

# **DO THEY COUNT? – THE IMPACT OF THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT ON WELFARE POLICIES IN HUNGARY**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The rise of the populist radical right parties in Europe was notable in the last couple of years. In Hungary the radical party managed to gain significant amount of mandates on the last elections. Their sudden arrival certainly affected the policy making in the country despite the fact that the governing center-right party had absolute majority. The question the thesis is trying to address is how the radical right affected welfare policymaking, particularly the public utility work schemes. I will try answer this question with help of the deservingness criteria theory and analysis of party manifestos of the two right wing parties in Hungary.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

CMP – Comparative Manifesto Project

FIDESZ – Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége/ Free Alliance of Young Democrats

KDNP – Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt / Christian Democratic People’s Party

LMP – Lehet Más a Politika / Politics Can Be Different

MIÉP- Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja / Hungarian Justice and Life Party

MSZP – Magyar Szocialista Párt / Hungarian Socialist Party

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## INTRODUCTION

The recent years in the European political field brought a lot of change and turned a lot of things around on the continent. Policy makers are faced with relatively new economic and political challenges. One of these notable changes in continent's politics is the rise of the populist radical right. In many cases, these parties managed to gain seats in parliaments or even become governing parties. The trend started earlier in 80's, 90's and many researchers tried to find answers for this political phenomenon. Most of them concluded that despite the wide range of variety there are certain elements that exist in most of these parties, and they belong to the same party family. These elements are namely authoritarianism, and the share of anti-immigration ideas (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Norris 2005; Mudde 2007; Bíró Nagy, et al. 2011)<sup>1</sup>.

The impact of populist radical right also resulted changes in connection to different policies, especially in connection to integration and immigration. Parties from both left and right were affected by the rise of the radical right that resulted important changes in policy outputs. However, it is important to note that most of the researches are mainly focusing on the Western European context and only a few include the Eastern part of the continent. Furthermore, these articles are mainly comparative researches using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The case that I am choosing is from Eastern Europe, since, there is less focus on this region (Mudde 2007, 3).

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<sup>1</sup>Clearly these books, articles are not the only ones dealing with the topic. The radical right party family is one of the most researched one and many comparative studies were created about them (Mudde 2007, 2-3). Without striving for completeness the thesis will try to cite the most relevant ones.

The rise of the populist radical right is also notable in Hungary. However, until the appearance of the Jobbik the radical right didn't make a significant impact in the Hungarian politics, since the system transition in 1989. The only party that could pass the electoral threshold was the MIÉP in the 1998. However, their impact was rather small. They were not part of the government, but with most of their parliamentary decisions they supported the ruling forces. Nevertheless, the party was suffering from internal conflicts and could not gain enough votes to pass the threshold on the next elections.

Jobbik on the other hand was capable to suddenly gain a lot of attention. Their first electoral success was in 2009 when they gained almost 15% and 3 seats on European Parliament elections. This was a huge surprise since most of the preliminary polls couldn't predict their success (Karácsony and Róna 2010, 31-32). During the upcoming general elections in 2010 Jobbik managed to improve its position and become a significant member of the legislation. They received almost 17% of the votes that resulted 47 mandates in the Hungarian National Assembly. Since then they didn't lose from their popularity and managed to keep their polls around 10% among the whole population and way above 10% among the certain party supporters (TÁRKI 2012) They became a possible choice for many people, since they offered a relatively new approach in several questions (Tóth and Grajczjár 2011, 62).

The growth of the radical right certainly affected the policy agenda in Hungary as well. However, there is an important difference compared to many European countries. One party managed to gain enough power to change the whole political set up. FIDESZ<sup>2</sup>, the center-right political power gained office with a 2/3 majority in

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<sup>2</sup>During the 2010 election FIDESZ ran on the election with the christian democratic party called KDNP. They formed an election union which means that most of their candidates were nominated by both parties. After the election they decided to form different fractions, but most of the decisions are still

2010. The aim of the thesis is to highlight the welfare changes in the country in this political set up. Consequently, my research question is: *how did the Hungarian radical right impact welfare policy in Hungary, despite the super majority of the governing party?* To answer this question, the thesis will analyze the parties' policy recommendations in their manifestos. Further on, the thesis will contain certain welfare state policy changes that occurred in the recent years and show how do the parties in Hungary relate to these reforms. This research due to the length is unable to observe the full welfare system and its transitions of the country. Therefore the focus will be mainly on the policies that target the unemployed.

The main reason for this particular choice of welfare policy is because the unemployed are one of the social groups that are mostly affected by the economic crisis. Hungary once again is no exception; the growth of unemployment in the last couple years was steady. Secondly, it is easy to identify who are the beneficiaries and who are excluded from the unemployment schemes. This is an important aspect, since I will try to use the literature about the deservingness of welfare states to understand the policy changes in Hungary. The reason to use this sort of analysis is because I believe that the question of "who deserves what" will be in an important aspect similarly to Western European immigration policies. I share the argument of some scholars who agree that the anti-immigration in West Europe and xenophobia in East can be similar (Bíró Nagy et al. 2011, 8) (Mudde 2007, 139).

The thesis will focus on a 2 years span including the 2010 election era, until 2012. The first part of the analysis that focuses mainly on the parties will include a short preface, which helps to understand the political debates of the elections. Later, in this part I will turn to the parties' manifestos and their welfare policy options. In this

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made by FIDESZ. Therefore to not confuse this alliance with other ones happened in the history I will simply use FIDESZ when referring to the governing forces.



section I will use the Jobbik's manifesto as a reference point to see where do FIDESZ land on the left-right scale when it comes to supporting the unemployed. The second part will include the focus on the output. In order to understand further development, it is important to see how the legislation operated in this question in the last 2 years of the center-right government. Therefore I will observe parliament activity and legislations as well.

## CHAPTER 1 - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

### 1.1 Terminology

Before further going on, it is important to understand the classifications of these parties, since many times it is mingled up. To do this I will use the terms Cas Mudde (2007) is using in his book. He highlights several important features that can help distinguish between the parties. The first is nationalism that exists to some degree in every right-wing party. If they are opposing immigration, or any other ethnic group their ideology is xenophobic. If these two ideologies exist in a party, Mudde classifies them as 'nativist', because they only want people to live on their soil who belong to the same nation. The following feature is authoritarianism, which not necessarily means anti-democratic ideology. It constitutes more as a 'law and order' type of approach that includes a 'punitive conventional moralism' as well. Mudde classifies this level as 'radical'. The following element is the anti-democratic ideology. These groups targeted the current democratic regimes, and they believe in changing them. Consequently, to achieve their goals they use extreme active measures that sometimes evolves to violent actions. The author classifies them as 'extreme or far right'. Mudde also deals with the party classification of 'populist' as well. He highlights that the term populist is mainly used to distinguish between the 'popular' and 'far-right, extremist' groups. His book primarily focuses on these populist and radical right parties and doesn't include the extremist or in other name far right groups. Therefore, he uses the term 'populist radical right parties' to classify this party family (Mudde 2007, 20-26). Following Mudde's terms and the personal identification of the party Jobbik, I will primarily use the radical right or populist radical right concepts.

