

**DEFENSIONES DALMATIAE: GOVERNANCE AND LOGISTICS OF THE VENETIAN
DEFENSIVE SYSTEM IN DALMATIA DURING THE WAR OF CRETE (1645 - 1669)**

By

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Abstract

This PhD dissertation deals with the Venetian defensive system in the Adriatic theater of operations; its structure, organization (the navy and the army), governance and administration, and logistical problems involved with keeping it operational. In temporal terms this study is limited only to the period of the longest war the Republic of Venice ever fought with the Ottoman Empire, the war known as the War of Crete (1645-1669). Although the War of Crete was just the first in the series of three subsequent wars fought in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries between these two states, in many respects, it represented a turning point. On one hand, in spite of resounding victories in the Dardanelles (1654-1657), and tenacious defense of Candia, the Republic failed to achieve its objectives in these zones, and the war did end with Ottoman victory and conquest of the island of Crete. On the other hand, in the Adriatic theater of operations, fortunes were reversed. In Dalmatia, Venice won its most celebrated land victories of this war, crowned its success by taking two sandjak beys as prisoners, and for the first time after a series of defeats during previous wars (1537-1539 and 1570-1573), the Republic could claim local victory in this region, and expand its territory. Although Venetian territorial gains in this war were insignificant when compared to those of the following two wars - when all the land between the Adriatic Sea and the Dinaric mountains was re-conquered - nevertheless, for the first time, the Ottomans were stopped and even pushed back on the eastern Adriatic shore.

To a lay eye, such final result of this war, the Venetian loss of the Island of Crete and limited territorial gains in Dalmatia, may seem as a very unlikely outcome. Although the Ottoman Empire had by the 17th century affirmed its position as a first class naval power in the Mediterranean, its main strength still rested on land. The series of unbroken victories against Christian powers in the course of the last two centuries preceding this war was more than impressive, giving its land forces a frightening reputation. On the other hand, even if by the mid-17th century the golden age of Venetian maritime power was long gone, the Republic was still a respectable naval power with a long tradition and experience in naval warfare. If

anywhere, it was on the sea that the Republic's best chance for challenging the Ottoman Empire was to be found. Achieving victory at sea and thus securing its possessions in the Levant seemed a more likely scenario than the denial of victory to Ottomans in Dalmatia, where the Empire could deploy its massive land forces. However, the course of events proved to be just the reverse. Through research of the Venetian military commitment in the Adriatic theater of operations during the War of Crete, this study aims to provide solid basis for the understanding of such unlikely outcome of this war.

The main theme of this study is best defined as the research of successes and failures of early-modern state administration in an "imperial republic" (supposedly in a condition of decline), in the liminal situation of war waged against a "real" empire (also supposedly in a condition of decline). The thesis is divided into three parts, each dealing with one particular context. The first chapter the "Military-Political Context," provides a sketch of the historical background, giving an overview of war events in the Dalmatian theater of operations during the War of Crete. The second chapter: "Military-Administrative Context" deals with a range of topics; in the first place with the structure and organization of the Venetian armed forces in Dalmatia, the structure of the military command, civil organs of control, and provides a general overview of the Venetian military commitment in Dalmatia. Additionally, this chapter also covers the problematic question of the integration of the Morlacchi in the Venetian defensive system in Dalmatia, and strives to provide the evaluation of the Morlacchi contribution to the overall Venetian war effort in this battlefield. The common theme that is interwoven into each of these inquires are that of military administration. Finally, the last chapter the "Logistical Context" tackles the problem of the supply of the Venetian forces in this battlefield, aiming to grasp the scale of the challenge the Republic of Venice faced in maintaining its war effort in Dalmatia, for more than two decades.

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Introduction

The War of Crete (1645-1669) was just the first in the series of three subsequent wars fought in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire, which led to this period being named "the century of iron (*secolo di ferro*)."

In many respects, this war represented a turning point in this conflict. On one hand, the war did end with Ottoman victory and conquest of the island of Crete - with Podolia, in 1672, being the Empire's last major territorial gain - but in the Adriatic theater of operations, fortunes were reversed. Here, for the first time after a series of defeats during previous wars (1537-1539 and 1570-1573), the Republic of Venice could claim local victory and expand its territory. Although Venetian territorial gains in this war were insignificant when compared to those of the following two wars - when all the land between the Adriatic Sea and the Dinaric mountains was re-conquered - nevertheless, for the first time, the Ottomans were stopped and even pushed back on the eastern Adriatic shore.

To a lay eye, the final result of this war, the Venetian loss of the Island of Crete and limited territorial gains in Dalmatia, may seem as a very unlikely outcome. Although the Ottoman Empire had by the 17th century affirmed its position as a first class naval power in the Mediterranean, its main strength still rested on land. The series of unbroken victories against Christian powers in the course of the last two centuries preceding this war was more than impressive, giving its land forces a frightening reputation. On the other hand, even if by the mid-17th century the golden age of Venetian maritime power was long gone, the Republic was still a respectable naval power with a long tradition and experience in naval warfare. If anywhere, it was on the sea that the Republic's best chance for challenging the Ottoman Empire was to be found. Achieving victory at sea and thus securing its possessions in the Levant seemed a more likely scenario than the denial of victory to Ottomans in Dalmatia, where the Empire could deploy its massive land forces. However, the course of events proved to be just the reverse. From the operational point of view, both the Aegean and Crete can be considered as failures. In spite of resounding victories in the Dardanelles (1654-1657), and

tenacious defense of Candia, the Republic failed to achieve its objectives in these zones, while in Dalmatia, it won its most celebrated victories on land during this war, and crowned its success by taking two sandjak beys as prisoners.

The factors that led to such an outcome were numerous and are discussed in more detail in the first chapter. At this point, only a short survey will suffice. In the first place, almost for the entire duration of this long conflict, the Ottoman Empire was plagued by a high level of political instability. The prolonged war and its high cost only accelerated and deepened already existing political and economic crisis of the Empire. In addition to perpetual armed uprisings in distant provinces of the Empire which tied down significant forces, frequent depositions of Grand Viziers (and even the Sultan himself) and other high state Ottoman officials, most notably of the Pasha of Bosnia, also resulted in frequent shifts of strategy and changes of campaign targets. All of this had detrimental a effect on the overall Ottoman war effort. Then, after 1658, when under the firm rule of Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha Köprülü, the political situation in the Empire more or less stabilized, the majority of the land forces of the Empire were for the next seven years entangled in Transylvanian affairs, and, from 1663, in a full fledged war with the Habsburgs. Apart from these political factors, Ottoman military commitment in Dalmatia was hindered too by a range of geographical factors that made deployment of a major Ottoman army in Dalmatia rather a costly operation, one that would redirect large quantities of Empire's resources from its naval effort. Finally, what must be accounted for are the technological/administrative changes that go under the common label of "The Military Revolution"¹ which increased the combat efficiency of European Christian

1 From its appearance in 1956, the thesis of the "Military Revolution" has transformed the historiography of Early Modern Warfare. The number of works on the topic, both those advocating the existence of such a phenomenon or denying it, is vast and practically impossible to account for. At this point, only several most seminal studies will be mentioned, beginning with the volume edited by Clifford Rogers, which provide an excellent summary of the debate: Clifford J. Roggers, *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the military transformation of early modern Europe*, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995); Michael Roberts, "The Military Revolution, 1560–1660" In *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, Clifford J. Rogers ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) pp. 13-35. Compare also: Jeremy Black, *A military revolution?: military change and European Society 1550-1800*, (London: Macmillan, 1991); Geoffrey Parker, *The military revolution: military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500-1800*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Brian M. Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993)

powers, especially in terms of defense, with the introduction of modern bastion based star-shaped fortifications. By closely examining the Venetian military commitment in Dalmatia, this study will attempt to shed some light on this historical phenomenon.

1. *Wars and Military History*

"How wars are won is the central question in military history."² The simplicity of this statement by Jeremy Black - one of most prominent contemporary military historians - obscures the complexity involved in the practice of achieving such a "simple" goal. Undoubtedly, majority of military historians today do agree that the main goal of military history is to capture the essence of war, but (un)fortunately there is no commonly accepted agreement on how to do this best. The methodology and the approaches of the traditional "drum and trumpet"³ military history, with its focus solely on strictly combat-related and operational aspects of the conflict, notwithstanding its undying popularity with the general public, is not considered to yield satisfactory scholarly results any more. Quite on the contrary, among majority of practitioners of military history today, it has become widely recognized that the research of human conflicts cannot be limited to strictly military activities, but that it also needs to include its relationship with the wider social context. From early 1960s on, the process known as the "*socialization of military history*" has begun.⁴ As a result, the focus of the military history has been significantly redirected, and the interest of military historians has expanded into areas covering non-combative aspects of conflict, such as recruitment, training and socialization of personnel, combat motivation, internal dynamics of military institutions, civil-military relations and - most importantly for the research of human conflict - the mutual relationship between military systems and their broader social context.⁵

Parallel to these developments, building on the same momentum of change, new trends

2 Jeremy Black, ed. *War in the Early Modern World 1450-1845*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999) p. 1.

3 Under the "drum and trumpet" military history I understand the old operational history implying heroic, often panegyric coverage of the past. See: Benjamin Franklin Cooling. "Toward A More Usable Past; A Modest Plea for A Newer Typology of Military History." *Military Affairs* 52, no. 1. (1988), p. 29.; and Jeremy Black, *Rethinking Military History*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004) pp. 26-27.

4 Colin Jones. "New Military History for Old? War and Society in Early Modern Europe," *European Studies Review* 12, (1982): pp. 97-98.

5 Peter Karsten, "The 'New' American Military History a Map of the territory explored and unexplored." *American Quarterly* 36, no. 3. (1984) p.389.

today known as the "new military history" also began to take hold. Unlike the "war and society" branch which shifted its focus away from combat, the "new military history" kept its focus on the operational aspect of the conflict, but approached it from a different angle than traditional military history. The metaphor used most frequently to describe this difference between the "old" and the "new" military history, is that of old military history being one to favor the top-down, while the new military history uses the bottom-up approach.⁶ The above classification of "war and society" and "new military history" based on central themes of their research is actually quite a theoretical one, since in practice, many historians who operate under either the "war and society" or the "new military history" label successfully combine the operational approach with the research of wider resonances of military activities.

However, the process of the transformation of the field did not come to its end merely with the introduction of a new set of topics, or with the change in approaches to the old ones. Soon, initiatives for further adaptation and more interdisciplinary approaches were voiced. As a consequence, over the last two decades new themes ranging from gender, historical anthropology and research on the use of violence, to cultural history were successfully introduced into the field. The influence of the later is especially important, so much that today some historians have started to talk about a "cultural turn" in the field of military history. Whether we can speak of the "turn" in the field of military history or not is of less importance. Today, more and more military historians understand combat styles and military capabilities not simply as pragmatic products of technologies, but also as cultural constructs, and do not evaluate military decisions, policy making or adoption or rejection of specific weapons or organizational factors solely in terms of efficiency and utilitarianism.⁷

The reasons for the success of this approach were twofold. First, it offered a way out of the long-lasting practice of giving explanations for military developments based mainly on technological factors, the phenomenon known as the mechanization of warfare. Secondly, the

6 Michael S. Neiberg, "War and Society," In Matthew Hughes and William J. Philpott eds., *Palgrave Advances in Modern Military History*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) p. 42;

7 John Lynn, "The Embattled Future of Academic Military History." *The Journal of Military History* 61, no. 4. (1997) pp. 787-789.; Jeremy Black, 2004, p. 233-244.; Jeremy Black, *Rethinking Military History*, pp. 55-58.

introduction of the concept of cultural relativism into the field of military history finally managed to successfully address the problem of Eurocentrism, present in military history from its earliest days. As Jeremy Black pointed out, an emphasis on culture offered a more relativist mode of explanation in military history. Military systems of competing states should no longer be measured against an absolute and universal scale of technological capacity and efficiency, one often modeled on the European=Western model of development, but they should rather be compared one to each other, taking into account all strategic, organizational and cultural specificities of their contexts.⁸

For Early Modern military historians, two closely interwoven topics are almost unavoidable. The first, already mentioned, military revolution thesis, was originally introduced into the field by Michel Roberts in mid 1950s, and afterwards redefined and expanded by Geoffrey Parker, first in his 1976 article *The 'Military Revolution', 1560-1660' a Myth?*, followed (in 1988) by one of seminal studies in the field of Early Modern military history: *Military Innovation and the Rise of the West: 1500-1880*.⁹ According to proponents of the military or gunpowder (as it is also commonly called) revolution thesis, the period between the 16-18th centuries (even 14-18th according to some)¹⁰, was marked by profound change in military tactics and strategy brought about by the innovation and wide dissemination of gunpowder weaponry. Furthermore, these technological advances are also considered to have had far reaching consequences for the development of the modern state and the rearrangement of power relationships between civilizations.

From its origin, the thesis was the subject of a lively debate among historians which evolved around almost every aspect of the thesis, challenging and redefining its tactical,

8 Jeremy Black, *Rethinking Military History*, p. 233.

9 Geoffrey Parker, "The 'Military Revolution', 1560-1660' a Myth?" *Journal of Modern History* 48 (1976) pp. 195-214.; Geoffrey Parker, *The military revolution: military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500-1800*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)

10 See: Clifford Rogers, "Military Revolution of the Hundred Years War," in *The Military Revolution Debate. Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, ed. Clifford J. Rogers (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995) pp. 55-93.; Jeremy Black, "A Military Revolution? A 1660-1792 Perspective," in *The Military Revolution Debate. Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, ed. Clifford J. Rogers (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995) pp. 55-93.; Jeremy Black, *European Warfare 1660-1815 (European Warfare 1660-1815* (London: UCL Press, 1994) pp. 5-7.

strategic and/or technological components, the proper periodization of the change in military affairs, the scope and limits of this change, whether the change indeed was revolutionary or if the main theme should be one of continuity and so forth. However, more importantly, the wider implications of the change in military affairs on the society as a whole linked the military revolution debate stream to a more general discussion dealing with the role of the war on the development of the state in Early Modern Europe. The interpretation offered by some of military theory advocates, that technological factors - the development of gunpowder weapons, new style of fortifications, and gunned sail ships – or/and the institutional and fiscal demands brought about by the increased scale of the new European way of war conduct, had through the professionalization of the army and development of the state bureaucracy led to the assertion of the central state power; was readily accepted and incorporated in their works by sociologists and political scientists, such as Brian M. Downing and Bruce D. Porter.¹¹ Yet, such causal interpretation of the effects of military changes was in turn challenged by several military historians who took the opposite view, and perceive the development of the absolutist state more as a cause than the outcome of the revolution in military affairs.¹²

The historiographical trends surveyed in previous paragraphs constitute the theoretical and methodological context of this study, which aims to approach the problem of the study of war through the following question: "How do states, in this case the Republic of Venice, wage war in a particular age?" In order to provide the answer to this question, the main focus of this study is put on research of the Venetian defensive system in the Adriatic theater of operations: its structure and organization (the navy and the army), governance (especially in regard to the specific political culture of the Venetian Republic) and logistical problems involved with keeping it operational. Through research of the Venetian military commitment in the Adriatic

11 Brian M. Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State* (New York: Free Press, 1994)

12 Clifford Rogers, "The Military Revolution in History" in *The Military Revolution Debate. Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, ed. Clifford J. Rogers (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995) p. 6; Alan James, "Warfare and the Rise of the State," In Matthew Hughes and William J. Philpott eds., *Palgrave Advances in Modern Military History*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2006) pp. 23-41. (especially pp. 29-30)

theater of operations during the War of Crete, this study aims to join the ongoing debate concerning the relationship between early modern governments and the conduct of war. As its intellectual predecessors, this study takes the series of similar works also concentrated on the study of armed forces, with an emphasis on military administration and/or logistics such as the path-breaking work by Geoffrey Parker: *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road (1567-1659)*¹³ or more recent studies by David Parrott *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624–1642*¹⁴ and Guy Rowlands' *The dynastic state and the army under Louis XIV: royal service and private interest, 1661 to 1701*,¹⁵ to name just a few that made the greatest impact on the author.¹⁶

Several factors have influenced my decision to concentrate on the Dalmatian theater of operation of this war only. So far, general histories of the War of Crete have treated Dalmatia only as the secondary battlefield, concentrating mainly on the Aegean, during the middle phase of the war (1650-1658), or on Crete, during the opening (1645-1648) and the final years (1664-1669), as the places of main activities. And indeed, the swift Ottoman conquest of the island (1645-7), the naval battles in the Dardanelles (1654-7) and the tenacious defense of Candia (1665-1669), taken as the culminating points of this struggle, may well serve as the justification for such a construction of the narrative. Yet, for a study concentrated on armed forces, their administration and logistics, the Dalmatian battlefield offers a rather good case study.

First, although it indeed was the secondary battlefield, Dalmatia was of great strategic value: it represented the crucial link between Venice and the other two battlefields. The link,

13 Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road (1567-1659). The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972)

14 David Parrott, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624–1642*, (Cambridge University Press, 2003)

15 Guy Rowlands, *The dynastic state and the army under Louis XIV: royal service and private interest, 1661 to 1701*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)

16 The number of similar studies that served as road marks for this one is large and includes: Robert A. Stradling, *The Armada of Flanders: Spanish Maritime Policy and European War, 1568-1668*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Mark L. Stein, *Guarding the Frontier. Ottoman Border Forts and Garrisons in Europe*, (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007); Claudio De Consoli, *Al soldo del duca: l'amministrazione delle armate sabaude (1560–1630)*, (Torino: Paravia, 1999); Jan Glete, *Swedish Naval Administration 1521-1721. Resource Flows and Organisational Capabilities* (Leiden and Boston: Brill Publishing, 2009)

which if cut would spell the end of the Republic's ability to wage war in the Levant. Consequently, as this study will show, this strategic importance was equally matched by Republic's commitment to this area whenever Ottomans threatened it. Moreover, the military commitment of the Republic to this battleground included both land and naval forces and, even more importantly, it was the successful use of these combined arms that provided the Republic with tactical advantage crucial for defending the province. Moreover, although not as dramatic as the other more famous engagements of this war, the nature of warfare in Dalmatia was very diversified, consisting of sieges, land battles, skirmishes and constant small scale guerilla actions of Venetian irregulars. Thus it represents excellent research material for exploration of the ability of the Republic to adapt to local conditions, circumstances and combat styles. Finally, from the operational point of view, both Aegean and Crete can be considered as failures. In spite of resounding victories in the Dardanelles (1654-1657), and the persevering defense of Candia, the Republic failed to achieve its objectives in these zones. By contrast, the Dalmatian battlefield offers a success story.

2. *Earlier Historiography*

The majority of the works on the War of Crete, or general histories of Venice, only casually deal with events in Dalmatia as a peripheral battlefield of this war. For example, the great collective project: *Storia di Venezia*, gives only a short account of events in the Dalmatian battlefield, mentioning the services of much celebrated Venetian commander Lunardo Foscolo and the German condottiere in Venetian service Baron Christoff Martin von Degenfeld.¹⁷ A similar account of events in Dalmatia during this war can be found in Ekkehard Eickhoff's rather well known work *Venezia, Vienna e i Turchi*,¹⁸ Kenneth Setton's *Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century*,¹⁹ or Gaetano Gozzi's survey of Venetian history in the 16th and 17th centuries.²⁰ All of these works in their narrative of the

17 See for example: Piero del Negro, "La milizia" In *Storia di Venezia. La Venezia Barocca*, vol. 7. (Roma: Istituto per la Enciclopedia Italiana, 1997) pp. 509- 532. (especially 519-520)

18 Ekkehard Eickhoff, *Venezia, Vienna E i Turchi: Bufera nel Sud-Est Europeo 1645-1700*. (Milano, 1991) pp. 87-99 (especially 94-96.)

19 Kenneth M. Setton, *Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century*, (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1991)

20 Gaetano Cozzi, "Venecija u XVI. i XVII. stoljeću, [Venice in XVI. and XVII. century]" In Gaetano Cozzi,

War of Crete commonly dedicate attention to the Dalmatian battlefield only during the first, more dynamic years of the war, when the Republic's military commitment in the area was significant, ignoring or simply quickly passing over the last two decades of the war, which is rather understandable since their focus is mainly on the larger Ottoman-Venetian confrontation.

A much more detailed account of events can be found in the works dealing with the history of Dalmatia, especially those of local origin. However, before proceeding further with the analysis of these works, a few remarks concerning the importance and consequences of the events of the War of Crete for historical development in the Eastern Adriatic are due. For the future of Dalmatia, the deep structural changes that occurred in the course of this war were more important and lasting than the limited territorial gains achieved. At the core of these changes was the massive and organized migration of Ottoman subjects – Vlachs or *Morlacchi*,²¹ as they are referred to in Venetian sources - to the territory of Venetian controlled Dalmatia, which also continued on an equal scale during the Morean War. The impact of this migration was twofold. First, it introduced new administrative elements in the Dalmatian society. The Morlacchi were settled in the depopulated regions of the Dalmatian hinterland reconquered during these wars and organized into *krajine*, or military districts of frontier character. Although, the Venetian military frontier in Dalmatia was not properly

Michael Knapton and Giovanni Scarabello, *Povijest Venecije [History of Venice] vol.2*, (Zagreb: Antibarbarus, 2007) pp. 149-162.

21 The question of the Vlachs is both a controversial and a complex one, and by far surpasses the scope of this dissertation. However, what is commonly accepted among the majority of scholars is that Vlachs settled along the western Ottoman border, towards the Republic of Venice and the remains of the Croatian Kingdom, and were a semi-nomadic, Christian, mainly Slavic population, enjoying special social status in the Ottoman Empire in exchange for their services as auxiliary military troops. The existing literature on the problem of Vlachs is vast and extensive, thus here I will mention the especially interesting latest work by Zef Mirdita only, dealing with the question of Vlachs in historiography. The study covers all major regional historiographies (Albanian, Romanian, Serbian, Croatian...) and also contains an excellent and extensive bibliography on the topic of Vlachs, see Zef Mirdita, *Vlasi u Historiografiji [Vlachs in Historiography]*, (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2004); Additionally, for a brief info on the position and status of the Vlachs in the Ottoman Empire, in English see entry by Nenad Moačanin in: Gábor Ágoston and Bruce Masters, *The Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, (New York: Facts on File, 2009) pp. 585-6. As for the *Morlocchi*, it was a term with a life of its own, but by the time of the War of Crete, this name was used by Venetians for almost all non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire living along their border - from the Dinaric Mountains to the coastal town of Budva. For the contemporary usage of the names Vlachs and Morlacchi in the Venetian documents, see a study by Grga Novak, "Morlaci (Vlasi) gledani s mletačke strane [Morlacchi (Vlachs) as seen from the Venetian Side]" In *Zbornik za narodni život i običaje Južnih Slavena*, (1971) pp. 579-603.

organized and given institutional coverage until the 18th century, the experience of Venetian attempts to integrate Morlacchi during the War of Crete served as an embryo from which that institution evolved later.²²

Secondly, this migration which drastically changed the ethnic structure of the Dalmatian society also created a gap between the islands and the coastal areas on one side and the Dalmatian hinterland settled by the Morlacchi on the other. The Morlacchi, unlike Dalmatians who were "čakavian" speaking, Catholics and mainly urban population with strong civic traditions, were mainly "štokavian" speaking²³ and of mixed Catholic and Orthodox denominations. The civic traditions of the Dalmatian subjects of the Serenissima, those of autonomous urban communes, town statutes, and urban life in general, were not shared by these former Ottoman subjects. Theirs was the tradition of the frontier: of rural self-governed patriarchal kindreds, of a highly militarized society, of epic songs, heroism and bravery, of honor and personal freedom.

The large cultural gap between the Dalmatian coastal towns and the Morlacchi hinterland was already noted by the Venetians of the 18th century.²⁴ Together, these two groups within the

22 For more on the Dalmatian military frontier and historiography of this topic see Šime Peričić, "Vojna krajina u Dalmaciji [Military frontier in Dalmatia]," In *Vojne krajine u Jugoslavenskim zemljama u novom veku do karlovačkog mira 1699. [Military frontiers in Yugoslav lands until the peace of Karlovac 1699]* Vasa Čubrilović, ed. (Beograd: SANU, 1989) pp. 169-214.; also see: Ivan Grgić, "Postanak i početno uređenje vojne krajine kninskog kotara pod Venecijom [Formation and initial organization of military frontier of Knin Kotar under Venice]" *Starine* 52 (1962): pp. 249-271., Alessandro Sfrecola, "Le Craine di Dalmazia la 'Frontiera Militare' di Venezia nel Primo Settecento e le Riforme del Feldmaresciallo von Schulenburg," In *Microhistory of the Triplex Confinium: International Project Conference Papers*, Drago Roksanđić ed. (Budapest: Central European University, 1998) pp. 137-145. As for the Ottoman side of the frontier, the Bosnian historian Kreševljaković Hamdija, in his work on development of Bosnian "kapetanije" (military districts), was among the first to point out that similar developments as those that led to the formation of the Croatian-Slavonia frontier also took place on the Ottoman side of the border Hamdija Kreševljaković, *Kapetanije u Bosni i Hercegovini [Captaincies in Bosnia and Hercegovina]* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1980)

23 From the linguistic point of view, the corpus of the Croatian people consists of three distinct dialect zones. In the northwestern parts, around Zagreb, the dominant dialect is known as "kajkavian", while the one in the territories of Istra, the Croatian littoral and the Dalmatian coast and islands as "čakavian." The third dialect "štokavian", is the one shared by both Croats and Serbs. Furthermore, it is this dialect that served as the basis from which modern literary Croatian language was later developed. For a good short overview of these linguistic issues and their influence on the national questions of Serbs and Croats see: Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993) pp. 75-85.

24 Excellent testimony of this society was preserved in the work by Alberto Fortis, *Viaggio in Dalmazia* (Venice, 1774), which contains his famous chapter "On the Customs of the Morlochs." See: Alberto Fortis, *Put po Dalmaciji [Voyage in Dalmatia]*, (Split: Marijan tisak, 2004) pp. 33-69; An interesting, treatment of the representation of the Morlacchi in Venetian literary discourse of the 18th century can be found in: Larry Wolf, *Venice and the Slavs: the Discovery of Dalmatia in the Age of Enlightenment*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); However, this work remains rather problematic, since it is based not on archival research but on quite arbitrary collection of literary sources which comes down to the few plays by Goldoni

political framework of the Republic of St. Mark, formed a sort of amalgam society, with a strong gap between the urban areas of the coast and the rural hinterland organized as military frontier. This complex society endured until the 19th century when it was swallowed by rival national movements. While a significant part of the Dalmatian elite, under strong influence of Italian culture and bilingualism, either outright opted for Italian identity or for the short-lived idea of a multi-national autonomous Dalmatian identity,²⁵ the majority of the population of Dalmatia was divided along religious lines, the Orthodox becoming Serbs and the Catholics Croats.

Such fundamental changes did not go unnoticed in earlier historiography, and the age of the War of Crete in Dalmatia has been given considerable attention. However, strong national tensions among Italians, Croats and Serbs also found a way into historical works and influenced the shaping of several competing narratives. The full overview of this problem is beyond the scope of this introduction and constitutes a research topic in itself deserving a separate study, one focused on the relationship between national ideologies and historiography. At this point it suffices to say that different ideological positions are most visible in the treatment of the problem of the Morlacchi and in the role played by the Republic of Venice, more concretely its regular forces in this conflict.

Pre-World War II Italian scholars of Dalmatian origin, who wrote the first modern studies of the history of Dalmatia under Venetian rule, such as Giuseppe Praga or Antonio de Benvenuti, tend to belittle or even ignore Morlacchi contribution to the overall war effort in this battlefield.²⁶ The situation is no different with contemporary Italian scholars. For example, the study by Feruccio Sassi, probably the best and the most detailed account of

and several letters by Giacomo Casanova. Much more detailed and deeper analysis of the Dalmatian 18th century society and the relevance of Dalmatia for the Venetian Republic as its "enlightenment project," based on extensive archival research, and far better mastery of regional secondary works is provided in: Filippo M. Paladini, *Un Caos che Spaventa: poteri, territori e religioni di frontiera nella Dalmazia della tarda età veneta*, (Venezia: Saggi Marsilio, 2003)

25 For more on this regional phenomenon and the ideology of Dalmatian Autonomist movement which aimed to preserve the multi-national identity, see: Josip Vrandečić, *Dalmatinski autonomistički pokret u XIX. stoljeću*. (Zagreb: Dom i Svijet, 2002)

26 Antonio de Benvenuti, *Storia di Zara dal 1409 al 1797*. (Milano: Fratelli Bocca, 1944); Giuseppe Praga, *Storia di Dalmazia*, (Varese: Dall' Oglia editore, 1981)

military operations in Dalmatia during the first years of the war (1645-1648), barely mentions the migration and Morlacchi participation in destruction of Ottoman strongholds in the Dalmatian hinterland, and simply limits the study to major military encounters during these first four years of the conflict.²⁷ In addition, the majority of the studies by Italian scholars of Dalmatian origin have a very favorable view of the Venetian rule over Dalmatia and the themes of the patriotic and faithful Dalmatian subjects, of the continuity of rule and of Dalmatia belonging to the Italian political and cultural context, are common ones.²⁸ After the Second World War and the tragic events that led to the exodus of Italians from Dalmatia, the interest in these topics abated, and events in Dalmatia were discussed mainly as part of the more general narrative of the War of Crete as mentioned above.

The narrative of the events of the War of Crete in Dalmatia, in what can be labeled as South Slavic historiographies: Croatian, Serbian and Yugoslav ones, is rather different. Here the central role in the narrative is commonly given to the Morlacchi. From the late 19th century till the early 1990s, a significant number of studies dealing with Dalmatia in the age of the War of Candia were produced.²⁹ Surprisingly, only a few of them have the War of Crete in Dalmatia as their central research topic. So far, the most complete and reliable study remains the one by Gligor Stanojević, "Dalmatia in the Age of the War of Candia,"³⁰ written in 1958, dealing mainly with the military-political aspect of the conflict. Other relevant works can be arranged in two main groups. The first consists of studies mainly dealing with the topic as part of general national histories, as are for example cases of Jorjo Tadić's chapter covering

27 Feruccio Sassi, "Le Campagne di Dalmazia durante la Guerra di Candia (1645-1648)" *Archivio Veneto* 20 (1937): pp. 211-250; Feruccio Sassi, "Le Campagne di Dalmazia durante la Guerra di Candia (1645-1648)" *Archivio Veneto* 21 (1937): pp. 60-100; (henceforth *Sassi I* and *Sassi II*)

28 For example, such is the tone of Giuseppe's Praga discourse concerning Dalmatian territorial militia, the so called *cernide*: "La loro fedeltà a Venezia e l'amore per il Principe diverranno Legendari e si manifestano in modo commovente alla caduta della Repubblica." Giuseppe Praga, *Storia di Dalmazia*, p. 195.; Compare also: Arduino Berlam, "Le Milizie della Serenissima: I fedeli Schiavoni," *La Rivista Dalmatica* vol. 16. no. 1 (1935): pp. 47-58.; Giuseppe Sabalich, *Huomeni d'arme di Dalmazia*. (Zara, 1909); Giuseppe Sabalich, "La Dalmazia guerriera," *Archivio storico per la Dalmazia* 30, (1928): pp. 279-300.

29 The beginning of scholarly research of the Venetian-Ottoman wars and formation of the military frontier in Dalmatia is marked by the publication of the study by Luka Jelić, "Lički sandžakat i postanje mletačke krajine početkom kandijskog rata 1645-48 godine [The Sandjak of Lika and the formation of the Venetian military frontier at the beginning of the War of Crete 1645-1668]" *Narodni Koledar* (1898): pp. 78-248.

30 Gligor Stanojević, "Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata," *Vesnik vojnog muzeja* 5, no. 2. (1958): pp. 93-182.

the war of Candia in *History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia*,³¹ Radovan Samarđić's in *History of Serbian people*,³² Marko Jačov's study *Le guerre Veneto-Turche del XVII secolo in Dalmazia*³³ or Gligor Stanojević's other work *Yugoslav Lands in the Venetian-Turkish Wars of 16-18th century*.³⁴

Even a casual glance at the some of the above titles reveals the main role of those works: the integration of the historical events of the War of Crete into great national or supranational narrative, where the national designator - Croatian, Serbian or Yugoslav - changes according to national preferences of the author and the time and the place of publication. The main themes of such narratives are either the heroic war of liberation from the Turkish yoke, or the heroic struggle and sufferings of "our" peoples in wars fought for foreign rulers and their interests – the latter being more in line with the (at that time official) ideology of "unity and brotherhood" of Yugoslav peoples. The second group is composed of studies that deal with the War of Crete as part of other, (broader) research topic, as is the case with Mile Bogović's "Catholic Church and Orthodoxy in Dalmatia under the Venetian administration,"³⁵ Jovan Radonić's "Roman Curia and the South Slavic lands 16-19 century"³⁶ or with Šime Peričić's study *Military frontier in Dalmatia*.³⁷ What these two groups commonly share is the view of the Morlacchi rebellion/migration during the War of Crete as the beginning of the process of the national struggle for the liberation of the Dalmatian hinterland from the Ottoman rule. Additionally, in general, the attitude toward the Venetian rule is also somewhat negative, depicting the Serenissima as an egoistic rule that puts its own interest before the interests of

31 Jorjo Tadić, "Kandijski rat (1645-1669) [War for Crete (1645-1669)"]" In *Historija Naroda Jugoslavije [History of Yugoslav peoples]*, vol. II. (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1959.) pp. 555-566.

32 Radovan Samarđić, "Kandijski rat (1645-1669) [War for Crete (1645-1669)]" In *Istorija Srpskog Naroda [History of Serbian people]*, vol. 3. no.1. (Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga, 1993) pp. 336-424.

33 Marko Jačov, *Le guerre Veneto-Turche del XVII secolo in Dalmazia, (Venezia, 1991)*

34 Gligor Stanojević, *Jugoslovenske zemlje u mletačko turskim ratovima XVI-XVIII vijeka [Yugoslav lands in the Venetian-Turkish Wars]*, (Beograd: Izdanje istorijskog instituta, 1970) (henceforth: *Jugoslovenske zemlje*); See also: Gligor Stanojević, "Crna Gora u doba kandiskog rata (1645-1669) [Montenegro in the Age of War for Crete (1645-1669)]," *Istorijski Glasnik 1-2* (1953): pp. 3-53.

35 Mile Bogović, *Katolička Crkva i pravoslavlje u Dalmaciji za Mletačke vladavine* (Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost, 1982)

36 Jovan Radonić, *Rimska kurija i južnoslovenske zemlje od 16 do 19 veka [Roman Curia and the South Slavic lands 16-19 century]* (Beograd: Naučna Knjiga, 1950)

37 Šime Peričić, "Vojna krajina u Dalmaciji," In *Vojne Krajine u jugoslovenskim zemljama do karlovačkog mira*. (Beograd: SANU, 1989.) pp. 169-215.

local Dalmatian peoples. Another serious objection that could be raised in case of the majority of historiographical works of South Slavic origin is the one concerned with what might be called the *Vlach question*.

The problem of the national/ethnic identification of Vlachs, with either the Serbian or the Croatian nation dominated and in many cases seriously tainted a large number of works. While the majority of Croatian historians accepted the view of a separate Slavic identity of Morlacchi in Early Modern period and the existence of the 19th century integration processes in Dalmatia, which resulted in the alignment of national and religious identities (that is Catholic=Croat, Orthodox=Serb), the overwhelming majority of Serbian historians simply claimed all of Morlacchi (same as Vlachs in the Croatian-Slavonian military frontier) for the Serbian national corpus. A feeble and short lived attempt out of this debate was offered in 1958 by the previously mentioned Montenegrin historian (and expert on the War of Crete), Gligor Stanojević, who called for Yugoslav unity, and complained "that, instead of seeing in them (Morlacchi) the element of unity of the Croatian and Serbian people," the entire affair developed into "bad taste, unscientific discussion."³⁸ Yet, to little avail. As a consequence of this entrapment into what can be labeled as "the *Vlach paradigm*" and the retro-projection of the 19th century national concepts, as well as the 20th century Yugoslav integrative ideology into historical realities of early modern pre-national times, such historical interpretations rendered a distorted and one-sided image of the past and led to the (counter-productive) concentration of studies to a few specific areas of inquiry only.

As a rule, these older historiographical studies in their national narrative mainly depict one single enemy, the Turks, ignoring the complexity of social, cultural and demographic trends following the establishment of the Ottoman rule in the region and the fact that, if not the majority, then at least a significant part of the population in "liberated" areas are Slavic speaking indigenous population, who converted to Islam. The theme and one-sidedness of the narrative of these works is probably illustrated best by a paragraph from Gligor Stanojević's

38 Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 113. (footnote 125)

"History of the Yugoslav Lands in the Venetian-Turkish Wars," commenting on raiding activities of the Morlacchi (to whom he refers as *Uskoks* in this study) during the War of Crete:

The Uskoks in Dalmatia had opened a new chapter in the liberation struggle of our peoples against the Turks. At the time, for the first time in the history of our peoples, the supreme will and peculiar striving to consciously and actively step into the blood and fight against the ancient oppressor and butcher can be discerned. This was the striving to avenge, through blood, smoke, enslavement and plunder, all personal humiliation and centuries of Turkish violence so vehemently and cruelly inflicted upon our peoples.³⁹

During the last few decades, new trends and approaches entered the field providing fresh impetus. Initial impulses mainly came from researchers previously not associated with any of South Slavic national historiographies and thus unburdened with any historiographical legacy. For example, such is the case with Catherine Wendy Bracewell and her study on the *Uskoks* of Senj,⁴⁰ or of Karl Kaser and his work on the military border in Croatia and Slavonia,⁴¹ both of which successfully demonstrated the fruitfulness of new approaches to topics previously thought to be well researched. The introduction of new research questions, methodologies, a move of focus from national to regional and inter-regional, and most importantly the abandonment of 19th century concepts of the nation in dealing with various ethnic and social groups of early modern period constituted a sound basis for new historical interpretation.

These impulses gave additional push to trends already underway from the early years of the 1990s, as the example of the group of scholars gathered by Drago Roksandić around the international project *Triplex Confinium*, vividly testifies.⁴² What differentiated this project from previous similar studies was the approach to the research of the phenomenon of this southern frontier in its full scope, expanding the research beyond traditional political and/or

39 *Uskoci u Dalmaciji otvorili su novo poglavlje u oslobodilačkoj borbi naših naroda protiv Turaka. Tada prvi put u istoriji naših naroda zapaža se ona velika volja i htjenje da se svjesno i aktivno zagazi u krv i borbu protiv vjekovnog porobljivača i krvnika. Da se kroz krv, dim, robljenje i pljačkanje osvete za sva lična poniženja i za sva ona vijekovna nasilja Turaka tako bezdušno i svirepo primjenjivana.* Gligor Stanojević, *Jugoslovenske zemlje*, p. 223.

40 Catherine Wendy Bracewell. *The Uskoks of Senj: piracy, banditry, and holy war in the sixteenth-century Adriatic* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992)

41 Karl Kaser, *Freier Bauer und Soldat: die Militarisierung der agrarischen Gesellschaft and der kroatisch-slowanischen Militärgrenze (1535-1881)* (Wien: Böhlau, 1997)

42 For a full bibliography and overview of project activities (seminars, conferences etc.) see: Drago Roksandić, *Triplex Confinium. Ili o granicama i regijama Hrvatske povijesti 1500-1800 [Triplex Confinium. Or Concerning the Border and Regions of Croatian History, 1500-1800]* (Zagreb: Barbat, 2003) pp. 229-242.

military subjects and insisting on the unity of the frontier as a single space; a unity that manifested itself in similar patterns of life, shared mentality, cultural traditions, economy etc., along the entire Habsburg-Ottoman-Venetian border. Furthermore, over the last decades, the role of the Venetian Republic on the development of the Dalmatian society in Early Modern period was greatly re-valorized. Thanks to the exploration of strong links between Venice and Dalmatia, especially in the works by Lovorka Čoralić - as for example *In the City of St. Mark: History of the Croatian Community in Venice*⁴³ - the Serenissima is no longer perceived as a foreign imperialistic ruler but as the political, economic and cultural Metropolis of a part of the Croatian national corpus. Finally, a recent study by Tea Mayhew, *Dalmatia between Ottoman and Venetian Rule. Contado di Zara 1645-1718*,⁴⁴ dealing with the institutional and social transformations of the district of Zadar, the center of Venetian Dalmatia, caused by the integration of acquired territories and subjects in the Dalmatian hinterland, serves as an excellent example how the new approaches can be used to offer a new and fresh interpretation of the Venetian-Dalmatian relationship; one free of ideological baggage of previous studies.

3. *The Agenda and Point of Departure*

In spite of apparently sufficient number of works dealing with Dalmatia in the age of the War of Crete, there is still sufficient space for further research, and strange as it may seem, especially in the field of military history. From the perspective of military history, the only aspect of this conflict that is sufficiently covered in existing historiography are the political and military developments, with addition of a few biographies of some of the most famous participants. Therefore, it is not only the topics and themes belonging to the New Military History that are still practically untouched, but there are also large gaps in coverage of the topics from the field of traditional military history, such as research of the organization of Venetian land forces,⁴⁵ tactics, armaments, conduct of particular battles or military operations.

43 Lovorka Čoralić, *U gradu Svetoga Marka: Povijest hrvatske zajednice u Mlecima [In the City of St. Mark: History of the Croatian Community in Venice]* (Zagreb: Golden marketing, Zagreb, 2001); See also: Lovorka Čoralić, *Hrvatski prinosi mletačkoj kulturi: odabrane teme [Croatian Contributions to the Venetian Culture: Selected Themes]*, (Zagreb: Dom i svijet, 2003)

44 Tea Mayhew, *Dalmatia between Ottoman and Venetian Rule. Contado di Zara 1645-1718*, (Rome: Viella, 2008)

45 Unlike the Venetian navy which captured the interest of numerous historians and is subject of a multitude of

The aim of this study is to follow recent regional historiographical trends described above which aim to supersede, first, the synoptic treatment of the subject in histories of Venice and Dalmatia, and, secondly, the nationalist renderings of the past, and merge it with the theoretical-methodological framework of the New Military History, while, at the same time, fill some of the mentioned gaps from the domain of traditional military topics.

The main theme of this study is best defined as the research of successes and failures of early-modern state administration in an "imperial republic" (supposedly in a condition of decline), in the liminal situation of war waged against a "real" empire (also supposedly in a condition of decline). The thesis is divided into three parts, each dealing with one particular context. The first chapter the "Military-Political Context," provides a sketch of the historical background, giving an overview of war events in the Dalmatian theater of operations during the War of Crete. The second chapter: "Military-Administrative Context" deals with a range of topics; in the first place with the structure and organization of the Venetian armed forces in Dalmatia, the structure of the military command, civil organs of control, and provides a general overview of the Venetian military commitment in Dalmatia. Additionally, this chapter also covers the problematic question of the integration of the Morlacchi in the Venetian defensive system in Dalmatia, and strives to provide the evaluation of Morlacchi contribution to the overall Venetian war effort in this battlefield. The common theme that is interwoven into each of these inquires is that of military administration. Finally, the last chapter the "Logistical Context" tackles the problem of the supply of the Venetian forces in this battlefield. This chapter aims to grasp the scale of the challenge the Republic of Venice faced in maintaining its war effort in Dalmatia, for more than two decades.

The lines of investigation dealing with the Venetian military commitment in this battlefield

studies, the number of works dedicated to Venetian land forces, especially those of the 17th century, is rather limited. The most well known and quoted remains: Ennio Concina, *Le trionfanti et invittissime armate venete: Le milizie della Serenissima dal XVI al XVIII secolo* (Venezia: Filippi, 1972); More modern and detailed are the studies by: Alberto Prelli, *L'esercito veneto nel primo '600*, (Venezia: Filippi, 1993); Alberto Prelli, *Le Milizie Venete in Palma 1593-1797* (Ciandetti Editore, 1988); Sergio Perini, "Le milizie della terraferma veneta verso la metà del Seicento," *Studi Veneziani* 29 (1995): pp. 193-210.; Gregory Hanlon, *Twilight of a Military Tradition: Italian Aristocrats and European Conflicts, 1560-1800* (London: UCL Press, 1998) pp. 143-163.; Piero Del Negro, "La politica militare di Venezia e lo Stato da Mar nel sei-settecento," *Studi Veneziani* 39, (2000): pp. 113-122.

and the problems concerning its supply, are an attempt to provide the answer to one of the fundamental questions necessary for the evaluation of the relationship between the Republic of Venice and its Dalmatian possessions. That is, to provide some concrete figures as to the scale of Venetian commitment in defense of its Adriatic possession; the number of troops deployed, amounts of money spent, quantities of grain and other victuals shipped etc, commonly held by traditional South-Slavic historiographies to have been low and insufficient. However, as this study will show, although not as high as it could be wished for by Venetian governors in command of this battlefield, at several points during the war the Republic diverted considerable resources to this theater of operations and made it its top priority. Moreover, these figures represent the hard facts that more than anything else speak of the financial and material strains the decades of the war put on the Republic and of its decreasing ability to sustain its war effort.

On the other hand, limits of possible military achievements in some battlefield are not dictated only by commitment of material resources to it, such as troops, money, grain, ammunition etc., but also by constraints imposed by institutional limitations, both by organs of command and control and by armed forces of the state. In the Venetian case, the provincial administration was the main agent charged with the execution of the tasks set forth by the central organs of the state, yet one that enjoyed high level of independence in running of military operations. Without the knowledge of the structure and the functioning of the agents entrusted with the implementation of state policies, it is practically impossible to understand the rationale behind the decisions or policies of the central organs, and also of the conduct of the war by the Venetian Republic in general. By approaching the topic of the War of Crete from the perspective of the study of governance, military administration and logistics, this study aims to enhance our knowledge of the functioning of both, the central organs of the government in Venice and the provincial administration in Dalmatia.

Finally, several leading military historians have for long advocated that alleged military superiority of European powers, attributed to the effects of the military-gunpowder revolution

should be tested on the cases of conflicts of European powers with other non-European gunpowder empires. Obviously, the study with the War of Crete as its main object of research represents a perfect candidate for such an analysis. Yet, like many other works of the New Military History, this study puts its emphasis on the non-combat oriented aspects of the conflict, in this case military administration, governance and supply. In the light of what was previously said, such a decision not to place the focus of the research on actual fighting, weaponry, and tactics, (although these topics are still addressed within the discussion of the Venetian military) may seem a strange one. However, the choice to give such marginal treatment to these technical aspects of the military revolution was intentional.

This decision was very much inspired by the convincing challenge of the claim of the technical superiority of European powers in the pre 1699 period by Gábor Ágoston, one of leading experts on the Ottoman military. In his work *Guns for the Sultan*, after a detailed analysis of Ottoman weapons technology and armaments industries, Ágoston put forth the claim that it "was not the better guns that ultimately gave the advantage to the Europeans, but better drill, command and control and bureaucratic administration."⁴⁶ Furthermore, Ágoston is far from being the only one to voice such concerns. A similar view is also held by Jeremy Black who argues that really revolutionary developments which increased combat effectiveness of European armies and gave them superiority over their adversaries, like the development of the socket bayonet, flintlock musket, pre-packaged cartridges and similar, all occurred in the period after 1660s.⁴⁷ Thus, in the light of the stated above, the research on the functioning of the Venetian state administration during the War of Crete, undertaken in this study, is expected to provide empirical data, the importance of which surpasses strictly regional context, but also represents relevant contribution to (1) the wider global debate on the "East-West" confrontation and (2) the debate concerning the character of the change in the military affairs during Early Modern Period.

46 Gabor Agoston, *Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) p. 202.

47 See: Jeremy Black, *A Military Revolution? Military Change and European society*, (London: Macmillan, 1991); *European Warfare 1660-1815* (London: UCL Press, 1994)

Chapter 1: The Military-Political Context

This first chapter aims to provide a survey of challenges the Venetian defensive system in Dalmatia had to meet; however, its goal is not to provide a detailed account of every military encounter, Ottoman or Morlacchi raid or skirmish that took place in Dalmatia during this war, the work having already been done fairly well by a number of earlier studies.⁴⁸ Instead, it aims to provide an overview of main military and political events of this war in the Dalmatian theater of operations, and when necessary, to correct previous studies. The chapter is written mainly based on rich secondary literature; however, in case of new findings and/or new interpretations it is complimented by archival references. The chapter departs from previous historiographical works in one regard. It dedicates more space and attention to several war years of no apparent importance in terms of engagement or battles that took place, or put more aptly – that did not take place. Being relatively uneventful, these years were usually ignored or passed over quickly by previous studies that concentrated mainly on chronology and more concrete war events, such as: battles, sieges, encounters, raids, forays, etc. Yet, lack of military encounters does not imply absence of military activities. Army and fortresses need to be provisioned and equipped, troops need to be fed and paid, enemy movements had to be matched by proper responses: dispatches of reinforcements, repositioning of troops etc. Therefore, since the focus of this study is on the Venetian defensive system and its functioning, these so far fairly neglected years have also been given due attention.

48 As mentioned earlier, the most comprehensive study of this war up to today remains previously mentioned Gligor Stanojević's "Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata [Dalmatia in the Age of the War of Crete]." The most detailed coverage of the first 4 years of the war is given by Feruccio Sassi in his, also previously mentioned, two part study "Le Campagne di Dalmazia durante la Guerra di Candia (1645-1648)." Other works of note are: Gligor Stanojević, *Jugoslovenske zemlje*, pp. 198-299.; Gligor Stanojević, "Crna Gora u doba kandiskog rata (1645-1669) [Montenegro in the Age of the War of Crete (1645-1669)]," *Istorijski Glasnik 1-2* (1953): pp. 3-53.; Radovan Samardžić, "Kandijski rat (1645-1669) [War for Crete (1645-1669)]" In *Istorija Srpskog Naroda [History of Serbian people]*, vol. 3. no.1. (Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga, 1993) pp. 336-424.; Marko Jačov, *Le guerre Veneto-Turche del XVII secolo in Dalmatia*, pp. 9-145.; the following studies dealing with regional histories provide good local accounts of the events of the War of Crete: Pavao Butorac, *Boka Kotorska u 17. i 18. stoljeću. Politički pregled. [Boka Kotorska in 17th and 18th century. Political Overview]*, (Perast: Gospa od Škrpjela, 2000) pp. 41-100.; Karlo Kosor, "Drniška Krajina za turskog vladanja [Drniš Krajina during the Ottoman Rule]," In *Povijest Drniške Krajine [History of Drniš Krajina]*, Ante Čavka ed. (Split, 1995) pp. 103-179.

1. *The Dalmatian Theater of Operations*

The dominion over the Adriatic sea was one of the foundations on which the prosperity and existence of the Most Serene Republic rested. "First and last, Venice depended on the Adriatic,"⁴⁹ wrote Frederic Chapin Lane, simply and accurately summarizing this connection between Venice and the Adriatic. The Adriatic was the crucial link between Venice, its overseas possessions and Levantine trade. Furthermore, lordship over the Adriatic was not merely a basis for Venetian economic dominance in the region, but also one of the premises deeply rooted in the political culture of the Venetian ruling elite. Venice considered the Adriatic Gulf as its sovereign territory and claimed exclusive right to maintain armed vessels in it. Moreover, these were not just empty symbolic statements; in defense of these claims, the Republic was ready to take arms even against other Christian powers, as was for example the case with Austrian Habsburgs in 1615-1617 and the Spanish Monarchy in 1616-1620.⁵⁰ And the key to this control lay in the control of the long Dalmatian coast or of dual province of Venetian Dalmatia and Albania.

1.1. The Dual Province of Venetian Dalmatia and Albania

During the first decades of the 15th century the Republic of Venice reestablished its rule over Dalmatian *communes* lost in 1358, by exploiting internal strife and civil war in the Hungarian-Croatian kingdom. One by one, either willingly or by force, all major Dalmatian towns (Zadar/Zara, Šibenik/Sebenico, Trogir/Traù, Split/Spalato) and islands (Rab/Arbe, Cres/Cherso, Brač/Brazza, Hvar/Lesina and Korčula/Curzola) accepted the Venetian lordship once more. In the 1480s, the transformation of the Adriatic Sea into the *Golfo di Venezia* came to an end, when, with the acquisition of the island of Krk/Veglia, the entire Dalmatian coast from Novigrad in the north-west to the community of Makarska in the south-east, and all islands from Kvarner (*Quarnero*) in the north to Korčula in the south, were under the rule of the Most Serene Republic. Moreover, with the sole exception of the Republic of Ragusa, Venice's possessions along the eastern Adriatic coast extended far to the south, and included

49 Frederic C. Lane, *Venice: A Maritime Republic* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973) p. 407.

50 For more on ideological foundations see: Filippo de Vivo "Historical Justifications of Venetian Power in the Adriatic," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 64 (2003), pp. 159-76.; Compare also: Roberto Cessi, *La Repubblica di Venezia e il problema Adriatico* (Napoli: Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 1953)

all major ports from Kotor/Cattaro to Durrës/Durazzo/Drač on the Albanian coast.⁵¹

Yet, about the time when Venice's overseas possessions "*Stato da Mar*" reached their maximum extent during the 1480s, the geopolitical image of the Balkans went through radical change. Weak feudal states of the previous century were replaced with the new emerging European superpower: the Ottoman Empire, which begun its bid for dominance, both on land and the sea. The Empire's steady advance westward brought it just next to the Republic's immediate neighborhood in Dalmatia, where it replaced the enervated Hungarian-Croatian kingdom. In the series of Venetian-Ottoman wars that followed, starting in 1479, and finishing with the peace treaty of 1573, the Republic's Adriatic dominion was seriously reduced. In the south, Venice lost all of the Albanian coast, keeping merely the area centered around the Bay of Kotor, that consisted of the towns of Kotor, Perast/Perasto and Budva/Budua. These remains became known as the province of *Albania Veneta*, thus named to differentiate it from the rest of the region under Ottoman control and referred to as *Albania Ottomana*. In Dalmatia, even though the Republic managed to preserve all coastal towns and forts (Novigrad, Nin, Zadar, Šibenik, Trogir, Split, Omiš), territories under its control were reduced to a thin strip of land along the coast, at certain points no wider than 8-10 miles, while the rest of the Dalmatian hinterland was integrated within the Ottoman Empire. From the 1580s onward, these two geographically separated territorial units were organized as a single administrative unit: the dual province of Venetian Dalmatia and Albania (see map 1.1), which was under the supervision of a single state official, the governor-general in Dalmatia and Albania (*Provveditore Generale in Dalmatia et Albania*).⁵²

51 For establishment of Venetian rule in Dalmatia in 15th century see: Marko Šunjić, *Dalmacija u XV stoljeću. Uspostavljanje i organizacija mletačke vlasti u Dalmaciji u XV st [Dalmatia in XV ct. Establishment and Organisation of Venetian rule in Dalmatia in XV ct]*. (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1967); For the expansion and acquirement of the overseas possessions see: Benjamin Abel, "Colonie d'oltremare," In Alberto Tenenti and Ugo Tucci (eds.), *Storia di Venezia. Dalle Origini alla Caduta dela Serenissima. Il Rinascimento. Società ed economia*, vol. 5. (Roma: Istituto per la Enciclopedia Italiana, 1996) pp. 947-985.

52 For an overview of Venetian-Ottoman conflicts in Dalmatia in the 16th century see: Tea Mayhew, *Dalmatia between Ottoman and Venetian Rule*, (Roma: Viela, 2008) pp. 23-29.; Giuseppe Praga, *Storia di Dalmazia*, pp. 179-185; For a more detailed account of the Venetian-Ottoman wars in the 16th century, with the emphasis on the military-political developments see: Gligor Stanojević, *Jugoslovenske zemlje*, p. 11-92.; Concerning the formation of the Venetian administrative context, also see: Filippo M. Paladini, *Un Caos che Spaventa*, pp. 13-24.; Also compare: Ivan Pederin, *Mletačka uprava, privreda i politika u Dalmaciji (1409. - 1797.) [Venetian administration, economic policy and politics in Dalmatia (1409-1797)]* (Dubrovnik: Časopis 'Dubrovnik', 1990)

After 1573, the Venetian Republic enjoyed a rather long period of continuous peace with the Ottoman empire, which lasted for over 70 years. However, in spite the official state of peace between the two states, the level of everyday violence in Dalmatia was still very high. This was due to the fact that the conditions in the region, following the demarcation of the new border in 1576, left plenty opportunities for conflict. In the first place, there were groups on both sides that disputed the newly established border, and claimed abandoned settlements in the borderlands. Secondly, with the loss of major part of their districts, Dalmatian towns found themselves nailed to the coast, without enough farmland. This led many Venetian subjects to start cultivating lands on the Ottoman side of the frontier, with or without formal agreement with Ottoman lords, thus creating a constant source of tensions. Another source of incidents was the regular transhumance migration of Vlachs, Ottoman Christian subjects, who crossed state borders uncontrolled, with their cattle infringing on property of Venetian subjects. In addition to direct damage their herds committed, there was also a real danger that the Ottomans would use repeated pasture of Vlach herds on a particular terrain as pretext for putting forward claims of ownership on those.⁵³ However, the greatest threat to peace on frontier was indigenous robbery, conducted by Ottoman and Venetian subjects alike, which created an endless circle of retaliatory attacks.⁵⁴

Furthermore, as if this was not enough, during the period up to the 1620s, Ottoman-Venetian relations were even more strained by the activities of *uskoks*, Christian privateers in Habsburg service, who indiscriminately raided whatever they held to be an Ottoman target from their fortified stronghold of Senj/Segna, both on land and sea. Not only did *uskoks* use

53 Grga Novak, *Comissiones et Relationes Venetae (Annorum 1621-1671)* vol. 7, (Zagreb: JAZU, 1972) p. 169. (henceforth: *Comissiones et Relationes 7*)

54 For a demarcation of the new border see: Seid Traljić M., "Tursko-Mletačke granice u Dalmaciji u XVI. i XVII. stoljeću [Turkish-Venetian borders in the 16th and 17th ct.]," *Radovi JAZU u Zadru* 20 (1973): pp. 447-457.; For the conditions on the Ottoman-Venetian frontier see: Jospi Vrandečić, "*Dvije Dalmacije*" za vrijeme osmanlijskih ratova u XVI. Stoljeću [Two Dalmatias in the age of Ottoman wars in 16th century] (MA dissertation, University of Zadar, 1993) pp. 95-98, 112-114. (henceforth: *Two Dalmatias*); Seid Traljić M., "Tursko-Mletačko susjedstvo na zadarskoj krajini XVII. st [Turkish-Venetian coexistence on Zadar frontier XVII. ct.]" *Radovi JAZU Zadar* 4-5 (1959): pp. 409-424.; Compare also: Tea Mayhew, *Dalmatia, between Ottoman and Venetian Rule*, pp. 26-29; Also see the report concerning the conditions on the Ottoman-Venetian border, by Venetian Dragoman Giovanni Battista Salvago from 1626, when the border in Dalmatia was revised, which lists all of the above mentioned issues as causes of disorders along this frontier. Grga Novak, *Comissiones et Relationes 7*, pp. 17-38.

Venetian territories as the gateway to Ottoman lands, but – to complicate matters further - the fact was that many Venetian subjects acted as *uskok* accomplices, providing them with shelter and protection. Because of this, *uskok* raids were a constant cause of disputes with Ottomans, who accused Venetian officials in Dalmatia of not doing enough to prevent these attacks and protect Ottoman subjects and their property. Moreover, the Ottoman side also threatened with the Ottoman fleet entering the Adriatic in case the Republic did not resolve this issue, attempting to use *uskok* raids as an opportunity to set a serious political precedent.⁵⁵

In such circumstances, opportunities for conflict and outbursts of violence were rife. Some incidents, escalated into real border skirmishes, as was for example the case in the 1630s, when the Captain of Klis/Clissa and *Berrak-ogli Mustafa* gathered 1,500 men and came robbing all the way to the walls of Split, calling out to Venetians to come out and fight duels.⁵⁶ Even more serious were the events of 1641, when the attempt of Ottoman magnate Durak-bey to settle the abandoned village of Vrba near Zadar provoked a series of accusations and counter accusations for breaches of peace on the frontier. This incident inflamed spirits along the entire Dalmatian frontier, bringing to surface all accumulated dissatisfaction and frustration on both sides. Hostilities culminated in September 1641 when the Ottoman force 4,000 men strong attacked the village of Vrpolje near Šibenik, held by Ottomans to be one of the main robber's nests on the Venetian side.⁵⁷

Still, in spite of all, the two states managed to maintain peace and prevent border incidents from escalating into a new war. The Venetian *Bailo* in Istanbul could almost always count on support of the central government in resolving such breaches of peace in borderlands. Yet,

55 For a sound overview of the problems created by *uskoks* for the Venetian Republic see: Wendy C. Bracewell, *The Uskoks of Senj*.; For the Ottoman point of view compare: Suraiya N. Faroqhi, "The Venetian presence in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-30," in *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*, ed. Huri İslamoğlu-İnan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) pp. 314-317.

56 The imperial order addressed to the Bosnian Vizier, with commands to investigate this issue, punish offenders and maintain peace with the Venetian Republic was issued in March 1633. Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig, *Orientalische Handschriften*, Signatur: B.or. 137. f. 10v-11r; For the conflicts on Trogir-Split Ottoman frontier compare also: Krešimir Kužić, "Osmanlijski zapovjedni kadar u tvrđavama Klis, Lončarić i Kamen oko 1630. godine [Ottoman Command Staff in the Fortresses of Klis, Lončarić and Kamen around the year 1630]" *Zbornik Odsjeka za povijesne znanosti Zavoda za povijesne i društvene znanosti HAZU 23* (2005): pp. 187-214.

57 For a detailed account of border conflicts immediately preceding war for Crete, in 1641-2, see: Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 94-97.

Dalmatia still very much depended on personal disposition toward the Republic of the particular Ottoman official involved in the affair (*kadi, caus, sandjak bey*). Those, sent from afar, usually saw these incidents as an opportunity for personal material gain and let themselves be bribed by Venetians to act in their favor in settling local affairs. On the other hand, local Ottoman lords, who very often held highest positions in border sandjaks, were divided. On one side, there were those among whom *gazi* mentality prevailed, and who were outright hostile toward the Republic advocating the elimination of its presence in Dalmatia. During the decades before the War of Crete, the most proponent representatives of this party were Halil-bey and his son Durak-bey, lords of Vrana, a prosperous Ottoman stronghold in the vicinity of Zadar.⁵⁸ Others, on the other hand, desired peace and advocated coexistence between the two states, whether because they saw source of material gain in the Venetian Republic (either through trade or in form of "gifts" that could be extracted in return for their good disposition and "friendship"⁵⁹), or because of other, more altruistic motives.

From the perspective of economic and military resources, these two provinces did not amount to much. According to a detailed statistical survey, compiled by Governor-General Grimani in 1642,⁶⁰ Venetian Dalmatia and Albania counted 74,890 persons, out of which 21,000 were men fit for arms. Because of the loss of a major part of town districts to the Ottomans during the 16th century wars, proximity to the frontier and thus constant threat of

58 For more on this well known and influential family see: Seid M. Traljić, "Vrana i njezini gospodari u doba turske vladavine [Vrana and its lords in the age of Turkish rule]," *Radovi JAZU Zadar* 18 (1971): pp. 343-375.

59 In the period after the Cyprus war, money and gifts were the most effective means of ensuring peace. However, local Ottoman officials soon began to probe the limits of Venetian willingness to placate them, and ensure peace with money. In 1593, the Venetian Governor of the town of Šibenik, which borders two Ottoman sandjaks, complained that these sandjak beys "for every small incident make great reclaims and threats, and send letters written in the manner of barbarians," moreover, the governor pointed out that it is not enough to bribe only sandjak beys, gifts also had to be sent to other principal Ottoman officials: *cadi, caus* and similar. *Comissioness et Relations* 5, p. 83.; In order to stop such pretensions, the Venetian government issued several decrees regulating gift giving to Ottoman officials, thus providing its governors in Dalmatia with an effective excuse from excessive demands by local Ottoman beys. Over the years, gift giving was even further regulated and the Venetian government kept a close watch that no deviation occurred from established practices and customs. For example, in 1605, the governor-general felt the need to remind *Conte et Capitano di Spalato*, that on occasion of gift giving to sandjak bey or any other Ottoman officials "*si deve fare come e stato osservati in proposito negli anni passati*." Ljerka Šimunković and Marin Berket (trans), *Zlatna knjiga grada Splita [Golden book of Town of Split]* vol. 2. (Split: Književni krug, 2006) p. 73.

60 The survey was an attachment to the final report (*relatione*) concerning his service in Dalmatia and Albania, under the name "Inserto Grimmani," it was published in: *Commissiones et Relationes Venetae* vol. 7, pp. 187-238.

Ottoman incursions, majority of the population along the coast lived in overcrowded fortified towns.⁶¹ To make matters worse, lack of farming land made the provinces completely dependent on imports of grain, mainly from the Ottoman hinterland, since local production could cover the province needs for no more than 4-6 months.⁶² Similarly, due to lack of pasture, live stock was very limited as well; all in all, merely 2,052 horses, 4,885 donkeys and 20,161 cattle could be found in the entire province.

Likewise, with the sole exception of the salt pans, local industry was practically non-existent. If in Venetian Dalmatia arable land and grain were lacking, the sun and sea, main prerequisites for salt production, were available in abundance. Already from the Middle Ages, salt was an important strategic resource and a major export product for the province. However, from the beginning of its rule, Venice proclaimed salt production and sale to be a monopoly controlled by the state, allowing salt manufacturers, the largest of which was the production complex on the Island of Pag, to freely sell but $\frac{1}{4}$ of their production, while the rest was being bought by the state at a very low price. In such a manner, the Republic ensured the supply and control of this important strategic resource, at the benefit of the Republic's central treasury, but greatly hindered further development of this industry.⁶³ Similarly, due to Venetian mercantile policy, local commerce was also of very limited volume while taxes imposed on it contributed very small sums to the provincial budget. Because of all this, the provincial treasury was always in deficit. According to the previously mentioned report by Governor-General Grimani from 1642, yearly treasury incomes from taxes and the local sale of salt amounted to 65,125 *ducats*, while regular expenses for the cost of provincial

61 These extraordinary circumstances led to a serious distortion of the urban-rural ratio of Dalmatian towns and consequently in the structure of the Dalmatian society. Due to this "forceful urbanization," which was in direct proportion to the level of the Ottoman threat, at the end of the 16th c, Dalmatian towns had a very high percentage of urban population, ranging from 38% in case of Trogir to 70% in case of Split. For more see: Josip Vrandečić, *Two Dalmatias*, pp. 121-129.

62 Josip Vrandečić, *Two Dalmatias*, pp. 181-188, 276-279; Knapton, *Pomorski posjed*, p.393-394.

63 On salt manufacture and trade see: Ivan Pederin, *Mletačka uprava, privreda i politika u Dalmaciji, 1409-1797*, pp. 132-141; Šime Peričić, *Razvitak gospodarstva Zadra i okolice u prošlosti [Economic Development of Zadar and its Surrounding in the Past]* (Zadar; HAZU, 1999) pp.90-93; The Venetian policy concerning the production and sale of salt was not peculiar to Dalmatia, but rather the standard Venetian state policy which aimed to control salt anywhere in areas of its influence. For more on Venetian salt policy in Adriatic see: Jean Hocquet C., *Le sol et la fortune de Venise*, vol. I. (Publications de l'Universite de Lille, 1982) pp. 177-208.

administration and wages of military garrisons equaled approximately 210,000 *ducats*, resulting in a yearly deficit of 136,375 *ducats*, which had to be supplied from the central treasury.⁶⁴

However, the raw fiscal data is somewhat misleading. Even though provincial treasury accounts indeed clearly show that local income could not cover the cost of the provincial administration, possession of Dalmatia was still a profitable enterprise for the Republic of St. Marc. Provincial accounts do not calculate indirect income from the province, such as, for example, the previously mentioned $\frac{3}{4}$ of salt produced in Dalmatia, which was practically appropriated by the Republic.⁶⁵ Even more important was the existence of the *scala*, or trading post, in Split, which consisted of a custom house and a large quarantine. Opened in 1592, at the initiative of the Jewish merchant Daniele Rodriguez, during the decades preceding the war, the Split *scala* – with its ups and downs - functioned as the principal way station in trade between the Venice and the East. Since this trade was mainly of transit character and in the hands of Venetian and Jewish merchants, local community and consequently provincial treasury profited little from it.⁶⁶

The merchant *scala* in Split, beside its strictly commercial value, also provided another beneficial effect. It greatly influenced Republic's relations with the Ottoman hinterland. Since the peace was the main prerequisite for functioning of the *scala*, everyone who profited from this lucrative enterprise also had strong interests in keeping the two states away from armed conflict. As a source of additional revenue, trade was not merely in the interest of the Ottoman state and as such enjoyed support of the central government, but it also bound many

64 *Commissiones et Relationes* 7, pp. 183, 273

65 The income varied from year to year, depending on the level of production of Dalmatian salt-pans, and the price of salt in the region, yet, for orientational purposes it is still worth noting that, for example, in 1591 income from the salt-pans of Pag and Šibenik alone equaled between 70-80,000 *ducats*. Michael Knapton, *Između Vladarice i njezina posjeda*, p. 381.

66 Viktor Morpurgo, "Daniel Rodriguez i osnivanje splitske skele u XVI stoljeću, [Daniel Rodriguez and foundation of the Split *scala* in 16th ct.]" *Starine* 52-53 (1962): pp. 185-248, 363-415.; Renzo Paci, *La "scala" di Spalato e il commercio Veneziano nei Balcani fra cinque e seicento*, (Venezia, 1971); Renzo Paci, "La scala di Spalato et la politica veneziana in Adriatico," *Quaderni Storici* 13 (1970) pp. 48-105.; See also: Nataša Bajić-Žarko, *Split kao trgovačko i tranzitno središte na razmeđu istoka i zapada u 18. st. [Split as commercial and transit center on the crossroad between the East and the West in 18th ct.]* (Split: Književni krug, 2004)

individuals to it, ranging from Muslim merchants from Sarajevo, various Bosnian notables whose goods found their place in caravan cargoes, to Jews, and a range of local Ottoman officials whose income depended on taxes from trade caravans.⁶⁷ Moreover, trade also created a new shared discourse in diplomatic relations between the Republic and the Ottoman Empire. The accusation of the disruption of trade became one of the main rhetorical arguments used by Venetian ambassadors, both at the *Porte* and on the court of the Bosnian pasha in Sarajevo against the Ottoman "hawks" from the Dalmatian frontier.⁶⁸ To keep the trade flowing was a common interest of both the Venetian administration in Dalmatia and the Ottoman administration of the Bosnian *eyalet*, and thus both sides were ready to invest extra effort in suppression of robbery and keeping roads safe. Given the above, one could argue that commerce in general and the Split *scala* in particular, which further integrated Ottoman Balkan trade into the commercial network of the Republic, contributed more than anything else to development of cooperation, coexistence and preservation of peace in these borderlands.⁶⁹

Finally, when discussing the financial resources of Dalmatia, two more institutions need to be mentioned: *monte di pietà* (mount of piety) and *fontico*. Lacking proper banking institutions, these two served the needs of local communities for having easily obtainable capital for specific purposes at their disposal; *monte* as a public loan institution,⁷⁰ and *fontico* for purchasing grain in time of need. During the first decades of the 17th century, almost every Dalmatian community managed to obtain permission from Venice to establish its own *fontico*

67 The taxes paid for Ottoman goods sold in Split were the income of the local treasury of the Bosnian *eyalet*, while those of Ragusa were not. Therefore, the Bosnian administration favored the Venetian trade outpost of Split to that of Ragusa, which was a tributary state of the Empire, and on several occasions managed to obtain imperial commands prohibiting merchants to visit the Ragusan *scala*, as was for example the case in 1633. Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig, *Orientalische Handschriften*, Signatur: B.or. 137. f. 15v;

68 For example see the case against the captain of Klis in: Suraiya N. Faroqhi, *The Venetian presence in the Ottoman empire*, pp. 323-324.

69 Gligor Stanojević, *Jugoslovenske zemlje*, pp. 182-185. Compare also: Gligor Stanojveić, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 97-98.

70 *Monte di Pietà* originated in Italy - in Tuscany and Umbria during the 15th century - however these quickly spread and soon almost every Italian town, with the sole exception of Venice, had its own *monte* established. For a good overview on development of this institution in the Italian context see: Vittorino Meneghin, *I Monti di Pietà in Italia dal 1462 al 1562* (Vicenza: L.I.E.F. Edizioni, 1986); also see a shorter summary in: Brian Pullan, "Good Government and Christian Charity in Early Modern Italy" in Donald T. Critchlow and Charles H. Parker eds. *With Us Always: A History of Private Charity and Public Welfare* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998) pp. 77-98.

and/or *monte*, allocating funds either from existing taxes to it or introducing new ones. However, these two institutions were of communal character, and their funds were owned by the local community. Still, in time of war, they represented the capital that could be easily tapped by the state, as indeed happened during the War of Crete. By 1642, according to the report compiled by Governor-General Grimani, these funds accumulated approximately 62,174 *ducats*. Otherwise not that significant amount of money, but in time of war, when hard cash was in high demand, even such medium sums proved to be of great value.

1.2. Defensive Infrastructure and Geo-military Context

The state of fortifications of Dalmatian towns was a direct consequence of the conciliatory policy adopted by the Venetian Republic in its relations with the Ottoman Empire, after the War of Cyprus. The policy aimed to avoid any unnecessary conflict, and maintain good relations with the Republic's most important trade partner. *Uskoks*, North African Corsairs, and ever present banditry on the Dalmatian frontier, put enough strain on the relationship between the two states as it is, and construction of new modern fortifications in Dalmatia, immediately before the Empire's doorstep - an act that could easily be interpreted as hostile - represented security risk which Republic's policy makers were not willing to take. Thus, after 1573, the Republic refrained from embarking on any new major fortification projects in Dalmatia for almost 70 years. Whether the risk of provoking the Ottomans was real, or it simply served as a comforting argument for not doing anything, and thus saving the public from great expense involved in such projects, is of no importance, the final result was still the same. Addition of a bastion or *mezzaluna* here and there, expansion and clearing of a ditch, repair and modernization of a section of a crumbling wall with the construction of a parapet or some similar structure, these were the fortification projects that the Republic limited itself to in Dalmatia.

Such developments in Dalmatia were in contrast with the situation in other parts of Venice's maritime state, most notably Crete, where modernization and expansion of existing fortifications continued ceaselessly during the entire interwar period.⁷¹ Nevertheless, such

⁷¹ For more see: Elisabetta Molteni, "La scienza del fortificare" in Concina Ennio and Elisabetta Molteni, *La*

state of affairs should not be attributed to some Venetian policy of neglect or disregard of its Dalmatian possessions. In addition to previously mentioned political factors, i.e. the risk of provoking the Ottomans, the fact that due to poverty of the province local administration was financially dependent on subsidies from Venice, could also greatly influence Venetian policy makers to abstain from embarking on expansive and politically sensitive construction projects. As John Hale argued, during the 16th century, more was done (in regard to fortification projects) on Crete and Cyprus, because local communities were "better able to bear the whole, or large part of the costs."⁷² If Dalmatia had not been so completely financially dependent on Venice and had been able to participate more actively in defense costs, it would have probably been much easier to create a favorable political climate in the Senate for approving certain fortification projects in Dalmatia than it was under existing conditions when all funds had to be sent from Venice.

The only exception to what was said previously was Zadar, the political and administrative center of the province, in defense of which the Republic never ceased to invest.⁷³ In regard to the strength of its fortifications and geographical features of its location, Zadar was by far the strongest of all Dalmatian towns. Situated on a peninsula, and connected to the mainland by a strip of land no wider than 400 meters, the town enjoyed an excellent natural defensive position since its beginnings. Moreover, Zadar was the only Dalmatian town protected by fortifications reconstructed *alla moderna* (mainly during the years preceding the War of Cyprus), and additionally expanded with an outer modern fort (so called *forte*), which

Fabbrica Della Fortezza: L'Architettura Militare di Venezia (Verona: Banca Popolare di Verona, 2001) pp. 214-231.

72 John. R. Hale and Michael E. Mallett, *The Military Organization of a Renaissance State. Venice c.1400-1617* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) p. 433.

73 According to some scholars, such Venetian policy was a product of strategic recommendations of count Sforza Pallavicino (1519-1585), famous *condottiere* and engineer, extensively employed by the Republic on all of its possessions from Crete to *Terraferma*. In the aftermath of the War of Cyprus Pallavicino inspected Dalmatian fortifications and found them in very bad condition requiring large sums of money to be remodeled according to the new fortification and siege techniques. Therefore, *Pallavicino* argued for concentration of Republic's resources and forces on the defense of two strongest towns only: Zadar and Kotor. Still, no study so far has provided any kind of arguments, based on primary research in the Venetian archives in favor of the hypothesis that this Pallavicino's report influenced Venetian policy for more than seven decades, they all simply rely on otherwise rather accurate Chronicle of the War of Crete in Dalmatia by the Dalmatian historian Francesco Difnico (Franjo Difnik-Divnić), contemporary of the war. Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, (Split: Književni krug, 1986) pp. 62-63.

replaced the old medieval *burgus* and defended the town from the southeast side which connected it to the mainland.⁷⁴ As such, Zadar was, in spite of several shortcomings of its fortifications, held by the Venetians to be impregnable.⁷⁵ The rest of Dalmatian towns were protected by fortification complexes, modernized to varying degrees during the 16th and the first half of the 17th centuries, through additions of bastions, and strengthening of the walls in an attempt to make them more resilient to artillery fire. Apart from Zadar, the sole major fortification project in Dalmatia was the construction of a strong but ill conceived fort of St. Nicolò, guarding the entry to the bay of Šibenik, in the 1530s.⁷⁶

Further, in addition to shortcomings of their fortifications, both Split and Šibenik had another serious defensive handicap. Their locations did not provide good natural defense, as was the case with Zadar. On the contrary, both towns were situated within depressions with nearby heights overlooking them. During the Middle Ages, such locations did not represent a handicap, but, with the gunpowder revolution and the development of siege artillery, nearby heights came to pose a grave defense risk, as enemy could position batteries there. So it became necessary to defend the heights by outer fortifications in order to deny these to the enemy. Unfortunately, both towns lacked such facilities. Moreover, in regard to strengths (or better said, weaknesses) of its defense (both natural and artificial ones), Split was considered as the weakest among all Dalmatian towns and practically indefensible in case of a formal attack.⁷⁷ The only other Dalmatian town, except for Zadar, which was considered more or less secure, was Trogir, which even though it was protected by antique fortifications, also enjoyed

74 For the fortification works in Zadar, during the period up to 1645 see: Andrej Žmegač, *Bastioni jadranske Hrvatske [Bastions of Adriatic Croatia]* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2009) pp. 31-47, 57-62; Tomislav Raukar et al. *Zadar pod mletačkom upravom 1409-1797 [Zadar Under the Venetian Rule]* (Zadar, 1987): pp. 276-353.; Angelo de Benvenuti, *Fortificazioni Venete in Dalmazia*, (Venezia: Liberalato, 2006) pp. 65-77.

75 The strength of Zadar's fortifications, their impregnability and the low quality of fortifications of other Dalmatian towns became a standard theme in letters/reports by Venetian officials through the years. For example, a report from 1644, by the previously mentioned Governor-General Grimani, can be taken as an exemplary model of such discourse: *Oltre la piazza importantissima di Zara, alla quale aggiunta qualche fortificatione alla parte del porto, possederebbe il titolo d'inespugnabile, non vi è altra città che vaglia per qualita di fortificationi. Commissiones et Relationes* 7, p. 177.

76 For more on the construction of the fort of St. Nicolò, see: Andrej Žmegač, *Bastioni jadranske hrvatske*, pp. 47-57.; Josip Čuzela, *Šibenski fortifikacijski sustav [Fortification System of Šibenik]* (Šibenik: Gradska knjižnica "Juraj Šižgorić", 2005) pp. 75-93.

77 More details on pre-1645 fortifications of Split in: Arsen Duplančić, *Splitske zidine u 17. i 18. stoljeću [Split Town Walls in 17th and 18th Century]* (Zagreb: Ministarstvo kulture, 2007) pp. 9-10; Andrej Žmegač, *Bastioni jadranske hrvatske*, pp. 78-81.

very good natural defense due to its location on an island separated from the mainland by a narrow channel .

So it came to be that, with the exception of Zadar and in some measure Kotor, Dalmatian towns entered the war in 1645 with outdated and weak fortifications, not suitable for 17th century siege warfare.⁷⁸ It was but occasionally during the times of immediate crises, that the Republic demonstrated willingness to act and try to remedy this situation. For example, when the threat of a new war with the Ottoman Empire was looming in 1638, the Senate charged the engineer Nicolo Candido, a Dalmatian from the island of Hvar, to inspect the state of Dalmatian towns and their fortifications. In his report Candido recommended a series of fortification works, intended to modernize existing town fortifications, also proposing the construction of new forts at the mouths of the channels of Novigrad, Šibenik and Kotor, and erection of badly needed new outer fortifications on the heights overlooking the towns of Šibenik and Split. However, with easing of the tensions between the two states, the Senate returned to its old policy and decided to postpone the construction of new fortifications for some better, future days. Such projects had to wait until the outbreak of a new war, when hasty works on fortifications during 1646-7 were mainly conducted along the lines proposed by engineer Candido.⁷⁹

Two other military facilities of importance deserve to be mentioned here as well: the arsenals in Zadar and Hvar. The arsenals of *Stato da Mar* were specialized depots of naval stores, weapons, ammunition, and various spare parts. Their role was to support the operations of the Venetian navy by providing ships in transit with facilities for limited repair-work, replenishing of consumed materials (ropes, oars, hardware, wood, etc.) and ammunition (cannon balls, gunpowder etc.). As such, the arsenals were essential for the Republic's ability

78 For more on technological innovations in the sphere of siege warfare of the late 16th and first half of the 17th century see: Christopher Duffy, *Siege Warfare: The Fortress in the Early Modern World 1494–1660* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979); Bert S. Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe: Gunpowder, Technology, and Tactics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); a very good survey of 17th century siegecraft, with emphasis on Ottoman innovations and specializations, can be found in: Mark L. Stein, *Ottoman Border Forts and Garrisons in Europe*, pp. 30-47.

79 Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 62-63.; For more on development of Šibenik's fortifications during the years before the War of Crete see: Josip Čuzela, *Šibenski fortifikacijski sustav*, pp. 75-92; Andrej Žmegač, *Bastioni Jadranske Hrvatske*, pp. 47-57, 91-102.

to project its naval power. Venice organized an unbroken chain of such facilities through its maritime possessions, stretching from Zadar to Hvar, over to Corfu, and ending with two arsenals on Crete, at *Candia* and *Canea*.

Even though it is true that "the importance of a particular city of *Stato da Mar* was clearly marked by presence or lack of the arsenal,"⁸⁰ not all arsenals were of uniform size, or provided the same set of services. The arsenals at Crete were the largest ones, and were, additionally, also capable of constructing new galleys and *fustas*, thus these resembled the famous Venetian arsenal most. This was in accordance with the role these ports at Crete played as the bases of the Republic's main fleet during its operations in Eastern Mediterranean.⁸¹ Similarly, the size of the Zadar arsenal at the other end of the chain reflected the role Zadar played in Venice's overall naval strategy. Zadar was not the main naval base of the Republic in the Adriatic, this was the role of Venice. Instead, Zadar served as an operational base of a much smaller fleet, a squadron under the command of the governor-general of Dalmatia and Albania. During peace-time, this squadron counted between two to four galleys and 20-30 smaller vessels: brigantines, frigates, *galeotte* and so called armed boats (*barche armate*). Accordingly, the Zadar arsenal was scaled to match the needs of this fleet (refitting, minor repairs, yearly maintenance), in addition to its main function as the service facility for Republic's ships in transit to and from the Levant.⁸² Same was the case with the arsenal at Hvar, the smaller of the two Adriatic arsenals. The island of Hvar functioned as one of the main transit ports and shelters for ships sailing along the Venice-Levant course; consequently its Arsenal served but as a naval depot where ships in transit could be refitted and their stores replenished.

Though 16-17th century engineers have managed to convince contemporary policy makers

80 Michela Dal Borgo and Guglielmo Zanelli, *Zara. Una fortezza, un porto, un arsenale (secoli XV-XVIII)*. (Roma: Viella, 2008) p. 38.

81 Elisabetta Molteni, *La scienza del fortificare*, pp. 212.

82 For more on development and expansion of the arsenal in Zadar during the period of Venetian rule see: Michela Dal Borgo and Guglielmo Zanelli, *Zara. Una fortezza, un porto, un arsenale*, pp. 39-47.; Antonija Mlikota, "Arsenal u Zadru – Povijest, funkcija i revitalizacija [Arsenal in Zadar – History, Function and its Revitalization]," *Radovi Zavoda za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Zadru* 52, (2010): pp. 205-230.

all over Europe that "the newest is probably best," as John Hale has eloquently put it,⁸³ the claim that existence or lack of fortifications "*alla moderna*" was a decisive factor in defense of particular fortress, is challenged today by many military historians. Factors other than technological ones, such as morale of forces, lack or abundance of sufficient provisions and prospect of timely arrivals of relieving force, are all seen to play a more important roles in the final outcome of a particular siege.⁸⁴ Nevertheless, this technological debate aside, modernized or not, for the Early Modern fortress to be effective, it needs to be sufficiently equipped with artillery weapons, ammunition, gunpowder and, above all, manned with enough soldiers willing to defend it.

Concerning the number of guns, positioned along their walls, the situation of Dalmatian towns during the years before the war, also resembled the sorry state of their fortifications. Except for Zadar, Kotor, and the fortress of St. Nicolò, all other Venetian localities along the Dalmatian coast lacked sufficient artillery firepower (see table 1.1). Although, at first glance, the total sum of 28 or 42 artillery pieces in cases of Split and Trogir (having in mind that these were not so large towns) could appear sufficient, however, these figures taken by themselves are rather misleading. What must also be taken into account is the structure of the artillery arsenal of a particular town/fort. As can be seen from table 1.1. - which contains a summary of artillery pieces in Dalmatian coastal towns/forts grouped by caliber - with the exception of Zadar, Kotor and the fort of St. Nicolò, majority of the artillery arsenals in other towns and forts were composed mainly of pieces of small calibers. These weapons were very effective against infantry assaults or sappers, but not for firing at enemy batteries. In order to prevent them, or at least slow them down as much as possible, from breaching town fortifications by their fire, the guns of medium (calibers 20-30) and large size (calibers 40+) were necessary, and only Zadar, Kotor and the fortress of St. Nicolò were sufficiently provided with such pieces. This was of crucial importance for successful defense of the town.

In Early Modern siege warfare, the moment when the wall was breached represented the

⁸³ John R. Hale, *The Military Organization of a Renaissance State*, p. 434.

⁸⁴ For the full elaboration of such argumentation see: David Parrot, "The Utility of Fortifications in Early Modern Europe: Italian Princes and Their Citadels, 1540-1640," *War in History* 7, (2000): pp. 133-135.

turning point of the siege, since, afterwards the attacker could finally put to use his superior numbers and overrun defenders. During the 16th-17th centuries, fortress with breached walls was considered as good as taken, which is why the laws of war of Early Modern Europe considered this as the last occasion for defenders to negotiate surrender and avoid the carnage of taking the town by storm.⁸⁵

	Fort of Novigrad	Town of Zadar	Town of Šibenik	Fortress of St. Nicolò	Town of Trogir	Town of Split	Port of Omiš	Fortress of Statigrad	Town of Kotor
Canoni da 150				2					
Colobrine da 60									1
Colobrine da 50		3		2					2
Colobrine da 40		1							
Periere da 100			1						
Periere da 50							2		
Canoni da 60		1							
Canoni da 50		6		6		1			5
	0	11	1	10	0	1	2	0	8
Periere da 30							2		1
Colobrine da 30		4							8
Colobrine da 20		5				1			2
Canoni da 30		2							
Canoni da 20		10	1	6		4			5
	0	21	1	6	0	5	2	0	16
Colobrine da 14		8	1		13	1			4
Canoni da 16								1	
Aspidi da 12			4	1	4		2		10
Sacri da 12	3	12	6	6	3	6	1	1	5
Periere da 14		1							4
Periere da 12					1	11			
Falconi da 6	4	21	7	6	4	3	5	3	6
Falconi da 3	1	5	3		4	6	5	3	8
Falconi da 1		4	2	1	2	9	4		3
Passavolanti da 9			3						
	8	51	26	14	31	36	17	8	40
Town/Fortress total:	8	83	28	30	31	42	21	8	64

Table 1.1. Distribution of artillery pieces along Dalmatian coastal towns and fortifications (1642).⁸⁶

In accordance with its general defense strategy, Venice kept just a skeleton force in Dalmatia (as in other parts of its maritime state as well), whose task in the peace-time was

⁸⁵ For a similar assessment of 17th century siege warfare, but from the point of view of the Ottomans, compare: Mark L. Stein, *Guarding the Frontier. Ottoman Border Forts and Garrisons in Europe*, (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007) pp. 33-36.; Compare also Geoffrey Parker, "Early Modern Europe" in Michael Howard, Georg J. Andreopoulos and Mark R. Shulman, eds. *The Laws of War* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994): pp. 40-58.

⁸⁶ *Commissiones et Relationes* 7, pp. 188-238.

maintaining law and order, suppressing robbery, and repelling small Ottoman raids, thus protecting towns from falling victim to some surprise attack. In times of war, these forces were expected to withdraw behind fortifications and absorb the shock of the first Ottoman attack, until the Republic's navy would arrive bringing reinforcements. The Republic's strategic reserves consisted of two main sources that could be tapped in case of war. In the first place, the Republic had at its disposal 11,000-14,000 man strong army kept in the garrisons of *Terraferma* even during peacetime.⁸⁷ Secondly, from the 16th century onwards, in order to compensate for the lack of its own manpower, Venice relied either on stand-by arrangements with various foreign agents who were supposed to raise troops abroad for the Republic in time of war, or on its extensive diplomatic network to secure ad-hoc contracts with interested parties for recruitment of new units.⁸⁸ Obviously, these troops required more time to gather and the first wave of reinforcements rushed to the most endangered places would have to come from the army of *Terraferma*.

The Venetian army consisted of a mixture of various types of "national" troops, named according to the origin of their soldiers. These troops varied in quality, unit size, internal command structure, armament and fighting style, all of which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. The backbone of the Venetian peace time contingent in Dalmatia were so called *compagnie di fanti Italiani*, infantry companies made of soldiers recruited in Italy. These were, considered by the Venetian government as the most trusted troops and made the core of town garrisons. Units of *fanti Italiani* counted 892 soldiers, and were organized in 12 regular companies (of varied strengths, 40-81 men), and 10 smaller platoons (see Table 1.2.). In addition to these units, which were considered as ordinary garrisons, in 1642, the Republic also reinforced its forces with two extraordinary infantry companies, one composed of Albanians and one of Greeks, both stationed in Zadar and totaling 116 men. This core of professional soldiers was further strengthened by paid territorial troops, a practice much in disfavor by the Venetian Senate. Still, four small platoons of territorials were maintained in

87 For more on the Venetian army of *Terraferma* in the first decades of the 17th century see: Sergio Perini, *Le milizie della Terraferma veneta verso la metà del Seicento*, pp. 193-210. (here especially page 194.)

88 John R. Hale, *The Military Organization of a Renaissance State*, pp. 313-330.

Dalmatia in most endangered regions of the frontier, and two large companies, one of 100 men from Poljica, a region under Ottoman rule but with a high level of autonomy, and one company of 155 men from Perast, were added as reinforcements to Split and Kotor garrisons, respectively.

Similarly, the core of the Republic's cavalry forces in Dalmatia consisted of 12 units of mercenaries (Albanians and Croats), and two units of paid territorials, stationed in the frontier outposts of Posedarje and Biograd. Due to the proximity of the Ottoman frontier, the cavalry played an important role in the security of the province. If infantry was fundamental for garrisoning towns and strongholds, the cavalry was crucial for preserving the countryside, which would suffer greatly from Ottoman incursions without its presence. For example, Governor-General Christoforo Valier discussed the need for cavalry in Dalmatia, in his final report, in the following manner: "without the cavalry in Dalmatia, the confines are infested, the lands laid to waste, the subjects falling prey, the commerce is destroyed, the peace disturbed and the cities only slightly less oppressed, ...;"⁸⁹ The cavalry forces in Dalmatia counted 361 men and the bulk of them were stationed in Zadar and in nearby strongholds, guarding the only considerable patch of land under Venetian control on the Dalmatian coast.⁹⁰

In addition to these land forces, the Republic also kept 1-2 galleys and 20 companies of marine infantry in Dalmatia (11 composed of Albanians and 9 of Croats), serving aboard armed boats (*barche armate*). These were entrusted with regular patrolling along the Adriatic and were used for a variety of tasks ranging from supporting the galleys, pursuing small pirate vessels, to preventing of contraband or smuggling and performing various guarding duties. All in all, the Republic kept on its payroll 2,234 infantrymen (including 60 professional gunners), and 369 cavalrymen, giving the combined total of 2,603 men constantly under arms.

Infantry (payed)

Cavalry (payed)

**Artillery
(Bombardieri)**

⁸⁹ *Commissioness et Relationes* 5, p. 189.

⁹⁰ As a comparison, and further evidence of high level of everyday violence in Dalmatia, it is worth noting that the Republic's cavalry forces on the Italian mainland, in charge of infinitely greater territory than small patches of land under Venetian control in Dalmatia, counted only between 1,200-1500 men. See: Sergio Perini, *Le milizie della Terraferma veneta verso la metà del Seicento*, p. 194.

Garrison	Italians	Albanians, Croats, Greeks	Territorial units	Albanians, Croats	Territorial units	Payed gunners	Scolari	Cernide
Budva (<i>Budua</i>)	25					1		912
Kotor (<i>Cattaro</i>)	199		155	31		8	90	353
Korčula (<i>Curzola</i>)						2	30	1000
Hvar (<i>Lesina</i>)	23					3	21	296
Brač (<i>Brazza</i>)								85
Omiš (<i>Almissa</i>)	27					1	18	480
Split (<i>Spalato</i>)	61		100	10		3	40	800
Trogir (<i>Trau</i>)	17			21		5	46	1456
Šibenik (<i>Sebenico</i>)	120			31		12	103	1462
Zadar (<i>Zara</i>)	334	116		248		18	123	
Posedarje (<i>Possedaria</i>)			25		12			
Biograd (<i>Zaravechia</i>)					16			
Ražanac (<i>Rasanze</i>)			25					
Nin (<i>Nona</i>)						1		268
Novigrad (<i>Novegradi</i>)	41		56					
Pag (<i>Pago</i>)	18					2	22	236
Rab (<i>Arbe</i>)						1	35	323
Krk (<i>Veglia</i>)	15					1	25	760
Sv. Petar (<i>St. Petar</i>)	12					1		
Cres i Osor (<i>Chreso et Oszero</i>)						1	40	560
Navy (<i>Barche Armate</i>)		805						
Total:	892	921	361	341	28	60	593	8991

Table 1.2. Venetian peace-time forces in Dalmatia and Albania (1642).⁹¹

Following the policy introduced first on its mainland possessions at the beginning of the 16th century,⁹² Venice organized its subjects in Dalmatia into units of territorial militia, the so called *cerinde* (units composed of rural subjects) and bombardiers or *scolari* (units made of urban population: artisans, craftsmen and such). According to a survey from 1642, in case of war, at least on paper, Venice could count on 8,991 militiamen organized in 119 companies, and 593 *bombarideri scolari*, or the total of 9,584 men (approximately 44% of the total male population of 21,000) obliged to military service.⁹³ During peace these troops served for no pay, and only during war were they entitled to some form of financial recompense, even though their wages were much smaller than those of professional soldiers.

Because of the claim put forward by some historians that the main defensive strength of

⁹¹ *Commissiones et Relationes* 7, pp. 188-238.

⁹² John R. Hale, *The Military Organization of a Renaissance State*. pp. 350-366.

⁹³ It is worth pointing out that the percentage of population obliged to this service on *Terraferma* was much, much smaller, just 12% of the entire male population. Compare: Peter January and Michael Knappton, "The Demands Made on Venetian Terraferma Society for Defense," *Ateneo Veneto no.2* (2008), p. 28.

the province in case of war consisted of these troops,⁹⁴ the question of military usefulness of these troops requires further discussion. What must be noted first is that Dalmatian *cernide* suffered greatly from the extensive territorial losses Dalmatian towns suffered during the 1570-73 war, which resulted in almost complete destruction of local militia units. This discontinuity in institutional coverage, in the end resulted in insufficient training of these troops and lack of tradition, which is commonly used to develop the spirit of unity and companionship, and create cohesion among members of the same unit. Thus, although during the following decades *cernide* were reconstituted, the quality of organization still varied greatly from community to community.⁹⁵ Moreover, in his report, Grimani points out that, at the beginning of his service, he found *cernide* in disorder, and that accordingly he regulated them; recompiling lists of conscripts and appointing new Captains and officials charged with regular training of troops.⁹⁶ At the same time, proximity to frontier and active involvement in border skirmishes, in case of certain units more than compensated for lack of formal training.

Militia units with longer and less abrupt tradition were those of so called *bombardieri scolari*, named thus because they were organized around fraternities (*scuole*) of St. Barbara (the patron saint of gunners), which as any other fraternity, in addition to its military function also played an important social role. *Scolari* were expected to practice firing from guns on each first Sunday of the month, and as far as it can be traced in reports by governor-generals these troops were deemed capable of providing good service.⁹⁷ All in all, when deployed along side regular army, these units performed satisfactorily, as was for example the case during the defense of Šibenik in September 1647.

Their combat effectiveness aside, when discussing the military utility of these troops, one also has to consider their tactical limitations. In practice, militia units are usually very hard to deploy out of their home territories, especially in case when these are also threatened.

Dalmatian militias during the War of Crete were no exception to this rule, only in one case

94 For example see: Gligor Stanojević, *Jugoslovenske zemlje*, p. 199.

95 Šime Peričić, *Vojna krajina u Dalmaciji*, pp. 174-185.

96 *Commissiones et Relationes* 7, p. 170.

97 *Commissiones et Relationes* 5, p. 190.

territorial units were successfully engaged in aiding another town, in 1657, when during the attack on Split the governor of Hvar organized an ad-hoc volunteer force and led it to the aid of the besieged town. Never during the War of Crete was the Republic able to utilize these units in their full nominal strength, of 10,000 men; the only operation in which considerable number of Dalmatia *cernide* participated was the failed attack on Knin in 1654, in which some 1,200 militia men participated.⁹⁸ Even more problematic was the trend of rapid deterioration of these units once the war started. One of the first consequences of renewed Ottoman attacks was depopulation of the countryside of Dalmatian coastal communities - whether as a result of casualties among civilian population or of their resettlement to more secure areas - which also greatly damaged militia units. Furthermore, large part of these 10,000 conscripted militiamen came from Dalmatian islands, which due to the availability of qualified seamen adept for hard galley service, also figured as important recruiting grounds of the Venetian navy.⁹⁹ So it came to be that, already in the first years of the war, the growing needs of the navy outweighed any other considerations, and these manpower resources were quickly depleted.¹⁰⁰

These last sections gave the overview of the resources which the Venetian Republic had at its disposal in Dalmatia at the beginning of hostilities in 1645. Now, it is time to look over the border at the resources of the other side in the conflict.

1.3. On the Other Side: the Pashaluk of Bosnia

As was the case with preceding sections, which do not discuss the military-economic

98 See the survey of troops that went on this operation: Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Senato, Dispacci, *Provveditori da Terra e da Mar* (henceforth ASVe, PTM), b(usta) 475. letter num.(ber) 120. (Zara, 26. Aprile 1654) attachment numbered 13.

99 Even though the statement from 1591 by the governor-general, that the Republic can arm 10 galleys in Dalmatia, was a little excessive, the greatest contribution of Dalmatians to the Venetian navy was arming of eight galleys during the 1570-1573 war. *Comissioness et Relationes* 5, p. 23.

100 During the War of Crete, Venice armed just two Dalmatian galleys, those of the islands of Rab and Brač. Furthermore, the inhabitants of the islands next to Zadar were subject to serving crews aboard the galley of the Captain-General of Sea, a vessel with probably the highest level of casualties in the Republic's navy. Galley service was extremely hard and represented great burden for island communities, completely draining them of manpower over the years. In 1657, upon receiving the order to organize new conscription of reinforcements for the galley of the Captain-General, Governor-General Antonio Bernardo reported that since the beginning of the war 600 men were gone to Levant (from Zadar islands only) and that none have returned, and that thus it is practically impossible to find recruits for requested reinforcements. ASVe, PTM, b. 482. num. 140. (Liesina, 16 Novembre 1657)

potential of the entire Venetian Republic, but are limited merely to Venetian Dalmatia and Albania, the following sections are dedicated to the region of the Ottoman empire most engaged in the military operations in the Adriatic battlefield, namely the pashaluk of Bosnia.¹⁰¹ Even though there were plans, and though serious preparations were put in motion on several occasions (for example in 1657 and especially in 1658), never in the course of war did the Dalmatian theater of operations become the main battleground, one to which the Empire deployed its main army led by the Grand Vizier or the Sultan himself. As seen from the perspective of Istanbul, there were always more pressing matters to be taken care of than the liquidation of this weak province. In the years 1645-1647, the main preoccupation of the Ottoman government were operations on the Crete. Then, from 1648 up to 1657, due to the Venetian blockade of the Dardanelles and political turbulence this caused in the capital, the Aegean Sea and naval operations figured as the main concern of the central government. Thereafter, from 1658 to 1664, Transylvanian affairs and the open war with the Habsburgs tied up Empire's forces, and finally up to 1669, the attention of the Porte was focused on ending the war by eliminating the last Venetian stronghold on Crete, the town of Candia. So it came to be that, since the attention of the Empire was always focused elsewhere Dalmatia remained a secondary battlefield and the burden of war conduct in this region was left to provincial forces regularly reinforced with a few thousand strong contingents of janissary infantry and timariot cavalry.

On the Ottoman side, the commander in chief on this battlefield was the Bosnian Vizier, head of the pashaluk of Bosnia. Organized in 1580 from seven border sandjaks, the Bosnian pashaluk was one of the two westernmost provinces of the Empire in Europe, facing the Habsburg Empire to the west, and Venetian Dalmatian possessions to the south. In size, the pashaluk surpassed by far the territorial extent of the medieval Bosnia, whose name it

¹⁰¹For more on the formation and organization of this unit of the Empire see: Hazim Šabanović, *Bosanski pašaluk: postanak i upravna podjela [Pashaluk of Bosnia formation and administrative division]* (Sarajevo: Oslobođenje, 1959); Hazim Šabanović, "Vojno uređenje Bosne od 1463 do kraja 16 st. [Military Organization of Bosnia from 1463 until the end of 16th century]," *Godišnjak društva istoričara Bosne i Hercegovine 11* (1961): pp. 173-224.; For the administrative organization compare also: Nenad Močanin, *Turska Hrvatska: Hrvati pod vlašću Osmanskog Carstva do 1791. [Turkish Croatia: Croats Under the Rule of the Ottoman Empire until 1791.]* (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1999) pp. 37-45.

inherited, integrating large parts of the Croatian kingdom and almost the entire mainland Dalmatia (see map 1.2). Directly facing Venetian territories were four sandjaks. Dalmatia was encompassed by the sandjaks of Lika¹⁰² and Klis, while territories of the Venetian Albania were immersed within two large sandjaks: Hercegovina and Skadar/Shkodër/Scuttari (not part of the pashaluk of Bosnia). These four sandjaks were to bear the main burden of the war on the Ottoman side. The sandjak bey of Skadar acted as a sort of semi-autonomous commander, in charge of operations against Venetian Albania, and in case of joint operations the sandjak of Hercegovina was to be under his command, as was for example the case during the attack on Kotor in 1657.¹⁰³ On the other hand, the sandjak bey of Skadar was expected to coordinate his operations with the pasha of Bosnia, and when their forces were to join the pasha of Bosnia was to act as the commander in charge. The Porte left a high level of autonomy in execution of military operations to the pasha of Bosnia. He was rather free in choosing the targets and the strategy for the upcoming campaign season, which had to be coordinated with the overall Ottoman war effort, and as such he was in charge of all troops committed to this battlefield, be that *timariot* or garrison forces of sandjaks under his administration or reinforcements sent from the capital or/and nearby provinces.

Military resources that the pasha of Bosnian had at his disposal were considerable. According to the summary *timar* inspection undertaken in 1631, the pashaluk of Bosnia counted 150 *kiliç ziamet* and 1793 *kiliç timar*.¹⁰⁴ Based on the calculation which assumes the average of 2,5 armed retainers (*jebelu*) accompanying each *timar sipahi*, and 10 for every *zaim*, this would put potential military strength of timariot forces in Bosnia to approximately 7,925 men.¹⁰⁵ In addition to this, the pasha also had substantial number of cash paid garrison troops, stationed in the fortresses on the fringes of the province, at his disposal. Throughout

¹⁰²In literature, this sandjak is usually referred to by its double name, that is: sandjak of Lika and Krka or Lika-Krka, in this study I opted for the shorter version of the name: the sandjak of Lika.

¹⁰³Gligor Stanojević, *Jugoslovenske zemlje*, pp. 243-252.

¹⁰⁴Figures taken from Murphey Rhoads, *Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1999) p. 40-41.

¹⁰⁵This calculation is based on using the mean value of the maximum amount of armed retainers a particular type of *Sipahi* was obliged to provide. For a *timâr Sipahi* this was five retainers (hence the figure of 2.5 and *Sipahi* in person), and for *ziamet Sipahi* up to twenty (thus 10 and *Sipahi*).

the second half of the 16th century, as a response to the developments on the Habsburg side, the Ottomans also created their own frontier system (*serhadd*). Along the pashaluk's southern and western border, a dense system of fortresses and armed outpost was organized around the so called captaincies (*kapetanije*), military districts under the command of a captain. By 1645, nineteen such captaincies were established, comprising 83 forts and 43 fortified posts (bridges, guard towers etc.), with the total of 13-15,000 men stationed in garrisons within this border zone.¹⁰⁶ However, significant portions of these troops, especially those in western and northern parts of the border zone, had to be left guarding the frontier from incursions by Habsburg forces. Still, almost 1/5 of these troops, 2,983 men, were stationed in forts directly arrayed in front of Venetian Dalmatia in the sandjaks of Lika and Klis.¹⁰⁷ One should also add a number of Ottoman Christian subjects to these troops, who would join the Ottoman army on campaign in their role as irregulars. The number of these irregulars ranged from a few hundred to a few thousand depending on the prospect of booty; the more successful the Ottoman army was, the higher number of these followers it could expect to attract.

Additionally, even if the bulk of the Empire's resources were committed elsewhere, these local forces were still not left to fighting alone. Almost every year, the Bosnian pasha could count on reinforcement of a few thousand janissaries, sent either from the capital, or from much closer Belgrade, one of major Ottoman bases in the European part of the Empire.

106Adem Handžić, "O organizaciji krajine bosanskog ejaleta u XVII stoljeću" in Vasa Čubrilović ed. *Vojne krajine u Jugoslavenskim zemljama u novom veku do karlovačkog mira 1699*. [Military frontiers in Yugoslav lands in early Modern period up to the peace of Karlovac 1699] (Beograd: SANU, 1989) pp. 77-91. The most comprehensive study of this institution up today, still remains pioneer work of: Hamdija Kreševljaković, *Kapetanije u Bosni i Hercegovini* [Captaincies in Bosnia and Hercegovin] (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1980); See also: Nenad Moačanin, *Turska Hrvatska*, pp. 30-34.

107According to a summary report of this zone from 1616, total number of men in garrisons was 10,107. An estimate of ca. 15,000 given above is based on available data from 1643 for four central sandjaks: Krka, Lika, Bihać and Bosnia, which shows the increase in garrison sizes of 50% in regard to the size of garrisons in 1616. See: Adem Handžić, *O organizaciji krajine bosanskog ejaleta u XVII stoljeću*, p. 89; and Fehim Spaho Đ. "Organizacija vojne krajine u sandacima Klis i Krka u XVII stoljeću [Organization of the Military Frontier in Klis and Krka sandjaks]," in Vasa Čubrilović ed. *Vojne krajine u Jugoslavenskim zemljama u novom veku do karlovačkog mira 1699*. [Military Frontiers in Yugoslav Lands in Early Modern Period up to the Peace of Karlovac 1699] (Beograd: SANU, 1989) p. 108.; Compare also: Kornelija Jurin-Starčević, "Vojne snage Kliškog i Krčko-Ličkog sandžaka pred Kandijski rat – osmanska vojska plaćenika [Military Forces of Sancaks Klis and Krka just before the Candian War - Ottoman Army of Mercenaries]," In Damir Agičić ed. *Zbornik Mire Kolar-Dmimitrijević* (Zagreb: FF Press, 2003) pp. 79-93.

Furthermore, one of the main features of the timar system was that the Empire always had a large untapped reserve force, in spite of an active engagement on several fronts, which could be easily mobilized and deployed at no or at least very low cost for the central treasury.¹⁰⁸ Even though provincial forces of the northern provinces of Kanizsa and Buda were mainly tied down guarding the Habsburg-Ottoman frontier, other nearby sandjaks belonging to the provinces of Rumeli and Smederevo, served as regular sources of reinforcements for Dalmatian campaigns. Furthermore, since the arrival of the new Bosnian pasha also needed to serve as symbolic show of Ottoman might, intended to strengthen the spirit and resolve of local population, the new pasha was almost always sent accompanied with a few thousand troops. These were also occasions to bring exotic troops from distant parts of the Empire to this battlefield. For example, in July 1648, Dervis Mehmet Pasha arrived accompanied by 5,000 fighters, 1,000 of which were Tatars.¹⁰⁹ Yet, even more spectacular was the entry of Topal Mehmet pasha in Sarajevo, in December 1655, when he arrived at the head of the force of 5,000 men, all from Persia, followed by 180 camels carrying supplies.¹¹⁰ Still, despite such (limited) resources, it was possible for the Bosnian pasha to deploy year in and out, armies 15,000 - 20,000 men strong, and once even of approximately 30,000 (for the 1648 campaign).

Sheer military strength aside, there was also the sharp contrast in the abilities of Venice and the Ottomans in waging war in this region. In order to protect its possessions in the Adriatic, the Republic practically had to supply almost everything, from soldiers to what the Venetian sources called *munitioni da viver* (haystack, food, grain, vine,...) and *munitioni da guerra* (arms, gunpowder, cannon balls, bullets, etc.). On the other hand, the Ottomans enjoyed a far more advantageous position. The abundance of food and richness of natural resources in Bosnia was a common theme in Venetian reports. Unlike Dalmatia, which depended on food imports for pure survival, Albania and Bosnia acted as exporters of all kind of food for centuries: grain, cattle, sheep etc. Furthermore, while lack of pastures was a

¹⁰⁸Murphey Rhoads, *Ottoman Warfare*, p. 37.

¹⁰⁹ASVe, PTM. b. 466. num. 438. (Zara, 15. Luglio 1648.) attachment: *Copia di Contenuto in costituito dell Ill.(ustrissi)mo C:(ont)e di Spalato*

¹¹⁰Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 135.

constant problem that, year in and out, decimated the ranks of the Venetian cavalry and set limits to its deployment on the Dalmatian battlefield, the Ottomans had no such problems. Additionally, Bosnia and Serbia were also rich in important strategic assets, such as deposits of iron (Banja-Luka, Rudnik, Kamengrad) and lead (Banja-Luka, Srebrenica and Olovo),¹¹¹ used extensively in Early Modern weapons industries. All firearms bullets were cast from lead, while iron was fundamental ingredient necessary for casting small caliber guns, cannon balls, and was also used for manufacturing various tools: shovels, picks, chains, all necessary for siege warfare. That these resources were at hand was of great benefit to the Ottoman war effort since this meant that necessary equipment and armaments could be produced locally and did not need to be transported from afar.

Furthermore, the consequence of the centuries of policy of economic centralization was that the only production facility of importance that remained in Dalmatia were the shipyards in Korčula. As a result once the new war began, the Republic could not even organize local production of such simple items as carriages for guns (*letti per Artigliaria*), as it attempted to do in 1646.¹¹² On the other hand, the Ottomans could turn to local industry to provide for all base necessities: guns, personal weapons, ammunition, tools, etc. Although much smaller in size and production output than the *tophane* in Istanbul, the cannon foundries of Belgrade and Valona had production capacity far greater than the needs of this battleground required. For example, just in 1663, on the eve of a new war with the Habsburgs, no less than 230 guns were cast in Belgrade alone.¹¹³ The situation was similar in case of local iron foundries. Facilities in Banja-Luka - capable of yearly output of 29,300 cannon balls (figure from 1663) - and several other smaller ones scattered around the pashaluk were more than sufficient to provide the army of the Bosnian pasha with munition and all the iron tools it required.¹¹⁴ Finally, Banja-Luka, Sarajevo and Belgrade were major centers for the production of one of most valuable war commodities: biscuit, which practically represented the basis of the

111Gabor Agoston, *Guns for the Sultan. Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) p. 175.

112ASVe, Senato Rettori, R(egistro)-17, f. 57v., 10. Marzo 1646.

113Gabor Agoston, *Guns for the Sultan*. p. 180-182.

114Gabor Agoston, *Guns for the Sultan*. pp. 176-177.

soldiers' diet during the campaign.

As shown previously, the potential of Dalmatia for self-defense was very low. On the other hand, visible even from this rudimentary sketch, in addition to numerical superiority, the Ottoman forces were almost self sufficient in terms of food supplies, ammunition and other material prerequisites for waging war. Yet, there was an Achilles' heel in the Ottoman defensive system, one, that was, during the War of Crete, successfully exploited by the Christian power for the first time. The War of Crete was the first war in which Ottoman Christian subjects came to play a prominent role. The Venetian Republic managed to develop very intense agitation among the Ottoman Christian subjects and with varying success, at one time or another, manage to stir up rebellion among them. This was the hallmark of the events that were going to take place in the aftermaths of the failed siege of Vienna in 1683, and that were to bring the forces of Prince Eugen as far south as the town of Skoplje in Macedonia.

1.4. Cracks in the Wall: Ottoman Christian Subjects along the Ottoman-Venetian Border in Dalmatia

The territories along the Venetian-Ottoman border, roughly following the ridge of the Dinaric mountains, stretching from the Lika in north-west and extending as far south-east as the port of Ulcinj in northern Albania, can be seen in terms of three zones. The first zone consisted of the territories of the two Ottoman sandjaks Lika and Klis, north of the Venetian-Ottoman border in Dalmatia, stretching from the region of Lika in north-west, to the mountain of Biokovo above the last Venetian Dalmatian possession - port of Omiš/Almissa in the south. The coast from Omiš to the border of the Ragusan Republic, encompassing the communities of Makarska/Macarsca and Poljica/Poglizze, and lands around the mouth of the Neretva river, made the second zone. Finally the rest of the sandjak of Herzegovina and the territory of the sandjak of Skadar can be seen as the third zone. This area also represents the zone of the Venetian influence in the region, the level of which was proportional to two factors: firstly, the level of the Venetian military/political presence in its vicinity and the secondly, the proportion of Christians within the local population of a particular zone.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵Compare also: Maria Pia Pedani, "The Border from the Ottoman point of view" In Egidio Ivetić and Drago Roksandić eds. *Tolerance and Intolerance on the Triplex Confinium: approaching the "Other" on the*

Before proceeding any further, onto discussion of ethnic/religious structure of the population settled along the Ottoman-Venetian border, one methodological caveat is required. In order to avoid the danger of anachronism, and use of modern national names (Croatian, Serbian or Montenegrin) for pre-modern communities, I have adopted the view of the region as it was seen by contemporary Venetians in this study, and used their taxonomy and names for various communities settled in this region. Yet, by doing so I do not intend to neither

Borderlands Eastern Adriatic and beyond 1500-1800, (Padova: Coop. Libreria Editrice Universita di Padova, 2007) pp. 195-214; For a position of this particular borderland in the wider context of the Ottoman frontiers see: Alfred Rieber, "Triplex Confinium in Comparative Context," in Drago Roksandić and Nataša Štefanec (eds.), *Constructing Border Societies on the Triplex Confinium* (Budapest: Central European University, 2000) pp. 13-29.; Andrew C.S. Peacock, "The Ottoman Empire and Its Frontiers," In Andrew C.S. Peacock (ed.), *The Frontiers of the Ottoman World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) pp. 1-30.; For discussion concerning the classification of the frontiers and a survey of methodological/theoretical approaches see: Daniel Power, "Frontiers: Terms, Concepts, and the Historians of Medieval and Early Modern Europe," in Daniel Power and Naomi Standen (eds.), *Frontiers in Question: Eurasian Borderlands, 700-1700* (London: Macmillan Press, 1999) pp. 1-12.; Alfred J. Rieber, "The Frontier in History," In *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, vol 9 (Amsterdam, New York: Elsevier, 2001) pp. 5812-17.

advocate nor dispute possible specific ethnic characters of these communities, based on use of this terminology. The motivation for this approach was very simple; the goal has been to avoid what I hold to be anachronistic, discussing collective identities of the 17th century communities using modern national terms. This resulted in a more diverse and fragmented image of the region, depicting it as a mosaic of smaller communities and groups, each with its own legal, cultural, religious and political traditions, a view which I hold to be more suitable for 17th century reality than the uniform national perspective of the 19th and 20th ct. national historiographies.¹¹⁶

Therefore, as seen from the Venetian point of view, the population of this area was as follows. In the territories of the first zone, Muslims had a marginal majority, while the rest of the population was made of the people Venetians called *Morlacchi*, (*Morlachi*, *Murlachi* ...). As mentioned in the introduction, the *Morlacchi* or Vlachs, represent one of the most debated issue among historians of this region, far beyond the scope of this study. For the purposes of this study, suffice it to say that Venetians used the name *Morlacchi* (derived from *Morovlasi* or "black vlachs") for majority of the Ottoman rural subjects, of both Orthodox and Catholic denomination, who lived in the area along the border of Lika, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Dalmatia. For Venetians, and for the majority of contemporary Dalmatians alike, these people were simply the *nazione Morlacha*.¹¹⁷ The appearance of the Vlachs, along the Venetian-Ottoman border in Dalmatia, as well as along the Habsburg-Ottoman one in Croatia, was one of the consequences of the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans in the 15th and 16th century.

116For a good survey of the historiography on the Habsburg-Venetian-Ottoman frontier zone, covering also imperial, local and social-historical accounts, see: Wendy C. Bracewell, "The Historiography of the Triplex Confinium: Conflict and Community on the Triple Frontier, 16th-18th Centuries," In Steven Ellis and Raingard Esser (eds.), *Frontiers and the Writing of History, 1500-1850* Hannover-Laatzten: Wehrhahn Verlag, 2006) pp. 211-228.

117Some authors have attempted to circumvent this problem, by recurring to using the name "Uskoks," instead of *Morlacchi*, because of its etymological value meaning those who jumped in. However, since this name is usually associated with the Ottoman subjects who fled to Senj and entered Habsburg service there, and also does not provide any additional benefit to ongoing debate beyond the use of a more or less neutral denominator, in this text I have decided to adopt the Venetian view of this population and use the Italian version of their name, this being *Morlacchi*. In addition to the already mentioned study of Grga Novak "Morlaci (Vlasi) gledani s mletačke strane [Morlacchi (Vlachs) as Seen from the Venetian Side]," compare also: Giuseppe Gullino, "'Different' Peoples of the East Adriatic. The point of view of the Venetian patricians (18th Century)" In Egidio Ivetić and Drago Roksanđić eds. *Tolerance and Intolerance on the Triplex Confinium: approaching the "Other" on the Borderlands Eastern Adriatic and beyond 1500-1800*, (Padova: Coop. Libreria Editrice Università di Padova, 2007) pp. 153-162.

Vlachs participated as auxiliary military units in operations of the Ottoman army, and were used to colonize the depopulated areas along the newly established Ottoman border after conquest. In Dalmatia, Morlacchi settled abandoned countryside and lived either the life of nomadic shepherds, or – in case of more fertile lands as in Petrovo Polje (*Campo di Pietro*) near Drniš in the Dalmatian hinterland - lived as sedentary farmers, while towns were mainly left to Muslim inhabitants.¹¹⁸

Venetian, as well as Habsburg, influence in this zone was weak.¹¹⁹ In the first place, as we have seen, Ottoman military presence in the region was quite strong. Secondly, Morlacchi and the Venetian Republic had no common history nor shared traditions prior to war. Moreover, Venetian officials in Dalmatia generally held very low opinion of Morlacchi, considering them as trouble makers and plain robbers. Yet, as the events of the war were going to show, Venetian-Morlacchi relations had a great potential for improvement. In the period between 15-18th centuries, the legal status of the Vlachs in the Ottoman Empire underwent several changes. While during the first phases of the conquest the Vlachs enjoyed a sort of privileged position within the Empire, and were more or less treated as the military order, the stabilization of the western border of the Empire brought the change in their status, and by the 1620s, it more and more resemble that of ordinary *raya*, and their military service being turned from privilege into *kuluk*.¹²⁰ Thus, even before the war, many Morlacchi decided to

118In addition to already mentioned literature on the Vlachs see also: Snježana Buzov, "Vlaško pitanje i osmanlijski izvori, [Vlach's question and Ottoman's sources]," *Povijesni prilozi* 11 (1992): pp. 39-60.; Marko Šarić, "Inter-confessional Relations and (In)tolerance among the Vlachs (16th-17th Centuries)," In Egidio Ivetić and Drago Roksandić eds. *Tolerance and Intolerance on the Triplex Confinium: approaching the "Other" on the Borderlands Eastern Adriatic and beyond 1500-1800*, (Padova: Coop. Libraria Editrice Universita di Padova, 2007) pp. 181-195.; Mile Bogović, *Katolička Crkva i pravoslavlje u Dalmaciji za mletačke vladavine*, pp. 11-17.; For the confessional structure of the urban centers in sandjaks of Lika and Klis see: Kornelija Jurin-Starčević, "Islamsko-osmanski gradovi dalmatinskog zaleđa: prilog istraživanju urbanog razvoja u 16. i 17. stoljeću [Muslim-Ottoman towns in the Dalmatia Hinterland: Contribution to the Study of the Urban Developments in 16th and 17th centuries]," *Radovi Zavod za hrvatsku povijest* 38 (2006): pp. 149-150.

119For a good overview of two Habsburg attempts to start insurrection among the Ottoman subjects in Turkish Dalmatia see: Gunther E. Rothenberg, "Christian Insurrections in Turkish Dalmatia, 1580-1596," *Slavonic and East European Review* 40 (1961): pp. 136-147.

