Evaluating Conditions for Successful Negotiation with Terrorists

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Abstract

This paper hopes to build on the work of Audrey Kurth Cronin,[1] specifically looking at cases of 'resolved conflict', 'stable', or 'unstable' negotiations of terrorist groups with governments. With these cases, I hope to build on her research and evaluate additional factors that she omits, to address the question: under what conditions does negotiation lead to resolution of a conflict, or at minimum, a stable conflict classification? I look at the three criteria that I had hoped would influence the success of negotiations: 1) the level of democracy of the country being attacked, 2) the number of attacks and victims were more likely to produce successful outcomes, and 3) whether or not failed states were more likely to have unsuccessful negotiations. At first glance, the criteria appeared to be significant variables in the overall outcome of the negotiation. However, what I found after a closer analysis of the material is that instead of specific criteria acting as individual, significant factors that alter the outcome of negotiation, the criteria do not conclusively suggest a significant or even a necessarily positive impact on the overall outcome of any negotiations.

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[1] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Raw Data Downloads," *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns*, Raw Dataset, Published 10 September 2009.

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Introduction

      A considerable amount of literature has been published on topics of terrorism as well as a large volume of studies on various counter-terrorism strategies. In recent years there has been an increase in the study of terrorist negotiations with the principal debate revolving around whether or not a state should or should not negotiate with terrorists. There are two main arguments that surround the debate that respectively advocate and discourage negotiation with terrorists. On the one side are those who discourage the use of negotiation and suggest that negotiations lend legitimacy to the terrorist group. On the other side are those who advocate for the use of negotiations between terrorist organizations and focus on the ability of negotiations to reduce, or end violent activities, particularly after other conflict management tactics have failed. Research on terrorism is critical to the field because it is a current area of conflict that in the present day is not anticipated to end or reduce in intensity any time in the near future. With the growth of transnational terrorism and more groups forming under the auspices of al Qaeda, it is important to learn not only about these organizations and how conflicts begin, but also to focus on ending the conflict, reducing the amount of violence to an acceptable level, and being prepared with tried and true tactics that are effective to overall counterterrorism strategy. By examining factors that influence negotiations, one can hope to focus on those aspects that increase the chances of producing more favorable outcomes, and therefore, work towards achieving the larger goal of reducing violence and overall terrorist activity. This is a valuable area for research, as it will help to bridge the gap between the central issues that are prominent in the existing literature that focuses on the conditions necessary for states and terrorists to negotiate with one another and determining whether or not a negotiation is considered a success or failure. It will be valuable to the overall discourse in understanding more conditions of negotiation that lead to resolved or stable conflicts in an effort to better understand and thus, develop more effective counterterrorism strategies.

      I utilize Audrey Kurth Cronin's *How Terrorism Ends* dataset of 457 cases.[2] Cronin's dataset includes cases where terrorists negotiated with the government. It is divided into categories that include the extent of negotiation with the government, whether or not there were any stable negotiations, level of achievement of strategic objectives, the estimated group lifespan, as well as additional categories. This data is useful in understanding the basic background information of a group and provides a starting point for gathering additional research. In the extensive research

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2 Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Raw Data Downloads," How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns, Dataset, Published 10 September 2009.

Cronin has compiled and studied she arrives at the conclusion that negotiations with terrorist organizations are historically rare, where approximately 18% of the 457 terrorist groups even entered the first stage of talks. She discovered that there is a relationship between groups that did negotiate and the longer lifespan of the terrorist group, indicating that the aim of a group is to survive negotiations.[3]

Within her evaluation, Cronin has looked at the conditions to follow for success of negotiation with terrorists. From a policy perspective, she notes that policymakers should have a plan in place to impede continuing acts of violence on behalf of the terrorist group during, or even after, negotiations have taken place.[4] Similar to Casmir, she notes that both the terrorist organization and the policymakers should be able to "unite" with one another in an effort to produce sustainable negotiations and make progress towards their goals.[5] She states that negotiations are often most successful when all other avenues for conflict resolution have been tried and did not produce the desired results.[6] Cronin also observed that terrorist groups had a higher rate of success if they expressed tangible demands.[7] Cronin's research generally focuses on when terrorist violence ends, which she notes is often when the group is disbanded.[8] In addition, she addresses six additional criteria for successful negotiations: 1) the nature of the organization, leadership, and public support,[9] 2) not utilizing suicide attacks, as they demonstrate an unwillingness to live side by side,[10] 3) strong leadership within the terrorist group,[11] 4) "splintering" of groups, which she suggests can either be beneficial or harmful to the negotiation process,[12] 5) "sponsors" or the use and role of third-party actors; those with an interest in resolving the conflict tend to aid in successful negotiations,

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3 Audrey Kurth Cronin. When Should We Talk to Terrorists? Special Report. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, May 2010, www.usip.org, 3.
4 Audrey Kurth Cronin. When Should We Talk to Terrorists? Special Report. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, May 2010, www.usip.org, 1.
5 Audrey Kurth Cronin. When Should We Talk to Terrorists? Special Report. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, May 2010, www.usip.org, 1.
6 Audrey Kurth Cronin. When Should We Talk to Terrorists? Special Report. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, May 2010, www.usip.org, 1.
7 Audrey Kurth Cronin. When Should We Talk to Terrorists? Special Report. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, May 2010, www.usip.org, 3.
8 Audrey Kurth Cronin. When Should We Talk to Terrorists? Special Report. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, May 2010, www.usip.org, 2.
9 Audrey Kurth Cronin. When Should We Talk to Terrorists? Special Report. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, May 2010, www.usip.org, 5.
10 Audrey Kurth Cronin. When Should We Talk to Terrorists? Special Report. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, May 2010, www.usip.org, 6.
11 Audrey Kurth Cronin. When Should We Talk to Terrorists? Special Report. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, May 2010, www.usip.org, 7.
12 Audrey Kurth Cronin. When Should We Talk to Terrorists? Special Report. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, May 2010, www.usip.org, 8.

particularly if adapted in the beginning of the talk,[13] 6) context, if the groups actions occur as part of larger political/economic/historical changes that are occurring at the same time, success is more likely to be achieved. Context is the most relevant to the cases I am reviewing as much of the success, including the achievement of strategic objectives, was a result of larger issues occurring in the state. Examples of these issues include a change in government leadership, or political system. However, these are factors that I will not be reviewing, as Cronin has already done an in-depth analysis of these factors in her book.

This paper hopes to build on the work of Audrey Kurth Cronin,[14] specifically looking at cases of 'resolved conflict', 'stable', or 'unstable' negotiations of terrorist groups with governments. With these cases, I hope to build on her research and evaluate additional factors that she omits in answering the question: under what conditions does negotiation lead to resolution of a conflict, or at minimum, a stable conflict classification? I examine the three criteria that I believe would influence the success of negotiations: 1) the level of democracy of the country being attacked, 2) the number of attacks and victims were more likely to produce successful outcomes, and 3) whether or not failed states were more likely to have unsuccessful negotiations. At first glance, the criteria appeared to be significant variables in the overall outcome of the negotiation. However, what I found after a closer analysis is that instead of specific criteria acting as individual, significant factors that alter the outcome of negotiation, the criteria do not conclusively suggest a significant or even necessarily positive impact on the overall negotiation outcome.

Definitions

Before one can focus on answering questions, a few assumptions regarding commonly used terms must first be clarified. While there are numerous and lengthy approaches to defining "terrorism," it is generally understood to contain the three elements. The first is Political, meaning terrorism it is political in nature, a terrorist group's motivation lies in the goal of changing a political program or objective. The second is Violence, meaning the group seeks to create violence with intent to terrorize the primary target – civilians; however military installation may also become targets. Last is Repetition, there must be multiple, violent attacks, with the intent to terrorize, in an attempt to modify or achieve a political aim. Similar to the elements above, Cronin defines terrorism as having

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13 Audrey Kurth Cronin. When Should We Talk to Terrorists? Special Report. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, May 2010, www.usip.org, 9.
14 Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Raw Data Downloads," How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns, Raw Dataset, Published 10 September 2009.

at a minimum, "four characteristics: a fundamentally political nature, the symbolic use of violence, purposeful targeting of noncombatants, carried out by nonstate actors."[15] Richardson builds on the definitions above and narrows the definition of terrorism by adding that the goal of terrorism is not necessarily to defeat the enemy, but rather to send a message.[16] She continues that both the terrorist act and the target often have some type of symbolic significance that adds shock value and thus, psychological impact, to the actual violent attack.[17] The third element Richardson contributes is that terrorism is not an act of states, but an act by sub-state groups.[18] She observes that victims are the means by which terrorists alter the behavior of the targeted audience, which is usually the government.[19] Finally, Richardson strongly argues that the most important characteristic of terrorism is that it deliberately targets civilians, which is in contrast to the exception that sometimes, terrorist acts can be targeted toward military or aid personnel. She makes the distinction that groups that target military or aid personnel are more aligned with insurgent groups or Guerrillas.[20] Bard E. O'Neill uses the term insurgency to refer to "a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics" where politics is defined as "the process of making and executing binding decisions for a society."[21] According to these definitions, Bard argues that terrorism falls under the category of insurgency and thus, can be viewed as a tactic and more specifically, a form of warfare.[22] These are the main assumptions that this paper will follow in terms of defining what is meant by terrorism and terrorist groups.

There are many different definitions of negotiation, especially when one looks at it from the perspective of negotiating with terrorists. Raymond Cohen looks at negotiations from a broad international perspective and utilizes the following definition: "International negotiation can be defined as a structural dialogue of claim and counter-claim in which an attempt is made by the

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15 Audrey Kurth Cronin. How terrorism ends: understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011, 7.
16 Louise Richardson. What terrorists want: understanding the enemy, containing the threat. New York: Random House, 2006, 4.
17 Louise Richardson. What terrorists want: understanding the enemy, containing the threat. New York: Random House, 2006, 5.
18 Louise Richardson. What terrorists want: understanding the enemy, containing the threat. New York: Random House, 2006, 5.
19 Louise Richardson. What terrorists want: understanding the enemy, containing the threat. New York: Random House, 2006, 5.
20 Louise Richardson. What terrorists want: understanding the enemy, containing the threat. New York: Random House, 2006, 6.
21 Bard E. O'Neill, Insurgency & terrorism: from revolution to apocalypse. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005, 15.
22 Bard E. O'Neill, Insurgency & terrorism: from revolution to apocalypse. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005, 33.

accredited representatives of states to reconcile opposing views and reach agreement on subjects of mutual concern."[23] Starkey et. al adds that tribal, clan, religious, and linguistic identifications complicate the negotiation process and emphasizes that both external and internal relations impact foreign policy.[24] He also contends that negotiations are generally determined by "how salient the central issue is for political actors."[25] Bercovitch and Jackson look at negotiation from a conflict resolution standpoint where negotiation aims "to stop violence and reach an agreement through a joint decision-making process involving all parties."[26] Finally, Zartman offers the definition of negotiation as taking place "when neither party in a conflict is strong enough to impose its will or to resolve the conflict unilaterally."[27] All of these definitions are applicable in terms of how this paper looks at negotiations. However, I focus on the aspects of negotiation that revolve around reducing violence, and negotiations that take place between a hostile side and a government, thereby making both the Bercovitch and Jackson, as well as, the Zartman definitions most applicable. These basic understandings of negotiations will help us to better understand the interplay between governments and terrorists groups and how their relations ultimately impact why they choose to negotiate with one another.

Common Strategies for Dealing with Terrorists

Dean G. Pruitt highlights five common strategies for dealing with terrorists. The first is capitulating, which is essentially meeting the demands of the terrorists' and is very uncommon.[28] Second is combat, which seeks to defeat the terrorists and is often a preferred method for governments because it does not require the state to offer concessions, it does not grant legitimacy to the terrorist organization, and it is consistent with following the rule of law regarding violent activity. Combat is often most successful with smaller terrorist groups that do not have a large constituency, whereas it is far less successful among ethno-nationalist groups (including al Qaeda) and

23 Raymond Cohen, Deadlock: Israel and Egypt Negotiate, in Communicating for Peace: Diplomacy and Negotiation, Edited by Felipe Korzenny and Stella Ting-Toomey, (Sage Publications, 1990), p. 136.
24 Starkey et al. Negotiating a complex world□: an introduction to international negotiation. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005, 5.
25 Starkey et al. Negotiating a complex world□: an introduction to international negotiation. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005, 106.
26 Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson. Conflict resolution in the twenty-first century principles, methods, and approaches. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009, 20.
27 Zartman, I. William. Negotiation and conflict management□: essays on theory and practice. London: Routledge, 2008, 100.
28 Dean G. Pruitt. "Negotiation with Terrorists." International Negotiation 11, no. 2 (June 1, 2006): 371.

organizations with large populations. The third strategy is isolation or marginalization, which is aligned with timing, a crucial aspect in understanding the environment for which negotiations could begin. The purpose of this strategy is to "erode the numbers and morale of the terrorists to the point where they are forced to stop their operations".[29] Mainstreaming terrorists is the fourth way to deal with terrorists according to Pruitt. Mainstreaming involves convincing the terrorist organization to give up violence and pursue their goals within the existing political structure. For this strategy to be successful, the terrorist organization must believe they can achieve power by becoming part of the existing political structure. An example of this is Hamas, which ran candidates against Fatah and won a majority of seats in Palestinian legislature. The final strategy, and the one that I will be examining in detail throughout, is negotiation. Pruitt mentions that while negotiation is rarely the preferred method, it is less uncommon with non-ideological ethno-nationalist terrorists because it often produces a settlement over negotiating with ideological groups, which is very rare because demands are usually "extreme and inflexible."[30] He notes that negotiation becomes an option for consideration when other confrontational strategies mentioned above are counterproductive and "a perceived stalemate develops." One of the limitations with this perspective is that it does not specifically look at the conditions under which negotiations should begin. This would have made Pruitt's argument more useful to the overall literature. Possibly prior to the start of a pre-negotiation session, evaluation and pre-planning would provide a more auspicious atmosphere for successful terrorist negotiations. While Pruitt offers a significant contribution to the overall literature by outlining ways to manage the threat of terrorists, these are possible areas to expand on to further his contribution.

