

Memory and Identity in Croatia-The Process of Europeanization

By

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Abstract

Croatia has gone through two important regime changes. One was transition from being part of Yugoslavia to becoming an independent state, with Franjo Tudjman as first president of Croatia. The first one was followed by referendum for independence. The second transition happened in January 2012 when on EU accession referendum, Croatia voted yes. In this thesis I argue that in this context memory and identity became more significant and intertwined. In the time of crises or in this case identity crises, the strong link between them were even more emphasized. Political leaders like Tudjman understood the power of that past has, and thus a constructed particular historical narrative to address his “political need” which is Croatia being an independent state. Coming back to the present, this was again invoked, just “the need” was different and this time pro-European narratives are dominating the discourse.

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INTRODUCTION

Identity and Memory have both become an object of interest in the last century. In the 1950's Erick Erickson managed to attract wide audience in relations to the term identity while in the last thirty years there has been a "memory boom" which begun sometime in the late 1970s. The reason for the latter is explained by stating that "after the fall of postwar modernist narratives of progressive improvement through an ever expanding welfare state, nation-states turn to past as a basis of shoring their legitimacy".¹ Due to turbulent period in the beginning of the 20th century, there was a need for recalling on the wrongs done in the War and now "states are allegedly judged on how well they atone for their past rather on how well they meet their fiscal obligations and inspire future projects".² What is visible is that the importance and the amount of research regarding memory has increased.

My focus in this thesis is on a specific type of interest in this field of studies and that is the collective memory. Sociologist Maurice Halbwach is considered to be the father of this term and in his view social interactions structure and influence our memory in a way that it is impossible to remember outside of group context because it is always socially framed. Besides being socially constructed it is relevant to understand how it manifests itself. Cruz explain it by saying that "shaped by post struggles and shared historical accidents, collective memory is both a common discriminating experience (this was right, this was wrong) and a "factual" recollection – a seemingly veridical narrative -

¹ Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Serroussi and Daniel Levy, "Collective Memory Reader," (New York:Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 3

² Ibid, 2011 p. 3-4

of the group's past "as it really was".³ From this follows that discriminating and factual uses of memory are powerful instruments in forming public opinion and gaining public support.

There are other scholars that are dealing with this topic from the perspective of anthropology, history, sociology, cognitive psychology and so forth. My source of interest is the relationship between identity and memory and as said by John R. Gillis "the parallel lives of these two terms alert us to the fact that the notion of identity depends on the idea of memory, and vice versa".⁴

This is especially true when talking about national identity, scholars like Klaus Eder stress the importance of narratives in constructing identity. In his opinion "national identities are based on strong and exclusive stories".⁵ What this author also noted is how the formation of this type of identity is especially important in the making of a nation state. Drawing upon his argument, I argue that for Croatia, as a country that gained independence in the beginning of 1990s, memory was the essential element in constructing the collective identity during the period of nation-building process.

Franjo Tudjma, the first Croatian president who was in power during and after the Croatian War of Independence, has formed a specific historical representation of the past, and besides using factual manipulation he also used a discriminatory one by creating the "other". In the second and third chapter I will discuss more about the former one, by

³ Consuelo Cruz, "Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember Their Past and Make Their Futures," *World Politics* 52, No. 3 (2000), p. 276

⁴ John R. Gillis, "Memory and Identity: The History of Relationship," in "Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity" by Gillis (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 3

⁵ Klaus Eder, "A Theory of Collective identity Making Sense of the Debate on a 'European Identity'," *European Journal of Social Theory* 12, No.4 (2009), p. 427

using examples of two crucial events that marked the Croatian history. One of them is the memory of misdeeds done by Ustashe -supporters of Nazi regime during Second World War who formed and lead concentration camps of which Jasenovac was the largest. The other one is connected with the War in the 90's where the idea of Croatian collective victimhood run counters when ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) and urged that war criminals need be prosecuted from their country. Additionally, Subotic, claims that Tudjman promoted specific types of historical narratives, such as one of a collective victimhood of Croatian nation in order to “underpin violent ethnic-nationalist agendas”.⁶

In the fourth chapter I discuss the representation of what Croatia's origins are as used by Croatian president in creating the “other” and that was done by demonizing Serbs and distancing themselves from Yugoslavia. Claiming their European heritage and denying any relations to the Balkan was a way of distancing themselves. I argue that this was a combination of factual and discriminatory use of memory. Both ways have served the goal of legitimizing acts of political elites and mobilizing citizens in order to get public support which I believe was the case in Croatia.