## ***1.2 Literature on the Populist Radical Right and their impact***

A political trend all over the world as mentioned above is the growth of the radical and populist right parties. Unlike the economic crisis that happened suddenly, the rise of these political associations started earlier, but their ascent became more and more visible in the last couple of years. In many cases they managed to gain more than 10% on the general elections and five of them became a governing party since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century in Western Europe (Norris 2005, Akkerman 2012, 511-515). These electoral successes of the populist right certainly influenced policymaking. Also, the competitiveness they generated likely changed the political discourse on different fields.

Many researches have already focused on the Western European populist radical right parties and their electoral support (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, Swank and Betz 2003, Jesuit et al. 2009, Veugeliers and Magnan 2005). These important studies tried to find a relationship between the growths of the radical right and the level of unemployment, social capital or immigration. The findings however are in some cases contradictory. It seems that the ‘losers of modernization’ are voting for these parties in some countries and that these parties are trying to fill in a gap in the political spectrum. They mainly do this by focusing on a combination of a few policy issues that makes certain citizens vote for them.

Some of these policies are integration and immigration policies, since in most of the cases the populist radical right parties try to set their agenda along these themes. The question of immigration can easily shuffle the political spectrum up. In this case it is hard to predict where the non-radical right parties will position themselves. Commonly, the classical left-right approach can loosen up and parties end up being

on the opposite side in connection to immigration policies. Moreover, political competitors will likely to pick a position that is the most advantageous for them and they will be less divided in this field. This theory however is not completely supported by evidence, since it is still unclear how immigration and integration is for the parties and how do they relate to different forms. (Odmalm 2012, 16-18).

Another author, van Spanje in his recent work (2011) is focusing on how radical right parties change the political competition and how they impact other parties. More precisely, he concentrated on immigration policies and how do other parties react if an anti-immigration party appears. First of all, he found evidence that if an anti-immigration party becomes more successful, the other parties will be opposing immigration. On the other hand, far left (communist) and green parties will less likely be against immigration. Governing parties tend to be less restrictive as well, since they have less room to maneuver and the voting-maximizing force doesn't affect them as much. Rightist parties however will likely be more restrictive with migrants, but the anti-immigrant parties will compete with left and right parties as well. (van Spanje 2010, 563-569).

Therefore the impact of the radical right parties is clear and we can distinguish between direct and indirect effects. The indirect effect is the above mentioned electoral pressure which effects both center-right and social democratic parties. According to Akkerman (2012) the indirect impact is more visible at the center-right parties, because the populist radical right can lure their voters more easily. (Akkerman 2012, 513). As also mentioned above, the social democratic parties are pressured as well, however they adapt differently to this situation. The tendency of stricter integration and immigration policies is visible on the left as well, but it is not as simple as in the case of the right. They are balancing between different policy

options, trying to stick with their general values, but trying to also keep up with other parties. In other words, leftist parties are not only impacted by the radical right, but by other political forces, like the center-right or liberals (Bale et al. 2010, 422-423).

Also it is important to mention the direct impact of the radical right that is more recognizable if they manage to gain office. In this case it is unclear how they influence policies, but it is clear that the direct effect is not as great. They are not as ready to be part of the government as other classical parties. Populist radical right parties are missing important organizational background as well to make significant direct impact. Therefore one can make the assumption that the populist radical right parties can make a bigger impact if they stay in opposition. (Akkerman 2010, 513-51; Mudde 2007, 281).

As mentioned earlier, most of the above cited researches are focusing on the Western European perspective. At the same time, some researchers focused on the Eastern context. In comparison to the West it is even harder to identify similarities between the countries in the East. Mudde (2007) finds that Eastern European parties tend to be more nationalistic and have ties to racist groups. Moreover, the biggest difference between Eastern and Western European populist radical right is in their economic policy difference. In East these parties tend to have a more a leftist, in many cases demagogic economic policy, while in West the focus is more on the free market concept (Kitschelt and Bustikova 2009; Mudde 2007, 130-132).

Finally, it is also important to note that some scholars are not agreeing on to use the same party family categorization of the Eastern European radical right parties as in Western Europe. Their main claim is that in East the parties are functioning on more movement based ideology, rather than functioning as political parties. Also they found ideological differences and they claim that most of these groups were never

really successful (Eatwell 2003, 53; Minkenberg 2002, 361-362). However, one can argue that their findings were not necessarily the objects of the populist radical right parties, but more like extremist groups. Also, the Eastern part of the continent changed significantly after these articles were made in the last 5-6 years. For example the Slovakian party, SNS managed to become a governing force in 2006, or Jobbik's success didn't happen until 2009-2010. Therefore, I share Mudde's argument that the populist radical parties in Eastern Europe can be classified in the same party family as the ones in West (Mudde 2007, 4).

### **1.3 Literature on Deservingness Criteria**

An important element of the analysis I will use is the deservingness criteria of welfare states. This section will try to summarize the most important literature created in this topic. One of the most significant scholars in this topic is van Oorschot (2000). The author is focusing on welfare policies and trying to find the answer to the question of "who should get what and why". He primarily concentrated on the Netherlands, where he created a criterion that is based on previous findings on conditions of welfare states. The criterion is based on how the public might perceive certain social groups (van Oorschot 2000, 35-37). The elements are the following:

1. *Control*: The level of control of a group's own situation. If it is outside of the their control the public will perceive them as a group that deserves more
2. *Need*: The level of support is needed for the group. If the group needs more help, the more will deserve more
3. *Identity*: The level of moral closeness of a group to the majority. If the groups are far in identity they deserve less

4. *Attitude*: The group's reaction to support. If they are thankful and complying more they deserve more

5. *Reciprocity*: The level of contribution to the system. If a group already or going to pay its contribution they deserve more (van Oorschot, 2000, 36)

Van Oorschot also gives two group examples for better understanding how the criteria work. The following table contains the details:

**1. Table:** Group examples to van Oorschot's deservingness criteria

	<b>Elderly</b>	<b>Unemployed</b>
<b>1. Control</b>	A person can't control aging	Common argument that everyone can find a job, so they are in control of their situation
<b>2. Need</b>	The support is needed, especially in advanced age	If they are in control, they need less support
<b>3. Identity</b>	Everyone feels them close, because everyone will become old at one point or has an old relative	They are usually represent a small percent of the society, therefore they distant from the majority
<b>4. Attitude</b>	The elderly are generally under demanding	Most of them complain about welfare assistance, so their attitude is not appreciated
<b>5. Reciprocity</b>	Most of them already paid its contribution at active age as taxes	They can only contribute if they work.

