Jan Hupkens

Supervisor Professor Fetzer

US English

APA Style

Master Thesis

31st of May, 2012

The New Radical Right in the Western Political Landscape

The case of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom

By

Jan Hupkens

Submitted to

Central European University

Department of International Relations and European Studies

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Supervisor: Professor Thomas Fetzer

Word Count: 15.165

Budapest, Hungary,

2012

Contents

Acronyms

Acronym	Original Name	English Name
PVV	Partij voor de Vrijheid	Freedom Party
CD	Centrum-Democraten	Centre-Democrats
CP	Centrumpartij	Centre-Party
PVDA	Partij van de Arbeid	Dutch Labour Party
CDA	Christen-Democratisch Appel	Christian Democrats
VVD	Volkspartij van Vrijheid en Democratie	Liberals
GL	GroenLinks	Green-Party
LPF	Lijst Pim Fortuyn	Party Pim Fortuyn
LN	Leefbaar Nederland	Liveable Netherlands
SP	Socialistische Party	Socialist Party
NVU	Nederlandse Volks Unie	Dutch People's Union
D66	Democraten66	Democrats
UKIP	UK Independence Party	UK Ind. Party
EDL	English Defence League	English Def. League
BNP	British National Party	British Nat. Party
BNF	British National Front	British Nat. Front

Abstract

This research will outline the recent rise of the New Radical Right, here abbreviated as the NRR, on the Western European political scene through a two-country comparison of The Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Whereas in the United Kingdom NRR electoral success has rarely exceeded the margin of 0.5 %[1] resulting in no national parliamentary representation, The Netherlands has seen a sharp increase in NRR success, where since the early 2000's parties such as the LPF have gained over 17% of the votes in 2002 and the PVV managing to obtain 15.5% in the elections of 2010.[2]

This research will argue that as a result of different political system, contradicting a two and multi-party system, the adaptability of the parties to the wider political spectrum and their position and distance towards the traditional radical right, alongside the skillful incorporation of charismatic leadership, an explanation can be provided for the relative discrepancy between NRR electoral support in both countries.

Focusing on the parties themselves in direct relation to their political performance, a number of theories will be tested and de-constructed, including amongst others the framework of demand-supply side politics put forward by Jackman and Volpert, explaining the relation between the effects of globalization and NRR support, coalition theory by Robert Ericson, tracing the levels of political space for the NRR in different electoral systems and charisma theory developed by Max Weber, exemplifying the importance of charismatic leadership in NRR party formation and success. The addition of this research to the academia dealing with the Radical Right lies in the particular comparison between two countries sharing many socio-economic and historical similarities, allowing for a potential investigation of how institutional factors, socio-economic trajectories and personal traits shape the success of the NRR.

---

[1] Hansen, 2000. 7
[2] Dutch Parliament Online 2012

1. Introduction

> I don't want any more Muslims in the Netherlands, I would rather like to see less of them, so I want to close the borders for migrants from Muslim countries. Moreover, I want to encourage Muslims to leave the Netherlands voluntarily. The demographic trend should be such that the chances are small that again two of them will be part of the Cabinet. There is too much Islam in the Netherlands right now.[3]

Recent electoral success of political factions referred to as the 'new radical right', 'far right' or 'extreme right' with on top of their political agenda the opposition to what they call the 'Islamization' of Europe, the staunch resentment against immigration, renewed emphasis on the national cultural identity and the portrayal of the traditional political landscape as 'old politics', a relic that has lost touch with the electorate, has greatly influenced the contemporary European political debate. Parties such as the Dutch Freedom Party, the Flemish Block in Belgium, the Austrian Freedom Party and the Danish People's Party have all gained relative political success over the past decade with their staunch rhetoric based on the presumption that the spread of Islam and its manifestations should be limited, incorporating the previously mentioned wider dis-satisfaction with general patterns of immigration and immigrant's integration.[4]

In this research framework the term 'new radical right' abbreviated as NRR will be used as the main term of reference. Based on the ample amount of differences and party-manifestations the NRR has shown, the heterogeneity of these movements marks the difficulty to encompass the NRR in a single, solid definition. However, in this research, two complementary definitions outlined by George Betz and Werner Bauer will be followed. According to Betz the NRR can be classified as: ' parties that radically oppose the current cultural and socio-political system in the Western democracies, but without directly attacking its foundations. They reject individual and social equality and emphasize cultural or ethnic homogeneity in society, with a preference for 'our own people' over 'foreigners'; that is, for the most part, immigrants. [5] Bauer elaborates on the latter by adding the 'identity-politics' component where at the core of the NRR political discourse the concept of 'das Volk', the 'people' is positioned. In the center of the NRR discourse stands the average citizen, silenced and alienated from political participation by power-hungry establishment, manifested in the corrupted 'elite'. [6]

---

[3] Wilders, NRC Handelsblad, 2007
[4] Goodwin, 2012, 3
[5] Betz, 1993, 7
[6] Bauer, 2010, 5

This concept of 'the people' according to Bauer has become sub-divided in the juxtaposition between two elements: The opposition between the 'people' and the traditional political scene, here noted as the 'establishment' on the one hand, and the opposition between the 'people' and the 'other', i.e. the 'immigrants', 'Muslims' but also forces of globalization and supra-national institutions such as the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, that are perceived as encroaching on the self-determination of the 'people', on the other.[7]

The choice for the term 'new radical right' has been based on the fact that it is less value laden in contrast to other designations such as the 'extreme right', where: ' the term extremism is associated with the complete rejection of liberal democracy and anti-parliamentary and anti-constitutional goals, a term with negative connotations. The term radicalism and radical reflect a path of action, which may or may not be anti-democratic. '[8] The latter being a subtle, yet important difference in the category of classification as the majority of NRR parties analyzed in this research framework in fact operate within the limits of the modern-day democratic framework, often participating in national and European elections. Additionally, political scientist Miroslav Ares has pointed out that the adjective 'extreme' and the connected term 'extremism' have been overused in the academic and media discourse, mostly by: 'mainstream parties in order to deliberately de-legitimize groups with the 'extreme' label. '[9] – Indicating the important power of classification through the use of specific terminology.

Additionally, the term 'extreme right' has been linked in the broader debate of what marks the distinction between the 'traditional' Radical Right and the NRR, where it is important to note that a sharp distinction between traditional and current forms of operating of the radical right becomes apparent, as in the majority of cases there are no clear institutional continuities of the NRR with the traditional radical right movements.[10]

The NRR can be distinguished from traditional radical right-wing parties by their ways of operating, shifting political tactics from the focus on a free-market system, emphasis on individual achievement and sentiments of xenophobia or open racism[11], towards one stressing the importance of operating within the sphere of liberal democracies and the significant use of popular media to their advantage.
An additional sharp distinction between the previously mentioned 'traditional' Radical Right and the NRR is the latter's incorporation of religion as the main marker of identity, in contrast to the historical emphasis on ethnicity and race. The notion and term anti-Islamist often applied to the policies of and

---

[7] Bauer, 2010, 5
[8] Kopecek, 2007
[9] Kopecek, 2007
[10] Goodwin, 2012, 5
[11] Betz, 1993, 3

by the NRR itself as a foundation of its political cause, can be framed as a sentiment of Islamophobia, being: 'unfounded hostility towards Muslims, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims.'[12]. The latter incorporation of anti-Islam political rhetoric has been seemingly operating effectively within the normative sphere, while at the same time having clear limitations as: 'it also covers tremendous ground by including those who have limited or no knowledge of Islam and fear it as a whole with those who are seemingly fighting against radical Islamism, which would also include many Muslims.[13]

Nevertheless, the new reality of increasing electoral success for the new radical right throughout Europe cannot be labeled as a distinctively identical phenomenon applying everywhere. In generally deemed 'similar' countries with historical trajectories of post-colonial and labor migration, a well-established democratic system and significant economic prosperity such as the Netherlands and the UK, one has witnessed a relatively different level of NRR support based on the thriving concept of Islamophobia, prevailing in the respective country's main political discourse.

Regardless of the availability of extended previous research on the functioning and core foundations of the NRR, the aspect of cross-country differences and the corresponding comparative framework has been under-explored, yet deserves thorough attention. Adding to the previously performed scholarly work on the NRR, that has mostly emphasized singular cases, hereby neglecting potential wider and cross-national trends, this research will take into account the historical framework of both the traditional and NRR, while at the same time concentrating on both the similarities and the specificities of the individual country-context, covering the literature gap in the study of contemporary NRR political groupings and add to the existing scholarly debate on the topic.

Engaging with notable scholars in the field of NRR politics such as Cas Mudde, George Betz, Goodwin and Jackman & Volpert and emphasizing a qualitative approach to the subject of NRR politics, this research will draw on a multitude of theoretical frameworks, including institutional factors, socio-economic and ideational arguments. Through the linkage of historical and contemporary facets of Radical Right Politics, empirical electoral results and personal reflections by policy makers, this research framework will aim to provide explanations for general patterns causing a rise of NRR political groups, emphasizing its historical background, bases of support and party formation. Adding to the latter, the main material covered in this thesis will be the engagement with previous scholarly work in the form of books, journal publications and opinion pieces in the international media, alongside cross-disciplinary theoretical frameworks such as Max Weber's charisma theory, Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade and individual contributions by academics and activists working in the specific field of NRR politics.

---

[12] University of California Berkeley Defining Islamophobia
[13] Esposito, 2011, 7

The research will be centered on the following research question: Which factors account for a discrepancy in the levels of political success of the New Radical Right in The Netherlands and the United Kingdom?

Starting with a theoretical framework providing potential and cross-disciplinary explanations for the rise of the NRR, the research will continue by exploring the country-cases of The Netherlands and the United Kingdom, mapping its institutional, historical and political specificities after which points of overlap and difference will be presented tracing back to the previously elaborated theoretical framework and ending with a final presentation of the arguments and findings in the conclusion.

2. Theoretical Explanations for the rise of the New Radical Right and Islamophobia

In the course of tracing the rise of the NRR in Western Europe and the related discrepancy in NRR support across the previously mentioned case studies, a number of theoretical and explanatory frameworks will be put forward that will function as the backbone of this research. A clear-cut separation of three lines of theoretical arguments will be made, framed as institutional, socio-economic and ideational arguments, with institutional factors indicating systemic factors such as unemployment levels as related to a perceived threat to social security and wider popular dissatisfaction as a result of globalization processes.

Socio-Economic Factors

The socio-economic factors outlined in the following theoretical chapter will be centered on the levels of globalization that have impacted the electorate in the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial society. Moreover, levels of unemployment, related to the citizen's notion of social security and government performance will function as a key-part of both the theory of demand side politics and the theory of political space.

1.1.1 Demand Side Politics

Conceptualizing the apparent rise of support for the New Radical Right and the modern-day connected phenomenon of Islamophobia, importance needs to be put on explanatory theoretical frameworks.

Operating under the umbrella of the so called 'Demand Theory', indicating a power void in the contemporary political arena of many Western European democracies that has left many voters disillusioned and in search of radical alternatives. 'The emergence and notable growth of the NRR has occurred concomitantly with significant increases in international integration, post-industrialization and the rise of 'post-materialist' values and policy orientations. Many scholars have stressed that, similar to past movements of the radical right, radical right-wing populist parties have appealed to, and received support from, groups that lose from contemporary features of modernization.'[14]

Demand side politics can in this respect be framed as a moment of 'political opportunity' for the NRR, where as a result of the switch from an industrial to a post-industrial society, a class of people has emerged, expressing the feeling of not being able to 'keep up' with the globalization processes in

general and the competitive labor market in particular. Whereas scholars such as Betz[15] have outlined that: 'transnationally mobile manufacturing and financial enterprises as well as highly skilled professionals, technical personnel and managers are the 'winners' of globalization'[16] –since the beginning of the 1990's, one has also witnessed a less fortunate side, mostly concentrated in what the theoretical framework of Heckscher-Ohlin[17] calls the 'generation of losses'. The latter Heckscher-Ohlin model: 'predicts that semi- and unskilled workers bear significant costs of the globalization of developed economies, that is, models of factor-price convergence suggest that the relative prices commanded by comparatively scarce factors in the developed economies, decline with internationalization, as the relative demand for comparatively abundant factors, here highly skilled workers, increases.'[18]

Additionally, rising amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the influx of foreign workers as a result of the abolishment of migration restrictions might result in decreasing wages of mostly un-skilled laborers already the most susceptible to NRR rhetoric. According to Wood[19] globalized trade-flows between: 'developed and developing economies, have led to the estimate that trade is responsible for a 21.5% decline in the demand for lower-skilled workers in developed economies.'[20]
The changes resulting from the latter transition to post-industrialism have had an impact on the electoral behavior of so called dis-enfranchised voters, making them distrustful of the established political representation for their failure to provide more 'security' and 'stability' in the lives of its citizens, seeing a transfer of national processes to a supranational level such as the EU as another result from the same globalization, resulting in a perceived loss of 'national sovereignty'.

