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Candidate selection patterns in the 2010 Hungarian parliamentary elections

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Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION.....	1
1 CANDIDATE CELECTION IN THE THEORY	6
1.1 Organizational fit of selection process	7
1.1.1 Contingency theory	8
1.1.2 Boundaries of path dependency: external shocks	11
2 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND INTRODUCTION OF THE SELECTION PROCESS	14
2.1 Dimensions of Candidate Selection.....	14
2.2 Unit of analysis	21
2.2.1 Case selection – Hungarian parties	21
2.2.2 Data collections and trade-offs.....	23
2.3 Political environment and party competition.....	25
2.4 Parties as Organizations.....	29
3 PROCESSES AND THEIR LIMITATIONS	31
3.1 FIDESZ – Hungarian Civic Union (FIDESZ).....	31
3.2 Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (JOBBIK)	35
3.3 LMP	38
3.4 Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)	43
3.5 Comparing the four processes	47
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS	51
4 REFERENCES	54
4.1 Figures	61

INTRODUCTION

Parties as the primary important political organizations have been investigated in many senses through the political science literature. Some researchers are interested in membership and role of members, some investigate the financial background of parties and there are many other issues which one can take a closer look at. In my paper I join those (Hazan and Rahat 2010, Marsh 1988, Katz 2001, Hopkin 2001) who decided to engage with the organizational features and processes of parties. More precisely I focus on a very special issue, candidate nomination and selection process of parties.

The literature on candidate selection argues that the candidate selection process is “a private affair (of parties), even if there are legal regulations” (Epstein 1967:201). Gallagher and Marsh (1988) go even further by referring to the private nature of the process describing it as the ‘secret garden of politics’. Ranney indicates that it is one of parties core competence to design the selection process so as to be able to possess the right to decide which persons are legally eligible to achieve public office (Ranney 1981 in Hazan and Rahat 2010). However, there are only a small number of countries where the selection process is legally bounded, which also enables parties to develop their own, confidential selection methods. Previous studies also noted that while the second type of legislation is prevailing, well known examples for detailed legislation processes (Hazan and Rahat 2010) are Germany, Finland and the United States of America. According to Katz (2001), in the systems where there is mandatory, detailed legislation of the process, parties are considered public utilities. In the other extreme, when there is a lack of legislation, parties are considered autonomous voluntary organizations. This practice enables parties to develop and use the most suitable process to choose their running candidates.

Historical investigation of candidate selection method shows that previously selection into public office has been the privilege of a small group of leaders. It also has to be recognized that each party type, during the evolution of parties, developed their own characteristics of selection method, which fitted best with their aims and political environment. Based on Katz and Mair's (1993) classical typology, Hopkin (2001) summarizes the most important differences of candidate selection methods of party types. At early stages of party evolution parties were perceived as a group of people with similar opinion and goals. These loose groups were organized around a candidate who had his own resources to run for public office. This shows that in the case of cadre parties a very different logic of candidate selection was applied, since the party organization, more precisely the party in center office was very weak (if it existed at all). This all shows that at this time the selection process was not the defining organizational feature, of the party. According to Hopkin, mass party (and changes in political environment) brought substantial changes to candidate selection method. As parliamentary work became more organized and structured, party organizations also had to develop stronger and more bureaucratic intraparty structures and therefore aimed to gain more control over the selection process to public offices (Katz and Mair 1993). The catch all party evolution (Kirchheimer 1995 in Katz and Mair 1993) influenced substantially the power balance between the faces of parties, which had implications for the functional structure as well. As the party in public office became more and more important, the party in central office could not manage to keep full control of candidate selection methods. The changes in intraparty power balance are even more visible in the next evolutionary step, cartel parties. On the one hand, electoral success became more attractive than membership based loyalty which strengthened the party in public office, as Ilonszki argues the party became an appealing ground for relatively independent politicians (Ilonszki 1996:44). On the other hand, political parties have never had such a strong relationship with the state and such a weak relationship

with civil society. Hopkin (2001) argues that this disattachment from civil society implies the decreasing relevance of grassroots membership and increasing relevance of individual members in decision making. Taking a closer look at candidate selection methods, may modulate this picture since there are ambitions for empowering membership in decision making, but in many cases these either remain in the planning period or do not exceed formalities.

As a more detailed literature review also shows, previous researchers focus almost exclusively on the selection process, but do not investigate the relationship between the organization the selection process embedded into, and the process itself. This paper argues that the question whether the party organization finds the most suiting way for selecting its candidates for public office is a key success factor. This fit between the organization's environment and culture and candidate selection process of parties and is a less frequently researched feature of candidate selection process. Therefore this paper proposes to focus on the reasons why a selection structure could prevail and not exclusively the structure itself. The argument that intraparty competition matters, divides this paper from the Downsian (1957) view of parties. Since if it is assumed that intraparty competition is a meaningful one and there is a difference in the running candidates ideological view and policy preferences, then it cannot be assumed that parties are unitary actors. Barnea and Rahat (2007) also note that investigation of intraparty competition reflects a framework where parties are considered open units. Openness of parties means that political organizations are not isolated, we expect that special events and developments of the environment will have effects on the political entities and force them to adjust their behavior.

This paper has two goals. First, an empirical study of Hungarian parties' candidate selection process will be conducted, with the aim of contributing a better understanding of the changing notion of the Hungarian party competition after the 2010 general parliamentary election. This

paper also aims to investigate the organization fit of the selection process in order to understand why a specific selection method is chosen in a party organization, and what determines the process choice. Second, previous researches are more concerned with the American and Western European experiences and devote less attention to newly emerging democracies (De Luca and Jones and Tula 2002). They argue that such ignorance is possible because of electoral and structural volatility of these new democracies. However, Hungary seems to be an exception in this issue since after one term, the party system froze into an almost two party system and only the 2010 elections seem to bring substantial changes to the structure of the party competition. Moreover this paper argues that investigation of candidate selection process in new democracies is even more important than in 'old democracies'. It is a common argument that the parties face substantial decrease in the number of their members and their credibility is also challenged. On the basis of this, De Luca *et al* (2002) argue that parties should be more aware of their credibility because of the general tendencies and put emphasis on the issue of internal democracy more. Candidate selection as one of the key factors could provide a good indicator of internal democracy (Ilonszki 1996).

The paper argues that candidate selection method matters of its own and in an organizational perspective as well. Moreover the paper demonstrates that candidate selection process, as one of the defining function of parties (Sartori 2005) is an organic process and embedded to the organizational characteristics of the party. The paper shares the view of previous studies conducted on Hungarian parties, that party's constitutions regulate candidate selection procedure very similarly. On the other hand this paper would like to make a step forward and argues that embeddedness of candidate selection process is a key feature and therefore similar regulations have different meaning and implications in different party organizations. Asking the question how much influence external factors, like legal environment and party competition and intraparty factors have on the candidate selection procedure, the paper

demonstrates that the procedure is path dependent not only because of backroom deals of politicians, but also because of organizational factors. Parties as bureaucratic organizations apply strict regulations in order to use their resources as smartly as possible. Therefore reforms of core processes like candidate selection are rare, since new processes bring uncertainty and have unwanted costs.

The paper does not make exclusive methodological commitments, because it argues that investigation of the selection process should contain both the descriptive statistics as the analysis of quantitative data and introduces party constitutions and interviews as qualitative sources for the deeper understanding of the uniqueness of the practically applied process. The second chapter of the paper will provide a more detailed introduction of the sources and their relevance.

The first chapter introduces previous findings and studies on candidate selection and asks the question why it is an important, defining process of parties, and why candidate selection matters. The following chapter defines the scope of the study, introduces the selected parties and their political context, the methodological considerations and also defines the most important dimensions of candidate selection. The third chapter introduces case studies investigating the prevailing selection methods of the Hungarian political parties elected in 2010, on the basis of party constitutions and quantitative research. Finally the study analyses qualitative data and interview material in order to gain a better understanding of the organizational fit or embeddedness of selection process.

1 CANDIDATE CELECTION IN THE THEORY

Political parties are one of the most important actors of democracies. Parties are said to be responsible for recruitment of elites, aggregation and articulation of interests. Moreover, one of the central defining functions of political parties is candidate selection, if it is not *the defining function*. Sartori's definition for parties¹ points out that the candidate selection process is an essential defining feature of parties. It implies that selection mechanisms define which candidates can achieve public office. Katz and Mair (1993) point out that this office seeking behavior is an important feature of politicians and political parties. They argue that party organizations should be disaggregated, and within their framework office holders consist of one of the three faces of parties, the 'party in public office' (1993:4). Moreover they highlight that the party in public office can be considered as the core of the party not because of its symbolic relevance, but also because the basic claim of legitimacy of a party is electoral success.

