

EU “EXTERNAL ACTION” AT THE UNITED NATIONS

By
Attila Molnár

Submitted to
Central European University
Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Anton Pelinka

Budapest, Hungary
(2012)

ABSTRACT

The present thesis sets out to make an empirical contribution to the literature on European foreign policy, and the question of European voice on the international stage. European voice is defined as the degree to which the European Union (EU), a closely integrated polity in several domains, and an entity dedicated to *effective multilateralism* while being multilateral in itself, is capable of acting as a unified actor on the international stage, with a view to coupling its economic weight with political leverage. It is assumed that the further deepening of integration brought by the Lisbon Treaty should have a palpable effect on the dynamics of EU Member State voting in what is arguably the most universal of multilateral bodies, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), understood to be “the only forum in which a large number of states meet and vote on a regular basis on issues concerning the international community”¹. The study departs from this fundamental assumption and sets out to analyse the European voice in the United Nations, following the Lisbon Treaty. Building on existing scholarly literature; interviews with diplomats, and staff of the European External Action Service at two United Nations headquarters; as well as raw voting data, the above assumption is tested in a study comprising both qualitative and quantitative accounts. The study concludes that, in spite of an abundance of theoretical and practical arguments for increasing unity, actual voting in the UNGA does not provide any grounds for an overly hasty departure from a state-centric view of European foreign policy.

¹ Erik Voeten. “Clashes in the Assembly.” *International Organization* 54 (2000): 185-186.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Anton Pelinka of Central European University, for his continued support, guidance and invaluable insight. I am also very grateful to Professor Péter Balázs, Professor Judit Sándor, Dr. Attila Fölsz and Dr. Tamás Meszerics for the food for thought they have provided. I am greatly indebted to Dr. Eszter Tímár for endless hours of reading and commenting on the previous drafts of the thesis, and to the participants of the Thesis Writing Workshops at Central European University for their comments and questions. I am very thankful to my four anonymous interviewees for providing me with valuable qualitative data and points of departure for my hypotheses; to Dr. István Lakatos, Human Rights Ambassador of Hungary for his support and guidance; to Claudia Lässig, my supervisor during my internship at the United Nations in Vienna, for enabling me to carry out my field research; and to Ruth Jaeneke-Elias of the United Nations Library in Vienna for her help in gaining access to necessary resources.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	i
Acknowledgements	ii
Table of Contents	iii
Introduction	1
Chapter 1: Fundamental Considerations.....	10
1. 1. Challenges of Globalisation and Global Role	12
1. 2. Principal-Agent Theory and Multi-level Games.....	14
Chapter 2: The Actors and Dynamics of the CFSP	19
2. 1. A Brief History of “European Voice”	19
2. 2. European Voices: France and the United Kingdom	20
2.3. Old and New Institutions.....	24
Chapter 3: The EU at the UN	35
3.1 EU Foreign Policy and Global Multilateralism	35
3. 2. The EU and the UN, or EU-UN Relations.....	39
3. 3. The EU at the UN	45
Chapter 4: Voting in the General Assembly	54
4.1. Voting Cohesion before Lisbon.....	55
4.2. Voting Cohesion after Lisbon	58
Conclusions and Further Research	60
Appendix – List of Interviews.....	63
Bibliography.....	64

INTRODUCTION

Before the opening of the sixty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2010, the Belgian Presidency of the European Union (EU), introduced a draft resolution² in which the EU and its closest partners wanted to update the EU's participation in the Assembly's meetings in accordance with the latest of the EU's fundamental treaties, the Treaty of Lisbon. The draft resolution proposed that "the representatives of the European Union [...] be invited to speak[,] [...] be permitted to circulate documents, [...] make proposals and submit amendments, [...] raise points of order, [...] and to exercise the right of reply"³. The proposal was not about quasi-membership, as it would not have allowed EU representatives to vote, it merely asked for a more palpable presence as an observer. It also proposed that the same rules apply to any other regional organisation "when [...] [it] has reached the level of integration that enables that organisation to speak with one voice"⁴.

Following the introduction of the draft resolution, a motion was raised to adjourn the debate on the EU's participation in the UN. The motion passed with 76 votes in favour, 71 against and 26 abstentions, putting off the discussion on the EU's new "voice" to the next session of Assembly. Before the adoption of the motion to adjourn the debate,

speakers representing the African Group, Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and various small island developing States requested more time to analyse the text and its implications, arguing that it would alter the working methods of the Organization and interaction among States.⁵

As an EU official said, countries other than the partners of the EU in the UNGA saw the EU

² UNGA Draft Resolution A/65/L.64 on the Participation of the European Union in the work of the United Nations

³ Michael Emerson and Jan Wouters, "The EU's Diplomatic Debacle at the UN – What else and what next?" CEPS Commentaries, Centre for European Policy Studies, <http://www.ceps.eu/book/eu's-diplomatic-debacle-un-what-else-and-what-next> (accessed 26 December 2010), 4.

⁴ Ibid., 4.

⁵ <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ga10983.doc.htm> (accessed 28 December 2010).

effort as a attempt to get a twenty-eighth voice for the Union.⁶ The EU, on the other hand saw it as the exact opposite: as an attempt to limit themselves and formulate only one statement instead of twenty-seven (let alone twenty-eight), but one which carries more weight.⁷ The facts became that, when the issue was taken from the table at the sixty-fifth session of the UNGA, a very similar draft⁸ was adopted without significant obstruction. Clearly, Member States would be allowed to intervene in support of the single European voice, making it, in theory, twenty-eight, but, as the account in *Chapter 2* will demonstrate, this has neither been the ambition of the EU, nor has it become an unintended reality. The goal the EU and its Member States set is rather the contrary: closer coordination, and less intervention.

Whether the fact that a special entity and not the country holding the Council Presidency speaks for the EU truly “alter[s] the working methods” of the UN remains to be studied and understood, but the point that can be noted already is that it took almost a year for the EU to muddle through a question with significant operative implications for its member states, in a forum where its “partners in the rest of the world[, who] generally want the EU to speak with one voice and act more coherently”⁹ are supposed to be in majority. What the debacle revealed was that what was responsible for the cumbersomeness of the process to reach a “vocal” coordination of EU diplomacy in the UN was weak EU diplomacy in the UN! This raises fascinating questions pertaining to the EU’s voice in international relations, and, notably, the global multilateral scene.

⁶ Interview no. 2.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ UNGA Draft Resolution A/65/L.64 on the Participation of the European Union in the work of the United Nations

⁹ Graham Avery, “Towards a European Foreign Service: Conclusions and Recommendations,” in European Policy Centre. “The EU Foreign Service: How to Build a More Effective Common Policy.” EPC Working Paper No. 28. (Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2007), [http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/555858396_EPC Working Paper 28 The EU Foreign Service.pdf](http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/555858396_EPC%20Working%20Paper%20The%20EU%20Foreign%20Service.pdf), 76.

The present thesis sets out to make an empirical contribution to the literature on common European foreign policy, and the question of European voice in international relations. European voice is defined as the degree to which the European Union, a closely integrated polity in several domains, and an entity dedicated to “effective multilateralism”¹⁰ while being multilateral in itself, is capable of acting as a unified actor on the international stage, with a view to coupling its economic weight with political leverage. Bearing this fundamental challenge in mind, the thesis analyses to what degree the Lisbon Treaty, “the foreign policy treaty of the EU”¹¹, has proven to be a meaningful step forward in the Union’s external representation, and how its provisions have been implemented in EU action at the UN during the first three years of the first term of the EU’s newly-appointed foreign policy chief, the High Representative (2009-2012).

The enquiry aims at filling a small part of the a considerable gap in existing research, by providing the UN chapter of “[d]etailed case studies of specific policy areas [...] needed to properly understand the political competition between the different institutional actors within the EU, and its role in shaping foreign policy cooperation”¹². Bickerton points out that

more work is needed to understand the paradox of member states struggling with other EU actors over who has final authority in foreign policy and yet also using foreign policy cooperation as a way of escaping their own international responsibilities. How can we reconcile this struggle for political power within the EU with a refusal of power projection in the rest of the world?¹³

¹⁰ European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy* (Brussels, 2003), 9, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> (accessed 3 January 2012).

¹¹ Richard Whitman, “Promised You a Miracle? The EU’s Global Role in the Afterglow of Lisbon,” (lecture at the Center for European Union Research Launch Conference, Central European University, Budapest, 2 December 2010).

¹² Christopher J. Bickerton, “Funcionality in EU Foreign Policy: Towards a New Research Agenda?” *European Integration* 32, no. 2 (2010): 224.

¹³ Christopher J. Bickerton, “Funcionality in EU Foreign Policy: Towards a New Research Agenda?” 224.

Acknowledging the “recognised shortcomings in the macro-theories”¹⁴, this study aims at providing part of the answer “through empirical observation, examining the nature of the actors involved”¹⁵. Nevertheless, it is recognised that much work is still to be done before one can claim that all gaps have been filled.

The study employs two analytical tools for approaching the EU’s foreign policy apparatus, both of which are well-established and acknowledged across schools of European Studies. The first tool is principal-agent theory, widely used for structures involving delegation, and the second is the concept of multi-level games, originally devised by Robert Putnam to describe the nature of interaction between the domestic political sphere and international politics. The two approaches are relied on to analyse why EU member states consider delegating authority in the foreign policy domain, and the dynamics of this delegation and the emanating multi-level games. Providing an analysis of the actors involved, the study does not stop at giving a static picture of the state of affairs, but, using the first two and a half years of the existence of the foreign policy institutions established by the Treaty of Lisbon (the “Lisbon institutions”: primarily the External Action Service, headed by the High Representative) as a point of reference, it also speculates on future potential for agency loss (potential of EU agents to expand their scope of action vis-à-vis member states), ultimately approaching the question of EU leverage within the international community. The following two research questions are specifically addressed: firstly, how has the Lisbon Treaty changed the framework of European external representation at the UN; secondly, what is the practical manifestation of this framework and what are its implications for the EU’s voice on the international stage?

¹⁴ Laura Cram, “Integration Theory and the Study of the European Policy Process,” in *European Union. Power and Policy-Making*, ed. Jeremy Richardson, New York: Routledge, 1996., 54.

¹⁵ Ibid., 55.

Hypotheses can be set up on a continuum between two extremes. On the one extreme, the null-hypothesis, coherent with the intergovernmentalist school of European Studies, holds that EU member states as principals are and will remain in full control of their foreign policy agents, and European presence at the UN will remain of full-fledged national-state character. The alternative or federalist hypothesis, would hold that the Lisbon institutions are to take over European foreign policy-making and representation, and there will soon be only one, pan-European voice in the UN. This extreme would also question the applicability of the principal-agent approach, asserting that agency loss is of such large scale that it exceeds the conceptual limits of the principal-agent model. What the present thesis does is seek out the realistic point on the continuum between these two extremes. The question asked is, therefore not of the “whether or not” nature, but of the “to what degree” nature.

The study is original in two fundamental respects. First, it explores the unknown through conducting interviews with diplomats and EU officials, gathering anecdotal data on the ongoing implementation of the Lisbon institutions. Secondly, it makes an institutional account of the EU polity from a comparative perspective, and tests the insights gained through an analysis of voting behaviour in the UNGA. By this, it provides originality in the use of data belonging to the disciplines of Comparative Politics and International Relations, and conducts a two-fold enquiry into the question of European voice. As the study positions itself within European Studies, a field that is itself interdisciplinary in character, this goal is only natural. Comparativist interest stems from the fact that foreign policy is a highly significant domain in a system of governance, hence its integration is naturally largely contested in integration into a European governance system. The relevance of the study from an International Relations perspective stems primarily from the fact that the research questions ultimately boil down to the issue of sovereignty, and its supposed decline and/or re-structuring in the present-day

international system.

It should be emphasised at this point that the approach used in this study, in coherence with the nature of the questions asked, is primarily empirical, rather than theoretical. This is only in part due to the fact that there is no grand theory for the study of European integration in general, and EU foreign policy in particular. It is noted that the specific dynamics at work do not allow the use of one theoretical model¹⁶, but a more fundamental reason for concentrating on empirics is that the goal of the study is not to provide a new theory for European integration, but rather to build on the fundamental considerations on which there is relatively widespread agreement in already existing theories, bearing in mind that “macro-theories” of integration, such as neo-functionalism or intergovernmentalism “tend to lose their explanatory power” when analysing questions related to “policy setting” or “policy shaping”.¹⁷ Finally, due to inevitable limits on its scope, the present study does not deal with issues such as “democratic deficit” or “sovereignty deficit”, which supposedly originate from delegation, and which are arguably relevant themes when discussing foreign policy. Due partly to their importance, and to the fact that their discussion would necessitate a major digression from the research questions of the thesis, the connection between these concepts and the contemporary development of EU foreign policy are better left to be explored in separate studies, building on the already existing extensive discussion among some of the most renowned scholars of European integration (see, for example, Moravcsik¹⁸, Follesdal and Hix¹⁹).

¹⁶ Sonia Mazey, “The Development of the European Idea. From Sectoral Integration to Political Union,” In *European Union. Power and Policy-Making*, edited by Jeremy Richardson, 40-58. New York: Routledge, 1996., 25.

¹⁷ John Peterson, “Decision-Making in the European Union: Towards a Framework for Analysis,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 2, no. 1 (1995): 84, cited in Laura Cram, “Integration Theory and the Study of the European Policy Process,” 54.

¹⁸ Andrew Moravcsik, “In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 4 (2002): 603-624.

¹⁹ Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, “Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone

The foreign policy of a significantly enlarged European Union is as salient an issue today as ever before. As opposed to previous Treaties, which primarily had an intra-EU focus through building the internal market (Single European Act, 1986), the “pillar system” (Maastricht, 1992), reweighting Council votes or preparing for enlargement (Amsterdam, 1997, and Nice, 2001), the Lisbon Treaty has been a serious institution-builder in the foreign policy domain. With only symbolic changes with regard to the Constitutional Treaty in this realm, and with the highest number of foreign policy clauses, it has established several *sui generis* institutions and mechanisms in the already existing, but overwhelmingly intergovernmental foreign policy framework of the EU.

This study begins with analysing how this “foreign policy treaty”,²⁰ calling for the creation of new foreign policy institutions such as the President of the European Council (Article 15(6)), the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the European External Action Service (Article 27), as well as giving an international legal personality to the Union (Article 47) and an increased role to the European Parliament in ratifying the EU’s international treaties²¹, has been implemented between 2009 and 2012. The reason why it is justified to study the implementation through such an extended period of time is that the setting up of such institutions as those of the Lisbon Treaty, as the interviews conducted for this study reveal, is a long and delicate process, which is not only difficult for administrative reasons, but is also hindered politically, to an extent that is not insignificant.

