy."
  Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33 (2): 331–348.

Wimmer, Andreas, and Nina Glick Schiller. 2002. "Methodological Nationalism and Beyond:
  Nation–state Building, Migration and the Social Sciences." *Global Networks* 2 (4): 301–
  334.

Wolbert, Barbara. 2001. "The Visual Production of Locality: Turkish Family Pictures, Migration
and the Creation of Virtual Neighborhood." *Visual Anthropology Review* 17 (1): 21–35.
doi:10.1525/var.2001.17.1.21.

———. 2008. "Ein Fest Fuer Die Kamera: Hochzeitvideos and Virtuelle Nachbarschaften." In
*Evet - Ja, Ich Will. Hochzeitkultur Und Mode Von 1800 Bis Heute: Eine Deutsch-turkische
Begegnung*, ed. Wolfgang Weick, Alfried Wieczoreck, Gisela Framke, and Petra Hesse-
Mohr. Vol. Band 33. Mannheim, Germany: Reiss-Eingelhorn Museen.

Yahirun, Jenjira. 2009. "Take Me 'Home': Determinants of Return Migration Among Germany's
Elderly Immigrants." In *UC Los Angeles: California Center for Population Research.*
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/1rp64439.

Zhelyazkova, Antonina. 1990. *Разпространение На Исляма в Западнобалканските Земи Под
Османска Власт XV-XVIII в [Spreading of the Islam in the Western Balkans Under
Ottoman Ruel 15th-18th Century]*. Sofia: BAN.

Zhelyazkova, Antoninna. 1997. "Формиране На Мюсюлманските Общности и Комплексите
На Балканските Историографии [The Formation of the Muslims Communities and the
Complexes of the Balkans Historiographies]." In *Musulmanskite Obshnosti Na Balkanite*,
ed. Antonina Zhelyazkova, Bozhidar Alexiev, and Zhorzheta Nazurska. Sofia: IMIR.