120Nenad Močanin, "Introductory Essay on an Understanding of the Triple-Frontier Area: Preliminary Turkologic Research" In Drago Roksandić, ed. *Microhistory of the Triplex confinium: international project conference papers* (Budapest: CEU, 1998) pp. 133-134.; For an overview of the Christians in service of the Ottoman Empire also compare: Milan Vasić, *Martolosi u jugoslovenskim zemljama pod turkskom vladavinom [Martoloses in Yugoslav Lands under the Ottoman Rule]* (Sarajevo: Akademija nauka i umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, 1967)

leave their homes and flee to the Venetian side of the border. Their requests to be accepted as subjects of the Most Serene Republic were usually met with suspicion and mistrust. Moreover, Governor-General Grimani suggested that Morlacchi should be relocated to Istria or Italy, in order to prevent any incidents with Ottomans that could come out of their presence along this frontier.¹²¹ However, when the new war between the Republic and the Ottoman Empire broke out in 1645, and the Ottoman empire begun showing signs of weakness, the idea to abandon their former lords and search for better life elsewhere found fertile soil among many of the Morlacchi.

The second zone, that spanned over the coastal area between the last Venetian strongholds in Dalmatia: Split and Omiš, and the Republic of Ragusa, consisted of two territorial units. At its western end, bordering the district of the town of Split and completely encircling the Venetian port of Omiš, the small county of Poljica was situated, while the Venetians called the rest of the area *provincia di Primorgie* (derived from the Croatian word *Primorje* literally meaning seaside/littoral region) or *provincia di Craina* (meaning frontier) and its inhabitants *popoli Primorgiani*. Venetian influence in this zone was very strong. In contrast to the first zone, the population here was predominantly Christian, moreover of Catholic denomination, and the Ottomans had but one significant stronghold in this zone, the fortress of Zadvarje, which was situated between these two communities and was the foundation of their dominance in the area. Furthermore, both of these communities were former subjects of the Republic, and although they were forced to accept Ottoman lordship in order to avoid being destroyed, their links with the rest of Venetian Dalmatia and the Republic of St. Mark were never severed.

The County of Poljica, was a small community consisting of just 12 villages called "okruzi" (*cantons*), and represented a sort of an anomaly, a semi autonomous political entity, type of which are usually found at the fringes of the empires, in remote and hardly accessible regions. In return for yearly tribute, it enjoyed a rather high level of autonomy, including self-

¹²¹*Commissioness et Relationes Venetae* 7, p. 168.

administration, own codified law system, right to choose its leader, whose title was "knez" or *conte*, and most importantly, no Muslim was allowed to live within its borders except the imperial official empowered for tax collection.¹²² The case of Primorje and its political and economic center town of Makarska was similar as well. Although the Ottomans stationed a small garrison in the town, and made it the seat of *emin*, local elites managed to preserve a high level of autonomy along the lines of the privileges enjoyed by Poljica. However, more problematic than this limited Ottoman presence was economic stagnation, caused by the separation of this micro-region from the rest of Dalmatia. This stagnation that was not resolved with the establishment of a profitable trading outpost (*scala*) for salt sales in this area in the 1570s. The reason for this is that even though the *scala*, was frequented both by Ragusan and Dalmatian salt merchants, the profit from the trade was in the hands of Ragusans and Ottoman officials supervising the work of the *scala*, rendering economic benefits of this trade out of reach of local communities.¹²³

The third zone, covering the rest of the territory of the sandjak of Hercegovina and the entire sandjak of Skadar, also represented an area of strong Venetian influence. The ratio between Muslims and Christians was in favor of the former, but, in these lands, Christians were deeply fragmented and lacked political entities with legal or historical tradition as was the case in the county of Poljice. In addition to this division along confessional lines, namely Orthodox-Catholic, Christians in this zone were also divided along ethnic lines: Slavs-Albanians. The situation was additionally complicated by the internal tribal structure of these societies, organized along clan lines, which on account of constant feuds over lands and pastures further promoted divisions among clans. Additionally, although the tribes were led by their own leaders: knez (*conte*), vojvoda (duke) etc., unlike Poljice, or Makarska, the tribes

122For more on this curious political entity, which some historians even called a "Peasants' Republic" as opposite to the aristocratic republics of Venice and Ragusa, see: Ante Laušić, *Postanak i razvitak poljičke kneževine (do kraja XV. stoljeća) [Origin and development of the Poljice County (until the end of XV ct.)]* (Split: Književni krug, 1991); also compare: Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskoga rata*, pp. 99-100; Domljan, Žarko (ed), *Omiš i Poljica [Omiš and Poljica]* (Naklada Ljevak: Zagreb, 2006)

123For an overview of the relationship between Venice and this small Adriatic community see: Lovorka Čoralić, "Politički, gospodarski, crkveni i kulturni odnosi Makarske i Mletaka od XVI. do XVIII. stoljeća [Political, economic and religious relationship of Macarsca and Venice from XVI to XVII ct.]," *Kačić: Zbornik Franjevačke provincije Presvetoga Otkupitelja 36-38*, (2004-2006): pp. str. 57-85.

did not enjoy any kind of special privileges, and lacked any form of formal codified institutions, beyond the traditional (irregular) gatherings of tribal representatives (*zbor*).

Situated at the periphery of the Empire and exposed to abuses and overtaxation of local Ottoman lords and officials, these communities felt weakening of the central state power and increase of autocracy and anarchy heavily. However, mainly settled in karstic, mountainous and inaccessible regions, the tribes of Montenegro and Hercegovina were in peacetime prone to resistance. The collection of *harac* here resembled more small scale military operations than the ordinary all-in-a-days-work job of tax collector. When in 1645 a new war begun, the tribes of Montenegro had already been refusing to pay *harac* to sandjak bey of Skadar for two years, because the previous pasha executed 15 of their compatriots during the *harac* collection in 1643.¹²⁴

Even though majority of Christian communities in this zone lacked any political links with the Venetian Republic (with the exception of the towns of Bar and Ulcinj lost to the Ottomans during the 1570-1573 war), there were strong links between the Republic of St. Mark and the local population. The town of Kotor, was the natural economic and political center of this micro-region and as such played an important role in the lives of the people in the region. Furthermore, during peace, the sandjak of Skadar and other parts of Ottoman Albania were one of traditional recruitment centers for the Venetian army. Ottoman advances in Albania and the conquest of coastal towns (Bar and Ulcinj) induced an exodus of the elites of these areas, majority of who found shelter in the territories of Venice, and continued to earn livelihood in the service of the Republic. These and many others, from the region served as professional soldiers in Venetian forces and used their relatives and connections in the lands under Ottoman rule to raise companies for the Republic's army. Families, such as Cruta, Ginni, Scurra, Orlandić and many others, practically turned military profession into family trade.¹²⁵

¹²⁴Gligor Stanojević, *Jugoslovenske zemlje*, pp. 205.

¹²⁵As a good example of these historical trends can serve the case of the Ginni family, which in the course of the 16th and 17th centuries counted as one of the most prominent families of Albanian origin in Venetian service in Dalmatia, for more see: Lovorka Čoralić, "Albanska obitelj Ginni u povijesti Dalmacije i Istre (XVI. i XVII. st.) [Albanian Family Ginni in History of Dalmatia and Istria (XVI and XVII ct.)]" *Povijesni prilozi* 33 (2007) pp. 272-287.; For the migrations from Bar and Ulcinj to the Venetian territories see: Lovorka Čoralić, "Iz prošlosti istočnoga Jadrana – tragom iseljenika iz grada Ulcinja u Mlecima [From the

In the 1640s, units called *compagnie di Albanesi* (both of cavalry and infantry), composed of ethnic Albanians but also of Slavs from the region, stationed on *Terraferma* and all over *Stato da Mar*, counted a few thousand men.¹²⁶

The years of service in the armies of *Serenissima*, and grants of stipends, pensions, titles and knighthood of the order of St. Mark to most meritorious soldiers and officers, created strong bonds between the Christians from this zone and the Republic. This network of people who tied their existence and well being to the Republic was one of the main pillars onto which Venice based its influence in this zone. What made this relationship even more successful, in the long run, was its mutual benefit. The local notables used glamor of acquired Venetian titles and offices in order to increase personal prestige and strived to secure support of the Republic in promotion of personal political aspirations among local tribes. Maybe the most prominent and well known of these in the years of the War of Crete, were Vuk Orlandić (Vuco Cernizza in Venetian sources) and his family. Orlandić, who spent his entire life in Venetian military service, managed to use his good standing with the Republic to impose himself on Montenegrin clans during their negotiation with the Republic, in 1647, achieving that clans themselves asked for Vuk Orlandić to be appointed as their leader with the title of governor (*govenratore*) of Montenegro.¹²⁷

"Liberation" of Balkan Christians from the "Ottoman yoke," and acquisitions of new lands and titles, including those of royal rank (some of which were based on historical foundations such as the kingdoms of Serbia (*Rascia*), or Bosnia, while some were pure inventions of mythical origin as the kingdoms of Albania, Macedonia or Rumelia) was a dream that enchanted many contemporaries. This chimera was at the beginning of the 17th century, equally chased by some of the major powers: Papacy, Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs, same

History of the Eastern Adriatic – Tracing the Emigrants from the Town of Ulcinj in Venice]" *Povijesni prilozi* 27 (2004) pp. 37-56.; similarly for the emigrants from Bar compare: Lovorka Čoralić, "Izbjeglištvo kao sudbina - Barani u Mlecima (XIV.-XVII. st.) [Emigration as Destiny - Barans in Venice]" *Zbornik Odsjeka za povijesne znanosti Zavoda za povijesne i društvene znanosti HAZU u Zagrebu* 23 (2005): pp. 87-185.

126For example see ethnic composition of the army on *Terraferma* in 1640s in: Sergio Perini, *Le milizie della Terraferma veneta verso la metà del Seicento*, p. 195.

127Gligor Stanojević, *Jugoslovenske zemlje*, pp. 208-9.

as second-rank players, such as Dukes of Savoy or Mantua.¹²⁸ However, nothing came out of these projects, and the Republic of Venice, in the years of the War of Crete, was the first one to manage to stir Christians under the Ottoman rule to some action. In the first years of the war, using its influence and military presence in the region, and playing on the tensions and movements just outlined in brief, the Republic engaged in an attempt to initiate a large scale rebellion among Ottoman Christian subjects.

Not all attempts achieved equal success and in time a patchwork system of communities with different types of relationships toward the Republic of St. Mark and the Ottoman Empire emerged along the Venetian-Ottoman border. While the community of Makarska eagerly deflected to the Venetian side already in 1646 and, with the acceptance of Venetian officials, practically became integrated in the province of Dalmatia, the region of Poljice, located in the hinterland, lacking a favorable strategic position on the coast that would enable easy support by Venetian forces in case of danger, even though it nominally embraced Venetian "protection" throughout the entire war, still kept its ties with the Ottomans unsevered, playing both sides and waiting for the war to end. Even more complicated was the situation in the lands of the third zone. Here, at least at a declarative level, Venetian efforts to win over the hearts of Ottoman subjects were completely successful. At one point or another, majority of clans and tribes declared their support for the Republic. However, when the moment was right for demonstration of change of allegiance through concrete military actions, results were more than limited. Due to fragmentation of Christians and lack of proper Venetian military engagement in this area, tribes which declared themselves to be on the Venetian side, in fear of Ottoman retribution, usually excused themselves from engaging openly in armed conflict. Highly aware of its military weakness in this zone, the Republic demonstrated a high level of pragmatism and tolerated such behavior, aiming to keep these people well disposed toward its

¹²⁸For more on Spanish plans and initiative in this regard see: Peter Bartl, *Der Westbalkan Zwischen Spanischer Monarchie und Osmanischem Reich: Zur Turkenkriegsproblem an der Wende vom 16. zum 17. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden : Harrassowitz, 1974); For an overview of the initiatives to start large scale rebellion of Balkan Christians, starting with tribes of Hercegovina and Montenegro, known in the South Slavic historiography as the "Great Conspiracy," see: Zdenko Zlatar, *Our Kingdom come. The Counter Reformation, the Republic of Dubrovnik, and the Liberation of the Balkan Slavs*, (Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs, 1992); compare also Gligor Stanojević, *Jugoslovenske zemlje*, pp. 117-167.

cause so that at least they do not openly join the Ottomans. The rebellion of Christians in Albania, into which Venice invested high hopes, proved to be a complete failure with nothing of lasting consequences coming out of it. On the other hand, in the first zone, where during the pre-war years, the Venetian influence was probably the weakest, the large scale armed rebellion of Morlacchi in 1647-8 bore rather unexpected fruit.

On account of available data, the province of *Primorje*, in the second zone, can be used as a very good showcase for the trends shortly outlined above and provides an insight into motives that led Christians in the area to attempt to overthrow the Ottoman rule. At the end of 1646, the notables of Makarska and *Primorje*, sent their delegation led by the Bishop to Venice with the task of presenting to the Doge with a proposal for a contract under which they were ready to accept Venetian lordship.¹²⁹ The articles of the tentative contract are indicative of the trends and aspirations of the local elites, which led this community away from the Ottoman side. Of the 24 articles composing the document presented to the Doge and the Senate in February 1647, only three were concerned with current war events, discussing the obligation of the Republic to fortify and protect the town, provide the arms and munition and similar. All other articles deal with the future position of the province and town of Makarska in the Republic, and its internal organization, namely: establishment of the commune, limits of power of the Venetian governor, right to freely summon councils, income clauses, appointments of commune officials and exemptions and privileges of the local elite. From these articles, it is clear that the notables of Makarska aimed to transform their community along the lines of other Dalmatian communities and acquire the same position and status as enjoyed by the other Dalmatian patricians for themselves. Moreover, article 20, is quite interesting, stipulating the salt trade is to be under control of the local community, and can not be given by to anyone without following strictly prescribed election procedures in the local council.¹³⁰

As can be seen, the motives for a change of sides were not only (if at all), as the

¹²⁹Gligor Stanojević, *Jugoslovenske zemlje*, pp. 206-207.

¹³⁰The contract was published in: Nikola Z. Bjelovučić, "Ugovor makarsko-primorskih knezova s mletačkom republikom god. 1646 [Contract Between notables of Makarska with the Venetian Republic from 1646]," *Starine JAZU* 32 (1907): pp. 317-322.

contemporary Venetian chronicles would like to put it, liberation from the *tiranide Ottomana*,¹³¹ but were rather more aimed at promoting the material and political interests of local elites and communities as a whole. In this regard, the case of Makarska is indicative of the trends among other Ottoman Christian subjects as well. In case of Morlacchi from the first zone, it was the slow but visible change of their status, caused by the cessation of the need for their military service that moved them away from the Ottomans. The notables of Poljica, Hercegovina and Montenegro clans were motivated by similar motives as leaders of Makarska. For all of them, the new Ottoman-Venetian war was an opportunity to, through the change of the lordship, also attain new economic, social or political privileges for themselves and their communities alike. Simply put in case of local elites, the Empire became a dead end street. Social, political and economic trends caused by the stabilization of empire's western borders, which marked the end of the age of territorial expansion, were not favorable for them. Short of abandoning the Christian faith and converting to Islam, there was almost no opportunity for personal advancement for leaders of these communities. The outbreak of the new war in 1645 served as the catalyst that accelerated these tensions up to the breaking point. This in no way implies readiness among all Christians to throw in their lot with the Venice. The risk of the Ottoman wrath and prospect of the total destruction of particular community was not one to be taken lightly. Thus the allegiance of a particular community was more than anything else determined by the current military situation in their area.

1.5. The Dalmatian Theater of Operations in a Wider Geo-Strategic Context

... the importance of preservation of this province, which can be considered the maritime suburb of Venice, is well known to common wisdom;

(Governor-General Girolamo Foscarini)¹³²

Military-economic resources of Venetian Dalmatian possessions, discussed previously, were rather insignificant when compared to, for example, the resources Venice could tap in

¹³¹For example, see the interpretation of this event in Girolamo Brusoni, *Historia Dell'Ultima Guerra Tra Venziani e Turchi* (Venezia: Presso Stefano Curti, 1673) p. 108.

¹³²... *alla sapienza publica è sufficientemente nota l'importanza dell' conservazione di questa Provintia, che dalla parte di Mare, si può chiamar li Borghi di Venetia*. ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 99. (Zara, 18. Aprile 1652.)

case of war from its *Terraferma* subjects;¹³³ however, the preservation of these two provinces represented a strategic imperative for the Republic. Since the middle ages, navigational routes through the Adriatic have not changed much, and ships traveling via the East-West course (and *vice versa*) favored the route by the Eastern Adriatic coast. This was in the first place due to currents which favored this course. Secondly, due to still predominant use of galleys as main fighting ships in the Mediterranean, which needed to regularly replenish water supplies for their crews,¹³⁴ the Dalmatian coast, with a high density of good anchorages and numerous water sources suited the navigational needs of this type of a vessel perfectly.¹³⁵ Galleys leaving from Venice for Levant would usually first make a call in some port in Istria, than proceed through the Kvarner gulf, and arrive at Zadar. From here on, the route would take them to the island of Hvar and from there either in direction of Ragusa or Kotor, or the ship would head directly for the next Venetian naval base, the island of Corfu. In case of war in the Levant, the control of these sea routes was of outmost importance for the Venetian war effort. As Jan Glete pointed out, "Warfare at sea is essentially a contest about the *maritime lines of communication*."¹³⁶ To put it simply, the loss of control or even disruption of maritime lines of communication through the Adriatic would have seriously undermined the Republic's ability to supply its armies and fleets in the Levant.

The loss of ports along the Albanian coast was just a hint of the danger hostile ports in the Adriatic could pose for Venetian shipping. Over the 16th century, Ulcinj, Herceg-
Novi/*Castelnuovo* and the island of St. Maura (*Leucas* in the Ionian Sea) developed into

133For the sake of comparison, concerning the obligations Venice could impose on its subjects on Italian *Terraferma*, in case of the War of Gradisca (1615-1617) and the War of the Mantuan succession see: Peter Januray and Michael Knapton, *The Demands on Venetian Terraferma Society For the Defence in the Early Seventeenth Century*, pp. 25-115.

134Due to the extreme physical effort to which galley rowers were exposed, especially during warm Mediterranean summers, water supply was critical for the survival of the crew. Furthermore, long and slim design of war galleys left little room for cargo storage, large part of which had to be filled with ammunition and war materials as well. Therefore, it was an absolute necessity for a galley to anchor frequently, in intervals no longer than two weeks at most, at places where water supplies could be replenished. John Guilmartin F., *Galleon and Galleys* (London: Cassell & Co, 2002) p. 120.

135Compare also: Gaetano Cozzi, "Mletačka Republika u novom vijeku – Od Rata za Chioggia do 1517. [Venetian Republic in Early Modern Period – From the War of Chioggia until 1517]" In Gherardo Orthali, Giorgio Cracco, Gaetano Cozzi e tal. eds. *Povijest Venecije [History of Venice]*, vol. 1., (Zagreb: Antibarbarus, 2007) pp. 465-6.

136Jan Glete, *Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650. Maritime Conflicts and the Transformation of Europe* (London: Routledge, 2000) p. 1.

Ottoman corsair bases and became a constant security threat for navigation in the Adriatic. Even in peacetime, in order to keep navigation safe, Venice kept a small fleet in the Gulf under the command of the governor of gulf (*Provveditore di Golfo*).¹³⁷ Moreover, to defend its dominion of the Adriatic and eradicate piracy, the Republic was ready to go as far as to risk a war with the Empire. When in 1638 a corsair fleet consisting of 16 galleys from Algeria and Tunis, retreated to Ottoman port of Vlorë/Valona after their raids in Adriatic, the Venetian fleet nevertheless attacked the corsairs and bombarded the forts.¹³⁸

Although in times of war Ottoman *fustas* operating from their bases could seriously threaten transfer of goods, troops and munition to the Levant, still, as the events from the years of the War of Crete demonstrated, they lacked the power to put a stop or seriously interrupt it. Without help from the Ottoman main navy or squadrons from the Barbary coast, these forces were insufficient to threaten the Venetian dominion of the Gulf. Furthermore, such joint naval operations were handicapped by the lack of capacity of the northern harbors (Ulcinj and Bar) to host medium or large size fleets. The port of Herceg-Novi in the bay of Kotor, was easily blockaded due to its position, as Venetian forces successfully did for almost the entire duration of the war. The two remaining major Ottoman ports and naval bases, Vlorë and Durrës were too far south to function as naval bases for the operations in the northern and middle Adriatic. Practically, the sole port capable of hosting fleets of significant size in the southern Adriatic, out of Venetian hands, was Dubrovnik/Ragusa, which although a tributary state of the Ottoman Empire, followed the policy of strict neutrality.

Events from spring of 1657 provide a good example of these strategical limitations and an insight into the place Ragusa played in Ottoman strategic planning as well, in spite of its self-proclaimed neutrality. According to the reports received in May 1657 by governor-general in Dalmatia and Albania Antonio Bernardo, from his confidants and spies, the fleet of the beys

¹³⁷For more on the office of the governor of the Gulf, organization of the Venetian sea squadrons and policing of the Adriatic in the peace time see: Alberto Tenenti, *Piracy and the Decline of Venice 1580-1615* (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd, 1967) pp. 120-121.

¹³⁸For more on this incident see: Kenneth M. Setton, *Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the seventeenth century*, pp. 108-109; Ekkehard Eickhoff, *Venezia, Vienna e i Turchi. Bufera nel Sud-Est Europe 1645-1700*, pp. 22.

of Tunis, consisting of 14 galley and 18 large ships of war, was sailing towards the Adriatic. The fleet was expected to anchor not in some Albanian port, but rather in Ragusa and use it as a base of operations for the coming campaign season and combined land and sea attacks on Split in Dalmatia and/or Kotor in Venetian Albania. Fortunately for both Adriatic Republics, an unexpected storm stranded this fleet on the coast of Sicily and thus it never made it to Ragusa, its *rendezvous* point with the army of the pasha of Bosnia.¹³⁹

Even graver consequences for the Republic's ability to wage war overseas would result from the loss of the Dalmatian coast. Gaetano Cozzi rather accurately summarized consequences of such an event, stating that without Dalmatia "*Venezia sarebbe stata soffocata nella sua laguna, e sarebbero rimasti bloccati i suoi traffici e le sue comunicazioni, e impedito l'invio di qualsi voglia soccorso a Candia, così come alle altre isole che il Turco si fosse deciso a conquistare.*"¹⁴⁰ The Venetian Senate was well aware of this worst case scenario, still, governor-generals in Dalmatia found it convenient to remind their superiors from time to time of the consequences of further neglect of the province entrusted to them, and thus strengthen their appeals for money, grain, hardtack, or reinforcements. For example, at the beginning of April 1658, when Venetian naval presence in the Adriatic declined to only four galleys with depleted crews, and after receiving alarming news of the gathering of Ottoman forces gathering both on sea (seventeen *fustas* left the St. Maura, while further seven were being fitted in Ulcinj and an unknown number of North African vessels was sailing towards the Adriatic) and on land (according to rumors, either the Sultan or the Grand Vizier were expected to personally take over the command for that campaign), Governor-General Antonio Bernardo sent a rather blunt and accurate analysis of the present dangers to the Senate:

If this bulwark is overcome (God forbid it forever), the Ottomans will have no further need for any other more secure nest than this one, from where, even with the small squadron of the Barbary coast vessels or some others, it could dominate and close the Gulf, cutting all help for the Levant, and with such siege in place compel the entire *Stato da Mare* of the Republic to fall into its possession. The Ottomans can later turn these secure ports into

¹³⁹ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 97. (Zara, 8 Maggio 1657); Still, in June, Bosnian Pasha was waiting news and confirmations concerning arrival of this fleet: ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 101. (Budua, 9. Giugno 1657)

¹⁴⁰Gaetano Cozzi, "Venezia nell' XVI e XVII. secoli" in Gaetano Cozzi, Michael Knapton and Giovanni Scarabello eds. *La Repubblica di Venezia nell'età moderna: dal 1517 alla fine della Repubblica* (Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 1992) p. 119.

bridgeheads for landings in Istria, which lay so close, or anywhere else they find it fitting to proceed with their conquests.¹⁴¹

What significantly complicated the life of governor-generals and limited their strategical options was that the Ottomans needed not conquer the entire province for this catastrophic scenario to come into being, only one town with a good fortified port would suffice. And eastern Dalmatian coast offered a wide range of good targets. In January 1658, Governor-General Antonio Bernardo having received the instruction to select and prepare 1,000 soldiers from Dalmatian garrisons for transfer to Levant, warned the Senate of possible military implications of this diminution of Venetian military presence in Dalmatia:

If, God forbid it, a single port in Dalmatia is lost, under which protection can be sheltered, not entire, nor even the part of the Ottoman navy, I would say, but just one squadron of twenty or thirty Barbary vessels - and the *Gran Signore* has already assigned one million and a half of gold coins to the Pashas of Algeria and Tunis - the Adriatic Sea will be dominated by Ottomans, and they will be able to raid all the way to the lagoons with no obstacles; if it comes to the enemy establishing its foothold on the coast in the heart of Dalmatia, in this case the entire distant bulwark [Crete], the sole existence of which depends on the Levant fleet, will be destroyed, because here the enemy will have the mode and means, not only to shelter, but to build an entire new fleet, consisting of galleys and ships of all sorts.¹⁴²

Reports by engineers and other military experts in Venetian service concerning the state of fortifications of Dalmatian towns and proposed plans for their improvements usually also dedicate some space to discussion of the strategic importance and quality of the site of a particular town. Obviously, the purpose of such discourse was to promote and strengthen arguments in favor of some fortification project, still, these can be considered as relevant strategical analyses. This especially because not all of them were favorable. For example, the report from November 1657, by Don Camilo Gonzaga, the commander of Venetian forces in

¹⁴¹Se questo antemurale si supera (che Dio non lo permetta mai), non haverà altro bisogno la forza Ottomana di più sicuro nido di questo, da serrare, e predominare il Golfo, e con puoca squadra de legni di Barberia, o altri tagliare i soccorsi per Levante, e costringer con tal forma di assedio à cader in poter suo tutto il stato da Mare della Republica, per farsi poi da questi Porti securissimi, scala certa, e franca con sbarco verso Istria tanto vicina, o dove meglio le complisse da proseguir ad' altre imprese.

ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 172. (Zara, 7. Aprile 1658)

¹⁴²Se si perde, che Dio non lo permette, una Piazza in Dalmatia, sotto il calore possa ricoverarsi, non dirò tutta, ne parte dell' Armata Turchesca, ma una sola squadra da vinti, o trenta legni Barbareschi, se ben per altrettanti di più ha il Gran Sig.re di già assignato un millio, e mezzo d'oro alli de Bassa di Algeri, e di Tunisi, devesi considerare, che resta in predominio de gli Ottomani il Mare Adriatico, et che senza ostacolo potranno scorrere sino alle lagune; si che venendo à piantar il piede alle rive del mare nel seno della Dalmatia, in questo caso sarebbe rotto l'antemurale tanto lontano, che vien presupposto consistere solamente nella sola Armata maritima esistente in Levante, poiché qui il nemico haverebbe modo, e luoco non solo di ricoverare, ma di andar fabricandone un'altra all' incontro, e di Vascelli, e di Galere, e d'ogni altra sorte de legni.

ASVe, PTM. b. 482, num. 155. (Spalato, 14. Gennaro 1657. mv.)

the province, (after successful defense of the town), concerning the position of the town of Kotor states: "Of all disastrous sites that nature has created in this world, it has never produced a more unhappy, more indiscreet, nor more disastrous than this one."¹⁴³ Gonzaga concluded that because of such a position the town was unsustainable and its defenses could not be perfected in such a manner that the town would be made impregnable.¹⁴⁴ What could be done is improve current fortifications to a more satisfying state. The cost of all necessary works was estimated by Don Gonzaga at 50-60,000 *Reali*, an amount for which "an entire new town at a more advantageous site can be built."¹⁴⁵

On the other hand, almost every report discussing the position of some Dalmatian town points out the same set of benefits: quality of the site, proximity to a good source of water, existence of nearby woods, necessary for both construction works and the shipyard, and in some cases availability of rivers (a bonus for the transfer of goods). Finally, the most important item these reports stress too is the quality of their bays/harbors which are capable of hosting large fleets.¹⁴⁶ Even though all Dalmatian towns were in possession of ports of sound capacity, the town that most concerned the Venetian government was Šibenik. In case of its loss, the province would be cut in two parts and in addition to all benefits listed above, its bay protected by the fort of St. Nicolò could provide excellent shelter for the Ottoman fleet. In case of such an outcome, in addition to wider strategical implications, Venetian forces were in

143Tra gli siti più disastrosi che ha creata la natura in questo mondo, niun credo che già mai habbi prodotto il più infelice il più indiscreto, ne il più disastroso di questo, ...; ASVe, PTM. b. 482. num. 137. (Cattaro, 4. Novembre 1657) attachment: *Relatione del S.re D. Camillo Gonzaga*

144For the 16th and 17th century (pre Vauban age) fascination with the myth of the impregnable fortress see: David Parrot, *The Utility of Fortifications in Early Modern Europe*, pp. 127-153.

145ASVe, PTM. b. 482. num. 137. (Cattaro, 4. Novembre 1657) attachment: *Relatione del S.re D. Camillo Gonzaga*

146Such is for example the report on the town of Trogir, by two chief engineers: Alessandro Magli and Vincenzo Benaglia, from spring of 1651, when they inspected the state of fortifications of all Dalmatian towns, Il sito della città di Trau è considerabile in se stesso, et rispetto alla sicurezza(?) della navigazione del Golfo. In se stesso per la Campagna vicina abbondante d'acqua, porto sotto la Citta capace di mediocre armata, Porto nel Isola Bua vicina, et capacissimo d'ogni grand armata.

Alla sicurezza della navigazione del Golfo

Ha il più commodo e capace porto, che sia in tutto il tratto di Terra Ferma da Narenta sino a Sebenico.

Ha il mare vicino aperto, et per ciò del Porto di Trau possono facilmente esser scoperti, et infestati quelli che navigare in Golfo.

Ha tanti seni e Porti vicine, che riesce commoda, e l'uscita, e l'entrata con diversi venti.

Ha due Bocche larghe distante una dall' altra miglia dodeci, formate nell' Isola Bua, perciò di fecilm.[en]te si può esser impedita l'uscita, e l'entrata.

ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. (17. Spalato, 10. Aprile 1651.) attachment to the letter

danger of losing their main tactical advantage in this theater of operations. That is, the ability to quickly deploy their forces at most threatened spot, using sea transport. Thus, it is not surprising that in the first years of the war, Šibenik figured as the main Ottoman target, and was the object of two attacks (in 1647 and 1648). Governor-generals, from the beginning until the end of the war, never failed to remind the Senate about the strategical importance and the danger the loss of this town would pose.¹⁴⁷

Thus, the strategic problem the Republic faced in the Adriatic was quite contrary to the one Ottomans had to cope with. What troubled the Venetian high command was not lack of good ports-cities but rather the fact that there was so many of them. Capture of any Dalmatian town by the Ottomans, and establishment of a major naval base in the middle of the Adriatic would pose a serious danger for the Republic's control of maritime lines of communication, and consequently for its overall war effort. Whether Ottomans could, or could not, successfully challenge Venetian control of the Adriatic, in the end, is actually not that relevant, since any increase in Ottoman naval presence in the Adriatic would need to be proportionally matched by the Republic. And, every additional Venetian galley in the Adriatic, protecting transport of badly needed supplies: food, munition or reinforcements, to the Levant meant one less galley in the Levant, blockading the Ottoman fleet and preventing pouring of supplies and war materials to the Ottoman army on Crete. Needless to say, once the Ottomans secured their maritime lines of communication, and warfare in Crete was reduced to a competition of "who

147An exemplary model of such discourse can be seen in the letter from 1656, written by Governor-General Antonio Bernardo at the beginning of his service in Dalmatia, who named Šibenik the "center and the soul of this Province," and wrote: *Mi chiamano pero le altre Piazze, che devo riveder à non inferiori assistenze, spetialmente quella di Sebenico, centro et anima della Provincia, la cui conservatione è stimata del pari alla salvezza di tutto il stato sino à cotesti Lidi, in riguardo, che ha Porto di capir, et tener salva ogni gran Armata, che può far forza humana, Boschi, bittume, edificij di acque, terre vicinissimi da fabricar Navi, et ogni altra sorte de Legni, con Molini à Scardona per macinar grani in che quantità si vuole, ritenendo la Città, et sue fortezze dentro un seno lontano da ogni pericolo di offesa di forze da Mare, assicurato unicamente da un strett[issi]mo Canale, che rifferisce alla fortezza di S. Nicolò, ...;* ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 63. (Trau, 19. Novembre 1656.);

Almost identical in content, but more elaborate in description of the strategical importance of Šibenik can also be found in the treaty concerning the state of the fortifications of Dalmatian towns from around 1660, compiled by Onofrio del Campo, engineer who spent almost five years in Dalmatia and worked under the command of Governor-General Bernardo. Miroslav Bertoša ed., *Tvrđavni spisi Onofrija del Campa. Traktati i memorabilije jednog kondotjera u Dalmaciji u doba Kandijskog rata. [Fortification files of Onofrio del Campo. Treaties and memorabilia of the condotiere in Dalmatia in the time of War for Crete]*, (Rijeka: Državni arhiv u Rijeci, 2003) pp. 137-138.

had more resources," the advantage definitely shifted to the Ottoman side. As in fact the actual war events did demonstrate once the Venetian fleet lifted the blockade of the Dardanelles, from Ottoman point of view the war became "a drawn-out and costly but controllable affair."¹⁴⁸

These were the challenges the Venetian high command was facing in the Adriatic theater of operations. If the Republic was to have any chance at all to defend its *Stato di Mar*, it was here on this long thin limes of great strategical importance that Ottomans had to be stopped.

2. The Republic at War: Military Operations in Dalmatia (1645-1669)

On the 28th of September 1644, Maltese privateers captured an Ottoman convoy, full of riches and notables. When subsequently the Maltese galleys dropped their anchors at Kalismene, at the southern shore of Crete, replenishing their supplies of water there, no one could predict that this incident would put in motion a chain of events which would ultimately lead to the Ottoman invasion of the Venetian island of Crete, and the beginning of the long lasting Cretan War. From October 1644 till June 1645, the Venetian *bailo* strived with all means to deny the Republic's involvement in this affair and to avert the rage of the Porte. For several months peace held in balance. Yet, the situation was quickly deteriorating, and the relationship between the Republic and the Ottomans in spite of all *bailo's* efforts, were becoming more and more strained.¹⁴⁹ Finally, when on the 24th June 1645 the great Ottoman armada, which on the 30th April set sail from Dardanelles allegedly heading for Malta, landed on Crete, it was a clear sign to the Venetian government that diplomacy had failed and that the new war with the Ottoman Empire started.

Meanwhile, gradual increase of tensions between the two states was also reflected in the developments in Dalmatia. In January 1645 an order was sent to the Pasha of Bosnia and the sandjak bey of Klis, forbidding commerce and sale of war materials and food to all Christians, be they friends or enemies. When in spite of this ban Ottoman caravans carrying goods

¹⁴⁸Christoph K. Neumann. "Political and diplomatic developments," in SuraiyaN. Faroqhi ed. *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. 3. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) p.50.

¹⁴⁹For detailed overview of the diplomatic developments in Constantinople that preceded the opening of hostilities see: Kenneth M. Setton, *Venice, Austria and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century*, pp. 110-125.

continued to arrive to Split, in April 1645, the order was repeated, this time finally cutting off Dalmatia from this vital food source.¹⁵⁰ Additionally, commotion among frontier Ottoman lords, movements of troops along the border in Dalmatia and Ottoman "police" operations in Montenegro against tribes of *Cuzzi* and *Clementi*, did not go unnoticed by Venetian officials. However, what remained unclear was whether these were merely the initiatives and provocations by local notables, or actions commanded by the central government.¹⁵¹ Thus, when the news of Ottomans landing on Crete reached Dalmatia, at the beginning of July 1645, local administration had already been in the state of increased readiness for some time.

2.1. Opening of the Hostilities and the Transformation of the Dalmatian Society (1645-1646)

Although the Republic, probably striving to avoid any action that could be interpreted by Ottomans as provocation, did not dispatch any reinforcements to Dalmatia before the formal opening of hostilities, all such considerations became superfluous from July onwards. From August 1645, the Venetian government begun pouring reinforcements into Dalmatia. On 18th of August, the first contingent of troops that was drawn from *Terraferma* garrisons, under the command of Baron Christoph von Degenfeld,¹⁵² appointed as the military commander of all Venetian forces in the province, arrived to Zadar. Additionally, in order to better meet challenges of armed conflict, the Republic also expanded its administration in Dalmatia to its wartime size. Two extraordinary governors (*Proveditori Estraordinari in Provintia*), Lunardo Foscolo and Nicolò Dolfin, were sent as aids to Governor-General Vendramin, and four more extraordinary governors were put in charge of strategical key points in Dalmatia, one for each of the following: the fortress of Novigrad, the towns of Šibenik and Kotor, and one joint for the towns of Trogir and Split.¹⁵³ Yet, luckily for the Venetian side, "marching orders" from

¹⁵⁰Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 103-104.

¹⁵¹Sassi I, pp. 218-220.

¹⁵² For more concerning Christof Martin von Degenfeld, one of most well known military professionals in the Venetian service and his descendants see: Thürheim, Andreas. *Christoph Martin Freiherr von Degenfeld. General der Venezianer, General-Gouverner von Dlmazien und Albanien und dessen Söhne (1600-1733)*, (Wien: Wilhelm Braumuller, 1881.); Lovorka Čoralić, "Njemački vojskovođa Chritoph Martin Degenfeld u Kandijskom ratu u Dalmaciji [German Military Commander Christoph Martin Degenfeld in the War for Crete]," *Godišnjak Njemačke narodnosne zajednice Zagreb* (1996): pp. 10-17.

¹⁵³ Andreas Thürheim, *Christoph Martin Freiherr von Degenfeld. General der Venezianer, General-Gouverner von Dlmazien und Albanien und dessen Söhne (1600-1733)*, (Wien: Wilhelm Braumuller, 1881) p.18-19.; Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 65-66.

Istanbul arrived rather late in the season. The Bosnian pasha made it to Livno, a place appointed as the muster point for Bosnian *sipahis*, no sooner than the beginning of September 1645. Thus, the Venetian side was given ample time to build up its military presence. By the time the Ottoman army assembled in full, the season already came to its end and, at the beginning of November, the pasha disbanded his forces, returning to Banjaluka, only to be relieved of his office at the end of the year. With the exception of a small skirmish in the vicinity of Split in September, and a small Ottoman incursion in the Zadar district in December, the year of 1645 went by without any serious military action on either side. It was the year of "guerra senza guerra," as the extraordinary governor Nicolò Dolfin called it.¹⁵⁴

During the next year, 1646, both sides entered conflict with more vigor and determination. In January 1646, Venetian forces in Dalmatia already counted 4,762 foot and 589 horse (garrisons in Kotor not included) and constant flow of reinforcements by August 1646 brought these to the strength of 9,000 foot and 600 horse (out of which 930 men were stationed in Venetian Albania). In addition to these land forces, the governor-general had at his disposal a small naval force, consisting of more than 30 armed vessels (so called *barche armate*), each carrying a company of marine infantry, 50 men strong, and seven war galleys. All in all, forces at disposal of the governor-general in Dalmatia and Albania came to count more than 12,000 men.¹⁵⁵ Furthermore, the Venetian Senate constantly dispatched various military experts: artillery specialists, masters for explosives and bombs (*maestri di fuochi artificiali* and *bombisti*) and veteran captains without companies, to serve under the governor-general, thus significantly increasing not merely the size of the force in Dalmatia but also its quality and combat strength.¹⁵⁶ Yet, probably the most significant contribution for the Venetian war effort, in the long run, was the change of leadership. In December 1645, after two years of service, Governor-General Andrea Vendramin was allowed to return to Venice and was succeeded by a more energetic Lunardo Foscolo, at the time the extraordinary governor in Dalmatia.

¹⁵⁴Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 105-106; Sassi I., pp. 225, 229.

¹⁵⁵Sassi I., pp. 230, 239-240, 243-244.

¹⁵⁶For example, just between 18th May and 13th July 1646, the Senate ordered 35 military experts (three engineers, five veteran captains and 27 experts for explosives and artillery) to report without delay for duty to the governor-general in Dalmatia. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, f. 117v, 128r, 132v, 140v, 148v-151v, 185r-v.

Even before the official opening of hostilities in June 1645, works had begun to improve combat readiness of the fortifications of Dalmatian towns. Because of their sorry state due to the years of neglect and lack of funds, works progressed at very slow pace. Furthermore, to great discontent of Dalmatians, the works were originally limited to the fortifications of Zadar and Kotor. Yet, as time went on the works were gradually extended to all other Dalmatian towns, and by summer 1646, all Dalmatia resembled one big construction yard. This change in the policy was as a consequence of a combination of pressure from representatives of the communities of Split, Šibenik and Trogir put on Venetian government, and their demonstrated eagerness to participate, both in terms of free labor and own financial means, in reinforcing existing and constructing new fortifications. In Trogir, townspeople of their own initiative, begun works on *barbican* and the construction of artillery platforms along city walls. Similarly, in Split and Šibenik, new earthen ramparts were constructed and ditches cleared and expanded. In order to assert control and increase the quality of these "public works," the Republic dispatched engineers to supervise them, Antonio Leni to Šibenik and Alessandro Magli to Split and Trogir, and in some cases even decided to provide financial support.¹⁵⁷ The most intensive works went on in Šibenik, where - almost in open confrontation with Republic's officials in Dalmatia - citizens managed to obtain permission to build the new fortress of St. John on the nearby hill of the same name, supported by the engineer Antonio Leni.¹⁵⁸

These works on fortifications were accompanied by a radical change of landscape of districts of Dalmatian towns. In order to deny any kind of shelter or cover to attacking Ottoman forces, the areas in immediate vicinity of town walls were cleared and all solid

¹⁵⁷Pavao Andreis, *Povijest grada trogira [History of City of Trogir]* (Split: Splitski književni krug, 1977) pp. 261-263.; Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 85-87.; In March 1646, the Senate granted 3,000 ducats to the community of Šibenik for works on the fortifications, also giving permission that 900 ducats be spent for this purpose as well, which represented the annual communal income allocated to *fontico*. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, f. 61v.

¹⁵⁸The negotiations concerning the fortification of the hill of St. John, overlooking town, went on for almost an entire year, and when finally, on the eve of Ottoman approach, permission was granted, the fortress was constructed in two months only. Pavao Andreis, *Povijest grada trogira*, pp. 261-263.; Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 85-86; Jelka Perić, "Šibenik u mletačko-turskim ratovima [Šibenik in Venetian-Turkish wars]" *Magazin Sjeverne Dalmacije* 2 (1935): pp. 84-85.

buildings torn down. In Šibenik, an entire town suburb was destroyed and inhabitants moved to nearby islands. In Trogir and Zadar, nearby gardens and olive yards were cleared out, and the stone bridge that connected town with the mainland in Trogir was destroyed. Even the church bells in this town were removed from churches in countryside and transferred to town walls, to be used for sounding alarms.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, entire settlements judged incapable of withstanding an Ottoman attack were abandoned, the most notable being the town of Nin in the vicinity of Zadar, which was demolished and its population transferred to the nearby island of Pag by orders of Governor-General Vendramin, already in 1645. Vendramin's successor, Lunardo Foscolo continued to follow this policy and, at the opening of a new campaign season in 1646 ordered the destruction of an entire range of villages in the hinterland of Zadar: Grusi, Ljubač, Ražanac, Nerežane, Bokanjac, Turanj, Sveti Filip i Jakov and Pakoštane were all burned and their population evacuated to islands.¹⁶⁰

Simultaneously, the Dalmatian society was quickly going through the process of the transition from the state of peace to a state of war. Rapid growth of town garrisons may have greatly increased the security of the towns from Ottoman attacks, but in no way was the presence of dozens of hundreds of mercenaries beneficial to security of the persons and properties of town inhabitants. Consequently, decrees were being published in all towns, aiming to increase army discipline and regulate everyday life under new conditions.¹⁶¹ Furthermore, in order to compensate for lack of professional troops, the Republic called upon its Dalmatian subjects to participate in its defense. For example, one of the first measures introduced in Zadar as early as April 1645, was the mandatory night watch composed of 12 citizens.¹⁶² Soon, this measure was greatly expanded. In almost every Dalmatian town, district militia commanders were elected and, in order to secure early warnings of incoming Ottoman raids, a system of outer guard outposts was established.¹⁶³ Moreover, to further motivate

¹⁵⁹ Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, p. 66. Pavao Andreis, *Povijest grada Trogira*, pp. 263, 267-268.; Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 107.

¹⁶⁰ Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 66, 76.

¹⁶¹ Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 107.

¹⁶² Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 104.

¹⁶³ For example, for the introduction of these measures in Trogir, see: Pavao Andreis, *Povijest grada Trogira*, pp. 263-264.;

villagers for military duty, the Senate allowed Governor-General Foscolo in June 1646 to grant half-pay and a portion of hardtack to all those serving in territorial militia units of the Zadar district.¹⁶⁴

2.2. The First Ottoman Offensive: Loss of Novigrad and the Attack on Šibenik (1646)

The Ottoman side was equally active as well. From March 1646 onwards alarming news of massive Ottoman preparations begun reaching Governor-General Foscolo. Throughout the pashaluk of Bosnia, food was being gathered and great quantities were stored in Banjaluka, Sarajevo, Jajce and Knin; muster lists were updated and gunpowder was being transported toward Dalmatia from Banjaluka, followed by 8 large guns sent from Belgrade. The new Bosnian pasha, Ibrahim, did not waste time like his predecessor. That year, already at the beginning of May, the pasha was at Livno, the main mobilization center for the Bosnian army,¹⁶⁵ rather strictly following the Ottoman war calendar which marks the day of St. George as the beginning of a new campaign season.¹⁶⁶ In June, 20,000 men strong Ottoman army, carrying 8 guns, crossed the Dinaric mountains and arrived at Knin. Because of its central position, Knin represented an ideal base of operations, since the Ottoman army positioned there represented a threat for all Venetian strongholds along the coast. Furthermore, the discord between the Bosnian pasha and frontier beys that almost paralyzed Ottoman operations the previous year was now gone, and the new pasha enjoyed full support of local notables. Thus, after a short break the Ottoman army was again on the move heading for the Venetian fortress of Novigrad which was designated as the main objective of that season. After two weeks of maneuvering, the Ottoman army cut off the fortress, preventing arrival of any help except by sea, and on 8th of July 1646, after only a few days of combat, the fortress garrison surrendered to the overwhelming Ottoman force. In a short while, and almost without any losses Ottomans won their first victory in Dalmatia during this war.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁴Senate decrees of 1st and 21st June 1646: ASVe, Senato, Rettori, R-17, f. 133v, 147v.

¹⁶⁵Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 107.

¹⁶⁶Roads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, pp. 20-21.

¹⁶⁷Sassi I., pp. 231-234.; Compare also: Franjo Difnik, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 82-85.; Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 107-108.

Such unity and concord in execution of military operations, was not characteristic of the Venetian high command, which, at the time, was plagued by indecisiveness and disunity, so characteristic of collective decision making in military affairs. That the fortress of Novigrad was one of the probable targets of Ottoman attack had been well known to the Venetian side for a long time. For almost a year, the Venetian command was unable to reach a decision on how to proceed: should the fortress be destroyed and abandoned or not, and in case of the latter what resources should be committed to its defense? In April 1646 the Senate ordered Governor-General Foscolo to assemble the war council (*consulta*) and discuss the issue of Novigrad.¹⁶⁸ The *consulta*, unwilling to take responsibility for this delicate decision, in return, asked the Senate for precise instructions and its dispositions concerning this issue, only to be answered back that the decision should be made by those who are on the spot and have a better overview of the situation.¹⁶⁹ While this tossing of responsibility back and forth between the Senate and the provincial administration in Dalmatia was going on, the Ottoman army was steadily marching onto Novigrad. The question of the defense of Novigrad divided the Venetian military command in Dalmatia as well. The commanders in charge of the fortress argued the post is indefensible and should be abandoned on account of its weakness, while majority of *consulta* members were not ready to commit themselves to this radical step which could have dire effect on Venetian morale. Neither was *consulta* ready to authorize a large scale fortification project (at great expense), so that Novigrad could stand a chance against a formal Ottoman attack. Instead, a compromise solution was chosen and the fortress was merely provisionally reinforced, under the supervision of engineer Vincenzo Benaglia.¹⁷⁰

The culmination was reached in the middle of June, when an Ottoman advance and Venetian inactivity resulted in an open rupture within the Venetian command in Dalmatia. Alarmed by an Ottoman approach, the governor of Novigrad, Tagliapietra, personally came to Zadar in order to advocate his plea for evacuation of the fortress in *consulta*. Yet, the emergency *consulta* not only rejected his arguments, but also ordered Tagliapietra arrested

¹⁶⁸ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17, f. 89v, A di 19. Aprile 1646.

¹⁶⁹Sassi I., pp. 235-236.

¹⁷⁰Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 78-82.

because he abandoned the post.¹⁷¹ However, these actions of *consulta* had another consequence too. Baron Degenfeld, professional soldier hired by the Senate as the chief military commander of the Venetian forces in Dalmatia (*governator generale dell' armi*), was for quite a long time one of main proponents arguing for a more active defense strategy. In front of just mentioned *consulta*, Degenfeld argued that in case the pasha arrives at Novigrad with 20,000-25,000 men and sufficient artillery, the post should be evacuated, thus preserving prestige, men and equipment. On the other hand, if the pasha came leading only 12,000-15,000 men, Degenfeld advocated the formation of a force, totalling 3,000-4,000 men, which should take fortified a position near the Ottoman encampment and challenge the enemy's control of the countryside. The decision of *consulta*, not to accept any of his proposals but opt for a policy of passivity instead, and simply dispatch a few companies as reinforcements to Novigrad, (which subsequently failed to arrive in time), pushed Baron Degenfeld, who was already for a long time dissatisfied with war conduct in Dalmatia, to finally ask the Senate to be relieved of his duty in Dalmatia and be sent to Italy, Crete, or anywhere else the Senate found fitting.¹⁷²

However, the shock caused by the loss of Novigrad had a positive effect on the Venetian side and functioned as the trigger that stirred it from inactivity and slumber. In order to prevent Ottomans to use newly acquired control of the Novigrad channel and cross to the islands of Pag, Rab or Cres, Governor-General Foscolo promptly dispatched a naval squadron of three galleys and 10 *barche armate*, to block the straits. For more than a month, this force harassed the Ottoman army camped around Novigrad and made futile any Ottoman attempt to

171 After the capture of the fortress by the Ottomans, Taglipietra was sent to Venice for a trial, but was freed of all charges after almost a year spent in prison. Sassi I., p. 236.

172 ... Ma vedendo con grandissima mia mortificatione che le cose militari in questa provintia (scusa derogare alla prudenza di questi Ill.mi Sig.ri che la governano) non si praticanno secondo la regola di guerra et che continuando così non vi è speranza di buona riuscita gli miei fedelissimi raccordi essendo havuti in poca consideratione mi trova tanto lontano delle pretensioni sudette che suffliro humill.te V. Ser.ta se così prive alla Publica Prudenza di mandare qualche altro soggetto per commandar le armi in questa Provintia o concedermi al meno qualche commando per il quale io potesse render conto.

Perché praticandosi le cose in contrario di qual che si fa in altre guerre metterci la mia ripputatione nelle paesi ove ho altre volte ne servito in troppo gravi rischio.

ASVe, *Capi di Guerra*, b(usta) 1. Letter of Baron Degenfeld to the Senate from 4. July 1646 and attachment to the letter, a summary of his positions concerning the defense of Novigrad. After the news of the fall of Novigrad reached Zadar, baron Degenfeld immediately repeated his plea to be relieved of command: ASVe, *Capi di Guerra*, b. 1., Letter from 11th of July.

construct boats and floating platforms.¹⁷³ Meanwhile, when the news of the fall of Novigrad reached Venice, the Senate, startled by this Ottoman success, promptly approved new reinforcements for Dalmatia, ordering the dispatch of 2,000 infantry and four companies of heavy cavalry (*corazze*) already ready in *Terraferma*.¹⁷⁴

Besides, it seemed as if, after this initial success the roles became reversed, and indecision and bad judgment begun to plague the Ottoman command. In the middle of August, after one month spent uselessly at Novigrad, and under constant attacks by the Venetian navy, demoralized by lack of food, water and outbreak of dysentery, the Ottoman army finally broke camp and begun their retreat toward the base at Knin, leaving the 600 men strong garrison to guard the newly captured fortress.¹⁷⁵ Yet, the pasha was not ready to finish this campaign so soon, without a major victory. Since the arrival of massive Venetian reinforcements rendered any attempt of attack on Zadar futile, the pasha decided to try his luck with Šibenik instead, the loss of which would cut Venetian territories in half. However, instead of heading directly toward this target, the Ottoman army lost precious time, almost two months, attacking smaller settlements in the area between Zadar and Šibenik. When finally on 11th of October, the pasha arrived to Šibenik with c.a 10,000 combatants, Venetians had more than enough time to prepare the town for defense by pouring in reinforcements and finishing the new fort of St. John on the hill of the same name. After a few days of futile assaults, the pasha realized that nothing further could be achieved and retreated toward Drniš.¹⁷⁶ The two months the Ottoman army lost maneuvering from Novigrad to Šibenik, Governor-General Foscolo used not only to concentrate the bulk of his forces in Šibenik,¹⁷⁷ but also to regain the strategic initiative, and shifted his forces from passive defense to offensive. In addition to the main force under his

¹⁷³Sassi I., pp. 240-241.

¹⁷⁴On 11th of July, the Senate ordered transport of 1,000 foot and four companies of *corazze*, followed by another decree, from 19th of July, which ordered the dispatch of additional 1,000 men to Dalmatia. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17. f. 164v-165v, 173r.; ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, f. 183r.

¹⁷⁵Sassi I., pp. 242, 245.

¹⁷⁶Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 108.; Sassi I., pp. 245-247.

¹⁷⁷On 18th of August, Foscolo left Zadar leading a force of three galleys and dozens of armed vessels, boarded with good body of infantry, with the aim to follow the movement of the Ottoman army on land by sea. As the vanguard of this main force Foscolo also dispatched 1,000 foot under the command of baron Degenfeld directly to Šibenik. Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, p. 88.

command, one that closely monitored pasha's movements, Foscolo also formed another task force of two galleys and 16 smaller vessels, based in the waters of Split and Trogir, under the command of the Extraordinary-Governor Paolo Caotorta.

As was previously mentioned (see chapter 1.2.4), the community of Makarska, even before the war, had been favorably inclined toward the Republic of St. Mark. After the outbreak of hostilities, representatives of Makarska went even one step further, and begun negotiating the subjugation of their community to the Republic. On the 1st of May, the Venetian Senate, issued an order to Republic's representatives in Dalmatia and Levant to attempt to stir Ottoman subjects well disposed toward the Republic to "*sottrarsi dalla tiranide, e barbarie del governo Turchecso,*" and capture some Ottoman fortress using such means.¹⁷⁸ In accordance with this general order, Foscolo charged Caotorta to conclude the negotiations with representatives of Makarska, and capture the Ottoman fort of Zadvarje which they put forth as the condition for their acceptance of the Venetian rule. At the end of August, in a swift surprise attack, Venetian forces captured Zadvarje, and a few days later Caotorta ceremoniously entered the town of Makarska on a war galley, officially accepting the community under the protection of the Republic.¹⁷⁹ Although the Venetian forces could not defend Zadvarje, which was soon lost to Ottoman counter attack, and a subsequent Venetian attack on Skradin near Šibenik on 19th September failed, the conquest of Makarska made a strong impression on other Ottoman Christian subjects.

The departure of the Bosnian pasha for Bosnia, in late November, finally marked the end of military operations during this campaign. Although spent without any major encounter, this year was of great significance for the Venetian war effort in this battlefield, not so much because of what happened but more because of what did not. In the first place, the Venetian side managed to deny Ottomans any major victory, this at the time when they were more prepared for conducting military operations than the Republic and enjoyed clear superiority in all aspects. At the same time, the Republic also managed to accomplish several important

178ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17, f. 102v-103r.

179Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 92-95.

goals: significantly increase the strength of fortifications of Dalmatian towns, (especially those of Šibenik and Trogir), build up its military presence in the region as well on land as on sea, and finally to win over the first of the Christian communities under Ottoman rule for its cause. Furthermore, during this season, Venetian forces demonstrated the potential of their greater mobility granted by the control of maritime lines of communications for the first time. From August on, Governor-General Lunardo Foscolo, skilfully utilizing tactical advantage the sea transport offered, managed to keep numerically superior Ottoman forces in check.

Already this first real campaign in Dalmatia contained all elements characteristic of military operations in this battlefield: Ottoman winter preparations for the upcoming campaign, assembling of the Ottoman army in Livno in late spring, crossing to Dalmatia at the beginning of summer, march toward its designated target on the coast; followed by Venetian counter actions: strengthening of the endangered place and small diversionary attacks intended to protract Ottoman forces. That this was the script Ottomans were to follow next year was quite clear to the Venetian command in Dalmatia. From January 1647 on, Venetian spies and informers begun reporting of massive Ottoman preparations and indicated Šibenik, as the main Ottoman target for the upcoming season.¹⁸⁰ However, the Venetian command was not ready to play along this script and simply wait for Ottoman attack, it had a plan of its own.

2.3. The First Venetian Offensive and the Morlacchi Rebellion (Winter-Spring 1647)

As was mentioned previously during 1646, the Republic significantly increased its forces in Dalmatia. Governor-General Foscolo intended for quite some time to put this force to some active use. So, when the weather became less harsh, in February 1647, but mountain passes between Dalmatia and Bosnia were still closed by snow, Venetian forces in Dalmatia went on the offensive. The goals set for this offensive were limited. The Venetian command aimed to utilize temporary numerical superiority in the region and inability of Ottomans to bring reinforcements from Bosnia, in order to attack and destroy some Ottoman base before the

¹⁸⁰Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 109.

beginning of the new campaign. Yet, Governor-General Foscolo did not share the same view as his superiors concerning the choice of a target for this attack.

The Senate, which favored caution and advised preservation of military forces,¹⁸¹ designated Skradin and Novigrad - the locations suitable for building *fustas* (small galleys) - as top priority targets. On the other hand, Governor-General Foscolo favored the destruction of Ottoman strongholds in the vicinity of Zadar, which would deny to Ottomans their use as logistic bases during the upcoming campaign.¹⁸² Moreover, the first attacks against Ottoman targets in the Zadar hinterland, conducted with smaller combat groups did not yield satisfactory results, and convinced Governor-General Foscolo that limited commitment, favored by the Senate, could achieve nothing.¹⁸³ According to Venetian estimates, Hallil-bey sandjak of Lika, from his seat in Zemunik, the closest and the most fortified Ottoman stronghold in the vicinity of Zadar, was quickly able to assemble up to 6,000 combatants, a force sufficient to effectively thwart any small scale Venetian attack. This convinced Governor-General Foscolo that the primary goal of Venetian forces should be neutralization of Zemunik and the sandjak bey of Lika. During the subsequent war council, convoked in order to discuss prospective Venetian operations, Foscolo used all his authority to cast aside all objections of his subordinates, and justifying his actions to the Senate as the prerequisites for desired recuperation of Novigrad, ordered rather ambitious and risky operation to capture Zemunik.¹⁸⁴

For this attack Foscolo concentrated majority of the Venetian forces in Zadar, leaving the rest of the province with only bare bone garrisons, and on 14th March dispatched 3,000 foot

181For example, see the letter to Governor-General Foscolo on 6th of February 1647. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17. f. 339v-340r, 6. *Febraro 1646. m.v.*

182ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17. f. 287v-288r, *Adi 8. Dicembre 1646.*

183In January and February, Venetian forces attempted to attack the Ottoman strongholds of Poljicane and Suhovare in the vicinity of Zadar, but with rather limited success. Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 110-112.

184... *con tentare la demolitione di quel luoco, nel quale risedendo il Sanzacco, come posto di maggiore importanza, sperar si poteva, che perduto il capo, li altri luochi pure, cader potessero, et particolarmente Novegradi, alla ricupera del quale sendono le mie mosse, impossibile stimando mentre il Sanzacco, in posto di stima et autorità, libero si ritrovasse pronto all'union della gente et ad accorrer con vevoli aiuti al luoco del bisogno, conseguir alcun bene.*

ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 219. (Zara, 18. Marzo 1647); Also, for the opposition of Venetian military commanders in Dalmatia to this plan see: Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 113-114.

and 600 horse under the command of Governor-General of Cavalry (*provveditore generale della Cavalleria*) Marc' Antonio Pisani, with orders to capture Zemunik. Parallel to this main attack, Foscolo also launched two other, smaller diversionary operations: the first, against the fortress of Novigrad in the north, and the second against the town of Skradin to the south-east, with goal of tying down local Ottoman forces and preventing them from coming to aid of the sandjak bey at Zemunik. The governor-general's gambit paid off, and after several days of intense fighting, the Venetian forces captured the fortress of Zemunik, along with several hundred prisoners, including also Hallil-bey himself. Seizing the momentum, Foscolo ordered the majority of the forces at Zemunik to proceed toward Novigrad where he personally arrived on 28th March, at the head of a naval squadron consisting of three galleys and numerous *barche armate* bringing fresh provisions to troops. A few days later, on 31th March, after intense artillery bombardment, faced with superior Venetian forces and without prospect of relief, the Ottoman garrison surrendered. Moreover, the capture of Zemunik and the sandjak bey, also achieved the secondary effect Foscolo was hoping for: panic struck the Ottoman side, allowing Venetian forces to capture several nearby castles (Lukovari/Luccovari, Islam and Polišane/Polissani) without any resistance, containing large quantities of food, fodder and ammunition, stockpiled here for the next campaign. The only setback that darkened this success was a failure of the force sent to attack Skradin, which, after initial progress, encountered stiff resistance and was in the end routed, suffering heavy casualties of almost 200 men.¹⁸⁵

It seemed as if the scope of success surprised even Governor-General Foscolo, who wrote to the Senate that: "the miraculous doings of the Lord, it might be said, have turned one pigmy into a giant."¹⁸⁶ In no more than 15 days, the strategic situation in the region changed

¹⁸⁵Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 109-110; Marko Jačov, *Le guerre Veneto-Turche del XVII secolo in Dalmazia*, pp. 29-35.; For a detailed description of these operations see: Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 115-127.; Compare also: Vicko Solitro, *Povijesni dokumenti o Istri i Dalmaciji [Historical Documents Concerning the Istria and Dalmatia]* (Split: Splitski književni krug, 1989) pp. 273-282, 295-310.; For Foscolo's reports of these operations see: ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 220. (Zara, 20. Marzo 1647), num. 222. (Zara, 22. Marzo 1647), num. 226 (Novegradi, 31. Marzo 1647), num. 228 (Zara, 7. Aprile 1647)

¹⁸⁶*Il s(igno).re Dio miracolosamente operando, ha fatto posso dir un pigmeo gigante.* ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 231. (Zara, 13. Aprile 1647)

drastically in favor of the Venetian side. Not only did the Ottomans lose several important strongholds on the frontier, but even more importantly, several principal local leaders were captured and confusion and disarray struck Ottoman *sipahis* in these parts. In order to reestablish control and prevent the spread of panic, the Bosnian pasha accompanied by a small retinue, personally arrived to Knin in the middle of April, but with little or no effect.¹⁸⁷

Encouraged by the current progress of its arms, the Venetian side decided to continue with military operations, while Ottomans were still disorganized and middle of April onwards, after the return of Baron Degenfeld, the chief military officer, from Italy,¹⁸⁸ Venetian forces renewed their attacks. In a swift offensive, remaining Ottoman stronghold around Zadar: Obrovac, Tin, Nadin and Vrana, were all captured, and same as Novigrad and Zemunik earlier, in accordance with the senate's order "that nothing may remain but a memory of the name,"¹⁸⁹ razed to the ground. The events of previous months once again repeated, every other Ottoman stronghold except for Vrana was captured without any or only after token resistance. With these conquests, Venetian forces liquidated all major Ottoman bases around Zadar, becoming the undisputed masters of the countryside. At the end of operation, Foscolo was able to inform his superiors, that to Ottomans "in those parts does not remain a single palm of land, all has been reclaimed by the arms of Your Serenity."¹⁹⁰

After securing Zadar, in a described manner, Foscolo decided it was time to turn his attention to other towns under his care, namely Šibenik, Trogir and Split. Not giving his forces more than a few days of respite, at the beginning of May, Foscolo, with 5,000 foot, five galleys and 25 *barche armate*, sailed from Zadar and on 7th May arrived to Šibenik. From here, Venetian forces, using the Krka river, navigated to Skradin in the third attempt to capture this Ottoman stronghold. This time, superior firepower of the Venetian navy, rendered any resistance futile and after delaying Venetian forces for a few hours, in order to secure the

187 ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 232. (Zara, 14. Aprile 1647)

188 Already on 22nd March, the Senate instructed Foscolo, that upon arrival of baron Degenfeld, they should plan and execute an attack on some Ottoman target of their choosing. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-18, fols. 57-r-v, 22. Marzo 1647.

189 ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-18, fol. 72V, 4. Aprile 1647.

190 ... *in quelle parti più non resta ne anco un palmo di Terreno, tutto guadagnato dall' armi di Vostra Serenità.* ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 238. (Di Galea, Pontadura 26. Aprile 1647)

retreat of civilian population, defenders retreated leaving the town to the Venetian forces. Governor-General Foscolo again strictly followed the prescribed "scorched earth" tactics ordering destruction of the town after it was plundered by soldiers. After devastating the countryside for a few days Venetian forces retreated to Šibenik. Here, Foscolo left larger part of his force under the command of Baron Degenfeld, who he charged with the task of preparing town defenses for the upcoming season, while he sailed for Split with 1,600 selected troops. At Split, events from Zadar and Šibenik repeated, and in a swift surprise attack, superior Venetian forces quickly overrun and burned Solin/Salona and Kamen/Sasso, two Ottoman centers in the immediate vicinity of Split.¹⁹¹

With these conquests, Governor-General Foscolo pushed his forces to their limit. The desired capture of famous fortress of Klis which dominated the Venetian towns of Split and Trogir, the seat of sandjak bey and the strongest Ottoman fortress in Dalmatia, could not be undertaken this year. Exhausted by constant campaigning for over two months, and frustrated even more by delay of their pay, the Venetian army was on verge of rebellion.¹⁹² Furthermore, the arrival of the Bosnian pasha to Knin, in early April, also begun to yield results, and the Ottomans begun recovering from initial shock. By the second half of May, according to Venetian informers, the pasha managed to organize two task forces: one at Knin and one at Drniš, each 5,000 men strong, and was expecting further reinforcements from Bosnia, as soon as weather would permit it.¹⁹³ All this convinced Foscolo that the time has come to fall back to Zadar and start preparations for the forthcoming Ottoman attack.

The destruction of Ottoman strongholds in front of Dalmatian towns was of great

191For a detailed overview of the April-May offensive see: Franjo Difić, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 127-138; Marko Jačov, *Le Guerre Veneto-Turche del XVII secolo in Dalmazia*, pp. 40-43. Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 110. Furthermore, for Foscolo's reports on capture of Skradin, Solin and Kamen see: ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 243. (Sebenico di Galea 11. Maggio 1647), num. 247. (Di Galea Salona, 22 Maggio 1647)

192By the middle of May, the debt to the army amounted to more than 230,000 ducats. Immediately after the capture of Skradin, Foscolo reported about growing discontent among troops, informing the senate that captains and officials are losing control over the soldiers, who are even threatening their lives. ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 245. (Di Galea Sebenico, 17. Maggio 1647), num. 246. (Di Galea Sebenico, 18 Maggio 1647) attachment of 15th May 1647: *Avanzo delle militie a Piedi servono in Dalmazia per tutto il mese di Maggio 1647, non compreso quello delle militie di Cattaro per esser pagate a parte.*

193ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num (246. Di Galea Sebenico, 18 Maggio 1647) attachment: *Costituto d'avvisi.*

strategical value. It pushed Ottomans from the coast and forced them to organize their logistical bases further away in the Dalmatian hinterland, at Knin, Drniš and Sinj. This in turn resulted in increased travel time of any Ottoman army carrying siege trains toward their target on Dalmatian coast, giving the Venetian side more time to prepare. Even more importantly, this also shortened the time available for the siege, making the already tight schedule of Ottoman military commanders even tighter. Additionally, the Venetian spring offensive of 1647 also had one other unexpected outcome. And one, that had long lasting consequences for the course of war in this battlefield: it provided an additional incentive to dissatisfied Morlacchi pushing them into open rebellion against their Ottoman lords.

Individual Morlacchi groups had been defecting to the Venetian side already from the beginning of the war. During 1646, a few hundred Morlacchi crossed to the Venetian territories and entered Venetian service as soldiers.¹⁹⁴ Yet, Venetian military successes in early spring of 1647 initiated a full scale rebellion among the Morlacchi settled in the areas of military operations. Following the progress of the Venetian arms, entire Morlacchi communities, either willingly or forced by threat of arms, burned their homes, gathered their cattle and other movable properties and begun their move toward Venetian towns on the coast. By August 1647, only in the territory of Zadar, which was a major migration center for the Morlacchi, almost 1,400 adult males fit for arms accompanied by thousands of children, women and elderly crossed to the Venetian territory.¹⁹⁵ As the war progressed, more and more Morlacchi crossed to the Venetian side every year. According to official Venetian estimates, during the first few years of the war, between 28,000 – 30,000 Morlacchi migrated to Venetian controlled lands.¹⁹⁶ For the dimensions of these migrations to become clear one must take into account that the entire pre-war population of Dalmatia counted no more than 75,000 souls. The Morlacchi that crossed to Venetian lands formed three separate communities, the largest being the one of the Morlacchi settled in the region of Ravni Kotari in the territory of

194Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandisjkog rata*, pp. 113-114.

195ASVe, PTM, b. 464. num. 283 (Zara, 6. Agosto 1647)

196Above estimate is taken from a report by Governor-General Lorenzo Dolfin from 1655. Grga Novak, *Commissione et Relatione Venetae* 7, p. 116

Zadar, followed by those of the Morlacchi settled in the suburb of the town of Šibenik and nearby villages, while the third and the smallest Morlacchi community was that consisting of Morlacchi settlements of Vranjic, Solin, Kamen and suburb of Klis, in the district of Split.

The effects of this migration for the Venetian military effort were twofold: it not only provided the Republic with a new pool of manpower, increasing significantly its military presence in Dalmatia, but at the same time it also left Ottomans deprived of this very same resource. Concerning this double advantage received by the Republic from these new troops, Governor-General Foscolo wrote to the Senate that all are well familiar with the countryside, yet even more importantly, they fight against their "*Prencipe naturale, che li pretende, che li blandisse, et li richiama,*" and that good treatment of these can serve as an incentive to other Ottoman subjects to change sides.¹⁹⁷ From a tactical point of view, the Morlacchi represented an addition of a new important component to the Venetian military. Organized and led by their own leaders, the Morlacchi functioned either as auxiliary units joined to main Venetian force, charged with devastation and depopulation of the countryside around Ottoman strongholds captured by the regular Venetian army, or performed individual guerrilla raids deep into Ottoman territory, leaving behind destroyed settlements and burning fields. As irregular guerrilla units, Morlacchi could reach where units of Venetian regular army could not, thus providing the Republic with capability to bring war to enemy's doorstep without risking precious units of regular army.

Already from June 1647, after his return to Zadar, as part of preparations for the incoming fighting season, Foscolo began dispatching groups of Morlacchi into the countryside with orders to burn crops and fodder and prevent Ottomans, who returned to areas devastated during the spring campaign, from collecting this year's harvest.¹⁹⁸ These small raids also revealed another strategical benefit brought by the Morlacchi rebellion. Turning Morlacchi against their former lords created almost insuperable gap between the two. Ottomans were

197ASVe, PTM. b. 466. num. 439. (Zara, 19. Luglio 1648)

198ASVe. PTM. b. 464. num. 265 (Zara, 30. Giugno 1647), num. 269 (Zara, 9. Luglio 1647), num. 271. Zara, 10. Luglio 1647)

shocked by this betrayal, and blamed Morlacchi for all misfortunes that befell them. In July, local Ottoman lords gathered under the command of Alaibey Ferhatpašić and organized a punitive expedition against the Morlacchi who awaited transport to islands in improvised camps around Zadar. Even though the raid proved very successful, Morlacchi suffered heavy casualties and while this brought a degree of satisfaction to Ottoman lords, yet it yielded no lasting results. If anything, it only alienated Morlacchi even more.¹⁹⁹ In less than a month, the full potential of Morlacchi was demonstrated, when Morlacchi conducted their first major raid, in revenge for this attack, in August 1647. Amassed in large number (over 1,000 combatants), the Morlacchi penetrated deep into Ottoman territories and burned the town of Gračac in Lika to the ground. Upon their return to Zadar, the Morlacchi brought 70 prisoners and 30 heads of distinguished Ottomans, as gruesome trophies of their victory.²⁰⁰

Over the following years, the Morlacchi came to play a significant role in the war conduct in this battlefield, and Ottomans committed serious resources and efforts in operations aimed at destroying them. To be just, one must mention that in doing so Ottoman commanders were not motivated only by a simple desire for revenge. True, once the blood feud was created, and the circle of violence began, it was hard, not to say impossible, to stop it, and the desire to exhort revenge on these outcasts on personal level certainly played a role at least among some of Ottoman lords. On the other hand, Morlacchi villages represented much easier targets with greater prospect of plunder, than other fortified Venetian strongholds, defended by modern fortifications, guns and navy. Be that as it may, still, instead of concentrating their energies against targets of more strategic importance for the final outcome of war, Ottomans frequently dissipated their forces practically fighting a small war against their former subjects.

2.4. The Ottoman Siege of Šibenik and its Consequences

The loss of Novigrad, Vrana, Zemunik and numerous smaller forts along the frontier, the apostasy of Makarska, and, finally, a large scale insurgency of Christian subjects, could not go

199Marko Jačov, *Le guerre Veneto-Turche*, pp. 48-51. For a detailed report of Governor-General Foscolo on this skirmish see: Boško Desnica, *Istorija kotarskih uskoka 1646-1684. [History of Kotar Uskoks 1646-1684]* (Beograd: Naučna knjiga, 1950) pp. 19-23.

200Marko Jačov, *Le guerre Veneto-Turche*, pp.51-52.; For Foscolo's reports on this attack see: ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 288. (Zara, 12. Agosto 1647), num. 289. (Zara, 17. Agosto 1647)

unnoticed in Istanbul. Consequently, Ibrahim pasha was deposed and Techieli-pasha was sent to take over command as the new governor of Bosnia. Accompanied by 3,000 janissaries and 1,000 *sipahis* the new pasha arrived at Knin on 15th July, and a few days later joined the army already assembled by the old pasha at Drniš, the main Ottoman base in Dalmatia for this campaign. The Ottoman army gathered at Drniš, already numbered 10,000-12,000 men, seven siege pieces, and new reinforcements were arriving daily.²⁰¹ In the summer of 1647, Ottoman-Venetian confrontation in this battlefield was reaching its culmination. Still fresh, and not suffering from war exhaustion both sides committed significant resources to this battlefield and after an eventful spring during which Venetian forces dominated the battleground, the initiative passed to the Ottoman side. The Venetian command in Dalmatia followed movements of the Ottomans with dread, who begun this campaign very well prepared. Not only, had they gathered an impressive military force and accumulated large quantities of food and war materials, but, with a change of leadership they also put these forces under command of an experienced soldier.²⁰² Thus, the chances that the Ottoman army would loose time in futile maneuvering like last year were rather small. If Ottomans were to capture some important stronghold on the coast, all Venetian successes from last spring would be negated. The worst fear of the Venetian command was that the pasha would launch parallel attacks on Split and Šibenik.²⁰³ The question that troubled equally Governor-General Foscolo and the Venetian Senate was if the center could hold.

At the beginning of August Techieli Pasha sent his forces on the move. The pasha personally led the majority of the force against Šibenik, but in order to keep Venetians in the dark as long as possible concerning his final destination, a smaller cavalry contingent was also dispatched to attack Split. So far, pasha's execution of military operations was flawless, and when, on 21st August, the Ottoman army (ca. 20,000-25,000 men strong),²⁰⁴ carrying 8 large

²⁰¹Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 110-111.

²⁰²Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, p. 138.

²⁰³ASVe, PTM, b. 464. num. 263. (Zara, 26. Giugno 1647)

²⁰⁴Venetian reports speak of 30,000 – 40,000 combatants, but more a conventional estimate of 20,000-25,000 seems more realistic. See: Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 112. See also Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, p. 140. and especially, report from a runaway Ottoman who deflected to the Christian side: ASVe, PTM, b. 465. num. 308 (Zara, 8. Settembre 1647) attachment from 3.

siege pieces and 12 smaller ones, arrived to Šibenik, no additional Venetian forces awaited them there. The command of the town was entrusted to Baron Degenfeld, an experienced commander who had the garrison of 3,500 men and several hundred men of local militia at his disposal. As predicted by Venetian engineers the recently fortified hill of St. John played the key role in defending the town. From day one, the Ottomans directed their efforts to capture this height overlooking the town. For more than two weeks, most ferocious fighting took place for control of the fortress of St. John. Battered by three gun batteries, the defenders of the fortress endured wave after wave of Ottoman attacks. Casualties on both sides were heavy, yet although costly Ottoman advance was steady. When on 8th of September, the pasha ordered a general charge, the outcome of the siege hanged in balance. Heavy rain made use of firearms impractical and less effective, and fighting practically returned to the middle ages, to the push of the pike and slash of the sword. Finally, after six hours of heavy fighting the Ottomans were repulsed, and the Venetian commander, Baron Degenfeld, in celebration of this victory ordered all church bells to ring *Te deum*.

While the fighting was going on, the Venetian side was paralyzed by heavy illness that befell Governor-General Foscolo. Yet, in spite of the governor-general's condition, additional reinforcements of 500 regular troops and 400 Morlacchi reached Šibenik, providing badly needed boost to the morale of the defenders. As the siege progressed and the governor-general's health improved, *consulta* held on 7th September decided that, in order to encourage defenders, Governor-General Foscolo should personally bring much needed provisions and reinforcements to Šibenik.²⁰⁵ Thus, on 8th September, leading much larger fleet than was the actual force it carried - no more than 700 soldiers and an unknown number of territorial troops - Foscolo left Zadar and arrived at Šibenik on 11th September. The failed attack of 8th September had a deteriorating effect on the morale of the Ottoman army. Already for some time, smaller groups of demoralized *sipahis* were leaving the Ottoman camp under the cover of the night. Now, with the outbreak of dysentery in the camp, and in combination with the

September 1647.

205ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 308. (Zara, 8 Settembre 1647.) attachment to the letter

sight of what appeared to be a large Venetian force bringing reinforcements and supplies to the besieged town, the Ottoman morale completely collapsed. In order to avoid a complete rout of his force, on 16th September, the pasha ordered lifting of the siege and retreated to Drniš, soon disbanding his army.²⁰⁶ The Republic won its greatest victory so far in this battlefield, and in November, as recognition for achieved victories in Dalmatia, the Senate awarded Foscolo with the title of the procurator of St. Mark.²⁰⁷

The retreat of the Ottoman army from the field of battle was followed by renewal of Venetian attacks. Deciding to utilize the full potential of newly acquired Morlacchi units, Foscolo begun dispatching them accompanied by units of Venetian cavalry against smaller Ottomans settlements. First, in October, they destroyed the Radutz castle in Lika²⁰⁸ and two weeks later the fortress of Ostrovica/Ostrovizza, the last remaining Ottoman stronghold between Zadar and Šibenik.²⁰⁹ Seeing the misfortunes that befell the Ottomans and the seemingly unstoppable progress of Venetian forces, numerous so far irresolute Morlacchi begun crossing over to Venetian controlled territories, offering their allegiance to the Republic. Moreover, the success of Venetian arms, inspired not only the Morlacchi in Dalmatia, but other Ottoman Christian subjects begun putting their hopes in the Republic as well. In the first place, the mountain tribes of Montenegro and northern Albania, several of which, as early as May 1647, accepted Venetian protection.²¹⁰ Yet, even more promising seemed the prospect of an uprising among Albanian Christians.

Already at the beginning of 1646, Venetian Republic was contacted by representatives of Albanian Christians, led by principal members of the Catholic church hierarchy: the

206Franjo Difinik, *Povijest kandisjkog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 143-158.; Marko Jačov, *Le guerre Veneto-Turche*, pp. 52-61; Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 111-113.; Ferruccio Sassi, "Le campagne di Dalmazia durante la guerra di Candia," *Archivio Veneto* 21 (1037): pp. 78-83. (henceforth: Ferruccio Sassi, *Le Campagne in Dalmazia Durante la Guerra di Candia* (2)); compare also Foscolo's reports: ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 317. (Di Galea Sebenico, 16. Settembre 1647)

207Franjo Difinik, *Povijest kandisjkog rata u Dalmaciji*, p. 162.; ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 347. (Zara, 2. Dicembre 1647)

208ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 330. (Zara, 16, Ottobre 1647)

209ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 338. (Zara, 4. Novembre 1647)

210The most comprehensive overview of the affairs in the hinterland of the Bay of Kotor can be found in Gligor Stanojević's synthesis of Venetian-Ottoman wars in South Slavic lands, for the period 1645-1652 see: Gligor Stanojević, *Jugoslovenske zemlje*, pp. 205-223.; compare also: Marko Jačov, *Le guerre Veneto-Turche*, pp. 46-48.

archbishops of Durrës and Bar, and bishops of Skadar, Lezhë/Alessio and Sapa, who offered to put the entire kingdom of Albania under the dominion of the Republic. The involvement of high church officials gave much credit to these conspirators in the eyes of the political leaders of the Republic, while the prospect of acquiring entire new *regnum* caught the imagination of the Senate. After the initial contacts during the first half of 1647, the Senate gave its favorable opinion of this project and charged Governor-General Foscolo with the task of finishing the negotiations and executing the operation at the moment he found most opportune, offering the greatest chance of success. Soon, the Bishop of Shkodër, Gregorio Fasina arrived at Zadar to function as a liaison officer between Foscolo and the conspirators in Albania. After the Ottoman failure at Šibenik, and arrival of new reinforcements and materials to Dalmatia, the Senate suggested Foscolo to employ these resources in Albania. At the same time, the archbishop of Durrës begun organizing insurgents in Albania and the attack on Lezhë was scheduled for the 23rd March 1648, at which time the arrival of a Venetian expeditionary force was expected as well.²¹¹

2.5. Foscolo's Triumph: The Second Venetian Offensive (spring 1648)

However, Governor-General Foscolo was unwilling to embark on such a risky expedition, before first securing Dalmatian towns. Therefore, the Venetian command in Dalmatia planned a new winter offensive against remaining Ottoman bases in the Dalmatian hinterland: Drniš and Knin, which Ottomans used the previous year for staging the attack on Šibenik. Incentive for this attack also came from numerous Morlacchi communities from this region. They offered to become Venetian subjects if Venetian forces would come to their aid. In a swift operation, a Venetian force of 6,000 foot and 700 horse spearheaded by Morlacchi irregulars penetrated into Ottoman lands, and on 22nd February, arrived to Drniš surprising the Ottomans. Unknown to Venetians, the Bosnian pasha Techieli was present in person in Drniš, which he had chosen for winter quarters. Yet not even his presence could rally defenders and superior Venetian forces quickly overrun them, capturing the town. The pasha was forced to

211 Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 204-206.; Marko Jačov, *Le guerre Veneto-Turche*, pp. 69-70.

flee leaving behind his standard which was captured by the Venetian forces and sent as a trophy to Venice.²¹² The appearance of Venetian forces and the news of the fall of Drniš once again spread panic among Ottomans in those parts. While the Venetian war council was debating whether or not to continue the operation and attempt capturing the fortress of Knin, the news that the Ottoman garrison abandoned the post arrived. Seizing the opportunity, Foscolo immediately ordered his forces on the march and ,on 27th February, Venetian forces captured and devastated Knin without meeting any resistance.²¹³

When Venetian force returned to Šibenik, Foscolo was greeted by the bishop of *Skadar* who brought bad news from Albania. While Republic's forces were engaged in Dalmatia, the Ottomans discovered the rebel plans in Albania and begun prosecuting all involved, crushing the rebellion before it even started.²¹⁴ Since this rendered the expedition to Albania pointless at this moment, Foscolo decided to continue with military operations in Dalmatia. The governor-general judged the time was right to eliminate the strongest remaining Ottoman stronghold in Dalmatia, fortress of Klis. The force of almost 10,000 men was gathered for this operation, including a large contingent of Morlacchi and several hundred men from the region of Poljice, who, upon arrival of Venetian forces to Split, proclaimed their allegiance to the Republic and joined the attack. However, this time, the Ottomans were well prepared. Klis had a garrison of 600 defenders commanded by the sandjak bey, an excellent natural defensive position and was amply provisioned with arms, food and ammunition. Additionally, after the rout at Drniš, the pasha begun organizing local *timariot* forces on this side of the Dinaric mountains. This time, there was to be no quick and easy victory for Venetians. For two weeks attackers bombarded and charged at the fortress walls, only to be thrown back time after time. In the end, only after the relief force of 5,000 men led by the Bosnian pasha was

212After the flight of the Bosnian pasha, Foscolo informed the Senate with great satisfaction that: "*poco mancando che non si rimasto prigionie.*" ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 379. (Di Galea Scardona, 27. Febraro 1647. mv.)

213Marko Jačov, *Le guerre Veneto-Turche*, pp. 62-69.; Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 118-119.; Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp.164-175.; For Foscolo's report on capture of Drniš and Knin see: ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 377. (Di Galea Scardona, 26. Febraro 1647. mv.), num. 381. (Di Galea Scardona, ultimo Febraro 1647. mv.)

214Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 207-208. ASVe, PTM. b. 466. num. 384. (Di Galea Caocesto, 10. Marzo 1648.)

routed, did the defenders offer to surrender the fortress in exchange for their lives and free passage to Ottoman controlled lands. Seeing his forces exhausted from harsh weather conditions and already suffering more than 500 dead and hundreds of wounded, Governor-General Foscolo was ready to accept these terms and bring the siege to its end. On 31st March, Venetian forces took over the control of the fortress, and the Ottomans were transported by a Venetian fleet to the delta of the Neretva river to Ottoman controlled lands.²¹⁵

The conquest of Knin and Klis presented the Venetian command with a serious dilemma: what to do with these two important fortresses? Should they be razed, as was the usual practice so far with all other captured Ottoman strongholds, or refortified and garrisoned? The man on the spot, Governor-General Foscolo, used his prerogatives and decided not to follow up on the proposal made by one of his most senior commanders, *Conte Fernando Scotto*, who strongly advocated the rebuilding of Knin. Foscolo judged the place located too far in the hinterland for the Venetian side to be able to defend it successfully in case of Ottoman attacks, and ordered its immediate destruction.²¹⁶ As far Klis was concerned, opinions were highly divided. Foscolo favored the preservation of Klis, yet he met strong opposition from part of *capi di guerra* (including almost all of his engineers), who argued the fortress was very badly damaged during the conquest, and since it was late in the season, it would be impossible to bring it to the satisfactory state before the arrival of the Ottoman army. Not willing to act on his own in case of such a renowned fortress, he asked the Senate for the final ruling. After reviewing the recommendations by several engineers and military commanders from Dalmatia, the Senate finally decided to make an exception in case of Klis and instructed

215Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 119-120.; Marko Jačov, *Le guerre Veneto-Turche del XVII secolo in Dalmazia*, pp. 71-78.; Franjo Difić, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp.175-197.; Vicko Solitro, *Povijesni dokumenti o Dalmaciji i Istri*, pp. 257-270.; For Foscolo's report on the capture of Klis see: ASVe, PTM. b. 466. num. 386. (Di Galea Salona, 1. Aprile 1648); For divided opinions concerning what to do with Klis see: ASVe, PTM, b. 466. num. 398. Zara, (20. Aprile 1648.)

216ASVe, PTM. b.466. num. 383. (Di Galea San Nicolo di Sebenico, 8. Marzo) attachment: *Scrittura del S. (igno)re Conte Scotti circa il fortificarne Knin*; For the next few months, the Senate did not give up on the idea to rebuild and garrison the fortress of Knin. In January 1649, Foscolo was asked again for his opinion concerning this project, yet, again his assessment was negative. Among multiple problems involved with the execution of this project, Foscolo held the most important one to be the inability of the Venetian forces to relieve or bring aid to it in case of siege, because of its distance from the coast. ASVe, PTM. b. 469. num. 532. (Di Galea Perasto, 31. Genaro 1648. mv.)

Foscolo to refortify it and place a garrison there.²¹⁷

The loss of a Klis had a demoralizing effect on Ottomans. The pasha retreated his remaining forces from Dalmatia, also evacuating Sinj, the last Ottoman stronghold in Dalmatia - which was subsequently burned in April by Venetian forces - to Livno in Bosnia and begun assembling his army there. Yet, no further major engagement occurred this year. Both sides limited their actions to construction projects: Venetians were frantically rebuilding Klis, while the Ottomans begun works to refurbish Livno into a major logistical base, necessary for future operations against Dalmatia.²¹⁸ For the remainder of the year fighting was left to Morlacchi irregulars, and warfare was reduced to their raids and Ottoman counter raids. In fact, the season of 1648 was one marked by most intensive Morlacchi raiding. In May, Morlacchi led by Petar Smiljanić advanced deep into the region of Lika, and plundered the town of Unac, while another group at the same time, under the command of famous Morlacchi leader Vuk Mandušić, burned the town of Ključ.²¹⁹ In June, another great Morlacchi raid followed. This time, the Morlacchi gathered in the greatest number so far, almost 3,000 men, and attacked the town of Udbina in Lika.²²⁰

However, this year, fighting also revealed one of unfortunate features of Morlacchi guerrilla style warfare, namely: the high mortality rate among their leaders. In August, in less than a month, in two separate encounters, first during the Morlacchi raid against the Ottoman fort of Ribnik, and then during Morlacchi pursue of an Ottoman raid, the Morlacchi lost all three of their principal leaders: Don Stipan Sorić, Petar Smiljanić and Vuk Mandušić.²²¹ Yet,

217ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-20, f. 74v-75r, 11. Aprile 1648.; ASVe, PTM. num. 388. (Di Galea Salona, 4. Aprile 1648.)

218Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 124.

219Boško Desnica, *Istorija kotarskih uskoka I.*, p. 35.; ASVe, PTM. b. 466. num. 411. (Zara, 16. Maggio 1648); ASVe, PTM. b. 466. num. 419. (Zara, 3. Giugno 1648); For more on these three well known Morlacchi leaders see: Anđelko Mijatović, *Uskoci i Krajišnici. Narodni junaci u pjesmi i povijesti [Uskoks and Frontiersmen. Folk Heroes in Epic Song and History]*, (Zagreb: Školska Knjiga, 1995) pp. 83-94, 121-135.; Roman Jelić, "Smiljanići – Kotarski serdari [The Smiljanići – Serdars of Kotari]" *Radovi JAZU u Zadru* 29-30. (1982/1983): pp. 111-132; Bogumil Hrabak, *Smiljanići od Zadra sokoli [The Smiljanići, the Falcons of Zadar]* (Beograd: Prosveta, 1953) pp. 7-22; Boško Desnica, *Sabrana djela [Collected Works]*, (Zagreb: Prosvjeta, 2008) pp. 118-124.; Šime Peričić, "Don Stipan Sorić (U zbilji i pjesmi) [Don Stipan Sorić (In Reality and in Epic Poetry)]," *Radovi Zavoda za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Zadru* 39, (1997): pp. 211-242.

220Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 122.; ASVe, PTM. b. 466. num. 426. (Zara, 21.

Giugno 1648) and attachment: *Relatione del Prete Sorich*

221Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 122-125.

in spite of this setback, Morlacchi operations proved of great benefit for the Venetian side. No Ottoman settlement was safe from their attacks. Some Morlacchi groups reached even as far as the Sava river in the North,²²² and threat of Morlacchi attacks tied up considerable Ottoman forces to guard duties.

2.6. Success is Never Final: Expedition to Albania (December 1648 – February 1649)

After three years of fighting in Dalmatia, the results were far from satisfactory for Ottomans. Almost the entire area of sandjak of Klis was destroyed and depopulated, while the sandjak of Lika, to the north-west, was heavily devastated. Furthermore, the Christian regions of *Poljice* and *Makarska* declared themselves free of Ottoman rule and accepted Venetian protection. Although the destruction of major Ottoman strongholds, Drniš, Knin and Sinj, during the previous campaign, left the Ottomans without any suitable base of operations on the Dalmatian side of the Dinaric mountains, thus greatly increasing the strength of the Venetian defensive position, all these successes could not break the will of the Ottomans to continue fighting. Moreover, these losses, although of great strategical value, had not seriously reduced Ottoman military potential in the region. No matter how spectacular Foscolo's successes in Dalmatia appeared, with these last conquests of Klis and Sinj, in 1648, they have reached their strategical limit. In order to harm Ottomans and reduce their fighting capabilities, it was necessary to bring war to other nearby regions: Hercegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia, Serbia etc. In this regard, Albania remained the most promising target in the eyes of the Venetian policy makers. Failure, of the rebellion by Albanian Christians in March 1648 did not put a stop to these plans. Bishops maintained their contacts and continued live anti-Ottoman agitation. At the same time, the Senate also did not give up on the plan to initiate rebellion of local Christians and to send an expeditionary force there.

In August 1648, as part of the preparations for this operation, the Senate has also sent to

²²²The raid led by *harambaša* Petar Miljković, was one of the most spectacular Morlacchi operations. Miljković and his group spent almost 7 weeks in Ottoman controlled lands, attacking numerous Ottoman settlements in Bosnia, most important of which was Novi Vakuf, and penetrated all the way to the Sava river, where they ambushed and sunk a raft carrying three guns from Belgrade. ASVe, PTM. b. 466. num. 438. (Zara, 15. Luglio 1648) attachment: *Constituto del Harambassa inoltratosi al fiume Sava*

Governor-General Foscolo the so called Sultan Iachia (Jahija, Jahya), a pretender on the Ottoman throne, who was allegedly accepted by Montenegrin tribes as their ruler, hoping to use his person to give strength to the insurgency.²²³ The arrival of Sultan Iachia in Dalmatia rather conveniently coincided with a great political turmoil in Istanbul - an assassination of sultan Ibrahim and accession of his underage son Mehmed IV.²²⁴ However, Governor-General Foscolo was rather skeptical concerning the entire plan, and wrote to the Senate that so far the success of the operation in Albania rested solely on favorable disposition of the local population, warning that he does not possess any other basis for this entire enterprise than the assertions of the Prelates, and other clerics, who are mainly interested in reclaiming their dioceses, and monasteries from which they are excluded.²²⁵ Also, Foscolo informed his superiors of his concerns regarding the role of Sultan Iachia in this expedition, since the latter openly stated to him that: "he has no experience of those lands, nor does he maintain any correspondence with local people."²²⁶ Yet, the Senate chose to ignore these warnings and decided to push its will and the preparations for the "Albanian expedition" went on. However, although Foscolo had, already at the end of September 1648, sent the list of requirements for

223Sultan *Iachia (Jahija, Yahya)* represents one of typical picturesque Baroque characters. Allegedly the son of the Sultan Murad III, smuggled to the West to avoid death upon succession of one of his older brother, this adventurer played a role in various anti-Ottoman plans for decades. Peter Bartl, *Der Westbalkan zwischen spanischer Monarchie und Osmanischem Reich*, pp. 179-199; Franjo Difičnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 209-210.;

224The news of the upheavals at the Porte inflamed the imagination of rebels and conspirators in Albania, who again began to dream of nothing less than throwing the Ottomans out of Europe. For example, in his letter from Zadar dated 3rd October 1648, the archbishop of Ohrid wrote to the Senate that because of the recent revolution on the Ottoman throne, no time should be lost, and that now was the right time for action. Stating that Albania could be taken within a month, and Christian forces could easily cross to Serbia and Macedonia from there, and from there finally head for Constantinople. ASVe, PTM. 467. num. 486. (Zara, 3. Ottobre 1648.) Attachment: *Lettera di Archivescovo di Ochrida, 3. Ottobre 1648.*; For the political consequences of the deposition of Sultan Ibrahim see: Joseph Hammer, *Historija Turskog/Osmanskog Carstva [History of the Ottoman Empire] vol. 2.* (Zagreb: Elbookers, 1979) pp. 358-375; See also Kenneth M. Setton, *Venice, Austira and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century*, pp. 151-154.;

225Governor-General Foscolo described the situation to the Senate with the following words: "*che altro fondamento non tengo, che l'assertione di Prelati, et altri Religiosi, quali se ben interessati, per le Diocesi loro, et Monasterij, da quali con grave loro pregiudizio si vedono esclusi, ...*"; ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 468. (Zara, 7. Settembre 1648.)

226ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 494. (Zara, 17. Ottobre 1648)

the operation,²²⁷ and the Senate approved requested provisions,²²⁸ their actual sending to Dalmatia was much delayed until the end of November.²²⁹

What was even worse, unable to wait any longer, because of the need to keep up with the agreed schedule with rebels in Albania, a Venetian expeditionary force under Foscolo's command was forced to sail for Albania not fully provisioned. Although the Senate had, already at the beginning of October, voted for considerable resources for this operation, 120,000 *ducats*, actual sending of this sum to Dalmatia was constantly postponed.²³⁰ Thus, when finally, on 13th December 1648, a fleet of eight galleys, 45 *barche armate*, 15 transport ships, carrying around 3,000 men, sailed from Zadar toward Albania on a very ambitiously devised operation to capture a new kingdom for the Republic, it was lacking both money and food provisions, the most critical being supplies of hardtack which it had enough but for one month.²³¹ The final target of the Venetian expeditionary force was Lezhë, where they were to *rendezvous* with the rebel force raised by the archbishop of Durrës. However, before taking his troops deeper into the hinterland and away from the coast, Foscolo wanted to secure unhindered passage for the transport of supplies and reinforcements. In order to do so, Foscolo decided to first capture the Ottoman coastal bases: Bar and Ulcinj.

Unfortunately, the attack on Bar, that started on 11th January, proved to be a total fiasco,

227As ordered, on 30 September Foscolo submitted a list of most necessary provisions to the Senate:

Cose necessarie al viaggio d'Albania

Danaro, à questo solo effeto destinato Militia

Biscotto miara trecento per hora

Mille Moschetti

Cinquecento spade larghe

Tende Per Galere, e Barc' armate

Drappi per Galeotti

Panni, e forniture, per militie, con camise

ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 483. (Zara, 30. Settembre 1648) Attachment: *Nota delle cose neccessarie per il viaggio*

228ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-21, f. 91v, *Adi 7. Ottobre 1648*.

229Lack of hardtack, grain, and money constantly delayed the departure of Venetian forces, and rather frustrated Governor-General Foscolo, who complained to Senate that "*In somma in un formal purgatorio mi ritrovaò,*" ASVe, PTM. num. 515. (Zara, 29. Novembre 1648.)

230ASVe. Senato Rettori, R-21, f. 80v, 93r-v; *Adi 3. Ottobre 1648, Adi 7. Ottobre 1648*.

231Since the shipment of money was not to be seen, Foscolo was finally forced to borrow some 8,000 ducats from Zadar merchants, in order to have at least some amount of money at his disposal to distribute as gifts and stimulations. Forces led by Foscolo to Albania were: 700 regular infantry, 100 heavy horse, 50 dragoons, 400 Morlacchi volunteers and 1,700 marine infantry serving as crews on *barche armate*. ASVe, PTM. b.467. nun. 519. (Zaravecchia di Galera, 13. Dicembre 1648.)

from the beginning until the end. First, during the amphibious landing, one transport ship carrying horses stranded causing total disorder among landing troops, and then, one of the two siege guns, disembarked on the shore, malfunctioned and exploded, while the second failed to achieve any significant damage to the town's fortification. Furthermore, the Ottomans gathered reinforcements much more quickly than Venetians predicted and finally, most importantly, local Christians, in whose support Venetian planners put so much trust, did not merely not join Venetian forces, but on the contrary, supported Ottomans and attacked Venetian troops.²³² After five days, frustrated by these developments, Foscolo wrote to his superiors that before the start of this operation he had dutifully informed them of all possible difficulties and hazards involved. Yet, that he was constantly convinced by the letters that "*la sola comparsa del Generale, et del Vesilo di San Marco, bastar dovesse alla revolutione d'un Regno,*" which did not happen concluding that: "*nell' instabilità di questi Popoli per quanto si vede, poco o niente sperar si può, et forse meno fidare.*"²³³ Expanded *consulta* held on 16th January 1649 - which in addition to members of Foscolo's staff also included five Catholic bishops whose dioceses were in the Ottoman Albania – decided, after a lively debate, that nothing could be achieved at Bar and that Venetian forces should fall back to Budva.²³⁴

Yet, the retreat to Budva had an unexpected effect. The presence of the Venetian force and the person of the governor-general encouraged the tribes of Montenegro and Hercegovina, who began courting Governor-General Foscolo, offering allegiance yet asking that their security be ensured by the destruction of Ottoman strongholds in the region, mainly the two fortresses in the Bay of Kotor: Herceg-Noví and Risan. In order to bind the mountain clans to the Republic more closely, and in such a way ensure that the Ottoman forces from the sandjak of Hercegovina would not be able to pass to Albania once the planned rebellion of Christians started, Foscolo launched an attack on Risan. At Risan, same as during the attack on Bar, the

²³²ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 527. (Di Galea in Spiaggia d'Antivari, 11. Genaro 1648), num. 528. (Di Galea in Spiaggia d'Antivari, 16. Genaro 1648)

²³³ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 529. (Di Galea Budua, 18. Genaro 1648. mv.)

²³⁴Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 211-212.; Marko Jačov, *Le guerre Veneto-Turche*, pp. 89-90.; See also: ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 529. (Di Galea Budua, 18. Genaro 1648) attachment: *Records of the Consulta held on 16. Genaro 1648.*; Compare also: Gligor Stanojević, *Jugoslovenske zemlje*, pp. 211.

local Christians have not risen in arms against the Ottomans, but joined them instead. Yet this time the Venetian forces were successful, and after 11 days of fighting, Risan was captured.²³⁵ With this victory, the Republic gained much prestige among local tribes, which declared themselves openly for the Republic. At the same time while Venetian forces were attacking Risan, people of Nikšić in Hercegovina rose in rebellion and attacked and captured the town of Grahovo. As Gligor Stanojević, aptly put it: "the hopes that were buried in front of Bar, came alive at Risan."²³⁶ *Consulta* held in the aftermath of the capture of Risan decided it should be kept in order to increase Venetian presence and influence in the region, so works on rebuilding the town fortifications begun immediately.²³⁷

Unfortunately, after this initial success, shortage of money and provisions of all kinds completely paralyzed any further operations. At the same, the mountain tribes which invested high hopes in the Republic, increased their petitions to Governor-General Foscolo to attempt to capture Herceg-Novı, the strongest Ottoman fortress in the region, and/or town of the Podgorica in the hinterland. Yet, Foscolo was unwilling to commit his badly provisioned and unpaid forces to these risky operations. Most that the governor-general was ready to commit to, was to send a group of 200 Morlacchi, in February, to join the Nikšić clan, aiming to help them spread rebellion in Hercegovina,²³⁸ and to provide material support to the expeditionary force of 400 Venetian volunteers organized and led by the archbishop of Ohrid/Ochrida. The goal of this force was the Ottoman held town of Podgorica in Montenegro hinterland, the capture of which was supposed to initiate rebellion among mountain tribes. However, this

235Governor-General Foscolo, probably with some satisfaction, informed the Senate of this, confirming again how the hopes put in support of local population for the Venetian cause were unfounded: *Christiani particolarmente contro la credenza sostengono à tutto potere il partito di Turchi, et liberamente si dichiarano, pronti esser di così eseguire fin alla morte*, ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 533. (Di Galea Porto di Risano, 8. Febraro 1648. mv.); For Foscolo's report on the conquest of Risan see: ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 535. (Di Galea Risano, 12. Febraro 1648. mv.)

236Gligor Stanojević, *Jugoslovenske zemlje*, p. 212.

237*Consulta* decided that the town fortifications should be rebuilt, but in such a way that this suits Venetian tactical realities. Meaning, that the town walls facing sea should be made weak, so that in case of Ottoman reconquest the town could be easily recaptured. ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 536. (Di Galea Risano, 15. Febraro 1648. mv.)

238ASVe, PTM. b. 467, num. 539. (Di Galea Cattaro, 23. Febraro 1648. mv.); After Morlacchi arrived to Nikšić, other mountain tribes, so far neutral: *Cuzzi, Clementi* and *Barde*, also expressed same requests to Foscolo asking him to send them Morlacchi units for their own protection. ASVe, Senato, Dispacci, PTM. b. 467, num. 540. (Cattaro, 25. Febraro 1648. mv.)

expedition failed completely. Upon seeing such a small Venetian force, majority of the mountain tribes did not join the attack, and as was to be expected it failed. This marked the end of the four month long Venetian expedition in Albania. At the end of March, pressed by the shortage of money and other provisions, Foscolo finally left Kotor for Zadar. With this event, all hopes of rebellion in Albania ceased, and greatly disappointed Montenegrin tribes were forced to somehow reconcile with the Ottomans. Their status remained ambiguous until the end of war. Although favorably inclined toward the Republic, their own weakness and lack of Venetian military presence in the region forced them into a quasi neutral status.²³⁹

2.7. Outbreak of the Plague and the Ottoman Recuperation (1649-1653)

Governor-General Foscolo upon his return to Dalmatia, found there an enemy far more fearful than the *Turk*. In late May 1649, the plague broke out in Šibenik, and soon spread to other Dalmatian towns.²⁴⁰ As a result of this unfortunate event, even though the Bosnian pasha amassed significant forces, the Ottoman army spent entire campaign waiting at Livno. This does not imply that peace came to this battlefield. The so called small war, consisting of raids and forays, continued uninterrupted on both sides in spite of the epidemic. In May, a 8,000 men strong Ottoman force, raided the countryside of Šibenik, inflicting heavy casualties on local Morlacchi. Soon, the Morlacchi repaid them in the same currency. First in July, Morlacchi led by their new emerging leader, young *harmabaša* Ilija Smiljanić, won a resounding victory against an Ottoman raiding party near Knin, soon to be followed by several daring raids, culminating in the attack on town of Bilaj in Bosnia, in November 1649, when it was burned to the ground.²⁴¹ Nevertheless, in spite of lack of major military operations, the year 1649, due to the outbreak of the plague epidemic represented the deadliest year of the entire war. The exact figure of dead until the end of the epidemic in the

²³⁹Gligor Stanojević, *Jugoslovenske zemlje*, p. 212-213.

²⁴⁰The first news of the plague in Šibenik reached Venice in Foscolo's letter of 10th of June 1649. ASVe, PTM. b. 468. num. 581. (Zara, 10 Giugno 1649.) For more on this outbreak of the plague and its consequences see: Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 127-128; Compare also: Franjo Difić, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 215-217.

²⁴¹Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 126-127. Harambaša Ilija Smiljanić, was a son to the late Peter Smiljanić, one of the first three Morlacchi leaders who managed to rise to prominence in the first years of the war. Ilija Smiljanić surpassed the achievements of his father and established himself as the leader of all Morlacchi groups settled in the territory of Zadar, acquiring for himself the title of *serdar*. This problem will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 3.

middle of 1650 is unknown. Also, not all communities were hit with the same intensity, but the death toll among the local population was very high.²⁴² According to an estimate by Gligor Stanojević, in Dalmatia, more than 10,000 people died of the plague in years 1649-1650.²⁴³

Next year, 1650, was equally uneventful in terms of large scale military actions. The only operation worth mentioning was a failed attempt by the new commander of Venetian forces in Dalmatia, general Gil d'As, in August 1649, to capture the fortress of Herceg-Novi by surprise.²⁴⁴ Ottomans limited their activities too to occasional smaller incursions mainly against the Morlacchi settlements, but refrained from undertaking any major military operations during this year. Venetian Morlacchi were more passive as well. In addition to several smaller incursions, the sole notable raid occurred in August when the Morlacchi, under the leadership of harambasha Janko Mitrović attacked the settlements of Bajčevac and Vakuf in Bosnia. However, lack of military engagement does not mean that the Ottomans were idle this year. The Bosnian pasha used this campaign to rebuild the town of Sinj, destroyed by Venetian forces in 1648. Rebuilding of Sinj, and placing of strong garrison there, was of considerable strategical importance. By doing so, the Ottomans regained a logistic base for staging attacks on Dalmatia on the southern side of Dinaric mountains. Also, garrisoned Sinj greatly impeded Morlacchi operations against targets in Bosnia, hence significantly increasing security in southern border regions. Although Morlacchi frequently petitioned Governor-General Foscolo to destroy this fortress, it was to no avail.²⁴⁵ Governor-General Foscolo who was already for some time pleading with the Senate to be replaced, was not willing to engage in another risky military operation at the end of his mandate.

²⁴²For example, in Zadar which was more or less spared, in the period between September and December 1649, 542 persons died. On the other hand, the town of Šibenik was worst hit, where during the epidemic more than 3,000 citizens (more than half of the town population) and 500 soldiers died. The number of casualties for Zadar is taken from the series of letters by Governor-General Lunardo Foscolo, dating from 9th September to 4th December 1649. ASVe, Senato, Dispacci, PTM., b. 469. num. 621. (Zara, 9. Settembre 1649), - num. 654. (Zara, 4. Dicembre 1649.)

²⁴³Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 128.; Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 215-217.

²⁴⁴Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 217; ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 735. (Zara, 9. Agosto 1650), num. 736. (Zara, 16. Agosto 1650)

²⁴⁵Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 128-129.

Furthermore, by 1650, the Venetian Republic already begun demonstrating signs of serious exhaustion. Gone were the days of the years 1647-1648, when the governor-general commanded over 10,000 men and more. In September 1650, all in all, General Foscolo had at his disposal merely 5,600 foot, and a few hundred horse.²⁴⁶ In addition, shortage of money and food, in Dalmatia, which was acute already from early spring of 1648 became chronic by 1650. A deeper analysis of these problems will be undertaken later, in Chapter 3, at this point I will merely provide a simple sketch of the financial and logistical situation the Venetian administration in Dalmatia had to operate in. In March 1650, the total debt of the Republic toward its military forces in Dalmatia, not including Morlacchi and various stipendiaries, amounted to 521,279 *ducats*,²⁴⁷ and was growing monthly. Only in the period from September 1649 to September 1650, the difference between monthly spending in the province and the amount of money that was sent equalled some 250,000 *ducats*. Shortage of coin was such that as soon as the shipment of money would arrive in Dalmatia, it was almost immediately spent.²⁴⁸ Moreover, during the last six months of Foscolo's mandate, from September 1649 until February 1650, not a single coin arrived to Dalmatia. By the end of his mandate in February 1651, Foscolo, frustrated by incessant shortage of all major provisions necessary for war waging: money, food, grain, hay etc. and constant mutinies of troops, wrote to his superiors: "if my own blood could be converted into money, I would certainly not spare it."²⁴⁹ In such circumstances the Venetian administration in Dalmatia was almost completely paralyzed, and the Republic's ability to wage war was seriously hindered. Organization and execution of an attack against an Ottoman stronghold, deep in Dalmatian hinterland, to which Ottomans could easily come to aid with superior force was at the time beyond the abilities of Venetian forces. Fortunately for the Republic's war effort, Foscolo was well aware of his limitations and decided to reduce military activities solely to defense and Morlacchi raids.

²⁴⁶ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 755. (Zara, 17. Ottobre 1650) attachment: *Nota di spese mensuale, 16 Settembre 1650*.

²⁴⁷ASVe, PTM., num. 688. (Zara, 18. Marzo 1650)

²⁴⁸From the accounts attached to the letter dated 17 October 1650, it can be seen that when in September 40,000 ducats finally arrived, they were almost immediately spent. ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 755. (Zara, 17. Ottobre 1650) Attachment: *Conto di spese*

²⁴⁹... *se il proprio sangue si fosse potuto convertir in denaro risparmiato non l'havrei al sicuro*. ASVe. PTM. b. 470, num. 786. (Zara, 10. Febraro 1650. m.v.)

When finally in February Lunardo Foscolo left Dalmatia, this was not the end of his travails. Shortly before his departure his brother died, soon followed by his wife, who did not survive the winter passage on a galley from Zadar to Venice.²⁵⁰ Furthermore, the Republic was not ready to deny itself his services. Already in August 1650, at the age of 72, Foscolo was elected for even more demanding office, that of the captain-general of the Sea, for which he departed in no less than six months after his return to Venice. Foscolo's successor at the post of the governor-general in Dalmatia and Albania was Girolamo Foscarini, who in the year of 1648 served in Dalmatia in the role of *Comessario in provintia*, and was therefore already familiar with the problems of both: local administration and strategical/tactical realities of this battlefield.

The year 1651, turned out to be an unexpectedly peaceful one in Dalmatia. Both sides were rather inactive, and mainly concentrated their efforts on naval operations in the Dardanelles.²⁵¹ General Foscarini used this year for inspecting Dalmatian towns' fortifications - sending detailed reports compiled by the engineers in his entourage to Venice - and for the consolidation of the local administration and treasury, which fell into a state of disorder during the last six hard months of Foscolo's service. The only fighting done this year was by the Morlacchi, who successfully repulsed several Ottoman raiding parties.²⁵²

With the coming of the new year, 1652, both sides renewed military operations with new vigor. In February, Governor-General Foscarini, following the pattern established by Foscolo, of launching the offensives during late winter months, sent his forces on the move. The war council held in February discussed the prospect of a long sought attack on Sinj, however,

²⁵⁰It seems that in spite of all his military achievements, Governor-General Foscolo left Dalmatia rather dissatisfied after five years of service. In one of his last letters he complained to the Senate, not only concerning the tragedy that befell his house (in regard to the recent deaths of his brother and wife), but, also that by the end of his service he was left with no real authority, and only with the empty title of the General. Foscolo complained of how, due to chronic shortage of money, during the last 6 months of his mandate, he was forced to borrow more than 50,000 *ducats*, and how, in the end, since no shipment of money arrived from Venice, he was forced to leave without repaying them with grave consequences for his honor and reputation, leaving this debt to his successor. ASVe, PTM., b. 470. (unnumbered letter) (Pirano 16. Marzo 1650 m.v.)

²⁵¹Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 129.; Kennet Setton M., *Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century*, pp. 163-164.

²⁵²The most notable Morlacchi victory this year was the destruction of two Ottoman raids that attacked the district of Zadar in July 1651. ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. 41 (Spalato, 10. Luglio 1651)

consulta found the operation too risky, and it was decided instead to destroy the rebuilt fort of Zadvarje. The goal of this operation was to, by eliminating this Ottoman stronghold, greatly increase security of the regions of Makarska and Poljice.²⁵³ The Venetian force, of 3,200 foot and 200 horse, captured the fort during a short operation. After the 3,000 men strong relief force under the command of Bosnian Alai-bey Ismail Fetibegović was routed in open battle by the united forces of Morlacchi from Zadar and Šibenik, which accompanied the Venetian army on this campaign, the defenders, in exchange for their lives and freedom, surrendered the fortress which was then demolished.²⁵⁴

In early July, following their usual schedule, Ottoman forces begun crossing into Dalmatia. Well aware that the new Pasha of Bosnia, Fazil, was gathering large quantities of war materials and guns at Livno already from late spring, Venetians kept a close watch on these movements. Furthermore, the rumors that the new pasha was sent from Istanbul with orders to capture some Venetian stronghold in Dalmatian was an additional source of discomfort for the Venetian command. However, Fazil pasha did not intend to repeat the mistake of his predecessors and risk his forces and reputation in an attack against some fortified town. Instead, the pasha sent a strong force under the command of one of the most prominent frontier Ottoman beys, Ali Pasha Čenigć, to rebuild the recently destroyed fort of Zadvarje, while he at the same time established a camp at Knin and begun works to rebuild this strategically important fortress. By September, Knin was rebuilt, equipped with guns and garrisoned with 1,000 men.²⁵⁵ While the Ottoman camp at Knin numbered some 18,200 men,²⁵⁶ the strength of the Venetian forces in the province, at that time, dropped down to a low of 4,400 foot. In such circumstances Governor-General Foscarini had no option but to keep his forces entrenched behind city walls, and watch as the Ottomans regained the positions lost during previous years. The only option at governor-general's disposal was

253ASVe, PTM. b. 474. num. 90. (Almissa, 20. Febraio 1651. m.v.)

254Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp.223-225.; Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 129-130.; ASVe, PTM. b. 474. num. 91. (Almissa, 24. Febraio 1651. m.v.)

255Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 130.

256ASVe, PTM. b. 474. num. 125. (Zara, 17 Agosto 1652) attachment: *Costituto di Durac Spachia Dulimenovich, 17. Agosto 1652. Zara*

attempting to disrupt these construction works by dispatching several Morlacchi raiding parties, yet with no success.²⁵⁷ With this enterprise Fazil pasha demonstrated not that much his military skills, but rather his good sense for Ottoman politics, since at the end of the campaign the pasha reported to the Porte that, as he was ordered to do so, he captured two important fortresses in Dalmatia.²⁵⁸

Rebuilding of Knin also had a significant strategical consequence. By doing so, the Ottomans have reacquired an excellent base of operations on this side of the Dinaric mountains. Positioned in the center of the province, Knin was suitable for staging attacks against all Venetian targets on the coast. Additionally, since the fortress of Knin also commanded routes toward the north, its garrison represented a dangerous obstacle for Morlacchi raiding parties, seriously impeding their freedom of action. While at Knin, the pasha also issued two proclamations. The first was a call to all *sipahis* from this area to return and resettle these lands, or face loss of their estates. The second, rather more interesting one, was an offer of pardon and the grant of a wide range of privileges to Morlacchi willing to return under the rule of *Gran Signore*. In addition to this public proclamation, the pasha also sent personal letters to several principal Morlacchi leaders promising them lands and stipends if they were to abandon the Venetian side and return.²⁵⁹ Yet, in spite of such generous and tempting offers, years of bloody warfare between Morlacchi and the Ottomans created a gap that could not be easily crossed and the Ottoman offer passed almost without any reaction from the Morlacchi.

257In July 1652, Governor-General Foscarini dispatched a large Morlacchi party with the task to attempt to disrupt works at Knin, but Morlacchi faced an overwhelming Ottoman force and retreated without achieving anything. ASVe, PTM. b. 473. num. 119. (Zara, 25 Luglio 1652); num. 122. (Zara, 3 Agosto 1652)

258In tanto il Bassa va procurando di stabilir la sua fortuna, et la sua permanenza al governo, che era molto vacillante col avvantaggiarsi à Constantinopoli; scrivendi di far giorni imprese, et acquisti di Città; Volendo con tali forme far creder, che questi luoghi fossero tuttavia tenuti dalle nostre arme, et riconquisti dalle sue, col mezzo del suo valor, e coraggio. ASVe, PTM. b. 473. num. 129. (Sebenico, 6 Settembre 1652)

259... promettendole un sincere universal pardon del Gran Sig.(no)re, et la fratione di rimarcabili privilegi di perpetue essentioni da Carazzi, e da ogni altro aggravio niuno eccettuato; Un indulto, che alcun loro creditore non possa molestarli, per esser pagato; ma quello che più importa ai Capi afferiscono feudi, et universalmente ogni miglior, et più desiderabile trattamento; Venendomi anco soggiunto, che le sia stato offerto di lasciar viver, e governarsi à modo loro, senza altra dipendenza se non di esser sudditi del Gran Sig.re; et alla conditione, che godono li Mori Morlachi, et li popoli di Moldavia, Valachia, et di Transilvania; in ordine che è corra pur voce, che sia stata loro anco esibita la Piazza di Chnin, per loro sicurezza, mentre havessero voluto accettar le sopraccennate esibitioni. ASVe, PTM. b. 473. num. 129. (Zara, 6 Settembre 1652)

What probably contributed significantly to such a reaction on the part of the Morlacchi were the efforts by Governor-General Foscarini, who, from the beginning of his mandate took special care to nurture a good relationship with the Morlacchi, especially with their leaders. In order to ease their hardships, Foscarini intervened on more than one occasion on the behalf of the Morlacchi to the Senate, asking for food and provisions for them.²⁶⁰ In particular, Foscarini developed quite a good relationship with young Morlacchi leader Serdar Ilija Smiljanić. Foscarini not only personally attended Smiljanić's wedding and the baptism of his wife (born a Muslim) in the role of the godfather,²⁶¹ but also urged the Senate to award Smiljanić with a golden necklace as recognition for his services.²⁶² Thus, it is not without any grounds to assume that Foscarini's favorable treatment of the Morlacchi and their leaders played a part in almost total absence of any reaction among Morlachi to Ottoman reconciliation efforts.

Because of his deteriorating health,²⁶³ at the beginning of January 1653, Foscarini was allowed to leave Dalmatia, and was replaced by Lorenzo Dolfin. The new governor-general continued the practice established by his predecessor, and kept Venetian regular forces stationed in fortified towns, while leaving the fighting to the Morlacchi who he supported with munition and provisions issued from state magazines. From March, till June, the

²⁶⁰Foscarini's plans on how to integrate the Morlacchi and provide them with means to support themselves and their families will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.4.2.

²⁶¹ASVe, PTM. b. 471, num. 37. (Zara, 19. Giugno 1651)

²⁶²The Senate, upon a recommendation by Foscarini, actually did award the golden necklace to Ilija Smiljanić already in July 1651, after his victory over a large Ottoman raiding party in the district of Zadar. ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. 43 (Spalato, 12. Luglio 1651); Yet, the necklace failed to reach Dalmatia for quite a long time. From month to month, Foscarini awaited the arrival of this sign of recognition for the most prominent among Morlacchi leaders, and although golden rings and necklaces awarded to others dully arrived, this one failed to do so. In March 1652, Foscarini reminded the Senate about it, and the fact that Smiljanić is expecting it. ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 98. (Spalato, 29. Marzo 1652); The situation became rather delicate in April 1652, when the Senate awarded two gold necklaces to Dalmatian nobles Georgio Civalleli and Zorzi Papali, charged with the duty of supervising Morlacchi, yet because of the fear that Smiljanić could be gravely offended because of this, Foscarini decided to keep the news secret until the necklace for Smiljanić arrived. ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 102. (Zara, 22. Aprile 1652); The necklace for Smiljanić finally arrived two months later, in July 1652, and Foscarini was able to hand over all three of them at the same time. ASVe, PTM. b. 473. num. 113. (Zara, 4 Luglio 1652)

²⁶³For almost the entire second year of his service in Dalmatia, Foscarini was constantly troubled by health problems and pleaded to the Senate to release him from service, and appoint his successor. In June 1652, Foscarini fell to bed and his health did not improve even after 40 days. ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 105. (Zara, 2. Giugno 1652); He repeated his instances for release at the end of July, again complaining of his bad condition, warning the Senate that because of this, at the moment, the army in province did not have an adequate commander. ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 108. (Zara, 27. Giugno 1652)

Morlacchi executed several successful raids, the most prominent of which was the joint operation of Šibenik and Zadar Morlacchi, in April, when Serdar Ilija Smiljanić led 900 foot and 500 horse against the town of Glamoč in Bosnia, burning it to the ground.²⁶⁴ Then, in June, after the Bosnian pasha gathered between 10,000-12,000 men at Livno and crossed to Dalmatia, the roles were reversed, the Ottomans begun their raids, and the Morlacchi went on the defensive. During the entire summer skirmishes were fought all along the coast but without any significant result, and when in September the pasha disbanded his troops, the Morlacchi went on the offensive again until snow and harsh weather brought an end to all military operations. The year 1653, was the one in which the Morlacchi took the main burden of the defense of the province.