Furthermore, Katz (2001) argues that there are two main reasons why candidate selection has such an important role. First candidate selection and delegation to parliament is a distinctive feature of political parties and it separates them from other types of interest groups. The second profile of nominated candidates identifies and to a certain extent defines the party itself. In this sense Katz's reasoning leads to the conclusion that candidates, as public faces, mirror the ideological and sociological, demographical, geographical and ideological identities of the party as a whole, so a careful selection process could be crucial. This mirroring effect has been challenged by new types of parties (catch-all and cartel) and socio-economic changes (decreasing importance of cleavage), which made substantial differences in the prevailing representation patterns. On the other hand, it still holds that the outcome of the

¹ , "A party is any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office." (Sartori 1976:64 in: Hazan and Rahat 2010)

selection process combined with the voters will (results of parliamentary elections) have effects on the structural features of a country, like legislation and legislative actors, not to mention the party itself.

Further criticism points out that there are possible limitations to the importance of candidates. According to the marginalization hypothesis, even successful candidates could be considered for less important in the policy making and legislation process. This view highlights the role of party leaders and undervalues the role of ordinary candidates. Although this critique may provide a valid judgment for the quality of selection outcomes, but it is not valid for the process itself. However, it reminds the researcher of the contingent nature of, selection process on intraparty democracy and relevance.

Nevertheless, Rahat (2007) has argued that there are four main reasons why the candidate selection process is an interesting and important topic to investigate. First, political consequences determine who might become a member of parliament and this way determines representation; moreover it may influence the successful candidate's behavior in the parliament, which is clearly a way to affect party cohesion. Second the selection process plays a major role in the delegation process, so if parties are agents of voters then candidates are considered for agents of parties. Third the method reveals the power balance within parties through the distinction between centralized (exclusive) and decentralized (inclusive) methods. Finally, the personalization tendencies of politics usually mean the rising power of candidates over parties.


1.1 Organizational fit of selection process

Contingency theory as a basic organizational theory, argues that organizations are embedded into their environment and therefore they can act proactively or reactively, but cannot refuse challenges coming from the environment. In this section the paper argues that by responding

environmental threats and opportunities organizations develop processes that fit best for them. Effectiveness and efficiency of such processes can be crucial and good processes can become a defining function and a core competence of the organization. This argument also holds for parties, since these are special political organizations which have to face the similar challenges as other organizations. In this section the paper introduces the concept of contingency theory and demonstrates that complementing contingency theory with historical institutionalism's path dependency concept it can serve as a basis of a potentially new approach of candidate selection process investigation.

1.1.1 Contingency theory

This paper argues that the literature introduced in the previous sections has a shortcoming in a sense that they introduce selection process as an independent process. Although many believes that selection process not only one of the core activity of the political party but this is what defines the organization (Sartori 1976 in: Hazan and Rahat 2010), their investigation do not discusses selection process as an organizational feature. This paper assumes that parties are open organizations and just like business organizations they share a vision about their goals and aim to achieve their goals in the given environment (Dobák 2008). Such theoretical arguments provide opportunity to apply the assumptions of contingency theory. Contingency theory argues that the environment can be divided into two meaningful parts on the basis how the environment structures the culture of the organization, these are the external and internal environmental factors (Kieser 1995, p.153.). Figure 1.1 introduces the subcategories of internal and external environmental factors and also points out how these affect the structure, strategy, behavior and performance of the organization.



1.1. figure: The flow figure of contingency theory (Source: based on Dobák 2008)

Contingency theory also argues that in optimal cases there is a balance between internal and external environmental factors. So the strategy, behavior and structure developed by the organization is based on this balanced input therefore organizations are capable to produce the most effective and efficient solutions. Contingency theory is a useful approach for party and political process investigation since it highlights and puts into context important environmental factors of organizational change. It also makes easier to identify possible sources of threats and grow, therefore application of contingency theory as a framework, designates further steps of investigation of candidates selection method. More precisely contingency theory highlights that the candidate selection process is embedded into the organization and reasons why certain processes have been reformed should have internal and/or external environmental sources.

Criticism points out that this approach is theoretically valid, but empirical data shows that it has shortcomings. Because of internal power struggles, bureaucratic, organizational cultural reasons (and may be many others) there are many cases where not the most salient but a suboptimal candidate will be selected for running. Pfeffer (1981) argues that suboptimal outcomes are more likely when there are power imbalances in the organization. According to

Bakacsi (2004) such imbalance in the Hungarian case manifests in two issues. First it is only the highest organizational level that has access to key resources. Second, power structure is mostly coded into the bureaucratic structure of the party, which means that this power structure rarely volatile and in many cases it is hard to change (Bakacsi 2004). The latter issue points out a key feature of the paradoxical behavior of organizations in a sense that organizational change, which in this case, the changing notion of selection process is not exclusively leaded by environmental factors. In Bakacsi's understanding the change may be the result of hidden, internal (in some case personal) struggles or conflicts. Barnea and Rahat (2007) reports similar findings in Israel. Their analytical framework divided the environment for two external, political system and party system and one internal, intraparty level. The Israeli example is unique in the sense that both external factors seem to be very stable, and that is why changes in selection methods seem to reflect more to internal struggles. At the same time they note that changes on the external levels usually force changes in the selection process, therefore the role of external factors cannot be overruled.

These findings have important implications. First a practical one, in terms of research written and qualitative data provided valid and good description of the process itself, this will not be able to explain all cases. In order to gain a better understanding of selection method this paper will apply interviews with party officers who have witnessed candidate selection procedures. Second, although as the previous section of the paper showed the political science literature argues that parties aim for the most salient candidate, the organizational theory implies that this may not be the real case. Parties (just as business organizations) have their own culture and there are other considerations apart of selecting the best possible candidate, who would win the elections, no matter what. The third implication is a more theoretical one, since based on the contingency theory it is assumed that organizations rationally reflect their internal and external environment and develop procedures which helps them to adjust and operate

successfully. At the same time, empirical studies have demonstrated (interview2, 2012) that in many cases suboptimal outcomes will get accepted, more specifically not the most probable candidates will be selected to run for public office. The question is whether it is a deficit of the selection process, or because of the inner struggles and power plays of political parties selection processes are designed to achieve the best possible solutions. The following section focusing on path dependency investigates this question in a historical institutional framework.

1.1.2 Boundaries of path dependency: external shocks

Based on the arguments of contingency theory about organizations introduced above, this paper assumes that individuals involved in politics and political organizations have strategic, rational goals. On the one hand, talking about individuals this assumption coincides with motivational theory which argues that politicians have either office or policy seeking behavior, but in both cases they seek reelection to fulfill their potentials (Wittman 1983). On the other hand, in order to reach their goals parties develop organizational procedures and individual members of the organization follow formal and informal rules and processes, apply the organization's cultural routines and norms. In these senses procedures and conventions are embedded in the organizational structure and expectations of the political community (Hall and Taylor 1996). Besley (2002) also points out that the cohesiveness among the goals of parties and individual members or candidates is crucial. Many examples from pre-electoral races highlight the importance of the relationship between goal settings. In case of weak incentive structure, norms or not bounding organizational processes, candidates may risk the reputation of the party while seeking their own re-election. Such free-riding on the parties reputation can be extremely harmful, when candidates are not following the party line and draw a picture of themselves for the voters as though they were independent their party's directions. In this way selfish, office seeking candidates may maximize their votes in their own district or among their own followers, but they surely undermine the party's reputation at

the national level. Lack of coherence of goal settings also results in ineffective allocation of party resources. Parties provide various resources for running candidates, financial support of campaigns is only one of them, and argued to be not the most important (Jacobson 1982). Being in an alliance with its own party the candidate can get, for example, access to organizational knowledge, work of activists – which can provide strategic advantages to them.

Historical institutionalism's argument complements contingency theory's implications through the concept of critical junctures. This concept highlights that political organizations are less responsive to external factors generally, namely parties develop path dependent procedures for selection processes but in case of external shocks (for example a lost election) parties are forced to develop effective answers. Processes are considered path dependent when the actors shape their expectations on the basis of past experience (Liebowitz and Margolis 1995). On the one hand this definition highlights that certain actions and decisions in a given circumstances are limited by the decisions made in the past, even in cases when the past circumstances and previous norm setting decisions may no longer be relevant. On the other hand, this definition of path dependency is a permissive one, since the focus of it can be either a very specific moment of time and it can refer to long run equilibria.

This paper argues that outcomes of selection processes and procedures of party organizations are path dependent for two reasons. First, the party organizations have to develop procedures, which are predictable and also sticky enough. These features are important, because parties strive to implement the easiest organizational regulation to follow, to keep their costs low and minimize divisive issues (interview2, 2012). Second, path dependent selection procedures benefit individual party members and prospect candidates by enabling them to adjust their behavior accordingly and also for the party since it can minimize resources spent on internal organizational debates.

Many have been puzzled with the question what triggers institutional change (Hall and Taylor 1996; Lohmann 2003), and this study certainly agrees with them that it cannot be bypassed because of its importance. In this section this paper deals with the theoretical background of the changing notion of candidate selection processes. Institutional theories point out, that path dependent solutions have to face with shortcomings, since rigorous processes will not be able to aggregate and mirror personal preferences. It is also clear that such solutions are designed to handle ordinary cases, but will not be able to cope with the extremes. This implies that in such organizational context normally institutions are sticky and changes will be postponed until the organization cannot handle extreme, outlying cases any more. Historical institutionalism theory argues that fundamental changes are possible when previous institutions completely collapse and are not able to fulfill its norm setting role. Based on the contingency theory this paper argues that external shocks, like a lost election or the change of legislative environment can lead to a fundamental changes in the written selection procedures. This assumption is also in line with Barnea and Rahat's (2007) findings. Their investigation of Israeli parties' party constitution over more than a fifty year period of time, find that changes are more frequent in the regulation of the process when both the external and internal environment were increased rivalry exists.

