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**Political Mobilization via Social Media – Strategies of Serbian  
Political Parties**

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## **1. Abstract**

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether major political parties in Serbia that were running for parliamentary elections in May 2012 developed the strategies for online mobilization of their potential voters on two major social networks – Facebook and Twitter. My main presumption is that political parties in Serbia, although insufficiently informed about the possibilities of social media in political communication, are at least aware of the main advantages that social networks brings in the world of communication – the reduction of campaign costs, the possibility of two-way communication, the possibility of precise and easy group targeting and the weaker mechanisms of content filtering and gatekeeping. Another assumption is that political parties will use those advantages in accordance with the specificities of Serbian political environment and that they will use it in a way that will promote their current position in Serbian party system in a best possible way. After the analysis of the different parties and their Facebook and Twitter pages, which is consisted of qualitative content analysis, interviewing and simple quantification of data, I concluded that key political parties in Serbia mostly did not recognize the main advantages of social networks. The reasons for that mainly were the widespread skepticism about possibilities of online mobilization and insufficient knowledge about the new media in general

## 2. Introduction

The formation of what is often called Web 2.0 has been in the focus of communication experts ever since it had been developed to the extent that it began to change not only the existing media environment, but also everyday life and daily habits of its users. Naturally, many structures of the society that are not exclusively from the field of communication became interested in new media and its enormous communication potentials. Politicians and political parties recognized social media as a favorable tool for mobilization of new voters and party members and they started using it extensively in that purpose.

Serbian political parties recognized this capacity as well, but unlike developed Western political parties they did it rather late. The number of social networks users in Serbia rapidly increased in past two years, unlike in Western countries where social networks such as Facebook and Twitter became popular several years before. Therefore, it is fair to assume that Western parties already have a large-scale experience with communicating with their main target groups via social media, while political parties in Serbia are still in the process of development of their communication strategies. It is also justified to assume that Serbian political parties are highly interested in the communication potentials of social media, since the number of their users became significantly elevated. Statistics shows that, for example, Facebook penetration in Serbia is 43.05% compared to the entire population, and 76.99% compared with the total number of Internet users in the country.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, it is natural that parties and other political organizations started creating their own corporative accounts and sharing different contents with their followers. However, if we consider that this aspect of political marketing is still new and

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<sup>1</sup> The data from socialbakers.com, accessed on 23<sup>rd</sup> of April 2012.

relatively unknown for politicians and even for communication experts in Serbia, especially compared with the process of communicating via old media, the question arises whether both politicians and communication experts hired for managing the political marketing succeeded to develop winning-strategies for “selling” their political activities on social media.

However, not only the lack of experience in social networks usage may differentiate Serbian case from other more developed Western parties. The specificity of Serbian party system, especially ruling party discourse and current political situation, is sufficient reason to believe that Serbian political parties may have different online strategies than parties from Western democracies. Extremely divided society, distorted value system, powerful opposition, weak and inefficient government, clientelism, partocracy, corruption, unemployment, poverty, unsolved problem with state borders, uncertainty about joining the European Union, etc. are only some problems that Serbia is facing at this moment, and for which political parties should provide solutions through their pre-election programs. At the same time, all those accumulated problems are the threat for vulnerable young democracy in Serbia and may cause antysystemic mood among citizens and some political organizations. All those specificities make the case of Serbia different from any other case that has been studied so far, because they may radically change the nature of communication of political parties in the campaign period. Therefore, it would be interesting to determine whether the specificity of the political environment shapes the practice of using online space for political mobilization.

In this research I will try to deeper investigate the mobilization strategies of Serbian political parties via two largest social networks – Facebook and Twitter, and to give answers to three important groups of questions.

First group of questions is message-oriented and it includes several dilemmas: what kind of messages are political parties addressing through social media as a channel for targeting new voters? What kind of discourse are those messages promoting?

Second group of questions is target-group oriented: Are political parties primarily interested in obtaining wider support, gaining new voters, getting new potential members or activists, etc? Which group of users will be of their primary interest?

Third group of questions is dealing with party on-line-mobilization strategies: what kind of political parties have the biggest potential to succeed in on-line mobilization? What are their main strategies in group-targeting? What are their primary goals of when it comes to group-targeting? What is the degree of importance that they are giving to mobilization through social media?

The analysis is narrowed down to relevant political parties in Serbia. The criterion of relevancy in this case is determined by current political situation in Serbia. Since the parliamentary elections took place on 6<sup>th</sup> of May 2012, only the leading parties and party coalitions that were running for the elections are taken into account. Other political organizations such as NGO-s or governmental agencies are excluded from the further analysis. One of the reasons for limiting the scope of the research only to parties which were running on parliamentary elections is that they were more active on social networks than other political organizations since they were conducting the campaign, which means they were more motivated for political mobilization. Therefore, it was easier to track their activity on mobilization via social media and to identify main patterns and strategies of on-line mobilization.

### 3. Literature Review

The main difficulty when it comes to relevant literature is the lack of research on the territory of Serbia. Namely, there is almost no relevant literature about the utilization of social media by political parties in Serbia in mobilizing new supporters, not even in the field of political marketing.

However, one significant research has been done recently in the domain of media-monitoring. Konrad Adenauer foundation run the project named “Media Trends” (2012) within which was implemented the monitoring of online media. The team of researchers and journalists was analyzing the activities of six political parties and their leaders in the period from 6<sup>th</sup> of April to 6<sup>th</sup> of May 2012. They were focused on their activities during the election campaign in order to investigate whether political parties in Serbia are aware of key advantages of social networks in the communication with their supporters and potential voters. Their overall conclusion after they conducted qualitative and quantitative content analysis was that “virtually no intrinsic advantage of the online sphere was used” (Media Centar Beograd). They stated that political parties used social networks similarly as they were using traditional media – they did not use the advantages of two-way communication and they were mostly copy-pasting contents from traditional media to their Facebook and Twitter pages.

“Campaign on social networks was only the "extension" of traditional campaign. What was important is to partisan messages reach as many people as it is possible, but not to provide a reverse influence. The need of parties to absolutely control the communication was obvious even on social networks, although their main feature is complete freedom and equality of all participants in the communication. Therefore, no wonder that the first online campaign in the country can be described as uninventive, unconvincing and monotonous, completely opposite than it should be.” (Media Centar Beograd)

As the reason for this omission, Zoran Stoiljkovic stated for Status Magazine article “Online Voter-Hunting” that was published on 15<sup>th</sup> February 2012. that it was done on purpose. He argued that political parties simply wanted to avoid “tricky questions” and critique that may easily come up in two-way communication. In his words, “this type of communication should be the choice of modern and reformist parties, and it would be an excellent framework for the appearance of new parties. If someone wants to enter into the new nomenclature and to gain the support of younger and more educated circles, social networks are a great mechanism for that. I see no other way to fight for his place in the political arena.”

However, besides this research and several articles published in popular newspapers<sup>2</sup>, very little has been done for the deeper investigation of the online strategies of major Serbian political parties. Also, the deeper analysis of Serbian political system and its specificities were mostly neglected when the analysis of different party strategies was conducted.

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<sup>2</sup> For example, “Online Voter-Hunting” by Marko Nedeljkovic, published in Status magazine in February 2012

## 4. Theoretical framework

Two kinds of literature and theoretical issues are of the biggest importance for the creation of general theoretical framework and the formulation and the justification of my hypotheses – first, the literature that deals with social media, and second, the literature about political parties in Serbia. From the literature which subject of interest is social media, we can single out two important groups that are of the biggest importance for this particular topic. First one is dealing with the structure of social media, its communication potentials and major debates about their nature and changes that they are (not) bringing in the world communication. The second relevant group is presenting previous relevant research in the field of social media that is concerned with online party strategies. The literature about political parties in Serbia can be divided in two important groups as well. First, there is a significant literature that is investigating the political system of Serbia, and second, there is a literature that is explaining dominant party discourses in Serbia. In the end, it is of great importance for the purpose of further analysis to briefly present major political parties in Serbia that were running for 2012. parliamentary elections – their main standpoints, ideology and the brief history of their existence.

### ***4.1. Social Networks and Political Organizations***

When it comes to the previous work in the domain of social networks and political campaigning, it can be said without restraint that the significant amount of research had been already done. When the new media started to penetrate into the world of everyday communication and to significantly change its character, experts from the field of communication were primarily interested in the architecture of social networks and Internet in general. Network technologies “can alter the speed and cost of communication, the distance that information can travel within any given time period, the amount of intelligence/functionality that can be transferred, the

density and richness of information flows, the relationship and interdependencies among parties to an act of communication, and the perceptions of the parties communicating.” (Garcia 2002, 41)

What was particularly interesting for scientists in the field of communication is the change in mediated communication that occurred with the invention of Internet. There is a general agreement that the new media is significantly different in comparison with the old media in terms of transmission and reception of mediated contents.

“The bewildering variety and dynamism of cultural expression on the Internet has often been understood as an effect of a new mode of communication (distributed and many-to-many rather than centralized and few-to many). If we consider the technical form of the media, one of the basic ways in which this network of networks differs from the mass media system is that it does not operate by synchronizing a closed space of receivers around single or limited number of frequencies so that a particular message flow can be steamed from a central point (involving a handful of broadcasters) to the margins (involving a segmented multiplicity of viewers).” (Terranova 2004, 64)

This view is nowadays widely accepted among communication experts and there is a general agreement that the invention of Internet changed profoundly the nature of mediated communication. For example, Mayer and Cornfield (2003) stressed three main “promises of Internet” that are making a new way of communication not only specific, but also superior to communication that was present in the era of old media. First of them is “interactivity” that allows direct connection between transmitters, the message and recipients. Further, “the depth of access and content” allows to receivers to obtain more profound message. The third characteristic, “independence”, makes the communication freer of gatekeepers and other information filters that are present in old media.