Source: (van Oorschot, Who should get what, and why? On deservingness criteria and the conditionality of solidarity among the public 2000, 35-37)

The comparison of the two groups reveals that in most circumstances the elderly are going to have a higher level of deservingness and as a result they will likely have wider welfare assistance. Policy makers will also reflect to these public perceptions as well. Consequently, they will formulate the welfare policies to be in line with these attitudes and support those who are perceived to deserve more.

Later, van Oorschot (2006) conducted another research on a larger sample that contained 23 countries. He wanted know how the elderly, the unemployed, the immigrants and sick/disabled are perceived. He found out that Eastern and Central European countries have high conditional solidarity with the exception of Slovenia. From this sample Hungary was the least solid with the highest deservingness perception for the elderly. Out of the other groups the sick and disabled were close to the elders, while the unemployed and the immigrants took up the other side of the criteria.

Later, Larsen (2006) developed Van Oorschot's theory. He shows through a cross-country analysis that the deservingness criteria have institutional implications as well. Three dimensions are identified that affect the deservingness. One is the degree of job opportunities and the institutional set up that try to overcome the growing unemployment caused by the transition to post-industrialization. If the problem of unemployment was tackled and people started to have jobs, the perception of the unemployed was that they less deserve assistance, because they are in control of their situation. Secondly, the economic difference between the rich and the poor also had implication on deservingness. If the distance is too big between them they won't share a common identity and the majority can easily disclose the other group. Thirdly, the universalism of the redistribution system matters as well. If a set up constitutes as universal every group will receive some sort of assistance, therefore they will be close in identity. Therefore everyone will also share the same attitude about the system, and the question of reciprocity not going to appear. Finally, Larsen found out that his cross-country findings are in line with the classical Esping-Andersen's (1990) regime types and can be classified as socialist, conservative or liberal.



### **1.4 Hypothesis**

As mentioned in the introduction the aim of the thesis is to show why can the populist radical right influenced welfare policies in Hungary. Following the above cited theories and researches about deservingness my main assumptions are the following:

(1) Coming from the research question, I assume that the populist radical right impacted the welfare policies. Van Spanje finds that due to entrance of the radical right the rightist parties also become more restrictive (van Spanje 2010, 564) This also goes in line with the claim of Akkerman (2012, 513) who states that the center-right parties go along to some degree with the radicals, to keep their votes.

(2) Secondly, using the deservingness criteria I assume that the radical right will make its impact mainly around the question of “who gets what and why”. From the point of view of the radical right’s deservingness it is a very important question, because of the identity criteria

(3) The two parties will be close in the question of deservingness. The center-right, from its conservative standpoint will likely recommend a stricter, less universal welfare policy. Moreover, the radical right due to its nativist ideology will also have selective policies. The two parties therefore will select certain groups that will be identified as less deserving

### **1.5 Methodology**

To test the above mentioned hypothesizes I will mainly use qualitative methods. The first part of the analysis will try to find evidence to prove the assumptions (2) and (3). This section is going to content and discourse analyze the party manifestos. The content analysis will try to identify the relevance of certain concepts by searching and

comparing their appearance frequency.<sup>3</sup> I also used expert data, and looked at the information collected by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). This raw data looks at the frequency of policy topics in relation to the whole text. It can help either identify the direction or the target of the policies. From the whole dataset I have picked 8 variables that are in relation to welfare policies and policy targets. The meanings for each variable are explained in the Appendix 1 of the thesis. The second part of the research will contain the analysis of the policy changes of the public utility work schemes. A series of significant transformations were made that can help understand more about the policy ways of the government. In order to see the evaluation of the radical right as well, I will look at the parliamentary activity of Jobbik in connection to the newly introduced public utility work schemes.

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<sup>3</sup> Researched concepts that can help identifying the policy direction: labor, state, enterprise, public utility work.

Researched concepts that can help identifying policy target groups: employer, employee, unemployed, people living with disabilities, families with children, people living in rural areas, poor/indigent, elderly

## CHAPTER 2—POLICIES IN THE PARTY MANIFESTOS

### ***2.1 Preface to the 2010 election***

This section of the thesis will be collection of events that preceded the 2010 general elections. Important political and social policy changes happened that highly framed the discussions on labor market policies. The year 2006 brought a lot of scandals in the Hungarian public life. MSZP, the social democratic party won its second term, but they lost popularity shortly after. The preceding years spending policies created a situation when significant cutbacks had to be introduced by the government. Also not long before the municipal election, a prime minister's speech was leaked to the press, in which he admits to lying during the campaign and wrongfully governing in the previous term.

This situation was enough to start a series of protests in the country, and the rise of the radical right was starting to be more visible. Later, in 2008 a small municipality in Northeast Hungary decided to take measures and introduced regulations in connection to social assistance and public utility works. Their action was simple, yet complicated. Following the mayor's initiative, the village introduced a set of conditions for receiving social aid. The primary rule was to participate in the public utility work formed by the municipality in order to receive any social aid from them. This action gained way to the news very quickly and started many debates in the public sphere. The main arguments were about deservingness and the mayor stated that a long term unemployed shouldn't receive any assistance from the municipality or government if he or she didn't contribute. His slogan was: *"Those who don't work shouldn't be aided!"* (Vizin 2008). Moreover, this issue became an ethnical question as well. The

media was framing this issue as a Roma related case. Also, It was clear that the local mayor was trying to somehow regulate the local Roma community. In addition the Hungarian Parliamentary Commissioner for Minority Rights decided to intervene and investigate the case. He came to the conclusion that this action was an unlawful, unconstitutional act and that it was a typical case of indirect discrimination, since mainly Roma were affected by the regulations (Kállai 2009, 252, 271)

Later, other municipalities joined and created similar rules, and despite the big opposition and warnings about the unlawful regulation, many kept their decisions in charge. The pressure was big on the MSZP government at that point, since ignoring a situation like that would have created serious legal uncertainties. Therefore they decided to comply and put together a policy that gave the opportunity for the municipalities to pay for public utility workers. The program was named “*Way to work!*” (*Út a munkához*) and was based on previous years experience in public utility work policies that were very similar to this one. Its declared goal was to help redirect the long term unemployed back to the labor market. The major change in the system was that it made it mandatory for everyone who received the regular social aid to participate in the program in order to keep receiving it. The program started from 2009, and it didn’t seem to come up to its original expectations. Many people managed to work, but the program seemed to be costly and municipalities still conducted discriminations (Kerstin and Varga 2010, 25-26; Váradi 2010, 79-81).