2.8. Venetian Defeat at Knin and its Aftermath (1654-1656)

Already at the beginning of his mandate, in spring 1653, Governor-General Dolfin planned to undertake an attack against one of newly rebuilt Ottoman strongholds: Sinj or Knin, yet the preparations for the operations went too slow, and *consulta* decided it was best not to attempt anything during that year.²⁶⁵ In January 1654, Dolfin again gathered *consulta*, and in spite of opposition by Governor-General of Cavalry Benzon, Dolfin decided to launch an attack on Knin in March.²⁶⁶ For this operation Dolfin gathered a task force of 6,152 foot and 284 horse, a force not put into field by the Republic in Dalmatia for quite some time. However, the units of the Venetian regular army made less than 50% of this force, its larger part, 3,675 men, consisted of territorial militia and the Morlacchi. Moreover, the entire operation was very badly conceived, and almost equally badly executed. Provisions taken by the army were insufficient, siege guns failed to inflict sufficient damage on fortifications, yet, what proved decisive was the fact that the Venetian command operated under wrong tactical assumptions concerning the geographical composition of the routes and mountain passages, and

²⁶⁴Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 131.

²⁶⁵Franjo Difić, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 227-228.

²⁶⁶The first choice for the attack of the governor-general was actually the fortress of Herceg-Novi in the Bay of Kotor; however, the operation was judged to be complicated and the fortress of Knin was chosen instead as the target of the attack for this spring. ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 102. (Zara, 16. Genaro 1653. m.v.); Franjo Difić, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, p. 228.

consequently the Ottoman ability to bring reinforcements.²⁶⁷ Because of this, the commander in charge of the operation, Governor-General of the Cavalry Benzoni, had no clear plan on how to react to the appearance of Ottoman relief force. A miscalculation which was to prove fatal for the outcome of the entire operation. In short, upon the news of the Venetian attack on Knin, the Bosnian pasha quickly assembled the force of 5,000 men and leading it unopposed through unguarded mountain passes, managed to take Venetians by surprise. In the short battle that followed the Ottoman force which enjoyed an overwhelming cavalry superiority completely routed Venetians.²⁶⁸

Venetian losses were high, almost 1,400 men (or 24%) were killed or captured; yet, what hurt most was that the majority of these casualties, 1,052 men, came from the ranks of professional army.²⁶⁹ In a single day, the Republic lost almost 1/4 of its military force in Dalmatia and a large number of experienced veterans who were very hard to replace.

Governor-General Dolfin, wrote urgent dispatches to the Senate, asking for hasty reinforcements and informing his superiors that, all in all, paid units of the Venetian army at the moment count only 4,170 men.²⁷⁰ Venetian prospects in Dalmatia for that season seemed very bleak. Over the years, the Ottoman corsairs from Herceg-Novi, Ulcinj and St. Maura, grew in number, and in 1654, according to Venetian reports, no less than 24 Ottoman *fuste* operated in Adriatic.²⁷¹ Even more threatening was the news brought by various spies and informers in Venetian service, concerning Ottoman plans and military preparations for the upcoming campaign. According to the information available to the governor-general, the

267The fortress of Knin is geographically set in a mountain valley, and *consulta* gathered with the goal of operation planing, based on the reports by the engineers that were sent to scout the place, and who wrongly assumed that there were only three mountain passes that the Ottomans could use in order to come to aid to the fortress in case of attack. This was the first, strategical, mistake. Secondly, *consulta* decided that the units of Morlacchi should be put in charge of these passes and assumed that they will be able to hold off for long enough for the Venetian force to conquer the fort. This was the second, tactical, mistake. What actually did happen, was that when the Morlacchi observed the approach of the strong relief force, they immediately retreated and joined the main body of the Venetian army bringing news of the Ottoman approach.

268Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, p. 229-213.; Marko Jačov, *Le guerre Veneto-Turche*, pp. 107-110; For the Dolfin's reports of this operation see: ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 112. (Galea, Scradona 20. Marzo 1654); num. 113. (Galea, Sebenico, 24. Marzo 1654)

269ASVe, PTM. b. 475, num. 120. (Zara 26 Aprile 1654) attachment number 14, dated 1654. 10. Aprile, Zara; Compare also Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, p. 231.

270ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 114. (Zara, 29. Marzo 1654); ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 117. (Zara, 10. Aprile 1654)

271ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 115. (Zara, 29. Marzo 1654)

Bosnian pasha was amassing a great force at Livno (July estimates reckoned with the size of the Ottoman army of 12,000 men),²⁷² and provisions, guns and munitions were pouring from all sides.²⁷³ Klis and Split were designated as potential targets for this campaign - the latter being the weakest link in the Venetian defensive lines on the coast²⁷⁴ - and 14th of August was set as the attack date.²⁷⁵ Widespread opinion among the Venetian military hierarchy was that if the Ottomans would undertake a formal attack on Split, it could not be defended.²⁷⁶

The first reinforcements arrived to Dalmatia already in May: two companies of heavy cavalry (*Corazze*) dispatched from the Italian mainland,²⁷⁷ and an ad-hoc gathered force of 500 men of Istrian *cernide*.²⁷⁸ In order to compensate for the losses, the Republic hastily begun recruiting new units on all sides, yet this was a slow process and the time was not working in favor of the Republic. It was not before late July, that the first newly levied companies slowly begun arriving to Dalmatia.²⁷⁹ Yet, help came from an unexpected side. In late May, Croatian magnate Petar Zrinski, upon own initiative, organized a large raid in the province of Lika, disrupting Ottoman preparations in these parts and tying the forces of the westernmost sandjaks of the Bosnian pashaluk for the remainder of the campaign season.²⁸⁰ Finally, in spite of all gloomy predictions, the campaign season passed without any major engagement. The Bosnian pasha, Fazil, decided that the safest course is not to take any chances. The 200 heads and 220 prisoners already sent to Istanbul as trophies of his victory at Knin were very well received, and an attack on a Venetian stronghold represented but

272ASVe, PTM. b. 476. num. 144. (Zara, 8. Luglio 1654)

273Gligor Stanojević. *Dalmacija u dona kandijskog rata*, p. 134.

274In June, Governor-General Dolfin informed the Senate that the prospects of defending Split were very weak, stating that the defense of Split lies primarily in the hands of God. Dolfin also attached to his letter the report compiled by baron d'Herberstein, who in the role of *soprintendente d'armi* inspected fortifications of threatened towns and fortresses: Split, Trogir and Klis. According to Herberstein's assessments, of the three, Split was indefensible in case of a formal attack, and so he recommended that in the case of an Ottoman advance toward this town, it should be evacuated. ASVe, PTM. b.476. num. 134. (Zara, 5. Giugno 1654) attachment: *letter of baron Herberstein dated 31. May 1654*.

275ASVe, PTM. b. 476. num. 145. (Zara, 13. Luglio 1654)

276During his inspection of Split and Trogir in July, Governor-General Dolfin met with Colonels serving in Split, who all jointly presented to him their opinion that Split could not be defended, in case of a serious Ottoman attack. ASVe, PTM. b. 476. num. 148. (Di Galea Trau, 28. Luglio 1654)

277ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 126. (Zara, 17. Maggio 1654)

278ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 128. (Zara, 23. Maggio 1654)

279In late July, the first new 4 companies with 320 men arrived to Dalmatia. ASVe, PTM. b. 476. num. 149. (Di Galea Trau, 28. Luglio 1654)

280Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 135.

unnecessary risk.²⁸¹ Thus, this campaign season, the Ottomans attacked neither Split, nor any other Dalmatian town. Instead, the pasha was content with a simple raids on districts of Dalmatian towns, and retreated with booty to Bosnia in September.²⁸² Yet, misfortunes continued to befall the Venetian side. As always, the retreat of the main Ottoman army from Dalmatia signaled the renewal of Morlacchi attacks. In September, Serdar Ilija Smiljanić, who led a daring raid on Bilaj in Bosnia in face of Ottoman advance already in June,²⁸³ organized an attack on Udbina in Lika. The raid that proved to be his doom. Morlacchi raiders successfully penetrated into Ottoman lands and as planned plundered the area of Udbina, capturing rich booty. However, upon return, the Morlacchi were ambushed by a small Ottoman party and Serdar Smiljanić fell as one of the first casualties in this skirmish.²⁸⁴ With his death, the Republic lost a competent, energetic and probably the most successful of Morlacchi leaders in its service during this war.

Fighting in Dalmatia in the year 1654 begun disastrously for the Venetian side, yet, fortunately for the Republic, ended without any serious consequences. The Ottomans were irresolute and failed to use this opportunity, while the Venetian garrisons in Dalmatia were seriously undermanned to strike a decisive blow and capture some fortified port on the Dalmatian coast. Such outcome could have reflected greatly on the Republic's war effort in the Levant. Nevertheless, even without such accomplishment, 1654 can be taken as the turning point for the Ottomans in this battlefield. During the previous years, the Ottomans had by rebuilding Sinj and Knin, reestablished its military presence in central Dalmatia, and after the Venetian defeat at Knin, it has become clear that they also regained military dominance and strategic initiative in the region. The days of Venetian offensives were gone, and from 1654 until the end of the war, Venetian forces would not attempt any formal military operations against the targets in the hinterland. Instead, the Republic limited the use of its armed forces solely to defense, already for last few years leaving any offensive operations in

281Kenneth M. Setton., *Venice, Austria and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century*, p. 170.

282Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 135.

283ASVe, PTM. b. 476. num. 136. (Zara, 14. Giugno 1654)

284Boško Desnica, *Istorija kotorskih uskoka*, pp. 76-77

Dalmatian hinterland to its irregulars (Morlacchi and *hajduks*).

In January 1655, Lorenzo Dolfin was replaced by the new Governor-General, Giovanni Antonio Zeno. The year 1655 was rather peaceful for Dalmatia, apart from a few small raids, the Ottomans did not undertake any serious attacks. The reason for this was the June rebellion that broke out among the local Muslims in Bosnia, caused by oppression and autocracy of Fazil pasha. This internal turmoil paralyzed Ottomans for an entire campaign and finally led to the removal of Fazil pasha from the post of governor.²⁸⁵ However, the departure of Fazil pasha did not mark the return of smooth functioning of the Ottoman military apparatus. Military preparations for the campaign season of 1656 were seriously hindered by political upheavals at the Porte. In the period from the recall of Fazil pasha, in October 1655, until July 1656, no less than three governors exchanged at the head of the Bosnian *eyalet*.²⁸⁶ The Venetian side was not immune to the problems of frequent changes of its governor-generals in Dalmatia either. After Foscolo's departure from Dalmatia, the Republic was unable to find more permanent replacement for him. The latest Governor-General Antonio Zeno, spent only 18 months in Dalmatia, before being excused to depart due to serious health problems, in July 1656. Antonio Bernardo was appointed as his successor who at the time already served in Dalmatia as the *provveditore straordinario*. At least, in such a way, the Republic was able to secure smooth transition and uninterrupted functioning of its administrative organs in the province.

As a result of political upheavals, military preparations and the assembly of the Ottoman army at Livno progressed at a slower pace than during previous years. This gave Governor-General Bernardo more time to prepare for defense. Moreover, Bernardo decided to act more actively than his predecessor Zeno. Informed by spies and informers that Ottomans planned to attack Split this year, Bernardo decided to attempt to disrupt their preparations. In order to do

²⁸⁵In late June, Governor-General Antonio Zen, reported that, instead to Dalmatia, the Bosnian pasha led his forces toward Banjaluka to quell the rebellion in parts around Gradiška and Lika " *e d'altre parti, tutte congiurate contro da lui, per l'estorsioni che va facendo.*" ASVe, PTM. b. 477. num. 47. (Zara, li 21. Giugno, 1655)

²⁸⁶Gliogor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 135-136.

so, Bernardo equipped and dispatched a Morlacchi party, 1,000 men strong, to attack and plunder the countryside of the fortress of Knin. Since the majority of the Ottoman army at Livo consisted of "*i Spahi militia feudataria, che poco ben volentieri si riduce ad ubbidire, viaggiar, e partire con caldi estremi*," Bernardo's aim was to provide an excuse to frontier *sipahis* not to join the army of pasha at Livno (under the pretext of the need to defend their homes against Morlacchi raids) and, also, to draw back to the defense of their homes many of those who already joined the Ottoman camp at Livno.²⁸⁷ Additionally, if this operation managed to divert Ottomans away from Split and toward Zadar - the strongest Venetian stronghold in the region - so much the better.

It seems that Bernardo's plan worked as intended. In his letter dated 18th August, the governor-general informed the Senate, that "*Aghe, et altri principali Capi*," have made strong pressure on the Bosnian pasha, protesting that Christians: "are annihilating their subjects, who are either cut down or falling to slavery; that they are not safe to leave their strongholds, that their property and animals are plundered daily, and that they do not have the means to support themselves in such conditions." Because of this, Bernardo claimed, the pasha changed his plans and ordered his forces to march toward Zadar.²⁸⁸ For the entire summer, Venetians prepared for the awaited Ottoman attack on Zadar; the town's district was evacuated, women and children sheltered on nearby islands, armed vessels positioned on guard posts along the coast and provisions of ammunition distributed to smaller settlements left along the coast. Yet, no attack came, since, the Bosnian pasha lost the entire campaign season in irresolute maneuvering. Only in late October did the Ottoman army attempt a half-hearted attack against the fortress of Klis, which was easily dislodged by the Venetian force led personally by Governor-General Bernardo, who assembled a strong naval squadron, embarked as much infantry as possible and followed pasha's movement on land by sea, arriving to Split at the same time as the Ottoman army.²⁸⁹ After dispatching several raiding parties against Zadar and

287ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 28. (Zara, 4. Agosto 1656)

288 ... *annihilando li suoi sudditi, cadendo chi sotto il ferro, e chi in schiavitù; Non esser sicuri d'uscir fuori delle Piazze, venir gli rapite le sostanze, depredati giornalmente gl'animali, e non haver più modo di sostenersi in questa forma.* ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 32, (Zara, 18. Agosto 1656)

289ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 43. (Spalato, 23. Settembre 1656); num. 51. (Spalato, 9. Ottobre 1656)

Šibenik, the pasha retreated to Livno, failing to achieve anything this year.²⁹⁰

Much more successful, at least in the beginning, were the Ottoman corsairs in the Adriatic. In May, an unexpected surge of eight Ottoman *fuste* from Ulcinj caught the Venetians by surprise, spreading terror and insecurity all over the Adriatic. After less than a month Ottoman corsairs returned towing to Ulcinj no less than six prizes.²⁹¹ However, this provoked a strong response from the Venetian government. Reinforcements were brought from Corfu and Ionian Islands and the strengthened squadron of the governor of the Gulf was ruthlessly persecuting Ottoman corsairs. The result was that by the beginning of September only three *fuste* remained blocked in Ulcinj, and Governor-General Bernardo could proclaim Adriatic secure for navigation.²⁹²

If the year 1656 was rather uneventful in Dalmatia, and passed without any serious engagement of lasting consequences, this was not the case in the Levant. On 1st August 1656, the news of the great Venetian naval victory, in what became known as the third battle of the Dardanelles,²⁹³ reached Dalmatia and quickly became the cause of celebration and jubilee.²⁹⁴ However, as it turned out, this victory was to have unexpected and profound consequences for the further course of the war. Success of Venetian arms precipitated the fall of the government and gave impetus to the rise of the new and energetic grand vizier, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, founder of the most prominent dynasty of grand viziers.²⁹⁵ Soon, very disturbing news reached Dalmatia, namely, that the new government wanted to avenge this defeat on sea by victory on land, and that Dalmatia was chosen as the main target for the next campaign. Already in October, rather fantastic rumors reached Governor-General Antonio Bernardo, that next year the grand vizier would personally lead the army to Dalmatia, and that the emissary of the Tartars promised no less than 120,000 combatants for this campaign.²⁹⁶ A few weeks later, the

²⁹⁰Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 136.

²⁹¹ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 11. (Dalla Galera Al Posto delle Rose nelle Boche di Cattaro, a 8 Giugno 1656)

²⁹²ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 38. (Budua, 3. Settembre 1656)

²⁹³For more on naval operations in Levant, in 1656, see: Kenneth M. Setton, *Venice, Austria and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century*, pp. 182-185.

²⁹⁴ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 27. (Zara, 1. Agosto 1656)

²⁹⁵Joseph Hammer, *Historija Osmanskog Carstva vol. 2*, pp. 430-432; Kenneth M. Setton, *Venice, Austria and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century*, p. 185.

²⁹⁶ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 48. (Spalato, 6. Ottobre 1656)

rumors became even graver, claiming that the young Sultan expressed his intention to personally lead the army on this campaign.²⁹⁷

During the entire winter news of large Ottoman preparations ceaselessly arrived to Venice. At the same time guns were being cast in Bosnia, troops began marching from Belgrade to Sarajevo and Banja-Luka, and food and munition were gathered. When in February 1657, the new Bosnian pasha, Seid Ahmet Pasha, a former commander of the Sea, reached Sarajevo accompanied by 5,000 troops and large provisions, there were no more doubts that Ottomans are preparing serious military operations in this battlefield for the next campaign.²⁹⁸ Alarmed by Ottoman preparations, Governor-General Bernardo compiled a detailed report concerning the state of defense of all Venetian strongholds along the coast, stressing the unpreparedness of the province for the expected Ottoman invasion. Bernardo's concern was easy to understand, in December, the forces he commanded counted no more than 5,200 men, and according to the estimates of his staff in order to hold off Ottoman attack 18,000 combatants were required.²⁹⁹ What troubled the Venetian command most, were the Ottoman plans to attack two Venetian strongholds at the same time, thus preventing Venetians to - utilizing sea transport - concentrate the majority of their forces at one spot threatened most. As the targets for the upcoming campaign, Kotor in Venetian Albania to the south, and Šibenik or Split in Dalmatia were designated. The attack on Kotor was to be undertaken by the sandjak beys of Skadar and Herzegovina with the latter acting as the commanding officer, while the Bosnian

297ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 54. (Trau, 16. Ottobre 1656)

298Gligor Stanojević. *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 136.; The new pasha, already with his ceremonial entry into Sarajevo, riding at the head of the picturesque army composed of various ethnic groups (thus representing the diversities and strength of the Empire), dressed as a warrior and without the turban, made a clear statement of his intention to wage war this campaign seassion.

Finalmente è arrivato in Serraglio il Bassa della Bossina alli 23, del mese di Febraro passato, facendo l'ingresso con molta solenità, vestito da Guerrire, senza Turbante in testa, armato di Celata, corteggiato dal Bassa di Canisa, e di Vlasca, et da duecento de proprij venturini, con seguito numero de valorosi comandanti Persiani, Greci, Croati, et Albanesi, con quattro cento Delie, potendo ascender tra tutti, (compreso il corteggio) al numero di quattro in cinque mille persone à Cavallo; portando voce, che à Belgrado havesse lasciato il Bassa di Temisa, et Fasli Bassa suo Precessore con molta gente, che ivi addunavano d'ordine del Gran Sig(no).re.

Non ben smontato, ha subito distribuiti commandamenti rigorosi [2] ad ogni parte, perché tutti li Spahij, et Gianizzeri debbano ritorvarsì in stato di marchiar seco, alla Guerra dentro il termine di giorni vinti.
ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 91. (Zara, 7. Aprile 1657)

299ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 69. (Sebenico, 10. Decembre 1656) and attachment: *Ristretto Generale di tutte le Militie si a Piedi, come a Cavallo, che si attrovano negl' infrascritti Presidij delle Provintie di Dalmatia et Albania*

pasha was to be in charge of the attack on Dalmatia and overall supervision of the entire operation.³⁰⁰

2.9. Ottoman Attacks on Split and Kotor (1657)

By the second half of May 1657, the Republic managed to scrape up and send some 2,500 men to Dalmatia, bringing its forces there to some 8,000 men.³⁰¹ These were the forces with which Antonio Bernardo was to meet the Ottoman attack on a wide front. At the beginning of June Bernardo sailed for Kotor, judging it the most endangered of all sites, leaving Don Camillo Gonzaga the general in command of Venetian forces in Dalmatia, in Šibenik. In spite of Ottoman plans to simultaneously attack multiple Venetian targets this summer, this was not what happened. Bernardo's passage to the south provoked the pasha to make a daring move. Not waiting for his force to fully assemble, the Bosnian pasha headed straight for Split, in an attempt to capture the town by storm. In order to gain speed the Ottoman army left heavy siege artillery behind and brought along only a few smaller pieces.³⁰²

Pasha's gamble almost succeeded. The Ottoman army begun its attack on the Split on 13th June, and defenders would probably not have been able to resist the general assault planned for the 16th had it not been for the prompt arrival, the day before, of *Don Camillo Gonzaga* with 700 men. Soon, other Venetian reinforcements begun pouring in. First, on 18th June, the governor of the Island of Hvar arrived at the head of a numerous flotilla of small vessels, carrying several hundred men of local *cernide* units, soon followed, on 20th June, by a naval squadron from Kotor led by the governor-general personally. Bernardo entered the town with great pomp, with unfurled banners and sounds of instruments, intending to create the impression that he was bringing much greater reinforcements than was actually the case.³⁰³ It seems that this deception achieved the desired effect. Upon seeing a constant flow of Venetian reinforcements to Split the Ottomans lost heart, and on 21st June, the pasha ordered his forces

300ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 92. (Zara, 9. Aprile 1657); num. 94. (Zara, 17. Aprile 1657)

301 ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 100. (Zara, 21. Maggio 1657)

302ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 103. (Di Galera sotto Budua la notte di 16 venendo li 17 Giugno 1657)

303ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 104. (Spalato, 20. Giugno 1657); Also for the attack on Split see: Grga Novak, *Povijest Splita [History of Split]*, vol. 2, (Split: Čakavski sabor, 1961) pp. 1093-1106.; Josip Posedel, "Opsada Splita 1657. godine prema djeku Nicolinija [Siege of Split according to the work of Niccolini]," *Kulturna baština: časopis za pitanja prošlosti splitskog područja* 14 (1983): pp. 92-101.

on the move. Having lost 500 men without achieving anything, the pasha found at least some comfort in plundering the large village of Bosiljina, in the district of Trogir, followed by devastating the countryside of Makaraska before retreating to Livno.³⁰⁴

Much more serious was the planned Ottoman attack on Kotor. At first, the preparations for the campaign, in the sandjak of Skadar, were somewhat delayed by internal power struggle, which almost erupted in armed conflict between the newly appointed sandjak bey sent from Istanbul, and the old holder of the office, Jusufbegović, one of most prominent frontier beys, who refused to acknowledge his deposition.³⁰⁵ However, once this affair was peacefully resolved, the new sandjak bey energetically begun preparations for the attack. The Venetian side did not remained passive. Throughout the entire spring and during early summer of 1657, the Republic engaged in an intense agitation among the mountain tribes of Hercegovina, Montenegro and northern Albania, distributing gifts and stipends, all aimed at winning their support for the upcoming battle. Yet, the Christians were not willing to openly commit to the Venetian cause and were ready to go as far as remaining passive in this conflict.³⁰⁶

304 The attack on the well populated village of Bosiljina was actually one of most embarrassing Ottoman operations, and also became one of most well remembered events of this war. The inhabitants of village offered stiff resistance, in order to buy time for children, women and the old, to be evacuated by sea. In his letter to the Senate, Bernardo scornfully described how the pasha was forced to use artillery to capture a simple unfortified village. More over in his letter to Ali Pasha Čengić, one of the most powerful local beys and a Venetian confidant, concerning the pasha's military proves Bernardo wrote: "*Il vostro Basso di Bossina ha perso più di mille de voi combattenti sotto una nostra villa chiamata marino overo Bosciglina et si siamo maravigliati che lui in persona sia stato con tanto pezzi di canone contro una [2] villa per che li veri guerrieri non vano sotto le Ville con canoni se non sotto la Città et cosi non dovrebbe tratar l'honor del Gran s.re et perder tanta gente per una sol villa di dieci case se bene pui ha abbruggiato alcuna Capane havendo Noi in fizza sua caduto fori dalla d.ta villa tutto il popolo di donne et putti et lasciato solamente pochi homeni per difender sino l'ultimo sangue come valorosamente hanno fatto.*"

However, what secured the fame and long remembrance of this event was the participation of women in armed defense of the village. The motif of the heroic defense of women of Bosiljina against the *Turks*, entered folk songs and poetry and kept alive the memory of his otherwise militarily insignificant skirmish for a long, long time. Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 137.; Marko Jačov, *Le guerre Veneto-Turche*, p. 118-121.; ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 105. (Zara, 22. Giugno 1657); For Bernardo's reports on attack on Bosiljina see: ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 106. (Spalato, 1. Luglio 1657); num. 108. (Cattaro, 12. Luglio 1657); Andrija Kačić Miočič, *Razgovori ugodni naroda slovinskog [A pleasant talks of the Slavic people]*, (Zagreb, 1862) pp. 288-290.; Compare also: Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 243-247.

305As part of the program of consolidation of central authority, the Porte appointed its candidate as the new sandjak bey of Skadar, and charged him with the execution of the attack on Kotor. However, the old, deposed sandjak bey, Jusufbegović one of most influential and powerful local lords was not ready to surrender his position easily. When his first attempts to save the title of the sandjak bey with gifts and bribery failed, after spending 3,000 *Scudi*, Jusufbegović, took up the arms in order to resist his deposition by force if necessary. With meditation of other local lords, the conflict was resolved and some pragmatical solution found, yet valuable time was lost. Gligor Stanojević, *Jugoslovenske zemlje*. pp. 239-240.

306Gligor Stanojević, *Jugoslovenske zemlje*. pp. 243-250.

The attack begun on 30th July 1657, when the 10,000 men strong Ottoman force, carrying seven large siege guns and four smaller pieces, descended to Kotor bay. Despite extensive preparations for this attack, which was led by two sandjak beys: those of Skadar and Hercegovina, after two months, at the beginning of October, the Ottoman army gave up and retreated without accomplishing its objective. The reasons for this failure were numerous. In the first place, the Ottomans did not manage to close the entry to the bay of Kotor, thus preventing Venetians from bringing reinforcements in. Yet, the most decisive factor was the disunity and what can even be characterized as open treason within the ranks of the Ottoman army. Numerous frontier beys, most notable of whom were: old sandjak bey Jusufbegović and his relative Ali Pasha Čengiċ (*Cengizade*),³⁰⁷ the sandjak bey of Hercegovina (the second in command of this operation and also a Venetian *confidante*), were more interested in using this operation as means to undermine and get rid of the new sandjak bey sent from Istanbul, than in capturing the town of Kotor. So it came to be that a large part of the Ottoman army participated in the attack but half-heartedly, and even sabotaged some attempts. Moreover, the Christians in Čengiċ's retinue served as couriers between him and the governor-general in the town, bringing news of planned Ottoman attacks and reports on the state of morale in the Ottoman camp. Finally, similar behavior was also demonstrated by the pasha of Bosnia. After his debacle at Split, the pasha, out of fear that the success of Skadar sandjak bey could bring his deposition about, remained passive in Livno for the entire duration of the attack, and did not join the Ottoman force besieging Kotor until the very end of the siege. Under these circumstances, one could say that the attack was doomed to failure before it even started.³⁰⁸

2.10. The Year of Great Expectations (1658)

Absence of major Ottoman commitment in Dalmatia in 1657 was in the first place a consequence of the concentration of the Ottomans on the Aegean theater of operations. In a

³⁰⁷The intriguing and controversial person of Ali Pasha Čengiċ, one of most powerful beys of Hercegovina was yet not been given sufficient attention in historiography. The already mentioned study by Gligor Stanojeviċ, contains numerous references and information concerning the activities of this Ottoman notable. However, Stanojeviċ's work is somewhat burdened with his very negative opinion of Ali-Paša, depicting him as traitor of the Empire and oppressor of Christian subjects. Gligor Stanojeviċ, *Jugoslovenske zemlje*, pp. 217-221, 228-9, 232-238, 243-4, 247, 250, 252, 259, 276-7, 281.; Equally negative is the view of Radovan Samardžić, compare: Radovan, Samardžić, *Istorija srpskog naroda 3*, p. 375.

³⁰⁸Gligor Stanojeviċ, *Jugoslovenske zemlje*. pp. 250-251.; Marko Jačov, *Le guerre Veneto-Turche*, p. 121-125.

series of hard-fought, bloody encounters in the Dardanelles, during the summer of 1657, the Ottomans managed to recover the strategically important islands Tenedos and Lemnos, and break the Venetian blockade of the straits.³⁰⁹ Now, Grand Vizier Köprülü was free to turn his attention to the developments on the north-western edges of the Empire. Venetian diplomatic dispatches from Istanbul, already from February of 1658, begun bringing news that Dalmatia was going to be the principal Ottoman target during the next campaign.³¹⁰ Furthermore, news that reached Governor-General Bernardo from his spies in Sarajevo, in April, were even more troubling. According to these reports, the grand vizier was about to embark on a trip to Belgrade where he planned to hold a war council, and the pasha of Bosina was ordered to prepare lodgings for him in Sarajevo, a clear sign of grand vizier's intentions to participate in the campaign in Dalmatia.³¹¹ During the entire spring, the Ottoman side was very busy with preparations. Two new bridges were being constructed over the Sava river, the first, on the border of Slavonia and Bosnia, intended to enable easy passage of the imperial army into Bosnia, and the second in the direction of Smederevo in order to enable the passage of a large Tartar army, that was allegedly on the move. In Belgrade, large stockpiles of ammunition and food were being gathered, and all over Bosnia, subjects were ordered to prepare hay and food.³¹²

The Republic could not remain passive and ignore these Ottoman preparations. In Dalmatia, Governor-General Bernardo turned to same tactics he successfully utilized the previous year, and sent a large Morlacchi raid in May, consisting of 1,000 men, against the province of Lika, with the aim to force as many *sipahis* as possible to stay at their homes.³¹³ In

309 Kenneth Setton M., *Venice, Austria and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century*, pp. 185-189.

310 ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num 163. (Zara, 10. Marzo 1658) Attachment: *Leterra da Segretario Ballorino*

311 ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 170. (Zara, 4. Aprile 1658); Venetian fears that Dalmatia was going to be the primary battlefield for the Ottomans this year were also confirmed by the dispatches of the Habsburg ambassador in Adrianople, Simon Reniger. On 19th of March (1658) Reniger informed his master, Leopold I, that "the arms of the Turks will primarily be directed towards Kotor in Dalmatia;" a few days later, (3rd April 1658), followed by another letter, stating that although Rákóczi reappeared in Transylvania, the Grand Vizier plans to personally go to Dalmatia, and send another army to join Tatar Khan in Transylvania.

Österreichische Staatsarchiv – Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Staatskanzlei Türkei (Turcica), Karton 129.

Fasc. 64. Conv. A, fol. 243v-244r; HHStA, "Türkei I." Kt. 130. Fasc. 64. Conv. B, fol. 4r

312 ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 176. (Zara, 25. Aprile 1658) attachment: *Avvisi di Serraglio, 6 di Aprile 1658*.

313 Although the raid turned out to be rather successful it failed to achieve such excellent results as those of the previous year. The Morlacchi penetrated nine days of travel in depth of the Ottoman lands, burning crops and

Venice, the Senate begun organizing and dispatching fresh reinforcements to Dalmatia. That the Senate took the Ottoman threat seriously can be seen best from reinforcements ordered for Dalmatia for that season, consisting of almost 5,000 men. The core of these reinforcements consisted of: two full regiments (one Swiss 1,200 strong, and one of Papal troops, 1,000 men strong), three companies of cavalry drawn from the Italian mainland (one heavy and two light) and 24 gunners. In addition to these regular forces, same as during previous years, the Senate ordered a large contingent of 1,575 men of territorial militia (*cernide*), partly from Istria but largely from the Italian mainland, to serve in Dalmatia for the duration of this campaign.³¹⁴ Equal attention was also dedicated to Republic's naval forces in the Gulf. Due to the increased pirate activity of Ottoman *fustas*, the number of which rose to 24, by 1658,³¹⁵ three new galleys were allocated for service in the Adriatic, bringing the number of galleys under Bernardo's command to eight.³¹⁶ Yet, the main addition to Republic's naval forces in the Adriatic, for this year, were four sail warships destined to guard the entry to the bay of Kotor, and secure unchallenged transport of reinforcements and provisions to Kotor in case of an attack.³¹⁷

By June, the Venetian army in Dalmatia counted almost 8,500 men and when, in July, entire regiment of Swiss mercenaries arrived to Split,³¹⁸ Governor-General Bernardo had at his disposal a force that had not been seen in Dalmatia since the long past "glorious" years of Foscolo's conquests. However, it proved far more easier for the Senate to organize and send reinforcements, than to provide for them, especially in terms of their wages. The financial situation was so disastrous, that the desperate Governor-General Bernardo asked the Senate,

hay along the way. Also, the Morlacchi defeated an ad-hoc gathered Ottoman force of c.a 2,000 men who tried to oppose them returning with large booty and 110 prisoners. ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 182. (Zara, 20. Maggio 1658)

314ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-33, f. f. 73r-v , 81v-82r; However, not all planned reinforcements arrived to Dalmatia. The Papal regiment failed to assemble in full, due to the death of Conte Baldeschi, who was in charge of task of this task, and only 300 men were in the end sent to Dalmatia. Equally, of 2500 *cernide* troops planned, only 1575 finally arrived in Dalmatia. Finally the Swiss regiment, although arrived almost in full strength, failed to show up in Dalmatia until July 1658. ASVe, PTM b. 483, num. 192, (Trau, 24 Giugno 1658)

315Of those, 17 vessels were from St. Maura, and 7 from Ulcinj. ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 172. (Zara, 7. Aprile 1658)

316ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 177. (Zara, 26. Aprile 1658); num. 181. (Zara, 14. Maggio 1658)

317ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-33, f. 56r, 81v;

318ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 193. (Spalato, 8. Luglio 1658)

not to send any further reinforcements, since he did not have the means to provide for those troops already serving in Dalmatia. Furthermore, Bernardo warned the Senate that the morale among the troops is so low that he dreaded that dissatisfied soldiers would surrender some town to the enemy.³¹⁹ Bernardo's warning did not pass unheeded. From June 1658 onwards, the Republic slowly began matching its military commitment in Dalmatia with equal/proportionate assignments of financial funds, dispatching to Bernardo galleys carrying 40,000 and even 50,000 *ducats*, the shipments that had not been seen in Dalmatia for years (see appendix 2 table 2).

However, Dalmatia was not the sole item on the agenda of the grand vizier, who from late May resided in Belgrade. In 1657, Transylvanian prince György Rákóczi II decided to use the Ottoman preoccupation with fighting in the Dardanelles, to embark on a campaign in Poland as an ally of Sweden. Rákóczi's ignoring the Porte, followed by the failure of his Polish campaign, moved the new Ottoman government under Mehmed Köprülü to interfere in Transylvanian affairs. Consequently the Porte demanded from the Transylvanian diet to dismiss Rákóczi and elect a new prince.³²⁰ At the same time, the Bosnian pasha started a new campaign in Dalmatia rather early. Already in June, the Ottoman army 12,000 men strong crossed the Dinaric mountains and descended to the countryside of Split which it devastated for two weeks. From there, the Ottomans crossed to the territory of Zadar and continued operations against targets in that area. After fighting skirmishes for a few weeks, the pasha satisfied with the booty gathered, retreated his forces to Livno. There he awaited the arrival of the reinforcements and provisions from Belgrade in order to begin the siege against some target on the coast. Yet the reinforcements never came, since the developments in Transylvania diverted the Ottoman attention to the north. Rákóczi's refusal to abdicate, and his victory in June over the vanguard led by Ahmed Saidi, the pasha of Buda, provoked the Grand Vizier Köprülü to change his plans and commence a full scale invasion of the

319ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 184. (Zara, 1. Giugno 1658)

320 Katalin Péter, "The Golden Age of the Principality (1606–1660)" In *History of Transylvania*, vol. II., László Makkai and Zoltán Szász eds. (Columbia University Press: New York, 2002) pp. 140-144.

principality.³²¹ By late August, news that the Ottomans are moving all of their forces to the north against Transylvania reached Dalmatia, and practically signaled the end of military operations for this year.³²² The Pasha of Bosnia simply spent the rest of campaign season peacefully in Livno and disbanded his army in October.³²³

2.11. All Quiet on the Western Front (1659-1669)

The military campaign of 1658 was the last major Ottoman offensive in Dalmatia. From this year on, the Empire never committed any significant resources to this battlefield and war waging was practically left to the initiative of local Ottoman lords, who were already for some time demonstrating signs of exhaustion and war weariness. These first 14 years of war (1645-1658), have been dealt here in more detail since they constitute the active and dynamic period of the conflict. Until the end of the war, the strategical situation practically did not change at all. The military objectives achieved in this period account for the final result of war operations and in this sense, these years actually represent the essence of fighting in the Dalmatian theater of operations. For the next 11 years, the war simply dragged on until finally in 1669 peace was concluded. During these years, fighting was reduced to smaller Ottoman incursions numbering 1,000-5,000 men, and an occasional Morlacchi raid or foray, void of any strategic significance.

In the years 1659-1662, the Ottomans were deeply entangled in Transylvanian affairs, and from 1663-1664 in open war with the Habsburgs.³²⁴ During this period, the battlefield in Dalmatia was positioned very low on the list of priorities of the central government in Istanbul. The fighting season in 1659 was opened with a large Morlacchi raid. Two Morlacchi serdars, Janko Mitrović and Ilija Milković, led 2,000 Morlacchi and attacked the Ottoman

³²¹Katalin Péter, *The Golden Age of the Principality*, pp. 147-148.; According to the reports of the Habsburg ambassador in Adrianople, Simon Reniger, from 24th of June 1658, the plan of the Ottomans was not to undertake a formal campaign against fortified places in Transylvania, but simply to persecute Rákóczi, and direct their efforts against Dalmatia. For this, the Grand Vizier decided to commit to Transylvanian campaign the Tatars auxiliary, pashas of the northwestern provinces of the empire and Wallachians and Moldavians, while he was intent on personally leading the campaign against Dalmatia. HHStA, "Türkei I." Kt. 130. Fasc. 64. Conv. B, fol. 168v;

³²²ASVe, PTM. PTM. b. 483. num. 206. (Spalato, 25 Agosto 1658)

³²³Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 138-139.

³²⁴Ágnes R. Várkonyi, "The Last Decades of the Independent Principality (1660–1711)" In *History of Transylvania*, vol. II., László Makkai and Zoltán Szász eds. (Columbia University Press: New York, 2002) pp. 233-262.

settlements in the region of Cetina, yet in the fighting that ensued, both serdars were wounded and in a few days dead. This proved to be the last great Morlacchi raid in Ottoman lands. For years, the Morlacchi were losing strength and from this moment on, they concentrated mainly on defense, and limited their offensive activities to smaller incursions and forays. In 1659, the Ottomans were again paralyzed by frequent changes of leadership, and when finally in mid-August the third Bosnian pasha, took over, there was almost no time left for any serious operations. The Ottoman forces simply ravaged the countryside of Šibenik, Split and Trogir, and returned home with booty.³²⁵

The following year, 1660, after serving for almost full five years in Dalmatia, Antonio Bernardo was finally excused, and replaced by Andrea Corner who took over the post in March 1660. Ottoman inactivity during previous years prompted Venetian government to also further reduce its military presence in Dalmatia. At a muster held upon his arrival in Dalmatia, new Governor-General Corner found out the Venetian military forces in Dalmatia counting no more than 3,200 men.³²⁶ Still, even this small force proved sufficient to repel Ottoman attacks this year. The Ottomans conducted only one incursion in Venetian territories. Rather early, in late May 4,000-5,000 men led by the Bosnian pasha attacked the lands between Klis and Split. Since the Ottomans did not bring any artillery, they limited their activities only to burning crops and attacking unfortified villages. After several days of fighting Morlacchi and territorial militia, supported by the Venetian navy, the Ottomans retreated.³²⁷ In 1661, the death of Mehmed Köprülü and internal power struggle that accompanied the succession of his son to the position of the grand vizier, combined with Ottoman engagement in Transylvania, resulted in the first peaceful year in Dalmatia since the beginning of the war in 1645.³²⁸

The year 1662 begun with an unexpected winter raid against the Zadar countryside. A party

³²⁵Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 139.

³²⁶ASVe, PTM. b. 487. num. 1 (Zara, undated)

³²⁷The Governor-General used this incident to plead for reinforcements, reminding his superiors that: "*il coraggio dimostra ben la divotione inclinata de gl' animi, ma non è mezzo bastante per se solo à ribbattar i tentativi, che i nemici superiori di forze, e ben muniti d'ogni apprestamento intraprendessero à preiud.o di questa Provincie..*"ASVe, PTM. b. 487. num. 18. (Sebenico, 5. Giugno 1660)

³²⁸Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 139.

of 4,000 Ottomans managed to surprise Morlacchi, and not only gather considerable plunder but also to inflict heavy defeat on the Morlacchi who attempted to pursue them, killing and capturing almost 400 of them. This was one of the worst Morlacchi defeats in the course of this war. In April, troubling news of Ottoman preparations reached Zadar, in Bosnia a large army of 12,000-15,000 men was assembling, destined to attack Split and Kotor.³²⁹ Fortunately, this force was also diverted to the north and the rest of the year was marked only by skirmishes fought between the Ottomans and the Morlacchi in Dalmatia, yet with no significant consequences.³³⁰ If the Ottomans were relatively inactive in Dalmatia in 1662, this was because they concentrated their efforts in the sandjak of Hercegovina, where local Christians had already for some time practically been out of their control. During the entire year, the sandjak of Hercegovina was engaged in a large scale police operation with the goal to pacify local Christians. The time for negotiations and clemency was gone, and the Ottomans ruthlessly struck at their Christians subjects, plundering their settlements and executing dozens of clan leaders lured by false promises of security to reconciliation negotiations. Venetians could only watch with frustration how Ottomans eradicated Venetian influence in that area.³³¹

In order to reestablish Venetian influence among the Christians of Hercegovina and Montenegro, new Governor-General Girolamo Contarini begun preparations for the attack on the Ottoman fortress of Herceg-Novu in the bay of Kotor. A move desired by local Christians for quite a long time. For this operation, during the winter months of 1663, Contarini assembled a strong naval squadron, of five galleys, one *galeazza*, numerous *barche armate*, and 900 soldiers.³³² However, deeply aware of limited resources at its disposal in this battlefield, the Senate instructed Contarini not to take any chances and to sustain from the planned attack in case it proved dangerous and risky. Therefore, Governor-General Contarini,

329ASVe, PTM. b. 488, num. 126. (Zara, 27. Aprile 1662) attachments to the letter with the news of Ottoman preparations.

330Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 139-140.; ASVe, PTM, b. 488. num. 114. (Zara, 19. Febraro 1661. mv.)

331Gligor Stanojević, *Jugoslovenske zemlje*, p. 258-260.

332ASVe, PTM. b. 490. num. 60. (Zara, 17. Marzo 1663)

in his orders to the commander of this operation, Baron Alessandro di Spaar, designated the Ottoman port of Ulcinj as a secondary target in case the attack on Herceg-Novi could not be undertaken. So it came to be that the Venetian fleet that sailed from Split on 26th March (1663) in the end attacked the port of Ulcinj, heavily bombarding the town and fort, burning the town's suburb and destroying six *fuste* captured by surprise in the harbor. Rather strictly following received orders Baron Spaar, did not take any chances. After a half-hearted attempt to crack open town gates using mines, the Venetian commander, satisfied with what was achieved, led his forces back to Dalmatia. His decision to attack Ulcinj, instead of the much stronger fortress of Herceg-Novi, Baron Spaar justified with the treason of the Ragusans who allegedly informed the Ottomans of Venetian plans to attack Herceg-Novi. The attack on Ulcinj was the last offensive action of the republic in this battlefield, and as Gligor Stanojević has already correctly concluded it was more of an improvisation than a well planned operation.³³³

In Dalmatia, the Ottomans opened the fighting season with a repeated winter raid against the Morlacchi of Zadar, again inflicting heavy damage on them. As a response to this Ottoman incursion, Governor-General Contarini, in June 1663, dispatched his irregulars. Joint Morlacchi forces of Zadar and Šibenik attacked the territory of Knin, while at the same time *hajduks* from Makarska raided Ottoman settlements along the Neretva river. Although Morlachi were rather successful in their raid they were again hit by misfortune. In the short skirmish fought with local forces both of their leaders, serdars Miljković and Grgurica were killed.³³⁴ Heavy casualties among Morlacchi, in the first decade of war, and constant exposure to Ottoman raids, resulted over the years in a significant decrease of their military strength. For example, while in 1648, the Morlacchi of Zadar counted 4,000 men able to carry arms, by May 1664, their number fell to less than 1,500.³³⁵ At the same time, as the military activity of Morlacchi was decreasing, the region of Makarska and the Island of Hvar, were developing as

³³³Gligor Stanojević, *Jugoslovenske zemlje*, p. 260-261.; For Contarni's reports see: ASVe, PTM. b. 490. num. 63. (Zara, 26. Marzo 1663); num. 67. (Zara, 11. Aprile 1663)

³³⁴Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 140.; For the report of Governor-General Contarini on deaths of Morlacchi serdars see: ASVe, PTM. b. 492. num. 83. (Spalato, 7. Luglio 1663.)

³³⁵ASVe, PTM. b. 492. num. 151. (Zara, 31. Maggio 1664)

new centers for Venetian irregulars, the so-called *hajduks*, who heavily raided the sandjak of Hercegovina and neutral Ragusan Republic. Increased hajduk activities finally provoked the Ottomans to undertake a punitive operation against them. At the end of August 1663, the sandjak bey of Hercegovina Ali Pasha Čengiċ, otherwise very favorably inclined toward the Republic, led 3,000 men against the region of Makarska and Primorje with the objective to eradicate local *hajduks*.³³⁶

Absence of any serious military operations in Dalmatia, during the year 1663, was in the first place a consequence of the outbreak of war between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburgs. For the next two campaign seasons, this conflict tied up all of the Empire's resources, including also troops from Bosnia which were called to Hungary. Due to the same reasons, the following year of 1664 was even more uneventful, and the Republic put all of its efforts to upholding of peace on this frontier. The year 1665, with the exception of the Ottoman attack on Zadar Morlacchi, in March, was also a year in which both sides refrained from any serious military actions. By this time both sides were already exhausted, and were looking for means to end this conflict. Although, in 1666, violence erupted again, it was limited to small raids and forays, and the sole notable Ottoman operation (from September 1666 when pasha led 8,000 men), was directed against the *hajduks* of Primorje, which was easily repelled with the help of the Venetian navy.³³⁷

From the end of 1665, peace talks begun in Istanbul, and dragged on inconclusively until 1667, when it was finally clear that diplomatic solutions to this conflict were still impossible. However, renewal of Ottoman offensives on Crete in 1667 did not result in any significant increase in activities in Dalmatia. Occasional Morlacchi raids, and punitive Ottoman actions against the Morlacchi or *hajduks*, summarize in short the military operations of the last three years of the war in this battlefield. Actually, the conditions did not differ much from the "state

336Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 140-141.

337Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 143-144.; ASVe, PTM. b. 496. num. 175. (Spalato, 29. Agosto 1666); The Pasha of Bosnia even wrote courteous letter to Governor-General Cornaro justifying his actions against Primorje, as the operation ordered by the Gran Signore against the local *hajduks*, not as the act of hostility directed against the Republic. ASVe, PTM. num. 182. (Di Galea nell' Aque di Primorgie, 24. Settembre 1666) attachment: *Letter of Pasha of Bosnia to Governor-General Cornaro*.

of peace" in the pre-war years. Finally, when the news of the surrender of Candia, the last Venetian stronghold on Crete, on 6th September 1669, reached Dalmatia, the war was officially over. The last war time Governor-General, Antonio Priuli, left Dalmatia in late December 1669, and one his last acts was to issue the public proclamation prohibiting Venetian subjects to attack Ottoman targets.³³⁸

The job of the next peace-time Governor-General, Barbaro Antonio, was actually much harder and more complex one: maintenance of peace and border demarcation. The establishment of the new border was not finished until 1671, and was preceded by outbreaks of hostilities along the frontier that almost reverted the two states back to war. Finally, when the new border was marked, the territorial gains of the Venetian side were much less than what was expected based on the successes of the Venetian arms in this battlefield. In order to attain peace, the Republic had to renounce majority of its territorial gains. In the end, the Republic kept only Klis, Skradin and significant part of the lands in Ravni Kotari in the Zadar hinterland, settled by Morlacchi, but had to abandon all the rest, including the communities of Poljice and Makarska which were forced to return under the Ottoman rule.³³⁹

3. Strategic Geography: Permanently Operating Factors and their Influence on the Course of War

While previous sections provided an overview of the military operations within their political context, the following paragraphs aim to discuss what some historians refer to as the immutable context of warfare (Rhoads Murphey), or the realm of "permanently operating factors" (John Keegan) namely: geography, weather, climate and seasons and their influence on war conduct in the Dalmatian theater of operations.³⁴⁰ Ottoman and Venetian military operations in Dalmatia strictly followed the change of seasons. In this regard, the Ottoman

³³⁸Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 145.

³³⁹For more on these developments see: Tea Mayhew, *Dalmatia between the Ottoman and Venetian Rule*, pp. 48-61.; Also compare: Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. -145146.

³⁴⁰John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (London: Pimlico, 1994) p. 63.; Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700*, pp. 20-25.; At this point the acknowledgment and credit is due to the studies that influenced the writing of this section greatly: Pádraig Lenihan, "Strategic Geography 1641-1691" in *Conquest and resistance: war in seventeenth-century Ireland*, ed. Pádraig Lenihan (Brill Publishing, Leiden, 2001) pp. 115-150; and Lorraine White, "Strategic Geography and the Spanish Habsburg Monarchy's Failure to recover Portugal 1640-1668," *The Journal of Military History* 71, (2007): pp. 373-409.

military calendar in this battlefield did not diverge from standard Ottoman practices, and the days of St. George and St. Demetrius marked the beginning and the end of the military campaign for the Ottoman army.³⁴¹ Practically all major Ottoman military operations in this battlefield, with the exception of a few winter raids, such as those at the end of the war, in the years 1662-1663, took place in this period. On the other hand, if the months from May until early November belonged to Ottomans and represented the period of their military dominance, the rest of the year (more or less) belonged to Venetian forces, regular ones and irregulars alike. Venetian forces were especially active during the months of early spring: February-April, which represented the favorite campaign period for Venetian commanders. As we have seen, these were the months during which most successful Venetian operations, offensives by Governor-General Foscolo in 1647 and 1648, took place. Furthermore, with the exception of the expedition to Albania, which begun in the middle of winter, in December 1648, all offensive operations by Venetian regular forces were confined to these months. In 1652, Governor-General Foscarini organized an attack on Zadvarje, the failed attack on Knin took place in March, planned but never realized attack on Sinj was supposed to take place in March 1653, and so on. Yet, such seasonal warfare, was not merely the result of Ottoman mobilization and demobilization practices, governed by previously mentioned feasts of St. St. George and St. Demetrius, but was also profoundly influenced by geographical factors: lay of the land, climate etc.

The key factor of strategic geography, which marked this battlefield was the mountain range of the Dinaric Alps or the Dinarides, that stretches for more than 640 kilometers along the Adriatic coast. Its three central mountain ridges: Velebit, Dinara and Biokovo, form a natural divide between Dalmatia and Bosnia, cutting the Ottoman territories in the region in two separate areas. To the south of this mountain divide lay: Klis, the most southern sandjak of the Bosnian pashaluk and a large part of the sandjak of Lika. Although the mountains could be crossed by individuals and small parties even in the midst of winter, a feat by no means free of danger, only two mountain passes suitable for passage of medium to large size military

341Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, pp. 20-21.

forces connected Dalmatia and the rest of the Ottoman hinterland. To the north-west, the pass called the "Knin gate" (*Kninska vrata*), situated to the north of the fortress of Knin, provided an entry to Dalmatia for the forces of the western parts of the Bosnian pashaluk, those facing Habsburg military frontier: Lika, Krbava and Bihać, while to the south, the Vaganj pass, which connects Livno and Sinj, served as the main entry point for the forces of the rest of the pashaluk. Moreover, due to harsh weather conditions, these passes were practically closed for army movement for quite long periods, raging from 5 to 6 months, depending on the amount of snow and the length of winter, but usually from early November until late April - early May.³⁴²

To conclude this sketch of the geographical features of the Dalmatian battlefield, one further feature needs to be tackled, its two main rivers: the Krka and the Cetina. The central plateau, between the Dinaric mountain ridges and the sea, that constituted the main battlefield in this theater of operations, is divided by the Krka and the Cetina rivers into three consecutive parts stretching in east-west direction. Both rivers represented natural obstacles to any army moving along the east-west route through this plateau, and, reasonably bridges and crossings were of great strategic importance. The main crossings over the Cetina were the bridges around Sinj, and across the Krka those at Knin and one bridge further to the south along the road that connects Zadar and Drniš, roughly halfway the distance between Knin and Šibenik. The southern bridge over the Krka river was destroyed already in October 1647,³⁴³ leaving as the only available passage for the Ottomans the bridge at Knin which was of inferior quality and was destroyed the next year (1648), when Venetian forces captured the fortress. For almost two years, the Ottomans possessed no guarded crossing over these rivers,

³⁴²One of most harsh and snowy winters was that of 1656-1657, when Governor-General Bernardo reported that such snow had not been seen in those parts for 50 years. ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 91. (Zara, 7. Aprile 1657); Moreover, the quantity of snowfall was such that the Ottomans also had to adjust their plans for crossing to Dalmatia for that year. Venetian spies reported to Bernardo of the frustration of the Bosnian pasha because of delay in transport of ammunition and provisions caused by snow which kept closed not only mountain passes toward Dalmatia closed but also prevented transport of goods all over Bosnia during the entire April. ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 97. (Zara, 8. Maggio 1657)

³⁴³Venetians destroyed the bridge aided by Morlacchi as part of the preparations for the incoming migration of Morlacchi of Bukovica and Velebit area to their lands during the late fall of 1647, thus practically cutting off already heavy devastated Ottoman territories around Zadar from the sandjak of Klis. ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 326. (Zara, 8. Ottobre 1647); num. 327. (Zara, 11. Ottobre 1647)

until, first, in 1650 they reestablished their outpost at Sinj, and, in 1652, refortified Knin. Because of their strategic importance, these bridges were frequent targets of Morlacchi attacks, especially during pre-season, when by destroying them, the Venetian side aimed at slowing down movement of the Ottoman army.

Even though these two rivers did not contribute much to the Venetian side in terms of defense - these did not protect any Dalmatian town, nor did the Venetian army ever attempt to challenge any crossing of the Ottoman army over them - they played rather an important role during Venetian offensive operations in the Dalmatian hinterland. The flows of both rivers were navigable, especially that of the Krka, which, with its wide bed and several spacious lakes, enabled even larger vessels such as Venetian galleys, to travel far upstream. These geographical features were used by Venetian forces to their advantage in their attacks against Ottoman Skradin, including the third one (1648), in which Governor-General Foscolo brought upstream a navy squadron of considerable size, the firepower of which ultimately broke the defenders. Furthermore, during the preparations for the attack on Knin in the winter of 1654, the Venetian command discussed two routes of approach to the target. The first route envisioned Venetian landing at Novigrad and from there, marching eastward toward Knin. The second, southern route, included transport of troops by ship all the way to Skradin, or even further upstream, and from there taking a much shorter passage over land. As always, when faced with such choices, the Venetian command opted for the southern route, one that included a much shorter land section.³⁴⁴

The decision to choose the second route was greatly influenced by logistical concerns as well. Venetian forces operating in the Dalmatian hinterland were never more than a few days away from the coast or navigable river, which could be used for bringing reinforcements, food provisions and munition in to troops in the field. Moreover, it could be argued that reliance on the sea water/sea lanes of communications was an integral part of the Venetian military

344ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 112. (Galea, Scradona 20. Marzo 1654) attachments to the letter: reports of engineers Alessandro Magli and Marc' Antonio Alberti. While Alberti favored the northern Novigrad route, Magli advocated the approach from the south.

doctrine. The navigable flows of rivers not only enabled the Republic to project its naval power against targets further away from the coast, these were also crucial in providing troops with needed logistical support. Additionally, in worst case scenario, they were used as safe evacuation channels as for example occurred after the defeat of the Venetian forces at Knin. The role water lanes played in conduct of the military operations is illustrated best by the Venetian spring campaign of 1647 and the expedition to Albania during the winter 1648/1649. After the capture of Zemunik in March 1647, the Venetian task force stirred to the north toward Novigrad, where it was met by a fleet carrying provisions necessary to replenish their supply. After a short siege of Novigrad, the Venetian forces were transported by sea to Zadar, for short respite, and in less than two weeks they were on the move again. This time against Vrana, reaching it before the Ottoman side could organize and bring in reinforcements from Bosnia.

The practice of organizing its supply lines over sea lanes or rivers also had a strong influence on Venetian strategy. The entire ambitious expedition in Albania in 1648/9 revolved around the use of water communications. According to the initial plan, Foscolo and the expeditionary force were to capture the town of Lezha and then utilize the Bojana river to reach Skadar to the north where they were to join with rebel forces under the command of the archbishop of Durrës Monsignor Scurra.³⁴⁵ However, Governor-General Foscolo realized that the ports of Bar and Ulcinj left in Ottoman hands would threaten his lines of supply and thus had to be conquered first before embarking on the planned attack on Lezha.³⁴⁶ Consequently, the entire operation was doomed to failure when Venetian forces failed to capture its first objective: the port of Bar, and were forced to retreat back to Kotor.³⁴⁷

Nevertheless, in light of all that was said, it can be argued that the constraints put on the Ottoman strategy and tactics, by the geographical layout of the Dalmatian battlefield,

³⁴⁵The initial sketch of the plan was proposed by the archbishop of Durazzo in September 1648 and represented the foundation from which the Venetian command developed their own operational plan of this expedition. ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 481. (Zara, 28. Settembre 1648.) *Lettera di chi porto le lettere di Mons.or di Durazzo dated 19.Settembre 1648.*

³⁴⁶ASVe, PTM. 467, num. 525. (Di Galea Budua, 4. Genaro 1648. mv.)

³⁴⁷ASVe, PTM. b. 467, num. 529. (Di Galea Budua, 18. Genaro 1648. mv.) attachment to the letter dated: *Adi 16 Gennaro 1648, m.v.*

influenced the war conduct in this battlefield more than anything else, significantly contributing to Venetian success both in case of their defensive as well as offensive actions. As was mentioned previously, during the two short winter campaigns (1647 and 1648), Venetian forces, one by one, captured almost all Ottoman strongholds south of the Dinaric mountains. Without any doubt, it can be said that the inability of Ottomans to send reinforcements to their two sandjaks in Dalmatia, combined with the Morlacchi rebellion were the foundations for this success. No doubt, Foscolo's decision in 1647 to strike first at Zemunik, the seat of sandjak bey, and eliminate Ottoman command in the area of operations, contributed significantly to disorder and paralysis that befell the Ottomans in the next few months, enabling Venetian forces to pick and destroy their targets one by one.

However, it was, in the first place, due to closing of the mountain passes during the winter months that Venetian forces were able to achieve and then utilize their temporary military dominance in the region. The significance of these geographical factors, are even more clearly visible in the campaign of 1648, when the Ottomans did not lose their commander during the first Venetian attack (Skradin, March 1648). Moreover, in 1648, for the entire duration of the Venetian campaign, the Bosnian pasha was present and active in Dalmatia, quelling the rebellious Morlacchi, organizing reinforcements and leading relief forces to besieged strongholds etc., yet as we have seen to no avail. Venetian forces, under the leadership of Governor-General Foscolo, exploited to the fullest the failure of the Ottoman side to predict and/or overcome the restrictions the geography forced on their ability to deploy forces in Dalmatia during winter months.

Although the capture of main Ottoman strongholds, such as Zemunik, Vrana and especially Klis, followed by the capture of two sandjak beys, brought fame to Governor-General Foscolo and provided a boost to Venetian morale, the destruction of the fortresses of Knin, Drniš and Sinj, in the campaign of 1648, were, from the strategical point of view, much more significant. These three strongholds constituted the hub of the road network that connected Dalmatian coastal towns with their hinterland. Venetian capture of these fortresses disrupted

this important line of communication, and even more importantly, denied Ottomans of their logistical bases on the Dalmatian side of the Dinaric mountains. As a consequence, the Ottomans were forced to organize Livno as their main base of operations and military headquarters (*piazza d'armi*). Although, Livno did traditionally function as the mobilization center for Bosnian forces directed against Dalmatia, lack of strongholds on the other side of the mountains meant that depots of munition, siege guns and food, could not be organized along the way for the advancing army and that the Ottoman force had to carry those all the way from Livno to its target somewhere on the coast. This in turn resulted in significant reduction in the distance that army could cover in a day and consequently shorter campaign time, significantly impeding Ottoman military operations in this battlefield.

As the previous chapter has shown, it took the Ottomans almost four years (1649-1652) to reestablish their presence in Dalmatia, by rebuilding the chain of fortified logistical bases, along the Livno – Sinj – Knin line. Truth to be told, the Ottoman position in 1652 was still far worse than that from 1645, rebuilt fortresses were an oasis in the desert. Around them lay ruined and abandoned countryside and they were constantly exposed to Morlacchi attacks. Yet, undoubtedly, the reorganization of this corridor significantly increased Ottoman offensive capabilities for their operations in Dalmatia. The fortress of Knin, due to its central position, was especially important since it again brought the Ottomans, to express it somewhat metaphorically, within the "striking distance" of Venetian targets on the coast. In this regard, Venetians' failed attack on Knin from 1654 can be taken to truly mark the end of one phase of the war. It signaled the end of Venetian offensive operations in the Dalmatian hinterland, and without doubt confirmed that the strategic initiative shifted again to the Ottoman side. Furthermore, prompt assembly of the 5,000 strong Ottoman relief force led by the Bosnian pasha and sandjak bey of Hercegovina, showed that the Ottomans had learned their lesson and that it was not any more that easy to catch them off guard, as in the early days of the war.

In the years that followed, the Ottomans still had the strength and the resources not only to regain lost ground, but to renew military operations with new vigor, which was what

happened in 1656-1658, while the Republic was barely able to organize defense of its strongholds along the coast. However, reclaiming these forts also represented the limits of Ottoman achievements. The rebuilding of fortresses in Knin and Sinj did not break Ottomans free from the restraints of seasonal warfare, imposed by the climate and geography of this battlefield. In terms of capacity to provide winter quarters for the army, the fortress of Knin was still rather a small one. Nothing comparable to Belgrade, which could host an entire army, or at least a large part of it, (as it happened during the winter 1663-4, when the Grand Vizier spent the winter there), was available in Dalmatia. Thus, since the Empire lacked the facility capable of hosting even medium sized army south of the Dinaric mountain ridges, its commanders were forced to follow basically the same script from year to year. Gathering of *sipahis* and supplies at Livno, slow march toward the coast, and earliest in late August, if not in September, attack against some Venetian target. This probably, more than any other military defeat represents the greatest Ottoman failure in this battlefield.

Finally, one more issue needs to be tackled, the ability, or more aptly put, logistical problems linked with the deployment of the Empire's forces to this battlefield. In his well know study on Ottoman warfare, Rhoads Murphey correctly stated that the geographical and logistical considerations did favor Ottoman military deployment in the Balkans and Trans-Danubia, compared to those in the East.³⁴⁸ Still one must bear in mind that Bosnia and thus the Dalmatian battlefield were located outside the main routes that the Ottoman army usually used to deploy its forces for Hungarian campaigns, and that in addition to the set of political factors that influenced the deployment of empire's forces to the Dalmatian battlefield (as presented in the previous chapter), there were also serious logistical problems involved. Simply put, the Empire did not possess the established military corridor with organized supply stations that could be used by a large scale military force on its journey all the way to Dalmatia. In order to do so, a new one had to be organized, not a simple task even during peacetime, least of all in circumstances of prolonged warfare when the Empire was engaged in multiple theaters of operation. Obviously, for the Empire capable of deploying tens of

348 Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700*, p. 22.

thousands men in the rough mountainous region of Ervan, or taking its armies as far as Bagdad, these factors did not represent an unsurpassable obstacle. Yet, new bridges had to be constructed, existing roads cleared and adjusted to suit the needs of the large Ottoman force and its siege train, supply stations along the way organized etc. As a consequence, the already high cost of moving troops and provisions over the land would only increase.³⁴⁹

The planned campaign of 1658 accurately demonstrates the logistical problems linked with the deployment of the large Ottoman army in Dalmatia. The first section of the planned itinerary of the imperial army on its way to Dalmatia consisted of the standard military corridor from Istanbul to Belgrade, with usual gathering of feudal forces of the European provinces along the way. This was the standard and most used march route by the Ottoman military for its deployment in the West. One with good and maintained roads (at least according to contemporary standards), network of supply stations built upon strong agricultural capacity of the regions through which this route passed, enabling the marching army to move with relative speed and easiness.³⁵⁰ Furthermore, at its end lay the fortress of Belgrade, one of major logistical centers of the Empire in its European part, where the Ottoman army could replenish its used equipment, arms munition and rest comfortably.³⁵¹ Yet, from here, the journey became more complicated.

From Belgrade the army was to cross to Slavonia and continue its march eastward until reaching the crossing of the Sava river, where a new bridge was constructed. At this point the army was to cross to Bosnia and head south towards Sarajevo, the most prosperous city of the province, where, already since the early spring, lodging was being prepared for the Grand Vizier.³⁵² However, when in April the first vanguard force of Janissaries and *sipahis* from Greece and Buda, arrived to Sarajevo, Venetian confidants begun sending reports of scarcity

349For an analysis of Ottoman transport costs see: Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700*, pp. 70-83.

350Mesut Uyar and Edward J. Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottoman Empire: from Osman to Atatürk*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2009) pp. 83-84.

351Also for the use of the Istanbul – Belgrade route see Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700*, pp. 65-66.

352Unfortunately available sources do not name the location of this bridge but it is safe to assume, since the final destination of this section of the trip was Sarajevo that it lay somewhere between Županja in the west and Sremska Mitrovica in the east. ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 170. (Zara, 4. Aprile 1658)

of food of any sort, and by the middle of June, even of famine that befell the town.³⁵³

Moreover, it seems that preparation measures, proclaimed in early spring, of prohibition of any kind of commerce with Venetian subjects and the double increase of all the taxes during that year, had the contrary effect and only increased the scarcity of food all over Bosnia. Either because of this, or because of the inadequacy of roads leading from north through mountainous region to Sarajevo, the itinerary was changed and more western route, the one passing through Banja Luka was selected.

In June 1658, the Bosnian pasha received new orders, to begin constructing the bridge over the Sava river further to the west, three days' journey from Banja Luka and also to expand the roads leading to Livno, so that artillery and provisions could be transported more easily.³⁵⁴ By taking this route the army would be able to utilize available rivers to the maximum, for the transport of baggage and artillery. First, by using the long flow of river Sava through Slavonia (almost 300 km), and then the Vrbas river and its magnificent canyon (until Bugojno some 160 km to the south), leaving only the last section Bugojno – Livno – Split (some 200km) as pure land route. Still, even though most accessible and shortest route was chosen in this manner, the problem of finding sufficient provisions in Bosnia for supporting the large imperial army was not solved. It was clear that the army on its March toward south could not count on local agricultural resources, and would thus have to carry larger part of their own supplies. This was a factor that would seriously slow down the already slow movement of a large army on the march. However, as was said previously, the Ottoman army never undertook this journey, instead, it was diverted north to handle Transylvanian affairs.

The above paragraphs attempted to point out to the role the geographical and climate factors had on, or better said, the problems they posed for, the (1) Ottoman war conduct in the Dalmatian battlefield and (2) the ability of the Empire to project its military power to this region. As was shown, geography played a significant role in strategical decisions of the

353ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 172. (Zara, 7. Aprile 1658) and attachments

354The new bridge was supposed to be constructed at the locality named *sfignar*, (Svinjar) which corresponds to the village of Srbac of today, where the Vrbas river meets the Sava. ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 198. (Spalato, 18. Luglio 1658)

Ottoman command. On the other hand, these paragraphs also strived to demonstrate how forces of the Republic, on more than one occasion, used geographical factors to their advantage: closing of the mountain passes between Dalmatia and its hinterland during winter months in order to achieve temporary military superiority and conduct offensive operations against a selected target, or, utilization of sea/river communications for quick deployment of forces and projection of its naval power against inland targets situated along the flows of navigable rivers. Yet, as we have also seen, this also represented the operational limits of the Venetian side. Republic's land forces were successful as far inland as long as they were within reach of the guns of the Venetian navy. All that was said above considered, this section argues that the statement put forward by Patrick O'Sullivan and Jesse W. Miller, that "the fundamental strategic and tactical problems are geographical in nature,"³⁵⁵ can be applied almost without any reservation to the war conduct in this battlefield.

³⁵⁵Patrick Edmund O'Sullivan and Jesse Miller W., *The Geography of Warfare* (New York: St. Martin's Press: 1983) p. 7.

Chapter 2: The Military-Administrative Context

The heart and body of the Venetian defensive system in Dalmatia were the Republic's armed forces – the army and navy. As is well known, the majority of the seventeenth century armies were "national" only in their names. The armed forces of the major European powers, French, Spanish, English, Swedish, and others as well, were in fact conglomerates made of native and foreign recruits in varying proportions. For example, the ranks of the Spanish army of Flanders were filled with Germans, Walloons, English and Italians as much as with Spaniards. Similarly the French armies employed Germans, Italians and a wide range of other nations in large numbers. Employed either as entire regiments, or mixed with native troops, foreign mercenaries made an unavoidable component of all European armies of the 16th and 17th centuries, and the *national* name associated with such forces only designated a ruler or a state in which service they fought. Maybe the most representative and well known such case is that of the "Swedish" army of the Thirty Years War, which ranks were filled with Germans, Irish, Scots, French and others. The number of the ethnic Swedes in the ranks of the Swedish army in a later phase of the war was only 12% of its overall numbers.³⁵⁶ Many smaller states followed this practice, and some, like the Dutch, even preferred to fill the ranks of their armies with foreigners in order to preserve its native industrious and tax paying population.³⁵⁷ The armed forces of the Republic of Venice also fitted this pattern.

By the time of the War for Crete, the Republic had a long tradition of reliance on foreign mercenaries to fight its wars. Already, during the wars for the Italian mainland in the 15th and the early 16th century, employment of a large number of foreign mercenaries represented an

³⁵⁶Frank Tallet, *War and Society in Early Modern Europe, 1495-1715* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) pp. 88-89.; For example of particular national cases see: John A. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610-1715* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) pp. 328-336.; Christopher Storrs, "The Army of Lombardy and the Resilience of Spanish Power in Italy in the Reign of Carlos II. (1665-1700) (Part I)," *War in History* 4, (1997): pp. 394-396; Compare also: Geoffrey Parker, *The army of Flanders and the Spanish road*, pp. 21-27, 276.; For the Dutch case see: Olaf Van Nimwegen, *The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions, 1588-1688*, (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2010) pp. 33-37.

³⁵⁷Gunther Rothenberg E. "Maurice of Nassau, Gustav Adolphus, Raimondo, Montecuccoli, and the 'Military Revolution' of the Seventeenth Century," in *Makers of Modern Strategy, from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Peter Paret ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) pp. 40-42.

absolute necessity for the Republic.³⁵⁸ With the population of no more than two millions, the Venetian Republic could hardly support its war effort over any longer period of time from its own manpower pool.³⁵⁹ Numbers necessary to fill the ranks of its land forces and to man the war navy surpassed by far the demographic resources of the Republic. At the same time, the Venetian ruling class, at least on an ideological level, strove to depict this weakness as a virtue, advertising it as one of the principles of good governance. The discourse of a group of Venetian patricians engaged in a discussion with the Ottoman ambassador, in the aftermath of the victories of 1517, who noted that "in the recent cruel war, in which all the monarchs of the world were ranged against us, not one man in this city was killed: all was done with money and at the cost of foreign soldiers' lives,"³⁶⁰ is exemplary.

Still, even for the seventeenth century standards, due to its diverse ethnic composition, the Venetian land forces represented a sort of curiosity. Although not as exotic in outlook as the Polish or Hungarian armies, the 17th century armed forces of the Republic were one of the most mongrel mixtures of the period. Its ranks were filled with the recruits of all Christian denominations (Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, Orthodox) who originated from almost all parts of the continent. French, Germans, Swiss, Walloon, English, Irish, Scots, Dutch and Corsicans, to name just the usual suspects, same as the Italians from all parts of the Peninsula, from Sicily to the Alps, all filled the ranks of the forces of the *Serenissima*. Additionally, what gave a specific flavor to Republic's military forces were its colonial troops, with their exotic looks and armaments, recruited in the Levant and in the various parts of the *stato di Mar*: Albanians, Croats, Greeks, Montenegrins, Morlacchi, and on occasion even *Turks*.

Due to such diversity amongst recruits of different territorial and cultural origins, the governing bodies of the Republic were faced with a wide range of problems, not all strictly military in nature, but rather organizational and administrative. How to organize such a group of individuals from diverse military traditions, practiced in different (sometimes even

358For more see: John R. Hale, *The Military organization of a Renaissance State*, pp. 221-226, 313-366.

359For the demographic resources of the Republic see: Michael Knapton, *Između vladarice i njezina posjeda*, pp. 239-244.

360John R. Hale, *The Military organization of a Renaissance State*, p. 313.

incompatible) combat styles and techniques into an efficient combat force? Moreover, with no common language at hand, how to even command and manage such a force? These were just a few of the problems faced by the rulers of the Republic. This chapter aims to address these issues, and is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the structure and composition of the Republic's armed forces serving in Dalmatia during this war and their specifics in regard to other contemporary western European forces. In addition to the sections discussing the three main branches of the Venetian land forces - infantry, cavalry and artillery - separate sections are dedicated to the Adriatic naval squadron and the command hierarchy of Republic's forces in the province. Within this part, the problems related to Venetian irregulars, the Morlacchi, are discussed, as well as the problems of their integration into the Venetian defensive system. Finally, the second part deals with the problems of a military administration, discussing topics such as raising an army (mobilization and recruitment), organizing and holding of musters, management of troops etc.

1. The Armed Forces of the Republic "Glorioso Armi della Serenissima: Albanesi, Croati, Corsi, Italiani, Oltramontani ..."

The challenges involved with the governance of a multinational force presented above also found their way into the organizational structure of the armed forces of the Republic. Unlike modern armies which strive for uniformity, the Early Modern Venetian military was anything but uniform. In addition to the standard organizational division into foot and horse, and paid (professional mercenaries) and unpaid (militia levies and various irregulars) troops, the Republic's land forces were also divided along, what the contemporary Venetians considered to be, distinctive "national" lines. Based on the provenience of recruits, the Venetian army distinguished the following groups of "national" units: Italian, *Oltramontani* (trans-alpine) and *Oltramarini* (overseas).

Of these three denominations, the Italian was the clearest and distinct. It was used for all units composed of the recruits from the Italian Peninsula. The term *Oltramontani* was used for all the recruits from the lands beyond the Alps, including Germans, Swiss, French, Dutch,

Walloon and others. The term *Oltramarini*, was used for the recruits originating from the overseas lands, Albania, Croatia, Dalmatia, Greece and the Levant in general. Moreover, at least in theory, units were expected to be made exclusively from the soldiers of a single ethnic group. For example, Albanian, Croatian and Greek soldiers would not be mixed up in a single unit, but would be organized in different, separate units. Also the companies of each of these major “national” groups (Italian, *Oltramontani*, *Oltramarini*), differed in size, organization, structure, armament and a combat style. Finally, all companies in the Venetian service were, according to their status, divided into ordinary or extraordinary ones. The ordinary companies belonged to the Venetian peacetime standing army, while the extraordinary companies were those raised only due to a temporary need to expand the army because of an outbreak of an armed conflict or crisis, and whose captains could not count with certainty on the prolongation of their service once hostilities had ended. The following sections discuss the structure, size and tactical specificity of particular types of professional/regular units of the Venetian army.

1.1. Regular troops or *Militie pagate* (Infantry and Cavalry): Order of Battle, Weapons, Equipment, combat tactics

The main tactical and administrative unit of the Venetian army was a company under the command of a captain. Unlike modern companies, the Venetian 17th century companies were not subdivided into smaller units, as platoons, but represented an indivisible body of soldiers. In practice, this is also where the uniformity among various types of units in the Venetian service ends. In addition to the previously mentioned *national* categorization, infantry companies were further classified either as regimental, those belonging to a larger military formation called a regiment commanded by a colonel, and *sciolte* – “stand alone ones” - those not subordinated to any other military commander except their captains. Yet, this division applied only to Italian and trans-alpine infantry companies, since no regiment of *Oltramarini* was ever formed, thus all such companies acted as “stand-alone”. In the years before the war the companies of both Italians and *Oltramontani* serving in garrisons on *Terraferma* were

mainly “stand-alone” ones.³⁶¹ Yet, when the war started, due to the need to tremendously expand the Republic's armed forces, it was much more practical to deal with dozens of colonels charged with tasks of raising entire new regiments than with tens of dozens of captains. Therefore, a general trend in raising the new units of trans-alpine infantry was to contract private entrepreneurs capable of recruiting entire regiments, not just a single company, while in the case of the units of Italian infantry both methods were practiced.

Venetian regiments were named after their colonels, which was also a prevailing practice amongst other major European military forces with the exception of some Spanish tercios or French regiments which were named according to the regions of their origin. Due to the heterogeneous composition of the Republic's armed forces, regiments in the Venetian service greatly varied in size. Depending on the origin of troops, they consisted of anything between 800 to 3,000 men organized in 4 to 15 companies. For example, the regiment of the Swiss sent to Dalmatia in October 1648, consisted of 11 companies numbering 2,200 men.³⁶² Regiments of trans-alpine infantry were usually of a similar size as the Swiss ones, consisting of 8-10 companies and numbering 1,200-2,000 men.³⁶³ The Italian regiments, raised and payed by Venice, were even of a smaller size, usually consisting of 6-8 companies and numbering c.a 800-1,200 men. The regiments provided by the Papal State that were in the Venetian service were of similar size and composition. For example, the Papal regiments sent to Dalmatia in 1647 and 1658, both nominally counted 1,000 men.³⁶⁴

At the head of a regiment was a colonel who also commanded one of the companies, which thus bore the name of *colonella*. A monthly pay of a colonel of trans-alpine infantry was

³⁶¹Sergio Perini, *Le milizie della terraferma veneta verso la metà del Seicento*, p. 195.

³⁶²ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-20, f.205v, *Adi 1648. Agosto 8.*; This was almost a standardized composition and size of Swiss regiments (2,000 men in 10 companies) serving in other European armies. For example, for the discussion concerning the Swiss in the French service, see: David Parrott, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government, and Society in France*, pp. 303-304.

³⁶³These troops were the most similar to the Imperial infantry regiments of the Thirty Years war, which in theory consisted of 10 companies yet each of a little greater size than the Venetian ones counting 300 men. William P. Guthrie, *Battles of the Thirty Years War: From White Mountain to Nordlingen, 1618-1635*, (London: Greenwood Press, 2001) pp. 8-9.

³⁶⁴ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-18, 99v-100v, *Adi 9. Maggio 1647.*; ASV. PTM. b. 464. num. 255. (Zara, 12 Giugno 1647); ASV.PTM., b. 481. num. 98. (Zara, 8, Maggio 1657.); ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-33, fols. 73r-v, *A di 16. Aprile 1658.*

usually set at 150 *ducats*, while that of Italian infantry equaled 100 *ducats*.³⁶⁵ The second in command of a regiment was a lieutenant-colonel, who was in charge of the second company of a regiment, and whose salary was 100 *ducats* a month in the case of trans-alpine infantry, and 60 in the case of Italian infantry. Third and the last member of a regimental command was a sergeant-major, who commanded over the third company of a regiment and was charged with the police task of maintaining discipline and order in a regiment. Additionally, colonels also had under their command a small body of 7-15 soldiers armed with halberds or partisans who acted as their personal bodyguards.

The backbone of the Republic's forces were companies of Italian and trans-alpine infantry. Although similar in armaments and style of combat - both were armed with pike and shot (by the time of the War of Crete the heavy matchlock muskets represented the standard armament of these units) in ratio of 1:2, *de facto* European standard of the time³⁶⁶ - these units differed in their internal structure. The companies of trans-alpine infantry were very similar to the standard companies of the Imperial army of the Thirty Years War, with a nominal strength of around 200 men (150-160 men in the case of British levies), and a company's command cadre composed of ten officers and NCO's (non-commissioned officers). Table 2.1. contains the structure of an ideal trans-alpine company, with the corresponding wages of soldiers and officers.³⁶⁷ As can be seen, the wages of the soldiers serving in these units equaled 30 *lire* a month. Additionally, at least in theory, a captain had at his disposal *caposoldo*, a sum of additional 80 *ducats* (in case of full company of 200 men, and proportionately less when not) to be distributed as he saw fit among the soldiers under his command.

Number	Ducats	Lire per	Lire per
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³⁶⁵For example see the contract concluded between the Ambassador of the Republic in Paris, Gio Battista Nani with Colonel Sidney Atkins. Allen B. Hinds, ed. *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice (1643-1647)*, vol. 27. (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1926) pp. 235-236. (henceforth *CSP-Venice*) For the assignment of the stipend to the colonel of a regiment of Italian infantry see: ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-34, f. 105v-106r, *Adi 28. Maggio 1659*.

³⁶⁶Compare: William P. Guthrie, *Battles of the Thirty Years War*, p. 9.; Concerning the armament and equipment of these troops in Venetian service see: Alberto Prelli, *Le Milizie Venete in Palma 1593-1797*, pp. 10-12; Alberto Prelli, *L'esercito Veneto al primo '600*, pp. 20-21.

³⁶⁷Very similar in structure, but with the command compartment consisting of 11 officers per company, were the standard Spanish companies serving in Flanders, after 1636, see: Geoffrey Parker, *The army of Flanders and the Spanish road*, p. 274.

	per month	month	month (total)
Captain	1	60	
Lieutenant	1	32	
Ensign (<i>Alfiere</i>)	1	24	
Sargent	2	15	
Corporal (<i>Capo</i>)	4	8	
Scribe	1	10	
Sub Total:	10	188	1165:12
Soldier	200	30	6000
Total:	100		7165:12

Table 2.1. Structure and wages of the soldiers serving in the company of trans-alpine infantry.³⁶⁸

Quite similar in structure, armament, weapons and combat style, but somewhat smaller in size, were the companies of Italian infantry. In 1620, the Senate decreed that the companies of Italian infantry should count between 60 and 100 men, one third armed with the pikes and two thirds with the muskets, whose wages were set at 4 *ducats* a month. The command complement of these units consisted of one captain, with the salary of 25 *ducats* a month, one ensign (8 *ducats* a month), one sergeant (8 *ducats* a month) and two corporals (6 *ducats* per month each).³⁶⁹ Such structure was well suited for peacetime, when desertion rates among the military units were rather low. However, with the outbreak of the hostilities in 1645 and the significant increase of wastage rates among the units stationed in the zones of military operations due to desertion, famine, and, last but not least, combat, it was necessary to increase the initial strength of newly raised units of this type.

From the commissions issued to captains by the Senate, authorizing new levies of companies of Italian infantry for the Republic's service, it is clear that by the time of the War for Crete the nominal strength of these units was raised to 150 men.³⁷⁰ Furthermore, the command structure of these units was also expanded by introduction of a second sergeant

³⁶⁸Data taken from: *Ristretto delle tre Reggimenti d'Oltramontani Costret, Esser, et Antonini*, attachment to the: ASVe. Senato, Dispacci, PTM., b. 464. num. 257. (Zara, 13. Giugno 1647.); The amount of 5,700 lire per month assumes full contingent of 190 soldier. See also: ASV, Senato, Dispacci, PTM. b. 476. no. 149. (Di Galea Trau, 28 Luglio 1654), Attachment: *Ruolo della Compagnia di Fanti Oltramontani del Sig. Coll.e Co. Enrico Capra*. (1646 a di 19 Luglio di Parma); Also see: ASVe, PTM. b. 499. num. 65. (Zara, 2. Maggio 1668) Attachment from 27.th of April 1668: *Comparso delle due paghe anticipate che dovranno farsi alle sottoscritte Compagnie, che per ordine Pub.(li)co si e spediscono in Candia*; CSP-Venice, vol. 27. 235-236.

³⁶⁹Alberto Prelli, *L'esercito Veneto al primo '600*. p. 20.; Sergio Perini, *Le milizie della terraferma veneta verso la metà del Seicento*, pp.196-197.

³⁷⁰For example see: ASVe, Senato Mar, R-109, f. 120r, 22. Aprile 1649; Compare also: ASVe, Senato Mar, R-109, f. 163r, 18. Maggio 1649.

when the strength of a company reached 125 men and by the addition of one extra corporal for every 25 men. So in theory, such a company, when at its full strength of 150 men, would be commanded by one captain, one ensign, two sergeants and six corporals, bringing the number of officers and NCOs to the same number as in the case of companies of trans-alpine infantry. Finally, since all of the newly raised units were extraordinary, meaning that they were expected to remain in service only for the duration of the war, the wages of officers and soldiers were higher than of those serving in ordinary companies. Yet, unlike the companies of trans-alpine infantry, where a *caposoldo* was set at 80 *ducats*, giving the amount of 2,48 *lire* per soldier, a *caposoldo* at the disposal of captains of the companies of Italian infantry amounted to only one *lire* per soldier. In February 1648, when it became clear that the war would not end any time soon, the Senate decided to bring wages of the ordinary companies of Italian infantry to the same level as that of the extraordinary ones, ordering also to their captains to increase their units to the new wartime sizes.³⁷¹ The table 2.2. below shows a nominal wartime structure of a company of Italian infantry (both ordinary and extraordinary) in the Venetian service with corresponding wages.

	Number	Ducats per month	Lire per month	Lire per month (total)
Captain	1	40		
Ensign (<i>Alfiere</i>)	1	20		
Sargent	2		63	
Corporal (<i>Capo</i>)	6		42	
Sub Total:	10	60	378	750
Soldier	150		30	4500
Total:	160			5250

Table 2.2. Wartime composition of a company of Italian infantry with corresponding wages.³⁷²

These units represented the backbone of the Venetian armed forces both in defensive and offensive operations and, due to their discipline and combat effectiveness, Venetian military commanders held as the crucial precondition for conduct of any offensive military operations to have under their command a solid body of these units. For example, in May 1647,

³⁷¹ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17, 344r, *Adi 9. Febraro 1647. mv.*

³⁷²Data taken from: ASVe, PTM. b. 488. num. 94. (Sebenico, 28 Settembre 1661); ASVe, PTM. b. 499. num. 65. Zara, 2. Maggio 1668) attachment dated: *Adi 27. Aprile 1668.*

Governor-General Foscolo justified to the Senate his decision not to attack the fortress of Klis by not having a sufficient number of Italian and trans-alpine infantry units under his command.³⁷³ The fighting style of these troops was the same as of any other contemporary European armies, namely, fighting in solid blocks of pike and shot, with the pikes grouped tightly in the core providing protection to the shot deployed more loosely around it.³⁷⁴ When led by competent commanders, these troops were not just a match for the Ottomans but were capable of defeating much larger forces in an open field. For example, in August 1655, the Ottoman raid of some 1,500 men of foot and horse which invaded the district of Split, was routed by the Venetian force consisting of no more than 700 men (with units of local militia included in that number) who suffered only slight casualties.³⁷⁵ Moreover, on a few occasions it was simply enough to deploy these forces in the countryside and to cause Ottoman raiding parties to retreat. In July 1653, when two Ottoman raids, 3,000 men each, were operating in the Zadar district, Governor-General Dolfin, aiming to provide support for the Morlacchi in the countryside, dispatched the force of only 900 men, foot and horse, which took strong defensive position and issued the call to the Morlacchi to join them. In spite of the obvious numerical superiority, the Ottomans refused to be drawn into a battle and retreated after contended themselves with pillaging the area around Novigrad.³⁷⁶

Moreover, the Italian and trans-alpine companies were not only held to be tactically the best part of the Venetian army but they were also considered by the Venetian command to be the most trustworthy. It was them that the defense of all Dalmatian towns was entrusted to. The case of these units is rather similar to that of the Spanish troops serving in the army of

373 *Se quantità di militia proportionata al' acquisto di Clissa, al qual ???devar le nostre mire, havessimo havuto ben di cuore applicato vi [6] haveressimo l'Animo, ben sapendo di quanto profitto riuscita sarebbe l'impresa: ma scarsi di militie, non tenendone in maggior numero di seicento in circa tra Italiani et Oltromontani, sopra quali fondar si possono l'intraprese; oltre le genti Crovati et Albanesi , che se ben brave, non pero molto in esse confidare si può, facilissime essendo alla sconvolta, mentre disordinate combattendo;*

ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 247. (Di Galea Salona, 22. Maggio 1647); Similar reasoning was also used in 1650, by Gil d'Has, a general in the Venetian service, to excuse himself because of not proceeding with the attack on the Ottoman stronghold of Herceg-Novì after a successful initial skirmish in front of the town. ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 736. (Zara, 16. Agosto 1650)

374 Christer Jørgensen, Michael F. Pavkovic, Rob S. Rice at all, *Fighting Techniques of the Early Modern World ad 1500 - ad 1763: Equipment, Combat Skills, and Tactics* (St. Martin's Press: New York, 2006) pp. 24-26.

375 ASVe, PTM. b. 478, num. 60. (Zara, 2 Settembre 1655)

376 ASVe, PTM. b. 474. num. 62. (Di Zara, 14. Luglio 1653); num. 63. (Di Zara, 15. Luglio 1653)

Flanders. Both represented fighting forces made of foreigners with the high proportion of veterans and fighting in the country hundreds of miles away from their homes with little or no contact with the local population.³⁷⁷ The Venetian command was rather suspicious concerning the companies of oversea (*oltramarini*) infantry - Croats and Albanians - in its service because of their alleged links with the local Ottomans. Due to this, the use of these troops was perceived as a considerable security risk, and the Venetian government preferred to keep the most endangered outposts garrisoned with the companies of Italian and trans-alpine units. The letter of Governor-General Foscolo from July 1647, in which he explains to the Senate why it was necessary to garrison the port of Omiš, the southernmost Venetian stronghold in Dalmatia, with at least one company of Italian infantry in addition to the Croatian and Albanian units, serves as a good illustration of the Venetian intrinsic mistrust in these local units and trust which they had for the Italian units:

... I have not deemed it convenient, in the time of such grave circumstances, to entrust the most important posts to the territorials, or to the units of Croats or Albanians; these neither have skills nor determination needed to defend them, and maintain the friendship with the frontier Turks; in short, they can neither be trusted nor are any good to defend them;³⁷⁸

Furthermore, the case of the important fortress of Klis represents the most illustrative example of this reasoning since its garrison for the entire duration of the war consisted exclusively of companies of Italian and trans-alpine infantry.

It may be the truth that the units of trans-alpine and Italian infantry were indeed the shield on which the defense of the province was rested, but these companies were not cheap "toys." At its full strength of 200 men, a single company of trans-alpine infantry would cost the Republic the considerable amount of 7,165 *lire* and 12 *soldi* (roughly 1,155 *ducats*) every month, while a company of Italian infantry, at its full strength of 150 men, would consume 5,250 *lire* (or 847 *ducats*).³⁷⁹ Far cheaper were the companies of *Oltramarini* infantry. The

³⁷⁷Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, p. 27.

³⁷⁸... non stimando conveniente nell' ardire congiunture presenti raccomandar li posti più importanti et gelosi à Paesani, o vero altra gente Crovatte, o Albanese, che non così habili, ne costanti sono nel mantenerli, et tenendo amicitia, et interessi con Turchi confinanti non tanto se ne può fidare, ne così vagliono, per difenderli, ASVe, PTM., b. 464. num. 254. (Di Zara, 8. Giugno 1647)

³⁷⁹*Ducat* mentioned here represents the money of account, which consisted of 6 *lire*, and 4 *soldi*, and each *lira* was made of 20 *soldi*. For more detailed overview of the contemporary Venetian money and coinages see Appendix 2.

letters of governor-generals may be filled with complaints concerning the low discipline and elements of disorder which the units of Croats and Albanians had been inaugurating into the Venetian force during fights with the Ottomans, still, their low cost and the multiplicity of pressing affairs – a large number of the posts that had to be guarded and, especially, the need to provide crews for a large number of smaller, armed vessels (*barche armate, fuste, galeotte, brigantini*) serving in the Adriatic - made the use of these troops an absolute necessity.

Both the structure and armaments of these troops were adjusted to conditions of their service. The nominal strength of the companies of Croatian and Albanian³⁸⁰ infantry was only 50 men including its command core consisting of a captain, an ensign and a sergeant,³⁸¹ sufficient to arm all types of smaller warships, excepting larger *galleote* (small galleys) which usually required two such companies. *Oltramarini* units were armed mainly with muskets, swords or axes and few shorter pole arms - brandistock or partisan - arms well suited to the conditions of sea service and manning of fortification walls.³⁸² However, these troops were not trained in using the pike and, unlike the companies of Italian and trans alpine infantry which fought in the close block formations of pike and shot, they fought in much looser and less orderly formations. Moreover, the lack of pike protection and a lower level of military discipline and unit cohesion made these units extremely vulnerable to the enemy cavalry attacks. Thus, these troops were almost never deployed alone against larger Ottoman raids of which a dominant part was usually the cavalry. As a rule, Venetian forces meeting the Ottomans in a field were composed of a core of Italian and trans-alpine companies strengthened with auxiliary *oltramarini* units which were there in order to swell the ranks and compensate for a lack of numbers.

³⁸⁰The subject of Albanians (and Montenegrins recorded in the Venetian sources under the same name) in the Venetian military service was the object of the extensive research. In addition to the previously listed works see also: Lovorka Čoralić, 'Benemerita nazione': albanski vojnici i časnici u Zadru (XVI.-XVIII. st.) ['Benemerita nazione': Albanian Soldiers and Officers in Zadar], "Zbornik Odsjeka za povijesne znanosti Zavoda za povijesne i društvene znanosti HAZU 27, (2009): pp. 121-164.

³⁸¹ASVe, PTM. b. 500. num. 122. (Zara, 30. Settembre 1668) attachment dated: *Adi 30. Settembre 1668*.

³⁸²According to the preserved inventories it can be seen that the armaments of the company of Croatian and Albanian infantry serving aboard *galeotta* included 12 brandistocks. For example see: ASVe, PTM. b. 489, num. 34. (Spalato, 22. Ottobre 1662) attachment: *Nota da nuovi arsili di galeotte con gli armizzi et armi che occorrono*;

The lower quality and smaller sizes of these *Oltramarini* units were also reflected in the salaries of the officers commanding them. Thus, the salary of a captain of such a company was set at 25 ducats monthly, while an ensign and a sergeant were entitled to 10 and 8 ducats respectively. The wages of soldiers serving in these units before the war, were set at four *ducats* a month and a daily portion of biscuit. However, in order to avoid spread of discontent among these troops in December 1646, the Senate equalized the salaries of the soldiers serving on land with that of the soldiers of Italian infantry to 30 *lire* per month.³⁸³ So in the ideal case a company of Croats or Albanians serving aboard their *barca armata*, at its full strength of 50 men, would cost the Republic an amount of only 1,466:12 *lire* (ca. 236.5 ducats). In prewar years companies of Croatian and Albanian infantry served mainly as crews aboard armed vessels, yet with the outbreak of the hostilities, the Republic also began to employ them more and more on the land as cheap reinforcements for town garrisons, otherwise manned almost exclusively by companies of Italian and trans-alpine infantry.

The mounted troops of the Republic, as in other contemporary European forces, consisted of the heavy cavalry, light cavalry and dragoons.³⁸⁴ The heavy cavalry in the Venetian service were known as *Corazze*. The first units of this type appeared in the Venetian service at the beginning of the 17th century and from that time onwards they gradually replaced the older type of men-at-arms armed with lance.³⁸⁵ *Corazze* were equipped with heavy armor protecting head, breast and groin which was capable of stopping a bullet, and were armed with heavy sword and a pair of pistols. Due to the high cost of their equipment, and especially expensive were their warhorses capable of carrying heavily armored raiders, these troops represented the elite part of the Venetian cavalry and were from the beginning filled with persons of some esteem or even higher social ranks. The size of these units was not uniform and ranged between 60 and 80 men. The elite status of these troops was reflected in the primarily in the wages of men serving in them. A company of *Corazze* was commanded by the captain with a pay of 80 ducats per month, as his aides were one lieutenant and one ensign, both receiving 40

³⁸³ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17, f. 305v-307r, *Adi 19. Dicembre 1646*.

³⁸⁴Compare: William P. Guthrie, *Battles of the Thirty Years War: From White Mountain to Nordlingen*, pp. 5-6.

³⁸⁵See: John Hale R., *The Military organization of a Renaissance State*, pp. 367-375.

ducats a month, while the soldiers were entitled to rather high wages of the 15 ducats per month.³⁸⁶ As such one company of *Corazze* of 60 men would require 1,080 *ducats* every month, rating it as the most expensive unit of the Venetian army.

Same as companies of trans-alpine and Italian infantry, companies of *Corazze* were either “stand-alone” or belonged to a regiment. In the years preceding the War of Crete, the Republic kept a contingent of some 400-600 *Corazze* stationed in *Terraferma* garrisons as a part of its peacetime standing army, 90% of which were of trans-alpine origin while the rest was made of Italians.³⁸⁷ However, once the war started and the demands for the new units of all types increased, several companies of *Corazze Crovate* or *Corazze paessane* made of the local Dalmatian population were formed during 1646. In 1648, one unit of *Corazze* was even formed from the *Terraferma* outlaws willing to serve their sentences in army. The combat style of these units was a well known *caracole*, however, they were also no strangers to bolder tactics of charging directly into an enemy. Moreover, the ability of these heavy troops to charge into and crash the lightly armored enemy gave the Venetian forces a significant tactical advantage when confronting the Ottomans in an open field. For example, the combat value of these troops when amassed together in solid numbers was fully demonstrated during the siege of Klis in 1648. At that time Governor General Foscolo had at his disposal one full regiment of trans-alpine *Corrazze* (consisting of four companies), four companies of Italian provenience and two local Dalmatian companies. Almost all eyewitness accounts agree that it was the charge of the *Corazze* companies at the enemy flank that broke the Ottoman relief force led by the Bosnian pasha to the aid of the besieged fortress, routing it completely and thus ensuring this important victory, which enabled Venetian forces to continue the siege of the fortress of Klis uninterrupted.³⁸⁸

These heavy troops suited well the needs of this battlefield in the periods when the

³⁸⁶Alberto Prelli, *Le Milizie Venete in Palma 1593-1797*. pp. 25-27.; Alberto Prelli, *L'esercito Veneto al primo '600*.pp. 48-51.

³⁸⁷Sergio Perini, *Le milizie della terraferma veneta verso la metà del Seicento*, p. 203.

³⁸⁸ASVe, PTM. b. 466. num. 386. (Di Galea Salona, 1. Aprile 1648); Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 183-184.; Vicko Solitro, *Povijesni dokumenti o Istri i Dalmaciji*, pp.263.

Republic was practicing a doctrine of active defense, and its forces were either engaged in military operations against the Ottoman strongholds in the Dalmatian hinterland or in sorties in the countryside in order to engage the invading Ottoman forces. However, a gradual shift in the Venetian strategy towards a strictly passive defense in this battlefield, which took place between 1652 -1654 (see the previous chapter), also changed the role of the cavalry in this battlefield. As the core of the Venetian forces was confined to the defense of town walls and restrained from engaging the enemy in an open field, the need to maintain a large number of these, above all, very expensive troops, in this battlefield ceased. From that time onward, the cavalry was mainly used for policing the countryside, reconnaissance and scouting missions, or for skirmishing with the smaller Ottoman raids. Heavily armored and slow, companies of *Corazze* were not suitable for these tasks and consequently, their numbers in Dalmatia gradually diminished until the last decade of the war when these troops completely disappeared from the muster lists of the Venetian forces in Dalmatia.

More fitting to the new role given to the cavalry in the Venetian defensive strategy were the companies of light cavalry - *Carabini* and *Capelleti*. Unlike the heavy cavalry, or *Corazze*, these troops were primarily made of the subjects of the Republic. The ranks of *Carabini* were made of both Italians and Slavs, while those of *Capelleti*, also known as *Capelleti a Cavallo*, were filled by Croats and Albanians. *Capelleti* in fact were the 17th century descendants of the Venetian colonial mounted troops from the previous centuries known under the name of *stradioti*. *Capelletti* did not wear heavy cuirassiers, but were protected only by leather jackets and steel helmets from which they draw their name. By the time of the War of Crete, these troops abandoned the lance - used in the previous centuries - and adopted the use of firearms: arquebuses and pistols. Additionally, these troops were also armed with a heavy curved sword known as *schiaivona* which became their trademark. Companies of *Carabini* wore similar equipment as *Capelleti*, yet with no mandatory steel helmet, and instead of the heavy sword were armed with a lighter one. Their main weapon was a *carabin* (wheelock arquebus), from which their name was derived, a type of firearm lighter than the heavy infantry matchlock

musket and thus more suited to the use of cavalry troops.³⁸⁹ Both types of units shared the same command structure, one captain with monthly pay of 25 *ducats*, and one lieutenant and ensign both with 15 *ducats* a month. The number of soldiers in these companies was set at 31 for the ordinary companies, while the extraordinary companies were of larger size and counted 50-60 men. Monthly wages of ordinary soldiers varied from 4-8 *ducats*.³⁹⁰ These troops left no such distinguishable records of their military proves as did the regiment of the trans-alpine *Corazze* of Colonel Longavalle during the siege of Klis, yet theirs was the hard daily work of guarding the frontier and confronting smaller Ottoman raids.

The dragoons were basically mounted infantry who, unlike companies of *Carabini*, always fought dismounted. The first attempt to introduce these troops into the ranks of the Republic's armed forces date back to the last decade of the 16th century, when an attempt was made to organize them from volunteer territorial militia units. Yet, due to numerous reasons this initiative failed³⁹¹ and by the time of the War of Crete, the ranks of dragoons were filled almost exclusively with foreigners, mainly of trans-alpine origin.³⁹² The dragoons were organized in regiments consisting of 3-5 companies and numbering 300-500 men. A colonel of dragoons enjoyed a rather high salary of 150 *ducats* a month, while that of a captain amounted to 60 *ducats*, same as a captain of a company of trans-alpine infantry. The command structure of a company of the dragoons consisted also of one lieutenant with the salary of 32 *ducats* a month and one ensign with the monthly pay of 24 *ducats*.³⁹³

These troops armed with heavy muskets combined the tactical mobility of the light cavalry with the firepower of regular infantry. The Dragoons were well suited to the warfare in the Dalmatian battlefield where smaller skirmishes prevailed over massive confrontations in an open field. In 1647, the Senate ordered the transfer of one regiment of the Dragoons, counting

389Sergio Perini, *Le milizie della terraferma veneta verso la metà del Seicento*, p. 204; Alberto Prelli, *L'esercito Veneto al primo '600*. pp. 52-59.

390ASVe, PTM. b. 468. num. 562. (Zara, 3 Maggio 1649) attachment dated 3. Maggio 1649.

391John R. Hale, *The Military organization of a Renaissance State*, p. 369.

392For more on the dragoons in the European armies of the 17th century see: William P. Guthrie, *Battles of the Thirty Years War*, pp. 5-6.; For dragoons in Venetian service on *Terraferma* see: Alberto Prelli, *Le Milizie Venete in Palma 1593-1797*. pp. 29-30.; Alberto Prelli, *L'esercito Veneto al primo '600*. pp. 52-54.

393For example see: ASVe, PTM. b. 468. num. 562. (Zara, 3 Maggio 1649) attachment to the latter dated: Adi 28th Aprile 1649.

300 men, to Dalmatia,³⁹⁴ which in the course of the next three years gave a very good service and demonstrated in full its usefulness. The Dragoons accompanied almost every sortie of the Venetian cavalry in the countryside, providing it with additional firepower without slowing it down. This unit was disbanded in May 1650, when all of its mounts were lost, and remaining men were distributed among the companies of trans-alpine infantry.³⁹⁵ In spite of its proven tactical usefulness and numerous demands by governor-generals for new reinforcements of these troops³⁹⁶ no new contingent of the Dragoons was dispatched to Dalmatia in the remaining years of the war.

1.2. Auxiliary troops: Cernide, Papal, Swiss, Savoy contingents

In addition to these regular/paid troops, in the defense of the province the Republic could also count on the participation of the local population. As was told in the previous chapter (1.2.2.), based on the practices previously implemented on *Terraferma*, the local population of Dalmatia was organized in units of territorial *milita*. Town inhabitants were organized either as *scolari* (volunteer part-time gunners) or the *cernide* - units formed from the rural population. Although, at least on paper, the Republic had a considerable manpower pool in these troops (some 9,584 were enrolled in 1641), these units in the pre-war years, especially the rural *cernide*, lacked a formal organization, with appointed commanders and some form of regular pay for militiamen. Thus, when the war began, Governor-General Foscolo with the aim to improve the combat effectiveness of the territorial *cernide* and to prevent the rural population from leaving their homes, proposed to the Senate that monthly pay should be granted to the *cernide* members for the duration of the war. In June 1646, the Senate gave its consent to this project and allowed the grant of half-pay and a portion of biscuit to those capable to bear arms.³⁹⁷ Similarly, the pay of the Dalmatian nobles acting as the commanders of these troops were also increased.³⁹⁸ However, these measures proved to be very short lived.

³⁹⁴ASVe, *Senato Rettori*, R-18. f. 113r; Adi 28 Maggio 1647.

³⁹⁵ASVe, PTM., b. 468. num. 562. Zara, 3 Maggio 1649); PTM. b. 470. no. 703. (Zara, 5. Maggio 1650)

³⁹⁶For example in August 1655, Governor-General Zen complained concerning the sorry state of the cavalry in the province and asked for reinforcement of 300 dragoons, reminding the Senate how one such unit "with great public profit and little expense" served in Dalmatia. ASVe, Senato, Dispacci, PTM. b. 478. num. 57. (Zara, 14 Agosto 1655)

³⁹⁷ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17, f. 132v-134r. 174.

³⁹⁸For example, the pay of *Capitano di Contado* of Šibenik was given monthly pay of 50 ducats. ASVe, Senato

In October 1647, faced by the constant shortages of cash and judging that with the destruction of the Ottoman strongholds in the vicinity of Zadar during the 1647 campaign the imminent danger to the countryside ceased, Governor-General Foscolo decided to abolish the monthly payments to the rural *cernide* and thus to reduce monthly expenses by some 2,800 *ducats*.³⁹⁹

In the end, the overall role of these units in the defense of the province remained limited. The reasons for this were twofold. In the first place, as was mentioned previously, the militia troops were, as a rule, very hard to deploy outside of their home areas which rendered them effective only in the defense of their homes. Secondly, the 1649-1650 plague epidemic and ceaseless Ottoman raids regularly destroying crops and villages caused a heavy depopulation of the coastal towns districts and exodus of the population to the more secure Dalmatian islands. The disappearance of the native population in an area also spelled the end of the existence of organized militia units in that area. The most heavily depopulated areas where the district of Šibenik and, to a lesser extent, that of Zadar, were due to the population losses, a large part of the countryside was practically left in the hands of the newly arrived Morlacchi (of which will be more said later).⁴⁰⁰ On the coastal area between Trogir and Split, where the population lived in fortified villages "Kaštela" under the protection of guns of the Venetian navy, the situation was much better and the local *cernide* units survived until the end of the war. It was the disappearance of the native population from the countryside more than the decision of the Venetian administration to stop their financing that caused a slow, yet still sure, decay of these troops.

The Dalmatian *cernide* were not the only *milita* units that served in Dalmatia. Over the years, it had become increasingly difficult for the Republic to meet the constant demands for fresh troops in all three areas of operations - Aegean, Crete and Dalmatia. Lacking sufficient regular troops, the Republic began to turn to its subjects, that is to the *cernide* units of Italian

Rettori, R-18, f. 96v-97r.

399ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 331. (Zara, 16. Ottobre 1647)

400By the 1661, the diminution of the number of the native rural population in the Šibenik district was such that it moved Governor-General Andrea Cornaro to propose to the Senate to either completely abolish the office of local *Capitano di Contado* or to reduce significantly its salary of 50 *ducats* per moth. ASVe, PTM. b. 488. (num. 94. Zara, 7. Ottobre 1661)

Terraferma and Istria, in order to compensate for this shortcoming. The first contingent of non-local militia that arrived in Dalmatia were 200 *cernide* from Istria in 1651.⁴⁰¹ Next year, 1652, no new militia reinforcements were sent to Dalmatia but rather, the Republic magistrate in Istria was ordered to keep in readiness a body of 500 men.⁴⁰² The next group of Istrian *cernide* sent to Dalmatia was 500 men dispatched quickly in May 1654, after the defeat of the Venetian forces at Knin.⁴⁰³ Similarly, in 1657, when disturbing news concerning the Ottoman preparations had begun reaching Venice, 500 *cernide* from Istria were promptly conscripted and dispatched to Dalmatia.⁴⁰⁴ Almost simultaneous attacks on Split and Kotor of that year (1657), convinced the Senate that the Ottomans indeed had a serious plan in this battlefield and for the upcoming season of 1658 ordered the impressive reinforcement of 4,200 men for Dalmatia. How exhausted and worn down by this long war the Republic had become can be best seen from the structure of these troops. Out of 4,200 men destined for Dalmatia only 2,200 were regular troops (1,200 Swiss and 1,000 Papal troops) while the remaining 2,000 consisted of the *cernide* from the Italian mainland (1,500) and Istria (500).⁴⁰⁵ This also represented the greatest commitment of these troops in the Dalmatian battlefield. Although until the end of the war the Republic almost without interruption had continued to send *cernide* reinforcements to Dalmatia, contingents sent were of much smaller size (usually around 300 men).⁴⁰⁶

Cernide from Italy and Istria alike were organized the same, in companies of 150-200 men.⁴⁰⁷ During their service in Dalmatia, these militiamen were entitled to the soldier's pay and the provision of food. The duration of their service in Dalmatia was always limited to a single campaign; arriving between March and May, *cernide* would be allowed to return to

401ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-25, f. 156v, *Adi 31. Agosto 1651*.

402ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-26, f. 84r, *Adi 7 Maggio 1652*.

403Order to send 500 men from Istria: ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-28, f. 56r, *Adi 31. Marzo 1654*; ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 128. (Zara, 23. Maggio 1654)

404ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 89. (Zara, 18. Marzo 1657)

405ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-33, f. 73r-v, 16. Aprile 1658; ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 185. (Zara, 1. Giugno 1658)

406For example, force of *cernide* from Istria sent in 1661, numbered 200 men, that sent in 1663 300 men, etc.

ASVe, PTM. b. 488, num. 77. (Sebenico, 27 Maggio 1661); PTM. b. 488, num. 69. Zara, 10. Maggio 1663)

407For more concerning the *cernide* in *Terraferma* see: Alberto Prelli, *L'esercito Veneto al primo '600*. pp. 30-39.; Luciano Pezzolo, "L'archibugio e l'aratro. Considerazioni e problemi per la storia delle milizie rurali venete nei secoli XVI e XVII," *Studi veneziani* 7 (1983): pp. 59- 80.

their homes in October or latest in November.⁴⁰⁸ For men enlisted to serve in *cernide*, not being professional soldiers, the arrival in Dalmatian garrisons and facing harsh terms of the military service was a real shock. This especially proved to be the case with the contingent of the Italian *cernide* sent in 1658. Governor-General Bernardo informed the Senate about the sorry state of these troops, many of whom, shocked by the realities of the war and conditions of military life, fled from service. Yet, as Bernardo reported, these poor souls, not possessing any knowledge of roads or the countryside only ended up being captured by the Ottomans or the Morlacchi and sold as slaves.⁴⁰⁹

In addition to not being accustomed to military life, the non-Dalmatian *cernide* were also of a very questionable use in an actual combat. When in 1654, 500 *cernide* from Istria arrived in Zadar, Governor-General Dolfin was not impressed at all by this reinforcement and sent to Venice the following assessment of these troops:

The men are indeed of a good appearance, yet incapable of maintaining themselves, ill disciplined and in the fear of fire of the fuse of a musket, which they have openly declared to me, in the case of need, little or nothing can be expected from them, as their officers, who are most practiced with them, also confirm.⁴¹⁰

Similar assessment was also given by Antonio Bernardo who expressed his dissatisfaction with the military skills of these troops.⁴¹¹ Nevertheless, even if the combat skills of these troops left much to be desired, they could still be used to man walls and swell the ranks in the case of an Ottoman attack. That the Senate was well aware of the combat shortcomings of these troops, can be concluded by reading the Senate's instructions to Governor-General Foscarini from 1651. On this occasion, the Senate explicitly ordered the Governor-General

408For example see: ASVe, PTM. 476, num. 165. (Zara, 5. Ottobre 1654);PTM. b. 482. num. 142. (Spalato, 25. Novembre 1657)

409ASVe, Senato, Dispacci, PTM. b. 483. num. 185. (Zara, 1. Giugno 1658)

410La gente in apparenza è bella, ma per propria sussistenza così inetta, rozza, luntana della disciplina, è timorosa del fuoco della serpa del moschetto che convengo con tutta apertura dichiararmi, doversi nel loro servizio formar poco più, che nessun capitale all' occasioni, et lo confermano i medesimi suoi capi, che li hanno anco meglio praticata. ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 128. (Zara, 23. Maggio 1654)

411In March 1659, after having experience for more than two years with these troops, Bernardo wrote the following assessment concerning their uses:

Di Cernide poi del stato; non si faccia piu conto di ricever frutto alcuno perché le Istriani, non hanno immaginabile attitudine al maneggio delle armi, [15] et quelle di Terraferma, talmente si inviliscono per passione di ritrovarsi lontani dalle proprie famiglie, che si accorano di dolore, et moino miseramente. ASVe, PTM. b. 485. num. 238. (Zara, 16. Marzo 1659)

that he was allowed to employ these troops "*in sola occasione di attacco di qualche piazza*" in order to strengthen a defending garrison.⁴¹² Fortunately for them and the Republic, these troops had never seen a proper combat action in Dalmatia. Their use was, according to the wishes of the Senate, restricted to guard duties.

However, Italian and Istrian *cernide* still gave a significant contribution to the overall defense of the province, if not as soldiers than as builders and pioneers. Governor-General Antonio Bernardo (1656-1660), during whose mandate had begun a great construction project of encircling the town of Split with a new modern fortification complex,⁴¹³ was the first to introduce practice of employing Italian and Istrian *cernide* as laborers in these works.⁴¹⁴ His immediate successors, Andrea Corner and Girolamo Contarini, both continued to rely heavily on this practice for the completion of the construction works on the fortifications. How fundamental have the *cernide* became for this undertaking is best illustrated with the events of 1660. When, in the spring 1660, the Senate decided not to send any *cernide* reinforcements to Dalmatia for that season (since it was clear that the Ottomans have become entangled in Transylvanian affairs), Governor-General Andrea Corner still repeatedly asked for dispatch of these troops warning that the works in Split had all but stopped due to a lack of coin.⁴¹⁵ Having an additional 300-500 pairs of working hands for free over the period of six months, not only greatly increased the speed of the construction works but also significantly lowered their cost. As can be seen from the letters of Governor-General Bernardo, the monthly expenses of the construction works were estimated to less than 1,000 ducats (6,000 *lire*).⁴¹⁶ Without the free labor of these axillary troops, such a low cost of the construction works

412ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-25, f. 156v, *Adi 31. Agosto 1651*.

413In the years 1656-1664 the Republic built around the medieval core of the town the most modern - state of the art - fortification complex, which transformed Split, from weakest of Dalmatia towns to the second strongest Venetian stronghold on the Adriatic coast. For more see: Andre Žmegač, *Bastioni Jadranske Hrvatske*, pp. 83-91.

414In 1657, in the wake of the Ottoman attack, Bernardo asked that a contingent of *cernide* be sent to Dalmatia, and commented that in spite of a low combat value of these troops, they would provide very good service if employed in construction works: *Le cernide ottime di servir per guastadori, sono cosi avverse, vili, et incapaci da maneggiar l'armi, che non occorre far conto alcuno di servirsene per combattere*.

ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 95. (Zara, 17. Aprile 1657)

415See: ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-35, f. 185v-186r; ASVe, PTM. b. 487. num. 32. (Sebenico, 13. Agosto 1660); PTM. b. 488, num. 68. (Zara, 15. Marzo 1661); num. 72. (Sebenico, 24. Aprile 1661)

416ASVe, PTM. 480, num. 80. (Sebenico, 19. Gennaro 1656 mv.)

would not be possible to achieve.

The struggle of the "the small Christian Republic against the most powerful Empire in the world," as went the classical Venetian *topos*, manage to arouse the interest of European rulers and even stirred some to offer their forces to the Republic. In addition to the troops paid by the Republic and raised by various private persons (captains and colonels) on its behalf discussed so far, several contingents of the troops provided by other European states served in Dalmatia during this war as well. Depending on the agreement concluded with the Republic, these troops were either paid by Venice or by the native state/ruler which raised them. For example, two Savoy regiments - serving in Dalmatia in the period between July 1660 and December 1660 - each of the nominal strength of 500 men were raised by the Duke of Savoy, but equipped, paid and provided for with food and supplies by the Republic.⁴¹⁷ On the other hand, one Florentine regiment of 400 men, which served in Dalmatia between the April 1668 and August, was in addition to being raised and equipped, also paid for by the Grand Duke of Tuscany.⁴¹⁸ All of these troops represented sort of a foreign body within the Venetian military. Due to the special terms of their service concluded with their rulers they were commonly outside of the regular chain of command and were subjected to special administrative and legal rules. For example, the terms of service of the Savoy regiment stipulated that its companies could not be separated, and stationed among the several garrisons, but that the entire regiment should serve in a single place. The following sections discuss the cases of the two largest contingents of foreign troops that saw service in Dalmatia during this war: the Swiss and Papal regiments. The cases of these two regiments demonstrate all the administrative and military problems which the Venetian military administration in Dalmatia had to face while using these auxiliary troops.

Not surprisingly, the first ally that came to the Venetian aid was the papacy under the

⁴¹⁷For the letter of the Senate, bringing the news that the negotiations between the Republic and the Duke of Savoy for the hire of 1,000 men were concluded and that these would be sent to Dalmatia, see: ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-35, f. 135r-v, *A di 2. Giugno 1660.*; Arrival of 830 men in Venice, and issuing them with arms and ammunition: ASVe, Senato Mar, fols. 177r-v, 189r; Arrival in Dalmatia: ASVe, PTM. b. 487. num. 28. (Sebenico, 17. Luglio 1660); Departure from Dalmatia: ASVe, PTM. b. 487. num. 55. (Spalato, 6. Dicembre 1660)

⁴¹⁸ASVe, PTM. b. 500. num. 104. (Lessina, 10. Agosto 1668.)

pontificate of Innocent X, who as soon as May 1645 offered five galleys and 2,000 men. Although the diplomatic initiatives to form a new league of Christian powers for the war against the Ottomans came to nothing, Innocent X provided the Republic with material help, allowed the Republic to recruit troops in the territory of the Papal state and also raised and sent to Dalmatia one regiment 1,000 men strong.⁴¹⁹ These troops were raised, paid, equipped and supplied by the papacy, however because of these reasons they also claimed the special status within the Venetian military. When the regiment arrived in Zadar in June 1647, its Commander, Marchese Mirolli, informed Governor-General Foscolo regarding the terms of service of his regiment. Marchese Mirolli insisted on 1) an exclusive legal authority over his men, 2) that they were to receive commands only from the Governor-General and no other *capo di guerra* or public official, and finally 3) that companies of his regiments were to be kept together as much as possible. Due to possible political complications, the Senate decided to tread carefully and conceded to the first condition, recommended to Foscolo to attempt to respect the third as much as possible and through its diplomatic service attempted to refute the second condition, yet with limited success.⁴²⁰

Governor-General Foscolo found the soldiers of this regiment to be of a satisfactory quality, yet expressed his serious doubts concerning the military skill of their officers and their ability to control their troops. Such assessment, Foscolo based primarily on a large number of deserters from this regiment. Although at the muster in Ancona, the regiment counted 1,000 men, of those only 800 men, including servants and followers, arrived in Zadar. Moreover, when the regiment was in July 1647 transferred to Šibenik, the most threatened place of that campaign, only 590 men disembarked from the transport ships.⁴²¹ However, in spite of the shortcomings of their captains which resulted in constant breaches of discipline and incidents involving local population, the military record of these troops was rather good. They participated in the successful defense of Šibenik in 1647, after which the regiment was

419See: Ludwig Pastor, *The history of the popes: from the close of the Middle Ages. Drawn from the secret archives of the Vatican and other original sources*, vol. 30. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd: 1940) pp. 352-361.

420ASVe, PTM., b. 464. num. 255. (Zara, 12 Giugno 1647); ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-18, f. 130v-133r.