The Big Picture of Negotiation Literature

In order to provide a more thorough understanding, it is helpful to have an recognize where the question, under what conditions does negotiation lead to resolution of a conflict, or at minimum, a stable conflict classification, fits in to the overall literature. This broader context forms the theoretical background from which the specific literature on terrorist negotiation theory is developed. Therefore, it will help the reader to understand where terrorist negotiations fit in to the larger context of conflict management theory. The primary theoretical background is negotiation theory, which focuses on the process of negotiation. In this theory, there is less of an emphasis on the rational

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29 Dean G. Pruitt. "Negotiation with Terrorists." International Negotiation 11, no. 2 (June 1, 2006): 376.
30 Dean G. Pruitt. "Negotiation with Terrorists." International Negotiation 11, no. 2 (June 1, 2006): 380.

actor, however, while rationality is still a key factor, there is more leeway.[31] One of the key tenets of negotiation theory is that negotiators must manage the complexity of the issues at hand. This often involves building coalitions, which allow for the sharing of information, the coordination of action, and ultimately a means by which to navigate multilateral negotiations, thereby producing results.[32]

Another theoretical background is known as interest-based bargaining, also known as the problem solving approach. This negotiation framework advocates working together to achieve an agreement that is better for both sides than not reaching an agreement would be. The underlying interests of the negotiators are emphasized and encourage relationship building and maintenance.[33] This perspective is often the ideal position from which negotiations begin. Positional bargaining is a common framework of conflict management and it is often zero-sum focused. It begins with one party making a demand, and the other party proposing a follow-up offer or demand after which reciprocal concessions are made until either a negotiation is reached or deemed a failure.[34] While this approach has taken place in past terrorist negotiations, it is infrequent and not the primary theoretical background that is followed. The final framework that will be highlighted here is mediation. This strategy involves at least two parties and a mutually agreed upon third party facilitator. The benefits of this strategy include management of emotional tension, fostering effective communication, and an outside, and objective perspective.[35] This was demonstrated with South West African Peoples' Organization, which involved negotiations between South Africa, the South West African Peoples' Organization, the United Nations, as well as certain Western powers. The third party facilitators, both the United Nations and Western powers, brokered negotiations between the South African government and the terrorist organization, South West African Peoples' Organization. These different models provide a background for better understanding the basis of the negotiation aspect of conflict management. They offer a jumping off point to begin further evaluation and potential development of an approach that allows for a better understanding of the intricacies of terrorist negotiations.

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31 Christian Downie, Managing Complexity in International Negotiations: Is there a role for treaty secretariats? Regulatory Institutions Network, Australian National University, 5.
32 Christian Downie, Managing Complexity in International Negotiations: Is there a role for treaty secretariats? Regulatory Institutions Network, Australian National University, 5.
33 Harvard Law School, Program on Negotiation, http://www.pon.harvard.edu/category/research_projects/harvard-negotiation-project/
34 Harvard Law School, Program on Negotiation, http://www.pon.harvard.edu/category/research_projects/harvard-negotiation-project/
35 Harvard Law School, Program on Negotiation, http://www.pon.harvard.edu/category/research_projects/harvard-negotiation-project/

The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis identifies two negotiating strategies, which, unlike the previous two authors, takes into account the role of terrorists in a negotiation. The first strategy involves reducing the terrorists' terms, and the second is to change the stated terms of the terrorist group. A crucial aspect to a successful negotiation is for the "terrorists to become convinced that a search for a solution is legitimate and acceptable to both sides" and thus, mutually beneficial.[36] To accomplish this, tactics may include a 'take-it-or-leave-it' approach, a firmer, more demanding approach, or even a 'time-is-on-the-side-of-the-negotiator' option.[37] The IIASA suggests that any concessions made by the state are 'payment' for abandoning violent terrorism. If the state makes concessions, the organization must also make concessions, which is often a reduction or elimination of violence. The main limitation of IIASA is that it does not delve into the intricate details involved in all of the elements of terrorist negotiations. It seeks to draw attention to a few important aspects of negotiating with terrorists but completely disregards looking at necessary evaluations *before* negotiations begin. However, the ideas outlined by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis is similar to Stephen Krasner's theory of pareto-improving agreements that can be applied here. According to Krasner's theory, pareto-improving agreements, although focusing on sovereignty, argues that if both sides reach an agreement where which both sides benefit equally, the agreement will become self-enforcing.[38] This results in both sides continuing to uphold their side of the bargain, because they both benefit from their agreement. They both have invested interests in the ultimate success of the agreement.

Bercovitch and Jackson provide additional insight into added factors necessary for negotiation by identifying two theoretical frameworks that highlight the conditions affecting the decision to negotiate. The first is called the "Dual Concern Model" which implies that the choice of strategy is determined by the concern for oneself and the concern for the others' outcomes.[39] The second theoretical framework is relative to procedural justice, where preferences for resolving disputes surround the legal arena. Of these two, the authors suggest that procedural justice is most relevant to successful negotiation; for example, when conflicts are of low intensity, parties tend to prefer to settle through negotiation rather than involving a third party. One of the limitations of this framework is that it does not explain the role of the third party; therefore, one does not know if a

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36 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Negotiating with Terrorists: A Mediator's Guide, IIASA Policy Brief, vol. 6 (March 2009) p. 1-4.
37 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Negotiating with Terrorists: A Mediator's Guide, IIASA Policy Brief, vol. 6 (March 2009) p. 1-4.
38 Stephen Krasner. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, (1999).
39 Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson. "Negotiation or Mediation?: An Exploration of Factors Affecting the Choice of Conflict Management in International Conflict,"

third party is beneficial, or as Bercovitch and Jackson have alluded, having a third party is a negative attribute in a negotiation. Another criticism of Bercovitch and Jackson's work is that they do not address the possibility that a third party may not have a concern for the other side's outcome.

In contrast to the other scholars discussed thus far, Sederberg's argument focuses primarily on the central debate within the realm of negotiating with terrorists. He argues that sometimes states chose to enter into negotiations with the intent of political concessions.[40] This is often a contentious plan as both parties view this as a strong threat to their political agenda and limits of power. It is common among the discourse that conciliatory practices often encourage, rather than reduce, further acts of terrorism. Concessions often include prisoner exchanges and ransom for hostages, among other accommodations that encourage a cessation of violence.[41] Sederberg notes that in determining an appropriate response to an act of terrorism, one must reflect on two sets of criteria. The first to be discussed is the acceptability of the response should conform to "democratic sensibilities". The second criterion to be discussed is the effectiveness of the intended response, or whether or not the potential solution is likely to minimize the problem at hand. It is important to consider whether or not an acceptable response is effective and whether or not an effective response is acceptable. For example, Sederberg says that turning a country into a police state, while plausible and potentially acceptable, is not necessarily the most effective option. He notes that it is necessary to not overvalue a plausible solutions' effectiveness as this could ultimately dismiss the "efficacy of the conciliatory process."[42]

Another issue that must be appreciated is evaluating how the plausible solution will function both over the short and long term. He further notes that it is important to view the terrorist as a rational actor or there is no need to have any faith in any type of conciliatory practice.[43] One of the limitations of this argument is the focus on the terrorist as a rational actor. Although Sederberg provides a valuable, if somewhat limited, contribution, Christian Grobe also deserves recognition. He notes that, historically, most of the discourse has focused on the rationalist bargaining theory perspective. He argues that it is necessary to look at the rationalist belief-based explanations as well as a more constructivist, preference based explanation of negotiation to gain a more thorough

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40 Peter C. Sederberg. "Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy," Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 3 (August 1995): 295–312.
41 Peter C. Sederberg. "Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy," Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 3 (August 1995): 295–312.
42 Peter C. Sederberg. "Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy," Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 3 (August 1995): 298.
43 Peter C. Sederberg. "Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy," Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 3 (August 1995): 295–312.

perspective.[44] It is important to appreciate the possibility that newer theories, such as the input from constructivists might serve to provide valuable insight in making negotiations with terrorists more successful.

An interesting observation that is often overlooked is presented by Sederberg, who notes that tactical negotiations and concessions are usually only viewed as critical in that they are part of a larger conciliatory strategy which has the goal of reducing or ultimately eliminating terrorism, or at the very terrorism. Martha Crenshaw provides the viewpoint that terrorism declines because of three factors: first, a physical defeat of the extremist organization by the government; second, the decision to abandon the terrorist strategy; and finally, the resulting organizational disintegration.[45] This notion is consistent with the model presented by Audrey Kurth Cronin. Sederberg adds that both the war and the deterrence models of conflict management suggest the possible effectiveness of conciliation towards the challenger terrorist in an effort to successfully abandon terrorist activities.

Bueno de Mesquita is one of the scholars who argue strongly that terrorist violence increases after concessions are made by the state. He suggests that this occurs because concessions are often targeted towards moderate members and this leaves extremist members in control, and therefore, more likely to increase violent actions to demonstrate protest of the concessions and the moderate members.[46] Bueno de Mesquita further contends that concessions are "not credible in the absence of ongoing violence." Additionally, he adds, citing Darby (2000), that increased violence often occurs during negotiations because of uncertainty within the organization, as well as reduced counterterrorism efforts by the government (which signifies trust). A critique of his argument is that he identifies the probability of a government's success at negotiation by identifying two variables: 1) the amount of money, time, and effort invested in counterterrorism efforts, and 2) whether or not former terrorists are helping the government. I find it arguable that these are the two key variables that he chooses to focus on and does not factor in ideology or other characteristics that greatly influence how negotiations began. However, he does note that 'turned terrorists' can add value to the government by solving the dilemma of "credible commitment" when negotiating concessions which is a valuable possibility.[47] This can serve to be useful, especially during negotiations and as part of a counter-terrorism strategy. While much of de Mesquita's argument has become commonplace to the

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44 Christian Grobe. "The Power of Words: Argumentative Persuasion in International Negotiations," European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 1 (January 5, 2010): 22.
45 Martha Crenshaw. "How Terrorism Declines," Terrorism and Political Violence 3, no.1 (1991): 69-87.
46 Ethan Bueno de Mesquita. "Conciliation, Counterterrorism and Patterns of Terrorist Violence," International Organization, (Winter, 2005), vol. 59:1, p. 145-176.
[47] Ethan Bueno de Mesquita. "Conciliation, Counterterrorism and Patterns of Terrorist Violence," *International Organization*, (Winter, 2005), vol. 59:1, p. 145-176.

argument of terrorist negotiations, he makes a valid point in noting these characteristics are crucial to focus on *during* a negotiation and should be evaluated and prepared for during the pre-negotiation stage. Despite the good intentions of this argument, I can see how difficulties may arise however, when an attempt is made to implement this tactic. A final drawback to de Mesquita's perspective is similar to that of other literature, it fails to offer a more thorough evaluation of the full negotiation process, and merely focuses on one particular aspect.

Casmir discusses the role of power and trust in negotiations. He argues that expectations are related to power, and power can be defined as something that is clear to all, whereas authority is something that must be defended.[48] He is quick to remind the reader that power is not something that can be exerted; rather it must be accepted as meaningful authority. Casmir further argues that the perception of power is often times more valuable than true power. This is an important consideration because it reminds the negotiators to be mindful of their reputation and how they portray themselves. It is beneficial for the negotiators to project the most powerful, yet authoritative posture as possible in an effort to suggest strength, and imbue trust within the negotiating relationship. Casmir makes the point that arbitrary daily events are often an unexpected aspect that can interfere with negotiations. He also states that the perceptions of participants, as well as the environment in both the external (world) and internal (negotiation setting), can interfere with negotiations.[49] This statement serves to highlight the importance of power and trust in a negotiation. He continues his argument with a reference to Gulliver (1979), who notes that there are three characteristics that negotiation procedures do not take in to account.[50] The first to be considered is that there is rarely enough time to consider all aspects of all options. Second, negotiators are human, and thus, are likely to change positions, arguments, assessments, and choices. Third, negotiation is an intensely complex process and it is only exasperated by multiple problems occurring at the same time. Fourth, is that oftentimes limited resources must be shared. These limitations of negotiation procedures illustrate other considerations that both negotiators must take in to account throughout the process in order to produce an effective agreement. This also leads one to question exactly how can a representative best portray power and authority during the negotiation process? Although the

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[48] Fred L. Casmir, *International Negotiations: A Power and Trust Relationship*, In Communicating for Peace, Diplomacy and Negotiation, Edited by Felipe Korzenny and Stella Ting-Toomey, (Sage Publications, 1990).
[49] Fred L. Casmir, *International Negotiations: A Power and Trust Relationship*, In Communicating for Peace, Diplomacy and Negotiation, Edited by Felipe Korzenny and Stella Ting-Toomey, (Sage Publications, 1990), 43.
[50] Fred L. Casmir, *International Negotiations: A Power and Trust Relationship*, In Communicating for Peace, Diplomacy and Negotiation, Edited by Felipe Korzenny and Stella Ting-Toomey, (Sage Publications, 1990), 43.

argument presented by Casmir can be viewed as critical to all stages of discussion, one could argue that it is most useful after the negotiation process has begun, rather than in the preliminary stages.

Referencing these authors, who have contributed to the greater discourse on negotiation theory within the realm of conflict management; provide the backbone for more specific literature on negotiating with terrorists. These different perspectives on negotiations and relevant strategies offer insight into the pertinent literature on the broader context of options available to states in managing the threat of terrorism. Additionally, they illustrate the multitude of areas that are pertinent to the negotiation process and, under the right circumstances; negotiation can be the most well suited option for managing the threat of terrorist violence.

A Focus on Terrorist Negotiation

The arguments advocating for and discouraging negotiation are plentiful. The concern over negotiations lending legitimacy to the terrorist organization highlights the main debate when considering negotiation as a plausible option of conflict management.[51] The unwillingness to negotiate on behalf of the government stems from the fear of according legitimacy to a terrorist organization prevents many governments and states from considering negotiation as a viable source of managing terrorist organizations.[52] Another point of concern with negotiating with terrorists is that negotiation will be unsuccessful or fears that negotiation will signal weakness on behalf of the government.[53] A moral aversion is often another explanation for an unwillingness to negotiate.[54] Yet another is that negotiating with terrorists' sets precedence, which many states view as unfavorable.[55]

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51 Harmonie Toros. "`We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!': Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts." Security Dialogue 39, no. 4 (August 1, 2008): 407. ; Peter R. Neumann. "Negotiating with Terrorists." Foreign Affairs 86, no. 1 (February 2007): 128–138. ; Martha Crenshaw and Irving Louis Horowitz. Terrorism, legitimacy, and power□: the consequences of political violence□: essays. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1986.
52 Harmonie Toros. "`We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!': Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts." Security Dialogue 39, no. 4 (August 1, 2008): 407. ; Peter R. Neumann. "Negotiating with Terrorists." Foreign Affairs 86, no. 1 (February 2007): 128–138. ; Martha Crenshaw and Irving Louis Horowitz. Terrorism, legitimacy, and power□: the consequences of political violence□: essays. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1986.
53 Peter R. Neumann. "Negotiating with Terrorists." Foreign Affairs 86, no. 1 (February 2007): 130. ; Harmonie Toros. "`We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!': Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts." Security Dialogue 39, no. 4 (August 1, 2008): 410. Toros also cites Walter Laqueur (1987: 308). Neumann also references Paul Wilkinson of the University of St. Andrews.
54 Dean G. Pruitt. "Negotiation with Terrorists." International Negotiation 11, no. 2 (June 1, 2006): 380.
55 Peter R. Neumann. "Negotiating with Terrorists." Foreign Affairs 86, no. 1 (February 2007): 129.