The policies introduced above tried to somehow solve the problem of people who were stuck in the welfare system with the help of the public work programs. The really new element was the higher level of strictness and the shift from more universal to a more selective system. People who didn’t comply or accept the public utility work were closed out from receiving further aids. This meant a change in the deservingness

and a form of stigmatization has started. A discussion had opened up on who are in need and about whether the recipients of social aid are to blame for their own situation.

As a conclusion, we can state that Hungarian welfare system, particularly the ones directing the unemployed had shifted to a selective system. The public debates showed that many people are on the side of stricter policies to which even the social democratic MSZP had to act on. Later, in 2009 the same mayor, who introduced the regulation about receiving social aid only for public utility workers, came up with the idea to introduce a social card initiative. The main goal was to receive social aid only on a bank card that can only be used to buy food or important necessities, similarly to the food stamps policy in the USA. This initiative had become popular as well and public debates started about deservingness. The parties once again positioned themselves in this question and it was clear at that point that the question about deservingness and welfare policies are going to be inevitable on the 2010 elections.

## ***2.2 Election of 2010 – manifesto analysis***

### **2.2.1 Jobbik**

After the 2009 European parliament elections it was clear that the populist radical party, Jobbik would gain significant amount of votes and seats on the 2010 general elections. Most of the preceding polls showed steady above 10% popularity and despite the higher vote share the party was still disappointed. Their declared goal was to become the strongest opposition power by outgrowing the previously governing MSZP. They didn't reach their goal for several smaller scandals, but as a new runner on the general election their result was very impressive, since they managed to double

their number of voters in less than a year (Bíró Nagy and Róna 2011, 242-243, 275-277).

As mentioned before Jobbik's success probably came from the opportunity that they managed to become an acceptable option in several policy fields. One of their tools was to try and appear in most of the policy fields and develop arguments next to the two bigger parties. According their policy preferences there are 9 identifiable policy fields where they tried to appear the most. These are the following: anticommunism; law and order policies; Roma issue(s); elite opposition; nationalism; religiousness; economic policy; economic globalization; euroscepticism (Bíró Nagy and Róna 2011, 250-252). From these policies clearly the Roma issue is the one that stands out. Despite Jobbik's lower media appearance level, they managed to control this question and become „issue owners” of the debates. Further on, their successes in politicizing the Roma issue lead to their significant electoral success. (Karácsony and Róna 2010, 55-56). The over dominance of this topic however made Jobbik's other policies less visible and in many other questions could not even appear in the media (Bársony, Gyenge and Kovács 2011)

Since the party's only available opportunity to be present in the public discourse was through Roma issues, they had very limited tools to show their policy options. Probably to avoid to be recognized as a one sided, one issue party they were the first ones to come out with their program<sup>4</sup>. They titled it *Radical Change* with the sub-heading *Jobbik's Parliamentary Election Program for the Nation's Autonomy and Social Justice*. Their manifesto contains a wide range of policy fields, probably the most detailed out of all parties competing in 2010. The 88-page document contains 7 chapters with several sub-chapters that are divided to two detailed sections. In every

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<sup>4</sup>According to their website they published the manifesto on the 20th of January in 2010. The first round of the elections was held on 11th of April.  
<http://jobbik.hu/program> (accessed at 30th May, 2012)

recommendation they collect what went wrong in the last 20 years in connection to that particular policy field and the second parts contain their propositions.

The center of attention is clearly on economic and related topics. Almost half of the manifesto is about this theme. Employment policies are mentioned in several parts of the manifesto and it is the primary part of Jobbik's economic policy:

*“Creating jobs is in the focus of Jobbik's employment policy. Based on the diligence of the Hungarian people, politics must restore, both materially and morally, the honor of labor and develop an economic and taxation climate that inspires job creations.”* (Jobbik 2010, 8)

From this few lines several things are visible. First of all it is clear that Jobbik is expecting a big involvement from the side of the political sphere. They base most of their policies on state interventions and expect the government to act to create more jobs. This policy concept also exists along their social policies and it is subordinated to their general employment policies. The primary goal is create more jobs even if it means more state funding or nationalization of previously privatized goods. To reach this goal Jobbik would use the public utility work as one of their primary policy tools. The first mention is in connection to the development of the rural areas in Hungary. Here, they declare that the public utility work programs need to be extended, so the municipalities can use it to improve their infrastructure. In this section they also highlight that it is important to give more opportunity to the unskilled, uneducated and that the state needs to widen the program (Jobbik 2010, 12).

The question about who is entitled to benefit from the public utility work comes in a later stage of the manifesto. Section IV/2. is dealing with social policies in detail,

which is titled „*Solidarity and Responsibility*”. In the preface they highlight that Jobbik imagines a wider contribution from every side of the state (local, county municipalities and central government) and even from churches. They claim that the traditional Western welfare state failed and it is unsustainable. Therefore it is important for Jobbik’s policy to shift from a universal to a more selective system. They state that only people who are in real need and contributed enough through out their work should receive assistance. They also make the distinction between respectful and non-complying poor, claiming that there are people who only take advantage of the social aid (Jobbik 2010, 35).

Later, they go into more details about how Jobbik is imagining the transformation especially on the dimensions of need and reciprocity. The motto, in the manifesto is very similar to the one mentioned above that was used by the municipalities.