It is assumed that the further deepening of integration brought by the Lisbon Treaty should have a palpable effect on the dynamics of EU Member State voting in what is arguably

and Moravcsik.” *European Governance Papers* No. C-05-02 (2005), <http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-05-02.pdf> (accessed on November 5, 2011).

²⁰ Richard Whitman, “Promised you a Miracle?”.

²¹ Adrienn Nász, “Az Európai Parlament Lisszabon után” [The European Parliament after Lisbon], *Európai Tükör* XV/6 (June 2010): 23.

the most universal of multilateral organisations, the United Nations, and, notably, its plenary organ, the UNGA, understood to be “the only forum in which a large number of states meet and vote on a regular basis on issues concerning the international community”²². The study departs from this fundamental assumption, and sets out to analyse the European voice in the United Nations, following the Lisbon Treaty.

Chapter 1 provides a review of the relevant scholarly literature, explaining the logic of and reasons for delegating authority in the foreign policy domain. *Chapter 2* provides a historical-descriptive critique of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), with the aim of identifying the actors, institutions and dynamics at work in the EU’s foreign policy game. The analysis goes beyond most of the extensive CFSP literature in that it encompasses the period between 2009 and 2012. Furthering the scope of the historical literature available, this part also uses insight gained through interviews with EU officials and diplomats. The historical and anecdotal data gained here are used to formulate preliminary conclusions, which are subjected to testing in two subsequent chapters.

This account is original based on its empirical merit, and also offers a substantive basis for refining some theoretical aspects of the phenomena discussed, by providing insight into the framework of current CFSP actors, apparently operating along a logic described by several different schools of International Relations (IR), and theories of European integration. These include, but are not limited to, historical determinism, intergovernmentalism, interdependence and regime theory, neoliberalism, (neo-)institutionalism and constructivism. However, operating with the assumption that there is no grand theory to explain European integration and foreign policy in general, and EU foreign policy in particular, *Chapter 1* and *2* do not embrace any single theoretical approach or analytical framework. This is due, primarily to the

²² Erik Voeten. “Clashes in the Assembly.” *International Organization* 54 (2000): 185-186.

empirical phenomenon that it is in the nature of practice to be in conformity with a certain theory at one time, and with its direct opposite at another. The overall purpose of this part of the study is to synthesise a comprehensive picture of the dynamics analysed, which is deemed necessary for the formulation of the hypotheses.

Building on the insight gained in *Chapters 1 and 2*, *Chapter 3* identifies the surfaces at which the EU and the UN deal with each other. This part ascertains the implications of the dynamics and actors examined for the EU's action at the UN. In *Chapter 4*, the hypotheses and the conclusions drawn from the comparative analysis of *Chapter 2* are tested through the analysis of European voting in the UNGA.

CHAPTER 1: FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

Theoretical literature on European integration is rich and diverse, entailing largely divergent conceptions of the state of integration, as well as its potential for development in the foreseeable future. Through more than six decades of developments in the integration process, theoretical understandings have proliferated considerably, with some views, such as neofunctionalism, gaining more popularity at times than others, but none becoming hegemonic. The foreign policy domain, one of the few policy areas that are traditionally considered to be at the hard core of nation-state sovereignty, has, for most of the integration process, remained characterised, at its best, by intergovernmental coordination, and, at its worst, by complete disagreement. It has been the Constitutional Treaty, and, after its failure, the Lisbon Treaty, whose institutions first seem to contain the promise of something not unadjacent to what might be referred to as “integration”.

For the purpose of this study, I refer to the most important dividing line in political (as opposed to economic or sociological) theories of European integration that is relevant to the subject of this thesis. On one side of this hypothetical line are theories which regard the prevailing consensus-based model of foreign policy decision-making a meaningful and decisive obstacle in the way of a shift towards supranationality. I will refer to this collection of views as *diplomatic state-centrism*. A refined version of this point of view sees Europe’s future role as the economic superpower in a multipolar world characterised by several actors of great power status, wielding power on largely different dimensions. Notwithstanding this vision, the state-centric view aims at little more than describing the status quo, and, as I demonstrate by taking a sample of literature in the following, it does so by overlooking a variety of important actors and circumstances, and, ultimately, possibilities.

On the other side of the dividing line are theories which consider perceiving decision

making as solely characterised by consensus, at least partly, as outdated, and, in turn, which emphasise internal and external incentives capable of causing *political spillover* of integration to the foreign policy domain. What is meant by political spillover, is thesis that integration in certain policy fields brings about integration in other, political fields.²³ Its essence was eloquently envisioned in the Schuman Declaration of 1950, calling for the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. In his declaration, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman asserted that “Europe [...] will be built through concrete achievements which first create a *de facto* solidarity”²⁴ among member states. This solidarity would then cause further integration not out of sheer necessity (*functional spillover*), but much like among members of a community of friends. Spillover to the foreign policy domain can be hypothesised to be preceded by integration in domains such as economic policy or justice and home affairs.

It should be reiterated that the present study is primarily of empirical nature, and does not aim at invoking one particular theory of integration or at elaborating a new one. What is done in this chapter instead, is the review of a sample of the relevant scholarly literature, and the establishment of meaningful theoretical foundations for the enquiry conducted in subsequent chapters. To do so, shortcomings of diplomatic state-centrism are used as point of departure. In accordance with the above, the study makes reference to what is probably the most fundamental division in European Studies: the cleavage between state-centric and non-state-centric approaches, which have traditionally dominated integration theory and continue to do so today.²⁵

Several theorists, including Hill and Toje, argue that there is an obstinate “capability-

²³ Laura Cram, “Integration Theory and the Study of the European Policy Process,” 46-47; David Mutimer, “Theories of Political Integration,” in *European Integration: Theories and Approaches*, ed. Hans J. Michelmann and Panayotis Soldatos, Lanham: University Press of America, 1995., 28-29.

²⁴ <http://www.eppgroup.eu/Activities/docs/divers/schuman-en.pdf> (accessed 22 March 2012).

²⁵ Laura Cram, “Integration Theory and the Study of the European Policy Process,” 51.

expectations gap” or a “consensus-expectations gap”²⁶ with regard to several policy domains, which also affects the aptitude of Europe as an international actor. That is, those calling for a strategic actor Europe or a Europe capable of global (hard-power) leverage are unfoundedly optimistic, or misguided about its potential. The EU, in this view, is not capable of becoming a state-like actor of international relations based on the resources or tools it is able to wield, or the consensus-based decision-making it employs. Accordingly, Europe must make do with what she has, and must try to make the most of her soft power. The following four sections provide theoretical considerations for departing from the static view of diplomatic state-centrism, thus establishing the theoretical basis for the alternative hypothesis, which is then tested in the chapters that follow.

1. 1. Challenges of Globalisation and Global Role

First, the characteristics and strategic goals of present-day EU as an international actor should be established. For this end, Balázs provides a very useful analytical framework when classifying the EU’s international “actorness” along three main dimensions: (1) the harmonisation and representation of the interests of Member States vis-à-vis the rest of the international community, (2) becoming a model and norm-setter for the Euro-Mediterranean macro-region and its periphery, and (3) assuming a global role.²⁷ It is a worthy task to address the EU’s potential in the first two dimensions; but it is the third one that is most relevant to the subject of this thesis, the EU’s role in global multilateralism. Balázs argues in favour of striking a balance between what Member States can agree on and what fits the (enlarged)

²⁶ see Asle Toje, “The Consensus–Expectations Gap: Explaining Europe’s Ineffective Foreign Policy,” *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 1 (2008): 121-141, <http://sdi.sagepub.com/>.

²⁷ Péter Balázs, “Az Európai Unió nemzetközi kapcsolatai” [The Foreign Relations of the European Union], in *Európai Közjog és Politika [European Public Law and Policy]*, ed. Tamás Kende and Tamás Szűcs (Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 2002), 809.

European family in its entirety²⁸; or, in other words. bridging the capability/consensus-expectations gap. Hinging on the same aspect of “actorness”, other authors write about European ambitions for the “management of globalization”, that is the mobilisation of various “public or private actors to ensure that the liberalization of rules [...] goes hand in hand with formal practices to bind market players and their governments”.²⁹ This falls in line with the understanding that what has emerged in European economic integration has done so as a result of a struggle between two dominant economic projects: “neoliberalism” and “regulated capitalism”³⁰. Some who view regional integration as the fig leaf of protectionism see the EU’s limited foreign policy toolkit as the reason for its protectionist policies.³¹

It can be argued that globalisation faces the EU with the question of what it *must* do, rather than the question that what it *can*, which some theorists tend to deal with. In a way, globalisation necessitates *development through crisis*. If the EU does not manage to speak with a voice that is taken seriously by the international community, it will inevitably lose out in a number of fields. Pressures of globalisation produce or threaten to produce an international leverage crisis if the EU does not come up with new mechanisms and solutions to speak with one earnest voice on the international stage. Developing countries, especially the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) are exerting increased pressure on multilateral institutions for the stronger representation of their interests.³² Without the possibility of going into the details

²⁸ Ibid., 810.

²⁹ Wade Jacoby and Sophie Meunier, “Europe and the Management of Globalization,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 17, vol. 3 (2010): 299-300.

³⁰ Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “The Making of a Polity: The Struggle Over European Integration,” *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)* 1, no. 4 (2002), <http://ssrn.com/abstract=302663> or doi:10.2139/ssrn.302663.

³¹ Deepak Lal, “Trade Block and Multilateral Free Trade,” in *Economic and Political Integration in Europe: Internal Dynamics and Global Context*, ed. Simon Bulmer and Andrew Scott, Blackwell Publishers, 1994., 193.

³² Discussing the details of the representational reform of multilateral forums, and, most notably, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) goes beyond the limits of the present study, and is only referred to briefly in

of their claims and the debates surrounding them, the author of this study holds that it is unavoidable that the needs of these countries be attended to, but believes that the corresponding fall-out of former colonial masters, today arguably mediocre (European) states has equal justification to be compensated for by a clear European voice on the multilateral scene. The reason why this is a necessity for Europe, rather than merely an option is that the management of globalisation is impossible merely through commanding a sizeable market, and requires the wielding of power in *harder* fields³³ as does the pursuance of the EU's strategic objectives, such as market expansion, energy or competitiveness.

1. 2. Principal-Agent Theory and Multi-level Games

Institutions, once established, often have a penchant for developing their own rules and practices. One of the most influential theories of delegation, or, arguably, *the* most influential, is the principal-agent approach, which originates from the corporate governance literature and describes how decision makers (principals) delegate their authority to agents, in order to cut transaction costs, make use of informational advantages, as well as because of a number of different reasons relevant to the specific task delegated.³⁴

Focusing on EU negotiators as agents, Delreux and Kerremans provide an empirical study of EU negotiators, primarily at multilateral trade negotiations, and highlight ways in which these agents can widen their choice sets vis-à-vis their principals (Member States), primarily through making the principals themselves interested in surrendering some of their

Chapters 3 and 4, where relevant.

³³ Wade Jacoby and Sophie Meunier, "Europe and the Management of Globalization," 313.

³⁴ For a collection of applications of the model by various schools of integration theory, see Hussein Kassim and Anand Menon, "The Principal-Agent Approach and the Study of the European Union: Promise Unfulfilled?" *Journal of European Public Policy* 10, no. 1 (2003): 121-139. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350176032000046976>.

control.³⁵ While Delreux and Kerremans examine policy domains that have for a long time belonged to the community sphere, it should be noted that a similar network of EU negotiators is created by the Lisbon Treaty for the foreign policy domain. Furthermore, that this is done so with an agency with a record of innate pro-activity³⁶. Besides EU negotiators (mainly Commission and Council officials, or, after the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative and the External Action Service in its entirety), there are other actors contesting the supremacy of national leaders in the foreign policy domain. Bickerton points to the role of foreign policy space-gaining as “identity building” for the European Parliament³⁷, arguably the entity which is empowered the most by the Lisbon Treaty. While the construction and staffing of the European External Action Service (EEAS) was mainly to be done from three building bricks devised in the Treaties (Member States’ foreign services, the Commission and the Council Secretariat), Parliament has also become involved in the form of consultation, especially in questions with budgetary implications.³⁸ As is often the case in any international negotiation, however, issue linkages and logrolling have been used by Parliament as well, which has hence got involved also in other issues.³⁹ This empirical phenomenon fits in well with Parliament’s penchant for a non-restrictive interpretation of its (foreign policy) licences, and its push for increased involvement in numerous dimensions of the EU’s external relations.

Outcomes caused by agency are amplified by the established network of the EU’s relations with international organisations: a web of structures of multi-level governance.

³⁵ Tom Delreux and Bart Kerremans, “How Agents Weaken their Principals’ Incentives to Control: The Case of EU Negotiators and EU Member States in Multilateral Negotiations,” *Journal of European Integration* 32, vol. 4 (2010): 357-374.

³⁶ See *Chapter 2*.

³⁷ Christopher J. Bickerton, “Functionality in EU Foreign Policy: Towards a New Research Agenda?” *Journal of European Integration* 32, vol. 2 (2010): 220-221

³⁸ Interview no. 2.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

Young⁴⁰ used Putnam's two-level game⁴¹ metaphor to describe how the domestic and foreign spheres of EU actors impact their international bargaining position. This account was preceded by the so-called domestic politics approaches to European integration, which were first to emphasise the importance of the domestic political spheres of member states in explaining the dynamics of integration.⁴² This approach is inherent in both state-centric⁴³ and non-state centric⁴⁴ conceptions of European integration.

In case of state-actors, the model consists of two spheres or levels: level I is the actor's position in an international negotiation, and level II is the domestic politics of a country.⁴⁵ "The range of possible outcomes that would command sufficient domestic support for ratification [of an international agreement]" is the "win-set", which is proportional to the opportunity cost of international agreement.⁴⁶ Applied to the EU's foreign relations, the game becomes a double-two-level or three-level game with a similar logic, but with two important implications. Firstly, that, *ceteris paribus*, the win-set of the EU is smaller than that of other governments; and, secondly, that EU Member States have a choice between a two-level game and a three-level game in policy areas that are not exclusively within Community competence.⁴⁷ In an earlier study, I applied Putnam's and Young's multi-level game metaphor to EU action at the

⁴⁰ Alasdair R. Young, "What Game? By Which Rules? Adaptation and Flexibility in the EC's Foreign Economic Policy," in *Understanding the European Union's External Relations*, ed. Michèle Knodt and Sebastiaan Princen, (London: Routledge, 2003), 55.

⁴¹ Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 427-460, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706785>.

⁴² Laura Cram, "Integration Theory and the Study of the European Policy Process," 50.

⁴³ Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 4 (1993): 474.

⁴⁴ Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and Kermit Blank, "European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-Level Governance," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 34, no. 3 (1996): 346.