Creating collective identity usually requires using manipulation and persuasion. First of all it is important to understanding the meaning of these two terms in the context that I am analyzing. In the words of Croatian sociologist Dusko Sekulic, “identity is actually a manipulative concept that anyone can use when there is a lack of solid

⁶ Ljiljana Radonic, “Standards of evasion: Croatia and the “Europeanization of memory” , *Eurozine*, 2012/04/06, <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2012-04-06-radonic-en.html>

arguments to legitimize and defend our own interests.⁷ Persuasion especially comes alive when there are critical points or political events that are of great matter for the country. “Rival political leaders and entrepreneurs seek to persuade themselves and others that thing must remain as they are or be changed in significant ways”.⁸

Croatia has gone through two big political and social transformations and transition, and they are both connected to two referendums in the country. One was referendum for independence in 1991 and the other for accessing the EU in January 2012. In both cases the outcome was satisfactory, and citizens have accepted the change. Vresse notes that “framing of a referendum issue by political actors and key information sources during a campaign may therefore be unusually important to the referendum outcome”.⁹

Of course, here the context of referendums is equally relevant and without denying it I argue how in the contexts of the two referendums the political elites have played very important role, if not a crucial one. What was specific for these periods is that they were periods of identity crises. In the first, was the transformation of national identities, from Yugoslavian to Croatian, whereas in the second, from national to European. Taking this into account, I claim that political actors attempt to legitimize themselves and discriminate or mobilize a wider public by the use of collective memory.

⁷ Rade Kalanj, “Identitet i Politika Identiteta,” in Neven Budak (ed.) “Hrvatski Nacionalni Identitet u Globalizirajućem Svetu,” (Zagreb: Centar za demokraciju i pravo, 2010), p. 118

⁸ Cruz, (2000), p. 276

⁹ Claes H. de Vresse (ed), “The dynamics of Referendum Campaigns: An International Perspective,” (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 1

As quoted in the article by Freyburg and Richter identities are the results of “discursive processes in which political actors assign and accept meaning”.¹⁰

I will use theory of social constructivism that relies on the idea of social constructed individual as well as collective identity that is formed and transformed through constantly changing social relations. When identity comes in place, there are two clearly distinct views between primordialists and constructivists. The fact that supporters of primordial perspective claim that identity is fixed and remains unchanged during the lifetime of an individual is difficult to prove since there are” basic shortcomings which are highlighted by common findings such as: individuals with dual national identity¹¹, individual differences in importance given to national identity, and changes of national identity over a lifetime of an individual.¹² Critics of this view base their argument in stating the inconsistency of primordialists claim with reality of the modern world.

There is a lot of debate among scholars on the question of identity, but on what most of them agree is that this term is something that is dynamic and not fixed, “no form of identity is ever complete or stable”.¹³ Furthermore there are “three factors involved in

¹⁰ Thomas Risse, *European institutions and identity change: what have we learned?* In R.K. Herrmann, T. Risse and M.B. Brewer (eds.), “Transnational Identities. Becoming European in the EU”, (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield), p. 267

¹¹ Marry C. Waters, “Ethnic options,” (Berkley: University of California Press, 1990), quoted in Jasna Milosevic Djordjevic, “Primordialistic concept of national identity in Serbia, “ (Drustvo psihologa Srbije: Beograd, 2007), p. 386

¹² Jasna M. Djordjevic, “Primordialistic concept of national identity in Serbia, “ (Beograd: Drustvo psihologa Srbije:, 2007) <http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0048-5705/2007/0048-57050703385M.pdf> , p. 387

¹³ Dirk Jacobs and Robert Meier, “European identity: Construct, Fact and Fiction,” in Gastelaars, M. & de Reuijter, A. (eds.) *A United Europe. The Quest for a Multifaceted Identity.* (Maastricht: Shaker), p. 15

dynamic creation of identity: past memory, present existence and the future self”.¹⁴ Time is essential moment when speaking of identity because “the past defines the nation’s present and directs it towards the future”.¹⁵ This is especially the case in the aftermath of wars and other critical junctures, as was the case with Croatia that went through a bloody War in 90s.