In contrast, there are many arguments in support of negotiations with terrorists. Many authors argue that negotiation can be the best tool for preventing an undesirable outcome. Still others believe that negotiations are most successful if they are begun in secret. Other scholars suggest that negotiation can be a feasible option provided tangible goals are outlined early on, or the realization that violence, in and of itself, has its limitations.[56] Furthermore, many authors suggest that negotiations take place at a "strategic juncture, one that questions "the utility of violence but not necessarily on the verge of defeat" as the most valuable time to initiate a successful negotiation.[57] Among those who agree that negotiations are a feasible option, there is a general consensus that negotiations should not immediately be ruled out and that they should remain an option in order to prevent greater violence from harming a state. It should be noted that negotiations do not guarantee a decrease in violence, but can provide the possibility for conflict resolution provided other outlets have failed and both sides are willing to achieve their own goals by working with the other.[58]

Bertram I. Spector argues that a state that holding a no negotiation policy is at a greater risk than a state that does not outwardly dismiss negotiating.[59] He continues that once a group has been labeled a "villain," as terrorist organizations are labeled because of their violent actions, the group is no longer eligible for the normal rules of the international community, which include negotiations. His argument follows along the lines that negotiation accords the terrorist group legitimacy. However, there are other authors, such as Lapan and Sadler who suggest that a no concession policy is inconsistent as there are numerous empirical studies which show states that adopt this policy do not always maintain a no negotiations policy.[60] There are several cases where states originally adopted a no concession policy only to hold negotiations at a later date, both Tucker and Sederberg have discussed this.

Navin A. Bapat argues that in order for negotiations between the state and the terrorist organization to succeed, the terrorists must first convince the government that they are a credible bargaining source/actor. If the terrorist group does not have a suitable reputation for trustworthiness, then the group must work to establish trustworthiness either through an external enforcement group that monitors sides to ensure agreements are being followed, or in the case of transnational terrorist groups, rely on the host state to "constrain behavior" by controlling weapons,

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56 Peter R. Neumann. "Negotiating with Terrorists." Foreign Affairs 86, no. 1 (February 2007): 130.
57 Peter R. Neumann. "Negotiating with Terrorists." Foreign Affairs 86, no. 1 (February 2007): 132.
58 Audrey Kurth Cronin. How terrorism ends□: understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011.
59 Bertram I. Spector. "Negotiating with Villians Revisted: Research Note," International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice 8 no. 3. (2003).
60 Navin A. Bapat. "State Bargaining with Transnational Terrorist Groups." International Studies Quarterly, no. 50 (2006): 215.

supplies, funding, and political support. [61] Importantly, Bapat suggests that it is doubtful that weak states have the capability to constrain terrorist behavior.[62] Donohue and Taylor suggest "terrorists find themselves in a role that imposes more constraints on their ability to control the negotiation process and attain their desired outcomes. This reduced power places the terrorist in a one-down position that becomes more prominent over time as authorities develop tactical and negotiation positions. In response to this position, terrorists often use violence to "generate fear, coercion or intimidation in and effort to realign the balance of power."[63]Browne and Dickson suggest, "If negotiations fail, relations between actors revert to the status quo."[64] They also argue "an actor who makes a public commitment not to negotiate with a counterpart it considers to be beneath diplomacy, but who then subsequently does so, is especially motivated to ensure that negotiations do not fail. This motivation, naturally, reduces her own bargaining power."[65] Negotiating with terrorists is a highly debatable topic among the various terrorism authorities. However, as mentioned in the preceding paragraphs and in the literature review, there are junctures when negotiation may offer the most promising results; particularly if those negotiations begin under the suitable conditions previously discussed.

Conditions for Success

I have identified three major factors that appear to be associated with negotiation success. The first is the correlation of democracy to successful negotiation. The second condition is the effect of attacks and victims on successful negotiation. The third, and final factor, is failing/failed states impact on negotiation. I will use these conditions to test my hypothesis that these three specifications have a positive impact on the success of negotiations between terrorist organizations and the government. Success is defined and measured as any case within Cronin's dataset that has negotiated with the government; had some level of achievement of strategic objectives; and is currently in a

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61 Navin A. Bapat. "State Bargaining with Transnational Terrorist Groups." International Studies Quarterly, no. 50 (2006): 215.
62 Navin A. Bapat. "State Bargaining with Transnational Terrorist Groups." International Studies Quarterly, no. 50 (2006): 215.
63 William A. Donohue and Paul J. Taylor. "Testing the Role Effect in Terrorist Negotiations." International Negotiation 8, no. 3 (2003): 532.
64 Julie Browne and Eric S. Dickson. "We Don't Talk to Terrorists: On the Rhetoric and Practice of Secret Negotiations." Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 3 (March 10, 2010), p. 13.
65 Julie Browne and Eric S. Dickson. "We Don't Talk to Terrorists: On the Rhetoric and Practice of Secret Negotiations." Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 3 (March 10, 2010), p. 24.

relative state of peace between organization and government. Using this measure, I divided the cases in Cronin's dataset into three categories: resolved, stable, and failed. I then use induction and case narrative to determine whether these three independent variables determine the grouping in to higher versus lower success of negotiations. I utilize Cronin's dataset, which best illustrates terrorist groups that have participated in negotiations with the government, to test the relevance of factors for success that go beyond the negotiations themselves. Ultimately, I find that the factors I anticipated as having a significant impact on successful negotiations were inconclusive.

Methods

This paper employs grounded theory, an inductive theory of qualitative analysis, which focuses on examining the cases to derive a theory. It is this bottom-up approach that allowed me to generate new factors that might be relevant not only for the specific cases I evaluated, but also for future research efforts. To establish causality, I also utilized process tracing for the specific case studies to look at the causal process to better establish an understanding of specific events that triggered or impacted the outcome of negotiations.[66]

Utilizing an inductive approach and analyzing the cases that had 'some level of achievement of strategic objectives' in each of the three categories mentioned above, I arrived at the criteria for further analysis. Cronin notes that, "achievement is indicated if the group's goals were wholly or partially achieved during the group's lifespan, *regardless of who directly achieved or negotiated that outcome.*"[67] Cronin's definition of full achievement includes a complete achievement of the groups stated aims, which can include "full independence of a territory, control of the government, or successful disruption of specified government action."[68] Partial achievement is defined as the "achievement of a qualitatively substantial component of the group's strategic aims, such as establishment of regional autonomy without independent statehood."[69] Cronin defines limited achievement as "minor

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66 Alexander Lawrence George, Andrew Bennett, and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 2005.
67 Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Raw Data Downloads," How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns, Data Information and Codebook, Published 10 September 2009, p. 3.
68 Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Raw Data Downloads," How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns, Data Information and Codebook, Published 10 September 2009, p. 3.
69 Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Raw Data Downloads," How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns, Data Information and Codebook, Published 10 September 2009, p. 3.

compromise on elements of a group's strategic aims" and this is the definition I will follow for consistency.[70]

With regard to the definition of the extent of negotiation with the government, Cronin listed cases that "engaged in any discussions with external agents, most commonly with the government of the state in which they are active, over the groups fundamental aims or strategies" as those groups which held negotiations.[71] Within the groups that held negotiations, she further subdivided them into four categories: resolved conflicts, stable, unstable, and failed. Resolved conflicts are defined by Cronin as "the organization has engaged in negotiations; negotiations have effectively resolved or diffused the conflict and the group has either effectively disbanded or fully normalized activity."[72] Stable cases are those "the organization has engaged in negotiations; negotiations have led to a stable cessation of conflict, however, without fundamental resolution to ensure that violence will not flare up again".[73] For the purpose of data consistency I have maintained these specific definitions.

Throughout, I will focus only on those groups which had some level of achievement in order to identify specific key factors, not previously recognized, which were relevant to achieving a successful negotiation, principally from the terrorist organization's viewpoint. I therefore define success as cases that held negotiations, were classified as either 'resolved conflict' or 'stable' and had either a 'full', 'partial', or 'limited' achievement of strategic objectives. While I recognize that there is extensive literature on the subject of conditions for successful negotiations, with far more criteria for 'success' then mentioned above, this was done intentionally. The purpose is maintaining consistency with Cronin's definitions and data, while testing for the relevance and importance of other conditions. It is also in an attempt to identify new criteria that have not been considered, particularly in regard to some of the lesser known, yet still pertinent, cases within the dataset. Cronin's research has proven to be invaluable to those in the field of understanding terrorist negotiations and it is her research which I will develop to offer more conditions for negotiations to succeed, particularly the groups which showed some level of achievement of their strategic objectives. More information regarding negotiations, specifically those that were deemed successful, will provide greater insight into future counterterrorism policy decisions.

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70 Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Raw Data Downloads," How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns, Data Information and Codebook, Published 10 September 2009, p. 3.
71 Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Raw Data Downloads," How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns, Data Information and Codebook, Published 10 September 2009, p. 3.
72 Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Raw Data Downloads," How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns, Data Information and Codebook, Published 10 September 2009, p. 3.
73 Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Raw Data Downloads," How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns, Data Information and Codebook, Published 10 September 2009, p. 3.

To obtain information on the level of democracy, I utilized Freedom House data from 1972 through 2011 to examine changes in the freedom designation during the years the group was active. With this data, I will evaluate whether or not the level of democracy changed around the time of negotiations, possibly indicating a correlation, as well as addressing the question of whether or not more democratic nations are more likely to have successful negotiations. Evaluating the number of attacks and victims is a more straightforward variable. If there is a significant range within each category then I conclude that the number of attacks and victims does not produce more favorable negotiation conditions or results. The final criterion looks at whether or not failed states are more likely to have unsuccessful negotiations. The Failed States Index, published by the Fund for Peace utilizes twelve indicators of state vulnerability, a partial list includes social, economic, and political and military indicators. The Index measures the vulnerability of the state in terms of collapse or conflict where higher scores are more vulnerable than lower scores. To determine this, I looked for one of two possibilities to occur. The first possibility is that the state was not determined to be a failed state by the Failed State Index from the Fund for Peace at the time the terrorist group began (again, according to the time frame listed by Cronin's dataset), but became a failed state after negotiations. The second possibility is that the state was failing at the start of the terrorist group's presence, negotiations took place, negotiations were successful, and the state is now no longer viewed as a failed state. While this second option independently does not suggest that negotiations can single handedly alter failed state status, it could indicate that negotiations are a factor in cases where there has been terrorist activity that has been negotiated, and that successful negotiations can aid in the transition of a state.

The basic premise for my research is to look at a limited number of cases in each category (resolved, stable, and failed) to test whether my hypothesis of the three conditions I described earlier impact the success of negotiations. This paper has been divided in to three chapters, the first chapter looks at resolved cases and compares them with the independent variables. The second chapter examines stable cases, while the third chapter looks at failed cases. Finally, I present a conclusion of my overall findings.

Chapter 1, Resolved Conflicts

Relevant Cases

The three principal cases that will be examined in this chapter are: the African National Congress (ANC), the South West African Peoples' Organization (SWAPO), and the Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU). These cases were selected because they were the only cases to achieve a "full level of achievement of strategic objectives" and resulted in peace following the end of negotiations. I will begin by providing a brief overview of each of these cases before moving on to the conditions for success.

The African National Congress was a reorganization of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) in 1923; however, following the reorganization it lacked cohesion. In the 1940's and 1950's in response to Apartheid policies, the group became active in opposing racial discrimination and violence. In 1955 the Congress of the People and the Freedom Charter were established to support and promote the abolition of Apartheid.[74] In 1961 the ANC, along with the South African Communist Party (SACP) established the MK, the military wing of the ANC.[75] This was done partially in response to the Sharpeville Massacre, in which sixty-nine individuals were killed and 186 injured when police opened fire on an unarmed crowd of peaceful protestors. Shortly after, the government bans the ANC under the 'Unlawful Organizations Act' because it was viewed as a 'threat to the public.'[76] Throughout the 1970's Apartheid grew stronger and in the mid 1980's the government declared a state of emergency, causing widespread upheaval and an increase in MK activity that lasted throughout the decade. During the time period of 1986-1988, secret talks between Hendrik Jacobus (Kobie) Coetsee, a lawyer authorized by State President Botha, and Nelson Mandela began.[77] After initial talks, negotiations continued until 1989. Interestingly, it is during the time of negotiations that MK attacks were the highest and produced the greatest number of

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74 "The Long Walk of Nelson Mandela - Chronology." Frontline, n.d.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/mandela/etc/cron.html.
75 "African National Congress Timeline 1960-1969 | South African History Online", n.d.
http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/african-national-congress-timeline-1960-1969.
76 "African National Congress Timeline 1960-1969 | South African History Online", n.d.
http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/african-national-congress-timeline-1960-1969.
77 There is discrepancy among sources as to when the secret talks actually began.

casualties.[78] In 1990 the ban on the ANC was lifted, and casualties dropped significantly. The ANC was responsible for 606 attacks, 380 fatalities, and 1293 injured as a result of the attacks.[79] Today, the ANC is the governing body of South Africa, a republic democracy.

The South West African Peoples' Organization (SWAPO) is another South African group that was active during the Apartheid years in what is now known as Namibia. South West Africa was a German colony that was transferred to South Africa under a League of Nations mandate in 1915.[80] SWAPO was established in 1960 with the intent to liberate South West Africa from South African control as part of a partitioning policy to establish "independent ethnic states" in South Africa.[81] Despite international criticism, South Africa continued to control South West Africa arguing it was trying to prevent a communist-backed SWAPO government despite the fact that the UN had recognized SWAPO as the only lawful representative of the population.[82] In 1988 negotiations were taking place between South Africa, SWAPO, the United Nations, and Western powers. In 1989 elections were held and SWAPO was elected with 57% of the vote to become the leading government.[83] SWAPO is responsible for 63 incidents of terrorism from 1970-1990 with a total of 98 fatalities, and 199 injured persons.[84] Today, Namibia's government type is a republic and is considered a democracy.[85]

The Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU) was active from 1965-1987, and like the other African groups above, underwent the transition from armed liberation movement to governing party (verify?). In 1965, Ian Smith of the Rhodesian Front declared independence of Zimbabwe (then, Rhodesia) under white minority rule from the United Kingdom, which sparked international

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78 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=281. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd

79 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=281. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd

80 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database: http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4394. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd

81 "Namibia | South African History Online", n.d. http://www.sahistory.org.za/places/namibia.