421ASV. PTM., b. 464. num. 258. (Zara, 19, Giugno 1647)

transferred to Split, where it was stationed until 1654. The regiment participated in the failed attack on Knin in March 1654, and was on that occasion almost completely destroyed. Only 80 soldiers from the Papal regiment returned to Split; all the rest, some 220 men, were either killed or fell into the Ottoman captivity.⁴²² Also, since these troops were not paid by the Republic, and did not share hardships of lack of pay with the other troops in the Venetian service (paid by the Republic), they were frequently used by the Venetian magistrates as a police force to quell the unrest of troops of other nationalities.⁴²³

In 1657, the second Papal regiment consisting of 1,000 men organized in five companies arrived in Dalmatia. Its commander Conte Baschi insisted on the same terms of service as his predecessor Marchese Mirolli had enjoyed, namely juridical independence and indivisibility of his regiment.⁴²⁴ However, this time all the negative aspects of such an arrangement combined with the poor quality of commanding officers were exposed in their fullness. Upon its arrival to Zara, the Papal regiment was transferred to Šibenik, where its soldiers almost immediately came into an open conflict with both civilians and soldiers from other Venetian units.⁴²⁵ The numerical superiority of this force over all the other Venetian troops stationed in Šibenik, and incompetence of its commanders - who acquired position through nepotism or solely through their social status - to maintain their soldiers disciplined resulted in a series of incidents which culminated in the events of August 1658. After a pub brawl between one Venetian ensign and one soldier of the Papal regiment, the Papal troops completely ran out of control. Not only was the lieutenant seized and killed, but the commander of the town garrison who, with the help of his guards, attempted to restrain them was chased off with gunshots and wounded. And this was just the beginning. Soon followed the wholesale

⁴²²ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 114. (Zara, 29. Marzo 1654); Because of these high losses the regiment was recalled from Dalmatia and left Split in May 1654. ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 133. (Zara, 31. Maggio 1654); Furthermore, it seems that Foscolo did not misjudge the poor combat quality of these troops. According to the testimony left by Giovanni Battista Foscone, who participated in the operation, the first of the Venetian units that fled the field at the sight of the Ottoman cavalry were Papal troops, causing the rout of the entire Venetian army. *Commissiones et Relatines* 7, pp. 89.

⁴²³Such was for example the case during the unrest of the cavalry forces in Split in May 1651. ASVe, PTM. b. 471, num. 26. (Trau, 6. Maggio 1651)

⁴²⁴ASVe, PTM., b. 481. num. 98. (Zara, 8, Maggio 1657)

⁴²⁵The first serious incident occurred not a month after the arrival of the Papal regiment in Šibenik, when the shootout between the Papal soldiers and a patrol on a guard duty resulted in two dead and several wounded. ASVe, PTM., b. 481. num.113. (Cattaro, 23. Luglio 1657)

insurrection of the soldiers of the Papal regiment, who seized all the key points and took over the control of the town, practically "invading the town they were supposed to defend" as Governor-General Antonio Bernardo described the situation.⁴²⁶

The responsibility for this incident Governor-General Bernardo put exclusively on their commander, Conte Baschi, "a youth with no experience, not custom to the exercise of justice, nor capable to hold the rank of a *Potesta*," and who prior to this appointment had not commanded anything larger than a company.⁴²⁷ His inability to quell smaller incidents gradually led to the complete loss of military discipline and the respect of his soldiers toward any authority. After this incident, overwhelmed by constant petitions of the Šibenik citizens complaining how in the current situation: "*l'honore delle Donne, e le sostanze de sudditi non erano sicure*," Governor-General Bernardo had no other choice but to remove this problematic regiment from Šibenik to Zadar where it could be controlled by other Venetian troops stationed there. In November 1658, some 660 soldiers of this regiment were under heavy escort transferred to Zadar, where they remained for the rest of their service.⁴²⁸

Almost completely opposite was the Venetian experience with probably the most famous mercenary force of the Early Modern Europe, the Swiss. In August 1648, the Senate informed Governor-General Foscolo that the Republic's resident in Zurich had completed negotiations with the Swiss Cantons concerning the hire of one Swiss regiment numbering 2,200 men destined for service in Dalmatia.⁴²⁹ A levy of this regiment was regulated by a contract, so-called capitulations, concluded between the Republic's representative in Zurich and the Swiss Confederacy.⁴³⁰ Although paid by the Republic, the Swiss troops, due to these capitulations, enjoyed a special status within the Venetian military. They enjoyed legal exemption and their

426ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 203. (Spalato, 10 Agosto 1658) For a detailed description of the entire incident see: ASVe, PTM. b. 484. (non numerated letter) (Spalato, 1. Ottobre 1658)

427... *giovane senza esperienza, non uso ad essercitar giustizia, ne capace da sostenere il grado della Potesta*, ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 203. (Spalato, 10 Agosto 1658)

428ASVe, PTM. b. 484. num. 220. (Zara, 17. Novembre 1658)

429ASVe, ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-20, f. 205v, *Adi 1648. Agosto 8.*; ASVe, Senato Mar, R-108, f. 27v, *Adi 22 Settembre 1648.*

430For the example of the capitulations obtained by the Swiss in the service of the Republic see the contract concluded in February 1658, which also includes all the articles of the 1648 capitulations: ASVe, PTM. b. 484, num. 212. Spalato, 1. Ottobre 1658. (pp. 18+1) attachment: *Capitulazioni del Regimento Svizzero fatte colla Ser.(enissi)ma Republica*

Colonel had the exclusive authority to prosecute crimes committed by his soldiers. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that the Swiss, unlike the Papal regiments, had no problems of serving divided in several garrisons, there were still serious limitations to their tactical use. The Swiss colonel flatly refused to send his troops to the fortress of Klis, justifying his stand with the article from the capitulations which prohibited the use of Swiss troops for occupation of newly acquired places. In spite of all of his rhetorical skills, Foscolo could not convince the colonel that Klis was in fact an ancient Venetian possession which had only been reacquired by its rightful master and that therefore the term of the capitulations did not apply in this case.⁴³¹ In this, same as in all subsequent disputes, the Swiss commander, Colonel Rodolfo Verdarmüller, proved to be a very tough negotiator, and strictly kept to the letters of the capitulations. The excuse that he can not depart from the articles of the capitulations without an explicit consent of his government proved to be a very effective one, to the great frustration of Governor-General Foscolo.

On the other hand, the Swiss troops, quite in accordance with their reputation, were of a significantly better quality than the Papal ones. The soldiers were of better stature, more disciplined and most importantly, commanded by experienced and competent officers. However, the Swiss were not without their own set of problems. In the first place, these troops were very expensive. Wages of the Swiss soldiers were significantly higher than those of other nations. Instead of 31 *lire* per month as was the standard monthly pay of footmen in Venetian service, the monthly pay of a Swiss soldier amounted to 46:15 *lire* (4,25 *Scudi*). Thus, one Swiss company of 200 men required 420 *doppie* (c.a 2,235 ducats) monthly, or almost twice the cost of a company of transalpine infantry of the same size. The entire regiment of 11 companies and 2,200 men required 24,590 *ducats* each month for their wages, or, to put these costs on an annual scale, more than 295,000 *ducats* were consumed by just one such regiment in a course of a year.⁴³²

431ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 492. (Zara, 12 Ottobre 1648); Moreover, the articles of capitulations stipulated that the Swiss regiment can serve only in Italy and Dalmatia, not mentioning Crete or the Levant. See article num. 9: ASVe, PTM. b. 484, num. 212. Spalato, 1. Ottobre 1658. (pp. 18+1) attachment: *Capitulazioni del Regimento Svizzero fatte colla Ser.(enissi)ma Republica*
432ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 503. (Zara, 31. Ottobre 1648);

The second problem involved with these troops concerns their numbers. Out of 2,200 soldiers that were commissioned by the Republic only some 1,950 actually arrived in Zadar, yet more than 300 of them fell sick to the epidemic of influenza that spread among them during the transport. When the first muster of the regiment was held in November 1648 only 1630 men were found.⁴³³ Over the next two years, due to an epidemic of plague, inadaptability to a local climate and outbreaks of malaria, the number of the soldiers in the Swiss regiment diminished constantly. When the regiment finally left Dalmatia in November 1650, it counted only 880 men.⁴³⁴ Yet, there was nothing particular in these trends; constant decrease in unit strength was common to the troops of all nationalities in the Venetian service. What was particular for the Swiss, was that the Republic was constantly paying for more of these soldiers than their actual number in the service.

At the great displeasure of Governor-General Foscolo, the articles of their capitulations stipulated that the regiment cannot be brought to a muster (and thus establish its actual strength), if the regimental pays were not fully covered. Since the pay was practically always in arrears, the task of compelling the Swiss to a muster was rather complicated, involving long and hard negotiations with their very businesslike Colonel.⁴³⁵ All in all, the Venetian administration in Dalmatia, managed to organize only three musters of the Swiss regiment. The first in November 1648, upon their arrival, the second in November 1649, when only 1,019 soldiers were found instead of 1,630,⁴³⁶ and the last one before their embarkation for Venice in November 1650. As a consequence, the Republic constantly ended up paying for soldiers long dead. Moreover, the delays in payment of these troops not only made them very expensive (in regard to their actual numbers), but, what was even worse, rendered them completely useless. When their pay was not covered in full, again in the accordance with their capitulation, the Swiss restricted their military activities only to guard duties in Dalmatian

433ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 512. (Zara, 24. Novembre 1648)

434ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 768. Zara, 28. Novembre 1650)

435For the course of the negotiations concerning the arrangement of the muster in November 1649, see: ASVe, PTM. b. 469. num. 622. (Zara, 15 Settembre 1649); num. 624. (Zara, 21 Settembre 1649); num. 627. (Zara, 29 Settembre 1649); num. 634. (Di Zara, 15 Ottobre 1649) attachment: *Scrittura per il Collonello di Svizzeri*.

436ASVe, PTM., b. 470. no. 755. (Zara, 17. Ottobre 1650) attachment dated: *Adi 16. Settembre 1650*.

towns and refused to enter the countryside in order to meet Ottoman raids.⁴³⁷ Thus, although of a good quality and disciplined, the Republic had little use for these troops. The news of their departure from Dalmatia to Venice, Governor-General Foscolo accompanied with the following assessment of these troops and their service: "very fine and well disciplined men, yet I would not say seasoned, since during their stay in these lands they have not seen the face of the enemy."⁴³⁸

The backing of the Swiss Confederation provided the Colonel of the Swiss regiment with much stronger negotiating positions than was that of other colonels in the Venetian service. Wishing to avoid any form of political complications with colonel's employers, ie. the Swiss cantons, and thus compromise or even close this recruitment ground, the Senate treated the Swiss colonel with great courtesies and patience, basically respecting all of the articles of the contract and what is even more important colonel's interpretation of those. However, it seems that the Republic's policymakers drew their own conclusion from this unfortunate experience and in the course of the following 8 years, refrained from hiring any new units from the Swiss. Only great Ottoman preparations for the planned campaigns of 1657 and 1658 (see the previous chapter) made the Senate change this policy and order its resident in Zürich to hire a new Swiss regiment. By April 1658 a new regiment was formed and troops began their march towards the Adriatic.⁴³⁹

In July 1658, a newly recruited regiment of 1,200 Swiss consisting of six companies arrived in Dalmatia. The 15 months service of these troops in Dalmatia was a repetition of all the problems from the previous years when the first Swiss contingent served in Dalmatia. Again, immediately upon their arrival to the province, 311 soldiers ended up in hospital stricken by a fever.⁴⁴⁰ Although the Swiss were willing to serve in Split, - the most threatened

437ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 757. (Zara, 23. Ottobre 1650)

438*Gente bellissima, et benissimo disciplinata; ma non dirò aguerita, non havendo in queste parti veduto la faccia del Inimico*; ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 768. (Zara, 28. Novembre 1650)

439ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-33, f. 66r, *Adi 4. Aprile 1658*.

440ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 200. (Spalato, 30. Luglio 1658)

of the Dalmatian towns, - without any objections, again, delays in their pay resulted in constant disputes and postponing of the date of their muster, with the same detrimental effects for the Republic's finances. When the last muster at the departure of the regiment from Dalmatia was held, in October 1659, the Governor-General established that out of 1051 men present at muster in November 1658, and paid by the Republic for the last 12 months, total of 224 were actually missing.⁴⁴¹ Finally, the debt accumulated by this unit was of a considerable size (c.a 100,000 *ducats*)⁴⁴², and again the Republic spent on this regiment tens of thousands of *ducats* with little or no benefit.

1.3. Military Engineers and Other Specialists: *Bombardieri, Minadori, Bombisti*

Among the 17th century military specialists, engineers represented the elite - they were one of the most valuable resources in the Venetian military. In addition to their primary trade as architects and constructors of fortification complexes,⁴⁴³ they were also employed in a wide range of other more combat oriented tasks. As the experts in military fortifications, they were considered to be the crucial asset necessary for both the defense of a town during a siege, and for successful attacks on Ottoman strongholds. For example, during the Ottoman siege of Šibenik in 1647, engineer Giovanni Namur was charged with the *ad hoc* improvised repairs of damaged fortifications and, with assisting in directing of the Venetian artillery counter fire.⁴⁴⁴ Similarly, engineers were an integral part of every Venetian offensive operation. During the spring 1647, engineer Vincenzo Benaglia, who also held the title of *soprintendente dell'Arteglia*, accompanied Venetian troops in all major operations of that campaign (Zemunik,

441ASVe, PTM. b. 485. num. 255. Spalato, 3. Luglio 1659) attachment: *Nota delle milite del Reggimento Svizzero*; ASVe, PTM. b. 486. num. 267. (Spalato, 30. Ottobre 1659); How detrimental was this arrangement for the Republic is nicely illustrated by the event of November 1658, when Bernardo managed to organize a muster of the Swiss regiment and discovered that one captain had been receiving pay for 200 men while the actual strength of his company was only 70 men. ASVe, PTM. b. 484. num. 219. (Zara, 14. Novembre 1658)

442ASVe, PTM. b. 485. num. 248. (Spalato, 15. Maggio 1659)

443For more on the division in the field of architecture on the civilian and military one, and the birth of the specialists in the field of military constructions, that is military engineers, see: Horst De La Croix, "Military Architecture and the Radical City Plan in Sixteenth Century Italy" *The Art Bulletin* 42 (1960): pp. 263-290.

444ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 317. (Di Galea Sebenico, 16. Settembre 1647); Franjo Difnik, *Povijest Kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 152-153.; Not surprisingly, when in May 1649 engineer Namur was again sent to Dalmatia, in order to utilize his experience as much as possible the Senate designated as the preferable place of his service the town of Šibenik. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-108, f. 136r, *Adi 1. Maggio 1649*.

Novigrad, Vrana).⁴⁴⁵ For the attack on Klis, Governor-General Foscolo brought with him all the three engineers at his disposal at the moment, Giovanni Namur, Vincenzo Benaglia and Alessandro Magli, while for the attack on Zadvarje in 1652, Governor-General Foscarini employed two of his engineers, Magli and Benaglia.⁴⁴⁶

As esteemed military specialists, engineers were also regular members of an advisory war councils (*consulta*) summoned by a Governor-General in order to discuss some important military issues. In that regard, engineers played especially important role in the war councils called upon to discuss the question whether some conquered stronghold should be kept or destroyed. Such was for example the case in 1652, when Governor-General Foscarini based on the recommendations of the engineers decided to destroy newly conquered fortress of Zadvarje rather than to rearm it.⁴⁴⁷ Yet, as the outcome of the *consulta* held after the capture of Klis had shown, even though very important and having tangible weight, recommendations of the engineers had merely advisory character. Governor-General Foscolo immediately upon investment into the fortress, charged the engineers with the task of inspecting the state of the fort and compiling reports with their recommendations what to do with it.⁴⁴⁸ On the *consulta* held two weeks later, out of 12 present members, all three engineers and almost all military professionals (the only exception being *sergente maggiore* Sabbini), with eight votes against four, voted for the destruction of the fortress.⁴⁴⁹ However, Governor-General Foscolo used his authority to overrule this vote and proceeded with fortification of the fortress in accordance with the expressed wishes of the Senate.

Engineers' duties also included reconnaissance missions in the Ottoman lands and inspection of the strongholds designated as possible targets of attack. Engineers Alessandro Magli and Marc Antonio Alberti played a special role during preparation for the attack on

⁴⁴⁵Governor-General Foscolo commended his conduct during the capture of Zemunik: ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 222. (Zara, 22. Marzo 1647)

⁴⁴⁶ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 91. (Almissa, 24. Febraio 1651. m.v.)

⁴⁴⁷ASVe, PTM. b. 472, num. 93. (Almissa, 4. Marzo 1652) and attachments; num. 94. (without date and place)

⁴⁴⁸ASVe, PTM. b. 466. no. 388. (Di Galea Salona, 4. Aprile 1648)

⁴⁴⁹ASe, PTM. b. 466. num. 398. (Zara, 20. Aprile 1648) attachments: *Consulta Circa il tenir Clissa, Scrittura circa la fortezza di Clissa del Ing, re Benaglio, Scrittura delli Ing.ri Benaglio et Magli circa la Fortezza di Clissa*

Knin in 1654. Ottoman stronghold of Herceg-Novi figured as the first choice of Governor-General Dolfin, as the prospective target for the 1654 campaign. Yet, after engineer Alessandro Magli returned from a reconnaissance mission in Bay of Kotor, and submitted his report presenting all the difficulties involved with the attack on Herceg-Novi, the fortress of Knin was chosen as the new target for the incoming campaign.⁴⁵⁰ Soon, Governor-General Dolfin, dispatched both of the above mentioned engineers, Magli and Alberti, on a rather dangerous mission of inspecting available approach routes and the state of this fortress, situated in the heart of the Dalmatian hinterland. After the return of the engineers, based on the Magli's report, the *consulta* selected the southern route, one utilizing the river Skradin as far inland as possible, as the approach route for the Venetian force.⁴⁵¹ All of these activities involved a high personal risk, which can best be seen from a high casualty rate among Venetian engineers (at least in the first and the most active years of the war). Out of eight engineers that served in Dalmatia between 1646-1649, two lost their lives in the military operations of 1646-7, one more (Zappich) was lost during the attack on Knin, while one (Alessandro Magli) was captured by the Ottomans in 1652.⁴⁵²

The life these military specialists lived might have indeed been a dangerous one but still the dangers were more than compensated by their wages which clearly reflected their higher status and level of responsibility that was put on them. A stipend of a particular engineer depended on his reputation and a negotiating skill (in selling his services to the Senate), and ranged from 40 to 100 *ducats* a month. On the average, an engineer of a good reputation and skill, destined for service in Dalmatia, could count on the yearly stipend of 800 *ducats* (c.a 67 *ducats* a month). For example, both Alessandro Maglia and Vincenzo Benaglia were granted such stipends.⁴⁵³ This pay was on the level of captains of trans-alpine infantry. However,

450Franjo Difnik, *Povijest Kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 228-229.

451ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 112. (Galea, Scradona 20. Marzo 1654)

452ASVe, PTM. b. 469, num. 623. (Zara, 16. Settembre 1649) attachment: *Nota degl' Ingegneri*; ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 116. (Zara, 7. Aprile 1654); ASVe, PTM. b. 473. num. 125. (Zara, 17 Agosto 1652); ASVe, PTM. b. 469. num. 656. (Zara, 11. Dicembre 1649) attachment: *Nota de Avantageggiati Stipendiate et Provisionati Creditori per tutto Ottobre 1649*

453For Senat's decree granting the *condotta* of 800 ducats to Magli see: ASVe, Senato Mar, R-107, f. 74v, *A di 20 Ottobre 1648.*; ASVe, PTM. b. 469. num. 656. (Zara, 11. Dicembre 1649) attachment: *Nota de Avantageggiati Stipendiate et Provisionati Creditori per tutto Ottobre 1649.* For the appointment of engineer

unlike captains who served with 200 men (recruited and maintained by them) under their command, engineers served accompanied only by one to three adjutants. Adjutants were paid either by engineers themselves, or by the Republic, as was the case with Vincenzo Benaglia whose son Gerolimo Benaglia accompanied him on military campaigns (1646-1648), learning the father's trade and was in January 1651 granted a monthly pay of 20 *ducats*.⁴⁵⁴ Although hiring of engineers was in the domain of the Senate, governor-generals also held the authority, in a case of need, to accept into service suitable candidates and the adjutants already serving (or those that had served previously) in Dalmatia were the most obvious choice. Such was for example the case in June 1662, when Governor-General Girolamo Contarini upon his arrival in Dalmatia found not a single engineer in the province, and on the spot hired Tomaso Sandolini giving him the monthly salary of 30 *ducats*. Sandolini previously served as an engineer adjutant but at the time of the hiring was serving in the province as a *venturiere* for no pay at all.⁴⁵⁵

Engineers who proved their worth, could count on increasing their income through special favors and acquiring of additional titles. For example, over the years both Magli and Benaglia had seen their stipends increased to 100 *ducats* per month.⁴⁵⁶ And not only that, in August 1651, as an act of favor, the Senate granted Magli command over a company of transalpine infantry that was left without a captain, which increased his monthly income by additional 60 *ducats*.⁴⁵⁷ A capable engineer with some social skills could rise quite high in the Venetian military hierarchy, as is best illustrated by the well researched case of engineer Don Onofrio del Campo.⁴⁵⁸ A veteran of many European wars, del Campo entered the service of the

with monthly stipend of 40 ducats see also: ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, fol. 140v, *Adi 1. Giugno 1646*. 454ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 782. (Zara, 8. Genaro 1650. m.v.); ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-24, f. 250r, *Adi 21.*

Gennaro 1650 m.v.; Few years later, in April 1654, young Gerolimo Benaglia was sent to Dalmatia to be at disposal of the Governor-General, to serve independently of his father with a monthly stipend of 25 ducats.

ASVe, Senato Mar, R-117, fols. 86r-v. *Adi 11. Aprile 1654*.

455ASVe, PTM. b. 489. num. 4. (Spalato, 8. Giugno 1662) attachment: *Patente di Tomaso Sandolini Ingegnere*

456Stipend of Magli was increased already by October 1649, while Benaglia got an increased to 100 ducats some time before July 1652. ASVe, PTM. b. 469. num. 656. (Zara, 11. Dicembre 1649) attachment: *Nota de Avantageggiati Stipendiate et Provisionati Creditori per tutto Ottobre 1649*; ASVe, PTM. b. 473. num. 116. (Zara, 12 Luglio 1652)

457ASVe, PTM. b. 471, numo. 50. (Zara, 15. Agosto 1651); Confirmation of the Foscarini's appointment: ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-25, f. 151v, *Adi 24. Agosto 1651*.

458See also introductory study to Onofrio del Campo's scripture: Miroslav Bertoša, *Tvrđavski spisi jednog kondotijera*, pp. 6-36.

Republic and arrived in Dalmatia in 1655 as a simple engineer. Through his diligent work, he soon gained the trust of Governor-General Antonio Zen who appointed him in May 1656 as a "*soprintendente delli armi di Spalato, Trau e loro territorij, e delle fortificationi tutte di Dalmatia, et Albania*," granting him a monthly stipend of 120 *ducats*.⁴⁵⁹ Although, Zen left Dalmatia soon after this appointment, because of his skills and expertise Del Campo remained in high favor with his successor, Governor-General Antonio Bernardo, as well. Backed by Bernardo's positive assessment of his service, in February 1660 Onofrio Del Campo managed to obtain from the Senate appointment to the post of the "*soprintendente delle Milite di Dalmatia et Albania*." As such Del Campo was subordinated only to the persons of the rank of a general and enjoyed seniority and command over all other military commanders and specialists serving in Dalmatia and Albania.⁴⁶⁰

The number of engineers serving in Dalmatia varied from year to year. In the first years of the war, Governor-General Foscolo could count on having four to seven engineers at his disposal, while the rest of his successors could be considered lucky if three or four of these specialists were present in Dalmatia, as was the case during the campaigns of 1656-1660. Being a military specialist whose skills were in high demand, a good engineer could also count on rather active involvement of the Republic in a case of his capture by the Ottomans. When in August 1652, Magli was ambushed and taken prisoner by a small Ottoman raiding party while inspecting the Klis fortifications,⁴⁶¹ the Senate immediately ordered Governor-General Foscarini to find out who had captured him and to open negotiations for his ransom. And indeed, negotiations were soon started and even more importantly concluded fairly quickly. In less than six months, in January 1653, Magli was again free and in exchange for him the Republic had released from captivity two Ottoman beys.⁴⁶²

⁴⁵⁹For Senate's increase of stipend to 120 *ducats* see: ASVe, Senato Mar, R-119, f. 62r, *Adi 29. Marzo 1656*.; For appointment to the post of *soprintendente* see: ASVe, PTM. b. 479. num. 109. (Sebenico, 12 Maggio 1656)

⁴⁶⁰This appointment also brought to Onofrio Del Campo further increase in his salary of some 60 *ducats* (amount of four *lanze spezzate* – free lances or cavalry pays granted as sign of a favor to persons of rank) and put at his disposal as his adjutants two of the *stipendiati* serving in Dalmatia. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-123, fol. 310r, *Adi 18 Febraro 1659 mv*.

⁴⁶¹ASVe, PTM. b. 473. num. 125. (Zara, 17 Agosto 1652)

⁴⁶²ASVe, PTM. b. 474. num. 7. (Di Zara, 16. Genaro 1652 m.v.); num. 15. (Di Spalato, 22. Febraro 1652 m.v.)

Not as versatile as the military engineers but still playing an equally important role in the 17th century warfare were various specialists for the artillery and explosives, known as *maestri di fuochi artificiali: bombisti, petardieri* and sappers (*minadori*). These technical experts, performed a wide variety of combat-engineering duties. Being experts for explosives, *bombisti* and *petardieri* were charged with the task of preparing and handling of the bombs, grenades and other explosive devices used during defense of a town. Sappers and *petardieri* were engaged in tasks of destruction of captured Ottoman strongholds.⁴⁶³ Equally important was their participation during the attacks on enemy strongholds, especially in the cases when a configuration of the landscape or a position of a fortress made difficult the use of the artillery and gates or breaches in walls had to be made by means of mining and/or explosives. Moreover, in cases where it was possible, the use of mines could free attackers from the need to use the artillery and thus speed up an attack significantly, as for example occurred, in 1647 when the small fort of Karin was taken by the assault after the gates were breached by the *petard*.⁴⁶⁴

The importance of these troops is illustrated best by the situations when they had not performed their duties in accordance with expectations. Such was, for example, the case with the otherwise very successful Venetian campaign of spring 1647. Throughout the entire campaign Governor-General Foscolo was dissatisfied with a meager performance of French sappers in the Venetian service. First in March 1647, after the capture of Zemunik, Foscolo complained how the French sappers (*minadori*) had not been able to destroy the town's castle and that, finally, he had been forced to employ the artillery for this task, which consumed large quantities of gunpowder, munitions and time.⁴⁶⁵ Similarly, after the recapture of Novigrad a few weeks later, in April, more than two days were consumed in destroying the

⁴⁶³Some of the strongholds had to be demolished several times. In order to prevent the Ottomans to repair and inhabit the places captured during the spring 1647, in January 1648, a group of sappers led by engineer Benaglia and accompanied by the cavalry and Venetian Morlacchi, was sent to the Zadar countryside to level to the ground ruins of Vrana, Zemunik, Nadin and other places. ASVe, PTM. b. 465, num. 359. (Zara, 2 Genaro 1647. m.v.); num. 361. (Zara, 10. Genaro 1647 m.v.); num. 369. (Zara, 27. Genaro 1647. m.v.)

⁴⁶⁴Vicko Solitro, *Povijesni Dokumenti o Dalmaciji i Istri*. pp. 278.

⁴⁶⁵ASVe, PTM. b. 464, num. 222. (Zara, 22. Marzo 1647)

fortress with mines.⁴⁶⁶ In an operation where speed was an operational necessity such a waste of time could have had dire consequences. Therefore, it is not surprising that Foscolo upon his return to Zadar, dissatisfied by their performance, recommended to the Senate discharge of the French *minadori* from service.⁴⁶⁷ However, lack of good sappers was most felt during the Venetian attack on Risan in 1649. Situated on a rocky hill, with no suitable platform in the vicinity where the Venetian artillery could be posted, Risan practically remained untouched by Venetian bombardment. Lacking good miners and sappers, Foscolo was more than relieved when after 11 days the morale of the defenders broke and signal was given that they were ready to parley.⁴⁶⁸

These experts, being a special, more technical branch of the Venetian military, did not have a strict command and organizational structure. They were commanded directly by a governor-general or some other Republic official in command of a place where they served. Nor did the Republic had a more or less standardized system of pay for these experts, as it had for the regular infantry or cavalry. Same as military engineers, these specialists negotiated their condottas on individual bases. Also, in their case, as in the cases of military captains, the Republic preferred negotiations with individuals of esteem and experience who were able to bring into their service an entire troop of specialists.

The above mentioned French sappers were part of the troop brought to Venetian service by the two French gentlemen, Chevaliers De Zarie and La Grange Petitiere, experts for artillery and *fuochi d'artificio*. In March 1646, the ambassador of the Republic in France finalized the terms of their service, which provide a good illustration of how valuable for the Republic were these experts and what favorable terms of service they could obtain. According to the articles of their contract, Zarie and La Grange Petitiere were to be given monthly stipends of 60 *ducats*, starting with the day they presented themselves in the *Collegio* in Venice, as was customary with all *stipendiati* of the Most Serene Republic. Before their departure from Paris,

466ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 228. (Zara, 7, Aprile 1647)

467ASVe, PTM. b. 464, num. 229. (Zara, 9. Aprile 1647)

468ASVe, PTM. b. 467, num. 535. (Di Galea Risano, 12. Febraro 1648. mv.)

De Zarie, La Grange, and all other members of their troop were to be given two full payments, in order to cover the expenses of their voyage to Venice. Regarding their return back home, the contract stipulated that after their discharge from the service each of them would be given a gift of 200 *Scudi*, an amount sufficient to cover the expenses of their voyage home. For their part, Zarie and La Grange obliged themselves to serve wherever they were commanded to, and to bring into the Venetian service a troupe of the following 12 experts: four *petardieri*, (with monthly pays of of 50 *ducats* each), two *bombisti*, four *maestri per lavorar li fuochi d'artificio* and two corporals of sappers (each with a monthly pay of 25 *ducats*).⁴⁶⁹ As such this small unit of 14 experts was rather expensive, consuming 520 *ducats* each month.

Nevertheless, even if the skills of the sappers brought by La Grange and Zarie left much to be desired for, it seems that a pragmatic view that in time of need whatever expert at hand is always better than no expert at all, overran all possible concerns. In 1657, during the siege of Kotor, Governor-General Bernardo, again took Monsieur La Grange into service, this time with a title of the "*soprintendente dell' artiglieria*" in Dalmatia, granting him the same stipend he had enjoyed previously. This appointment designated La Grange as the commander of all "*bombisti, granatieri et maestri de fuochi d'artificio*" and of all gunners (*bombardieri*).⁴⁷⁰ Gunners can be taken to represent the rank and file of this branch of Venetian military. As was told in the first chapter, in 1644 the contingent of gunners on the state payroll in Dalmatia counted 60 men, with the additional reserve of some 600 *scolari* - part time artillery trainees (see table 1.2). Unfortunately, it seems that the Dalmatian *scolari* were of questionable proficiency in handling guns and more resembled simple town militia than trained gunners. Moreover, as in the case of the regular army forces, a number of available professional gunners was adequate for peacetime duties, but was far from sufficient to cover the needs of the province in the times of the war.

⁴⁶⁹ASVe, PTM. b. 482. no. 135. (Cattaro, 14. Ottobre 1657) attachment: *Articoli accordati et conclusi tra l'Ecc.mo Sig.re Batt.(ist)a Nani Amba.(sciato)re della Ser.(enissi)ma Republica di Venetia et lo ss.ri de Zarie e de la Grange Petitiere.*; All 14 French experts arrived in Venice in May 1645, and were immediately sent to Dalmatia. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, fol. 128r, *Adi 23. Maggio 1646*.
⁴⁷⁰Ibid, attachment dated: *Cattaro à 25 Settembre 1657*.

And indeed, immediately upon the opening of the hostilities the Republic had taken steps to remedy the situation and increase the number of gunners and artillery experts in the province. In the first place, for every Dalmatian town one *capo di bombardieri* was appointed, and charged with the command over a body of gunners serving there. Furthermore, from its pool of gunners serving either on *Terraferma* or in Venice, the Senate began transferring groups of 10-20 men to Zadar for service in Dalmatia. For example in April 1646, a group of 20 *bombardieri* and two masters was dispatched to Dalmatia, followed, in August 1647, during the siege of Šibenik, by the next group of 12 expert gunners from Italy, promptly dispatched to the endangered town.⁴⁷¹ Also, as we have seen in the case of *Messieurs La Grange* and *Zarie*, the Republic began searching for military specialists with proficiency in handling explosives and artillery, willing to enter its service. In addition to taking into the service entire troops of military specialists, individual veterans with artillery proficiency were also hired whenever they could be found, and dispatched to Dalmatia.⁴⁷² Since Governor-General Foscolo had almost never complained about the shortage of these troops in the period 1646-1649, it seems that these recruiting efforts were rather successful and the Republic managed to brought the number of gunners serving in Dalmatia to a satisfactory level.

However, what was problematic, was not the number of gunners dispatched to Dalmatia but their quality. Due to the need to quickly expand its contingent of gunners in the province, apparently, the Senate was more concerned with their quantity than the quality. The French sappers, mentioned previously, were not the only ones discharged from the service due to lack of skills. When Governor-General Girolamo Foscarini took over office from Lunardo Foscolo, he found out that there was a shortage of gunners in the province. Over the years, a large number of gunners was discharged from service by various public officials without any notice and approval from the Governor-General. Some were indeed discharged due to the lack of necessary skill, but many simply obtained permission to leave Dalmatia from the lower

⁴⁷¹ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17, fol. 90r, *Adi 19 Aprile 1646.*; ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-18, f. 194r, *Adi 20 Agosto 1647.*

⁴⁷²For example in April 1646, three Frenchmen artillery specialists were hired and immediately sent to Dalmatia. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, f. 72v, *Adi 7 Aprile 1646.*

magistrates in order to get rid free of this hard service. This moved Governor-General Foscarini to declare void all such discharges and recall all the gunners back to service.⁴⁷³ Yet, in spite of such measures, over the next few years the number of gunners further decreased. By June 1655, of the gunners sent to serve in Dalmatia 47 were either dead, fled from the service, or in the Ottoman captivity.⁴⁷⁴ Not only it was necessary to substitute for these losses, but the construction of new fortress complexes in Šibenik, Trogir and especially Split, resulted in the considerable expansion of the artillery train in the province (of which more will be said in the next chapter) which in turn created the need for additional reinforcements of gunners.

Harsh conditions of the service in Dalmatia and decrease of already low salaries of gunners due to the Republic's financial problems caused by the protracted war (see the next chapter), did not help to improve the situation. By 1656, the situation was such that Governor-General Zen had to inform the Senate that he had decided to keep in service six old gunners who, although not any more fit for active duty, still possessed valuable skills and expertise that could be used.⁴⁷⁵ During the critical years 1656-1660, unable to recruit a sufficient number of new professional gunners, the Republic adopted a new policy of sending to Dalmatia the *bombardieri* from the *Terraferma*, but, with their service time limited only to the duration of a single campaign. For example, in March 1658, a group of 25 *bombardieri* from the *Terraferma* was sent to Dalmatia to serve under such conditions.⁴⁷⁶ Although the number of the gunners in Dalmatia rose considerably, when compared to pre-war years - in May 1658, there were 145 gunners, 6 *bombisti* and 3 *minadori* serving in Dalmatia – yet, these figures represented only 2/3 of total numbers needed (see table 2.3 below). In the following years, aiming to address this problem the Republic turned to even more drastic levies of the gunners from the *Terraferma*. For example, in 1665, seasonal reinforcements of the gunners ordered to Dalmatia amounted to no less than 100 men.⁴⁷⁷ Nevertheless, as much as it tried, the Republic

473ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. 29. (Zara, 14. Maggio 1651)

474ASVe, PTM. b. 477, num. 45. (Zara, li 10. Giugno, 1655)

475ASVe, PTM. b. 479. num. 98. (Zara, 14 Marzo 1656)

476ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-33, f. 56r-v, *A di 28. Marzo 1658.*

477ASVe, Senato Mar, R-128, f. 464v-465r, *Adi 19 Febraro 1654 mv.*

was unable to provide a sufficient number of gunners to cover the wartime needs of the province and the shortage of gunners persisted until the end of the war.⁴⁷⁸

Town	Number of Gunners (Bombardieri)		Number of <i>Minadori</i>	Number of explosive experts (<i>Bombisti</i>)	Total number of specialists serving
	present	needed more			
Zadar	26	30	0	2	28
Šibenik	33	20	1	2	36
Trogir	12	10	0	0	12
Split	21	12	1	0	22
Klis	10	4	0	0	10
Omiš	7	0	0	0	7
Kotor	36	20	1	2	39
Total:	145	96	3	6	154

Additional numbers of bombisti needed:

4

Table 2.3. Overview of the actual number of artillery and explosive specialists present in the Dalmatian towns in May 1658, with the numbers of additional specialists needed.⁴⁷⁹

Compared to the pay of engineers, *bombisti* and other technical specialists, the wages of gunners were considerably lower. The wages of gunners depended primarily on their status, that is, whether they belonged to the ordinary gunners who would be kept in service after the war, or to the extraordinary ones, those destined for discharge once the hostilities ended. Monthly pay of ordinary gunners ranged between 20 and 40 *lire* a month depending on the skill of a gunner, while those of extraordinary gunners were a little higher, set at 80 *lire* for gunners serving in the fortress of Klis, and 60 *lire* for those serving in other Dalmatian towns.⁴⁸⁰ Monthly stipends of *capi di bombardieri* were not that uniform and varied significantly. For example, the monthly stipend of ordinary *capo di bombradiieri* in Zadar, Marin Rounelli in the period 1646-1654 (until he was lost in the attack on Knin) was set at 12 *ducats*.⁴⁸¹ Similarly, a few years later (in 1658), the ordinary *capo di bombardieri* in Split was

⁴⁷⁸Requests for gunners were practically constant, repeated annually by Governor-General Bernardo, for example see: ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 87. Zara, 4 Marzo 1657); ASVe, PTM. b. 483, num. 166. Zara, 11. Marzo 1658) Furthermore similar requests were also repeated by his successors, see also: ASVe, PTM. b. 492. num. 143. Spalato, 27 Aprile 1664); Moreover, by the February 1668, the number of gunners decreased even more to 128. men. ASVe, PTM. 498, num. 39, (Zara, 18. Febraro 1667. m.v.) attachment: *Rsitretto delle Militie*.

⁴⁷⁹Data taken from: ASVe, PTM. b. 485, num. 248 (Spalato, 15. Maggio 1659) attachment: *Ristretto de Bombardieri attuali et che mancano*.

⁴⁸⁰ASVe, PTM. b. 484, num. 222 (Di Galea nel Porto di Zara) attachment: *Nota del numero delle militie*

⁴⁸¹ASVe, PTM. b. 4646. num. 235. (Zara, 20. Aprile 1647)

given a monthly stipend of 100 *lire* (c.a 14 *ducats*). At the same time, the extraordinary *capi di bombardieri* in Kotor and Klis, enjoyed the stipends of c.a 20 *ducats*.⁴⁸²

2. *The Navy: The Adriatic Naval Squadron*

No other factor can contribute to the safety of these towns, as much as the protection of some warship accompanied by galleys, with them it is possible to accommodate bringing of the help [to the spot] where the most vigorous attacks are undertaken.

(Governor-General Antonio Bernardo)⁴⁸³

In addition to the land forces discussed above, in order to complete this survey of the Republic's armed forces in the Adriatic theater of operations one more branch of the Venetian military needs to be examined - the Adriatic naval squadron. Before proceeding any further, a few remarks justifying brevity of this section and its focus are in order. In the first place, due to the nature of the warfare in the Adriatic theater of operations, with the clear predominance of the land operations over the naval engagements, the focus of this study has been put on the Republic's land forces. Secondly, the Venetian galleys and *galleasses* rank among the most famous topics of naval history in general. It is practically impossible to find a study of the early modern naval warfare without section dedicated to these ships. Moreover, in the more narrowed studies, those dealing with the Venetian history, to the galleys and the command of the sea are accorded one of the central places in the success story of this city-state. All in all, it can safely be claimed that the Venetian merchant and the war fleet alike, both represent well researched subjects, with the considerable number of studies dealing with the wide range of topics relative to these ships: their use, arming of their crews, construction and administrative problems. Due to these reasons and in order to avoid repeating the topics already well covered by existing studies, the space dedicated to the Venetian galleys is shortened and an emphasis has been put on the other, smaller vessels of the Adriatic naval squadron, namely armed boats, *fuste*, *galletotte* and *bregantini*, less well researched so far. Finally, this choice can be further justified by the nature of the naval warfare in the Adriatic and the tasks put before this squadron by the Venetian high command.

482ASVe, PTM. b. 484, num. 222 (Di Galea nel Porto di Zara) attachment: *Nota del numero delle militie*

483Niuna cosa potria riuscir di più sicura salute di esse Piazze, quanto il calore di qualche Vascello da guerra, e di Galere ancora, con quali si potesse accomodare à porgere gl' aiuti, dovesi facessero più gagliardi gl' attacchi. ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 54. (Trau, 16. Ottobre 1656)

It may be that no dramatic naval engagements, like those fought in the Dardanelles during 1654-1657, took place in the Adriatic during this war, still, as was pointed out in the first chapter, securing the sea lanes of communication in the Adriatic was the mandatory precondition for Venice to be able to wage war in the Levant at all. Consequently, the prosecution of Ottoman corsairs ranked as the first duty set before the ships of the Adriatic squadron. The second duty of the Adriatic squadron was to provide support to the Venetian land forces. This consisted of wide range of tasks: from rushing in emergency delivery of supplies and reinforcements to the endangered towns during Ottoman attacks, as was the case in 1647 and 1657, to providing the protection to the Venetian regular and irregular forces fighting along the coast. Moreover, based on all discussed in the previous chapter, it can be safely argued that the control of the sea and the additional firepower that could be brought by the navy to the engagements along the coast, gave the Venetian land forces the tactical and strategical edge which compensated for their numerical inferiority.

Each spring during the war, at the beginning of a campaign season, the Adriatic naval squadron would divide into several smaller task forces (each consisting of 4-8 vessels) and would deploy to the guard posts along the coast. The areas of deployment of these smaller task forces were the following: 1) the north littoral, stretching from Novigrad via the Island of Pag til the southern border of the Zadar district, 2) Šibenik and its littoral 3) the coastal area between Trogir, Split and Omiš, 4) the waters of the islands of Hvar and Korčula 5) the Bay of Kotor and 6) the task force under the command of a Governor of the Gulf with no specific post but charged with cruising the Adriatic in search for Ottoman corsairs. An actual number of ships deployed at a particular post changed year in and out, and depended, above all, on estimation of a level of danger of an Ottoman attack. For example, during the years 1653-1656, when Split figured as the most threatened target, up to 20 armed vessels were positioned in its waters.⁴⁸⁴ Similarly, in 1657 before and during the siege of Kotor, the Republic deployed the major part of the Adriatic squadron (six galleys, three sail gunships and

484ASV, PTM. b. 474. num. 16. (Spalato, 4 Marzo 1653) attachment: *Notta di Militie che sono in Spalato, Clissa, et Almisa con le Barc' Armate.*

about 20 smaller armed boats) in that area.⁴⁸⁵

The operational requirements of the duties sketched above dictated the composition of the Adriatic naval squadron. The table 2.4 below contains the data concerning the numbers of particular types of ships serving in the Adriatic squadron during this war. The core of the squadron consisted of a small group of light galleys (usually 3-5), however, the bulk of this force consisted of smaller warships: *fuste*, *galeotte*, *barche armate* and *brigantini*. Such composition was the direct result of the need to provide armed vessels for each of the multitude of the guard posts along the coast. All these vessels belonged to the category of small, oar propelled ships, armed with varied number of guns and firearms. *Brigantini* and armed boats (*barche armate*) were the smallest, and consisted of a single deck with between 10 to 12 benches (one oar per each) and one sail. Each vessel carried crew of one company of *oltramarini* infantry (up to 50 men), and was usually armed with two heavy muskets (*moschetti da braga*), two nine pounder *periere*⁴⁸⁶, and one three pounder *falconeto*.⁴⁸⁷ *Fuste* and *galeotte* represented smaller versions of the galleys (with a *galeotta* being slightly bigger than a *fusta*), with 14-18 benches and a single triangular sail. Armament of these ships consisted of six *periere* of different calibers (mainly 9 and 12 pounders) and six heavy muskets. Their crews were of a larger size than those of armed boats and brigantini, numbering between 60 to 100 men (usually two full companies of *oltramarini*).⁴⁸⁸

Once it became clear that the war with the Ottoman Empire was imminent, the Adriatic naval squadron went through rapid expansion similar to that of the Republic's land forces in the region. In March 1646, the Senate informed Governor-General Foscolo that 12 hulls of

485ASVe, Senato Dispacchi, PTM. b. 481, num. 118. (Zara, 14. Agosto 1657); num. 127. (Cattaro, 11. Settembre 1657)

486*Periere* were gunpowder weapons of a smaller caliber loaded with replaceable gunpowder cartridges, commonly used to arm *fregates*, *fuste* and *galeotte*. See: Marco Morin, "Artiglierie navali in ambito veneziano: tipologie e tecniche di realizzazione," *Quaderni di oplologia* 23, (2006): pp. 3–28.; For more on the historical development of these weapons see: Kelly DeVries and Robert D. Smith, "Removable Powder Chambers in Early Gunpowder Weapons," In *Gunpowder, Explosives, and the State. A Technological History*. ed. Brenda Buchanan (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) pp. 251-265.

487Alberto Tenenti, *Piracy and the Decline of Venice*, pp. 152-3.; Such was the armaments issued to the brigantino of Governatore Fivi in March 1646. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, f. 35R, *A di 2 Marzo 1646*.

488Alberto Tenenti, *Piracy and the Decline of Venice*, pp. 154.; For the armaments of these see: ASVe, PTM. b. 489, num. 34. (Spalato, 22. Ottobre 1662) attachment: *Nota da nuovi arsili di galeotte con gli armizzi et armi che occorano*

armed boats were ready to be sent to Dalmatia, and at the same time the magistrates of the Arsenal have been ordered to prepare 20 more.⁴⁸⁹ Followed, in December 1646, by another ten armed boats which were dispatched to Dalmatia.⁴⁹⁰ In addition to sending such bulk reinforcements, the Adriatic squadron was also gradually strengthened by issuing armed boats to individual captains charged with the task of rising new extraordinary companies of *oltramarini*, destined for service in the Adriatic.⁴⁹¹ With these reinforcements, by 1647 the number of *bregantini* and armed boats in Adriatic squadron rose from 20 to more than 40 vessels. As can be seen from the table 2.4 below, throughout years 1646-1660 the number of armed boats in the Adriatic was maintained at around 40-50 vessels.

However, as can be seen from the table 2.4 below, from 1656, the composition of the Adriatic force began to change, and slowly, over the years, armed boats and *bregantini* were replaced by their larger counterparts *fuste* and *galeotte*. This change was brought by a growing number of the Ottoman corsairs operating in the Adriatic, which became visible from 1654. Armed boats and *bregantini* well suited the needs of the first several years of the war when the navy was used mainly as the support of Venetian land forces. Yet, the increased activity of the Ottoman corsairs in the Adriatic, shifted the focus of the duties of the Adriatic squadron and its main priority became securing the navigation through the Gulf. Armed boats, being smaller than Ottoman *fuste*, were not well accommodated to the task of prosecuting these ships. Although 2-3 armed boats could overcome one Ottoman *fusta*, the problem was that because of a smaller number of rowers, and thus being slower, these ships usually could not catch it.

The larger Venetian galleys, when fully manned were, in terms of speed and combat strength, superior to Ottoman *fuste*, yet, these warships were rather cumbersome tool for pursuing Ottoman corsairs in the Adriatic. The galleys required very large crews which were almost never full, in the end resulting in reduced maneuverability of these vessels. Finally,

489AVe, Senato Rettori, R-17, f. 59v-60r, *Adi 16. Marzo 1646*.

490ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, f. 324, *Adi 24 Dicembre 1646*.

491Such was for example case with Captain Marco Sodorovich in March 1646. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, f. 34v, *Adi 2. Marzo 1646*.; See also: ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, f. 277v-278r, *Adi 2 Novembre 1646*.

due to the needs of naval operations in the Levant, the number of galleys in the Adriatic was always limited and they had to be supported with smaller warships, in this case armed boats which only slowed them down. All these problems were presented to the Senate in June 1660 by Governor-General Andrea Corner who, as the solution to the problem, advised replacement of the worn out armed boats with *galeotte*, a number of which was at that moment already slowly rising (see table 2.4 below).⁴⁹² *Galeotte* were perfectly suited to the task prosecuting Ottoman *fuste*. Being of a slightly larger size, they matched *fuste* both in speed and in strength. Consequently, a task force of *galeotte* could either operate independently, or as a support of the galleys without significantly slowing them down. Following the advice of Governor-General Corner, over the years, the Republic reconfigured the Adriatic squadron and at the end of the war, in addition to seven galleys, the total of 21 Venetian *fuste/galeotte* served in the Adriatic.

Date	Galleys	Armed boats	Fuste / Galeotte	Sail warships	Note	Source
1646. June	7	30		0		Sassi I. pp. 239-240.
1647. Ottobre - February				3		SRR-19, f. 40v; SMR-105, f. 267r-v;
1648. December-	12	45	0	0		PTM-467-519; Galleys: PTM-468-552;
1649. February						PTM-468-565;
1649. March	10					PTM-470-687;
1650. March		31	0	0	(1)	PTM-470-755;
1650. September	3					PTM-471-34;
1651. June	5			0		PTM-472-99-Nota delli pagamenti;
1652. April	3	40	1	0	(1)	PTM-473-115;
1652. July	4			1		PTM-475-97; (Galleys: November)
1653. December	5	40	1	0	(1)	PTM-476-165; PTM-476-159;
1654. October	5	39	0	0	(1)	PTM-477-6;
1655. February		49	0	0		PTM-479-19; PTM-480-21-22;
1656. July-August	6	35	3	1		PTM-480-80;
1657. January	6	35	4	1		PTM-481-100;PTM-481-118;
1657. May	9			3	(2)	PTM-483-193; PTM-484-222;
1658. July-November	7	41	0	4	(4)	SRR-33-56;
1659. July	7					PTM-485-257;
1660. March	6	?	?	0		PTM-487-3;
1661. June	5	?	5	0		PTM-487-18;
1661. September		?	8	0		PTM-488-91;
1662. June-October		5	18	0	(3)	PTM-489-5;PTM-489-34;
1663. March-September	5			3	(5)	PTM-490-60;PTM-491-95;
1664. September		6	15	0		PTM-492-176;

492ASVe, PTM. 487, num. 31. (Sebenico, 27. Luglio 1660); num. 33 (Sebenico, 13. Agosto 1660); num. 61. Zara, 6. (Gennaro 1660 m.v.)

Date	Galleys	Armed boats	Fuste / Galeotte	Sail warships	Note	Source
1666. June	6		25	0		PTM-496-163;
1668. January	7	0	21	0		PTM-498-35;PTM-498-39;

Table 2.4. Composition of the Adriatic Naval squadron (1646-1669).

- (1) Does not include ships at the guard duty in the Bay of Kotor.
- (2) Arrival of seasonal reinforcements of 3 galleys from Corfu.
- (3) Four of 18 *fuste* and *galeotte* were *galeotte grande*.
- (4) The number of *fuste* or *galeotte* among these 41 armed boats can not be established.
- (5) One of the sail ship was *galeazza*

The last time when Venice had been fully mobilized for a naval engagement before this war was in 1619, and at the time its war fleet consisted of one or two *galleasses*, some 50 galleys, and several dozens of sail gunships hired from northerners.⁴⁹³ Such composition of the Republic's navy was the consequence of a global shift in the naval warfare. The shift, marked by the rise of gun-carrying sail ships (caravels, bretons, galleons) which steadily had gained dominance over oar-propelled galleys and which by the second half of the 17th century evolved into a completely new model of a specialized warship, so called *ship-of-the-line*.⁴⁹⁴ When the War for Crete broke out in 1645, the age of galleys and galleons was effectively at its end, yet both of these types represented the core of the Venetian navy fighting in the Levant. In 1646, same as 27 years earlier, as a part of the preparations for naval operations in the Levant, in addition to the extensive program of arming the galleys stored in the Arsenal for service, the Republic again engaged in the project of massive hiring of galleons and merchantmen armed with guns, mainly from Dutch and English captains. In spite of their cost,⁴⁹⁵ these vessels, armed with 20-40 guns each, fully demonstrated their usefulness already in May 1649, when the Venetian fleet consisting of only 19 sail ships defeated the much larger Ottoman force of 11 sail ships, 10 *galleasses* and 72 galleys. Through the entire first phase of the war up to the fourth battle of the Dardanelles (1657), between 20 and 30 of these

⁴⁹³Alberto Tenenti, *Piracy and the Decline of Venice*, pp. 142-143.

⁴⁹⁴For a detailed survey of this trend see: John F Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleys, Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the 16th Century* (London: Conway Maritime Press, 2003) pp. 269-289.; See also: John F. Guilmartin, *Galleons and Galleys*, pp. 206-213.

⁴⁹⁵On the average monthly cost to hire one galleon armed with 20-30 guns amounted between 1,800 to 2,100 *ducats*. For example see: ASVe, Senato Mar, R-107, fols. 40v-42v; R-112, fols. 40v-42v, 50v-52v, 53r, 54r, 59v-61v, 114r-116r, 151r-156v, 158r-159v; ASVe, Senato Mar, R-121, fols. 29v-32v, 34r-37r, Adi 1 Marzo 1657.

ships served in the Venetian fleet in the Levant, but still few galleons and armed merchantmen also saw service in the Adriatic.⁴⁹⁶

In contrast to the Levant, where these ships were used mainly in naval engagements against Ottoman vessels, in the Adriatic theater of operation the main role assigned to these ships was to support the Venetian land force defending Dalmatian coastal towns. The Republic put its trust on these floating gun platforms and their firepower to guard the entries into the bays of Dalmatian towns and to prevent the Ottomans from closing these entries and cutting off besieged towns by placing gun batteries along the shore.⁴⁹⁷ The first two of such warships (one armed merchantmen and one galleon) were hired in haste and dispatched to Dalmatia in September 1647, during the dramatic days of the siege of Šibenik.⁴⁹⁸ Even though these ships arrived too late to participate in the town defense they made an impression on Governor-General Foscolo who requested them for the planned but never realized expedition to Albania in winter 1647-1648. Nevertheless, although the Senate approved this request, in January 1648, when it became clear that the entire operation was compromised, in order to cut out the expenses these ships were recalled without seeing any action.⁴⁹⁹ The next time sail gunships were employed in the Adriatic was in 1657. Alarmed by the news of massive Ottoman preparations that were steadily reaching Zadar, in 1656 Governor-General Antonio Zen included four "ships of war," well armed with cannons on the list of required reinforcements necessary for the defense of the province.⁵⁰⁰ The first galleon arrived as soon

496For the participation of the foreign sail ships in the Venetian navy, so called *Armata grossa* see: Guido Candiani, *I vascelli della Serenissima: guerra, politica e costruzioni navali a Venezia in età moderna, 1650-1720* (Venezia: Istituto veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti, 2009) pp. 22-64.; Guido Candiani, ; Guido Ercole, *Vascelli e fregate della Serenissima. Navi di linea della Marina veneziana 1652-1797*. (Gruppo Modellistico Trentino, 2011) pp. 14-24.

497For a very good description of this defensive doctrine, and discussion of the problems of defending Dalmatian towns and keeping the sea access to the potential besieged town open, see the letter of Governor-General Antonio Bernardo entirely dedicated to the discussion on this topic. ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 69. (Sebenico, 10. Dicembre 1656)

498Contract of hire of two armed merchantmen Sant Angelo and galleon Cornaro, for 1,200 and 1,900 *ducats* respectively. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-105, f. 267r-v, *Adi 2 Settembre 1647*

499ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 324. (Di Galea, Sebenico, 3, Ottobre 1647); ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-105, fols. 81r, 92v; The only benefit of the service of these two ships in Dalmatia, was that Foscolo used the guns from one of those to arm the new fortifications erected in Trogir. ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 360. (Zara, 6. Gennaio 1647. m.v.)

500ASVe, PTM. b. 479. num. 101. (Zara, 18 Marzo 1656)

as in June 1656, followed by two more in May 1657.⁵⁰¹ This time the reinforcements arrived on time and Governor-General Bernardo made a very good use of them during the defense of Kotor that year.

Motivated by this positive experience, the Senate destined for the next campaign (1658) four such vessels for the defense of Dalmatia.⁵⁰² Nevertheless, since in the meanwhile the Ottoman attention has turned towards the north and Transylvania, these ships saw no action in 1658. It seems that the threat of years 1656-7 left a lasting mark on the Venetian command, because, until the end of the war, news of Ottomans preparations for an attack on Kotor were cautiously matched by a dispatch of gunned sails ships to the Adriatic, as was for example done in 1663 when two galleons were sent on guard in the Bay of Kotor.⁵⁰³ All in all, the service record of this type of warships in the Adriatic remained meager, especially in regard to their high cost and could be considered to be far from satisfactory for the Republic policymakers. Rather different was the service record of the Venetian light galleys deployed in the Gulf.

Long, slim and fast, the light galleys (*galere sottile*) for centuries represented the main naval weapon of the Republic. Much has been said about tactical characteristics of these oar-propelled vessels and their suitability to the conditions of service in the Mediterranean Sea. In short, armed with up to five guns at a bow, one of which was a heavy 50 pounder, the main siege weapon of the era, due to its ability to use oars and position itself into a favorable firing position, light galleys proved to be excellent tools for support of land operations, either by firing precise salvos at shore fortifications or at enemy troops. Galleys also functioned as excellent transport ships well suited for landing of assault parties and last but not least, their large crews were convertible and if circumstances demanded could also be used on land.⁵⁰⁴ Venetian military commanders used all these features of their galleys. As told in the first

501ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 20. (Sebenico à 9 luglio 1656); PTM. b. 481. num. 118. (Zara, 14. Agosto 1657)

502ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-33, f. 56r, *Adi 28. Marzo 1658*.

503Since it quickly became clear that there was no prospect of the Ottoman attack that year, these two ships were discharged from duty even before the end of the campaign season at the end of the July. ASVe, PTM. b. 491, num. 95. (Spalato, 3. Settembre 1663)

504John F. Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleys*, p. 75-96.

chapter, the Navy provided crucial support both during some offensive operations (Skradin and Novigrad in 1647 for example) and during defense of besieged towns (like Split and Kotor in 1657). Yet, the full extent of galley's usability against shore targets was best seen in the Venetian attack on Ulcinj in March 1663. The naval squadron which core consisted of three galleys and one *galeazza*,⁵⁰⁵ after blockading the port of Ulcinj and disabling the defending artillery, uninterruptedly bombarded the port for almost 24 hours, destroying six Ottoman *fuste* captured in the port and the arsenal full of naval stores as well.⁵⁰⁶ Galley crews also participated in the attack on Knin and were even employed as additional work force on Dalmatian fortifications, as was the case in 1656.⁵⁰⁷

However, galleys were at their prime when operating on an open sea. It may be the truth that the second half of the 17th century marked the coming of the age of sail and rising to dominance of the sail warships armed with platforms full of guns. Still, galleys represented excellent policing vessels. As numerous examples testify, one on one, Ottoman *fuste* stood no chance when faced with this formidable enemy. Very often, Ottoman *fuste* did not operate as an organized group, but cruised the Adriatic individually in order to cover as large area as possible. Yet, by doing so they risked an encounter with a Venetian galley, as indeed happened on several occasions, sometimes even providing the opportunity to a single galley to hunt for multiple enemies overcoming them one by one. In April 1661 within only few days galley *Brazzana* captured two *fuste* from Ulcinj after which the entire Ottoman force left the Adriatic.⁵⁰⁸

Moreover, although the 17th century sail warship armed with 40-60 guns was out of its league, the Venetian galley had no problems with handling the armed merchantmen carrying

505 *Galeazza* was an attempt in Early Modern shipbuilding to keep the maneuverability and independence of galleys and to combine it with the firepower of sail ships. However, in the end the, due to its demand for huge crews (some 500 men) and still the need to be towed by other oar propelled vessels to a suitable firing position in a battle, *galleazza* was assessed as having the worst of both worlds. For more on 17th ct. Venetian *galeazza* see: Frederick C. Lane, *Venice. A Maritime Republic*. p. 374.; John F. Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleys*, pp. 245-7, 258-9.

506 ASVe, PTM. b. 490. num. 67. (Zara, 11. Aprile 1663)

507 ASVe, PTM. b. 480. PTM. b. 480. num. 46. Spalato, 3. Ottobre 1656); num. 55. (Trau, 30. Ottobre 1656); num. 64. (Sebenico, 21. Novembre 1656)

508 ASVe, PTM. b. 488. num. 71. (Spalato, 9 Aprile 1661)

more than double of its firepower (10-20 guns). The encounter in the northern Adriatic, from December 1655, provides a good addition for the ongoing debate concerning the shift in naval warfare. Upon receiving the news that an unknown armed ship had been spotted, galley *Arbessana* set itself to search for it and soon found the offending vessel. The captain of the vessel, which turned out to be an armed merchantmen (carrying 13 guns) in the Service of the Knights of Malta, mistook the Venetian galley for an Ottoman *fusta* and gave the order for sails to be raised. This in turn, was by the Venetian commander (correctly) interpreted as a hostile action. After skillfully using its superior maneuverability to position his galley, the Venetian commander ordered three shots to be fired. The first shot consisted of the heavy cannonball aimed to damage and slow down the enemy ship, followed by the second made of chain-linked cannonballs which tore down the main mast, and finally the third shot consisted of the canister which incapacitated the majority of the crew on the deck. After this the merchantmen was through-fully devastated and its crew gave the signal that they were to surrender bringing this encounter to a quick end.⁵⁰⁹

Galleys were also in high demand and concerning the question of their deployment, as is only to be expected, the priority was given to the Levant where the Republic deployed the majority of its naval forces. The number of galleys in the Adriatic ranged from 1 to 12 depending on circumstances. The minimal "sensible" number of the galleys necessary to maintain the Adriatic was estimated at three. One galley accompanied by a dozen or so of armed boats was always held in the Bay of Kotor, one was to be positioned in the center of the province in the waters near Split and one galley was to be stationed at Zadar where it served as the strategic reserve at disposal of a governor-general.⁵¹⁰ A number of galleys was fluid, as can be seen from the Table 2.4 above; when some major military engagement was expected in Dalmatia, the Republic would commit a larger number of galleys to this theater of operations. For the expedition to Albania in 1649, the task force of no less than 12 galleys was formed.

Similarly, for the season of 1657, when a major Ottoman offensive was expected, the

⁵⁰⁹ASVe, PTM. b 480. num. 59. (Trau, 15. Novembre 1656) attachment: report from the hearing of the merchantmen captain.

⁵¹⁰For example see: ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 10. (Zara, 30. Giugno 1652)

Republic deployed nine galleys in the Adriatic. Yet, on the average, between three to six galleys were always present in the Adriatic.

In addition to the strictly combat duties mentioned above, galleys were also employed for a range of other tasks which would take them away from their regular services. The most common of such tasks was the dispatching of a galley from Dalmatia to Venice in order to collect provisions of money needed to pay the Republic's forces in the province (of which more will be said in the next/following chapter). Galleys were also used as transport ships for the transfer of troops from Dalmatia to Corfu, Ionian Islands or all the way to Crete. Galleys destined for voyage to Corfu could be expected to return but those sent further were usually ordered to remain with the main fleet in the Levant. For the Venetian Republic, the galley was not just the warship, it was a symbol of the Venetian power. As such, the galleys, including those serving in the Adriatic, were used for a wide range of ceremonial duties. Every arrival of some Republic's magistrate, not only of governor-generals, in the province represented a public event and the part of the standard decorum was that arrival into the place of service be done aboard one of the Republic's galleys. For example, in March 1651, during the stay of Governor-General Foscarini in Trogir, the new extraordinary Governor of Trogir and Split also arrived into the area aboard a sail ship. This moved Governor-General Foscarini, in order to "upkeep the dignity of this service in the town so close to the enemy," to relinquish his own galley to the extraordinary Governor for his ceremonial entry into Split.⁵¹¹

Ceremonial duties could also take galleys away from Dalmatia. For example, whenever a galley for transfer of governors to Corfu or "Three Islands" was not available in Venice one of the galleys from Dalmatia would be recalled and assigned to this task. Such tasks usually occupied the galley for one or two months, depending in the primarily on the pace of preparations for the departure of a designated magistrate from Venice.⁵¹² Equally, departing governor-general and his staff would also return to Venice same as they had come - aboard a

511ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. 12. (Trau, 24. Marzo 1651)

512In 1661, for example galley *Magna* was recalled to Venice to serve for the transport of the Governor-General of "The Three Islands." ASVe, PTM. b. 488, num. 91. (Spalato, 12. Settembre 1661)

galley.⁵¹³ Of other "ceremonial" duties that resulted in dislocation of a galley from its standard duties in the Adriatic for a long period of time, worth mentioning at this place, was the task of transporting the Republic's envoys to Istanbul. Moreover, although the return of a governor-general to Venice was the occasion to send some of the weakest vessels to be refitted there, this important duty could sometimes took away some of the best galleys from the Adriatic squadron too.⁵¹⁴ All in all, it was not uncommon that because of these secondary duties, the number of the galleys in service in the Adriatic would even fell to a single one, to the great annoyance of governor-generals.⁵¹⁵

The crew of the fully armed Venetian light galley consisted of c.a 290 men, some 200 of which were oarsmen, 48 armed soldiers of marine infantry, while the rest was made of various specialists: gunners, carpenters, surgeon, oar master, wood workers etc. (for a detailed structure of the Venetian light galley crew see appendix 1.3). The prospect of being boarded by some 250 men was for the crews of merchantmen or smaller Ottoman *fuste* a sufficient argument to give up the fight and try to find salvation either in surrender or escape. However, the large crews, which represented one of the main advantages of galleys were also their major drawback. When the strength of a galley crew would fall below a certain number, a galley would become unable to move and thus would practically be rendered useless. Thus, galleys were extremely sensitive to the outbreak of epidemics among their crews, especially among the rowers, who due to the very harsh conditions of their service combined with malnutrition, were very susceptible to various diseases.

How deadly could be the galley service is illustrated best by the following few examples. In June 1653, immediately upon the arrival of galley Trona in Zadar, its captain and 40 rowers were so sick that they needed to be admitted into the hospital, anchoring the galley in the port

513Occasionally, to the great frustration of a current governor-general, this service could occupy two galleys from Dalmatia, as it happened in February 1652 and 1660, when Governor-Generals Girolamo Foscarini and Antonio Bernardo left Dalmatia for Venice. ASVe, PTM. b. 474. num. 15. (Di Spalato, 22. Febraro 1652 m.v.); PTM. b. 487. num. 3. (Zara, 22. Marzo 1660)

514Such was for example the case with galley *Cornera* in October 1652, which was charged with the duty of transport of extraordinary Ambassador Capello to Istanbul. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-26, f. 180v, *Adi 5 Ottobre 1652*; ASVe, PTM. b. 473, num. 143, (Zara, 21 Ottobre 1652)

515For example see: ASVe, PTM. 472, num. 110 (Zara, 30. Giugno 1652.)

until they were cured.⁵¹⁶ Even more radical was the case of galley *Civrana*, which in December 1655 arrived in Zadar after a long and hard winter voyage. Upon docking, 48 of its rowers, that fell sick during this single voyage, were immediately dispatched to hospital. Moreover, since the galley had already lost 55 crewmen during the previous campaign season (the overwhelming majority of them rowers) its crew was reduced to barely 99 men (or only 40% of its full strength) making the galley completely incapable of sea service.⁵¹⁷ These were not isolated cases, and the campaign seasons which required frequent and speedy voyages of the Venetian galleys in order to match the movement of Ottoman forces or prosecute Ottoman corsairs, would take a great toll on the galley crews. For the campaign season of 1658, the Republic dispatched four newly armed galleys to the Adriatic, and already in August, even before the end of that season, the state of these four galleys was deplorable. The total of 168 crew members were dead and further 113 were hospitalized, bringing total losses to 281 men, or almost 25% of the crews were lost during a single campaign season.⁵¹⁸

Although this last example may seem to be rather extreme, it was not that much out of ordinary. The table 2.5 below, contains the data compiled from the muster records of the galleys serving in the Adriatic. As can be seen the galley crews were, on the average, at between 75-83% of their full strength. An extensive loss suffered during a single season, as those previously mentioned during 1658, could be attributed partially to a more demanding campaign, but probably even more to the inexperience of newly formed crews. Cases of several galleys shows that after suffering initial losses, the core of veteran crew members adjusted to conditions of the sea service would be formed and the crew strength would stabilize. Moreover, several cases of the galleys whose crews were armed solely with the Venetian subjects from *Terraferma*, and, those armed with population from Dalmatian islands, provide arguments in favor of the hypothesis that the inexperience with the conditions of the sea service could have dire consequences for the state of a galley crew. Galley *Bergamesca*,

516ASVe, PTM. b. 474. num. 44. (Di Zara, 1. Giugno 1653);

517ASVe, PTM. b. 478. num. 80. (Zara, 7. Dicembre 1655)

518ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. (num. 207. Spalato, 25 Agosto 1658) attachment: *Nota delli morti et infermi delle Galere*.

armed with the crew from inland Bergamo who had had little or no experience in the sea service, already by May 1647, lost a majority of its crew and was docked in the Zadar harbor.⁵¹⁹ On the other hand, two Dalmatian galleys, *Brazzana* and *Arbessana*, armed during 1646 - named after the island communities of Brač and Rab, responsible for providing their crews⁵²⁰ - remained in service for the entire duration of the war and gave a very good account of their service. Even though, when in 1653 galley *Brazzana* was rearmed (because its hull became completely worn out and not seaworthy), it was lacking 118 crew members, yet this was the consequence of almost seven years of the uninterrupted service. Never during the war was recorded a sharp decrease in the strength of the crews of these two galleys, whose crews were made of the island population traditionally accustomed to the conditions of the sea service.⁵²¹ Moreover, since the galley served so close to its homes, many of the missing crewmen should be considered as fugitives who simply had enough and went home.

	1646. February		1649. May		1659. July		1660. March		1668. February	
	Num.	%	Num.	%	Num.	%	Num.	%	Num.	%
Galleys at muster	6		8		6		3		3	
Nominal crew strength	1748	100	2328	100	1746	100	874	100	873	100
Total crew present	1324	75.74	1902	81.70	1460	83.62	663	75.86	-	-
Total crew missing	424	24.26	426	18.30	286	16.38	211	24.14	-	-
Galeotti nominal strength	1200	100	-	-	1200	100	600	100	600	100
Galeotti present	928	77.33	-	-	1145	95.42	529	88.17	539	89.83
Galeotti missing	278	23.17	-	-	55	4.58	71	11.83	61	10.17
Structure of the galeotti										
Freemen (<i>zontavoli</i>)	883	95.15	-	-	671	58.60	398	75.24	224	41.56
Convicts (<i>condenati</i>)	5	0.54	-	-	448	39.13	123	23.25	285	52.88
Others	40	4.31	-	-	0	0	6	1.13	5	0.93
Ottoman prisoners (<i>Turchi</i>)	0	0	-	-	26	2.27	2	0.38	58	10.76

Table 2.5. Strength and structure of the Adriatic squadron galley crews.⁵²²

519ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 248. (Di Galera Almissa, 27. Maggio 1647); num. 278. (Zara, 27. Luglio 1647.)

520ASVe, ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17, f. 51v-52r, *Adi 2 Marzo 1646*; Senato Mar, R-104, fols. 74v-75r. *A di 6 Aprile 1646*.

521See: ASVe, PTM. b. 473. num. 119. (Zara, 25 Luglio 1652); ASVe, PTM. b. 474. num. 30. (Di Zara, 24. Aprile 1653)

522The number of galleys recorded in this table does not represent a total number of galleys serving in the Adriatic, only a number of those present at musters. Data taken from the following galley musters: ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 216. (Zara, 11. Marzo 1647); ASVe, PTM. b. 468, num. 565. (Zara, 10. Maggio 1649); ASVe, PTM. b. 485, num. 257 (Spalato, 28. Luglio 1659); ASVe, PTM. b. 487. num. 3. (Zara, 22. Marzo 1660); ASVe, PTM. b. 498. num. 35. (Zara, 5 Febbraio 1667. m.v.)

Over the years, the task of maintaining these two galleys constantly in the service and well armed with crews begun to represent too heavy burden for the two island communities, and the obligation to provide for their crews was expanded also to the islands of Korčula and Hvar.⁵²³ It is also important to note that Dalmatia was one of the traditional recruiting grounds for Venetian galleys and this war was no exception to this practice. In addition to two already armed island galleys, in 1647 the Republic planned to put into the service the galley of the town of Šibenik, yet imminent Ottoman danger and the need to defend the town put this project temporary on hold,⁵²⁴ only to be completely discarded after the plague heavily depopulated the town and its countryside. In addition to the two Dalmatian galleys which for the entire duration of the war served almost exclusively in the Adriatic, hundreds of Dalmatians also ended up serving aboard the galleys in the Levant. The seat of the Venetian administration in Dalmatia, the town of Zadar and the islands of its littoral were burdened with one of the most heavy duties, providing the rowers for the galley of Captain-Generals of the sea.

During the first few years, levying of men for this duty went without any serious problems. Every few years, when a new governor-general would set forth toward the Levant some 100 or 150 men would be levied for his galleys in Zadar. However, since those who left for the Levant almost never returned, the first difficulties in finding the men for this service began to appear by 1650.⁵²⁵ When the next order to gather 150 men for this duty arrived in Zadar, in July 1651, Governor-General Foscarini informed the Senate that he was approached by the representatives of the community of the Zadar islands, who inquired if it is possible for them to provide as their supplements the Ottoman prisoners and slaves bought from the Morlacchi and *hajduks*. After pondering the issue for some time, Governor-General Foscarini decreed

523In 1650 obligations of these communities were more formalized and in order to avoid misuses of local galley commanders, the recruitment of galley reinforcements was allowed only with an explicit order of the Senate. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-110, f. 175r-176r, *Adi 18 Giugno, e 13 Luglio 1650*,

524Governor-General Foscolo informed the Senate concerning the difficulty to execute this order in the following letter: ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 229. (Zara, 9. Aprile 1647)

525In March 1650, Governor-General Foscolo, informed the Senate about the difficulties in gathering the reinforcement of 100 rowers for the galley of the Captain-General of the Sea. ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 688. (Zara, 18. Marzo 1650)

that only freemen can serve aboard the galley of captain-general, however, that the prisoners could be offered to other galleys and the replaced crewmen transferred to the galley of the captain-general.⁵²⁶ How effective was this measure is unknown, yet by 1655, when the next contingent of 150 rowers was demanded, Governor-General Zen informed the Senate that the manpower pool of the islands was almost completely exhausted. Zen wrote to his superiors that the situation was such that at the first rumor of this order the remaining men available for service, were ready to either hide or flee, some even to the Ottoman lands.⁵²⁷

However, the Senate continued to draw on this resource and in March 1657 even planned to arm an entire new galley with the population from Zadar and its district. Governor General Bernardo, informed the Senate of the strong opposition of the local population to this initiative, since up to that time, some 500 men left for the Levant and only few had returned.⁵²⁸ In spite of Governor General Bernardo's doubts, the Senate decided to press forward with this plan. Over the following months, as ordered to do so Bernardo managed to conscript prospective members of the crew for the new galley, but only after conceding to the demands of the local population, that the galley was to serve only in the Adriatic. This new levy had completely exhausted the resources of the province, and when in October 1657 the new order for the conscription of 150 rowers came to Zadar, Bernardo was forced to send armed boats to collect the prospective conscripts, however, these returned with only four men, all the rest had fled at the first sight of Venetian vessels.⁵²⁹ The next attempt to gather reinforcements for the crew of the Captain-General in March 1658 also yielded similar result; at the first news of the arrival of Venetian ships sent to collect conscripts for the galleys the remaining inhabitants of the islands and the Zadar countryside took cover and prescribed quotas of the crewmen simply could not be gathered.⁵³⁰

The statement that the galley service was extremely unpopular, at this point at least, needs

526ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. 48. (Zara, 10. Agosto 1651)

527ASVe, PTM.b 477, num. 21. (Spalato, 22. Marzo, 1655)

528ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 87. (Zara, 4 Marzo 1657)

529ASVe, PTM. b. 482. n. 140. (Liesina, 16. Novembre 1657)

530ASVe, PTM. b. 482. num. 158. (Zara, 15. Febraro 1657 mv)

no further argumentation. As was told above, due to the high casualty rates, over the years it had become more and more difficult to find those willing to serve aboard the Republic's galleys, not only in Dalmatia but also on *Terraferma*. This resulted in the fundamental change in the structure of the galley crews, which can be noted in the sample data collected in the table 2.5 above. While the convicts made less than 1% of the crews of the six galleys presented at the muster in March 1646, their number steadily rose and at the muster of the six galleys held in July 1659, they constituted almost 40% of the crews. In order to compensate for the lack of its own manpower, the Republic resorted to manning the galleys with convicts, even before this war.⁵³¹ In that regard, the data from the table 2.6 can be interpreted as the sure indicator of how the war gave additional impetus to this trend, already on the rise for some time.⁵³²

3. *Command Hierarchy*

3.1. Control Organs of the Civil Government

The war, the famine, the plague, which in continuity for an entire year scourged this city, and also penetrated into my palace, can be called compendium of all the evils.⁵³³

(Governor-General Lunardo Foscolo)

The main representative of the Republic in the province, in peacetime as in wartime, was the governor-general in Dalmatia and Albania (*provveditore generale in Dalmatia et Albania*) who acted both as the commander-in-chief of all Venetian forces in this battlefield and the head of the civilian administration. The competences of the governor-general were rather wide, covering almost all aspects of life in the province (from social to economic ones) and also included maintaining the diplomatic correspondence with the Ottoman and Christian dignitaries and lords in his neighborhood.⁵³⁴ As such the office brought a great responsibility,

531See: Alberto Tenenti, *Piracy and the Decline of Venice*, pp. 112-113.

532Compare: Luca lo Basso, "Il Mestiere del Remo nell' Armata Sottile Veneziana: Coscrizione, Debito, Pena e Schiavitù (Secc. CVI-XVIII)," *Studi Veneziani* 48, (2004): pp.113-115.

533*La guerra, la carestia, la peste, che per un ano continuo affligge questa Città, et che s' inoltra già pure nel mio stesso Palazzo si posson chiamar compendij di tutti mali.* ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num 720. (Zara, 30. Giugno 1650.)

534For a good overview of the duties of a governor-general and survey of the role of this office in a longer time-frame see: Tea Mayhew, *Dalmatia between Ottoman and Venetian Rule*, pp. 150-156.; Compare also: Ivan Pederin, *Mletačka uprava, privreda i politika u Dalmaciji (1409-1797)*. p. 105.; For the survey of the office of governor-general in general see: John R. Hale, *The Military Organization of a Renaissance State*. pp. 267-274.

which became even greater in wartime, when governor-general was practically charged with the directing of Republic's war effort in this battlefield. Withholding the Ottoman military pressure on the Dalmatian coast, as was shown on the previous pages, was neither easy nor popular task.⁵³⁵ In her study Tea Mayhew rightfully pointed out that the office was not a "fashionable position of superficial Venetian noblemen who would unfortunately pass his two years of duty in such a periphery as Zara, trying to amuse himself with constant party organizing."⁵³⁶ Regarding the wide range of its competencies and the central role this office played in regulating life in the province, at this point, it must be noted that the discussion in the following paragraphs is focused only to the duties of the governor-general as the head of the military administration.

The term of the service of the governor-generals, in theory, was to be two years, however during this war more than half of the governor-generals served longer terms, and some, like Lunardo Foscolo or Antonio Bernardo, were kept on the duty for double terms. The staff at the disposal of the governor-general, which he brought with him from Venice, consisted of 10 persons: a secretary which had to be a Venetian nobleman selected by *Cancellaria Ducale*, one *capo di Albarideri* who was in command of a governor-general's personal bodyguards, one chancellor charged with the formation of criminal processes, one *Raggionato* whose domain was the administration of treasury and five aides.⁵³⁷ In addition to this official staff provided and paid by the Republic, almost every governor-general also brought to Dalmatia various family members, on whom they could rely in order to help them ease the burden of service. For example, Governor-General Foscolo was accompanied by his wife and brother, while Governor-General Lorenzo Dolfin brought two of his nephews.

The governor-generals were responsible for their actions to the state organ which also

⁵³⁵Some Venetian nobles, with an impressive service record, were even ready to offer significant amounts of money in order to be freed from this duty once they were elected. Such was for example the case with Gio. Antonio Zen, in 1652 whose offer of 1,000 *ducats* was accepted and he was excused from this duty. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-113, f. 207v-208v, *Adi 31. Giugno 1652*.

⁵³⁶Tea Mayhew, *Dalmatia between Ottoman and Venetian Rule*, p. 156

⁵³⁷For example see the order concerning the election of the successor of Antonio Bernardo: ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-33, f. 37r-v, *Adi 9. Marzo 1658*.

elected them - the Senate – and majority of their letters and reports were directed to this institution. The Senate represented the supreme authority of the Republic concerning the adoption of official policies or choosing general strategic courses, thus in its domain was the directing of the war effort on the highest level. Also, the Senate was in charge of the wide range of operational tasks; the mobilization, employment and negotiation of the terms of the service of all military commanders from the rank of the captain above, and the most important task, the allocation of material resources - money, grain, biscuit, munition, arms, ships, reinforcements etc. - to a particular zone of operations. In theory, the governor-generals in Dalmatia, like all other higher magistrates of the Republic, were simply the executioners of the will of the Senate.⁵³⁸ However, although the Senate did have the final word, the policy adopted was based on the input and recommendations provided by the governor-generals, as was shown in the section dealing with the integration of the Morlacchi into the Venetian defensive system. In this way the provincial administration actively participated in, and greatly influenced, the formulation of the policies they were to implement in the end.

Moreover, in the domain of the war conduct the governor-generals enjoyed large autonomy. More so, because the orders sent by the Senate were usually very general and vague. For example, in March 1647, the Senate simply ordered Foscolo that upon arrival of Baron Degenfeld he was to assemble a military council (*consulta*) and organize an attack on some Ottoman stronghold of his choice.⁵³⁹ Similarly, the decision to attack Knin in 1654, was made by Governor-General Lorenzo Dolfin, who estimated the attack on Herceg-Novti, which was the actual target proposed by the Senate, as unfeasible. Moreover, the orders sent to the Foscolo's predecessor, Governor-General Vendramin, in 1645, could not be more vague - "*difendere ed offendere*,"⁵⁴⁰ - wrote the Senate. In short, the Senate would provide general

⁵³⁸These tasks the Senate performed on the basis of proposals, drafts and other documents prepared by *Colleggio*, *Savi* and other organs of the Republic, yet putting of some policy in power was an exclusive prerogative of the Senate. For an overview of the functioning of the Venetian government and the competences of various magistracies of the central government in relation to the Senate see: John. R. Hale, *The Military Organization of a Renaissance State*. pp. 248-262; Compare also: Alberto Prelli, *L'esercito Veneto al primo '600*, pp. 5-12.; Alberto Prelli, *Le Milizie Venete in Palma 1593-1797*. p. 9

⁵³⁹ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-18, 57r-v, *Adi 22. Marzo 1647*.

⁵⁴⁰Sassi I., p. 227.

strategic guidelines, allocate the funds deemed necessary and left the operational aspects to be handled by its governor-general, leaving to his discretion, as the man on the spot, the final decision whether some operation should or should not be undertaken.

However, the real powers of governor-generals lay in the domain of the military administration and justice. They functioned as the supreme representatives of the Republic in the province and all appeals to the Senate, both civil and military, were to pass through them, thus giving them a large discretionary power to support or decline to forward to the Senate some petition. Additionally, governor-generals also had the right to issue legal decrees known as *terminazioni*, which had the power of law in the provinces under their rule and could be overruled only by the direct decree of the Senate. With this legal instrument in hands, governor-generals administered the armed forces under their command. Their tasks included the regular surveys of troops, the discharge of the soldiers unfit for service, promotions, assignments of bonuses to persons who proved their valor, the grants of stipends to wounded or retired deserving soldiers etc. Although governor-generals did not have the power to employ new captains without prior authorization of the Senate - as for example occurred in 1646 when Governor-General Foscolo was given the authority to issue patents for levies of the companies of Croats and Albanians or in April 1654 when, after the defeat at Knin and in order to recompense for the losses the Senate instructed Governor-General Dolfin to organize new levies, ⁻⁵⁴¹ the disbandment of weakened companies, or the appointments of commanders to the companies left without one, were all within their competencies.

Besides, as mentioned above, governor-generals also had great powers in the domain of the military justice. In case of disciplinary incidents, the governor-generals had sufficient authority to act independently of the magistracies in Venice, and did not refrain from using it. They had the powers to sentence soldiers to galleys, impose corporal punishment or even to recur to the capital punishment in case of the gravest offenses. The judicial authority of the governor-generals was not limited only to the rank and file, it also extended over all *capi di*

541ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17, f. 281v, *Adi 26. Novembre 1646.*; ASVe, Senato Rettori R-28, f. 68r. *Adi 15 Aprile 1654.*

guerra serving in the province: captains, colonels, engineers and even military commanders of the rank of the general. In 1651, governor-general Foscarini as an example for the others sentenced Captain Francesco Olivieri, who was during the muster discovered to have cheated on the number of soldiers in his company, to five years of prison.⁵⁴² Even more radical was the case from 1656, when the conflict over precedence between Marchese Villanova, commander of the Venetian forces in the province, and the chief engineer Onofrio del Campo escalated beyond any control. After Marchese Villanova dispatched his companions to assault Onofrio del Campo, and the later ended with serious wounds, Governor-general Zen decided that "*un tratto tanto scandaloso*" could not be tolerated. In spite of the dire need for the experienced military commander in the province, Zen discharged general Villanova from service, disbanded his companies, declared the terms of his *condotta* void and issued a proclamation banishing him from all the territories of the Republic.⁵⁴³

The seat of the governor-generals in Dalmatia was Zadar, yet their duties – the inspection of garrisons, the supervision of fortification works or quelling of mutinied garrisons - frequently led them on tours of the province. Also, the intelligence that some town was threatened by an Ottoman attack was a sufficient motive for a governor-general to move his seat to that place for the duration of a campaign season, as was done by Lorenzo Dolfin in 1654, or Antonio Bernardo in 1657-9, both spending the majority of these campaigns in Split. In the case of the Ottoman attack on some town under their jurisdiction, the governor-generals were expected to arrive in the threatened place and with the personal example encourage the defenders. In such a manner, in 1647, Foscolo personally arrived in Šibenik during the siege bringing fresh reinforcements, while Antonio Bernardo, in 1657, spent the entire siege of Kotor with the defenders of the town. Moreover, how troublesome were the years of the mandate of Governor-General Antonio Bernardo is also clear from the fact that he spent majority of his time outside Zadar, cruising the province from Kotor to Šibenik, but mainly

542ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. 27. (Trau, 10. Maggio 1651); num. 50. (Zara, 15 Agosti 1651)

543Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 235; ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. 109. (Sebenico, 12 Maggio 1656) attachment: *Proclama contre il marchese di Villanova*; num. 111. (Zara, 26 Maggio 1656) attachment: *Decree of Governor-General Zen, dated 16th May 1656*.

staying in Split surveying the advance of the local construction works.

When on a campaign, the governor-generals very rarely personally led the forces under their command on the field. Instead theirs was the command position in the nearest stronghold or aboard a galley in nearby waters. During the reconquest of Novigrad in 1647, Governor-General Foscolo did not accompany the Venetian force on its land route, instead he arrived to the siege on a galley, with the aim to "*per maggiormente incalorire coll' assistenza l'intrapresa*."⁵⁴⁴ Similarly, Governor-Generals Foscarini and Dolfin during the operations against Zadvarje in 1652 and Knin in 1654, waited for the arrival of the news about the outcome of the operations aboard their galleys.⁵⁴⁵ Only exceptionally, as was for example during the surrender of Klis, did the governor-general personally joined the army and took part in the last stage of the operation.⁵⁴⁶ Instead, the operational command and execution of the military operations was left to the professional military commanders, or to the governor-general of the cavalry. Such arrangements are quite understandable if one takes into the account that the persons elected for this duty were men with plentiful administrative experience and usually of age 60 and more. What dire consequences could come from the incapacity of a governor-general to perform his duty was plainly demonstrated during the Ottoman siege of Šibenik in 1647, when due to the sickness that incapacitated Foscolo, his departure with the reinforcements and provisions for the besieged town was delayed for almost two weeks.⁵⁴⁷

The governor-general of the cavalry (*provveditore generale della cavalleria*) was the second ranking Venetian military official in the province, and this post was also exclusively filled by the members of the Venetian patriciate. In the domain of the military administration his duties were similar to those of the governor-general yet limited only to the management of the

⁵⁴⁴ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 224, (Zara, 26. Marzo 1647)

⁵⁴⁵Governor-General Lorenzo Dolfin with the following words described his role in the campaign: *restando io a Scradona con le guardie dovute alla dignità della Carica, per la missione de viveri, e d'altri soccorsi second' havesse ricercato l'occorrenza,...*; ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 112. (Galea, Scradona 20. Marzo 1654)

⁵⁴⁶ASVe, PTM. b. 466. num. 386. (Di Galea Salona, 1. Aprile 1648)

⁵⁴⁷For letters with reports on the state of his health see: ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 303. (Zara, 2. Settembre 1647); num. 307. (Zara 5. Settembre 1647); finally, arrival in Šibenik: num. 312. (Di Galea Sebenico, 13. Settembre 1647)

cavalry forces. He did not possess any legal authority and could not issue *terminazioni* as the governor-generals, nor could disband entire units or discharge officers from service. However the governor-general of the cavalry enjoyed supremacy over all other Republic's representatives in the province (with the exception of the governor-general) and all other *capi di guerra* in the Venetian service. His seat was also the town of Zadar, and since the majority of the cavalry force was always stationed there he did not cruise the province as often as the governor-general. However, the duties of governor-generals of the cavalry were much more combat oriented than those of the governor-general. It was to them as the field commanders that the governor-generals left the execution of the military operations agreed upon by a war council (*consulta*). During the successful Venetian campaign of 1647, Governor-General Marc' Antonio Pisani was in charge of the most critical phases of the campaign, the attacks on Zemunik and Vrana. Similarly, the command over the failed attack on Knin (1654) was entrusted to Governor-General of Cavalry Gio. Battista Benzon, who otherwise gave good service in fighting off Ottoman parties invading the district of Zadar.

However, the relationship between the two governor-generals was not always the best example of the republican unity and concord, as wished for by the Senate. If we are to believe Dalmatian chronicler of this war, Franjo Difnik, who is usually a very reliable source, during a war council, Governor-General Marc' Antonio Pisani strongly objected to Foscolo's decision to launch an attack against Zemunik.⁵⁴⁸ Similarly, Governor-General Benzon, raised strong objections not against the entire operation of the attack on Knin itself, but against the proposed battle plan.⁵⁴⁹ Nevertheless, both dutifully executed the operations they were charged with, however with quite different results. While Pisani won the first major Venetian victory in this battlefield, the Benzon's led operation proved to be the greatest Venetian defeat. The opposition to the planned attacks, expressed during war councils by Pisani and Benzon, is not that hard to understand if one considers that in the case of a failure, the governor-general of the cavalry was going to be the first to whom the Senate would direct its

548 Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, p. 113.

549 *Commissiones et Relationes* 7, p. 76.

gaze in the search for the person responsible for that misfortune. After the defeat at Knin Governor-General Benzon went through a lengthy process until he was finally cleared of all charges.⁵⁵⁰ As such, governor-generals of cavalry served as convenient scape-goats for governor-generals, when someone to blame for some unfortunate event had to be found quickly. For example, when in July 1647 the Ottoman raid surprised the Morlacchi refugees in the Zadar district inflicting on them heavy casualties, this misfortune Foscolo attributed to the passivity of Governor-General of the Cavalry Pisani.⁵⁵¹

In the years that followed, as the strength of the cavalry forces in the province decreased, the importance of this office declined as well, gradually leading to its temporary suspension in 1655. First in 1652, in order to cut down expenses, the Senate ordered integration of the separate treasury of a governor-general of cavalry with that of a governor-general, thus seriously reducing the competencies of this office.⁵⁵² Finally, when in July 1655, after less than 4 months of service, Governor-General of the Cavalry Antonio Loredan came into a conflict with the Governor-General Antonio Zen, and left for Venice in order to present his complaints, the Senate used this opportunity and suspended this office.⁵⁵³ No official decree was issued by the Senate, the post was simply abolished. Until the end of the war no new governor-general of cavalry was appointed and the office was left vacant. At that time the strength of the cavalry force in Dalmatia fell to less than 300 men, and the trends of further decrease in the number of regular cavalry and a growing number of mounted Morlacchi irregulars made this office superfluous.

The temporary suspension of the office of the governor-general of the cavalry was not the only change in the structure of the Venetian administration in Dalmatia brought by this war.

550Franjo Difičnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, p. 231.

551ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 275. (Zara, 21. Luglio 1647)

552The merge of the treasuries also led to the opening of the investigation against Governor-General of the Cavalry Andrea Donado by Governor-General Foscarini who had found numerous irregularities in the management of the cavalry, the gravest being the discovery of 115 *piazze morte* (places filled with non-existent soldiers) resulting in the superfluous monthly expense of 1,610 *ducats*. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-25, f. 218v, *Adi 10. Gennaro 1652.*; ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 82. (Zara, 18 Genaro 1651.); num. 83. (Zara, 18 Genaro 1651.) and attachment to the letter: *Ristretto di cavalleria*; ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-25, fol. 225v: *Adi 1652. Gennaro 16*;

553ASVe, PTM. b. 478. num. 51. (Zara, 2 Luglio 1655)

In peacetime Dalmatian communities were governed by Venetian magistrates (*rettori*) with titles of *Conte* or *Conte et Capitano*, charged with presiding over a community council and running local affairs. A town's *Conte* was in his work helped by a small core of administrative staff: secretary, treasurer, steward and such.⁵⁵⁴ In order to better meet the extraordinary demands of the war, in addition to the expansion of its armed forces, the Republic also expanded its administrative staff in the province. In August 1645, together with Baron Martin von Degenfeld, leading first reinforcements from Italy, also arrived six extraordinary governors (*provveditori straordinari*).⁵⁵⁵ One extraordinary governor was destined for each of the following places: Kotor, Šibenik, Novigrad and one joint extraordinary governor was appointed for Split and Trogir. Extraordinary governors were superimposed over the regular Venetian administration and were charged with the overseeing and administration of all armed forces (both cavalry and infantry), *bombardieri* and other *stipendiati* of the Republic, serving in the place assigned to them.⁵⁵⁶ They were subordinated to the governor-general of the province and were expected to communicate their needs through him and not by directly writing to the Senate.

Additionally, the Senate had also appointed two extraordinary governors in the province - Nicolò Dolfin and Lunardo Foscolo, who were assigned to Governor-General Andrea Vendramin and were to act as his aids. These two extraordinary-governors were to be present at *consulte* each with the right of vote, and in the absence of the governor-general they were superior to all other public officials and military commanders. However, while the offices of extraordinary governor of Šibenik, Kotor, Split and Trogir, remained constantly occupied till the end of the war, that of the extraordinary governor in the province proved to be less permanent. Until 1648-9, the Republic had regularly appointed two extraordinary-governors, yet after that time this service became more irregular, and the number of extraordinary governors was reduced to only one, sent only in the special circumstance. Such was for

⁵⁵⁴For a detailed survey of the duties of a *Conte e Capitano* of Zara, which enjoyed the preeminence among the Dalmatian *rettori*, see: Tea Mayhew, *Dalmatia Between Ottoman and Venetian Rule*. pp. 156-162.

⁵⁵⁵Sassi I., p. 226.; Franjo Difić, *Povijest kadnijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 65-66.

⁵⁵⁶For example see the decree of an election of a new extraordinary governor for Split and Trogir. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17, f. 201r-v, *Adi 22. Agosto 1646*.

example the case in 1656, when Antonio Bernardo was in May sent to Dalmatia to assist Governor-General Zen who, due to a grave illness, was becoming more and more unable to perform his duties.⁵⁵⁷ Moreover, Bernardo's duty as the extraordinary governor represented just a transitional period, intended for him to become familiar with the conditions in the province, until his appointment as the Governor-General and recall of Antonio Zen in June 1656.

The radical increase in the number of troops in Dalmatia in 1646, presented provincial administration with numerous logistical problems. In order to introduce more order and improve the management of logistical and financial affairs, in September 1647, the Senate dispatched to Dalmatia Girolamo Foscarini with the title of Commissary (*commissario*) in Dalmatia.⁵⁵⁸ The arrival of the commissary, significantly eased the burden on the Governor-General who already for some time had coveted this aid.⁵⁵⁹ Commissary Foscarini took over the tasks of inspection of troops, supervision of the distribution of food, paying of troops and management of the magazines, but also the communication with the Senate and other central magistracies in Venice responsible for the supply issues.⁵⁶⁰ All of which enabled Governor-General Foscolo to concentrate more on the actual war conduct.

The service of a commissary was very demanding and included constant cruising of the province, visiting garrisons and inspecting state magazines. Additionally, the post also required considerable administrative skills. When Foscarini arrived in Dalmatia he found the Venetian forces in a very bad state. Exhausted after the long campaign, lacking in clothing, equipment, armaments, horses and in the possession of the huge credit of almost 300,000

557In March 1656 Zen fell into bed and reports to the Senate were not only written but also composed by his secretary, informing the Senate about the sorry state of the Governor-General: *L'indispositioni, che aggravano l'Ecc.za sua rappresentate in più mano di lettere facendosi sempre maggiori, l'hanno questa mattina fatto cader al letto con affanni, tosse perpetua e sputo tinto di sangue provenuto da distialatione salsa, onde se il Sig.r Dio con la sua santa mano non allegerirà il male difficilmente, certo potra continuare sua ecc.(ellen)za nell' applicationi incessanti che sono chiamate dall' incombenze ben gravi della carica, et io ciò con tutta riverenza rappresento à V.(ostra) Ser(eni).ta in adempimento dell' humilissimo mio debito.* ASVe, PTM. b. 479. num. 99. (Zara, 18 Marzo 1656)

558Commissary Foscarini arrived in Dalmatia in October: ASVe, PTM. 465. num. 327. (Zara, 11, Ottobre 1647);

559ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 260. (Zara, 21. Giugno 1647); PTM. b. 465. num. 303. (Zara, 2. Settembre 1647)

560For a the role of a commissary in *Terraferma* and during the war 1615-1617 see: John Hale R., *The Military organization of a Renaissance State*, pp. 279-281.; Compare also Tea Mayhew, *Dalmatia between Ottoman and Venetian Rule*, p. 38.

ducats (see next chapter) of overdue salaries. Fortunately Girolamo Foscarini proved to be a rather good administrator (as was confirmed few years later when he returned to Dalmatia as the governor-general) and performed his duties skillfully and with considerable zeal.

Foscarini's diligent inspection of the accounting books led to the arrest of one of the highest administrative staff members, Vice Collateral due to his frauds discovered by Foscarini.⁵⁶¹ Moreover, Foscarini did not hold back when the public affairs required him to employ his personal funds. Such was the case in April 1648, when in the aftermath of the conquest of Klis in April 1648, part of the Venetian army rebelled due to the lack of pay and Foscarini used his private wealth in order to appease the troops.⁵⁶²

Although demanding and unpopular, the office was not without prestige. In situations when a governor-general was to depart from Zadar, the management of the affairs was entrusted to the commissary. Such was the case, for example, in 1648-9, when Foscolo departed on the expedition to Albania.⁵⁶³ However, the office of the commissary in Dalmatia also proved to be short lived. A significant decrease in the Republic's military commitment in early 1650s rendered the existence of this office unnecessary. Thus, when in March 1651, Girolamo Foscarini returned to Dalmatia, this time as the Governor-General, the Senate relieved of duty current Commissary Corner, and ordered him to depart and take over the duty of the extraordinary Governor on Crete.⁵⁶⁴ For the next nine years no new commissary was sent to Dalmatia, until March 1660, when Michiel Malipiero was elected to this duty. However, this time competences of the commissary were limited only to the management of food provisions and magazines, while the financial affairs and supervision of troops remained in the domain of the governor-general.⁵⁶⁵ After Malipiero's departure from Dalmatia in February 1662, no new commissary was sent for the duration of the war.

The last extraordinary office that needs to be touched upon is that of the Governor in the

561ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-20, f. 113r-v, *Adi 19. Maggio 1648.*

562ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. 13. (*Trau, 24. Marzo 1651*)

563ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-19, f. 209v, *Adi 18. Febraro 1648*; ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-21, f. 119v-120r, 122v, *Adi 29. Ottobre 1648.*

564ASVe, Senato Mar, R-112, fol. 56v-57r, *Adi 14 Marzo 1651.*; Similar decree was repeated in: ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-24, f. 68v-69r, *Adi 14. Aprile 1651.*

565ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-35, f. 47v, *Adi 31. Marzo 1660.*

Gulf. The growth of the Republic's naval forces in the Adriatic resulted in the need for a single commander who would be in charge of this force and through whom a governor-general could coordinate its actions with the land operations. To meet these demands in July 1647, the Senate appointed the Governor of Pula, Gabriel Zorzi, as the *Provveditore Straordinario in Golfo*, setting him as the commander over all the galleys and armed boats serving in the Adriatic. A governor in the gulf was granted a seat on war councils yet he was in all affairs subordinated to a governor-general.⁵⁶⁶ As in the case of other posts, this one was not filled for the entire duration of the war. Between 1650 and 1654, the post was left vacant, but the increased activity of Ottoman corsairs in the Adriatic prompted the Senate to renew this command post. In April 1654, Alvise Civrano was elected as the extraordinary Governor in the Gulf and as his main task was the prosecution of Ottoman corsairs and keeping the Adriatic safe for navigation.⁵⁶⁷ Until the end of the war this post was mostly occupied and governors of the Gulf cruised the southern Adriatic area between Ancona, Kotor and Ulcinj, in search for Ottoman corsairs. In that period, governors of the Gulf had under their command a separate squadron numbering 1-2 galleys accompanied by several smaller vessels, *fuste*, *galeotte* or armed boats.⁵⁶⁸ The bases of operations of this squadron were the islands of Korčula and Hvar, which shipyard and arsenal provided a necessary supportive infrastructure for this force.

In addition to the introduction of the office of a governor of Klis (from 1648), these were the changes introduced into the structure of the provincial administration caused by the demands of conducting the war. All of these posts were reserved exclusively for Venetian noblemen and they were entrusted with the burden of the duty to preserve the Republic's possessions in Dalmatia and control of its armed forces.

3.2. Capi di Guerra

In the aftermath of the defeat at Knin, expecting the arrival of the Ottoman army,

⁵⁶⁶ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17, f. 171v-172v, *Adi 19. Luglio 1646.*; Compare also *Sassi I.*, p. 239.

⁵⁶⁷ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-28, f. 67v, *Adi 15. Aprile 1654*; f. 76r-v, *Adi 23. Aprile 1654*; ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 122. (Zara, 27. Aprile 1654); PTM. b. 476. num. 136. (Zara, 14. Giugno 1654)

⁵⁶⁸ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 122. (Zara, 27. Aprile 1654)

Governor-General Dolfin once again, in vain, pleaded with the Senate to send him "*un principal capo di guerra, d'accreditato coraggio, valore et isperienza, che altre volte havesse sostentato l'assedio d'una piazza.*"⁵⁶⁹ Governor-generals and other Venetian patricians serving in the province were primarily professional administrators, not soldiers. Like modern managers, they were mainly decision makers who based their decisions on the advice of specialists and skilled professionals. In the case of fortification works, these specialists were engineers, while in the running of military operations, Venetian patricians relied on professionals with military experience known as *capi di guerra*. The Venetian Republic did not have a strict military hierarchy for its high commanding officers above the level of colonel. The table 1.2 in appendix 1, gives the list of military professionals who served as army commanders in Dalmatia during this war. As can be seen, they went under a range of titles: *governator general dell'Armi, governatore dell'armi, generale dello sbarco, infanteria, artiglieria, soprintendente d'armi* and so forth. The rank and the title of a particular military commander in charge of the Venetian forces in the province depended in the first place on his reputation, social status and his negotiating abilities, not on some prescribed order of battle. The Venetian forces in the province were during the war commanded by *capi di guerra* with ranks as low as a simple *soprintendente d'armi*, as well as those with the prestigious rank of *generale dell'infanteria*.

The ranks with the title of a general in them were of the highest esteem. Of those, that of the *Generale dell' Infanteria*, held by Don Camillo Gonzaga Marchese di Mantova (1657), Gil d'Has (1658-9) and Marchese Francesco Villa (1665) were superior to all others. The patent of the appointment of Marchese Villa clearly states that as the *generale dell'Infanteria* he was given "*commando sopra tutti li Generali della Cavalleria, Artiglieria, Sbarco, Sargenti Generali di Battaglia, Condottieri, Collonel, et altri ufficiali maggiori e minori di qualsi voglia grado, o conditione, e saranno al Servittio della Republica nostra,*"⁵⁷⁰ thus providing a hierarchy of the ranks in the Venetian army. This rank also brought the greatest material

⁵⁶⁹ASVe, PTM. b. 476. num. 144. (Zara 8 Luglio 1654)

⁵⁷⁰Taken from: Rostagno, Gio. Battista. *Viaggi Dell'Illustrissimo, & Eccellentissimo Sign. Marcese Ghiron Francesco Villa in Dalmatie e Levante.* (Torino, 1668) pp. 20-21.

benefits. The *condotta* Marchese Villanova managed to obtain consisted of an annual stipend of 18,000 *ducats* for himself, 5,000 *ducats* on the account of two adjutants and four captains at his disposal, and of extra 720 *ducats* for the annual pay for one engineer.⁵⁷¹ Thus, this commander and his staff cost the Republic the staggering sum of 23,720 *ducats* a year. If one takes into the consideration such high costs linked with this prestigious rank it is clear why the Republic had refrained from appointing commanders of that rank every year. Instead the most common rank given to the commanders of the Venetian forces in Dalmatia was that of a *governatore generale di armi*. The *condotta* of a governor general of arms was not uniform, it usually consisted of 3-6,000 *ducats*, one or two adjutants, two to four captains and 12 *lanze spezzate*.⁵⁷²

Besides this military commander charged with the overall command of the Venetian land forces in the province, one military commander with the title of a *governatore di armi (di piazza)* or *soprintendente di armi*, was appointed for each of the following towns: Zadar, Šibenik, Split, Kotor and Klis (from 1648). These officers were charged with the defense and command of military forces in the place under their jurisdiction, and was superior to all colonels and captains serving there. Governors of arms or superintendents were in turn subject only to Republic's magistrates (*provveditori* and *rettori*), who supervised their daily work. The most prestigious of these posts was that of a *governatore di armi* of Zadar, whose monthly salary could reach 125 *ducats*,⁵⁷³ while probably the most responsible was that of a *governatore* of Klis. For this important posts the Republic had a policy of appointing the persons of proven military valor and experience, and if possible, charged solely with this task.⁵⁷⁴ Occasionally, lacking experienced persons and/or in order to cut down the costs, the Republic would resort

571ASVe, Senato Mar, R-130, f. 37r-v, *Adi 29 Settembre 1665*.

572For example see the conditions of the *condotta* of Barun Martin Christoff von Degenfled: ASVe, Senato Mar, R-106, f. 122v, *Adi 1. Maggio 1648*.; Compare also conditions set forth by Marchese di Villa, for the acceptance of the command in Dalmatia for the season 1656: ASVe, PTM. b. 478. num. 64. (Zara, 13 Settembre 1655) attachment: *Scrittura del Sig.re Marchese Villanova*

573Such was the pay given to Rodolfo Sbrogliavacca, who served as a *governatore di armi* in Zadar in period (1646-1650): ASVe, PTM. 469. num. 656. (Zara, 11. Dicembre 1649)

574As a preparation for the campaign of 1653, Governor-General Lorenzo Dolfin appointed as superintendent and commander of forces in Split and Trogir, Conte Ludovico Capra and Baron Maximilian d'Erberstein for Šibenik. DAZd, *Atti di Provveditori Generali*, vol. 18, fols. 23r-24r, *Zara, 10. Luglio 1653*.

to appointing as governors of arms or superintendents, some of the colonels already serving in the province, adding some smaller bonus to their pay.⁵⁷⁵

Additionally, already in 1646, one extraordinary *sergente maggiore di piazza* was appointed for each of the province garrisons. These sergeants major, similarly to their regimental counterparts, were responsible for maintaining the discipline and order, but on the level of the entire town garrison; they supervised guards, controlled army quarters, assisted Venetian magistrates at musters, performed arrests and a multitude of similar tasks. According to the military regulations from 1619, candidates for this responsible job were required to have spend at least three years in wartime military service at a post of command.⁵⁷⁶ The pay of a sergeant major was merely 20 *ducats* a month, but very often in order to increase their prestige and income the Republic resorted to granting them as a special favor a command over one infantry company.⁵⁷⁷ With the exception of a sergeant major of Zadar, all the other ones represented extraordinary posts which were to be abolished after the war. The last post of a sergeant major introduced in the course of this war was that of the newly constructed fortress of Gripe near Split in 1662.⁵⁷⁸

As was mentioned previously, companies of *otlramarini* (Croats and Albanian) were not organized in regiments. However, commanding and coordinating actions of several dozens "stand-alone" companies would be highly impractical, especially during wartime. Even before the war, the special command post above the level of captain existed in this branch of the

575For example in 1648, Colonel Andrea Britton was appointed as a Governor of Arms in Klis and given bonus of 4 *lanze spezzate* and a golden necklace worth 500 *ducats*. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-21, f. 77v, *Adi* 26. *Settembre 1648.*; In February 1649, Governor-General Foscolo appointed Colonel La Lunga to the post of a Governor of Arms in Kotor which became vacant. ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 538. (Di Galea sopra Cattaro, 20. Febraro 1648. mv.); In August 1653, Governor-General Dolfin appointed Colonel Cornelio Vimes as superintendent of the fortress of Klis. DAZd, *Atti di Provveditori Geenrali*, vol. 18, f. 32v-33r, *Zara*, 25, *Agosto 1653.*

576*Regolatione et ordini presi nell'eccellentiss. Consiglio di Pregadi. Adi* 23. *Marzo 1619. In materia de capitaniij, sergenti, & altri*, (Venezia, Antonio Pinelli, stampator ducale. A S. Maria Formosa, in Cale del Mondo Nouo, 1619); As far as can be concluded from the archival sources, these requirements were respected, for example Girolamo della Negra before his appointment as the Sergeant Major of Zadar, first served three years in Germany as an ensign, followed by three years of the service on Crete as a captain in command of a company of trans-alpine infantry and additional three years in Dalmatia also as a captain. DAZd, *Atti di Provveditori Generali*, vol. 18, f. 17r-v, *Zara, primo Maggio 1653.*

577See appointments of sergeant majors for Klis and Split: ASVe, Senato Mar, R-112, f. 216v-217r, *Adi* 2. *Agosto 1651.*; f. 413r, *Adi* 29. *Febraro 1651.*

578DAZd, *Atti di Provveditori Generali*, vol. 24. f. 10v., *Adi* 5 *Giugno 1662.*

Venetian military. This post went under a very general title of a *govenratore di Militie Albanese* or *Croate*, (not to be confused with *governatore di armi (di piazza)* or similar administrative functions). This "ethnic" title denoted a commander in charge of several companies of marine infantry serving aboard the armed boats, commonly also the ones that a person in question recruited himself. The title usually (but not always) brought some small stipend, ranging from 6-12 *ducats*, depending on the merit and status of the particular individual.⁵⁷⁹

Even so, the rise of the number of companies of Croats and Albanians serving aboard armed boats to more than 50, during 1646-7, underlined the need to coordinate the actions of these *Oltremarini* more efficiently, which consequently led to the creation of a new command post above the level of *governatore*. In July 1648, the Senate sent to Dalmatia a well experienced and proven commander, *Cavaliere* Nicolo Delimarcovich (Delimarković), with the title of *Collonelo della nazione Crovata* and with a yearly stipend of 500 *ducats*. Although his title referred to him as the colonel of only the Croats, Delimarcovich was in charge of all companies of armed boats, whether Croat or Albanian.⁵⁸⁰ After Delimarcovich was killed in combat, in July 1653, he was succeeded by Vuco Cernizza, whose title was adjusted (to reflect his actual authority), to that of *collonelo delli Nationi Crovata, et Albanese*.⁵⁸¹ The arrival of Colonel Delimarcovich, coincided with the introduction of the post of sergeant major of the armed boats, to which Foscolo appointed Colonel's nephew Captain Zorzi Delimarković.⁵⁸² With introduction of these two posts the Republic finished organizing

579For example see the decrees granting the title of *governatore*: ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, f. 242v, Adi 15 Settembre 1646.; R-106, f. 80v, *Adi 2. Marzo 1648.*; R-113, f. 53v-54r, *Adi 13. Marzo 1652.*; R-113, f. 102v-103r, *Adi 19. Aprile 1652.*;

580ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-20, f. 188v-189r, *Adi 25. Luglio 1648.*

581ASVe, PTM. b,474, num. 53. (Di Zara, 17. Giugno 1653); ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 118. (Zara, 14. Aprile 1654); See also appointment of Marco Cernizza, brother of Vuco, as his successor at this post: ASVe, PTM. b. 489. num. 20. (Spalato, 28. Agosto 1662); For more on the rather well known person of Vuco Cernizza (Vuk Črnica-Orlandić) Conte di Montenegro see: Gligor Stanojević, *Crna Gora u doba kandiskog rata*, pp. 25-29.; Gligor Stanojević, *Jugoslovenske zemlje*, pp. 208.-209.; Dragoje Živković, *Istorija crnogorskog naroda [History of the Montenegro People]*, vol. 2. (Cetinje, 1992) pp. 25.-29.; Lovorka Čoralić and Savo Matković, *Crnčičani u mletačkim dokumentima XVII st. [Family Črnica in Venetian Documents]* (Bar: MVPrint, 2004) pp. 79-92;

582The appointment took a place upon the Colonel's arrival in Dalmatia in July 1648, yet two years later the Senate had still not confirmed it, so Colonel through the mediation of Governor-General Foscolo sent the petition to the Senate. ASVe, PTM. b. 470, num. 726. (Zara, 25. Luglio 1650)

companies of the armed boats serving in the Adriatic into single corps which resembled a regiment.

Commanding a multinational force, as was the Venetian army, was not a simple task. The multitude of languages made even issuing of commands problematic. The official command language, if we can speak of one at all, was Italian, that is the language of Venetian magistrates. Still, during military operations, commands were also issued in Slavic, the language spoken practically by almost one half of the troops. For example during the landing at Bari in January 1649, the combat order of units and commands prohibiting plunder and robbery of the local Christians were proclaimed in Italian "alli Corpi tutti di Italiani et Oltramontani" and "in Lingua Schiava alli Corpi di Crovati, Albanesi e Morlacchi, premesso il suono di Tromba, et Tamburi molti presenti."⁵⁸³ It is quite possible that a large part of the captains of trans-alpine infantry spoke or at least understood some Italian, yet this still left plenty of space for disorder especially in the confusion of battle. Moreover, over the years a number of non-regimental trans-alpine companies (or companies separated from their regiments which were at Crete) increased. In order to better manage these troops and exercise command over them during combat, the institution of "national" commanders (in the sources often referred to as *Capo Nazionale*), was introduced into the command structure of trans-alpine troops. In June 1660, Colonel Guglielmo a Hienus was appointed as the overall commander of all German companies in Dalmatia.⁵⁸⁴ Two years later, in July 1662, a similar appointment was made for the French troops, with the appointment of Colonel Michiel di Gomerville as the *Colonello, e soprintendente della Militia Francese in Provintia*.⁵⁸⁵ Both of these titles, were introduced on the initiative of governor-generals and did not involve any increase in the stipend of the Colonels (which was the prerogative of the Senate), still in addition to the command authority, the titles gave their holders a prestige and preeminence among other colonels. All of which, in the world of baroque professional military

⁵⁸³DAZd, *Atti di Provveditori Generali*, vol. 15, f. 60-63r.

⁵⁸⁴ASVe, PTM. b. 487. num. 18. Sebenico, 5. Giugno 1660); DAZd, *Atti di Provveditori Generali*, vol. 23. f. 443v.

⁵⁸⁵ASVe, PTM. b. 489. num. 27. (Spalato, 1. Ottobre 1662) attachment: *Patente del Gomerville Coll.(onel)o e soprintendente della Nazione Francese*

commanders represented the issue of no small importance.

The above paragraphs provided the overview of the command structure of the Venetian army in Dalmatia. One of its main characteristics was that it lacked strictly prescribed hierarchy of ranks (on the level above the colonel), one in which a particular rank would be associated with the standardized set of predefined competencies and authorities and which would require some particular command post. Instead, it can be said that the entire command structure was more task oriented and above all personal. Commanders were dispatched to Dalmatia with commissions spelling out their competences on personal bases. This often led to overlapping competences and resulted in conflicts over the authority among the commanders in the Venetian service to the great annoyance of governor-generals. Already, in April 1647, the Governor-General warned his superiors in Venice to adjust properly the authorities of *Capi di guerra* before their dispatch to Dalmatia,⁵⁸⁶ yet to no avail since the entire system was such that conflicts were practically unavoidable.

The first conflict over authority occurred already in 1647, when Baron Christof Martin Degenfeld, at that time serving in Dalmatia with the title of Governor of Arms, pretended to supremacy, not only over other *capi di guerra* (which was indeed asserted by his commission) but also over Marc' Antonio Pisani, the Governor-General of the Cavalry. The issue was resolved by the Senate in June 1647, with the decreed stipulating that the Governor-General of the Cavalry enjoys preeminence among all other commanders.⁵⁸⁷ However, this was not the end of the affair. In 1650 Baron Degenfeld was replaced by Gil d'Has, who also arrived with the title of a governor of arms, however his terms of service differed from those of Degenfeld. While, Degenfeld's (modified) commission clearly spelled that he was also subordinated to the Governor-General of the Cavalry, the new commission issued to Gil d'Has stated that the governor of arms is subordinated to the governor-general and *rettori* (the town magistrates) leaving out both governor-general of the cavalry and commissary. Such formulation of the competences of the governor of arms moved these two to approach Foscolo and urged him to

586ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 228. (Zara, 7. Aprile 1647)

587Sassi I., p. 64.

ask the Senate for clarification.⁵⁸⁸ Even though this affair was quickly resolved, this negligence on the part of the Senate in writing of commissions opened the door for other conflicts in the future. The question concerning the authority and subordination between military commander and governor-general of cavalry popped up again in April 1655, when Marchese Villanova (*sopraintendente di armi*) insisted that according to his commission he was superior to all other commanders and governors, with the exception of governor-general. When Governor-General Zen pointed out that the governor-general of cavalry was a public representative and thus excluded from his competences, Marchese replied that his commission did not contain article that excludes the governor-general of cavalry and that he refuses to serve under such conditions.⁵⁸⁹ The issue of precedence was resolved only when the last governor-general of cavalry was recalled and office was left vacant.

The conflicts over the rank and authority were not limited only to the relationship of public representatives and military commanders. While the majority of the military professionals in Venetian service had no problems accepting the authority of Venetian nobles, as the representatives of the Republic, they were more than sensitive when the question of subjugating to another military commander arose. How far they were ready to go, and what kind of unforeseeable problems the Venetian administration had to deal with, is nicely illustrated by the case of *Barone di Spaar*, who served in Dalmatia in 1663 with the title of *Sergente Generale di Battaglia*. Upon receiving the news of the expected arrival of *Tenete Generale dell'Artigliaria* Verdarmüler, who was to take over the command of the Venetian forces in Dalmatia and that he was, as his subordinate, supposed to transfer to Kotor, he flatly refused to accept this command. *Barone di Spaar* stated that "for the sake of reputation, he can not be subordinated to *Signore Tenente Generale dell' Artigliaria* Verdarmüler, adding that in Germany that rank is inferior to that of *Sergente General di Battaglia* openly declaring that he would leave Venetian service on the arrival of Verdarmüler "with the appointment superior to

588ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 699. (Di Zara, 24. Aprile 1650); ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-24, f. 80r, Adi 7. Maggio 1650);

589ASVe, PTM. b. 477. num. 28. (Zara, 18. Aprile, 1655)

his."⁵⁹⁰

The military commanders in the Venetian service were above all professionals who offered their services on the free market of military entrepreneurs, and their most valuable asset was not their military skills, but their reputation. Their prospective employment and salary were determined by their *corsus honorum*, stating what they have achieved, in service of which prince and under whose command they have served so far. Conceding to a person of a lower or equal rank was considered as a stain on their honor and reputation, and could set a dangerous precedent for the future. Such bickering over precedence and ranks could seem petty, yet in the world of the 17th century mercenaries these were not issues to be taken lightly, since they directly reflected on the material aspect of their living.

4. *The Venetian Irregulars: the Morlacchi*

Two ways by which a prince may increase his strength and the number of his people

Prince's subjects and his strength may be increased in two ways: propagation and acquisition. By agriculture and the arts, by assisting the education of children, and by establishing colonies, he will encourage propagation; and he will gain subjects from other rulers by assimilating his enemies and destroying neighboring cities, by extending the privileges of citizenship, by treaties and alliances, by ties of kinship, and similar means which will be discussed as we proceed.

(Giovanni Botero, *The Reason of State*)⁵⁹¹

All the troops/ships discussed so far belonged to the regular professional forces of the Republic. However, due to a specific nature of the land warfare in this battlefield, characterized by predominance of small skirmishes, raids and counter raids, equally important were the Venetian irregular troops - Morlacchi and *hajduks* (*haiduchi*). The following paragraphs address these troops and the administrative problems involved with them. As was said previously, the migration of the ex-Ottoman subjects of Christian faith settled along the Dalmatian-Bosnian border, known in the Venetian sources as Morlacchi (*Morlachi*, *Murlachi*, *Morlacci*), to the territory under Venetian control was one of the most striking events of this war. Encouraged by the successes of Venetian arms in Dalmatia in the first years of the war, a large number of Morlacchi decided to leave their homes in the Ottoman Empire and throw in

⁵⁹⁰ASVe, PTM. b. 490. num. 73. (Zara, 1. Giugno 1663)

⁵⁹¹Giovanni Botero, *The Reason of State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956) p. 148.

their lot with the Most Serene Republic. The report of Governor-General Lorenzo Dolfin from 1655, estimates the number of the Morlacchi who had defected to the Venetian side in the first few years of the war at between 28-30 thousand.⁵⁹²

These "noble savages," disobedient beyond any measure but brave and fierce warriors - as the Morlacchi were usually described in contemporary sources – who, in "search for liberty" and to escaping the oppression of "the Ottoman yoke " fled to the Venetian side, managed to capture the imagination and interests of those who came in contact with them. For example, the Frenchmen, Pierre Michel De la Haye, in his work on the Venetian Republic from 1669, described the Morlacchi as the "Iroquois of these parts."⁵⁹³ Equally, the Morlacchi also drew the attention of the Catholic Church. Although nominally Christians, to the 17th century Catholic priests, the Morlacchi appeared as creatures from some other, darker age.