Of course, this new mean of communication brought many changes in the world of political communication and political campaigning as well. Once they recognized the potential of social networks, politicians and political parties started to change their communicational habits in accordance with the nature of new media. Moreover, Bennet (2003) and many others argued that network-based communication started to shape not only organizational and communicational relations within political organizations, but also organizational patterns itself. Many theoreticians, such as Chadwick, Bimber, Stohl, Flanagin, etc. argued that political parties experienced large organizational changes. Chadwick (2006) argued that not only the hybrid types of political organization occurred, but also that with network-based communication shift many other general changes happened – party competition has increased with reduced campaign-costs that created a chance for small parties to raise their voice, power diffusion inside the parties has changed as a consequence of changes in communication networks, and as everyday politics moves online the political institutions will experience more and more institutional changes as the result of adaptation to new circumstances. Bimber, Stohl and Flanagin (2009) also convincingly argued that organizational changes in political parties are visible through less organizational levels within the organization, simpler management and renewed political power of the wider scope of party members. As the justification for this, they designed the model on which they explained that interaction pattern has significantly changed, alongside with the pattern of engagement that moved from institutional to entrepreneurial. They were going so far in their argumentation that they stated that nowadays political organizing can be possible even without the existence of actual organization.

Naturally, all those changes resulted with further changes in communication between parties and their voters. Political parties started to adopt new ways of campaigning, primarily due to the

cost-reduction and the possibility of permanent campaigning (Chadwick, 2006). Schmitt-Beck and Farrell (2002) emphasized that campaigning has transformed in what they called “post-modern campaigning” or Third cycle that is rudimentary post-Fordist. They analyzed three different campaign cycles that were alternating through the campaigning history, taking into account three main dimensions – technical development, resource development and thematic development. Characteristics of so called “Third Cycle” are indubitably shaped by the invention of Internet and network based communication, since permanent campaigning that is the main characteristic of third stage could not be possible without new technical developments. The new ways of media use are characterized by the direct targeting via e-mails, video-mails and similar web-based technologies, while professionals that are in charge of campaigning rely on interactive capabilities of Internet to get the feedback from their potential supporters. New “marketing concept” of campaigning that they are describing, especially easier targeting of specific groups of voters, was indubitably impossible before the Internet era.

On the other hand, Lofgren and Smith (2003) gave a profound analysis of four different on-line strategies of modern political parties. In spite of the thesis about organizational transformation of modern parties that occurred with the communicational change, they argued that political parties still can be roughly classified as more or less mass-parties and cartel parties. They also added two hybrid forms in their analysis that they named “emancipator mass party” and “elitist cartel party” that are using different on-line strategies than classic parties. Further, they analyzed four different strategies – mass-party strategy, cartel party strategy, “The Consumerist strategy” that is typical for emancipator mass-parties and “The Grassroots strategy” that is used by elitist cartel parties. They argued that, while traditional types of parties use new informational technologies and channels mostly as a complement for other forms of political communication or during the

campaign, new types of parties use it more extensively, primarily to capture public opinion and to establish constant two-way communication with their supporters and members. Especially interesting is “The Grasroot strategy” that includes not only the electronically mediated communication with supporters, but also the electronic membership in the virtual organization. Their analysis confirms the argument from above that new Internet technologies profoundly changed organizational patterns of traditional political parties and allowed completely new types of political organization that is “organizationless”, multi-directional and communitarian.

However, in spite of all these theoretical premises, we should keep in mind that all the work in this field comes from scientists who based their analyses mostly on cases from Western Europe and the United States. As I stated before, in the case of Serbia it is not possible to speak about the same extent of technological development as it is the case in Western democracies. However, with the extensive penetration of Internet and social media in everyday life, it can be assumed that some main premises given above can be applied even to this case. Therefore, in this paper I will suppose that political parties in Serbia mainly recognized some of the main advantages of Internet in general and social networks in particular, and that they started to use them extensively while creating their online mobilization strategies. By “main advantages” will be considered reduction of campaign-costs, possibility of two-way communication with potential supporters, weaker gatekeeping and the possibility of direct targeting. I will also assume that it is possible that organizational change might occurred in some parties – it is not impossible that, in terms of communication, some parties became less centralized and more fragmented and that “regular” members became more in-charge than they were before.

## ***4.2. Political parties in Serbia 2012.***

Since I intend to analyze mobilization strategies of dominant Serbian political parties on Facebook and Twitter, it is not possible to achieve thorough analysis without general knowledge about current political situation in Serbia. Turbulent and changing political environment immensely contributed to the creation of truly specific party system that is extremely polarized, fragmented and unstable. Since I will include leading political parties that were running for the parliamentary elections on 6<sup>th</sup> of May 2012, I will give the short overview of most striking specificities of Serbian party system. I strongly believe that uniqueness of Serbian party system, dominant party discourse and main political standpoints of key political parties will significantly shape not only their electoral campaign style, but also their mobilization strategies on social media.

### **4.2.1. Serbian party system**

Serbia has a multiparty system that is highly competitive. The electoral system is proportional with only one constituency, with relatively high threshold of 5%. Therefore, political parties are often forced to form pre-election coalitions in order to secure their places in the parliament. Many authors, such as Zoran Stojiljkovic and Vladimir Goati, who studied profoundly the electoral system and the party system of Serbia, generally concluded that changes in the electoral system influenced changes in the party system and vice versa. The high threshold of 5% was set as an effort to encourage the merging of small parties and the development of stable party system. However, the long tradition of corruption, high ambitions of small political leaders and imperfections in the electoral system resulted with an entirely different outcome. Nowadays,

Serbia has 88 registered political parties and movements, out of which 49 are parties of national minorities.<sup>3</sup>

It is of immense importance to point out the great instability and the low level of institutionalization of the party system in Serbia. Stoiljkovic (2006) noted that several factors influenced this instability. In the first place, the reason is a great oscillation in party strength in the period of last twenty years that is caused by fragile relationship between political parties and their supporters, relatively low level of party identification and distinct antipartism. Furthermore, relatively frequent changes of the electoral system and “the rules of the game” in general can be also blamed for the low level of institutionalization of the party system. Since the multiparty system was introduced in Serbia in 1992, the electoral system was changed several times in accordance with the interests of the ruling parties.<sup>4</sup> Of course, one of the key factors for this state of the party system is the dynamic of internal party relations and cleavages, alongside with leadership aspirations and unwillingness of parties to cooperate with each other.

Therefore, following Sartori’s typology of party systems, Komsic, Pantic and Slavujevic (2003) classified Serbian party system as “polarized pluralistic system”, while Stoiljkovic (2006) added that the system of polarized pluralism in Serbia is characterized by the existence of more than five relevant parties with emphasized ideological distance between them and the existence of so-

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<sup>3</sup> Official data from the website of Serbian government, <http://www.drzavnauprava.gov.rs/article.php?id=784>, accessed on April 23rd

<sup>4</sup> There were several cases of manipulation in the electoral system of Serbia. In 1992, was introduced the proportional system with the threshold of 5%, D’Ondt’s system of votes distribution and nine constituencies. However, there were several cases of manipulation with the threshold and constituencies in the following years – for example, on parliamentary elections in 1997, the number of constituencies was increased from 9 to 29, while the threshold was increased to 15% (Stoiljkovic 2006, 152 – 156).

called “bilateral oppositions” that mutually exclude the possibility of governmental cooperation. However, it is of immense importance to notice that on the ideological spectrum the distance between parties started to diminish after the strongest opposition party, Serbian Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka – SRS), disintegrated in September 2008. The new party that originated from SRS, Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska napredna stranka – SNS), took primacy in opposition forces, mainly because their new leaders abandoned nationalistic and populist rhetoric and strived to get closer to the position of moderate right. This and other changes in the party system and the party discourse in Serbia will be presented in following chapters.

#### **4.2.2. Serbian party discourse**

In my further analysis, I will, among other things, abandon the term “party ideology” on the behalf of the term “party discourse”. There are several reasons for this terminological change. While the term “ideology” refers mainly to ideas which have led political and social organizations and movements, the word “discourse” pertains to entire communication of political thoughts.<sup>5</sup> Not only that the word “discourse” have a broader meaning in terms of comprehensiveness of the wider range of phenomena (not only ideas, but their historical and practical change, major debates about those changes and overall communication of ideas), but also its usage removes the danger of misreading the term “ideology”. Namely, there is a considerable danger of improper equation of the term “ideology” with a traditional left-right spectrum that is quite outdated. This division is not sustainable anymore in Serbian party system because the border between “leftist” and “rightist” ideological ballast, although it was sustainable before, became too blurry in the light of recent changes in past ten to twenty years. I

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<sup>5</sup> For further explanation look at [dictionary.reference.com](http://dictionary.reference.com)

do not think that it is necessary to go too deep in the historical analysis of political parties after the crash of communism, disintegration of Yugoslavia, war and Kosovo independence, but it is evident that those key social changes highly influenced the ideological transformation of political parties.<sup>6</sup>

Furthermore, I will argue that nowadays there are two predominant party discourses in Serbia – radical and progressive.