EU as political entity also has three stories that connect the time frame necessary for identity formation. Europe as an example, in the words of Eder has three stories that are promoted and conveyed to European citizens and candidate countries because Europe needs more than a Euro zone to connect rational individuals by means of promoting their interests. “It needs a story which tells people that they are citizens of a political community”.¹⁶ In short, it connects ‘Jean Monnet success story’ of EU as a successful economic and political project, to the idea of shared past, where these stories “constitute boundaries with high emotional value”¹⁷ and the future one that relies on creating a diverse community in Europe.

As it can be seen from this example it does not relate only to the elites in new nation states but it also refers to the European Union as an external political actor, “where the generation and stabilization of collective identities are mainly subject to elites and

¹⁴ Allison Keeley, “The Art of Memory: Memory as the Maker,” (The Harvard Advocate, 2009) <http://www.theharvardadvocate.com/content/art-identity-memory-maker?page=4>

¹⁵ Marko Hajdinjak, “The Memory of Violence and Genocide: Memory and Identity among Serbs and Croats,” paper presented at the International Symposium: The memory of Violence and Genocide: It’s meaning in the Process of Peace Building (University of Tokyo, 2006) http://www.imir-bg.org/imir/reports/Memory_and_identity.pdf, p. 3

¹⁶ Klaus Eder, 2009, p. 434

¹⁷ Ibid, 2009. p.433

actions and their motivation to gain legitimacy. “Elites are at pain to reconstruct the collective identities of their own citizens”.¹⁸. What they create is the time frame of a group, forming and linking their past, present and the future through narrative bonds.

While talking about identity as a conceptual construction, Croatian sociologist Rade Kalanj also notes that “identity is suitable discursive refuge for new reconstruction and revision of history, forming social present and future”.¹⁹ Historical revisionism is an instrument that leaders use in order to create a certain perception of reality and this is particularly exercised in the time of a ‘political need’. Whether it is gaining and protecting their independence or becoming a member of EU.

Political conditionality directed towards future EU members is an example of that “political need” for country to change in accordance to their requirements. In order to become successful in fulfilling this “need” domestic political actor often need to “(re-) interpret the requirement in an ‘identity-friendly’ manner”²⁰, so they would get desirable public opinion. In the case of Croatia, the government was able to shift the negative public opinion surrounding the necessity to extradite Croatian war criminals and finally managed to fully cooperate with the ICTY.

¹⁸ Ireneusz P. Karolewski, “European identity making and Identity Transfer,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 63, No. 6 (2011), pp. 935-955, p. 937

¹⁹ Rade Kalanj, 2010, p.118

²⁰ Antje Wiener, “The invisible Constitutions of Politics. Contested Norms and International Enquirers,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) in Tina Freyburg and Solveig Richter, “National Identity Matters: The Limited Impact of EU Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans”, (Journal of European Public Policy 17:2, 2010,) pp. 263-281, p. 267

This is the part of the process of Europeanization of identity and memory, which represents the transformation from Tudjman's era until present day in Croatia. The whole process will be presented and discussed in the next chapters. Changes exhibited in collective memory demonstrate this shift and merging of European and national narratives that eventually led to desirable referendum outcome. Europeanization of memory would be better visible through the discourse analysis of newspaper articles covering the Croatian EU referendum campaign which I will demonstrate in the last chapter.

Theory of social constructivism that emphasizes the importance of identity in state behavior has been contested by realist oriented theories. Through the analysis of the Croatian case, I aim to prove that in the specific context, when country is going through crises or big transitions from one system to another; political elites both (external or internal) use different kind of strategies to create a favorable public opinion and support while in the same time legitimizing their goals. The strongest one relating to my case is collective memory and identity construction.

The significance of my research is that it speaks to the existing literature on the topic of collective memory and identity and aims to discover link in relation to specific temporal and spatial context of Croatia. As far as I am aware such research has not been conducted so far with the exemption of Ljiljane Radonic who has dealt with the topic of Europeanization of memory but more focusing on relations to the memory of Jasenovac. I will further elaborate this and thus expanding the existing body of literature by adding the Croatian case. In the broad context, it is also significant to understand how, why and

when identity and memory became much more intertwined which will lead to better understanding of the relationship between political elites and these two concepts.