The following section of the paper introduces the case selection decision this paper chose to make and also the methodology that will be applied. Introduction of the Hungarian electoral legislation and the structure of the party competition will also be introduced in the third part of the paper. The next section pays special attention to the changing legislation and the changing notion of the Hungarian party system.


2 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND INTRODUCTION OF THE SELECTION PROCESS

2.1 *Dimensions of Candidate Selection*

As was concluded from the literature before, candidate selection is more than an internal power struggle within parties. Influences of selection methods reach further than policy announcements and the image of a party. Candidate selection may also determine the extent of the party's ability to remain united in the legislature (Hazan and Rahat 2010). It is also an important issue to mention that candidate selection processes not only affect party politics, they also reflect it. Research should take this factor into consideration and analyze candidate selection methods both as a dependent and as a independent variable. Morgenstern Siavelis (2003) notes that introducing candidate selection as dependent and independent variable of the research at the same time is important for two reasons. First, such practice allows the deeper understanding of the nature of the selection process. Second, it provides insight into the mechanism, how recruitment affects the incentive structure, electoral and political behavior.

Pippa Norris' (1996) work provides arguments that in terms of candidate selection three level analysis should be applied. The first level is introduced as system variables, such as legal, electoral and party variables. The second level contains recruitment structures such as the characteristics of party organization, internal party regulation of nomination and selection process and ideological features. Finally, the third level, namely the recruitment process, focuses on the process itself, how eligible nominees become elected candidates including factors like party gatekeepers and electoral choice. Barnea and Rahat (2007) incorporates this idea with the notion of competition and reforms since they argue that long-term organizational developments and changes should be interpreted in the context of inter- and intraparty

competition. The authors propose to investigate three levels of competitive environment, because in such “extensive framework extensive framework enables researchers to analyze the complexities of the politics of reform without oversimplifying them” (2007:376). They also expect that by comparing political and party system level with intraparty level they can identify relevant factors and contribute to a better explanation of changes of candidate selection.



2.1. figure: Dimensions of the candidate selection; (Source: own concept, based on Hazan and Rahat (2010))

As Figure 2.1. shows, the first level of Norris’s framework can be complemented with Hazan and Rahat’s three dimensions. Since the nature of the study supposes that all the parties exist within the same legal and electoral environment – introduced above in the paper – the following sections of the paper will focus on the three most relevant party variables, the three dimensions of the selection process. The paper investigates Hungarian parties’ candidate selection practice in terms of the inclusive or exclusive nature of the ‘selectorate’; second the social and territorial decentralization of selection, and third the competitiveness of the selection process. The following section introduces the dimensions and also proposes measurement techniques.

The *selectorate* is the body of political parties assigned to select the party's candidates running for public office. This paper investigates the role of the selectorate in the selection process on the basis of inclusiveness or exclusiveness. According to the classification of Hazan and Rahat (2010) the most inclusive selectorates are voters, while the most exclusive selectorate is the leader of the party. However, the authors point out that voters and party leaders are the two extremes of the continuum. These extremes define the borders, but research has to develop in-between cases as well. On the basis of a cross country research they distinguish between simple and complex selection patterns in terms of selectorate, and argue that complex cases could be divided into three, the assorted, the multistage and the weighted candidate selection methods (Hazan and Rahat 2010). This line of argument already shows the complexity of determining the selectorate dimension of the selection method.

The classifications mentioned in the previous paragraph do not capture the whole complexity, since they focus on a moment of time and such approach does not deal with the reforms of the selection method. This paper limits the definition of reforms in significant and changes in the method. This is necessary, because there are cases when the parties make substantial changes in the regulation of candidate selection, but because of organizational peculiarities the process itself will not differ. For example changes of regulation does not make real difference in the selection process when the party changes the regulation in order to democratize the selection process, but because of local leaders having strong position it may not have real effect on the outcome. Western European examples show (Hopkin 2001) that although primaries and other forms of empowering party membership in selection processes for public offices became more frequent, it did not mean real reforms. The closer investigation of British and Spanish examples reported that party leaders managed to gain control over the changed selection process, so at the end reforms were successful only formally. Barnea and Rahat (2007) found very similar trends in Israel. Both parties introduced more democratic processes in the late

1970's, but it turned out to be a less effective and favorable so parties have moved back to more exclusive selectorate.

The above introduced examples highlight that the complexity of the selection method should be captured. This paper proposes to describe the selectorate on the basis of the questionnaire taken with candidates and interview material. On the other hand this description has to be complemented with the introduction of previous reforms, in order to gain a better understanding of the organizational fit of the candidate selection method.

In terms of *decentralization of selection*, parties face new challenges and have paid increased attention to the so called territorial dimensions of electoral politics (Hopkin 2003). Territorial dimension issues have two aspects, first, the party competition level and second the intraparty level. Studies on Western Europe found that politics become more and more denationalized and they also report the emergence of non-statewide parties. Although, the emergence of regional and local parties is an interesting phenomena, but this paper will not investigate this line, rather focuses on intraparty level of decentralization. In this sense decentralization is an organizational feature which can be either on the basis of spatial and geographical issues or parties can apply non-territorial decentralization techniques. Intraparty decentralization's focus generally speaking should and could not be limited to candidate selection methods, since it also covers the degree to what extent local and national level can influence the parties work. At the same time decentralization is an important dimension of candidate selection methods.

Several scholars (Epstein 1967; Schlesinger 1994; Ranney 1981) who did significant researches in the field of party organization and candidate selection devote substantial consideration to the degree of decentralization of candidate selection method. These scholars propose centralization as the most important characteristic of the candidate selection process.

They argue that centralization is the extent to which the national level of party politics can influence the selection process opposed to the regional or local levels of party organizations. Moreover, Schlesinger (1994) shows that the more power distributed to local levels, the less centralized the candidate recruitment is. Hazan and Rahat (2010) introduce the idea that territorial dimension is only one of the possible dimensions of decentralization. They argue that decentralization of candidate selection may have nonterritorial aspects as well. These aspect usually manifest in quotas or thresholds in the regulation in order to provide for example fair gender or minority representation in the selection procedure.

Decentralization is territorial when nomination and selection process is devoted to local or regional levels of the party. Nonterritorial decentralization, as it have been mentioned before can be found in parties strongly committed to representation issues or strongly connected to trade unions or other interest groups. Lijphart points out (1999:56 in Hazan and Rahat 2010) that regardless of the decentralization's extent, each category could vary in its level of inclusiveness. For instance, in a territorial example the selection process is still considered centralized, when it is done on a local level, but only the leader of the nuclear has the power to decide.

This paper applies the measurement method of assessing the territorial decentralization of candidate selection provided by Hazan and Rahat (2010). This method uses the perspective of the candidates themselves. Social issues require a different approach, so the paper investigates the rules and internal guidance and candidacy requirements of the parties which ensure social representation – for example reserved positions or quotas. In the Hungarian case there are two available sources of data, the 2010 Hungarian Electoral Research and valid operating regulations of parties. Both of them will be introduced in more detail in the following section of the paper.

In terms of intraparty *competition* there are two main issues to mention. In the case of candidate selection, this paper investigates directly the competition between prospect candidates, although personal competition for candidacy sometimes only the manifestation of competition of various interest groups within the party (interview2 2012; interview4 2012). Second, there is the issue called quality of the competition. In the following section, when actual selection process of Hungarian parties will be introduced this paper will argue that there is a chance for meaningful intraparty competition even in cases when there is only one potential candidate in single member districts.

By the same token, many believes that the presence or absences of intraparty competitiveness is a significant organizational cultural feature of parties, because of the basic assumption that intraparty competition is important for democracy, although it cannot serve as a sufficient substitute. Moreover, within party competition is an important issue not only because it shows the number of challenger nominees, but because nominees who compete are considered more responsive to their selectors and more accountable for their actions (Sartori 2005). Furthermore Caillaud and Tirole (2002) points out that while competition (both intra- and interparty) is very important for politicians, because it prevents losing the sense of reality, at the same intraparty competition should be regulated by the party. Party regulations and well described organization processes avoid reputation damages and also decrease the organizational cost of competition.

The literature mentions several possible definitions for intraparty competitions (Sartori 2005, Hazan and Rahat 2010). These definitions differ mostly because of the differences in the electoral systems and legal environment. Some of the definitions focus on the number of contestants and some of them focus on number of realistic positions, and there are others concentrating on the effect of multiply positions. Intraparty competition should be imagined as a continuum, where the noncompetitive end is the case when the number of candidates is

equal to the number of realistic positions. The other extreme of this continuum would be a case where there are more candidates than the number of realistic position, and one candidate can run for multiple positions such as list and single member district positions. Quotas and internal regulation of the party and the reelection of the incumbent shadow the already complicated picture.