⁴⁵ Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games."

⁴⁶ Alasdair R. Young, "What Game?," 55.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 56.

World Trade Organisation (WTO).⁴⁸ In the WTO, besides its Member States, the EU is itself a member, and the Commission speaks on behalf of all 27 EU member states. Hence in negotiations within the framework of the WTO, the choice between two- and three-level games can be said to be decided a priori, as international trade is a domain that has long been community competence.

The metaphor, with some restrictions, can be applied equally well to the more narrowly-conceived foreign policy domain. Some students of International Relations would argue that this traditional realm of foreign policy constitutes an autonomous and independent sphere which is isolated from constituencies, hence, level II of the game actually makes no sense (foreign policy makers do not care what their constituents think). This argument, however, clearly fails in the case of democracies, where politicians can be and are held accountable for their actions, including their foreign policy decisions,⁴⁹ and can also be effectively argued to fail in non-democracies, where the political elite, corporatist, aristocratic or otherwise, can be seen as a “functional equivalent” of an electorate that holds its leaders accountable.⁵⁰ The point to be emphasised here is that in democratic Europe, the domestic sphere does matter, and governments with a view to re-election should and most often do bear this in mind. In fact, it seems increasingly meaningful to speak about the suggested choice between two- and three-level games at the UN, where EU member states can either choose to go their own way (as in the cases of Iraq or Palestine), upholding the three-level game, or can opt for

⁴⁸ Attila Molnár, “The Political Economy of the European Union’s WTO-membership.”

⁴⁹ For a vivid example, see the (in)stability of governments, owing, not to an insignificant degree, to their ethnic politics, in Central Europe (e. g. the case of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia) or Western and Northern Europe (immigration policy in France, the Netherlands or Denmark) or the Middle East and Afghanistan policy of the Blair Administration. I am grateful to Professor Péter Balázs of Central European University for his help in constructing this argument.

⁵⁰ I thankfully acknowledge Dr. Tamás Meszerics of Central European University, for making this point during the course “Information, Decision Making and Foreign Policy”, in the winter semester of Academic Year 2011/2012, held in the Political Science Department of Central European University, Budapest.

coordination and have the EU negotiator (until recently: the Council Presidency, but since 2011, if technically possible, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the External Action Service, *see Chapter 2*) speak on their behalf.

If they choose to opt for coordination and/or delegation, then the implications of having a smaller win set than negotiating partners come into play. On the one hand, a smaller win set decreases chances for coming to an agreement⁵¹, but, on the other hand, it makes it possible to drive a harder bargain, by shifting the blame for not being able to compromise with negotiating partners to level II⁵², or, directly or indirectly, to level III (the domestic spheres of EU member states).

In summary, what using the principal-agent theory and the multi-level game metaphor reveals is that EU member states may well be motivated to coordinate their foreign policies and to delegate authority to EU-level actors, for a number of reasons. These are the most important theoretical arguments whose vectors point in the direction of the alternative hypothesis.

⁵¹ Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," 437-438.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 440.

CHAPTER 2: THE ACTORS AND DYNAMICS OF THE CFSP⁵³

2. 1. A Brief History of “European Voice”

The Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1992) was the first of the Treaties not only to envision a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the European Union (EU), but also develop an institutional framework for it. The new CFSP brand grew out of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), an intergovernmental foreign policy coordination mechanism, brought to life by the so-called Davignon Report or Luxembourg Report of 1970, which had described the EPC’s *raison d’être*: to back up the Communities’ economic power with international actorness in a realist sense, but on largely intergovernmental grounds. The intergovernmental nature of the EPC was later also preserved in the CFSP.

In what the Maastricht Treaty did go past intergovernmentalism with regard to European voice, however, was basically two instruments: “common position”, set up by the Council and pertaining to *general issues*, to be upheld by the Member States in various international fora; and “joint action” decided on by the Council, guided by the Heads of State and Government, designed to react to *specific situations* (Articles J.2. and J.3.). The Maastricht Treaty also set up the so-called “pillar system”, which based the newly-founded Union on three distinct pillars: the first, the community pillar, included the former European Communities; the second was the CFSP, largely intergovernmental; and the third pillar was *Justice and Home Affairs*, intergovernmental to start with, but later partly relocated into the first pillar by the Treaty of Amsterdam.

Such a historical retrospect highlights that (1) the ambition to speak with one voice has

⁵³ This Chapter of the thesis is based to a significant degree on term papers submitted to professors Anton Pelinka and Péter Balázs, in their respective courses “Comparative European Politics” and “European Governance” in Academic Year 2010/2011 at Central European University, Budapest.

been on the table of European integration for more than forty years, and (2) still foreign policy has remained a predominantly intergovernmental domain. So why is it that, after forty years of foreign policy coordination, the dilemma of the European voice appears to be much the same? Why is it that even after the end of the Cold War, when Europe ceased to be a (geo)strategic playground, and also re-welcomed its old family members of the Central and Eastern European region, there is still no single foreign policy voice of Europe when it comes to foreign policy, capable of conveying leverage proportionate to her economic and social potential?

2. 2. *European Voices: France and the United Kingdom*

The present section provides an account of overall trends in the foreign policies of the United Kingdom and France, the two former great powers and EU Member States which are also permanent members of the Security Council, the only European nuclear powers, and incircumventable factors in UN policy making. In the state-centric environment of foreign policy design, some EU Member States have traditionally adopted assertive roles of their own with regard to, but often not conducive to the common policy lines. The Member States that have done so are arguably the only ones that are endowed to be capable of exercising anything like power diplomacy on the global level.⁵⁴ The purpose of this account is to explain the historical directions of foreign policies (largely on the nation state level) out of which a “European” can be thought to emanate. It is noted that other influential states also exist among the Member States of the EU, and such countries can also emerge in the coming years in many different aspects. The reform of the Security Council, a process apparently stalled for

⁵⁴ I gratefully acknowledge Professor Thomas Glaser, visiting faculty at Central European University’s International Relations and European Studies Department, who put forward the argument in the course “EU Diplomacy: From Theory to Actor” in the winter semester of Academic Year 2011/2012 at Central European University, Budapest.

the foreseeable future, encapsulates such trends rather clearly, and also provides thoughts on why there is no clear way out of the present rigidity of the system of Security Council membership, which, while giving Europe two permanent seats and a de facto renewed seat of Germany, might still be referred to Pareto inefficient for Europe. It is impossible to explore this realm within the framework of the present thesis, and the only reason why it is invoked is to demonstrate that the present rigid reality of the global multilateral scene does not allow the serious consideration of any other European country other than France and the United Kingdom as an insurmountable cornerstone of the system, as it opens up debates similar to those surrounding the Security Council reform (especially: what role for Germany, Italy or other European members?), which apparently have not led anywhere meaningful.

In his influential work⁵⁵, Parsons argues that the idea behind creating the European Union or the prevalence of the so-called community method largely has its roots in France. In his insightful book, the author provides a detailed account of how the idea of Europe evolved in France parallel to European integration, and how this French idea of Europe influenced the integration process at every given turn. Within this record of making Europe, the de Gaulle era can be seen as the heyday of realism, when the European Community can be construed as instrumental to achieving the strategic goals of the nation-state – an idea that is in harsh contrast to what is known as the *community method*.⁵⁶ In Parson’s own words: “[o]nly because the EEC reconfigured international and domestic demands did he [de Gaulle] arrive at policies based on a community Europe”⁵⁷. Put differently, in an era of a strong man’s leadership in French politics and foreign policy, Europe can be understood as the “extension of the French hand” in a time when France’s *grandeur* had long been but an image of the past.

⁵⁵ Craig Parsons, *A Certain Idea of Europe*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003.

⁵⁶ Craig Parsons, *A Certain Idea of Europe*, 119.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 142.

With these goals in mind, the France of de Gaulle is still seen as a proponent of a powerful (N.B. instrumental) Europe regarding the classic tools of foreign policy,⁵⁸ in pursuit of geopolitical goals. This predominant logic of the period is therefore best described by the intergovernmentalist school of European integration.

The resistance of France to the influence of the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, which culminated in her withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command, as well as in repeatedly blocking British accession, must be seen in this light, and as a factor of opting for the community method in many respects. At least formally, therefore, what characterised French foreign policy thinking in the period was a pro-continental, anti-Atlanticist affinity, and, at many turns, seeing Franco-German partnership (headed by France) primarily as means to achieving these ends.⁵⁹ The long-term importance (and truth to) such a view cannot be overlooked, as the analysis of present-day dynamics of European foreign policy making demonstrates later on in the present chapter.

Among Gaullists after de Gaulle, however, the anti-Atlanticist stance was repeatedly called into question, as was the view of integration as so unapologetically instrumental. In this era, most probably because of an increasing realisation of a choice between going it alone and weak, or in Europe (especially together with Germany), strong⁶⁰, conceptions of Europe began to "cut across the main lines in French politics"⁶¹. By the 1990s, long after the eventual

⁵⁸ Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, "The Big Member States" Influence on the Shaping of the European Union's Foreign, Security and Defence Policy," in *The Future of the European Foreign, Security and Defence Policy After Enlargement*, ed. Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006., 27.

⁵⁹ Craig Parsons, *A Certain Idea of Europe*, 119.

⁶⁰ I gratefully acknowledge Professor Anton Pelinka of Central European University, who provided this argument as part of our correspondence during 14 May 2012.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 175.

accession of the United Kingdom, it is already valid to mention a French “rapprochement”⁶² to Atlanticism, launched by the joint declaration of St. Malo with the United Kingdom (1998). In the Declaration, the French and British Governments state that “[t]he European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage”⁶³. The subject of this citation not only hinges on the main theme of the present thesis (Europe’s global role), but what can be seen as perhaps the most remarkable is that, according to the Declaration, Europe not only encompasses the United Kingdom, but the United Kingdom is actually one of its motors. This trend appears to be on the rise with the Franco-British military cooperation agreement announced in the autumn of 2010.

As opposed to the incremental tradition of French foreign policy since World War II, the United Kingdom can be said to have an unbroken record of trans-Atlanticism. The *special relationship* with the United States has been in the centre of British strategic thinking for the better part of the twentieth century, and arguably still is today. As Tony Blair put it in a speech, “our job is to keep our sights firmly on both sides of the Atlantic”⁶⁴. In fact, it can be argued that the EU itself has no other choice but to “keep its eyes on both sides of the Atlantic”. Having Britain “in”, which oftentimes provides difficulties especially with regard to *positive integration* (integration by building new institutions; as opposed to *negative integration*: integration by removing institutions, such as trade barriers), is definitely an advantage when developing the partnership with the United States, both economic and political. The High Representative, a Briton herself, has emphasised the importance of the EU-US relationship at several turns, adding weight to her words by conducting repeated meetings with US Secretary

⁶² Gisela Müller -Brandeck-Bocquet, “The Big Member States” Influence on the Shaping of the European Union’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy,” 34.

⁶³ St. Malo Declaration, qtd. in Ibid., 34.

⁶⁴ Tony Blair, qtd. in Ibid., 52.

of State Hillary Clinton⁶⁵ in an important initial period when the new CFSP actors face a window of opportunity for determining their roles for a longer period to come the longer term.

2.3. Old and New Institutions

This section analyses the new political dynamics of the institutional framework behind the CFSP, following the Treaty of Lisbon. *Figure 1* depicts the actors in the new game, as well as their positions and inter-relatedness.




Figure 1. The EU actors of the CFSP after the Treaty of Lisbon

The figure lists the most important actors which have or have had a role in defining the EU's foreign policy. With the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, and subsequent episodes in European politics and on the international stage, it can be claimed that some actors are or have become more important than others, in a way that cannot be derived from the text of the Treaty.

At first glance, the Commission, traditionally seen as a consistent and pro-active entity in external policies within its competence, has been sidelined with the introduction of new posts: the permanent President of the European Council and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The Commission has also “lost weight” due to the elevation of the Parliament to co-decision-maker status with the Council, and not least its role in selecting the College of Commissioners. Looking more closely at the role of the Commission, however, one finds subtleties that question the supposed decline of Commission

⁶⁵ <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135530.htm> (accessed 3 June 2011)

impact on the EU's external role and representation. Such a view is further strengthened by a recently leaked report indicating that the Commission "still pulls the strings on" the EEAS through significantly influencing the allocation of its budget.⁶⁶

Outside the realm of finances, however, one might take the operational case of Geneva as an example, where the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has its headquarters. The facts are that consequent to the Treaty of Lisbon, two separate EU delegations, with roles, office space, but what is vital to note: with staff of different backgrounds have been created. (1) The Permanent Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations Office and to other international organisations in Geneva (EUDEL-UNOG) promotes internal and external coordination of EU Member States' foreign policy at diverse UN fora in Geneva covering a wide range of issues including human rights and humanitarian affairs; while (2) the Permanent Mission of the European Union to the World Trade Organisation (EUMIS-WTO) deals with international trade issues, which have long been in community competence. The latter realm of EU action had, before Lisbon, been dealt with by the Commission⁶⁷, but EUMIS-WTO is now an integral part of the EEAS. What has to be noted, however, and what indicates that the Commission still has considerable impact on trade matter is the fact that EUMIS-WTO is staffed primarily by former Commission officials, while EUDEL-UNOG reflects the general composition of the European External Action Service (EEAS).⁶⁸ This is arguably more than a human resources technicality, as it is indicative of the fact that expertise, as well as operative control remains with the Commission, albeit under the aegis of the new EU diplomatic service. This can be seen to be in strict accordance with the policy lines of Lisbon, or the

⁶⁶ <http://euobserver.com/18/115145> (accessed 13 May 2012).

⁶⁷ Attila Molnár, "The Political Economy of the European Union's WTO-membership," (term paper for the course "Political Economy I" at Central European University, Budapest, 2010/2011 fall term, professor: Anil Duman).

⁶⁸ Interview no. 2.

Europeanisation of foreign policy.

Bearing its history of coordination in this field in mind, and the fact that trade has been, since the 1970s, but arguably since the Single European Act (1986), a non-area for Member State intervention, it is unsurprising that at the WTO, besides speaking with a unified voice through EUMIS-WTO, the strong rule is no Member State interventions at plenary debates.⁶⁹ However, the fact that some Member States, and notably the United Kingdom, arguably an odd-one-out from continental interests pertaining to trade issues, have retained the habit of intervening in debates⁷⁰: by no means to undermine the EU effort substantively, but to have their voice heard as separate cornerstones of international trade. A recent example includes an intervention of the representative of the United Kingdom, emphasising the country's contribution to the WTO's International Trade Centre.⁷¹ Such episodes can be seen as examples of countervailing forces to the integrative spirit of Lisbon, ultimately showing that Member State sovereignty should not be downplayed by the analyst, and its pooling cannot be taken for granted even in the most straightforward of policy domains.