The radical party discourse is predominantly rightist and nationalistic. It originates from the period of disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1990s, when nationalistic feelings and ethnical hatred suddenly increased. Major parties that promoted this discourse in early 1990s were Serbian Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka - SRS) and its leader Vojislav Seselj, and Serbian Socialist Party (Socijalistička partija Srbije – SPS), the official successor of old Communist Party of Yugoslavia<sup>7</sup>, and its leader Slobodan Milosevic.<sup>8</sup> Nowadays the nationalistic feeling that was present during 1990s has largely weakened and took the moderate form, especially after 2000, when the parties of progressive discourse finally entered the government. However, since the problem of state boundaries is still unsolved due to Kosovo problem, some aspects of the

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<sup>6</sup> It is also important to mention the confusion that might occur with party names. For example, Milosevic's Serbian Socialist Party, which was the ruling party until 2000, was the rightist nationalistic party, although the word "socialist" in its name may lead to the wrong conclusion that the party was actually leftist.

<sup>7</sup> Before 1992, when the multiparty system was officially introduced in Yugoslavia, Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and later Socialist Party of Serbia, were only existing parties in the time of socialism.

<sup>8</sup> Although the word "socialist" in the party name may refer to the leftist party, it was not the case – in 1990s this party experienced a big ideological transformation from predominantly leftist, egalitarian party to the rightist, nationalistic one. However, in some program positions (mostly in ones related to the economy and the public ownership) SPS kept the left-wing position. This hybrid type of the party is not the only case that can be found in Serbian party system and this is also one of the reasons why I decided to introduce the terminological change ("party discourse" instead of "party ideology")

nationalistic discourse remained strong even in 2012. Political parties within the radical discourse advocate that Kosovo has to stay within the borders of Serbia regardless of the price, and that any other solution would be unacceptable in terms of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. Additionally, in their advocacy for preserving Kosovo within Serbia they often relate Kosovo problem with traditional values. It is common in radical rhetoric that Kosovo is often nominated as “Serbian holly land”, where Serbian medieval state was born, with a special reference to cultural heritage and orthodox churches and monasteries that remained on the territory of Kosovo. Traditional values that radical parties often refer to are orthodoxy, church, traditional family, the bravery of Serbian people, the unconditional love for the fatherland, the superiority of Serbian nation, etc. Praising of those values resulted with the discourse that is primarily concentrated on the perseverance of national spirit and dignity, and that is politically focused on interests of the nation-state. In policy terms, parties with predominantly radical discourse generally support unitary and centralized governance, oppose privatization and foreign investments, as well as the potential membership in NATO and the European Union.

On the contrary, progressive party discourse is predominantly liberal and democratic. It has its roots in mid 1990s, when anti-war attitudes and opposition to Milosevic’s government became stronger. Politicians educated in the countries of Western Europe and rose in the pro-European spirit, who started realizing the absurdity of the war and how unrealistic the counteracting to entire international community truly is, eventually formed Democratic Opposition of Serbia (Demokratska opozicija Srbije – DOS). This coalition of all pro-Western parties of that time became the main pivot of the new pro-European ideas. After 2000. DOS finally managed to oust Milosevic from the power, but soon after the successful regime change it fell apart. (Stoiljkovic, 2006) However, it is appropriate to note that all political parties in Serbia that are presently

within progressive discourse originated from this large coalition. Also, since progressive parties have been governing since the fall of Milosevic's regime in 2000, it is justified to say that this discourse has been the ruling discourse on Serbian party scene for last 12 years. These parties often portray themselves as civic parties that care for the benefit of each and every citizen of Republic of Serbia. They are committed to different values than ones from the radical discourse – democratic values, Europeanization, ethnic tolerance, freedom, professionalization, rule of law and respect for the constitution, etc. In their policy programs they usually emphasize the importance of European integration processes, primarily joining NATO and European Union, the need for quick and efficient solution for the status of Kosovo, the significance of privatization and economic development and the creation of stable parliamentary democracy in general.

However, it is indispensable to emphasize that the division to radical and progressive party discourse should not be taken for granted. For many contemporary political parties in Serbia it is not easy to determine which discourse they are representing. It is mostly due to the fact that Sartori's model of "polarized pluralism" is getting less and less "polarized". Parties often change their attitudes in order to achieve more centrist position that is by default more acceptable for the larger number of citizens. They follow so-called "logic of appropriateness" (Lofgren and Smith, 2003) in the creation of democratic self-image that turned out to be the necessity in order to gain a wider support. Also, besides "moving toward center" logic, many problems that occurred in contemporary political situation in Serbia require a solution that is independent of the specific discourse. In addition, especially sensitive problems, such as the problem of Kosovo and state borders, are the proof that parties of radical and progressive discourse can share the same

attitude. Except Liberal Democratic Party (Liberalno demokratska stranka – LDP)<sup>9</sup>, all key parties in Serbia share “the position on the need for consistent implementation of resolution 1244 (which retains formal sovereignty of Serbia in Kosovo), or non-acceptance of the independence as the final solution.” (Stoiljkovic 2006, 199). Therefore, this division is made only in methodological purposes of further analysis and it should be taken with the caution.

#### **4.2.3. Parliamentary elections 2012.**

The most recent parliamentary elections in Serbia were held on 6<sup>th</sup> of May 2012, together with local elections, presidential elections and elections for members of Assembly of Vojvodina. Since Serbia has a proportional electoral system in which mandates are allocated by the system of a largest quotient, all electoral lists had to pass the threshold of 5%. In order to register for the elections, all electoral lists had to collect at least 10 000 voter signatures and to submit it to the Republic Electoral Commission (RIK). There were 18 registered lists for 2012. parliamentary elections, out of which 6 of them were minority lists. I will briefly present all the lists except the minority ones, because they will be excluded from the further analysis.<sup>10</sup>

##### **1. Choice for a Better Life – Boris Tadic (Izbor za bolji zivot – Boris Tadic)**

This wide coalition is formed around Democratic Party (DS), the major governmental party of socialdemocratic orientation and the representative of progressive discourse. In past parliamentary elections they managed to form the coalition government with the coalition formed around Socialist Party of Serbia (Socijalisticka partija Srbije - SPS) and minority

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<sup>9</sup> This is the only party that openly advocates the recognition of Kosovo independence.

<sup>10</sup> Further justification for exclusion of minority parties from the analysis will be in presented in “Research methodology” section.

representatives, in spite of the fact that they did not achieved the best result in the elections.<sup>11</sup> Democratic Party was present in the government since the fall of Mislosevic's regime in 2000, when they declared themselves to be "the engine of change in Serbia" They are considered to be the successors of official politics of assassinated prime minister Zoran Djindjic and the promoters of the vision of "better, successful, modern, pro-European Serbia". DS is the one of the largest Serbian political parties, with more than 119 000 members. (Demokratska stranka)

## 2. Serbian Radical Party – Vojislav Seselj (Srpska radikalna stranka – Vojislav Seselj)

Serbian Radical Party (SRS) was formed in 1991. and it is a typical representative of radical political discourse. Before democratic changes in 2000, SRS was two times in coalition government with Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). After the fall of Milosevic's regime, this party became the strongest oppositional party in Serbia until 2008, when the party split into two different parties – SRS, led by war prisoner and the founder of the party Prof. dr Vojislav Seselj, and Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska napredna stranka – SNS), headed by Tomislav Nikolic. With the separation of Nikolic, SRS lost wide support that it had before, but they remained consistent with their ideological beliefs. On the official website of SRS, it is stated that their main program objectives are the unification of Serbian lands, the unity of Serbian nation, the development of national consciousness and patriotism, the preservation of national traditions and relationship with Serbian Orthodox Church.

## 3. United Regions of Serbia – Mladjan Dinkic (Ujedinjeni regioni Srbije – Mladjan Dinkic)

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<sup>11</sup> They got 22.11% of the votes, while the coalition around Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) got 24.04%. Results were taken from the official website of Serbian Electoral commission (RIK) [http://www.rik.parlament.gov.rs/cirilica/propisi\\_frames.htm](http://www.rik.parlament.gov.rs/cirilica/propisi_frames.htm) accessed on 8th of May 2012.

United Regions of Serbia (URS) were formed in 2010. as the alliance of several political parties, moves and organizations. The strongest party in the alliance and its founder is G17+, which declares to be the party of right centre. It was founded in 2002. and since then it was participating in the government. URS stands for decentralization and devolution of power, departization, larger investments in agriculture, economic reforms and strengthening and joining the European Union. Its civic, reformist and democratic position classify it as a representative of progressive discourse. (Ujedinjeni regioni Srbije)

#### 4. Turnover – Cedomir Jovanovic (Preokret – Cedomir Jovanovic)

Turnover coalition is a representative of progressive discourse and it is consisted of several political parties that declare themselves to be liberal or libertarian. The most influential one among them is Liberal Democratic Party (Liberalno demokratska partija - LDP) that was founded in 2005. after the separation of one fraction of Democratic Party. They stand for “new politics and new economy” and they are one of the biggest critics of the current government that comes from the same party discourse. Their main specificity is the request for changing the official state politics towards Kosovo and open commitment to NATO and EU. (Liberalno demokratska partija)

#### 5. Let’s Get Serbia Moving – Tomislav Nikolic (Pokrenimo Srbiju – Tomislav Nikolic)

The pivot of this coalition is Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska napredna stranka - SNS) that is the best example of rapid discourse change within just few years. SNS was founded in 2008. after the secession from Serbian Radical Party. The new leader of the party, Tomislav Nikolic, and his “right hand” Aleksandar Vucic were prominent figures in SRS, especially after the leader

of SRS, Vojislav Seselj, was extradited to International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). After a disagreement about the future direction of the party, Nikolic formed SNS and withdrew a large portion of SRS electorate. Although within SRS Nikolic was advocating for “big Serbia” and anti-EU politics, in SNS he greatly changed his position. SNS declare themselves as the right-centrist party, but their ideology became unusually ambivalent. In internal relations they declare to be national conservative, while in international relations they claim to be pro-European oriented. (Srpska napredna stranka) This party is the largest opposition party in Serbia that won last elections, but did not succeed to form the government. They are in between radical and progressive discourse, but if we take into consideration the political past of key SNS figures and emphasized populist rhetoric that remained unchanged from SRS period, they can be considered to be a moderate representative of radical discourse.