Missionario Apostolico in Zadar, Baldassario Albanasio, in his letter to the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, from June 1648, wrote that he had found the Morlacchi who had recently settled in the town district to be "in total darkness, they do not know how to make the sign of cross, and are ignorant of the principal mysteries of our Sacred faith, without which it is impossible to reach salvation."⁵⁹⁴ Thus the Catholic Church took a great interest in the Morlacchi and undertook vigorous missionary activities among them in order not only to convert the Orthodox Morlacchi, but also to re-instruct in the post-Tridentine doctrines and teachings those among them who declared themselves to be Catholics.

However, the most interested in Morlacchi were the Venetian governor-generals in Dalmatia. For them the Morlacchi were, above all, a valuable military asset which enabled

⁵⁹²Commissione et Relatione Venetae 7, p. 116.

⁵⁹³*Ces Contréss sont assez peuplées & de Gens aguerris & accoustumez à la fatigue, entre autres les Morlaques qui sont pour ainsi dire les Iroquois de ce païs-là. Je n'ay jamais veu de Nation si adroite, ny si subtile pour des Courses, & qui prene mieux son party dans une rencontre fascheuse. La connoissance parfaite qu' ils ont des Montagnes, leur donne ces avantages; ils campent d'ordinaire aux pieds de bonnes Volles sans aucun ordre Militarie, avec leurs Bastiaux, & leus Famille, & entrent dans ces Places quand elles font menacees d'un Siege, & que l'on n' est pas assez fort pour tenir la Campagne.* Piere Michel de la Haye, *La Politique civile e militare des Venetiens* (Cologne, 1669) p. 103.

⁵⁹⁴ ... tanto idiote, che non sanno farsi il segno della Croce, et sono ignorantis[im]e delli principali Misteri della no[st]ra S[anta] Fede, senza li quali è impossibile il salvarsi. Marko Jačov, *Le Missioni Catholiche nei Balcani durante la guerra di Candia (1645-1669) vol I*, (Vatican: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1992) p. 186.

them to, at least partially, compensate for a constant lack of resources and, after 1649, for the Republic's decreasing military commitment in Dalmatia, caused by the financial strains of prolonged warfare and pressing needs of other battlefields, mainly Crete and the Aegean. In June 1647, the number of the Morlacchi fit to bear arms that crossed to the Venetian side was around 1,000,⁵⁹⁵ by January 1648, this number rose to 2,000⁵⁹⁶ and by May 1648, when the major phase of the migration was over, the Republic had acquired more than 4,000 potential combatants.⁵⁹⁷

Morlacchi community	Number of Adult Morlacchi (1648-1650)	Number of Adult Morlacchi April 1651	Number of Adult Morlacchi May 1664 – March 1665
Zadar	4030	1570	1472
Šibenik	1800	830	441
Split, Kaštela, Vranjic, Klis	?	191	150
	5830+	2591	2063

Table 2.6. Number of available combatants in the Morlacchi communities (1647-1664).⁵⁹⁸

The integration of the Morlacchi into the Venetian defensive system in Dalmatia was done along the lines of the model of the, so called, "military frontier," a model, at that time already successfully implemented on both sides of the Habsburg-Ottoman border to the north.⁵⁹⁹ The key feature of such defensive systems was that instead of an exclusive reliance on (expensive)

595ASVe, PTM., b. 464. num. 256. (Zara, 13. Giugno 1647)

596ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 365. (Zara 21. Genaro 1647 m.v.)

597ASVe, PTM. b. 466. num. 416. (Zara, 27. Maggio 1648); ASVe, PTM. b. 466. num. 428. (25. Giugno 1648)

598Data for the first two colums for this table is taken from the report of Governor-General Foscarini: ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. 22. (Spalato, 14. Aprile 1651); while that for the 1664 from: ASVe, PTM. b. 492. num. 151. (Zara, 31, Maggio 1664); ASVe, PTM. b. 493, num. 5. (Sebenico, 5. Genaio 1664 m.v.); num. 25. (Spalato, 5. Marzo 1665)

599For a good overview in English of this unique institution which managed to survive well into the second half of the 19th century see a classical work by Gunther E. Rothenbeg, *The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522-1747* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960). The literature on the Croatian-Slavonian military frontier is vast and extensive. A relatively recent work by Karl Kaser, contains a good survey of the historiography on this topic: Karl Kaser, *Slobodan seljak i vojnik [A Free Peasant and Soldier]* (Zagreb: Naklada Naprijed, 1997) pp. 21-29.; Compare also: Wolfgang Kessler, "Njemačka i austrijska historiografija Vojne krajine [German and Austrian Historiography of the Military Frontier]," In *Vojna Krajina [The Military Frontier]*, ed. Dragutin Pavličević (Zagreb: Sveučilišna naklada Liber, 1984) pp. 101–117.; For similar developments in the wider context of the entire Ottoman-Habsburg frontier see: Géza Pálffy, "The Border Defense System in Hungary in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries." In Veszpremy Laszlo and Kiraly Bela K. eds. *A Millenium of Hungarian Military History*, (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 2002) pp. 111-135.; Géza Pálffy, "The Origins and Development of the Border Defence System Against the Ottoman Empire in the Hungary (Up to the Early Eighteenth Century)." eds. Pál Fodor & Géza Dávid In *Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe: the military confines in the era of Ottoman conquest*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000) pp. 3-70. For the literature on the Venetian military frontier see footnote 22. A good survey of the etymological development of the terms *confinium*, frontier, border, "krajina" and other similar Slavic variants, is given in: Drago Roksandić, *Triplex Confinium*, pp. 25-50.

units of the regular professional army, it also employed a large number of irregular troops, who, in exchange for land and small subsidies in grain and money, performed various military services, ranging from guard duties to raids deep inside enemy territories. In such defensive systems only major, key-fortifications were garrisoned with the contingents of regular armies, while the rest of the borderlands was entrusted to these irregular troops. In Dalmatia, this was the role fulfilled by the Morlacchi, who made the heart and body of this new component of the Republic's defensive system in Dalmatia.

Under Venetian rule, the Morlacchi enjoyed a large measure of autonomy. They were governed and led into actions by their own leaders, elected by the Morlacchi and confirmed by the Venetian administration, who styled themselves with a mixture of Ottoman-Venetian titles (*serdar*, *harambaša*, *capitano*, *knez*, *governatore*). The size of the Morlacchi units was not as uniform as was the case with the units of regular Venetian army. At the beginning of the war, the Republic formed 22 companies of the Morlacchi which were of the same size and structure as other units of *oltramarini*, yet in the case of Morlacchi units their sizes depended primarily on the person of its leader (*harambaša*), his charisma, skills and status among the Morlacchi, and could range anywhere between 20 to 200 men. In addition to these company level commanders, the Morlacchi of Zadar district also elected one of their chieftains as their overall leader with the title of *serdar*⁶⁰⁰ (an Ottoman title used to denote a military leader). The *serdar* was acknowledged as their supreme military commander and judge, he was in charge of war parties, made decisions concerning the selection of targets and routes, and, most importantly, on the distribution of the booty.

Such arrangement did not come into being over night; it was the result of an integration process that spanned over several decades and, as already Tea Mayhew in her study pointed out, was the testimony of the "flexibility of the Venetian government to accept and adapt different forms of good practices from the Croatian medieval and Ottoman system into the

⁶⁰⁰The title of the *serdar* or *sardar* represents a part of the Ottoman legacy that the Morlacchi brought with them to the lands of the Most Serene Republic, and denotes a supreme military leader. For more see: Bosworth C.E, Donzel Van, E., Henrichs W. P. et al: *Encyclopedia of Islam. New Edition vol. 9* (Leiden Brill, 1997) p. 50.

administrative organizations of the new territory and subjects."⁶⁰¹ The following two sections are an attempt to tackle two important questions for Morlacchi-Venetian relations, the first being the contribution of the Morlacchi to the Venetian war effort and the second, the process of integration of the Morlacchi into the Venetian defensive system in Dalmatia.

4.1. The Morlacchi Contribution to the Venetian War Effort

The Morlacchi, who embark on raids and forays daily, always return with the considerable booty and some slaves, accompanied with death of many enemies, and destruction of the sites and lands subject to the Turk.

(Governor-General Lunardo Foscolo)⁶⁰²

In April 1650, after directing Venetian war efforts in Dalmatia for almost five years Governor-General Lunardo Foscolo, under whose supervision the Morlacchi migration had taken place, wrote a rather favorable evaluation of the Morlacchi in the Venetian service, comparing them with the other regular paid troops under his command. In his dispatch, Foscolo stated that: "they [Morlacchi] are well practiced in sites, places, and all other essential particulars of these parts, and at present, I may say, serve as the bulwark (*antemurale*) of these cities, which without their exterior protection would require significant garrison reinforcements." Foscolo added further, that the expenses necessary to maintain the fidelity among these simple people "who are good, brave soldiers, and who meet violence bravely, are insignificant in comparison to the costs necessary to maintain the units of the regular army. Moreover, the units of the regular army in the first place, need to be recruited abroad at the great expense, and then transferred to Dalmatia, during which time many of the soldiers die or runaway; when finally they arrive at the place where they are needed, due to the change of climate, and air, many of them fall sick, and are lost; furthermore, those who survive are so weak that during that campaign season, they can provide little or no service at all, and serve only to increase expenses; beyond this," continues Foscolo "these soldiers are inexperienced in the warfare with the Turks, and acquire experience only in time, with additional costs in money and equipment. On the contrary, the poor Morlacchi, sustain themselves alone in any

⁶⁰¹Tea Mayhew, *Dalmatia between Ottoman and Venetian Rule*, p. 21.

⁶⁰²*Li Morlachi, che van giornalmente sortendo in partite, sempre ritornando con bottini di consideratione, con morte de diversi dell' inimico, con disfacimento de luochi, et terre al Turcho soggette, et con qualche schiavo.* ASVe. PTM. b. 465. num. 336. (Zara, 29, Ottobre 1647)

kind of weather, their bed is raw ground, they are always at guard in the countryside, and are the first to expose themselves in the defense of the state and the citizens; they are experienced in fighting the Turks; stand always ready on the front, agile to pursue and damage the enemy, and finally," concludes Foscolo, "by fighting for us, they deprive the Ottomans of their services, which is a point worthy of reflection."⁶⁰³

Two of Foscolo's immediate successors, Girolamo Foscarini (1651-1652) and Lorenzo Dolfín (1653-1655), both shared his view on the utility and value of the Morlacchi as a fighting force. The reasons for this were quite simple; the forces and the resources they had at their disposal were almost half a size smaller than those that Foscolo could count on (see table 2.8). In order to compensate for this weakness both of them increased their reliance on the Morlacchi. Girolamo Foscarini not only followed Foscolo's practice of supporting Morlacchi raids as much as possible, which he saw as a means to "provide some prestige to public arms,"⁶⁰⁴ but also had plans to organize Morlacchi as an effective military force (of which more will be said on the following pages) capable of coordinating its actions with the units of the Venetian regular army in major military operations. What is even more important, his first tests of the feasibility of such a project, gave quite positive results. In 1652, during the operation to recapture the fort of Zadvarje,⁶⁰⁵ the Morlacchi for the first (and the last) time operated as a separate individual fighting force, arriving in the area of the operations by

603... *prattici delle forze, de siti, et d'ogni altro particolare più essenziale di questa parte, et servendo al presente, dir posso, per antemurale delle Piazze, che prive di questa esteriore, ben valida difesa, accrescendosi le gelosi sarebbe pur necessario rinforzar tanto più li presidij, et si converrebbe, per iscarsar una per così dir, picciola spesa mensile in riguardo à quella delle Militie pagate, con la quale si potrebbero mantener in fede questi meschini, buoni soldati bravi, et coraggiosi assentir con violenza; ma necessariamente ad un grosso dispendio, che si fa ne donativi per le leve d'altre militie, prima, che ricever alcun servizio al quale anco prima di portarsi, tanti soldati muoiono et fuggono, condotti poi al luoco del bisogno, nella mutatione del Clima, et dal Aria, s' infermano onde molti se ne perdono [3] et gl' altri son così poco buoni, o restano così languidi, che per quella Campagna à poco, o niente posson servire, oltre che inesperti del guerreggiar di Turchi non riescono, se non doppo qualche tempo, et pure la spesa continua sempre eccessiva, oltre la quantità di schiavine, et pagliazzi, che se li devon somministrare, che pur tutto costa, la dove poveri Morlacchi, con le proprie si riparano dall' ingurie di qualsi voglia tempo sinistro, et per pagliazzi si servono della nuda terra, sempre si trattengon alla campagna; son li primi ad espor li petti, per la difesa dello stato, et di sudditi, pratici del guerraggiare, con Turchi; standoli sempre à fronte, agili ad inseguirli, et pronti à danneggiarli, se si perdono combattendo, non muoiono invendicati, et di diminuisce la spesa, et finalmente, militando per Noi, si levano all' Inimico, che è il punto ben degno di più pesati riflessi.*

ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 697. (Zara, 18 Aprile 1650)

604ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. 18. (Spalato, 13. Aprile 1651)

605For more on this operation see: Stanojević. *Dalmacija u doba kandiskog rata*, pp. 129; Jačov, *Le guerre Veneto-Turche*, p. 102.

marching overland more than 200 km, while the main Venetian force was transported via the sea. At the end of the operation, Governor-General Foscarini had only words of praise for the Morlacchi, led by two Dalmatian nobles (Donato Civalleli and Zorzi Papali) in the roles of the Morlacchi superintendents, boasting that he had succeeded to "bring the Morlacchi to travel in the parts far away from Šibenik and Zadar, to fight under their banners, to march in order and discipline, and to occupy and maintain (even for days) the posts assigned to them, same as the regular troops would do," adding that this can serve as an excellent example of the advantages that can be gained from "*questa feroce Nazione*" if it is well taken care of.⁶⁰⁶

Foscarini's successor, Lorenzo Dolfin, continued the policies of his predecessors concerning the reliance on Morlacchi for the defense of the province, but went even a step further. During the ill fated attack on Knin in 1654, more than one third of the 6,000 men strong Venetian force was made of the Morlacchi under leadership of their *serdar* Ilija Smiljanić. Moreover, in the overall plan of the operation, the Morlacchi were given one of the crucial tasks; they were charged with the task of guarding the three major mountain passes leading from Bosnia and thus preventing the arrival of Ottoman reinforcements. Unfortunately, when the 6-7,000 men strong relieving force of the Bosnian pasha appeared, Smiljanić and his several hundred Morlacchi guarding the pass, refused to play the role of Leonidas and his 300 Spartans and, instead, successfully retreated, joining the main body of the Venetian army at Knin.⁶⁰⁷

However, not all of the Foscolo's successors shared the same positive attitude towards the Morlacchi and their usefulness for the Republic's war effort. Dolfin's immediate successor, Antonio Zen (1655-1656), already, in one of his first letters to the Senate, expressed his dissatisfaction with the Morlacchi. As a rule, upon every arrival of a new governor general in Dalmatia, Morlacchi chieftains would pay him a visit, and presented him with the standard

606... *ridur li Morlachi a portarsi in parti così lontane da Sebenico, e da Zara, a militar sotto Insegne, marchiando con l'ordinanza, prescrittale, et pressi li Posti assegnatili, mantenersi in quelli per più giorni ad uso di Militie pagate*; ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 91. (Almissa, 24. Febbraio 1651 m.v.)

607See Chapter 1.2.8. For the numbers of the Morlacchi engaged in this operation see: ASVe, PTM. b. 475, num. 120. (Zara, 26 Aprile 1654) attachments: *Nota di Morlachi di Contado di Zara, Nota di Morlachi di Contado di Sebenico*.

repertoire of their grievances, liquidation of their debts (for the long overdue stipends), subsidies of grain, hardtack, munition, arms etc. Irritated with these requests, Antonio Zen complained to the Senate: "Every day, they (the Morlacchi) torment me, with requests for license to go on raids, for their down payments, for ammunition and hardtack, however, I must admit that I am very displeased with these activities," and expressed his view that little public good was gained from the Morlacchi, who, according to Zen, just "tease the enemy, are the source of thousand disorders and represent the major obstacle to the peace on this frontier."⁶⁰⁸

The accusations of the insolence and beastly nature of the Morlacchi are motives frequently found in the letters of almost all governor-generals serving in Dalmatia, however, a majority of them were unanimous in the assessment that without Morlacchi it would not be possible to repel Ottoman attacks and keep this province. This is how in 1667, Catherino Corner, upon his return from the service as the governor-general of Dalmatia and Albania, in his report to the Venetian Senate, began the description of the lands and people that had been entrusted to him.

Everywhere there are Morlacchi, although their concentration is largest in the countryside of Zara where they have a great deal of lands. They are fierce and indomitable beyond belief and, with the sole object of freedom and easing of burdens, they left the Empire – to which they were previously subjected – and willingly subordinated themselves to Your Serenity. They live of agriculture and warfare, plundering the enemy and exposing themselves willingly to any hardship on any occasion. As much as they are meritorious for the maintaining of the countryside, which otherwise would be completely uninhabited and the Turks would uncontestedly loot it down to the walls of every city, that much they are rash and insolent, they do as they please, and give to the landowners as much as they feel it's proper: they have their own Sardars, and it is from them rather than from the public officials they receive regulations and laws.

(Relazion dell' Eccellentissimo signor Catherino Corner, Provveditor Generale in Dalmatia, 14. Dicembre 1667)⁶⁰⁹

By the time of Corner's service in the Dalmatia (1664-1667) for almost two decades the Morlacchi constituted the first line of the defense of Dalmatian towns. Serving as the irregular militia, settled in the deserted areas of no-man's-land stretching practically from the walls of Dalmatian towns at the coast to the Ottoman border in the hinterland, they provided the

⁶⁰⁸ASVe, PTM. b. 477. num. 8. (Zara, 8. Febbrario 1654 m.v.)
⁶⁰⁹Grga Novak, *Commissione et Relatione Venetae*, 259.

Venetian defensive system with several valuable services. In the first place they shielded the Venetian controlled lands from smaller Ottoman raids. Secondly, through the line of guard outposts they provided the Venetian forces with an early-warning system which enabled the local population to make timely retreat into the protection of fortified strongholds. Moreover, when warned in time and given time to prepare an ambush, on more than one occasion the Morlacchi were able to destroy rather large Ottoman raiding parties (2-4,000 men).⁶¹⁰ Equally important were their offensive capabilities. Morlacchi raiding activities reached a peak in the first years of the war (1647-1650) with parties frequently numbering over 1,000 men,⁶¹¹ and throughout devastation and depopulation of the Ottoman settlements in the Dalmatian hinterland south of the Dinaric Mountains were the result of Morlacchi raiding parties as much as of the actions of Venetian regular army. Moreover, with these operations the war and destruction was brought deep into the enemy controlled lands far beyond the reach of Venetian regular forces.

The importance of the Morlacchi as a fighting force grew even more after 1654, when in the aftermath of the defeat of Venetian forces at Knin, they remained the only available means for the Republic to project its military power into the enemy controlled territories away from the coast. Moreover, while in the first years of the war, Morlacchi raids were more or less random and served three main goals - (1) to test their loyalty by directing them against their former lords, (2) to strengthen Venetian defensive position with the destruction of Ottoman-supportive infrastructure (settlements, corps, horse fodder, bridges etc) in the border zones and (3) to provide them with substance necessary to support themselves through the means of booty and loot - over the years Venetian commanders learned how to better coordinate Morlacchi actions with the overall defensive strategy. Especially skillful in that regard was Governor-General Antonio Bernardo (1656-1660) who was the first to perfect more active use of the Morlacchi in defensive operations. Instead of simply using the Morlacchi to lay ambushes for small and medium size Ottoman raids as was the usual practice with his

⁶¹⁰Such was for example the case in July 1651, when Morlacchi under command of serdar Ilija Smiljanić, ambushed and routed Ottoman party from Lika. ASVe, PTM. b. 471, num. 41 (Spalato, 10. Luglio 1651)

⁶¹¹For a detailed account of this actions see: Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 121-129.

predecessors, or allowing them to indiscriminately attack targets in the borderlands, Bernardo perfected the use of the large scale Morlacchi attacks against Ottoman regions with the goal of tying down local *Sipahi* forces in the defense of their homes, or provoking their return home from the main Ottoman army. Moreover, while his predecessors looked favorably at bloody Morlacchi-Ottoman engagements, Bernardo aimed to preserve the Morlacchi as much as possible, by explicitly ordering them to burn and loot as much as possible but not to engage in with organized Ottoman forces.⁶¹²

For example, when in 1656 the pasha of Bosnia ordered a regular gathering of the Ottoman forces at Livno with the aim to attack Split, Governor-General Bernardo gathered as many Morlacchi as possible from both Zadar and Šibenik and dispatched them against the fortress of Knin aiming to draw back local Ottoman lords to the defense of their homes.⁶¹³ Similarly, in July 1657, when Bernardo was forced to depart for Kotor which was threatened by an Ottoman attack, he dispatched a combined force of the Morlacchi from Zadar and Šibenik against the province of Lika, aiming to draw there as many Ottoman lords as possible.⁶¹⁴ Similar tactics Bernardo also applied in 1658,⁶¹⁵ and in 1659, when he somewhat adjusted tactics and instead of dispatching one large raid he organized a multitude of smaller parties directed against targets deeper into the Ottoman lands intending to spread insecurity and fear across the entire border zone.⁶¹⁶

These Morlacchi actions not only tied down considerable Ottoman feudal forces in defense of their own communities, but they also had a detrimental effect on the morale of the frontier Ottoman lords, many of whom, after more than a decade of the war and with no prospect of peace in the near future, began to search for their own venues for securing survival. For

612 *In tanto per far qualche diversione e socncertare le truppe Turchesche esistenti in vicinanza de confini, ho fatto unire, e sortir in Campagna li Murlachi di Zara, e di Sibenico, che saranno al numero di mille tra Cavallaria, et pedoni, incaricati di infestare, et incendiare il Paese nemico à tutto potere, ma non impegnarsi in azzardo di soccomber ad alcun discapito, colla qual rissoluzione spero di veder sturbate in buona parte le scorrerie divise sopra quelli Territorij, piu dalla perfidia de confinanti, che dalla volta del Bassa.* ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 122. (Liesina, 23. Agosto 1657)

613 ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 99. (Zara, 19. Maggio 1657)

614 ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 104. (Spalato, 20. Giugno 1657)

615 ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 180. (Zara, 14. Maggio 1658)

616 ASVe, PTM. b. 485. num. 259. (Zara, 24. Agosto 1659)

example, when in 1659, the Morlacchi intensified their operations, reaching all the way to Sarajevo, several Ottoman lords approached Governor-General Antonio Bernardo through their Christian subjects and asked him to "...receive them under the protection of the Republic, obliging themselves to pay a moderate annual tribute as a token of the recognition of its Dominion, and not to commit any act of hostility, but rather to live as good neighbors."⁶¹⁷ The Senate approved this arrangement and in December, in return for an annual tribute, the Governor-General accepted into the Venetian protection 28 villages.⁶¹⁸ This was not an isolated case; many Ottoman lords followed this practice. For example, in September 1662, Il Turco *Hassanbegh Vlahovich da Dumno*, offered a tribute of 100 *Real*i in grain in exchange for the protection of the Republic.⁶¹⁹

During the last decade of the war, the scale of fighting in the Dalmatian battlefield considerably lessened. The majority of the Empire's forces was engaged in Hungary and Transylvania and no Ottoman force larger than 6,000 men was seen in Dalmatia during those years.⁶²⁰ Yet, to the Morlacchi this brought only a slight respite. The core of the Venetian regular forces, units of Italian and trans-alpine infantry, remained entrenched behind the town walls and almost never entered the countryside, leaving practically all of the fighting on the land to the Morlacchi, and on the sea, to the companies of Croatian and Albanian infantry aboard armed boats. Due to the engagement of the bulk of the Empire's forces in the north, large Ottoman raids in Dalmatia were replaced by smaller, but still quite deadly ones. Moreover, these "smaller" Ottoman incursions of 6,000 combatants or so, led by frontier lords, proved to be more effective than large scale military operations of Bosnian pashas. In 1662 and 1663, the Ottomans changed their tactics and launched their attacks on the Venetian lands rather early, at the end of the winter, in February. By doing so they managed to achieve the element of surprise and inflicted heavy losses on the Morlacchi. Due to this change in the

617... *riceverli in protettione della Republica; obligandosi di riconoscer il Dominio di essa annualmente con qualche moderato tributo; non commetter alcuna hostilita, ma vicinar, come se fossero sudditi.* ASVe, PTM. b. 486. num. 268. (Spalato, 16. Novembre 1659)

618ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-34, f. 307r-v, *Adi 5 Dicembre 1659.*; ASVe, PTM. b. 486. num. 278. (Spalato, 9. Gennaro 1659. m.v.)

619ASVe, PTM. b. 498. num. 23. (Spalato, 18. Settembre 1662)

620Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 139-145.

tactics, in 1663 the Morlacchi suffered some of the worst casualties of this war losing more than 450 men.⁶²¹

Also, after the departure of Antonio Bernardo, Morlacchi offensive actions became less frequent and of much smaller scale. The raid of February 1659, when serdar Janko Mitrović led a party of 2,000 Morlacchi and local militia troops, represented the last major Morlacchi raid of this war.⁶²² Reasons for this were twofold; in the first place the Republic, rather content with the turning of Ottoman attention to other battlefields, began to restrain the Morlacchi in order to prevent them from provoking the Ottomans and from animating them to undertake some action against Dalmatia.⁶²³ In addition, Governor-General Catherino Corner introduced a practice that Morlacchi should pay for the munitions issued to them *per andar in partite*, which definitely could not have any encouraging effect on the Morlacchi.⁶²⁴ Secondly, the long years of constant fighting took a heavy toll among Morlacchi leaders. When in June 1663, Governor-General Girolamo Contarini made a survey of the Zadar Morlacchi he noted that they are "... all men of good stature, well armed, yet badly provided with leaders, which can not be remedied, since the best and bravest among them have perished in the frequent encounters during this war, ..." ⁶²⁵ The life expectancy among the Morlacchi serdars was between 2-4 years and no better was the situation with other prominent Morlacchi chieftains. The petitions of the Morlacchi to the Senate with pleas to be granted some state stipend on account of their military services are full of dramatic and tragic family stories of entire generations of males lost in the war. For example, in February 1655, *governatore* Bože Županović in his petition stated that of the four brothers and three cousins that crossed to the Venetian territory with him at the beginning of the war, now 8 years later, he had lost four of them, all in the service of the Republic.⁶²⁶ Even more extreme case is recorded in the

621Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 140.

622ASVe, PTM. b. 484. num. 232. (Da Galera Paruicchio sotto Sebenico, 12. Febraro 1658 mv.)

623Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 142-144.

624ASVe, PTM. b. 493. num. 21. (Zara, 16. Febrario 1664. m.v.)

625... *tutta gente di buona presenza, ben armata, ma mal provveduta de Capi, ne vi si può applicare compenso, li migliori e più bravi essendo mancati già nelle frequenti fattioni seguite questa guerra, ...*; ASVe, PTM, b. 490. no. 73. (Zara, 1. Giugno 1663)

626ASVe, *Senato Mar*, filze, 1655 (Marzio-Aprile)

application of Šimun Miljković from 1668, in which can be seen that out of 12 male members of his family only two were alive at the end of the war.⁶²⁷

Such were the results of the prolonged Morlacchi-Ottoman conflict, which over the years, just like any other guerrilla warfare that targets civilian infrastructure of an enemy, developed into a bloody conflict full of acts of savage atrocities and resulted in a close circle of unending personal vendettas.⁶²⁸ In such circumstances, the customary norms of the 17th century warfare, usually respected in the European-Ottoman conflicts – as was the giving of quarters and/or respect for rank and titles - were in this particular conflict more the exception than the norm.⁶²⁹ Moreover, not only was guerrilla warfare practiced by the Morlacchi, made up of small scale skirmishes and ambushes, very bloody and often merciless,⁶³⁰ but the fighting style of both the Ottomans and Morlacchi, combined with the refusal to give quarters, resulted in very bloody engagements. Unlike western troops that fought in orderly squared formations of pike and shot, consisting of firing salvos and "push of the pike" in which only the first few rows were actually engaged on both sides, the Ottomans and Morlacchi usually fired a single salvo at the beginning of an encounter which was then followed by the charge with steel in hands. An exemplary case of a large scale Morlacchi-Ottoman engagement is the encounter from February 1652, when, during the Venetian siege of the fortress of Zadvarje, the joined forces of the Morlacchi of Zadar and Šibenik routed 3,000 men strong Ottoman relief force, killing some 300 and wounding much more.⁶³¹ Governor-General Foscarini left a vivid

627Boško Desnica, *Istorija kotarskih uskoka*, pp. 133-134.

628The Venetian sources are full of records of acts of gruesome violence that gave this war its notorious frontier character, such as killing of prisoners, head-taking and collecting of noses and/or ears of killed Ottomans, to be presented as a proofs of their deeds to the Venetian authorities, who then in turn awarded bearers of such items with stipends of grain or money. For example, in October 1653, Gregorio Galatovich who presented to the governor-general the head of Ottoman *agha*, named *Assan Cuna*, was awarded with one portion of hardtack per month for the duration of the war. Boško Desnica, *Istorija kotarskih uskoka I.*, p. 69.

629Such was for example the case in July 1653, when the Morlacchi repelled the Ottoman raid in the area of Posedarje. One of the Ottoman prisoners captured by the Morlacchi was of a higher rank (holder of the *zaim*), and as was customary that prisoner should have been allowed to offer ransom for his life. Yet, in spite of efforts of Janko Mitrović, the *harambaša* of a great esteem, under whose command the Morlacchi fought in this encounter, to protect him, he was nevertheless brutally killed by the vengeful Morlacchi. ASVe, PTM. b. 474. num. 63. (Di Zara, 15. Luglio 1653)

630More than once the Morlacchi had succeeded in ambushing Ottoman parties in such a way that either no escape route was available to the Ottomans or that the only venue of escape lay in swimming over the river which also usually resulted in high casualties.

631ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 90. (Almissa, 20. Febraio 1651 m.v.)

description of this encounter that serves as an excellent testimony of the brutality of the Morlacchi-Ottoman warfare:

The victory was indeed one of the bloodiest ever heard off, because after the first salvo of the firearms, the Morlacchi drew their sabers, and with cold steel in hand [charged the enemy] carrying out the cruel massacre, pursuing him for a long stretch of the land, with murders of many wounded, leaving the horrible spectacle of naked bodies, in a manner not any more practiced; the Morlachci infantry fought off the Ottoman cavalry with truly marvelous courage.⁶³²

In his challenging study "Rethinking Military History," Jeremy Black has pointed out the problematic aspects of the interpretation of the success of European forces based solely on technological (adoption of firearms) and cultural (sustained development of culture of war) factors and warned that the experience of several non-European theaters of operations has shown that Western forces "indeed to be effective," were frequently forced "to adopt to local fighting methods,..."⁶³³ The successes of the campaigns of 1647 and 1648, when the Venetian regular forces went from one victory to another, capturing Ottoman strongholds one by one and routing Ottoman relief forces in open fields, can be taken as a good argument in favor of the more general statement, that by the mid 17th century, due to the development of new fighting techniques and methods, European forces had become tactically superior to the Ottomans. At least when fighting between forces of similar sizes was concerned. However, in the end this tactical superiority of Venetian forces by itself does not provide any kind of guarantee for the successful defense of the province. Moreover, as the outcome of the battle at Knin in 1654 has demonstrated, when allowed to utilize a terrain and their cavalry superiority Ottomans were more than capable of putting European forces to rout. It may be that the Venetian command considered companies of Italian and trans-alpine infantry the foundation on which rested the defense of Dalmatian towns, yet the defense of the countryside rested on the shoulders of the Morlacchi. It was them who for more than two decades prevented Ottoman raiding parties from freely looting the countryside and forced them to pay a heavy

⁶³²*La vittoria fu veramente delle più sanguinose, che mai si udissero, [3] perché dopo la prima salva dell' arme da fuoco, diedero li Morlachi mano alle sciabole, et coll' arme bianche fecero strage crudelissima de nemici, seguitandoli per gran tratto di Paese, con atrocità di molti feriti, lasciando li cadaveri nudi, con horrido spettacolo di quelle campagne, et con maniera forse non più praticata; combattendo il Morlachi pedoni con gli inimici à Cavallo, con coraggio veramente meraviglioso.* ASVe, PTM., b. 472. num. 94. (no place nor date)

⁶³³Jeremy Black, *Rethinking Military History*, pp. 84-85.

cost in blood for the booty collected. What can be taken as a real novelty of this war if compared to the previous Ottoman-Venetian conflicts in Dalmatia and an important step in the development of the Venetian defensive system, was the successful integration of the Morlacchi irregulars.

4.2. Integration of the Morlachci in the Venetian Defensive System in Dalmatia

When in the April 1646, the Senate authorized Governor-General Foscolo to engage in negotiations with the first groups of the Morlacchi willing to deflect to the Venetian side, it was envisioned as a limited operation. Judging from the Senate's instructions and consequent negotiations of Governor-General Foscolo with the first few Morlacchi groups, the Republic's policymakers had three simple goals on their minds: (1) to secure some additional manpower for galley crews or (2) a few new companies of marine infantry and (3) to use the newly acquired population for recolonization of the province of Istria.⁶³⁴ When the first groups of Morlacchi began arriving on the Venetian controlled territories, Governor-General Foscolo, acting in accordance with these general instructions began forming companies of marine infantry for service aboard armed boats, from the newly arrived Morlacchi. Additionally, Foscolo transferred their families and herds to the nearby islands, justifying this act with the concerns for their safety, but the real reason for this separation was that the families were to act as the hostages and secure faithful service from the newly conscripted Morlacchi.⁶³⁵

However, soon the scope of the migration, with hundreds of Morlacchi leading their families and herds and arriving in the vicinity of Zadar, rendered the Senate's existing orders inadequate. By mid June 1647 in addition to 200 Morlacchi already enlisted more than 500 additional conscripts were available. Furthermore, with new groups arriving daily, by the

⁶³⁴The Senate was especially keen concerning the prospect of persuading the Morlacchi to volunteer for the service aboard the galleys, and authorized Foscolo to offer *donativo* of 25-30 *Realì* to each Morlacc willing to serve in this manner. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17, f. 76v-77r, Adi 4. Aprile 1646.; For the overview of the first negotiations between Morlacchi and Governor-General Foscolo see: ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 230. (Zara, 11. Aprile 1647); ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 232. (Zara, 14. Aprile 1647); Full contract between the Morlacchi of Vojnić is also published in: Boško Desnica, *Istorija kotarskih Uskoka*, pp. 12-13.

⁶³⁵For the migration of the first groups and instructions how to treat with them see: ASVe, b. 464. num. 236. (Galea in Canal di Novegradi, 23. Aprile 1647); ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-18, 93r-v; ASVe, PTM., b. 464. num. 256. (Zara, 13. Giugno 1647)

beginning of July, the number of the adult Morlacchi fit for military service rose to over 1,000. According to the estimates of Foscolo's administration, enlisting all these men would increase the monthly expenses of the military by 5,000 *ducats*. Unfortunately, by that time Venetian administration in Dalmatia had already begun to experience a serious shortage of coin (see the following chapter) and Governor-General Foscolo lacking the authority to authorize such large increase in spending and not willing to act without the Senate's direct order, urgently demanded new instructions from the Senate.⁶³⁶ For almost the entire next year, the Senate and the Governor-General exchanged letters discussing the best course in dealing with the Morlacchi, while in the meantime, their number continued to grow constantly.

As the most preferable solution for the Morlacchi problem, both the Senate and the Venetian administration in Dalmatia, saw/considered their transfer to Istria, or at least to the Kvarner Islands (Krk, Cres and Osor).⁶³⁷ The merit of this plan was that it provided a solution to both security and material problems involved with Morlacchi. By transferring Morlacchi, or at least their families, to Istria, they would cease to represent a security risk and it would free the Republic from the need to provide food for several thousand hungry mouths. Acting in accordance with this plan, already at the end of June 1647, Governor-General Foscolo shipped the first few large groups of Morlacchi to Istria and to the Island of Krk (Veglia), followed by a constant flow of smaller groups over the next few months. However, the full execution of this plan was strongly opposed by the remaining the Morlacch. While many were willing to settle on the nearby islands of Pag and Krk, the overwhelming majority resisted Venetian attempts to reallocate them to Istria. The cause of such strong Morlacchi opposition lain mainly in Istria's climate and eco-conditions to which Morlacchi were completely unaccustomed. During the first few years, Morlacchi settlers in Istria were practically decimated by endemic epidemics of malaria and similar indigenous diseases. Due to this Istria acquired a notorious reputation among the Morlacchi, to the extent that some named it "sepulcher of the living" (*sepulcro di viventi*). In the end, in spite of all the Venetian efforts to

636ASVe, PTM., b. 464. num. 256. (Zara, 13. Giugno 1647); PTM. b. 464. num. 268. (Zara, 5. Luglio 1647)
637ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-18, f. 115r-116r, Adi 1. Giugno 1647; f. 130v-133r, Adi 19 Giugno 1647.

convince Morlacchi to concede to transfer, their stubborn refusal to leave Dalmatia rendered full execution of this plan impossible.⁶³⁸

Meanwhile, the Venetian administration in Dalmatia, heavily engaged in the conduct of military operations and left without a formally defined encompassing policy on how to proceed concerning the Morlacchi, resorted to the set of more or less improvised measures in line with the general guidelines provided by the Senate. The most important issue that required to be addressed was the question of loyalty of the newly arrived Morlacchi. In addition to the practice of (temporary) separation of Morlacchi families, the administration also introduced the practice of burning Morlacchi villages upon their crossing to the Venetian side.⁶³⁹ However, the measure that gave the best results and the one that was to be the longest lasting was the so-called policy of "*insanguinarli con Turchi*," the goal of which was very simply to create such a bloody feud between the Morlacchi and their former lords that would render Morlacchi pardon impossible.

As soon as the Morlacchi arrived, as a test of their allegiance the Governor-General began dispatching Morlacchi raiding parties against targets in the Ottoman lands.⁶⁴⁰ The migration left the Morlacchi without any mean to support themselves, and therefore no significant effort was needed to initiate them for these actions. The prospect of plunder and booty, combined

638Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 116; *Sassi I.*, pp. 73-74.; ASVe, PTM, b. 465. num. 349 (Zara, 9 decembre 1647). The Venetian government never abandoned its plan to settle as much as possible of Morlachi in Istria, and in the course of the entire war governor-generals were instructed to attempt to convince Morlacchi to agree to their transfer to Istria, and not to miss any occasion to ship some group of willing Morlacchi in that direction. For example further 18 families were transferred to Istria in December 1647. ASVe, PTM, b.465. num. 351 (Zara, 14 Decembre 1647). Still, a final number of the Morlacchi that were transferred to Istria is unknown and only partial data concerning their migration to this province is available. The Bishop of Pula, the largest migration center in Istria reported to Rome, that by the February 1648, 53 Morlacchi families with estimated 1,000 souls had settled in his diocese. However, it is safe to conclude that in spite of all of the efforts of the Venetian government, the majority of the Morlacchi remained in Dalmatia. Marko Jačov, *Le Missioni Catholiche nei Balcani durante la guerra di Candia*, vol I., p. 168.

639For example on 5th May 1647 Governor-General Foscolo ordered to Conte di Possedaria to burn abandoned houses of the Morlacchi in order to "*levarli l'allettamento del ritorno*." Similar order was also repeated on 15th of May 1647. Boško Desnica, *Istoriya kotarskih uskoka*, p. 15, 17.

640The first military action in which Morlacchi were employed was a joint operation with the forces of the Venetian cavalry led by Governor-General of the Cavalry Marc' Antonio Pisani at the end of June 1647. ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 265. (Zara, 30. Giugno 1647); This was soon followed by more successful Morlacchi led raids during which Venetian cavalry simply provided the protection in a case of retreat. ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 269. (Zara, 9. Luglio 1647) ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 273. (Zara, 18. Luglio 1647); Moreover, it seemed that this last action resulted in an additional benefit since it provoked the Ottomans to conduct a punitive raid against these Venetian Morlacchi. ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 275. (Zara, 21. Luglio 1647); Boško Desnica, *Istoriya Kotarskih Uskoka I.*, pp. 19-23.

with the assurances of the protection of Venetian forces in a case of emergency as well as the supply of ammunition was all the motivation that Morlacchi needed.⁶⁴¹ At first, Governor-General Foscolo, suspicious of the Morlacchi and concerned with their loyalty, employed them mainly in joint actions with other Venetian troops, yet soon it became clear that the Morlacchi operated best when employed individually and led by their own commanders.⁶⁴² Nevertheless, for years after the migration, the Senate still, whenever discussing the question of Morlacchi, almost never missed an opportunity to repeat the instruction to governor-generals to ensure that Morlacchi were to be as much as possible smeared with the blood of Turks, or as the source would put it "*l'insanguinarli con Turchi*."⁶⁴³

On the other hand, as far as the Morlacchi were concerned, the most efficient way for securing their loyalty was to enroll them in salaried units of the Venetian army. The requests to be enrolled constituted the integral part of almost every Morlacchi-Venetian negotiation in 1647-1648 and the Morlacchi considered it to be the most preferable and safest way to secure material support for their families. And indeed during the summer 1647, from the first Morlacchi groups that arrived, Foscolo formed 20 companies counting 600 men in total. Yet soon, the Senate, being acutely mistrustful of these former Ottoman subjects put a ban on their further enlistment in companies of armed boats. The Venetian government faced with the financial strains of the prolonged warfare and the threat of an open rebellion of the regular units of the Venetian army, due to a huge accumulated debt, considered the enrollment of a

641The basis of these policies were formed already at the beginning of the migration. In June 1647, Governor-General Foscolo informed the Senate about his plans concerning the newly arrived Morlacchi: *... dopo molte considerationi fatte resto finalmente concluso, che gl'Animali venduti fossero, eccettuati li necessari all'uso del lavoro, impossibile essendo sostener il resto; et le famiglie, et gente inutili sotto il pretesto di sicurezza, ricoverar se debbano, parte ne scogli di Zara in quanto saran capaci, et il resto ritirar si debba sopra l'isola di Pago, restando le persone atte all'Armi in Terraferma, per portarsi dove ricercar potesse il bisogno, et per acquietarli, et maggiormente consolarli, et scansar quanto più si possi la spessa (punto da me invigliato al segno maggiore) li ho vivamente persuasi à portarsi in campagna per raccogliere l'entrate dell'Inimico, promettendoli l'assistenza di Cavalleria, et infantaria per spalleggiarli, et assicurarli in ogni evento, che venissero Turchi per attaccarli, accio con li haveri del nemico, provvedessero al vito loro;* ASVe, PTM, b. 464. num. 256 (Zara, 13. Giugno 1647)

642The crucial actions that convinced the Venetian administration in Dalmatia that the Morlacchi can be trusted were the attack on Gračac in August 1647 and the arrival of 400 Morlacchi to Šibenik (September 1647) under Priest Don Stipan Sorić. ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 288. (Zara, 12. Agosto 1647); num. 293. (Zara, 17. Agosto 1647); PTM. b. 465. num. 303. (Zara, 2. Settembre 1647); Boško *Desnica, Povijest Kotarskih Uskoka I*, pp. 25-26.

643Earliest recorded such instruction sent to Governor-General Foscolo dates from July 1647. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-18, f. 144v-145v, *Adi 3 Luglio 1647*.

thousand or more Morlacchi a very undesirable step. Yet, by doing so it considerably worsened the situation of the Governor-General in Dalmatia. Foscolo already in September 1647, while expecting a new Morlacchi migration wave, had complained that the current instructions concerning the treatment of the Morlacchi - keeping them out of walled cities and fortresses and engaging them as much as possible in combat with the Ottomans – were no longer sufficient, especially since the Senate had explicitly prohibited him to grant them salaries of marine infantry.⁶⁴⁴

In order to at least partially ease the burden of the Governor-General in Dalmatia, in October 1647, the Senate, did authorize Governor-General Foscolo to attempt to organize several companies of Morlacchi for service on the Italian mainland, with the same conditions of service as those of other companies of Croats and Albanians, even though it prohibited the enrollment of Morlacchi in companies of armed boats for the service in Dalmatia.⁶⁴⁵ As it turned out, this policy proved to be quite successful. In February 1648 the first two companies of the Morlacchi counting 210 men arrived in Venice.⁶⁴⁶ Pleased with the success of this operation, in April 1648, the Senate ordered formation of additional Morlacchi companies. Governor-General Foscolo followed up on this order and began issuing patents for levy of Morlacchi companies, resulting in the transfer of further six companies in October of the same year.⁶⁴⁷ This operation was continued in the next year, when, in April of 1649, three new companies of the Morlacchi, destined for the service on *Terraferma*, arrived in Venice.⁶⁴⁸ In this way, by significantly diminishing their number in Dalmatia, at least some of the burden of maintaining an ever growing number of Morlacchi was lifted from a governor-general in Dalmatia.

Parallel to these developments, in the period from October 1647 till May 1648, the

644ASVe, PTM, b. 465. num. 316 (Di Galea Sebenico 16. Settembre 1647)

645ASVe, ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-19, f. 92v-94r, *Adi 15. Ottobre 1647*.

646ASVe, *Senato Mar*, R-106, f. 60v; ASVe, PTM, b. 465. num. 374 (Zara, 8. Febbraio 1647 m.v.)

647ASVe, PTM, b. 466. num. 408 (Zara, 4. Maggio 1648); num 415. (Zara, 25. Maggio 1648); ASVe, Senato Mar, R-107, f. 80r.; For an example of a license to levy Morlacchi companies see patent issued by Governor-General Foscolo to Domino Michiel Vitanovich allowing him recruitment of eight companies of Morlacchi counting 400 men, from 10 July 1648. DAZ, *Atti di Provveditori Generali*, vol. 15, fols. 376r-v.

648ASVe, *Senato Mar*, R-108, f. 108v, 133r.

foundations of Morlacchi-Venetian relationship acquired their final form. On the 8th October 1647 Foscolo again informed the Senate that the petitions of the Morlacchi to be "*ricevuti come sudditi, et trattati al pari degl'altri*;" were multiplying and proposed that two measures should be undertaken. Foscolo's first suggestion was that the newcomers were to be offered only half-pay instead of the full pay they were asking for, although the Governor-General expressed his doubts concerning the applicability of this measure since the example of the first Morlacchi groups who had received full pay could seriously undermine this initiative. Secondly, Foscolo petitioned the Senate to allow him - after they had consented to sending their families to Istria or the Islands - to settle the Morlacchi in the deserted villages of *Contado di Zara* in agreement with the owners of the lands.⁶⁴⁹ Although the Senate authorized both propositions (leaving the question of half-pay to the discretion of the Governor-General), of the two, only the second one was implemented and the Morlacchi were settled on the deserted lands of the Zadar district.⁶⁵⁰

The subsequent developments soon rendered irrelevant the entire question whether the Morlacchi enrolled in the future levies should be granted half-pay or full-pay. At the beginning of the December, Foscolo was approached by 20 Morlacchi captains who asked to be allowed to increase the strength of their companies from 600 to 1,000 men. Although the Senate on 20th December 1647 gave its consent to this new levy, by the time this order had reached Dalmatia, Foscolo was already facing a much larger problem.⁶⁵¹ By the end of December 1647 the migration of *Morlacchi di Bucovica* was finished and the number of adult Morlacchi requesting enrollment rose to over 2,000. On the 25th December 1647, Governor-General Foscolo wrote to the Senate that the most secure way to ensure Morlacchi loyalty would be to enlist them all as soldiers, but since the lack of money did not allow this course to be taken, he proposed that the Morlacchi and their families should be compensated solely with

649ASVe, PTM, b. 465. num. 326 (Zara, 8, Ottobre 1647)

650The Senate authorize settlement of the Morlacchi on the deserted lands of Contado di Zadar and left the question of the half-pay to Foscolo at the same Senate meeting on which formation of companies for service on *terraferma* was authorized. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-19, f. 92v-94r, *Adi 15 Ottobre 1647*.

651ASVe, PTM, b. 465. num. 349 (Zara, 9. Dicembre 1647); ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-19, f. 154v, *Ad i 20 Dicembre 1647*.

bread, and a monthly stipend of 4 *ducats* should be given only to "Capi delle Ville." In this way, wrote Foscolo, with annual spending of only 2-3000 of *ducats*, a sum "*si può dir insensibile, et che con le morti s'andarebbe diminuendo, ricavar se ne potrebbe inesplicabil vantaggio.*"⁶⁵² On 2nd January 1648, the Senate gave Foscolo pretty broad instructions, authorizing him to keep the leaders of the Morlacchi satisfied and loyal with grants of monthly stipends, and in the course of time, if the circumstances allowed it, to grant salaries also to soldiers.

However, when in the spring of 1648, in the aftermath of new victories of the Venetian arms, additional thousands of Morlacchi crossed to the Venetian side, it became obvious that enlisting the Morlacchi on a large scale would be impossible to undertake under the current circumstances. In May 1648, Governor-General Foscolo informed the Senate that he had formed three new companies from the Morlacchi newly settled in the district of Šibenik (150 men in total), yet, Foscolo continued, due to a chronic lack of money which prevented him from even providing for the regular salaries for the regular army, he had to refrain from following up the policies prescribed by the Senate.⁶⁵³ Instead, based on the authority granted to him by the Senate's decrees of 28th January 1648 and 16th May 1647, to assign some token of recognition to deserving "capi, harambasse de Morlacchi," Foscolo began granting monthly stipends of 4 *ducats* to distinguished Morlacchi leaders.⁶⁵⁴ By the end of the Foscolo's mandate almost all Morlacchi of esteem were granted state stipends and apart from 600 Morlacchi from Zadar and 150 from Šibenik, all the rest served only for food subsidies and booty, without receiving any pay for their service. Thus, in the end the policy adopted by the Most Serene Republic, in dealing with the Morlacchi was the one proposed by Governor-General Foscolo already in December 1647, who recommended: "*sempre più irritarli contro Turchi, insanguinarli, et allettarli con bottini, ma procurar anco di guadagnar gl' animi almeno di Principali, per haverli pronti nell' occorrenze, che rappresentarsi potessero.*"⁶⁵⁵

⁶⁵²ASVe, PTM, b. 465. num. 355 (Zara, 25, Dicembre 1647)

⁶⁵³ASVe, PTM, b. 466. num. 408 (Zara, 4. Maggio 1648)

⁶⁵⁴For example of such decrees of Lunardo Foscolo in yeas 1648-1649 see: Boško Desnica, *Istoriya kotaskih uskoka*, pp. 32-33,52-55.

⁶⁵⁵ASVe, PTM, b. 465. num. 355 (Zara, 25, Dicembre 1647)

As was shown, the Venetian attempts in organization and utilization of Morlacchi during their migration went through several phases and significant changes. While the Morlacchi who went over to the Venetian side in the first two years of the war (1645-1646), simply served as a recruiting ground for filling the ranks of the Venetian regular army, the majority of the Morlacchi of the first wave (spring 1647) were conscripted as salaried soldiers under their own captains. However, the military situation, especially the successful Venetian defense of Šibenik, and the spring campaign of 1648, which initiated the new wave of Morlacchi migration, rendered the continuation of this practice impossible. Due to a chronic deficit of the provincial treasury such large numbers of newcomers could not be accommodated in the ranks of salaried units. Instead, the Morlacchi were left to organize themselves as auxiliary forces under their own leaders and state stipends were given only to the most prominent of the Morlacchi leaders, while the rest served for a share in the booty and a limited quantity of grain or hardtack. In fact, the problem of providing the Morlacchi with means to support themselves was never properly solved. The Morlacchi, were consoled and paid on irregular basis, less in money (and then only in a form of small advances on their salaries) and more in grain and biscuit (*biscotto*) and although they frequently demanded the clearance of their accounts this was never completely realized. In the end, the Morlacchi, even those who were enrolled, were left to live off plunder and their cattle and sheep.

The problem with this arrangement in the long run was that the Morlacchi were too successful in raiding the nearby Ottoman lands, which by 1651 became almost completely desolated and empty, forcing the Morlacchi to search for their booty further and further away in distant and more dangerous "hunting grounds." As a consequence, gradually the Morlacchi became more and more discontent with the rule of the Most Serene Republic and when in February 1651 Foscolo was finally replaced with the new Governor-General, Girolamo Foscarini, the situation he found was all but rosy. Upon his arrival in Dalmatia, Foscarini reported to the Senate that not only had some groups of Morlacchi returned to the Ottomans, but those who stayed were almost beyond control and were conducting raids not only on the

Ottoman lands but also on the area of Poljica which subordinated itself to the Venetian Republic, and even on some Dalmatian Islands.⁶⁵⁶

Furthermore, Foscarini reported that the number of the Morlacchi had declined significantly, and that they counted only 2,591 adult males fit for service, partially enrolled in 22 companies (18 from Zadar and another 4 from Šibenik). In his long report, Foscarini seriously criticized the current Venetian policies concerning the treatment of the Morlacchi. Foscarini argued that arbitrary and irregular distribution of material help in the form of money, hardtack and grain resulted only in substantial spending without producing any form of a permanent solution. According to a balance sheet made by Foscarini's administration, up to the 1st March of 1651 the Republic had spent on the Morlacchi almost 166,000 *ducats* in various forms of subsidies, but with none or limited results, since the Morlacchi in general remained neglected and very dissatisfied.⁶⁵⁷

To prevent the complete alienation of the Morlacchi and their return to the Ottomans, Foscarini advised the Senate to authorize him to undertake a reform, the essence of which would be organization of the Morlacchi into paid units. Foscarini proposed that all male Morlacchi should be enrolled with a regular monthly salary, although much smaller than the one granted to ordinary soldiers of *barche armate*, with the exceptions of *harambašas*, who should continue to receive full salaries. Finally, Foscarini suggested that one of Republic's Dalmatian subjects should be appointed as the Morlacchi's "principal capo."⁶⁵⁸ Due to the constant financial problems, Foscarini's plan was never approved nor applied. On the contrary, during Foscarini's service in Dalmatia (1651-1653) the monthly pay of the enrolled Morlacchi for Zadar district, were gradually converted into irregular distribution of grain granted to them for services rendered and these companies were disbanded. In order to appease the captains of the Morlacchi companies, because of this change in their status, they were with the grants of monthly stipends of four *ducats* equaled with the other *harambašas*, also compensated in this

656In the April of the 1651, one raiding party attacked Dalmatian islands of Brazza (Brač) and Lessina (Hvar).

ASVe, PTM, b. 471. num. 12 (Trau, 24. Marzo 1651)

657ASVe, PTM, b. 471. n.um 22 (Spalato, 14. Aprile 1651)

658Ibidem.

way. Additionally, a few of the most prominent captains were granted higher stipends which reflected their higher status among the Morlacchi and in order to win over their support for this measure.⁶⁵⁹

The four companies of Šibenik Morlacchi survived for quite a long time, yet only on paper, since no payments were made to their captains and soldiers. Nevertheless, over the years, the heirs of original captains from 1647, inherited not only their posts but the wages due to them as well, which over the years grew to a considerable sum. The problem of these companies was finally resolved in December 1665, when they were officially dissolved and the debt of the State towards them converted into 100 *stara* of grain issued to each of the companies.⁶⁶⁰ With this final act the status of all Morlacchi communities was finally made uniform and the last legacy of the initial Venetian efforts to incorporate them into the Venetian military as regular units of *oltramarine* infantry was erased.

Concerning the question of Morlacchi leaders, from the very beginning of the war, the Venetian administration took a very practical stand. It was ready to recognize as a legitimate candidate for this job anyone who could exercise some level of authority, and who was able to organize them and lead them into combat when ordered to do so. However, as the events had shown such policy of non-interference into the internal affairs of the Morlacchi was not without its own risks. It did not take long for some of the more enterprising Morlacchi leaders who managed to prove their abilities as combat leaders, to began accumulating stipends and favors from the Venetian administration beyond the customary four ducats and a portion of biscuit. Moreover, the Venetian side also began looking at these *capi principali di Morlacchi* (as they were referred to) as a suitable partners on the Morlacchi side. By granting them special honors, whether titles, higher stipends, necklaces, medals, rings or other similar gifts, the Venetian administration strove to bind them more closely to its cause. However, this at the

659Out of the Morlacchi captains affected by this change, Govenror-General Foscarini recommended to the Senate that to the four most distinguished of them, Captains Boxe Zuppanovich, Nicolo and Francesco Sorich and Mattio Mircovich, should be granted stipends of six instead of usual four ducats. ASVe, PTM, b. 473. num. 158 (Dai Scogli di Zara, 9 Gennaro 1652. m.v.)
660ASVe, PTM. b. 495. num. 113. (Zara, 15. Dicembre 1665)

same time increased the prestige of these persons among the other Morlacchi. As a consequence of this policy, in the period between 1648 and 1650, an interesting process took place, one that resulted in the birth of the position of *serdar*, or a single leader recognized by all the Morlacchi groups settled in the Zadar district.

The emergence of the institution of *serdar* among the Venetian Morlacchi was a result of several factors. In the first place the deterioration of the Morlacchi-Venetian relations during 1649, caused by constant shortage of food and famine. Frustrated by constant Morlacchi pleas for material help and his inability to provide it, Foscolo directed sharp criticism of the current Venetian policy toward Morlacchi, writing to the Senate that 100 or 200 *stara* of grain distributed on irregular basis among 12,000 persons could do little or no good in satisfying their needs. Therefore, concluded Foscolo "(living) surrounded by major calamities, one should attribute to a miracle the constancy of their (Morlacchi) faith."⁶⁶¹ The miserable material conditions in which Morlacchi lived made them aware of the need for a single representative who could act as their central rallying point and through whom their grievances could be more strongly represented. The second factor was the dynastic efforts of the Smiljanić clan, which turned out to be the most successful in building its power base among various Morlacchi groups after their defection to the Venetian side and was the first of the prominent Morlacchi families that managed to acquire this title. And finally, the third factor was the failure of the Venetian administration in Dalmatia to recognize the need for the existence of such institution among the Morlacchi and to create and insert its own instrument of control into that position, instead of allowing the Morlacchi to freely organize themselves.

The most successful among the contestants for positions of power among the Morlacchi, proved to be *harambaša* Ilija Smiljanić,⁶⁶² a son of a prominent Morlacchi leader Petar

661... *onde à miracolo atribuir si deve la loro costanza, ne so, come persister possino, circondati essendo dalle maggiori calamita.* ASVe, PTM. b. 468. num. 601. (Zara, 20. Luglio 1649); For a description of very hard circumstances and misery in which Morlacchi lived, some were even selling their children to the Ottomans in order to survive, see also: ASVe, PTM. b. 469. num. 650. (Zara, 25 Novembre 1649); num. 672. (Zara, 25 Gennaro 1649 m.v.)

662Roman Jelić in his study of the Smiljanić family, ascribed the position of *serdar* already to Petar Smiljanić, Ilija's father. Jelić based this claim on the decree of Governor-General Foscolo from May 1648, in which Petar was given judicial powers to preside over law cases and disputes among the Morlacchi of Bucovizza. However, no confirmation of this position can be found in the available sources. The first recorded mention

Smiljanić, who succeeded his father as the leader of Morlacchi of Bukovica. In the period between the death of his father in August 1648 and sometime early in 1650, Ilija managed to establish himself as the leader of all of the Morlacchi settled on the territory of Zadar, and styled himself with the title of *serdar* to mark his new position.⁶⁶³ As the *serdar*, Ilija was acknowledged among the Morlacchi of the Zadar district as their supreme military commander and judge. Moreover, this newly acquired title also earned him respect of the Morlacchi groups of Šibnik and Split, and it was always him who was in charge when joint war parties were assembled.⁶⁶⁴

Governor-General Foscolo, during whose mandate the rise of Ilija Smiljanić and his pretensions to the new title of *serdar* occurred, looked very unfavorably on these developments among the Morlacchi of Zadar district. Dissatisfied with their situation and the unfulfilled promises given to them before their crossing to the Venetian side, in February 1650, the Morlacchi of Zadar gathered and held their diet, "*sbor generale ciò è radunanza*," From this gathering the Morlacchi sent three letters to the Governor-General expressing their grievances. Moreover, the most important event of this diet, which Foscolo styled as "*universal, et tumultuario congresso*," was the election of Ilija Smiljanić by the Morlacchi as their capo.⁶⁶⁵ This first Morlacchi assembly caught Foscolo's administration somewhat off guard, yet when in September 1650, the rumors of yet another Morlacchi diet in which the Morlacchi of Šibenik were also supposed to participate, came to Foscolo, he did all he could

of a title of *serdar* among the Morlacchi is that of Ilija Smiljanić, from February 1650, when Morlacchi petitioned the Governor-General to allow a passage of their *serdar* to Venice, so that he could personally present their grievances to the Doge. Roman Jelić, *Smiljanići - Kotarski serdari*, p. 117; Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 172; ASVe, PTM, b. 469. num. 680 (Zara 18 Febraro 1650) attachment: *Lettera scritta da Morlachi*

663The first record of Ilija Smiljanić as *serdar* dates from February 1650, when the Morlacchi representatives presented Governor-General Foscolo with the petition for aid and subsidies. ASVe, PTM. b.469. num. 680. (Zara, 18 Febraro 1649 m.v.) attachment: *Lettera scritta da tutti li Harambasse Morlachi*

664For example such was the case with the first joint operation of the Morlacchi of Zadar and Šibenik in November 1649 when they united their forces and attacked town of Bilaj, or few years later in the December of 1653 when combined forces of the Zadar and the Šibenik Morlacchi attacked Ottoman lands around Sinj. Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 127, 134.; ASVe, PTM. b. 469. num. 655. (Zara, 4 Decembre 1649)

665From their diet, "*sbor generale ciò è radunanza*," the Morlacchi have sent to the Governor-General three letters, two were joint ones, signed by "*Capitanij et Carambasse di Morlachi*," while the third one was signed only by Ilija Smiljanić. ASVe, PTM. b. 469. num. 677. (Zara, 14 Febraro 1649 m.v.); num. 678. Zara, 16. Febraro 1649 m.v.)

to prevent it from happening. Foscolo immediately summoned to personal interviews several prominent Morlacchi leaders, whom he considered as more favorable toward the Republic, and urged them to act as voices of reason and quell the passions of the others. Foscolo combined this diplomatic action with a demonstration of force and went as far as to order the deployment of cavalry in the countryside and publicly proclaimed that the houses of all those who planned to attend this congress would be burned and their cattle confiscated.⁶⁶⁶

Concerning the person of Ilija Smiljanić, Foscolo wrote that he "exercise despotic authority over the Morlacchi, which is not tolerable, and his presence in these parts, I am much afraid, will always be the source of scandals, [especially since] this was not his first transgression," and suggested that he should somehow be removed from these parts.⁶⁶⁷ Following this advice, the Senate instructed Foscolo to offer Smiljanić a levy of a company for service on *Terraferma*, yet Smiljanić proved disinterested in such initiatives and nothing came of it.⁶⁶⁸ On the contrary, not only did Smiljanić remain in Dalmatia, but as the years passed by his position as the *serdar* grew stronger and stronger. In the person of Ilija Smiljanić as their single representative the Zadar Morlacchi found an excellent negotiating instrument. In the middle of the war, when the Republic relied heavily on the Morlacchi service for the defense of its Adriatic possession, a negotiating position of a *serdar* proved to be quite strong. How firm a position the Morlacchi could take can be illustrated best by the events from July 1653, when a large Ottoman force, 10,000-12,000 men strong, invaded the district of Zadar with the goal of harassing the Morlacchi. On the news of the approach of the Ottoman forces, Ilija Smiljanić, as the representative of the Morlacchi, went to the Governor-General of the Cavalry and demanded that the Venetian forces under his command provide support to the Morlacchi in defense of their homes. He threatened openly that otherwise they (Morlacchi *harambasse*) would renounce all their titles, stipends and assignments of any sort, and that

666ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 753. (Zara, 3. Ottobre 1650)

667 ... *sopra Morlacchi esercita troppo dispotica autorità, che non è tollerabile, et la sua permanenza in queste parti, temo assai sarà pietra di scandalo in ogni tempo, non essendo questa la prima legierezza fatta da lui,...*;ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 753. (Zara, 3. Ottobre 1650); See also: ASVe, PTM. b.470. num. 761. (Zara, 3. Novembre 1650)

668ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-24, f. 201r-202v, *Adi 22. Ottobre 1650.*

they would search for their happiness somewhere else.⁶⁶⁹

As long as Ilija Smiljanić was able to exert control over the Morlacchi, unite them and lead them against the Ottomans when ordered to do so, governor-generals were content to tolerate the introduction of this novelty, in the form of "serdarship." In this regard, Ilija Smiljanić without doubt fulfilled the expectations of the Venetian administration. His military record surpassed by far that of his father or other famous Morlacchi leaders such as Vuk Mandušić and Don Stipan Sorić.⁶⁷⁰ Therefore, it is not surprising that, as the influence of the family grew, in order to bind them as closely as possible to the Venetian cause, Foscolo's successors continued to lavish gifts and favors on them.⁶⁷¹

At the beginning of his career, in July 1648, Ilija Smiljanić was like any other prominent *harambaša*, given a monthly stipend of four ducats.⁶⁷² However, when in June 1651 the young *serdar* got married in the church of St. Simon in Zadar, and his wife - born as a Muslim - was baptized, Foscolo's successor Governor-General Girolamo Foscarini personally attended both ceremonies, in the roles of the best man and godfather, giving the couple a sapphire ring and 12 *brazza* of velvet, and contributing large quantities of biscuit and several barrels of wines for the celebration.⁶⁷³ Moreover, at the recommendation of Foscarini, in March 1651 the Senate awarded a golden necklace to Ilija Smiljanić.⁶⁷⁴ The following year, 1653, Ilija was given a house in Zadar,⁶⁷⁵ and the power base of the family was even further enhanced with the appointment of his younger brother Filip to the position of the captain of a company of regular cavalry in May of 1653.⁶⁷⁶ Furthermore, in the meantime, as a reflection of his new

669... *altrimenti protestava à nome di tutti gl'altri Karambasse, et Morlacchi, che rinontavano Condotte, stipendij, et assegnamenti d'ogni scorse, et che sarebbero andati à cercar loro fortuna in altra parte.* ASVe, PTM, b. 474. num. 62 (Di Zara, 14. Luglio 1653)

670For a more detailed overview of the Ilija Smiljanić' military activities in the period 1648-1654 see Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, pp. 125-134.

671It is also interesting to note that the Venetian Republic was not without competition. The fame of young *serdar* Ilija Smiljanić also draw the attention of a famous and powerful Croatian magnate, *Conte Pietro di Srin* (Petar Zrinski), who attempted to draw Smiljanić and his companions to cross to his territories and enter his service. ASVe, PTM, b. 471. num. 43 (Spalato, 12. Luglio 1651); num. 49 (Zara, 15. Agosto 1651)

672Boško Desnica, *Istorija kotarskih uskoka*, pp. 40-41.

673ASVe, PTM, b. 471. num. 37 (Zara, 19. Giugno 1651)

674ASVe, PTM, b. 473. num. 115 (Zara, 12. Luglio 1652)

675Boško Desnica, *Istorija kotarskih uskoka*, p. 66.

676Boško Desnica, *Istorija kotarskih uskoka*, pp. 66-67.

status, Ilija's monthly stipend was increased to a hefty sum of 50 *ducats* per month. However, Ilija Smiljanić did not enjoy his fame for long; in September 1654 he got killed leading a Morlacchi raid in Lika.⁶⁷⁷ In the same month, his younger brother Filip, at that time 24 years old, was unanimously elected by the Morlacchi as their new *serdar*, and a few days later at the request of Morlacchi *harambašas* his election was confirmed by Governor-General Lorenzo Dolfin.⁶⁷⁸

By the time of the death of Filip Smiljanić, in February 1656 less than two years after his appointment,⁶⁷⁹ the Venetian administration had already been tangibly alarmed by the power concentrated in the hands of *serdar*. However, since the post of *serdar* proved to be such an efficient instrument in management of the Morlacchi, nothing was done to prevent the election of the next *serdar*. Nevertheless, this time several significant changes had occurred. First of all, the newly elected *serdar* was not a member of Smiljanić family; the choice of the Morlacchi fell on *harambaša* Janko Mitrović. Secondly, this time the Venetian government took a more active role in the entire process. Although the Morlacchi informed Governor-General Antonio Zen of their choice immediately after the death of Filip Smiljanić on 5th February 1656, the confirmation of Janko Mitrović as the new *serdar* by the Governor-General took place more than a month later on 25 March 1656, only after receiving approval from the Senate. Third and most important, under the pretext of convenience, since the power base of the Mitrovićs was located further to the north of the Zadar district, around the town of Posedarje (*confinium superior*) and his duties would require his presence there, the Governor-

677Boško Desnica, *Istorija kotarskih uskoka*, pp. 75-77. ASVe, PTM, b.476. num. 158 (Zara, 9. Settembre 1654)

678ASV, PTM. b. 476. num. 160. (Zara, 16. Settembre 1654). On the same occasion Katarina, the widow of late Ilija Smiljanić, with the support of all Morlacchi leaders, petitioned the Governor-General to be granted some monthly stipend as a sign of recognition for the service of her late husband. In accordance with its usual practice of conceding to similar requests (of widows or children of its deserving subjects), and to appease the Morlacchi, the Senate instructed the Governor-General to approve this request, and Lorenzo Dolfin entitled her with the stipend of 12 *ducats* per month for life. Boško Desnica, *Istorija kotarskih uskoka I*, p. 79.; For more on the wife of Ilija Smiljanić, so called "Kate turkinja" also see: Tea Mayhew, "Widows and Families: Social and Political Status of the Professional Warriors of the Venetian Republic (1648-1718)," In: *Professions and Social Identity, New European Historical Research on Work, Gender and Society*. (Pisa, 2006) pp. 90-93.

679Unlike his father and brother, Filip Smiljanić, did not die fighting Ottomans, instead was killed in the brawl with the Venetian soldiers in Šibenik. In order to appease the Morlacchi because of this incident, he was given state funeral and was ceremonially buried in Zadar Cathedral. ASVe, PTM, b. 478. num. 89 (Zara, 5. Febraio 1655. m.v.); Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, p. 234.

General appointed as his *tenente* and in charge of Morlacchi around the city of Zadar (*confinium inferior*), *harambaša* Ilija Milković.⁶⁸⁰

Several factors made this possible. First, there were no more direct descendants of Petar Smiljanić, and it seems that his closest living relative, his nephew Smoljan, at the time had not yet acquired enough reputation and prestige among the Morlacchi. Secondly, and even more importantly, by that time a small inner circle was formed among Morlacchi chiefs. This, so to say oligarchy, consisted of no more than a dozen chieftains who managed to build their own power bases and acquire the most lucrative positions and benefits granted by the Venetian government, and who were, in the end, probably as concerned by the rise of the Smiljanić family as was the Venetian administration. By the arrival of Governor-General Antonio Zen in Dalmatia, in January 1655, the number of the Morlacchi *harambaša* in the district of Zadar that enjoyed state stipends amounted to 68 persons.⁶⁸¹ However, when in 1653 Ilija Smiljanić, went to Venice to plead for the Morlacchi cause, his credentials were signed only by 22 of the most respected Morlacchi leaders, who can be taken to roughly represent this inner circle. Not surprisingly, at the top of that list one can find names of Janko Mitrović and Ilija Milković, the newly appointed *serdar* and his aide.⁶⁸²

At the time of his election as *serdar*, Janko Mitrović had already been a well known and influential *harambaša*; he had received several tokens of recognition from the Venetian administration, and his monthly salary at the time of his election was not the customary 4 but rather 20 *ducats*.⁶⁸³ Moreover, it also seems that even before the death of Filip Smiljanić, the Morlacchi inclinations had shifted in Mitrović's direction.⁶⁸⁴ Even though eventually Milković

680ASVe, PTM, b. 478. num. 89 (Zara, 5. Febraio 1655. m.v.; DESNICA 1950, 89)

681ASVe, PTM, b. 477. num. 12 (Zara 11. Febraio, 1654) attachment to the letter.

682Boško Desnica, *Istorija kotarskih uskoka*, 65-66.

683Moreover, in recognition of his services, Mitrović also succeeded in securing a monthly stipend of 6 ducats for his underage son Stojan. Boško Desnica, *Istorija kotarskih uskoka*, p. 67, 70.

684While in the days of Ilija Smiljanić it was almost always him who presented Morlacchi applications to the Governor-General, in the days of "serdarship" of his brother Filip this was more and more done by *harambaša* Janko Mitrović. For example the repeated requests of Morlacchi chiefs for the payments of the money indebted to them, on account of their monthly stipends, were submitted to the Governor-General by Janko Mitrović. ASVe, PTM, b.477. n. 12 (Zara 11. Febraio, 1654. m.v.); b. 478. n. 79 (Zara, 1. Decembre 1655)

also assumed the title of a *serdar*,⁶⁸⁵ Janko Mitrović remained the supreme leader of the Morlacchi, and the level of power and influence he accumulated among the Morlacchi of Zadar were without precedent. It seems that Mitrović did not limit his pretensions only to Morlacchi communities, but also attempted to extend his authority over the indigenous inhabitants of the Zadar district. All this seriously alarmed the Venetian administration and especially Governor-General Antonio Bernardo who, although posthumously, accused Mitrović of usurping "una potesta assoluta."⁶⁸⁶

What probably troubled governor-general the most was that through a person of a powerful *serdar* the Morlacchi were able to effectively oppose plans for their further integration into the Venetian defensive system. In 1656, the idea of Governor-General Foscarini from 1651, that the Morlacchi should be put under the command of a Dalmatian noble, was revived, and with the support of the Governor-General, a Dalmatian nobleman *governatore Francesco di Possedaria* began a campaign to be appointed as the "collonelo de Morlacchi," which would give him a military command over the Morlacchi. This project seriously alarmed the Morlacchi, and through their *serdar* Mitrović they informed the Governor-General that they would never accept as their commander anyone who was not a Venetian noble.⁶⁸⁷ Met with strong opposition on the behalf of the Morlacchi, the Venetian administration was forced to temporarily abandon this project. It is not surprising that when in February 1659 both *serdars* were killed in combat,⁶⁸⁸ the Governor-General refused to appoint a new *serdar*, and in his final report submitted to the Senate (in 1660), he even suggested that the title of *serdar* should never again be given to anyone else, but rather that *harambašas* should be overseen in their management of the Morlacchi by public officials and a military command over the Morlacchi should be given to a single public representative.⁶⁸⁹

Although for almost a year after the death of Mitrović in March 1659, no new *serdar* was

685Boško Desnica, *Istorija kotarskih uskoka*, p. 103.

686*Commissiones et Relationes Venetae* 7, p. 145.

687Boško Desnica, *Istorija kotarskih uskoka* pp. 90-92.

688Boško Desnica, *Istorija kotarskih uskoka*, pp. 101-103. Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 139.

689*Commissiones et Relationes Venetae* 7, p. 145.

elected by Morlacchi nor appointed by the Republic's magistrates, and Morlacchi were managed through several of their chiefs who enjoyed the trust of the Governor-General, but without any official appointment and/or extra salary, this turned out to be only a temporary solution. With the arrival of the new Governor-General, Andrea Corner, in March 1660, the Venetian administration again turned towards the office of *serdar* as the most appropriate tool for managing the Morlacchi. However, there was one significant change. This time already at the beginning two *serdars* were appointed right away, both of equal rank, and none subordinated to the other, with the division of their territorial jurisdiction as was done in the 1656 appointments. Furthermore, this time the Venetian administration was aware of the dangers of hereditary practice, and although the *serdar* in charge of the area around Zadar came from the Milković family, the one in charge of the area previously overseen by powerful Janko Mitrović, was not his son Stojan Mitrović, but rather *harambaša* Petar Grgurica.⁶⁹⁰ In this manner, the position of *serdar* was seriously weakened, and with the extension of participation in this lucrative position to the new clan, their support to the Venetian cause was further secured.

Soon the Venetian administration realized that they had finally found the correct policy. When in July 1663, both *serdars* died after an encounter with the Ottomans, the Morlacchi informed the new Governor-General, Girolamo Contarini, that they would like to have as their single chief *harambaša* Matija Mirković.⁶⁹¹ However, it seems that the memory of the days of powerful *serdars* (Smiljanić and Mitrović) was still alive, and the Venetian administration had no wish to revive them again. Instead, the new Governor-General followed the same practice as his predecessor; again two *serdars* were appointed and neither of them from any of the clans that had previously given *serdars*, (as were Smiljanić, Mitrović or Milković), but rather from two other prominent families, the above mentioned Mirković and the Čačić families.⁶⁹²

⁶⁹⁰First in May 1660, the captain of Zadar appointed two new *serdars*, proposed by the Morlacchi, and later in March 1661, the Governor-General confirmed this appointment of his subordinated officer, and established their monthly stipends at 10 *ducats*. Boško Desnica, *Istorija kotarskih uskoka*, pp. 105-106.

⁶⁹¹ASVe, PTM, b. 490. n. 83 (Spalato, 7. Luglio 1663)

⁶⁹²Although due to the absence of the Governor-General from Zadar (from July 1663 until May 1665 Governor-General Girolamo Contarini was supervising the fortifications works in Split), the new *serdars* had to wait until 21 May 1664 for the official decree of their appointment and confirmation of their salaries (of 20 *ducats*)

Meanwhile, one last step in the integration of the Morlacchi into the hierarchy of the Venetian administrative structure in Dalmatia took place. In December 1663, Donato Civalleli, a Zadar nobleman who held the office of *soprintendente di Morlacchi* since 1654, died, and the Governor-General put in his place another Dalmatian noble, the powerful and influential *Colonello Francesco di Possedaria*.⁶⁹³ This appointment had serious consequences for the Morlacchi-Venetian relations, because with it a nominal supervision of a *soprintendente* over the Morlacchi was turned into a reality. While in the days of Donato Civalleli, the Morlacchi usually bypassed him and presented their grievances and petitions directly to governor-generals through their *serdars*, now they started to do it through the person of *Francesco di Possedaria*,⁶⁹⁴ who also began to attend the Morlacchi assemblies as the representative of the Governor-General.⁶⁹⁵ In addition, orders of governor-generals concerning Morlacchi affairs were from that time onwards usually addressed to *Colonello* (Possedaria), *serdars* and other *capi*.

The role which the Venetian administration envisaged for Francesco di Possedaria to play in the Venetian-Morlacchi relations soon became clear. In October 1664, since the two existing *serdars* were already of old age and required help in performing their duties, the third office of *serdar* was created. With this act, not only the prestige of the title of *serdar* was further diminished, but the position of Francesco di Possedaria in the hierarchy was given an

per months each), it seems that they assumed their roles much before that time. When in February 1664, Count Petar Zrinski asked the Governor-General to send the Morlacchi representatives to his estates at Bakar, for a meeting with a goal of coordinating military actions against the Ottomans in Lika, above mentioned *serdars* Matija Mirković and Ivan Čačić attended the negotiations held in March 1664. ASV, PTM, b. 491. num. 130 (Spalato, 11. Febraro 1663 m.v.); b. 492. num. 138 (Spalato, 29 Marzo 1664); Boško Desnica, *Istorija kotarskih uskoka*, pp. 117-118.

693At the time of his appointment, *Francesco di Possedaria*, had already acquired several important offices; by his birth he was the Count of Posedarje, and as such also held the title of *Governatore*, or the civil administrator of the area, he was also the *colonello* in charge of the territorial militia of the town of Nin and now he was appointed as the head of the Morlacchi of the district of Zadar. ASVe, PTM. b. 491. n. 116 (Spalato, 10. Dicembre 1663)

694For example in May 1664, it was through *Francesco di Possedaria* that Morlacchi petitioned the Governor-General for a ration of munitions and bread to be used while performing guard duties. ASVe, PTM, b. 492. num. 147 (Zara, 17. Maggio 1664)

695It seems that over the years the diligence of the Morlacchi to guard the passes to the Zadar district had fallen down, furthermore, the flight of three families back to the Ottoman side seriously alarmed both the Senate and the Governor-General. In order to address these issues, Governor-General Contarini ordered the Morlacchi to hold their general assembly (*Congresso generale in Campagna*) and appointed also *Colonello Francesco di Possedaria* to assist the Morlacchi during the assembly. ASVe, PTM, b. 492. n. 151 (Zara, 31. Maggio 1664)

official confirmation as well. The decree of the appointment clearly stated that a new *serdar* like the two old ones, Mirković and Čačić, was to be subordinated to "colonello Francesco di Possedaria loro capo e direttore." In this way, what could not be done in 1651 or 1656, in the days of the strong Morlacchi *serdars*, was finally successfully achieved in 1664, and *serdars* were subordinated to an appointed state official. Most probably, in order to appease the Morlacchi, the position of third *serdar* was given to *capitano et harambassa* Smoljan Smiljanić,⁶⁹⁶ the head of the famous and widely respected Smiljanić family. With these events a long process of creating a framework for the integration of the Morlacchi came to an end, and until the end of the war no new changes in the Morlacchi-Venetian relationship were introduced. In the end, although *serdars* remained freely elected by the Morlacchi, they were confirmed by governor-generals (and with this act simultaneously granted state salaries) and in their work (at least in theory) supervised by a Venetian official.

As this section has argued, the final result, the integration of the Morlacchi in the Venetian defensive system in Dalmatia as an irregular militia, with a separate command structure, was not the intended product of a single long term policy defined by the central organs of the Venetian government. Instead, it rather represents an outcome of combination of skillful improvisations on the behalf of the various governor-generals in Dalmatia - their responses to challenges of daily needs and particular situations, material constraints within which they had to operate and general instructions formulated by the central organs of the state.

5. *Republic's Military Commitment in Dalmatia*

I have the spirit for every occasion, but neither men, nor commanders to sustain it.

(Governor-General Antonio Bernardo)⁶⁹⁷

The table 2.8 below, contains the data concerning the number of troops deployed in Dalmatia during this war. The data collected comes from various reports of governor-generals and differences in the representation of the data are the result of lack of uniformed format of these reports. Sometimes, governor-generals would report only the overall number of troops

⁶⁹⁶Boško Desnica, *Isorija Kotarskih Uskoka I*, p. 119.

⁶⁹⁷*Ho cuore da ogni incontro, ma non gente, ne Capi da sostentarlo.* ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 47. (Spalato, 5 Ottobre 1656.)

under their command, on other occasion detailed rosters of all troops serving in some garrison would be sent, yet the most informative and unfortunately the least common were the detailed reports sent after a general muster of the troops serving in the province. Thus, due to the lack of uniformity of the available sources, the data in the table is divided in two parts. The first, with its own subtotal, records a number of regular troops raised and paid by the Republic, discerning, when possible, a number of crews of armed boats from troops serving in garrisons. The second part contains the information on various auxiliary troops (Swiss, papal, Savoy, Florentine regiments and Venetian *cernide*) serving in the province. What is common for all these reports is that they were based on the results of musters and thus the data from the table 2.8 does not represent the paper strength of the Venetian armed forces in Dalmatia but rather a very close assessment of their actual strength. However, to be able to provide some assessment of the Republic's commitment in Dalmatia these numbers should to be juxtaposed with the actual numbers needed for the task of the defense of the province.

One of the most common themes found in the letters of governor-generals of Dalmatia and Albania written to the Senate were complaints about the insufficient number of troops and requests that new reinforcements were to be sent. Although a military commander not complaining about insufficient forces at his disposal is indeed a rare occurrence, the complaints of Venetian governor-generals were in place more often than not. For example, in May 1651, Governor-General Foscarini complained to the Senate that he had under his command effectively only 2,835 men (of Italian and transalpine infantry) distributed among 9 fortified places, reminding them that for the defense of Šibenik in 1647 more than 4,100 men were needed (a similar complaint was repeated in July 1652).⁶⁹⁸ However, this and other similar requests should be taken with caution; Foscarini forgot to mention that at the same time besides these 2,835 men serving in garrisons, he also commanded over additional 1,600 men aboard armed boats, 600 men of galley crews and about 400 men of the Papal regiment (see table 2.8 below) all in all extra 2,600 men. Such rhetorical figures were not just Foscarini's specialty, they were also characteristic for other governor-generals. Be that as it

698ASVe, PTM. b. 471, num. 32. (Zara, 25. Maggio 1651); PTM. b. 473, num. 111. (Zara, 2 Luglio 1652.)

may, the truth remains that in case of another Ottoman attack on Šibenik it would be necessary to strip down all Dalmatian garrisons and deploy all the marine infantry in order to meet this demand for 4,100 defenders.

The estimates of governor-generals concerning the number of troops needed to defend the province varied significantly. Some, like Antonio Bernardo, asked for rather impossible figures (18,000 men)⁶⁹⁹ while others gave more sensible estimates. When discussing the number of troops needed for the defense of the province, one should discern between two operational tasks - regular guard duty shielding a town against a possible surprise attack and the actual defense of a place in case of a formal attack. The number of troops required for each of these depended on the quality of a town's fortifications and its defensive position. For example, Venetian strategy-makers considered 3,000 foot and 400 cavalry as the sufficient number required for the successful defense of Zadar, the strongest and the best fortified of all Dalmatian coastal towns, against a formal attack.⁷⁰⁰ On the other hand, some 4,100+ men (the actual number of its defenders from 1647), was taken as the number of soldiers needed to defend Šibenik, which had much weaker defenses than Zadar.⁷⁰¹ In the case of Split which, until 1656-8 and the start of the construction works on town's new fortification complex, was by many held to be indefensible and several military commanders in the Venetian service advocated its abandonment in a case of a real Ottoman attack, the estimates sets the number of troops necessary for its defense at 5,000 foot and 400 horse.⁷⁰²

Estimates of numbers of troops considered necessary for ordinary guarding of towns and to function as the first line of its defense in a case of an attack before reinforcements were rushed in, were much smaller. These estimates provided by military professionals on the

699ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 69. (Sebenico, 10. Dicembre 1656)

700The request for supplies of munition, gunpowder and other war materials for Zadar magazines from March 1660 are based on these figures, see: ASVe, PTM. b. 487, num. 2. (Zara, 18. Marzo 1660)

701For example see: ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. 32. (Zara, 25. Maggio 1651)

702The first to give such assessment of the Split and its fortifications was famous Barun Martin von Degenfeld, celebrated as the defender of Šibenik, who stated in 1648 that the state of Split was such, that even the presence of god Mars himself could not save the town from an Ottoman conquest. ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 452. (Zara, 11. Agosto 1648) attachment: *Lettera del Barone di Degenfeld*; Similar opinions were repeated in 1654, by two colonels, Vimes and Fabritio Giustiniani. ASVe, PTM. b. 476. num. 148. (Di Galea Trau, 28. Luglio 1654); The number of troops needed for town defense taken from Onofrio del Campo's memorandum. Mirolsav Bertoša (ed), *Tvrđavni spisi Onofrija del Campa*, pp. 99.

Republic's payroll, superintendents of arms, colonels, captains, engineers and similar, differed slightly. Some put the required size of the Zadar garrison at 1,000, others at 1,200, that of Split between 1,200-1,500 etc. In that regard, a detailed survey of a number of troops necessary for guarding and the actual strength of particular garrisons (see table 2.7 below), compiled by Governor-General Antonio Zen from March 1655, which accompanied his request for reinforcements, represents the most comprehensive estimates and the given total of 3,950 men of Italian and transalpine infantry can be considered as the reliable figure concerning the optimal number of troops needed. The fortress of Klis was a sort of an exception. Although located away from the coast and thus, in a case of an Ottoman attack, with no safe venue available for bringing in reinforcements, the size of its garrison deemed sufficient for guard duty and that for a defense was the same, 500 men.

Garrison	Number of men needed for guard duties	Actual garrison strength
Zadar	1000	553
Šibenik and surrounding fortifications	1000	650
Trogir	300	149
Split	1000	594
Klis	500	380
Omiš	150	128
Totals:	3950	2455
Number of troops lacking	1495	

Table 2.7. Estimate of garrisons strength needed for guard duties and the actual number of troops in service (based on the estimate from March, 1655).⁷⁰³

This distribution of troops, proposed by Zen, represents a general deployment pattern. Depending on gathered intelligence concerning the targets chosen by Ottomans for that season, governor-generals would adjust their deployment and concentrated the majority of their forces in the most threatened places. During the 1646-8 campaigns that place was Šibenik, after 1654 Split became the main concern of the Venetian high command, while in 1657 Kotor, in 1658 Split again and so on. However, as can be seen already from the table 2.7 above, and even more clearly from the figure 2.1, throughout the entire war the actual number of garrison troops was below the estimated optimal number of 3,950 men. The only

⁷⁰³ASVe, PTM. b. 477. num. 23. (Lesina, 29. Marzo, 1655) attachment: *Nota di soldati sono necessarij per guardar convenientemente le sottoscritte piazze.*

exceptions were the first years of the mandate of Governor-General Foscolo (1646-1648) and the campaign season of 1658. In such circumstances a concentration of forces in one place was very dangerous, since it left other strongholds exposed to surprise attacks. Not once during this war, was Zadar, deemed by the Venetians as the strongest of their Adriatic possessions, left with dangerously low garrison strength. In the campaigns of 1657-1659 the Ottomans attempted to stretch Venetian forces by attacking multiple targets along the coast. In that regard especially dangerous was the campaign of 1657, when almost at the same time the Ottomans launched attacks on Split and Kotor. However, due to the command of the sea (as already discussed in the Chapter 1) in a matter of only three days, sufficient reinforcements were rushed into the town of Split and the attack repulsed.

All in all, this data shows the true value of the availability of the sea transport for the Venetian defensive strategy. Governor-General Antonio Zen, assessed that for the successful defense of the province in addition to standard town garrisons it was necessary to keep in readiness a strategic reserve of 5,000 foot and 800 horse, which could be rushed to a threatened spot.⁷⁰⁴ Such numbers were rarely met, moreover, Governor-General Foscolo having such force at hand in the first years of the war did not keep it behind town walls but rather went on the offensive and pushed the Ottoman logistical bases far away from the coast. As the events of this war had demonstrated, a strategic reserve of 2-3,000 men of mixed composition - Italian-transalpine infantry, crews of armed boats, Morlacchi and *cernide* - was the hard reality for majority of governor-generals. Without the strategical advantage of increased mobility provided by sea transportation, the defense of the province with the number of troops that governor-generals usually had under their command would hardly have been possible.

704ASVe, PTM. b. 479. num. 101. (Zara, 18 Marzo 1656) attachment: *Foglio contenenti le Provigioni necessarie per la Provincia.*

Date	Companies of Italiani, oltramontani and oltramarini	Companies of armed boats, fuste, brigantini, galeotte	Total (Venetian regulars)	Swiss	Papal	Cernide: Istria and Italia	Others	Total infantry (1)	Cavalry	Note	Sources
1645.August			3688	0	0	0	0	3688	426		Sassi-1, p. 222;
1646.January			4762	0	0	0	0	4762	589		Sassi-1, p. 230;
1646.August			8936	0	0	0	0	8936	606		Sassi-1, pp. 243-4;
1647.June-August			7670	0	590	0	0	8260	1230		PTM-464-258;PTM-464-297
1648.June	4213			0		0	0				PTM-466-423
1649.October-November				1019		0	0		521		PTM-470-685;PTM-469-638;
1650.January-February	3217	2173	5390	1019	400*	0	0	6809	407		PTM-469-665;PTM-470-685;
1650.October-November	2763	1813	4576	880	400*	0		5456			PTM-470-755-768
1651 May	2859	1594	4453	0	400*	0	0	4853			PTM-471-32;
1652.January-July	3222	1200	4422	0	400*	0	0	4822	259		PTM-472-83; PTM-473-116;
1653.April	3328	1564	4892	0	400*	0	0	5292	299		PTM-474-24;PTM-474-31
1653.December	3648	1676	5324	0	300*	0	0	5624	376		PTM-475-97
1654.April-May	2369	1544	3913	0	60	500	0	4473	269	Cernide arrived in May	PTM-475-114; PTM-475-120;PTM-475-128;
1655.February	2714	1675	4389	0	0	0	0	4389	349		PTM-477-6;PTM-477-9;
1655.May	2454	?	?	0	0	0	0	?	?		PTM-477-32
1656.October	3097	1243	4340	0	0	0	0	4340	223		PTM-479-47;
1656.December	3090	1316	4406	0	0	0	0	4406	213		PTM-479-69
1658.January	4665	?		0	800	0	0			Includes Kotor	PTM-482-155;
1658.November	4811	1356	6167	1046	660	1575	0	9448	91	Includes Kotor	PTM-483-181-220;PTM-484-2
1660.March-July	3200	?	?	0	400*		800			Savoy regiment	PTM-487-1-28-46;
1662. June	2690	799	3489	0	400*	0	0	3889	?		PTM-489-5;

Date	Companies of Italiani, oltramontani and oltramarini	Companies of armed boats, fuste, brigantini, galeotte	Total (Venetian regulars)	Swiss	Papal	Cernide: Istria and Italia	Others	Total infantry (1)	Cavalry	Note	Sources
1663.May-July	4860	1166	6026	0	400	300	0	6726	?		PTM-490-69; D: PTM-490-87
1665.June			6340	0	0	0	0	6340	?		PTM-494-66
1666.July-September			3192	0	0	0	350	3542	?	(2)	PTM-496-165;PTM-497-249
1668.February	2777	733	3510					3510	52	Includes Kotor	PTM-498-39


Table 2.8. Number of Venetian regular and auxiliary troops in Dalmatia (1646-1669)

(1) The garrison of Kotor is not included unless stated otherwise

(2) Others refers to the Florentine regiment that arrived in Dalmatia in July.

(*) estimate based on the nearby data

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Graph 2.1. Number of troops serving in Dalmatia in relation to the number estimated necessary for guard duties (3950 men).

The data collected in table 2.8 reveals one so far less known fact. The highest recorded number of troops serving in Dalmatia does not date from the most active phase of the war, that is the years of much celebrated Governor-General Foscolo, but from 1658. At that time Governor-General Antonio Bernardo had at his disposal the force of 9,448 foot, 91 horse, 7 galleys and 4 gun sail ships. This represented, as far as sheer numbers were concerned, the peak of the Republic's military commitment in the Dalmatian battlefield. However, there were considerable differences in the composition and quality of this force and the one under the command of Governor-General Foscolo. The first most obvious difference was the number of cavalry troops. While Bernardo had at his disposal only two companies of light cavalry, numbering barely 90 men, in 1647 Foscolo commanded over 1,200 horse, of which between 6-8 companies were belonging to the elite and rather expensive heavy cavalry (*Corazze*). The other main difference was that out of 9,448 foot commanded by Bernardo 34% or 3,281 was belonged to auxiliary units of varied quality - 1046 Swiss, 660 papal troops and 1571 *cernide*. On the other hand, during the campaigns of 1647 and 1648, the only auxiliary unit under Foscolo's command was the Papal regiment of some 400-600 men (5-8%). Finally, in 1647-8, Foscolo had under his command a solid core of veteran troops, who had already spent one or two campaigns in Dalmatia. In Bernardo's case, a major part of his force was new to this battlefield, and all in all, it can safely be concluded that although Bernardo commanded a slightly larger force than Foscolo, his was of much inferior quality.

These differences were consequences of some more general trends, namely war weariness caused by more than a decade of fighting and financial hardship which were heavily pressing the Republic. A financial strain was most visible in the increased use of cheap Venetian *cernide* to fill the ranks of the Venetian forces in Dalmatia and a growing number of auxiliary regiments raised and paid by other states - the Pope, Grand Duke of Tuscany or French King (sent exclusively to Crete).⁷⁰⁵ When discussing the changes in the composition of the Venetian forces in Dalmatia one more phenomenon must be mentioned. A gradual shift of the Venetian

⁷⁰⁵For more on the aid sent by France and other European princess to Venetian war effort in the east (1660-1669) see: Kenneth Setton M., *Venice, Austria and Turkey*, pp. 190, 193-195, 198, 206-243.

forces from active to passive defense was not without negative effects on the combat effectiveness of the Republic's forces. In February 1655, upon his arrival on duty in Dalmatia, Governor-General Antonio Zen noted one serious shortcoming of the troops present at the muster. The soldiers of trans-alpine and Italian companies, instead of being armed, one third with pike and two thirds with shot, almost completely lacked pikes. The disappearance of pike from the armaments of Venetian forces in Dalmatia, was the consequence of several years of restricting the troops solely to guard duties, and the decay of military discipline. Zen warned the Senate that such a force not only was not capable of the defense of a town, but that musketeers deployed in an open field without the protection of the pike when faced with a superior enemy cavalry force were in grave danger, as the events of the recent Venetian defeat at Knin could testify.⁷⁰⁶

Still the most notable change in the composition of the Venetian force in Dalmatia, caused by a change in strategy and logistical problems, was the gradual disappearance of the cavalry. During the first campaign of the war (1646), the Republic built up its cavalry forces, bringing the number of horse for the 1647 campaign to more than 1,200. This consisted of 9-10 companies of heavy cavalry, one regiment (300 men strong) of dragoons while the rest was made of 14 companies of light cavalry. However, logistical problems, mainly lack of horse fodder (of which more will be said in the next chapter) and high casualties among the horses in frequent sorties in the countryside took a heavy toll among the horses. Over the years the situation did not improve and in spite of all efforts of the Venetian government to maintain its cavalry with a sufficient number of horses, their number was declined constantly and as can be traced in table 2.8 above the number of cavalry was in constant decline.

Especially problematic were the units of heavy cavalry, which required specially trained warhorses which simply were not available in Dalmatia and had to be shipped from Italy. As the Republic went on the defensive after the destruction of Ottoman strongholds in the Dalmatian hinterland, the need for a large number of these troops was gone and in order to cut

706ASVe, PTM. b. 477. num. 7. (Zara, 8 Febrario 1654 m.v.)

down on military expenses by 1649,⁷⁰⁷ the number of these units was reduced only to five companies (two *Corazze Crovate*, one *Oltramontani*, one Italian and one known as *Corazze Bresciane di Banditi* made of the outlaws serving their sentences in the armed forces of the Republic).⁷⁰⁸ By April 1653, the companies of bandits ceased to exist, yet during the campaigns of 1656-7 the size of the *Corazze* contingent in Dalmatia was steadily maintained at four to six companies when it was finally reduced to only two companies. Finally, in the last decade of the war the Republic completely gave up on the idea of maintaining these troops in Dalmatia.

Units of light cavalry also followed a similar trend of steady decline. In May 1650, the Senate ordered the disbandment of the six weakest companies of light cavalry,⁷⁰⁹ soon followed by further reductions bringing down the number of these troops to only six companies in 1653.⁷¹⁰ Annoyed with this constant decay of the cavalry due to the lack of horse fodder, Antonio Bernardo in September 1657, proposed to the Senate to recall to Italy all but three companies from Dalmatia.⁷¹¹ The Republic heeded this proposal and by November 1658 only two companies, one stationed in Zadar and one in Split, charged with the duty of escorting supply convoys to the fortress of Klis remained in service. The reasons for this decline in numbers were mainly the same as in the case of the heavy cavalry; the need to cut down costs as much as possible, logistical problems in providing the horses with fodder etc, but also because the duties usually entrusted to these troops were taken over by mounted Morlacchi irregulars. The number of the mounted Morlacchi was from the beginning of the war on the steady rise and by the 1664 they came to count some 800 men. So it came to be, that in time, the mounted Morlacchi irregulars practically completely replaced regular units of

⁷⁰⁷The first to leave Dalmatia for *terraferma* was the regiment of the transalpine heavy cavalry, consisting of 4 companies, of Colonel Longavalle, which departed Dalmatia in December 1648. ASVe, PTM. 467, unnumbered (Zara, 5. Dicembre 1648)

⁷⁰⁸ASVe, PTM., b. 470. num. 685. (Zara, 1. Marzo 1650) attachmen: *Numero de soldati a cavallo*; ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-24, f. 101r, *Adi 19 Maggio 1649.* ; See also: ASV. PTM. b. 472. num. 83. (Zara, 18 Genario 1651 m.v.) attachment to the letter survey of cavalry forces serving in the province; ASVe, PTM. num. 31. (Di Zara, 24 Aprile 1653)

⁷⁰⁹ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-24, f. 90r-v, *Adi 19. Maggio 1650.*

⁷¹⁰ASVe, PTM. b. 474. num. 31. (Di Zara, 29. Aprile 1653.) attachment: *Ristretto della Cavalleria*; See also: ASVe, PTM. b. 477. num. 9. (Zara 8 Febraro, 1654. m.v.) atachment: *Ristretto di formento*

⁷¹¹ASVe, PTM. b. 482. num. 131. (Dalla Galera dal stretto delle Catene in Canal di Cattaro, 30. Settembre 1657)

the light cavalry, taking over its tasks⁷¹² like scouting and policing of the countryside, fighting smaller Ottoman raids, capturing deserters and similar.

This rise in number of the light Morlacchi cavalry made possible a significant reduction in the regular cavalry forces in the last decade of the war. At the end of the war, in February 1668, the Republic kept on its payroll in Dalmatia only one company of light cavalry numbering 52 men, stationed in Zadar. Additionally, from the early 1660's the Republic introduced a new practice, similar to the one already used for gunners. If circumstances demanded, the Senate would order a transfer of a few companies of heavy cavalry from *Terraferma* to Dalmatia, which were destined to return to Italy at the end of a campaign season.⁷¹³ With this arrangement, the Republic finished adjusting the composition of its cavalry forces in the province to the financial and logistical constraints and tactical needs of this battlefield in the final phase of the war.

6. *Military Administration*

The previous sections have already tackled some of the principal administrative problems related to the navy and the Morlacchi, thus the following paragraphs are limited to the problems of mobilization and administration of the Republic's regular land forces in the wartime. Moreover, the 17th century entrepreneurial model of raising an army is a well known and researched topic. The seminal work by Fritz Redlich "The German military enterpriser and his work force,"⁷¹⁴ which even today still remains the authority on this topic, is adequately complemented with research on the adoption of that model and its variations by other European powers, especially in French and Spanish cases.⁷¹⁵ Since the mobilization of trans-alpine and Italian units into the Venetian service was done along these lines and did not differ much from established practices, the following paragraphs will be focused on the specifically

⁷¹²ASV, PTM. b. 492. num. 151. (Zara, 31, Maggio 1664)

⁷¹³For example such was the case in 1663, when 4 companies of the cavalry were sent to Dalmatia in March, and withdrawn at the end of the year. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-38, Adi 31. Marzo 1663; ASVe, PTM. b. 491, num. 111. (Spalato, 10. Novembre 1663.)

⁷¹⁴Fritz Redlich, *The German military enterpriser and his work force: a study in European economic and social history*, 2 vols (Wiesbade: Franz Steiner, 1964-5)

⁷¹⁵Compare with: Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, pp. 21-41; Similarly, for the French rejection of the entrepreneurial model and their way of raising an army see: David Parrot, *Richelieu's army: war, government, and society in France*, pp. 313-365.

Venetian variations in adaptation of this model, mainly related to the problems of raising companies of *oltramaroni*, that is Croats and Albanians. Equally, since the handling of mutiny and maintaining military discipline in the Venetian case do not differ from prevailing European trends which are also rather well researched they thus are not given any attention here. Instead, the problems specific for the management and administration of the Republic's armed forces regarding its pronouncedly multinational character have been given a due attention.

6.1. Raising An Army: Mobilization and Recruitment

When, in 1645, the war broke out between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Venice, almost all of Christian Europe was entangled in a series of seemingly unending wars. A majority of popular histories of Venice usually point out that Venetian appeals for help to European rulers went unanswered and that in the first years of the war Venice stood alone.⁷¹⁶ True, the political situation was indeed unfavorable and, apart from the Papacy and a few Italian princes, there was not much hope that any other state would come to Venetian aid. Yet situation was not as bleak as it might seem. By 1645, the Thirty Years' War had entered its final phase and already for some time all the participants were experiencing serious consequences of war weariness and exhaustion, best illustrated by the galloping rise of debts of European rulers to their armies.⁷¹⁷ However, the decades of continuous warfare and mobilization on an unprecedented scale, left the Europe full of military contractors and professionals, either already discharged from service or about to be as soon as the hostilities ended. Similarly, the first English Civil War was also coming to its end and numerous colonels, royalist and parliamentary alike, were facing demobilization and consequently unemployment.

Even if only a few European princes offered their help to the Republic, the multitude of private military entrepreneurs did not shy away from offering their services. For them, the

⁷¹⁶For example see: Ciro Paoletti, *Military History of Italy*, (Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2008) p. 32.

⁷¹⁷For the financial burden the Thirty Years War put on the Spanish monarchy, which at its end was in debt for 36 million of ducats see: Peter H. Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy. A History of the Thirty Years War*, (London: Penguin Books, 2009) pp. 655-657.

new zone of conflict in the south represented an excellent business opportunity; a new market where their services could be offered. Furthermore, it should not be ignored that the diplomatic network of the Republic played no small role in mobilization of its armies during the first years of the war. The ambassadors in Rome, Paris, Vienna and Munster were heavily engaged in negotiations with military entrepreneurs who approached them offering to raise troops for the Republic.⁷¹⁸ The final decision, however, was in the hands of the Senate, which granted patents and commissions to raise troops on the account of the Republic either to those who personally presented their offers in Venice, or to those who contacted Republic's representatives at European courts. These contracts stipulated several important articles like the number of troops to be levied, conditions of discharge, reformation, issuing of arms, start of pay, traveling money and similar (see Appendix 1.4 for examples of contracts for various types of troops in the Venetian service).⁷¹⁹ These elements will be addressed in the following paragraphs.

What needs to be emphasized at the beginning of this discussion is that the mobilization and assembling of an army was far from cheap. Although regiments and companies were to be raised by colonels and captains based on commissions issued by the Senate, this operation was not cost free. Recruiting officers expected to be compensated for costs of recruitment, and transport of troops to a location specified by their commission as a *piazza di armi*. This expenses went under the name of gift (*donativo*) and was set per *capita* of soldiers brought to a *piazza di armi*. The amount of a *donativo* varied from one mobilization region to another, increasing proportionally with the distance of a particular region from Venice. As such, the most expensive were units of trans-alpine infantry, especially levies of the English, Scots and Irish. For example, in January 1646, the agreement between colonel Sidney Atkins and

⁷¹⁸The correspondence of Giovanni Battisata Nani, the ambassador of the Republic in Paris from these years is full of references to negotiations with French, English and Irish colonels and other military enterprisers. For example, Nani was approached by dozens of English gentlemen; in October by Colonel Rosbury who offered levy of 1,000 men, in January 1646 by Colonel Atkins who offered 1,200 men, in October 1647 by Sir John Douglas who offered two smaller regiments, etc. CSP-Venice, pp. 214, 232, 235-6, 238, 241, 244-5, 290, 294, 297.

⁷¹⁹For the practices of the Dutch Estates Generals, which are almost the same see: Olaf Van Nimwegen, *The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions*, pp. 31-33.

Giovanni Battista Nani the Republic's ambassador in Paris, stipulated that in addition to the obligation to hire the ships needed for transport from London to Crete, for "entire levy, its embarkation, the cost of the voyage, food and all other requirements, from London to Candia excepting only the hire of the ships," colonel Atkins was to be paid 24 *ducats* for each of the 1,200 men brought to Crete.⁷²⁰ Soon, in order to cut down such high costs, (if completed this operation would have cost the Republic no less than 28,800 *ducats*), the Republic instructed its ambassadors to attempt to convince potential contractors to consent to bring their troops for embarkation to Texel in the Netherlands and to accept a *donativo* of only 15 *ducats* per head.⁷²¹

The troops brought over land routes to Venice (through the Alps from Germany), were slightly less expensive than those shipped from England or the Netherlands, requiring a *donativo* between 15 to 21 *ducats*. However, by 1652 the *donativo* for transalpine troops stabilized at 18 *ducats* for each soldier presented at Lido, and it remained constant at that level til the end of the war.⁷²² The levies of Italian infantry were much cheaper and a *donativo* for soldiers varied between 5 and 7 *ducats* depending on the state of grace with the Senate of a particular commander.⁷²³ Finally, a *donativo* was being paid not only for the levies of new units but also for the levies of reinforcements of existing units.

Levies of Croatian and Albanian troops followed slightly different trends. What must be mentioned first, is that Croatian and Albanian recruits in addition to being subjects of foreign states - the conditions of patents or commissions unavoidably stipulated that the recruits should be "soggeti di alien stato," - were also in a significant proportion the subjects of the

⁷²⁰CSP-Venice, vol. 27, p. 232.

⁷²¹Such was for example a case in the negotiations with Sir John Douglas and his offer to levy two smaller regiments for the Republic. CSP-Venice, vol. 27, p. 297.

⁷²²For example see decrees for payments to Conte Henrico Capra and Baron Martin Christof von Degenfeld from 1652:ASVe, Senato Mar, R-113, f. 78r, *Adi 22. Marzo 1652.*; f. 153r-v, *Adi 25. Maggio 1652.*; Although this was a customary *donativo* some colonels were ready to accept lower amounts, as did for example Colonel Castret who in 1649 conceded to payment of 15 ducats instead of 21 ducats as was customary in dealing with him until then. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-108, f. 154v, *Adi 11. Maggio 1649.*; See also patent for levy of 600 men issued to Conte Henrico Capra in October 1645, specifying *donativo* of 15 *ducats*: ASVe, PTM. b. 476, num. 149. (Di Galea Trau, 28. Luglio 1654) attachment to the letter.

⁷²³ASVe, Senato Mar, R-108, f. 163r, *Adi 18 Maggio 1649*; ASVe, Senato Mar, R-113, f. 95r-v, *Adi 10 Aprile 1652.*

very same state the Republic was waging the war against, the Ottoman Empire, especially in the case of Albanians (including Montenegrins). At the start of the war (1645-1650), the patents issued to captains authorizing them to levy troops for the Republic did not stipulate any form of a *donativo* given to soldiers recruited. This was the case with both the patents issued by Lunardo Foscolo in Dalmatia and those issued by the Senate in Venice.⁷²⁴ However, the manpower pools from which Albanians and Croats were recruited were by far smaller than that of Italians, Germans or French and soon it became impossible to attract sufficient numbers of men into the ranks with a sole promise of pay. Thus, from 1650-1651, the Republic introduced a new practice of paying to the captains *sovventione* of 3 ducats for each soldier to be recruited. Unlike a *donativo*, given to Italian and transalpine troops, a *sovventione* was an advance on soldier's first pay and was to be deducted from it.⁷²⁵ Due to an increased demand for these troops and the depletion of this manpower pool after almost two decades of the war, since 1660, the Republic increased *sovventione* payed to the recruits to 5 *ducats*, adding also two measures of biscuit.⁷²⁶

Malversations with the *donativo* were a common and frequent occurrence. The case from October 1668, when new reinforcements for the regiment of Colonel Vulpio, recruited in Romagna, arrived in Dalmatia, serve as a good example of all negative sides linked with this practice. At the inspection of the new troops, Governor-General Antonio Priuli discovered that a large number of recruits were press-ganged and that the levy also included a large number of boys too young to bear arms. Moreover, all of these were not only denied *donativo*, which was withheld by their officers, but they were also robbed of their personal properties and clothing.⁷²⁷ Finally, this levy also managed to cause a small diplomatic incident, because the

⁷²⁴For the commissions granted by the Senate during 1646 see: ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-104, f. 37v, 66v, 93r, 101r-v, 109v-110r, 141v-142r, 145v, 155v-156r, 242v, 271r-v; For example of the patents issued by Foscolo to 15 captains during February-March 1646 see: DAZ, *Atti di Provveditori Generali*, vol. 14, f. 112v-113r, 124r, 141r-142r;

⁷²⁵See commissions from March-October 1651: ASVe, Senato Mar, R-112, fols. 44v, 45v-46r, 110r, 137r, 238r, 290v-291r;

⁷²⁶For example see the commission to levy 300 fanti Albanesi issued to Colonelo Marco Cernizza, in December 1661. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-125, f. 202r-v, Adi 23. Dicembre 1661.; ASVe, PTM. b. 489. num. 39. (Spalato, 25. Novembre 1662) attachment: *Scrittura del Coll.(onel)o Marco Cernizza, e del Sargente Maggiore Simon Craponese*.

⁷²⁷ASVe, PTM. b. 500. num. 134. (Zara, 21. Ottobre 1668)

press ganged recruits included also five Roman Catholic priests on whose behalf the Holy See intervened demanding their release.⁷²⁸ It is very likely that such occurrences were more common than not. The only exceptional thing involved with this case is that it left a trace in the documents. Once shipped to Dalmatia or Crete, the only way of escape for soldiers was aboard Venetian ships, and Venetian commanders, always lacking manpower, rarely inquired after origin and quality of their recruits.⁷²⁹

However, greed was not the only motive for captains or colonels to turn to the method of forceful mobilization. Every commission to raise troops also specified the time-frame for that operation, lasting usually 2 or 3 months. In case of proven commanders and/or large levies, the Republic was ready to grant an extension of this deadline, as it did for example in May 1651, when Captain Giacomo Danz was given extra two months to complete the levy of 1,000 *fanti oltramontani*.⁷³⁰ However, in case of a captain's failure to meet a given deadline, the Republic considered recruited soldiers as its own property, to dispose with at its liking. For example, in October 1652, when the levy of six new companies of Albanians authorized by the Senate was not finished in due time, acting on the authority granted to him by the Senate, Governor-General Foscarini terminated the entire operation and distributed the amassed soldiers among the existing companies of armed boats.⁷³¹

Conditions stipulating the start of accounting for pay differed among the various types of national units. Whereas for the units of the trans-alpine infantry this was the day of their arrival in Venice (at Lido) or at Crete (if troops were to be shipped there directly), for the units of Italian and *oltramarini* infantry the conditions were more elaborate.⁷³² Italian troops usually had designated as *piazza di armi* (place where a unit was to be assembled) either Lido in Venice or some other town on the territory of the Republic in Italy or Istria. If Lido was not

⁷²⁸ASVe, PTM. b. 501. num. 240. (Zara, 1. Dicembre 1669)

⁷²⁹Similarly, when in October 1647, Governor-General Foscolo at the muster also discovered large number of boys, instead of discharging them he retained them in service yet reducing their monthly pays to half. Foscolo justified his action with the fact that majority of these boys were not the subject of the Republic and could not return to their homes if discharged from service. ASV, PTM. b. 465. num. 334. (Zara 25. Ottobre 1647)

⁷³⁰ASVe, Senato Mar, R-112, f. 130r, *Adi 27 Maggio 1651*.

⁷³¹ASVe, PTM. b. 473. num. 141. (Zara, 16. Ottobre 1652)

⁷³²For example see: CSP-Venice, vol. 27, pp. 235-236.

designated as a *piazza di armi*, soldiers were to receive a first half of *donativo* at *piazza d'armi* and the second half only once they were presented at Lido. When the number of soldiers in a company reached 25, the pay would begin to be accounted to these soldiers and one corporal, while the moment the number of soldiers reached 75, the pay would start to be accounted for captain and other officials as well.⁷³³ In the case of the companies of *oltramaroni*, conditions were somewhat different; once the number of troopers reached 20, the pay would start to be accounted for captains and other officials, while for soldiers this would start automatically once they were presented at a *piazza di armi*. Designation of *piazza di armi* for levies of Croatian and Albanian infantry was usually left to governor-generals in Dalmatia.

The elements of the various types of patents and commissions discussed above do not represent a uniformly prescribed practice; there were numerous exceptions and variations. Depending on whether troops were in demand or not, conditions of a *condotta* could differ significantly. Very commonly, prospective captains or colonels would offer to raise new companies at no additional cost for the Republic, forfeiting the *donativo* or *sovventione*, only asking for themselves the right to nominate captains of newly formed companies, who would be confirmed by the Senate later,⁷³⁴ counting on the profit from a venerable 17th century institution of the sale of offices. In addition, captains of proven valor could count on obtaining a title of a *governatore*, sometimes even accompanied by some smaller increase of their stipends.⁷³⁵ Others, like *harambaša* Petar Kulišić in 1655, who had more talent for forward thinking, included in their offers to levy companies also a request to be granted a commission to continue their service after the war, as captains in command of the ordinary companies of infantry or cavalry, stationed in Italy.⁷³⁶

⁷³³ASVe, Senato Mar, R-108, f. 120r, *Adi 22 Aprile 1649*; f. 163r, *Adi 18 Maggio 1649*.

⁷³⁴For an example of such cases see the commission granted to Captain Andrea Guroi to raise two *compagnie italiane forestieri*: ASVe, Senato Mar, R-108, f. 120r, *Adi 22 Aprile 1649*.; Similarly, for commissions to raise multiple companies of Albanians or Croats see: ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, f. 145v, *Adi 21. Giugno 1646*.; f. 242v, *Adi 15 Settembre 1646*.; R-112, f. 137r, *Adi 2. Giugno 1651*.; f. 412v-423r, *Adi 29. Febbraio 1652*.; R-113, f. 161v, *Adi 31. Maggio 1652*.; R-118, f. 208v-209r, *Adi 7 Settembre 1655*.; f. 213r-v, *Adi 11 Settembre 1655*.; f. 215r.v, *Adi 15. Settembre 1655*.;

⁷³⁵Such was for example the case of Captain Nicolo Messia who was granted the patent to raise four companies of Albanian infantry, which was accompanied by the title of a *governatore* and an increase of monthly stipend from 4 to 10 ducats. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, f. 242v, *Adi 15 Settembre 1646*.

⁷³⁶ASVe, PTM. b. 478. num. 75. (Zara, 3. Novembre 1655)

This was not to be a war of two million or so of the subjects of the Republic against an Empire that spanned over three continents, as some historical works like to paint it. The manpower pool at the disposal of the Republic was in fact much much larger and encompassed almost all Western Europe and even Ottoman Christian subjects. Even more important, in military entrepreneurs the Republic had at hand the instrument necessary to tap these resources. All it needed was money (easier said than done) and troops could be readily produced. Moreover, in the case of *oltramarine* infantry, the Republic was even fighting the Ottomans with its own subjects. However, this did now go unnoticed, and the Ottomans, by occasionally closing commerce, and thus transport and goods and people, between their lands and Kotor and Budva, managed to deny this pool of manpower to the Republic. This happened, for example in June 1652, when Governor-General Foscarini reported that it had become impossible for captains to attract new recruits into their companies.⁷³⁷ Although this was only a temporary setback, and soon commerce was renewed, levies of these troops, in spite of the increase of *sovventione* to 5 *ducats*, remained problematic until the end of the war.

The manpower pools for the levies of Italian and trans-alpine units were much larger and were not limited by such constraints, the only limiting factor in their case being the availability of coin in the Republic's treasury. As mentioned previously, the recruitment of these troops was a costly operation, especially in the case of trans-alpine troops. Even with a lowered *donativo* of 15 or 18 *ducats* per soldier, the cost to levy 1,000 soldiers amounted to 15,000 or 18,000 *ducats*. The levies of Swiss regiments, on the other hand, did not include any *donativo*. As such the Swiss represented the ideal choice in times of need when new troops were needed quickly and at minimal cost. Yet, although initially cheap, these units proved to be a great burden for the Republic's treasury. Not only were their wages much higher than those of other nations, the inability of the Republic to secure their regular payments combined with the articles of their capitulations led to a situation in which it was impossible to bring these units to muster and determine their actual strength, and the Republic ended up paying for soldiers long dead or fled from the service.

⁷³⁷ASVe, PTM. b. 473. num. 115. (Zara, 12. Luglio 1652)

Italian regiments, although cheaper to raise, (on the average a levy of 1,000 men would require some 7,000 *ducats*) were problematic in other regards. Similarly to the case of *oltramarini*, the Republic preferred to fill the ranks of its armed forces with *Italiani forestrieri* and not with its own subjects, who were reserved for the service in units of *cernide* and *bombardieri (scolari)*, or aboard galleys. Yet, for this resource the Republic had to compete with the other Italian states, and also required to obtain a permission from local ruler to raise levies on his territories. This represents the political background of the appearance of various Italian regiments in Venetian armies, raised by other states and handed over to the Republic. If mobilization of 1,000 men was not cheap, paying for them was even more expensive. Furthermore, disbandment of 1,000 men posed a significant security risk for the local community where demobilization would take place. Thus, many Italian rulers started offering troops they amassed to Venice as a venue to get rid of them once they were not needed any more. Such was for example the case, in 1649, with the Duchess of Mantova. Alarmed by the movement of the French and the Spanish forces the Duchess raised 1,000 men for the defense of her territories, and once the danger had passed, through mediation of Colonel Sottovia, her subject in the Venetian service, the Duchess offered these troops to the Republic.⁷³⁸

When in April 1651 Governor-General Foscarini, after informing the Senate of the sorry state of the army and high desertion rates, wrote that "these troops are the precious capital of the public liberty,"⁷³⁹ he was not speaking only figuratively. The army indeed represented a capital investment of the Republic.

6.2. Instruments of Control: Ruoli and Musters

By the middle of the 17th century "government by paper" was an unquestionable reality in the running of military and civilian affairs alike. In addition to a paper trail that accompanied all orders and shipments of cash, food and war materials, the Republic also kept precise records (so called *ruoli, roli ...*) for all the units in its service, recording all payments, issuing of provisions of food, arms and ammunition to them. The *ruoli* represented one of the main

⁷³⁸A SVe, PTM. 468, num. 563. (Zara, 3 Maggio 1649) attachment: *Lettera del Collonel Sottovia*
⁷³⁹... *esse militie sono il capitale pretioso della publica liberta*; ASV, Senato, Dispacci, PTM. b. 471. num. 18. (Spalato 13 Aprile 1651)

tools for the successful governance of its army, as Governor-General Girolamo Foscarini put it "the Rouli are the foundation and the means" for successful governance of the army and without them the profusion of treasures employed by the Republic to maintain its war effort could not be controlled.⁷⁴⁰ During the transfer of companies from one administrative area of the Republic to another, the *ruoli* were also sent with the troops. The system was simple yet effective, as was best discovered by those who attempted to cheat it. For example, in October 1648, six companies of the Morlacchi destined for service in Italy arrived in Venice, yet their captains, probably in hope of achieving double payments, claimed that they had not been given any accompanying letters nor *ruoli*. The Senate simply informed Governor-General Foscolo of this incident asking to resend the documents, which arrived three weeks later providing records of all payments in money and kind to these units.⁷⁴¹

The original *ruoli* of all military units serving in Dalmatia were at the beginning of the war kept in the office of the governor-generals in Zadar, and were in charge of a governor-general's *collaterale*. With the arrival of a commissary in 1647, along with superintendence of payments to the troops, he also took charge of these documents.⁷⁴² However, in June 1648, the Senate ordered that *ruoli* of the troops serving in Šibenik were to be sent to the extraordinary Governor of Šibenik.⁷⁴³ With this exception the Senate had paved a way for the introduction of a serious disorder. When in 1651, Foscarini took over the duty of a governor-general in Dalmatia, the state of these records was in total disarray. Only part of the original *ruoli* were in the hands of Commissary Corner, the rest was deposited with extraordinary governors of Šibenik, Split-Trogir and Kotor. Additionally, there was also a large number of copies of *ruoli* (some even of suspicious origin) containing only summary information. Between March and May 1651, Governor-General Foscarini fought a real political battle with Commissary Corner who stubbornly refused to hand over the original *ruoli*, constantly providing only copies.⁷⁴⁴

740ASVe, PTM, b. 471. num. 13. (Trau, 24. Marzo 1651)

741ASVe, Senato Mar, R-107, f. 80r-v, *Adi 24 Ottobre 1648*; ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 508. (Zara, 14. Novembre 1648) attachment: *Conto delli Ultimi Morlacchi*.