1.1 Theory of Social Constructivism

Social constructivism as theoretical approach differs from most of the realist IR theories, for these are materialist which means that they concentrate merely on power and interest. The focus is on “how the distribution of material power, such as military forces and economic capabilities defines balances of power between states and explains the behavior of states. Constructivists reject such a one-sided material focus”.²¹ According to Nicholas Onuf, “constructivism applies to all fields of social inquiry and has the potential to bring together matters which at first seem unrelated”.²² This is the reason why for my argument I try to combine different concepts from collective memory, identity to the process of Europeanization, in order to show their relationship with political elites framed in a specific context.

Additionally, constructivism puts emphasis on social aspect by concentrating on “ideas and beliefs that inform the actors on the international scene as well as the shared understandings between them”.²³ Ideas are standing at the core of constructivist theory

²¹ Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, “Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches,” (Oxford University Press, 2007), http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199548842/jackson_ch06.pdf , p. 160

²² Nicholas Onuf, “Constructivism: A User Manual” in Maja Zehfuss, “Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 19

²³ Jackson and Sorensen, 2007, p. 160

where values and meanings are created by social interaction at the specific time and space and they need to be widely shared to matter. These ideas and beliefs that matter are part of historical consciousness of citizens and what is important here is that these ideas can be a powerful instrument influencing present and possible the future. My focus is on this type of meanings with intent of showing its significance in relation to the particular political and social climate that exists in a period of crises, in my case identity wise.

When talking about the interaction between identity and constructivism Maja Zehfuss states that their relationship is much more problematic than it seems in the case of conceptualizing this term set by prominent scholar in this field, Alexander Wendt. The reason for this is that his approach does not appreciate the complexity of identity where “contingent, elusive and even contradictory character must be excluded”.²⁴ In her opinion Wendt concentrate more on interaction between states than on interaction on the national level. Regarding the first critique from Zehfuss it is true that Wendt focuses more on international system and politics then on state identity formation, and he had clearly stated it by saying that “the former relies on latter in ways that are consequential for thinking about international politics but state identities are also heavily influenced by domestic factors which I do not address”.²⁵

Since in my research I argue that political elites use memory in constructing desirable identity, I turn to not only domestic political actors like Tudjman but also towards EU as an external actor. By this meaning how even though Wendt is focusing on

²⁴ Maja Zehfuss, “Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison,” (European Journal of International Relations 7(3), 2001), pp. 315-348, p. 341

²⁵ Alexander Wendt, “Social Theory of International Politics,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.11

the interaction between states rather on a national level, in my argument I aim to show that in time of identity crises whether it is national or national and European, memory matters equally. On the second remark, in relations to Wendt not appreciating complexity of identity I do agree, however given that I analyze specifically memory as an instrument of mobilizations, legitimization and construction of collective identity as its broader concept this is not of much relevance.

Another scholar Anthony D. Smith connects social constructivism and essentialism, and portrays identity “as a product of both “natural” continuity and conscious manipulation”.²⁶ According to Smith “natural” continuity comes from origins or ethnic identity and is close to primordialists’ view which relies on the idea of inherited commonalities. I disagree with the first one since understanding identity in a fixed way, can only be understood if political elites manipulate with this term like Tudjman has done, and thus creating a sense of “natural” continuity.

As social circumstances change so does identity and for that reason constructivist deal with the interaction between state transformation and identity. On the other hand, Jervis argues that this theory does not explain the process of change and that constructivist fail to clarify “how norms are formed, how identities are shaped, and how interests are defined as they does not, by itself, tell us something about the processes at work in political life”.²⁷ In contrary, constructivists believe that they do study change and

²⁶ Karen A. Cerulo, “Identity Construction: New Issues, New Directions,” (Annual Review of Sociology 23, 1997), pp. 385-409, p. 390

²⁷ Robert Jervis, “Realism in the Study of World Politics” (International Organization: Cambridge University Press 54(4), 1998) in Jackson and Sorensen, 2007, p. 117

such criticism is not grounded. Shifting sociopolitical and historical context in their opinion leads to identity transformation.