#### 6. Democratic Party of Serbia – Vojislav Kostunica (Demokratska partija Srbije – Vojislav Kostunica)

This party is another example of a moderate representative of radical discourse. After the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) fell apart, the leader of Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), Vojislav Kostunica, enjoyed a great popularity among the supporters of democratic option. However, his attitudes towards cooperation with ICTY and collaboration with the European Union, as well as his attitudes towards Kosovo independence, moved him away from the progressive discourse and brought him closer to the radical one. On DSS’s official website is stated that the main program goals of this party are the rule of law, the return of nationalized property to the Serbian Orthodox Church, the preservation of territorial integrity of Serbia with

Kosovo within the state borders, etc. It is also stated that “honesty and respect for the basic proven principles are the moral measure of political action” (Demokratska stranka Srbije).

7. Ivica Dacic – Socialist Party of Serbia, Party of United Pensioners of Serbia, United Serbia (Ivica Dacic - Socijalistička partija Srbije (SPS), Partija ujedinjenih penzionera Srbije (PUPS), Jedinstvena Srbija (JS))

This coalition is formed around Serbian Socialist Party (SPS) and its leader Ivica Dacic. SPS is the formal successor of Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia and an example of moving towards radical to progressive discourse. Nowadays this party can be classified as the party of left center that is basically socialdemocratic. In their program it is stated that they advocate for “freedom, equality, solidarity and justice”. (Socijalistička partija Srbije)

8. Dveri – For The Life of Serbia (Dveri – Za život Srbije)

Dveri is political movement that was founded in 1999. It is the representative of radical discourse and they declare that in the root of their movement is orthodoxy, the unity of the Serbian people, traditional family values, skepticism towards EU, anti-globalism and the belief in creationism. (Dveri)

9. Reformist Party – Milan Visnjic (Reformistička stranka – Milan Visnjic)

Reformist Party (RS) is the party based in the city of Nis that is advocating for “the substantial decentralization of the country”. Their primer political goals are the fight against corruption and the development of modern democratic society, with an emphasis on workers’ rights. (Reformistička stranka) However, their rhetoric is very populist and they have critical attitude

towards government and the entire political system. In accordance with that and their anti-privatization posture, they can be put inside the radical discourse.

#### 10. Movement of Workers and Peasants (Pokret radnika I seljaka)

The main program goal of Movement of Workers and Peasants (PRS) is return to agriculture as the engine of economic development. This party is progressive – it stands for democratic reforms and stable government free of corruption. (Pokret radnika I seljaka)

#### 11. Social Democratic Alliance – Nebojsa Lekovic (Socijaldemokratski savez – Nebojsa Lekovic)

This party is a party of left center and the representative of progressive discourse. In their official party program, they stand for free health care and education, for the strengthening of agriculture and economic reforms before EU accession (Socijaldemokratski savez Srbije)

#### 12. Communist Party – Josif Broz (Komunisticka partija – Josif Broz)

The party leader and the key figure of KPJ is Josif Broz, the grandson of famous Yugoslavian president Josip Broz Tito. This party is leftist and they preserve the values of Tito's Communist Party. Although leftist, this party can be marked as the representative of radical discourse, since it is anti-capitalistic, anti-system and deeply eurosceptical. (Komunisticka partija)

## 5. Research questions

The purpose of my research is to identify whether political parties in Serbia already have developed strategies in online mobilization via social networks, and, if they do, what are their main characteristics. This question is imposed due to insufficient research in this field. Since the utilization of social networks for purposes of political marketing and mobilization is still new in Serbia, it is justified to assume that political parties still may not have clear defined strategies in on-line mobilization. Also, it is equally legitimate to suspect that specificities of Serbian political environment may have an influence on the strategy-shaping and that Serbian party-strategies (again, if they exist) may differ from strategies developed by Western parties.

Hence, the main puzzle would be the identification of party-strategies itself and the differentiation of Serbian case with respect to Western strategies that were previously studied.

Related to the puzzle I identified, I have several different research questions. By the assumption that key political parties in Serbia have already discovered the main advantages of social networks related to political marketing and mobilization, I formed three different groups of questions.

First, what kinds of messages are key Serbian parties posting via their Facebook and Twitter accounts?

I assumed that Serbian political parties recognized the main advantages of social networks related to the message content – less filtering, easier spread of information and fast feedback. Therefore, I wanted to investigate whether they are using social networks in accordance with those advantages. The most important question is whether they successfully use social network capacities to promote the specificities of their current position in Serbian party system.

Second, who are the main target groups of Serbian political parties on social networks?

I supposed that major parties in Serbia are aware that social media is an excellent tool for targeting specific groups of voters. Also, I presumed that they are familiar with the fact that young people are the most frequent users of social networks. Therefore, I wanted to investigate the targeting abilities of key parties via social networks.

Third, which parties recognized the potential of social networks?

I suspected that parties will not have equal knowledge, resources and motivation to mobilize through Facebook and Twitter. Hence, I wanted to investigate which parties are the ones who best understood the importance and necessity of on-line mobilization.

## 6. Research design

In order to provide answers to questions about on-line mobilization strategies of relevant political parties in Serbia, I developed three-step research methodology that is consisted of qualitative content analysis, qualitative interviewing and the quantification of data.

In my research I decided to follow the guidelines for so-called “web content analysis” (Gerodimos and Ward, 2007). They suggested the combination of content analysis with some other method which will help in overcoming the shortages of traditional content analysis and achieving a clearer insight in the problem. Out of three suggested models that Gerodimos and Ward were offering, the one that is most suitable for my research is two-stage model that includes a qualitative content analysis of social media together with interviews with webmasters and message producers that will complement or compare the results of content analysis. Qualitative data analysis will include all contents that political parties are posting to two major social networks - Facebook and Twitter.

The reason why I decided to use this specific research design is because I strongly believe that the lack of data in one segment, for example in interviewing process, can be easily fulfilled with the results gained through another part of the analysis and vice versa.

### 6.1. Sampling

As I already stated above, I decided to limit the scope of my sample only to relevant parties in Serbia. The criterion of relevancy in this case is determined by the current political situation in Serbia. Since the parliamentary elections took place on 6<sup>th</sup> of May 2012, only those parties that were running for the elections are taken into account. Other political organizations such as NGO-

s or governmental agencies are excluded from the further analysis. The reasons for that decision are previously stated.

In total, there were eighteen different electoral lists running for the elections, out of which six<sup>12</sup> of them were national minority lists. Firstly I wanted to include those lists in the analysis as well, but I decided not to do so because of two principal reasons. First one is related with objective possibilities of the analysis - since their Facebook and Twitter pages are on the language of national minority that they are representing, it would be very hard to conduct the content analysis without knowing the language of national minority.<sup>13</sup> Related to this, in the phase of the research when I was considering including those party lists in the analysis as well, webmaster of Vajdasági Magyar Szövetség pages refused to give me an interview,<sup>14</sup> when I definitely decided to exclude this party and other minority parties from the further analysis. Second reason for that comes from specificity of Serbian electoral system – namely, as it was previously stated, all the parties had to exceed the threshold of 5% in order to get seats in parliament. However, this rule is not applicable for parties of national minorities – they do not have to pass this threshold in order to get into the parliament because their seats are constitutionally guaranteed. Therefore I justifiably assumed that these parties may have a lower interest to mobilize via social networks and to compete with other parties. Consequently, assuming that minority parties will have less

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<sup>12</sup> Those lists are: Savez Vojvodjanskih Madjara (Vajdasági Magyar Szövetség) – Istvan Pasztor, Stranka demokratske akcije Sandzaka (SDAS) – dr Sulejman Ugljanin, Svi Zajedno – BDZ, GSM, DZH, DZVM, Slovacka stranka – Emir Elfic, Koalicija Albanaca presevske doline, Crnogorska partija – Nenad Stevovic and Stranka Nijedan od ponudjenih odgovora.

<sup>13</sup> Those languages are Hungarian, Slovakian, Albanian, Romanian, Bosnian and Montenegrin, out of which only the pages on Bosnian and Montenegrin would be possible for me to analyze without a translator.

<sup>14</sup> Without an interview I would have to rely only on content analysis, and since I stated that these pages are on language of national minorities, It would be almost impossible for me to make a proper analysis.

developed strategies that would be hard to identify, I definitely decided to leave them out of further analysis.

Out of the rest of electoral lists, seven of them were single-party lists<sup>15</sup>, while five of them were coalition lists.<sup>16</sup> I had to make a decision whether I will analyze the strategy of each party within the coalition or the strategy of the coalition in general. As I decided that criterion of relevancy should be the candidature for forthcoming elections because I assumed that mobilization strategies can be seen better during the election campaign, and since it is legitimate to presume that all parties within the same coalition will promote the same or similar contents in this specific period because they are formed from politically and ideologically closely related parties, I decided to analyze the strategy of the coalition in whole instead of each party within the coalition. In case where the coalition did not have an official Facebook or Twitter account, I was analyzing official pages of the key party within the coalition.<sup>17</sup> I consider this to be reasonable since it is expected that the strongest party will be the best representative of the coalition and that it will promote common activities.

