CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2012
| Author | Radovanovic, Milos |
|---|---|
| Title | Counterfactuals and Causation: Transitivity |
| Summary | Lewis claimed that counterfactuals are not transitive and that causation is. I present views according to which counterfactuals are transitive, dismissing Lewis’ reasons to think otherwise. I move on to Lewis’ theory/theories of causation, in which the transitivity of causation is left somewhat unexplained. I explore what transitivity of counterfactuals can mean for the transitivity of causation, and whether it can solve the problems raised by counterexamples to transitivity of causation. I find that even if counterfactuals are transitive, that helps us little with problems of intransitive sequences of causal statements. Moreover, it seems that transitive counterfactuals pose an equally bad, or even worse, basis for causation then Lewis’ intransitive counterfactuals do. |
| Supervisor | Huoranszki |
| Department | Philosophy MA |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2012/radovanovic_milos.pdf |
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