82 "Namibia | South African History Online", n.d. http://www.sahistory.org.za/places/namibia.

83 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database: http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4394. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd

84 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database: htttp://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2432. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd

85 Central Intelligence Agency. World Factbook: Namibia. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/wa.html

outrage and resulted in economic sanctions.[86] Guerilla war against white rule continued to grow throughout the 1970's, with incidents of terrorist violence peaking in 1979.[87] The same year the Lancaster House negotiations took place in London between all parties and led to a new constitution and peace agreement.[88] ZANU and another nationalist party ZAPU merged to become the current Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) with Robert Mugabe as Executive President. While ZANU no longer is viewed as a terrorist organization today, there are questions regarding its respect for democracy and human rights. ZANU is responsible for twenty-one incidents of terrorist violence, twenty-six fatalities, and four injured persons.[89] Currently, Zimbabwe is classified as a parliamentary democracy.[90]

Conditions for Success

In this section I will address the three independent variables that are anticipated to impact the success of negotiations. To determine if the level of democracy of the country attacked influences the success or failure of negotiations, I used the time frame of the organization given in Cronin's dataset to obtain a level of democracy rating for that time period. A comprehensive chart illustrating the year-by-year level of democracy is show in the appendix section.

The first variable examined is the correlation of the attacked country's level of democracy. The level of democracy is based on the Freedom House data, which assigns a designation of "free", "partially free", or "not free" based on a checklist of political rights and civil liberties. For the African National Congress, in 1973 data shows South Africa was partially free through the end of 1980. In January of 1981 through August of 1982 it was viewed as not free, and after August 1982 it returned to partially free. This is consistent with information that states that Apartheid was growing stronger during this time period of greater unrest. South Africa remained partially free through the negotiation period and in 1994 became listed as free, where it stands today. This is likely to indicate that following the end of negotiations and the demise of the terrorist faction and violence in 1990, over a period of four years, the African National Congress was able to transition well not only to the

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86 "BBC News - Zimbabwe Profile - Timeline", n.d. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14113618.
87 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=3716. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd
88 "BBC News - Zimbabwe Profile - Timeline", n.d. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14113618.
89 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=3716. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd
90 Central Intelligence Agency. *World Factbook: Zimbabwe.* https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html

governing body, but ultimately strengthening the country's level of overall freedom. The corresponding end of negotiations and transition of the ANC from a terrorist organization to a governing body is consistent with the evolution of not free in the early years of struggle, partially free, and then following the end of negotiations, a free country. This would suggest that successful negotiations could aid in the transition of a state's democracy.

Namibia is a bit more challenging to find consistent evidence of the level of democratic freedom. From 1973-1975 Namibia was designated as not free. There is no reported data from 1976 to November 1988. From November 1988 to December 1989 Namibia is classified as a partially free state and in 1990 it achieves free state designation where it remains. Since limited data is available for Namibia, I also looked at Angola where the South West African Peoples' Organization was also based, which produced more fruitful results. From 1975 to 1990 Angola is classified as not free. In 1991 it is viewed as partially free, in 1992 it returns to not free where it remains in 2012. This data does not clearly indicate the role of SWAPO in the level of democracy because SWAPO was not isolated to a specific state. Furthermore, Angola, as illustrated by the data, has been a violent area, yet interestingly, in 1991, the only time it was categorized as partially free, was the year following the end of the terrorist violence of SWAPO. While this does not strongly suggest anything, it might be a small indication that the end of negotiation and the resolution of the SWAPO conflict had an impact on Angola for a short period.

The data for Zimbabwe, home to the Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union, shows that from 1972-1977 Zimbabwe holds a not free designation and from 1978 to November of 1989 it holds a partially free designation. This is consistent with the ZANU terrorist activity from 1965-1987 preventing the state from reaching free status. A somewhat unexpected finding is that at the peak of terrorist violence in 1979, the designation changed from not free to partially free only on year prior. This could indicate that there was another factor besides terrorist violence that significantly altered the democratic state of Zimbabwe. For this case, it would be a reasonable assumption where one can assume the end of negotiations as 1987, since this is the listed end date of a resolved conflict according to Cronin's data, thus once can assume the terrorist violence and conflict ended in 1987. Based on this assumption it was three years following the resolution of the conflict and the end of violence before the state, Zimbabwe, became a free state. This would allow enough time for the Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union to transition to governing body and more fully establish political rights and civil liberties to achieve the free state designation. This is important because based on this case, there is a possibility that terrorist violence that was ended through successful negotiation could be a factor in predicting an improvement in the level of or transition to a more free

democracy. The cases of both the Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union in Zimbabwe, and the African National Congress in South Africa both indicate that during the period of terrorist activity the states were primarily viewed as partially free and only following the end of negotiations, the resolution of the conflict, and the transition of the group from terrorist group to governing body did the state become a free democracy. While I acknowledge that this is the reverse of my original hypothesis, further research on evaluating this area has the potential to be a useful contribution to the discourse on the subject. However, to return to my original hypothesis that a more democratic state is more likely to have successful negotiations, the data suggests this to be false, and therefore, inconclusive.

The second variable assesses the effect of victims on successful negotiation. In all three of the African cases above, a greater number of attacks, or a greater number of victims does not necessarily produce better conditions for successful negotiations. If one looks at the number of fatalities they range from 380 to twenty-six and both achieved the same level of success, a full level of achievement of strategic objectives. The same is true for the number of injuries sustained by individuals, the range is 1293 to four, thus indicating and even greater disparity of the injuries to likelihood of success hypothesis. Therefore, these findings make this variable irrelevant in determining a condition for successful negotiation.

The third variable relates to the whether the attacked country was classified as a failing or failed state. The Failed States Index, published by the Fund for Peace utilizes twelve indicators of state vulnerability, which include social, economic, and political and military indicators. The Index measures the vulnerability of the state in terms of collapse or conflict where higher scores are more vulnerable than lower scores.[91] In 2011 South Africa had a total score of 67.6, and in 2006, the first year data was available, a score of 55.7. This indicates that South Africa has not maintained a path of improvement and is in an increasingly vulnerable position. Namibia has remained fairly stable with a total score of 71.7 in 2011 and in 2006, 70.7. Zimbabwe, in contrast, has become more vulnerable. In 2005 it had a score of 94.9 and in 2011, 107.9. Finally, in a surprising case Angola had a score of 87.3 in 2005, and 84.6 in 2011, far less vulnerable than one might have thought given the above information. Unfortunately, since the 2006 data is over a decade after South Africa and longer for the other states, first became listed as a democratically free country in 1994, it becomes impossible to determine the failed state status in 1994 to gain an accurate measure of whether or not failed/failing states are more likely to have unsuccessful negotiations. Unfortunately, this lack of reliable,

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91 Fund For Peace. *Failed State Index Frequently Asked Questions.* http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-faq

consistent data for these cases during the appropriate time period makes it impossible to accurately determine the role failed states play in negotiations in these cases. However, this could be a possible area for future research to focus on.

Chapter 2, Stable Conflicts

Relevant Cases

The two cases that I will look at in this chapter are the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and The Sudan People's Liberation Army of South Sudan. These cases were selected because they were the only two cases that met the criteria of having a "partial level of achievement of strategic objectives." While both cases also ended the same year, 2005, the groups were active in different parts of the world, which provides an opportunity for comparison. The two groups were selected in order to evaluate the impact of a "partial success" classification and to limit variables. As in the previous chapter, I will provide a brief overview of each group, before moving on to assess the independent variables of my study.

The Free Aceh Movement was an active terrorist group between 1971 and 2005 and was based in Aceh at the northern tip of the Indonesian island of Sumatra. GAM wanted an independent Islamic kingdom and was opposed to the forceful Indonesian military.[92] Secretive negotiations have taken place since 2000 and there have been approximately five rounds of negotiations, mostly unsuccessful until 2005. In 2002 a peace agreement was signed by both parties; however in 2003 cease fire monitors left the country and the government declared martial law and launched an offensive by the Army. The Free Aceh Movement continued with guerilla tactics. The following year the government retracted the martial law declaration and replaced it with a designation of civil emergency.[93] In 2005, yet another comprehensive peace agreement was signed by both sides, which brought an end to fighting in early 2005.[94] The 2005 negotiations were different from all other attempts at negotiation because more concessions were given on both sides. The state was to withdraw its forces and give Aceh greater autonomy and control, and the The Free Aceh Movement

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92 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database:
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3600. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd
93 "Free Aceh Movement", n.d. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/aceh.htm.
94 "Free Aceh Movement", n.d. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/aceh.htm.

was to demobilize and turn in weapons, among others.[95] A European Union led "Aceh Monitoring Mission" which as of 2006 remained in place monitored the peace process.

The Sudan People's Liberation Army of South Sudan, achieved a partial level of achievement of strategic objectives and was an active group between 1983, when Shari'a law was implemented, and 2005. The goal of the group was to establish a secular and democratic Sudan and was in opposition to the implementation of Islamic Shari'a law.[96] Preliminary meetings between the Sudan People's Liberation Army and the government took place in 2002 in which the government agreed to exempt South Sudan from Shari'a law, allowing the south to hold "a referendum on secession after a six-year interim period" and reached an agreement that gave South Sudan the right to self-determination.[97] Unfortunately, fighting over the key town of Torit derailed the talks. In late 2005 a peace treaty was signed and in 2011, South Sudan became its own country.[98] Both of these cases highlight the fact that despite long and complex conflicts, negotiations can be beneficial to reducing violence and bringing about relative peace.

Conditions for Success

The first variable examined is the correlation of the attacked country's level of democracy. From 1972-1992 Indonesia is listed as partially free, from 1993-1997 it was not free, but in 1998 it returned to partially free until 2004. The following year, 2005, it was listed as free, where it remains today. From August 1982-November 1983 Sudan was classified partially free, from November 1983 to November 1985 the status changed to not free. From November 1985-November 1988 it was partially free again, and from November 1988 to 2005 it was listed as not free, where it remains today. Negotiations began in 2000, possibly indicating that negotiations could not begin while the country was in deep turmoil and essentially viewed as a non-democratic state. The transition to a partially free democracy in 1998 and lasted through 2004 potentially shows that the level of democracy does influence the success of negotiation. It is plausible to argue that once South Sudan

95 "Conflict and Peacemaking in Aceh: A Chronology | Worldwatch Institute", n.d. http://www.worldwatch.org/node/3929.
96National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database:
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3516. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd
97 "Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)", n.d. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/spla.htm.
98 "BBC News - Q&A: South Sudan Independence", n.d. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12111730.

became relatively democratic, negotiations were able to take place and produced desirable results. However, this is not a strong correlation and requires further testing by additional means.

The second variable assesses the effect of victims on successful negotiation. The Sudan People's Liberation Army has 39 instances of terrorist activity with 83 fatalities and 64 injured.[99] The Free Aceh Movement has 113 incidents of terror with 124 fatalities and 145 injured.[100] My hypothesis that the greater number of attacks and victims, the greater the likelihood for successful negotiations to occur, proved to be inconclusive. Similar to the level of democracy, this data is not an outright failure of the hypothesis. One could argue that the reasonably high levels of fatalities and injuries did produce successful negotiations, however, this argument could be easily disproven. Therefore, the results for this variable are also inconclusive.

The third variable relates to the whether the attacked country was classified as a failing or failed state. In 2005, Sudan was listed as the third most vulnerable country in the world for failed states, with a total score of 104.1.[101] Also in 2005, Indonesia was ranked forty-seventh most vulnerable, with a total score of 87.0.[102] These high scores for both countries are in the alert or the highest warning level indicating they are failing states. This tells us that this criterion of failing/failed states as more likely to have unsuccessful negotiations is false as both of these cases are viewed as having some success because they held negotiations that achieved some level of strategic objectives.

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99 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=611. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
100 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=1512. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
101 Fund For Peace. Failed State Index 2005. http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2005.
102 Fund For Peace. Failed State Index 2005. http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2005.

Chapter 3, Failed Conflicts

Relevant Cases

When examining the dataset, one of the most interesting cases is that of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), a communist/socialist group from Chile that was active from 1983 to 1995. I chose to examine this case further because it is a unique instance, it is classified as an unstable case even though it had a full achievement of strategic objectives, the only case in the unstable category to hold such a distinction. Upon further examination, I found that the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front is an armed wing of the Chilean Communist Party with the goal of overthrowing the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet.[103] In 1989 the Pinochet government fell and the government returned to democracy, which satisfied the group's goal of removing Pinochet. However, the FPMR splintered off in to two groups, the FPMR Party and the FPMR-Dissidents (FPMR-D). The FPMR-D took over the terrorist violence in the early 1990's, which was quite limited in comparison to its peak in 1988.[104] However, soon after, leaders of the FPMR-D were arrested the group diminished, and no longer poses a threat.[105] The fall of the Pinochet government clarifies why the group was listed as able to achieve a full level of achievement of its strategic goals. However, the fall of the Pinochet government was not the result of negotiations with the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front. Despite this, negotiations were attempted[106] in 1983 with Chile's Roman Catholic Cardinal Juan Francisco Fresno and 1985 led to the signing of the "National Accord for Transition to Full Democracy."[107] This document served to transition the government to civilian rule,

103 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database:
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=222. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd
104 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database:
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=222. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd
105 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database:
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=222. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd
106 There is dispute over how much "negotiating" was actually taking place with different sources saying negotiations did take place, and others saying that both sides never made it to the point of negotiation.
107 "Chile - Authoritarianism Defeated by Its Own Rules", n.d. http://countrystudies.us/chile/88.htm

end restrictions on civil liberties, and to establish free, direct, presidential elections.[108] Unfortunately, the Pinochet government refused to acknowledge the existence of this document, which led to increased violence by the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front. Negotiations continued, unsuccessfully until 1988 when during elections it was determined that the way to remove Pinochet was through the vote in the plebiscite.[109] Drake et al. note that "Although the plebiscite was devised as a mechanism for perpetuating the regime and keeping Pinochet in power, the opposition turned it into an effective vehicle for the partial politicization and democratization of society."[110]Pinochet was defeated in 1988 with 54.5% of the vote against him.[111]

The second case I chose to look at more closely is the Simon Bolivar Guerilla Coordinating Board (CGSB). I chose this group because it had the third largest number of incidents of terrorist violence behind Hamas and the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, with 206 incidents. Hamas fell outside the scope of this chapter since the group is still active. In order to obtain more useful information, I wanted to reduce variables and select a case that is currently listed as inactive. This similar variable of inactive group status, allows the Simon Bolivar Guerilla Coordinating Board to be a more similar comparison to the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front.