Another criterion of relevancy was the existence of official Facebook and Twitter account of the electoral list or the major party within the list<sup>18</sup>. Out of 12 different lists, three of them

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<sup>15</sup> Srpska radikalna stranka (SRS) – dr Vojislav Seselj, Demokratska stranka Srbije (DSS) – Vojislav Kostunica, Dveri za zivot Srbije, Pokret radnika i seljaka (PRS), Socijaldemokratski savez (SDS) – Nebojsa Lekovic, Reformisticka stranka – Prof. dr Milan Visnjic and Komunisticka partija – Josif Broz

<sup>16</sup> Izbor za bolji zivot – Boris Tadic, Ujedinjeni regioni Srbije – Mladjan Dinkic, Cedomir Jovanovic – Preokret, Pokrenimo Srbiju – Tomislav Nikolic and Ivica Dacic – SPS-PUPS-JS.

<sup>17</sup> This was the case with three coalitions – The choice for a better life (I analyzed the official pages of Democratic party), Let's Get Serbia Moving (official pages of Serbian Progressive party) and The Turnover (official pages of Liberal Democratic Party)

<sup>18</sup> The condition was having both Facebook and Twitter page.

(Komunisticka partija Jugoslavije, Socijaldemokratski savez and Pokret radnika I seljaka) did not have pages on Facebook or Twitter. Therefore, they were excluded from the further analysis as well.

Overall, I analyzed 9 different political parties/party coalitions that were running for 2012. parliamentary elections. This implies 6 different qualitative interviews with the webmasters<sup>19</sup>, qualitative content analysis of each party/coalition official Twitter and Facebook page and quantitative measure of information sharing of each party/coalition via their official Twitter and Facebook account.

## ***6.2. Qualitative interviews***

I decided to conduct semi-structured qualitative interviews with webmasters and message creators as the first step of my analysis. Since I decided to set the candidature for the parliamentary elections as a main criterion for party relevancy in this specific case, the main criterion for the choice of interlocutor was whether he or she is administrating official Facebook page and Twitter account of relevant political party. I contacted nine persons in total since there were nine different electoral lists relevant for my research. Three of them did answer at all or did not accept to send me their replies.

All interviews were conducted in the period between 16<sup>th</sup> of April and 6<sup>st</sup> of May. Since that period was in the peak of the campaign, I had to prevent the refusal of interviewing by offering the different forms of interviews to webmasters: the possibility of face-to-face interview, phone

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<sup>19</sup> Three of them refused to give the interview or were out of reach – Serbian Progressive Party, Democratic Party of Serbia and The Movement of Workers and Peasants. Serbian Radical Party was willing to give an interview, but the person that was in charge of on-line marketing resigned in the middle of the campaign, so the party did not have any other relevant interlocutor for my topic of interest.

interview, Skype interview and e-mail interview. Therefore, I had to prepare exceptionally detailed interview guide that is not typical for semi-structured interviewing, in case that some webmasters choose to respond via e-mail. In the end, it turned out that all the respondents chose to answer the questions electronically. All questions and subquestions were roughly divided in five different topical groups – first group was the form of “the facesheet” of general and specific information about webmaster, while the other four groups of questions were related to four main research-question groups (message, target-group, strategy and effects-assessment).

The purpose of qualitative interviews was to obtain the information that could not be extracted from the content analysis – primarily, the questions about overall strategy, targeting, financing and organizing the posting. Therefore, information from interviews will be used as an addition and fulfillment of the results gained through the content analysis of Facebook and Twitter posts.

### ***6.3. Qualitative content analysis***

Qualitative content analysis was conducted for two reasons. First one was to get the insight to the content of Facebook and Twitter posts of different political parties. I was primarily concentrated on the ideological nature of posts – namely, on the tendency of parties with different party discourse to post contents specifically related to their party discourse. Second, I wanted to discover whether those posted contents are designed in the way to attract some specific target group. Since the most frequent users of the social networks are young people, with the use of content analysis I wanted to discover whether the posts of different political parties are mainly consisted of the topics of interest to young people.

I analyzed posts on official Facebook and Twitter accounts of relevant political parties in the last month of the election campaign – from 5<sup>th</sup> of April to 5<sup>th</sup> of May 2012.

In the first step of the content analysis, I divided all parties related to their party discourse. Afterwards, I was reading and re-reading posted material and trying to identify the main themes that are related to each discourse. Within every theme I created separate codes and in the end I coded all the posts manually. I decided that it is better for my content analysis to be inductive rather than deductive – I was identifying topics and creating codes while I was reading raw material rather than creating it before getting familiarized with the content of posts.

In the second part, I analyzed the posts related to the topics of interest of young people without the party division. The procedure was planned to be the same as during the analysis of ideological/non-ideological nature of posted messages. However, it turned out that the amount of messages dedicated to young people was so small that it made no sense to do the qualitative analysis. Therefore, I decided to do the simple quantitative analysis instead – I was counting all the posts and tweets that contained the phrases “young”, “youth”, “scholars”, “students” and “scholarship”.

Another important thing to state is that social media allows posting of multimedia contents (text, pictures, video, audio). Therefore, many posts included some of these contents. The unit of the analysis was the body of each post. In cases when in the body of the post was a video, picture, audio or external link to another written material (for example, newspaper articles, other websites, documents, etc.), I was analyzing them directly only in cases where there was nothing else in the body of the post that is referring to those contents.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> For example, if there was a YouTube video in the post, but brief summary or explanation given together with YouTube link in the body of the post, I was analyzing only the body (the summary, explanation or comment on the video). If the YouTube link was given as the only content, without the further information in the body of the post, I was analyzing the video directly.

On Facebook, I firstly filtered all contents and analyzed only those posts that were published by the page administrator. On Twitter I included the tweets that come directly from the account of the party, as well as “retweets” from other followers.

#### ***6.4. Quantification***

The last methodological step in my research design is the quantification of Facebook posts and tweets of each party. It is consisted of simple post-counting and sorting in the accordance with my hypotheses. The result of the quantification will be presented in a separate table in the “Analysis” part.

## **7. Analysis of on-line party strategies**

My further research is focused on three main subject of interest: the content of posts, the recipients of posts and parties which are the most successful in recognizing the importance of online campaigning.

For this purpose, I formulized three main hypotheses and divided the analysis part in three different sections related to them: content, targeting and motivation.

### **7.1. Content**

Since I was arguing that party discourse and the specificities of political situation of Serbia may shape the nature of messages transmitted via social media, I wanted to investigate whether political parties will use social networks in order to promote their party discourse.

As I stated before, the progressive discourse has been the ruling discourse in Serbian party system since 2000. However, some parties within radical discourse also remained strong after 2000, which can be noticed from their previous election results. Still, their discourse is less popular in current political circumstances, when key political questions and problems are joining the EU, resolving the status of Kosovo, the reduction of unemployment and overcoming the economic crisis, increasing the efficiency of government, etc. Problems that radical discourse is promoting, such as the problem of preserving traditional values, values related to Orthodox church, the glorification of political past, etc. are currently of secondary importance for the citizens of Serbia. Therefore, it can be justifiably assumed that parties within the radical discourse will struggle more to emphasize their key standpoints and to gain more supporters for what they are promoting. Also, some themes within radical discourse are highly sensitive,

especially ones that deals with nationality, sexual orientation and culture. The promotion of some standpoints within these themes can be highly problematic in terms of political correctness. Traditional media that have developed and strong system of filtering and gatekeeping is not the best solution for promoting such contents. Therefore, the use of Internet may be the only solution for those parties whose rhetoric can be designated as politically incorrect or problematic.

Transferred to social networks, I will argue that parties within radical discourse will be more likely to promote their discourse than parties that comes from progressive discourse.

*H1: Parties within radical discourse will post more discursive contents than parties within progressive discourse.*

“Discursive contents” are messages that can be found within one discourse only. It means that themes that both discourses are sharing and covering are excluded from this term.<sup>21</sup> Another excluded information are informative contents (about guest appearances in TV shows, party rallies, etc.), calls for participation (voting, joining a cause, invitation for a rallies, etc.), photos from the campaign and external links unrelated to the party discourse or party policies (YouTube songs, funny pictures, etc.)

In Table 1 and Table 2 are presented the results of the content analysis of discursive contents.

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<sup>21</sup> By this, I am referring mostly to policy problems that parties from both discourses (at least declaratively) want to solve – the problem of Kosovo, unemployment, low standard of living, corruption, partocracy, etc.

Table 1 – The discursive contents of progressive parties

Theme	Code	Example
Progressive values		
	<b><i>Freedom</i></b>	<i>“Our state should raise a flag that will preserve every freedom - freedom to love, freedom in religion and language, freedom to be different”</i>
	<b><i>Equality</i></b>	<i>“Any woman in the country today has 8.5% lower wage than men! So is it fair? In which century do we live? And have you ever heard that human rights activists mentioned that topic? No! I will abolish this discrimination! Men and women must have equal pay in the same workplace if they have the same degree.”</i>
	<b><i>Diversity</i></b>	<i>“Every person in this country, and they are Serbs, Romani, Hungarians, Croats, Slovaks, Romanians and Ruthenians and Checks and Bulgarians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Bosnians, Vlachs - all the people in this country, all ethnic communities that I have mentioned, are safe within our manner of policy guiding”</i>
	<b><i>Tolerance</i></b>	<i>“Serbian society is too divided in the wrong way. We want a country in which the creator of wealth will be the fact that we can celebrate two different Easters or say "goodbye" in Serbian or Bulgarian. Serbia must be a different country, a country of people who live in it, not the country of Serbs and others”</i>
Europe		
	<b><i>Integration</i></b>	<i>“European integration is the only rational way for the modernization of Serbia. Without it, Serbia will remain unfinished country, unable to cooperate with Moscow, Beijing and Washington.”</i>
	<b><i>Pro-EU</i></b>	<i>“People in Serbia need European values and EU as a mean to achieve these values. It is necessary to establish a society of social justice and economic development.”</i>
	<b><i>Pro-NATO</i></b>	<i>“Did all around us join NATO? Well, then we have to join NATO as well, in order to solve our disagreements with others in a normal manner. If we don't do this, we will be an isolated black hole.”</i>
Looking forward		
	<b><i>Future</i></b>	<i>“Our policy strategies are not determined by the opinion of our ancestors, but by our idea of Serbia in the future that is</i>