742ASVe, PTM. b. 466. num. 334. (Zara, 25. Ottobre 1647)

743ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-20, f. 146r, *Adi 18. Giugno 1648*.

744ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. 13. (Trau, 24. Marzo 1651); The difference between originals and copies is defined by Foscarini as: *ne Ruoli originali vi sono tutte le note di cassationi, falligioni, rimesse, morti*

The affair was not resolved until June 1651, when the service of commissary Corner was terminated and he was ordered to go to Crete. Only then did Foscarini manage to collect all *ruoli* existing in the province (both copies and originals) and began to assert some order into the management of these documents. Foscarini ordered keeping of original *ruoli* in the office of a governor-general in Zadar, while, at the same time, to each of extraordinary governors in the province were sent only authenticated copies,⁷⁴⁵ thus establishing the practice that remained in use until the end of the war.

The consequences of this state of disarray quickly became visible. Over the next two months Governor-General Foscarini undertook a detailed inspection of all *ruoli* in his possession and in September 1651 informed the Senate of his findings. "*Ma perché Verità vuole sempre haver il suo luogo, resta ella,*" wrote Foscarini, "*lucidamente posta in chiaro,*" and began the survey of financial disorders discovered. In the first place, Foscarini found out that 15 captains, whose companies had been disbanded, had received in money, food and munition no less than 41,200 *lire* more than they had been due. In addition, other 23 captains, who were fortunately still serving in Dalmatia, had been overpaid by further 54,707 *lire*, as were three captains transferred to Crete who had received 20,603 *lire* too much. In short, the neglect of Commissary Corner and the misbehavior or incompetence of his staff cost the Republic 116,510 *lire* (c.a 18,800 *ducats*).⁷⁴⁶

The second important instrument of the military administration was the musters or surveys of troops. The musters had two main goals: (1) to establish the exact number of troops in each company to avoid paying for long dead troopers (marked as *morti* in survey reports) or gone from service (*faliti*), and (2) to purge the ranks of those not fit for service (marked as *cassi* in survey reports). The later encompassed a wide range of persons, from already mentioned

trasporti, rassegne, e quel, che più importa delle cose contribuite a militie di tempo in tempo, in Biscotti, et alimenti di Viveri, drappi, munizioni, et altro; Cose nelle copie restando omessa la puntualità delle sopradette importanti circostanze, altro non vi apparisse, che il trasporto di quei nomi di soldati, che in esse copie se vedono descritto, senza quali fondamenti se io habbi potuto rassegnar alcuna compagnia; far conti a capitani; riconoscer gl' errori, e rifacimenti, che per giornata da alcuni di loro si pretendono circa, i, premessi particolari, o dar forma di buona direzione á giusto importante maneggio. ASVe, PTM. b. 471, num. 27. (Traù, 10. Maggio 1651)

745ASVe, PTM. b. 471, num. 38 (Zara, 26. Giugno 1651)

746ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 60. (Trau, 14. Settembre 1651)

young boys to old invalid soldiers, servants of officers (so called *casalini*), or seemingly fit soldiers but who had already been discharged from the service because of some previous transgression. The musters were regularly held by extraordinary or ordinary governors of the garrisons, a commissary (when one was available in the province), a governor-general of the cavalry and/or a governor-general on his cruise of the province. Moreover, the first task of every governor-general was to visit all garrisons and inspect troops serving there.

Additionally, every six months or so, a so called general muster, or survey of troops in all garrisons, was organized. The initiative for this sometimes came directly from the Senate, usually in the aftermath of some military operation.⁷⁴⁷

Yet, there were some prerequisites to organizing musters. As far as the troops were concerned, a muster was the occasion on which they were to be given long sought coin, the amount of which depended on circumstances and varied from full wages to regular advances on their pay, so called *terzi* (see the next chapter). During a master all troops serving in a particular garrison would be arrayed under their banners and one by one each soldier would approach a desk for inspection upon being called.⁷⁴⁸ As such, the musters, either of particular garrisons or general ones, were rare occasions when the wish of the Senate that the money was to be given directly into the hands of soldiers and not to their captains was respected.⁷⁴⁹

This also meant that a lack of money could prevent organizing musters. Such was for example the case in August 1648, when the extraordinary Governor of Split, suggested that due to the great discontent of the troops because of a huge debt owed to them, a muster should be postponed until the arrival of the commissary Molin with 50,000 *ducats* from Venice,

⁷⁴⁷Such was for example the case in 1649, when the Senate ordered Commissary Molin to, upon Foscolo's return from Albania, organize a general muster of the troops in the province. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-21, f. 214v, *Adi 24. Febbraio 1649*.

⁷⁴⁸For a good description of musters see, letters of Governor-General Foscarini, from his tour of the province in March-May 1651, when he complained to the Senate because he was forced to organize musters without having original *ruoli* with him: ASV, PTM, b. 471. num. 13. (Trau, 24. Marzo 1651); num. 27. (Trau, 10. Maggio 1651); PTM. b. 472, num. 83. (Zara, 18 Genaro 1651); see also: ASVe, PTM. 493, num. 4. (Sebenico, 2. Genaro 1664 m.v.); See also Foscolo's decree (*terminazione*) regulating organization of musters in Kotor: DAZ, *Atti di Provveditori Generali*, Lunardo Foscolo, vol. 15. fols. 196r-199v

⁷⁴⁹For example see the instruction of the Senate: ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-20, f. 181v-182r, *Adi 15. Luglio 1648*.; Paying wages directly into the hands of soldiers was a goal of many Early Modern Governments which with this measure aimed to protect soldiers from extortion of their officers and to achieve paying only those soldiers who actually served. Compare: Olaf Van Nimwegen, *The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions*, pp. 47-51.; Geoffre Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road*, pp. 135.

deeming it not profitable to "hazard public reputation with such an undertaking."⁷⁵⁰ And it came out that the extraordinary Governor was more than right. Even when the money did arrive, the general muster was not successfully concluded. A general muster, in theory, implied having musters on the same day in all Dalmatia garrisons, in order to prevent captains from borrowing troops from each other. Commissary Molin, after finishing musters in Zadar and Šibenik, all on the same day, proceeded to Split and Trogir, yet upon his arrival the trans-alpine cavalry mutinied and prevented finishing this general muster.⁷⁵¹

Special troops, such as the cavalry or expensive Swiss regiments, required special attention and some adjustment of standard procedures. Upon the arrival of a Swiss regiment to Zadar, in October 1647, Foscolo inspected the troops, yet in order to prevent captains of the Swiss regiment from borrowing soldiers from other captains, before the disembarkation of the Swiss, the Governor-General ordered all troops, both the cavalry and infantry, to leave the town.⁷⁵² Similar procedures were also applied for the musters of the cavalry. A common practice was to order the cavalry out from a garrison and to hold a muster outside of a town in order to prevent mixing of the infantrymen with the cavalry troopers.⁷⁵³ Results of a muster would be sent to the Senate which would, based on these reports, order dispatch of reinforcements, provisions of food, money etc.⁷⁵⁴

Occasionally, the results of these inspections could provoke a reaction from the Senate resulting in the introduction of some new administrative measures. This for example occurred in December 1649 when Commissary Molin's report from 28 November 1649 reached Venice. According to the report, of the total number of soldiers recorded in *ruoli*, at the muster, 1,190 soldiers were found missing (*faliti*), and further 1,088 soldiers were discharged (*cassi*) from the ranks, yet at the same time the Commissary found that 2,569 soldiers previously discharged, were again remitted (*rimessi*) into the service. Such high fluctuating

750... *azardare con queste mosse la publica riputatione*. ASV, PTM. b. 467. num. 462. (Zara 29. Agosto 1648)

751ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 473. (Zara 12. Settembre 1648); num. 478. (Zara 24. Settembre 1648)

752ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 493. (Zara, 17. Ottobre 1648)

753ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 685. (Zara, 1. Marzo 1650)

754For example see the Senate's order that general muster was to be hold in Dalmatia: ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-23, f. 56r-v, *Adi 2. Ottobre 1649*.

numbers of discharged and remitted soldiers could not go by without eliciting the Senate's reaction, which ordered that, in the future, discharged soldiers could be accepted back into the service only by governor-generals and not by any other public official. Additionally, the Senate instructed Foscolo to warn all magistrates in the province about such high desertion rates, and to incite them to be more watchful in this regard.⁷⁵⁵

6.3. The Management of the Army: Reformation, Regulation and Inheritance of Companies

Commanding a multinational army, such as that of the Venetian Republic, was no easy task. As was mentioned previously, in response to these challenges the Republic introduced into its command structure national colonels who acted as liaison officers between the Venetian command and corresponding national units. In addition, one of the principal policies of the army administration was to keep various national units filled only with the members of that particular *nation*. This policy was based on the conviction that units composed of soldiers of different languages, rites and customs, could not be effectively commanded by their captains. Thus, in order to avoid disorder and increase combat effectiveness of companies, governor-generals kept close watch during musters to maintain ethnically homogenous units.⁷⁵⁶ Additionally, in the case of Swiss troops, which enjoyed greater wages than the rest of the infantry, the Senate also had material motives in promotion of this policy and at first rumors of any irregularity concerning the composition of the Swiss units, instructed governor-generals to investigate it.⁷⁵⁷ The policy of not mixing different nations within companies represented a general policy extending also to the Venetian forces on Crete and in Italy. Furthermore, this principle also applied to unit commanders, as can be most clearly seen from the Senate's instruction to the Governor-General of the Arms on Crete from March 1651. On

⁷⁵⁵ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-23, f. 100r-v, *Adi 1649. Dicembre 7.*

⁷⁵⁶For good example of such reasoning, see the letter from Governor-General Catherino Corner, after the inspection of the troops of the Zadar garrison: *A la divesita delle nazioni osservate in tutte le Compagnie, essendovene tal una composta, di tre e di quattro differenti tra di loro di lingua, riti e costumi, ho pure applicato il pensiero, et considerandolo per impotante, a [6] causa principale di non poter tutti intender gli ordini de loro officiali, ho creduto molto conferente, riddur cadauno sotto le proprie insegne, per renderli più docili nell' armamento di loro offi.(itia)li, et più uniti tra di loro, et più contenti; e questa prattica sarà pur da me incaminata per tutte l'altre piazze della Provincia.* ASVe, PTM. 493., num. 4. (Sebenico, 2. Genaro 1664 m.v.)

⁷⁵⁷ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-24, f. 122r-v, *Adi 2. Luglio 1650.*; ASVe, PTM. b. 470, num. 724. (Zara, 18. Luglio 1650)

the news that the companies of trans-alpine infantry were being commanded by Greek or Italian captains who had "either little experience in military discipline, or do not know the language of the soldiers, thus frequently rendering themselves odious to them, and provide a detrimental example and fruitless service;" ordering him that "thus, to the *Oltramontani* always should command *Oltramontani* officers, and similarly to other nations, those of their nationality;" using the same opportunity to remind him to purge the companies of soldiers of different nationality.⁷⁵⁸

Although the trans-alpine troops, probably constituted a majority of the Venetian army, due to the vagueness of this category, which included Germans, French, Walloons etc, the single most numerous ethnic group in the Venetian army were Italians.⁷⁵⁹ The Republic took good care to maintain the balance of the number of "national" troops in garrisons. When in October 1648, the Senate ordered a transfer of 400 Italian infantrymen to Crete,⁷⁶⁰ Governor-General Foscolo informed his superiors that this would result in overwhelming majority of trans-alpine troops in the province and warned that, if during the last unrest of the troops, in the spring 1648, the troops were not "*mediocrement bilanciate da diversità di Nationi,*" irreparable tragedies would have been seen.⁷⁶¹ By promoting internal division among its armed forces on a national group level, the Republic was aiming to avoid development of corporate solidarity and prevent large scale mutinies such were, for example, those of the Spanish forces in Flanders.⁷⁶²

The structure and sizes of the various types of companies in the Venetian service discussed previously, represented nominal strength of those units, seen probably only at Lido once a company was assembled and before its departure for Crete or Dalmatia. In reality, the

758... *o poco prattichi, o non avesti à quella disciplina, o non possedendo l'Idioma loro ben spesso si rendono odiosi à soldati, infruttuosi al servizio di danno, e d'esempio pregiudicialissimo; ... onde à Oltramontani sempre Oltramontani commandino, et alla altre Nationi similmente, quei della loro natione;* ASVe, Senato Mar, R-113, f. 70r-72r, *Adi 22. Marzo 1652.*

759For example see the muster lists attached to the following letters: ASVe, PTM. b.470. num. 755. (Zara, 17 Ottobre 1650); PTM. b. 475. num. 97. (Spalato, 21 Dicembre 1653); PTM. b. 489. num. 5. (Spalato, 8 Giugno 1662)

760ASVe, Senato Mar, R-107, f. 59r-60v; *A di 10 Ottobre 1648.*; ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-21, f. 93r-v; *Adi 7 Ottobre 1648.*

761ASVe, PTM. b. 467, num. 492. (Zara, 12. Ottobre 1648)

762Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road*, pp. 157-176.

effective strength of companies was far under those figures. After the end of the spring campaign of 1647, Governor-General Foscolo made a tour of the province and inspected the state of the troops. His findings that the companies were under their nominal strength were not that surprising, but the scope of decay of the units was indeed alarming. All units of Venetian army were seriously undermanned, and the situation was worst with the units of the trans-alpine infantry. As an example of the sorry state of trans-alpine troops, Foscolo compiled a report concerning the numerical strength of the three regiments of *oltramontani* (composed of 13 companies) serving in the province. In theory these regiments should together count between 1950-2600 men, yet their actual strength was only 654 men, with the average of 50 men per company instead of 150-200.⁷⁶³

As such these units had become utterly cost-ineffective. The core of the problem laid in the ratio between the officers and soldiers and the fact that, in spite of a significant decrease in a number of soldiers, these units retained their entire officer staff. The consequence of this was that although their combat strength had fallen to 32%, their costs still remained at 65% of the costs when at the full strength. The pay of the officers of trans-alpine company amounted to 1152:12 *lire* (188 *ducats*) which was the equivalent of sum of 37,6 wages of ordinary soldiers. In the case of Italian companies, the pay for the full commanding staff (750 *lire*) equaled 25 ordinary soldier's wages. According to the Venetian military doctrine, these units, in order to be cost effective, had to count at least 70 men (officers included) in the case of trans-alpine companies, and 50 men in the case of Italian companies.⁷⁶⁴

Once the strength of a company fell below these numbers it became cost-ineffective and a unit was in danger of being "reformed" or "regulated" which meant its disbandment and merging of its soldiers into other units of the same type.⁷⁶⁵ An initiative for the reformation of

763For example see the report of Governor-General Foscarini from November 1651, in which he sent a list of companies which did not satisfy these conditions. ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 257. (Zara, 13 Giugno 1647) attachment: *Ristretto delli tre Regimenti d'Oltramontani: Castreto, Esser, Antonini*.

764ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 72. (Zara, 21. Novembre 1651) attachment: *Ristretto delle compagnie Oltramontane, Italiane e Corse, manco numerose della Provincia*

765For similar practices in other Early Modern European armies see: Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road*, pp. 177-189; David Parrot, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government, and Society in France*, pp. 68-69, 354-355.

infantry companies usually came from a governor-general, while that for entire regiments or more expensive cavalry units was commonly (although not always) ordered by the Senate. For example, in January 1650, the Senate ordered Foscolo to reform the regiments of trans-alpine infantry sending detailed instructions. Out of six regiments serving in the province, two (Britton and Castret) were to remain in the service reinforced with the soldiers from three other regiments (Esser, Sorgo and Bacil) which were to be completely disbanded, while the sixth regiment (Sottovia) was to be disbanded and from its soldiers formed two “stand alone” companies.⁷⁶⁶ While for the captains and officers of the companies being reformed this represented the end of their service, for other captains, those who would be given their soldiers this represented a free ticket out from a danger zone. The Senate seldom spelled out detailed instructions concerning the distribution of soldiers (as those mentioned above) and usually left the entire affair at the discretion of a governor-general. As such, the reformation represented one of the most powerful instruments of governance in the hands of governor-generals: an instrument that could be used for promoting favorite commanders and punishing unruly and disobedient ones.

Obviously, reformation of his company was one of the worst fears of every captain and understandably they attempted to avoid it by all means. The captains facing the threat of reformation usually protested and pleaded, providing records of their faithful service and pointing out that it was not their fault that the units had decayed. This, they claimed was in the first place the result of the lack of pay which forced the soldiers who could not any more withstand the misery of service to flee from it.⁷⁶⁷ The Republic did not have one standardized policy for handling unit reformation, instead decisions were made on a case to case basis, in respect to a service record of a captain and in accordance with current circumstances. Outright reformation was used mainly as a disciplinary measure, in all other cases captains were given a chance to bring their companies to full strength. For example, after the intensive fighting for Šibenik in 1647, the Senate approved Foscolo's decision not to reform weakened companies

⁷⁶⁶ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-23, f. 145v, *Adi 12. Gennaro 1650*.

⁷⁶⁷For example see: ASVe, PTM. b. 487. num. 60. (Zara, 28. Dicembre 1660)

of *oltramaringi*, but instead to give their captains a term he deemed most fitting for bringing their companies to full strength. Moreover, on this occasion, as a grant of favor for their good service, the Senate also allowed that in these companies could be admitted even Morlacchi and the Republic's subjects from Dalmatia.⁷⁶⁸ Similarly, in December 1660, Governor-General Andrea Corner gave all the captains of weakened companies three months term to bring them to satisfactory numbers.⁷⁶⁹

In November 1651, in order to prevent the captains of weakened companies from abandoning their units in Dalmatia, leaving them to slow decay, and departing for Venice under a pretext of recruiting reinforcements but with no real intention of doing it, the Senate ordered that the captains must stay with their units at all times. At the same time, a governor-general was authorized to grant permits to lieutenants to leave the province for a strictly defined period of time for carrying out this task.⁷⁷⁰ Occasionally, as a sign of favor and recognition for good service rendered, selected captains and colonels were also granted the payments of *donativo*, to help them to better complete this task. Such was for example the case with colonel Castert, in 1649, who was granted the *donativo* of 15 *ducats* per soldier.⁷⁷¹ In cases of levies of reinforcements for regiments the practice was similar, that is, not to allow colonels to leave Dalmatia, but rather to send to Italy their lieutenant-colonels.⁷⁷²

From the point of view of principles of good governance reformation of units can be seen as the most commendable measure. In August 1665, the Governor-General praised his own good administration of the army, informing the Senate that at the time of his arrival in the province the garrisons counted 3,800 men divided in 83 companies and that although the number of men rose to 6,340, the number of companies remained the same.⁷⁷³ However, this measure was not free of political complications. The most delicate question was what to do

⁷⁶⁸ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-19, f. 79v-81v, *Adi 8. Ottobre 1647*.

⁷⁶⁹ASVe, PTM. b. 487. num. 60. (Zara, 28. Dicembre 1660)

⁷⁷⁰ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-25, f. 188v-189r, *Adi 2. Novembre 1651*.

⁷⁷¹ASVe, Senato Mar, R-108, f. 154v, *Adi 11. Maggio 1649*.; Similarly, the Senate allowed levy of 50 *fanti oltramontani* to Conte Henrico Capra with grant of *donativo* of 18 ducats per head. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-113, f. 78r, *Adi 22. Marzo 1652*.; Compare also: ASVe, Senato Mar, R-113, f. 100r, *Adi 13. Aprile 1652*.

⁷⁷²For example see the commission for a levy of 150 men for the regiment of the colonel Giorgio Zanco: ASVe, Senato Mar, R-113, f. 103r, *Adi 19. Aprile 1652*.

⁷⁷³ASVe, PTM. b. 494. num. 75. (Spalato, 19. Luglio 1665)

with reformed captains? In order not to alienate captains of reformed companies, and deprive itself of any prospect of their future services, in September 1648, the Senate instructed Foscolo to give them some smaller pay or other type of compensation, as he saw fit.⁷⁷⁴ In January 1650, when Foscolo reformed 12 companies of Croats and Albanians, the Senate approved his proposal to grant monthly pay of 3-4 *ducats* to the reformed captains for the duration of the war.⁷⁷⁵ In the following years this became the standard practice for dealing with reformed captains, not only those of armed boats, but also of the units of trans-alpine and Italian infantry.⁷⁷⁶ Army governance in the 17th century, as in modern times, was as much a political as a military affair. The recompense given to reformed captains varied significantly, and persons of rank, prominence or reputation would fare much better than a *semplice capitano*. For example, in October 1651, the Senate sent back to Dalmatia to be at disposal of Governor-General Foscarini, four reformed captains each with a monthly stipend of 25 *ducats*.⁷⁷⁷ The Captain of *corazze*, Giorgio Detrico, a member of an influential Zadar noble family, was even granted a larger stipend, 40 ducats a month after his company was reformed.⁷⁷⁸

Another major competence of governor-generals in the domain of military administration, was the authority to appoint commanders to vacated posts. This was an excellent tool for promotion of favorites and for awarding persons of merit, practically at no cost for the Republic. For example in March 1647, Foscolo, after the death of Captain Girolamo Vanentini, appointed as the commander of his company Giovanni Barocciero who distinguished himself at the capture of Zemunik.⁷⁷⁹ The most common were appointments to the post of captain of a company left without one, however, extraordinary appointments to other military posts of importance such as *sergente maggiore di piazza*, *governatore di armi*

774ASVe, Senato Mar, R-??, f. 27r, *Adi 22. Settembre 1648*.

775ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-23, f. 145v, *Adi 12. Gennaio 1650*.

776For example see the decree from September 1653 to grant pays of 4 *ducats* to the reformed captains and 2 *ducats* to the officers off the companies of the armed boats. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-27, f. 165v, *Adi 20. Settembre 1653*.; See also reformation of the companies performed by Antonio Bernardo in October 1656:

ASVe, PTM. 480., num. 46. (Spalato, 3. Ottobre 1656)

777ASVe, Senato Mar, R-112, f. 285r-v, *Adi 14. Ottobre 1651*.

778ASVe, PTM. b. 473, num. 141. (Zara, 16 Ottobre 1652)

779ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 225. (Zara, 26. Marzo 1647)

di piazza, or *governatore* of ethnic units were also within the competencies of governor-generals.⁷⁸⁰ All of these appointments had to be confirmed by the Senate, but from a practical point of view, this was just a formality.⁷⁸¹ An appointment by a governor-general had administrative weight; a person appointed was effectively put into the command and most important he was entitled to the pay associated with a post.

In this regard one interesting practice of the Venetian Republic needs to be tackled at this point, namely the question of inheritance of vacant companies by other family members of a deceased captain. In May 1650, Ludovico Begna, aged 22, a son of Carlo Begna, a Zadar noble and the Captain of a company of *Corazze*, approached Governor-General Foscolo and petitioned him that the company commanded by his father, who recently had passed away, be entrusted to him. Foscolo conceded to this request, appointed Ludovico as the commander and recommended his cause to the Senate, which in less than a year confirmed Lodovico as the Captain.⁷⁸² The petitions of the families of deceased captains asking for the transfer of the command of a company to close kin (son, brother, nephew, ...) were a common occurrence. Moreover, both the Senate and governor-generals almost always, in honor of the good service of the deceased, conceded to such requests, even in the cases when a captain left no adult male heir. For example, in February 1655, cavalry Captain Marco Suliman left behind a wife and two under aged sons, 10 and 13 years old at the time. Governor-General Antonio Zen, in regard to a good service of the captain and his ancestors left the company to the wife, who was to select one *valoroso commandate*, to run the company until her son reached adulthood.⁷⁸³

780For example, in November 1648, Foscolo appointed extraordinary *segente maggiore* for Šibenik and in 1649 with the appointment of the *governatore di armi* for Kotor. ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 508. (Zara, 14. Novembre 1648); PTM. b. 467. num. 538. (Di Galea sopra Cattaro, 20. Febraro 1648. mv.); Similarly, Governor-General Antonio Bernardo, in August 1656, appointed Nicolo Sdugia as the *governatore delle milite Albanese*. ASVe, PTM. b. 480. (unnumbered), (Zara, 14. Agosto 1656) attachment: *Decree of appointment*.

781For example of Senate's confirmations of Foscolo's appointments see: ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, f. 148v, *Adi 5. Giugno 1646.*; R-108, f. 108r, *Adi 14. Aprile 1649.*; f. 120v, *Adi 22. Aprile 1649.*

782ASVe, PTM. b. 470, num. 708. (Zara, 17. Maggio 1650); ASVe, Senato Mar, R-112, f. 84r, *Adi 14. Aprile 1651.*; See similar decree in the case of another influential Dalmatian family, *Conte di Possedaria*: ASVe, Senato Mar, R-119, fol. 160r-v, *Adi 6 Luglio 1656.*

783ASVe, PTM. b. 477., num. 14. (Zara 15. Febraro, 1654 m.v.) attachment: *decree of appointment.*

However, there were some very damaging consequences of this benevolent policy of the Venetian government. In February 1658, Governor-General Antonio Bernardo informed the Senate that during his tour of the province he had noted that replacement officers (reformed captains or lieutenants), whom the Senate or his predecessors had charged with temporary running of companies, until the sons of the dead captains were old enough, "*non potendo haver alcun amore à Compagnie, che non sono loro proprie.*" Because of this, writes Bernardo, captains did not pay sufficient attention to their companies and they were decaying. Bernardo called upon the Senate to reconsider this policy, and proposed that in these troublesome times it would be more fitting to grant stipends to heirs of *capitani benemeriti* and appoint as commanders of vacant companies "*huomini di vaglia, atti à ben comandarle.*"⁷⁸⁴ Yet the Senate remained faithful to its policy, thanked Bernardo for his observations and instructed him to be watchful and to appoint to vacant posts of command only "*persone da sufficienza.*"⁷⁸⁵ The Senate's policy was in accordance with a carefully preserved image of the Republic as a just and benevolent ruler that awarded those who served it faithfully.

6.4. A Benevolent Commander: The Ideology of the Serenissima and the Military Administration

... and because the kind will of the Prince, always incline to satisfy the merit of those who faithfully serve, ...⁷⁸⁶

Like all other contemporary European rulers, the Venetian Republic was rather harsh in the domain of military justice. Breaches of military discipline such as disobedience, stealing and attacks on the property of civilians were usually publicly punished by the procedure known as "*dar la corda,*" which consisted in pulling an offender to the top of a beam and letting him fall down.⁷⁸⁷ Deserters caught on the run could expect the most severe punishment; in July 1663, out of 23 French soldiers that fled from Split 15 were caught and brought back, two leaders of

⁷⁸⁴ASVe, PTM. b. 482. num. 158. (Zara, 15. Febraro 1657 m.v.)

⁷⁸⁵ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-33, f. 34v, *Adi 9. Marzo 1658.*

⁷⁸⁶... *perche inclina sempre la benignità del Prencipe a consolar il merito de chi fedelmente serve, ...*; The above quote is taken from the decree issued by Governor-General Dolfin granting 4 ducats of pay to 17 reformed captains of *oltramarine* companies, for the duration of this war, with the obligation to serve personally under arms. DAZd, *Atti di Provveditori Generali*, vol. 18, f. 55r-v, Zara, 13 Ottobre 1653.

⁷⁸⁷For example see punishment of soldiers accused of disorder in Šibenik: ASVe, PTM. b. 484. num. 220. (Zara, 17. Novembre 1658)

this enterprise were sentenced to death and all the rest to galley service.⁷⁸⁸ Mutineers could expect even less mercy, whether or not their reasons for mutiny were justified. When in February 1653, the Governor of Klis, sentenced to death one soldier because of minor negligence during guard duty, the garrison in Klis mutinied and with arms in hand, "*gridando Viva San Marco*," demanded the change of the Governor. The garrison was appeased by the payment of wages and opening of a formal investigation against Governor Balbi,⁷⁸⁹ yet the three main leaders of this mutiny were sentenced to death and their bodies displayed in the Split harbor "*ad esempio, e terrore degl' altri*," while five other mutineers were sentenced to galleys.⁷⁹⁰ The Republic simply did not tolerate open disobedience from soldiers in its service.

However, there was the other another side of this coin. The image of a benevolent and just ruler that the Republic advertised in other aspects was also present in the governance of the military affairs. The Republic did not miss the opportunity to appear generous toward those who served it faithfully. As was mentioned previously, the standard practice was to leave the companies of deceased or old captains to their family members. If wives and daughters of the captains fallen in the service of the Republic managed to present their petitions to the Senate, they could expect to be given a state support, either in a form of a monthly stipend or one time help. For example, Margarita, a converted Muslim and wife of deceased Captain of armed boat Pietro Sestana, was in June 1652 granted by the Senate a monthly stipend of 5 *ducats* for life, their under aged son 10 *ducats* a month for a period of 10 years and their daughter 50 *ducats* "*al tempo del suo maritare, o monacare*."⁷⁹¹

Similarly, persons of quality and renown could count on the Republic's generosity in the case of their falling into Ottoman captivity. The previously mentioned case of engineer Alessandro Magli for whose release the Republic gave two Ottoman beys was not an isolated case. If the truth be told, although the Republic was willing to provide Ottoman prisoners for

788ASVe, PTM. 490. num. 78. (Spalato, 24. Giugno 1663)

789ASVe, PTM. b. 474. num. 11. (Di Zara, 3. Febraro 1652 m.v.); num. 13. (Di Zara, 11. Febraro 1652 m.v.)

790ASVe, PTM. b. 474. num. 16. (Di Spalato, 4. Marzo 1653); The Senate quickly approved all of Dolfin's actions. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-27, f. 38r, *Adi 8. Marzo 1653*.

791ASVe, Senato Mar, R-113, f. 200r-v, *Adi 22. Giugno 1652*.

exchange, it was not willing to pay ransoms except in the case of its nobles.⁷⁹² However, once released from captivity, officers could count on being given recompense on the account of their pays for the time spent in captivity. In August 1651, the Senate decreed that Captain Bernardin Bertolazzi, a member of a distinguished Dalmatian family was to be paid all of his pay for the period of two years and three months which he had spent as an Ottoman prisoner.⁷⁹³ In the aftermath of the Venetian defeat at Knin in 1654, when a large number of Venetian captains and officers were captured by the Ottomans, the Senate granted half pay to all of them. Over the next few years, one by one, as they managed to obtain their liberty, the ex-captives presented themselves in Venice in order to obtain the settlement of their debts.⁷⁹⁴

Whether the actions above can be labeled as "social" policies or simple political pragmatism, investment into the men that could be expected to continue their service, or propaganda intended to promote faithful service to the Republic, is open to debate. What can be certain is that the Republic was consistent in the application of these policies. The archival records of the Senate are full of petitions of old and worn out officers; widows, brothers, daughters and sons of deceased soldiers, all asking for grants of stipends or some other form of material help in proportion to the merit of their dead relative's service. Almost without an exception, the Senate granted all such requests. However, providing financial resources for these stipends was another matter. It was to the communal treasury of the place of habitation of a supplicant, that fell the responsibility for payment of these stipends in the years to come. In the case of petitions of Dalmatian subjects of the Republic this was the treasury in Zadar. The efficiency of the Republic in meeting not only its financial obligations, but also the demands of supplies, food, arms, munitions and other provisions of war, is the subject of the next chapter dealing with the logistical context of the Dalmatian battlefield.

792Such was for example the case in September 1653, when the Senate authorized the expense of 110 *Reali* for ransom from captivity of *Signore Cornaro*. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-27, f. 165v, *Adi 20. Settembre 1653*.

793ASVe, Senato Mar, R-112, f. 246r, *Adi 31. Agosto 1651*.

794For example, lieutenant Giacob Federico Ilirus, after 15 months of captivity has with the recommendation of Governor-General Zen departed from Dalmatia to Venice. ASVe. PTM. b. 479. not numerated (Zara, 7. Marzo, 1656)

Chapter 3: The Logistical Context

The Republic's governor-generals in Dalmatia, like any other early modern military commanders, were fully aware that equally important as having an army in the area of operations was the ability to maintain it with adequate provisions of ammunition, food and, above all money. After governing the Republic's war efforts in Dalmatia for almost five years, dissatisfied and tired, the Governor-General Lunardo Foscolo reminded the Senate once again of the grave consequences of lack of fundamental provisions with the following words:

For God's sake, I beg Your Excellencies to reflect upon the extremity of my sufferings, after the service of five years and two months, I am reduced to such a state that I am left with little else than just the title of General, whereas without money and grain to console and sustain the troops, respect is lost, and obedience perishes; the sole authority of the office is not sufficient to divert disorders if it is not supported by the means to maintain it with required decorum.⁷⁹⁵

And indeed, one of most common themes found in the letters by the governor-generals is that of total lack of money and food, accompanied by pleas that the intolerable burden of their service be eased by swift transfer of these provisions. While the previous chapter has dealt in length with the Republic's military commitment in Dalmatia and the peculiarities of the Venetian administration of its armed forces, this chapter divided into two parts aims to discuss two equally important problems: (1) that of financing the army and (2) that of providing troops with enough ammunition, food and other necessary materials. Without taking this logistical context into consideration, it is impossible to understand why the war events as described in the first part took the course they did. As Martin Van Creveld in his seminal work put it, strategy and politics may be the arts of possible, still what is possible is in the first place determined by "the hardest facts of all: those concerning requirements, supplies available and expected, organization and administration, transportation and arteries of communication."⁷⁹⁶

⁷⁹⁵*Supplicole rifletter, per pietà, l'estremo di mie afflittioni, doppo il servitio di cinque anni, et vicine doi mesi, che mi ritrovo in questa Provintia, ridotto in stato di posseder poco altro, che di nome, di solo Generale, mentre senza denaro, et biade per consolarle militie, et sostener le, manca il rispetto, si perde l'obediencia, ne per scansar disordini basta l'auttorità della Carica, mentre non vi son li mezzi, per sostenerla col dovuto decoro.* ASVe. PTM. b. 470. num. 751. (Zara 30. Settembre 1650.)

⁷⁹⁶Martin Van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980) p. 1.

1. *Financing the Venetian War Effort in the Dalmatian Battlefield: Words can not be spent instead of money ...*⁷⁹⁷

As it was mentioned in the first chapter, even before the war started, from the administrative point of view, Dalmatia was not financially self-sufficient. Every year, some 120,000 *ducats* had to be supplied from Venice in order to cover the deficit of the provincial treasury, charged with paying the costs of local administration and defense. With the outbreak of hostilities, in 1645, the pressure on the local treasury increased drastically. What worsened the financial situation even further was the fact that because of the war and the interruption of commerce with the Ottoman Empire, the incomes of the Dalmatian communes decreased significantly. While during pre-war years some 65,000 *ducats* could be collected locally from taxes and salt trade, by 1662 the incomes of the local treasuries of the Dalmatian communes amounted to merely 32,703 *ducats*.⁷⁹⁸ To meet the extraordinary costs of the war - upgrading existing fortifications, constructing new ones, maintaining the army of almost 10,000 men, launching offensive campaigns - far larger sums were necessary, and obviously those had to be sent from Venice. However, before proceeding with the analysis of the financial challenges the Republic faced in financing the defense of the Dalmatian theater of operation, one more issue needs to be tackled: the question of the monetary system of the Venetian Republic and the consequences its financial policy had on financing the overall war effort.

1.1. The Monetary Policy of the Republic and its Influence on War Financing

The complexities of early modern monetary systems are far beyond the scope of this study, yet, in order to avoid possible confusion and/or misunderstandings, a few remarks concerning the currencies in circulation and the monetary system of the Venetian Republic are necessary. The term *ducat*, used extensively in the previous chapters and also in further sections of this chapter, does not refer to the actual coin, but rather to the money of account, that is the

⁷⁹⁷"*Non si possono spender parole per danari,...*" quote by Governor-general Lunardo Foscolo. ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 360. (Zara, 6 Genaro 1647. m.v.)

⁷⁹⁸According to a report (*relazione*) by Lorenzo Dolfin to the Senate, after his return from service in Dalmatia, the income of Dalmatia communes fell to 33,018 *ducats*. *Commissiones et Relationes Venetae* 6, p. 103; Similarly, in 1662, the incomes of local treasuries of Dalmatian communes amounted to 32,703 *ducats*. ASVe, PTM. b. 489, num. 19. (Spalato, 28. Agosto 1662)

monetary unit used for bookkeeping and accounting. In the middle of the seventeenth century, one *ducat* of account (*ducato ideale o immaginario*), was set to be worth six *lire* of account, each of which in turn consisted of 20 *soldi*. The famous Venetian gold coin, minted in the Republic's mint or *Zeccha*, the name of which – the *Ducat* - this money of account inherited, was actually called *Zecchino* (*Cecchino*), or *Ducato d'oro*. Due to its high proportion of gold, this currency enjoyed considerable respect and was used for large scale financial transactions.⁷⁹⁹ The official value of this currency was, by the decree of 13 November 1643, established at 16 *lire*.⁸⁰⁰ In addition to its own money of very good quality, the Republic was flooded with other coins, both gold (*Ongar, Doppia*) and silver ones (*Scudo, Real*) of lower qualities, used extensively for everyday life consumption, and in case of silver coins, especially *Reali*, for trade with the Ottoman empire.⁸⁰¹ That said, what remains to be tackled is the question of the difference in the value of the particular currency in Venice and in provinces.

Due to a scarcity of "hard cash" in Dalmatia, or for that matter in any other part of *Stato di Mar*, the coins had a greater value in overseas provinces than in Venice. This different rate used to value the currencies in Dalmatia, was known as: "*moneta di provintia, valuta di provintia, corso di provintia ...*" Table 1, in Appendix 1.4, contains the data concerning the value of the particular currency in Dalmatia expressed in *lire* (and *soldi*) of account. For example, until 1653, the silver *Scudo*, which was valued in Venice at 9 *lire* and 6 *soldi* (9:6L), was worth 11 *lire* in Dalmatia, giving the Republic the additional profit of 18.28 percent when paying for its obligations in the province using this currency. By 1653, the value of *Scudi* in Dalmatia rose to 11:10 *lire*, producing even greater profit of 23.66 percent. However, as can be seen from the same table, during the first six years of the war (1645-1651), the most

⁷⁹⁹For more on Venice's monetary system see: Ugo Tucci, "Monete e Banche" in *Storia di Venezia. Dalle Origini alla Caduta della Serenissima*, vol. VII. (Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1997) pp. 569- 594; For an overview of the Venetian coins produced by the Republic's mint in the period of the War of Crete see: Nicolò Papadopoli Aldobrandini, *Le Monete di Venezia. Descritte ed Illustrate*, vol. 3. (Venezia: Tipogtaphia Libreria Emiliana, 1919) pp. 267-390.

⁸⁰⁰Nicolò Papadopoli Aldobrandini, *Le Monete di Venezia*. p. 268-9.

⁸⁰¹For more on use of various European currencies in the Balkans, especially silver *Reali*, see: Vuk Vinaver, *Pregled istorije novca u jugoslovenskim zemljama [Survey of History of the Money in the South Slavic Lands]*, (Beograd: Istorijski Institut, 1971.) pp. 142-144, 150-153;

profitable currencies for use in Dalmatia were the silver *Real* and the Republic's own *Zecchino*, valued at 8 and 16 *lire* in Venice and at 10 and 20 *lire* (respectively) in Dalmatia, thus both yielding the profit of 25% (see Table 1. in Appendix 1.4). Whenever possible the Republic would indeed ship high quantities of those currencies to Dalmatia, as was the case in February 1648, when as part of the preparations for Foscolo's spring offensive, a large shipment of more than 100,000 *ducats* was sent to Dalmatia composed entirely of *Reali* (80,000 coins).⁸⁰² Yet these coins were in high demand, and often not available in the Republic's mint. Thus the Republic's paymaster had to make do with what was at hand and send provisions of money to the Dalmatian provincial treasury in the form of currencies with less favorable exchange rates, such as the previously mentioned *Scudo*. For example, the 50,000 *ducats* that arrived in September 1648 were mainly composed of *Scudi* (22,493) and only a smaller portion of the money arrived in the more favorable *Reali* (12,000).⁸⁰³ Moreover, during the last years of Foscolo's mandate, in the period from September 1649 to September 1650 the main currency in use was the *Scudo*. Out of 193,000 *ducats* shipped in this period, the largest portion arrived as *Scudi* (82,819 coins), while the rest consisted of 11,654 *Doppie* and 6,250 *Zecchini*.⁸⁰⁴

The most interested in these financial "machinations" were the governor-generals in Dalmatia, who had to make most out of limited resources sent to them from Venice. It therefore comes as no surprise that they kept a close watch on the standing of the particular currency in the province, and kept their superiors well informed concerning current exchange rates. In June 1651, after receiving a shipment of 50,000 *ducats*, partly composed of *Ongari*, a currency not previously used, Governor-General Girolamo Foscarini informed his government that *Ongars* were very valued in Dalmatia, giving a somewhat higher profit of

⁸⁰²For example, in February 1648, as part of the preparations for the spring offensive a large sum of more than 100,000 *ducats* was sent to Governor-General Foscolo, consisting entirely of *Reali* (80,000 coins). ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-19, fols. 92v, 97v, 141r, 167r, 176v, 179r, 195r; ASVe, PTM b. 466. num. 389 (Di Galera Salona, 7. Aprile 1648)

⁸⁰³ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 470. (Zara, 9. Settembre 1648.) attachment: *Compartita delli ducati m/50*, dated 9th of September 1648.

⁸⁰⁴ASVe, PTM. b.470. num. 755. (Zara, 17 Ottobre 1650) attachment: *Nota del Dannaro spedito*, dated 17th October 1650.

25.81 percent, and recommended their further use as the most favorable currency for use in Dalmatia.⁸⁰⁵ As can be seen from the summary account of the money received in the provincial treasury for the year 1653, it seems that the Senate followed the advice of its governor-general and began to use this currency extensively: out of 185,000 *ducats* sent from January 1653 until November 1653, apart from the 6,000 *Scudi* and 3,648 *Doppie*, all the rest was sent in the form of 63,840 *Ongari*.⁸⁰⁶ However, soon the position of the most profitable currency for use in Dalmatia passed to Republic's own *Zecchino*. By May 1654, the value of *Zecchino*, (the value of which was set in Venice at 17 *lire*), rose in Dalmatia from 20 *lire* (in 1648) to 21:10 *lire*. Consequently, the profit that could be extracted from the use of this currency rose from 25 percent to 34.38, making it the most profitable currency in circulation. This prompted Governor-General Lorenzo Dolfin to recommend that all further shipments of money be made in this currency.⁸⁰⁷ When, in July 1654, the next shipment of money came, consisting however of *Doppie* (which by that time also lost some of its value in the province) instead of *Zecchini*, Governor-General Dolfin, complained that *doppia* is: "*moneta la più svantaggiosa negli estorsi*," and asked that the next shipments be made in *Zecchini*, as he had already recommended.⁸⁰⁸ And, indeed, facing a constant cash shortage the Senate did not need further convincing. The next shipment of 20,000 *ducats* in September 1654 arrived to the pleasure of the governor-general, consisting only of *Zecchini*.⁸⁰⁹

Until the end of the war, the Republic relied mainly on its own currency and its high profit (when converted to its provincial value) to finance its war effort in Dalmatia. Simply put, specie worth 10,000 *ducats* in Venice could be worth as much as 13,438 *ducats* when shipped and spent in Dalmatia. Moreover, by the end of 1667, due to the extreme shortage of money in the province, the value of *Zecchino* rose even further, to 22 *lire* for a coin, and the difference in value in regard to its account value in Venice to 37.5 percent.⁸¹⁰ This made the use of

805ASVe, PTM, b. 471, num. 38, (Zara, 26. Giugno 1651)

806ASVe, PTM, b. 475. num. 97. (Spalato, 21 Dicembre 1653) attachment: *Ristretto di denaro*, dated 20th of December 1653.

807ASVe, PTM, b. 475. num. 129. (Zara, 23. Maggio 1654)

808ASVe, PTM, b. 476. num. 149, (Di Galea Trau, 28 Luglio 1654)

809ASVe, PTM, b. 476. num. 165, (Zara, 5 Ottobre 1654)

810ASVe, PTM, b. 498, num. 24. (Di Galera viaggiando verso Sebenico, 19. Dicembre 1667) attachment:

Zecchino, until the end of the war, the most sensible practice and also the cause of constant displeasure for governor-generals when long awaited money would finally arrive, but in some other less favorable currency. Such was for example the case in September 1668, when 15,520 *ducats* arrived all in *Realì*, the value of which at the time in the province was the same as it was at the beginning of the war, that is: 10 *lire* per coin (8 *lire* in Venice) giving extra profit of "only" 25%.⁸¹¹ Moreover, as the war approached its end, and the pressure on the Republic to maintain its defense on Crete rose, the "weaker" *Realì* almost completely substituted *Zecchini* as the main currency shipped to Dalmatia.⁸¹²

At first glance, this system may seem strange and incomprehensible to the modern reader, accustomed to a uniform and standardized value of money within the territories of modern states. Yet, one must approach the coins as a type of commodity, which, just as all others, was subject to and governed by market laws, more precisely by the laws of supply and demand. Simply put, the scarcer the money was in a particular province, the higher its value was. Therefore it should come as no surprise that the value of *Zecchino* in Kotor, and the rest of Venetian Albania, where the shortage of money was even worse than in Dalmatia, was also significantly higher. By the end of the war, in June 1669, a single *Zecchino* was valued in Venetian Albania at as much as 25 *lire* per coin.⁸¹³

All troops, military and administrative personnel serving in the provinces of the Republic were paid in coin and received their wages calculated on the basis of the current rate of *corso di provintia*. By using these altered rates of exchange, the Republic practically transferred part of the financial burden of the war on those in its service. As can be expected, such an arrangement was not popular among those in Republic's service and, not surprisingly, many tried to circumvent it. Especially strongly opposed to this practice were troops of other states rented to the Republic, and not previously familiar with it. Such was for example the case

Ristretto del denaro, dated 22nd December 1667.

811ASVe, PTM, b. 500 num.116 (Corzola, 14. Settembre 1668)

812The last 45,000 *ducats* shipped to Dalmatia from June until the August 1669, all arrived in *Realì*.ASVe, PTM, b. 501. num. 199. (Lessina, 6 Giugno 1669); num. 204 (Lessina, 20. Giugno 1669); num. 213 (Spalato, 31. Luglio 1669); num. 217. (Zara, Spalato 22. Agosto 1669)

813ASVe, PTM, b. 501. num. 199. (Lessina, 6. Giugno 1669)

with two Piedmont regiments, serving in Dalmatia for the campaign season of 1660.⁸¹⁴ Even some of Republic's own forces, those with several years' long service, tried to attain exception from this practice, on account of their long and faithful service and/or reputation of their commanders. For example, in March 1647, two companies of *Corazze*, the elite heavy cavalry, that of Colonel Longavalle and Baron Capet, after their transfer from the Italian mainland to Dalmatia, asked to be exempt from this practice or that their wages be increased.⁸¹⁵ However, the Senate considered granting of any such exemptions in Dalmatia as a possible dangerous precedent that could result in similar requests from troops serving on Crete, and thus possibly open the door to the collapse of the entire system. So, in this case, just as in any further similar request, the Senate remained firm, and refused to make concessions. However, in order to avoid offending Colonel Longavalle, who served the Republic for a long period of time, the Senate instructed Governor-General Foscolo to appease him with a personal gift of some 300-400 *ducats*.⁸¹⁶

The strategy with much better chances of success, than an outright attempt to avoid being paid according to the exchange rate of the province was that used by the colonel of the Swiss regiment serving in Dalmatia, from October 1648. Familiar with the practices of the Venetian service, the colonel did not dispute the calculation of the wages according to the exchange rate of the province, but rather flatly refused to be paid in *Reali* (a currency which gave the highest profit to the Republic - 25%), declaring that he is willing to accept only *Doppie* or *Scudi*, both currencies less detrimental for the receiver (see Table 1 in Appendix 1.4). Such a stand bewildered Governor-General Foscolo, who informed the Senate with frustration concerning the pretensions and "*chimere*" (as Foscolo called it) of the Swiss colonel.⁸¹⁷ However, the colonel, who justified his stand by the claim that such was the arrangement previously made between the Republic and his superiors in Zurich, got the upper hand in this

814ASVe, PTM. b. 487. num. 40. (Spalato, 12. Settembre 1660)

815ASVe, PTM. 464. num. 217, (Zara, 12. Marzo 1647)

816ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-18, fols. 51r-52r, 107r-108r; In May Foscolo followed up on this order and made a payment of 100 Zecchini to the Colonel *Longavalle*. ASVe, PTM. 464. num. 244. (Sebenico Di Galera, 12. Maggio 1647)

817ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 514, (Zara, 26. Novembre 1648)

affair, since all further provisions of cash sent to Dalmatia for payments to the Swiss regiment consisted of either *Scudi* or *Doppie*.⁸¹⁸ Although not being able to entirely avoid the Republic's intrusion on their wages, the Swiss managed at least to establish some level of damage control over it.

This erosion of their wages was hard not merely for the ordinary soldier but also for the various *Capi di Guerra* in Venetian service. For the *condottieri* of higher ranks - generals, superintendents, etc. -, whose annual stipends amounted to several thousand *ducats*, this could result in the loss of rather high sums of money. Therefore, not surprisingly, they tried to escape this additional "tax" on their stipends in numerous ways, mainly by asking for the settlement of their credits in Venice. Yet, the general policy of the Senate was that the payment of wages to the persons in the service of the Republic, whether in advance or for services already rendered, should be made according to the exchange rates of their place of service, and not according to the exchange rate of the place where payment took place. In short, this meant that colonels, captains and others, coming to Venice in order to settle their credits, would still be paid according to the exchange rate of Dalmatia, Crete or other province in which they served.⁸¹⁹

The Republic did not abandon this practice in cases of heirs of deceased military commanders, who asked for settlement of their credits, and decreed payments to be adjusted according to the rate of the province of service of the deceased. Such was for example the case with the heirs of Colonel Francesco Ernest Castret, to whom the Senate granted the payment of six due wages calculated according to the rate of Dalmatia.⁸²⁰ An excellent example of the implementation of this policy is the resolution of the Senate regarding the application of Colonel Andrea Britton, from May 1651. Before his departure for service in Dalmatia, Colonel Britton asked for (1) an advance payment of his stipend, so he could

818ASVe, PTM. b. 469, num. 656. (Zara, 11. Dicembre 1649) attachment: *Nota del denaro*; ASVe. PTM. b.470.; num. 755. (Zara, 17 Ottobre 1650) Attachment to the letter: *Nota del denaro*; ASVe. PTM. b.470. num. 764. (Zara, 20 Novembre 1650) attachment to the letter: *Conto in Ristretto di Dannaro spedito da Venetia dall' Off(itia).li sopra le Camere per li paggam(en).ti delle Millitie Svizzere.*

819 Such are for examples settling of the credit of Colonel *Guglielmo Sargo*, in September 1648, or the debt of Colonel *Andrea Britton* in March 1651. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-107, f. 6v; R-112, f. 44r; 820ASVe, Senato Mar, R-113, f. 160r;

support himself during the voyage, and (2) that the payment of one half of his annual stipend be transferred to *camera di Padova*, and paid there to his agent. The Senate granted both of these requests: it decreed immediate payment, in advance, of six colonel's stipends, and approved the transfer of payment of other six to the treasury of Padova, yet clearly stating that, still, all payments should be made according to the exchange rates of Dalmatia.⁸²¹

Of course, there were also exceptions to this general rule. The shortage of qualified, experienced military commanders above the rank of colonel: superintendents, *governatori*, generals etc., which troubled the Republic through the entire course of the war, provided those with better bargaining positions, especially as hostilities dragged on from year to year. It was not uncommon for the Senate to decree, as an act of special personal favor, that a particular person be paid for the service rendered overseas according to the rates of Venice. For example, Baron Christof Martin Degenfeld, who served in Dalmatia as *Governator Generale di Armi*, manage to obtain settlement of his credit for the season of 1646 in Venice, calculated according to the exchange rates of Venice, not of Dalmatia.⁸²² Similarly, during the final years of the war, Marchese degl' Oddi judged his bargaining position strong enough, and during the negotiations for the extension of his contract as the commander of Venetian forces in Dalmatia for the upcoming campaign of 1669, requested that both his credits from the previous year and all future stipends be paid according to "*moneta corrente Venetiana, e non Dalmatina*."⁸²³

On the other hand, the prospect of being paid according to the exchange rate of Venice, instead of a particular overseas province of the Republic, could also be used as a strong stimulant in convincing individuals to accept the hard and unpopular service in the Levant. If the service in Dalmatia was hard, that on Crete was far harsher and more unpopular. Commanders serving in Dalmatia could, at least in theory, rather easily obtain permission to leave and go to Venice in order to settle their financial issues. By contrast, those serving in the

821ASVe, Senato Mar, R-112, fols. 109v-110r;

822ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, fols. 321v-322r, 330r;

823ASVe, PTM. b. 500. num. 147. (Zara, 22. Novembre 1668)

Levant, faced the prospect of spending rather long periods, sometimes even years, before being able to return to Venice, to settle their credits and overdue salaries. Accordingly, the Republic had to offer some compensation to those ready to accept this service. And indeed, it did so in the form of several financial incentives: settlement of previously accumulated credits and payment in advance of several (usually six) monthly wages, all calculated according to the rate of Venice, and not that of Crete. The Senate's decree of 11th May 1652, concerning the departure of *Conte Ossalco de Polcenigo* for his service on Crete, can serve as a good illustration of the implementation of the policies outlined above. First, the Senate ordered that before the departure of *Conte Polcenigo*, the second half of his yearly stipend from the previous year, when he served in Dalmatia, is to be paid in full and calculated according to the rate of Dalmatia, and secondly, that one half of his annual stipend for the next year, is to be paid to him in advance, calculated according to the rate of Venice.⁸²⁴

In this manner, with a simple administrative ordinance the Republic was able to create additional value from its specie. The difference in the exchange rates between the center and the provinces enabled it to draw significant profit (as was mentioned above, in the case of *Zecchino* even up to 37.5 per cent), once the coins were employed in the province. Secondly, this monetary policy also provided the Republic with additional bargaining space, in its relations with individuals employed in its service. By granting special favors, in the form of payment of stipends to important individuals, according to the exchange rates of Venice, at their great satisfaction, the Republic could easily promote the image of the good and benevolent ruler, by simply giving up on its profit.

1.2. Transporting Money

Unlike, for example, the Spanish monarchy, which heavily relied on commercial infrastructure of the Netherlands or Genoese financiers for sending large sums of money to its army paymaster in Flanders as paper credit in the form of letters of exchange,⁸²⁵ the Republic of Venice, although quite familiar with such financial instruments, did not resort to them so

⁸²⁴ASVe, Senato Mar, R-112, f. 134v, *Adi 11. Maggio 1652*.

⁸²⁵Geoffrey Perker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road*, pp. 146-148.; For the French case, compare: John Lyn, *Giant of the Gran Siècle*, pp. 155-6.

extensively for transferring funds to Dalmatia. The reasons for this were multiple. In the first place there simply were no resident merchants, in Dalmatia, rich enough to provide the Republic with sufficiently large sums in the form of short term credits. Secondly, such credits did not come without any cost. For example, in the Spanish case, the interest rates on these credits fluctuated between 7 and 20 percent, depending on the current ruler's demand for hard cash.⁸²⁶ The Venetian ruling elite, whether wishing to avoid such additional expenses, judging them unnecessary, or because of some other more ideological reason (deeming such contracts between the state/*publico* and its subjects inconsistent with their vision of proper running of public affairs) kept the state monopoly on the issuing of money to the state representative in provinces. As the final outcome, every *ducat* destined for Dalmatia had to be sent not as paper money, but as specie. Only occasionally in special cases, did the Republic authorize its governor-general in Dalmatia to issue letters of exchange payable in Venice, to particular persons either as the instrument of assurance or as a grant of favor.⁸²⁷ Such was, for example, the case in October 1649, when the colonel of the Swiss regiment conceded to accept a letter of exchange in the amount of 17,000 *Doppie di oro* from Governor-General Foscolo, instead of hard cash, before consenting to the muster and inspection of the numerical strength of his regiment.⁸²⁸

⁸²⁶Geoffrey Perker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road*, p. 151.

⁸²⁷The governor-general was the only public representative authorized to issue letters of exchange payable in Venice. When at the beginning of the war, in July 1647, the letter of exchange in the amount of 1667 *Scudi*, issued by the extraordinary governor of Šibenik for the money spent on fortifications and army, arrived to Venice, the Senate ordered the governor-general to inform all of Republic's officials in Dalmatia, that such credit papers must be issued with participation of the governor-general, otherwise these will not be paid. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-18, f. 153v-154r; Adi 11, Luglio 1647.; Nevertheless, in spite of this decree, public officials of higher rank, when faced with army mutiny due to lack of coin turned to this instrument to appease captains. Such was as for example the case with *Provveditore Straordinario* of Split and Trogir, Pesaro, who, in September 1648, resorted to issuing letters of exchange to local garrisons in order to avoid eruption of disorder. ASVe, PTM, b. 468, num. 481. (Zara, 28. Settembre 1648)

⁸²⁸Because of the Republic's inability to ensure regular payments to these rather expensive troops, their debts accumulated from month to month. Moreover, since special privileges, specified in their contract with the Republic, prevented the muster of this regiment in case of active debt, the Republic was accumulating further debts for soldiers long dead, or deserted. In order to establish the exact number of these troops, and put a stop to this excessive expenditure, the Republic ordered Governor-General Foscolo to attempt to convince the colonel of the Swiss regiment to accept the letter of exchange in the amount of 12,000 *Doppie d'oro* (c.a. 63870 *ducats* according to the exchange rate of the province). After hard negotiations Foscolo succeeded, but was forced to issue the letter of exchange, in the amount of 17,000 *Doppie* (c.a. 90,483 *ducats*) instead of 12,000. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-23, fols. 54r, 56r, 61r; ASVe, PTM, b. 469, num. 634. (Di Zara, 15 Ottobre 1649.) Attachment: *Scrittura per il Collonello di Svizzeri*

One of the main drawbacks of this policy was that the time between the Senate's decision to allot the funds for Dalmatia and their actual arrival in the province could prove to be quite long. First, the sum decreed for transfer needed to be assembled, and as the war dragged on, collecting assigned sums of money proved to be a more and more difficult and time-consuming task. In order to remedy for these delays caused by slow collection of funds the Senate usually opted for increasing the sum assigned. Yet, by doing so, it also caused further delays. Finally, once the allotted sums were gathered, all that was left to be done was transfer them. Although Zadar was rather close to Venice, and under favorable conditions the distance could be covered by galley in as little as four days,⁸²⁹ still, bad weather, especially during fall and winter could cause additional delays of unpredictable duration, further frustrating governor-generals in Dalmatia, eagerly awaiting the arrival of this badly needed resource.

For example, on 15th October 1647, the Senate voted for the decision that 12,000 silver *Reals* were to be sent to Governor-General Foscolo in Dalmatia. Since the preparation of the assigned sum was progressing rather slowly, on 6th December the Senate voted to increase the sum to an impressive 60,000 *ducats*. Almost a month later, on 2nd January 1648, the money was finally ready, and the Senate informed the governor-general that the galley *Dotta* was about to depart and that the sum was increased by further 7,000 *Reals* destined for Kotor. Yet, because of the need for some additional repairs the galley *Dotta* was delayed in its departure. To compensate for this delay, on 18th January, the Senate informed the governor-general that the sum being sent was further increased by additional 8,000 *Reals*, to be used to pay for the galleys serving in the Adriatic. Finally, on 24th January, everything was ready and the galley *Dotta* was ordered to depart for Dalmatia as soon as possible. Unfortunately, for the next two weeks bad weather kept the galley in port, and it was not before 6th February 1648 that the galley finally departed for Dalmatia. All in all, the entire process, from initial assignment of the funds until their arrival to Zadar took almost four months.⁸³⁰ This represents one of most drastic cases, yet it illustrates well all the unpredictable factors involved in the shipment of

⁸²⁹Such was for example the case in October 1658, when the galley *Brazzana* brought 40,000 *ducats*. ASVe, PTM. b. 484. num. 217. (Spalato, 31. Ottobre 1658)
⁸³⁰ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-19, fol's. 92v, 97v, 141r, 167r, 176v, 179r, 195r;

specie to Dalmatia.

Transporting valuable goods over a distance was always a delicate and costly operation involving high security risks, especially when goods had to be moved by land.⁸³¹ Fortunately, the Republic could rely on its navy and use much cheaper and more practical sea transport for the transfer of specie to Dalmatia. Still, although the trip to Zadar was a relatively short one, the entire operation was not free of expense and security hazards. For the Venetian side, the worst-case scenario would be the capture of a ship carrying provisions of money by Ottoman corsairs. In order to overcome these challenges, the Republic almost always entrusted this task to its war galleys (see Appendix 1.4/Table 2). A large crew of 290 men, good armaments, seaworthiness and the speed of these vessels, were characteristics expected to ensure safe passage of the money to its overseas destination. Additionally, especially during spring and summer months, several smaller war ships, so called *barche armate* were assigned to the galley as its escorts during its trip to Zadar.⁸³² Ottoman corsairs were not the sole threat that prompted the Senate to assign escorts to ships carrying money. Equally dangerous was also the "enemy within," or prisoners or convicts serving aboard as chained rowers, as an incident from November 1650 testifies. While the galley *Cornara* was sailing for Dalmatia with 30,000 *ducats* for the wages of the Swiss regiment, in the waters near Pula in Istria, a number of convicts serving their sentences on the galley mutinied. Convicts attempted to kill officers, take over control over the ship and afterwards save themselves by flight to nearby shores. However, due to diligence of the galley's captain, the mutiny was suppressed and disaster was avoided. In his letter informing the Senate of this incident, Governor-General Foscolo did not miss the opportunity to warn the Senate of the dangers of dispatching galleys carrying money

831For example, for problems involved in transport of specie using land routes in the French case see: David Parrott, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France*, pp. 244-5;

832Such was the case, for example, in June 1651, when the Senate ordered that galley Arbessana, carrying 50,000 *ducats* for Dalmatia should be accompanied by two *barche armate*. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-24, f. 92v; Similarly, on 19th June 1658, the Senate informed Governor-General Antonio Bernardo that the galley Zane is ready to depart with 50,000 *ducats*. At the same time, the Senate also informed Bernardo that because of increased corsair activity in the Adriatic, on its trip from Venice to Istira, the galley would be escorted by one armed boat, and ordered him to send two *barche armate* under his command to take over escort duty from there until Zadar. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-33, f. 145v-146r;

without the escort of other galleys or at least some other armed vessels.⁸³³

Large crews, which represented one of the main advantages of galleys in regard to security risks, also represented their main shortcoming considering the logistical problems involved in their use. Not only was equipping these vessels with adequate provisions for sea voyage (water, food, ammunition, ropes, oars etc.) rather costly, but finding substitutes in case its crew was depleted by hardships of service was time consuming and a very unpopular task as well. For example, in 1650, although 50,000 *ducats* destined for Dalmatia were ready by 18th August, the galley *Vitturi* charged with its transport was in such bad shape that a new levy of 100 rowers, one carpenter and a series of small repairs including changing the main sail, needed to be ordered. All of this resulted in the delay in departure of the galley by more than two weeks.⁸³⁴ In order to avoid such complications and cut costs, in case of shipments of smaller sums of cash, or when it had to be sent urgently, the Republic turned to the use of smaller armed vessels. For example, in September 1651, 10,000 *ducats* destined for the governor of Klis, were sent by *barc' armata*.⁸³⁵ Yet the quickest way of sending money was using postal ships, the so-called *Caichio* which could leave the port almost immediately and arrive in Zadar, in as little as 2-3 days. Such were for example cases with the transfer of 4,000 *ducats* for Kotor in October 1652,⁸³⁶ or 5,000 *ducats*, in December 1654 sent to Governor-General Lorenzo Dolfin to cover the debts of his office before his departure from Dalmatia.⁸³⁷

Moreover, as the war became prolonged and as Ottoman corsair activity increased, it became highly impractical to detach a galley from the naval squadron on guard service in the Adriatic and send it to Venice where it could wait for an indefinite amount of time for the funds to be ready. This, coupled with the chronic shortage of hard cash, which resulted in frequent transfers of smaller amounts of coin, was the reason why during the last year of the war (October, 1668 – October, 1669), the use of galleys for transferring money fell

833ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num 766. (Zara, 26. Novembre 1650)

834ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-24, fols. 154v-155r, 167r;

835ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-25, f. 163r-164v;

836ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-26, f. 183v;

837 ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-28, f. 262r, 269v-270r;

significantly: out of ten shipments of money during this period, four were entrusted to postal vessels (*caicchio*), and two to small galleys (*galleote*).

1.3. Institutional Framework and a Note on Sources

Table 2 in Appendix 1.4, "Shipments and arrivals of money in Dalmatia (1646-1669)", contains data concerning all major shipments of money to Dalmatia in the years 1646-1669. The raw data for this table have been compiled from three major series of documents: in the first place, from decrees by the Venetian Senate (*Deliberazioni*), ordering assignments of funds to Republic's officials in Dalmatia, recorded in the series: *Senato Rettori*, and *Senato Mar*. In the period of the War of Crete, although not any longer the main policy making organ, the Senate was still the main nominal authority in directing the Republic's war effort.⁸³⁸ Every assignment of funds to the Republic's officials, and its military forces both on land and sea had to be voted for by this body. Yet, although Venetian officials often liked referring to it as *Augustissimo Senato*, the Senate was far from being a divine omnipotent entity, and many of its decrees never got implemented. In order to eliminate funds voted for in the Senate which actually never materialized, the collected data were further complemented with information from the so-called "*dispacci*," or letters by governor-generals confirming arrivals of ships carrying provisions of money to the province. As such, the table contains records of all of shipments of money to two central treasuries of the province, both located in Zadar, that of the governor-general, and up to 1652 (when, in order to cut the expenses, both treasuries were merged into a single one), that of the governor-general of cavalry.

Of the two treasuries, that of the governor-general was the more important one. While the treasury of the governor-general of cavalry was charged with maintenance of cavalry forces serving in the province only, that of the governor-general was responsible for covering all other ordinary (wages of infantry, navy and various military and administrative personnel) and

⁸³⁸The main state organ charged with everyday administration of military affairs was the *Collegio*, yet the legislative authority and thus putting a particular policy in practice was within the domain of the Senate. For the role of the *Collegio* and the Senate in running of the military affairs see: John R. Hale, *Military Organization of a Renaissance State*, pp. 248-283; Alberto Pirelli, *Le Milizie Venete in Palma*, pp.9-10; Alberto Pirelli, *L'esercito Veneto al primo '600*. pp. 5-12; For more on the relations and internal communication between the organs of the Venetian Republic see: Filippo de Vivo, *Information and Communication in Venice: rethinking early modern politics*, (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) pp. 37-40.

extraordinary (fortification works and launching of military campaigns) expenses linked with the conduct of war. Once received in the treasury of the governor-general, funds were next, as circumstances demanded, distributed to the administrative offices (*camere*) of provincial centers: Zadar, Šibenik, Split, Trogir, Kotor, etc., each with its own cash desk (*cassa*) charged with payment of all troops and personnel serving there. The only exception was the town of Zadar, where three cash desks (*cassa*), with clearly divided areas of responsibilities, existed simultaneously. The first, that of cavalry, was charged with payment of cavalry forces, the second, that of the *camera* of Zadar, was liable for payments of ordinary units only (*compagnie ordinarie*) and a multitude of administrative and military personnel (engineers, superintendents, governors, *stipendiati*, *provvigionati*, ...) serving in Zadar too, and finally the third cash desk, that of the governor-general's office (*generalato*), was responsible for payment of salaries to all extraordinary infantry units, both garrison troops and units serving aboard smaller armed vessels (*barche armate*, *fuste*, *galleotte*), and also for providing of monthly subsidies to galleys serving in the gulf.

These two treasuries represented the main entry points for funds sent from Venice to Dalmatia. As can be seen from the table 2 in Appendix 4, the Senate would sometimes engage in micro management of the funds sent, and allocate partial or entire sums to some specific tasks, such as: fortification works, restitution of some particular public debt or similar. However, the distribution of the funds was mainly left to discretion of the governor-general. Additionally, the table also contains records of shipments of smaller amounts of coin, occasionally sent directly to the treasury of Kotor, which due to its position, separated from the rest of Dalmatia, functioned as a semi-independent center also charged with handling the financial affairs of Budva and Paštrovići. Imperfect as it is, the table includes all major shipments of money sent to cover the cost of the war in Dalmatia, and thus serves as a good illustration concerning the scale of the financial burden this battlefield represented for the Republic's war effort. Therefore, the following section of this chapter is devoted to rather a simple question: how much money did the Republic spend in Dalmatia during the course of

the war?

1.4. The Republic's Military Expenditure in Dalmatia (1646-1669)

Figure 3.1, below, constructed from the raw data gathered in "Table 2 in Appendix 1.4," displays the dynamics of the Republic's annual expenditure in Dalmatia. During 24 years (March 1646 -October 1669), the Venetian Republic spent slightly more than four million *ducats* in Dalmatia, with an average expenditure of 168,350 *ducats* per year. By themselves, these figures do not speak much, and call for some additional comments that would provide the context. When the war broke out in 1645, the Republic found itself threatened on three different fronts: Dalmatia, the Aegean and Crete. Obviously, the limited material and financial resources of the Republic could support a full commitment to all of the above battlegrounds for a short period of time only. In circumstances of prolonged conflict, as this war turned out to be, it was practically impossible for Venice to simultaneously meet the financial needs of all theaters of operations. Thus, year after year, the Republic's policy makers had to make the hard choice of deciding to which battlefield the majority of the Republic's resources should be directed. In this regard, although no similar study exists concerning the annual expenditures of the Republic for the fleet in the Aegean, or the army on Crete, during this war, it can safely be said that this graph aptly reflects the general trends in the Republic's overall war strategy and the direction of financial resources to and from the Dalmatian theater of operations.

It has already been pointed out in Chapter 1.2. "The Republic at War," how, during 1646, alarmed by the prospect of Ottoman conquests in Dalmatia and the consequences they would have on the Republic's ability to wage war in the Levant, the Republic considerably increased its military presence in the region. A quick glance at Figure 3.1, also reveals that this increase in Republic's military commitment was also simultaneously matched by an increase in financial resources dedicated to this theater of operation. This steady increase in sums shipped to Governor-General Lunardo Foscolo reached its maximum in 1648, the year of Republic's greatest military successes in this battlefield (the capture of Klis, Knin, Drniš, Sinj). Furthermore, more than 400,000 *ducats* transferred to Dalmatia in the year 1648 represent the

largest sum of money sent to Dalmatia in a single year. Never again for the remainder of the war would the Republic make such a financial commitment to this theater of operations as it did during these first four years. All of Foscolo's successors had to meet the challenges of their service with much smaller financial resources.


From the next year, 1649, which began with the failed Venetian expedition to Albania, the provision of cash arriving to Dalmatia started to decline rapidly, until 1656, when the war time annual minimum of merely 96,000 *ducats* was reached. This significant reduction in the funds dedicated to Dalmatia coincides with the shift of the Republic's focus towards the Levant, and marks the change in the Republic's strategy in the Dalmatian theater of operations, from active to passive defense (see Chapter 1.2.). In this regard the period 1654-1657 is the most characteristic. The visible depression in Figure 3.1 during these four years in the middle of the war overlaps with the culmination of the naval battles in the Levant during this war, known as the "Four battles of the Dardanelles." During this period, the Republic committed all of its energy and resources to the Aegean theater of operations, in an attempt to establish a firm blockade of Constantinople. By doing so, the Republic aimed not only to prevent the transfer of Ottoman reinforcements, supplies and ammunition to Crete, but also to force the Ottoman government to open peace negotiations.⁸³⁹ Similarly, the Venetian failure to achieve this strategic goal and the already mentioned Ottoman shift of focus to Dalmatia from 1657 (see Chapter 1.3.10), are also reflected in Figure 3.1 in the sharp increase in Republic's spending in Dalmatia for the year 1658 (211,000 *ducats*), as the Republic became aware of this new danger.

Another interesting phenomenon, which accounts for the sharp increase in the funds sent to Dalmatia in the years 1653, 1660 and 1665 is also visible in Figure 3.1. Whenever possible, the Republic would ensure that its senior magistrates would arrive at the place of their service in style: accompanied by sufficient numbers of companions of fitting rank and status, well provisioned with ammunition, food and above all, with as abundant a sum of money as

⁸³⁹For more see: Kenneth M. Setton, *Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century*, pp. 172-189; See also: Ekkehard Eickhoff, *Venezia, Viena e Turchi*, pp. 141-167.

possible. Every change of the governor-general was usually preceded by a series of "dry" months, when only small provisions of cash, or in worst cases none at all, would reach Dalmatia, while the funds were being collected in Venice for the new governor-general. The above-mentioned increases in the graph represent the arrivals of the new governor-generals: Lorenzo Dolfin (1653), Andrea Corner (1660) and Catterino Corner (1665).

Figure 3.1. Annual shipments of money from Venice to Dalmatia



The graph is based on the data from Table 2 in Appendix 1.4.

Of all governor-generals who served in Dalmatia in the course of this war, the one that remained remembered and praised most for his achievements both by contemporary (17th century) historians and modern ones alike, was Lunardo Foscolo. And indeed, the record of military successes of the Venetian arms during his mandate – the capture of Drniš, Klis, Knin, Nadin, Novigrad, Risan, Skradin, Vrana, Zemunik (to name just the most prominent conquests), the defense of Šibenik, taking two sandjak-beys prisoners etc. - provide sufficient justification for such treatment. No doubt, Foscolo's competent leadership did play a significant part in these achievements. However, he also enjoyed remarkable material advantages in comparison to his successors, factors rarely taken into account when discussing the Republic's military engagement in the Dalmatian theater of operations. In the first place, as was shown in the previous chapter, the military forces Governor-General Lunardo Foscolo had under his command surpassed by far both in numbers and quality those of his successors.

The only governor-general who commanded an army similar in size to that of Foscolo was Antonio Bernardo (1656-1660). Yet, as was also pointed out, his force was of much inferior quality, both in terms of composition of the troops - almost 20% of his forces were made of territorial militia (*cernide*) and the number of cavalry was only one fourth of those Foscolo commanded – as well as the number and quality of *capi di guerra* and military specialists (engineers, gunners, miners etc.). Secondly, and equally importantly, the financial resources at his disposal, as can be seen even from a quick glance at Figure 3.1, surpassed by far those of his successors. While the rest of governor-generals could count on 10-12,000 *ducats* for monthly expenses, Foscolo's monthly average amounted to more than twice as much. On the average, during the years of Foscolo's service, more than 25,500 *ducats* were available for spending each month (see Table 3.1 below, containing data on financial resources available to each governor-general). To illustrate the imbalance in a different way, out of the ten Governor Generals, Foscolo was the only one to dispose of financial means above the calculated monthly average.

Period	Governor-general	Months of Service	Total amount of money received (Ducats)	Monthly average (Ducats)
1646. March – 1651. February	Lunardo Foscolo	60	1535741	25.595,68
1651. March – 1652. December	Girolamo Foscarini	22	282100	12.822,73
1652. March – 1654. December	Lorenzo Dolfín	24	309675	12.903,13
1655. January– 1656. June	Gio. Antonio Zen	18	192000	10.666,67
1656. July – 1660. February	Antonio Bernardo	44	545250	12.392,05
1660. March – 1662. May	Andrea Corner	26	315800	12.146,15
1662. June – 1664. December	Girolamo Contarini	32	351000	10.968,75
1665. January – 1667. September	Cattarino Corner	33	402700	12.203,03
1667. October – 1669. December	Antonio Priuli	26	243726	9.374,08
		285	4.177.992	14.659,62

Table 3.1. Overview of the financial resources available to governor-generals serving in Dalmatia during the war (1646, March – 1669, December)

The calculations of the average sum available each month to a particular governor-general given in the Table 3.1 provide sound orientation concerning general financial trends during their service. However, these figures can be misleading. In order to get the full picture of the challenges faced by governor-generals during the months of their service these figures should be taken jointly with the data provided in Figure 3.1. In this regard, and in the light of previously mentioned favorable treatment of Lunardo Foscolo in historiography, it is worth taking a look at the case of Antonio Bernardo. His 40 months of service represented the second longest mandate among governor-generals serving in Dalmatia during this war. As can be seen from Table 3.1, the monthly average of the money available for spending during his service amounted to 12,392 *ducats*. The sum is just over half of the funds available to Foscolo, yet not considerably higher or lower than those recorded for the rest of governor-generals.

However, these figures are rather misleading. The first years of Bernardo's mandate, 1656 and 1657, represent the years with some of the lowest recorded sums of money shipped to Dalmatia, 96,000 and 105,000 *ducats* respectively (see Figure 4.1). During the first 18 months of his service (1656, July – 1657, December), Bernardo had to get through with the sum of no more than 146,000 *ducats*, or 8,111 *ducats* per month (only 1/3 of the sum available on the average to Lunardo Foscolo). Frustrated with the hopeless situation in which he was left, in

anticipation of an imminent Ottoman attack on Dalmatia during the next campaign season of 1657, Governor-General Bernardo wrote to the Senate: "I do not know any more which policy to follow. I am reduced to such a state of desperation that I'll rather wish to serve Your Excellencies as a simple soldier, than as the Governor-General."⁸⁴⁰

Nevertheless, with these funds Bernardo not only managed to keep in line an army of almost the same size as Foscolo's, but also had to meet the most dangerous Ottoman offensive in Dalmatia after the siege of Šibenik in 1647. During the campaign of 1657 Ottoman forces launched almost simultaneous attacks both on Split and Kotor (see Chapter 1.3.9), and laid siege to the latter lasting more than two months. Moreover, as if this did not represent a task challenging enough, for almost six months: 1657, August – 1658, January, a period that includes the core of the campaign season (August - October), Bernardo was provided with merely 20,000 *ducats*.⁸⁴¹ Only in 1658 and 1659 did the financial situation improve significantly, thus bringing the statistical monthly average of the sums available for expenditure during his mandate to its misleadingly high level of almost 12,000 *ducats*, as recorded in Table 3.1.

What made this possible were comprehensive administrative changes and introduction of new policies in the system of providing for Republic's armed forces, which occurred in the period between the mandates of these two governor-generals (and is the subject of the next section). Yet, before proceeding further with the analysis of the cost of the Venetian defensive system in Dalmatia and the administrative problems involved in paying for troops, in order to complete the image of the financial resources available for this task, one more factor has to be accounted for. How did governor-generals serving in Dalmatia manage to get through the long periods when Republic's finances were exhausted, and/or directed toward other battlefields, while no provisions of money reached Dalmatia for several months, as was for example the case with Governor-General Antonio Bernardo during the 1657 campaign? The problem of

⁸⁴⁰*Io non so qual partito più prendere: Son riddotto à termine delle disperatione, augurandomi di servirle in stato più tosto di un semplice Soldato, che di Prov.(vedito)re G(en)erale.* ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 78. (Sebenico, 22. Gennaro 1656. mv.)

⁸⁴¹ASVe, PTM. b. 482. num. 154. (Spalato, 14. Gennaro 1657 mv.)

provincial financial resources is fundamental for understanding such questions.

1.5. Local, Provincial Financial Resources

When discussing the ability to wage war during the "Thirty Years' War" both smaller states, such as Sweden and larger Early Modern polities as well, such as the Habsburg or French monarchies, Geoff Mortimer pointed at three main developments in the organization of early modern warfare, which enabled military commitment on so far unperceived scale. According to Mortimer these new developments consisted of: "(1) the system of military contracting, which allowed princes (and other rulers of states) to engage large numbers of mercenary troops quickly and easily, (2) availability of sources of credit, which enabled them to put armies in the field having barely paid a deposit on them, and (3) the so-called contributions, which forced the populations of occupied territories to bear the main cost of war."⁸⁴² As was presented in the previous chapter, the Venetian Republic utilized in full the system of military contracting in order to raise armies far beyond its real capacities. Secondly, although its golden age of economic prosperity was far gone, the Republic of Venice still figured as a rather rich state, with considerable financial resources at her disposal. And indeed, as can be seen in Table 2 in Appendix 1.4, for almost 24 years, the Republic managed to ensure a constant (although slightly irregular) flow of hard cash to the Dalmatian theater of operations.

However, what is the real specificity of the Venetian context, in regard of the above-mentioned wider European trends, was the inability of the Republic to rely on forced contributions to maintain its military forces. For the Republic of Venice it was practically impossible to organize a system of contributions, similar to that established in Germany by warring parties, on its possessions in Dalmatia.⁸⁴³ Such a policy would be completely in opposition to the ideological foundations of the Venetian Republic, the *Serenissima*, which

⁸⁴²Geoff Mortimer, "War by Contract, Credit and Contribution: The Thirty Years War." In *Early Modern Military History, 1450-1815*. ed. Geoff Mortimer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) p. 101.

⁸⁴³For more on contributions system see: Fritz Redlich, "Contributions in the Thirty Years' War," *The Economic History Review* vol. 2, no. 2 (1959): pp. 247-254; Compare also: John Lynn A., "How War Fed War: The Tax of Violence and Contributions during the Grand Siecle," *The Journal of Modern History* vol. 65, no. 2 (1993): pp. 286-310.

represented itself as a just and benevolent ruler over its subjects. Moreover, in the Most Serene Republic, there were also insurmountable practical obstacles. The material resources of the province were insufficient to support such a policy and if such a project had ever been attempted, it would without doubt have resulted in complete depopulation of the province and its loss to the Ottomans. Be that as it may, if not in the form of notorious contributions, the local population still made significant financial contribution to Republic's war effort, although not large in terms of the actual sums provided. From the point of view of Venetian governor-generals, who faced constant shortages of money, any local financial resources that could be tapped at the time of utmost need, no matter how small, were worth more than all the silver of the *Potosi* mines, far away on the South American continent.

Communal deposits: monte di pietà and fontico

The financial resources in question, came in the first place from the communal funds deposited in the so called *monte di pietà*, and *fontico*. As was mentioned previously (see chapter 1.2.1.), these two financial institutions of charity character existed in every one of Dalmatian communities and the funds deposited in them before the start of hostilities amounted to some 62,000 *ducats*. In 1646, faced with an imminent Ottoman attack, the two most threatened towns, Split and Šibenik, frustrated by slow progress of construction works on their fortifications, offered, on their initiative, the capital from these funds to speed the works up, while the community of Trogir offered these funds for payments to troops.⁸⁴⁴ Significant as these sums may seem to town magistrates, the role they played in overhauling town fortifications varied. In the case of Split, whose medieval fortifications required a major, high cost modernization project, the contributed communal funds represented just a drop of water in the desert, and caused town magistrates, in 1648, to complain, that in spite the fact that they had spent all of their communal funds on town defense, nothing of importance was done.⁸⁴⁵ The works undertaken during the first years of the war served more to appease the

⁸⁴⁴Franjo Difnik, *Povijest Kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 86-87; Pavao Andreis, *Povijest grada Trogira*, (Split: Čakavski Sabor, 1977) pp. 276-7; Arsen Duplančić, *Regesta zapisnika splitskog velikog vijeća od 1620. do 1755. godine [Regestae of records of Split's Great Council from 1620-1755]*, (Split: Državni arhiv u Splitu. 1998) pp. 65-66.

⁸⁴⁵ASVe, PTM. b. 467, num. 448. (Zara, 6. Agosto 1648.) attachment: *Scrittura de Spalatini*;

town's citizens, creating the impression that efforts were being made for their defense, than in actual improvement of the town's chances to withstand an Ottoman attack. The town had to wait until the great construction works from 1660-1668, which provided it with state of art fortifications.⁸⁴⁶

The situation was slightly better in Trogir. Although communal funds were already consumed by March 1647,⁸⁴⁷ they were sufficient for initial fortification repairs and improvements, and provided the initial incentive for more serious state sponsored works.⁸⁴⁸ An even more important role was played by the communal funds of Šibenik. These were mainly employed to begin works on the new fort of St. John which played a crucial role in the defense of the town during the 1647 siege. This project was initially opposed by the Venetian administration in Dalmatia, and only the stubbornness of the town's inhabitants and their readiness to employ their own resources ensured the construction of this strategically important fortification.

The funds from *fontico* and *monte di pietà* of Zadar were extensively used by Governor-General Foscolo for various purposes. For example, in January 1646, while the quarters were being prepared for accommodating the arrival of thousands of soldiers the Republic was shipping to Dalmatia as reinforcements for the incoming campaign season, Foscolo borrowed 2,000 *ducats* from town's *monte di pietà* to finance these works.⁸⁴⁹ Similarly, in April 1648 Foscolo helped himself to 500 *ducats* from *monte di pietà* in order to finance the operation of the demolition of Zemunik, Nadin and other nearby places, captured during the spring offensive of previous year (1647).⁸⁵⁰ Finally these funds also played rather an important role in the defense of Šibenik. While awaiting the shipment of money to arrive from Venice, Governor-General Foscolo turned to these resources and used them for payments to troops

⁸⁴⁶See: Andrej Žmegač, *Bastioni jadranske Hrvatske*, pp. 81-89.

⁸⁴⁷Governor-General Lunardo Foscolo, in his letter from March 1647 complained that construction works in Trogir has all but stopped due to exhaustion of the funds drawn from town's *monte di pietà* and *fontico*.

ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 215. (Zara, 10. Marzo 1647)

⁸⁴⁸See also: Andrej Žmegač, *Bastioni jadranske Hrvatske*, pp. 104-106.

⁸⁴⁹DAZ, *Atti di Provveditori Generali*, vol. 15, fols. 135v-136r;

⁸⁵⁰DAZ, *Atti di Provveditori Generali*, vol. 15, fols. 179r-v;

defending Šibenik.⁸⁵¹

Short term loans (imprestido, imprestito...)

However, funds taken from the town's *fontico* and *monte di pietà* served as one-time shots, which, once consumed, could be not counted upon again. Although the Senate occasionally ordered repayment of these funds to particular Dalmatian communities, as for example in July 1648, when Governor-General Foscolo was instructed to repay the money taken from Šibenik's *fontico*,⁸⁵² in circumstances of prolonged armed conflict it was practically impossible to replenish these deposits.⁸⁵³ So it came to be that by the end of Foscolo's mandate these resources were all but exhausted. Much more important for the maintenance of Venetian forces in Dalmatia were short term loans, known as *imprestito* (or *imprestido*), taken by the governor-general in the name of the Republic from private persons. The slowness of the central organs of the Republic in sending funds to Dalmatia, combined with the unpredictability of sea transport, often left governor-generals in Dalmatia to handle discontented troops with a completely empty provincial treasury. In such situations, when governor-generals were facing high desertion rates, loosening of already low level of discipline, and in some of worst cases threats of open mutiny and/or sacking of private property of Republic's subjects, the only remedy they could rely on were short term loans from private persons.

Such practices were well known in the Italian context. For centuries, Italian republics or communal cities relied on these voluntary loans to cover their deficits.⁸⁵⁴ What was characteristic of these loans was that, unlike contributions, they were: (1) completely voluntary and (2) they were not burdened with any kind of interest rate. In theory, they were

851ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 323. (Di Galea, Sebenico, 3, Ottobre 1647)

852ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-20, f. 189r;

853Similar was the situation with the *fontico* of Trogir. The 8,606 *lire* deposited there were spent on payments to troops, during Foscolo's mandate. In May 1649, representatives of the town managed to obtain restitution of these funds in Venice, yet they were soon spent again on maintaining the town garrison. In spite of good will of the Senate, and the decree from February 1650, ordering the return of these funds, it was impossible for Foscolo's successor, Girolamo Foscarini to settle this debt. See: Pavao Andreis, *Povijest grada Trogira I*, p. 286. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-22, fol. 91v; *1. Maggio 1649*.

854For a good survey on raising money through the system of forced or voluntary loans in the Italian context see: Luciano Pezzolo, "Government Debts and Credit markets in Renaissance Italy," in *Government Debts and Financial Markets in Europe*, Fausto P. Caselli ed. (London: Pickering & Chatto Ltd., 2008) pp. 17-32.

given by loyal subjects moved by patriotic feelings to the representative of the Republic in time of great need. Yet, if there were no obvious direct material benefits for providers of loans, this does not mean there were none. If one takes into account the rather wide range of competences and high level of autonomy of governor-generals, being in their good favor could turn out to be quite profitable. For example, Dalmatian merchants ready to provide cash in times of need could hope to acquire recommendations and testimonies of their patriotic services issued by the governor-general, which could later be employed in Venice to strengthen their appeals. Practically, any petition coming from Dalmatia without recommendation of the governor-general had significantly smaller chances of being granted by the Senate. For military officers of local origin (Dalmatian or Albanian) the chance to supply an *imprestido* and earn favors of the governor-general could be a way to promotion, acquirement of anew title, or means to avoid being regulated.

In general, families loyally serving the Republic could count on grants of favors by the *publico*. For example, the well known Kotor noble Vincenzo Bolizza,⁸⁵⁵ who served the Republic for decades, as head of the Venetian intelligence network in Albania and Montenegro, who ran the diplomatic postal service between Istanbul and Kotor, held the title of the superintendent of the territorial militia, and who on several occasions also supplied his own private money in the form of *imprestido*, represents a good example of the relationship between the Republic and its loyal subjects.⁸⁵⁶ When in August 1662, cavalier Vincenzo Bolizza died, his son and nephew approached Governor-General Girolamo Contarini with the request that stipends, honors, and various offices held by the late Vincenzo be transferred to them, which the governor-general gladly conceded to, issuing a patent of appointment. Furthermore, Bolizza's son also pleaded that father's title of cavalier of St. Mark be inherited by him, to which the Senate gave its consent.⁸⁵⁷

⁸⁵⁵For more on the Bolizza family see: Lovorka Čoralić, "Kotorski plemići iz roda Bolica - kavaljeri Svetog Marka [Kotor nobles of family Bolizza – Knights of St. Mark]," *Povijesni prilozi* 31 (2006): pp. 149-159.

⁸⁵⁶For example, during the unsuccessful Venetian offensive in Albania in winter 1649, when Governor-General Foscolo found himself deprived of any cash, *cavalliere Bollizza*, gathered all available family funds and supplied 1,000 *Real*. ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 531. (Di Galea Budua, 28. Genaro 1648. mv.)

⁸⁵⁷See: ASVe, PTM. b. 489. (num. 15. Spalato, 16. Agosto 1662); num. 21. (Spalato, 10. Settembre 1662.); The Senate awarded Vincenzo's son, Giovanni Bolizza, with the title of cavalier of St. Mark on 7th March, 1663.

Unlike communal deposits from *monte di pieta*, and *fontico*, which were mainly spent on fortification works, money acquired from these short term loans was spent to ensure more or less constant payments of wages to troops. Moreover, Governor-General Foscolo relied heavily on these loans to finance military operations. A shipment of 50,000 *ducats* that arrived from Venice in March 1647 was quickly spent and by mid-April 1647, in the middle of the operation of conquest of the Ottoman strongholds of Nadin, Vrana and Novigrad, Foscolo was forced to rush back to Zadar in order to obtain financial resources necessary to ensure the continuation of the offensive.⁸⁵⁸ By the time the next shipment of 110,000 *ducats* arrived in July, Governor-General Foscolo had already borrowed some 50,000 *ducats* from Zadar merchants, part in cash and part in goods, all spent on maintaining army in the field during this offensive.⁸⁵⁹ Such heavy borrowing seriously depleted local Dalmatian financial resources, and never again was any governor-general able to borrow funds on such a scale.

In the following years, it was only on rare occasions that Foscolo was able to obtain any significant amounts of cash in the form of these loans. For example, in 1649, before departing for the campaign in Albania, Foscolo managed to secure a loan of 5,000 *Reali*, (c.a 8,065 *ducats* according to the exchange rate of the province). Yet, if merchants were not ready to offer their funds for financing of military operations, the threat of soldiers' mutiny could almost always convince them to open their chests. On 5th August 1647, in the wake of an Ottoman attack, the garrison of Šibenik mutinied, demanding their long overdue wages, and when they were not provided, troops began looting private houses and shops.⁸⁶⁰ Although the unrest was soon quelled, this incident spread fear and horror among the local population of all Dalmatian towns. Consequently, when in January 1648, the garrison in Trogir began to show signs of slipping out of control, Governor-General Foscolo managed to quickly scrap-up 1,500 *Scudi di argento* from merchants, and sent them to town in order to prevent any further

Pietro Pazzi, *Cavalieri di San Marco: Storia documentata* (Perast: Gospa od Škrpjela, 2008) p. 214.

858ASVe, PTM. b. 464. no. 237. (Di Galea in Porto di Novegradi, 24 Aprile 1647.)

859ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 261. (Zara, 22 Giugno 1647.) attachment: *Fede de ducati m/50 in c.a prestati da mercanti*

860ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 286. (Zara, 7. Agosto 1647.); See also: Franjo Difnik, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 142.

deterioration of the situation.⁸⁶¹ Similarly, Foscolo's greatest success, the capture of Klis in April 1648, was followed by an almost whole-scale rebellion of Venetian forces in Dalmatia. The unrest started among the cavalry, spread to units of Croatian and Albanian infantry, and was soon followed by the mutiny of garrisons of Italian and transalpine infantry in Split, Trogir and Šibenik. Almost the only regiment not affected by this movement was that of Papal troops, which were paid not by the Republic but by the treasury of the *Holy See*. Nevertheless, such a wide spread mutiny could not be quelled by force, and Foscolo used all of his authority and skill to secure funds for payment of troops. On this occasion, Governor-General Foscolo managed to gather some 10,000 *ducats* from Zadar merchants, a sum that surprised even him, which was sufficient to reduce soldiers back to obedience.⁸⁶²

Creditor	Credit (Lire)
Al Sig.(no)re Zuanne Mondini	2300:00
Al Sig.(no)re Michiel dalla Brazza	1700
Al Eredita Colombini	65800:00
Al Ill.(ustrissi)mo Sig.re Gabriel Gozzi	5000:00
Al Sacro Monte di Pieta di Zara	26673:12
Al Sig.(no)re Giac.(o)mo Califfi	31565:00
Al Sig.(no)re Marc' Antonio Lantana	16000:00
Alli Fontici di Zara	17145:00
All Eredita del Coll.(onnel)o Sultan	5500:00
All Convento delli R(everen)di Padri di S.o Francesco	3122:00
All Cancellaria Criminal per depositi	1248:00
Alla Scuola di San Silvestro	8100:00
Alli Monasterij di San Antonio et San Zuanne di Liesena	6178:00
Al Sig.(no)re Pietro Ventura	22000:00
Al Sig.(no)re Nicolo Capogrosso	16500:00
Total debt of the treasury of Governor-General Foscolo in October 1650:	228832:4

Table 3.2. Creditors of the provincial treasury (*cassa di generalato*) in Zadar (October, 1650).⁸⁶³

As the war progressed, in spite of the governor-general's efforts and the decrees of the

861ASVe, Senato, Dispacci, PTM. b. 465. num. 361. (Zara, 10. Genaro 1647 m.v.)

862ASVe, Senato, Dispacci, PTM. b. 466. nun. 392. (Di Galea Salona, 9. Aprile 1648); num. 394. (Zara, 12. Aprile 1648); num. 397. (Zara, 19. Aprile 1648)

863ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 755. (Zara, 17. Ottobre 1650): attachment dated 16th September 1650: *List of creditors*.

Senate for repayment of debts to particular creditors, the public debt remained unsettled. There was simply not enough money in the local treasury to satisfy all creditors, and in order to appease at least some of them, Foscolo gave support to their petitions that the issue of repayment be transferred to the central treasury in Venice. Such was for example the case with Domino Marc' Antonio Lantana, a rich Zadar merchant, who on several occasions provided *imprestido* to the governor-general, and whose credit to the state in September 1650 was 112,00 *lire* (c.a 18,065 *ducats*).⁸⁶⁴ By the end of Foscolo's mandate, the debt of the central provincial treasury to its creditors amounted to 228,832:4 *lire* (c.a 36,000 *ducats*). The list compiled by Foscolo's ministers in October 1650, (see Table 3.2. and Figure 3.2) provides a good insight into the structure of the creditors of provincial treasury. As can be seen, the majority of the creditors were private persons, who held 72.7% of the public debt, while the various institutions (*fontico*, *monte di pietà* and monasteries) supplied the rest (27.3%).

Moreover, Foscolo had to endure the last six months of his mandate (September 1650 – February 1651) relying completely on these loans. Accordingly, the debt of the provincial treasury only further increased. In February 1651, the celebrated Governor-General Foscolo, the conqueror of Klis, and captor of two sandjak beys, finally left Dalmatia, under rather unhappy circumstances, leaving behind him a large unsettled debt. By the time of his departure the debt of the provincial treasury toward Dalmatian communities and private creditors reached 343,344:14 *lire* (c.a 55,380 *ducats*). All that was in Foscolo's power to do was to compile a list, dividing his creditors in two groups, the first consisting of those who asked for settlement of their credits in Venice, and the second, of those who preferred that their debts be paid in Zadar, and recommend them to the Senate.⁸⁶⁵

⁸⁶⁴ASVe, PTM. b. 470, (unnumbered letter) (Zara, 19. Settembre 1650); attachments: *Letter of recommendation of governor-general Foscolo and petition of merchant Marc' Antonio Lantana*.

⁸⁶⁵Of creditors who supplied these 343,344:14 *lire*, almost one half of them, holding the 171,705:17 *lire* of the debt, expressed their wish that payment of their loans be transferred to the central treasury in Venice. ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 789. (Dello scoglio di San Euffemia, 23. Febraro 1650. m.v.) attachment dated 20. February 1651: *Nota de Creditori dalla cassa dell Ecc.mo Gnal Foscolo*.




Figure 3.2. Composition of the private and public creditors of governor-general's treasury.

However, Foscolo's successors would be more than happy to rule under such unfortunate circumstances when it was at least possible to contract the debt of 55,000 *ducats*. For them, such an abundance of available local financial resources was the stuff of fairy tales. When in 1655, the new Governor-General Antonio Zen arrived to Dalmatia, he immediately noted how difficult it had become to find local merchants ready to supply him with financial means.⁸⁶⁶ Similarly, Zen's successor Antonio Bernardo, in December 1656 complained as well about the exhaustion of financial resources of the province:

... in addition, under the pretext of fortification projects promised to them, all financial resources the towns possessed, both grain funds and those of *Monti di Pietà*, have been consumed; not a single fund or deposit, either private or public remains here.⁸⁶⁷

Furthermore, since financial difficulties often prevented repayment of contracted debts to Dalmatian merchants, they began to excuse themselves, and refuse to supply money to governor-generals in their capacity as public servants, offering it to them instead as private

⁸⁶⁶Questi mercanti non sono certo valevoli à porgermi alcun sovegno di denaro nella ristrezza loro de contanti, e nelle provate difficulta à ricuperar gl' imprestidi altre volte fatta. ASVe, PTM. b. 477. num 14. (Zara, 15 Febraro 1654. m.v.)

⁸⁶⁷... essendo in oltre stati consumati per avanti alle Città sotto titolo delle fortificationi promessegli, tutti li Capitali, che havevanno, e de Fonteghi, di biade, e de Monti di Pietà, ne vi e più sostanza alcuna, ne di depositi, ne d'altro, sopra che possa farsi fondamento imaginabile ne di publico, ne di privato ragione. ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 68. (Sebenico, 9. Dicembre 1656)

persons - humiliation endured stoically by several governor-generals. Such was for example the case with loans given in January 1656 to Antonio Zen,⁸⁶⁸ or in April 1667 to Catherino Corner.⁸⁶⁹ Even graver was the case of Girolamo Contarini, from January 1664. When after four months of waiting, the Galley Brazzana finally arrived, yet carrying only 30,000 *ducats*, Governor-General Contarini was, as he himself put it, "forced to make virtue from necessity," and suspended the repayment of 3,000 *Zecchini* to creditors, taking over this public debt on himself as a private person, giving a guarantee that it will be settled before his departure from the province.⁸⁷⁰

Nevertheless, in spite of all negative experience from the end of the Foscolo's mandate and difficulties involved in reclaiming their loans,⁸⁷¹ local merchants and other persons of good standing continued to supply money to governor-generals during the entire war. Fear of army mutiny, of *soldatesca* running loose, combined with special efforts taken by the Venetian government to ensure repayment of all debts contracted by governor-generals toward private creditors before their departure from the province,⁸⁷² proved sufficient to keep local merchants willing to borrow their funds to state officials in need. Without exception, all of Foscolo's successors used these short term loans, although on a much smaller scale - yet more and more frequently toward the end of the war - in order to ensure wages for the army during long intervals they were left waiting for funds to arrive from Venice.

868ASVe, PTM. b. 478. num. 83. (Zara, 17. Genaro 1655 m.v.)

869ASVe, PTM. b. 497. num. 210. (Zara, 12. Aprile 1667)

870ASVe, PTM. b. 491. num. 121. (Spalato, 12. Genaro 1663. m.v.)

871The case of previously mentioned Zadar merchant Domino Marc' Antonio Lantana provides an excellent example of unexpected difficulties and dangers the private persons could run into while attempting to settle debts the state owned them. Lantana was one of the main financiers for Foscolo and his successors: Foscarini, Dolfon and Zen, to who he supplied several thousand *ducats* in the course of years. After long and futile attempts to settle his credits in Dalmatia, Lantana managed to transfer these to the central treasury in Venice, where he also sent his agents. Yet, after his agents received the money they fled with it. In spite of this incident Lantana continued to provide loans to the Republic until the end of his life. ASVe, PTM. 481. num. 90. (Zara, 19. Marzo 1657) attachment: *Petition of the Zadar merchant Marc' Antonio Lantana*.

872The Senate would either provide sufficient funds to the departing governor-general, as was for example case with Antonio Bernardo (July, 1656 - February, 1660), see: ASVe, PTM. b. 486. num. 285. (Zara, 28. Febraio 1659. mv.); or would assign special funds just for this purpose to the newly arriving governor-general. Such was, for example the case with Antonio Zen, who was due to illness forced to leave Dalmatia prematurely and his debts were covered by the new Governor-General Antonio Bernardo who received 5,000 *ducats* just for this occasion. Similar was also the case with Antonio Priuli, who arrived to his duty carrying 45,500 *ducats*, of which 5,000 were designated for settling the debts left by the departing Governor-General Catherino Conrenr. ASVe, PTM. b. 479, num. 119. (Zara, 6 Luglio 1656); PTM, b. 498, num. 24 (Di Galera viaggiando verso Sebenico, 19. Dicembre 1667) attachment: Ristretto del denaro

Furthermore, as the war progressed and sums reaching Dalmatia became smaller and smaller (see "Table 2 in Appendix 1.4"), governor-generals became ever more dependent on these funds from private/local resources. By late 1650s, the dependence became such that it was not uncommon for money arriving from Venice to be practically immediately spent on repayment of accumulated debts to private creditors, leaving governor-generals in need of searching for another loan and ask for a new shipment of money from Venice. For example, in February 1660, the galley *Barbariga* arrived in Dalmatia with 3,000 *Zecchini*, yet Governor-General Antonio Bernardo rather stoically informed the Senate that a new shipment of money is required, since only 200 *Zecchini* had reached him in Split, while all the rest was withheld in Zadar for repayment of debts to merchants.⁸⁷³

Except in the case of Governor-General Lunardo Foscolo, it is impossible to make any estimate of how much money the particular governor-general managed to obtain through these loans. In the first place, no systematic records of loans have been preserved, and secondly, after the experience of Foscolo's mandate, the government in Venice took special care that all the debts contracted by a particular governor-general were at the end of his mandate settled. What can be said without any doubt is that these loans, especially toward the end of the war proved to be fundamental for maintenance of the Venetian military forces in Dalmatia. Without the help of these funds, governor-generals would be completely dependent on irregular shipments of cash from Venice, and presumably, without a serious reorganization of the entire system of war financing, the defensive system in Dalmatia would collapse. Although completely different in nature to the notorious *contributions*, the Venetian *imprestido*, served a similar function for the Republic's war effort.

2. *Paying The Army*

... if my own blood could be converted into money, rest assured I would not spend it sparingly, not being able to watch universal misery of these poor soldiers, who perish from the lack of basic necessities, living only on bread and water;

(Governor-General Lunardo Foscolo)⁸⁷⁴

873ASVe, PTM. b. 486, num. 279. (Spalato, 19. Gennaro 1659. m.v.)

874... *et se il proprio sangue si fosse potuto convertir in denaro risparmiato non l'havrei al sicuro, soffrir non potendo veder l'universali miserie di questi meschini soldati in particolare che periscono di necessità,*

Having overviewed the financial resources available to governor-generals in Dalmatia during this conflict, now it is time to take a look at how the entire system functioned in practice. From the financial point of view, the local administration's primary goal was maintaining the army with the funds allocated to it by the Senate. Within these material restrictions, the governor-general in Dalmatia had rather large autonomy in governing the army and local affairs. As this section will show, the provincial administration adjusted its mode of operation and practices involved in payment of troops to match the circumstances of prolonged warfare and constant shortage of money. The data concerning the amounts of money at disposal of the particular governor-general, discussed previously, represents only one variable in the equation, the other, equally important one is that concerning how much money was in fact necessary to meet the financial demands of war. Table 3.3 below contains a compilation of data concerning monthly costs of the Venetian defensive system in Dalmatia. Since the provincial administration lacked a unified methodology in compiling the reports concerning monthly expenses, the figures expressed in table 3.3 vary considerably in their content: some do not include expenses of the Kotor garrison, while the others lack wages of the military personnel, galleys or cavalry.

Date	Monthly expenses (Ducats)	Sources
1647. April (a, c, d)	50,000	PTM-464-240;
1648. April (a, c, d)	50,000	PTM-465-389
1648. June (a, c, d)	52,000	PTM-466-423
1648. September (a, c, d)	44,000	PTM-469-656
1649. November (a, c, d)	46,000	PTM-469-656-Nota del denaro; PTM-469-672
1649. October (a, c, d)	40,000	PTM-470-755
1650. September (a, c, d)	40,000	PTM-470-755
1653. December (b, c)	17,314	PTM-475-97-Ristrretto
1654. October (b, c)	14,860	PTM-476-165
1655. April (b, c)	15,000	PTM-477-29
1656. January (b, c)	15,000	PTM-478-83
1656. June (b, c)	16,000	PTM-479-113
1657. January (b, c)	18,000	PTM-480-80
1658. August (b)	45,437	PTM-483-204
1658. November (b)	35,456	PTM-484-222
1660. July (b, e, f)	16,132	PTM-487-30
1660. August (b, e, f)	22,793	PTM-487-30
1661. July (b, e, f)	16,250	PTM-488-83
1662. August (b, e, f)	18,600	PTM-489-14

vivendo di solo pane, et acqua; ASVe. PTM. b. 470, num. 786. (Zara, 10. Febraro 1650. m.v.)

Date	Monthly expenses (<i>Ducats</i>)	Sources
1663. May (b, e)	24,000	PTM-490-69; PTM-491-104
1664. November (b, e, f)	18,457	PTM-491-111
1668. January (b, e)	14,021	PTM-498-29; PTM-498-39;
1669. January (b)	14,409	PTM-501-172

Table 3.3. Monthly costs for the maintenance of the Republic's armed forces serving in Dalmatia and the Adriatic Gulf.

- (a) Full pay
- (b) Subsidies only
- (c) Kotor not included
- (d) Does not include cavalry
- (e) Galleys not included
- (f) Does not include military and administrative personnel

By juxtaposing the figures concerning the monthly expenses of the republic's armed forces from table 3.3 above, with the average annual sums available to a particular governor-general, expressed in table 3.1, it can easily be deduced that the service of almost all governor-generals was a long struggle with constant shortage of cash. For example, between October 1648 and September 1649, the total of 228,141 *ducats* arrived to Dalmatia, while monthly costs amounted to approximately 40,000 *ducats*, resulting in a deficit of 250,859 *ducats*, during this period.⁸⁷⁵

To say that shortage of money was a perennial problem which plagued the Venetian administration in Dalmatia during this war is to state the obvious. The goal of the following paragraphs is not to account for each interruption or breakdown in the functioning of the provincial treasury, a tedious and unproductive task. Rather, they are helpful in pointing out key moments which resulted in change in the functioning of the provincial administration. Moreover, through a descriptive analysis of the policies involved in payments for the Republic's armed forces, this section aims to explain how it was possible for the Republic to maintain its military presence in this battlefield with such limited and apparently insufficient funds. Thus, this section represents a sort of a parallel narrative of the war; a narrative concentrating on the administrative and financial aspects of the Republic's military commitment in this battlefield, as opposed to the one presented previously in Chapter 1.3.,

⁸⁷⁵ASVe, PTM. b. 470, num. 755. (Zara, 17 Ottobre 1650) attachment to the letter: *Nota del Dannaro*

which deals mainly with the key military and political events of the war.

2.1. The First Years of War (1646-1651)

As can easily be seen from Figure 3.1, the figures for the period 1646-1648 record a steady increase in the Republic's shipments of money to Dalmatia. The sums sent: 293,000 *ducats* in 1646, then 370,000 in 1647 and 414,741 for 1648, may seem considerable, yet, as was pointed out in the previous chapter, a single company of Italian infantry, at its full strength of 150 men, consumed 870 *ducats* a month, while the company of more expensive trans-alpine infantry (at its full strength of 210 men) required 1,235 *ducats* per month in order to cover the pay of its soldiers and officers. When during 1646, the Republic increased its military commitment in Dalmatia to almost 12,000 men, 30 armed vessels and 7 galleys (see Chapter 1.3.1), the expenditures for defense sky-rocketed. Monthly expenditures needed to cover just the wages of the infantry and military personnel (*bombardieri, stipendiati, provvigionati, salariati*) serving in the province rose to 50,000 *ducats*.⁸⁷⁶

Throughout 1646, and early 1647, the provincial treasury fulfilled its financial obligations as best as it could. Depending on the arrival of provisions of specie, the payments of arrears would be made to unit commanders, usually covering overdue pay for several months at once. For example, on 9th March 1647, the treasury made payments to captains of marine infantry for three to six overdue monthly wages, thus clearing the unit's accounts until November 1646 (included). Similarly, on 2nd March 1647, the payments for three overdue monthly wages were made to colonels and captains of the Italian and transalpine infantry, settling their accounts until January 1647.⁸⁷⁷ However, in spite of constant flow of cash from Venice, the local treasury was losing breath and could not provide for all the financial demands of war: pay for the army, fortification works, extraordinary costs involved with movement of troops and launching of military operations, and so forth. Consequently, month in and out the debt toward the army steadily accumulated. By fall 1647, the system begun showing the first signs of possible collapse.

⁸⁷⁶ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. (215. Zara, 10 Marzio 1647); num. 240. (Di Galea sopra Zara, 28 Aprile 1647)

⁸⁷⁷ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 246. (Di Galea Sebenico, 18 Maggio 1647.) attachment: Summary of payments of provincial treasury, dated 15th May 1647.

In May 1647, at the end of the Venetian spring offensive, Governor-General Lunardo Foscolo informed the Senate that the debt toward the army had reached the alarming sum of 231,841 *ducats*, and that the 35,000 *ducats* assigned to Dalmatia were far from sufficient. Foscolo's letter was accompanied with a detailed survey stating all the credits accumulated so far by each unit under his command. From the survey it is visible that the majority of companies of Italian and transalpine infantry had not been given their pay for the last four months, that is from January 1647. The situation was far worse with the units of Albanian and Croatian infantry. Companies serving on land were 5-6 pay in arrears, while those serving aboard between 6 to 8 months (and in some extreme cases arrears of as many as 14 months of were recorded).⁸⁷⁸ Moreover, in order to be able to launch an offensive in the first place, Foscolo required considerable financial resources. Since the money arriving from Venice was not sufficient to meet the demands of troop wages even for a single month, Foscolo had to secure the necessary funds from some other sources. He turned to Zadar merchants, from whom he borrowed some 50,000 *ducats*. Additionally, given the shortage of hard currency, Foscolo also resorted to the very unpopular measure of the emission of *bolletini*, letters of credit which could be exchanged for provisions or money (once it was available in the local treasury). All in all, Foscolo issued to the various colonels and captains serving in the province *bollettini* to the value of no less than 50,000 *ducats* – a measure which was met with considerable displeasure in the Senate.⁸⁷⁹

Fortunately, the Venetian spring offensive was extraordinarily successful, and the capture of numerous Ottoman strongholds was also accompanied by considerable booty, which helped to keep troops content at least for the duration of the campaign.⁸⁸⁰ Yet, once the campaign was finished and troops returned to their quarters, dissatisfaction continued growing again. The

⁸⁷⁸The survey records the amount of overdue wages in ducats, and the number of months the amount outstanding to a particular. See: ASVe, PTM. b. 464, num. 246, (Di Galea Sebenico, 18 Maggio 1647): attachment: Summary of credits held by army, dated 15th May, 1647.

⁸⁷⁹The entire affair had something suspicious around it. Foscolo informed the Senate of these steps only when this debt in the books of Camerlengo was discovered by Extraordinary Governor Malipiero, who dutifully informed the Senate and Foscolo concerning his findings. ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 253. (Di Galera, Morter, 6. Giugno 1647.); num. 261. (Zara, 22 Giugno 1647)

⁸⁸⁰For example see: Vicko Solitro, *Povijesni dokumenti o Dalmaciji i Istri*, pp. 280, 301.

simultaneous mutiny of the transalpine marine infantry in Šibenik, in May 1647, was a clear sign of the prospects for the future, in case no solution for the Republic's finances was to be found.⁸⁸¹ The considerable sum of 110,000 *ducats* dispatched promptly by the Senate, which reached Dalmatia in July,⁸⁸² only provided a short respite. There was a multitude of pressing needs - urgent fortification repairs, repayment of debts to private creditors and settlement of several arrears to the army - which quickly exhausted this provision of money. Thus, in spite of this seemingly lavish provision of cash, the debt of the provincial treasury toward the army continued to grow, and by August 1647, it reached 286,000 *ducats*.⁸⁸³ On 5th August 1647, while the Ottoman army was approaching the town, the units of transalpine infantry in Šibenik, dissatisfied by lack of pay and provisions, mutinied.⁸⁸⁴ Foscolo quickly appeased the troops with the swift dispatch of provisions of cash, gathered by *imprestido*, only further increasing the debt of the provincial treasury.

However, all such measures were just short term remedies, not a lasting solution for the chronic problem of financing the Republic's forces in Dalmatia. During 1647, and 1648, wages only of infantry units and military personnel serving in Dalmatia amounted to roughly 50,000 *ducats* per month (see table 3.3), thus demanding the total of 600,000 *ducats* per year to be covered in full. At the same time, sums sent from Venice amounted to 370,000 and 414,741 *ducats* respectively (see Graph 3.1), or enough to cover barely 66-69% of these expenses only. It is obvious that operating within these financial constraints the local treasury simply could not provide for full payments of the wages due to the army. Under such circumstances, not surprisingly, the debt continued to grow from month to month. In the case of a short war this would not pose such a problem. By the time the credit of the army reached its critical level and the troops began to refuse obedience and mutiny, the war would be over. Consequently, units would disband, and the Republic would return to peacetime operating

881ASVe, APTM., b. 464, num. 252. (Di Galera, Vodizze, 5. Giugno 1647)

882ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 270. (Zara, 10. Luglio 1647)

883ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 286. (Zara, 7. Agosto 1647.) See also attachment to the letter: *Dispensa delli*

D(uca).ti settanta mille capitati da Ven.(eti)a con la Galea sotil Gov.(ernat)or di N.H. Ser Lorenzo Donado
884ASVe, PTM. b. 464, num. 286. Zara, 7. Agosto 1647); For the effects of this mutiny on the local populace see: Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, pp. 142.

mode, paying accumulated debts to captains and colonels in due time.

Yet, in circumstances of prolonged warfare, it was just a question of time when the discontent of soldiers would reach its critical threshold. In order to avoid large scale mutiny and cut desertion rates, the Venetian administration in Dalmatia, already from the beginning of the war, in the periods when it faced a shortage of money, resorted to the practice of paying merely the subsidies instead of full pay to troops. These subsidies differed from pay in two ways. In the first place they were much smaller in amount, and secondly, they represented an advance on future pay (unlike pay which was given for services already rendered). These subsidies known as *terzi*, since they were expected to be paid to soldiers every ten days (at least in theory) were supposed to provide soldiers with some means to sustain themselves and keep them at least partially content.

Moreover, the irregular payment of several arrears at once, as was practiced by Foscolo's administration during 1646 and 1647, benefited colonels and captains most, not soldiers. Since ordinary soldiers frequently had to endure the hardships of military service for long periods without receiving their wages, they were left with no other choice but to borrow money or take provisions from their captains or merchants accompanying the army, needless to say under unfavorable terms. Consequently, of the sums paid to captains, the soldiers would see only a small portion if anything at all.⁸⁸⁵ For soldiers the prospect of regular payments of smaller subsidies, although being far from a perfect solution, represented the lesser of two evils. When in January 1648, the garrison in Trogir came close to mutiny and was appeased by the discharge of 1,500 *Scudi*, acquired through *imprestido*, extraordinary governor of Split and Trogir Coccoa informed Foscolo that upon his and *Comissario's* Foscarini entry to the town, they were met with soldiers threatening desertion, if in future their *terzi* were not paid regularly.⁸⁸⁶

On the other hand, as far as the official policy went, the armed forces of the Serenissima

⁸⁸⁵For abuses or lack of regular pay to soldiers in the Spanish case see: Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road*, pp. 160-161.

⁸⁸⁶ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 361. (Zara, 10. Gennaro 1647. mv.) attachment dated: Trau, 2. Gennaro 1647. mv.

were expected to be satisfied in full, if possible. The dichotomy between such wishes of the Senate and hard realities faced by the provincial administration is illustrated best by the events of August-September 1648. When in August 1648, Foscolo received the notification that only 50,000 *ducats* were allotted as the next provision for Dalmatia (of which 15,000 for cavalry), he informed his superiors that with such a small sum it was impossible to pay full wages to the army, as was the desire of the Senate. Divided and distributed among the provincial garrisons, this small sum, Foscolo warned, can only serve: "to cover a few *terzi* due to troops, and to maintain them alive for the short duration of time while it lasts."⁸⁸⁷ And indeed once the 50,000 *ducats* arrived at the beginning of September, they were immediately consumed. The repayment of the *imprestido* taken from Zadar merchants, in order to provide for the troops in the period from July till September, and the transfer of 15,000 *ducats* to the treasury of cavalry - as ordered by the Senate – left the treasury of the governor-general with less than 1/3 of the sum.⁸⁸⁸ Moreover, as can be seen from Table 3.4., once the money was distributed to provincial garrisons, Foscolo was left barely with 3,370 *ducats* (profit from exchange rates of the province included). In such a situation, governor-general Foscolo was left with no other option but to implore his superiors for prompt shipment of the next provision of money and meanwhile, until it arrived, to again call upon private creditors to supply the funds needed to keep troops at least somehow provisioned and content.

	Lire	(Ducats)	%
Reinstitution of loans to Zadar merchants (used to sustain the army from July)	138876	22399,35	37,8
<i>Sovventione</i> for Cavalry in Zadar	110000	17741,94	29,94
<i>Sovventione</i> for infantry in Split	42000	6774,19	11,43
<i>Sovventione</i> for infantry in Klis	14.700	2370,97	4
<i>Sovventione</i> for infantry in Trogir	10.500	1693,55	2,86
<i>Sovventione</i> for infantry in Šibenik	30.450	4911,29	8,29
<i>Remaining</i> in the treasury in Zadar	20.897	3370,48	5,69
	367.423	59261,77	100

887... *per somministrar pochi terzi alle Militie stesse, et serviranno, per mantenerle in vita, il poco tempo, che duraranno.* ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 451. (Zara, 11. Agosto 1648)

888ASVe, Senato, Dispacci, PTM. b. 467. num. 470. (Zara, 9. Settembre 1648) attachment: *Compartita delli ducati m/50*

Table 3.4. Distribution and spending of the 50,000 *ducats* brought in September 1650 by commissary Marco Molin.


As the war continued, the situation did not improve, quite on the contrary. In the period from December 1648 till September 1649, the total of 275,024:6 *ducats* were received in the treasury of the governor-general, while monthly expenses for the infantry and army personnel on the average amounted to 46,000 *ducats*, thus creating a deficit of 219,7201:14 *ducats*.⁸⁸⁹ Similarly, for the period from September 1649 to October 1650, the deficit equaled 250,859 *ducats* (monthly expenses were c.a 40,000 and the sums arrived amounted to 229,141 *ducats*).⁸⁹⁰ Under such circumstances, regular payments of soldiers' wages in full (*page effettive* or *page intiere*) remained a purely theoretical matter for the provincial administration in Dalmatia, something for the central organs of the state to worry about. The struggle to provide even for the payment of subsidies was the hard reality of life for governor-generals in Dalmatia. The account of the disbursal of 40,000 *ducats* from October 1650 (the last provision of money sent to the Dalmatian treasury during the mandate of Lunardo Foscolo), reveals the same pattern as that from September 1648 (see Table 3.5 and Figure 3.2 below) and the total financial paralysis into which the local treasury fell.⁸⁹¹ No sooner did the money arrive than it was already spent.

Expenses category	Lire	%
Payments of current subsidies to army units (<i>sovventione</i>)	103430:0	35
Repayments of credits (<i>imprestido</i>)	73900:0	25
Payments to <i>stipendiati</i>	43090:0	15
Payments for 3 galleys currently serving in the gulf	19640:0	7
Payments of the current <i>bolletti</i> due this month	16980:3	6
Payments to specific units or persons on account of their debts	14045:0	5
Payments of subsidies to the Swiss regiment (<i>sovventione</i>)	11000:0	4
Various <i>spese</i>	10958:15	4
Total:	293043:18	100

889ASVe, PTM. b. 469. num. 656. (Zara, 11. Dicembre 1649) and attachment to the letter dated 1st December 1649: *Nota del denaro capitato da Venetia per la Cassa del G(e)n(er)al(a)to in Dalm(ati).a da primo Novembre 1648 fino primo dicembre 1649.*

890ASVe, PTM. b.470. no. 755. (Zara, 17 Ottobre 1650) attachment dated 16th of September 1650: *Nota del denaro.*

891ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 755. (Zara, 17. Ottobre1650.) attachment to the letter dated 16th September 1650: *Conto della Dispensa delli ducati quaranta mille.*

Table 3.5. Dispense of the 40,000 *ducats* arrived in September 1650.Figure 3.3. Dispense of the 40,000 *ducats* that arrived in September 1650.