The Simon Bolivar Guerilla Coordinating Board is a Colombian group and was active from 1987 to 1993, a relatively short time in comparison to other cases, and only half the time of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front. Another reason the Simon Bolivar Guerilla Coordinating Board is a unique case is because it is a group that committed violent terrorist attacks, but was comprised of members from other Colombian rebel groups including: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the April 19 Movement (M-19), the National Liberation Army (ELN), the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), the Workers' Revolutionary Party (PRT), and finally, the Quintin Lame Command.[112] The group was formed as a coordinating board to handle negotiations with the government and its members. In the early 1990's negotiations between the government and the Simon Bolivar Guerilla Coordinating Board took place, which resulted in the M-19 and EPL ceasing

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108 "Chile - Authoritarianism Defeated by Its Own Rules", n.d. http://countrystudies.us/chile/88.htm
109 "Chile - Authoritarianism Defeated by Its Own Rules", n.d. http://countrystudies.us/chile/88.htm;
Drake, Paul W, Ivan Jaksic, San Diego. Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies University of California, Berkeley. Center for Latin American Studies University of California, and Institute of the Americas. "The struggle for democracy in Chile". Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995, p.226.
110 Drake, Paul W, Ivan Jaksic, San Diego. Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies University of California, Berkeley. Center for Latin American Studies University of California, and Institute of the Americas. "The struggle for democracy in Chile". Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995, p.231.
111 "Chile - Authoritarianism Defeated by Its Own Rules", n.d. http://countrystudies.us/chile/88.htm
112 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database:
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4393. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd

operations and the Quintin Lame Command demobilized.[113] Under the Virgilio Barco Presidency, "President Barco offers an 'outstretched but firm hand" to the rebels, promising them full participation in civil and political life if they lay down their arms."[114] However, the FARC launched an attack that killed twenty-five soldiers and the government called off the offer.[115] Negotiations in 1991 and 1992 between Simon Bolivar Guerilla Coordinating Board and the César Gaviria government were unsuccessful because the CGSB refused to accept the government's condition that the group, and the FARC in particular, remain in a confined geographical area for the duration of the negotiations.[116] The Simon Bolivar Guerilla Coordinating Board also declined to participate in President Gaviria's constituent assembly when it was offered only seven out of 70 available seats.[117] Unfortunately, negotiations between the FARC and ELN members of the Simon Bolivar Guerilla Coordinating Board were not successful, and both of those groups remain active terrorist organizations in the present day, despite the fact that the CGSB disbanded in 1993.[118]

Conditions for Failure

The first variable examined is the correlation of the attacked country's level of democracy. For the case of Chile, the state was not viewed as democratic at the beginning of the negotiation, however, following the fall of Pinochet, the transition to democracy began. However, the transition to democracy was not a result of successful negotiation, but rather due to the fact that the Pinochet regime fell. Therefore, in this unique case, the hypothesis that the more democratic a country is the more likely it will have successful negotiations is false. The case of Colombia and the Simon Bolivar Coordinating Board is a potentially more straightforward case in terms of the level of democracy impacting the success of negotiations. From 1987-1988 Colombia was viewed as a free or democratic state, according to Freedom House. However, from 1989 through present day, Colombia is listed as a partially free state. This indicates that at the peak of violence the transition from a free state to a

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113 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database:
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4393. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd; "Crisis Group Multimedia: The FARC", n.d.
http://www.crisisgroup.be/flash/farc_mar09/farc.html.
114 "Crisis Group Multimedia: The FARC", n.d. http://www.crisisgroup.be/flash/farc_mar09/farc.html.
115 "Crisis Group Multimedia: The FARC", n.d. http://www.crisisgroup.be/flash/farc_mar09/farc.html.
116 "Crisis Group Multimedia: The FARC", n.d. http://www.crisisgroup.be/flash/farc_mar09/farc.html.
117 "Crisis Group Multimedia: The FARC", n.d. http://www.crisisgroup.be/flash/farc_mar09/farc.html.
118 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database:
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4393. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.

partially free state occurred, and thus, the level of democracy decreased. This tells us that for these cases the level of democracy does not influence the successful outcome of negotiations, thereby once again, disproving my hypothesis.

The second variable assesses the effect of victims on successful negotiation. The Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front is responsible for 830 incidents of terrorist violence of which 299 people were injured and 73 were killed.[119] The Simon Bolivar Coordinating Board is responsible for 206 incidents, of which 115 people sustained injuries and 392 people were killed.[120] However, it is important to note that only the incidents where the Simon Bolivar Coordinating Board was named as the responsible party are included in this count. These numbers do not include the number of attacks or victims that took place by members of the Simon Bolivar Coordinating Board. These numbers indicate that the number of violent attacks do not influence the success of negotiations as both of these groups had failed negotiations with the government, despite a full achievement of strategic aims by the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front and a limited achievement by the Simon Bolivar Coordinating Board.

The third variable relates to the whether the attacked country was classified as a failing or failed state. There is no data from the Failed State Index for 1993 or 1995, the last year the Simon Bolivar Coordinating Board and Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front respectively, were active. However, for 2011, the Failed State Index ranks Colombia as 87.0 whereas Chile has a score of 40.7.[121] However, one must take into account the drastic changes that have occurred within the Chilean government to produce such fairly stable scores. The stability of Chile during the 1980's and today is drastically different and thus, not eligible for comparison based on current ratings. In contrast, one can assume that Colombia has likely remained in the same level of "warning" vulnerability since the Simon Bolivar Coordinating Board was active. However, without specific data, it is not possible to reach a conclusion regarding the correlation between failed state status and these cases.

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119 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database:
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?expanded=no&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&succ ess=yes&perpetrator=381&ob=GTDID&od=desc&page=1&count=100#results-table. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
120 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=605 Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
121 Fund For Peace. Failed State Index 2011. http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2011.

Conclusion

This study set out to determine how three independent variables impacted the success of negotiations with terrorist organizations. I looked at the correlation of the attacked country's level of democracy, the effect of the number of victims, and the failed state status in relation to success of negotiations. I had begun this study anticipating finding that all three independent variables would have a significant impact upon the dependent variable. What I found instead was that none of the independent variables conclusively impacted the success of terrorist organization negotiations with a government. My hypothesis pertaining to the country's level of democracy was that the more democratic a country, the more likely they were able to hold negotiations that resulted in some level of achievement for the terrorist organization, and a peaceful resolution, my measure for success. Instead, what I found was that the level of democracy does not produce more successful negotiations. For my second variable, the effect of the number of victims, I anticipated finding that the greater number of victims, the more likely negotiations would result in success. I expected to find this because most states reasons for entering negotiations are to reduce, or ideally, end violence. Therefore, if there is a group that is constantly attacking and producing large numbers of casualties, that provides the government with incentive to negotiate with the terrorist group in an effort to stop the violence. However, this was not what I found. I did not find a strong correlation between the number of victims of terrorist attacks and more successful negotiations. For my third and final variable, the level of failed state status, I anticipated finding that failed states were more likely to have unsuccessful negotiations. This was a difficult variable to measure, as data was limited for the date range of the cases that I was looking at. Therefore, I was unable to draw any significant conclusions either way. However, despite some difficulties in obtaining relevant data, I was able to point to possible correlations of the variables for specific cases, therefore indicating that these variables have merit and further testing is recommended. I remain committed to the premise that negotiations with terrorists should not immediately be disqualified as an implausible conflict management tool.

Appendix

Cronin's Dataset

Terrorist Group Name	Extent of Negotiation with Government	Any Stable Negotiations	Any Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Full Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Level of Achievement of Objectives	Region	Year Group Began	Year Group Ended	Estimated Group Lifespan	Lifespan, 0 recoded to 1	Lifespan Rounded to Upper 5	Is this a Listed Foreign Terrorist Organization?	Any Non-failed Negotiation with Government	Any Negotiation with Government
New People's Army (NPA)	Failed	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	1969	2006	37	37	40	Listed FTO	No	Yes
Janashakti	Failed	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1992	2006	14	14	15	Not listed	No	Yes
Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD)	Failed	None or Failed	No	No	No	Africa	1991	2003	12	12	15	Not listed	No	Yes
National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU)	Failed	None or Failed	No	No	No	Africa	1988	2006	18	18	20	Not listed	No	Yes
Khmer Rouge	Failed	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	1951	1998	47	47	50	Not listed	No	Yes
Communist Party of India-Maoist	Failed	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	2004	2006	2	2	5	Not listed	No	Yes
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)	Failed	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (partial)	Southeast Asia	1972	2006	34	34	35	Not listed	No	Yes
United National Liberation Front (UNLF)	Failed	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1990	2006	16	16	20	Not listed	No	Yes
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)	Failed	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1966	2006	30	30	30	Not listed	No	Yes
Shining Path	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1968	2006	38	38	40	Listed FTO	No	No
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1989	2006	17	17	20	Listed FTO	No	No
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	2000	2006	6	6	10	Listed FTO	No	No
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1978	2006	28	28	30	Listed FTO	No	No
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1991	2006	15	15	15	Listed FTO	No	No
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine -- General Command (PFLP-GC)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1968	2006	38	38	40	Listed FTO	No	No
DHKP/C	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1994	2006	12	12	15	Listed FTO	No	No
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1978	2001	23	23	25	Listed FTO	No	No
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	None	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1967	2006	39	39	40	Listed FTO	No	No
Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North Africa	1996	2006	10	10	10	Listed FTO	No	No
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1996	2006	10	10	10	Listed FTO	No	No
Asbat al-Ansar	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian	1990	2006	16	16	20	Listed FTO	No	No

Terrorist Group Name	Extent of Negotiation with Government	Any Stable Negotiations	Any Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Full Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Level of Achievement of Objectives	Region	Year Group Began	Year Group Ended	Estimated Group Lifespan	Lifespan, 0 recoded to 1	Lifespan Rounded to Upper 5	Is this a Listed Foreign Terrorist Organization?	Any Non-failed Negotiation with Government	Any Negotiation with Government
						Gulf								
al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	2004	2006	2	2	5	Listed FTO	No	No
Hezbollah	None	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1982	2006	24	24	25	Listed FTO	No	No
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	1991	2006	15	15	15	Listed FTO	No	No
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Central Asia	1998	2006	8	8	10	Listed FTO	No	No
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North Africa	1995	2006	11	11	15	Listed FTO	No	No
Kach	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1971	2006	35	35	35	Listed FTO	No	No
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1974	1994	20	20	20	Listed FTO	No	No
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades	None	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	2000	2006	6	6	10	Listed FTO	No	No
Aum Shinri Kyo	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1987	2006	19	19	20	Listed FTO	No	No
National Liberation Army (Colombia)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1964	2006	42	42	45	Listed FTO	No	No
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1998	2006	8	8	10	Listed FTO	No	No
Islamic Jihad Group (Uzbekistan)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Central Asia	2004	2006	2	2	5	Listed FTO	No	No
al-Qaeda	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1985	2006	21	21	25	Listed FTO	No	No
Revolutionary Organization 17 November (RO-N17)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North Asia	1974	2003	29	29	30	Listed FTO	No	No
Revolutionary Nuclei	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Asia	1974	2000	26	26	30	Listed FTO	No	No
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	1993	2006	13	13	15	Listed FTO	No	No
Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MeK)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1971	2006	35	35	35	Listed FTO	No	No
Ansar al-Sunnah Army	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	2003	2006	3	3	5	Listed FTO	No	No
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1986	2006	20	20	20	Listed FTO	No	No
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1974	2006	32	32	35	Listed FTO	No	No
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North Africa	1995	2006	11	11	15	Listed FTO	No	No

Terrorist Group Name	Extent of Negotiation with Government	Any Stable Negotiations	Any Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Full Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Level of Achievement of Objectives	Region	Year Group Began	Year Group Ended	Estimated Group Lifespan	Lifespan, 0 recoded to 1	Lifespan Rounded to Upper 5	Is this a Listed Foreign Terrorist Organization?	Any Non-failed Negotiation with Government	Any Negotiation with Government
Covenant Sword and Arm of the Lord (CSA)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North America	1983	1985	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan (ARGK)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1984	2000	16	16	20	Not listed	No	No
Rajah Solaiman Movement	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	2002	2006	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
Popular Resistance Committees	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	2000	2006	6	6	10	Not listed	No	No
Sami al-Ghul Brigades	None	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	2006	2006	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Muslim United Army	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	2002	2003	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Pattani (BRN)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	1963	2006	43	43	45	Not listed	No	No
People's Liberation Forces (Colombia)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1995	1999	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
International Solidarity	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1990	2006	16	16	20	Not listed	No	No
People's Liberation Army (PLA)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1978	2006	28	28	30	Not listed	No	No
Revolutionary Worker Clandestine Union of the People Party	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Central America						Not listed	No	No
Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners (FLLF)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1977	1983	6	6	10	Not listed	No	No
Youth Action Group	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1974	1977	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No
al-Faran	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1995	2002	7	7	10	Not listed	No	No
Liberation Battalion	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1987	1987	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Jund al-Sham	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions						Not listed	No	No
Resistance, Liberation and Independence Organization (AAA)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	1972	1972	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Spanish Basque Battalion	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1975	1981	6	6	10	Not listed	No	No
Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1998	2006	8	8	10	Not listed	No	No
United People's Democratic Front (UPDF)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1998	2006	8	8	10	Not listed	No	No
Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Africa	1980	2006	16	16	20	Not listed	No	No