		<i>dedicated to those who will be born. Therefore, our policy is dedicated to life. We are not traditionalists, we have been facing life and future, creating bridges, landing a hand to reconciliation, we defy to hatred and danger and we never give up."</i>
	<b><i>Anti-past</i></b>	<i>"How would it seem that Serbia is again isolated from the Europe, different from the rest of the world? Serbia, whose citizens at every border crossing are hiding the name of the passport of origin? How would that Serbia look like?"</i>


**Table 2 – The discursive contents of radical parties**

<b>Theme</b>	<b>Code</b>	<b>Example</b>
<b>Radical values</b>		
	<b><i>Family</i></b>	<i>"Family comes first! We do not agree to anti-family law that regime of Boris Tadic wants to enforce. We want to be clear that the "family" is not a statistical error, that the family is the pillar of Serbian society and the pole that will not collapse. We do not give up on the family and family values, and we will fight for it until the end."</i>
	<b><i>Serbian orthodox church</i></b>	<i>God will help us, said Patriarch Pavle. And the prayer of St. George will be with us. Why? Because we know God and His saints, and their role in our history. Because we did not sell our religion, honesty and our cross. Because we love Mother Serbia, and we are putting it over not only the European Union, but also over the whole world.</i>
	<b><i>National unity</i></b>	<i>"We need to clearly tell them we do not want them (EU) because they took us of Kosovo and Metohija, because they want to take the Raska region as well - a mufti of Novi Pazar is running for a president! They want to steal Vojvodina, just watch videos of Pantic and Canak, it is pure separatism! But they are not the only separatists, there is Bajatovic as well. They are separatists, and all those who voted to give approval for the Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. We need to save Serbia, we have to be unified. If we are united then we can solve all our problems."</i>


	<b><i>National pride</i></b>	<i>"We must defend our own! First, the pride and the dignity. Who can restore our pride and dignity? Faithful people! Vojislav Seselj, who is ready to sacrifice his life for the interests of Serbia."</i>
<b>Anti-Europe</b>		
	<b><i>Anti-imperialism</i></b>	<i>"Europe is a comfortable grave for small nations, because as all multi-national and multi-confessional imperial dissolution models and empires fell apart in the blood and ashes. Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and Soviet, and all those before them. Athens is on fire, Spain is in recession with the highest unemployment rate in modern history, together with Portugal, Ireland, Romania, Hungary... "Titanic" sinks heavily, the captain is about to leave, and we are sweaty and agitated paddle to him in order to board."</i>
	<b><i>Anti-EU</i></b>	<i>"The EU cannot be our friend, because they participated in the bombing of our country, established the ICTY in order not to see who really dismantled Yugoslavia and then 22 countries of the EU recognized the terrorist "Kosovo". Every six months they make progress reports about Serbia and a special report on the progress of "Kosovo". What does Serbia have to do within the EU, which tells us to our face - we have kidnapped Kosovo and Metohija from you?"</i>
	<b><i>Anti-NATO</i></b>	<i>"Šutanovac is one of the biggest NATO lobbyists, and Dveri are against membership of Serbia in this criminal military alliance."</i>
<b>Looking backward</b>		
	<b><i>History</i></b>	<i>"Serbs are preparing for 28<sup>th</sup> of October, the celebration of 100 years of entering the famous Serbian army in Kosovo and Metohija. I am convinced that every Serb admires these immortal heroes, and that not a single Serb admires Slovenia and Croatia. We will soon celebrate a century of the great accomplishment of Gavriilo Princip, whose name speaks for itself. We have a lot to be proud of, Serbian people are extraordinary and the Serbian name is great."</i>
	<b><i>Tradition</i></b>	<i>"Serbia should be East to the West, and West to the East, relying on the ancestors, relying on tradition, like a neutral state that was in the Middle Ages, as well as modern state in the nineteenth century, or as a neutral state as the part of Yugoslavia in twentieth century".</i>

In Figure 1 and Figure 3 is presented the amount of discursive posts on Facebook and Twitter.

**Figure 1 – Proportion of discursive posts of radical parties on Facebook and Twitter**




**Facebook posts**



**Tweets**

Radical discourse	Facebook	Twitter
	overall/discursive	overall/discursive
SNS	100/2	352/4
SRS	32/17	129/36
DSS	36/13	17/7.
Dveri	61/19	38/7
RP	36/4	94/6
<b>Overall</b>	<b>265/75</b>	<b>630/60</b>

**Figure 2 – Proportion of discursive posts of progressive parties on Facebook**



Progressive discourse	Facebook	Twitter
	overall/discursive	overall/discursive
DS	88/12	511/20
LDP	114/16	235/14
SPS	105/5	162/6
URS	59/4	148/4
<b>Overall</b>	<b>366/37</b>	<b>1056/44</b>

As it can be seen from the results, it is confirmed that parties that represent radical discourse were overall posting more discursive contents than parties within progressive discourse.

On Facebook, 28.30% of all contents that radical parties were posting are related to themes that are typical for their discourse. The party that was by far dominant in discursive-content posting is Serbian Radical Party (53.12% of total number of posts), while Serbian Progressive Party posted the least discursive contents from all parties within radical discourse (only 2% of total number of posts).

Parties of progressive discourse posted significantly less discursive contents than parties within radical discourse – 10.10% of the total number of posts can be characterized as “discursive”. The highest amount of discursive posts within this discourse has Democratic Party (13.63% of total number of posts), while the lowest amount is present within Socialist Party of Serbia (only 4.76% of total post number.)

On Twitter, the results are somewhat different. It remained unchanged that parties within radical discourse were generally posting more discursive contents than parties that are coming from the progressive discourse, but the percentage of discursive contents was significantly lower than on Facebook.

Radical discourse parties posted in sum 60 discursive tweets, which is 9.52% of total number of tweets. Serbian Progressive Party remained the party with the lowest amount of discursive contents (only 1.13%), but the leader in discursive posting has changed – instead of Serbian Radical Party (27.9% of entire number of tweets), Democratic Party of Serbia preceded with the number of discursive tweets (41.17% of entire number of tweets was discursive).

Parties of progressive discourse overall had 4.16% of discursive tweets. The largest number of discursive content had Liberal Democratic Party (14 out of 235), while United Regions of Serbia had the lowest percentage of discursive tweets (only 2.7%).

If we compare these results with the interview answers that I got from the webmasters of political parties, the result was somewhat expected. Webmasters of progressive parties were mostly claiming that they usually do not post ideological contents, with the exception of Democratic Party and Liberal Democratic Party. The webmaster of Democratic Party said that

their Facebook and Twitter messages have an ideological dimension since their main goal is to promote “socialdemocratic values”. It was also the case with Liberal Democratic Party, whose webmaster noted that their on-line messages are created to present their policy and their ideology in the best possible way. On the other hand, the webmasters of Socialist Party of Serbia and United Regions of Serbia both said that their goal is not to promote party-ideology, but to promote concrete solutions to current problems. In the words of the member of on-line team of Socialist Party of Serbia, they are not spreading discursive contents because they “advocate for concrete, achievable and realistic things.” Unfortunately, within radical discourse I did not achieve to reach the webmasters of three most important parties – Serbian Progressive Party, Democratic Party of Serbia and Serbian Radical Party. According to what the webmaster of Reformist Party said, it is of great importance to promote party discourse on-line, since it reflects the program and the manifesto of the party. Also, Vjerica Radeta, the member of Parliament and the member of SRS, stated recently for “Standard” magazine that “Serbian Radical Party has already developed a program and attitudes for which we are consistently fighting for. Party politics is created by the party organs in accordance with the Statute of the party. Social networks are only needed to be a mean for introducing our politics to people in the right way, so they can choose Serbian Radical Party and thus enable the implementation of our program that will help to improve lives of all citizens.” (Nedeljkovic et al. 2012)

## ***7.2. Targeting***

Another aspect that I wanted to investigate is whether political parties extensively use one of the main features of social networks – group targeting.

Although different group of interest can be segregated by many criteria in accordance with party discourse or party position in political system of Serbia, the most logical targeting-strategy of all parties should be the youth targeting. It is widely recognized that young people are the most frequent users of social networks.(Bennet, 2008) The generation of “digital natives” is using Internet and social media not only in their free time, but in political purpose as well. Although there is still an ongoing debate about whether modern democracies are successful in coping with new values and different forms of political engagement of young people (Mesch and Coleman, 2007), it is still undisputed that posted contents will firstly reach the youngsters.


Thus, I will argue that, in spite of the discourse they are promoting or the place in party system that they are taking, political parties in Serbia will try to reach young people through their on-line campaigning activities.

*H2: All parties will post the significant amount of contents that young people are interested in.*


By the contents that “young people are interested in” I primarily cluster the posts related to school, scholarship, first employment, etc.

In Figure 3 and Figure 4 are presented the results of quantification of posts designed especially for young people.