What has to be seen as the bigger, and in a way, genuinely new trend with the Treaty in force, however, is strong pressures (both internal and external) to achieve a common position. However, if a Member State has a strong particular interest in a question that diverges from the EU consensus, such a Member State might be unwilling to give in, and may choose to pursue a separate path (for example, to maintain their individual high profile as a generous humanitarian donor).⁷²

Moving on to the European Council, which is now an officially named institution

⁶⁹ Interview no. 4.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Interview no. 4.

under the Treaty of Lisbon, and the reborn Foreign Affairs Council, one finds that these fora are now chaired by the President and High Representative, respectively, and this fact can considerably change the dynamics of their sessions, albeit as a natural function of the personalities of the actual chairs. What is more, to an arguably more significant degree than the introduction of qualified majority voting (QMV) in European Council sessions, a mechanism whose actual application seems somewhat problematic in the foreseeable future, and about which there is little knowledge accessible to the analyst because of the secrecy under which European Council sessions operate.

Finally, the role of the country holding the rotating Council Presidency, a post which before Lisbon was paramount to the EU's external image, is now also significantly reduced, although, as demonstrated in the following section, this in no way suggests that its actions are without relevance to the perception of the EU in the international community. Once again, the degree to which this is the case can be argued to depend on the actual Member State holding the post, its diplomatic and political elite, and the Presidency programmes, now designed by three sequential Presidencies (trios) for a period of one and a half years.

The remaining part of this chapter is dedicated to an in-depth analysis of the roles of the Lisbon institutions, with the goal of identifying their relevance to the EU at the UN game in *Chapter 2*. At times, reference is made to inventions of the failed Constitutional Treaty, when considered relevant to the subject of analysis.

Building on the role played by former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, who had filled the post of High Representative from 1999, the Constitutional Treaty (2004) had included the establishment of the post of EU "foreign minister". However, due to the failure of the ratification process in France and the Netherlands, the Constitution never entered into force. Instead, it was replaced by the Reform Treaty, signed in Lisbon in 2007. Entering into

force on 1 December 2009, the Treaty, with the highest number of articles dealing with foreign policy, is much the same as the Constitutional Treaty was with regard to CFSP-reform. This is largely unsurprising in the light of the fact that it was not the foreign policy elements of the Constitutional Treaty that triggered most of the significant debates which emerged around the Treaty.⁷³ In fact, the changes the Treaty of Lisbon brought relative to the Constitutional Treaty were virtually limited to the renaming of positions with the air of statehood around them to those with connotations reminiscent of the names of high-ranking administrative posts of International Organisations.

Rethinking the name “foreign minister”, although probably not essential to the acceptance of the Treaty of Lisbon, is a meaningful symbolic indicator which cannot be overlooked by political scientists. It signals that the EU is not a state, nor does it look out to become one based on its Constitution, the Treaties and EU law. Instead, the international “actorness” of the EU can be construed as a unique and complicated reality which can be approached from diverse points of view. Ginsberg gives a concise summary of such possible efforts when he describes the EU’s foreign policy activities as an interplay between “integrationist” and “intergovernmentalist” forces.⁷⁴ When it comes to international trade negotiations, the former approach is apparently dominant. In the WTO, as I have argued elsewhere, even though all of its Member States are original members, the EU assumes a unified stance, building on its first-mover advantage and experience in trade liberalisation issues, as well as in order to protect its already well-established common *acquis* when it comes to protectionist measures (e. g. in the case of agriculture).⁷⁵ However, in the CFSP realm,

⁷³ Graham Avery, “Towards a European Foreign Service,” 74-75.

⁷⁴ Roy H. Ginsberg, “The EU’s CFSP: the Politics of Procedure,” in *Common Foreign and Security Policy – The Record and Reforms*, ed. Martin Holland (London: Pinter, 1997), 15.

⁷⁵ Attila Molnár, “The Political Economy of the European Union’s WTO-membership”.

where state-like actorness has obstinately been the name of the game, the EU's intergovernmental facet is pushed to the foreground. Not least because in the genuinely state-centric environment of multilateral diplomacy, non-state actors are faced with a number of preconceptions, as well as procedural obstacles (see *Chapter 3*). This is the very issue that lies at the root of the European voice dilemma: Europe can only be a global actor if she stands united, since atomised interests asserted individually by any of its (medium-power) Member States will increasingly be doomed to failure in the emerging new, multipolar world order.

Before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, the Heads of State and Government had agreed that the newly-established post of High Representative would be filled by Lady Catherine Ashton, former Trade Commissioner, British labour politician and life peer. Her appointment, as almost every political appointment in the EU, reflects at least two different compromises which had to be made. The first was between the two major political factions of Europe and the second between those in favour of the idea of a strong foreign policy chief and those supporting a weak one. The first compromise seems evident: Lady Ashton is from the British Labour Party. As for the second aspect, some argue that Ashton, inexperienced in foreign policy as she was, was a weak High Representative to elect.⁷⁶

After being nominated by the European Council through qualified majority voting, and agreed on by the President of the Commission, the High Representative, together with the other Commissioners, is put to vote in the European Parliament (EP).⁷⁷ The EP does not vote on the Commissioners one-by-one, but as a body. The MEPs' time to signal discontent is at an

⁷⁶ Zoltán Gálík, “‘A következő felszólaló: az Európai Unió’ A közös európai külpolitika első valódi lépései: felszólalási jog az ENSZ-ben, nagyköveti kinevezések és új stratégiai partnerek” [‘Next speaker: the European Union’ The First Real Steps of the Common European Foreign Policy: Right to Speak in the UN, the Assignment of Ambassadors and New Strategic Partners], Brief analyses, Hungarian Institute for International Affairs, <http://www.hiia.hu/index.php?menu=26&gyors=2051>.

⁷⁷ General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, “The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / The European External Action Service,” Press Releases, Council of the European Union, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/111301.pdf.

earlier stage: the individual hearings of the proposed members of the Commission.⁷⁸ It is worth noting that this (indirect) channel of EP influence on foreign policy is not the only one contained in the Treaty of Lisbon. According to the Treaty, the EP's consent is also necessary for the Union to enter into certain types of international treaties. Under the Treaty, this power does not extend to issues covered by the CFSP. However, the increased contestation of issues in the EP, as well as its increased willingness to act, rhetorically making use of being the only popularly-elected EU institution, and to exercise democratic control over other institutions shows that the EP has a penchant for filling its roles with content rather than shying away from doing so. Vivid examples are when MEPs twice (in 2004 and 2009) made their voice heard in the prospective composition of the college of commissioners.⁷⁹ Nász specifically points to the deputies' growing activity as a signal of the EP's intent to broaden its licences in participation in international conferences and in the drafting of international treaties.⁸⁰

The role of the rotating Presidency of the Council has to be examined together with the newly-established post of President of the European Council. This coupling is necessary because, under the Treaty of Lisbon, the post of President of the European Council, filled by Belgian Christian democratic politician and former Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy for the first and second two-and-a-half-year terms, inherits a number of responsibilities formerly belonging to the rotating Council Presidency. According to Article 15, paragraph 6 of the Treaty,

[t]he President of the European Council:

- (a) shall chair [...] and drive forward [...] [the] work [of the European Council];
- (b) shall ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the

⁷⁸ see the EP hearing and consequent step-down of the original Bulgarian candidate, Rumiana Jeleva in January 2010.

⁷⁹ I am very thankful to Professor Anton Pelinka of Central European University for proposing this argument.

⁸⁰ Adrienn Nász, "Az Európai Parlament Lisszabon után" [The European Parliament after Lisbon], *Európai Tükör* XV/6 (June 2010): 23.

General Affairs Council;

(c) shall endeavour to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council;

(d) shall present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the European Council.

The President of the European Council shall, at his level and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.⁸¹

The Treaty is clear that the President of the European Council is not intended as competition for the High Representative when it comes to being the EU's foreign face, however, chairing the meetings of the European Council, the highest political body of the Union, the President has as much influence as any Chair at any multilateral negotiation at the Heads of Government level. As to the choice of personality, it should be noted that the President, as opposed to the High Representative, was elected (by the European Council) from the political sphere of Belgium, traditionally considered largely more *européer* than Britain, from the *right wing* of the European political spectrum. Furthermore, his public appearances have not apparently revealed exceptional temperament or charisma. In the first two respects, Van Rompuy might be seen as a political antithesis to Ashton, which, again, hints on at least two compromises: between integrationism and intergovernmentalism, as well as the European left and right. As for the second dimension (weak versus strong), Van Rompuy, as opposed to the previous candidate, Tony Blair, but similarly to Ashton, can also be understood as less of a political driving force than as a technocratic moderator. In the eye of the European public, he is not perceived as a President who would be overly willing to step out of his role, or who would necessarily embody the unity of Europe.⁸² It should be noted, however, that this was neither the intent described in the Treaty of Lisbon in the first place, and, secondly, nor is

⁸¹ European Union, "Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union," *Official Journal of the European Union* C 83 (2010).

⁸² for a collection of views, see, for example, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8369681.stm> (accessed 2 April 2011)

it the intent of this study to propose speculations about Van Rompuy's role in the long term. The only point of making mention of the above peculiarities was to emphasise that a similar logic and set of compromises have been at work in the selection process of both of the top positions of Lisbon.

On less of a speculative, and more of a factual note, it is necessary to discuss the role of the rotating Council Presidency, which, similarly to the Commission, can appear to have suffered a decline in influence (1) through the appointment of the permanent President of the European Council and (2) because of the establishment of the Council Presidency trios, which supersede single half-year presidencies. Although several post-Lisbon Council Presidencies, including the first one, that of Spain, have sought an increased role, the rotating presidency can be described as suffering a loss of role⁸³. However, to illustrate a potential for the contrary, an episode of public controversy can be called into memory, which happened in Hungary, while the country was holding the Council Presidency in the first half of 2011.

In late 2010, shortly before Hungary succeeded Belgium in the chair of the Council Presidency, the Hungarian Parliament, in which, owing to the elections of April 2010, the governing conservative alliance of Fidesz-KDNP commanded a two-thirds majority, passed a new media law. The justification behind the new law was, argues Gábor Takács of *Nézőpont Intézet*, a government-friendly Hungarian think tank, that “[t]he Orbán Cabinet inherited a media regulation which was entirely outdated. For example, neither the current press act dating from 1986 nor the media act adopted in 1996 regulate [sic!] online media”⁸⁴. The analysis of this statement would require a thesis of its own, as would the domestic and international controversy that emerged in the wake of Hungary's new media legislation, but

⁸³ Richard Whitman, “Promised you a miracle?”.

⁸⁴ Gábor Takács, “An Up-to-Date Legal Framework for Media,” *Nézőpont Intézet* (13 December 2010) <http://nezopontintezet.hu/en/hungarian-political-summary/an-up-to-date-legal-framework-for-media/> (accessed on 30 March 2011).

the purpose of mentioning the story here is different: to illustrate a possibly significant impact of the Council Presidency on Europe's "voice", well after the Treaty of Lisbon.

A single piece of information necessary to be borne in mind about the new Hungarian media law was that it established an authority for overseeing virtually all Hungarian media, as well as those service-providers broadcasting from abroad who do so with the aim of circumventing Hungarian legislation.⁸⁵ The controversy mainly emanated from (1) the fact that the members of the overseeing authority are unilaterally appointed by the prime minister (chairperson) and the governing party (four additional members), and (2) that many clauses of the media law are "rubber band clauses", and especially the clause which "forbids for any media to openly or surreptitiously insulting [sic!] [added by the author] inter alia nations, national, ethnic, linguistic and other minorities and any majority (sic!) [in the original quote] or churches"⁸⁶ and the one stating that "journalists are allowed to protect their sources only when the information to be published is 'in the public interest'. This kind of protection, where an authority decides on whether the publication is 'in the public interest', rests on no legal right."⁸⁷ Concerns with the former clause are about the freedom of expression, the ones with the latter pertain to the rule of law, as well as the freedom of expression. Finally, both points give way to worries about censorship and self-censorship.

The point in the evaluation above was to demonstrate that events in the country holding the Council Presidency that are followed by the careful attention of the international public, ultimately become wider European issues that affect the image and credibility of

⁸⁵ The latter would, again, require a separate, international commercial law analysis to ascertain how this is even possible, but, again, this does not strictly belong to the point made here.

⁸⁶ Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (TASZ), "Concerns About Media Legislation in Hungary (part I)," (3 January 2011) <http://tasz.hu/en/szolasszabadsag/concerns-about-media-legislation-hungary-part-i> (accessed 30 March 2011).

⁸⁷ TASZ, "Concerns About Media Legislation in Hungary."

Europe as an international actor. The concern is eloquently voiced by former liberal Hungarian MP Mátyás Eörsi, in the prelude to the Summit for the Eastern Partners, held by Hungary in the spring of 2010:

How will it be possible to tell Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich that changing the election law weeks before polling is not democratic, especially when it only favors the party in power? How will it be possible to explain to Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenko what freedom of the media means? These questions could become more than a distraction for the EU, which, as Hungarians were told at our accession, is based on the values of democracy.⁸⁸

Clearly, the Council Presidency, partly because the role it has traditionally played in EU foreign policy, partly because it is a direct channel of the will of particular Member States, still has the potential of being an important outlet of European voice, whether intentionally or not. As such, it necessarily retains a role going beyond a symbolic one in the EU's external relations. Again, however, the significance of one actor (the Council Presidency) is not to be used to downplay that of another. The Commission, which has assumed assertive roles also in the case described above, finally pressuring the Hungarian Government to amend its media legislation on a number of controversial points, again played a role in the EU's foreign image. A rather indirect one, however: by exerting pressure and control on the EU Member State holding the Presidency of the Council. It is worth noting that only a few months later, however, when Hungary no longer held this post, the media law issue also became less salient, and hardly any international media attention was given to its implementation and follow-up.

Having identified the relevant actors and historical dynamics, this concludes the second chapter of the thesis. Observing the actors identified, *Chapter 3* describes the structures of EU-UN interaction, with a view to analytically approaching channels of EU influence.

⁸⁸ Mátyás Eörsi, "Hungarian Media Law: Tip of the Iceberg?," *Central Europe Digest* (7 January 2011) http://www.cepa.org/ced/view.aspx?record_id=281 (accessed 30 March 2011).

CHAPTER 3: THE EU AT THE UN

Speaking with one voice in the United Nations (UN) tells much about the stage of foreign policy integration⁸⁹, and, with the Lisbon Treaty, “the foreign policy treaty of the EU”⁹⁰ in force, the topic is as relevant today as ever before.