Terrorist Group Name	Extent of Negotiation with Government	Any Stable Negotiations	Any Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Full Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Level of Achievement of Objectives	Region	Year Group Began	Year Group Ended	Estimated Group Lifespan	Lifespan, 0 recoded to 1	Lifespan Rounded to Upper 5	Is this a Listed Foreign Terrorist Organization?	Any Non-failed Negotiation with Government	Any Negotiation with Government
Maruseido (Marxist Youth League)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North Asia	1974	1974	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Kurdistan Freedom Hawks	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	2004	2006	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
Guadeloupe Liberation Army	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Central America	1980	1986	6	6	10	Not listed	No	No
Jordanian Islamic Resistance	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1997	2000	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No
People's Vanguard Organization	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Central America	1980	1995	16	16	20	Not listed	No	No
People's Revolutionary Army (Argentina)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1969	1977	8	8	10	Not listed	No	No
West Nile Bank Front (WNBF)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Africa	1990	1999	9	9	10	Not listed	No	No
Islamic Renewal Movement	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1991	1995	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
Aryan Nations (AN)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North America	1979	2006	27	27	30	Not listed	No	No
de Fes	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1994	1994	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
National Revolutionary Command (Omar al-Mukhtar)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1986	1986	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
New Red Brigades/Communist Combatant Party	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1984	2006	22	22	25	Not listed	No	No
Pedro Leon Arboleda Movement	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1979	1986	7	7	10	Not listed	No	No
Saif-ul-Muslimeen	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	2003	2006	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No
Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1996	2006	10	10	10	Not listed	No	No
Padanian Armed Separatist Phalanx	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1998	1998	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1985	1989	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
Army of God	None	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	North America	1982	2006	24	24	25	Not listed	No	No
Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1975	1983	8	8	10	Not listed	No	No
Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1974	1985	11	11	15	Not listed	No	No
al-Madina	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	2002	2006	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
OPR-33	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1971	1976	5	5	5	Not listed	No	No

Terrorist Group Name	Extent of Negotiation with Government	Any Stable Negotiations	Any Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Full Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Level of Achievement of Objectives	Region	Year Group Began	Year Group Ended	Estimated Group Lifespan	Lifespan, 0 recoded to 1	Lifespan Rounded to Upper 5	Is this a Listed Foreign Terrorist Organization?	Any Non-failed Negotiation with Government	Any Negotiation with Government
Lebanese Arab Youth	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1977	1977	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
East Turkistan Liberation Organization	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Asia	2002	2006	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
People's United Liberation Front (PULF)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1995	2006	11	11	15	Not listed	No	No
23rd of September Communist League	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Central America	1973	1982	9	9	10	Not listed	No	No
International Justice Group	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1995	1995	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1992	1999	7	7	10	Not listed	No	No
Croatian Freedom Fighters (CFF)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North America	1976	1981	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
Albanian National Army (ANA)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	2002	2006	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
Omega-7	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North America	1974	1983	9	9	10	Not listed	No	No
Bolivarian Liberation Forces (FBL)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1992	2006	14	14	15	Not listed	No	No
Bagramyan Battalion	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1990	1998	8	8	10	Not listed	No	No
Odua Peoples' Congress	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Africa	1999	2006	7	7	10	Not listed	No	No
Free Papua Movement (OPM)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	1961	2006	45	45	45	Not listed	No	No
Macheteros	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North America	1978	2006	28	28	30	Not listed	No	No
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (IFLP)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1986	1990	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
New Revolutionary Alternative	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1996	1999	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No
Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa Brigades	None	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	2001	2006	5	5	5	Not listed	No	No
Hector Riobe Brigade	None	None or Failed	Yes	Yes	Yes (full)	Central America	1982	1986	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1983	2001	18	18	20	Not listed	No	No
Takfir wa Hijra	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1982	2006	35	35	35	Not listed	No	No
Islamic Army in Iraq	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	2004	2006	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1979	1984	5	5	5	Not listed	No	No
TKEP/L	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1990	2000	10	10	10	Not listed	No	No
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Africa	1976	1988	12	12	15	Not listed	No	No
People's War Group (PWG)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1980	2004	24	24	25	Not listed	No	No

Terrorist Group Name	Extent of Negotiation with Government	Any Stable Negotiations	Any Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Full Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Level of Achievement of Objectives	Region	Year Group Began	Year Group Ended	Estimated Group Lifespan	Lifespan, 0 recoded to 1	Lifespan Rounded to Upper 5	Is this a Listed Foreign Terrorist Organization?	Any Non-failed Negotiation with Government	Any Negotiation with Government
Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People (FARP)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Central America	1999	2006	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Soldiers of the Prophet's Companions	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	2005	2006	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Shurafa al-Urdun	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	2001	2006	5	5	5	Not listed	No	No
Tigers	None	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Africa	1998		0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)	None	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Africa	2006	2006	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Revolutionary Offensive Cells	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	2003	2006	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No
Black December	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1973	1973	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Action Directe	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1980	1987	7	7	10	Not listed	No	No
Third of October Group	None	None or Failed	Yes	Yes	Yes (full)	Europe	1980	1981	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
al-Intiqami al-Pakistani	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	2003	2003	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Amal	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1975	1998	23	23	25	Not listed	No	No
Russian National Unity	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1990	2006	16	16	20	Not listed	No	No
Saad bin Abi Waqas Brigades	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	2005	2006	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Tontons Macoutes	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Central America	1958	1991	33	33	35	Not listed	No	No
Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1941	2006	65	65	65	Not listed	No	No
Egypt's Revolution	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1984	1987	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No
Revolutionary Movement of October 8 (MR-8)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1968	1972	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
Jenin Martyr's Brigade	None	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	2003	2006	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No
Swords of Righteousness Brigades	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	2005	2006	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
al-Fuqra	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1980	2006	23	23	25	Not listed	No	No
People's Revolutionary Organization	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1992	1997	5	5	5	Not listed	No	No
Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Africa	1994	2001	7	7	10	Not listed	No	No
United Revolutionary Front	None	None or Failed	Yes	Yes	Yes (full)	South America	1997	1999	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Arab Communist Organization	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1974	1977	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No
September-France	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1981		0	1	5	Not listed	No	No

Terrorist Group Name	Extent of Negotiation with Government	Any Stable Negotiations	Any Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Full Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Level of Achievement of Objectives	Region	Year Group Began	Year Group Ended	Estimated Group Lifespan	Lifespan, 0 recoded to 1	Lifespan Rounded to Upper 5	Is this a Listed Foreign Terrorist Organization?	Any Non-failed Negotiation with Government	Any Negotiation with Government
Red Flag (Venezuela)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1970	1984	14	14	15	Not listed	No	No
PKK/KONGRA-GEL	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	2003	2005	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
South Londonderry Volunteers (SLV)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1999	2006	7	7	10	Not listed	No	No
South Maluku Republic (RMS)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1998	2006	8	8	10	Not listed	No	No
Harkat ul-Ansar	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1993	2001	8	8	10	Not listed	No	No
Red Army Faction	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1978	1992	14	14	15	Not listed	No	No
Revolutionary Front for Proletarian Action	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1985	1985	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Syrian Social Nationalist Party	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1931	1989	58	58	60	Not listed	No	No
Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JuM)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1990	2006	16	16	20	Not listed	No	No
Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF)	None	None or Failed	Yes	Yes	Yes (full)	Africa	1976	1991	15	15	15	Not listed	No	No
Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1994	2001	7	7	10	Not listed	No	No
Canary Islands Independence Movement	None	None or Failed	Yes	Yes	Yes (full)	Europe	1977	1977	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras (FMLH)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Central America	1980	1992	12	12	15	Not listed	No	No
EYAL (Fighting Jewish Organization)	None	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1993	1995	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
Spanish National Action	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1972		0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Salafia Jihadia	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North Africa	1996	2006	10	10	10	Not listed	No	No
al-Fath al-Mubin Troops	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	2006	2006	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1974	1976	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
Lautaro Youth Movement	None	None or Failed	Yes	Yes	Yes (full)	South America	1988	1994	6	6	10	Not listed	No	No
Tawhid Islamic Brigades	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	2004	2006	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
Tawhid and Jihad	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	1998	2006	8	8	10	Not listed	No	No
Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1988	2006	18	18	20	Not listed	No	No
The Extraditables	None	None or Failed	Yes	Yes	Yes (full)	South America	1987	1991	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
Eritrean People's Liberation Front	None	None or Failed	Yes	Yes	Yes (full)	Africa	1970	1971	21	21	25	Not listed	No	No
Mohajir Qami Movement-	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1992	2006	14	14	15	Not listed	No	No

Terrorist Group Name	Extent of Negotiation with Government	Any Stable Negotiations	Any Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Full Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Level of Achievement of Objectives	Region	Year Group Began	Year Group Ended	Estimated Group Lifespan	Lifespan, 0 recoded to 1	Lifespan Rounded to Upper 5	Is this a Listed Foreign Terrorist Organization?	Any Non-failed Negotiation with Government	Any Negotiation with Government
Haqiqi (MQM-H)														
Peace Conquerors	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1985	1985	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Group of Popular Combatants (GPC)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1994	2006	12	12	15	Not listed	No	No
Official IRA	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1969	1972	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No
Night Avengers	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Central America	1997	1998	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
28 May Armenian Organization	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1977	1977	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Ninth of June Organization	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1981	1981	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
National Liberation Army (Bolivia)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1966	1988	22	22	25	Not listed	No	No
Puerto Rican Resistance Movement	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North America	1981	1981	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Africa	2000	2006	6	6	10	Not listed	No	No
Salah al-Din Battalions	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	2000	2006	6	6	10	Not listed	No	No
Justice Army of Defenseless People (EJPI)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Central America	1996	1998	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
Runda Kumpalan Kecil (RKK)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	2005	2006	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Underground Government of the Free Democratic People of Laos	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	2000	2006	6	6	10	Not listed	No	No
Terra Lliure (TL)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1972	1991	19	19	20	Not listed	No	No
Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PSF)	None	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1967	1989	22	22	25	Not listed	No	No
United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1998	2006	8	8	10	Not listed	No	No
United Nasserite Organization	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1986	1987	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Black Panthers	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North America	1966	1972	6	6	10	Not listed	No	No
Armed Revolutionary Left	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	2004	2006	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
Ingush Jama'at Shariat	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	2006	2006	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Rebolusyonaryong Hukbong Bayan (RHB)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	1998	2006	8	8	10	Not listed	No	No
People's Revolutionary Army (Colombia)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1995	2006	11	11	15	Not listed	No	No
Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	2002	2006	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
Popular Revolutionary Vanguard	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1968	1973	5	5	5	Not listed	No	No

Terrorist Group Name	Extent of Negotiation with Government	Any Stable Negotiations	Any Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Full Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Level of Achievement of Objectives	Region	Year Group Began	Year Group Ended	Estimated Group Lifespan	Lifespan, 0 recoded to 1	Lifespan Rounded to Upper 5	Is this a Listed Foreign Terrorist Organization?	Any Non-failed Negotiation with Government	Any Negotiation with Government
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Asia	1990	2006	16	16	20	Not listed	No	No
Army of the Corsican People	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	2004	2006	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
January 31 Popular Front	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Central America	1981	1982	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Africa	1984	2006	22	22	25	Not listed	No	No
Black Hand	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1983	1983	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Ansar al-Islam	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	2001	2006	5	5	5	Not listed	No	No
Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	2000	2006	6	6	10	Not listed	No	No
Movsar Baryayev Gang	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	2002	2002	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Oklahoma City Bombing Conspirators	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North America	1993	1995	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
al-Mansoorain	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	2003	2006	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No
Committee for the Security of the Highways	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1998	2001	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No
Corsican Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1992	2006	14	14	15	Not listed	No	No
Armed Revolutionary Action	None	None or Failed	Yes	Yes	Yes (full)	Transregional: 2+ regions	1971	1971	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Battalion of the Martyr Abdullah Azzam	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	2004	2006	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
Babbar Khalsa International (BKI)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1978	2006	18	18	20	Not listed	No	No
Montoneros	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1970	1979	9	9	10	Not listed	No	No
Dagestani Shari?ah Jamaat	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	2002	2006	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
Free Greeks	None	None or Failed	Yes	Yes	Yes (full)	Europe	1967	1974	7	7	10	Not listed	No	No
Arab Fedayeen Cells	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1986	1986	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Liberation Front of Quebec	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North America	1963	1978	15	15	15	Not listed	No	No
Masada, Action and Defense Movement	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1972	1988	16	16	20	Not listed	No	No
Mahdi Army	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	2003	2006	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No
Purbo Banglar Communist Party (PBCP)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	2003	2006	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No
Zarate Willka Armed Forces of Liberation	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1989		0	1	5	Not listed	No	No

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First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1975	2006	31	31	35	Not listed	No	No
Revolutionary Struggle	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	2003	2006	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No
Strugglers for the Unity and Freedom of Greater Syria	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	2005	2006	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Black Revolutionary Assault Team	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North America	1971	1971	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Nationalist Kurdish Revenge Teams	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1999	1999	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Order II	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North America		1986	8	8	10	Not listed	No	No
2nd June Movement	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1975	1981	6	6	10	Not listed	No	No
Popular Resistance	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Central Asia	2002	2006	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
Nestor Paz Zamora Commission	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1990	1991	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Red Brigades	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1969	1984	15	15	15	Not listed	No	No
Independent Armed Revolutionary Movement (MIRA)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1969	1971	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
December 20 Movement	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Central America	1991	1999	8	8	10	Not listed	No	No
Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1977	2006	29	29	30	Not listed	No	No
Boere Aanvals Troepe (BAT)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Africa	1996	1996	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Anti-Imperialist International Brigade	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1986	1988	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
Abu al-Rish Brigades (Fatah Hawks?)	None	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1993	2006	13	13	15	Not listed	No	No
al-Zulfikar	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1977	1981	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
Ku Klux Klan (KKK)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North America	1866	2006	140	140	140	Not listed	No	No
Islamic Liberation Organization	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1967	1985	18	18	20	Not listed	No	No
Peykar	None	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (partial)	Transregional: 2+ regions	1975	1982	7	7	10	Not listed	No	No
National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1989	2006	17	17	20	Not listed	No	No
Karbi Longri North Cachar Hills Resistance Force (KNPR)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	2004	2006	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
TKP/ML-TIKKO	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1972	2006	34	34	35	Not listed	No	No