Jackman and Volpert conclude the basis of substantial research they performed that a positive and direct correlation between unemployment levels and support for the NRR can be seen, with the latter being directly connected to the fact that the 'political space' attributed to NRR parties in the electoral system greatly shapes the viability of the NRR to present itself as a viable alternative to the traditional political establishment.[21] The NRR has handily incorporated this issue: 'while supporting free markets and liberalization domestically, they have systemically criticized international openness.'[22]

---

[15] Betz, 2002, 235
[16] Betz, 2002, 240
[17] Leamer, 1995, 11
[18] Betz, 2002, 251
[19] Wood, 1998, 1470
[20] Wood, 1998, 1474
[21] Jackman, 1996, 516
[22] Betz, 2002, 223

With the support of the NRR as previously mentioned, being not solely but majorly based on the traditional middle class and lower and un-skilled workers, research by Betz has proven that as a direct result of globalization forces: 'groups that face ostensible risks to income and employment and challenges to traditional values, institutions and social status, disproportionately support the NRR.'[23]

Political Scientist Piero Ignazi named the expansion of the radical right as a: 'certain kind of social reaction within post-industrial societies where the global economy demands a more mobile and flexible labor force, however, a large portion of society has had a difficult time adapting to the changes. They often found themselves in a marginalized position characterized by long-term unemployment, growing frustration and deprivation, and a longing for renewal of the previous 'status quo' with its traditional relationships, ties, order and harmony. '[24]

As a result of the latter forms of societal dis-cohesion the arrival of immigrants proved to be a strong foundation for the initial establishment of the traditional radical right and the later resurgence of the NRR, pioneering a political style that can be labeled as anti-systemic and thriving on an exclusionary framework based on racial and ethnic differences.

1.1.2 Theory of Political Space

The theory of political space as put forward by Matt Golder [25] emphasizes the level of perceived 'threat' to the national identity and culture as a result of immigration as the key framework explaining levels of support for the NRR. With NRR voters who have been concerned about issues related to immigration having historically had little options to find political representation of radical political parties in Western Europe and mainstream political parties avoiding the issues of dis-content as much as possible, a political void has been created out of which the NRR takes it advantage: 'Portraying the mainstream competitors as conscious agents of a multiculturalism that undermines national cohesiveness, much of the mainstream right has responded by strengthening its position on the immigration issue, yet it has not always been successful at countering the appeal of the far right. '[26]

The changes resulting from the latter transition to a post-industrial society, have had an impact on the electoral behavior of so called dis-enfranchised voters, making them distrustful of the established political representation for their failure to provide more 'security' and 'stability' in the lives of its citizens, seeing a transfer of national processes to a supranational level such as the EU as another result from the same globalization, resulting in a perceived loss of 'national sovereignty'.

---

[23] Betz, 2002, 242
[24] Kopecek, 2007
[25] Goldman, 2003, 435
[26] Goldman, 2003, 441

Jackman and Volpert conclude on the basis of substantial research they performed that a positive and direct correlation between unemployment levels and support for the NRR can be seen, with the latter being directly connected to the fact that the political space attributed to NRR parties in the electoral system, greatly shapes the viability of the NRR to present itself as a viable alternative to the traditional political establishment.[27]

Additionally, a number of scholars such as de la Candena and Green[28] have drawn on the political changes as seen in the rise of the NRR as a form of re-emerging 'cultural fundamentalism.' Based on a: 'homogeneous, static, coherent and rooted notion of culture.'[29] The latter theoretical framework parts from the concept of 'race' that needs to be protected, but names a: ' historically rooted, homogenous national culture: racism without race.'[30] By presenting the traditional political establishment, including the right-wing political movements as partly responsible for the failure to counter high levels of immigration, resulting in popular resentment, the NRR has perfected the ability create a form of political 'space', projecting itself as the sole defender of the 'national culture and identity.'

---

[27] Jackman, 1996, 516
[28] Green, 2003, 10
[29] Ghorashi, 2003, 5
[30] Ghorashi, 2003, 9

Institutional Factors

The institutional factors will be centered on the relation between the electoral and political system and NRR performance. Stating the differences between the bi and multi-party system, contrasting single-party-rule with high levels of coalition forming will function is the core of both the coalition theory and diversification theory. The theoretical argumentation will be sub-divided into two parts: 'NRR Success as a Result of the Political System' will explore the rise of the NRR as based on the system in which it operates, whereas 'NRR Political Maneuvering' will emphasize the ability of the NRR itself to extend its basis of support through its personal traits.

1.2.1 Coalition Theory

NRR Success as a Result of the Political System

Drawing on Robert Erikson's 'coalition of minorities' and 'disillusioned voter theory', it becomes clear that multi-party systems, based on high levels of political compromise fail to get approval from all segments of society, creating the image amongst its electorate that the political landscape is 'distant' from the ordinary citizen and that parties in their eventual compromising stance often neglect the initial promises they made during the election process, resulting in forms of popular resentment of the 'establishment', representing in the support for the NRR. As the government's agenda gets stalled by political procedures, or as promises seem to go unfulfilled, the once 'naïve' electorate turns against the traditional political elite, paving the road for extreme, anti-systemic political parties.[1]

Additionally, the relatively high chance of the breakdown of a coalition government as a result of the difficulties in forming a suitable governing faction, might lead to an apparent form of 'distrust' or 'dis-interest' in the political system, in turn creating political 'space' for the NRR's emphasis on the distance between the electorate and the 'traditional' political parties. 'When one party cannot gain a clear mandate to govern, the door is open to all manner of compromise with the extreme elements on the fringes of the political landscape.'[31]

In contrast, the two party system with its centrifugal ability has the tendency to: 'filter out the extreme elements, whereas the multi-party system brings the extreme, and often destabilizing, elements into the political system and thus the government, the two-party system forces the extreme elements that are not initially filtered, into the mainstream, or the center of the political spectrum in order to maintain their legitimacy and credibility.'[32] The latter legitimacy is less urgent and less deemed as a

---

[31] Alesina, 1988, 801
[32] Alesina, 1988, 799

factor of 'political survival' in the multi-party system where radical elements can maintain a larger amount of their political agenda, as the drive for mainstream incorporation is less profound.

What has to be noted however is that the latter appeal to sentiments of disenfranchisement amongst the electorate are not solely based on the political 'space' that has been there as a result of the historical political structure. This as the political system and the party landscape are neither definite nor static and have the potential to evolve and change over time, as seen in the relative rise of the Liberal Democrats in the United Kingdom as an indicator of potential changes in the long-standing two-party system, but merely on the latter political 'space' that the NRR succeeds in creating for itself, especially in relation to the perceived 'traditional' political representations, an issue that will be explored in the following paragraph.

1.2.2 Diversification Theory

NRR Political Maneuvering

Scholars such as Gallagher, and Mair[33] name the adaptation of the NRR in encapsulating policies beyond the mere anti-immigrant and anti-Islam rhetoric as the basis of their success.

The current economic climate has heightened rhetoric beyond national cultural protection to include economic interests and workers' rights allowing them to gain support from different sections of society. Kittschelt describes a 'winning formula', which involves the: 'combination of xenophobia with economic liberalism to target the support of anti-immigration blue-collar workers as well as white-collar workers anxious for reduced government intervention in the economy.'[34]

As a result of declining party-identification and the presentation of a broad political agenda beyond mere anti-immigration policies that nevertheless remain at the core of the party 'identity', a form of divergence with for example traditional 'leftist' parties has emerged, with the NRR often incorporating issues such as the opposition towards the increase of the minimum retirement age, emphasis on the 'ordinary' citizen, advocating for more public money to be attributed to public health-care, education and against the shifting of power towards the supra-national level, as resembled mostly in the European Union. Thus, the later diversification theory marks the outlined contrast between the single-issue oriented, static traditional radical right and the NRR that emphasizes a broad form of electoral appeal, widening its political agenda to incorporate additional policy issues and positioning itself as more 'inclusive'.

---

[33] Gallagher, 2008
[34] Murray, 2012

Ideational Factors

The ideational factors will be centered on the importance of personal charisma and political leadership in individual NRR cases. The argument will be framed on two levels: the internal dimension of charisma theory, where charisma and leadership can function as creating a solid party-framework from the inside and the external dimension of charismatic interaction with the electorate and the public media.

1.3.1 Charisma Theory

The Theory of Charisma as initially put forward by Max Weber[35], draws on the capacity and importance of 'personality' in the enhancement of political support. 'Personal charisma –as a sense of calling and self-confidence becomes valid because of the leader's capacity to perform exceptional deeds and the sense of duty of the followers to accept his/her claim and follow his/her leadership.' [36] Additionally, tracing Weber's concept of charisma, one can define the influence of charisma on NRR party structure by it enhancing to create: ' a cohesive dominant coalition held together by loyalty to the leader in a highly centralized organization involving a re-utilization of charisma, a transfer of loyalties from the leader to the organization, and a growing divergence between the party's organizational identity and the leader's personal political fortune.'[37]

The latter theoretical argumentation can be divided between an internal and external dimension, where the internal dimension of charismatic leadership aims at constructing a clear-cut intra-party hierarchy, creating a solid base of support amongst its followers, the external dimension is aimed at the public presentation of NRR parties, enhancing the credibility and connection with the electorate and public sphere. Emphasizing on the latter, Harmel and Svasand[38] mention that NRR party formation and charisma are connected through two phases. 'In the party's first phase the leader is the creator and operator who enjoys qualities such as originality and creativity, communication skills, charisma and authority, which would enable him to develop the message of the party, to communicate and draw attention to it. During second phase the leader should be focused on party development, mainly on the routinization of the party's operation: 'the leader should enjoy organizational and delegation skills along with strategic and consensus building skills.'[39] The new radical right is pioneering a new style of politics, they are increasingly promoting younger, charismatic, well-educated and politically savvy

---

[35] Schweitzer, 1974, 18
[36] Schweitzer, 1974, 31
[37] Pedahzur, 2002, 4
[38] Pedahzur, 2002, 7
[39] Pedahzur, 2002, 8

11

leaders in an effort to shake of their old reputations and rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the electorate, functioning as a source of legitimacy both internally and to the outside world. [40]

This framework of legitimacy and the connected political ideology has been firmly based on a previously mentioned new emphasis on 'national identity' and 'sovereignty', here connected to a larger phenomenon of up surging nationalism. Whereas, the concept of 'national identity' has been put in direct opposition to 'the other' in the form of immigrants and in particular Muslims, the support for the NRR does not always stem from direct immigrant presence but is strongly mediated through the media and public outlets skillfully managed by the NRR. This latter ability to: 'express opinions and viewpoints in the media'[41] can be linked to the increased reach of globalization processes that have marked a strong realization of political advantage and ability by the NRR maneuver professionally in the online world, maintaining sophisticated internet sites and making strong use of social media such as Facebook and Twitter. The latter catering the NRR's ability to appeal to a global audience based on strong leadership personality-traits, fostering substantial cross-national cooperation, where: ' while most far right parties are consistently critical of the European integration, many of them support some form of cooperation amongst each other, and most of them embrace the idea of a European alliance.'[42]

---

[40] Goodwin, 2012, 5
[41] Koopmans, 2009, 2
[42] Backes,2011, 12

3. Mapping the Political Landscape

This chapter will provide an overview of the party-system in place in The Netherlands and the United Kingdom, emphasizing the different electoral practices and electoral results. Additionally this chapter will aim to provide clarity on the historical framework in which the NRR operates in the respective countries, tracing the development of NRR political parties, mapping their main achievements and political agenda. Finally, room will be attributed to country-specific information on patterns of immigration and official government policy frameworks towards migration.