The measurement technique proposed by Hazan and Rahat (2010) suggests a basic numerical index, the aspiration index to calculate the level of intraparty competition (Hazan and Rahat 2010). The higher results indicate more competitive the selection process, which means that the number of competitors for each realistic position is relatively high. In terms of sensitivity, this index enables the accumulation of values for the whole population to the relative size of the pie in each selection event (Hazan and Rahat 2010).

$$AI1 = \frac{\sum \text{Number of contestants}}{\sum \text{Realistic Position}}$$

Another important index focuses on incumbency (AI2), and in this case also the higher value shows greater competition, meaning that the number of nonincumbent challengers is relatively high. However both indexes are relevant and good description of intraparty competition for candidacy, this paper because of the limitations of the data set (valasztaskutatas.hu 2012), will apply only the modified version of aspiration index. According to interview material none of the parties develop database on the number of competing prospects, and the election study program collected nominal scale data about the competitiveness of the selection. At the same time the question whether there was any competition among prospect candidates in the district should not be investigated only on the basis of previously mentioned sources. This paper argues that qualitative data will not be able to capture small and new parties selection process, since by these parties there is a chance that there is no quantitative competition, but there are other forms which have to be taken into

consideration. Complementary sources will be introduced to provide more detailed description of the selection.

2.2 *Unit of analysis*

On the basis of the literature it is a reasonable assumption that selection methods are unique features of parties and highly nonstandardized processes, which make parties capable of finding the best fitting candidates for parliamentary or general elections. The outcome of the process is the designation of those persons who will represent the party at the elections, the candidates or the list of candidates. Hazan and Rahan (2010) point out that in ideal cases the selection process establishes an interdependent situation, where the candidate defines themselves as the representative of the party and the party becomes effectively committed to the candidate, and mobilizes its strength behind the chosen ones.

This paper addresses the question, *how the selection of candidates by parties was made in Hungary at the 2010 parliamentary election?* Therefore the unit of analysis in this paper is a *single party*, in a specific country, Hungary; at a well defined point of time, the 2010 parliamentary elections. The following section provides more detailed explanation of my choice of case selection and introduces why this paper focuses only on one country and Hungarian parties.

2.2.1 Case selection – Hungarian parties

The paper argues that Hungarian parties are interesting cases to select for three reasons, lack of previous studies on Hungarian candidate selection methods, the unique and complex nature of the electoral system and the absence of detailed legislation on selection mechanisms. First, previous studies (Ilonszki and Kurtán 2011; Ilonszki 2006) on candidate selection address questions like who could become a viable candidate or what the most important social,

demographic or ideological characteristics of the successful candidates are. The answers to these sorts of questions provide deeper knowledge about candidates, but do not describe the method how these persons get selected. Machos' (2000) and work on Hungarian party organizations provided an insight of to selection procedures of parties on the basis of party constitutions, but did not covered the topic extensively.

Furthermore Martz (1999-2000) argues that the phenomena as parties face declining tendencies in many fields (for example: membership, internal participation, and programmatic coherence) raises the question of internal democracy. The issue of democracy within parties is even more crucial in the case of new democracies, where there may be no established rules and processes for controlling elites from preserving their domination within the organization. Martz's argument shows the importance of investigation of the nature and the strength of party elites in terms of their role in the selection process.

Second, the nature of the electoral system defines the final products that are expected from the candidate selection process (Rahat 2007:158), and this paper argues that the Hungarian as a unique electoral system, could serve as a good basis of case selection. The uniqueness of the Hungarian lies in its composition. Hungarian legal regulations create a mixed electoral system, which means that politicians have two channels to become a candidate, they may achieve a seat through the party list or through single member districts. The mixed electoral systems are challenging, because there is a complex goal, these systems aim to provide stability of governance and the best possible representation at the same time (Duverger 1984). On the other hand, such mixed systems allow comparison between the logic of the two channels; therefore can serve as a good basis of further, potentially cross-national investigations.

The third issue is the legislation environment. In Hungary there is a detailed legal process for elections but not for the selection of candidates. This practice enables parties to develop and use the most suitable process to choose their running candidates. Absence of legislation also has implications in terms of stability of selection processes cohesion. It is striking that candidate selection methods are not as stable mechanisms legally bounded institutional mechanisms for example electoral systems. The fact that candidate selections are frequently changing methods shows that they should be seen as reflecting party politics (Hazat and Rahan, 2001).

In terms of the selection of the parties, the research will focus on the four parliamentary parties elected in the 2010 elections. These were selected carefully so all relevant Hungarian parties will be represented in the research: Fidesz (conservative-christian democrat party), MSZP (social democrat party), Jobbik (extreme right party) and LMP (issue based party). However, there were trade-offs in the selection. All parliamentary parties are included in the sample except KDNP, the Christian democrat party, for two reasons. KDNP decided to run their campaign in a coalition with Fidesz, so it is a reasonable assumption that Fidesz, as a powerful partner, influenced the final list of KDNP's candidates, and the selection process itself. The second is a common sense argument which says that KDNP is not an autonomous party, but a subsection of Fidesz. This paper does not make any judgment on this issue, but because of lack of sources KDNP will be excluded from the sample.

2.2.2 Data collections and trade-offs

The most important sources are valid operating party constitution, which are public documents and have to have a part concerning candidate selection. In this research these serve as primary sources. Valid party constitutions are reliable sources in terms of determining inclusiveness or exclusiveness of selection process, and the paper expects to identify common

patterns and selection process regulation similarities in these public documents². Exceptions and outlying cases could also be telling, and worth further investigation.

This paper identifies three possible types of secondary sources. Qualitative data analysis will be done on one of the Hungarian Election Study project's database. This research was conducted in the summer of 2010, after the general elections and focused on the campaign methods and also had questions about the value commitments and political views of candidates. In the questionnaire, there are also general question questions focusing on the process of how the candidate perceives and evaluates the selection process (Tárki 2010). These questions are not good source of qualitative analysis in a sense that many of the answers are provided on the nominal scale. On the other hand the paper argues that although these questions would not provide valid source of causal investigation, but they serve well the purposes of a descriptive analysis. Moreover this dataset is useful because it is not biased in the sense that not only successful candidates were questioned, but "all" the running candidates (Tárki 2010). It also has to be noted that submission level of not selected candidates is lower than their elected counterparts and the paper will not apply any weighting of data.

As it was argued before *interviews*³ and media sources are crucial source of deeper understanding of the candidate selection process. In order to gain information the paper set up some initial criteria for finding interview subjects. First they have to be party officers, potentially operating on the higher levels of the organization or have a formal or strong informal relationship with the party (advisor for example). At the same time since the data set introduced in the previous section provides a fair representation of candidates, candidacy will be a welcomed, but not necessary criteria. Finally the most important characteristic of the

² Three out of four party published its party constitution on their websites. Jobbik, the only exception considers its constitution as an intraparty document, which should not be published, to avoid media attention. The party provided a hard copy for academic investigation, with a request, that the document cannot be enclosed to any public version of the paper.

³ Interview material will be introduced anonymously in each and every cases, because of the kind request of the interviewed person.

interview subjects were personal experience. I believe that personal experience is a crucial factor, because those who had their own experiences about the selection process seemed to have a deeper understanding of method and the candidate selection criteria of their own party.

Technically all the interviews were made in May 2012. The conversation during the interview was structured into three parts. Interviews have started with the overview of the selection method and identification of the most influential organizational levels and party offices. The second section of the conversation was concerned about recent changes of the regulation and investigated questions like whether the change of electoral law affected on the candidate selection process and when and why have the party changed its selection process. The last section was dedicated to future trends and was concerned about candidate recruitment and asked general questions about the preparation period for the next, 2014 general elections. All the questions were formed as open questions and I also attempted to have an open conversation instead of a formal interview situation. Finally one more technical note has to be made here. This paper cites all the interviews anonymously, because the author of this paper was kindly requested, by the interviewees to do so, to avoid further inconveniences.

2.3 Political environment and party competition

In this section the paper introduces the electoral system in 2010 and because of recent changes also points out how the legislation has been reformed. Since first elections will be held in 2014 under the new regulation, present time assumptions of this section refer to the electoral system constructed in 1989, named 1989 years' XXXIV. act. Interview material deals substantially with the effects of reforms on candidate selection process. In the second part of the subchapter the paper shifts its focus to the party competition level and introduces the parties' positions and changes after 2010 elections.

The *Hungarian electoral system* is a mixed system, which means that candidates may get selected on various channels. The Hungarian Parliament consists of 386 members, from whom 176 will be elected in single member electoral districts, 152 will win its membership through regional lists and the remaining 52 seats will be distributed from national list. On the one hand there are single member districts, where citizens may vote for individual candidates, seats can be won by relative majority of votes and each district elects one candidate. On the other hand seats are distributed on the basis of regional party lists, which is clearly a proportional channel, since voters submit their party preferences and parties achieve parliamentary seats based on the proportional distribution of votes. It is important to note that 152 is a maximum number of seats that can be distributed through this channel. There is another way how candidates can get selected, called the national list. This channel is a compensatory one, so no votes will be submitted on the national list. When the system was constructed, legislators wanted to add an extra step, which ensures proportionality of the elections, through reallocation the votes that otherwise would get lost. The not yet fulfilled seats of regional list will get distributed through the national list as well.