In order to overcome the problem of constant deficit and shortage of real currency in the province, Foscolo's administration developed quite a complex system of meeting its financial obligations. The Venetian administration in Dalmatia shifted its focus to regular payments, at least as best as they could, of monthly subsidies to troops, part in money and part in daily rations of bread, grain or hardtack. For the Foscolo administration, this was the top priority item when hard coin was concerned. At the same time, every month (at least in theory), the account of the credit of a particular company for that month, known as "*ristretto*," was formed and issued to its commander. The *ristretti* were supposed to be formed based on the actual number of soldiers found in that particular company on the date the survey was performed by the public official. However, in practice, *ristretto* was usually formed by simply copying the

number of soldiers from the previous *ristretto*, to great frustration of the Senate, which constantly warned against such practices. Once in a few months, this was followed by payments of several *ristretti*. In exchange for his *ristretti* the captain was given a money order (*mandato*), formed after deducting the food, provisions and subsidies (*sovventione*) issued to his unit so far, which was payable at the cash desk of the *generalato*.

In theory, this would be the final step in the process. The captains would present *mandato* at the cash desk and receive the coin settling their credit. However, the payment of *mandato* depended on the availability of hard cash, and very often *mandato* remained unpaid and in the hands of the captain (withheld until the time it could be settled later). Occasionally, captains desperate enough were ready to concede to settlement of their *mandato* with letters of credit, which could then be deposited with local merchants in exchange for food, wine and various trade goods, or kept and cashed in later either in Dalmatia or in Venice.⁸⁹² Based on maximum utilization of available hard currency, either sent from Venice or obtained by *imprestido* from local merchants and emission of large quantities of various credit notes and papers, the entire war financing was in fact based on trust; on implicit promise that all contracted debts would be settled by the Republic. Imperfect as it was, the system functioned and the military was kept at least partially provisioned and content. The question was how long such a state could be sustained.

Until the end of his mandate, Governor-General Foscolo dutifully continued to provide his superiors in Venice with reports concerning the current state of the credit of the troops under his command. Moreover, since there was a direct link between the level of discontent among the military and the amount of credit owed by it, these figures were used by Foscolo as effective arguments in pleas to the Senate for shipment of new provision of money and/or food. By December 1649, the credit of infantry and various *stipendiati* and *provisionati* grew

⁸⁹²The entire system was described in detail in letters by Foscolo's successor, Governor-General Girolamo Foscarini, who discovered the embezzlement of Foscolo's top ministers: *Camerlengo*, *Ragionatto* and *Vice Scrivano*. These three found a hole in this over complicated system and used it to appropriate significant amounts of money for their own private interests. For more see: ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 87. (Zara, 30 Genaro 1651. m.v.) attachment: *Modo praticato sotto il Generalato Foscollo nelle pagamenti et nel giro della scrittura*; num. 100. (Zara, 19. Aprile 1652)

to the sum of 290,844 *ducats* (after deducting money and provisions administered to them: food, equipment, clothing, etc.).⁸⁹³ The long period of almost seven months between September 1649 and April 1650, during which no provision of money arrived to Dalmatia, resulted in further growth of the army credit to the disturbing sum of 521,279 *ducats*.⁸⁹⁴ Finally, during the last six months of Foscolo's service, from September 1650 till February 1651, the provincial treasury was relying exclusively on *imprestido* (see above) for payments to the army, and the army credit increased even further. In one of his last letters to the Senate, Foscolo complained that during the last few months of his service "fortune has forced him to live with nothing else but the title of General."⁸⁹⁵ From the financial point of view, the final account of Foscolo's mandate was quite the opposite of his successful military record. The province was flooded with a multitude of credit notes and paper money, with the credit of the army reaching almost 700,000⁸⁹⁶ *ducats* and further 55,000 *ducats* due to private creditors. Such was the financial situation found by the new Governor-General Girolamo Foscarini when he took over the office at the end of February 1651, "armed" with only 80,000 *ducats* issued to him at the moment of his departure from Venice.

2.2. The Years of Consolidation (1651-1654)

Yet, the new Governor-General Girolamo Foscarini turned out to be a rather skillful administrator. During his short service in Dalmatia (1651, February – 1652, December) Governor-General Foscarini, reformed and considerably improved the functioning of the provincial administration. In the first place, during his tour of the province in spring 1651, Foscarini introduced more order in the running of all provincial treasuries (*camere*) by establishing firmer control over spending, cutting unnecessary expenses and rooting out numerous abuses and malversation schemes introduced by local officials.⁸⁹⁷ Furthermore,

893ASVe, PTM. b. 469. num. 656. (Zara, 11. Dicembre 1649)

894ASVe, PTM., b. 470. num. 688. (Zara, 18. Marzo 1650)

895ASVe, PTM. b. 470. (unnumbered letter) (Pirano 16. Marzo 1650 m.v.)

896According to the audit of the books of Governor-General Foscolo's administration, ordered by the Senate on 7th February 1652, and undertaken by his successor Girolamo Foscarini, the total debt (not including Kotor) was as follows: 404,970,5 *ducats* toward infantry (including those serving abroad *barche armate*), 47,878 *ducats* toward cavalry, and circa 234,000 toward ordinary units and *stipendiati*, *provvigionati*, *Morlacchi* and similar, all in all, the debt amounted to the total of 686,838 *ducats*. ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 100. (Zara, 19. Aprile 1652);

897For the regulations and measures introduced in running of provincial *camere* see: ASVe, PTM. b.471, num.

Foscarini proved to be ready to go even further and fight corruption and abuses at all levels of the provincial administration. In April 1651, because of discovered abuses, Ser Andria Trevisano, *Conte et Capitano* of Trogir was arrested and sent to Venice,⁸⁹⁸ followed in July 1651 by the even more spectacular arrest of Ser Paolo Boldu, the governor of Klis.⁸⁹⁹ Before his appointment as the Governor-General, Girolamo Foscarini had already served in Dalmatia, during 1647-8, as a commissary. Upon taking over this new office, Foscarini put his previous experience of a commissary to good use: diligently surveying forces under his command, both cavalry and infantry, regulating weak companies, discharging unsuitable persons from service and clearing the army lists (*ruoli*) of non-existent soldiers.

By doing so, Foscarini greatly cut army costs down, but he also came into conflict with both the current commissary Nicolo Corner, who considered these actions as infringing into his domain, and the Governor-General of Cavalry, Andrea Donato. While the escalation of conflict between the commissary Corner and Foscarini was resolved with Corner's appointment as *Provveditore in Candia*,⁹⁰⁰ Foscarini's discovery of mismanagement in the administration of cavalry forces led to Donato's recall from service and opening of an investigation against him in January 1652.⁹⁰¹ The culmination of Foscarini's inspection of the functioning of the provincial administration was reached with the formation of a process against the top ministers of Foscolo's administration: Gio Battista Riva (*Raggionatoto*), Gio Battista Zappich da Zara (*Vice Raggionato*) and Girolamo Capello (*Vice Scrivano di Camera*). Among numerous other misuses discovered by Foscarini, the most alarming and

25. (Spalato, 30. Aprile 1651.); num. 29. Zara, (14. Maggio 1651.) Especially decree attached to the letter: num. 33. (Zara, 26. Maggio 1651)

898ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. 16. (Spalato, 5. Aprile 1651.) See also: Pavao Andreis, *Povijest grada Trogira*, p. 287;

899ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. 40. (Spalato, 9. Luglio 1651)

900ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. 27. (Traù, 10. Maggio 1651); According to Foscarini's report Corner's mismanagement of this office resulted in direct financial damage at the expense of the Republic in the amount of some 18,800 *ducats*. ASVe, PTM. b.472. num. 60. (Trau, 14. Settembre 1651)

901ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-25, fol. 225v: 1652. *Gennaro 16*; Foscarini, not only discovered 115 *piazze morte* (places filled with unsuitable persons or not filled at all) in cavalry, with the total strength less than 400 men, but also the debt of treasury of cavalry of 180,000 *lire* toward private creditors, in spite of the fact that during the 20 months of his service, the governor-general of cavalry received the total of 88,329 *ducats* (in cash and provisions), an amount sufficient, according to Foscarini's calculations, to cover not only the subsidies but to provide for full pay of cavalry. ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 82. (Zara, 18 Genaro 1651); num. 83. (Zara, 18 Genaro 1651) and attachment to the letter: *Ristretto di cavalleria*

grave one was that these three conspired and exploited the complexity of management of the financial affairs of *generalato* (especially in management of the cash desk) and appropriated for themselves dozens of thousands of *ducats*.⁹⁰²

The discovery of such numerous cases of fraud at top level of the provincial administration could not go without reaction from the central government. The major institutional change which occurred during the mandate of Foscarini was the elimination of the separate treasury of cavalry, the duties of which were taken over by the treasury of the governor-general. In order to cut down on unnecessary expenses, the Senate was already for some time intent on merging of these two treasuries, and the mismanagement discovered in the administration of cavalry forces by Foscarini only gave additional wind to the entire affair.⁹⁰³ Furthermore, eager to root out fraud and introduce more order in management of the provincial affairs, the Senate gave rather ambitious instructions to Governor-General Foscarini to undertake a comprehensive revision of the local administration, especially concerning management of financial matters. However, such a project would have had to wait for more peaceful times. Foscarini excused himself by replying that one needed to dedicate all of his time and attention to such a complex task - not to mention the need for much more numerous staff than the one at his disposal - and that under current circumstances, when he was solely occupied with the urging tasks of directing Republic's defense, he simply could not follow up on this order.⁹⁰⁴

Still, as much as this was possible, Foscarini did revise the functioning of the provincial administration. In the first place, by collecting all *ristretti*, *mandati*, and *bollette* issued during

902On the 28th October 1651, alarmed by the growing number of suspicious credit notes that begun appearing in Venice, the Senate ordered an investigation of credit notes and papers in circulation in Dalmatia issued by Foscolo's ministers. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-112, f. 292v-293r, *Adi 28 Ottobre 1651.*; Following on this order, Foscarini undertook a diligent inspection of the books of Foscolo's administration and discovered numerous frauds. For the entire list of abuses and transgressions see: ASVe, PTM. b. 473. num. 133. (Zara, 16 Settembre 1652); num. 137. (Zara, 26 Settembre 1652.); num. 160, (Zara, 3 Gennaio 1652. mv.); See also: ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 87. (Zara, 30 Genaro 1651. m.v.) attachment: *Modo praticato sotto il Generalato Foscollo nelle pagamenti et nel giro della scrittura*; num. 100. (Zara, 19. Aprile 1652); According to the compiled list of Foscarini's ministers, the total worth of *bollete* and *mandati* missing from the books of generalato amounts to 183,209:18 *lire* (c.a 30,000 *ducats*). DAZ, *Atti di Provveditori Generali*, vol, 17, fols. 57r-58r;

903 ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-25, f. 218v; ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 84, (Zara, 18. Genaro 1651. m.v.); ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-25, fols. 218v, 225v;

904 ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 100. (Zara, 19. Aprile 1652)

the days of Foscolo, the province was cleared of all suspicious credit notes.⁹⁰⁵ Secondly, several control mechanisms were introduced in the management of the treasuries, aiming to prevent unauthorized or excessive emission of *bolette* and *bollettini*, and consequently the reoccurrence of similar fraud in the future.⁹⁰⁶ Finally, Foscarini's administration directed all of its efforts toward maintaining continuous payments of monthly subsidies in food and coin (avoiding the use of credit notes as much as possible).⁹⁰⁷

As a consequence, the greatest change that occurred during the mandate of the Governor-General Foscarini was the perfection and formalization of practices introduced already in the days of Foscolo's mandate. During the years 1651-2, the system developed fully and acquired the form it would retain until the end of the war. Complemented with the regular distribution of food provisions (either bread or biscuit - of which more will be told in the next chapter) every ten days (on the 1st, 10th and 20th day of the month), a subsidy known as *terzo* was paid to troops. In the infantry this *terzo* was established at 4 *lire*, with the exception of the newly acquired fortress of Klis, where due to the harsher conditions of service, the soldiers were granted the so called *paga di campagna*⁹⁰⁸ and *terzo* was set at 5 *lire*, giving the total 12 *lire* (in case of Klis 15 *lire*) paid to soldiers every month. At the same time in the cavalry, the *terzo* amounted to 10 *lire*, giving the monthly total of 30 *lire* paid to soldiers.⁹⁰⁹ As for military personnel (*bombardieri*, *stipendiati* and others), colonels, captains and other officers and NCOs, on the day of the distribution of the first *terzo*, they were given half of their monthly pay. Also, on that occasion, the *ristretto* was formed recording the unit credit (or persons in

905In the January 1652, Foscarini issued orders that all credit notes in possession of captains, merchants and other private persons, issued in the days of Governor-General Foscolo, were to be brought and presented in provincial offices (*camere*). ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 88. (Zara, 31 Genaro 1651. m.v.); By April 1652, these were collected and a detailed report was compiled. ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 100, (Zara, 19. Aprile 1652) attachment: *Nota di tutte le Bolette Ristretti et Copie de Partite essitente in Potere de i Coll,i et Cap.(itan)ij della Provincia cosi d'Infanteria come di barc Armate, eccequato Cattaro*

906See decrees proclaimed by Governor-General Foscarini regulating the merge of the treasury of the governor-general of cavalry, the articles of which also regulate the organization of cash desks, storing of the coin, procedures for making payments and issuing credit notes: attachment: ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 84. (Zara, 18. Genaro 1651. m.v.) attachment: *Ordini formati per regolar diversi abusi nell' affare della Cava(lla).ria*

907ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 99. (Zara, 18. Aprile 1652)

908ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-20, f. 172r, *Adi 4 Luglio 1648*.

909Such was the situation when the new Governor-General Lorenzo Dolfin arrived to his duty in Dalmatia in January 1653. ASVe, PTM. 474, num. 11. (Di Zara, 3. Febraro 1652 m.v.); See also: ASVe, PTM. 475, num. 97. (Spalato, 21. Dicembre 1653) attachment dated 20. December 1653.

case of *stipendiati*) for the current month with an authenticated copy being given to the unit commander, and the original deposited in *camera* of *generalato*. Only occasionally, for example in case of a potential Ottoman attack, as was the case during spring 1651, in order to motivate troops, payments were made to cover *ristretti* for one or two months.⁹¹⁰ In order to obtain the payment of *ristretti* and clear their credits, colonels, captains and the rest of military personnel had to direct their petitions to Venice. Depending on the will of the Senate, their credits would then be settled either in Venice, or a decree would be issued, instructing the governor-general in Zadar to settle this debt.⁹¹¹

Venetian war galleys serving in the Gulf remained outside of this system. From the beginning of the war - because of the specific nature of their service, so close to the state center with frequent visits to Venice, either to collect money or to escort a transport ship - the responsibility to pay for galleys was shared between Venice and the provincial treasury of the *generalato* in Dalmatia. It was usual to pay in advance two full monthly wages, c.a 1,000 *ducats*, to the galley commander and the crew before their departure from Venice to Dalmatia.⁹¹² From that moment on, payments of wages to the galleys were performed according to convenience, either by the provincial or the central treasury. During the Foscolo years, payments were made to galleys in the amount of some 1,000 *ducats*.⁹¹³ Yet, the financial strain of prolonged war also reflected on the pay of the galley crews. In the days of Governor-General Foscarini, the provincial treasury began paying only irregular subsidies of approximately 500 *ducats* for each galley. By 1657, the subsidies to galleys were further reduced to 1,500 *lire* monthly (c.a 242 *ducats*),⁹¹⁴ the amount that was to remain the nominal

910ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. 33. (Zara, 26. Maggio 1651.); Similar action was also made in July 1652, when *ristretti* for two months were paid to various captains and colonels: ASV. PTM. 473. num. 116. (Zara, 12 Luglio 1652.) attachment dated 12. Luglio 1652;

911For example, in April 1653, Captain Morgante of the transalpine infantry, presented to Governor-General Dolfin *Ducal* decree of 18th February 1653, ordering settlement of his credit of 5330 *lire* by the Dalmatian treasury, as was done. ASVe, PTM. b. 474. num. (24. Di Zara, 7. Aprile 1653)

912For example, see payment of two full pays to the *Sopracomito* and crew of galley *Brazzana* in April 1646. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, fols. 74v-75r. *A di 6 Aprile 1646.*; For more on the organization of the Venetian navy and system of providing pays to galley crews prior to the years of War of Crete see: Alberto Tenenti, *Piracy and the Decline of Venice, 1580-1615* (University of California Press, 1967) pp. 122-126.

913For example, the account of spending 50,000 *ducats*, attached to the letter, contains a record of payments made to three galleys serving in the Adriatic, stating amounts between 5,500 and 7640 *lire*. ASVe, PTM. b.470. no. 755. (Zara, 17 Ottobre 1650) attachment: *Conto in ristretto della dispensa delli ducati 50m*

914See: ASV, PTM. b. 480, num. 80. (Sebenico, 29. Gennaro 1656. mv.); PTM. 483, num. 204. (Spalato, 10.

subsidy for the galleys until the end of the war, although in practice the sums paid depended in the first place on availability of the cash in the provincial treasury. For example, in August 1664, subsidies of barely 800 *lire* were given to each of the galleys serving in the Gulf.⁹¹⁵

However, although the Senate did pay special attention to maintenance of Republic's warships and, as can be seen from Table 2 in Appendix 1.4, regularly allotted sums of money solely for their pay, payments to galleys were irregular and always in arrears. Consequently, over the years, galleys managed to accumulate considerable credits. While before the war credits of four or five thousands *ducats* were considered as huge ones,⁹¹⁶ wartime credits were far greater. For example, two Dalmatian galleys: *Brazzana* and *Arbessana*, which were in service from the summer 1646, managed to accumulate credits of 24,000 and 20,000 *ducats* respectively by 1656.⁹¹⁷ Not surprisingly, governor-generals in Dalmatia aimed to ease the burden of the provincial treasury by attempting to transfer the costs of maintenance of the galleys to Venice as much as possible. Almost on every occasion when galleys under their command were to depart for Venice, this was seen as an opportunity to ask the central government for the settlement of at least part of its credit or payment of several subsidies.⁹¹⁸

The last change that marked Foscarini's reign was that both the central organs of the state and the provincial administration dropped the pretense that the provincial administration would be able to pay the troops serving in Dalmatia in full. From the days of Foscarini, reports sent from Dalmatia concerning the monthly cost of armed forces serving in the province were mainly expressed in the figures necessary to cover just these minimal expenses,

Agosto 1658); PTM. b. 484, num. 204, (204. Spalato, 10 Agosto 1658); num. 222. (Di Galea nel Porto di Zara a 27 Novembre 1658)

915ASVe, PTM, no. 173. (Zara, 28. Agosto 1664); Nevertheless, Governor-General Catherino Corner, in his final report to the Senate, stated that the subsidies paid to galley crew were 140-150 *Reali* a month.

Commissiones et Relationes Venetae, p. 256.

916For example see: Alberto Tenenti, *Piracy and the Decline of Venice*, pp. 123-126;

917ASVe, PTM. 480, num. (26. Zara, 25 Luglio 1656); num. 68. (Sebenico, 9. Dicembre 1656.)

918For example, in April 1657, Governor-General Bernardo in conformance with the received orders to provide one galley for the transfer of general Gil d'As from Dalmatia to Venice, chose the galley Arbessana for this mission, and asked for at least partial settlement of its debt. ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 92. (Zara, 9. Aprile 1657): Similar was the case with the galley of *sopracomito* Dandolo in October 1657. ASVe, PTM. b. 482, num. 133. (Cattaro, 4. Ottobre 1657); Moreover, it was not uncommon even for *barche armate* to succeed in obtaining payment of their wages, (on occasion, even in full amount) in Venice, as was for example case with Captain Gio Rados in April 1654. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-117, fol. 100r, *Adi 26 Aprile 1654*.

that is payment of subsidies (see Table 3.3). By switching completely to this mode of providing for the army, based on smaller yet regularly paid subsidies, the Republic was able to maintain its armed forces in the province for the rest of the war with sums far smaller than those necessary in the days of Foscolo's administration, when an attempt was made to meet the cost of the army in full. For example, the report sent by Governor-General Antonio Bernardo in January 1657 notes that monthly *terzi* and half pay to officers and *stipendiati* amounted to 15,180 *ducats*, while full pays for these forces would require as much as 33,386 *ducats*.⁹¹⁹ That is, subsidies paid to troops equaled only 45% of full costs.

The system established run more or less smoothly through the entire mandate of Foscarini's successor, Lorenzo Dolfin (January, 1653 – December, 1654). Until the very end of his service in Dalmatia, with occasional recourses to *imprestido*, Governor-General Dolfin managed to maintain uninterrupted payments of *terzi*. Only at the very end, in the period from November 1654 till January 1655, did the provincial treasury fail to meet its obligations. So as to compensate for a total shortage of money in the province, Governor-General Dolfin resorted to distributing grain to troops.⁹²⁰ This small crisis was in the first place caused by the delay of Dolfin's successor, Gio Antonio Zen, who arrived to Dalmatia in January 1655, instead of December 1654.⁹²¹ Nevertheless, such interruptions in functioning of the system were standard occurrence accompanying almost every change of the governor-general. The real test of this financial policy came in the period 1655-1657, when the entire system came close to breaking point.

2.3. Further Adjustments and The Years of Hardship (1655-1657)

Heavy engagement of the Republic in the Levant during the years 1654-1657 and a visible drop in the sums of money reaching Dalmatia put a heavy strain on the functioning of the provincial administration. Especially difficult were the final years of this period: 1656 and 1657, when the provision of money sent to Dalmatia fell to merely 96,000 and 105,000 *ducats* respectively (see Figure 3.1). Governor-General Zen went through his first year of service

919 ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 80. (Sebenico, 29. Gennaro 1656. m.v.) attachment: *Ristretto di militie*.

920 ASVe, PTM. b. 477. num. 175. (Zara, 14. Nov. re 1654)

921 ASVe, PTM. b. 477. num. 178. (Zara, 15. Dicembre 1654.); num. 180, (Zara, 1. Gennaro 1654 m.v.)

(1655) without any major problems; the funds sent from Venice complemented with frequent recourse to *imprestido* were sufficient to enable continuous payments of *terzi*. Yet, the Republic was living on credit, and when, in June 1656, the payment of *terzi* was again temporarily interrupted, Zen warned the Senate that the deficit of sixteen months of his regency amounted to 54,711 *ducats*.⁹²² In such circumstances, even diligent management of armed forces with the regulation of weak companies, discharging superfluous officers and NCOs, or degrading them to the rank of soldiers, as was for example done by Zen's successor Antonio Bernardo in October 1656,⁹²³ could still not compensate for the chronic problem of lack of coin. In order to secure regular payments of *terzi* to soldiers, governor-generals Antonio Zen and Antonio Bernardo were forced to spend available funds even more sparingly than their predecessors, and made further cuts on the expenses. To do so they introduced several important changes in the practices established so far.

The major novelty introduced by Governor-General Zen was the introduction of the half *terzo* of only two *lire* instead of the usual four.⁹²⁴ From that time on, various provincial administrations turned to this very unpopular measure in times when the treasury was running low and no new provision of money was on its way. In the years of Governor-General Zen, this act was also usually accompanied by total abolition of any kind of payment to officers, for example in May (1656), officers accumulated credit of three half pays (usually paid on the first *terzo* of the month).⁹²⁵ Yet, these were just short term measures, which could not be maintained for a long time, without risking widespread mutiny of soldiers or officers

922At the end of his service, in June 1656, frustrated by his situation, Governor-General Zen informed the Senate that he was unable to continue with the payments of *terzi*. In the course of sixteen months of his service, Zen complained to the Senate he had received only 217,360 *ducats*, while at the same time average monthly costs of armed forces only (not including galleys, fortifications and other necessary extraordinary expense) in the province amounted to 17,000 *ducats*, resulting in the deficit of 54,711 *ducats*. ASVe, PTM. b.479. num. 113. (Zara, 5. Giugno 1656)

923In October 1656, Bernardo initiated a reform of armed forces. In the first place, Bernardo reduced the wages of dozens of officers and NCOs belonging to numerically weak companies of the trans-alpine infantry to that of ordinary soldiers. Also, the governor-general managed to reduce *page di campagna* of the Klis garrison to only six months. All in all, Bernardo informed his superiors that he has cut down monthly expenses by 1,247 *ducats*. ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 46. (Spalato, 3. Ottobre 1656); attachment: *Conto di ducati 1247 che al mese la avanzare al publico l'ecc.mo s.re P.re Gnal Bernardo in Dalmatia, et Albania*.

924Half *terzo* was introduced for the first time in period April-May, 1655, and again in January-February, 1656. ASVe, PTM. b. 477. num. 32. (Zara, li 4. Maggio, 1655); num. 83. (Zara, 17. Genaro 1655 m.v.)

925ASVe, PTM. b. 479, num. 103. (Zara, 3 Aprile 1656)

abandoning their service. Still, further cuts on monthly expenses were more than necessary, and a new, more sustainable policy had to be found. As a remedy for this problem, from October 1656, Governor-General Bernardo began to distributing half pay due to captains and officers, one half in coin and one half in grain, to their great displeasure.⁹²⁶ This policy represents the major novelty introduced by Bernardo and, in spite of opposition by the captains and officers it remained in place until the end of war.⁹²⁷

Still, the financial situation continued to worsen. Although the sums sent to Dalmatia remained more or less the same as during the previous years, due to more intense military commitment and a new Ottoman offensive, the expenses increased considerably. In the first seven months of Bernardo's tenure, the deficit between the funds that reached Dalmatia and those necessary to cover only the expenses of *terzi* and half-pay amounted to 63,947 *ducats*.⁹²⁸ In order to spare hard currency as much as possible, Bernardo began distributing grain to soldiers as compensation for their *terzi*.⁹²⁹ Moreover, by December 1656, Bernardo was relying almost exclusively on biscuit and grain to maintain Venetian forces in Dalmatia, which were, because of the overpriced value of state grain, on the verge of mutiny.⁹³⁰ During the crucial months of the siege of Kotor, Bernardo took advantage of the fact that the Republic provisioned the town with significant quantities of grain, flour, hardtack, and used these provisions to satisfy not only soldiers but also various other creditors.⁹³¹ Over the years, distribution of grain instead of coin, in spite of the express wishes of the Senate which did not approve of this practice, became the standard measure to which governor-generals turned in the periods of chronic shortage of cash.⁹³²

926ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 54. (Trau, 16. Ottobre 1656)

927For example, in April 1663, captains serving in Zadar collectively presented to Governor-General Cornero a supplication for the abolition of payments of one quarter of their pays in grain. Yet with no success. ASVe, PTM. b. 490. num. 65. (Zara, 8. Aprile 1663) Undated attachment to the letter.

928In these seven months only 50,000 *ducats* reached Dalmatia, while at the same time monthly expenses of the armed forces amounted to 6,278 *ducats*. ASVe, PTM., b. 480. num. 80. (Sebenico, 29. Gennaro 1656. mv.) attachment: *Ristretto di militie*.

929the first occurrence was in October 1656, when a ship carrying 600 *stara* of grain arrived to Zadar. ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 48. (Spalato, 6. Ottobre 1656)

930ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 68. (Sebenico, 9. Dicembre 1656)

931ASVe, PTM., b. 481. num. 109. (Cattaro, 12. Luglio 1657)

932On 19th July 1658, the Senate informed Governor-General Beranardo that it is resolutely against such a policy, of distributing grain, hardtack or bread as compensation for wages. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-33, fols. 163r-v, *Adi 19. Luglio 1658*; Similarly, the order was repeated to Governor-General Andrea Corner in January

2.4. The Years of Protracted Struggle (1658-1669)

Still, the implementation of all these mechanisms: reduced wages for captains, introduction of occasional half *terzi* and compensation of coin with grain, combined with frequent recourse to *imprestido*, due to the significant increase in Republic's military commitment in Dalmatia, could not prevent frequent interruptions in the payment of *terzi* and the grave effects it had on the morale of soldiers. In April 1658, Bernardo informed the Senate that the army is on the verge of mutiny: soldiers were refusing to serve and had begun robbing subjects who were practically besieged in their homes. Also, not surprisingly, desertion rates increased drastically - not only were individual soldiers running away crossing over to Ottoman lands⁹³³ - but, also, entire companies followed this pattern, as was the case in May 1658 after the mutiny of the garrison in Split.⁹³⁴ Furthermore, Bernardo added that in such situation: "the use of force to rein their unruliness, as I have intended [beforehand], will not serve, since the former is in their hands, and any coercion could move them to unite and grab arms to oppose it."⁹³⁵ In order to restrain troops, the governor-general was forced to resort to harsh measures: fugitives caught by villagers or Morlacchi were either put to death or sentenced to galley service.⁹³⁶

It seems that the constant stream of Bernardo's letters describing the catastrophic situation of the province bore fruit, since from July 1658, the provision of money sent to Dalmatia exhibits an increase in the sums (see Table 2, in Appendix 1.4). Nevertheless, when finally, after almost four years of service Bernardo left Dalmatia, the provincial treasury was left in fairly good order. All of the debts toward private creditors were settled and troops serving in Dalmatian garrisons were creditors of only two *terzi*, while companies aboard armed vessels were owed just one *terzo*.⁹³⁷

1662. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-36, f. 344v-345r; *Adi 4 Gennaro 1661. m.v.*

933For example, in April 1658, one large group of veteran soldiers fled from Klis and went over to the Ottoman side. ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 174. (Zara, 10. Aprile 1658)

934ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 181. (Zara, 14. Maggio 1658)

935*Ne occorre, che io pensi, di frenare la loro rilasciatezza cola forza, perché la medesima sta nelle loro mani, e ogni violenza potrebbe divenir ministra di comoverli ad venirsi per la resistenza, e prender l'armi;* ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 171. (Zara, 4. Aprile 1658); Moreover, by June 1658, the situation further escalated, and to the great displeasure of the governor-general, the soldiers also began pillaging churches. ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 186. (Zara, 4. Giugno 1658)

936ASVe, PTM. b. 484. num. 233. (Da Galera Paruicchio sotto Sebenico, 12. Febraro 1658. mv.)

937ASVe, PTM. b. 486. num. 285. (Zara, 28. Febraio 1659. mv.)

Yet during the mandate of Bernardo's successor, Andre Corner (1660, March – 1662, May), the financial situation turned worse again. After almost 16 years of war, the Republic was finally losing breath and encountered more and more difficulties in financing its war effort. The mandate of Governor-General Andrea Corner was plagued by frequent interruptions in payments of *terzi*, and troops accumulated large credits again. In addition to standard reasons, that is, long periods when no funds would reach the province, what was extremely damaging for the financial situation during the mandate of Governor-General Andrea Corner was the arrival of two regiments of Savoy to Dalmatia, in July 1660.⁹³⁸ The soldiers of these regiments, unlike others serving in Dalmatia, were according to the contract concluded between the duke of Savoy and the Republic, to be paid in full. Consequently, at great displeasure of Governor-General Corner, these two regiments refused to accept payments of the customary *terzi* and demanded full pay. This had grave consequences for the increase of monthly expenses. As Governor-General Corner reported to the Senate, while the monthly costs of all other troops in the province (counting some 5,000 men), both garrisons and companies aboard armed vessels, amounted to 16,132 *ducats*, that of the Savoy regiments numbering less than 1,000 men amounted to 6,661 *ducats*.⁹³⁹ In spite of all efforts, Governor-General Corner failed to convince the officers of the Savoy regiments to accept the same method of payment as other officers in the service of the Republic (one half in *ristretti*, one quarter in cash and one quarter in grain). His only success was to persuade them to accept payment of part of the wages of the soldiers in biscuit.⁹⁴⁰ Although, the regiments of Savoy stayed in Dalmatia for a brief period of time, since they left for Crete in December 1660, the effect of their stay, due to the large amount of cash consumed was detrimental for the functioning of the provincial treasury.⁹⁴¹

When in May 1662, Governor-General Corner finally left the province, the arrears of the army reached six to seven months of *terzi*, depending on the garrison.⁹⁴² According to a report

938ASVe, PTM. b. 487. num. 28. (Sebenico, 17. Luglio 1660)

939ASVe, PTM. b. 487. num. 30. (Sebenico, 13. Agosto 1660)

940ASVe, PTM. b. 487. num. 36. (Spalato, 23. Agosto 1660); num. 40. (Spalato, 12. Settembre 1660)

941ASVe, PTM. b. 487. num. 55. (Spalato, 6. Dicembre 1660)

942ASVe, PTM. b. 489. num. (2. Zara, 24. Maggio 1662); num. 4. (Spalato, 8. Giugno 1662)

sent by the new Governor-General Girolamo Contarini (1662, June – 1664, December) in August 1662, the credit of the army on their *terzi* amounted to 74,494 *ducats*.⁹⁴³ By August of the following year, 1663, the situation was critical; the debt toward the army rose to 115,359 *ducats*.⁹⁴⁴ Due to chronic shortage of money, Governor-General Contarini was forced to suspend payments of *terzi*, and switched to irregular payments of subsidies, the amount of which varied depending on the availability of the cash. Although the Senate, on 22nd September 1663, ordered restoration of the regular payments of *terzi*,⁹⁴⁵ this decree was not followed by adequate provisions of cash, and by March 1664 the 7,000 troops stationed in Dalmatia were creditors of some 170,000 *ducats*. As a consequence of this breakdown in the system of payment, the army slipped into disobedience: soldiers gave themselves to looting civilian homes, and desertions were almost a daily occurrence. In such conditions, discipline was kept only with the application of the harshest measures: sentencing to galley service or the death penalty.⁹⁴⁶ Over the ensuing years, the situation somewhat improved provisions of money became more regular, yet smaller in size (see Table 2 of the Appendix 1.4). Nevertheless, the sums proved sufficient and by September 1664, the payment of *terzi* started again and continued until the very end of the war, with several shorter periods of suspension.⁹⁴⁷

3. Other Extraordinary War Expenses

Payment of troops, either full pay or simple *terzi*, undoubtedly represented the number one

943ASVe, PTM. b. 489.num. (14. Spalato, 16. Agosto 1662)

944ASVe, PTM. b. 490. num. (89. Spalato, 15. Agosto 1663)

945ASVe, PTM. b. 490. num. (104. Spalato, 14. Ottobre 1663)

946In March 1664, Governor-General Contarini warned the Senate that:

Le fughe de soldati da tal capo seguite, li spogli dati alle Case de sudditi, che tuttavia continuano, procurai fermare quando con condanne al remo, quando con la pena dell' ultimo supplittio, e V.V.E.E., che comprendono l'importanza dell' affare, comendando la rissoluzione, mi incaricano con più Ducali, specialmente con quelle di 17 Novembre d'essercitare castighi esemplari, perché si astengano da simili delinquenze; ultimamente anc, de undici arrestati per furti, e fughe, uno soli fu condannato a morte, per l'esempio, gl' altri rimanendo ubligati alla Galera, e quando non si osservasse tal stile, in breve si disfarebbono li Presidij, onde mi regolai sempre con motivi di V. Giustitia, con la loro venerabil intentione, e con li oggetti di quel bene, che deve esser procurato da chi ha l'honore di servirle, non già con rigodi impoprij, non pesati, come pare si granda, alieni dal genio dall'inclinationi mie, ben note a Dio, che con giusta lance punisse, e premia, secondo richiedono gl' operati;

ASVe, PTM. b. 492. num. 134. (Spalato, 11. Marzio 1664)

947For example, because of the catastrophic earthquake that hit Ragusa and Kotor in April 1667, in order to direct all available funds for refortification of Kotor, Governor-General Cattarino Corner temporarily suspended payments of *terzi*. ASVe, PTM. b. 497, num. 210. (Zara, 12. Aprile 1667)

priority on the list of expenses for the governor-generals serving in Dalmatia, consuming the bulk of the funds sent to them. However, two other items also figured prominently in the provincial budget: fortification works and the transfer of troops to the Levant. As can be seen from Table 2 of Appendix 4, over the years, the Republic allocated and sent to Dalmatia considerable funds specifically for these tasks. Although occasionally the governor-generals would help themselves to these funds, as happened in February 1669, when Governor-General Antonio Priuli used 2,000 *ducats* intended for fortification works in Split to supply *terzi*,⁹⁴⁸ in general the Senate's orders were respected and the funds were employed strictly for their intended purpose.

The War of Crete left a vivid mark on the Dalmatian landscape. All the towns along the coast acquired new bastion style fortifications. In some cases, older medieval fortifications were improved by earthen works and the addition of a few new modern strong points, as was the case with Trogir, and especially Šibenik where, in 1646-7, the new fort of St. John was erected on the nearby hill overlooking the town.⁹⁴⁹ Yet, the most impressive fortification project undertaken in Dalmatia in the course of this war was the construction of a completely new modern bastion style fortification complex protecting the town of Split. The town was completely encircled with bastion styled walls strengthened by two modern outer forts: Gripe and Bačvice, positioned on two nearby hilltops.⁹⁵⁰ As is well known in historiography, such construction projects were extremely costly, requiring large sums of money.⁹⁵¹

An example from March-April 1651 can serve as an excellent illustration of these costs in the local context. Accompanying Governor-General Foscarini on his tour of the province were two engineers, Benaglia and Magli, who on his orders surveyed the state of fortifications of Šibenik, Trogir and Split. The costs of all the works needed in the case of the forts of St. John and St. Nicholas in Šibenik were estimated at 26,250 and 17,000 *ducats* respectively.⁹⁵² The

948ASVe, PTM. b. 501. num. 172. (Zara, 19. Febraro 1668 mv.)

949Andrej Žmegač, *Bastioni jadranske Hrvatske*, pp. 96-100.

950Ibid., pp. 83-91.

951For example, see the classical study by Simon Pepper and Nicholas Adams, *Firearms and Fortification: Military Architecture and Siege Warfare in Sixteenth Century Siena* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); Frank Tallett, *War and society in early-modern Europe*, pp. 168-9.

952ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. 10. (Di Galera nel porto di Grebavniza, 20. Marzo 1651) attachments to the letter.

works in Split were estimated at 30,000, while those in Trogir at 8,000 *ducats*. Engineers also strongly proposed building a new fort on the nearby island of Čiovo, the costs of which they set at 25,000 *ducats*.⁹⁵³ The cost of these works (not including the construction of the new fortress on Čiovo) totaled 81,250 *ducats*. Aware of the financial restrictions of the Republic and the fact that all the works had to be finished before the end of May, when the Ottoman army would traditionally take to the field, engineers also gave their estimate of the absolutely necessary works that needed undertaking if these towns were to be able to sustain an attack. According to Benaglia and Magli, the cost of these minimum works amounted to: 30,000 at Split, 8,000 in Trogir, 9,000 at the fort of St. John and 3,000 at St. Nicholas, giving the total of 50,000 *ducats*.

However, what the engineers wanted and what was within the domain of possible were two different things. The Republic's finances simply could not allow even these limited projects. Employing 50,000 *ducats* in fortifications at the time was simply impossible. Instead of comprehensive systematic works on the towns' fortifications, it was only the absolutely minimum upgrades and corrections, year in and out, that were undertaken with the goal of patching up the most obvious shortcomings for the duration of current campaigns. Over the years, the construction works on Dalmatian fortifications resembled a chaotic patchwork, in which one year an addition to town fortifications would be built by one engineer, only to be found lacking and torn down the following year by another engineer, at great expense and to the frustration of the governor-generals.⁹⁵⁴ Such a situation persisted until the late 1650s when more or less systematic works begun on the new modern fortifications of Split.

The problem with accounting for the cost of these works is that the amounts of money explicitly decreed by the Senate for fortification works represent only a fraction of the funds actually spent. More often than not the Senate would simply issue general instructions to governor-generals, expressing its conviction that in spending the money they are sending him

953ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. 17. (Spalato, 10. Aprile 1651) reports of the engineers, attachments to the letter.

954Very vivid account of damages and negative consequences caused by such unsystematic construction works was left by previously mentioned engineer Onofrio del Campo in his memorandum concerning the state of Dalmatian fortifications. Mirolsav Bertoša (ed), *Tvrđavni spisi Onofrija del Campa*, pp. 30-31, 100-101

he will take care of this important project, as he best sees fit. Moreover, from 1656 and the mandate of Antonio Bernardo, the construction works in Split and Šibenik received the character of public works in which entire communities willingly participated, helped by galley crews and *cernide* from Italy and Istria. By using this free labor Bernardo estimated the monthly expenses necessary for fortifications works at 6,000 *lire*.⁹⁵⁵ Therefore, unfortunately, due to the nature of the sources and the mode of construction, it is almost impossible to provide any precise figure as to how much money was spent on Dalmatian fortifications. On the other hand, much more can be said concerning the operation of transferring troops to the Levant.

In addition to being regulated (see previous chapter) and thus free to leave for Venice to plead for settlement of their credits, there was another venue available to captains for at least partial settlement of their credit: being transferred from Dalmatia to the Levant. The operation of transferring units from Dalmatia to the Levant was a complex one, involving a multitude of administrative tasks and expenses. Not only did ships need to be found and hired, but also, for their long voyage to the Aegean or Crete, soldiers had to be well provisioned with food, wine and water. At the same time, in Dalmatia, suitable units had to be chosen and their commanders convinced to willingly concede to the transfer, which more often than not proved to be a difficult task. The first major transfer of troops from Dalmatia occurred in January 1649, when 400 soldiers of Italian infantry were sent as reinforcements to Crete. This transfer serves as a good illustration of all the problems and obstacles involved in this operation. After successful closing the 1648 campaign, the Senate deemed it safe to decrease the Republic's military presence in Dalmatia and to strengthen its forces on Crete with the transfer of some veteran units. Consequently, in its letter dated 10th October, the Senate informed Governor-General Foscolo of its wish to send 400 soldiers from Dalmatia to Crete, providing detailed instructions on how to proceed.

Foscolo was ordered to select 400 of the best soldiers available in the province and to

955ASVe, PTM. 480, num. 80 (Sebenico, 29. Gennaro 1656. mv.)

organize their transport to the island of Hvar, where as was usual, they would be boarded on the ships hired by the Senate and waiting for them.⁹⁵⁶ This operation was completed a few months later, in January 1649, when commissary Molin led the selected 405 soldiers to the island of Hvar, where they embarked on three transport ships and sailed for the Levant. Also, as mentioned previously, part of the standard procedure was to regulate weak units and thus make them more cost effective before their transport to the Levant. Such was also the case this time, and from the initial 12 companies, only five were formed, each 85 men strong.⁹⁵⁷ The cost of shipping these troops to Levant were not negligible. While the fee usually paid to the captain of the ship for the transfer of a single soldier from Venice to Dalmatia was one half ducat only,⁹⁵⁸ for the transport to Crete the Republic was forced to pay six *ducats*, thus requiring further 2,430 *ducats*.⁹⁵⁹ Furthermore, in order to provide for maintenance of these 400 soldiers during their voyage to the Levant, in October 1648, the Senate allotted 17 *migliara* of biscuit.⁹⁶⁰

Yet these were not the most expensive aspects of this operation. In order to motivate officers and soldiers to concede more willingly to this transfer, it was a customary practice of the Republic to clear all of accumulated credits and also to provide two full rounds of pay in advance to the units destined for transfer. Therefore, out of 110,000 *ducats* decreed to Dalmatia in October 1648, the Senate allocated some 10,000 *ducats* to be spent solely for this operation.⁹⁶¹ In the course of war, the steps described above - conveying selected troops to Hvar, the regulation of companies, the payment of their credits and two anticipated wages, and finally embarking on transports destined to carry them overseas - was to become the standard procedure involved in each transfer of troops from Dalmatia to the Levant.

Occasionally, instead of hiring ships in Venice, the Governor-General in Dalmatia would be charged with this task as well, as was the case in 1668, when Governor-General Antonio

956ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-21, fols. 93r-v, *Adi 7 Ottobre 1648.*;

957ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 523. (Di Galea Lesina, 25. Dicembre 1648)

958ASVe, Senato Mar, R-113, fol. 209v-210r, *Adi 3. Luglio 1652.*

959For example see: ASVe, Senato Mar, R-107, fol. 59v, *A di 10 Ottobre 1648.*; R-117, fols. 100v-101r, *A di 22 Aprile 1654.*

960ASVe, Senato Mar, R-107, fol. 60v; *A di 10 Ottobre 1648.*

961ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-21, fols. 93r-v, *Adi 7 Ottobre 1648.*

Priuli hired three ships for the transfer of 500 men to Crete, at the fixed price of 170 *Zecchini* per vessel.⁹⁶²

Sometimes even the prospect of obtaining settlement of their credits and payments of two full monthly pay in advance was not sufficient to motivate soldiers to accept this transfer. During the first years of the war, service in the Levant was very unpopular among the units of Croatian and Albanian infantry. In January 1650, the Senate ordered a new transfer from Dalmatia to Crete, this time of 1,000 soldiers, specifying that 600 of them should be selected from companies of Italian and transalpine infantry, and that a further 400 should consist of eight *barche armate* and eight companies of Croatian and Albanian infantry. Aware of the unwillingness of the units of Croatian and Albanian infantry to accept service in the Levant, the Senate also instructed Foscolo to give license to captains to raise eight new units solely for this purpose.⁹⁶³ The Senate allocated the sum of 25,000 *ducats* for the entire operation.⁹⁶⁴ Yet even this proved to be insufficient. The captains chosen for this task reported great difficulty in finding recruits willing to sign up for this service, and even of those who signed, many simply fled or mutinied against the transfer to Crete. Finally, Governor-General Foscolo was forced to grant permission to captains (against standard policy) to fill their companies with recruits of any nationality, including Dalmatian subjects and Morlacchi, as long as the persons signed up were willing to leave voluntarily for Crete. Still, in order to prevent any further defection along the way, special security policies were put in place. Each armed vessel was left only with a bare bones crew of 15-20 trusted men, while the rest were embarked on galleys escorting transport ships. Only in this way was Foscolo finally able to complete this operation in June 1650.⁹⁶⁵

As the war progressed, credits of the units serving in Dalmatia increased and accordingly the cost of the transfer of these companies to the Levant too. Some regiments, over the years

962Entire operation costed 6,720 *ducats*. ASVe, PTM. b. 499. num. 65. (Zara, 2. Maggio 1669) attachment dated: *Adi 27. Aprile, Zara*;

963ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-23, fols. 136-v, 141r.

964ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-24, fol. 50r

965ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 716. (Di Galea nell'acque di Spalato, li 17. Giugno 1650)

managed to accumulate significant debts, which exceeded the funds destined by the Senate for their transfer to the Levant. Such was for example the case with the regiment of transalpine infantry of Colonel Andrea Britton, which was destined to be shipped to Crete in 1652.

Governor-General Girolamo Foscarini invited the colonel and his lieutenant to his residence and attempted to convince them to accept the payment of only a part of the debt of the regiment. However, Colonel Britton proved to be a skillful negotiator. He rejected Foscarini's offer, replying with all due courtesy that "without the risk of being marked as traitor to his nation and his regiment, he cannot concede to treatment different than the one practiced with all other troops sent from here (Dalmatia) to the Levant."⁹⁶⁶ The colonel also added that even if he would personally accept such a treatment, his officers would surely not. Furthermore, in addition to the credit of the regiment under his command, Colonel Britton also raised the question of the unpaid stipend (in the form of four *lanze spezzate*), granted to him during his service as the governor of arms at Klis in 1648-9, and finally presented one *bolletta*, for several thousand *ducats* due to his regiment for *paghe di campagna*, dating back to the years of General Foscolo. All in all Colonel Britton's credit reached 12,000 *ducats*. After long and difficult negotiations, the colonel and the governor-general agreed to the payment of 9,000 *ducats* to the regiment before its departure for the Levant.⁹⁶⁷

As the credits of the units rose, their commanders were more and more willing to concede to partial satisfaction of their outstanding debts. For example, in March 1655, Governor-General Antonio Zen dispatched four companies of transalpine infantry to the Levant, convincing their captains to accept payments of but a part of their credits, to the amount of 5,000 *ducats*.⁹⁶⁸ Moreover, the change of the financial policies in Dalmatia, namely the switch from paying full pay to the system of *terzi*, was also reflected in due course on the practices involved with the transfer of troops to the Levant. By September 1661, the units departing for Crete could expect to have settled, not their full credits, but just the *terzi* for which they were

966ASVe, PTM. 472. num. 107. (Zara, 27. Giugno 1652)

967Ibid.; ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 110. (Zara, 30. Giugno 1652)

968ASVe, PTM. b. 477. num. 23. (Lesina, 29. Marzo 1655)

in arrears, and also to be given the advance of two full wages. Such was, for example, the protocol for the transfer of 500 soldiers of Italian infantry to Crete in December 1661.⁹⁶⁹ In spite of the high cost of this operation, when compared to the dispatch of freshly raised units which had no accumulated credits, the Republic still continued with this practice throughout the entire war. The rationale behind this policy was the conviction that the units which had served one or more seasons in Dalmatia were considered to be adjusted to the harsh conditions of soldiers' life; especially to the warmer Mediterranean climate and air. Consequently, these were held to be less susceptible to deadly outbreaks of malaria than newly raised ones shipped to Crete directly from Italy. Moreover, following this line of reasoning, Governor-General Foscolo suggested to the Senate, in July 1650, that in case of prolongation of the war, Dalmatia should be used as the main *piazza d'armi* for the Republic's forces, instead of Lido.⁹⁷⁰ Based on this conviction, the practice of sending these "veteran" troops to Crete continued throughout the entire duration of war, in spite of high cost it implied.

4. Logistical Challenges in Supplying the Dalmatian Battlefield

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to state that due to the nature of available sources, it is simply impossible to provide such a comprehensive account of the Republic's logistical commitment in Dalmatia during this war, as it was done previously concerning the shipments of provisions of money. Unlike the transport of specie, which occurred between 4-8 times a year and the arrival of which was almost always confirmed by governor-generals, provisions of food or war materials were shipped on much more frequent basis and were less regularly mentioned in letters by governor-generals. As long as magazines and granaries were well provisioned, governor-generals only occasionally found it prudent to confirm arrivals of transport ships. On the other hand, once grain or biscuit was in shortage, and the prospect of famine began to loom over the province, a constant stream of letters asking for prompt dispatch of these fundamental resources would begin arriving at the Senate chamber. Similar

⁹⁶⁹ASVe, PTM. b. 488. num. (94. Sebenico, 28 Settembre 1661) attachment: *Conto paghe e sovventioni per le Compagnie Italiane*; num. 103. (Spalato, 16. Dicembre 1661)
⁹⁷⁰ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 722. (Zara, 7. Luglio 1650)

was the case with other types of provisions, such as: gunpowder, lead, weapons, shoes, cloaks, etc.

The following sections of this chapter attempts to capture the scale of the logistical challenge the Republic faced in maintaining its forces in Dalmatia. The first part deals with the most important logistical problem, that of feeding the army, while the second one is dedicated to the problems linked with providing it with other fundamental provisions: arms, munitions, clothing and similar.

4.1. Feeding the Army: grain, biscuit, corn, flour

During the years before the War of Crete, the Republic's peacetime garrison forces in Dalmatia amounted to approximately 1,000 foot and 370 horse.⁹⁷¹ As a rule, these troops were left to sustain themselves on their wages, by buying food on the local market. In addition to these garrison forces, some 800 men of Croatian and Albanian infantry served aboard *barche armate, fuste* and similar armed vessels. Due to harsher conditions of their service these soldiers were, like the crews of the Republic's galleys, in addition to their monthly pay of 4 *ducats*, entitled as well to rations of biscuit (issued from state magazines) and hot vegetable soup (*minestrone*). When during 1646, the Republic began to build up its military presence in Dalmatia such an arrangement could not be left unchanged. Some kind of regulation for the food supply was necessary. The maintenance of thousands of new troops could not be left solely in the hands of the merchants, whose main and only motive was profit.

Administrative coverage

The need to secure uninterrupted supply of the basic soldier's provisions and to protect troops from excessive overpricing of goods by merchants - a constant occurrence in every armed conflict – called for a more active role of the state in sustaining its armed forces. The initial incentive came from Governor-General Foscolo, who, alarmed by the poor state of soldiers resulting from the shortage of cash and extortions by merchants accompanying the army, warned his superiors about growing discontent among the troops.⁹⁷² Responding in

⁹⁷¹*Commissiones et Relationes Venetae*, vol 7, pp. 188-238.

⁹⁷²ASVe, PTM. 463, num. 193. (Zara, 3. Gennaro 1646)

February 1647, the Senate authorized its governor-general in Dalmatia to organize the regular (daily) distribution of bread to troops serving in Dalmatia, as was the customary practice in all other contemporary armies. Soon, this order was put in practice, and Republic's munitioners in Dalmatia began issuing provisions of food to captains, recording the type and quantity of provisions issued, so their value could be deducted from future payments to this unit.⁹⁷³

The discontent of the troops because of overpriced food and other provisions was not the only concern the Senate had in mind while promoting this policy. An additional incentive was the rapid growth of public debt toward the army. With the introduction of this practice, the Republic's policymakers aimed to slow down the rise of army credit at least partially. Yet, it seems that this practice was also welcomed by the captains, who found a way of misusing it to their advantage. They began asking from munitioners larger quantities of grain, bread or biscuit (depending on what the current food provision in a particular garrison was) than was necessary for sustaining their companies, with the intention of selling the surplus either on local markets or directly to their soldiers. In this manner they were able, at least partially, to compensate for their credit which was otherwise becoming increasingly difficult to liquidate. Although the captains suffered some loss, since the price they were able to get for these provisions was lower than the state fixed for accounting the provisions issued to them, the reasoning that "something is better than nothing" seems to have prevailed among them. Nevertheless, in the long run, this practice was very dangerous. It could cause the exhaustion of state granaries, which, in times of war could have dire consequences. Therefore, in February 1648, the Senate ordered further adjustments and instructed Governor-General Foscolo to limit the quantities of bread or biscuit issued to captains, so that it proportionally matched the number of soldiers in their companies.⁹⁷⁴

The basis of the soldier's diet consisted of bread or biscuit: dry hard baked wheaten bread (referred in the sources as *pan biscotto* or simply *biscotto*). Which of these two food provisions was distributed to the troops depended on the availability of these resources in

973ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17, fol. 352v; *Adi 23 Febraro 1647*.

974ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-19, fol. 196r-197r; *Adi 7 Febraro 1648*.

state magazines and on the official policy concerning their consumption. In June 1648, the Senate ordered shipment of new provisions of biscuit and grain to Dalmatia, and asked Governor-General Foscolo to provide exact information concerning the manner in which these resources were used. According to Foscolo's reply, all garrison troops were sustained by the bread baked from state owned grain and this was deducted from their wages. On the other hand, the consumption of biscuit was cut down to minimum. The biscuit functioned as emergency resource, to be used only in cases when grain was running low, or when the use of bread was impractical. As such, it was regularly distributed only to the crews of armed boats and galleys, without any deductions from their pay as was customary. Additionally, biscuit was also distributed without any charge to regular troops involved in military campaigns, as a supplement to their wages known as *paga di campagna*⁹⁷⁵ approved by the senate.⁹⁷⁶ Finally, rations of biscuit were also given to Morlacchi raiding parties in order to provide for their sustenance during these actions.

Daily rations of bread distributed to garrison soldiers consisted of 19 *onze* (ca. 075 kg) of bread (at least in Zadar). In order to meet the monthly production requirements of bread rations for a single soldier, according to the estimate by Governor-General Antonio Zen from January 1655 (which is supported by other data too), around one half *stara* of grain was necessary.⁹⁷⁷ On the other hand, the standard monthly ration of biscuit distributed to garrison soldiers consisted of 36 *libbre*, while cavalrymen belonging to the more elite branch of the military received 45 *libbre* of biscuit.⁹⁷⁸ Crews of armed ships were also entitled to slightly

975ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-20, fol. 146v, *Adi 18 Giugno 1648.*; ASVe, PTM. b. 466. num. 436 (Zara, 11, Luglio 1648)

976ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-20, f. 172r, *Adi 4 Luglio 1648.*

977ASVe, PTM. b. 477. num. 9. (Zara, 8. Gen. 1654 m.v.); Similar estimates can be obtained from a report concerning monthly consumption of grain from January 1653, compiled by Lorenzo Dolfin. These reports put monthly consumption of grain of the garrisons of Zadar, Split, Trogir and Omiš to 1088 stara. At the same time these garrisons counted 2,432 men, giving the total of 0.45 stara of grain as monthly consumption of grain per soldier. ASVe, PTM. b. 474, num. 110. Di Zara, 24. Genaro 1652 m.v.); num. 6 (Di Zara, 16. Genaro 1652 m.v.); num. 16 (Di Spalato, 4. Marzo 1653); num. 20 (Di Sebenico, 28. Marzo 1653); *Staro* or *Staro Veneziano* was the Venetian volume measure used for grain, wheat and other types of victuals. In case of wheat it amounted to 133 Venetian *libbre* or approximately 63.44 kg. For more on the Venetian weight measures, see Appendix 1.5

978ASVe, PTM. b. 477. num. 5. (Zara, 8. Febrario 1654. m.v.); ASVe, PTM. b. 484. num. 221. (Zara, 19. Novembre 1658); The *libbra* above refers to the Venetian wight measure, known also as *libbra grossa*, the equivalent of 0.47699872 kg.

higher rations than ordinary infantrymen, 42 *libbre* of biscuit per month, similar to *bombardieri*, various *stipendiati*, *provisionati*, *Morlacchi* leaders and others (widows, invalids, *benemeriti*), who were entitled to this provision as part of the Republic's social welfare program.⁹⁷⁹ However, the system as established in the days of Governor-General Foscolo's administration did not remain unchanged throughout the war. For example, with the introduction of *terzi* the distribution of biscuit was also regulated. From this time on, these two were linked, and soldiers began receiving biscuit rations in three installments every ten days. Moreover, the roles of the grain and the biscuit, as the main and auxiliary food provisions would also change over time, of which more will be said later. At this point, it is important to put the above daily (or monthly) figures of food provisions for a single soldier in their broader perspective: that of sustained logistical effort of the Republic to provide for a combat force of between 4-12,000 men in the overseas province, over the period of several decades.

The Scale of the Challenge: Monthly Quantities of Grain and Biscuit Needed to Feed the Army

Even in peacetime, during the years preceding the War of Crete, the Venetian possessions in Dalmatia could not produce grain and other victuals in quantities sufficient to feed the local population. As such, Dalmatia was completely dependent on the import of grain to cover its needs, mainly from Ottoman lands and the Italian markets in Puglia, Romagna and Marca. Once hostilities started, the situation turned from bad to worse. The imperial decree, *yasak*, issued in 1645,⁹⁸⁰ banned any type of commerce between the Ottoman empire and the Republic, therefore, at least officially blocking this source of food. Furthermore, once the hostilities in the region started, the success of the harvest in Dalmatia depended not only on the unpredictability of weather, but in the first place on the (un)timely arrival of Ottoman

⁹⁷⁹For more on this practice of the Venetian administration see: Tea Mayhew, "Soldiers, Widows and Families: Social and Political Status of the Professional Warriors of the Venetian Republic (1645-1718)" In *Professions and social identity : new european historical research on work, gender and society*, Berteke Waaldijk ed. (Pisa: Edizioni Plus – Pisa University Press, 2006) pp. 90-101.

⁹⁸⁰Gliogor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 103.; For the imperial order declaring the prohibition of trade with Christian states see: Vesna Miović, *Dubrovačka Republika u spisima Osmanskih sultana [The Republic of Ragusa in the Records of Ottoman Sultans]*, (Dubrovnik: Državni arhiv u Dubrovniku, 2005) p. 275.

raiders. Such a state of affairs rendered even this meager local source of food irregular and unpredictable. As a consequence, every ounce of grain and biscuit required to feed the Republic's armed forces in Dalmatia needed to be brought in by sea transport.

Table 3.6 below contains sample data concerning monthly consumption of grain and biscuit in Dalmatia. Although incomplete, the data still provides a good illustration of the logistical challenge which the supply of the Dalmatian battlefield represented for the Venetian Republic. As an illustration, let us take a closer look at the figures concerning the monthly consumption for the year 1654. In December 1653, the Venetian forces in Dalmatia consisted of 3,648 foot, 376 horse, 1,676 men of marine infantry aboard armed boats and three galleys, all in all, some 6,400 men.⁹⁸¹ The quantities of grain and biscuit necessary for sustaining this force for one year, based on the figures from January 1654 (the closest available data), would amount to the total of 6,000 *stara* of grain (380.64 metric tons) and 2,544 *miara*⁹⁸² of biscuit (1213.48 metric tons) that had to be shipped from Venice. The next question is how high, or low, did these provisions figure in the overall cost of maintaining the Republic's forces in this battlefield. As stated previously, the available data do not allow for the calculation of all materials (weapons, ammunition, clothing, ...) sent to Dalmatia, yet the relation between the costs of these most basic food provisions and the money necessary to pay *terzi* (minimum monthly subsidies necessary to keep soldiers content and provided for) for the army can be established.

Date	Grain (stara)	Biscuit (miara)	Source
1647. June	?	300	PTM-464-261;
1650. November	1000	?	PTM-470-761
1651. August	1200	?	PTM-471-52;
1651. October	976	?	PTM-472-69, Conto di Formento
1653. January	1088	150	PTM-474-10; Nota di Formento
1654. January	500	212	PTM-475-103-Nota del Biscotto
1654. September	500	234	PTM-476-157-Nota del Biscotto;
1655. January	1530,5	150	PTM-477-9; (estimate)
1656. October	-	300	PTM-480-52;PTM-480-54
1657. February	-	300	PTM-480-82;

981ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 97. (Spalato, 21 Dicembre 1653) attachment dated: 20. December 1653.

982One *miaro* (*migliario*, *migliaro*...) a thousand weight, referred to 1,000 of Venetian *libre grosse* equivalent of 476,99872 kg. For more see Appendix 3. Weight and Measures

1658. December	-	386	PTM-484-222;
1668. February	440	197	PTM-498-39; (Includes Kotor, grain is for ¼ of pay for officers and <i>stipendiati</i>)

Table 3.6. Monthly consumption of grain and biscuit in Dalmatia. (? - data not available)

The monthly sum necessary to cover *terzi* of the above mentioned force was calculated by Governor-General Dolfin at 107,349 *lire*, giving the yearly total of 207,772 *ducats*.⁹⁸³ At the same time, the quantities of grain and biscuit calculated above, when converted into the Venetian money of account, valuing one *libbra* of biscuit at eight *soldi* and one *staro* of grain at 32:10 *lire* (price from March 1654), give the sum of 195,000 *lire* (for grain) and 1017,600 *lire* (for biscuit) or the total of 1212,600 *lire* (c.a 195,580 *ducats*), which represents 94% of the amount necessary to pay for *terzi*. As can be seen for this sample year (1654), the yearly expenses necessary to pay minimum monthly subsidies to troops and the cost of basic food provisions for soldiers were almost equal. Yet, while the amount of *terzo* did not change through the time, the price of grain and biscuit were subject to market fluctuations (of which more will be said later), and grain prices could drop as low as 25 *lire* or rise as high as 51 *lire*, while biscuit prices ranged between 4-8 *lire*. Calculated at their lowest value (4 *soldi* for *libbre* of biscuit and 25 *lire* for *staro* of grain), the price of these provisions would drop by half, yet when grain is calculated at its highest price (of 51 *lire* per *staro*), the above-mentioned figure would increase by 10%. Based on the data it can be concluded that the cost of food provisions depending on market fluctuations could constitute 50-105 percent of the cost of *terzi*.

However, there was also another great difference in the nature of these two expenses. As can be seen from Table 2 in Appendix 1.4, in 1654, instead of the 207,772 *ducats* required to cover the *terzi* of the army, the Republic sent barely 104,000 *ducats* to Dalmatia, i.e only 50% of the sum necessary. The rest was turned into public debt and/or partially covered to the captains in Venice. Unfortunately, such manipulations and transfers of burden were not possible in case of food provisions. The soldiers could survive even without their pay, but not

⁹⁸³ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 97. (Spalato, 21 Dicembre 1653) attachment dated: 20. December 1653.

without their daily rations of food. Left without pay, the army would become discontent and unruly, yet still controllable at least to some degree. However, exposed to starvation and having their existence endangered, the soldiers would turn desperate and unpredictable, most likely beyond any control. Hunger was the invisible enemy against which no force could be used and no other remedy could be applied except provisions of food. As Governor-General Lunardo Foscolo vividly formulated in one of his letters to the Senate on this subject:

The pretensions of the enemies can be repressed with force, their boldness with iron and fire suppressed, and with courage the most grave obstacles overcome; and even if in doing so life ought to be lost, one can hope not to have died without revenge; however the threat of starvation can not be diverted but with meals, and for the meal bread is required, and no bread can be made without grain. All in all, mankind does not have a more horrendous enemy than starvation: against this enemy force is of no use; even the strongest and most powerful succumb to it and perish under its yoke; also, not even the greatest powers can resist it, and even the strongest towns are eradicated by it.⁹⁸⁴

The question that needs to be dealt with is: how successful was the Republic in meeting the supply requirements of its armed forces?

At the beginning of the war, it can be said that the Senate was indeed of generous hand when the supply of the Dalmatian battlefield was in question. How well the Republic's forces were provisioned by summer of 1647, when a major Ottoman offensive was expected, can be seen best from a report concerning the state of public magazines in Zadar, compiled in June 1647. According to the report, magazines in Zadar were provisioned with 1,100 *miara* of biscuit, 12,000 *stara* of grain and 3,000 *stara* of flour, with additional 471 *miara* of biscuit sent to magazines of other Dalmatian towns. Moreover, in just the two last weeks prior to 22 June 1647, additional 6,450 *stara* of grain and 426 *miara* of biscuit arrived to the province. All in all, the Republic provisioned its forces in Dalmatia with 18,500 *stara* of grain (c.a 11,736 metric tons) and almost 2,000 *miara* (954 metric tons) of biscuit (with the monthly expenses set at 300 *miara* this was enough to cover the needs of the Republic's navy in the gulf for

⁹⁸⁴*De nemici rintuzzarsi possono gl' orgogli con la forza reprimer l'ardire col ferro e col fuoco, et col corraggio superar si possono difficoltà tutte che gravissime; et quando anco lasciar convenisse la vita; sperar si potrebbe non morire senza vendetta ma alla necessita delle fame riparar non si può, che col cibo, ne cibarsi può senza Pane, ne per pane far si può senza grano. Inimico di più horrendo aspetto in soma non ha l'huomo della fame: contro questo forza non giova; à questo ceder convengono li più feroci, li più robusti, et sotto questo giogo vilmente perire; resister non possono le maggiori forze; debellate restano le più forti Città.* ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 509. (Zara, 17. Novembre 1648)

more than six months).⁹⁸⁵ Never again in the course of this war were state magazines so well provisioned.

The conditions of life were rather harsh in Dalmatia, and shortages of food more common than not, yet, no whole-scale outbreak of famine occurred in the province during this war. In spite of almost constant complaints by governor-generals concerning the inadequacy of the provisions available to them in comparison with the needs, the available statistical data support the assessment that the Republic was more or less able to meet the supply demands of its force in Dalmatia. The data concerning the shipments of biscuit from the period (23 April 1654 – 20 September 1654) can testify to this. Throughout these six months, the total of 1,179 *miara* of biscuit arrived to Dalmatia. Out of these, some 154 *miara* were dispatched to Kotor, leaving 1,025 *miara*, to cover needs of the province (see Table 3.7).⁹⁸⁶ At the same time, the monthly consumption of biscuit in Dalmatia for September was calculated by Governor-General Dolfin at 234 *miara*,⁹⁸⁷ giving the total 1,404 *miara* as the amount of biscuit necessary for these six months. As can be seen from these figures, the quantities of biscuit sent from Venice covered 73% of the needs of the province. In order to cover the difference, Governor-General Dolfin turned to *imprestido* and managed to obtain some 680 *miara* of grain.⁹⁸⁸

Similarly, the data available for the larger part of the mandate of Governor-General Bernardo, recording the provisions that arrived in the course of 32 months (1656, July – 1659, February), also points to the same pattern. Throughout this period, 11,661 *stara* of grain and 8,415 *miara* of biscuit were shipped to Dalmatia (see table 3.7 below), together with 1,251 *stara* of flour and 1,068 *stara* of bran. These figures give 364 *stara* of grain and 263 *miara* of biscuit as average quantities available for consumption every month in that period. At the same time, the demands of the army and others entitled to rations of biscuit were, according to a detailed report compiled by Governor-General Bernardo in December 1658, between 300

985ASVe, PTM. b. 464, num. 261. (Zara, 22. Giugno 1647) attachment numbered 6.

986ASVe, PTM. b. 476, num. 165. (Zara, 5 Ottobre 1654) attachment: *Nota di Boscotti capitati*

987ASVe, PTM, b. 476, num. 157. (Zara, 9 Settembre 1654) attachment: *Nota di Biscotto*;

988ASVe, PTM. b. 476, num. 165. (Zara, 5 Ottobre 1654)

and 386 *miara* of biscuit (table 3.6).⁹⁸⁹ Thus, even though the provisions of biscuit sent were enough to cover between 68 and 87% of the total needs, the quantities of 353 *stara* of grain and 39 *stara* of flour available every month - even if a significant portion of it was deducted and given to officers as compensation for one quarter of their pay - were sufficient to compensate for this deficit.

Period	Provision	Quantity	Unit	Num. Ships	Source
1647. May - 1647. June	biscuit	865437	libbre	7	PTM-464-221
	grain	10250	stara	9	PTM-464-221
	Segola	492,5	stara	2	PTM-464-221
	Miglio	3535	stara	5	PTM-464-221
1650. February - 1650. July	biscuit	927000	libbre		PTM-470-715
1651. February - 1651. August	grain	8376	stara		PTM-472-69
1654. April - 1654. September	biscuit	1179474	libbre		PTM-476-165
1656. July - 1658. November	grain	9661	stara	16	PTM-484-221
	biscuit	7392582	libbre	85	PTM-484-221
	formentone	5484,5	stara	12	PTM-484-221
	flour	1251,25	stara	4	PTM-484-221
	semola				
1658. November - 1659. March	grain	2000	stara	2	PTM-485-237
	biscuit	1022606	libbre	12	PTM-485-237
	formentone	2779	stara	3	PTM-485-237
	semola	1068	stara	2	PTM-485-237
1666. January - 1666. June	biscuit	1262715	libbre		PTM-496-168
	grain	1000	stara		PTM-496-168
	formentone	112,5	stara		PTM-496-168
1666. July - 1666. October	biscuit	1036630	libbre		PTM-496-192
	grain	2000	stara		PTM-496-192
1666. November - 1667. March	biscuit	367997	libbre		PTM-497-206

Table 3.7. Shipments of food provisions to Dalmatia.

Nevertheless, even if, as was stated perviously, no whole-scale famine occurred in Dalmatia during this war, the province came very close to it on several occasions. The main cause of these crises were short term (from 2-5 months) interruptions in the functioning of the republic's logistical system. These were caused either by the shortage of provisions in Venice or by bad weather which prevented shipments of provisions to Dalmatia, as was the usual case during winter months.⁹⁹⁰ Yet, the laws of nutrition are ruthless, and do not pay much attention

989ASVe, PTM. b. 484. num. 222, (Di Galea nel Porto di Zara a 27 Novembre 1658)

990Unpredictable bad sea weather which closed the Adriatic for navigation was a constant cause of problems for the Venetian high command, especially during winter months. In order to avoid shortages of food in the

to statistical data: if soldiers do not receive their 3,000 calories per day, they starve. Once magazines became exhausted, it was of no use to soldiers if in the next few months they were stuffed with provisions double then necessary. In this regard, just as in the case of provisions of money, the average figures of available quantities of biscuit calculated on the sample of several dozens of months, which usually fail to account for smaller crises, obscure rather than reveal the real state of affairs. The interruptions in the functioning of the logistical system were frequent, and even if they lasted only for a few months, they could have a devastating effect on the morale and the physical condition of the army. The mandate of Governor-General Antonio Bernardo, discussed above, represents a very good example of what dire consequences an interruption in the supply of food provisions can cause.

Bernardo's regency did not begin under auspicious signs. By June 1656, Ottoman corsairs, whose activity had been on the rise for years now, captured several transport ships⁹⁹¹ and devastated Dalmatian islands, thus spreading such terror that they came close to completely interrupting the navigation of the ships with provisions in the Adriatic.⁹⁹² Figure 3.4. below displays the dynamics of arrivals of shipments of biscuit to Dalmatia during these 32 months. As can be seen from the graph, during the first five months of Bernardo's service, the arrival of shipments of biscuit far below the province's monthly requirement of 300 *miara* is recorded.⁹⁹³ These five months (1656, July – 1656, December), when the total of 591 *miara* only arrived, represents one of the most critical periods of the entire war, as seen from the logistical perspective. Throughout the whole summer and fall, in order to escape starvation, desperate soldiers were fleeing Venetian service and crossing to Ottoman lands. By December

Levant and in Dalmatia, the Seante usually ordered *Provveditori alle Biave*, at the beginning of September to begin preparing a significant shipment of food. For example see: ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-33, f. 204v, 4. *Settembre 1658*; Moreover, visible drops in shipments of biscuit over winter months, in the Figure 3.4. account for this ordinary occurrence.

991 For example in April 1656, the Ottoman corsairs managed to capture a transport ship carrying 105 *miara* of badly needed biscuit for Kotor. ASVe, PTM. b. 479. num. 103. (Zara, 3 Aprile 1656)

992 *Per il terrore che hanno lasciato le fuste colle prede fatte in Golfo è così interrotta la navigazione, et traffico col quale si manteneva tutta la provintia specialmente di biade in che consiste il sostentimento universale soministrate abundantemente da sotto vento; che queste afflittissime Città e Territorij destrutti ultimamente dalla peste, e dalla corrente guerra ancora, cominciano ridursi in angustia di grano, et per conseguenza in pericolo di restar [4] prive in un istante del modo di vivere.*

ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 13. (Sebenico, 19 Giugno 1656)

993 ASVe, PTM. b. 484. num. 221. (Zara, 19. Novembre 1658)

1657, the situation was almost desperate, as in the course of these few months the shortage of food was such that soldiers began to suffer from *violenza della fame*, and were openly threatening the sack and plunder of the Republic's subjects. The state of the troops depicted by Bernardo in his letters sent to the Senate seemed very bleak indeed:

As a consequence of the hardships caused by cold and starvation, both, the troops in garrisons and galley crews, are dying, and from every place, on daily basis, a considerable number of them flee in order to escape from being reduced into such an unhappy state.⁹⁹⁴

Moreover, these were not the only problems of the governor-general. For the campaign of 1657, the Ottomans made a great plan: an attack on Split, Kotor and possibly Klis. The decline of the morale among the Venetian forces due to lack of basic provisions could not have come at a more inauspicious time. Although the logistical situation improved by spring 1657, the high desertion rates of the summer and fall of 1656 continued to cause the Venetian high command worries. In April 1657, Governor-General Bernardo warned his superiors that due to the high numbers of deserting soldiers, some of whom even entered Ottoman service, the enemy is more than well supplied with the information concerning the shortcomings of Venetian fortifications, lack of provisions and all other military intelligence.⁹⁹⁵

Such failures in the functioning of the supply system remained a constant occurrence for the entire duration of the war. For example, as can be seen from Figure 3.4. below, the visible drop in the shipments of biscuit recorded in the period (1658, June – 1658, December) represents one such recurrence. Yet, in spite of alarming letters by governor-generals depicting the horrific state of the army, with soldiers dying of starvation, no outbreak of major military revolt, on the scale which Spain experienced in the Low Countries when its entire fighting force became paralyzed, ever took place among the Republic's troops in Dalmatia.⁹⁹⁶ One half *stara* (31,72 kg) of grain or 36 *libbre* of biscuit (17,17 kg), needed every month to keep a single soldier from starvation, by itself does seem much. Yet, when this amount is

⁹⁹⁴*Per patimenti di freddo, e di fame, murono le militie nei Presidij, et le Ciurme nelle Galere, e da cadaun luoco ne va fuggendo giornalmente, considerabile quantità per non riddursi à termini della stessa infelicità.* ASVe, PTM. b. 480, num. 68. (Sebenico, 9. Dicembre 1656); Similar themes continued to dominate Bernardo's letter throughout entire winter 1656/7. See also: ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 78. (Sebenico, 22. Gennaro 1656. mv.); num. 80. (Sebenico, 29. Gennaro 1656. mv.); num. 82. (Sebenico, 8. Febraro 1656. mv.)

⁹⁹⁵ASVe, PTM. b. 481, num. 92. (Zara, 9. Aprile 1657)

⁹⁹⁶See: Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road*, pp. 157-176.

multiplied by 12 (number of months) and then again, by three or four thousand, resulting in the figures of a thousand and more metric tons, we come closer to the bird's eye perspective on the war of the republic's policymakers. According to a simple calculation 1,000 soldiers required approximately 380 tons of grain or 206 tons of biscuit every year. These were the non-negotiable shipping quotas the Republic ministers had to meet. The failure to do so, depending on the margin of the failure, always produced the same results: a paralyzed army, an increase in desertion rates, the fall of morale, the loosening of the discipline, refusal of service and even open mutiny, which in the worst possible case could result in the loss of some of the coastal towns.

Finally, the process that needs to be further examined is the one also visible from the data displayed in Table 3.6 above, and that is the transition from grain to biscuit as the main means of providing for the troops. As was mentioned previously, during the first years of Governor-General Foscolo's service, bread made from grain, provided by state granaries, represented the main food provision of the Venetian forces in Dalmatia, while biscuit represented a supplementary resource, reserved only for the navy and extraordinary situations: such as occurrences of shortage of grain, sieges, military operations etc. Yet, as can be seen from Table 3.6 above, by the days of the tenure of Governor-General Bernardo, the Venetian forces in the province were sustained solely by biscuit. These events and the contingency factors that led to this transition are the object of the research of the sections that follow. They provide a deeper insight into the functioning of Venetian logistics and all the practical challenges involved in supplying the Republic's armed forces in Dalmatia during the course of 25 years.




Figure 3.4. Arrival of shipments of biscuit to Dalmatia during the period of 32 months (1656, July – 1659, February).⁹⁹⁷

⁹⁹⁷Data from: ASVe, PTM. b. 484. num. 221. (Zara, 19. Novembre 1658); ASVe, PTM. b. 485. num. 237. (Zara, 9. Marzo 1659)

The Importance of Biscuit as Strategic Resource

Made of flour, water and salt, of high nutritional value, inexpensive and long lasting (if well stored, Venetian *pan biscotto* could endure months and even years) biscuit represented one of most important strategic military resources. Although not as popular among soldiers as baked bread, in war time biscuit represented the soldier's first and last line of defense against the most horrible enemy: hunger. When state granaries would began running low on grain in order to avoid outbreak of famine, biscuit would be distributed to the army, as was the case in December 1648, and later in October 1650.⁹⁹⁸ Moreover, when the progress of starvation threatened its forces the Venetian administration in Dalmatia was ready to exercise its prerogatives in full, and did not refrain from proclaiming ownership of biscuit as a state monopoly. Such was, for example the case in January 1650, when faced with the total lack of both grain and biscuit, Governor-General Foscolo issued a proclamation calling all of subjects to report the quantities of biscuit in their possession. These were to be noted in public records for use in case of emergency; those who disobeyed this order were to be fined with 100 *ducats* and, under the charge of contraband, the biscuit found was to be confiscated without the right to any form of compensation.⁹⁹⁹

Biscuit was also of crucial importance for the conduct of military operations both on land and sea. In the first place, biscuit represented the perfect means for sustaining Venetian land forces during campaigns. According to contemporary standards, in order to provide the soldier with his daily rations of bread, 24 ounces of flour were needed, as well as water, barm, wood and all other ingredients and tools necessary to bake bread while on campaign.¹⁰⁰⁰ However, lack of good roads, and the rough terrain of the Dalmatian hinterland rendered the use of large baggage trains carrying food and provisions very cumbersome and impractical. Thus, in order to cut down on baggage as much as possible, before embarking on campaigns each soldier was issued with provisions of biscuit sufficient to last from seven to ten days (using 1 and ½

998ASVe, PTM. b. 469. num. 654. (Zara, 4. Dicembre 1649); ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 754. (Zara, 12. Ottobre 1650)

999DAZ, *Atti di Provveditori Generali*, vol. 15, fol. 96r.

1000See: Martin Crevland, *Supplying War*, p. 34.

libbre of biscuit as the daily ration).¹⁰⁰¹ Since, as was stated previously, Venetian forces in the Dalmatian hinterland always operated within a few days' distance from the coast or navigable rivers and could count on being supplied with additional provisions by way of Republic's navy, it was possible to send troops to the countryside with such limited amounts of basic food provisions. Not only did this significantly reduce the baggage train of Venetian forces, the reliance on ready made biscuit rendered it free from all logistical problems involved in baking its own bread, thus significantly increasing the speed of such force. The importance of this was demonstrated best during Venetian spring campaign of 1647. The success of this Venetian campaign rested primarily on the speed of the Republic's forces. Ottomans, caught by surprise with the enemy *ante portas* of their strongholds, did not have the time to organize and offer unified resistance, but were rather picked off one by one by the superior Venetian force. In this battlefield, Venetian forces were fighting a numerically far superior enemy and could achieve only temporary military dominance. If given time, Ottoman forces from the region, once gathered and deployed, would surely outnumber Venetian ones, as the events of the Venetian defeat at Knin in 1654 vividly demonstrated.

Additionally, there were also other practical considerations specific to geo-strategic conditions of the Dalmatian battlefield, that made the use of biscuit for sustaining the Republic's armed forces not only more favorable than reliance on bread, but even presented itself as the only feasible option. For grain to be turned into bread, it needs to be ground into flour and then baked. While all Venetian strongholds along the coast, with the exception of Klis, had more or less sufficient baking capacities to cover the daily needs of their garrisons, the first phase of the process, grinding the grain, was precarious. Not only was the number of mills in Dalmatia very limited, even more problematic was their location. Almost all of the mills were situated in the countryside and thus frequently targeted by Ottoman raiding parties.¹⁰⁰² For example, in September 1650, the mills of Solin near Split were burned, while

¹⁰⁰¹For example, see the account of biscuit distribution during the failed attack on Knin in 1654: ASVe, PTM, b. 475. num. 120. (Zara, 26. Aprile 1654)

¹⁰⁰²In August 1651, Governor-General Foscarini sent a rather detailed report describing the state of available mills in Dalmatia. ASVe, PTM. b. 471, 51. (Zara, 15. Agosto 1651)

in October 1656, the mills on the Cetina river in Skradin near Šibenik were destroyed.¹⁰⁰³ Therefore, in spite of the fact that the mills could be repaired once the campaign season was over, the danger of Ottoman raiding parties rendered these facilities practically unusable not only during the formal siege of the town, but also during the larger part of the campaign season. As a consequence the Republic was forced to take special care that state magazines were well provisioned with biscuit for several months, especially in case of a potential Ottoman attack.

The case of the fortress of Klis is most exemplary in regard to the logistical contingencies presented above. The fortress not only lacked its own bakery, thus rendering the use of biscuit the only available option in providing for the garrison, but also - because of its isolated position away from the coast - in case of siege, the Venetian side could not count on sea transport for bringing fresh provisions and reinforcements. Therefore, all governor-generals kept Klis well supplied with provisions of biscuit sufficient to last for several months. For example, in summer 1654, when rumors of an Ottoman attack on Klis begun to circulate, Governor-General Dolfin informed the Senate that he had begun provisioning Klis with "*ogli, lardi, vini ed altre cause molto richiestemi.*"¹⁰⁰⁴ and that, by the middle of July, 160 *miara*¹⁰⁰⁵ of biscuit were stored in Klis, a quantity sufficient to support the local garrison for six months.¹⁰⁰⁶ His successor, Governor-General Antonio Zen, proved even more cautious and stuffed the fortress with provisions of biscuit sufficient to last for an entire year.¹⁰⁰⁷

However, the provincial administration in Dalmatia and the central organs of the state did not have a shared view concerning the expenditure of biscuit. While for the provincial governor-general biscuit represented the most practical solution for the multiplicity of provincial affairs, from providing for entire villages threatened with famine because of loss of crops due to Ottoman raids, to acts of public charity of granting daily rations of biscuit to

1003ASVe, PTM. b. 470, num. 745. (Zara, 12. Settembre 1650); PTM. b. 480. num. 54. (Trau, 16. Ottobre 1656)

1004ASVe, PTM. b. 476, num. 134. (Zara, 5. Giugno 1654)

1005One *miaro* (*milgliaro*, ...) referred to 1,000 of Venetian *libre grosse*, and is the equivalent of 476,99872 kg.

See appendix 1.5

1006ASVe, PTM. b. 476, num. 147. (Spalato, 19. Luglio 1654)

1007ASVe, PTM. b. 478, num. 55. (Zara, 14 Agosto 1655); ASVe, PTM. b. 479. num. 101. (Zara, 18 Marzo 1656)

families of deceased, meritorious Republic's servants or prominent Morlacchi leaders; the policy of the Senate was to attempt to limit its use as much as possible. For example in September 1646, the Senate instructed the newly appointed governor of Macarsca, which had only recently acknowledged Venetian rule, that biscuit should be spent most sparingly and only for sustenance of galleys and *barche armate*, warning him that the "*la gente del Paese non potendosi sostenere con tal allimenti.*"¹⁰⁰⁸ Similarly, in the instruction to Governor-General Foscolo, from June 1646, concerning the petition of villagers of the Zadar district to be granted half-pay and *biscotto* for the duration of this war, on account of their participation as territorial militia, the Senate instructed Foscolo to give biscuit and half-pay only to those serving aboard *barche armate*, while to take care of others with provisions of grain or corn.¹⁰⁰⁹ The motivation of the Senate for such an attitude was very simple.

Because of its much greater suitability to sea conditions than those of bread, which quickly became rotten, the Republic was relying on biscuit for centuries as means to sustain its navy. Each member of the galley crew was entitled to 600 grams of biscuit which together with cheese, honeycomb and wine constituted the basis of the sailors' diet.¹⁰¹⁰ According to contemporary estimates a single galley required 13 *miara* of biscuit (or the equivalent of 6.2 metric tons) every month.¹⁰¹¹ Consequently, the Republic's war fleet of some 30 galleys, as was the usual number of galleys serving in Levant during the first decade of this war,¹⁰¹² would require a provision of 390 *miara* of biscuit monthly or 4,680 *miara* yearly (expressed in modern measures this would amount to 186 and 2,232 metric tons of biscuit respectively). One must add to these the consumption of biscuit by crews of auxiliary ships accompanying the fleet: dozens of armed Dutch and English sail warships and several dozens of transport ships. According to a report by the Captain-General of the Sea from April 1652, the yearly requirements of the Venetian fleet in the Levant amounted to 6,000 *miara* (or 2,862 metric

1008ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17, f. 213r, *Adi 7. Settembre 1646.*

1009ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17, f. 132v-134r, *Adi 1. Giugno 1646.*

1010 David S. T. Blackmore, *Warfare on the Mediterranean in the Age of Sail: A History, 1571-1866* (McFarland, 2011) pp. 36-37.

1011ASVe, PTM. b. 484. num. 222, (Di Galea nel Porto di Zara a 27 Nov.re 1658) attachment: *Nota di biscotto*;

1012For the size of the Republic's war fleet in the Levant see Table 1 in: Luca lo Basso, *Il Mestiere del Remo nell' Armata Sottile Veneziana*, pp.111-112.

tons) of biscuit per year.¹⁰¹³ This amount covers only the demands of the Republic's war fleet, and does not include the consumption of all of the garrisons of *Stato di Mar* and other smaller naval task forces, such as those operating at Corfu, Zante and Crete. Such high demands for biscuit put a heavy strain on the Republic's capacity of manufacturing and providing biscuit for its naval forces, which had no other supply options, and were ranked as the first priority. As far as the Senate was concerned, biscuit was to be reserved for the navy (and the conduct of military operations), while for all other occurrences, it was preferable if they could be met with grain, flour or corn.

Shortages of Grain (1648-1650)

Based on the above rationale, the Senate favored the arrangement of providing for troops in Dalmatian garrisons whenever possible with bread made of grain instead of biscuit. In the period up to 1648, the Republic mainly managed to secure sufficient provisions of grain to provide for the needs of its forces in Dalmatia. However, by spring 1648, a shortage of grain struck Venice. In such circumstances the Senate prompted the governor-general in Dalmatia to start searching for other sources of grain in the region. Here, the Senate primarily had in mind the renewal of commerce with the Ottomans, having special focus on the rich Albanian grain market. Governor-General Foscolo was instructed to attempt to arrange the trade of state salt for grain, either in the north with the Ottomans from the province of Lika (already unsuccessfully attempted in February 1648)¹⁰¹⁴ or in Albania to the south. Additionally, Foscolo was also to encourage the initiatives of local merchants ready to purchase grain for the state. Finally, Foscolo was advised to maintain a strong squadron of galleys patrolling along the Albanian coast, with the task of capturing any ships carrying Ottoman grain which were to be escorted to Venice.¹⁰¹⁵

However, that year, all attempts to obtain grain from the Ottomans both in Lika and in

1013A report by the Captain-General of the Sea, from April 1652, puts the monthly consumption of the biscuit to 500 *miara*. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-113, fols. 110v-11r, *Adi 23. Aprile 1652*.

1014ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 375. (Di Galera Sebenico, 16. Febraro 1647. m.v.)

1015ASVe, ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-20, fols. 189r-v, 194r

Albania proved unsuccessful.¹⁰¹⁶ Meanwhile, since shipments from Venice became scarcer, grain also began running low in Dalmatia, and from September 1648, the troops were being distributed biscuit instead of bread.¹⁰¹⁷ In October 1648, the constant stream of letters from Dalmatia asking for shipment of wheat, corn, biscuit and other victuals was met with the Senate's reply that because of the great shortage of grain in Venice, at the moment no such provision could be sent.¹⁰¹⁸ In order to avoid famine, at the end of October, Governor-General Foscolo was forced to dispatch a squadron of 10 *barche armate* with the order to find and escort to Zadar any ship carrying grain encountered in the Adriatic. The Senate had no other option but to authorize this action.¹⁰¹⁹ This small crisis in the grain supply did not cause an outbreak of famine in Dalmatia that year, however, it did cause a few months' delay in the departure of the Venetian expeditionary force to Albania, and this period of time was used by the Ottomans to discover the network of conspirators and adequately prepare for the arrival of the Venetian force (see chapter 1.3.6).

When in 1649 and 1650, the supply of grain was again interrupted - partly because of shortages of grain in Venice and partly due to the outbreak of plague in Dalmatia which put the province under special sanitary procedures - the responsive actions of the Venetian side followed closely the patterns from the previous year. Galleys and *barche armate* were dispatched to search either for contraband shipping in the waters of Albania, and when crisis deepened, for any other ship carrying grain in the Adriatic. The projects of the revival of commerce with the Ottomans were again brought to life, this time with more success, especially in the parts of Lika where local beys proved more than susceptible to such

1016ASVe, PTM. b. 467. num. 487. (Zara, 6. Ottobre 1648)

1017ASVe, PTM. b. 467, num. 481. (Zara, 28. Settembre 1648)

1018ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-21, fols. 52v-53r, 81r;

1019ASVe, PTM. b. 467, num. 502. (Zara, 29. Ottobre 1648); ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-21, fol. 121v-122r; This was customary Venetian practice in the situation when shortage of grain threatened Venice with famine. For example, in January 1659, in order to supply Kotor, Governor-General Antonio Bernardo escorted one ship with 400 *stara* of grain and four ships carrying wine to the town, all encountered in the Adriatic during his voyage from Zadar to Kotor. ASVe, PTM. b. 484. num. 224. (Cattaro a 5, Gennaro 1658. m.v.); The question of compensation for the grain taken from Italian merchants was a constant source of incidents and disputes between Venice and the Spanish authorities in Naples. Moreover, it was not uncommon for the Holy See to intervene in some of more drastic cases. For example see: Antonio Calabria, *The Cost of Empire: The Finances of the Kingdom of Naples in the Time of Spanish Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) pp. 12-13.

initiatives.¹⁰²⁰ Moreover, this year a new market for Venetian salt trade opened up, that of the port of Bakar (*Buccari*), owned by Croatian magnate Count Petar Zrinski, from where, in September 1650, the first 300 *stara* of wheat were imported.¹⁰²¹ Also, it seems that local merchants intensified their activities, and in 1649, Foscolo was able to obtain through *imprestido* 600 *stara* of wheat (the equivalent of some 38 metric tons).¹⁰²² Yet, the Albanian grain market, the richest one in the region, still remain closed in spite of a rather enterprising initiative by Governor-General Foscolo from 1649. In December 1649, through the mediation of a well known and respected Kotor noble *Cavaliere* Vincenzo Bolizza, the Venetian side attempted to bribe Jusufbegović *sandjak bey* of *Scuttari*, and convince him to allow the purchase of grain in Albania to *cavalliere* Bolizza as a private person, under the cover of the imperial concession given to Ragusans which allowed them exports of grain.¹⁰²³ The set of actions outlined in previous paragraphs represented standard procedures of the provincial administration put in action when shortage of food provisions threatened the province.

The Switch to Biscuit as the Main Food Provision

Nevertheless, in spite of all its efforts, the Republic was unable to secure a constant and sufficient flow of grain shipments to Dalmatia. The distribution system, as established in the days of Governor-General Foscolo, remained unchanged during his successor Girolamo Foscari (1651, February – 1652, December), yet during the regency of Lorenzo Dolfin (1653, January – 1654, December) a shift toward biscuit as the main provision used for sustaining the army in the province took place. The interruption in the continuous supply of grain, the effects of which became manifest from June 1653,¹⁰²⁴ turned into a serious shortage of this resource in Dalmatia by August 1654. Following the usual procedure, Governor-General Dolfin began distributing biscuit, instead of bread, to town garrisons, saving the supplies of grain only for Zadar, the seat of the Venetian administration.¹⁰²⁵ Yet, what started

1020ASVe, PTM. b. 469. num. 638. (Zara, 27. Ottobre 1649); PTM. b. 469. num. 647. (Zara, 23. Novembre 1649);

1021ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 748. (Zara, 21. Settembre 1650)

1022ASVe, PTM. b. 469. num. 646. (Zara, 16. Novembre 1649)

1023ASVe, PTM. b. 469. num. 656. (Zara, 11. Dicembre 1649)

1024ASVe, PTM. b. 474. num. 56. (Zara, 20. Giugno 1653)

1025ASVe, PTM. b. 474. num. 73. (Di Zara, 30. Agosto 1653); ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 103. (Zara, 20. Genaro

as a temporary measure, a response to another (short-term) break in the supply system, turned into a more permanent arrangement. Occasional arrivals of ships with grain, throughout the rest of the mandate of Governor-General Dolfin, were sufficient enough to cover the needs of the Zadar garrison, but could not serve to reintroduce the distribution of bread to all garrisons.¹⁰²⁶

When in November 1654, Antonio Zen was elected as Dolfin's successor, one of the first tasks designated to him by the Senate upon his arrival to Dalmatia, was to establish the necessary quantities of grain needed for sustaining armed forces in Dalmatia.¹⁰²⁷ Although Zen compiled and sent a survey with precise figures, estimating monthly needs of the province at 1531,5 *stara* of grain,¹⁰²⁸ no change in the supply policy on the side of the central government followed. Throughout his short service in Dalmatia the usage of these two resources remained unchanged. Biscuit continued to serve as the main food provision, while bread was distributed to the Zadar garrison only. Yet, during the mandate of his successor, Antonio Bernardo, the shift to biscuit as the dominant food provision distributed to the soldiers was completed. From this time on, all infantry garrisons, cavalry forces and the crews of the republic's warships serving in Dalmatia, were maintained by rations of biscuit. Consequently, the consumption of biscuit in Dalmatia increased drastically. While in 1653, the monthly spending was c.a 150 *miara*, by December 1658 it reached 385 *miara* (see table 3.6).¹⁰²⁹ From the days of Antonio Bernardo, grain was mainly used as compensation given to military officers (see above) to the value of one quarter of their pay and as a supplementary resource used in times of crisis. As was for example the case in August 1663, when a shortage of biscuit occurred in Dalmatia,

1653. mv)

1026 Reports concerning the consumption of grain and biscuit sent by Governor-General Dolfin from January and September 1654 testify to prevailing reliance on biscuit over grain, in sustaining troops serving in the province. ASV, PTM. b. 475. no. 103. (Zara, 20 Genaro, 1653) attachment: *Nota del Biscotto, che si dispensa ogni mese per vito della militie, Barch' Armate, Morlachi et altri servono in Provincia*; ASVe, PTM. b. 476. num. 157. (Zara, 9. Settembre 1654) attachment: *Nota di Biscotto*;

1027 ASVe, Senato Mar, R-117, fols. 286r-v, *Adi 5 Novembre 1654*.

1028 ASVe, PTM. b. 477, num. 9. (Zara 8 Febbraro, 1654. m.v.) attachment: *Ristretto di formento*; This estimate does not include the demands of Kotor garrisons, yet, in his next letter Zen sent similar a report with the needs of the Kotor garrison. According to this report further 301 *stara* were required, raising the total of grain necessary to provide for all troops under his command to 1832.5 *stara*. ASVe, PTM. b. 477. num. 14. (Zara, 15. Febraro 1654. m.v.) attachment: *Ristretto di formento*

1029 ASVe, PTM.b. 484. num. 222, (Di Galea nel Porto di Zara a 27 Novembre 1658.) attachment: *Nota di quanto biscotto vi vuole al mese*;

and Governor-General Girolamo Contarini informed the Senate that as a temporary measure he had begun distributing bread to the garrison in Split.¹⁰³⁰ The partial data collected in Table 3.7, with the visible dominance of shipments of biscuit in relation to grain, supports the thesis of continuity of reliance on biscuit as the main food provision of the Venetian armed forces in Dalmatia throughout the rest of the war.

This reversal of roles between grain and biscuit was not the result of some Senate decree or officially promoted policy. As stated previously, what began as just a temporary measure, through the years, simply acquired a more permanent character. It is still possible to single out several factors the combined influence of which brought about such an outcome. Here, in the first place, it must be noted the increased Ottoman activities of the years 1656-1659, which rendered the use of mills around Trogir, Split and Šibenik difficult, if not impossible. Combined with constant rumors of planned attacks on Klis, Split and/or Kotor (which indeed did occur in 1657), these Ottoman operations created a state of affairs in which shipment of large quantities of biscuit to Dalmatia ranked as the most sensible decision. It is not unreasonable to assume that these factors played a role in the Senate's decision to postpone its plan of re-instituting grain as the main food provision for the army in Dalmatia. The second factor that also needs to be taken into consideration is the price of grain. While at the beginning of the war 1 *staro* of grain was priced in Venice between 24-26 *lire*, the increase in demands for this important resource by summer of 1649 almost doubled its price to 51 *lire* for *staro*.¹⁰³¹ The price of grain remained high, between 44-50 *lire* for *staro*, throughout the whole of 1650,¹⁰³² and only then did it take a slow downward course. Keeping the price of grain high could have helped the Republic attract ships carrying grain to Venice and thus secure a constant flow of this vital resource, yet it could not be met by much approval from troops which had to pay for bread made of such expensive grain.

However, the fluctuation of prices of grain in the days of Governor-Generals Foscolo and

1030 ASVe. PM- b. 490. num 88. (Spalato, 3. Agosto 1663)

1031ASVe, PTM. b. 470, num. 721 (Zara, 6. Luglio 1650)

1032ASVe, PTM. b. 470, 748. (Zara, 21. Settembre 1650)

Foscarini, did not rank prominently among the sources of discontent of the soldiers. The reason for this lay in the fact that in those years it was possible to compensate for high prices of grain in Venice by purchasing quantities of grain at far lower prices from regional resources. By mixing this grain, acquired locally, with the one received from Venice, the provincial administration was able to lower the price of grain distributed to troops and thus avoid the spread of discontent.¹⁰³³ During, first year of Foscarini's mandate, reliance on grain purchased locally was indeed significant. Between February and August 1651, out of 8,376 *stara* of grain that entered state magazines the total of 3,276 *stara* or 39.1% was obtained in Dalmatia at the price as low as 28 *lire* for *stara*.¹⁰³⁴ Why this profitable practice was not further promoted by the Senate remains unclear. What is certain is that, over the years, the financial situation worsened, and governor-generals missing funds to cover even the payments of simple *terzi* to soldiers did not possess free financial resources to engage in grain purchase. Missing hard currency, the only available option of the governor-general was to convince ship captains to accept *lettere di cambio* payable in Venice, as was done by Lorenzo Dolfin in September 1653.¹⁰³⁵ Yet not all captains could be swayed to accept this mode of payment, so this remained an emergency measure.

On the other hand, the growth of the price of grain was also followed by increase in the price of biscuit, which rose from four *soldi* per *libbra* (1647, November), to eight *soldi* per *libbra* (1649, October).¹⁰³⁶ This great increase in the price probably made biscuit, which was by itself inferior in taste to bread, even more unpopular among troops. Moreover, when the price of grain took a downward turn, that of biscuit did not follow. By March 1653, the price of grain fell to around 32:15 *lire* for *stara*, yet, the biscuit sent from Venice to Dalmatia was still valued at eight *soldi* per *libbra* as if the price of grain was 40 or more *lire*. Governor-

1033For example, in September 1650, Governor-General Foscolo informed his superiors that he had managed to obtain 300 *stara* of grain from Bakar, in exchange for salt, and that when he mixed this and grain sent from Venice he was able to lower the price from more than 50 *lire* for *stara* to 44 *lire* for *stara*, at great satisfaction of the army. ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 748. (Zara, 21. Settembre 1650)

1034ASVe, PTM. b. 471, num. 52. (Zara, 23. Agosto 1651); ASVe, b. 472. num. 69. (Zara, 27. Ottobre 1651) attachment: *Conto di Formento*

1035ASVe, PTM. b. 470, num. 76. Di Zara, 10. Settembre 1653)

1036DAZ, *Atti di Provveditori generali*, vol. 15, fols. 164v-165v, 201r-v;

General Lorenzo Dolfin informed the Senate concerning the growing discontent of troops because of this and asked for the price to be lowered.¹⁰³⁷ His advice was accepted by the Senate, yet its application in practice was left to the new Governor-General Antonio Zen, who upon his arrival in January 1655, as one of the first acts of his tenure, proclaimed lowering of the price of biscuit from eight to six *soldi* for *libbra*, to the universal satisfaction of troops.¹⁰³⁸

The final phase of the transition occurred during the campaign of 1656. As was mentioned previously, the financial hardships of 1656 resulted in almost complete suspension of payments in coin and distribution of grain as compensation for due *terzi* (see above). At the same time, the price of grain began rising again (mainly because of the outbreak of plague in Puglia), and by December 1657 it reached 38:14 *lire* for *staro*, making this practice extremely unpopular. In a situation when they were receiving no cash at all, the troops were using all available options to escape being paid in expensive grain as compensation for cash. Frustrated by the unpopularity of grain, Governor-General Antonio Bernardo wrote to the Senate that shipments of grain to Dalmatia can be temporarily suspended, since no one is willing to accept it because of its too high price.¹⁰³⁹ In such circumstances, both the Venetian administration and the troops considered less expensive biscuit as the preferable option. One year later, in December 1658, grain mainly served as compensation given in the value of one quarter of pay to captains, officers and other military and administrative personnel, while the cavalry, all the garrisons and crews aboard the warships were sustained by rations of biscuit. Such arrangements stayed unchanged until the end of hostilities in September 1669.

4.2. Supplying the Army

Feeding its forces in Dalmatia was not the only logistical concern of the Republic.

Although absolutely necessary, the bread and biscuit were simply the basic prerequisites for maintaining the troops. In order to keep its forces in some form of combat readiness, the Republic had to secure constant flow of provisions arriving into state magazines of the

1037ASVe, PTM. b. 474. num. 16, (Di Spalato, 4. Marzo 1653)

1038ASVe, PTM. b. 477. num. 4. (Zara, 11. Gen. 1654 m.v.); ASVe, Senato Mar, R-117, fol. 286r-v, *Adi 5 Novembre 1654*.

1039ASVe, PTM. b.480, num. 82. (Sebenico, 8. Febraro 1656. mv.)

province. Not only was it necessary to provide for weapons, bullets and gunpowder; shoes, trousers, cloaks, mattresses were all expendable, and to ordinary soldiers, even more important than his weapons. Moreover, all construction materials and tools necessary for fortification works (even nails and planks) also had to be transported from Venice to Dalmatia. In order to illustrate specific logistic problems of this battlefield this section is divided into parts each dedicated to logistical problems involved with supply of particular branch of the military: infantry, cavalry and navy with an additional section dedicated to the armaments of fortifications through the case study of the fortress of Klis.

Food, Clothing and Other Provisions for Soldiers

As far as soldiers' diet was concerned, nothing had change in the 70 years, since the last war with the Ottomans in Dalmatia. In the 1640s, as in the 1570s, the soldier serving in Dalmatia, in addition to state provided bread or biscuit, was fed on: cheese, lettuce, salted fish and meat, while oil and lard he was expected to purchase by himself.¹⁰⁴⁰ Alongside bread or biscuit, the most important nutritional provision in the life of the ordinary soldier was wine. Wine was more than just a commodity that made the otherwise miserable life of the soldiers bearable. Wine had high nutritional value and was the main supplementary source of daily calories for soldiers, who often could not purchase cheese or fish, not to speak about such an expensive commodity as meat. The situation when wine started missing from the soldiers' diet and they were reduced to sustenance comprising solely of bread and water, was considered by Venetian magistrates as a state of extreme misery. This is how Governor-General Foscolo described the situation of troops under his command in February 1649, during the expedition to Albania: "they nourish themselves with a little bread and water, not having the means to buy wine, a sight that could move even the hearts of stone;"¹⁰⁴¹ Moreover, wine was also considered by contemporaries as the absolute sanitary necessity. The local water was held to be very unhealthy and was considered as the main source of epidemics (and

¹⁰⁴⁰This seems to be one of constants in the daily life of the soldier, since the same conditions were recorded by the Republic's inspection in 1571. John R. Hale, *The Military Organization of the Renaissance State*, p. 386.

¹⁰⁴¹... *nutrinendosi di poco pane, et acqua mancandoli il modo per comprarsi vino, cosa che valer potrebbe per ammolir anco, i sassi, non che li cuori humani*; ASVe, PTM. b. 468. num. 537. (Di Galea Risano, 17. Febraro 1648. mv.)

not without good reason). A very good illustration of this attitude can be found in a letter by Governor-General Antonio Bernardo, from the year 1658. In this letter, Bernardo informed the Senate that during the previous campaign (1657) more than 1,000 soldiers had fallen sick, of whom 355 died in Kotor and further 300 in Šibenik, stating that almost all of them have succumbed: "to the flux caused by the unhealthy water they drink, not having money to maintain themselves with wine."¹⁰⁴² All in all, it came to be that in 1657, the Republic forces suffered more casualties from this epidemic than in combat with Ottomans.

Be that as it may, unlike bread or biscuit, the supply and distribution of which the state completely took over, wine mainly remained outside of the state domain. When in April 1647, Governor-General Foscolo complained concerning the high price of wine in Dalmatia, the Senate decided not to intervene directly and take distribution over, as had been done a few months before with bread. The Senate informed Foscolo that they were going to attempt to initiate some merchants from Venice to send shipments to Dalmatia, and thus lower the price on the local market.¹⁰⁴³ As far as the Republic was concerned, the wine from state magazines in Dalmatia was reserved for crews of galleys. As was mentioned previously, wine was part of standard daily rations given to the crews, yet wine was also the fuel that propelled galley crews when speed was needed. For example, in June 1657, Governor-General Antonio Bernardo made the trip from Budva to Split (which was under Ottoman attack) against unfavorable winds in only three days, and noted how, during the voyage the rowers were sustained from one hour to the next with nourishment of vegetable soup (*minestrone*), and "*perfetti vini*."¹⁰⁴⁴ Wine was distributed to infantry garrisons only in extraordinary situations. For example, in case of an outbreak of mutiny in order to appease soldiers and quell unrest in an early phase, as was for example done in January 1657 when troops in Kotor mutinied.¹⁰⁴⁵ Wine was also an integral part of provisions sent to the fortress of St. Nicolo, during the

1042... *quasi tutti di flusso per le acque crude che bevono, non havendo modo di mantenersi à vino*. ASVe, PTM. b. 482. num. 155. (Spalato, 14. Gennaro 1657 mv.)

1043ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num, 231. (Zara, 13. Aprile 1647); ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-18. fol. 83r, *Adi 23 Aprile 1647*.

1044ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 104. (Spalato, 20. Giugno 1657)

1045ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 80. (Sebenico, 29. Gennaro 1656. mv)

outbreak of plague in Šibenik. In order to isolate the fortress garrison from the town population, the Republic decided to supply all necessary provisions to it by sea, including wine.¹⁰⁴⁶

On the other hand, while the Republic mainly refrained from taking on itself the distribution of wine to troops, it could not leave provisioning of soldiers with clothing and footwear in the hands of merchants. In May 1647, the captains of transalpine infantry presented the governor-general with a petition asking to be granted *paga di campagna* for the few past months they spent on campaign capturing Ottoman strongholds. The captains supported their petition by argument that the campaigning has a ruinous effect on soldiers' clothing and shoes, and because of the financial hardships caused by the irregularity of their pay, and problems they face when they exchange their *bollete* for cash, soldiers are forced to take goods from merchants at excessively high prices. For example, the captains complained that their soldiers were forced to pay one *Real* (worth 10 *lire*) for a single pair of shoes.¹⁰⁴⁷

Providing troops with clothing and footwear by the state was an arrangement preferable to both parties. For the Republic, it represented an opportunity to further decrease its debt toward the army by making payments in kind. At the same time, although clothing and shoes distributed to troops in Dalmatia were accounted for at prices somewhat higher than those in Venice (on account of shipping and handling costs), these prices were still far inferior to what merchants were charging for their goods and thus such an arrangement was also more favorable for soldiers.¹⁰⁴⁸ Moreover, with the introduction of *terzi* and cutting of soldiers' monthly incomes to 12 *lire* a month only, it practically became impossible for soldiers to provide for their own clothing. Therefore, obtaining of clothing and footwear from the state on account of their credits became *de facto* the only way for soldiers to provide for these fundamental provisions. In theory, soldiers needed a pair of shoes every year (more if they

1046ASVe, PTM. b. 468, num. 582. (Zara, 14 Giugno 1649)

1047ASVe, PTM. b. 464, num. 244 (Sebenico Di Galera 12 Maggio 1647) attachment: *Scrittura della Militia Oltramontana*

1048For example, the shoes distributed to troops by August 1647 were accounted at the price of 5:10 *lire* for a pair. On the other hand, the price at which shoes could be bought in Venice, (although from the period of a few years later) was only: 2:18 *lire*. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-112, f. 336r, *Adi 23 Dicembre 1651*.

participated in military campaign on the rocky ground of the Dalmatian hinterland), two pairs of trousers and new winter clothing every few seasons. Especially sought after by soldiers were the pallets (*pagliazzi*), thick straw filled mattresses shared by two soldiers for sleeping.¹⁰⁴⁹ Because of the bad conditions of troops' quarters, pallets did not last long, and every year, soldiers demanded new provisions of these. As a form of special favor, pallets were issued to elite troops before departure for Dalmatia, as was for example the case with the Swiss regiments sent to Dalmatia in 1648 and 1658.¹⁰⁵⁰

In the beginning of the war, the Republic was rather generous concerning the provisions of shoes and clothing for the army. For example, in March 1647, the Senate ordered shipment of 10,000 pairs of shoes to Dalmatia.¹⁰⁵¹ From December 1646 until August 1647, the magazines in Zadar and Šibenik distributed to troops the following: 11,198 pairs of shoes and large quantities of wool coats and various clothing, the total of which was worth 59,577 *lire*.¹⁰⁵² Yet as the war dragged on, the quantities that reached Dalmatia were not those the Senate had ordered to be sent. For example, in January 1663, out of 1,000 trousers and 2,000 pairs of shoes ordered to be shipped, only 500 of each arrived to Dalmatia.¹⁰⁵³ The quantities shipped were never sufficient to cover the needs of troops. Until the end of the war with colder weather approaching, a stream of letters depicting the sorry state of soldiers and asking for shipment of these provisions would start reaching the Senate chambers by late August or early September.¹⁰⁵⁴ The Table 3.8 below contains sample data concerning the shipments of footwear and clothing to troops in Dalmatia. Even from these sample data, it can be seen that, even in later phases of the war, the Republic managed to send a few thousand shoes, mantles, cloaks and habits for soldiers and sailors and pallets to its troops in Dalmatia every year. It is impossible to estimate the value of these provisions, since available sources do not allow for a

1049ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 124. (Di Galera nel Porto di Liesena, 24. Agosto 1657)

1050ASVe, Senato Mar, R-108, f. 27v, *Adi 29 Settembre 1648*; ASVe, PTM. b. 483, num. 200. (Spalato, 30 Luglio 1658)

1051ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, fols. 59r-v, *A di 20 Marzo 1647*.

1052ASVe, PTM. b. 464, num. 286. (Zara, 7. Agosto 1647)

1053ASVe, PTM. b. 487, num. 48. (Zara, 21. Gennaro 1662 m.v.)

1054For example see: ASVe, PTM. b. 470, num. 749. (Zara, 25. Settembre 1650); PTM. b. 471, num. 50. (Zara, 15. Agosto 1651); PTM. b. 483, num. 207. (Spalato, 25 Agosto 1658)

reconstruction of their prices over the period of two and a half decades.

Period	Provision	Quantity	Unit	Source
1658. September – 1659. March	Wool robes (schiavine)	1500	pieces	PTM-485-237
	Clothing for soldiers	2800		PTM-485-237
	Shoes	1900	pairs	PTM-485-237
1664. January	Mantles (for sailors)	760	pieces	PTM-491-121
	Shirts (for sailors)	750	pieces	PTM-491-121
	Trousers (for sailors)	900	pieces	PTM-491-121
	Shoes (for sailors)	1000	pairs	PTM-491-121
	Sailors caps	800	pairs	PTM-491-121
	Clothing for soldiers	1000	pieces	PTM-491-121
	Shirts (for soldiers)	1000	pieces	PTM-491-121
	Trousers (for soldiers)	1000	pieces	PTM-491-121
	Shoes (for soldiers)	1000	pairs	PTM-491-121
	Mantels (for soldiers)	200	pieces	PTM-491-121
	Wool robes (schiavine)	1000	pieces	PTM-491-121
	Pallets	500	pieces	PTM-491-121
	1665. December – 1666. June	Trousers	1000	pieces
Shirts		1000	pieces	PTM-496-168
Shoes		1000	pairs	PTM-496-168
Wool robes (schiavine)		499	pieces	PTM-496-168
Mantles (for soldiers)		200	pieces	PTM-496-168
Pallets		500	pieces	PTM-496-168
Shirts (for sailors)		1000	pieces	PTM-496-168
Trousers (for sailors)		1000	pieces	PTM-496-168
Shoes (for sailors)		1000	pairs	PTM-496-168
1666. July – 1667. March	Sailors caps	1000	pieces	PTM-496-168
	Mantles (for sailors)	700	pieces	PTM-497-206

Table 3.8. Shipments of clothing for soldiers and sailors.

Cavalry and the Problem of Supplying Horse Fodder

In spite of frequent complaints from governor-generals in Dalmatia concerning the inadequacy of the quantities of provisions sent to the province, as we have seen, the Republic did manage to establish, more or less, functional logistical support for its armed forces. Yet, in one segment, the failure of the Republic's logistics was complete and unquestionable. While food provisions that reached Dalmatia were more or less sufficient to keep soldiers alive, the Republic failed to do the same for the horses. In theory, cavalrymen were supposed to take care of their horses, and pay for their food from their pockets. This was one of the reasons why they enjoyed higher salaries (at the average 15 *ducats* a month) than foot soldiers (5 *ducats* a month). Yet the problem was that fodder for horses was an extremely scarce commodity in Dalmatia. Larger part of the Dalmatian countryside and thus also pastures represented no man's land for the entire duration of the war. As such, it was frequently subject

to Ottoman raids, or during the years when major Ottoman operations were expected, subject to Venetian scorched earth tactics, aimed to deny the advantage of pasture to incoming Ottoman force.¹⁰⁵⁵ As a consequence, the cavalry serving in Dalmatia was almost entirely dependent on the state to secure shipments of sufficient food provisions for their horses.

When in the course of 1647, the number of horses in the province reached 1,200, the full scale of this logistical problem became apparent. Alarmed by the poor state of horses and even more by approaching winter, in October 1649, Governor-General Foscolo informed his superiors that in order to sustain Republic's cavalry forces in Dalmatia, 300 *carra* of horse fodder are necessary each month.¹⁰⁵⁶ The Senate, although fully understanding the great needs of the cavalry, replied straight away that such quantities of horse fodder simply could not be provided from Venice. As a solution, Foscolo was advised to attempt obtaining some quantities from other sources, namely: Italian markets or through the exchange of salt with Ottomans (in fact this is how this entire initiative begun). Meanwhile, the Senate recommended that part of the cavalry be transferred to the Italian mainland (to Palma), for the duration of the winter.¹⁰⁵⁷ However, since Foscolo had in mind a new attack on Ottoman strongholds for the late winter or early spring 1648, he decided to keep all cavalry forces concentrated in Dalmatia. Instead he summoned captains of cavalry companies and urged them to better provide for their horses.¹⁰⁵⁸ This early in the war, such transfer of responsibility was still possible and this measure was combined with new source of hay, found and tapped by the Senate in the province of Istria.¹⁰⁵⁹ Thus, cavalry forces in Dalmatia managed to pass through this winter without significant losses.

During early winter 1647, the Bishop of Pula sent two shipments of hay to Dalmatia, and, in time Istria would play a prominent role in supporting cavalry forces in Dalmatia.¹⁰⁶⁰

¹⁰⁵⁵Good analysis of these conditions in Dalmatia is provided in a letter by Governor-General Bernardo from August 1657, see: ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 124. (Di Galera nel Porto di Liesena, 14 . Agosto 1657)

¹⁰⁵⁶ASVe, PTM. b. 465, num. 328. (Zara, 11, Ottobre 1647)

¹⁰⁵⁷ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-19, f. 97r-98v, *A di 1647 Ottobre 17*.

¹⁰⁵⁸ASVe, PTM. 465. num. 358. (Zara, 1. Genaro 1647. m.v.)

¹⁰⁵⁹ASVe, TM. 465. num. 328. (Zara, 11, Ottobre 1647)

¹⁰⁶⁰For example in January 1651, the shipment of 472 *stara* of *biade per Cavalli* arrived to Dalmatia from Istria. ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 786. (Zara, 10. Febraro 1650. m.v.); An even larger provision, of 1200 *stara* arrived from winter until summer 1653. ASVe, PTM. b. 474, num. 31. (Di Zara, 29. Aprile 1653); num. 71.

Whenever, governor-generals begun to ask for significant provisions of food, they would be instructed to arrange transfers of these with the Republic's magistrates in Istria, as was for example the case with Foscolo's successor Governor-General Foscarini in November 1651.¹⁰⁶¹ Similarly, the measure of transferring cavalry to Italy during the winter months would over the next years practically become the standard practice used for preserving this expensive branch of the military. The first larger contingent, consisting of four companies of *Corazze*, left Dalmatia for Italy in December 1648.¹⁰⁶² Moreover, transfer to Italy was also used as the alternative measure to disbanding weakened units, since due to more regular payments and lower prices of food and horses, it was reasonable to expect that the companies could replenish their missing horses under such favorable conditions.¹⁰⁶³

Nevertheless, the muster of the cavalry in spring would always show significant reductions in the numbers of horses. The case from April 1653, can be taken as exemplary for the state of Venetian cavalry forces. Out of 333 cavalrymen that were present at the muster, a total of 69, or 20%, were missing horses.¹⁰⁶⁴ On the other hand, the muster from March 1650 can be taken as a good illustration of drastic ruinous effects of the failure to provide horses with fodder on the Venetian cavalry force. At the muster in October 1649, a total of 530 soldiers with 473 horses were present (89%); a few months later in March 1650, at the spring muster only 407 soldiers (-117) and 241 horses (-232) were found. The number of horses was almost cut in half. In order to remedy the lack of horses, over the years, the Republic put in action several administrative measures and projects. In February 1647, the Senate decreed that all *Capelletti al' Cavallo* who in the course of service lost their horses are to be paid a compensation of 30 *ducats* in order to purchase new mounts.¹⁰⁶⁵ This measure was soon extended also to *Corazze* to whom the subsidy of 45 *ducats* was granted to help them purchase mounts, yet this amount

(Di Zara, 23. Agosto 1653)

1061ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-25, fols. 187v, 197r.

1062ASVe, PTM. 467, (unnumbered) (Zara, 5. Dicembre 1648)

1063For example, regarding the projects to exchange weakened companies serving in Dalmatia with those available in *terraferma* see: ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-26, f. 180r-v, *Adi 5 Ottobre 1652*; ASVe, PTM. b. 473, num. 143, (Zara, 21 Ottobre 1652); PTM. 478, num. 95. (Zara, 25. Febbraio 1655. m.v.)

1064ASVe, PTM., b. 474. num. 24. (Di Zara, 7. Aprile 1653)

1065ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17, f. 352r-353v, *Adi 23. Febraro 1647.*; ASVe. PTM. 464., num. 217. (Zara, 12. Marzio 1647)

was to be deducted from their pay at the rate of 1 ducat a month. However, cavalry companies continued to decay and in January 1653, the Senate was forced to attempt a new approach, by sending 4,000 *ducats* to Dalmatia, dedicated strictly for the purchase of new horses,¹⁰⁶⁶ followed in June by a shipment of 40 horses purchased in Italy to be used to remount troopers.¹⁰⁶⁷ However, all these measures were aimed to replace missing horses, none at improving the supply system. Most probably due to shortage of funds, the initiative from May 1655, by Governor-General Antonio Zen, aimed at creating a financial deposit the sole task of which would be to provide funds to buy horse fodder in times when its price was low, similar in purpose and organization to the institution of the communal *fontico*, was never sanctioned by the Senate.¹⁰⁶⁸

The only pasture available to Venetian cavalry were those at the fringes of Venetian controlled lands. Such was for example the countryside of the town of Nin, to the northwest of Zadar, which was frequently used by Venetian cavalry forces concentrated in Zadar. However, as was observed by Governor-General Zen, in spite of the existence of Morlacchi outposts the release of the cavalry into the countryside in early spring, in order for horses to replenish their strength, still represented a significant security risk because of possible Ottoman raids.¹⁰⁶⁹ Nevertheless, once military operations in the Dalmatian battlefield again intensified in the period from 1656, pasture was frequently put to fire and these resources denied to both sides. Moreover, as the Republic begun experiencing shortages of all kinds of provisions (see previous sections): money, grain, biscuit, etc.; food for horses fell low on the list of logistical priorities. In September 1657, Governor-General Bernardo suggested that cavalry forces in the province, which were for years now on decline, diminishing in numbers, be cut down to three companies only. When the campaign of 1657 was finished this plan was put in action and three companies left for Italy, while the three strongest remained on duty in Dalmatia, stationed in Split, Trogir and Zadar.¹⁰⁷⁰ Moreover, as was presented in the previous

1066ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-26, f. 248r, *Adi 8. Genaro 1653*.