<u>The Netherlands</u>

3.1 The Dutch Political Landscape

The Dutch political system operates under the framework of a parliamentary representative democracy with a clear multi-party system with governmental coalitions usually consisting out of 3 or more political parties, having a constitutional monarchy with high levels of political decentralization. The Dutch political system has been characterized and famous for its consensus-based form of political cooperation, also known as the *poldermodel.* At the heart of the political system lies the so called *Staten Generaal*, the Dutch parliament, consisting out of a First Chamber where 75 members are elected by the *Provinciale Staten*, or regional parliamentary assemblies[43] and the Second Chamber, consisting out of 150 members that are directly elected for a term of four-years. Important to note is that the Dutch Second Chamber has the power of political initiative and amendment while the First Chamber only carries out the function of approving or rejecting proposals by the Second Chamber.

The Dutch state, based on the principle of a constitutional monarchy is headed by Queen Beatrix, holding the throne since the 30th of April, 1980, with no traditional separation of powers being apparent and the queen taking an active role in the formation of a cabinet after national elections.

The traditionally most established and influential political parties can be labeled the *Christen Democratisch Appel*, Christian-Democrats, the *Partij van de Arbeid*, the Dutch Labour Party, the *Socialistische Partij*, the Socialist Party, the *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*, the Dutch Liberals, *GroenLinks*, the Dutch Greens and the *Democraten 66.*

---

[43] The Economist Online, 2009

In the post-Second World War era the Dutch political system could be labeled as following the path of pillarization where different segments of society had their own established political representations. With the end of the latter pillarization in the 1960's new political parties such as D66 gained political foothold, with the Dutch system being famous for its extensive social security system, also deemed the 'welfare state'. The early 1990's marked the merging of power of the Social-Democratic party and the Liberals, deemed the 'purple coalition', resembling the mixture of the socialist color red and the liberal color blue. The murder of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 marked the end of the 'purple coalition' with the Dutch political system seeing recent strong power fluctuations, marking a relative decline of traditional political parties such as the Christian Democrats and the emergence of new factions such as Geert Wilder's Freedom Party, as seen in the table below.

Table 1. Historical Overview of Electoral Support in The Netherlands in Parliamentary Seats[44]

In this table the Dutch (New) Radical Right consisting out of the CD, CP, LPF and PVV is marked in red in order to highlight their electoral success.

	1946	1948	1952	1956	1959	1963	1967	1971	1972	1977	1981	1982	1986	1989	1994	1998	2002	2003	2006	2010
KVP	32	32	30	49	49	50	42	35	27											
ARP	13	13	12	15	14	13	15	13	14											
CHU	8	9	9	13	12	13														
CDA										49	48	45	54	54	34	29	43	44	41	21
SGP	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	2	2	2	2
PVV																			9	24
Christen Unie																	4	3	6	5
LPF																	26	8		
VVD		8	9	13	19	16	17	16	22	28	26	36	27	22	31	38	24	28	22	31
CP													1							
CD														1	3					
D66							7	11	6	8	17	6	9	12	24	14	7	6	3	10
PvdA	29	27	30	50	48	43	37	39	43	53	44	47	52	49	37	45	23	42	33	30
GroenLinks															6	5	11	10	8	7
SP															2	5	9	9	25	15
CPN	10	8	6	7	3	4	5	6	7	2	33									

---

[44] Dutch Parliament Online, 2012

The Dutch (New) Radical Right

Political Movements

The historical legacy and support for radical-right political parties in the Netherlands can be framed as weak. Lacking a strong ideological right-wing political tradition and power base, the Dutch far right has historically been: 'fragmented and divided.'[45] The reason for this division has been identified by Van Donselaar and Rodrigues as the so called 'adaptation dilemma' where the lack of a balance between the necessity of radicalization of the internal party support on the one hand, and the maneuvering in the post-Second World War judicial landscape requiring the parties to abide by Dutch anti-discrimination law, has led to the splintering of the initial Dutch far-right.

A continuation of the latter situation can be seen in the 1970's that have been marked by the foundation of the Dutch People's Union, *Nederlandse Volks Unie,* aiming to rehabilitate former Dutch war criminals that worked for the National Socialist Movement, *Nationaal Socialistische Beweging* and to merge the Netherlands and the Belgian province of Flanders.[46]
Confrontations with the judicial power over the party's political manifesto based on neo-Nazism and previously mentioned anti-discrimination legislation led to the separation of a fraction into the newly established Centre Party, *Centrumpartij*, in 1979. A remarkable transition by the CD had been the distancing from national-socialist and neo-Nazi ideologies as propagated by the former NVU, yet keeping xenophobe and racist political sentiments, illustrated by the desire to establish closer relationship with the Afrikaner apartheid regime in South-Africa.

Small political success has been achieved by the Dutch Center-Democratic Party, *Centrumpartij* in the beginning of the 1980's, but voting thresholds never exceeded 0.8% of the population, corresponding with one seat in the Dutch parliament. As a result of internal divisions and the withdrawal of the charismatic Hans Janmaat as their political leader, the CD ceased to exist in 1986 and was replaced by the increasingly 'moderate' Centre Democrats, *Centrum Democraten,* who after initial political success, gaining eleven seats in the municipal elections in 1990 repeatedly collide with the Dutch judicial apparatus as a result of overt anti-Semitism and racism. The mainstream political climate in the early 1990's, represented in the dominance of the Christian Democratic party under Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers pursued the political strategy of a *cordon sannitaire* excluding the CD from political cooperation, allowing the CD to portray the traditional political elite as an exclusionary framework, distanced from its people and the political reality of neglecting the people that voted for the CD, a

---

[45] Voerman, 1992, 37
[46] VPRO, Extreemrechts in Nederland, 2006

notable political tool still valid and used in the contemporary political landscape, i.e. by Wilders' Freedom Party.

The legal conviction of CD party leader Janmaat in 1996 on the basis of discrimination and incitement of ethnic hatred meant the ultimate blow to the organized extreme right in the Netherlands, with the CD party fading from the political scene. Important to note is that the political climate in the Netherlands has changed profoundly, political statements by the Dutch extreme right in the 1980's and 1990's such as 'Our People First, Full is Full and Death to Multiculturalism' back then led to legal convictions and prohibition of the respective political party, whereas being regarded as 'acceptable' and incorporated in the contemporary political discourse. The Dutch strand of 'new realism', a political designation explained later in this research framework has often encroached and deliberately challenged the limits of *vrijheid van meningsuiting* or freedom of speech, with the delineation between the right of expression and the ability to insult becoming increasingly blurred.

Street Movements

The Dutch NRR landscape has seen a significantly low amount of street movements, with the sole exception of the *Nationale Volksunie's* main splinter grouping, the 'Dutch Racial Volunteer Force', a movement claiming to attempt to keep '*Nederland blank'*, to keep The Netherlands 'white'.
A strong party identification exists between the Racial Volunteer Force and UK based street movements such as the EDL, a party on which the Racial Volunteer Force has modeled itself.
In 2002, the Dutch Racial Volunteer Force attempted to make the transition to the political field, presenting itself as a strictly political movement, participating in the national and local elections, a move that has proved to be un-successful, not resulting in any popular representation.

17

Dutch Immigration Policy in Historical Perspective

With specific regard to the current NRR in The Netherlands being mostly based on the strong opposition to the noted 'Islamization' of the country, it is possible to argue that with the colonial dominance of the Dutch Kingdom over what were back then labeled the 'Dutch East Indies', the archipelago that would later become the Republic of Indonesia and the largest majority-Muslim country in the world, The Netherlands has been historically exposed to the Islamic religion. Yet, the first substantial numbers of Muslims settling on Dutch soil came as part of the 'guest-workers' programs starting in the late 1950's as a result of the post-war economic growth, creating a dire need for mainly unskilled labor, filled with workers from mainly Spain, Portugal and Yugoslavia, and later mostly from Morocco and Turkey. ' Between 1960 and 1969 the number of foreign workers in the Netherlands grew from 5,700 to 68,900.'[47]

The latter framework of labor immigration marked the entry of the Islamic religion in the Dutch societal and political landscape. The reason why the religious entrance of Islam in the form of the 'guest-workers' program came to be perceived as a new cultural and religious domain, even after encounters with Islam in Indonesia can be explained as a result of the fact that: 'The colonial immigration from Indonesia had hardly led to the formation of Islamic institutions and organizations, mostly because most immigrants had been Christians or secularized people.'[48]

'Left'-leaning governments that took office during and after the period of large-scale labor immigration from Islamic countries decided to take the political responsibility to provide so called *geestelijk welzijn* or spiritual needs, with the Dutch Minorities Policy drawing on the notion of 'integration with retention of cultural identity.'[49]

This later political framework allowed migrants to retain high levels of their cultural and religious practices, often stimulated by government subsidies creating new places for religious worship and community organizations.

Starting in the mid 1970's the Dutch discourse on migrants has shifted from a focus on the framework of 'race' based on biological elements towards a notion of 'cultures' and 'identities', with the latter indicating an emphasis on 'ethnicity' and 'religion' as the main component of potential 'integration.'

The debate on 'multiculturalism' has always had its implications on the political dimension with the traditional 'Left', in The Netherlands composed of the Labor party, the Socialists and the Greens, advocating for the incorporation and respect of immigrants' culture and traditions, while the political

---

[47] University of Amsterdam DARE, 2006
[48] University of Amsterdam DARE, 2006
[49] University of Amsterdam DARE, 2006

'Right' either remained silent or advocated for the application of 'universal' values based on the principles of the enlightenment, with the latter being complicated by the fact that there has always been a: 'fuzzy border between what was in fact universal and what was merely 'ours'. ' [50]

In the early 1990's a new paradigm emerged in relation to the government-based initiatives in the field of immigration and integration. With the emphasis slowly shifting from the preservation of a minority's respective cultural and religious identity, towards the focus on socio-economic integration, summarized in the expression of former Dutch State Secretary of Economic Affairs; ' Dutch Muslims should know that one cannot bargain with the core values of Western Liberalism. [51] With the latter core values including the secularity principle of the division between church and state, freedom of expression and the aspect of non-discrimination on the basis of race, religion or sexuality, the more 'assertive' attitude of the Dutch government has been framed by scholars such as a 'new realism.' [52]

The Netherlands has arguably one of the nations where the previous multiculturalist approaches have been most sharply reversed, with even politicians often seen as 'architects' of the previously mentioned 'purple coalition', openly distancing themselves from the latter concept, stating that 'Dutch identity and culture' most come first in all cases, resulting in strong political and societal pressure for cultural assimilation. This political framework, often designated 'new realism' has manifested itself since its emergence on the Dutch political scene by: ' politicians presenting themselves as someone daring to face the facts, mentioning *waarheden* or 'truths' that have been often hidden in the political 'discourse'. Moreover, new realists put themselves forward as; ' spokesperson of the *gewone mensen* or 'normal people', being the autochthonous population referred to by Geert Wilders as 'Henk and Ingrid'. Additionally 'new realism' in the Dutch context has been characterized by the; 'connection between the focus on reality and Dutch national traits, hereby equating Dutchness with openness, directness and realism, while at the same time incorporating the opposition to the Dutch 'left', represented by 'new realists' in the progressive elite, strangling the public domain with its 'politically correct' viewpoints on fascism, racism and intolerance.' [53]

---

[50] Buruma, 2006, 30
[51] Prins, 2002, 2
[52] Prins, 2002, 4
[53] Prins, 2002, 5

The emergence of Pim Fortuyn, former political columnist for the center-right Elsevier magazine and sociologist by academic training, as the leader of the newly established party *Leefbaar Nederland* or livable Netherlands, later to be split into his own party, *Lijst Pim Fortuyn*, as a result of a so called 'clash of ideology' between the LF and Fortuyn's increasingly exclusionist political ideas, marked a further shift in the incorporation of anti-Islamism in the Dutch political discourse. ' His new realist performance changed the momentum, encouraging people to talk freely about ones problems and potential solutions, simply daring to speak up, to give expression of ones gut feelings. In this way Fortuyn managed to change the context of new realism into a form of hyperrealism where outspokenness no longer served the higher goal of establish the truth, but served a goal in itself. '[54]

The murder of Fortuyn on the 6th of May, 2002, 4 days before the general elections, by animal-rights activist Volkert van der Graaf meant the ultimate blow to the Dutch political tradition based on 'multiculturalism', leading to the establishment of conservative coalition and the incorporation of anti-Islam political parties in the framework of direct governance of the Dutch state.