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Kakurokyo	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North Asia	1969	1998	29	29	30	Not listed	No	No
Kangleipak Communist Party	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1980	2006	26	26	30	Not listed	No	No
Eritrean Liberation Front	None	None or Failed	Yes	Yes	Yes (full)	Africa	1960	1991	31	31	35	Not listed	No	No
Arbav Martyrs of Khuzestan	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	2005	2005	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Black Widows	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	2000	2006	6	6	10	Not listed	No	No
Jund Allah Organization for the Sunni Mujahideen in Iran	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	2005	2006	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Jihad Committee	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1986	2006	20	20	20	Not listed	No	No
Islamic Front for Iraqi Resistance - Salah-al-Din al-Ayyubi Brigades	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	2005	2006	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
People's Revolutionary Militias	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	2002	2006	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
Popular Self-Defense Forces (FAP)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Africa	1993	2006	13	13	15	Not listed	No	No
Turkish People's Liberation Army (TPLA)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1971	1980	9	9	10	Not listed	No	No
New Armenian Resistance (NAR)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1977	1983	6	6	10	Not listed	No	No
al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Africa	1988	1996	8	8	10	Not listed	No	No
Turkish Hezbollah	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1981	2004	23	23	25	Not listed	No	No
Turkish People's Liberation Front (TPLF) (THKP-C)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1971	1999	26	26	30	Not listed	No	No
Movement of the Revolutionary Left	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1965	2004	39	39	40	Not listed	No	No
Revolutionary Eelam Organization (EROS)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	1975	1986	11	11	15	Not listed	No	No
Territorial Anti-Imperialist Nuclei	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1995	2006	11	11	15	Not listed	No	No
VAR-Palmares	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1969	1972	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No
Mujahideen Division Khandaq	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	2000	2006	6	6	10	Not listed	No	No
God's Army	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	1997	2001	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
Che Guevara Brigade	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1976	1990	14	14	15	Not listed	No	No
Armenian Revolutionary Army	None	None or Failed	Yes	Yes	Yes (full)	Transregional: 2+ regions	1970	1985	15	15	15	Not listed	No	No
Anti-Terrorist Liberation Group	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1983	1987	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No

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Terrorist Group Name	Extent of Negotiation with Government	Any Stable Negotiations	Any Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Full Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Level of Achievement of Objectives	Region	Year Group Began	Year Group Ended	Estimated Group Lifespan	Lifespan, 0 recoded to 1	Lifespan Rounded to Upper 5	Is this a Listed Foreign Terrorist Organization?	Any Non-failed Negotiation with Government	Any Negotiation with Government
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)	None	None or Failed	Yes	Yes	Yes (full)	Transregional: 2+ regions	1975	1985	10	10	10	Not listed	No	No
Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave - Renewed	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Africa	1967	2001	34	34	35	Not listed	No	No
Harakat al-Shuhada'a al-Islamiyah	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North Africa	1996	2006	10	10	10	Not listed	No	No
Jaish al-Taifa al-Mansoura	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	2003	2006	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No
Islamic Action in Iraq	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1984	2003	19	19	20	Not listed	No	No
New Pattani United Liberation Organization (New PULO)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	1995	2006	11	11	15	Not listed	No	No
Islami Inqilabi Mahaz	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1997	2006	9	9	10	Not listed	No	No
Tupamaros	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1963	1973	10	10	10	Not listed	No	No
Turkish Islamic Jihad	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1991	1996	5	5	5	Not listed	No	No
Iraqi Liberation Army	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	1980	1981	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Iparretarrak (IK)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1973	2006	33	33	35	Not listed	No	No
Jewish Defense League (JDL)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North America	1968	1989	21	21	25	Not listed	No	No
Islamic Defense Force	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1997	1998	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Informal Anarchist Federation	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	2003	2006	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No
Lashkar-e-Jabbar (LeJ)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	2001	2006	5	5	5	Not listed	No	No
November's Children	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1998	2001	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No
Kurdish Democratic Party	None	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (partial)	Iraq	1946	2003	47	47	50	Not listed	No	No
United Self-Defense Forces of Venezuela (AUV)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	2002	2006	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
Apo's Revenge Hawks	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1999	1999	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Hisba	None	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Africa		2006				Not listed	No	No
Mujahideen Army	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	2004	2006	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
Hezb-e Azadi-ye Afghanistan	None	None or Failed				South Asia	1997	2006	9	9	10	Not listed	No	No
Bersatu	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	1989	2006	17	17	20	Not listed	No	No
Lebanese National Resistance Front	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1982	1992	10	10	10	Not listed	No	No
Secret Organization Zero	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North America	1974	1975	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Dukhtaran-e-Millat	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1987	2006	19	19	20	Not listed	No	No
Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1994	2006	12	12	15	Not listed	No	No

Terrorist Group Name	Extent of Negotiation with Government	Any Stable Negotiations	Any Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Full Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Level of Achievement of Objectives	Region	Year Group Began	Year Group Ended	Estimated Group Lifespan	Lifespan, 0 recoded to 1	Lifespan Rounded to Upper 5	Is this a Listed Foreign Terrorist Organization?	Any Non-failed Negotiation with Government	Any Negotiation with Government
Black September	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1971	1974	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No
Catholic Reaction Force (CRF)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1983	2006	23	23	25	Not listed	No	No
Revolutionary People's Struggle	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1975	1995	20	20	20	Not listed	No	No
Red Hand Defenders (RHD)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1998	2006	8	8	10	Not listed	No	No
Front for the Liberation of the French Somali Coast	None	None or Failed	Yes	Yes	Yes (full)	Africa	1965	1976	11	11	15	Not listed	No	No
Ansar Allah	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1994	2006	12	12	15	Not listed	No	No
Popular Forces of April 25	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1991	1986	5	5	5	Not listed	No	No
Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army (EGTK)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1991	1993	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
Cinchonero Movimiento Popular de Liberaci?n (MPL)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Central America	1980	1992	12	12	15	Not listed	No	No
Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	1999	2006	7	7	10	Not listed	No	No
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1979	2006	27	27	30	Not listed	No	No
Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei for the Construction of the Fighting Communist Party	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe		2006				Not listed	No	No
December 20 Torrijist Patriotic Vanguard (VPT-20)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1991	1993	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
Chukakuha	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North Asia	1957	2006	49	49	50	Not listed	No	No
Islamic Action Organization	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1961	2003	42	42	45	Not listed	No	No
Komando Jihad (Indonesian)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	1975	1981	6	6	10	Not listed	No	No
Maoist Communist Center (MCC)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1969	2004	35	35	35	Not listed	No	No
Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1985	2006	21	21	25	Not listed	No	No
National Warriors	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Africa	2002	2002	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
People Against Gangsterism And Drugs (PAGAD)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Africa	1996	2006	10	10	10	Not listed	No	No
1920 Revolution Brigades	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	2003	2006	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No

Terrorist Group Name	Extent of Negotiation with Government	Any Stable Negotiations	Any Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Full Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Level of Achievement of Objectives	Region	Year Group Began	Year Group Ended	Estimated Group Lifespan	Lifespan, 0 recoded to 1	Lifespan Rounded to Upper 5	Is this a Listed Foreign Terrorist Organization?	Any Non-failed Negotiation with Government	Any Negotiation with Government
al-Arifeen (linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT))	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	2002	2006	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
EPA (Ejercito del Pueblo en Armas)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	2002	2006	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
Divine Wrath Brigades	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	2004	2006	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
Imam Hussein Brigades	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	2005	2006	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1977	2006	29	29	30	Not listed	No	No
Dagestan Liberation Army	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1999	1999	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
al-Quds Brigades	None	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1978	2006	28	28	30	Not listed	No	No
Jaish-ul-Muslimin	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	2004	2006	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1989	2006	17	17	20	Not listed	No	No
American Front	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North America	1990	2006	16	16	20	Not listed	No	No
Tupamaro Revolutionary Movement - January 23	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1998	2006	8	8	10	Not listed	No	No
al-Saiqa	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1966	1985	19	19	20	Not listed	No	No
Clandestini Corsi	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1999	2006	7	7	10	Not listed	No	No
Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1978	2006	28	28	30	Not listed	No	No
Hammerskin Nation	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North America	1988	2006	18	18	20	Not listed	No	No
Carapaica Revolutionary Movement	None	None or Failed	Yes	Yes	Yes (full)	South America	2002	2006	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	2004	2006	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
Al-Barq	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1978	2002	24	24	30	Not listed	No	No
Group Bakunin Gdansk Paris Guatemala Salvador	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1981	1982	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Kahane Chai	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1990	2006	16	16	20	Not listed	No	No
Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	2000	2006	6	6	10	Not listed	No	No
Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Africa	1963	2006	43	43	45	Not listed	No	No
al-Sadr Brigades	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1978	2006	28	28	30	Not listed	No	No

Terrorist Group Name	Extent of Negotiation with Government	Any Stable Negotiations	Any Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Full Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Level of Achievement of Objectives	Region	Year Group Began	Year Group Ended	Estimated Group Lifespan	Lifespan, 0 recoded to 1	Lifespan Rounded to Upper 5	Is this a Listed Foreign Terrorist Organization?	Any Non-failed Negotiation with Government	Any Negotiation with Government
Aden Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1994	2002	8	8	10	Not listed	No	No
Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	1998	2001	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No
Black Panthers (West Bank/Gaza)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1989	1996	7	7	10	Not listed	No	No
Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1976	2006	30	30	30	Not listed	No	No
Al-Badr	None	None or Failed				South Asia						Not listed	No	No
Yemen Islamic Jihad	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1990	2006	16	16	20	Not listed	No	No
Borok National Council of Tripura (BNCT)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	2000	2006	6	6	10	Not listed	No	No
Guardsmen of Islam	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1980	84	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
Lashkar-I-Omar	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	2001	2006	5	5	5	Not listed	No	No
Sekihotai	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North Asia	1988	1990	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
Baloch Liberation Army	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	2003	2006	3	3	5	Not listed	No	No
Communist Combatant Cells	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1984	1985	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Morazanist Patriotic Front (FPM)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Central America	1988	1995	7	7	10	Not listed	No	No
Baader-Meinhof Group	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1968	1977	9	9	10	Not listed	No	No
May 15 Organization for the Liberation of Palestine	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	1979	1985	6	6	10	Not listed	No	No
International Revolutionary Action Group (GARI)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1974	1975	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Revenge of the Hebrew Babies	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	2002	2003	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Kurdish Patriotic Union	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1994	1994	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Gazteriak	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1994	2000	6	6	10	Not listed	No	No
El Rukn	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North America	1985	1986	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1990	2006	16	16	20	Not listed	No	No
Revolutionary Front for Communism	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1996	2006	10	10	10	Not listed	No	No
Mujahideen KOMPAK	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	2001	2006	5	5	5	Not listed	No	No
Breton Revolutionary Army	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1998	2000	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
People's Revolutionary Armed Forces	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Central America	1972	1977	5	5	5	Not listed	No	No

Terrorist Group Name	Extent of Negotiation with Government	Any Stable Negotiations	Any Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Full Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Level of Achievement of Objectives	Region	Year Group Began	Year Group Ended	Estimated Group Lifespan	Lifespan, 0 recoded to 1	Lifespan Rounded to Upper 5	Is this a Listed Foreign Terrorist Organization?	Any Non-failed Negotiation with Government	Any Negotiation with Government
(FRAP)														
Taliban	None	None or Failed				South Asia	1994	2006	12	12	15	Not listed	No	No
Arab Nationalist Youth for the Liberation of Palestine (ANYLP)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North Africa	1974	1974	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Arab Liberation Front	None	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (partial)	Transregional: 2+ regions	1969	2003	34	34	35	Not listed	No	No
Peronist Armed Forces	None	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (partial)	South America	1967	1974	7	7	10	Not listed	No	No
Fedayeen Khalq (People's Commandos)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1977	1988	11	11	15	Not listed	No	No
Mujahideen Shura Council	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	2005	2006	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Lebanese Socialist Revolutionary Organization	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1973	1974	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Nation of Yahweh	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North America	1979	1990	11	11	15	Not listed	No	No
al-Fatah Uprising	None	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1983	2006	23	23	25	Not listed	No	No
Islamic Shashantantra Andolon (ISA)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	2002	2006	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
Jaime Bateman Cayon Group (JBC)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1989	2006	17	17	20	Not listed	No	No
Save Kashmir Movement	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	2002	2006	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
Armed Forces of National Liberation	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North America	1974	1985	11	11	15	Not listed	No	No
Japanese Red Army (JRA)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1970	2000	30	30	30	Not listed	No	No
Charles Martel Group	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1975	1983	8	8	10	Not listed	No	No
Ananda Marga	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1955	1979	34	34	35	Not listed	No	No
al-Nawaz	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1999	2000	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
al-Umar Mujahideen	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1989	2002	17	17	20	Not listed	No	No
Alianca Libertadora Nacional (ALN)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1968	1970	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
Black Brigade	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1982	1988	6	6	10	Not listed	No	No
Saraya al-Shuhuada al-jihadiyah fi al-Iraq	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	2004	2006	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
Anti-Imperialist Cell (AIZ)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1994	1995	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Uganda Democratic Christian Army (UDCA)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Africa	1990	1994	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No

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Jamatul Mujahedin Bangladesh	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	2005	2006	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1988	2006	18	18	20	Not listed	No	No
Liberation Army Fifth Battalion	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	North America	1993					Not listed	No	No
Popular Revolutionary Army	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Central America	1996	2000	4	4	5	Not listed	No	No
Orly Organization	None	None or Failed	Yes	Yes	Yes (full)	Europe	1981	1983	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	2006	2006	0	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Guevarista Revolutionary Army (ERG)	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1993	2006	13	13	15	Not listed	No	No
al-Ahwal Brigades	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	2005	2006	1	1	5	Not listed	No	No
Islamic Jihad Brigades	None	None or Failed	No	No	No	Iraq	2004	2006	2	2	5	Not listed	No	No
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)	Resolved Conflict	Stable	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1984	1995	11	11	15	Not listed	Yes	Yes
African National Congress (ANC)	Resolved Conflict	Stable	Yes	Yes	Yes (full)	Africa	1961	1990	30	30	30	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)	Resolved Conflict	Stable	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Central America	1982	1996	14	14	15	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Mozambique National Resistance Movement	Resolved Conflict	Stable	No	No	No	Africa	1976	1994	18	18	20	Not listed	Yes	Yes
People's Liberation Forces (El Salvador)	Resolved Conflict	Stable	No	No	No	Central America	1970	1991	21	21	25	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Laskar Jihad	Resolved Conflict	Stable	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	2000	2002	2	2	5	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Guerrilla Army of the Poor	Resolved Conflict	Stable	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Central America	1954	1996	41	41	45	Not listed	Yes	Yes
February 28 Popular Leagues	Resolved Conflict	Stable	No	No	No	Central America	1970	1992	22	22	25	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Armed Forces of National Resistance	Resolved Conflict	Stable	No	No	No	Central America	1975	1991	16	16	20	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front	Resolved Conflict	Stable	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Central America	1979	1991	12	12	15	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Islamic Salvation Front	Resolved Conflict	Stable	No	No	No	North Africa	1989	1997	18	18	20	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Recontra 380	Resolved Conflict	Stable	No	No	No	Central America	1991	1995	4	4	5	Not listed	Yes	Yes
April 19 Movement	Resolved Conflict	Stable	No	No	No	South America	1970	1990	20	20	20	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT)	Resolved Conflict	Stable	No	No	No	Africa	1998	2002	4	4	5	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Guatemalan Labor Party	Resolved Conflict	Stable	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Central America	1952	1996	44	44	45	Not listed	Yes	Yes
UNITA	Resolved Conflict	Stable	No	No	No	Africa	1966	2002	36	36	40	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Bodo Liberation Tigers	Resolved Conflict	Stable	Yes	No	Yes (partial)	South Asia	1996	2003	7	7	10	Not listed	Yes	Yes