**Figure 3 – Radical discourse parties and posts dedicated to young people**



**Figure 4 – Progressive discourse parties and posts dedicated to young people**



It is quite devastating to admit that there was almost nothing to analyze, at least by the use of qualitative content analysis. The percentage of posts intended for young people was at the level of statistical error and it was more or less impossible to form separate topics and codes in which I can fit more than one or two posts. That is why I decided to abandon qualitative content analysis in this case and to conduct simple quantitative analysis – I was counting Facebook posts and tweets where the phrases “young”, “youth” “scholars”, “students” and “scholarship” are occurring. On Facebook, parties of radical discourse dedicated only 1.13% of overall posts to

young people and just a little bit more on Twitter – 1.42%. Parties of progressive discourse were slightly more “dedicated” to young people – on Facebook 3.35% of all posts and 2.08% on Twitter.

Therefore, my hypothesis can be rejected.

### **7.3. Motivation**

Finally, I wanted to investigate which parties will be more devoted in carrying out the on-line campaign. Since one of the main advantages of social networks is the reduction of campaign costs, it is a perfect chance for parties with the lack of resources to be heard. (Chadwick, 2006) I will assume that underresourced parties will recognize social networks as a substitute for costly traditional campaigns. Namely, it is well known that political campaigning is extremely expensive activity, especially when it comes to advertizing through traditional media. According to the Law of financing of political activities of Republic of Serbia, for the need of financing of political campaigns, all parties are getting 0.1% of national budget. 20% of these funds are further allocated in equal portions to all electoral lists. The rest of funds goes to those parties that won the seats in the parliament, proportionally with the number of mandates.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, small parties and parties that do not have enough support to enter the parliament are getting very limited resources for their campaigning activities. Hence, I will argue that parties that did not enter the parliament and the parties that did enter the parliament, but won less than 20 seats, were more interested in conducting the web-campaign than the parties who won a large number of mandates.

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<sup>22</sup> Serbian Law on financing of political activities, available at web-address [http://www.ifes.org/~media/Files/Publications/Reports/2011/The%20Serbian%20Law%20on%20Financing%20Politics\\_Serbian.pdf](http://www.ifes.org/~media/Files/Publications/Reports/2011/The%20Serbian%20Law%20on%20Financing%20Politics_Serbian.pdf) (accessed on May 8<sup>th</sup> 2012)

*H3: Parties with small and moderate support will overall post more than parties with big support.*

In the group of parties with “small support” I included parties that did not manage to pass the electoral threshold of 5% - Reformist Party, Dveri and Serbian Radical Party. Parties and electoral lists with “moderate support” are the ones who won less than 20 seats in the parliament<sup>23</sup> – United Regions of Serbia and Turnover.

In the Table 3 are presented the results of quantification of Facebook and Twitter posts of big and small parties

**Table 3 – The overall number of Facebook and Twitter posts of big and small parties**

BIG PARTIES	FB	Twitter	SMALL PARTIES	FB	Twitter
DS	88	511	URS	59	148
SNS	100	352	LDP	114	235
SPS	105	162	SRS	32	129
DSS	36	17	DVERI	61	17
<b>Overall</b>	<b>329</b>	<b>1042</b>	RP	36	94
			<b>Overall</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>623</b>

Facebook average » 82 posts/party  
Twitter average » 260 posts/party

Facebook average » 60 posts/party  
Twitter average » 104 posts/party

Big parties and electoral lists were more active both on Facebook and Twitter than parties and electoral lists with small and moderate support. On Facebook, bigger parties had all together 329 posts, which is approximately 82 posts per party. On the other hand, smaller parties had all

<sup>23</sup> The proportion of votes that they won is less then 7%

together 302 posts, but 60 posts per party on average. Most active parties on Facebook were Liberal Democratic Party with 114 posts and Socialistic party of Serbia with 105 posts, while the least active were Serbian Radical party with 32 posts and Democratic Party of Serbia with 36 posts.

On Twitter, big parties had almost two times more tweets than small ones – 1042 compared to 523 (on average, 260 tweets per party for big parties and 104 tweets per party for small ones). Indubitably, the most active party on Twitter was Democratic Party with 511 tweets. Out of smaller parties, Liberal Democratic Party was preceding in the number of tweets, with 235 posted tweets. The least active on Twitter were Democratic Party of Serbia and Dveri, both with 17 posted tweets.

The webmasters of parties had quite different views on the importance of on-line campaigning. The webmasters of parties that were posting more were emphasizing the importance of this way of communication. Administrator of official Facebook and Twitter account of Liberal Democratic Party stated that his party had always paid attention to communication on social networks and that they recognized its importance even before the elections, and that therefore they started to create their social network community on time. On the other hand, one of the members of on-line team of Socialist Party of Serbia, although his party was very active on both Facebook and Twitter, stated that, on his opinion, his party sometimes paid more attention on this kind of communication than it was necessary. He argued that on-line campaigning cannot really ensure votes. The similar opinion had a webmaster of Reformist party, who said that his party considered it important to develop the on-line campaign, but that they also considered that

it was not of crucial importance. In addition, he stated that he thinks that only small number of on-line followers is ready to engage in the real life.

According to the results, my hypothesis can be rejected.

## 8. Discussion

It is notable that political parties in Serbia failed to recognize important many aspects of social networks that can be beneficial in the campaign. Reasons for that mostly lie in the general skepticism related to this relatively new and insufficiently known way of communication. It is visible from the interviews with webmasters that they still do not believe in the benefits of communication through social networks in general. Many of them think that online engagement is not a guarantee for offline engagement that they actually need. This attitude is also visible in their approximation that only 5 – 20% of Facebook fans and Twitter followers would be ready to engage outside of social networks. In the words of a webmaster of Liberal Democratic Party, “online voter is quite passive. What you can do by clicking the mouse or keyboard - this is the ultimate range of his operations. Very few are willing to engage offline. This is a problem not only in political campaigns, but also when it comes to broader social actions.” A webmaster of Dveri characterized the form of social networks itself as “very strange”. He stated that people who spend too much time on social networks can be easily described as “asocial” and marked as the persons who are not truly “people of action”. That skepticism, alongside with insufficient knowledge of on-line campaign conducting, probably led to the devastating results that makes us wonder whether we can even speak about “strategies” in online campaigning in Serbia.

If nothing else, it seems that certain parties recognized the possibility of weaker gatekeeping mechanisms on social networks and decided to use it in promoting the contents they could not promote otherwise. The webmaster of Dveri said that Serbian media were mostly “closed” for their promotion because they were “crucially against current political situation in Serbia, and that attitude includes the media as well.” The tendency of radical parties to use social networks in the purpose of discourse promotion is visible in the results of the content analysis as well.

Nonetheless, it is important to notice that both radical and progressive parties were more likely to promote their party discourse on Facebook than on Twitter. One possible reason is the limited number of characters that can fit one tweet (only 140) and the entire visual solution of Twitter.<sup>24</sup> The platform of Facebook is more suitable for presenting the discursive material that is more complex than, for example, simple informative content. One especially interesting result in the domain of discourse-promoting is a very low amount of discursive content posted by Serbian Progressive Party. It is probably reasonable to presume that this happened due to their “image reorientation” and their struggle to move away from their previous standpoints. Moving away from the radical discourse was what brought them popularity and a larger support in the first place, and therefore it is not too unforeseen that they are not emphasizing discursive messages in their campaign. On the other hand, their main opponents – Democratic Party – were posting quite large amount of discursive messages. Plausible explanation for that is the fear of election loss and the big threat that is coming from Serbian Progressive Party as their main opponent. Democratic Party was playing on promotion of “European path” that they began to develop as the “engine of democratic change in Serbia” and on the emphasis on the importance of continuing with their policy.

However, when it comes to targeting, political parties in Serbia were completely unsuccessful in utilizing this very important aspect of social media. If we concentrate on their failure to target the young people as a specific target group, we should consider several reasons for that. Young people are considered to be “disaffected citizens” or “culturally displaced” (Loader, 2007), that

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<sup>24</sup> For example, posting YouTube video on Facebook and on Twitter looks completely different. If we post the link to YouTube video on Twitter, in the body of the tweet will be shown only the short version of the link. If we do it on Facebook, we will see complete link and the cover picture of the video that we want to post.

means that they are crucially not interested in traditional politics and that they can hardly find their place in “old” political culture out of digital world. Mesch’s and Coleman’s (2007) article about modern democracies and its failure to cope up with the new values of young people is showing that youngsters are usually not politically engaged in old, traditional way. They will rarely go out to vote, join a political party or do anything that is in interest of traditional political parties. They will express they interest in politics in a different way, and that “different way” is not what traditional parties aim for. Although some webmasters stated that they are paying attention to young people, especially when they are creating messages online (for example, the webmaster of Liberal Democratic Party noted that it is of great importance how the messages for the young people will look like in terms of language, form and content), the results clearly show that insufficient attention was given to this issue. It is also rather strange that almost all webmasters said that they do not have clearly formed target group at all.<sup>25</sup>

Related to the last part of the analysis and its results, if we ask a question why small parties do not use social networks more extensively, one possible answer emerges as a possible explanation. The specificities of Serbian party discourse probably strongly shape the communicational habits of political parties. If we look at the results again, we will clearly see that, among small parties, the most active are the ones that belong to progressive party discourse. Parties within radical discourse are more traditional, and most likely less used to two-way communication. It is quite possible that organizational pattern of radical parties simply does not allow two way communication because it can easily be perceived as an organizational threat.

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<sup>25</sup> Only Liberal Democratic Party stated that they were targeting people with “similar political beliefs as ours” (people who are likely to vote for liberal civic parties) and Reformist Party said that their target group is “people from the district of Nis”.

Parties within radical discourse are usually centralized, with clear structure and ruling system where everyone knows their place, tasks and responsibilities. Naturally, the communication in this type of organizations takes place in one direction (from top structures to the bottom). Therefore, it is possible that parties in Serbia still have not experienced the organizational change that occurred in more developed and more technology-shaped environments.