A powerful element of Dutch anti-Islamism has been the use of former Muslims themselves in the political debate, countering the often-heard argument that a 'lack' of in-depth and personal knowledge of Islam canalized Islam-critical viewpoints for both 'ordinary' citizens and politicians in the country. An example of the latter is Afshin Elian who came to The Netherlands as an Iranian refugee in the 1990's and became an influential figure in the Dutch political and media landscape. In relation to the previous point of Islam-critics from the Islamic community itself, Ronald Plasterk, former Dutch Minister of Education, Culture and Science stated in the Dutch popular newspaper 'De Volkskrant': 'Afshin Elian rightly made a name for himself as an expert critic of the Iranian regime, which he knew from the inside. Then something went wrong, he took the role upon himself of the ultra-right-wing critic of the soft multi-culti left: the foreign lapdog of the right. And when he can't find the soft left, he will make it up. In doing so, he adopts a tone that does not exist among Dutch writers.'[55]

An additional example, daughter of Somali parents, Ayaan Hirshi Ali claims to have escaped an arranged marriage, finding refuge in The Netherlands in 1992 where she became one of the fiercest critics of what she deems the patriarchal culture of Islam aimed at submitting women. Drawing on the phenomenon of multiculturalism, Ali has stated: 'I confront the European elite's self-image as tolerant, while under their nose women are living as slaves.'[56]

---

[54] Prins, 2002, 7
[55] Buruma, 2006, 24
[56] Ayaan Hirshi Ali, 2006

20

Generally seeing low levels of 'Muslim' political figures climbing up on the societal ladder and becoming incorporated in mainstream Dutch politics unless they function as Islam-critics themselves has led to the portrayed imagine of the Dutch political system where functioning as the so called *knuffel-allochtoon*, or 'huggable foreigner' practically means that as long as Dutchman of Islamic descent does not portray him or herself as a self-asserted and culturally confident member of the political arena, he or she can move up in the political ranks. This political tendency of projecting minorities as a 'legitimization' force is definitely not a new phenomenon, yet the widespread use of this in the Dutch NRR stands out from other countries facing similar fundamental societal questions.

With the entrance of Geert Wilders, former member of the Dutch Liberal Party V*olkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie,* a party he left due to his firm objection to the opening of membership talks with the Turkish Republic, another shift in the Dutch political landscape can be marked. Openly calling to stop the 'Islamization' of The Netherlands, comparing the Quran with 'Mein Kampf' and aiming to restrict immigration from 'Muslim countries', he functions as the imagine of anti-Islamism in The Netherlands and beyond. With his 'Freedom Party' being the current third largest political party in The Netherlands, Wilders has seen a gradual increase of electoral support during three consecutive electoral rounds. Gaining 4 seats in the elections for the European Parliament in June 2009, winning two municipal elections in The Hague and Almere in March 2010 and obtaining 24 seats out of 150 during the parliamentary elections in June 2010.[57]

The political success of Wilders has been largely based on a consistent appeal to an 'outsider' feeling, where comparable to the historical legacy of the *Centrumpartij* the Freedom Party projects the Dutch political landscape as static and unable to respond and listen to its electorate, hereby emphasizing the distance between the so called 'leftist elite' that is out of touch with reality, and the ordinary Dutchmen who has lost trust in the country's politics. In a personal interview with Jelle Klaas a notable Human Rights Lawyer who has amongst others supported the high school pupil Imane Mahssan in her case against the Don Bosco College in Volendam that has expelled the particular student for wearing a headscarf in class, Klaas stated that: 'Wilders has gained popularity by getting the support of people that feel increasingly insecure. By portraying the Freedom Party as a party for the 'hardworking' ordinary citizen, and because of a failure of the 'left', impersonated mostly by the Dutch *Partij van de Arbeid* or Labor Party, that has taken over many aspects from neo-liberal parties, Wilders has created a particular platform for himself as a political leader and the political ideas of his party.'[58] The latter is being framed by Vossen as: ' a preference for a style that can be labeled as

---

[57] Esposito, 2011, 37
[58] Jelle Klaas, 2011

'popular', as in opposition to the mores and vocabulary of the elite, aiming to provide an authentic style and relationship with the 'ordinary' people.'[59]

Whereas the delineation of what constitute the boundaries between 'freedom of speech' and 'encouragement of hatred' have been a widely discussed topic in Dutch politics, the sharp increase in the number of religiously charged incidents in the Netherlands in the post 9/11 world have swiftly diminished the imagine of the Dutch as being a tolerant people, living peacefully in a multi-cultural surrounding. Illustrating the latter aspect: ' A report by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on The Netherlands was adopted by the Council of Europe in June 2007 and made public in February 2008, it states that the Muslim, and notably the Moroccan and Turkish communities have been particularly affected by these developments, which have resulted in a substantial increase of Islamophobia in both the political arena and other contexts. This commission is an independent human rights monitoring body established by the Council of Europe, whose members are independent and impartial individuals who are appointed on the basis of their moral authority and recognized expertise in dealing with racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and intolerance.'[60]

Using popular media as an outlet for the projection of political ideologies, 'Freedom Party' strongman Wilders' publication of anti-Islamic movies such as 'Fitna' i.e. *struggle,* draws on the power of popular media outlets in shaping public opinion: ' For four months, the attention of the Dutch newspapers was seized by a movie no one had seen; in the period between the announcement in November 2007 and March 27, 2008, the day Wilders made 'Fitna' available on the internet, the case evolved into a remarkable media event, the movie would appear on television in January, Wilders states. Ultimately, this wasn't the case and the politician repeatedly postponed the 'launch' of 'Fitna', however somehow the attention didn't fade away, from then on, Wilders, 'Fitna' and Islam became the object of a fierce highly negative debate in Dutch society and given the democratic function of journalism, in the news media.'[61]

The power of the Dutch popular media in highlighting the particular aspect of anti-Islamism, allowing Wilders to instantly reach a vast potential electorate is reflected in a public poll by Maurice de Hond's polling agency, published in the Dutch renowned newspaper *NRC Handelsblad* on the 6th of April, 2008 showing that: 'If Wilders had run for office the day after 'Fitna' hit the Internet, his party would have garnered six more seats that it had actually won during the previous election.'[62]

---

[59] Vossen, 2009, 5
[60] Esposito, 2011, 39
[61] Esposito, 2011, 47
[62] Esposito, 2011, 51

In contrast to many neo-conservatives in for example the United States, propagating close ties with the Israeli state, an important standpoint of Wilders, he does not perceive the threat of society to be located in the loss of 'Judeo-Christian values', in fact openly defending gay and women's rights against what he labels the 'Islamic threat', he warns for the mere playing down of this latter threat in the eyes of the Western political elite. Drawing analogies between Neville Chamberlain as the 'appeaser', representing leftist Dutch politics and the often silenced but eventually decisive Winston Churchill as being Wilders himself, he has often portrayed himself as the victim of the traditional political environment.

During an interview designated for this research, Jean Tillie, Professor of Electoral Policies at the University of Amsterdam and author of important publications on the NRR in The Netherlands, stated on the topic of Wilders' prosecution and political 'modus vivendi': 'If you are debating outside the democratic framework, because you are violating the rules, there's no way to solve the issue within a democracy, so it stays an issue. We can question each other's lifestyles but we should do it in a way that is respecting three taboos: you should not call for violence, you should respect human dignity and you should not exclude people. I really believe that if people participate in a democracy they will eventually become democrats.'[63]

---

[63] Tilli, 2011

3.2 The British Political Landscape

The British political system is framed on the basis of a constitutional monarchy, with the current Queen Elizabeth the Second, reigning since the 6th of February 1952, being the official Head of State, as well as the appointee of the Prime Minister with David Cameron being the current Head of Government. The British system can be officially noted as a multi-party system but reality has shown a strong example of bi-party political competition. The British parliamentary system has been divided between two chambers with vested legislative power, the House of Commons, consisting out of 646 members that are directly elected on a first-past-the-post basis[64] also known as the 'winner takes all' system where the candidate with the most votes gets elected in contrast to the voting system based on an absolute majority and the House of Lords, consisting out of 786 members acting as a political body of expertise, amending and reviewing political proposals from the House of Commons. Additionally, British political system sees representation in the form of the Scottish parliament and Welsh and Northern Ireland assemblies.

Important to note is that the British electoral system differs between national and European elections, whereas in contrast to national elections that are characterized by the 'winner takes all principle', the European elections see the electoral framework of proportional representation where the number of seats won by a particular party is proportionate to the amount of votes gained in the election. The latter electoral framework marks a strong difference in levels of NRR support. Whereas as will be shown later in this chapter the NRR has proved to be insignificant on the national front, European elections have seen a gain of around 15% of the votes for the UKIP party.[65]

The traditionally most established and influential political parties can be labeled the Labor Party and the Conservative Party, with an increasing political significance of the Liberal Democrats, potentially challenging the bi-party system in the future.

---

[64] The Economist Online, 2008
[65] Whitehead, 2008

In this table the British (New) Radical Right consisting out of the BNP and UKIP is marked in red in order to highlight their electoral success.

	1945	1950	1951	1955	1959	1964	1966	1970	1974	1979	1983	1987	1992	1997	2001	2005	2010
Labour	393	315	295	277	258	317	363	287	319	268	209	229	271	418	412	356	258
Conservatives	213	297	321	344	365	304	253	330	276	339	397	375	336	165	166	198	306
Liberal	10	9	6	6	6	9	12	6	13	11	23	22					
Liberal Democrats													20	46	52	62	57
BNP												**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
UKIP														**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**

---

[66] UK Political Info Online, 2012

The (New) Radical Right in the United Kingdom

Political Movements

Historically the British far-right can be framed as weak, with the post-Second World War years seeing virtually no organized far-right groups nor political movements. Yet, with the merging of various scattered neo-fascist movements such as the White Defense League and the National Labor Party, into the newly established British National Party in 1960, the first nationally operating and well-organized far-right element in the country marked its political presence. The BNP's party doctrine being based on the restriction of immigration to the United Kingdom from the former British colonies at first attracted some political and electoral attention but collapsed due to internal rivalries during the 1979 general elections. Since then: ' The BNP's support in any electoral contest has almost always been below 5 percent of the vote, usually hovering in the 1-2 per cent range.'[67]

According to extensive research by Goodwin and Evans in 2011, the BNP electorate and basis of support rests on a majority of people from lower social classes, poorly informed about domestic and international events, with high levels of distrust towards the concept of 'diversity' in the country manifested in anti-immigration stances and express severe anxiety over the portrayed 'Islamization' of the united Kingdom with three-quarters of the BNP voters strongly disagreeing with the notion that Islam does not pose a threat to the West.[68]

Additionally, the British National Front, founded in 1967 has been a traditionally white-supremacy party, reaching its highest levels of electoral support in the late 1970's, gaining 0.6 % of the national vote in the 1979 elections, with the latter being a clear result of the BNP, the BNF's main competitor's collapse. [69] With the main ideological party foundations resting on the resentment to immigration, a strong stance against 'American Imperialism' and calls for a retreat of the UK from NATO and the European Union. Moreover, the BNF incorporated the propagation of capital punishment and 'historical revisionism', leading to political confrontations with the BNP with the National Front claiming that the attempted self-portrayal of the BNP as moderate and inclusive meant selling out its core principles of anti-Zionism and racial superiority.