*„Work instead of social aid: the one who doesn’t want to work shouldn’t eat!”*

(Jobbik 2010, 35)

Jobbik uses stronger words, expressing the punishment and work-creating element. They claim that only people who contributed should receive any assistance and those who don’t comply should be seriously penalized. The detailed policy recommendation doesn’t show otherwise. Their goal is that labor active people should only receive social aid if they work. They ask for larger participation from every level of the state and giving the management to the local labor offices. Jobbik also would like to change the allowance systems. Their recommendation is a shift from the cash allowances to a more in kind, where most of the amount goes to a social card, so that people can only use it to buy certain goods (Jobbik 2010, 35-36)



The topic of social policies once again appears in the manifesto at section that deals with the Roma<sup>5</sup> issue. As mentioned above it is an important question for the party, since most of their success and media appearance is due to their radical position. There is not much difference in the social policy recommendation in the Roma part compared to the earlier ones. Most of the propositions are repeat, however there is more emphasis on the penalizing and stigmatization. The “them-us” distinction is very strong, which is visible from most of the recommendations that try to distance the Roma both physically and morally. A new element here is a public utility work specialized for Roma that would employ more teachers with Roma origin in places where they are most concentrated (Jobbik 2010, 40-42).

In the literature review I mention that Eastern European radical parties tend to have a more leftist, demagogic economic policy than those in the West. This seems to stand in the case of Jobbik as well. Their recommendations contain several popular, but hardly executable options. The social policies are quite ambiguous. On one hand in some cases they would expand a lot of programs with extensive state involvement. They focus on many different groups as well; but only those who are in need would receive more assistance. Public utility work schemes would be expanded as well and be used especially to support the municipalities. On the other all of these policy would be introduced with a lot stricter conditions. The goal of most of the strict options is to close out those who are not contributing or who are not in need of the benefits. Moreover, the policies that penalize the non-compliers are claiming that the people are in control of their situation and assuming that there are significant number unemployed who don't want to work or don't appreciate the assistances. Finally,

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<sup>5</sup>The manifesto doesn't use the term Roma. Instead they use *cigány* (in French *Tzigane*) to identify, which is very close in meaning to the word Gipsy. However modern scholars only use Roma, since most expressions are considered to be pejorative. Following this pattern I will only use Roma, or Romani as well through out the whole thesis.

according the identity criteria, Jobbik doesn't share the same identity with many welfare receivers, especially with the unemployed who have Roma origin. In their manifesto rhetoric they try to mingle up the two groups and try to present a picture of an unemployed non-complying Roma groups. They use expressions in the Roma issue chapter like "*opportunistic child carriers*"<sup>6</sup> or they claim that there are generations of certain Roma groups who never worked.

It is also important to see how many times different expressions appear in the manifesto. One of the most common words is *labor* it is mentioned more than a 130 times. This supports the claim that Jobbik's main economic policy is based on increasing employment and providing more jobs. In this context there is significantly more emphasis on the side of the *employees*, it is mentioned 39 times. On the other hand, the *employer* side only mentioned 4. However the term *enterprise(s)* exist 50 times, mostly in the context of protectionism. It is clear that Jobbik puts more emphasis on state intervention since it comes up the most out of the observed concepts. The only contradictory concept appearance is the *public utility work*, since it only comes up 6 times, however the emphasis seems greater in the chapters where it is proposed. Despite the significant focus on labor, the *unemployed* are only mentioned 7 times. Compared to other attributes or social groups the unemployed appear less frequently than for example the people living with *disabilities*, *families with children* or people living in *rural* areas. These are groups who are not in control of their situation or can be easily identified with. Similarly to the unemployed the *poor* 6 and the *indigent* only comes up 5 times.

It is also important to take a look at how expert data viewed the manifesto. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, I have decided to pick 8 categories from the

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<sup>6</sup>The expression in Hungarian is „*megélhetési gyermekvállalók*.” However, it is very difficult directly translate this concept, but they mean that there are families who only have children to receive more benefit from the government.

Comparative Manifesto Data (CMP) that helps to understand the point of view of Jobbik in welfare question. The following table contains the percentages of each issue in relation to the whole text:

**2. Table:** Percentage of 'quasi-sentences' for each issue in relation to the whole text  
Jobbik - CMP data - 2010

Favorable mention of authority (per305)	0,84%
Social justice (per503)	1,65%
Welfare state expansion (per504)	6,80%
Welfare state limitation (per505)	0,99%
Favorable mention of labor groups (per701)	2,53%
Favorable mention of middle class (per704)	0,88%
Favorable mention of underprivileged (ex. handicapped) (per705)	0,29%
Favorable mention of non-economic demographic groups (ex. old) (per706)	1,47%

Source: Comparative Manifesto Data - 2010

The topic that comes up most significantly out of the observed ones is clearly the welfare state expansion. This is line with the argument that radical parties try to have a protectionist economic policy not just from foreign economic powers, but give support to those who suffered from the impacts of the globalization (Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007, 51). Social justice also seems to be an important dimension, since the people who are in need according the party also deserve a fair treatment from the government. It is visible from the CMP data as well that Jobbik is in favor of the authority. The medium rate appearance imply also imply that they believe in state involvement.

From the group's perspectives the labor groups, more likely the unemployed and regular employees are who play a significant role in the party's program. My findings however are somewhat contradictory with CMP, since I concluded that the underprivileged received a greater impact. However, it seems that Jobbik realized that their voter base has wider than it seems. Not just the lower class votes for them, but they have significant amount middle class, educated supporters (Karácsony and Róna

2010, 42). Therefore the middle class is also mentioned as a favorable social group relatively often.

Therefore Jobbik, following Larsen's theory about deservingness has more support for a selective welfare system. There are groups, like Roma, unemployed and poor that Jobbik doesn't identify with. These groups are mingled up in the manifesto and not really distinguished from each other. The appearance of the punishment notion in connection to these groups shows that the party identifies them as non-compliers, who are not really appreciative for the welfare policies. On the other hand there are groups according to the manifesto that need more help. Jobbik seems to identify with them more, since they are largely affected by the globalized economic world. This sort of distancing implies an effort from the party to move to a more conservative welfare system in these dimensions. The question of need is also somewhat touched, however not as much as other dimensions. Basically, the term indigent is only mentioned in connection with people who live in the rural areas. Jobbik has recognized that they need to put a big emphasis on this social group, since most of their votes are coming outside of the capital (Bíró Nagy and Róna 2011, 267; Larsen 2006, 52, 61).

### **2.2.2 FIDESZ**

Since the 2006 scandals there was no doubt about the success of the center-right at the next elections. Their main goal was to gain enough votes to have a super majority in the legislation. To reach this the only perspective they had to take into account was not make mistakes. Therefore their strategy was to some degree passive and cautious. FIDESZ tried to avoid any deep disputes and mainly focused to put their selves in a position where they become the only acceptable option. They had to focus not make any big mistakes, as in previous elections and still appear as the "party of the people".