A concrete mechanism of identity transformation, which Wendt considers, is based on conscious efforts to change identity. He states that identities are not given but developed, sustained or transformed in interaction”.²⁸ Furthermore he argues in relations to the structural change, that “a change in that structure will involve a change in collective identity, involving the breakdown of an old identity and the emergence of a new”.²⁹

Regarding the process of Europeanization, constructivist claim that identity as a social category is important because “political conditionality can only lead to short-term results in behavioral and institutional adaptation whereas socialization through normative suasion can lead to durable identity transfer”.³⁰ Burak in an article, that deals with EU Enlargement process, Burak states that constructivist assume that “continues interaction among states may have a transformative effect on role identities of states, and consequently on their interests”.³¹ Risse has also stressed that “constructivist emphasize that the EU deeply affects discursive and behavioral practices” of social and political actors.³² Accepting this as true, it follows that social interaction between EU and future

²⁸ Maja Zehfuss, 2001, p. 317-318

²⁹ Alexander Wendt, 1999, p. 338

³⁰ Iraneusz P Karolewski, 2011, p. 942

³¹ Begum Burak, “Social Constructivist approach and the European Union Enlargement Process” (The Liberator Magazine)
http://fatih.academia.edu/BegumBurak/Papers/886066/Social_Constructivist_Approach_and_the_European_Union_Enlargement_Process, p.2

³² Thomas Risse, “Social Constructivism and European Integration” in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez “European Integration Theory,” (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) p. 164

member state like Croatia has definitely influenced identity transformation on some level, which I will elaborate more profoundly.

In relation to my argument and concerning social interaction between actors I am focusing on productive power that is constructed by different types of actors. Productive power actually signifies that “particular meaning of development, for instance, orients social activity in particular directions, defines what constitutes legitimate knowledge, and shapes whose knowledge matters”.³³ The questions here is who forms and orients social relations and constitute meanings, and Wendt underscores that identity is a “property of international actors that generate motivational and behavioral dispositions”.³⁴

Martin Marcussen and his colleagues who were researching the impact of political elites in national identity construction in France, Germany and Britain that elites select certain ideas that correspond with their interests, but this is especially the case in the time of ‘critical junctures’ “when nation state identities are contested and challenged in political discourses”.³⁵

Most Constructivists, when talking about social actions, agree that among three logics of social action, “logic of consequentialism”, “logic of arguing” and “logic of appropriateness”, the last one is most favorable one. They want to shift from rationalist logic of consequences that is based on cost benefit relation, towards a normative logic of

³³ Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” (International Organization: Cambridge University Press 59, 2005) p. 3-4

³⁴ Maja Zehfuss, “Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 40

³⁵ Martin Marcussen, Thomas Risse Daniela Englelmann-Martin, Hans Joachim Knopf and Klaus Rocher, “Constructing Europe? The Evolution of French, British and German Nation-State Identities,” (Journal of European Public Policy 6(3), 1999), http://aei.pitt.edu/2326/1/002594_1.pdf, p. 2

appropriateness. Normative rationality implies constitutive effects of social norms and institutions, since these rules not only regulate behavior, that is, they have causal effects, but also define social identities (“good people do X”). This is where the “value added” of constructivism comes in.³⁶ EU as an external actor extends first its institutional identity to future member states, like Croatia, but it also import certain value system of “what is right, and what is wrong”.

To explain this further, under (normative) rationality constructivist mean that “action or belief may be called ‘rational’ when it ‘makes sense’ to act that way”.³⁷ It is followed by the logic of the social, meaning that “we must start with the idea that human behavior cannot reasonably be studied apart from the social structures within which it occurs, and that gives it meaning”³⁸, It does not matter whether this structures or networks are national or supranational. Combining this with everything that has previously been mentioned, it is more that obvious why constructivist theory is appropriate for my study.

At this point before I move on to analyze Croatian case in more details, I will first explain what collective identity and memory as concepts represent since it is important to understand why I am dealing with them in stating my argument, regarding my research subject, Croatia. Then, I will shift my focus on presenting how and why this transformation happens, considering that the process of Europeanization is a term that combines previous two.