---

[67] Hansen, 2000, 6
[68] Goodwin, 2011, 4
[69] Husbands, 1979, 2

The electoral support for the party has waned, with the 2010 elections marking the failure of the BNF to gain any representation at the national or local level, a trend that commenced with the party leadership of the Conservatives being handed over to Margaret Thatcher, giving the Tories an increasingly right-wing political undertone, addressing problems such as immigration and integration that were previously exclusively aimed at by the far-right as the basis of their political existence. The latter failure of the NF to navigate in Britain's political two-party system, where both Labor and the Conservatives have successfully managed to fill the 'grey' zone to the respective left and right of their own political framework, an important aspect that will be addressed later in this research framework. Finally, with its core ideology being based upon the opposition to further European integration, since its founding, the United Kingdom Independence Party has incorporated a wide range of NRR policies, offering a mixture of: ' nationalist, xenophobic, Eurosceptic and populist elements.'[70]

Openly calling for a return of border control, ending the promotion of 'multiculturalism' by the national government and organizations funded with public money, the removal of 'benefits' for 'immigrants' wanting to 'remain' and calling for the repelling of the 'Human Rights Act', designed to parallel UK law with the European Convention on Human Rights, entering into force on the second of October 2000[71] - The UKIP has been one of the most recently visible and well-organized NRR parties operating in the British political landscape. Moreover, known for its aims to foster trans-national cooperation, the UKIP has invited Dutch Freedom Party strongman Geert Wilders to show his anti-Islam movie 'Fitna' in the House of Lords, leading to the national government banning Wilders from entering the country, a measure that was later appealed and eventually overruled by the British Supreme Court.

---

[70] Goodwin, 2011, 7
[71] Goodwin, 2011, 8

In the British NRR landscape, an important distinction needs to be made between political movements, openly aiming to gain political representation through democratic means at the communal, regional or national level and street movements, here defined as a: 'grass roots social force, supposedly bringing community resilience against 'Muslim extremism.' [72]

A recent NRR street movement has been the English Defense League, founded in June 2009 as a street-movement, advocating policy matters on a single issue basis, namely campaigning to: 'protest against radical Islam's encroachment into the lives of non-Muslims, meaning being opposed to the creeping Islamization of our country. ' [73]

Even though the EDL can be framed as an anti-Islam 'social movement' based on a form of (cross) community organization, as a result of the party being affiliated with a BNP offshoot named the British Freedom Party, EDL members are facilitated and eligible to stand candidate in elections. With the movement being based in London and including mostly young and dis-illusioned males, a significant difference between the EDL and other NRR parties in the country is the party's stated attempt to include members from 'all races, faiths and political persuasions. ' [74] - A matter that has obstructed potential cooperation between the EDL and other NRR parties and has been the basis of frequent attacks on the party leadership, comparable to the criticism of the BNF on the BNP, mentioned previously, exemplifying the high level of fractionalization that has marked the British NRR historically. Regardless of the BDL affiliation with a BNP offshoot, the origins of the EDL: 'do not lie in the established or traditional radical right, but in several pre-existing ultra-patriotic, 'anti-Jihadist' organizations that have evolved from within the football casual subculture over recent years, as these groups such as March for England, were early prototypes for the EDL.'[75]

While in the United Kingdom the electoral support for either the traditional far-right or the NRR has remained small, with voting thresholds never exceeding more than two percent of the voters[76], the latter does not mean nor indicate that the phenomenon of an upcoming NRR does not exist.

Yet, compared to for example The Netherlands, the NRR has over the years played a role of very limited political significance and has therefore by many scholars been labeled as 'politically irrelevant.'[77]

---

[72] Copsey, 2010, 2
[73] Goodwin, 2011, 4
[74] English Defence League Online
[75] Copsey, 2010, 6
[76] Carter, 2005, 21
[77] Hansen, 2000, 11

In the modern day political landscape both the BNP, BNF, the EDL and UKIP have not managed to grasp the support of their electorate in national elections, this mainly due to a poor financial situation and internal splits, a phenomenon that has also been apparent in the political structure of the English Defense League and the BNF where internal fractionalization: 'Pits the EDL 'Infidels' faction, strongest in the north of the country, against EDL activists from the South and the Midlands, whereas the 'Infidels' hark back to the street fascism of the 1980's, working closely with the remnants of the National Front, this disrupts the EDL strategy of maintaining a moderate façade, claiming to oppose Islam without supporting racism or violence.'[78]

Important to note is that the weak political framework under which the British NRR operates does not mean that: ' the grievances they exploit have gone away.'[79] According to UK based think-tank Demos in 2011, the basis of support for the NRR in the UK lies in the perception of a 'cultural threat' in sharp contrast to the often portrayed economic and material argument that focuses on levels of unemployment and social mobility, indicating that the national economic output would have little effect on the levels of NRR support.

British Immigration Policy in Historical Perspective

Islam currently constitutes the second-largest religious community in the United Kingdom, with the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life estimating the number of Muslim adherents being 2.9 million, compromising 4.6 % of the British population.[80]
The majority of British Muslims are (former) immigrants from South Asia, notably Pakistan and India, accounting for around two-thirds' of Britain's Muslim population [81] with other notable groups including Malaysians, Nigerians, Somalis and Ugandans. Britain's Muslims population consists predominantly of people immigrating to the United Kingdom in the period between the 1950's and 1970's when substantial numbers of Indians and Pakistani's traveled to the United Kingdom in search of a better life, with post-colonial void resulting in wages that were up to 30 times higher in the UK than in for example their native Pakistan.[82] With the 'Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 and the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1968, family reunification became possible, hereby making the settlement of immigrants more permanent.[83]

---

[78] Collins, 2011
[79] Collins, 2011
[80] Field, 2010
[81] BBC, 2009
[82] BBC, 2009
[83] Abbas, 2005, 23

With the 1990's seeing a substantial degree of economic prosperity, the alliance of liberals and social-democrats dominating the Western political landscape and increasing exposure to significant waves of immigration, the political notion of 'multiculturalism', here defined as the: 'respect for pluralism of other cultures. ' [84] - Has been prevalent in many Western European countries, leading the way of what was back then termed; 'the basis of a (supra-national) societal project with universal aspirations, with multiculturalism functioning as the most sophisticated and humane political system.' [85]

Yet, with the changing political atmosphere in the post 9/11 world and the recent rise of NRR political parties thriving on an exclusionary anti-immigration and anti-Islamic discourse have marked what many scholars deem the 'end of multiculturalism'.

In the United Kingdom the criticism of the concept of multiculturalism and the NRR's anti-Islamic appeal has been marked by the 'Rushdie affair' of the late 1980's, when the publication of Rushdie's novel titled 'the Satanic Verses' caused major Muslim resentment with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issuing a so called 'Fatwa', allowing the killing of Rushdie in 1989, 9/11 and the terrorist attacks in the London subway on the 7th of July 2005. The Rushdie affair for some indicated: ' an irrational response to a legitimate expression of disgust at an offensive publication, it also led many in the liberal intelligentsia to see it as a problem of multiculturalism; that is, too great an emphasis was placed upon diversity at the expense of unity. ' [86] Yet, the official British policy has historically been one based on the incorporation of multicultural integration, a strong tradition of freedom of speech and religious interpretation and equality of opportunity. With the British government indicating that it has moved away from: 'its inherently postwar assimilationist principles and now seeks to develop a multicultural society in which the term 'British' can simultaneously refer to all cultures. ' [87]

Tracing the political dimension it becomes clear that: 'notions of cultural and social identification of the 'other' stem from an understanding and experience of imperialism and colonialism. As a result of British laissez-faire mercantilism and later capitalism, Muslims immigrants have traditionally had a minimal contributory role within the socio-economic and socio-political milieu of society. '[88]

The political designation and attitude of Tony Blair's New Labor during the beginning of the 2000's has been marked by a move away from traditional 'multiculturalism' with notably low levels of government interference in migrant communities, towards a renewed emphasis on 'assimilation'.

'Blair's Britain is defining a new ethnicity – Englishness as opposed to Britishness in an era of globalization and devolution.'[89]

---

[84] Sniderman, 2007, 8
[85] Shadid, 2002, 17
[86] Cherribi, 2011, 49
[87] Cherribi, 2011, 51
[88] Cherribi, 2011, 52
[89] Cherribi, 2011, 52

The alienation of Muslim communities in Britain's inner-city migrants have led portrayed feelings of exclusion and weak levels of social mobility. At the same time the political debate has continuously emphasized the notion of 'Britishness': 'a red herring that is an attempt to shift the focus from cultural pluralism or multiculturalism and toward mono-culturalism or cultural imperialism.'[90]

While British Prime Minister David Cameron in a speech at the Munich Security Conference on the 5th of February, 2011[91] named the 'question of identity' and weak identification with 'British values' and the 'British nation' as the main reasons for religious extremism in the country and subsequent negative responses by the British society and political discourse, a recent study by the Gallup Polling Agency[92] showed stronger levels of identification with the British 'nation' and national institutions for British Muslims than those experienced by other British citizens.

In the case of the United Kingdom, recent experiences of neo-colonialism, decolonization and immigration have greatly shaped perceptions of Islam, a study by the Runnymede Trust, already in 1997 as an important think thank stated that: ' Islamophobia is created analogously to xenophobia, which is the disdain or dislike of all things 'foreign'. The fear of Islam is mixed with racist hostility to immigration with Islamic cultures being perceived as substantially different from other cultures.'[93]

Something specific about the British context is the fact that whereas the notion of 'racial discrimination' has been incorporated by British legislation, protection of 'religious discrimination' is limited as the United Kingdom maintains a legislative system where: ' Protection is limited to religious communities who are also ethnically defined through case law, namely people from Jewish and Sikh community backgrounds in Britain. '[94] Yet, the United Kingdom has seen a sharp rise on political participation of minorities in general, and Muslims in particular. With the number of Muslim MP's being doubled at the last elections in 2010[95], and with the non-appearance of political movements aiming to ban minarets or the 'niqab' as seen in notably France, The Netherlands and Switzerland, finding no British political and societal support, one might argue that the significant political participation on both a national and local level has in fact led to a general acceptance of Muslims in the national political scene.

---

[90] Cherribi, 2011, 56
[91] Cameron, 2011
[92] Esposito, 2008, 2
[93] Cherribi, 2011, 57
[94] Cherribi, 2011, 72
[95] Adetunji, 2010

4. Points of Overlap and Difference

This chapter will aim to show the similarities and differences in the ways of operating and basis of support for the NRR in both countries. Starting with points of overlap it will be made clear how there are similar patterns of NRR political behavior on a cross-country basis, after which the points of difference part will explore the most notable differences.

4.1 Points of Overlap

'Both Britain and The Netherlands have promoted multiculturalism to expand opportunities for minorities to enjoy a better life and to win a respected place of their own in their new society, it is all the more unfortunate, that the outcome has been the opposite – to encourage exclusion rather than inclusion with the policy put in place to achieve conciliation has created division – certainly of majority against minority, perhaps also of minority against majority.'[96]

Important to note is that the recent rise of NRR political parties, their coverage in the public media and electoral support have been a fairly recent phenomenon, starting at the beginning of the 1990's when the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial society led to the previously mentioned 'political space' or demand for NRR groupings as traditional forms of 'national identity' and stability become eroded and a wide range of mostly lower-class voters felt un-protected and represented by the traditional parties operating in the political arena, especially when connected to rising numbers of immigration and a decrease in employment opportunities.