However the growth of the Jobbik seemed to trouble the party and in a later stage of 2010 campaign they took a clear stand in connection to the radical party. From a previously uninterested phase they tried to display Jobbik as an extremist group and communicate that they don't have a chance to become a governing power, so voting for them wouldn't really mean anything (Török 2011, 157-159).

This very cautious strategy can be traced in their manifesto as well. This section of thesis will analyze the center-right party's program and see what they offer in terms of social policies. Meanwhile, I will relate to the findings from the Jobbik's manifesto, so that a comparative perspective can articulate. FIDESZ published it relatively late, month before Jobbik and not too far away from the election date<sup>7</sup>. Its length (86 pages) is close to the radical party's, but the policy recommendations are not as long. Also it is general attribute through out the whole document is that they mention the previous socialist government quite often, as the sources of most policy problems. The title of the program is *The Politics of National Affairs*. The manifesto starts with a longer preface that contains several forewords from known, well-respected public figures. The policy section follows this personal pattern and the six chapters are connected to FIDESZ politicians.

The first one is the party's leader Viktor Orbán whose section gives a general overview of their program.

*“The first and foremost important connecting value is labor. The labor is the basis of every people's secure standard of living, separateness and independence. The labor teaches the celebration of the feast as well. The labor gives poise, honor and*

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<sup>7</sup>The manifesto was published on the 12th of March. <http://www.fidesz.hu/index.php?Cikk=147328> (accessed 30th May, 2012)

*recognition in that community where we belong: in the family, at the habitat, at the workplace, in the circle of friends.”*

(FIDESZ 2010, 20)

FIDESZ makes it clear in the beginning that their program is based on labor policies and it is in the center of their future plans. In this sense, job creation is their primary goal with the strong involvement from the state. The section that deals with the economic policies is coming right after Orbán Viktor's preface. It starts with the sub-chapter named "*one million new jobs in 10 years*", which later becomes a widely debated motto of the party. The chapter belongs to György Matolcsy, who later becomes economic minister of the government.

The part that first deals with the question of public utility work is in this economic section. Their policy recommendation is subordinated to their primary job creation policies. The manifesto highlights that the public utility works will mainly help the rural areas, where not just the municipalities but private, small businesses could benefit from the program. Also the recommendation contains, the development of the agriculture where the party believes public utility work has its place. However the section doesn't really go into details and only the end mentions that it can support the unskilled workers and the Roma. Finally, the manifesto sets out a few large scale project examples that can be done by using public work. These are all mainly infrastructure developments (FIDESZ 2010, 44). Later, the public utility works are not mentioned in the program, which implies that FIDESZ doesn't give that much emphasis on this policy.

Social policies in general however received a separate chapter in the manifesto. This section in the document belongs to Miklós Soltész, who later became the State

Secretary for Social, Family and Youth Affairs. The primary concept that the policies fall in line with is *social security*. Many different social groups are mentioned, who all received a sub-chapter as targets of the party's policies. It is also a general attribute that the previous years governments are commonly blamed for the existing social problems, claiming that the socialist redistribution and aiding systems created chaos. The aim of program was to set back the order in the system, and help who are in real need (FIDESZ 2010, 72-74)

The recommendations are very generous and a wide range of social groups named as indigent or who need extra help from the government.

*“In our family policy, therefore we plan to appreciate the extra performance of the parents, families who contribute to the nation's growth or to the sustainability of social capitalism not only by working, but with looking after and raising children.”*

(FIDESZ 2010, 76)

Most important out of these groups are the families with children. Many different policies are targeting them and the objective is to provide a better environment to have children. Most of the tools are coming from a wide range of fields, including taxation, education or employment policies. Moreover, this strong emphasis on families can be found along the whole document, which implies that the party identifies very much with this social group (FIDESZ 2010, 74-76).

Next to the families, the elderly, people with disabilities, the Roma, the poor and the youth are relevant target groups in the manifesto. The program tries to make an attempt to bring the older part of the society closer, since unlike the families with children or the youth the old identifies less with FIDESZ (Fábián 2005, 218).

Therefore they recommend more than just pension value stability, the party's clear goal is to bring closer different age groups. The manifesto nevertheless doesn't go further into details, and pays slightly more attention to the other communities.

Roma on the other hand are also an accentuated group in the document. It is stated as a key issue for the country and the development of the Roma's situation is in the whole country's interest. There is also an attempt in the program to bring closer the different groups despite the ethnical differences. The document highlights that using Roma as scapegoats in public discourse has to end. Different policy tools are named which also includes affirmative actions, scholarship programs, and providing better access to public services. Moreover, they deal with the question of mixing the social and ethnical classification. It is a common trend in Hungary that the concept of poor and Roma are mingled up causing more social tensions between the communities (Szalai 2000, 154-155). The manifesto shares the thought of clearly separating the classifications and recommends different policy approaches for both Roma and poor. Following the Roma section, the party's program is also dealing with people living in deep poverty. Their main suggestion is the extension of the social assistance that is available for these groups, arguing that the amount spent on integration is not enough and the previously launched public utility work programs are not functioning. Here again, the importance of creating jobs for everyone appears, based on the concept of *"giving jobs instead of social aid"* (FIDESZ 2010, 81-84).

In order to better compare the party programs of FIDESZ and Jobbik, we need to see how certain terms, concepts appear. Similarly to the radical party, here the word *labor* exists relatively quite often, 21 times. The emphasis in this context however is somewhat similar than in Jobbik's case. Small and medium enterprises play a major role in FIDESZ's economic policy, therefore these terms appear many times, mainly



in a protectionist manner. This is in relation with their public utility work policies as well, since they believe that combined private and public system should be created, where public utility workers can also be hired. *Public utility work* only appears 4 times in the whole document, which supports my argument that they don't give that important role as Jobbik. Also similarly to the radical party the role of the *state* is significant. It is mentioned 85 times. However there seems to be less emphasis on the *unemployed*. The document rarely mentions this group, only 4 times. Compared to other groups like *elderly* (17), or even the *poor* (11) it is a low appearance. However, both groups didn't seem to play an important role in the manifesto. Out of all the social groups clearly the *families with children* have the biggest impact. They are mentioned 34 times supporting the claim that FIDESZ identifies with them the most.

Similarly to Jobbik, I also looked at the CMP data in case of FIDESZ. In addition, due to the existence of the party since the system transition there is also cross-time data available.