³⁶ Thomas Risse, “Communicative Action in World Politics,” (Cambridge University Press: International Organization 54, 01, 2000), pp. 1-39, p. 4-5

³⁷ Maja Zehfuss, 2002, p. 16

³⁸ J. Samuel Barkin, “Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relation Theory,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 51

1.2 Conceptualizing Collective Memory and Identity

In social theory the idea of collective identity has been present among scholars from “Durkheim’s “collective conscience,” Marx’s “class-consciousness,” and Weber’s Verstehen, to Tonnie’s Gemeinschaft”.³⁹ Cerulo in her article gives a short definition of what collective identity means saying “that this notion addresses the “we-ness” of a group, stressing the similarities or shared attributes around which group members coalesce”.⁴⁰

Critics of the idea of collective identity believe that by claiming that it exists we exclude non-groupist social forms, stressing only the importance of groups and the lack of substantial proof that will justify its use. Eder mentions Brubaker who stresses that we should imagine the world in “which the social no longer needs an overarching naturalizing symbolism”.⁴¹

On the other hand, the more a human society is differentiated in creating indirect social relations, the more it needs a collective identity. In the modern societies the individual is often coming before the group and unity and solidarity in that sense is lacking. Collective identity is crucial in building social relations because “the network structure linking people, shapes the construction of the identity of that network which than is used to reproduce this network structure”.⁴²

³⁹ Cerulo, 1997, p. 386

⁴⁰ Ibid, 1997, p. 386

⁴¹ Eder, 2009, p. 430

⁴² Eder, 2009, p. 430

In his book *Imagined Communities* Anderson notes how social networks are necessary “for the emergence of vocabulary, the spread of information and eventually the emergence of collective identity”.⁴³ Political elites have more opportunities and resources to spread their discourse by means of communication, and thus more persuasive power. For instance Brass argues that “political ‘entrepreneurs’ attempting to mobilize groups for their own political purposes can have a dramatic impact on identity formation.”⁴⁴ Furthermore, functionalists also state that we need certain kind of bonds as part of the collective in order to accept social norms and obligations imposed on us by others.

These bonds can be narrative ones, what Eder mentions as an important part of collective identity and its construction is the necessity of an object to which it would be closely connected. These objects are “generalized emotions embodied in what can be called ‘narratives’”.⁴⁵ Social interactions are intertwined with narrative networks that function as a mediator in today’s complex societies. What this means is that collective identity is formed by using certain kind of stories which are the combination of images, songs or texts which citizens recognize as part of their, in the words of Eder, “particular we”.

The EU as political but also social entity consists of a number of states that have and promote different kind of narratives and due to this Europe seeks to construct a “dense network of social relations in Europe that need a collective identity as project of their

⁴³ David Rousseau and A. Maurits van der Veen, “The emergence of a Shared Identity: An Agent-Based Computer Simulation of Idea Diffusion (The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(5), 2005), pp. 686-712, p. 689

⁴⁴ Rosseau and van der Veen, 2005, p. 689

⁴⁵ Eder, 2009, p. 431

control”.⁴⁶ In the time of economic crises in the EU or possibility of threat and conflict, that type of construction is particularly needed. Against this background, Karolewski notes that “the plethora of publications stress that collective identity contributes in a crucial manner to societal and political cohesion among EU citizens and EU elites”.⁴⁷

This short overview of the concept of identity shows that it refers to shared meanings, values and ideas of a group. It states its importance by stressing how it is (a) crucial in building social relations and networks on national and EU level by creating political and social cohesion (b) in accepting social norms and standards of behavior and that it is (c) particularly needed in the time of crises, possibility of threat or conflict. What is also stressed is that collective identity needs referent object and those objects are narratives. Narratives can be different kind of stories but in the context that I am researching there are stories about the past.