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EZLN	Resolved Conflict	Stable	No	No	No	Central America	1983	1994	11	11	15	Not listed	Yes	Yes
South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)	Resolved Conflict	Stable	Yes	Yes	Yes (full)	Africa	1960	1989	29	29	30	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Unified Unit of Jihad	Resolved Conflict	Stable	No	No	No	North Africa	1991	1994	3	3	5	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola	Resolved Conflict	Stable				Africa	1956	2002	46	46	50	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Rebel Armed Forces	Resolved Conflict	Stable	No	No	No	Central America	1962	1996	34	34	35	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU)	Resolved Conflict	Stable	Yes	Yes	Yes (full)	Africa	1965	1987	22	22	25	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)	Resolved Conflict	Stable	Yes	No	Yes (partial)	Iraq	1975	2003	28	28	30	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Palestine Liberation Front	Stable	Stable	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Transregional: 2+ regions	1959	1993	34	34	35	Listed FTO	Yes	Yes
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)	Stable	Stable	No	No	No	South America	1997	2006	10	10	10	Listed FTO	Yes	Yes
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)	Stable	Stable	No	No	No	Europe	1959	2006	47	47	50	Listed FTO	Yes	Yes
Revolutionary United Front (RUF)	Stable	Stable	No	No	No	Africa	1991	2002	11	11	15	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M)	Stable	Stable	No	No	No	South Asia	1996	2006	10	10	10	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Ummah Liberation Army	Stable	Stable	No	No	No	Africa	1992	2000	8	8	10	Not listed	Yes	Yes
United Tajik Opposition (UTO)	Stable	Stable	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Central Asia	1994	2003	9	9	10	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Irish Republican Army (IRA)	Stable	Stable	No	No	No	Europe	1922	2006	84	84	85	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Resistenza Corsa	Stable	Stable	No	No	No	Europe	2002	2003	1	1	5	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO)	Stable	Stable	No	No	No	Southeast Asia			38	38	40	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)	Stable	Stable	No	No	No	Europe	1974	1998	24	24	25	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Free Aceh Movement (GAM)	Stable	Stable	Yes	No	Yes (partial)	Southeast Asia	1971	2005	34	34	35	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Kuki Liberation Army (KLA)	Stable	Stable	No	No	No	South Asia	1998	2006	8	8	10	Not listed	Yes	Yes
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)	Stable	Stable	No	No	No	South Asia	1988	2006	18	18	20	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF)	Stable	Stable	No	No	No	South Asia	1996	2006	10	10	10	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Sudan People's Liberation Army	Stable	Stable	Yes	No	Yes (partial)	Africa	1983	2005	22	22	25	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Self-Defense Groups of Cordoba and	Stable	Stable	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	South America	1994	2006	12	12	15	Not listed	Yes	Yes

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Uraba (ACCU)														
Dima Halam Daoga (DHD)	Stable	Stable	No	No	No	South Asia	1996	2006	10	10	10	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)	Stable	Stable	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1964	2006	42	42	45	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Birsa Commando Force (BCF)	Stable	Stable	No	No	No	South Asia	1996	2004	8	8	10	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA)	Stable	Stable	No	No	No	South Asia	1997	1998	1	1	5	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)	Stable	Stable	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	1978	2006	28	28	30	Not listed	Yes	Yes
al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (GAI)	Unstable	None or Failed	No	No	No	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1977	2006	29	29	30	Listed FTO	Yes	Yes
Armed Islamic Group	Unstable	None or Failed	No	No	No	North Africa	1992	2006	14	14	15	Listed FTO	Yes	Yes
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	Unstable	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1964	2006	42	42	45	Listed FTO	Yes	Yes
Hamas	Unstable	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1987	2006	19	19	20	Listed FTO	Yes	Yes
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	Unstable	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	1976	2006	30	30	30	Listed FTO	Yes	Yes
Andres Castro United Front (FUAC)	Unstable	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Central America			10	10	10	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Simon Bolivar Guerilla Coordinating Board (CGSB)	Unstable	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	South America	1987	1993	6	6	10	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	Unstable	None or Failed	No	No	No	Africa	1992	2006	14	14	15	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Popular Liberation Army	Unstable	None or Failed	No	No	No	South America	1967	2006	39	39	40	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)	Unstable	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	1984	2006	22	22	25	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Hizb-I-Islami	Unstable	None or Failed				South Asia	1975	2006	31	31	35	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale di a Corsica (FLNC)	Unstable	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1976	2006	30	30	30	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Kayin National Union (KNU)	Unstable	None or Failed	No	No	No	Southeast Asia	1959	2006	47	47	50	Not listed	Yes	Yes
al-Fatah	Unstable	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1958	1994	36	36	40	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Ulster Defence Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters	Unstable	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1971	2006	35	35	35	Not listed	Yes	Yes
United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)	Unstable	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1999	2006	7	7	10	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Orange Volunteers (OV)	Unstable	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1998	2006	8	8	10	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)	Unstable	None or Failed	No	No	No	Europe	1996	2006	10	10	10	Not listed	Yes	Yes

Terrorist Group Name	Extent of Negotiation with Government	Any Stable Negotiations	Any Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Full Achievement of Strategic Objectives	Level of Achievement of Objectives	Region	Year Group Began	Year Group Ended	Estimated Group Lifespan	Lifespan, 0 recoded to 1	Lifespan Rounded to Upper 5	Is this a Listed Foreign Terrorist Organization?	Any Non-failed Negotiation with Government	Any Negotiation with Government
Tanzim	Unstable	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1993	2006	13	13	15	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Polisario Front	Unstable	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1973	2003	19	19	20	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front	Unstable	None or Failed	Yes	Yes	Yes (full)	South America	1983	1995	12	12	15	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS)	Unstable	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1972	2006	34	34	35	Not listed	Yes	Yes
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K)	Unstable	None or Failed	No	No	No	Transregional: 2+ regions	1998	2006	8	8	10	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)	Unstable	None or Failed	Yes	No	Yes (limited)	Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1969	2006	37	37	40	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Kuki Revolutionary Army	Unstable	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1999	2006	7	7	10	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC)	Unstable	None or Failed	No	No	No	South Asia	1995	2006	11	11	15	Not listed	Yes	Yes
Internet Black Tigers						Southeast Asia						Not listed		
Lebanese Liberation Front						Greater Mid East and Persian Gulf	1996	1999	3	3	5	Not listed		

How Terrorism Ends
Data information and Codebook
Audrey Kurth Cronin

CASE SELECTION

Two primary criteria were used to select only those cases that fit the definitional requirements of a terrorist organization:

a. Eliminate any group indicated to have targeted only property or military targets, with no indicated associated civilian injuries or fatalities.
b. Eliminate any group that did not display sustained organizational capabilities, i.e. those groups with only one attacks or with only a single series of coordinated attacks within several days of one another and with no subsequent evidence of activity or communication.

This rubric worked effectively in most cases but suffered from certain complications inherent in the MIPT data. One of the most common complications in selection was inconsistencies within the MIPT reporting for a single group. In many cases, the MIPT incident statistics would indicate no civilian casualties as a result of the group's activities. In each of these cases the group's descriptive profile was carefully considered, and if it suggested attacks in addition to those listed in the incident statistics the group would be included as a terrorist organization, unless the description explicitly indicated that there were no civilian casualties.

Another common complication was provided by the proliferation of name changes and breakaway groups listed in the database. Again, for reasons of feasibility and consistency of interpretation, each listed group that met the requirements for terrorism was included as an individual group, regardless of any links to another group. The exception was the very few cases where a clearly and consistently defined 'armed wing' and the general organization were both listed and made mutual reference to one another; in these cases only the 'armed wing' was included to avoided double-counting the group (see the case of Resistenza Corsa and Accolta Nazinuale Corsa for example). In general, splinter groups, aliases, and name changes, so long as terrorist attacks could be ascribed to the name, were all included. For consistency, hijackings and kidnappings were held to the same standards of civilian injury as other incidents. In the context of the construction of this database, both types of incident are only considered terrorist actions if civilians are injured or killed at some point in the incident.

Groups that fit the selection criteria for inclusion as terrorist organizations were then coded for lifespan, level of engagement in negotiations over the group's fundamental aims or strategies, and the extent, if at all, to which the group achieved its strategic aims. Other variables, for example those that could directly examine the presence trajectories of decline discussed in this book, would be very interesting to consider, but unfortunately are not consistently accessible in the information provided by the MIPT

In the very occasional cases where meaningful values of the variables in question could not be obtained from the MIPT data the variables were coded as missing. All other cases were coded as follows:

CODEBOOK

fto - IS THIS A LISTED TERRORIST ORGANIZATION?
>   0 – No
>   1 – Yes

region – WORLD REGION
>   1 – North America
>   2 – Central America
>   3 – South America
>   4 – North Africa
>   5 – Greater Mideast and Persian Gulf
>   6 – Africa
>   7 – Europe
>   8 – South Asia
>   9 – Central Asia
>   10 – Southeast Asia
>   11 – Asia
>   12 – North Asia
>   13 – Transregional: 2+ regions

Lifespan

start – YEAR GROUP BEGAN
>   Determined by:
>   a. The founding year or period if provided by MIPT (approximate periods such as early 1970s were coded by an approximate year such as 1972).
>   b. If a founding year is not provided, the start year is obtained by the year of the first attack or communication from the organization.

end – YEAR GROUP ENDED
>   Determined by:
>   a. The year or period the MIPT database states that the group ended, if available.
>   b. The year the group entered ceasefire, renounced violence, entered government, or otherwise indicated a halt to terrorist activities, *so long as that change occurred more than three years ago (2003 or earlier) and there has been no further violence under that group's name*.
>   c. The year of the last terrorist attack if the MIPT does not otherwise indicate that the group is still active and the attack occurred more than three years ago (2003 or earlier).
>   d. Ongoing groups were coded with an end year of 2006 (the year the data was compiled

year – ESTIMATED LIFESPAN
>   The lifespan is calculated by the difference between the end and start years.

year1 – ESTIMATED LIFESPAN, <1 ROUNDED TO 1

years_grouped – LIFESPAN ROUNDED TO UPPER 5
>   Reflecting the relative imprecision of the data on the founding and conclusion of terrorist organizations, the data on lifespans is presented in five year clusters. While the median organizational lifespan is calculated as 8 years, that figure more accurately represents a lifespan between 5-10 years.

objective – LEVEL OF ACHIEVEMENT OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Achievement measures the extent to which a group was able to achieve their strategic objectives. Many of the groups listed by the MIPT are not indicated as having specific strategic goals beyond the expression of an ideal or ideology. While these groups could be understood to have 'achieved' by virtue of having expressed themselves, they are nevertheless coded as having not achieved as expression is qualitatively different from achieving specific strategic policy or political change which this variable 'Achievement' is interested in measuring. It is also important to note that achievement is indicated if the group's goals were wholly or partially achieved during the group's lifespan, *regardless of who directly achieved or negotiated that outcome*. Usually the strategic goal of a group is shared by various actors in a conflict, and this database does not attempt to claim which group enjoys primary responsibility for the outcome, if such responsibility could even be in such a complex situations.

    0 – No Achievement: No indication that any of groups strategic aims were achieved; no strategic aims were expressed by the group.

    1 – Achievement, Full: Full achievement of a group's stated strategic aims such as full independence of a territory, control of the government, or successful disruption of specified government action.

    2 – Achievement, Substantial: Achievement of a qualitatively substantial component of the group's strategic aims, such establishment of regional autonomy without independent statehood.

    3 – Achievement, Limited: Minor compromise on elements of a group's strategic aims.

negotiation – EXTENT OF NEGOTIATION WITH GOVERNMENT

Organizations were coded as participating in negotiations if they engaged in any discussions with external agents, most commonly with the government of the state in which they are active, over the groups fundamental aims or strategies. Organizations solely engaged in tactical negotiations such as hostage negotiations were not coded as having negotiated. In addition to coding for participation in negotiations, the extent of the impact of negotiations on the conflict was also covered. This data was obtained from the descriptive group profiles provided by the MIPT.

    0 – No Negotiation: The organization has not engaged in any strategic negotiations

    1 – Negotiation, Resolved conflict: The organization has engaged in negotiations; negotiations have effectively resolved or diffused the conflict and group has either effectively disbanded or fully normalized activity.

    2 – Negotiation, Stable: The organization has engaged in negotiations; negotiations have led to a stable cessation of conflict, however without fundamental resolution to ensure that violence will not flare up again.

    3 – Negotiation, Unstable: The organization has engaged in negotiations; negotiations, while not openly abandoned or broken, have effectively been disregarded or bypassed by either side of the negotiations. This includes cases in which state refuses to follow terms of agreement, even if terrorist organization has withheld violence; also includes cases of substantial split (not just splinter groups) in which part of the group attempts to maintain negotiations or the terms of the negotiations while a significant component carries on with the conflict.

    4 – Negotiation, Failed: The organization has engaged in negotiations; however, there has since been a clear, public breaking of any agreement or ceasefire or the full public breakdown and abandonment of talks prior to any conclusion.

ADDITIONAL 'DERIVED' VARIABLES:
Additional dichotomous variables were derived from the above, and included in the public dataset.

success – ANY ACHIEVEMENT OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
        0 – 0 Level of Achievement
        1 – 1, 2, 3 Level of Achievement

successgood –FULL ACHIEVEMENT OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
        0 – 0, 2, 3 Level of Achievement
        1 – 1 Level of Achievement

talks – ANY NEGOTIATION WITH GOVERNMENT
        0 – 0 Extent of Negotiation
        1 – 1, 2, 3, 4 Extent Negotiation with Government

talksstable – ANY STABLE NEGOTIATIONS
        0 – 0, 3, 4 Extent Negotiation with Government
   1 - 1, 2 Extent Negotiation with Government

talksnofail – ANY NON-FAILED NEGOTIATION
        0 – 0, 4 Extent Negotiation with Government
        0 – 1, 2, 3 Extent Negotiation with Government

Resolved Cases, Freedom House Level of Democracy

	Free		Partially Free		Not Free

Stable Cases, Freedom House Level of Democracy

Legend: Free (blue), Partially Free (lavender), Not Free (red). Rows span years 1972–2011; columns represent different groups/countries.

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