As a result of the dissatisfaction with 'traditional' politics, voters in both countries have followed the tendency to become less aligned with mainstream political parties, resulting in increasingly low levels of party identification and party membership. With levels of party membership in The Netherlands nearing approximately 2.5 % in 2009 and 1.21 % in the United Kingdom[97], a trend has emerged where the 'traditional' sources of political mobilization have shifted, following the pursuit of increasing globalization, relying more and more on modern forms of communication to reach the potential electorate. With the 'new radical right' parties becoming so firmly covered by the popular media and the electorate placing political issues such as 'immigration' and 'integration', mostly propagated by the NRR, on the top list of political priorities, the so called 'demand' for political incentives such as the restriction of immigration, a tougher stance on organized crime and the denoted 'Islamization' of Dutch and British society, leads to the emergence and solidification of NRR parties. Illustrating the latter: ' When asked about their most important area of concern in 2006, whilst their EU counterparts

---

[96] Cherribi, 2011, 75
[97] Van Biezen, 2011, 26

ranked immigration fourth (behind unemployment, crime and the economic situation) UK respondents placed immigration on top, followed by terrorism and crime. [98]

The latter can be framed closely identical in The Netherlands where in a recent survey by the Transatlantic Trend Poll, 27% of the Dutch indicated that according to them too many immigrants were present in the country and that the traditional political parties had failed in decreasing immigration levels.[99] Yet a difference here has been the relative levels of governmental support and trust and time frame of emergence of the NRR, a point that will be addressed later in this research.

With specific regard to the role of the public media, where media coverage can function as legitimizing force, expressing the traditionally neglected 'direct concerns' of the electorate. ' Empirical research produced from an examination of press coverage of the immigration issue between 1998 and 2003, for instance, reveals a strong correlation between peaks in coverage of immigration and coverage of the British National Party.' [100] - with the latter 'legitimization' forming a key political argument for the NRR, the perceived and sometimes overtly projected 'demand' for political ideas framed under the banner of anti-immigration, anti-Islamism and a renewed emphasis on the 'identity' serve and project the NRR as potential political 'alternative' on the supply side, breaking with the 'traditional' politics that they claim has distanced the voters from the political arena. A latter notable similarity can be seen in the Dutch political landscape, in particular regard to PVV frontman Geert Wilders, where as previously mentioned, according to a number of scholars such as Ian Buruma, the significant coverage and manipulation of the popular media by anti-Islamic politicians such as Geert Wilders has had a direct effect on the portrayal of the; ' negative characteristics of migrants and enlarges the sphere of fear. ' – Resulting in a clear political gain for the NRR[101]

Moreover, according to Buruma, the significant coverage and manipulation of the popular media by anti-Islamic politicians such as Nick Griffin and Geert Wilders has had a direct effect on the portrayal of the; ' negative characteristics of migrants and enlarges the sphere of fear.' [102] Increasingly functioning as the 'significant other', Foucault's particular notion of the 'outsider' that is articulated as a mirroring image of the 'true self': 'helping one to articulate the inner truth of one's authentic, unique identity.' [103] - has been projected as the main opposition to the traditional 'national identity' and state, yet this concept of the 'nation-state', heavily defended by the Dutch NRR manifested in most notably Geert Wilders, plays an ambiguous double role.

---

[98]Goodwin, 2007, 242
[99] BBC Online, 2011

[101] Esposito, 2011, 43
[102] Esposito, 2011, 43
[103] Forestal, 2009, 7

Framing the nation-state as the key concept of NRR rhetoric, openly advocating a Dutch and British retreat from the European Union and a re-evaluation of supra-national commitments on the one hand, parties such as the BNP, the Freedom Party and UKIP clearly advocate the appeal to defend Western-Europe culture against that 'other', implying the continuous internalization of the migrants different cultural loyalty, hereby extending the national-identity to a wider European 'culture', on the other, with the debate shifting from problems related to immigration and inter-cultural cohesion to the identity level: ' The 'West' and its open societies are no longer the result of a century-long, historical fight for its liberties, yet are portrayed as the 'essence' of a European 'identity' and 'civilization'

The political discourse in both The Netherlands and the United Kingdom has seen a shift away from the previous framework of 'multiculturalism', towards a framework marked by a more prominent form of 'national identity'. In response to the latter, with the main preoccupation of the integrationist paradigm being targeted at the incorporation of Muslims citizens, the political discourse has moved to classify its Muslim community as either 'good Muslims' following a government-based scheme of community assimilation path, or as 'bad Muslims' clinging to retain their culture and religious practices. For example: ' in the summer of 2001 the racist British National Party began explicitly to distinguish between good, law-abiding Asians and Asian Muslims. '[104]

Whereas, opposition to Islam and the traditional political establishment can in both countries be seen as the driving force behind NRR rhetoric and electoral support, a significant similarity of NRR political groups in The Netherlands and the UK can be labeled the trans-national appeal, forging ties and presenting its message across the national borders. In contrast to the NRR's political objection to the supra-national project of European integration: ' rather than the rise of the radical right emerging as separate national parties that simply stand opposed to the EU, we see that the parties are in fact using the arena in which to develop their trade. As such, the way NRR parties operate and the ideas that they bring forward from the fringes of the mainstream, are not born in isolation but are subject to wider European influences.'[105]

Although NRR political groupings such as the Freedom Party in The Netherlands have tried to firmly distance themselves from European counterparts, especially street movements such as the BDL that might damage their political legitimacy, a number of pan-European meetings have taken place with Wilders traveling to the United Kingdom on a number of occasions to express support and show his anti-Islam movie 'Fitna', facilitated by amongst others the UKIP.

---

[104] Abbas, 2005, 37
[105] Shearman, 2011

Finally, in both cases terrorism-related events such as the London bombings, the assassination of Theo van Gogh and Pim Fortuyn, have greatly influenced and shaped the rise of the NRR. In the case of the murder of Fortuyn, eight days before the general elections, the party rocketed a political victory, gaining 24 seats, hereby becoming the second-largest party in the parliament. Whereas in the United Kingdom there have been no direct elections surrounding the London bombings on the seventh of July 2005, one can see that with the election campaign of the NRR often referring to the bombings, the share of votes for the BNP tripled from 0.7% in 2005 to 1.9% in 2010.[106]

---

[106] Murray, 2012

4.2 Points of Difference

Returning to the Demand-side theoretical framework, whereas the UK has historically seen a fairly significant gap between the political elite and the so called 'man on the street', where between the early 1970's and the mid 1990's there has been a progressive decline in the number of people thinking the political system did not need much improvement[107], The Netherlands has seen relatively high levels of governmental trust, often contrasting with international electoral trends such as in the 1980's and 1990's.[108] Yet, where in 1998, two-thirds of the Dutch population claimed their government was doing a good job, by 2002 this number drastically dropped to one third of the population, compared to one fourth in the United Kingdom. [109] Additionally, a key explanation for the discrepancy in NRR support in The Netherlands and the United Kingdom draws on the previously mentioned coalition theory. According to Tim Bale, Political Scientist at the University of Sussex, the British two-party system with its centrifugal ability to incorporate political issues from a wide political spectrum in its bi-party environment, has succeeded in the 'mainstreaming' of far right parties. By adopting some of the far right's themes, it legitimized them and increased both their salience and the seats it brought into an expanded right bloc.' [110]

A theoretical framework put forward by Maurice Duverger[111] explains the difficulty NRR parties experience when operating within a two-party system as seen in the United Kingdom by stating that: 'voters gradually desert the weak parties on the grounds that they have no chances of winning' [112].
In the latter explanation, also labeled the 'wasted vote concept': 'Voters tend to abandon a third party in the political system in order to concentrate their votes on the two strongest parties, this tendency towards polarization, a psychological phenomenon, strengthens the mechanical factors conducive to a two-party system.' [113] The prospect and expectation by the electorate that the respective party won't be able to compete with the already established dominant political parties in turn strengthens the position of the two dominant parties.[114] This latter 'absorption' of marginal and newly established political factions in a two-party system stands in sharp contrast with the Dutch political landscape marked by the *poldermodel* of political agreement and coalition-forming, where relatively smaller parties can be decisive in gaining a majority in parliament.

[107] Bovens, 2009, 3
[109] Bovens, 2009, 12
[110] Bale, 2010, 2
[111] Duverger, 1972, 24
[112] Benoit, 2006, 72
[113] Duverger, 1972, 25
[114] Halikiopoulou, 2011

A good example of this is the recent political construction where allowing the NRR Freedom Party of Geert Wilders to enter the government construction proved to be the only possibility to form a center-right political bloc, clearly enhancing the Dutch NRR's prestige, legitimacy and ability to function as a deal-broker on terms relatively advantageous to itself. As a result of the difficulty to form an ideologically sound coalition, The Netherlands has seen a strong surge in government collapse, with the recent retreat of the Freedom Party from the coalition marking the fifth 'coalition crisis' in the past 10 years, where: 'Prime Minister Rutte came to power after general elections in 2010 that resulted in a deadlock with no clear majority at hand, illustrating the polarized political landscape in the country where after months of political wrangling, the Conservatives and Christian Democrats formed a minority government that could rely on the support of Wilders' party on some though not all issues.[115]

In his work 'Party Systems and Government Stability' Michael Taylor states that clearly anti-system parties, including contemporary NRR in the form of the Dutch 'Freedom Party': ' Have concentrated on the usual peaceful, democratic strategies of attempting to win seats in parliament, to become part of a government coalition, and, by bargaining with the government parties and by other means, to obtain favorable legislation. '[116] The appeal of NRR parties hereby becomes explained by their ability to perform according to the rules of the 'political gain', distancing themselves from connotations with neo-fascists and neo-Nazi organizations. Especially in the case of the Dutch political landscape, marked not only by plurality and proportional representation but also on the previously mentioned famous *poldermodel* where decision-making is based on cooperation and negotiation, parties with radical but clearly projected standpoints, directly appealing to the people's fear of Islam, have successfully distanced themselves from the 'old' radical right, widening their ideological agenda. A clear example of the latter is the Dutch Freedom Party's support for women's emancipation, homosexuality and Judaism, breaking with stereotypical notions of the traditional radical right, paving the road to broaden their potential electorate. On the contrary: ' this diversification of ideals and policies, however, is argued to have not been adopted by the British NRR in general and the BNP in particular, who are said to resemble the failures of the old, toxic, radical right.'[117]

The latter argument is connected with the so called charisma theory where the ability of the NRR to present itself as a viable alternative and credible political movement, with a specific focus on the rhetorical ability of its front-man in the contemporary age marking the importance of skillful interaction with the public media, has proved to be one of the decisive elements in measuring contemporary electoral support. A recent example of such a new generation of NRR political leaders can amongst others be named Geert Wilders of the Dutch Freedom Party, awarded with the prize for

---

[115] Janssen, 2012
[116] Taylor, 1971, 31
[117] Murray, 2012

'best politician of the year' in 2010, gaining 17.5 %[118] of the votes of preference by the viewers of the Dutch Public Television, hereby staying firmly ahead of Prime Minister Mark Rutte and the Socialist Party front-man Emile Roemer. Through Wilders' continuous denomination of the fact that he and with him the West is at 'war' with Islam in the eyes of his electoral base: ' Charismatic personal quality can become fused primarily with exceptional emotions or with belief in a particular faith or set of values.'[119] Following Max Weber, the expression of deep feelings of political passion and hatred, even though they might be founded on an exclusionary framework might create a form of 'admiration' of the electorate for the politician's 'emotional commitment' to his political initiatives. [120]

Additionally, the public trial of Wilders based on the claim that his political standpoints were inducing ethnic hatred and discrimination, and his latter acquittal in 2009 have reinforced his self-styled image of an anti-establishment fighter, determined to fight for his cause, providing him not only with significant media coverage but also with some form of popular status with the masses.