3.1 EU Foreign Policy and Global Multilateralism

In the fields of European Studies, International Relations (IR), and to a lesser extent, Comparative Politics, there is extensive literature studying European foreign policy, from its roots in the European Political Cooperation, through its institutionalisation as Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Treaty of Maastricht, and its significant reform in the Treaty of Lisbon. This section draws from classic, and to a greater extent, more recent general literature on CFSP,⁹¹ while carefully taking into account studies completed since the

⁸⁹ Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith, “Introduction – The European Union at the United Nations: Leader, Partner or Failure?” in *The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms*, ed. Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 3.

⁹⁰ Richard Whitman, “Promised You a Miracle? The EU’s global role in the afterglow of Lisbon,” (lecture at the Center for European Union Research Launch Conference, Central European University, Budapest, 2 December 2010).

⁹¹ “Classical” general works relied on include David Long, “Multilateralism in the CFSP,” in *Common Foreign and Security Policy – The Record and Reforms*, ed. Martin Holland (London: Pinter, 1997), 184-199; Roy H. Ginsberg, “The EU’s CFSP: the Politics of Procedure,” in *Common Foreign and Security Policy – The Record and Reforms*, ed. Martin Holland (London: Pinter, 1997), 12-33; Péter Balázs, “Az Európai Unió nemzetközi kapcsolatai” [The Foreign Relations of the European Union], in *Európai Közjog és Politika [European Public Law and Policy]*, ed. Tamás Kende and Tamás Szűcs (Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 2002), 781-810; with some of the more recent works being Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, “The Big Member States’ Influence on the Shaping of the European Union’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy,” in *The Future of the European Foreign, Security and Defence Policy After Enlargement*, ed. Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006), 25-53; Gerhard Hafner, “The CFSP in the Light of the Newest Enlargement,” in *The Future of the European Foreign, Security and Defence Policy After Enlargement*, ed. Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006), 9-23; European Policy Centre, “The EU Foreign Service: How to Build a More Effective Common Policy,” *EPC Working Paper No. 28* (Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2007), [http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/555858396_EPC Working Paper 28 The EU Foreign Service.pdf](http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/555858396_EPC%20Working%20Paper%2028%20The%20EU%20Foreign%20Service.pdf) (accessed 5 December 2010); Marise Cremona, “Defining Competence in EU External Relations: Lessons from the Treaty Reform Process,” in *Law and Practice of EU External Relations: Salient Features of a Changing Landscape*, ed. Alan

entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty.

Carta's recent book⁹² on the EU's "diplomatic service" provides the most comprehensive contemporary conceptual account of EU diplomacy. Surveying primarily the Commission as the most important pre-Lisbon actor in EU-level diplomacy, the volume approaches questions of European identity-building in international relations. After putting forward several assumptions about the European External Actions Service (EEAS), however, Carta ultimately concludes that its "narrative has not yet been written".⁹³ In other words, that it is too early to meaningfully conceptualise this new institution. But should such a conceptualisation be halted completely until another institution finally takes over the EEAS's place? The author of this thesis believes that the answer is in the negative, and the present study scrutinises the working of the EEAS in what is not merely a foreign policy realm, but a genuinely "diplomatic" one at that, the United Nations.

Two recent large-scale works on the EU's global role include that of Hill and Smith⁹⁴, dealing with fundamental conceptual and theoretical questions, as well as specific areas, policy arenas and partners, and that of Koutrakos and his contributors⁹⁵, providing accounts of EU foreign policy from both legal and Political Science perspectives.

An also very recent work of the Centre for European Policy Studies⁹⁶ maps the post-

Dashwood and Marc Maresceau (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 34-69; Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

⁹² Caterina Carta, *The European Union Diplomatic Service: Ideas, Preferences and Identities* (London: Routledge, 2011).

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 167.

⁹⁴ Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, eds. *International Relations and the European Union* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

⁹⁵ Panos Koutrakos, ed. *European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives* (Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011)

⁹⁶ Michael Emerson, Rosa Balfour, Tim Corthaut, Jan Wouters, Piotr Maciej Kaczynski and Thomas Renard, *Upgrading the EU's Role as Global Actor: Institutions, Law and the Restructuring of European Diplomacy* (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2011).

Lisbon institutional structure of EU foreign policy and possible points of departure for further in-depth research and case studies.

Within the EU foreign policy literature, a relatively small and new part⁹⁷ deals with strategic interactions in multilateral fora, such as the UN Security Council⁹⁸, the WTO⁹⁹, or the G20 and IMF, where, as Hodson demonstrates while highlighting the key role of national actors, the financial crisis has brought concert in the EU's macroeconomic policy.¹⁰⁰ In his comprehensive book, Rasch provides a survey of the actors and processes of the pre-Lisbon picture of EU foreign-policy-making, and also provides a quantitative analysis of EU voting behaviour in the UN General Assembly (UNGA).¹⁰¹ Smith's influential volume introduces, among other domains, the guiding principles, concepts and practices of the EU's human rights policy.¹⁰²

As for post-Lisbon accounts of the EU and multilateralism, Wessel launches an enquiry into the EU's new division of competences in concluding international agreements¹⁰³, while Gömbös surveys the realities of EU-UN cooperation (basically, EU funding) in various

⁹⁷ Panos Koutrakos, ed., *European Foreign Policy*, 284.

⁹⁸ Christopher Hill, "The European Powers in the Security Council: Differing Interests, Differing Arenas," in *The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms*, ed. Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 49-69.

⁹⁹ Jan Orbie, "The European Union' Role in World Trade: Harnessing Globalisation?" in *Europe's Global Role: External Policies of the European Union*, ed. Jan Orbie (Farnham: Ashgate, 2008), 35-66.

¹⁰⁰ Dermot Hodson, *Governing the Euro Area in Good Times and Bad* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 95-113.

¹⁰¹ Maximilian B. Rasch, *The European Union at the United Nations: the Functioning and Coherence of EU External Representation in a State-centric Environment* (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008).

¹⁰² Karen E. Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Cambridge, U.K. and Malden, MA, Polity: 2008), 111-141.

¹⁰³ Ramses A. Wessel, "The EU as a Party to International Agreements: Shared Competences, Mixed Responsibilities," in *Law and Practice of EU External Relations: Salient Features of a Changing Landscape*, ed. Alan Dashwood and Marc Maresceau (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 152-187.

areas¹⁰⁴. Smith analyses the cohesion and effectiveness of EU action on human rights at the UN¹⁰⁵, and Gowan and Brantner's annual reviews of "The EU and Human Rights at the UN" focus on the most important highlights of each year's debates, as well as voting cohesion in the Human Rights Council (UNHRC)¹⁰⁶. Using varied tools, all of these studies contribute to the conceptualisation of the EU as an actor in global multilateralism, ascertaining to what degree it speaks with one voice, and with what kind of implications. Koutrakos and his contributors find that a single voice works well in some UN system fora, and not so well in others.¹⁰⁷

For the purposes of this study, it is meaningful to make an admittedly simplified division of EU-UN relations. Firstly, there are issues on which the EU and the UN, basically two international organisations, cooperate. In this cooperation, what is meant by "the UN" is, in fact, the UN Secretariat, the body of bureaucrats responsible for the day-to-day running of the Organisation, but also, at the more senior-level positions, making a number of substantive decisions which affect the actual content of projects.

¹⁰⁴ Ervin Gömbös, "Az ENSZ és az Európai Unió együttműködése a lisszaboni szerződés tükrében" [Cooperation Between the UN and the European Union in the Light of the Lisbon Treaty], [http://www.menszt.hu/content/download/1285/5096/file/Az ENSZ és az EU.pdf](http://www.menszt.hu/content/download/1285/5096/file/Az_ENSZ_és_az_EU.pdf) (accessed 19 December 2011).

¹⁰⁵ Karen E. Smith, "The European Union, Human Rights and the United Nations", in *The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms*, ed. Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 154-174;

Karen E. Smith, "The European Union at the Human Rights Council: Speaking with one Voice but Having Little Influence," *Journal of European Public Policy* 17, no. 2 (2010): 224-241.

¹⁰⁶ Richard Gowan and Franziska Brantner, "The EU and Human Rights at the UN: 2009 Review," *Policy Briefs*, European Council on Foreign Relations, http://ecfr.eu/page//documents/ecfr_un_2009_annual_review.pdf (accessed 19 December 2011); Richard Gowan and Franziska Brantner. "The EU and Human Rights at the UN: 2010 Review," *Policy Briefs*, European Council on Foreign Relations, <http://ecfr.eu/page/-/documents/the-eu-and-human-rights-at-the-UN-2010-review.pdf>. (accessed 19 December 2011); Richard Gowan and Franziska Brantner. "The EU and Human Rights at the UN: 2011 Review," *Policy Briefs*, European Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR39_UN_UPDATE_2011_MEMO_AW.pdf (accessed 2 January 2012).

¹⁰⁷ Panos Koutrakos, ed., *European Foreign Policy*, 282-283.

3. 2. *The EU and the UN, or EU-UN Relations*

This section is about what can be referred to as EU-UN relations, or the EU *and* the UN. It is explained how this aspect of and approach to the topic is distinct from the aspect that is the focus of the remaining part of the thesis, the EU *at* the UN. It is demonstrated how this relationship, which basically manifests in a series of cooperative ventures between two international organisations, is of primarily administrative nature, albeit with some genuinely political aspects.

The philosophical underpinning of such cooperation is that the EU, as one of the most prosperous entities of the globe, and at the same time, also an international organisation, aids the UN in facing global challenges of the twenty-first century, such as development, climate change or humanitarian issues. These instances of cooperation have a clear-cut financial aspect, as the EU, which can be argued to have a rather limited budget itself, is considerably better financed than the UN in relative terms, which, in turn is at least in theory, better positioned to effectively tackle most global challenges where they arise. From a theoretical perspective, the relationship can be understood as a principal-agent one, or at a closer and more analytical look, an event of “orchestration”, depending on the actual scenario and field of cooperation discussed.¹⁰⁸

The EU’s external policies towards the UN were first articulated and elaborated in detail in 2001, in a Communication from the Commission to the Council to the European Parliament¹⁰⁹, which was further built on in another Communication¹¹⁰ two years later.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ For an elaboration of the concept, see Kenneth Abbot, Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal and Bernhard Zangl, “International Organizations as Orchestrators”, paper presented by Philipp Genschel on 28 November 2012 at the Center for European Union Research, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, available online at http://ceur.ceu.hu/sites/default/files/field_attachment/event/node-25616/agsz-orchestraton-draft-for-munich-conference-2011-09-28.pdf (accessed 22 March 2012).

¹⁰⁹ *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Building an Effective Partnership with the United Nations in the fields of Development and Humanitarian Affairs (COM(2001)231)*,

While in line with the EU's status and identity as a donor, the first Communication focused on development and humanitarian affairs, which could be referred to as "mainstream" North-South aid policies, the second Communication contained a more genuinely foreign policy approach, and bore numerous characteristics of foreign policy strategies, with an entire chapter dedicated to "[p]romoting the EU's values and interests effectively in the UN system",¹¹² and already taking into account the prospective provisions of the Constitutional Treaty¹¹³. As with all not-for-profit activities in the international domain, perhaps the most crucial question is funding, whose most important lines in the case of EU-UN "programmatic partnership" (cooperation mainly in the design and implementation projects, programmes or operations), are laid down in the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA).¹¹⁴

Gömbös goes as far as to assert that the EU, due its economic power, and to the under-financed situation of the UN, is capable of wielding the upper hand in disagreements concerning the implementation of programmes.¹¹⁵ However, a diplomat interviewee asked by the author of this thesis was rather of the opinion that the EU's bargaining position was relatively weak in most of the important domains and issues, and that the Security Council was perhaps the only forum where the West could be perceived to have a strong position in relative terms, asserting that although the P5 was a considerably closed club, there was still room for

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2001:0231:FIN:EN:PDF> (accessed 3 February 2012).

¹¹⁰ *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism (COM/2003/0526)*, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0526:FIN:EN:PDF> (accessed 3 February 2012).

¹¹¹ Ervin Gömbös, "Cooperation Between the UN and the European Union", 15 (endnote 1).

¹¹² *The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism*, 16.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 18.

¹¹⁴ Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/partners/humanitarian_aid/fafa/agreement_en.pdf (accessed 2 February 2012).

¹¹⁵ Ervin Gömbös, "Cooperation Between the UN and the European Union", 14.

widening it, whereas in other fora, such as the UNHRC, a more probable prospect was the loss of power.¹¹⁶

It is now important to turn to the specific actors involved on both the side of the UN and that of the EU. The UN Secretary General (SG), as head of the Secretariat, the largest international civil service in the world, is an influential actor in global diplomacy, as well as with regard to the main lines of international public policy.¹¹⁷ Still, the SG's role is a genuinely political one, and, as far as it is known and can be speculated, he (until today, there has not been a female SG) does not immerse in the day-to-day dealings of EU-UN relations that are the focus of this chapter, and, ultimately, the thesis. Even the above quoted cornerstone of the relationship, the FAFA is signed from the UN's side by Louise Fréchette, then Deputy Secretary General (DSG). The DSG is the direct deputy of the SG, and consequently, the second highest "administrative" position in the UN. Likewise, the EU signatory of the Agreement is Poul Nielson, then Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, on behalf of the Commission, representing the European Community. Nielson, a member of the Prodi Commission, is also to be seen as a certain version of a "second administrative chief", with President Prodi being the first. Both the DSG and the Commissioner posts are very high positions, but not the highest, which signals that the EU-UN agreement is not positioned on the highest level politically, and is to be implemented by the genuinely civil service core of those working in the respective administrative bodies.

Within the UN Secretariat, the Department of Political Affairs, unsurprisingly, has a traditionally strong record of not shying away from choices that can be seen to be part of the political and the global, but other Departments and Offices of the Secretariat also bear the

¹¹⁶ Interview no. 1.

¹¹⁷ Adam LeBor, *"Complicity with Evil": the United Nations in the Age of Modern Genocide* (New Haven: Yale University Press, c2006), 7.

characteristics of a decision maker in the implementation of programmes.¹¹⁸

Without the possibility of exploring the question further, it is noted that the staff of the UN Secretariat and the European Commission are civil servant bodies that are socialised similarly on many dimensions, but conversely on several others. Just to make a fundamental, if simplistic observation: European bureaucrats can be said to have a tendency to become detached from their countries of origin, owing not to an insignificant degree to the fact that their recruitment is in no meaningful way attached to their countries of citizenship, other than the minimal requirement that they be citizens of a Member State. On the other hand, UN staff, who are carefully selected to represent the composition and proportions of the UN's contributor countries, carry with them their national labels, and the requirements of neutrality and impartiality towards them are to be seen as cosmopolitan ideals rather than descriptions of reality, whilst in the EU case, they have a stronger basis for justification. To explore the relationship of two civil servant bodies that are so different in logic (with special regard to the cases when there are overlapping identities dealing with each other, for example a German UN staff member and a German EU administrator) is a fascinating topic for the future, which lies at the intersection of International Relations and Social Anthropology. With the intention of briefly returning to it later within the present subchapter, this issue is set aside temporarily.

