CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2012
| Author | Ivanova, Svetlana |
|---|---|
| Title | Russian State-owned Energy Companies through Principal-Agent Model |
| Summary | The objective of this work is to understand if Russian state-owned energy companies’ relationship with the Russian government can be characterized as a Principal-Agent relationship. The main criteria of the Principal-Agent Problem were drawn from the Principal-Agent Model and the Gazprom case was examined according to these criteria, assuming, as the theory suggests, that the Principal is the Government and Gazprom is the Agent. In the analyses primary sources were used. The result of the analysis shows that there is a Principal-Agent relationship between the Russian government and Gazprom, with a solved Agency conflict. Gazprom behaves in the interests of the government: the information asymmetry between the actors is limited and the government implemented the controlling systems effectively. However, interviews show that the Principal is not the government, but a group of decision-makers. The Principal-Agent Model should be complemented for the Russian case: the Principal is the group of decision-makers and both government and Gazprom are the Agents. |
| Supervisor | Andreas Goldthau |
| Department | Public Policy MA |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2012/ivanova_svetlana.pdf |
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