In sharp contrast to the latter, the British NRR has not seen a thriving electoral push by its use of charismatic leaders. The initial emergence of Nick Griffin as the leader of the BNP marked a relative increase of popular support, yet poor political performances in the public media, including his defense of the Ku Klux Klan on the British political debating show 'On Time', viewed by 8 million British citizens[121] marked the downfall of the BNP and indicate the importance of political 'delivery' in a highly globalized context. The latter: 'emotional appeal of the leader, driven by his own inner calling, causes an effectively internalized response because he can generate ecstasy, euphoria, resentment and politically relevant passions in his followers who feel united with him by an emotional bond.' [122] - indicates where the Dutch NRR has made great headway with Geert Wilders' charismatic personality instilling a great deal of support and actual compassion after his acquittal from the hate-speech charges. This in sharp contrast with the United Kingdom, where after the initial rise in popularity, Nick Griffin, previously designated as the new 'face' of the British NRR, failed to transmit his message, establish close contact with the electorate and perform well in the popular media, leading to the perception that: ' as a public figure he is now regarded as a liability during the parties recent slump in support.' [123]

---

[118] DutchNews Online, 2010
[119] Schweitzer, 1974, 41
[120] Schweitzer 1974, 46
[121] Goodwin, 2011
[122] Goodwin, 2011
[123] Murray, 2012

Focusing on the projected levels of 'threat' to the 'national identity' functioning as a trigger for NRR support it becomes important to note here is that in the context of the United Kingdom there has been a political tradition of: 'deep suspicion of extremes and an innate tendency not to interpret crisis as systemic and hence calling for radical alternatives. '[124] - An important foundation for the explanation of lower levels of electoral support for the NRR as the perceived threat to the national 'identity' has been perceived as less permanent, hereby creating leeway for other major political parties to pick up the issue and incorporate it in the mainstream of the political discourse. The latter in sharp contrast with The Netherlands where the political upheaval surrounding the murder of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh have created to a form of 'mass-hysteria' where the presence of immigrants and Islam have been portrayed as a major threat to the 'national identity'.

However, according to a recent study by the European Commission [125] tracing the level of opposition to immigration and immigrants' presence, one could conclude that the levels of popular resentment were located relatively close to each other, having a mean of 0.50 in the United Kingdom and 0.49 in The Netherlands. An additional survey by the German-Marshal Fund in 2009 claimed that: 'one in five Britons, twice the European average, thought immigration was the most important issue facing the country, also, two out of three Britons, more than in all other countries surveyed, including France, Germany, Italy, Spain and The Netherlands, thought immigration was more of a problem than an opportunity.' [126] Besides indicating the potentially poor accuracy of public surveys, the latter approximation of immigrant attitudes marks the potential failure of the theoretical frameworks in explaining the apparent different levels of NRR support in both countries, including the notable problem with public polls, as regional differences within a particular national context might play an important role in the potential support for NRR political discourse: 'it may be the case that regions with lots of foreigners exhibit high vote-shares for radical right parties on the grounds that voters have more direct contact with immigrations, however, it may also be the case that voters in regions with small numbers of immigrants are just as likely to vote for the extreme right because they fear an influx of immigrants into their region.'[127]

Finally, in the theory of cultural diversification, the recent Dutch political framework marked by relatively high levels of NRR support has portrayed a possible solution of socio-economic problems of migrants and the general levels of societal coherence, if migrants distance themselves from their particular cultural background and fully assimilate in Dutch society. Incorporating strong forms of societal pressure, the Dutch political landscape faces the danger of becoming stranded in an 'us versus them' paradigm, with harsh anti-Islamic political discourse only leading to increased experiences of

---

[124] Griffin, 2001
[125] Sides, 2007, 480
[126] Traynor, 2009
[127] Golder, 2003, 444

alienation and exclusion. The political opposition under the lead of the *Partij van de Arbeid,* the Dutch Labour Party and the *Socialistische Partij* are currently in the phase of trying to provide a different narrative based on 'functionalist theory' stressing the threat of disrupted 'majority'-'minority' relations based on the claim that: ' it is not functional for a society to become severely divided along the lines of ethnicity, race or religion. '[128]

The opposition's aim to create a more 'inclusive' political sound where cultural differences between the dominant and minority group can be prevented, have yet been overshadowed by the current politico-societal phenomenon of deeply rooted mistrust of Islam, a polling sample of 1100 respondents carried out by the established Dutch polling agency NIPO for TV Channel RTL showed that in 2007, 25% of the Dutch view Muslim presence in The Netherlands as something negative, compared to 20% who have a positive view and 55% who claimed to be neutral. Strikingly, in a survey carried out by the University of Leiden's department of Political Science in 2007, where based on personal interviews with approximately 600 Dutch pupils aged 12-18, across different educational levels, showed that slightly more than 50% of the Dutch youngsters held negative viewpoints towards the issue of Islam in the country, compared to 40% having a positive perspective, not deeming a very hopeful outlook for the co-existence of future generations of Dutchmen. [129] Whereas one has to note that the popular resentment against immigration in general and Islam in particular has been apparent in the United Kingdom in the same manner as in The Netherlands, the mediation or so called channelization of these sentiments has been: 'mediated through officially non-racist channels, rather than through protest parties: the right-wing of the Conservative Party, especially under the former Home Office minister Ann Widdecombe and the Labour Party that have jointly retained Britain's draconian immigration laws intact.'[130]

What the previous overview of NRR discrepancies in The Netherlands and the United Kingdom put forward is the importance that needs to be attributed to the electoral system the NRR operates in. Whereas the British national electoral framework has seen the ability by the two large parties, namely the Conservatives and Labour, to incorporate more extreme political elements into the 'mainstream', the Dutch multi-party system and resulting coalition-government have not only allowed 'political space' for NRR parties but have also strengthened their bargaining position in respect to government formation where marginal political support can already be decisive in gaining a majority needed to govern. The latter points are illustrated by the contrast between the previously mentioned British European and national elections, where a change in the electoral system has resulted in the clear gain of political ground for the British NRR.

---

[128] Van der Veen, 2006
[129] Wubbels, 2007
[130] Griffin, 2001

6. Conclusion

'Albeit the general consensus is that, with slight variation, contemporary far-right parties in Western Europe emerged at a similar time (i.e. the 1990's onwards). '[131] For some scholars, the failure of British radical right parties to attain prominence in national politics can be linked to the internalized view of the United Kingdom being a historically democratic and exposed, tolerant nation. The latter builds on a consensus that civic, democratic political life in the UK deems the exclusion of hatred and racism as part of the political tradition. However, political expansion, yet marginal, has countered the previous assumption.

Although there have been similar circumstances in which the NRR has emerged in both countries: a departure from the previous framework of multiculturalism, general patterns of decreasing alignment with traditional political parties and a clear emphasis on feelings of political mistrust against the establishment, there have been a number of key differences that have resulted in different levels of political success for the NRR.

Tracing the core research question of this work: Which factors account for a discrepancy in the levels of political success of the New Radical Right in The Netherlands and the United Kingdom? - What can be labeled as a key element in explaining why the 'new radical right' in the United Kingdom has not flourished to the extent it has in continental Holland is for the reason that British parties have been significantly less successful in detaching themselves from the historical stigma of linkages to fascism and the legacy of neo-Nazism; ' Movements such as the National Front remained too closely aligned to the 'fascist tradition', with their leadership, organization and policies too heavily influenced by Nazism. Historically the British far right has refrained from adopting the more successful innovative appeals and have remained committed to radical neo-fascism, overt xenophobia, 'classical' conceptions of race based upon biological lines and an outright rejection of parliamentary democracy and liberal democratic practice generally.' [132] This in sharp contrast to the 'new radical right' in The Netherlands embodied by charismatic PVV frontman Geert Wilders who has openly distanced himself from neo-fascism, often recalling his strong pro-Israel stance and public condemnation of for example the English Defence League. [133] Herbert Kitschelt, political scientist at Duke University of North Carolina has claimed that: ' At no point in British history did far-right leaders subscribe to a 'winning' formula, where adherence to political violence and street-based marches, blunt racist discourse, anti-

---

[131] Goodwin, 2007, 243
[132] Goodwin, 2007, 244
[133] DutchNews Online, 2010

Semitism and general nostalgia for fascism have combined to ensure that, historically, the far right in Britain has starved itself of any sense of political legitimacy. ' [134]

Additionally, the political structure of the British two-party system has led to the filtering and incorporation of political extremes, in sharp contrast to the Dutch multi-party system that has left a 'political space' for the NRR, often depending on the formation of coalition governments and political compromise. Although the similar 'under-belly' feelings in both countries have been apparent, their translation into a political response has taken a clearly distinctive path. Whereas, the Dutch NRR in the form of Geert Wilder's Freedom Party has skillfully used the trait of personal charisma as a way to operate in the political and media landscape, become an established figure in the political debate, the British NRR has failed to find a representative figure that could widen the NRR base of support and lead to a form of general acceptance in the political discourse.

The need will remain for future research to continuously monitor developments in the swiftly changing NRR party family in order to be able to provide accurate analysis and explanations for such phenomena.

---

[134] Goodwin, 2007, 248

7. Bibliography

Abbas, T. (2005). *Muslims britain: Communities under pressure*. London: Zed Books Ltd. Retrieved from

http://books.google.nl/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=GDMTeC_WB0oC&oi=fnd&pg=PR8&dq=islamophobia britain&ots=wRx_4IAmlb&sig=VaOL7FcEIpY8T2f9Ej7f0wHbwHg

Adetunji, J. (2010, May 7). General election 2010: First female muslim mp's elected. *The Guardian Online*. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/may/07/general-election-female-muslim-mps

Alesina, A. (1988). Credibility and policy convergence in a two-party system. *The American Economic Review*, *78*(4), Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/1811177

Backes, U. (2011). *The extreme right in europe: Current trends and perspectives*. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Retrieved from http://books.google.nl/books/about/The_Extreme_Right_in_Europe.html?id=RBnmachN8vkC&redir_esc=y

Bale, T. (2010). Cinderella and her ugly sisters: The mainstream and extreme right in europe's bipolarising party systems. *West European Politics*, *26*(3), Retrieved from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402380312331280598

Bartlett, J. (2011, July 25). Rise of the radical right. *Foreign Affairs Online*, Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/25/rise_of_the_radical_right?page=full

Bauer, W. (2010). Rechtspopulismus in europa: Vergangliches phanomen oder auf dem weg zum politischen mainstream?. *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*,

Benoit, K. (2006). Duverger's law and the study of electoral systems. *Palgrave McMillan Journals*, *4*(1), 69-83. Retrieved from http://www.palgrave-journals.com/fp/journal/v4/n1/full/8200092a.html

Betz, H. (1993). *The new politics of resentment: Radical right wing populist parties in western europe*. New York: City University of New York. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/422034?uid=3738736&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=56094380283

Betz, H. (2002). Globalization, the welfare state and right-wing populism. *Socio-Economic Review*, *1*, 215-245. Retrieved from http://pratiquesciencessociales.net/exposes/S8. Globalization Welfare state and right-wing populism in Western Europe.pdf

Bovens, M. (2009). Deciphering the dutch drop: Ten explanations for decreasing political trust in the netherlands. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Retrieved from http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/USBO/2009-0818-200204/Deciphering the Dutch Drop.pdf

Blinder, S. (2009). Keynesian economics. In *Library of Economics and Liberty* (2 ed.). Retrieved from http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/KeynesianEconomics.html

Blinder, S. (2012). Uk public opinion towards immigration: Overall attitudes and level of concern. *University of Oxford COMPAS*, Retrieved from http://migrobs.vm.bytemark.co.uk/sites/files/migobs/Public Opinion-Overall Attitudes and Level of Concern v3.pdf

British people top immigration anxiety survey. (2011, February 4). *BBC Online*. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12362464

Cameron, D. (2011, February 5). *Pm's speech at munich security conference*. Retrieved from http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference/

Carter, E. (2005). *The extreme right in western-europe: Success or failure?*. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Retrieved from http://books.google.nl/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=VKdHGR4KxXYC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=extreme right britain&ots=0PC8CxWQMl&sig=J_4lz1sS8MCpkPsE7WK82IexZYI

Cherribi, S. (2011). *Islamophobia: The challenge of puralism in the 21st century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved from http://books.google.nl/books?id=0WngXttmqjYC&pg=PA47&lpg=PA47&dq=islamophobia the netherlands&source=bl&ots=c8jdVuGNIN&sig=t_afJSfoR921ZkX7n1iXywzEmrM&hl=nl&sa=X&ei=ntiPT_XqO5OY1AXb-e2CAg&ved=0CG0Q6AEwCA