The pre-eminence of the Commission in EU-UN relations can be seen to be in coherence with the fact that, under the Nice Treaty, the Commission is entrusted with “ensur[ing] the maintenance of all appropriate relations with the organs of the United Nations and of its specialised agencies”¹¹⁹. At the time of the Nice Treaty, there was no High Representative as there has been since the Treaty of Lisbon, and no at least relatively

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ *Treaty Establishing the European Community*, Article 302.

diplomatic service-like EEAS, with the EU delegations being fully operated under the auspices of the Commission. In the Treaty of Lisbon, however, the provision on the Commission is removed, the relevant clause reading as follows: “The Union shall establish all appropriate forms of cooperation with the organs of the United Nations and its specialised agencies”¹²⁰. Less hence becomes more (or at least has the potential to), as the possible surfaces (and, consequently, fields) of EU-UN interaction are considerably broadened. Besides humanitarian issues and development, there are other areas where there has been significant cooperation between the EU and the UN, much like other regional organisations. These areas include peacekeeping (e. g. the European Union Force – EUFOR, or the UN Mission in Chad), good governance and electoral assistance (programmatic cooperation between the Commission and the United Nations Development Programme – UNDP), dealing with emergencies (cooperation on civil-military coordination between the Commission and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – OCHA), fighting international organised crime or strengthening democracy.¹²¹

Ultimately, it ought to be borne in mind that, among all the EU actors, old and new, it is arguably the Commission which possesses the largest amount of expertise in dealing with the UN, albeit not in traditional diplomatic or foreign policy matters. The European Communities (represented by the Commission) has been a permanent observer in the UN since 1974, is a party to some fifty UN treaties, has full membership in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and has maintained delegations in all of the UN Headquarters and some of the other major duty stations around the world.¹²²

In conclusion, it can be argued that EU-UN relations, with the FAFA notably at its

¹²⁰ *Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*, Article 220.

¹²¹ Ervin Gömbös, “Cooperation Between the UN and the European Union”, 2-8.

¹²² Ervin Gömbös, “Cooperation Between the UN and the European Union”, 2.

core have, until the present, entailed cooperative ventures primarily between the administrative staffs of two international civil services (i. e. the UN Secretariat and the European Commission). How the EU, as the UN's largest contributor, can influence the UN, and indirectly, pursue a global role through this technically symmetrical, financially asymmetrical channel of interchange, is a fascinating question which should be explored within the context of International Political Economy, with a view to furthering the conceptualisation of the EU's global role in the twenty-first century, similarly to the goals set by this study. The purpose of highlighting this at this point was to tell apart EU-UN relations from the EU action *at* the UN, which is the main object of the remaining part of the thesis, and is introduced in the following section. It is noted that this telling apart primarily serves analytical reasons, and as most social scientific ventures, it is not utterly and completely clear-cut. Furthermore, that there are clearly a number of areas that can be argued to be cases of the EU *and* the UN, as well as the EU *at* the UN.

While formal recognition of the EU's new capability to speak with one voice has only been pursued in the UNGA, EU Delegations have been exercising considerable effort to establish similar modalities in the subsidiary organs of the UNGA.¹²³ Such attempts manifest in EU Delegation staff and EU Presidency diplomacy approaching the Secretariats or Bureaus of respective UN bodies¹²⁴, in search of opportunities of placing the EU speaker on the speakers' list, in a position proportionate to that of EU Member States. This question becomes increasingly important at bodies with restricted membership¹²⁵ (such as the Human Rights Council with 47 members, or the Economic and Social Council with 54) where the EU Delegation simply cannot take part in negotiations, and has to go through the country holding

¹²³ Interview no. 2.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

the Council Presidency, or, if the country is not on the forum either, another Member State.

Taking note of this insight, however, as has been argued in this section, the differentiation between “*and*” and “*at*” does make sense conceptually, as well as substantially, as it divides the field into two main subfields that are genuinely different in nature. Hence, while the actual modalities of the EU’s external representation in UN bodies other than the UNGA are substantially influenced by relations between international civil services, such relations, with the establishment of the EU diplomatic service transform a previously “*and*” relationship (a relationship between two bodies of international civil servants) into genuinely “*at*”. Moreover, since the analysis to be undertaken in *Chapter 4* of the present thesis can be argued to be a rather clear-cut case of the EU *at* the UN, no borderline cases that would damage the validity and application of such a conceptual distinction are addressed.

3. 3. *The EU at the UN*

Having delineated the meaning of the EU *and* the UN, the EU *at* the UN is now to be the focus of analysis. The preposition *at* used in a meaning rather close to that of *in*, suggests that the EU is somehow a subset of the UN. In fact, if one speaks about the EU *in* the UN, it is completely clear that one means EU (member state) presence in various UN fora. In many cases, and especially in the FAO or the WTO, where the EU is a genuine member, it would specifically refer to the action of the EU representatives either directly at the meetings of the given forum, or in a more general way. *At* might also have a more representational meaning, such as the presence of a given member state’s delegation *at* an international organisation. However, these two meanings are more easily discerned in theory than in practice, and linguists might argue that there are several more, closely related ones. Since the approach of the present thesis is primarily empirical, this is not a problem that presents itself as overly vexing. What is important to note here is the difference of the *at* relationship from the *and*,

and that what is referred to by the former is a more political, and at the same time more genuinely Political Science or International Relations aspect, entailing phenomena such as bargaining, negotiation, coordination, issue linkages, and last, and most importantly for the present study: voting.

The Treaty of Lisbon also introduces a number of innovations pertaining to this representational aspect of the question. The new Treaty states that “Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the Union’s positions in such forums. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall organise this coordination.”¹²⁶ Regarding the role of the EEAS, it is stipulated that “Union delegations in third countries and at international organisations shall represent the Union”¹²⁷, that is: in questions belonging to the Union’s competence. In organisations where the EU is participating as an observer or on similar grounds, it is represented by the EU Delegations.

Despite the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, there has been a relatively long transitional period until the EEAS could be considered to be set up in its entirety. Until then, the diplomatic staff of the rotating Council Presidency was still performing its traditional representational duties at the UN, a telling example being the fact that the EU representatives have acted merely as co-chairs at EU coordination meetings.¹²⁸ This was the case during the Hungarian Presidency during the first half of 2011, but has significantly changed since then, with the tendency being a slant towards a greater role for EU Delegations, with them becoming better-staffed and more experienced and up to tasks of coordination and liaison with third countries, who have, in turn, also become more accustomed to dealing with such an

¹²⁶ *Treaty on European Union*, Article 34.

¹²⁷ *Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*, Article 221.

¹²⁸ Interviews no. 1 and 3.

unusual quasi-diplomatic actor.¹²⁹

In the transitional period, coordination and representation have been pounded with a number of obstacles. While dealing with significant questions relating, for example, to Iran during 2011, staff to later become the EEAS were still sitting in different offices.¹³⁰ The implementation of the Treaty had to begin in such difficult logistic circumstances, in which the EEAS in-the-making had to rely extensively on Member States.¹³¹ This situation was further complicated by the significantly different experience, expertise and *esprit de corps* of the three sources of prospective EEAS staff: the Commission, the Council Secretariat and the foreign services of Member States. Considerable understaffing in the transitional period caused a number of problems, but also meant, as previously noted, that the EEAS in-the-making had to extensively rely on the Council Presidency in “integrated teams”, as well as, also with other Member States, within the well-established system of “burden-sharing” agreements (division of tasks based on mutual agreement and willingness, making use of the advantages of being able to pool expertise of the EU and its Member States).¹³²

Such arrangements were not running completely smoothly from the outset, with one diplomat describing the EEAS, and especially its staff with a career background in the Commission, as self-assertive, and as always referring to “Brussels” for advice, even though the Commission itself had no business in the dealings at hand.¹³³ Even today, the EEAS is relatively slow and cumbersome at performing the routine tasks of diplomatic missions, with a telling example being the fact that, in Geneva, the formulation and issue of a *démarche* (a

¹²⁹ Interview no. 3.

¹³⁰ Interview no. 2.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Interview no. 3.

¹³³ Ibid.

written formal articulation of a position), which is normally completed overnight by a regular diplomatic mission, takes an average of four days for the EEAS.¹³⁴

As to the practicalities of external representation that have eventually been designed, it should be noted that each UN body, agency and forum differs in its responsibilities, as well as rules of procedure, therefore the elaboration of separate agreements for each entity is vital¹³⁵, determining the answer to the *who coordinates*, and *who speaks for the EU when and where* questions on a case-by-case basis. Starting with the Swedish Presidency of 2009, comprehensive guidelines and general arrangements have been continually elaborated in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) in Brussels, to determine general modalities of the EU's external representation in international organisations.¹³⁶ Following from the provisions and spirit of Lisbon, these arrangements call for increased coordination among EU Member States, while bearing in mind the importance of consensus and attention to “sensitive areas”.¹³⁷ COREPER has also borne in mind that delegation of tasks and the change in modalities of coordination and representation cannot be used to reshape the system of competences as enunciated in the Treaties¹³⁸ – in other words, agency loss is given a red light, and Member State principals reserve the right to retain responsibilities they have not purposefully delegated in the Treaties. Accordingly, a single European voice can take three main forms, in accordance with the system of competences elaborated in the Treaty of Lisbon: (1) in areas of EU competence, statements are issued “on behalf of the European Union”; (2) in areas of shared competence, where the EU and its Member States reach a common position,

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Interviews no. 1 and no. 4.

¹³⁶ Interview no. 4.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

statements are issued “on behalf of the European Union and its Member States”; and (3) when Member States agree to speak with one voice in areas belonging to their national competence, statements are issued “on behalf of the Member States”.¹³⁹ Such arrangements are still under implementation at the time of submission of the present thesis, with a report to be made on their implementation during 2012, with a view to possible revisions by COREPER.¹⁴⁰ However, the practical and conceptual implications of the path mapped out by these arrangements, in line with ambitions of the Treaty of Lisbon as a “foreign policy treaty”, cannot be overlooked. The envisioned way ahead seems to be speaking with one voice in multilateral organisations, traditionally ruled by states and states only, with the EU and its member states to work out the exact legal possibilities of doing so.

In the following, I present an overview of local practical measures undertaken to this end, as discovered during my interviews, for the international organisations in Vienna and Geneva. I have discovered that, at the UN entities in Vienna, the EU Delegation has either inherited the status of the former European Communities in each of the organisations, and therefore, after the EEAS has become fully functional, it speaks on behalf of the Union, as previously the rotating Council Presidency did. However, further achievements are seen as necessary in order to properly implement the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, including: the right to put forward motions and raise points similarly to Member States, propose amendments, present documents and co-sponsor resolutions, as well as tend to special seating arrangements and see to it that the EU does not fall back in subscribing to the speakers’ list.¹⁴¹ In order to achieve these goals, formal steps (e. g. changing rules of procedure), semi-formal steps (concluding agreements) and informal steps (gradually establishing practices and

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Interview no. 1.

customs) have been pursued.¹⁴² The goals set for this end are, in many ways, reminiscent of the language of the two draft resolutions introduced in the UNGA in 2010 and 2011¹⁴³. It can reasonably be expected that working papers and draft resolutions of a similar spirit will be introduced in all of the entities with rules of procedure independent of those of the UNGA in most UN headquarter locations, tailored to the specificities of each of the entities.

In Geneva, where I carried out research a year later, I was met with a picture showing significant signs of development, along the lines expected at Vienna towards integration. In bodies where the EU Delegation cannot technically assume the floor (such as bodies with limited membership, as referred to in the previous section), the EU would go through one of its Member States to address the meeting. Otherwise, it would have to take the floor among other observers, possibly at a time up to one or two days later.¹⁴⁴ In non-plenary sessions, however, such as *interactive dialogues* (e. g. discussions with a Special Rapporteur), the EU Delegation can obtain a position on the speakers' list as any Member State, as there is no difference between members and observers at such meetings.¹⁴⁵

Similarly to the way New York and measures elaborated for the UNGA can be regarded as the prototype for coordination and representation, in Geneva it is the Human Rights Council that entails the smoothest cooperation, as well as the most developed modalities of representation.¹⁴⁶ However, with an admirable record of coordination in the human rights realm already before Lisbon, the EU is still considerably far away from “effective multilateralism”; with its relative unity (“internal effectiveness”) coupled with impaired

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ See Introduction.

¹⁴⁴ Interview no. 2.

¹⁴⁵ Interviews no. 2 and 3.

¹⁴⁶ Interviews no. 2 and 4.

“external effectiveness”, i. e. an incapability to influence the agenda.¹⁴⁷ Reasons for this being the case are better left to be explored in a separate study, and it is not within the purpose of this thesis to articulate any speculations; it merely wishes to note that cooperation, while arguably being a necessary prerequisite of success, it is by far not a sufficient one. Especially notorious has been the Question of Palestine, which has caused significant splits in the EU vote¹⁴⁸ not only in Geneva, but throughout the UN System. To mention another case: on the question of convening a special session on peaceful protest, the EU was plagued with disunity, causing the failure of the entire idea.¹⁴⁹ Recent successes, however, are numerous, with the Union and Member States “running 25-30% of all resolutions and about 40-50% of country specific resolutions”¹⁵⁰. The case of Libya in 2011, which ultimately resulted in Security Council and UNGA resolutions, and in suspending Libya’s UN membership, had also originated in a special session of the UNHRC, initiated by the Hungarian Presidency¹⁵¹ and with EU-sponsorship.

Leaving this way open for further research, and returning to the main line of argumentation, relying extensively on Rasch¹⁵², updated in accordance with the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, and the findings of this study, the actors and processes of the *EU at the UN* game are summarised in *figure 2*.

¹⁴⁷ Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno, “Introduction – US Hegemony and International Organizations,” in *The United States and Multilateral Institutions*, ed. Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane and Michael Mastanduno (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 8, quoted in Karen E. Smith, “The European Union at the Human Rights Council,” 225;

¹⁴⁸ Interview no. 4.

¹⁴⁹ István Lakatos, “Statement at the Fourth Budapest Human Rights Forum, First Panel on the Activities and Representation of the European Union in the Field of Human Rights” (Budapest, 26 October 2011) [manuscript received from the presenter], 2.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 1.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 1-2.

¹⁵² Maximilian B. Rasch, *The European Union at the United Nations: the Functioning and Coherence of EU External Representation in a State-centric Environment* (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 34.




Figure 2. The Actors and Processes of the EU at the UN game. Updated version (based on author's own research) of Maximilian B. Rasch, *The European Union at the United Nations: the Functioning and Coherence of EU External Representation in a State-centric Environment* (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 34.