This electoral system has served six elections between 1990 and 2010, without substantial changes. Although it has to be noted that there were procedural changes like revision and change of competence of local electoral committees and introduction of voting at embassies, but changes left the major electoral channels introduced in the previous section intact. Latest changes, accepted at December 2011 (jogiforum.hu 2011) have brought major changes. First the number of parliamentary seats will be reduced to 199, from which 106 will be distributed in single member districts and the rest (93) through the national list. This shows that the regional list channel will not be kept and borders of electoral districts have been modified. The new legislation provides voting right for cross-border citizens and changes the conditions of candidate nomination process and also modifies the registration process of national lists.

As 2010 general election have passed, many have argued (Török 2010, Bíró Nagy 2010; Enyedi and Benoit 2011; Sitter 2011) that the election brought substantial changes to the *party competition*. Before 2010, the Hungarian party system was considered as the most stable part system in the Eastern European region, because of two reasons. First, there is a very low volatility in the number of competing parties, because there were rarely any new party and only some of the regime changers have vanished. Even the fact that in 2002 two parties, the radical right MIEP and the agrarian party FKGP have lost their positions, and did not manage their way back to the parliament did not make substantial differences in terms of proportional representations of parties (Török 2011). Second, historical overview of election data shows the party system after the 1998 elections seemed to be almost frozen. There are more factors which clearly support this argument. On the one hand governmental position is regularly shifted between the two strong, ideologically opposite parties MSZP and FIDESZ. These two parties have gained the same proportion of votes at the elections, and as it has been mentioned before disappearance of smaller parties did not shake up the power balance.

Sitter (2011:45) argues that the 2010 Hungarian general elections were “earthquake elections”. Earthquakes are sudden energy releases which take place when there is a great tension between geological faults. In politics elections are potential way for voters to release stress; therefore analysts call elections, where anti-establishment parties win an unexpected share of votes for earthquake elections. While two established small parties, SZDSZ and MDF not just fall out of parliament, but totally disappeared from the Hungarian party competition, two new parties have managed to exceed the five percent threshold and get into the Hungarian parliament for the very first time. It have to be mentioned that neither LMP and nor Jobbik does not fit to the previous pattern of party level competition. Both parties offer alternative way of thinking, since both sustainability and extreme right were niche markets in the Hungarian party competition. Both LMP, and JOBBIK consider themselves for anti-

establishment parties. Although their strategy differs in ideology and tactics, they both condemn political corruption and positioned themselves during 2010 elections as a clean, new choice in the party competition. In terms of newcomers there is one more interesting phenomena mentioned in the literature (Enyedi and Benoit 2011), namely LMP have demonstrated that there is a chance to open up the middle, and a party can be successful even in cases when there is a right and left middle party in the party competition.

Although the emergence of new parties at 2010 elections is a very interesting – and in the Hungarian case also a unique – event, but one should not forget that it was not the only factor that has changed the competition. The role, size and popularity of established middle parties like MSZP and Fidesz-KDNP also experienced as critical changes (Enyedi and Benoit 2011). However, the transformation process after the 2010 elections was very different by the two parties. The social-leftist MSZP kept its second position in the competition, but suffered substantial losses in terms of popularity and number of voters, since their support was almost halved⁴. In terms of organizational size, the party also had to face changes, since in 2011 Gyurcsány Ferenc and many of his followers leaved MSZP and founded a new party called Democratic Coalition (DK) (dk.hu, 2011). On the other side, the conservative right Fidesz won the elections with absolute majority, and formed a coalitional government with KDNP, the conservative party, with whom they have already formed coalition before the elections. The Fidesz-KDNP government had to face a relatively new situation, since they had challengers from the left (MSZP and LMP) and they also had opposition from the extreme right, Jobbik.

⁴ While MSZP won the 2006 election with 46,63% of the votes (49,22% of seats) their support decreased to 28,32% of votes (15,28% of seats) in 2010. (valasztas.hu; 2012)

2.4 *Parties as Organizations*

Political party organizations have been in the focus of investigation because of their special incentive structure and goals (Csizmadia 2005). According to them, political organizations have twofold goals to achieve. First parties are bureaucratic organizations where the successful internal regulation provides stability and predictable outcomes. At the same times parties are voluntary organizations (Panebianco 1988), since members, activists and followers join based on their free will, therefore incentives and motivations provided by the party can be crucial in keeping the membership active. Moreover Enyedi and Körösenyi (2001) points out that understanding the functional logic of party organizations may be a more telling source of parties' behavior than detailed knowledge about other factors like the electoral program of the party, general description of electoral basis or behavioral characteristics of potential voters.

Previous studies (Panebianco 1988; Enyedi and Körösenyi 2001) divide three organizational categories, namely the poliarchic, the very decentralized; oligarchic, the rule of small groups; and monocratic, where power is distributed to an exclusive leadership. The proper distinction between the three is made upon the level of decentralization, openness and power distribution within the organizational levels. Machos (2000) smartly notes that there is no clear distinction between the three, there are many possible ways how borders of each categories can be defined. Furthermore, Machos making her methodological commitment also argues that such simplistic categorization will not be able to capture the complexity of party's organizational structure. Since this paper shares this view, it proposes to limit its focus and investigate the candidate selection procedure and therefore all assumptions made here about the organizational categorization of Hungarian parties, are based on categorization by the selection process.

Previous studies argue (Enyedi and Körösi 2001; Machos 2000) that there is a common feature of Hungarian parties' organizational structure, that they are strongly influenced by a territorial logic and therefore parties are organized by a vertical structure. Vertical organizational structure in this sense means that the party organizations have a hierarchical structure, where the lowest levels are local groups and the highest level is the national board of the party. Machos (2000) also shows that Hungarian parties are very similar in terms of the regulation of organizational structure elements: they may use different names for the organizational levels and there may be some added level (typically differences show up at the regional and sub-regional level), but the functions and formal competences of organizational levels are described very similarly in the parties' constitutions.

3 PROCESSES AND THEIR LIMITATIONS

This section of the paper introduces the selected Hungarian parties' organizational characteristics and candidate selection methods in four case studies. These case studies will consist of three parts. The first part of the description provides a short introduction of the selected parties' organizational structure, paying special attention to its historical changes. Introduction of party structures is important in a sense that similarities and differences of selection processes are more visible if they are embedded into an organizational context. In the previous section of the paper it was also argued that the outcome of the process is highly dependent on organizational issues, so the introduction the party organization not just increases visibility, but also helps a deeper understanding of the process. The second part focuses on the formal selection process. Based on the party constitutions the paper introduces which levels do take part in the selection process. As it have been argued in the above sections of this paper, the procedure's actual implementation may differ from the formal method, analysis of qualitative and quantitative data will be applied to be able to draw a more precise picture about the candidate selection process of parties. In the third part of each case study the paper investigates, how the formally outlined process works in the field and emphasizes the uniqueness of the processes. Final section of the chapter compares the selection processes, in terms of the most important dimensions (selectorate, decentralization and competition) and which part of the party organizations participate in the candidate selection.

3.1 *FIDESZ – Hungarian Civic Union (FIDESZ)*

FIDESZ went through substantial ideological and organizational changes through the years, not to mention that the party successfully managed to change its profile from a single issue party representing young people into center-right party, which managed to win elections twice

and form government from 1998 to 2002 and from 2010 to the presence. These ideological and organizational changes were driven by substantial changes in the party's external environment and internal role perception.

The party's organizational history can be divided into three parts according to previous studies (Machos 2000; Hegedűs 2004), first the early period, until 1993 when the party broke up with its basis democratic model for good. Between the middle of the 1990' until 2002 lost elections is considered for the second period. The third and final section is the reorganization of the party from 2002 to nowadays. All three sections have its own specialties in terms of how the organization functions and how candidates will be selected into public office.

In the first period, FIDESZ was a very different party than we know it nowadays. In terms of ideology it followed centrist-liberal ideas and the party identified itself as the party of young people. Representation of youth was such an important issue, that the party even had an upper age limit for its members. In its early ages, FIDESZ followed a partial basis democratic model, which means that decisions were made with the most exclusive audience possible. As FIDESZ's candidates get elected and therefore the party managed to found its fraction in parliament, they had to face the shortcomings of the basis democratic model. According to Machos (2000) the leadership of the party has realized early that the parliamentary work requires more efficient and professional work and intraparty decision making which is not inherent with the nature of the basis democratic model. Their decision paid off in a sense that the organizational model change enabled and supported the party on its way to winning governmental position in 1998. In this middle section many steps were made to build a decentralized party organization, one should think of the separation of party leadership and


prime ministerial positions as an example of decentralization efforts⁵. In candidate selection process this period was a permissive one, where the local levels primacy has prevailed. End of the governmental term in 2002, and the lost elections questioned this organizational model in its basis and therefore the development of present party organizational structure can be dated to this event. The lost general election lead to a substantial changes in the party, which can be easily demonstrated on many levels, such as organizational structure, intraparty power balance and renewal of the ideological commitments of the party (Hegedűs 2004). The renewed structure is a more centralized and more dependent on the leaderships' will. According to Hegedűs (2004:145) 2003 congress's reforms openly moved the party organization to a more centralized functioning, through providing veto power for the leader of the party in selection of electoral district chairpersons⁶ and by decreasing the size of operative leadership of the party.