"Over-oligarchic and bureaucratic structure in which political parties are asking their head-in-charge for everything they need to do, simply does not work on social networks that allow equality in communication. This is the main reason for the lack of social networks usage for political purposes. Most of the parties, especially large ones, just do not want to get into that kind of risk where anyone can raise a very uncomfortable question and insist on a response. That act can be further supported by the rest of the users and their immediate reaction. In parties where one boss is in charge of everything, there is no sufficient autonomous persons that can respond and react quickly. Because of this, social networks are more likely to be a risk than opportunity." (Nedeljkovic et al. 2012)

However, the size of the party was not of decisive importance in this case. Out of parties characterized as "larger", Democratic Party of Serbia was much less active on social networks in comparison with other three "large parties", and at the same time less active than two "small parties" that are coming from the progressive discourse – Liberal Democratic Party and United Regions of Serbia. Therefore, there is a reasonable suspicion that the organizational pattern of radical parties does not allow them to use the advantages of social networks. In addition, all webmasters from progressive discourse parties were claiming that they had really high degree of freedom in doing what they were in charge of. Most of them said that they had an entire team of people whose job was to moderate and update their official Facebook and Twitter account. As they were stating, all members of the team had equal responsibilities and equal freedom to decide what will be published, when and why. Also, many of them claimed that they were reluctant to apply censorship and that it was happening only in extreme cases, such as the posting of

explicitly vulgar and offensive content. However, this claim should not be taken for granted since it cannot be checked empirically so easily. Nevertheless, according to the results of the analysis, we can suspect that parties within progressive discourse are organizationally more opened for the usage of social media.

## 9. Conclusion

If we try to find possible reasons for the failure of key political parties in Serbia to develop detailed and successful strategies on social networks, we should probably look back in the theory at the first place. There is still an ongoing debate between so-called “net optimists” and “net pessimists” when it comes to mobilizing potentials of Internet and social networks. One of the “net pessimists”, Evgeniy Morozov, in his book “The Net Delusion” (2012) presented one relevant, but quite critical point of view on the possibility of “net-revolution”. He argued that Twitter, Facebook and other social networks are not capable to truly force the social engagement in the offline reality. Alongside with Morozov, Malcom Gladwell (2010) made some interesting observations about non-hierarchical character of social networks and “weak bounds” between their users that are the main obstacles in their mobilization potential. On the other side of the perspective are “net-optimists”, such as Castells, who argued that social media revived network as a form of social organization and therefore redesigned entire social structure of modern society (Castells, 2000). It seems that parties in Serbia mostly have a “net pessimistic” attitude towards social media. However, this attitude cannot be the valid excuse for their total ignorance when it comes to especially important and useful dimensions of social media, such as direct targeting and the possibility of two way communication. Political parties in Serbia definitely underestimated the power of the illusion of direct participation that two way communication on social networks is creating in political process. Those citizens who are participating actively on social networks have a very strong impression that their voice is heard and that they can influence the political process with their comments, suggestions and judgments. Social networks are the perfect replacement for traditional door-to-door campaigning that is extremely time and money consuming, but on the other hand the most efficient form of pre-electoral promoting.

Therefore, the task for political parties in Serbia is to finally take this new way of communication more seriously and to try to develop the real strategies by next elections.

When it comes to suggestions for further research in this field, the next important and logical step would be the investigation of online campaigning effects. In this case when the strategies of political parties were almost nonexistent, it can be presumed that the effects of campaigning would also be quite devastating. However, the question of effects that I did not have time to process in this paper is important so the parties can be more motivated to develop their strategies – if it turns out that the online campaigning actually can bring them votes, the parties will finally become more aware of the advantages that social networks are bringing in the world of political communication.

Overall, since these parliamentary elections were the first ones in which parties were leading their campaigns online, it was expected that the results will not be satisfactory. However, parties in Serbia should take these elections as a “dress rehearsal” for the next ones and take the communication via social networks more seriously.

## 10. Appendices

### *Appendix 1 – The interview guide*

#### Section 1

1. Full name and surname, title, for which the party / movement / political organization do you edit pages on social networks? Since when are you on the given position and until when will you approximately do the given job?
2. Are you a member of the party that hired you? Are you a member of another political organization?
3. Are you professionally related to the field of communications, marketing or PR? If not, what is your profession? If you are a communication expert, are you an employee of a larger marketing-company that was engaged by the party in purpose of implementation of marketing activities?
4. Are you paid for the job that you do or are you a volunteer?
5. Do you work alone or within a team?
6. What is your workload? How much time do you spend daily doing it?
7. Who is superior? Who is giving you the guidelines what to publish and how to moderate and update the pages? How much freedom do you have in it?

#### Section 2

1. How important is the promotion through social networks to the political party whose pages you update? Are they aware of the importance of this type of communication and

interaction with the voters? Do you think that sufficient importance is given to communicating via social networks?

2. What are the main expectations of the parties? Do you think that social networking sites can bring new voters / members / activists to the party or the expectations are more moderate?
3. Is the party setting aside a sufficient amount of funds from its budget for on-line campaign? If not, why do you think that this is so?

### Section 3

1. What is, in your opinion, the main advantage of social networks in the implementation of the campaign?
2. What are the main disadvantages? What can go wrong?
3. How many social networking platforms facilitate the dissemination of information? How important is the general role of the moderator?
4. What factors would you highlight as the most important in political advertising on social networks (finance, human resources, creativity ...?)

### Section 4

1. What kind of messages you usually post? Is your primary goal to inform or to call for action? Are your messages intended to awake social engagement or simply to inform?
2. Are your messages ideological? Why are / are not?

3. Do you post sensationalistic contents? In what situations and how often? What is the purpose of it?
4. Do you encourage public debate on your pages? Do you open polls and discussions?
5. To what degree you resort to censorship? In which cases?
6. To what degree you tend to be "personal" with your followers (are you sending them private messages, etc..)? How often do you answer their questions / suggestions / criticisms?
7. Do you mention the competition in your messages? How often? Do you ever resort to negative campaign? Why?
8. Do you post some contents through social networks that you do not broadcast via old media? If so, what type and why?

## Section 5

1. What is your target audience? Why? Do you have it or you prefer a catch-all principle?
2. Do you customize the content and format of the message you are posting to target groups that you identified? In what way?
3. What kind of feedback you get from your followers? Does their feedback match your expectations? What can go wrong and contrary to expectations? How often this happens?
4. How would you assess the effect of the content placed on the target group? Do you think that campaigns on social networks have an effect and why?

5. How do you measure the success of on-line dissemination of information (the number of likes, the number of followers, the number of comments ...?)?
6. Roughly speaking, what percentage of companions actually engage in social networks (respect the new facilities, expanding existing ones, participate in debates, etc.).?
7. To what extent do you think they are on-line companions willing to engage outside of social networks? In what percent? Do you think that campaigns on social networks can influence it to win new voters, activists and members and to what extent you think that this is possible?

If you have anything to add, feel free to do so.

Thank you for your time and patience!

## ***Appendix 2 – The codesheet for the qualitative analysis of progressive discourse***

<b>Theme</b>	<b>Code</b>	<b>Example</b>	<b>Number of posts</b>
<b>Progressive values</b>			
	<i>Freedom</i>		
	<i>Equality</i>		
	<i>Diversity</i>		
	<i>Tolerance</i>		
<b>Europe</b>			
	<i>Integration</i>		
	<i>Pro-EU</i>		
	<i>Pro-NATO</i>		
<b>Looking forward</b>			
	<i>Future</i>		
	<i>Anti-past</i>		
<b>Non-discursive</b>			

### ***Appendix 3 – The codesheet for the qualitative analysis of radical discourse***

<b>Theme</b>	<b>Code</b>	<b>Example</b>	<b>Number of posts</b>
<b>Radical values</b>			
	<i>Family</i>		
	<i>Serbian orthodox church</i>		
	<i>National unity</i>		
	<i>National pride</i>		
<b>Anti-Europe</b>			
	<i>Anti-imperialism</i>		
	<i>Anti-EU</i>		
	<i>Anti-NATO</i>		
<b>Looking backward</b>			
	<i>Tradition</i>		
	<i>History</i>		
<b>Non-discursive</b>			

***Appendix 4 – The codesheet for content analysis of posts related to young people***

Code	Number of posts
<i>Young</i>	
<i>Youth</i>	
<i>Student</i>	
<i>School</i>	
<i>Scholar</i>	
<i>Scholarship</i>	
<i>Non-young oriented</i>	

## ***Appendix 5 – The list of analyzed Facebook and Twitter pages***

<http://www.facebook.com/srpski.radikali.zvanicnastranica>

<http://www.facebook.com/Liberalnodemokratskapartija>

<http://www.facebook.com/reformisti>

<http://www.facebook.com/dverizazivotsrbije>

<http://www.facebook.com/SocijalistickaPartijaSrbijeSPS>

<http://www.facebook.com/snssrbija>

<http://www.facebook.com/demokrate>

<http://www.facebook.com/demokratskastrankasrbije>

<http://www.facebook.com/ujedinjeniregionisrbije>

<https://twitter.com/#!/reformisti>

<https://twitter.com/#!/regionisrbije>

<https://twitter.com/#!/DSSvesti>

[https://twitter.com/#!/srpski\\_radikali](https://twitter.com/#!/srpski_radikali)

<https://twitter.com/#!/socijalisti>

<https://twitter.com/#!/DveriSrpske>

[https://twitter.com/#!/sns\\_srbija](https://twitter.com/#!/sns_srbija)

<https://twitter.com/#!/LDP>

<https://twitter.com/#!/demokrate>

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