The most noteworthy changes relative to before Lisbon are the fact that the coordination and representational tasks of the Council Presidency have been gradually transferred to EEAS Delegations, which now also encompass the tasks (and partly personnel) of former Commission Delegations. Bearing this fundamental change in mind, it is to be noted in conclusion that Member States, who provide primary input for what is to become common foreign policy, are still the first-movers and primary decision makers in areas belonging to national competence, and also, to some extent, shared competence. Furthermore, that whenever they see going a separate path to be more conducive to their national interests, some

Member States (often the United Kingdom, France or Germany) decide to do so, and pre-empt a joint position, oftentimes exploiting the “EU” or “EU and its Member States” problem, on which guidelines and practices are far from being clear-cut.¹⁵³ In other cases, some Member States will intervene in spite of their being a joint position, and add or emphasise parts they see as more important. This can, sporadically, also be the case in areas of EU competence (such as the WTO case).

What this chapter ultimately concludes, however, is that the trend, as described by the three interviews conducted in 2012¹⁵⁴, that is, the ones with overview on a longer and more complete period of implementation, has been an increasingly “cooperative”¹⁵⁵ or “positive”¹⁵⁶ approach, and a more smoothly-running coordination process among Member States and EU actors, as well as an improving atmosphere for internal, as well as external collaboration. The overview has shown that pushing for an opportunity to speak with a single voice (where possible, sounded by the EEAS in the making) is inherent in the will of Member State missions at the UN organisations in Vienna and Geneva in a similar way to what was revealed at the UNGA debacle of September 2010, and its resolution in April 2011. This informs the hypothesis of this study, making it especially meaningful to test how this “macro-experiment” (the UNGA episode) has been completed and followed up. The final question this thesis asks, therefore, is the following: has such a trend manifested in voting on resolutions?

¹⁵³ Interview no. 3.

¹⁵⁴ Interviews no. 2, 3, and 4.

¹⁵⁵ Interview no. 2.

¹⁵⁶ Interview no. 4.

CHAPTER 4: VOTING IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Rather surprisingly, bearing in mind the cumbersomeness of setting up the proper institutional arrangements for various particular events of representation (as well as the EEAS generally), it might even be hypothesised that the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is a flagship forum of EU coordination, where the prerequisites to speak with one voice have been met in less than one and a half years (by April 2011, counting from December 2009). But this might be a misleading interpretation of events, as the conditions are, in fact, external (right to speak in the UNGA), and the question whether the High Representative and her staff fill it with meaning, and, most importantly, whether the Member States themselves are willing and able to make use of the opportunity and increase the harmony amongst themselves, is a most vexing puzzle which ultimately returns the present analysis to its point of departure. This is the puzzle to which the present chapter finally proposes to provide the answer.

Hence, what is analysed is the fundamental assumption that the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon, which has brought significant change to foreign policy coordination within the EU, as well as the structure of the EU's external representation, should have an impact on the occurrence and substance of a genuine European voice on the international stage. For this end, European voting cohesion in the most multilateral and most universal international forum, the UNGA is analysed pre- and post-Lisbon.

As noted in *Chapter 1*, pre-Lisbon accounts are numerous across policy domains and fora, with arguably the most comprehensive account being Part Two of a seminal book by Maximilian B. Rasch, *The European Union at the United Nations*¹⁵⁷. In this part of the book, Rasch analyses EC/EU group voting coherence from 1988 to 2005, a period covering several

¹⁵⁷ Maximilian B. Rasch, *The European Union at the United Nations*.

watersheds in diplomatic history, as well as two enlargements eventually transforming the EC 12 into EU 25. The present chapter adds the 2010-2012 period to this account, exploring any changes occurring since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. It has to be noted at the outset that voting coherence among European Member States has steadily if not stably increased throughout the period analysed by Rasch, with neither enlargements, nor other landmark phenomena turning the coherence trend into steadily negative. In fact, this trend only appears characterised by seasonal lows, due to particular events on which Europe persistently stands divided. The implication for the present analysis is that, should a continued growth be witnessed, this could not be attributed to the Lisbon Treaty as a sole explanatory variable. But is there such continued growth in the first place?

4.1. Voting Cohesion before Lisbon

This part of the study analyses the voting cohesion of the EU in the UNGA before and after Lisbon, and compares the latter to the former. While data from most of the pre-Lisbon period are gained from Rasch¹⁵⁸, the post-Lisbon data have been collected for the purpose of this study. While diverse methods, both more and less sophisticated, can and have been employed by various authors to analyse voting in the UN (“such as Gutman scaling, factor analysis, complete analysis, cluster-bloc analysis or the employment of indices”),¹⁵⁹ the purpose of this study is to analyse whether the Treaty of Lisbon has brought a significant step forward with regard to a single EU voice. Therefore, 100 percent cohesion is regarded as the

¹⁵⁸ Rasch uses a dataset by Eric Voeten (*Documenting Votes in the General Assembly v 1.0* [<http://home.gwu.edu/~voeten/UNVoting.html>]), based on Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo, *UN General Assembly Voting V3.0* for the 1988-1996 period; another one by Zachary Wynne and Eric Voeten (*Documenting Votes in the UN General Assembly v1.0* [<http://home.gwu.edu/~voeten/UNVoting.html>]) for 1997-2003; and data compiled by himself, extracted from the UN Bibliographic Information System (UNBISnet) for 2003-2005. See Maximilian B. Rasch, *The European Union at the United Nations*, 217.

¹⁵⁹ Maximilian B. Rasch, *The European Union at the United Nations*, 207, see also for references to specific authors and earlier works.

benchmark, and the degree to which cohesion falls short of this benchmark can per se be regarded as a meaningful indicator. Data from the pre-Lisbon period are shown in *table 1*.

Table 1. EC/EU Voting Cohesion before the Treaty of Lisbon

Session	Number of resolutions adopted	Number of recorded votes	Number of votes with EC/EU consensus	% of votes with EC/EU consensus (recorded votes)	% of votes with EC/EU consensus (all resolutions)
43 (1988-1989)	327	136	62	45.59	77.37
44 (1989-1990)	342	116	55	47.41	82.16
45 (1990-1991)	344	86	40	46.51	86.63
46 (1991-1992)	315	75	40	53.33	88.89
47 (1992-1993)	295	75	47	62.67	90.51
48 (1993-1994)	337	65	42	64.62	93.18
49 (1994-1995)	336	68	47	69.12	93.75
50 (1995-1996)	335	81	48	59.26	90.15
51 (1996-1997) ¹	320	76	61	80.26	95.31
52 (1997-1998)	298	69	56	81.16	95.64
53 (1998-1999)	303	61	52	85.25	97.03
54 (1999-2000)	341	68	53	77.94	95.60
55 (200-2001)	328	67	54	80.60	96.04
56 (2001-2002)	360	67	53	79.10	96.11
57 (2002-2003)	351	73	57	78.08	95.44
58 (2003-2004)	324	76	53	69.74	92.90
59 (2004-2005)	325	71	53	74.65	94.46
60 (2005-2006)*	257	73	56	76.71	93.39

¹ without Greece; * until 21 December 2005; Source: Maximilian B. Rasch, *The European Union at the United Nations: the Functioning and Coherence of EU External Representation in a State-centric Environment* (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 221 (with author's own formatting modifications).

While the percentage of EU consensus relative to all UNGA resolutions (last column) show remarkable stability around 95 percent from the mid-1990s onward, these figures, can be misleading because they artificially magnify the degree of EU consensus by including resolutions passed without a vote (i. e. with consensus), which constitute the vast majority of all resolutions passed in the UNGA.¹⁶⁰ Therefore, it is more meaningful and informative to examine the proportion of EU consensus and EU disagreement among only those resolutions on which a vote was taken in the first place (penultimate column). Using these ratios, trends can be observed in the period under analysis, as visualised in *figure 1*.

¹⁶⁰ Maximilian B. Rasch, *The European Union at the United Nations*, 211.




Figure 3. EC/EU Voting Cohesion before the Treaty of Lisbon

‘ without Greece; * until 21 December 2005; Source: Maximilian B. Rasch, *The European Union at the United Nations*, 221 (with author’s own formatting modifications).

The data reveal that, after a trend of increasing unity throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, voting cohesion became stable with the mid-1990s, the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty (1992/1993) and its CFSP. The outstanding low of the 50th session (1995-1996) is in no small part due to exceptionally low coherence (slightly above 10 percent) on the otherwise most dividing issue, decolonisation and self-determination, on which the United Kingdom and France have tended to vote against the EU consensus.¹⁶¹ The following section analyses if this seemingly stabilised cohesion of around 70 to 80 percent has changed for the post-Lisbon period.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 226, 247.

4.2. Voting Cohesion after Lisbon

Voting cohesion in the post-Lisbon period is addressed looking at the 65th and 66th sessions of the UNGA. This restrictive approach is in coherence with the goals set by the present thesis, and serves well the comparison of these post-Lisbon data with longer-term pre-Lisbon trends. For any further studies aiming at analysing an uninterrupted time series, data for the period between 2006 and 2008 have been recorded by Voeten and Merdzanovic,¹⁶² and can easily be extracted to place a closer focus on this period. Data from 2008 through 2010 can then be extracted from the UN Bibliographic Information System (UNBISnet) similarly to how Rasch did for years preceding Lisbon, or the author of this study for the 2010-2012 period.

All in all, the present thesis focuses on longer trends in general, and the possible impact of Lisbon in particular, and its limitations necessitate a restrictive look only at data strictly after Lisbon. While the well-known UNGA resolution asking for an EU voice in the Assembly (see *Introduction*) was being prepared at the very end of the 64th session, its impact, backed with a partly, then, for the 66th session, almost fully operational EEAS and the efforts of the High Representative, can only be expected to present itself in these two more recent sessions. *Table 2* contains voting cohesion figures collected and recorded for these two sessions.¹⁶³

¹⁶² Erik Voeten and Adis Merdzanovic, “United Nations General Assembly Voting Data”, <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/12379> UNF:3:Hpf6qOkDdzzvXF9m66yLTg== V1 [Version] undata1_63descriptions.tab [fileDscr/fileName (DDI)] UNF:3:43gpFmtbWjyad2qox2VjbQ== (accessed 1 May 2012).

¹⁶³ Upon request, I am willing to provide all of my data sets through correspondence.

Table 2. EU Voting Cohesion with the Implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon

Session	Number of resolutions adopted	Number of recorded votes on resolutions	Number of votes with EU consensus	% of votes with EU consensus (recorded votes)	% of votes with EU consensus (all resolutions)
65 (2010-2011)	321	73	51	69.86	93.15
66 (2011-2012)*	261	66	53	80.30	95.02

* until 13 May 2012; author's own collection based on UN Bibliographic Information System (UNBISnet) data, <http://unbisnet.un.org/> (accessed 13 May 2012).

Voting data from the two UNGA sessions directly after Lisbon reveal no visible improvement in cohesion among EU Member States' votes. The low percentage of consensus for the 65th session (69.86%), while not unprecedented in the years closely preceding Lisbon, is a figure typical of the early 1990s: under or directly after the birth of the CFSP. The figure for the 66th session (80.30%), on the other hand, fits well into the late-1990s/2000s trend, and is one of the higher figures for the period. The benchmark of 100% is not even approached, for which a closer look at the most dividing issues seems to provide the explanation.

In spite of the “positive”, “cooperative” and “smooth” nature of post-Lisbon EU coordination, some obstinate and rather ancient questions continue to divide the EU. Significant aspects of the question of Palestine, nuclear disarmament and self-determination typically leave some EU member states (close friends of Israel, nuclear powers or former colonial masters) at odds with the rest of Europe. While two-way splits are far more widespread than three-ways (i. e. cases with some EU Member States voting in favour, others against, and again others abstaining); the latter, as most obvious and most discouraging cases of EU disagreement, also continue to occur. While in the longer term the possibility that an emerging “de facto solidarity” could supersede such divisions among EU Member States cannot be excluded, the findings of the present analysis suggest that this is not a realistic possibility any time soon. While Lisbon has changed a great many things, this change is not reflected in how its Parties vote in the UNGA.

CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

The present thesis has pursued the goal of making an empirical contribution to the literature on common European foreign policy, and the question of European voice on the international stage. European voice has been defined as the degree to which the European Union, a closely integrated polity in several domains, and an entity dedicated to “effective multilateralism” while being multilateral in itself, is capable of acting as a unified actor on the international stage, with a view to coupling its economic weight with political leverage. Bearing this fundamental challenge in mind, the thesis has analysed to what degree the Lisbon Treaty has proven to be a meaningful step forward in the Union’s external representation, and how its provisions have been implemented in EU action at the United Nations during the first three years of the EU’s newly-appointed foreign policy chief, the High Representative (2009-2012).

Review of the literature has provided theoretical considerations for departing from the static view of diplomatic state-centrism, which, at the same time, served as a basis for the null-hypothesis of the study. Using a principal-agent approach to delegation, and applying the multi-level game metaphor to the *EU at the UN* game, it has been demonstrated that EU member states may well be motivated to coordinate their foreign policies and to delegate authority to EU-level actors for a number of reasons, setting the direction for the alternative hypothesis, and a departure from the state-centrist null point. An overview of the history of European foreign policy highlighted that (1) the ambition to speak with one voice has been on the table of European integration for more than forty years, and (2) foreign policy has still remained a predominantly intergovernmental domain. The major foreign policy lines of the two predominant EU-UN powers, the United Kingdom and France have been analysed, and the most important institutions created by the Lisbon Treaty have been enumerated and assessed

from a comparative perspective. *Chapter 4* has tested the fundamental assumption that the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon, which has brought significant change to foreign policy coordination within the EU, as well as the structure of the EU's external representation, should have an impact on the occurrence and substance of a single European voice on the international stage. To this end, European voting cohesion in the most multilateral and most universal international forum, the United Nations General Assembly has been analysed pre- and post-Lisbon. The thesis concludes that, in spite of considerations based on theoretical arguments and empirical insights collected during interviews with actors and observers, actual voting in the UNGA does not provide grounds for an overly hasty departure from diplomatic state-centrism.

While the present analysis has focused primarily on the post-Lisbon era and its comparison to the pre-Lisbon, further studies could explore possible future trajectories by “extrapolating” trends from the continuum of European foreign policy integration, pre- and post-Lisbon. To this end, after filling a remaining gap in existing research (2008-2010), a meta-analysis should rely on data by Voeten, based on Gartzke and Jo, (1988-1996); Wynne and Voeten (1997-2003); Rasch (2003-2005)¹⁶⁴, Voeten and Merdzanovic (2005-2008)¹⁶⁵, and the present study (2010-2012).