Although substantial changes were made in the candidate selection process as well, it is less visible from the investigation of the party constitution. Formally the process remained almost completely intact, the single renewal that have been implemented is the stronger veto power of the national level in the selection process. Candidates are still nominated at the lowest possible level (Joó 2012a) but because of the strengthened veto power the real selection is argued to made by a very exclusive group, which consist of the leader of the party and his personal advisors (Joó 2012b). Therefore this paper argues that the selectorate moved on to the exclusive angle. However the picture should be a bit more shaded on the basis of media reports (Joó 2012a). These reports introduce cases where the local branches successfully

⁵ Machos (1998) notes, that this separation meant that the prime minister of the party could not be the same person as the formal leader of the party. However the change did not bring substantial difference into the power structure of the party.

⁶ Introduction of selection process will highlight the importance of this step, since electoral district charmanship is usually distributed to the candidate of the district.

expressed their disagreement with the national level's candidate choice by not supporting the candidate.



3.1. figure: Selection process of FIDESZ (Source: own concept)

In terms of competition FIDESZ as one of the biggest party⁷ in the Hungarian political market it is in a very special position, since it can motivate both office and policy seeking candidates. Degree of competition is also expected to increase because of the special attention the party pays to its recruitment processes. This paper argues that the high number of candidate prospect can be deduced from the fact that FIDESZ have built many channels and sacrificed resources for educating the next generation of candidates and party officers (fidelitas.hu, tranzit.hu). Analysis of qualitative data is in line with previous arguments. However it has to be noted that many of the candidates report a very inclusive selectorate, the members of the party. In terms of competition only some of the candidates report meaningful competition for candidacy.

⁷ Biggest refers to the parliamentary fraction and parliamentary representation.

3.2 *Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (JOBBIK)*

JOBBIK dates its founding to a university student group at ELTE, which group aimed to promote nationalist and religious values for university students (Bíró Nagy and Róna 2011). The group was politically active, but this activity became only visible for the public, when they offered campaign support for supported rightwing parties (Fidesz and MIÉP) at the 2002 elections. As one of their members stated their motivation was “keeping the communists away and securing FIDESZ’s reelection” (Jobbik 2010). As it follows the victory of MSZP was an important factor in their way of founding JOBBIK, but the role of FIDESZ is also undeniable. As it is stated in the official documentary film of the party, launched in 2010 (Jobbik 2010a) FIDESZ’ politics after 2002 was disappointing and could not offer a viable option for the members of the radical youth movement.

Although the party, JOBBIK was founded in 2003, they did not participate in the 2004 European Parliamentary elections and decided to run in coalition with MIÉP at the 2006 Hungarian general elections. There were minor events where JOBBIK could catch media attention⁸, but their reaction on the leaked speech of the former prime minister, Gyurcsány Ferenc and protest movements afterwards were undoubtedly important in the history of the party. The already mentioned elections had essential implications for JOBBIK, such as media attention is important, but the key of their success lies in organization building (Bíró Nagy and Róna 2011), therefore they have to dedicate vigorous efforts for developing nationwide JOBBIK network. In their analysis Bíró Nagy and Róna show that media attention is not the only factor of JOBBIK’s successful electoral performance in 2009 and in 2010. The authors report that the party invested effort and resources successfully into founding and developing

⁸ Events like the first national Cross placing movement before Advent in 2003 (Sebestyén 2003) should be listed here.


local branches and organizing strong and effective structure⁹. JOBBIK, just as the other three parties has developed a vertical structure, where the lowest local level consists of individual members and branches. The highest organizational level is the national one, where the leader and former head of the party, national board and chairmanship belongs. Although the party has a very strong leader, JOBBIK cannot be considered for a “Führer party” (Gunther and Larry 2003). According to the interview material and the investigation of other papers (interview3 2012; intrview4 2012; Bíró Nagy and Róna) strong leadership in the case of JOBBIK is not a difficulty, but a trigger of organizational institutionalization.

The history of the organizational structure development has implications for the candidate selection process of the party in terms of formal regulation, decentralization and competition dimensions of candidate selection. Since JOBBIK has only the timing of candidate selection reforms (which ones are necessary because of the changing legislation environment) but has not started the process yet, all the assumptions made in this section are valid for the prevailing selection process. Interviews reported that reforms will focus on limiting the number of candidates, but no substantial changes of the process are awaited. First, due to its relatively short history, relatively high degree of organizational fluidity and importance of informal processes can be observed. Interview material (interview4 2012) shows that JOBBIK’s de facto candidate selection process is slightly different than the process described by the party’s constitution¹⁰. According to the party constitution the regional party offices participate in the selection process, which is not exactly the case. Interviews (interview3 2012; intrview4 2012) report that there is a committee on the regional level which selects one, maximum two candidates who will get interviewed by the National Selection Committee of the party. The

⁹ By the beginning of 2009 the party had 249 (Bíró Nagy and Róna 2011) local branches and eleven thousand members from which around eight thousand was considered as an active member. There is a further increase in the number of local party offices, in 2012 five hundred local branches had the right of nominating the leader of the party (Wirth 2012)

¹⁰ The party constitution of JOBBIK is not a public document, therefore the author of this paper is thankful for the interviewed party officer , who provided a hardcopy of the document. All citation will is based on this hardcopy.

regional level committee works as an extra filter between the local and national levels, but not as it is described in the 123§/d section of the party constitution describes (Jobbik, 2010b). Moreover, according to the 144§/r section the national board participates in the selection process, but de facto it only delegates a member to the National Electoral Committee, but does not have any direct effect on the outcomes of the selection.



3.2. figure: Selection process of JOBBIK (Source: own concept)

Second, according to interviews (interview3 2012; interview4 2012) the party's selectorate is rather exclusive, but the selection process is not dependent on the leader of the party. The selection process itself has three separate levels – as the figure shows local, regional and national – but the power distribution between these is not balanced. Local and regional levels of the selection process nominate and filter the nominated candidates; and the final selection decision will be made at the national level, by a rather exclusive group of the party. This paper argues that candidate selection method of JOBBIK is centralized, because of two reasons. First, the final selection decision of single member candidates and lists (territorial and national) and approval of this selection will be made at national level. However,

JOBBIK's process is not completely centralized in a sense that none of the party leaders have veto power in the final selection, it will be decided by a majority vote of the national chairmanship (interview3 2012). At the same time it has to be mentioned that the process is even more complex. Empirical data shows that 18 out of 29 candidates¹¹ who filled the questionnaire reported national level as its selector, 11 reported more levels and there where one who reported local selectors. Interestingly 10 out of 18 candidates who marked national level selection also reported that they were selected by the members of their party. In this way they reported a centralized process with inclusive selectorate, which is clearly not coherent with the regulation of JOBBIK, since the party Congress has no role in the selection process. Based on this, although most of the candidates go through the same process¹² because of internal power struggles, background deals or just the selective capture of the procedure, candidates may name different selectorates and imply different level of decentralization. Empirical data shows a low level of intraparty competition, since only 11 candidates report serious competition for candidacy, although interview material argues that majority of local branches nominate more than three prospect candidates. However, it was also noted that only 15-20% of the Regional Electoral Committees used the option in the selection procedure for 2010 to keep two candidates in the competition (interview4 2012).

3.3 *LMP*

LMP is a special character of the Hungarian political market in terms of ideology, since their chosen focus is sustainability, which was a niche market among center-leftish parties before and has never had parliamentary representation in the Hungarian Parliament. On the other

¹¹ The description of the research shows that there were 33 JOBBIK candidates, who filled the questionnaire. Candidates in the original study were identified by their ID number which regardless of their party membership status showed which fraction they belong into. Unfortunately in R, this study could only identify candidates by the party_ID, which excludes non-party members.

¹² Prospect candidates who were previously elected to national level party offices may not go through the procedure, as their candidacy is secure through their position (interview4 2012).

hand it is the youngest party in the Parliament and therefore it has the most fluid organizational processes. This paper argues that although it is the more obvious way to capture LMP's organizational fluidity as a threat but it can be also provide growth opportunities for the party. LMP appeared at the political scene first before European Parliamentary elections (2009), where the party did not manage to get a candidate selected, but made a successful entry to the political market (and which is an identically important: earned the media's attention) just right in time before the 2010 general elections. Exceeding the threshold and delegating MP's to the parliament was the first step. Since then LMP struggles with adjusting to the rules of parliamentary work, which is a great challenge for parties who defines themselves against the existing regime (Szabó 1992), as an anti-establishment party.