**3. Table:** Percentage of 'quasi-sentences' for each issue in relation to the whole text FIDESZ - CMP data - 1998-2010

	1998	2002	2006	2010
Favorable mention of authority (per305)	3,54 %	4,25 %	0,00%	3,88%
Social justice (per503)	0,00 %	0,30 %	4,91%	7,66%
Welfare state expansion (per504)	11,88 %	8,50 %	13,64%	16,39 %
Welfare state limitation (per505)	0,00 %	0,00 %	0,14%	0,68%
Favorable mention of labor groups (per701)	0,00 %	0,00 %	3,27%	2,04%
Favorable mention of middle class (per704)	0,00 %	1,82 %	1,50%	2,23%
Favorable mention of underprivileged (ex. handicapped) (per705)	1,88 %	2,43 %	2,18%	1,16%
Favorable mention of non-economic demographic groups (ex. old) (per706)	4,17 %	3,64 %	0,82%	1,16%

Source: Comparative Manifesto Data – 1998-2010

FIDESZ, similarly to Jobbik puts the most emphasis on welfare state expansion, however in this case the appearance rate is even greater. Limitation, on the other hand is only mentioned in a very small rate. The appearance of the concept of social justice is also significant. This supports my claim that FIDESZ is trying to address a wide range of the population, by demanding equal treatment for everyone and removal of different social barriers in the society. Most of the supporters of FIDESZ are coming from the lower-middle class (Fábián 2005, 218). Therefore it is no surprise that out of the social groups the party is putting the biggest emphasis on the middle class. The labor groups are only shortly behind of the middle class strengthening the emphasis on the employment and labor based economic policy of the party. The least mentioned groups are the underprivileged and demographic groups. CMP data also shows that FIDESZ doesn't pay that much attention to these groups, since most of their supporters as written before are younger, lower-middle class people.

It is also important to see how these 'quasi-sentence' appearances changed across time for FIDESZ. The trends are visible in Appendix 2 figure. The main reason that this time I observed this time frame is, because FIDESZ went through a lot of changes since the system transition. Their current position on the left-right political spectrum was positioned only after the 1994 elections and was really visible by 1998 (Tóka 2005, 277). A clear trend is the growing significance of welfare state expansion and social justice. This implies that FIDESZ is more and more participating in a battle of "who offers more", and Jobbik is just adding to this pressure. Coming from the same political side offering welfare state expansion didn't leave too much room to maneuver for FIDESZ. Among the group appearance the trend seems to be decrease importance of labor groups from 2006 until 2010. Meanwhile the middle class had become the most important. I constitute this change, however a strategic move from

the party, since their goal during the 2010 elections was limited. They only had to make their voting base active, and didn't need to go into debates (Török 2011, 158). Therefore it wasn't important to address other than the middle class with more emphasis.

Following Larsen's theory, FIDESZ compared to Jobbik is constructing a more universal welfare regime. The conservative center-right party is significantly identifying with more social groups; therefore it has an interest in recommending a system that provides services for a wide range of different people. Out of these groups the unemployed doesn't make that big impact as other groups and the public utility work scheme doesn't seem to have an important role among the policies to help their situation. Another big difference between the two parties is that the punitive element doesn't come up in the social policy section of the manifesto. The main reason for this is that FIDESZ as mentioned before, trying to identify with a wide range of the society. Also, they accept the groups needs and the claim of low level control of their own situation. Moreover, FIDESZ doesn't argue that the groups won't comply or their attitude is not going to be appreciative. Therefore a punitive policy element is not necessary and wider range of people can identify with the party. At same time both party policies have populist elements, in the sense that they both offer protectionism, and expansion of the welfare policies. This implies that they are in favor of state intervention. As seen in the data authority plays an important role in their policies. Also, they both somehow try to present themselves as the members of the "ordinary people". FIDESZ is doing this by trying to support a wide range of social groups and Jobbik by putting a significant emphasis on people living in rural areas (Canovan 1999, 4-5).

### CHAPTER 3 - PUBLIC UTILITY WORK POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT

This chapter of the thesis will focus on those policy changes that happened after the election in connection to the public utility work schemes. I will argue that the changes conducted after the election are different in many ways and has common ground with the one proposed by the radical right. First, I will present the changes that happened in the public utility work policies after the election until 2012 and evaluate how did these transformations are in relation to deservingness. At every change in policy I will include the parliamentary activity around the legislations where I will try to find implications to the radical right's impact.

After the elections in 2010 FIDESZ gained enough votes to have an absolute majority in the parliament. It was clear that significant changes are going to happen in almost every policy fields, including social and welfare policies. Moreover, the country was faced with serious economic challenges and significant transitions were expected on multiple grounds. The first changes happened around the public utility work wasn't made long after the elections. The 2011 state budget contained funding that was targeted to start a new public working program that was based on different grounds than the one before. According to the budget regulation the amount available for public works in 2010 was 113 381,5 million HUF<sup>8</sup> and in 2011 64 000 million HUF<sup>9</sup>. This serious cut back, consequently brought serious changes in the system as well.

Previously, under the name of public utility work several different employments schemes were functioning. All funded and managed by different entities of the state.

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<sup>8</sup>Budget Act of the Year 2010, Act no. CXXX, 2009. Appendix no. 8 ch. 2.

<sup>9</sup>Budget Act of the Year 2011, Act no. CLXIX, 2010. § 15.

The new system merged all these schemes into one and started to only partly fund it from the central government. Also, most of the management duties were directed to the local labor branch-offices, who are more or less centrally coordinated. Another significant change was made for those who didn't receive any public work, but they are still active. The new system made stricter complying requirements. Only those could receive wage remount allowance that accepted the job or training offers of the branch-offices, no matter to their professional or educational background. Moreover, the allowances after the changes had to be reviewed on a yearly basis, where everyone had to provide proof of 30 days of fulfilled work or 6 month professional training. From the point of view of the municipalities the cutbacks were also felt. The new system has cut with the completely government founded policy and municipalities had to file tenders in order to receive funding for their projects. The most funding could only be received for part-time (daily 4 hour) employment in short-term (2-12 months) projects.(Ministry of National Economy 2010).

The first period of changes happened from the first introduction of the new 2011 budget numbers until the summer of 2011. At this period the legislation was introduced at the end of 2010. In this time frame 68 parliamentary speeches were made about the public utility works or touched the topic. Not surprisingly, the governing party made most of the remarks. They made speeches 34 times, from some were responses to questions or contribution during the general debates of the legislations. The second most speakers came from MSZP, with 28 remarks, regularly arguing the necessity of the retrenchment. LMP, the green party only addressed the government 2 times in this topic.