Further research should also explore in detail EU action at further UN fora after Lisbon. The Security Council, the organ bearing primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security should be approached from various conceptual and empirical angles. A different analysis could make an account of fora where the EU already speaks with one voice but fails to exert satisfactory influence, and compare it to cases where it can. The

¹⁶⁴ See footnote 156.

¹⁶⁵ Erik Voeten and Adis Merdzanovic. *United Nations General Assembly Voting Data*. <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/12379>, 2009 (accessed 18 December 2010).

main question such a study should ask is: with unity held constant, what are the factors that explain the EU's varying degree of success in influencing the multilateral agenda? Human rights, a question on which the EU most often stands united, but is frequently overwhelmed by opponents, could be a fruitful domain to analyse. It should be noted that, owing both to the limited membership of many UN bodies (such as the Security Council, or the Human Rights Council and the Economic and Social Council), and the special political implications of their subject matter, the methods and findings of the present research can not easily be re-applied in further enquiries. It can be speculated that analysis of voting behaviour in the same way as in the case of dealing with the UNGA would not yield meaningful results, and a different methodology, one capable of thoroughly mapping strategic interaction among a more limited number of Member States, should be applied.

APPENDIX – LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Table A.1. List of interviews

Interview number	Date(s)	Location	Interviewee
1	23 and 29 June 2011	Vienna	EU Member State Diplomat
2	8 May 2012	Geneva	EEAS Official
3	8 May 2012	Geneva	EU Member State Diplomat
4	9 May 2012	Geneva	EU Member State Diplomat

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Avery, Graham. "Towards a European Foreign Service: Conclusions and Recommendations." In *EPC Working Paper No. 28. The EU Foreign Service: How to Build a More Effective Common Policy*, 74-78. Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2007.
[http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/555858396_EPC Working Paper 28 The EU Foreign Service.pdf](http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/555858396_EPC%20Working%20Paper%20The%20EU%20Foreign%20Service.pdf) (accessed 6 March 2011).
- Balázs, Péter. "Az Európai Unió nemzetközi kapcsolatai" [The Foreign Relations of the European Union]. In *Európai Közjog és Politika [European Public Law and Policy]*, edited by Tamás Kende and Tamás Szűcs, 781-810. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 2002.
- Bickerton, Christopher J. "Functionality in EU Foreign Policy: Towards a New Research Agenda?" *European Integration* 32, no. 2 (2010): 213-227.
- Bretherton, Charlotte and John Vogler. *The European Union as a Global Actor*. London & New York, Routledge, 2004.
- Búrca, Gráinne de. "The Road Not Taken: The European Union as a Global Human Rights Actor." *The American Journal of International Law* 105, no. 4 (2011): 649-693.
- Carta, Caterina. *The European Union Diplomatic Service: Ideas, Preferences and Identities*. London: Routledge, 2011.
- Cram, Laura. "Integration Theory and the Study of the European Policy Process." In *European Union. Power and Policy-Making*, edited by Jeremy Richardson, 40-58. New York: Routledge, 1996.
- Cremona, Marise. "Defining Competence in EU External Relations: Lessons from the Treaty Reform Process." In *Law and Practice of EU External Relations: Salient Features of a Changing Landscape*, edited by Alan Dashwood and Marc Maresceau, 34-69. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Delreux, Tom and Bart Kerremans. "How Agents Weaken their Principals' Incentives to Control: The Case of EU Negotiators and EU Member States in Multilateral Negotiations." *European Integration* 32, no. 4 (2010): 357-374.
- Emerson, Michael and Jan Wouters. "The EU's Diplomatic Debacle at the UN – What else and What Next?" *CEPS Commentaries*. Centre for European Policy Studies, 2010.
<http://www.ceps.eu/book/eu's-diplomatic-debacle-un-what-else-and-what-next> (accessed 5 December 2011).
- Emerson, Michael, Rosa Balfour, Tim Corthaut, Jan Wouters, Piotr Maciej Kaczynski and Thomas Renard. *Upgrading the EU's Role as Global Actor: Institutions, Law and the Restructuring of European Diplomacy*. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2011.

- European Policy Centre. "The EU Foreign Service: How to Build a More Effective Common Policy." *EPC Working Paper No. 28*. Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2007. [http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/555858396_EPC Working Paper 28 The EU Foreign Service.pdf](http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/555858396_EPC%20Working%20Paper%20The%20EU%20Foreign%20Service.pdf). (accessed 5 December 2010).
- European Union. "Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union." *Official Journal of the European Union* C 83 (2010): 1-390.
- European Union. "Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community." *Official Journal of the European Communities* C 325 (2002): 33-184.
- European Union. *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*. Brussels, 2003. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> (accessed: 3 January 2012).
- Farrell, Mary. "EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations." In *The European Union at the United Nations : Intersecting Multilateralisms*, edited by Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith, 27-46. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. "The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / The European External Action Service." Press Releases. Council of the European Union. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/111301.pdf (accessed 5 January 2012).
- Ginsberg, Roy H. "The EU's CFSP: the Politics of Procedure." In *Common Foreign and Security Policy – The Record and Reforms*, edited by Martin Holland, 12-33. London: Pinter, 1997.
- Gömbös, Ervin. "Az ENSZ és az Európai Unió együttműködése a lisszaboni szerződés tükrében" [Cooperation Between the UN and the European Union in the Light of the Lisbon Treaty]. [http://www.menszt.hu/content/download/1285/5096/file/Az ENSZ és az EU.pdf](http://www.menszt.hu/content/download/1285/5096/file/Az%20ENSZ%20és%20az%20EU.pdf) (accessed 19 December 2011).
- Gowan, Richard and Franziska Brantner. "The EU and Human Rights at the UN: 2009 Review." *Policy Briefs*. European Council on Foreign Relations. http://ecfr.eu/page/-/documents/ecfr_un_2009_annual_review.pdf (accessed 19 December 2011).
- Gowan, Richard and Franziska Brantner. "The EU and Human Rights at the UN: 2010 Review." *Policy Briefs*. European Council on Foreign Relations. <http://ecfr.eu/page/-/documents/the-eu-and-human-rights-at-the-UN-2010-review.pdf>. (accessed 19 December 2011).
- Gowan, Richard and Franziska Brantner. "The EU and Human Rights at the UN: 2011 Review." *Policy Briefs*. European Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR39_UN_UPDATE_2011_MEMO_AW.pdf (accessed 2 January 2012).

- Gris, Emese. "Közös kül- és biztonságpolitika 2004-2009" [Common Foreign and Security Policy 2004-2009]. *Európai Tükör*, Special Edition (March 2009): 266-280.
- Groom, A. J. R. "Multilateralism as a Way of Life in Europe." In *Multilateralism Under Challenge? Power, International Order, and Structural Change*, edited by Edward Newman, Ramesh Thakur and John Tirman, 460-480. Tokyo, New York and Paris: United Nations University Press, 2006.
- Hafner, Gerhard. "The CFSP in the Light of the Newest Enlargement." In *The Future of the European Foreign, Security and Defence Policy After Enlargement*, edited by Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 9-23. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006.
- Hill, Christopher. "The Capability-expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role." *Journal Of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 3 (1993): 305-328.
- Hill, Christopher. "Closing the Capability-expectations gap". In *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP*, edited by John Peterson and Helene Sjursen, 18-38. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Hill, Christopher. "The European Powers in the Security Council: Differing Interests, Differing Arenas." In *The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms*, edited by Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith, 49-69. New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Hill, Christopher. "The Future of the European Union as a Global Actor." In *Managing a Multilevel Foreign Policy: the EU in International Affairs*, edited by Paolo Foradori, Paolo Rosa, and Riccardo Scartezzini, 3-21. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007.
- Hill, Christopher and Karen E. Smith, eds. *European Foreign Policy: Key Documents*. London: Routledge, 2000.
- Hill, Christopher and Michael Smith, eds. *International Relations and the European Union*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Hodson, Dermot. *Governing the Euro Area in Good Times and Bad*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks and Kermit Blank. "European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-Level Governance." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 34, no. 3 (1996): 341-376.
- Jacoby, Wade and Sophie Meunier. "Europe and the Management of Globalization." *Journal of European Public Policy* 17, no. 3 (2010): 299-317. <http://ebscohost.com/> (accessed 6 February 2011).
- Jørgensen, Knud Erik. "Intersecting Multilateralisms: The European Union and Multilateral Institutions" In *The European Union at the United Nations : Intersecting Multilateralisms*, edited by Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith, 195-211. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

- Kassim, Hussein and Anand Menon. "The Principal-agent Approach and the Study of the European Union: Promise Unfulfilled?" *Journal of European Public Policy* 10, no. 1 (2003): 121-139. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350176032000046976> (accessed 5 October 2011).
- Keukeleire, Stephan. "European Security and Defense Policy: From Taboo to a Spearhead of EU Foreign Policy." In *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World*, edited by Federiga Bindi, 51-72. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010.
- Keukeleire, Stephan and Jennifer MacNaughtan. *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- Koutrakos, Panos, ed. *European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives*. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011.
- Laatikainen, Katie Verlin and Karen E. Smith. "Introduction – The European Union at the United Nations: Leader, Partner or Failure?" In *The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms*, edited by Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith, 1-23. New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Laatikainen, Katie Verlin. "Pushing Soft Power: Middle Power Diplomacy at the UN" In *The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms*, edited by Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith, 70-91. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Lakatos, István. "Statement at the Fourth Budapest Human Rights Forum, First Panel on the Activities and Representation of the European Union in the Field of Human Rights" [manuscript received from the presenter]. Budapest, 26 October 2011.
- Lenaerts, Koen and Nathan Cambien. "The Democratic Legitimacy of the EU after the Treaty of Lisbon." *European Constitutionalism Beyond Lisbon*, edited by Jan Wouters, Luc Verhey and Philipp Kiiver, 185-207. Antwerp, Portland, OR: Intersentia, 2009.
- Long, David. "Multilateralism in the CFSP." In *Common Foreign and Security Policy – The Record and Reforms*, edited by Martin Holland, 184-199. London: Pinter, 1997.
- Manners, Ian. "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 2 (2002): 235-258.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. "Liberalism and International Relations Theory." *Center for International Affairs Working Paper No. 92-6*. Harvard University, 1992. http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/liberalism_working.pdf (accessed 12 April 2011).
- Moravcsik, Andrew. "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 4 (1993): 473-524.
- Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, Gisela. "The Big Member States' Influence on the Shaping of the European Union's Foreign, Security and Defence Policy." In *The Future of the*

- European Foreign, Security and Defence Policy After Enlargement*, edited by Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 25-53. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006.
- Mutimer, David. "Theories of Political Integration." In *European Integration: Theories and Approaches*, edited by Hans J. Michelmann and Panayotis Soldatos, 13-42. Lanham: University Press of America, 1995.
- Nász, Adrienn. "Az Európai Parlament Lisszabon után" [The European Parliament after Lisbon]. *Európai Tükör* XV/6 (June 2010): 15-27.
- Nye, Joseph. "The Future of Power in the 21st Century." Lecture at Central European University, Budapest, 19 September 2011.
- Orbie, Jan. "The European Union's Role in World Trade: Harnessing Globalisation?" In *Europe's Global Role: External Policies of the European Union*, edited by Jan Orbie, 35-66. Farnham: Ashgate, 2008.
- Puetter, Uwe and Antje Wiener. "Accommodating Normative Divergence in European Foreign Policy Coordination: The Example of the Iraq Crisis." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 45, no. 5 (2007): 1065-1088. <http://ebscohost.com/> (accessed 22 December 2011).
- Puetter, Uwe and Antje Wiener. "The Intergovernmental Dimension of EU Foreign and Security Policy: Enacting Normative Meaning-in-Use in Policy Deliberation." *CEUR Working Paper No. 2*. Budapest: Center for European Union Research, Central European University, 2011. <https://ceur.ceu.hu/ceur-working-paper-no-2-september-2011> (accessed 21 December 2011).
- Putnam, Robert D. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games." *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 427-460. <http://www.jstor.org/> (accessed 4 March 2011).
- Rasch, Maximilian B. *The European Union at the United Nations: the Functioning and Coherence of EU External Representation in a State-centric Environment*. Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008.
- Schneider, Gerald. "Getting Closer at Different Speeds: Strategic Interaction in Widening European Integration" In *Game Theory and International Relations*, edited by Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt, 125-155. Aldershot, Hants, UK and Brookfield, Vermont: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1994.
- Smith, Karen E. "The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?" *The International Spectator* 35, no. 2 (2002): 11-28. <http://www.iai.it/pdf/articles/smith.pdf> (accessed 29 December 2011).
- Smith, Karen E. *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*. Cambridge, U.K. and Malden, MA, Polity: 2008.

- Smith, Karen E. "The European Union at the Human Rights Council: Speaking with One Voice But Having Little Influence." *Journal of European Public Policy* 17, no. 2 (2010): 224-241.
- Smith, Karen E. "The European Union, Human Rights and the United Nations." In *The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms*, edited by Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith, 154-174. New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Taylor, Paul. "The EU in Geneva: Coordinating Policy in Economic and Social Arrangements of the United Nations System." In *The European Union at the United Nations : Intersecting Multilateralisms*, edited by Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith, 133-153. New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Taylor, Paul. *International Organization in the Modern World. The Regional and Global Process*. London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1993.
- Toje, Asle. "The Consensus–Expectations Gap: Explaining Europe’s Ineffective Foreign Policy." *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 1 (2008): 121-141. <http://sdi.sagepub.com/> (accessed 20 February 2011).
- Verola, Nicola. "The New EU Foreign Policy under the Treaty of Lisbon." In *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe’s Role in the World*, edited by Federiga Bindi, 41-50. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010.
- Voeten, Erik. "Clashes in the Assembly." *International Organization* 54 (2000): 185-215. <http://www.jstor.org/> (accessed 15 January 2011).
- Voeten, Erik and Adis Merdzanovic. *United Nations General Assembly Voting Data*. 2009. <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/12379> (accessed 18 December 2010).
- Wessel, Ramses A. "The EU as a Party to International Agreements: Shared Competences, Mixed Responsibilities." In *Law and Practice of EU External Relations: Salient Features of a Changing Landscape*, edited by Alan Dashwood and Marc Maresceau, 152-187. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Whitman, Richard. "Promised You a Miracle? The EU’s Global Role in the Afterglow of Lisbon." Lecture at Center for European Union Research Launch Conference, Central European University, Budapest, 2 December 2010.
- Young, Alasdair R. "What game? By which rules? Adaptation and Flexibility in the EC’s Foreign Economic Policy." In *Understanding the European Union’s External Relations*, edited by Michèle Knodt and Sebastiaan Princen, 54-71. London: Routledge, 2003.