As a new and anti-establishment single issue party, LMP have to face threats on three grounds. First, although some of the members were experience in politics, the party generally was in lack of practical political knowledge. The second one is a more organization related issue, namely the slowly developing party infrastructure. As it was reported (interview1 2012) without stabile local organizations the selection of candidates and providing their campaign activity was a great success for the party. At the same time, such bravura is possible for a new entry, but not necessarily repeatable after four years of parliamentary work. This leads to the third issue, which lies in organizational culture, the partial adaptation of basis democracy model. This model is popular among green parties and movements (Szabó 1992; Iránytű Intézet 2012). Previous studies also show that application of this model usually goes together with the low efficiency of strategy making and ideological positioning. They also note than in case of parties like LMP, where there are more competing ideological concepts and ideas within the party, efficiency can be a crucial in finding solutions. Although this paper argues that democratic candidate selection is a very important indicator of internal democracy, it also

notes that overstating intraparty democracy damages the efficiency of procedures and communication to the public. An interesting phenomenon of the party organization is that the national level of the party seems to be the strongest and the weakest part at the same time. The strongest, because it is visible, party in public office belongs to here and weakest since the leadership have to listen to and accommodate opinions from the lower organizational levels (Jávor 2012).

For the author of this paper one of the most important practical implications of candidate selection process that it is a highly operative task and even small inefficiency can cause substantial losses for the party. All the three issues mentioned in the previous section of the paper affect the candidate selection procedure. These three issues should be handled together, because they are interconnected in many ways. Strongly decentralized structure is the result of the value commitments of the party and it was also reported that as a (interview 2012) small and not very influential actor of the political market, LMP may not be able to serve its member office or policy seeking behavior effectively. However on the long run absence of these potentials is a crucial issue, but because of the strong organizational values they share, like decentralization and listening to each other's voice, the party can remain attractive for some viable candidates. The issue of infrastructure can be understood as an internal threat of the party organization. Failing building a stable and hardworking network of local and regional party offices, ultimately means losing elections and not being able to exceed the parliamentary threshold. This paper argues that party organization building, paying special attention for spatial coverage is crucial in times of election, because of its general importance. Focusing on candidate selection procedure it have to be noted that neither satisfactory number of recommendations cannot be collected and nor a satisfactory campaign cannot be designed without the help of local party offices.


Empirical data will not provide proper description about the dimension of candidate election (although may highlight important issues), since because of the age and present parliamentary fraction size of the party LMP is underrepresented in the sample¹³, only 2¹⁴ of their candidates have submitted the questionnaire (valasztaskutatas.hu 2010). However these are still interesting examples, but this paper will not make any qualitative conclusion on the basis of such limited sources. Not organized at the local level (and still not in 2012) – reform of party organization / party constitution still not passed (still in a draft version after, but change in electoral law is, recruitment channels and selection of new party officers/ public office candidates is still not solved.

LMP, like other Hungarian parties developed a vertical structure, which is strongly bounded by spatial and territorial features. However, this vertical structure cannot prevail successfully because of the “unorganized intraparty processes and organizational chaos“ (Scheirig 2012). Absence of strong leadership is not necessarily an organizational threat, but in the case of LMP many argues that lack of central power and balanced organizational processes disables the party from effective work and communication. Basis democratic processes also block the LMP’s responsiveness in many ways. Also an interesting phenomenon that however intra party democracy and the freedom of introducing alternative opinions are very precious values for LMP, candidate selection process not always reflects these values. At the 2010 elections candidate selection was a centralized process many ways, a small group of leadership made the final decisions. In the interview the member of the party commented this (referring to upcoming congress where they propose to change this regulation) as “it would have been pointless to distribute candidate selection rights to the congress”, they did not know the candidates and were lack of practical knowledge of selection process. Various reasons have

¹³ LMP is not underrepresented in the sample because of methodological issues, but the party did not have candidates in the previous Parliament because it did not exist. In this way, the researchers had a very limited pool for selection.

¹⁴ See footnote 10, for further explanation.

motivated the party to propose changes in internal regulation of candidate selection process. First, a strong external factor, change of electoral regulation has to be mentioned. They also report that due to the knowledge gathered about candidates running in 2010 it makes more sense to change to more inclusive selectorate and delegate candidate selection to the party congress.



3.3. figure: Selection process of LMP (Source: own concept)

In terms of competition, interviews report low chance of substantial qualitative intraparty competition for candidacy, because of lack of prospect candidates and a path dependent reasoning. The first issue is usually argued to be the result of the age and weak incentive structure of the party, which have been mentioned with more details before. Therefore LMP literally have to fish for potential candidates. This searching process is even more difficult in districts where the party does not have local branches, since the self nomination (which would be favored even outside of the party). At the 2010 elections in such cases András Schiffer have visited potential non-partisan local politicians. Schiffer as one of the leaders of the party

tried to convince these locals to run for public office as an LMP candidate. If this challenge get accepted by the prospect candidate, then the nomination was brought to the National Board of LMP, which could approve or disapprove the candidacy. On the other hand path dependent reasoning says that in some districts there will be no competition, because LMP followers know the candidate and are satisfied with the work done by him/her. It also was pointed out (interview1 2012) that there is a significant intraparty competition for candidacy in a sense that there are favored and less favored districts and many candidates fights for the favored ones. In this way the party's newcomer position and civic background and the character of their voter basis have important effects on the competitiveness of the selection process. The small, green party is more popular among urban audiences, and less known in villages and smaller settlements, and candidates would like to spend their resources on districts, where they have a slightly chance of winning.

Finally another specialty of the selection process has to be mentioned that the party applies gender quota in selection processes, which ensures that that the gender which would get a worse representation will be compensated through the process. It is an interesting phenomenon that unlike other party constitutions, LMP's uses a general wording so, although regulation practically aims to get fair representation of women it does not specifies gender.


3.4 *Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)*

MSZP, as the sole heir of the Hungarian Communist party¹⁵, after the regime change in 1990 have faced two major organizational challenges. First the organizational structure of the party had to be reformed, with the most important values of the party end in a view, like freedom of forming groups, representation of minority opinions, self-governance in the lower organizational levels and separation of power among intraparty offices (Machos 2000).

¹⁵ For further information on how MSZP's party organizational structure have changed see: Machos 2000:17

Second, MSZP have been struggling with finding the power balance between old and young membership. This intraparty debate manifested in many ways, but one of the most visible one for the public have always been the selection for party and public offices, more specifically selection of candidates and party leaders (interview2 2012).

The values alongside MSZP's organizational structure have been created in 1989 have not changed radically and these values had substantial effect on the organizational structure of the party (Machos 2000). MSZP's structure is territory based and organized in a vertical way. The lowest local levels are branches. MSZP, due to its history has almost a complete spatial coverage in term of branches, and it is also important to note that although the party suffered substantial losses, this completeness of coverage did not get damaged after the 2010 lost elections (interview2 2012). Single member district partnerships are still considered for local level, although regularly more branches make up one partnership. As partnerships are usually composed from more than one local branch, borders of the single member district define the number of branches participating in one partnership; and no such offices exist at Budapest. The next organizational level is the regional level which consists of three offices, alliances of county level offices, alliances of offices at Budapest, the capital of Hungary and regional councils. The highest organizational level, is the national one, where the national board, the chairmanship, parliament of the party, the congress and the leadership of the party belongs. Although the party as a vertical structure is strongly hierarchical, it does not mean that all the power is necessarily concentrated at the higher levels. Investigations show (Machos 2000; interview2 2012) that local party offices have strong bargaining power in the selection of party and public officers.



3.4. figure: Selection process of MSZP (Source: own concept)

The strength of local party office can be demonstrated well through the introduction of candidate selection process. Until the last candidate selection period (where candidates running at 2014 general election were selected) local branches had the right to decide who will run for office and higher organizational levels had almost no way to correct their choice. Many intraparty actions took place before previous general elections demonstrates that the national level was practically lack of veto power. Ilonszki (1996:54) notes that in 1993 (right before 1994 general elections) the national board has sent recommendation for candidate selection, which described the desired character of candidates, but was not bounding. After the lost 1998 elections many have blamed the electoral failure on the chaotic selection process arguing that many suboptimal choices were made at the local level, and this is why the party suffered several coordination problems during the campaign (Machos 2000:19). Therefore, in 1999, substantial changes were made in the regulation of the candidate selection process. These changes opened up the opportunity for the National Chairmanship to apply interventions. A very interesting outcome of the interview made with a high profile party officer (interview2 2012) shows that this regulation was very sparsely applied between 1999

and 2010 and although the regulation have passed, it rarely managed to get into practice. In 2010 and 2011 MSZP had to face challenges on more grounds. On the one hand one can see external factors, like the lost election in 2010, shocking decrease in the in the number of supporters and the change of electoral regulation, and on the other hand there were intraparty issues, like the collapse of the previous power structure and the split with the Democratic Coalition (DK). This paper will not judge whether any of these factors were more important than others, but it argues that these urged and triggered changes in the party constitution. Changes of course did not leave the candidate selection process intact. As a summary of the reforms two important notes have to be made. Changes of the candidate selection method regulation were substantial as, the new practice enables larger audience to participate in the selection process and at the same time selectorate became somewhat more exclusive and the procedure itself became more centralized. Local party level lost its exceptional power in the selection process, and the new regulation provides real veto power for national level offices (interview2 2012). Moreover, MSZP have reformed the process without making real changes the selectorate, as the veto power of national level is considered for a shift in making final decisions, but is not substantial enough to label it as the change of the selectorate.