Jobbik only made speeches 4 times in this time period. 3 out this were made during the general debate of yearly budget. There are several patterns that can be highlighted

from these speeches. They mainly argued that budgetary cutbacks will cause the downfall of the program and they believe that further expansion should be done instead. Jobbik also claimed that these works should be widened in terms of work types, and it should be used as tool to boost the agriculture<sup>10</sup>. However they expressed their appreciation about the stricter policy on the allowance redistribution and chance of closing out who don't comply with the system<sup>11</sup>.

The second set of changes on the public utility work schemes were introduced approximately a year later. The base of the system stayed, but the newly presented set up again pointed in the direction of centralization, retrenchment and stricter allowance conditions. A significant change was that the Interior Affairs Ministry had received the management of the program. This step by itself could imply to a lot of different reasons, but some media opinions agreed that it was a step to create a stricter, more centrally controlled system (Máriás and M. László 2011). The media rumors however were seemed to be valid. They decreased the allowance time to 180 days and after this time period people stop receiving assistance. The government also introduced the opportunity for the local municipalities to set extra conditions for redistributing the allowances. The mandatory compliance and acceptance of the work stayed with the new legislation even if it meant to accept a job offer from the other side of the country.

The new law was introduced in June, 2011 and created a way bigger dissatisfaction from the opposition parties. Only during the legislation procedure 57 modification drafts were handed in and 37 speeches were made. Out of these Jobbik made 9 remarks. A set of argument was about the differentiation between the unemployed, and the repeal of the mandatory acceptance of work for those who have professional

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<sup>10</sup> Speech made by Dániel Z. Kárpát (Jobbik), 53<sup>th</sup> Parliamentary day, Nov 26, 2011. 118<sup>th</sup> speech.

<sup>11</sup>Speech made by Dániel Z. Kárpát (Jobbik), 50<sup>th</sup> Parliamentary day, Nov 22, 2011. 307<sup>th</sup> speech.

qualification<sup>12</sup>. Also several speeches from the radical right requested again the expansion of the system, especially in the sphere of agriculture. Additionally they agreed with the proposition coming from MSZP about increasing the minimum time of workdays<sup>13</sup>. Finally, it is important to mention that Jobbik reference back to their manifesto in the debate about this legislation. The party feels that the government is using their recommendations from their program, because according to them the new set up has elements that were their ideas. They claim that the concept of “*work instead of social aid*” is originated from them<sup>14</sup>.

There are two trends that are visible from the legislation process of the public utility work schemes. First it is clear, that despite the government propositions, they retrenched the system and introduced very strict regulation. These attempts can be originated from FIDESZ’s previous government (Csoba 2010, 8), but also from the populist radical right. It seems to appear in the radical sides rhetoric and the idea appears in their manifesto as a very strong opinion. On the other hand, my second finding somewhat contradicts the first, since Jobbik doesn’t seem to influence the legislative processes in the parliament. They are not commonly talking about the topic as like MSZP, and if somebody makes a remark, it is mainly about proposing to expand the system.

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<sup>12</sup>Speech made by Szilvia Bertha (Jobbik), 105<sup>th</sup> Parliamentary day, June 28, 2011. 292<sup>h</sup> speech.

<sup>13</sup>Speech made by János Volner (Jobbik), 105<sup>th</sup> Parliamentary day, Nov 22, 2011. 356<sup>th</sup> speech.

<sup>14</sup>Speech made by Dániel Z. Kárpát (Jobbik), 102<sup>th</sup> Parliamentary day, Nov 22, 2011. 156<sup>h</sup> speech.

## CONCLUSION

Jobbik clearly made an impact on the Hungarian political life after their electoral success. Many questions were raised after they managed to receive a significant amount mandates. The aim of the thesis was to present this impact and try to prove that they affected welfare policymaking. My research question was: *how did the Hungarian radical right impact welfare policy in Hungary, despite the super majority of the governing party?*

After reviewing therelevant literature, I have created 3 assumptions. The first one was that Jobbik would make an impact in the welfare policy changes. My researches could only partly prove this, since I didn't find any direct evidence during the legislation procedures. However it is clear that by their presence and even with low amount of speeches can affect the policy discourse. To find direct links, further researches need to be conducted that looks deeper into parliamentary relations, bargains.

My second assumption was that Jobbik would bring the policy discourse to deservingness since it is an important issue for them. The manifesto research showed that Jobbik puts a big emphasis on “who gets what and why” especially in connection to the unemployed and the Roma. Moreover, the public work policy analysis also showed that they commonly address the question of deservingness and regularly ask for expansion for people who live in rural areas.

The final assumption tried to find ties between the two parties by claiming that they will have similar deservingness. The manifesto research showed that this wasn't the case during the election. FIDESZ mainly identified with the middle class, and offered a universal, socialist type of welfare. Jobbik on the other hand tried to find



common identity with unemployed and people living in the rural areas. Nevertheless, after the elections FIDESZ introduced a very selective type of policy and Jobbik made some remarks about their support in this question.

## APPENDIX 1

### Variables used from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data and their explanations

Political authority - per305	Favorable mentions of strong government, including government stability; manifesto party's competence to govern and/or other party's lack of such competence.
Social justice - per503	Concept of equality; need for fair treatment of all people; special protection for underprivileged; need for fair distribution of resources; removal of class barriers; end of discrimination such as racial or sexual discrimination, etc.
Welfare state expansion - per504	Favorable mentions of need to introduce maintain or expand any social service or social security scheme; support for social services such as health service or social housing.
Welfare state limitation - per505	Limiting expenditure on social services or social security; otherwise as 504, but negative.
Labor groups - per701	Favorable references to labor groups, working class, unemployed; support for trade unions; good treatment of manual and other employees.
Middle class - per704	Favorable references to middle class, professional groups, such as physicians or lawyers; old and new middle class.
Underprivileged minority groups - per705	Favorable references to underprivileged minorities who are defined neither in economic nor in demographic terms, e.g. the handicapped, homosexuals, immigrants, etc.
Non-economic demographic groups - per706	Favorable mentions of, or need for, assistance to women, old people, young people, linguistic groups, etc.; special interest groups of all kinds.


Source: CMP codebook –

[https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/data/MPDataset\\_full\\_codebook.pdf](https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/data/MPDataset_full_codebook.pdf)

(accessed May 30, 2012)

## APPENDIX 2

Percentage of 'quasi-sentences' for each issue in relation to the whole text across time



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