Collins, M. (2011, November 16). Far from growing, rightwing extremism in the uk may be on the wane. *Guardian Online*. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/nov/16/far-growing-rightwing-extremism-wane

Copsey, N. (2010). The english defence league: Challenging our country and our values of social inclusion, fairness and equality. *Faith Matters*, Retrieved from http://faith-matters.org/images/stories/fm-reports/english-defense-league-report.pdf

Defining islamophobia: University of california berkeley center for race and gender. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://crg.berkeley.edu/content/islamophobia/defining-islamophobia

Dutch parliament online: Election results 1918-2010. (2012, May 15). Retrieved from http://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/Na1918/Verkiezingsuitslagen.aspx?VerkiezingsTypeId=1

Duverger, M. (1972). Factors in two-party and multi-party systems: The technical factor, the electoral system. *Party Politics and Pressure Groups*, Retrieved from http://janda.org/c24/Readings/Duverger/Duverger.htm

English defence league mission statement. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://englishdefenceleague.org/about-us/mission-statement/

Erikson, R. (2002). *The macro polity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from http://books.google.nl/books?id=RYxYV87j6DIC&pg=PA36&lpg=PA36&dq=disillusioned voter theory&source=bl&ots=Asn33c3A-v&sig=1TbjAauosxkckEIWT8JdNQUiDdI&hl=nl&sa=X&ei=IsiPT9nUOeTH0QWY7tXhAQ&ved=0CCUQ6AEwAA

Esposito, J. (2008). *Who speaks for islam: What a billion muslims really think.* Washington DC: Gallup Press. Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/press/104209/who-speaks-islam-what-billion-muslims-really-think.aspx

Esposito, J. (2011). *Islamophobia: The challenge of pluralism in the 21st century.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved from http://books.google.nl/books?id=0WngXttmqjYC&pg=PA47&lpg=PA47&dq=islamophobia the netherlands&source=bl&ots=c8jdVuGNIN&sig=t_afJSfoR921ZkX7n1iXywzEmrM&hl=nl&sa=X&ei=ntiPT_XqO5OY1AXb-e2CAg&ved=0CG0Q6AEwCA

Extreemrechts in nederlands. (2006, February 24). Retrieved from http://tegenlicht.vpro.nl/nieuws/2006/februari/extreemrechts-in-nederland.html

45

Field, C. (2010, September 21). *How many muslims? british religion in numbers*. Retrieved from http://www.brin.ac.uk/news/2010/how-many-muslims/

Forestal, J. (2009). Identity, distinction and action: Re-evaluating the self in the work of taylor, foucault and arendt. *Ohio State University*, Retrieved from http://citationmachine.net/index2.php?reqstyleid=2&mode=form&rsid=7&reqsrcid=APAJournalArticle&more=yes&nameCnt=1&help=

Gallagher, M. (2008). The politics of electoral systems. *Trinity College Dublin*, Retrieved from http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/

Gelman, A. (2001). How much does a vote count? voting power, coalitions and the electoral college. *California Institute of Technology*, Retrieved from http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.28...rep

Ghorashi, H. (2003). Ayaan hirsi ali: Daring or dogmatic? debates on multiculturalism and emancipation in the netherlands. *Stichting Focaal*, Retrieved from http://www.kanak-attak.de/ka/down/pdf/amr/Halleh_Gorashi_Forum_Focaal_Final.pdf

Golder, M. (2003). Explaining variation in the succes of extreme right parties in western europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, *36*(4), 432-466. Retrieved from http://www.pratiquesciencessociales.net/exposes/S7. Explaining variation in the success of ERPs (Golder 2003).pdf

Goodwin, M. (n.d.). From voting to violence? far right extremism in britain. *Hope not Hate*, Retrieved from http://www.channel4.com/media/c4-news/images/voting-to-violence (7).pdf

Goodwin, M. (2007). Extreme right in britain: Still an 'ugly duckling' but for how long?. *The Political Quarterly*, *78*(2), Retrieved from http://nottingham.academia.edu/MatthewGoodwin/Papers/306028/The_Extreme_Right_in_Britain_Still_an_Ugly_Duckling_but_for_How_Long

Goodwin, M. (2011, May 21). Nick griffin and the fall of the bnp. *Guardian Online*. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/may/21/nick-griffin-bnp

Griffin, R. (2001). ' no racis, thanks, we're british. a survey of organized and un-organized right-wing populism in contemporary britain'. *University of Graz*, Retrieved from http://www-gewi.uni-graz.at/rpop/material/griffin.pdf

Guestworkers & islam in the netherlands. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press. Retrieved from http://dare.uva.nl/document/124668

Goodwin, M. (2012). The new radical right: Violent and non-violent movements in europe. *Institute of Strategic Dialogue*, Retrieved from http://www.strategicdialogue.org/ISD Far Right Feb2012.pdf

Green, J. (2003). Cultural and ethnic fundamentalism: The mixed potential for identity, liberation and oppression. *Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy*, Retrieved from http://www.uregina.ca/sipp/documents/pdf/SSfall03_green_final.pdf

Halikiopoulou, D. (2011). The nature of the british party system combined with the bnp's internal problems mean that it will be difficult for the extreme right to take advantage of the current economic crisis. *London School of Economics British Politics and Policy*, Retrieved from http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2012/01/06/bnp-2012/

Hansen, R. (2000). *Citizenship and immigration in post-war britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved from http://books.google.nl/books?id=UZNwYrFOI4sC&pg=PA224&lpg=PA224&dq=far right weak in britain&source=bl&ots=M27jBDB8GO&sig=lYYpMBVV-IBP6ux89upfRb5-sck&hl=nl&sa=X&ei=JveiT6jUMO304QT3qfGrCQ&ved=0CDoQ6AEwAw

History of islam in the uk. (2009, September 7). Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/uk_1.shtml

Husbands, C. (1979). The national front: What happens to it now?. *Marxism Today*, Retrieved from http://www.amielandmelburn.org.uk/collections/mt/pdf/09_79_268.pdf

Jackman, R. (1996). Conditions favouring parties of the extreme right in western europe. *British Journal of Political Science*, *26*(4), 501-521. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/194094

Janssen, R. (2012, April 23). The dutch government's fall will mean political deadlock for month's to come. *Guardian Online*. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/apr/23/dutch-government-political-deadlock-months

Koopmans, R. (2009). The rise of right-wing populist pim fortuyn in the netherlands: A discursive opportunity approach. *European Journal of Political Research*, *48*(5), 642-664. Retrieved from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.00846.x/full

Kopecek, L. (2007). The far right in europe: A summary of attempts to define the concept, analyze its identity, and compare the western european and eastern european far right. *Political Parties and Representation of Interests in Contemporary European Democracies*, Retrieved from http://www.cepsr.com/clanek.php?ID=318

Leamer, E. (1995). The heckscher-ohlin model in theory and practice. *Princeton Studies in International Finance*, *77*, Retrieved from http://www.princeton.edu/~ies/IES_Studies/S77.pdf

Murray, A. (2012). Why have far right parties been more succesful in some states than others. *e-International Relations*, Retrieved from http://www.e-ir.info/2012/01/24/why-have-some-far-right-parties-been-more-successful-in-some-states-than-others/

Netherlands: Political structure. (2009, July 1). Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/node/13939588

Pedahzur, A. (2002). The institutionalization of extreme right-wing charismatic parties: A paradox?. *Political Organizations and Parties Section of the American Political Science Association*, Retrieved from http://ppq.sagepub.com/content/8/1/31.full.pdf

Prins, B. (2002). Het lef om taboes te doorbreken: Nieuw realisme in het nederlandse discours over multiculturalisme. *Migranten Studies*, Retrieved from http://www.migrantenstudies.nl/wp-content/uploads/MS-2002-NR4-P241-254.pdf

Schweitzer, A. (1974). *Theory and political charisma*. (16 ed., Vol. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/178310?seq=5

Shadid, W. (2002). *Religious freedom and the neutrality of the state: The position of islam in the european union*. Leuven: Peeters. Retrieved from http://books.google.nl/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=taeJLgnCVx4C&oi=fnd&pg=PA158&dq=anti-islam&ots=Hk7QfoOW1p&sig=R0-eln-yVCm1DCJSJdUaXqd_qlE

Shearman, M. (2011). The european face of the far right - a transnational phenomenon?. *Europe and Me*, Retrieved from http://www.europeandme.eu/14brain/732-european-face-of-far-right?start=1

48

Sides, J. (2007). European opinion about immigration: The role of identities, interest and information. *British Journal of Political Science*, *37*, 477-504. Retrieved from http://home.gwu.edu/~jsides/immig.pdf

Sniderman, P. (2007). *When ways of life collide: Multiculturalism and its discontents in the netherlands*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Retrieved from http://books.google.nl/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=o9ZeGV2WL6oC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=multiculturalis m netherlands&ots=xhrupyY1nB&sig=q8M1Xu0sk0MAr1wPaxnaMFKTDus

Taylor, M. (1971). Party systems and government stability. *The American Political Science Review*, *65*(1), 28-37. Retrieved from http://www.econmsu.org/cmt2/lib/c/521/File/Party_Systems_and_Government_Stability.pdf

Traynor. (2009, December 3). Two in three britons think uk has immigration problem. *Guardian Online*. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/dec/03/british-against-eu-immigration-powers

Uk political info. (2012, May 28). Retrieved from http://www.ukpolitical.info/1945.htm

Uk: Political structure. (2008, September 23). Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/node/12031082

University of california berkeley: Defining islamophobia. (2012, May 12). Retrieved from http://crg.berkeley.edu/content/islamophobia/defining-islamophobia

Van Biezen, I. (2011). Going, going.gone: The decline of party membership in europe. *European Journal of Political Research*, *51*(1), 24-56. Retrieved from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.01995.x/full

van der Veen, W. (2006, April 21). *St mar'ys university: Theories of ethnic relations*. Retrieved from http://husky1.stmarys.ca/~evanderveen/wvdv/race_relations/theories_of_ethnic_relations.htm

Voerman, G. (1992). The extreme right in the netherlands. *European Journal of Political Research*, *22*(1), 35-54. Retrieved from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1992.tb00304.x/abstract;jsessionid=8E44EF46B2A510D97A1594AAEACBD556.d03t01?userIsAuthenticated=false&deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=

Whitehead, T. (2009, June 8). European elections 2009: Ukip claims political breakthrough. *The Telegraph*. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/5478468/European-elections-2009-Ukip-claims-political-breakthrough.html

Wilder's wins tv show's politician of the year award. (2010, December 14). *DutchNews*. Retrieved from http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2010/12/wilders_wins_tv_shows_politici.php

Wilders denounces english defence league demo. (2010, October 19). *DutchNews*. Retrieved from http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2010/10/wilders_denounces_english_defe.php

Wood, A. (1998). Globalisation and the rise in labour market inequalities. *The Economic Journal*, *108*(450), 1463-1482. Retrieved from http://www.crest.fr/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Pageperso/manondds/mondialisation/wood2.pdf

Wright, T. (2000). *The british political process: An introduction*. London: Routledge. Retrieved from http://books.google.nl/books?id=PYZ6dJKC8PoC&pg=PA12&lpg=PA12&dq=public confidence in british politics&source=bl&ots=7HVRTxXQW3&sig=CFi9uoPzpVScp8JDGlWJRXsw7eA&hl=nl&sa=X&ei=PF-ZT571MJOy8QP0qZSDBg&ved=0CEQQ6AEwAw

Wubbels, E. (2007, January 15). *Meerderheid jongeren negatief over moslims*. Retrieved from http://www.kennislink.nl/publicaties/meerderheid-jongeren-negatief-over-moslims

Zemni, S. (2008). Fitna en de teloorgang van de politiek. *Res Publica*, Retrieved from http://www.uitgeverijacco.be/download/nl/10052528/file/rp_2008-jg50-3_fitna_en_de_teloorgang_van_de_politiek.pdf