Recent reforms in the party constitution modifying the candidate selection method indicate the emergence of two trends. MSZP because of losing its positions in the party competition tries to find effective ways to redevelop those. As it was mentioned in the previous section, substantial electoral failures have been blamed many times on organizational failures. The party operates on the degree of decentralization that it is more appropriate to call for chaotic and internal struggles are damaging for the MSZP's reputation. Therefore reforms focus on the centralization of decentralized structures, which means that the higher organizational levels try to expand their range of functions to control as many issues as it is possible and minimize reputational damages originating from the intraparty debates visible for the public

(Mesterházy 2011). The second trend worth mentioning here is a general one in the Hungarian political era, the professionalization of party politics. This professionalization has clear signs in terms of candidate selection, mainly in the field of campaigns with which this paper will not deal substantially. Less clear, but from organizational perspective the length of candidacy as a structural feature is more interesting. MSZP have always selected its candidates earlier than its counterparts (Ilonszki 1996), but according to the analysis of questionnaires the length of candidacy periods have further increased. For example candidates have already been selected by the beginning of 2012 to the 2014 election period.

Introduction of a more exclusive selectorate was also crucial in order to reduce the price of intraparty competition. It was reported (interview2) that there were single member districts where the not selected candidate decided to run independently. By deciding running as an independent candidate, reluctant candidates prioritized their own utility and in most of the cases this practice damaged both the party's reputation and the chances of the originally selected candidate of MSZP. In terms of competition for candidacy both empirical and qualitative data reports a very colorful picture. There are single member districts where the running candidate have built such a strong social and political network or have been working for a long time as the candidate of the district, that challengers will not be considered as a viable option. In the other extreme there are districts, where there is a strong competition, with more than two candidates.

3.5 *Comparing the four processes*

This section provides a quick overview of the four processes introduced in each case studies, on the basis of two tables, first concentrating on the role of organizational levels in the selection process and the second summarizing the papers findings on the three dimensions of candidate selection.

3.1. table: Role of organizational levels in the selection process (Source: own concept)

Level / Party	FIDESZ	JOBBIK	LMP	MSZP
National level	selects, interviews and approves candidates	approves and interviews candidates	approves and interviews candidates	has veto power
Regional level	-	filters the selection of the local level	-	approves candidates
Local level	nominates candidates	nominates candidates	nominates candidates	nominates candidates

As the table describes there are one strong similarity in the selection process of the parties that parties have the ambition of nomination local candidates. Local levels have some sort of nomination role. Local levels also share the task of information gathering about the candidates themselves and also about their potential local support. One should notice clear differences in the regional level. There are two extremes, by MSZP's regional offices have the right to approve their candidates and on the other extreme by LMP and FIDESZ there is no real regional selectorate. However there are different reasons of the latter two practices, since for FIDESZ lack of regional selectorate is the reason of a centralization tendency and for LMP it is the reason of slowly developing organizational structure. JOBBIK distributed a more balanced filtering role for the regional level, and according to the report of a party officer this practice decreases the damages coming from power plays at the local level. Selection steps distributed to the national level are very similar by three out of four parties, namely a delegated committee interviews candidates and suggests a final list for leadership of the party, which approves or disapproves members of this list. However there are differences in the power balance between (will the nomination pass no matter what like in the case of LMP; is the final step made by a group of leaders, like at JOBBIK or this final step is made by a very exclusive selectorate as the example of FIDESZ shows), the description of the process and the stages are very similar. The only outlying case is the (or more appropriate to say that it was

outlying) the MSZP, where the national level *de facto* did not have veto power against the lower levels selection decision until recent changes in the party's leadership and structure.

3.2 table: Dimension of Candidate selection in a comparative table (*Source own concept*)

Dimension/ Party	FIDESZ	JOBBIK	LMP	MSZP
Selectorate	small group of leaders, veto power of the formal leader of the party	group of leaders with equal votes, leader is one of equals	group of leaders with equal votes	regional level delegates' assembly
Decentralization	primacy of the national level	primacy of the national level	primacy of the national level	importance of lower levels, with the control of national level
Competition	strong, quantitative	strong, quantitative	strong, qualitative	strong, quantitative

This table has similar implication as the previous table of this section, namely that the selection process of the parties is very similar, and one should look for the reason of differences in the present situation and organizational history and culture of the party. At the same time even small differences in the regulation may result very different processes. For example FIDESZ, JOBBIK and LMP have a similar selectorate structure, but because of the differences in the functioning of the leadership and the parties positions in the party competition, FIDESZ's selectorate is considered for very exclusive, JOBBIK has a rather exclusive, but balanced and LMP has a slightly exclusive selectorate. Not to mention, that the latter case, if proposed changes pass, they will shift LMP's selectorate to an inclusive model. This paper argues that FIDESZ and JOBBIK clearly operate a centralized process, where the primacy of national level is in line with the organizational culture and functioning of the party. The centralized process of LMP is a more interesting case, since based on interviews and media sources this paper assumes that the party selected its candidates for the 2010 election because of the absence of practical political knowledge and lack of organizational resources. Proposed changes in the regulation of selection process and the degree and nature

of intraparty competition support this idea. The paper argued that MSZP was an outlying case both in selectorate and decentralization because of the history of the party, but recent changes in the party's electoral environment and position in the party competition triggered the implementation of reforms.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This study investigated the question how the selection of candidates by parties was made in Hungary at the 2010 parliamentary election. Therefore the units of analysis in this paper are single parties in a specific country, Hungary; at a well defined point of time, the 2010 parliamentary elections.

This paper had twofold goals: introduce Hungary's candidate selection process and demonstrate that party constitution based and qualitative investigation of the procedure provides a good description, but will not reveal the real reasons of the candidate selection method choice of the party. Based on contingency and historical institutionalism's argument this paper argues that political parties are regular organizations in a sense that they are, to a certain extent, dependent on the change of their external environment and internal struggles. Moreover the paper argues that political organizations are somewhat different in a sense that they are more likely to develop path dependent solutions in order to reduce the organization's functioning costs, therefore candidate selection method are sticky over time. The paper also asks the questions how and why will path dependent selection methods get changed. The investigation of theory and international examples demonstrates that change in path dependent institutions is usually the result of serious external or internal shocks.

Following this line of argument, with the focus of candidate selection methods the third chapter of the paper investigates four Hungarian party's candidate selection process. All subchapters provide short historical introduction of the parties highlighting most relevant issues, like effects of electoral success or failure, organizational issues, degree of centralization of power in the organization and so on. On the basis of general knowledge the paper takes a closer look on each party's candidate selection process, through the formal

introduction of the process and also tries to detect the most important reasons behind methodological choices.

The paper finds that age, history and organizational commitments and values, and the organizational structural characteristics of the party are important factors of candidate selection method choices. Moreover it notes that processes defined in the party constitutions can be very distinct from the actual ones. However the paper does not question the relevance of background deals and personal considerations since it coincides with the nature of politics, but challenges the argument that the selection of public office candidates would consist only from background deals, rather it shows that candidate selection processes are usually transparent to the intraparty public. Moreover the paper demonstrates that reforms of selection processes are usually bounded to external or internal shocks. This paper does not deny the role of intraparty interest groups in the legislation of selection reforms but point out that such reforms are triggered and initiated by shocks which also have a clear affect on the regulation process' outcome.

Moving to concrete findings, the paper argues that left wing (LMP and MSZP) and right wing (FIDESZ and JOBBIK) have developed very similar candidate selection method, but as the previous section shows in terms of the three candidate selection dimensions, role of organizational levels on the level of implementation these processes have substantial differences. While for MSZP's and FIDESZ' shocks are usually linked to lost elections, LMP's most influential shock was a successful election where the party which neither in terms of organizational structure nor in was not ready for parliamentary work¹⁶. In the case of JOBBIK the paper does not identify extreme shocks, although it notes that there is a trap for extreme right organizations, namely that the popular reader of the party becomes an obstacle

¹⁶ This paper does not make any value judgment about the parliamentary work of LMP, but on the basis of report of internal struggles it argues that LMP's greatest shock is not external in a sense as it is by the other parties. However, changing legal environment is considered for an external shock by LMP too.

of development. Since it has not affected JOBBIK, this study identifies growth demand as a potential threat and challenge for the party.

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4.1 Figures

1.1. figure: The flow figure of contingency theory (<i>Source: based on Dobák 2008</i>)	9
2.1. figure: Dimensions of the candidate selection; (Source: own concept, based on Hazan and Rahat (2010)).....	15
3.1. figure: Selection process of FIDESZ (<i>Source: own concept</i>)	34
3.2. figure: Selection process of JOBBIK (<i>Source: own concept</i>).....	37
3.3. figure: Selection process of LMP (<i>Source: own concept</i>).....	42
3.4. figure: Selection process of MSZP (<i>Source: own concept</i>)	45
3.1. table: Role of organizational levels in the selection process (<i>Source: own concept</i>).....	48
3.2 table: Dimension of Candidate selection in a comparative table (<i>Source own concept</i>).....	49