1067ASVe, PTM. b. 474. num. 51. (Di Zara, 15. Giugno 1653)

1068ASVe, PTM. b. 477. num. 32. (Zara, li 4. Maggio, 1655)

1069ASVe, PTM. b. 487, num. 28. (Zara, 18. Aprile, 1655)

1070ASVe, PTM. b. 482, num. 131. (Dalla Galera dal stretto delle Catene in Canal di Cattaro, 30. Settembre

chapter, by November 1658, regular cavalry forces were reduced just to two companies counting 81 men.¹⁰⁷¹

However, in 1658, the Republic still had a rather large force of some 600-700 light horse at its disposal, in the form of unpaid Morlacchi irregulars (see previous chapter).¹⁰⁷² Being the only real masters of the countryside, the Morlacchi succeeded where more formal and institutional efforts of the Republic failed, that is in maintaining their horses and in case of loss replenishing them from the booty acquired in Ottoman lands. By 1664, their number increased to 800 cavalrymen.¹⁰⁷³ Over the years, the Morlacchi became the only cavalry force available to the Republic in the province. Moreover, one could argue that mounted Morlacchi irregulars, quick to assemble and begin pursuit or lay ambush, were more suitable to the task of repelling Ottoman raids than paid regular units of Venetian cavalry. Stationed inside town garrisons, regular cavalry companies were rather inert and slow in taking field, especially since the official doctrine of the Venetian military dictated that these expensive units should be provided with the support of musketeers when heading into action. The failure to efficiently solve the problem of supplying fodder for horses, as provisions sent were always insufficient or late, and thus to compensate for lack of pastures, combined with the shift in the strategy of the Republic from active defense (1647-1654), to strictly passive defense (from 1656), resulted in almost total disappearance of the cavalry from the ranks of Venetian regular forces and their replacement with Morlacchi irregulars.

The Navy: Galleys and Barche Armate

During almost the entire period from early spring till late fall, Venetian galleys and *barche armate* in the Adriatic were in constant service at sea, either searching for Ottoman corsairs or guarding posts exposed to Ottoman attacks. Like any other tool or instrument that is in continuous use, Venetian warships were prone to deterioration and breakage, and consequently in constant need of repair and maintenance. Since the Republic had at its

1657); PTM. b. 482, num. 142. (Spalato, 25. Nov.re 1657)
 1071ASVe, PTM.b. 484. num. 222. (Di Galea nel Porto di Zara a 27 Novembre 1658)
 1072ASVe, PTM. b. 484. num. 221. (Zara, 19. Novembre 1658)
 1073ASVe, PTM. b. 492. num. 151. (Zara, 31, Maggio 1664)

disposal facilities of the Zadar arsenal, the majority of the necessary repairs were undertaken there. When, due to prolonged use, some vessel was beyond repair, it was disarmed, either in Zadar with its usable parts stored in the local arsenal, or sent to Venice for the same purpose. At the same time the Senate would order the magistrates of the Arsenal in Venice to transport a replacement vessel to Dalmatia.

The replacements for galleys and armed boats were sent as ship hulls equipped with all necessary equipment but still not fully assembled. Once the hull reached Zadar, it would be assembled there and the old crew would take the ship over. Such hulls were in case of galleys called *arsili*, and in case of armed boats *corpi*. During the transport, hulls were operated by just skeleton crews and whenever possible the Republic grouped such vessels before dispatching them to Dalmatia or to Levant. For example, in July 1652, one galley *arsilo* and six *corpi di barche armate* were sent as a group to Dalmatia. To increase the security of this transport, the Senate also allocated one company of marine infantry aboard these vessels.¹⁰⁷⁴ Similarly, in 1659 six *corpi* of armed vessels were ordered to be shipped to Dalmatia.¹⁰⁷⁵ To what worn out state could patrolling the Adriatic in search of Ottoman corsairs reduce the Venetian naval forces, is aptly illustrated by a letter of Governor-General Girolamo Contarini from October 1662. Contarini informed the Senate that almost one half of small galleys or *fuste* under his command are unusable and that shipment of 14 *corpi of gallotte* is necessary in order to replace used vessels, not fit for service any longer.¹⁰⁷⁶

The arsenal in Zadar was the main facility that kept Venetian naval forces under the command of the governor-general in Dalmatia operational. Every year, the Republic's warships required dozens of smaller repairs, seasonal maintenance works, replacement of broken or used parts etc. In order to keep this facility operational and able to perform these functions, it was necessary to keep it well provided with sufficient quantities of naval stores

1074ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-26, f. 123r, *Adi 24 Luglio 1652*; ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-26, f. 133v, *Adi 9 Agosto 1652*.

1075ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-34, f. 111v-112r, *Adi 31 Maggio 1659*.

1076ASVe,PTM. b. 489, num. 34. (Spalato, 22. Ottobre 1662) attachment: *Nota da nuovi arsili di galeotte con gli armizzi et armi che occorrono*.

and construction materials. Since, at the time, the production capacities of the province were practically non-existent, all necessary material had to be shipped from Venice each year. As can be seen from inventory lists, for keeping the naval force of 3-6 galleys and of some 30-40 smaller vessels operational (*galleotte, fuste, barche armate*), every year, some five metric tons of tar was needed, 50,000 nails of various sizes, alongside with 3-5 galley sails, 20-25 sails for smaller vessels, 1-3 galley masts, 20-25 masts for *barche armate*, 50 oars for galleys and 400-500 oars for *barche armate* and dozens of other ship parts.¹⁰⁷⁷ It is not possible to estimate the yearly value of these shipments, yet based on data available, it is possible to provide some orientational data concerning the value of particular items. For example: 500 oars needed every year, totaled 3,000 *lire* (c.a 480 *ducats*, six *lire* each), the mast for the galley was priced at 90 *ducats*, while that of the armed boat at 11 *ducats*.¹⁰⁷⁸

But above all, the most important provision as far as ship crews were concerned was the woolen cloth (*rassa*) used for manufacturing the canvas (*tenda*) used by crews for protection from adverse weather in fall and winter, and hot sun in summer. Lack of these, especially during fall and winter months, was a constant source of suffering for ship crews, and frustration for the governor-general, who attributed high losses among crews of the galleys and other armed vessels mainly to this defect. The following paragraph illustrates a theme commonly found in letters of governor-generals:

Also, the provision of canvases is necessary for the preservation of poor crews [of the galleys], and the men of armed boats; the sooner these arrive, the more appropriate and profitable this will be, since without them [the crews] can not resist these winds and rain, and [will] succumb to miseries and lose their lives.¹⁰⁷⁹

Be that as it may, because of the harsh conditions of sea service, ships required replacement of their *tende* every year. The table 3.9 below contains an account, compiled in

¹⁰⁷⁷For example, the inventory lists with the requested materials and the needs of the Zadar arsenal can be found in: ASVe, PTM. b. 473. num. 113. (Zara, 4 Luglio 1652) attachment: *Nota di bisogni di Arsenal di Zara*; PTM. b. 475. num. 103. (Zara, 20. Genaro 1653. mv.) attachment: *Notta delle robbe che furono ricercate in Pubblico per bisogno di questo Arsenal et prima*; PTM. b. 479, num. 107. (Zara, 23 Aprile 1656) attachment: *Nota de remi da Galea, Barc' armate, et altro per Arsenal di Zara*.

¹⁰⁷⁸DAZ, Atti di Provveditori Generali, Lunardo Foscolo vol. 16, fols. 213r, 217r.

¹⁰⁷⁹Anco per la preservatione delle povere ciurme, et gente di Barc' armate neccessaria è la proviggione di Tendi, che quanto prima capitaranno, tanto piu riusciranno proprie, et profittevoli, mentre all' ingiurie di venti, et piogge di questa maniera resister non possono, et ceder convengono à pattimenti con la perdita della vita. ASVe, PTM. b. 465, num. 329. (Zara, 13, Ottobre 1647)

September 1654, concerning the requirements of *rassa* required to manufacture *tende* for the Republic's warships serving in the gulf at that time.

Type of the ship	Brazza needed per ship	Number of ships in service	Brazza Total:
Armed boats (<i>barche armate</i>)	195	36	7.020
<i>Bregantino</i>	150	5	750
Post office <i>Caichio</i>	130	3	390
Light galley (<i>Galera sotile</i>)	850	5	4.250
Yearly requirements of <i>rassa</i> for manufacture of <i>tende</i> :			12.410

Table 3.9. Account of the yearly needs of *rassa* for ship's *tende*, from September 1654.¹⁰⁸⁰

Weapons, Munitions and Provisions for Fortifications

Throughout the entire war, the Republic managed to keep the Dalmatian battlefield well supplied with basic war provisions: arms, gunpowder and munitions, not as much as governor-generals would like, but still sufficiently. The only recorded shortage of munition, was the one from winter 1663/1664, when the supply of lead bullets for muskets in Zadar reached low critically low levels.¹⁰⁸¹ On the other hand, the years 1647 – 1649 represented the period when larger provisions of arms were regularly destined for Dalmatia. In these years, Venetian forces were actively engaged in offensive military operations in the Dalmatian hinterland, which unavoidably resulted in the breakdown and loss of arms and thus in increased demand for replacement pieces. Moreover, as was said previously, for the winter 1647, the Republic planned an expedition to Albania that was to be coordinated with the uprising of local Christians, which was realized only in winter 1648-9. These two factors combined resulted in more frequent and larger shipments of arms to Dalmatia. From October 1647, till March 1649, the total of 7,000 muskets, 200 carbines, a few hundred pistols and swords, were shipped to Dalmatia.¹⁰⁸²

Since the expected uprising of the Albanian Christians never occurred, these weapons mainly remained unemployed. Consequently, they were distributed among state magazines in

¹⁰⁸⁰*Rassa* was measured in *brazza*, the Venetian measure used for cloth which was equivalent in length to 0.606 m. ASVe, PTM. b. 476. num. 159. (Zara, 16. Settembre 1654) attachment: *Nota de bisogni del Monitioner de Zara*; See also: ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 335. (Zara, 27. Ottobre 1647)

¹⁰⁸¹ASVe, PTM. b. 491, num. 119. (Spalato, 22. Dicembre 1663); num. 123. (Spalato, 12. Genaro 1663. m.v.)

¹⁰⁸²ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-19, f. 81r, A 8 di Ottobre; R-21, f. 91v, *Adi 7 Ottobre 1648*; R-21, f. 109v, *Adi 22 Ottobre 1648*; DAZ, *Atti di Provveditori Generali*, vol. 16, fols. 213r, 217r

the province, and represented a sort of a strategic reserve stocks of weapons. All the troops dispatched to Dalmatia would arrive in the province already armed. If soldiers were lacking arms at the recruitment time, or if they would arrive in Venice without any, they would be issued weapons at Lido, the cost of which would be later deducted from their wages at the monthly installments of 2 *lire*.¹⁰⁸³ Similarly, before their departure for Dalmatia, regiments were also issued initial provisions of cord fuses, gunpowder and lead balls for muskets at Lido. Limited storage of weapons in Dalmatia therefore represented the stock needed for replacing broken or lost weapons and were to be used in case of emergency (siege) as the pool of arms for civilians and troops alike. There was no system of regular replenishment of stocks of weapons and munition; these were sent to Dalmatia when requested by the governor-general. For example, in March 1658, Governor-General Bernardo noted that large part of town garrisons are lacking swords and asked for the provision of 2,000 *spade all' Italiana*.¹⁰⁸⁴ It is impossible to track all shipments of arms, yet it would be worth putting some price tags on the above mentioned provision from the first years of war, at least for muskets for which we have prices recorded in the sources. The value of the musket with its accessories (flask, bandolier and rod) ranged from 14 *lire* (shipment from October, 1648) to 22:8 *lire* (price of the last 2,000 muskets that arrived in March, 1649), giving the total of 114,800 *lire*.¹⁰⁸⁵ If the price of carbines, of 60 *lire* per piece, from June 1649, is to be taken as valid for this calculation, the above sum should be increased by further 12,000 *lire*, to the total of 126,800 *lire* (20,450 *ducats*) as the cost of these firearms.¹⁰⁸⁶

While muskets, swords, pikes and other cold steel weapons could be stored in magazines and if well maintained preserved for quite a long time, it was not possible to do so with gunpowder. Furthermore, since no gunpowder mill or similar facility existed in Dalmatia, even if there were no major military engagements that season, the Republic was forced to

1083For example, for Senate orders for arms to be issued to captains from the arsenal in order to arm their soldiers see: ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, f. 330, *Adi 3 Gennaro 1647*; R-106, f. 144r, *Adi 16 Maggio 1648*; R-106, f. 108v, *Adi 16 Aprile 1648*; R-107, f. 6r, *Adi 5 Settembre 1648*.

1084ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 166. (Zara, 11. Marzo 1658)

1085DAZ, *Atti di Provveditori Generali*, vol. 16, fols. 213r, 217r.

1086ASVe, PTM. b. 468. num. 580. (Zara, 10 Giugno 1649)

replenish parts of its stores of gunpowder yearly. What were the yearly quantities of gunpowder and lead bullets for firearms? In November 1655, Governor-General Antonio Zen asked for the provision of 130 *barilli* (one Venetian *barilla* equalled c.a 64,386 liters) of gunpowder and 100,000 *balle da moschetto*, which can be taken as standard provisions required after the end of campaign season in order to replenish consumed munition.¹⁰⁸⁷

Naturally, these figures were higher during the years when extensive military operations were expected. Six months later, Governor-General Zen, alarmed by information received from numerous sources concerning massive Ottoman preparations for a major attack in Dalmatia during the season of 1656, compiled a detailed report concerning the requirements for successful defense of the province. In addition to the plea for reinforcements of no less than 5,000 infantry, three new galleys, four sail warships and replacement of existing cavalry with new 800 horse, one half *Corazze* (heavy cavalry) and the other half light cavalry (preferably dragoons), Zen's report also specifies the quantities of munition and gunpowder necessary for the upcoming campaign. According to the estimate, the province, among large quantities of other materials, bombs, tar, nails, wood etc., also required the following additional quantities of munition: 200 *miara libbre* of gunpowder (95,4 metric tons), 150,000 musket balls, 150,000 balls for carbines, and 100,000 balls for *moshettone* (large city walls muskets).¹⁰⁸⁸ These figures represent provisions needed for that campaign in addition to those already existing in the province, and can be taken as orientational figures concerning the quantities needed to be sent to Dalmatia in years when more intense Ottoman operations were expected.

	Number of pieces	Number of balls	Gunpowder per shot (<i>libbre</i>)	Store of gunpowder (<i>libbre</i>)	Shots per day	Days
<i>Canon da 50</i>	1	400	27	11100	25	16
<i>Collombrina da 30</i>	1	200	24	4800	25	8
<i>Collombrina da 20</i>	1	800	14	11200	30	26
<i>Colombrina da 14</i>	2	950	12	11400	30	16
<i>Sacro da 12</i>	2	1700	7	11900	35	25
<i>Falcone da 6</i>	3	1100	4	4400	24	15
	10	5150		54800		

1087ASVe, PTM. b. 478. num. 77. (Zara, 9. Novembre 1655)

1088ASVe, PTM. b. 479. num. 101. Zara, 18 Marzo 1656; attachment: *Foglio contenenti le Provigioni necessarie per la Provincia*

Table 3.10. Inventory of gunpowder and gunshots available in the fortress of Klis, with the calculation of available shots (1651, May).¹⁰⁸⁹

Governor-General Zen did not draw these figures from the air, they represent the product of Venetian military doctrine. Although Zen's report itself does not include the calculus according to which these figures were obtained, it is still possible to read the basis of this calculation from other available, similar reports, noting the requirements of munition and gunpowder needed for defending a particular fortress or town. The table 3.10. above contains the information drawn from a report compiled in May 1651, concerning the quantities of gunpowder and cannon balls available in the fortress of Klis. The report also contains information about the quantities of gunpowder necessary for firing of single shots from particular artillery pieces and the proposed distribution of available gunpowder for using these pieces. Additionally, the report also notes the expected number of shots per day and calculation of how many days can a particular piece be operated with available quantities of gunpowder and cannonballs.

This data can be further enriched with a report from March 1660, compiled by Governor-General Andrea Corner, concerning the provisions necessary for the defense of the town of Zadar in case of a siege lasting three months. This report is interesting, since it also provides the calculation used to obtain the requirements of gunpowder and shots for soldiers.

According to it, monthly quantities of gunpowder required for a single musketeer were 7.5 *libbre* of gunpowder, an amount sufficient to cover three shots every day! The same frequency of fire was also noted as the norm used for artillery pieces, that is three shots on the average each day, for the duration of three months. In this regard, the Venetian armed forces did not depart from contemporary practices, which put the expected number of shots a single artillery piece between three and five per day.¹⁰⁹⁰ The number of necessary defenders was estimated at 3,000 foot and 400 horse, and the amount of gunpowder needed to sustain this force and 110 artillery pieces during siege lasting three months was calculated at 329,340 *libbre* (or 157

1089ASVe, PTM b. 471, num. 28. (Zara 14 Maggio 1651)

1090Compare: Martin Creveld, *Supplying War*, p. 35.

metric tons). As far as munition is concerned, Venetian estimates set their requirements as follows: 728,000 bullets for muskets, 27,000 bullets for *carabines* and 81,000 bullets for pistols. The stocks of reserve weapons were estimated at: 2,000 muskets, 200 carabines, 400 pairs of pistols, 250 partisans, 150 pole-arms, 800 brandistocks and 500 *spade all' Albanese*. These represent just main provisions. The report also specifies thousands of cannonballs of all profiles and sizes, thousands of bombs, grenades and other *fuocchi artificiali* used extensively in 17th century siege warfare.¹⁰⁹¹

The question is how close to meeting these requirements was the actual state of arms and munition in town magazines? A detailed survey of arms, munitions, food and all other equipment stored in magazines in the province, from January-March 1664, compiled by Governor-General Girolamo Contarini in execution of the orders of the Senate, can be used to answer this question. The table 3.11 below contains the compiled data from these reports recording only most important items, namely, the quantities (and types) of weapons, munitions, gunpowder and biscuit. As can be seen from the table, as far as weapons requirements were concerned, Zadar was provisioned with more than sufficient quantities of firearms, while cold steel weapons, with the exception of pikes, were in somewhat short supply in comparison with specified requirements from 1660. In regard to gunpowder the town had 66% of the quantities estimated as needed, yet as can be seen there were sufficient reserves of gunpowder in other storages in the province. The only serious handicap was the critical amount of bullets available. Instead of 728,000 bullets, Zadar was provisioned only with some 60,000; moreover, the entire province did not have more than 683 *miara* of musket bullets stored. Nevertheless, in spite of these serious shortcomings, overall, it can still be stated that the Republic kept its troops in Dalmatia well provisioned with arms and munitions. Surprisingly, at the time of writing of this report, even the supplies of biscuit in the province were quite satisfactory, 619 *miara*, a quantity sufficient for the period of 3-4 months.

Weapons, arms, munition	Klis	Trogir	Omiš	Split	Šibenik	Zadar	Total
<i>Moschetti da forzina</i>	25	0	0	1000	579	3032	4636

1091ASVe, PTM. b. 487. num. 2. (Zara, 18. Marzo 1660)

Weapons, arms, munition	Klis	Trogir	Omiš	Split	Šibenik	Zadar	Total
<i>Carabini</i>	0	0	0	80	24	134	238
Pike	96	330	0	650	1342	2536	4954
Half pike (<i>mezze piche</i>)	0	0	0	0	59	0	59
Halberd	0	0	0	110	112	146	368
Brandistock	30	20	20	96	135	145	446
Partisan	0	0	0	60	0	108	168
Swords (<i>all' Albanese</i>)	0	0	36	550	1184	546	2316
Two handed swords	0	0	0	25	2	104	131
Swords (<i>all' Italiana</i>)	114	0	0	0	60	0	174
<i>Balle da moschetto da forzina</i>	305610	1600	4389	51000	260044	60000	682643
<i>Balle da carabini</i>	0	0	3300	12000	2932	??	18232
Fuse cord (<i>libbre</i>)	11500	6000	3000	8000	61388	20400	110288
Gunpowder (<i>barilli</i>)	0	96	0	698	0	0	794
Gunpowder (<i>libbre</i>)	72010	0	5800	0	82784	219382	379976
<i>Risi</i> (<i>libbre</i>)	1240					25656	26896
<i>Miglio</i> (<i>stara</i>)	0	0	0	0	1000	0	1000
Biscuit (<i>libbre</i>)	111485	80000	4200	221000	118000	84596	619281

Table 3.11. Inventory of arms, gunpowder, munition and basic food provisions found in state magazines, January-March 1664.¹⁰⁹²

If such was the state of public magazines, it would be interesting to see how well single soldiers of the Venetian army were provided for, how much gunpowder and lead balls were they issued? Unfortunately, available sources are rather silent on this issue, still the case of the Swiss regiment from 1658 can be used to shed some light concerning this numbers. In June 1658, the Swiss regiment numbering 1300 men left for Dalmatia. Before its departure, at Lido, the regiment was issued with 680 *libbre* of gunpowder and 230 *libbre* of cord, and upon their arrival to the province with an additional provision of 900 *libbre* of gunpowder, bringing the total to 1580 *libbre* and 10,000 lead balls for muskets that were administered to the regiment from provincial magazines.¹⁰⁹³ On the average each of 1,300 soldiers would thus be equipped with six bullets, 0.18 *libbre* of cord and of 1.2 *libbre* of gunpowder. This small personal stock of munition was considered as sufficient for regular guard duties, yet what must also be noted is that the Swiss represented elite troops and were probably better equipped than the rest.

¹⁰⁹²All data for Klis, Split, Šibenik, Omiš and Trogir come from attachments to the letter: ASVe, PTM. b. 491, num. 126. (Spalato, 26. Genaro 1663. m.v.); while data for Zadar comes from: ASVe, PTM. b. 492, num. 135. (Spalato, 11. Marzo 1664); The number of available bullets for muskets for Zadar is taken from: ASVe, PTM. b. 491, num. 119. (Spalato, 22. Dicembre 1663)

¹⁰⁹³ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 200. (Spalato, 30. Luglio 1658)

In one area, the logistical commitment of the Republic to this battlefield is clearly visible. Before the war (see table 1.1) the artillery train of coastal Dalmatian towns and fortresses (Kotor not included), counted 175 pieces. After 19 years of war, as can be seen from the table 3.12 below, the fortifications of Dalmatian towns and fortresses mounted 331 pieces. This can be partially explained with addition of new fortified posts in the Republic's defensive system in Dalmatia: the newly acquired fortress of Klis, followed by the forts of St. John and fort Gripe constructed at Šibenik and Split, and especially the modernization project of Split fortifications with the introduction of new modern elements, bastions, ravelins and such. All of these new posts also required a significant number of guns. One can claim with certainty that the Republic took very good care to keep its towns equipped with sufficient firepower. When necessary, the guns were even taken from warships and transferred to town walls; such was for example the case in January 1648, when Governor-General Foscolo disarmed a Flemish vessel in order to equip Split fortifications with the necessary artillery pieces.¹⁰⁹⁴ Yet the case of Zadar probably serves as the best argument in favor of the above statement. In March 1658, Governor-General Antonio Bernardo complained that in spite of very strong fortifications, Zadar is in great peril in case of an Ottoman attack, because it is lacking large numbers of artillery pieces which had been transferred to newly built Split fortifications.¹⁰⁹⁵ Two years later, as can be seen from Table 3.12, the artillery train of Zadar counted 110 guns, almost more than double than the number it had before the war in 1641.

Artillery piece	Trogir	Omiš	Split	Šibenik	Klis	Zadar (*)
Collombrina da 60	0	0	0	0	0	6
Collombrina da 40	0	0	0	0	0	1
Collombrina da 30	1	0	0	2	1	7
Collombrina da 20	0	0	0	5	1	4
Collombrina da 14	6	1	5	6	1	8
Cannoni da 60	0	0	0	0	0	1
Cannoni da 50	0	0	2	7	0	6
Cannoni da 30	0	0	1	0	0	8
Cannoni da 20	5	2	0	13	0	50
Cannoni da 15	0	0	0	0	0	2
Falconi da 6	9	5	11	8	3	2
falconi da 3	3	5	5	6	0	2
Falconi da uno	2	6	6	4	0	3

1094ASVe, PTM. b 465. num. 360. (Zara, 6. Gennaro 1647. m.v.)

1095ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 166. (Zara, 11. Marzo 1658)

Artillery piece	Trogir	Omiš	Split	Šibenik	Klis	Zadar (*)
Sacri da 12	9	1	12	9	1	7
Cannoni perieri da 120	0	0	0	0	0	2
Periere da 14	6	2	3	4	8	0
Periere da 12	2	3	8	6	0	0
Aspidi da 12	3	1	0	6	0	1
Morter da Bombe da 100	0	0	1	0	0	0
Morter da Bmbe da 50	1	0	1	0	0	0
Passavolanti	0	0	0	2	0	0
Total	47	26	55	78	15	110
Total number of pieces in 1641	31	17	36	40	-	51

Table 3.12. Fortifications of Dalmatian towns and forts (1664, January-March).¹⁰⁹⁶

Although the barrels of the guns were long lasting and rarely broke up, the wooden and metal parts around them were not. Positioned along town walls the guns were exposed either to harsh weather and rain during fall and winter or heat from the sun in summer. Combined with Mediterranean air saturated with salt, this had a detrimental effect on wooden carriages, wheels and other accompanying parts of the cannon, which required constant replacements. Already at the beginning of the war in March 1646, induced by requests for large quantities of these parts, the Senate ordered Governor-General Foscolo to attempt to organize manufacture of those in Dalmatia.¹⁰⁹⁷ Yet due to lack of skilled labor, this project could not be put into action and throughout the entire war, requests for dozens of artillery carriages and wheels arrived to Venice each year. In an inventory list containing weapons, munitions and other materials, necessary to prepare for the 1656 campaign, Governor-General Zen asked for 6 carriages for each type of artillery pieces and also 12 wheels for each of the types. As can be seen from table 3.12 above, there were 21 different types of guns in the Republic's artillery train, thus in order to fulfill Zen's request magistrates over the artillery, had to ship to Dalmatia the following: 126 carriages and 252 wheels. Such requests were a common yearly occurrence. For example, the next year, 1657, Zen's successor Antonio Bernardo, sent a note asking for 61 different types of cannon carriages and 156 wheels needed just for the artillery of Split.¹⁰⁹⁸

¹⁰⁹⁶ASVe, PTM. b. 491, num. 126. (Spalato, 26. Genaro 1663); The data for Zadar is from 1660. ASVe, PTM. b. 487, num. 2. (Zara, 18. Marzo 1660)

¹⁰⁹⁷ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17, f. 57v, *Adi 10 Marzo 1646*.

¹⁰⁹⁸ASVe, PTM. b. 482. num. 154. (Spalato, 14. Gennaro 1657 mv.) attachment

5. *Final Analysis*

The figure of 126 million *ducats* is usually given as the realistic estimate of the total cost of the *War of Crete* for the Venetian Republic, with the annual spending of approximately 5 million *ducats*. Of these, it is estimated that, only one million was spent on the military, while the rest was consumed by other war related expenses.¹⁰⁹⁹ However, as this chapter has demonstrated, such broad statements concerning the cost of war obscure and simplify the complexity of the structure of war related costs. It is still rather hard to provide the answer to a simple question: how high was the cost of Venetian military commitment in Dalmatia? Due to available sources, it is practically impossible to provide an exact figure. Yet some realistic estimates can be given, at least as far as the cost of the military is concerned. For the rest of war related costs it is only possible to take a more descriptive approach and point to items that participated significantly in overall war expenses. In the course of this war, the Republic transported some 4.2 million *ducats* to Dalmatia, the largest part of which was consumed by soldiers wages with another, much smaller part going to fortification projects. The structure of the costs from January 1657, shown in table 3.12 below, can be taken as an exemplary account of the structure of most necessary expenses that needed paying in Dalmatia, and their mutual relationship. As can be seen, garrison troops and the navy serving in the Adriatic consumed 86% out of this amount, while only 5% of the sum was directed at extensive construction works undertaken during the period.

Expenses	Lire	%
Garrison infantry and cavalry	58612:12	57
Navy: <i>barche armate, begantini, fuste, caichi, galleys</i>	30070	29
Sallariati, Stipendiati, Condoti and other military personnel	14242	14
Costs of the maintenance of provincial magazines	1400	1
Fortification works	6000	5
Total expenses:	102924:12	100

Table 3.13. Structure of Monthly Expenses (1657, January).¹¹⁰⁰

1099See: *Ciro Paoletti, A Military History of Italy* (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008) p. 33.

1100Does not include the cost of the Kotor garrison, only armed vessels and galleys guarding the Bay of Kotor: ASVe, PTM. b. 480, num. 80. (Sebenico, 29. Gennaro 1656. mv.)




Figure 3.5. Structure of monthly expenses, January 1657.

Although, almost 90% of the 4.2 million of *ducats* shipped to Dalmatia was spent on the military, as was shown in this chapter, this sum represents only the minimum amount of hard currency necessary to maintain the Republic's forces *in piedi* in this battlefield, while actually, the full cost of the military serving in Dalmatia would be much higher. In the first place, one must bear in mind that *terzi* in the period up to 1657 covered around 50% of the total cost of army pay, and after this date, with the decrease of officers pay to only $\frac{1}{4}$ of the sum, paid in Dalmatia, *terzi* amounted to approximately 40% of the amount. Moreover, numerous *capi di guerra* with the rank of colonel and above (generals, superintendents, *governatore di armi* and similar) all managed to obtain the privilege that at least one half of their stipend or *condotta* was to be paid in Venice, so that reduction of pay in Dalmatia reflected only the portion of their pay that was expected to be paid in Dalmatia. Finally, as we have seen these 4.2 millions were far from enough to cover even for the payment of *terzi*. It was not uncommon for troops to endure for months without receiving any money at all. Furthermore, a significant portion of *terzi* was paid with money obtained through *imprestido* from private persons, repayment of which was transferred to Venice.

These were not the only costs of the military serving in the province transferred to Venice. Colonels in command of regiments with special capitulations were occasionally paid with *lettere di cambio*, payable in Venice. As for example, in 1649, when Governor-General Foscolo issued a letter of exchange worth 90,000 *ducats* to the colonel of the Swiss regiment.¹¹⁰¹ Additionally, when this regiment was discharged from service and left Dalmatia, its credit of further 84,000 *ducats* was also transferred to Venice.¹¹⁰² Letters of exchange were also used by governor-generals in emergency situations to pay for grain taken from ships intercepted in the Adriatic and escorted to Zadar. All this taken into consideration, if we assume that these 4.2 millions covered 40% of the cost of the military, the figure of little more than 10 million *ducats* seems a realistic estimate of the cost of the military serving in Dalmatia throughout this war.

However, wages of the military, be they full pay or simple *terzi*, represented only part of the Republic's yearly expenses in Dalmatia. The troops needed to be provided with some basic food provisions, bread or biscuit: horses with fodder; crews of galleys with vegetables and rice etc. Since victuals constituted the basis of the soldiers' diet, the cost to feed Republic's forces in the province was linked with the price of grain in Venice, and could on the average be taken to equal between 60-80% of the yearly amount of *terzi*. However, since food was deducted from soldiers' pay, these expenses do not increase the overall cost of the Dalmatian battlefield and should be considered as included in the above estimate of 10 millions. Similarly, clothing and footwear issued to soldiers from state magazines also simply represented another type of payment of soldiers' wages in kind, with no consequences for the above estimate.

What did increase the cost of the Republic's military commitment in this battlefield was the cost of fortification projects undertaken in the course of this war. However, as was said above, it is not possible to give an exact figure concerning the cost of these works. Several tens of thousands of *ducats*, sent from Venice dedicated specifically to this purpose (see Table

1101ASVe, PTM. b. 469. num. 627. (Zara, 29 Settembre 1649)

1102ASVe, PTM. b. 470. num. 768. (Zara, 28. Novembre 1650)

2/Appendix 4) do not represent all financial funds employed in this task. More often than not, disbursement of the coin was left to the discretion of governor-generals. Furthermore, as was also pointed out, the funds from communal deposits played a prominent role in financing these works in the early years of the war, yet only part of which left any track in preserved sources, mainly on occasions when the restitution of these funds was petitioned. Equally, a major item on the list of expenses for these construction works remains obscured. This is the value of, literally, hundreds of tons of construction materials: nails, planks, lime mortar, explosives used for construction works, unaccounted quantities of iron tools (shovels, hammers, etc), practically everything, except stone (which could be found in abundance locally), was shipped to construction sites in Dalmatia from Venice.

The situation with fundamental war provisions: gunpowder, ammunition and stocks of arms kept in reserve in magazines, is a little more clearer. As can be seen from table 3.11, the Republic maintained reserves of thousands of weapons, both firearms and cold ones, which from the financial point of view represented "dead capital," worth several dozens of thousands of *ducats*. On the other hand, every year, the stocks of gunpowder had to be replenished; as was pointed out some 130 *miara* of gunpowder and several tens of thousand of lead bullets for muskets had to be sent each year to Dalmatia. A smaller part of the cost of these gunpowder provisions was compensated through deductions from troops to which portions were issued, yet the rest was consumed either by artillery or was simply lost through the process of natural decay. Furthermore, in addition to weapons and munitions accounted for in table 3.11, state magazines in Dalmatia were filled with hundreds of other items, thousands of cannonballs of all sizes, bombs, grenades, tons of saltpeter, tar, various tools – the value of which is practically impossible to calculate today.¹¹⁰³ Finally, as was shown in table 3.12, the Republic increased its artillery train in Dalmatia by more than 150 pieces, and in order to maintain this arsenal of weapons usable, in addition to hundreds of cannonballs, shipments of hundred or so gun carriages of all sorts and sizes, accompanied by a few hundred gun wheels and other

¹¹⁰³See the inventories of goods stored in Split, Trogir, Omiš, Šibenik, and Klis magazines from February 1664, attached to the letter: ASVe, PTM. b. 491, num. 126. (Spalato, 26. Genaro 1663. m.v.)

similar parts had to be planned each year. The list of all the minor items that had to be shipped from Venice to Dalmatia, still not accounted for, such as saddles, hooves, scabbards for swords and similar is endless; it is however useless to further dwell on it. The above paragraphs provide a sufficient sketch from which the whole picture concerning the scale of the logistical challenge the Dalmatian battlefield represented for the Republic of St. Mark can be drawn.

Conclusion: War and State in Early Modern Europe

The role of war in state development in Early Modern Europe has been the subject of numerous fine studies, written not only by historians but also by political scientists, sociologists and other scholars interested in state-building processes. And, as was mentioned in the introduction to this study, many sociologists, political scientists and many military historians as well, incline to see war as the main driving force behind state growth. This is especially true for proponents of the Robert/Parker thesis of the Military Revolution who perceive technical developments in warfare - new fortifications types, army growth, changes in strategy, linear tactics, field artillery etc - as chief agents in the "social and constitutional change," that resulted in the birth of the modern state during the period between 1500 and 1800. The rationale behind the idea of war as the main agent for the growth of state power is very simple. The scale of demands of early modern warfare in terms of manpower, money, and war materials was such that it promoted the growth of state power as the necessary precondition for adequate mobilization of these resources, thus resulting in centralization efforts and development of a strong bureaucratic apparatus.

However, this view is not accepted by all scholars in the field. For a considerable number of eminent military historians such an interpretation of the causal nature of the link between war and the growth of state is highly debatable. For example, Jeremy Black, sees political developments as the precondition that enabled the increased scale of warfare and the adaptation of new expensive technological advances, not the other way around.¹¹⁰⁴ Although undoubtedly the period in question witnessed significant quantitative and qualitative changes in many Early Modern European governments, several scholars, such as I.A.A. Thompson, (in case of the Spanish Monarchy) or David Parrott (dealing with Richelieu's France) warned that the expansion of government machinery and professionalization of the upper strata of military administrators did not always result in the rationalization of warfare, improved command and

¹¹⁰⁴Jeremy Black, *A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550-1800* (London : Macmillan, 1991)

control of the state over its armed forces or instant removal of the private sector from army administration and supply.¹¹⁰⁵ This said, the question that needs to be addressed is how the experience of the Republic of Venice during the War of Crete relates to the above sketched debate.

In this, as in many other respects, the case of Venice turned out to be a peculiar one. Although engaged in a war lasting for more than a quarter of a century, the Republic did not go through any significant institutional changes caused by the operational requirements of protracted warfare, the main reason being that the Republic of St. Mark was - by seventeenth century standards – already a highly centralized state, which had for centuries possessed a rather well-developed and efficient bureaucratic apparatus. With such a tool at hand, the rulers of the Republic had at their disposal the entire administrative skeleton necessary to operate and supervise its armed forces in wartime. The Venetian patriciate with their intrinsic Republican distrust of personal power, always alert to prevent any attempt of usurpation of power by some clique, did not show any tendency to concentrate power into a single state organ, unlike, for example, France where in the course of the 17th century the war conduct was dominated first by two strong prime ministers (Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarini), and in the Age of Louis XIV, by two competent heads of the war department Michiel La Tellier and Louvois. Never during the War of Crete (or for that matter during the entire 17th century), was an attempt made by the rulers of the Republic to form an institution equivalent to that of a department of war – exclusively charged with handling war related affairs – and with a secretary or minister as its head. Instead, the entire task of war conduct was done within the existing framework of offices and magistracies (strengthened and expanded when needed), which remained highly fragmented but with a clear division of responsibilities.

The Republic's representatives in the provinces would send demands for supplies, money or reinforcements to Venice, where, via the College, they would reach the Senate. The Senate

1105For a good overview of the debate see: Steven Gunn, David Grummitt and Hans Cools, "War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Widening the Debate." *War in History* 15 (2008): pp. 371-388; Compare also: Kelly deVries, "Gunpowder Weaponry and the Rise of the Early Modern State," *War in History* 5 (1988) pp. 127-129.

would issue necessary orders to relevant magistracies charging them with the tasks of providing requested items; *proveditors* of the artillery were responsible for guns, powder and ball, *proveditors* of *biave* for grain and bread, those of the Arsenal for building supplies, materials, tools etc., while *Savio alla scrittura* would be charged with processing military contracts, and for providing the army with clothing, blankets and similar elementary provisions for soldiers. Finally, once provisions were ready for transport, the executors of the orders of the Senate would ensure their shipment to proper destinations. As far as the central organs of the government were concerned, the management of war conduct had not changed much since the time of the War of Gradisca (1615-1618), with the same magistracies charged with the same set of tasks.¹¹⁰⁶

Yet, the war did bring about significant changes in the structure of the provincial administration. As chapters 1 and 2 have shown, it was already at the beginning of the war, in order to meet the challenges of the war more aptly, that the provincial administration had been expanded by the introduction of a dozen of new extraordinary *provveditors*. These were dispatched to Dalmatia and charged with handling all extraordinary war-related tasks, such as the organization of defense, fortification works, management of thousands of new troops sent to the province, and so forth. Additionally, during the greatest military commitment of the Republic in this battlefield (1648-1651), the office of the commissary in the province was introduced and charged with the task of supervising finances and supply of the Republic's armed forces. Although the state administration expanded, in order to accommodate exceptional demands of the war, all newly introduced offices and posts were extraordinary in character, expected to last only for the duration of the war. Moreover, neither of these offices represented a novelty; both had already been used by the Republic when engaged in armed conflicts during the previous 150 years. Thus, it can be said that the changes in the structure of Republic's organs caused by the war were not qualitative but simply quantitative temporary changes.

1106John Hale, *Military organization of a Renaissance State*, pp. 280-1.

How effective was the "Venetian way" of war conduct in practice, how well its defensive system (including its administrative component) responded to day-to-day challenges of the armed conflict, was discussed in the previous chapters dealing with the military commitment of the Republic in the Dalmatian battlefield. What follows on the remaining pages of this conclusion is not a summary of previously discussed findings, nor retracing of the steps already taken. I have found it more fitting to finish this study with an attempt to provide some sort of an assessment of the Venetian armed forces and their governance by accounting their merits and flaws and to frame Venetian practices into the wider European context.

1. Comparative Analysis and Final Assessment

Concerning the governance of its armed forces, the administrative structure of the Republic, although quite efficient by contemporary standards, was not free of cases of mismanagement and outright corruption which caused serious drainage and waste of already rather limited material resources. The Venetian experience in this regard complies with experience of other early modern states, and the usual suspects, as always, turned out to be munitioners - managers of state magazines. Inspection of their books commonly discovered discrepancies between the items recorded and the actual materials present in magazines. For example, in June 1649, Governor-General Foscolo launched an investigation against the *munitionero* in Kotor, accusing him for 78,055 *lire* (c.a 12,590 *ducats*) worth of missing goods. The list of the missing goods provides a good illustration of what was in demand on the black market. Weapons constitute only a small portion of the missing items: 13 muskets, 16 carabines and 56 swords and a dozen pikes, while at the same time more than 26.4 metric tons of grain and other victuals, together with 28 tons of flour and more than 43 tons of biscuit were found missing. This is not surprising if we take into account that war-ridden Dalmatia was completely dependent on imports of food from Italy, and thus, these represented the most coveted commodities.¹¹⁰⁷ Even graver accusations were raised by commissary Malipiero against the *munitionero* of Zadar who allegedly embezzled at least 50, 000 *ducats* worth of

¹¹⁰⁷ASVe, PTM. b. 468. num. 580. (Zara, 10 Giugno 1649) and attachment: *Nota della stima delle Biave Biscotti Robbe munizioni ritrovate mancate nel Fondatto Maneggio dellei Fratelli Sebastian et Nicolo Palma monitioneri in Cattaro.*

goods.¹¹⁰⁸ These two examples nicely reaffirm the well known maxim that for one man a war may be a disaster and calamity, and for other, at the same time, an opportunity.

As much as the Republican ideology advertised *virù*, good service to the public, putting of state public good in front of private and other similar well known themes, in reality the ranks of Venetian patricians were not immune to the vice of corruption. In April 1651, after receiving a multitude of anonymous and formal accusations from representatives of the community of Trogir, Governor-General Foscarini had no other choice but to imprison *Conte e Capitano* of Trogir, Ser Andrea Trevisano. At the close of the investigation, the list of transgressions compiled by Foscarini was no less than 12 pages long, and Trevisano was accused of corruption, tyranny, appropriation of public and communal funds alike, fraud with grain and numerous other crimes.¹¹⁰⁹ Trevisano was not the only *Rettor* against who a case was brought because of misuse of his powers and oppression of his subjects. In the same manner, in 1656, Governor-General Bernardo released *Conte* of Brač from service, giving him a one month term to report to prison in Venice.¹¹¹⁰

Even more spectacular was the case of Ser Paolo Boldu, the governor of the fortress of Klis, also arrested by Foscarini and sent to Venice for trial. For some time, Governor Boldu was running the fortress of Klis as a very lucrative business. The women from the fortress' suburb were employed in processing of flax provided privately by Boldu, yet paid by biscuit and cheese from public stores. Additionally, Boldu and the sergeant major of the fortress opened up a shop in the fortress and all soldiers were forced to buy food there at inflated prices. Moreover, in order to supply provisions for this shop, Boldu and his sergeant major formed a partnership and invested into a ship which was buying food in the Habsburg lands on their behalf. Moreover, Boldu seized the opportunity to sell, for his own profits, shoes, biscuit and other provisions provided by the Republic to be distributed to soldiers on the account of their pay. Finally, Boldu, on occasion, even introduced his own exchange rate for

1108ASVe, PTM. b. 488. num. 85. (Spalato, 2. Agosto 1661)

1109For a full list of transgressions see: ASVe, PTM. b. 471., num. 16. (Spalato, 5. Aprile 1651); See also Pavao Andreis, *Povijest grada Trogira*, p. 287.; Franjo Difnik, *Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji*, p. 219.

1110ASVe, PTM. b. b. 480. num. 62. (Trau, 16. Novembre 1656)

coins given to soldiers in the fortress, accounting one *Scudo* at 11:10 *lire* instead at 11:00, retaining the profit for himself. However, all these wrongdoings represented more or less standard set of transgressions of a corrupt garrison commander. What cost Boldu his office was his decision to organize a private slave market in the fortress. Boldu was buying for himself Ottoman prisoners from the Morlacchi, and instead of sending those of lower status to the galleys and depositing the ransoms of those of some status and importance to the public treasury, he simply allowed everyone to be ransomed and kept the money for himself. Boldu treated notable Ottomans with respect, allowing them to be substituted by hostages and leave the fortress free in order to go and collect their ransoms. Such constant movement of Ottomans in and out of the fortress represented a serious security breach that could have not been tolerated.¹¹¹¹ However, there is nothing specifically Venetian or surprising in a highly autonomous frontier fortress commander going loose, and abusing his powers and position (a discovery of one who did not do so would be truly a surprising finding).

In addition to these cases of outright corruption and fraud, equally damaging for the Republic's war effort were cases of mismanagement caused by incompetence and neglect, as was the case of already mentioned commissary Corner from 1651, who cost the Republic some 18,800 *ducats*. However, all such cases were resolved by the standard system of checks and balances of the Republic. Much more serious and harder to discover were cases of corruption and malversation on the level of professional clerks. The outlines of the civil organs of control over armed forces in the province discussed in section 2.4.1 touched upon but a thin top layer composed of Venetian patricians. However, in their daily work, these magistrates were dependent on chancellors, secretaries and other clerks skilled in accounting and book keeping. The seriousness of the consequences that could be produced by corruption at this level is illustrated best by the case of three top ministers of Governor-General Foscolo's administration, discussed in the previous chapter. These three state servants conspired and issued *bollete* to captains instead of actual money and then charged the public treasury for the very same *bollete* while retaining cash for themselves, appropriating 30,000 and probably

1111ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. 40. (Spalato, 9. Luglio 1651)

even more *ducats*.

Falling of accounting books into disarray was common, and also occurred during the War of Gradisca.¹¹¹² Although we know little about them, similar bad practices most probably continued even after the term of service of Governor-General Foscarini. Whether fraud on this level was possible without the knowledge and/or even participation of the governor-general requires further investigation. Yet, what can be claimed with certainty is that frauds at this level of government were much harder to discover since the ruling elite had little or no experience in book keeping. While the requirements for higher posts in the Venetian administration included only birth, good family connections and a sufficient number of years of service, keeping track of stores of materials, running the treasury, and similar administrative tasks, all required actual skills in numbers and bookkeeping. Governor-General Foscarini, probably the best clerk among governor-generals, was more of an exception than the rule in this regard. As John Hale pointed out: "proveditors and commissaries could be produced at the punch of the electoral button," but good accountants and administrators could not.¹¹¹³ Yet, such cases of outright corruption or mismanagement of public affairs were common in all early modern governments, which they all tried to keep in check with the limited tools at their disposal.

Another problem that the Venetian government shared with other early modern governments, although on a more limited scale, were the frequent conflicts over jurisdiction and authority.¹¹¹⁴ Chapter 3 has accounted for many of the conflicts caused by a lack of clearly defined delineations of authority and responsibility between public officials and *Capi di guerra* and among *Capi di guerra* themselves, yet this problem also persisted among Republic's magistrates. Although the provincial administration had a clear and unambiguous pyramidal hierarchy with the governor-general at its top, a constant source of tensions and conflict were extraordinary offices, such as that of the commissary. As shown in Chapter 3, in

1112 John R. Hale, *Military Organization of a Renaissance State*, p. 283

1113 John R. Hale, *The Military organization of a Renaissance State*, p. 281.

1114 For the French case see: David Parrott, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France*, pp. 390-396.

spite of the unquestionable seniority of the post of the governor-general over that of a commissary, in 1651, Commissary Corner successfully evaded handing over *ruoli* to Governor-General Foscarini, using the vagueness of the letter of his appointment which did not specify which official's competence keeping of these books was.

The refusal of the Commissary to hand over the books of *ruoli* to the Governor-General was not a lone incident; there were more serious cases. The most problematic of extraordinary offices was that of *provveditore alla sanita*, dispatched to Dalmatia only in case of an outbreak of plague in the province. The most serious incident occurred in winter 1656/7, when several cases of plague were discovered on the island of Murter,¹¹¹⁵ and the Senate immediately dispatched a *provveditore alla sanita* to Dalmatia. In less than a month Signore Lione, *provveditore alla sanita*, and Governor-General Bernardo came into conflict over their areas of jurisdiction. The danger of the outbreak of plague gave the office of the *provveditore alla sanita* a great weight and importance, and Signore Lione interpreted the terms of his appointment rather freely. He did not consider himself to be subordinated to any public official in the province, including the Governor-General. Consequently, he did not give an account of his actions to the Governor-General and operated as a parallel organ of the government, putting under his command even armed boats and galleys and on a few occasions, appropriating money from the treasury in Zadar. The conflict culminated in January 1657, with the scandalous open confrontation between the Governor-General and *provveditore alla sanita* in front of other senior Venetian officials.¹¹¹⁶

As damaging as these incidents could be for the reputation of a particular governor-general in the political arena of the Venetian Republic, in general they had little influence on the command and control of the Republic over its armed forces. In spite of mentioned conflicts and bickering (mostly over precedence), the provincial administration had a clear pyramidal hierarchy with the governor-general at the top presiding over a group of extraordinary

1115ASVe, PTM. b. 480, num. 70. (Sebenico, 11. Dicembre 1656)

1116ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 73, (Sebenico, 5. Genaro 1656 m.v.); num. 76 (Sebenico, non dated); num. 79. (Sebenico, 22. Gennaro 1656. mv.)

governors who supervised the work of peacetime administration of the provincial centers. The authority of a governor-general as the supreme military commander of the forces in the province was never challenged, neither by professional soldiers in Venetian service nor by any other state official. All in all, the provincial administration served as a very efficient tool through which the central government was able to enforce its policies and control war conduct on this battlefield.

The concentration of civil and military executive powers in the office of the governor-general combined with a high level of autonomy in execution of military operations, proved to be a very fortunate combination, well suited to demands of the state of war. Through its governor-generals, the Republic was able to enforce its policies, coordinate war conduct on this battlefield with the Republic's overall war effort, more or less efficiently transfer troops from this zone to other theaters of operations and, very importantly, exert high level of control and restraint over professional military commanders in its service. No insubordinate field commander troubled the Venetian high command as was a common occurrence during the Thirty Years' War. Additionally, the high level of autonomy granted to governor-generals also prevented the rulers of the Republic from falling into the trap of attempting to micromanage military operations of the Dalmatian battlefield which, even though it was located rather close to Venice, would still be an impossible task to achieve without modern means of communication (such as telegraph, radio, video-link, etc.).

Very similar in terms of competencies to the post of the Venetian governor-general was the post of the captain-general of the Spanish forces in the Netherlands. From 1567 and the arrival of the Duke of Alba into the Low Countries, the civil and military executive powers were fused into a single office. Furthermore, the captain-general, like the Venetian governor-general, exercised considerable judiciary powers, controlled army finances and possessed the right of patronage.¹¹¹⁷ However, there were significant differences in the level of control that the central organs of these two states were able to exert over these two offices. While the

¹¹¹⁷Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road*, pp. 91-95.

Venetian Senate exercised rather tight and strict control over the actions of its governor-generals and other high level representatives, not only in Dalmatia but also in Italy and on Crete, royal control over its chief representative in the Netherlands, as Geoffrey Parker has shown, remained quite problematic throughout the entire period covered by his study (1567-1659). On more than one occasion, the crown was forced to accept the *fait accompli*, as for example in 1577 when Don John of Austria practically declared war on the States General by himself, usurping royal prerogatives.¹¹¹⁸

In addition to problems caused by distance and the institutional shortcomings of the Spanish monarchy (lack of proper state organs to which the captain-general would be responsible), a set of considerations, deriving from political, cultural and social backgrounds of office holders, further complicated the relation between the Crown and its representative in the Low Countries. The ability of the Spanish central government to control and restrain the actions of the captain-general was hampered by the fact that the holders of the office came either from the highest strata of the Spanish aristocracy, or from the royal family itself. As such, they all wielded a considerable power and influence themselves, and, although vassals to the crown, these landed aristocrats, imbued with knightly ethos, had to be treated tactfully. On the other hand, even though, as we today know, the image of selfless patricians, subordinated to the Republic, willing to put aside self-interest and personal ambitions for the common good belongs to the multilayered ideological construct known as the Myth of Venice,¹¹¹⁹ still, the level of social discipline among Venetian patriciate was unmatched among the ranks of the European aristocracy. By not having a separate political power base outside the city of Venice and trained in participating in administrative tasks of the government from their earliest days, Venetian nobles in general proved to be disciplined even if not virtuous. Usurpation of the prerogatives of the Senate would be almost unthinkable in 17th century Venice, the ruling elite of which was highly sensitive to any attempts to

1118 *Ibidem*, p. 95.

1119 For a comprehensive coverage of the subject of the Myth of Venice see: James S. Grubb, "When Myths Lose Power: Four Decades of Venetian Historiography," *The Journal of Modern Historiography* 58 (1986) p. 43-94.

usurpation of power.

Another segment in which Venetian institutions proved to be very efficient, and, apparently, above contemporary standards of large European monarchies, was that of army administration. The ideal case in which a state pays only for soldiers effectively in its service was without any doubt an unachievable feat for any state in early modern Europe. However, the Venetian system of keeping track of the effective strength of their troops (which seems to have been considerably improved since the War of Gradisca)¹¹²⁰ and more or less regularly held musters, although far from perfect, probably enabled the Senate to have better insight into the state of its armed forces than the majority of early modern governments. The main problems regarding army administration, were the elements of the army with a special status, outside the standard Venetian hierarchy, as were, for example, the Papal or Swiss regiments. The irregular arrival of cash to the province, and the privilege of the Swiss not to participate in musters unless their debts had been covered, resulted in huge financial damage for the Republic, as shown in Chapter 3.

Armed with such "accurate" information, complemented with collected intelligence concerning Ottoman plans for forthcoming campaigns, the Senate planned its responses, ordering levies of new troops and their transfer to the most threatened zones in sufficient numbers. As the war progressed and the resources of the Republic became more and more depleted, the deployment of forces in adequate numbers to proper zones of operation grew in importance. Simply put, the Republic could not afford to "overcommit" itself in Dalmatia. Over the years, the Republic developed the practice of using Dalmatia as a staging base before the transfer of troops to the Levant. During spring, reinforcements would be sent to Dalmatia to serve there during the season and as soon as it would become clear that the danger of Ottoman attacks during that campaign had passed, the Senate would order the transfer of part of the troops to Crete.¹¹²¹

1120For more see: John R. Hale, *Military Organization of a Renaissance State*, pp. 282-3.

1121Sometimes, "marching" orders would be issued already in July, as was the case in 1665, when 2,000 men from Dalmatia were ordered to Crete. ASVe, PTM. b. 494. num. 75. (Spalato, 19. Luglio 1665.);

Therefore, in spite of all previously enumerated shortcomings, the statement that the Republic was efficient in governing its armed forces during this war remains true. The central organs of the Republic responsible for the execution of the will of the Senate, although highly fragmented, had a clear division of responsibilities. Even though this fragmentation probably resulted in slower gathering of provisions, reinforcements and supplies, due to the necessity to coordinate the actions of magistracies, this handicap was more than counterbalanced with lack of internal conflicts between various organs of the government. This problem frequently troubled the Spanish or French monarchies, in spite of the concentration of competences into a single government body charged with war-related affairs such as was the war department, or the war council.¹¹²² The majority of malfunctions of the Venetian defensive system in Dalmatia, discussed in previous chapters, should not be attributed to some crisis of management, insufficient or inadequate institutional coverage, but rather to the crisis (i.e. lack) of resources. The last issue that requires to be tackled is the question of compliance of the Venetian model of paying and providing for its troops in the Dalmatian theater of operations, discussed in the Chapter 3, with the prevailing early modern European practices.

The practice of paying troops in several smaller monthly installments was not a Venetian specificity; similar practices were introduced in the armed forces of almost all European powers forced to wage prolonged wars.¹¹²³ Furthermore, the system of *terzi* used by the Republic to pay for its military was not, in fact, that detrimental for soldiers. For example, in the periods when biscuit was being distributed, the combined value of coin and payments in biscuit amounted to almost 23 *lire* ($36 \text{ libbre} \times 6 \text{ soldi} = 216 \text{ soldi} = 10:6 \text{ lire} + 12 \text{ lire}$ received in coin) out of 31 *lire* which was actually their standard pay of five ducats. The payment of the remaining amount, at least in theory, the soldiers were to settle with their captains who held the credit of the company with the Republic. This kind of practice was also in accordance with the prevailing contemporary doctrine which argued that a soldier needed

¹¹²²For example see: Christopher Storrs, *The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy, 1665-1700*. (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) pp. 182-189.; David Parrot, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government, and Society in France*, pp. 380-394.

¹¹²³Concerning similar practices in the French case see: David Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, pp. 342-344.

to be protected from himself, and should be neither too poor nor too rich.¹¹²⁴ Furthermore, such arrangements protected a soldier from extortion by merchants and, at least in theory, from their captains.

It was the captains and in part the lieutenants and NCOs who bore the majority of the financial burden. While soldiers managed to get some $\frac{3}{4}$ of their wages, the captains were from the beginning given only $\frac{1}{2}$ of their pay. The reduction of their salaries to only $\frac{1}{4}$ in coin and $\frac{1}{4}$ in grain represented a further serious infringement on their income. Yet, since the nominal monthly pays of the captains of trans-alpine and Italian infantry were 60 and 40 *ducats* respectively, a quarter of their pay was still significantly higher than the 12 *lire* received by their soldiers. On the other hand, this arrangement had put the NCOs, sergeants and corporals, into a far worse position, because a $\frac{1}{4}$ of their salaries amounted to less than the amount of soldiers' *terzi*. Thus, they became completely dependent on bonuses provided by their captains. Moreover, during long periods of intermission in payments of *terzi*, the maintenance of soldiers fell completely onto their captains' shoulders. It was they who had to somehow provide for soldiers under their command or risk mass desertion which would certainly have led to regulation of their company and their discharge from active service. Under such circumstances, over the years, as the war dragged on, captains became creditors of great sums of money, with apparently no prospect of settling those amounts any time soon.

This arrangement resulted in a peculiar relationship between the Republic and the officers in its service. As in many other states, the rulers of the Venetian Republic strove to achieve that payments of wages were made directly into the hands of soldiers and not through their captains. Before the introduction of *terzi* this was done during general musters only, yet with the introduction of *terzi* the Senate revived this initiative and in 1663 made plans to decree that in future all payments of *terzi* should be done in this way. However, shortage of cash precluded putting this plan into execution. In January 1664, Governor-General Girolamo Contarini informed the Senate that when the first news of this plan reached Dalmatia, he was

¹¹²⁴Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road*, p. 136.

approached by the captains of the Split and Klis garrisons. The captains, Contarini wrote, were resolute not to give a single coin any more for the maintenance of their soldiers, and, as Contarini formulated it, "modestly" reminded him that it was his duty to provide for troops and presented him with a petition asking for settlement of their debts.¹¹²⁵ Unable to secure regular payments of its financial obligation and meeting with resistance from the captains on whose resources it depended for maintenance of troops, the Republic backed down and gave up on this initiative.

As contradictory as it may seem to us, the existence of a huge state debt bound the colonels and captains even closer to the Republic. The captain who left (or was discharged from) service would forfeit all his debts. The longer a captain was in the service of the Republic and the higher his investment was, the more he had to lose and was thus more manageable and obedient. Captains practically had no option but to endure until the day of settling of accounts, or, as an alternative, they could obtain a license to leave the service and go to Venice and attempt to somehow settle their credits. It was to the captains that the Republic transferred a large amount of war cost, and in cases when the pays were in arrears for months, the burden of sustaining their soldiers fell exclusively on them.¹¹²⁶ Of course, not all captains in the Venetian service were ready to demonstrate such patience and obedience as was expected of them by the Republic's rulers. The case of Captain Andrea Rubcich, a Morlaccho from Skradin, can serve as a fitting example. After spending several years in the Venetian service, Captain Rubcich, who was characterized as "*veramente uno de più bravi soldati*"¹¹²⁷ by Governor General Antonio Bernardo in his letter to the Senate, decided that he could not serve any longer under present conditions, took his armed boat and his crew and left for Naples where he intended to enter into the Spanish service.¹¹²⁸

¹¹²⁵ASVe, PTM. 491, num. 123. (Spalato, 12. Genaro 1663. m.v.)

¹¹²⁶For example such was the situation during 16622, when the army was owed 6 pays. See: ASVe, PTM. b. 488. num. 118. (Zara, 21. Marzo 1662)

¹¹²⁷ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 177. (Zara, 26 Aprile 1658)

¹¹²⁸Concerning this incident, the Republic contacted its permanent representative in Naples and charged him with task to arrange for the extradition of Captain Rubcich and his soldiers back under the jurisdiction of the Republic, in order to be put to trial. It is also interesting to note that Governor-General Bernardo in his letter to the Republic's representative in Naples described Captain Rubcich with the following words: "*Un ingrato, un infedele, un Ladro, et un fellone,*" ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. 177. (Zara, 26 Aprile 1658.): attachment to

Similarly, as the Republic was able to transfer part of the burden of maintaining its armed forces to captains and officers, the cost of armament and ammunition was transferred to soldiers in its service. In doing so, the Republic was able to decrease, at least partially, the huge credit to the army. Again, such practices did not diverge from the common practices of early modern European states which also supplied arms to their troops. Although soldiers did not share the same favorable disposition toward this form of "payment in kind" as they did in case of bread or biscuit, still, as Geoffrey Parker has shown, such an arrangement resulted in better equipping of armed forces.¹¹²⁹ So, as far as the state was concerned, this was the most favorable form of arrangement.

However, in several instances, the Venetian Republic departed from prevailing contemporary practices. As was stated in the previous chapter, the Republic of Venice did not employ any private contractors who would take over the supply of food, munition, clothing and other provisions to its armies deployed overseas. This was, for example, the practice used by Spain in supplying its forces in the Netherlands or in Italy, or with the French Crown which left the purchase and distribution of food for its forces to entrepreneurial *munitionnaires*.¹¹³⁰ Although goods were mainly bought from the private sector, the Republic retained firm control over the distribution of provisions to its forces. Almost everything required by the Venetian military in Dalmatia was purchased by one or another magistracy of the Republic in Venice and then shipped to its destinations overseas.

Each supply model had its merits and flaws. The main advantage of the model adopted by the Spanish crown was that it was far easier and safer for the state to negotiate settlement of its debt with merchants than with its armed forces. Furthermore, since the entire system was based on prices of goods being defined in advance, its functioning was more or less protected from market fluctuations or temporary shortage of cash in the state treasury. On the other

the letter; ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-34, f. 31v. Adi 1. March 1659.

1129Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road*, pp. 40-41.

1130For more see: Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road*, pp. 135-138.; Compare also: Christopher Storrs, *The Army of Lombardy 1*, pp. 392-393; For more on the French case see: David Parrot, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624-1642*, pp. 381-396;

hand, such a supply system was extremely prone to misuse and frauds, since merchants were driven primarily by the motive of profit, not by providing troops with the best possible service.¹¹³¹ Furthermore, the mere existence of the middleman, that is a merchant contractor, between the Crown and the soldiers in its service, inflated the prices. Thus, although the system had the benefit of low operational costs, in the long run, because the credits needed to be settled on a regular basis, it was more expensive than would have been if the state had directly operated the supply of its forces, as it was done by the Venetian Republic.

The main advantage of the policy adopted by Venice was rationalization of expenses due to liquidation of middle men. Similarly, unlike, for example, the Spanish monarchy which extensively used the services of Genoese bankers to provide pay for its forces, the Republic avoided using letters of exchange and retained a firm monopoly on both the emission of coin in the overseas provinces and paying its troops. As was shown in the previous chapter, due to the monopoly retained by Venice on the emission of currency in its provinces and in paying the troops, the Republic managed, through manipulation of exchange rates, to extort considerable material gain (even up to 35% of the value of its coin). Yet, the main disadvantage of this model was that in order to function properly, it was dependent on constant flow of hard cash into the state treasury. At last but not the least, as the last chapter has demonstrated, the supply model adopted by the Venetian Republic, although less costly, was prone to frequent interruptions caused by temporary shortage of financial resources. A risk that the Venetian government was both ready and able to accept.

The main reason behind Venice's ability to turn to such a direct practice of supplying and financing its armies lay in simple numbers. In the first place, the armies the Republic had to maintain were significantly smaller than those of Spain and France. The annual amounts Venice had to transfer to the Dalmatian battlefield (between 150,000 – 300,000 *ducats*) represented only a fraction of yearly expenditures of Spain in the Low Countries (for example

¹¹³¹For example, for providing troops with completely uneatable bread, which represents rather a radical instance of common occurrence of cheating on the quality of goods provided to the army see: Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, p. 137.

in the period 1643-1653, the annual shipment of money from Spain to the Low Countries equaled between 2.5 and 6 million florins).¹¹³² Secondly, backed by its central mint (the famous *Zecca*), and for at least two centuries, Venice had established firm monetary control over its mainland possessions, enabling the Republic to efficiently manipulate exchange rates of its own currency. One of the main reasons why it had been able to do so lay in the fact that it had to control a much smaller territory than other great European states. The only seventeenth century state that managed to establish such firm control over the effective value (in terms of units of account) of its currencies were the Dutch, and even them not before the second half of the seventeenth century.¹¹³³ Furthermore, the control of exchange rates in its overseas provinces was greatly aided by the fact that in the mid-17th century these represented a European periphery, backwater territories far away from the main prospering economic centers, regions where Venice acted as the chief source of coin. The adoption of different models of supply organization, or fiscal policies concerning the payment of troops in distant theaters of operations by the Spanish or French monarchies and the Venetian Republic, was the result of differences in operational requirements and characters of these states. In the end, each of the states adopted the model which better suited its economic, political and administrative structures.

2. War and Formation of the Frontier Society – Further Venues of Research

Finally, it is time to touch upon the last contribution of this study. As suggested in the introductory chapter, the War of Crete had long lasting consequences for Dalmatia. More than two decades of warfare, the epidemics of plague that decimated the local population, combined with the migration of 30,000 Ottoman subjects to Venetian controlled lands, gave birth to a new Dalmatian society - a more rural one, with even a slight oriental character due to the Morlacchi's exotic clothing style and Ottoman titles of their community leaders

1132Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road*, pp. 221. (see also pp. 224-5 for the overall expenditure of Spain in the Netherlands during the period 1567-1665)

1133Jan de Vries, *The First Modern Economy. Success, failure, and perseverance of the Dutch economy, 1500-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1997) pp. 81-84.

(*harambaša, serdar*). Given the role the Morlacchi migration and rebellion played in shaping historical events and their position in the narratives of this war in previous studies (see Introduction), it was impossible for this study to avoid the subject. The first chapter as a whole can be said to represent an attempt to provide a balanced narrative of this war, a narrative that does not revolve completely around Morlacchi-Ottoman warfare but which does not neglect it either.

The sections of Chapter 2 have attempted to shed some light on two important questions, the first being the contribution of the Morlacchi to the overall Venetian war effort. As was suggested, the Morlacchi not only compensated for the decrease of Venetian regular forces in the province, but their forays and raids also played a crucial role in depopulation of Ottoman Dalmatia. Furthermore, it has been pointed out how the Morlacchi with their constant harassment of Ottomans both in Dalmatia and in the border regions of Lika, Krbava, Bosnia and Hercegovina tied down significant Ottoman forces and how, over the years, Venetian commanders learned to coordinate these actions with the general defensive strategy. The Morlacchi were not, as some historians would like to depict them, the main defensive force of the province, but they were the first line of the defense of the province, protecting it from Ottoman surprise attacks. Moreover, without the Morlacchi, the Republic would not have been able to prevent Ottomans from repopulating lost land in the sandjaks of Klis and Lika and from bringing their logistical bases much closer to Dalmatian towns. Countless small engagements, fought over two decades between Morlacchi and frontier Ottomans, took a terrible death toll on both sides. It can even be argued without any doubt that, after 1648, the Morlacchi represented for the Ottomans a much more frightening enemy than Venetian regular forces, the enemy that comes during the night, burns villages, enslaves women and children to be sold at slave markets in Naples¹¹³⁴ and who are always on guard at mountain

¹¹³⁴Over the last decade of the War of Crete, a rather lucrative slave market evolved in Naples. For more on Bosnian slave trade in Naples see: Gligor Stanojević, *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata*, p. 159-163. Aleksandar Solovjev, "Trgovanje bosanskim robljem do god. 1661," *Glasnik državnog muzeja u Sarajevu 1*, (1946): pp. 139-164.; Compare also letters of Catholic missionaries in Naples to Rome concerning the Bosnian Christians sold as slaves: Marko Jačov, *Le missioni cattoliche nei Balcani durante la Guerra di Candia vol. 2.*, pp. 40-43, 48-49, 78-79, 88-90, 114, 135-136, 151-154, 239-243, 263-264, 267-269, 318-320, 431-433, 444-446, 453.

passes, waiting in ambush for Ottoman raiding parties. As such, Morlacchi indeed constituted one of the fundamental elements of the Venetian defensive system in this battlefield.

The second problem related to the Morlacchi and put under scrutiny in this study was the question of their integration into the Venetian defensive system. The integration of tens of thousands Morlacchi immigrants and their transformation from Ottoman *raya* into obedient subjects of the Venetian Republic would have represented a serious problem for the Venetian government even in peacetime. During war-time the task was next to impossible. As this study has argued, the final result, the integration of Morlacchi into the Venetian defensive system in Dalmatia as units of territorial irregular militia, with their separate command structure, was not the intended product of a single long term policy defined by the central organs of the Venetian government. Instead, it was the outcome of a combination of skillful improvisations on behalf of various governor-generals in Dalmatia, their responses to the challenges of daily needs and particular situations, to the material constraints within which they had to operate and general instructions formulated by the central organs of the state.

Already at the beginning of the migration, General-Governor Leonardo Foscolo realized that the minimum requirement for establishing some level of control over Morlacchi immigrants was to win over their chiefs for the Venetian cause. And indeed, of all polices devised by the Venetian government to ensure loyalty of their new subjects, in the end the one proved to be most effective was state sponsored stratification of Morlacchi society. The consequence of this policy was the formation of a new elite among Morlacchi, an elite which was elevated to its privileged position through the acquisition of state stipends and other benefits granted by the Venetian government, and thus one closely bound to the Republic for its existence.

Another important process that took place during this war and which was also examined in more detail in this study was the accommodation of the institution of *serdar* - originally introduced by the Morlacchi of Zadar themselves - in the Venetian administrative structure. This study has shown how, in the period from 1649-1656, the election of *serdar* went more or

less without any interference from the Venetian administration. However, as the years passed, the Venetian administration became aware of both the utility and the dangers of this novelty introduced by the Morlacchi and acted accordingly. Gradually, the Republic began to assert some level of control and influence in the process of election by appropriating the right to confirm Morlacchi-elected *serdar(s)*. Moreover, by playing on the rivalry among Morlacchi clans, in the period between 1656 and 1664, the Republic managed to seriously weaken the position of these Morlacchi leaders by creating additional offices of *serdars*. The second *serdar* was first introduced in 1656 in order to become an aid to the main *serdar*, followed by the division of the Morlacchi of Zadar into three areas, each under the jurisdiction of one *serdar* in 1664. The emergence of the office of *serdar* (or *sardar*) among Venetian Morlacchi was one of the most peculiar events of this war. No such institution of similar higher ranking leader appeared among the Vlachs on the northern imperial military frontier, and *serdars* remained one of the specific institutions of the Venetian military frontier until its very end.

With the creation of several offices of *serdar*, the participation in state services and benefices was extended to a wider circle of influential Morlacchi families, and - in this way - a wider support for the Most Serene Republic among Morlacchi chiefs was ensured. When the war ended in 1669, it was *serdars* and other *capi di Morlacchi* that the Venetian administration turned to for maintaining law and order on the border and, most importantly, for preventing further Morlacchi raids. For the small inner circle of the *Capi di Morlacchi*, the loss of autonomy and their transformation from community leaders into state officials was a small price to pay compared to attained personal gains. In addition to the titles and stipends, after the war, the *capi di Morlacchi* were rewarded for their faithful services with grants of land.¹¹³⁵ Over decades, various titles and offices were practically turned into hereditary ones. Maybe the most striking example of such an outcome is the case of the Smiljanić family. After the appointment of Smoljan Smiljanić in 1664, for more than 130 years, till the very end of the Republic in 1797, the title of *serdar* was almost uninterruptedly held by some member of the

¹¹³⁵For more concerning land distribution at the end of this and two subsequent Ottoman-Venetian wars, and economic integration of the Morlacchi in the Dalmatian society see: Tea Mayhew, *Dalmatia between Ottoman and Venetian Rule*, pp. 227-249.

family.¹¹³⁶

Battlefield promotions were not unknown in the 16th and 17th centuries, but war rarely acted as such a rapid catalyst for the creation of an entire elite. The events from 1670 should be taken as a symbolic culmination of this process, when the widely respected and famous young *harambassa* Stojan Janković (son of *serdar* Janko Mitrović) was first, on 13th March 1670, as recognition for his services and those of his father, granted the knighthood of order of St. Mark by the Senate. A few months later, just like any other *capi di Morlacchi*, he was given large areas of state land.¹¹³⁷ In a span of just one generation, the Janković-Mitrović family crossed the gap from an Ottoman *harambaša* to a *Cavaliere di San Marco*.¹¹³⁸

Yet, in light of everything narrated above, it may seem strange that the subject of Morlacchi-Venetian relationship is not more represented in this study. The truth is that the Morlacchi theme was intentionally downplayed. The decision was not made lightly, and it was influenced primarily by my belief that given the historical significance of the Morlacchi migration, the relationship between the Republic of St. Mark and the Morlacchi during the War of Crete represents a research subject worthy of a study of its own, a study that would address not only the problem of the integration of the Morlacchi into the Venetian defensive system (even more so, since the analysis done in this study mainly focused on the Morlacchi elite), but one encompassing problems of the Morlacchi integration on all societal levels, not limited solely to the military sphere.

In this regard, especially interesting would be areas of inquiry not touched at all by this study, such as for example the politics of the post-Tridentine Catholic Church towards Morlacchi newcomers and its profound impact on Morlacchi society. The missionary

1136 Roman Jelić, *Smiljanići – Kotarski serdari*, pp. 115-131.

1137For more on the life of Stojan-Janković and his role in the Morean War (1684-1699) see: Drago Roksandić, "Stojan Janković u Morejskom ratu ili o uskocima, robovima i podanicima. (Stojan Janković in the Morean War, or concerning the Uskoks, slaves and subjects)" In *Triplex Confinium*, (Zagreb: Barbant, 2003) pp. 117-171; For the decrees of appointments see: Boško Desnica, *Istorija kotarskih uskoka*, pp. 143-145.

1138The order of the knights of San Marco was the only knightly order in the history of the Venetian Republic. Title of *Cavaliere di San Marco* was as award usually given to middle ranking military officers, diplomats, and various public officials for their services to the Republic. For more see: Ricciotti Baratti, "I Cavalieri di San Marco," *Nuovo Archivio Veneto* 16, (1898): pp. 321-349.


activities of the Jesuits among the Morlacchi and the organization of lay fraternities in newly established parishes in Klis, Kamen and Solin provides excellent material for this kind of research. Furthermore, the Jesuits were not the only power group within the Catholic Church interested in Morlacchi. Equally interesting is the relationship between the Morlacchi and the Bosnian Franciscans, who had not only led large groups of Morlacchi over to the Venetian side, but also acted as their pastors in their new homeland.¹¹³⁹ Furthermore, a comparison of methods of integration and the status the Venetian Morlacchi with the Vlachs in Habsburg territories to the north, rises as the unavoidable question that needs to be addressed.

Further venues for research are countless, yet without the prior research of the scale of the military commitment of the Republic in this battlefield, functioning of the Venetian defensive system in Dalmatia during this war, and material restraints in which provincial administration had to operate, I judged such a study not to be feasible. Therefore, due to limited space of this study, I decided to limit my inquiry only to the problem of the integration of the Morlacchi into the Venetian defensive system. All other questions and lines of inquiry mentioned above, as well as many other interesting topics remain to be addressed in some other study, one that will hopefully be built upon the contributions of the present work.

1139The Bosnian Franciscans, on few occasions, attempted to use the Morlacchi as means to acquire the post of Bishop. First in 1648 when they attempted to acquire the vacant post of the bishop of Nin, and later in 1651, when an attempt was made to obtain appointment of fra Miho Bogetić as bishop (without the seat) among the Morlachi. ASVe, Senato, Dispacci, PTM. b. 466. num. 432. Zara, 4, Luglio 1648); Marko Jačov, *Le missioni cattoliche nei Balcani durante la Guerra di Candia*, vol. I. pp. 369-372.

Maps

Map 1.1. Dual Province of Venetian Dalmatia and Albania in its full extent (XV. century)



Appendix

Abbreviations used:

SRR-17 = ASVe, Senato Rettori, Registro 17.

SMR-122 = ASVe, Senato Mar, Registro 122.

PTM-480-39 = ASVe, Senato, Dispacci, *Provveditori da Terra e da Mar*, busta 480, lettere numero 39. (date reference omitted for purposes of brevity)

1. Military-Administrative Context

Table 1. Senior Venetian Civil and Military Officials in Dalmatia (1645-1669)

Provveditore Generale and Provveditore Straordinario in Dalmatia and Albania		
Period	Person	Comments
1645.III. - 1645.XI.	Foscolo, Lunardo *, Nicolo Dolfin * Vendarim, Andrea	
1645.XII. - 1651.III.	Foscolo, Lunardo	
1651.III. - 1652.XII.	Foscarini, Girolamo	
1652.XII. - 1654. XII.	Dolfin, Lorenzo	
1654.XII. - 1656. VII.	Zen, Gio Andrea Bernardo, Antonio * (1656.IV-VII.)	
1656. VII. - 1660.II.	Bernardo, Antonio	
1660.III. - 1662.V.	Corner, Andrea	
1662.V. - 1664.XII.	Contarini, Girolamo	
1664.XII – 1667.IX.	Corner, Catherino	
1667.X. - 1669.XII.	Priuli, Antonio	
Proveditore Generale della Cavalleria		
1646.III. - 1647.X.	Pisani, Marc' Antonio	
1647.X. - 1650.III.	Zorzi, Giovanni Francesco	
1650.III. - 1652. II.	Donado, Andrea	Arrested and recalled from duty
1653.II. - 1655.II.	Benzon, Giovanni Battista	
1655.II. - 1655.VII	Loredano, Antonio	Recalled from duty after the conflict with Governor-General Antonio Zen
Commisario in Provintia		
1647.X. - 1648.VIII.	Foscarini, Girolamo	Later governor-general (1651-1652)
1648.IX. - 1650.VIII.	Molin, Marco	
1650.VIII. - 1651.V.	Corner, Nicolò	
1660.IV – 1662.II.	Malipiero, Michiel	

(*) *Provveditre Straordinario*

Table 2. Principal *Capi da Guerra*: Army commanders in Dalmatia (1645 – 1669)

Campaign season	Person	Title	Stipend
1646.	Baron Martin Christof Degenfelt	Governator General dell' Armi	
1647.	Baron Martin Christof Degenfelt	Governator General dell' Armi	
1648	Baron Martin Christof Degenfelt	Governator General dell' Armi	3000 + 1200 ducats
1650	Gil'd Has	Governator General dell' Armi	
1651	Conte Ferdinando Scotto	Governator General dell' Armi	
1652	Conte Ferdinando Scotto	Generale dello Sbarco (1)	
1653	Barone di Herbestein	Soprintendente d'Armi	
1654	Barone di Herberstein	Soprintendente d'Armi	
1655	Marchese Villanova	Soprintendente d'Armi	
1656	Marchese Villanova (2)	Governator General dell' Armi	
1657	Don Camillo Gonzaga (+)	Generale dell' Infanteria	
	Andrea Britton	Sarggente Generale di Battaglia	
1658	Gil d'Has	Generale dell' Infanteria	
	Andrea Britton	Sarggente Generale di Battaglia	
1659	Gil d'Has (+)	Generale dell' Infanteria	
	Andrea Britton	Sarggente Generale di Battaglia	
1660	Don Innocentio Conti		
1662	Barone di Spaar	Sarggente Generale di Battaglia	
1663	Barone di Spaar	Sarggente Generale di Battaglia	
1665	Marchese Francesco Villanova	Generale dell' Infanteria	
1666	Marchese Cesare Oddi	Sergente Generale di Battaglia	
1669	Rodolfo Verdmuller	Tenente Generale d'Artigliaria	

(+) Died in Dalmatia in the course of duty

(1) Originally destined for service with the navy in the Levant, but because of the massive Ottoman preparations for campaign season withheld in Dalmatia.

(2) Discharged from service and banished from Dalmatia

Table 3. Wages of the Military Personnel

Unit type	Rank	Monthly (Lire)	Monthly (Ducats)	Comment
Italian infantry	Colonel		100	
	Lieutenant		60	
	Colonel			
	Captain		40	

Unit type	Rank	Monthly (Lire)	Monthly (Ducats)	Comment
	Ensign		20	
	Sargent	63		
	Corporal	42		
	Drummer	35		
	Soldier	31		Also includes 1 <i>Lira of caposoldo</i>
Trans-alpine infantry	Colonel		150	
	Captain		60	
	Lieutenant		32	
	Ensign		24	
	Sargent		15	
	Scribe		10	
	Corporal		8	
	Drummer			
	Soldier	30		Additionally soldiers were also entitled to 2,46L of <i>caposoldo</i> (80 ducats for 200 men company)
Dragoons	Colonel		150	
	Captain		60	
	Lieutenant		32	
	Ensign		24	
Light cavalry - Carabini	Captain		25	
	Lieutenant		15	
	Ensign		15	
	soldier		8	
Heavy Cavalry – Corazze	Captain		80	
	Lieutenant		60	
	Ensign		40	
Cavalry	soldier		15	
Oltramarini	Colonel		500(A)	<i>Collonello della Nation Crovata</i> this is in an addition to the salary of the company commander
	Captain		25	
	Ensigng		10	
	Sargent		8	
	Soldier	24		This is the wage of the soldier serving on the armed vessel, in case of service on land, the wage is increased to 30 <i>lire</i> .

Unit type	Rank	Monthly (Lire)	Monthly (Ducats)	Comment
Cernide: Istra, terraferma	Captain	154		
	Ensign		10	
	Sargent	96		
	Corporal	72		
	Soldier	30		
	Sergente maggiore di Piazza			20/24

A – annual stipend

free lance (*lanzza spezzata*) – formerly a veteran cavalymen from disbanded companies yet by the 17th ct. these represented cavalry pays given to the persons of merit. The pay equalled to 12-15 *ducats*.

2. Commissions, contracts, patents

2.1. Contract of Hire of Regiment of Transalpine Infantry **Agreement between Battista Nani, Venetian Ambassador in France, and Colonel Sidney Atkins.**

The Colonel undertakes to levy a regiment of 1,200 experienced English soldiers for Venice and have them ready to embark in two months from the signing of this agreement. It shall consist of 8 companies of 150 or 160 including officers. The Colonel shall receive 150 ducats a month; a captain 60, a lieutenant 32, an ensign 24, two sergeants 15 each, 4 corporals 8 each, a secretary 10 and each man 30 lire. In the field they shall receive, a captain 100 ducats, a lieutenant 50, an ensign 30, a sergeant 15, a corporal 10, a secretary 15 and the soldiers the same as other troops. Pay shall begin from the day they land at Candia, which is their place d'armes. They shall then receive a whole month's pay. The republic will supply arms and deduct a lire a month from the pay for them from each soldier. When the war is over the republic may dispose of the regiment as it pleases, and in such case it shall be bound to maintain the Colonel's company for 5 years and two others for 3 years. During the war companies exceeding 30 men shall not be reformed. Those with less may be absorbed and their officers paid off. When paid off all the troops shall receive a month's pay as a gift. The Colonel shall obtain any leave that may be necessary for taking the men from England. He shall receive 5,686l. sterling for all costs to the place d'armes except the hire of ships, which the republic will pay, to wit 566l. on signing the agreement and the remainder at embarcation. The republic will provide and pay for the ships to take them from London to Candia. If the ships are not ready within the two months, the Colonel shall consign the troops to the republic's commissioner in London, who shall maintain them until the ships are ready. The Colonel shall find sureties. He shall have the benefit of any soldiers who die by the way. A commissioner shall be sent to London for this levy. If the levy is raised to 2,000 the same terms shall be extended.

Dated at Paris, the 10th January 1645. [M.V.]

(Signed) G. Battista Nani, Ambassador.

Sidney Atkins.

Taken from: Allen B. Hinds, ed. *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice (1643-1647), Volume 27*. (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1926) pp. 235-236.

2.2. Commission for the Levy of Company of Italian Infantry

A di 18 Maggio 1649.

Che sia data carica al Cap.o Manoli Gialina di Candia di ammassare nel termine de mesi tre prossimi una Compagnia de fanti cento, cinquanta Italiani forestrieri con el segenti paghe e conditioni.

Cap.p ducati quaranta, Alfiero ducati vinti, due sergenti, quando la compagnia sara sopra fanti cento e declinando da questo numero uno solo lire sessantatre, Caporali in ragion de quattro per cento lire quarantadoi, per cadauno, et alli soldati ducati cinque compreso il caposoldo. Haverà per Piazza d'Arme Segnato, dove arrolati fanti vinticinque corra loro la paga, et ad un Caporale, et gionta la Compagnia a fanti settantacinque effettivi s'inltre l'insegna corri la paga al Cap.o et à gl' Offitiali in ragion come sopra.

Gli erano dati ducati cinque di donativo per testa, cioè ducati due e mezzo arrolati, che saranno li soldati nella sud.a Piazza d'arme di segnago, e gl' altri due e mezzo condotti che saranno sopra il Lido con espressa dichiarazione, che per quelli soldati, che non conducesse al med.mo Lido, doverà restituire li donativi havuti in Piazza d'arme. Come sopra eccettuati pero quelli, che morissero, de quali doverà portare le necessarie giustificationi.

L'armi sarano date dal pub.co per scontarle à lire due al mese nella paga del soldato, overo in caso di sbando restituirle con la redintegratione del suo giusto alla ordinario.

(ASVe, Senato Mar, R-108, fol. 163v, Adi 18. Maggio 1649.)

2.3. Patent issued to Captain Francesco Marchi to form one company of Croati

Noi Lunardo Foscolo, Provveditore General in Dalmatia et Albania

Espedimo Voi Domino Fran.co Marchi ad ammassar una Compagnia di cinquanta fanti con le conditioni infrascitte in termine di mesi due.

Doveranno le genti esser di stato alieno non sudditi non putti, non vechi, o inhabili, ma tutto buoni soldati.

Descritti che saranno vinti fanti alemeno dovera a voi, et alli offitiali principiar la paga conforme l'ordinario.

Ai soldati principiaira dopo solam.te che saranno presentati, e rollati, ne sara corrisposta paga alcuna a quelli che fossero altrove rollati, e che non saranno presentati anco a Noi alla prima rassegna.

Prommetendo(?) Dalla prontezza vostra ogni fruttuoso impiego ad imitatione de vostri maggiori, che vi hanno lasciato [113r] essemplio, et attestati di merito. In quorm.

Zara 18 Febraro 1645. mv.

(DAZ, Atti di Provveditori Generali, Lunardo Foscolo vol. 14, f. 112v-113r.)

3. Composition of the Crews of the Venetian Light Galleys: Muster Held in February 1646

Ristretto delle gente di Galere

Laus Dio 1646 A di 22 Febraro Zara

Numero delle genti ritrovate nelle in fra scritte Galere alla Cerca fatta dall' Ill.(ustrissi)mo et Ecc.(ellentissi)mo sig.(no)re Lunardo Foscolo Prov.

(edito)re G(e)n(er)al in Dalmatia et Albania nell' in fra scritti tempi, con specificatione all' incontro delle genti che mancano nelle medessime.

	Galea N.H. Signore Antonio Michiel Gov.ernatore			Galea N.H. S.re Franc.o Querini Gov.r			Galea Bergamesca D.no Andrea Martinoni			Galea Brazzana D.no Zorzi Mladineo			Galea Arbesana D.no Marin Bizza			Galea Arbesana D.no Marin Bizza			Total Missing
	P	M	T	P	M	T	P	M	T	P	M	T	P	M	T	P	M	T	
Nobili	0	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	7
Scrivano	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	0	1	1	1		1	1
Capelano	1	1	2	0	1	1	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	2
Barbier	1		1	1		1	1		1	0	1	1	1		1	1		1	1
Comito	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	0
Paron	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	0
Pedotta	1		1	0	1	1	1		1	1		1	1		1	0	1	1	2
Sottocomito	1		1	0	1	1	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	1
Capo de Provisionati	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	0	1	1	1		1	1
Capi de Bombardieri	2		2	1	1	2	2		2	1	1	2	2		2	2		2	2
Scrivanello	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	0
Barberotto	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	0	1	1	1		1	1
Mistro de casa	1		1	1		1	1		1	0	1	1	1		1	1		1	1
Scalco	1		1	1		1	0	1	1	1		1	1		1	1		1	1
Cuogo	1		1	1		1	1		1	0	1	1	1		1	1		1	1

	Galea N.H. Signore Antonio Michiel Gov.ernatore		Galea N.H. S.re Franc.o Querini Gov.r			Galea Bergamesca D.no Andrea Martinoni			Galea Brazzana D.no Zorzi Mladineo			Galea Arbesana D.no Marin Bizza			Galea Arbesana D.no Marin Bizza			Total Missing	
Canaver	0	0	1		1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
(Due) Fanti del Piciol	2	2	2		2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	
(Quattro) sotto capi	4	4	3	1	4	4	4	1	3	4	3	1	4	4	4	4	4	5	
Marangon	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	
Marangonetto	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	
Calafatin	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Calafao	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	4	
Remer	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	
Remeretto	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1		1	0	1	1	1	1	1	3	
Fante del Comito	1	1	0	1	1	1		1	0	1	1	1		1	0	1	1	3	
Compagni	9	3	12	8	4	12	8	4	12	10	2	12	10	2	12	12		12	15
Scapoli	36	12	48	28	20	48	28	20	48	36	12	48	43	5	48	32	16	48	85
Galeotti	161		161	137	63	200	121	79	200	162	38	200	130	70	200	172	28	200	278
Della visentinain Deppo	40		40	0		0	0		0		0	0	0		0	0		0	0
Agurin	1		1	0		0	0		0		0	0		0	0	0		0	0
Condenati	5		5	0		0	0		0		0	0		0	0	0		0	0
	280	18	293	192	99	192	180	111	291	226	65	291	207	84	291	244	47	291	

Legend: P – present at muster, M – missing at muster, T – total number (P+M)
(ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 216 Zara, 11. Marzo 1647)

4. Money

4.1. Money of account:

1 ducat = 6 lire and 4 soldi

1 lira = 20 soldi

4.2. Exchange Rates in Dalmatia: Corso di Provincia

Table 1. Exchange rates in Dalmatia (1645 – 1669)

Period	Currency	Course Venice	Course Dalmatia	Diff. %	Sources
Entire duration of war	Real	8:0	10:0	25	PTM-467-470 Compartita delli ducati m/50 (A di 9 Sep. 1648); PTM-470-764 Conto in ristretto di Denaro, 1650 20 Novembre; PTM-500-116;
1650. November (up to)	Scudo (d'argento)	9:6	11:0	18,28	PTM-467-470 Compartita delli ducati m/50 (A di 9 Sep. 1648); PTM-470-755 Nota del dannaro 1648-set.re 1650;
	Doppia (d'oro)	28:0	33:0	17,86	b.470-755 Nota del dannaro 1648-set.re 1650
	Zecchino (d'oro)	16:0	20:0	25	b.470-755 Nota del dannaro 1648-set.re 1650
1651. May	Doppia (d'oro)	28:0	34:10	23,21	b.471-33 Ristretto del Conto
	Ongar	15:10	19:10	25,81	b. 471-38;
1653. January	Scudo (d'argento)	9:6	11:10	23,66	b.475-97 Conto del entrata, Gennaio - Novembre 1653.
	Doppia (d'oro)	28:0	34:10	23,21	b.475-97 Conto del entrata, Gennaio - Novembre 1653.
	Ongar	15:10	19:10	25,81	b.475-97 Conto del entrata, Gennaio - Novembre 1653.
1654. May	Zecchino (d'oro)	16:0	21:10	34,38	b.475-129 Maggio 1654;
1667. October	Zecchino (d'oro)	16:0	22	37,5	b.498-24; Ristretto del denaro; b. 501-191-Tratta del Giorlan Corrente
1669. June	Zecchino (d'oro)	16:0	25		b. 501-199; This is the value of Zecchino in Kotor.

4.3. Shipments and Arrivals of Money in Dalmatia (1646-1669)

The table below contains data concerning all of the major shipments of money to Dalmatia. More precisely, to the treasury of governor-general, up to 1651 to the treasury of the governor-general of cavalry and on several occasions to the *camera fiscale* of Kotor, when money is sent directly to this outpost. Additionally, it also records transport of majority of smaller shipments of money intended for some special purposes, for example: specific fortification works or for the transport of troops or ships on Levant. The data for this table is taken from three collections of sources. In the first place from the two *Senato* series "Senato Rettori," and "Senato Mar," where assignments (*deliberationi*) of funds were recorded (also with occasional note on the actual transport of funds). These information are combined with the data from *Dispacci* of the Governor-Generals, from the series: "*Senato, Dispacci, Provveditori da Terra e da Mar,*" which usually records the arrivals of money in Dalmatia. When not indicated otherwise the date given is the date of arrival of the money in the province. All amounts in the table below are given in Ducats (money of account). When sources only mention the amount in actual specie (for example *Scudi, Cechini, Reali* etc.) the amount has been converted into *ducats* using the exchange rates for that currency in Venice, not that of province.

Table 2. Shipments of specie to Dalmatia during the period 1646, March – 1669. November.

Date	Ducats	Designation	Transport	Sources
Lunardo Foscolo (1646. - 1651. February)				
1646. March	50.000	35,000 for Cassa di Generalato, 15000 for Kotor	Capitano General da Mar	SRR-17. f. 52r;
1646. May	60.000	Of these 15,000 for Provveditore Generale della Cavalleria	Galley Contarini	SRR-17, f. 85r, 90r, 118r
1646. July	50.000	Of these 8,000 for Provveditore Generale della Cavalleria	Galley Bergamesca	SRR-17, f. 155r, 162r
1646. September	50.000	Of these 16,000 for Provveditore Generale della Cavalleria	Galley Contarini	SRR-17, f. 172v, 199r, 214v, 217r
1646. October	25.000		Galley Minota	SRR-17, f. 234v
1646. December	58.000	Of these: 8,000 <i>ducats</i> were for Kotor, 10,000 for fortifications, 10,000 for Cavalry and 10,000 for galleys	Galley Minota	SRR-17, f. 280v, 288r, 298v; SMR-104, f. 315v;
Year total:	293.000			

Date	Ducats	Designation	Transport	Sources
1647. March	50.000	Of these 15,000 for cavalry	Galley Zena	SRR-17, f. f. 280v, 288r, 298v, 337v; PTM-464-224;
1647. May	60.000	Of these 15,000 for cavalry, and 10,000 for Kotor.	Mattheo Giustiniani Capitano Grande in Candia.	PTM-464-246; SRR-18, f.1r, 57r, 75r, 76v;
1647. July	110.000	Of these 30,000 for cavalry, 10,000 for Kotor	Galleys: Dona and Veronese, Minota	PTM-464-270; PTM-464-286-Dispensa degli d.ti 70m; SRR-18, f. 96r, 123R, 131v-132r, 134v;
1647. September	100.000	Of these 20,000 for cavalry, 15,000 for Kotor and 15,000 for galleys	Conte e Capitano of Šibenik Zorzi	SRR-18, f. 198r, 199r; SRR-19, f. 39v, 40v; PTM-465-323;
1647. October	50.000	5,000 <i>ducats</i> for Šibenik fortifications and 10,000 for cavalry	Commissario Foscarini	SRR-19, f. 54r, 63v; PTM-465-342;
Year Total:	370.000			
1648. March (1)	103.225	Of these, 15,000 <i>Reals</i> are for cavalry, 7,000 for Kotor and 8,000 <i>Real's</i> for galleys	Galley Dotta	SRR-19, f. 92v, 97v, 141r, 167r, 176v, 179r, 195r; PTM-466-389;
1648. April	68.000	8,000 <i>ducats</i> for fortifications of Šibenik and restoration of the money taken from town's "monte di pieta."	Galley Contarini	SRR-20, f. 74r; PTM-466-403
1648. April	6.000	For the three galleys designated for passage to Levant	Galley Vidman	SRR-20, f. 116r-v
1648. July	50.000	Of these 15,000 <i>ducats</i> were for the cavalry	Galley Gozi	SRR-20, f. 132v, 146r; PTM-466-434;
1648. September	50.000	For <i>Commissario</i> Molino	Galley Ottobona	SRR-20, f. 193r-v, 204v; PTM-467-470- Compartita delli ducati m/50;
1648. November	137.516	Of these 30k for cavalry and 10k for Kotor, 10,000 for 400 soldiers destined for the Crete and 17,516 <i>ducats</i> for the Swiss regiment	Galleys Querini and Valiero	SRR-21, f. 80v, 93r-v, 121r, 133v; PTM-469-656-Nota del denaro:
Year Total:	414.741			
1649. February (2)	16.500	Pay for the Swiss regiment		SRR-21, f. 170v, 205r; PTM-470-764;
1649. March (3)	50.000	Of these 10,000 <i>Reali</i> is for the cavalry and 5,000 for Kotor.	Galley Gozzi	SRR-21, f. 169v, 170v, f. 188r, 193v, 205r; SRR-22, f. 48r, 54v; PTM-468-553; PTM-469-656-Nota del denaro:
1649. April	16.500	Pay for the Swiss regiment	Ship of the Patron Andrea Nalovich	PTM-470-764; PTM-469-656-Nota del denaro:

Date	Ducats	Designation	Transport	Sources
1649. June	110.000	Of those 30,000 for the Swiss regiment, 12,000 for Cavalry, 10,000 for galleys and 10,000 for Kotor.	Galley Corner	SRR-22, f. 76r-v, 78r, 93v-94r, 105v; PTM-468-582; PTM-470-764;
1649. September	90.000	Of those 40,000 <i>ducats</i> were for the Swiss, 12,000 for cavalry, 2,000 for the fortifications of Klis	Galleys Zenobia	SRR-22, f. 152r, 155r, 192v, 211r, SRR-23, f. 36r-v, 38v.; PTM-468-617; PTM-470-764;PTM-469-656-Nota del denaro:
Year Total:	283.000			
1650. April	95.000	Of these: 20,000 <i>ducats</i> were for cavalry, further 25,000 for the 600 Italian and trans-alpine troops, 3 galleys and 8 <i>barche armate</i> , with 400 <i>oltramarini</i> , destined for transport to the Levant	Comissario Corner	SRR-23, f. 161r-v; SRR-24, f. 60v-61r; PTM-470-696;
1650. September	50.000	Of these 10,000 <i>ducats</i> for cavalry	Galley Vituri	SRR-24,125v, 154v, 167r; PTM-.470-755-Nota del dannaro; PTM-470-746;
1650. November	30.000	For the settlement of the debt of the Swiss regiment before its release fro service.	Galley Corner	SRR-24, f.192v-193r, 203v;
Year Total:	175.000			
Foscolo's mandate total:			1.495741	
Girolamo Foscarini (1651. February - 1653. January)				
1651. February	80.000	Arrival of the new governor-general Girolamo Foscarini		PTM-471-33-Ristretto del dennaro;
1651. June	52.000	Of these 15,000 ducats are for cavalry and 2,000 for galleys	Galley Arbessana	SRR-25, f. 84v, 92v; PTM-471-38;
1651. August	5.000	For Kotor		SRR-25, f. 135v;
1651. September	10.000	For cavalry	Barcha armata	SRR-25, fols. 143v, 158r, 163v, 164v; PTM-472-63;
Year Total:	147.000			
1652. January	10.000	Of these 6,000 <i>ducats</i> are for galleys and 4,000 for purchase of Ottoman prisoners for service as <i>gallioti</i> in the navy	barche armate	SRR-25, f. 165r, 187r; PTM-472-81;
1652. February	30.000		Galley Arbessana	SRR-25, f. 218v; PTM-472-88;
1652. June	51.000	Of these: 1,000 <i>ducats</i> for fortifications of Klis, 10,000 for galleys and troops destined for transport in Levant	Galley of the General-Captain of the Sea	SRR-26, f. 59r, 62r, 80r, 89v; PTM-472-107;

Date	Ducats	Designation	Transport	Sources
1652. September	32.100	Of these 2,100 ducats were for the armed vessels and galleys serving at bay of Kotor	Galley Michiella	SRR-26, f. 123r, 124r, 132r, 135r, 150v; PTM-473-128;
1652. October	8.000	For three galleys and one Regiment destined for transfer to the Levant		SRR-26, f. 165r, 185v; PTM-473-139;
1652. October	4.000	For Kotor	Post service <i>Caichio</i>	SRR-26, f. 183v
Year Total:	135.100			
Foscarini' mandate total:			267.100	
Lorenzo Dolfìn (1653. January – 1654.)				
1653. January	100.000	Arrival of the new governor-general in the province		PTM-475-97-Conto del entrata ;
1653. February	4.000	For the salaries of the navy serving in the province	Galleys Moceniga and Brazzana	SRR-26, f. 241r;
1653. March	4.000	For the purchase of the horses for the cavalry		SRR-26, f. 248r, SRR-27, f. 45r;
1653. May	35.000	Of these 5,000 <i>ducats</i> are for the fortification works	Galley Trona	SRR-27, f. 55r, 67r; PTM-475-97-Conto del entrata; PTM-474-43;
1653. July	2000	For Kotor		SRR-27, f. 122;
1653. August	30675	Of these 4000 <i>ducats</i> are for Kotor, and 675 destined for the restoration of <i>fontico</i> of Budva	Galley Malpiera	SRR-27, f. 122r, 132r; PTM-475-97-Conto del entrata ;
1653. November	30.500	Of these 4,000 <i>ducats</i> were for two galleys destined to Levant, and 1,500 for settlement of the part of the debt of galley Balbi.	Galley Balbi	SRR-26, f. 168r-v; 187v-188r; PTM-475-97-Conto del entrata;
Year total:	206.175			
1654. February	25.000		Galley Balbi	SRR-27, f. 230r;PTM-475-108;
1654. May	25.000		Galley Loredana	SRR-28, f. 59v; PTM-475-129;
1654. July	24.000	Of these: 3,000 <i>ducats</i> are for Kotor and 1,000 for galleys	Galley Trona	SRR-28, f. 145v, 150r; PTM-476-149;
1654. September	20.000		Galley Loredana	PTM-476-165-Conto in ristretto;
1654. December	10000	For the settlement of Governor-general's debts before his departure	Post service <i>Caichio</i>	SRR-28, f. 262r, 269v-270r; PTM-476-177; PTM-476-180;
Year total:	104.000			
Dolfìn' mandate total:			309,675	

Date	Ducats	Designation	Transport	Sources
Gio. Antonio Zen (1655. January – 1656. June)				
1655. January	50.000	Arrival of the new governor-general Antonio Zen		PTM-477-5; PTM-478-95-Foglio di denaro spedito in Provincia;
1655. April	5.000	For operation of transfer of four companies to the Levant	Merchantmen called "Nave Pace"	PTM-478-95-Foglio di denaro spedito in Provincia;
1655. May	24.000	4,000 <i>ducats</i> for Kotor	Galley Tron	PTM-478-95-Foglio di denaro spedito in Provincia;
1655. June	26.000		Galley Loredana	PTM-478-95-Foglio di denaro spedito in Provincia;
1655. September	32.000	Of these 4,000 <i>ducats</i> for Kotor and 3,000 for galleys serving in the Adriatic	Galley Loredana	PTM-478-88; PTM-478-95-Foglio di denaro spedito in Provincia;
	9.000	Sent by <i>Camera dell'Armamento</i> in Venice on various occasions		PTM-478-95-Foglio di denaro spedito in Provincia;
Year Total:	146.000			
1656. January	20.000		Galley Tron	PTM-478-95-Foglio di denaro spedito in Provincia;
1656. March	6.000		Galley Loredana	PTM-479-102;
1656. May	20.000	Of these 4,000 <i>ducats</i> are for Kotor	Provveditore straordinario Antonio Bernardo	PTM-479-108;
Zen's mandate total:			197,000	
Antonio Bernardo (1656. July – 1660.)				
1656. July	30.000	Of these 5,000 <i>ducats</i> are for the covering of the debts of the previous governor-general Zen and 3,000 for Kotor.	Galley Moceniga	PTM-479-119; PTM-480-25;
1656. September	6.000		Post service Caichio	PTM-480-42;
1656. November	14.000		Galley Caotorta	PTM-480-63; PTM-480-68;
Year total:	96.000			
1657. February	20.000	Of these 4,000 <i>ducats</i> were for Kotor and 1,000 extraordinary governor of the gulf.	Galley Arbessana	PTM-480-82;

Date	Ducats	Designation	Transport	Sources
1657. April (4)	20.000		Galley Caotorta	PTM-481-92;
1657. May	20000	Of these 10,000 <i>ducats</i> were for Kotor	Galley Arbessana	PTM-481-100;
1657. July	25.000	Of these 4,000 <i>ducats</i> were for Kotor and 1,000 extraordinary governor of the gulf.	prov. estr. Filippo Boldu	PTM-481-107;
1657. August (5)	20.000		Galley of Sopracomito da Ca da Mezzo	PTM-481-121; PTM- 482-142;
Year total:	105.000			
1658. January	20.000		Galley Dandola	PTM-482-154;
1658. March (6)	20.000	Of these 2,000 are for 4 galleys destined for transfer on the Levant	Galley of Sopracomito da Ca da Mezzo	PTM-483-165;
1658. April	20.000		Galley Moceniga	SRR-33, f. 71v, 73v; PTM-483-177;
1658. May	6.000	Arrival of the new extraordinary governor of Kotor Filippo Boldu with money, war material, food and provisions	Galley Vidmana	SRR-33, f. 72v, 76r; PTM-483-179;
1658. June	22.000	Of these 2,000 ducats are for the community of Perast	Galley Labia	SRR-33, f. 81v, 98v-100r; PTM-483-186;
1658. July	50.000	Of these 4040 <i>Cecchini</i> (c.a 11,000 <i>ducats</i>) are for the Swiss regiment	Galley Zane	SRR-33, f. 81v, 133r-v, 144v-145r; PTM-483-195, PTM-483-200;
1658. September	33000	11,000 for the pay of the Swiss Regiment	Galley Manina	SRR-33, f. 168r, 183r, f. 212v;PTM-483-211;
1658. October	40.000	Of these 16,000 ducats are for the Swiss regiment, and 1,000 <i>Cechini</i> for "Conti di Herzegovina"	Galley Brazzana	SRR-33, f. 235v; PTM-484-217;
Year total:	211.000			
1659. February	30.000	Of these 13,000 for the Swiss regiment, and 4,000 for transfer of two galleys to Levant	Galley Barbariga	PTM-484-229;PTM-485-252;
1659. March	40.000	Of this amount two full monthly salaries are to be payed to 1,500 troops destined for transfer on the Levant	Galley Manina	SRR-33, f. 290r, 301r, 306v; SRR-34, f. 29r-30r; PTM-485-237; PTM-485-252;
1659. March	11.000	1,000 is for the <i>Governator in Golfo Barbaro</i> , and the rest is for the operation of transport 1,500 men to Levant.	Galley Labia	SRR-34, f. 56r-v;PTM-485-252;
1659. June	30.000		Galley Morosina	SRR-34, f. 108; PTM-485-255;PTM-

Date	Ducats	Designation	Transport	Sources
1659. October	40500	Of these 10,000 <i>ducats</i> is for the departure of the Swiss regiment from Dalmatia, 1,500 for the General Gill d'Has	Galley Brazzana	486-266; SRR-34, f. 246r, 250v;PTM-486-267;
Year total:	151.500			
1660. January (7)	7.750		Galley Barbariga	SRR-34, f. 347v; PTM-486-279;
1660. February	20.000		Galley Morosina	SRR-34, f. 391r; PTM-486-283; PTM-486-285;
Bernardo's mandate total:			515.000	
Andrea Corner (1660. March – 1662. May)				
1660. March	50.000	Arrival of the Governor-General Andrea Cornaro		PTM-487-1;
1660. June	22000	Of these 2,000 <i>ducats</i> were for the stipend of Don Innocentio Conti		SRR-35, f. 135v; PTM-487-23;
1660. July	15000	Arrival of the Commisario Michiel Malpiero,	Galley Barbariga	SRR-35, f. 157r; PTM-487-36;
1660. September	32000	Of these 2,000 <i>ducats</i> are destined for Kotor.	Galley Arbessana	SRR-35, f. 204v, f. 245r, f. 260r-v; PTM-487-46;
1660. November	30000	For the transfer of 2 Savoy regiments and 2 galleys to the Levant		SRR-35, f. 291v, 342v, 334v-335r; PTM-487-55, PTM-487-56;
1660. December	20.000		Galley Brazzana	SRR-35, f. 355v; PTM-487-58;
Year total:	196.750			
1661. April	20.000		Galley Moresina	SRR-35. f. 412r, 416v-417r;PTM-488-69;
1661. June	25.000		Galley Arbessana	PTM-488-78;
1661. July	18.800		Galley Magna	PTM-488-83;
1661. September	20.000		Galley Magna	PTM-488-92;
1661. November	38.000	Of these 10,000 <i>ducats</i> is for the transfer of 500 troops to Levant, and 3000 for galleys serving in the Adriatic.	Galley Minia	SRR-36, f. 299v-300r, 301v; PTM-488-102;
Year total:	121.800			
1662. March	25.000		Galley Brazzana	SRR-36, f. 363v, 381v; PTM-118;
Corner's mandate total:			315,800	

Date	Ducats	Designation	Transport	Sources
Girolamo Contarini (1662. May – 1664. December)				
1662. May	60.000	Arrival of the governor-general Girolamo Contarini		SRR-36, f. 373v; PTM-489-2;
1662. October	20.000		Galley Donata	PTM-489-26; PTM-489-31;
Year total:	105.000			
1663. January	25.000		Galley Demezzo	PTM-489-48;
1663. March	36.000	Of these 3,000 are for fortifications, 2,000 for <i>condotta od barone di Spaar</i> , and 11,000 for the operation of attack on Herceg-Novigrad	Galley Brazzana, Galley Pollani	PTM-490-60; PTM-490-62;
1663. May	25.000	C.a 1500 <i>ducats</i> for Kotor	Galley Polani	PTM-490-72;
1663. July	30.000		Galley Benzona	PTM-490-86;
1663. September	25000		Galley Polani	PTM-491-101;
Year Total	141.000			
1664. January	30000		Galley Brazzana	PTM-491-115; PTM-491-120; PTM-491-121;
1664. March	20.000		Galley Polani	PTM-492-134;
1664. April	25.000		Galley Benzon	PTM-492-142;
1664. July	10.000		Galleotta of Colonel Cernizza	PTM-492-160;
1664. August	10.000		Galley Riva	PTM-492-173-Ristretto;
1664. September	10.000		Galley Lesegnama	PTM-492-182;
1664. October	25.000	Of these 2,000 <i>ducats</i> were for the navy (4 galleys).	Galley Michiela	PTM-492-186;
Year Total:	130.000			
Contarini's mandate total:			351,000	
Cattarino Corner (1664. December – 1667. September)				
1665. January	85000	Arrival of the new governor-general Cattarino Corner, of these 14,000 <i>ducats</i> are for fortification works (10,000 for Split, 1,000 for Kotor and 3,000 for Šibenik)		PTM-493-2; PTM-495-116;
1665. June	27.600	Of these 2,000 <i>ducats</i> were for ransom of Ottoman prisoners for	Galley Magna	PTM-494-65;

Date	Ducats	Designation	Transport	Sources
		galley service and 600 for wages of galley Benzon.		
1665. August	53000	Of these 28,000 <i>ducats</i> is for the transfer of 2,000 men on Levant	Galley Malipiero	PTM-494-71; PTM-494-81;
1665. August	12000	For transfer of additional 1,000 men to Levant	barca armata	PTM-494-91;
1665. October	25.000		Galley Malipiero	PTM-494-98;
Year Total:	202.600			
1666. January	25.000		Galley Magno	PTM-495-117;
1666. April (8)	25.000		Galley Lesignana	PTM-495-141;
1666. June	4.000	For the transfer of 400 men to the Levant		PTM-496-161;PTM-496-166;
1666. July (9)	20,000	Of these 3,000 were for Split fortifications.	Galley Luppi	PTM-496-154;
1666. September	20.000			PTM-496-192;
1666. October	0	Arrival of the new extraordinary governor of Kotor Loredano		PTM-496-190;
1666. December	20000		Galley Brazzana	PTM-496-200;
Year total:	94.020			
1667. April	30.000		Galley Vendramin	PTM-497-211;SRR-42-80v, 95v, 106v;
1667. May (10)	5.500	For repair works in Kotor after the earthquake	Fellucca	PTM-497-218;
1667. June (11)	30.600	Of these 600 ducats were for the Governor of Gulf Vendramin.	Galley Contarini	PTM-497-229; SRR-42-159v;
1667. August (12)	20.000	Of these ??? for transfer of 500 men to Levant.		PTM-497-242;
Corner's mandate total:			402,700	
Antonio Priuli (1668. October – 1669. December)				
1667. October	45.500	Arrival of new governor-general Antonio Priuli, of these 5,000 ducats are for the payments of the debts of previous governor-general and 500 are for the extraordinary governor of the Gulf.		PTM-498-24-Ristretto del denaro
Year Total:	131.600			
1668. February	25.000	Arrival of the governor in province Corner, of these 500 ducats are	Galley Querini	PTM-498-37; PTM-498-39-Ristretto

Date	Ducats	Designation	Transport	Sources
		for the extraordinary governor of the Gulf.		del denaro
1668. April	29.000	Of these 5,000 ducats were for the payback of <i>imprestido</i> to Zadar merchant Horatio Lantana and further 4,000 for the operation of transfer of 500 men to Crete.	Galley Contarini	PTM-499-64; PTM-499-65-Ristreto del Dinaro
1668. August	16.000		Galley Arbessana	PTM-500-104;
1668. September	15.220	Of these 5,000 were for the transfer of 300 men to Crete	Galley Giustiniana	PTM-500-116; PTM-500-117;
1668. October	12.781	Of these 3,000 ducats are for the transfer of 200 men to Crete	Two galeotte	PTM-500-135;
1668. December	10.000	Of these 2,000 were destined for works on Kotor fortifications	Caicchio	PTM-501-155;
Year total:	108.001			
1669. February	12.000	Of this sum 2,000 ducats were for Kotor and new extraordinary governor Lorenzo Bernardo.	Galley Querini	PTM-501-172; PTM-501-174;
1669. March	20000		Galley Vizzamano	PTM-501-179;
1669. May	4.000	For transfer of 200 men and two galleys to Levant.	Galleotta of Captain Bubich	PTM-501-193;
1669. June	15.000		Galley Brazzana	PTM-501-199;
1669. June	7.000	For transfer of 500 Italian infantry and two galleys to Crete.	Caicchio	PTM-501-204;
1669. July (13)	3.225	For Kotor and purchase of Ottoman prisoners from Haiducs for service on galleys.	Caicchio	PTM-501-213;
1669. August	20000		Galley Arbessana	PTM-501-217;
1669. October	9.000		Caicchio	PTM-501-230
Year Total:	90.225			
			Antonio's Priuli mandate:	243.726

(1) Money sent consisted of 80,000 *Reali*, which is the equivalent of c.a 103,225 *ducats*.

(2) Payment was made to the Colonel of the Swiss Regiment in Venice, and actual currency used was 11,000 *Scudi* (equivalent of 16,500 *ducats*)

(3) Entire amount is sent as 40,000 *Reali*, equivalent of ca. 50,000 *ducats*.

(4) Estimate based on previous and next shipments.

- (5) Estimate: based on the statement in letter 482-142, dated 25th November 1657, that in the last six month little more than 40,000 *ducats* arrived in Dalmatia (which will put this shipment to ca. 20,000 *ducats*).
- (6) Estimate based on previous and next shipments.
- (7) Provision of money that arrived consisted of 3,000 *Zecchini*, equivalent of c.a 7,750 *ducats*
- (8) Estimate based on previous and next shipments
- (9) Estimate based on previous and next shipments
- (10) Money sent was 2,000 *Zecchini*, equivalent of 5,500 *ducats*.
- (11) Estimate based on PTM-497-210, in which governor-general states that it is necessary to spend 1,000 *Zecchini* each *terzo*, and PTM-497-234, where he states that with money arrived in June he can supply *terzi*, for August 1667, which would mean that the money arrived in June was enough to supply for 9 *terzi*, giving a total of 9,000 *Zecchini*, or 27,000 *ducats*.
- (12) Estimate based on previous and next shipments.
- (13) Money arrived as 2,500 *Reali*, c.a 3,225 *ducats*.

4.4. Example of the Account of Deficit

- Laus Deo 1650 A di 16 Settembre Zara -

Nota del Dannaro spedito dall' Offi. sopra le Camere in Venetia da 16 Sett.re 1649 con l'Il.mo Sig.ri Gov.ri delle Infra scritte Galee sotil, come sotto et capitato in questa Città per li pagamenti delle Millitie servano in Dalmatia fino il suddetto giorno che e anno uno cioè.

1649, Adi 16 Sett(embre) col Ill.mo sig.(or)r Lunardo Venier V.(ice) Gov.(ernato)r di Galea sotil D(uca).ti 38000 nelle in fra scritte valute

Cechini d'oro _____	n.o 6250 _____	a L 16 _____	L 100000 -
Scudi d'argento _____	n.o 7500 _____	a L 9:6 _____	L 69750 -
Doppie d'oro _____	n.o 7500 _____	a L 28 _____	L 65850 -
			Summa: L 235600 -

per l'utile che si conseguire nelle suddette valute conferma a quello corrono in Dalmatia _____ L 4958: 10 -

Con il sopraddetto per le militie Sguizzere _____ D(uca)ti 40,000 nelle infra scritte valute:

Scudi d'argento _____	n.o 59860 _____	a L 9:6 _____	L 55673:19 -
Doppie d'oro _____	n.o 6868 $\frac{3}{4}$ p.ri 4 _____	a L 28 _____	L 192325:16 -
			Summa: L 248000 -

per l'utile che si conseguire nelle suddette valute come di sopra _____ L 44510: 16 -

1650, Adi 13 Aprile col Ecc.mo sig.r Nicolo Corner Commesario in Provintia ___ D.ti 75000 nelle infra scritte valute:

Scudi d'argento _____	n.o 50000 _____	a L 9:6 _____	L 465000 -
			per l'utile che si conseguire nelle sudette valute come di sopra _____ L 85000 -

1650, Adi 11 Settembre col Ill.(ustrissi)mo sig.(no)r Giacomo Vitturi V(ice). Gov.(ernato)r di Galea Coreggia ___ D(uca)ti 40000 nelle infra scritte valute:

Scudi d'argento _____	n.o 19333 L 3:2 _____	a L 9:6 _____	L 179800 -
Doppie d'oro _____	n.o 2435 L 20 _____	a L 28 _____	L 68200 -
			Summa: L 248000 -

per l'utile che si conseguire nelle sudette valute come di sopra _____ L 45044:4 -

	Summa: D(uca)ti	193000 -
l'utile sudetto fa: _____	D(uca)ti	36141 -

Summa tutto il dannaro capitato da Venetia in anno uno compreso l'utile et D(uca)ti m/25 esborsati alle militie Italiane, Oltramontane, Croate, et Albanesei spedite nel regno di Candia il mese di Lugnio passato: _____ D(uca)ti 229141 -

l'importo delli Paggamenti a Militie et altri in ragg. de D.ti m/40 al mese per mesi dodeci ponendo per quelle che si attrovano a presente con tretto col li mesi passati le militie ascendevano a maggior numero essendo al presente diminuite per la regulatione de Compagne et espeditioni nel regni di Candia importarebbe: _____ D(uca)ti 480000 -

Importarebbe li pagamenti per anno:	_____	D.(uca)ti 480000 -
Inviati:	_____	D.(uca)ti 228141 -
Mandati di meno:	_____	D.(uca)ti 250859 -

(ASVe. Senato, Dispacci, PTM. b.470. num. 755. Zara, 17 Ottobre 1650, Attachment to the letter)

4.5. Prices of weapons, munition, clothing, provisions

Category	Item	Date	Price (lire)	Quantity	Source
Weapons	Musket	1648, October	14	piece	DAZ-APG v.16, f. 213
	Musket	1649, March	22:8	piece	DAZ-APG v.16, f. 217
	Musket	1649, July	24	piece	PTM-468-580
	Carabin	1649, July	60	pice	PTM-468-580
	Pike	1649, July	8	pice	PTM-468-580
	Sword	1649, July	12	pice	PTM-468-580
	Brandistock	1649, July	6	pice	PTM-468-580
	Halberd	1649, July	12	pice	PTM-468-580
Clothing	Schiavine	1649, July	12	pice	PTM-468-580
	Gabani	1649, July	10	pice	PTM-468-580

5. *Venetian weight, length and volume measures*

5.1. Length and weight measures

Unit: 1 piede = 0,347735 meters, 1 passo = 5 piedi = 1,738675 meters

1 Lira or Libbra grossa = 476,99872 g. (0,47699872 kg)

1 Lira or Libbra sottile = 301,230 g

5.2. Volume, capacity measures

1 Staro Veneziano = 83,317 liters / 82,75 liters (measure used for grain, wheat, etc.)

1 Staro Veneziano = 133 libbra grossa = 63,44 Kg (in case of wheat)

1 Moggio/Mozzo = 4 stara (c.a 333,26 liters / 331 liters)

1 Mastelli = 75,1170 liters

1 Botta = 10 Masteli = 751,170 liters

1 Barilla = 6/7 Masteli = 64,386 liters

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Abbreviations used:

ASVe	Archivio di Stato di Venezia
ASVe, PTM	Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Senato, Dispacci, Provveditori da Terra e da Mar
CCX	Capi del Consiglio di Dieci
DAZ	Državni arhiv u Zadru (State Archive in Zadar)
HAZU	Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti (Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts)
HHSStA	Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv
JAZU	Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti (Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts)
SANU	Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti (Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts)
b.	Busta
R	Registro

Archives and Libraries

Archivio di Stato di Venezia

Senato Mar

Senato Rettori

Senato, Dispacci, Provveditori da Terra e da Mar

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