Collective memory as a product of popularizing these narratives is strongly connected to the idea of identity. Maurice Halbwachs, one of the most popular scholars in the field of memory studies, deals primarily with the construction of memories by identities. In contrast Benedict Anderson puts more emphasis on memory by giving evocative phrase “imagined communities”, “the more community is imagined the more it finds that “memory” is necessary to it, and so is “forgetting”.⁴⁸ Here is the question of how this type of community is manifested and constructed.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 2009, p. 431

⁴⁷ Karolewski, 2011, p. 935

⁴⁸ Allan Megill, “History, modernity and identity” in Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi and Daniel Levy 2011, p. 195

What Kansteiner stresses is that collective memory exists only if it manifests itself through the actions and statements of individuals, it is always mediated and it is a result of conscious manipulation.⁴⁹ Focusing more on the relationship of power and memory, the term “politics of memory” has emerged in the memory studies literature. “Memory is viewed here as a subjective experience of social group that essentially sustains a relationship of power”.⁵⁰ The factor of human agency in constructing a collective memory and identity under these circumstances is important because powerful social groups, like political elites and parties, form a historical background that is compatible with their social and political objectives. “Past events can only be recalled in collective setting if they fit within the framework of contemporary interests”.⁵¹ In contrary they can lead to unsuccessful memory construction.

Collective memory is constructed by and within the societies, and when the particular interest and struggle for power is involved the political elites use this type of memory in their advantage. Elites especially see memory as a legitimizing instrument that promotes and repeats certain narratives.

These narratives of past, in which I am more interested, create a memory in the minds of people. More specifically, in the period when identity is in conflict or after crucial political events memory becomes even more important. Identity as a concept is

⁴⁹ Kansteiner, Wulf, “A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies,” (History and Theory 41 (2) , 2002), pp. 179- 197

⁵⁰ Alon Confino , “Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of the Method” in Olick, Seroussi and Levy 2011, p. 198

⁵¹ Nancy Wood, “Vectors of Memory,” in Wulf Kansteiner “Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies,” (Blackwell Publishing: History and Theory 41, 2, 2002), pp. 179-197, p. 188

related towards memory in a way which shows that “memory is valorized where identity is problematized.”⁵² Crises of identity are often followed up by the crises of memory, which is especially the case after ethnic conflicts or some other significant political and social events. Croatia has gone through ethnic war in the 90s and EU accession that both were crises over identity which came after these two big transitions.

Understanding society and underlying reasons of social change is not an easy task but collective memory studies can be good enough ground for researching these topics in a more detailed manner. Scholars turn to them especially if they are interested in investigating the sources of mobilization by answering the question why, in contrast to mobilization and process theories that just focus on the ways they happen. As said in the article by Polleta and Jasper “by examining the formation of collective identities, scholars would shed light on the macro-historical context within which movements emerge”.⁵³

In relations to the methodological critique of collective media studies, Wulf Kansteiner mentions in his article that there is the lack of attention among scholars concerning the problem of reception both in terms of methods and sources, because they are more focused on analyzing memory relating to different setting.⁵⁴ In his opinion what is needed is conceptualizing collective memory are three types of historical factors: “The intellectual and cultural traditions that frame all our representations of the past, the

⁵² Allan Megill, “History, Memory, Identity,” (History of the Human Sciences 11(3), 1998) quoted in Kansteiner 2002, p. 184

⁵³ Francesca Polleta and James M. Jasper, “Collective identity and Social Movements,” (Annual Review Sociology 27, 2001) pp. 283-305, p. 284

⁵⁴ Kansteiner, 2002

memory markers who selectively adopt and manipulate these traditions, and the memory consumers who use, ignore or transform such artifacts according to their interest”.⁵⁵

My focus is on “memory markers” since my claim is that political elites are the ones that use memory in the period of identity crises and in regards to “memory consumers” the way we can measure the power of memory is through looking upon important political events like referendums. On referendums forming of a desirable public opinion is even more significant since it influences the political and social future of one country and in case of Croatia two big system transitions.

Memory has not yet been in the mainstream of political science, and in the opinion of Langenbacher and Shain “scholars have been slow to recognize the importance of memory in international affairs and have not yet advanced major theoretical works in the area. Increased rigor in theorizing the impact of memory’s, in developing a conceptual framework, and in selecting appropriate methods are all needed”.⁵⁶ Therefore I am exploring more collective memory from political perspective and forming relations between identity and memory in regards to specific political background. Since I am also concentrated on the relationship between identity, memory and political change the process of Europeanization is consisting of all of them and combines them as well.

⁵⁵ Wulf Kansteiner, “A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies,” (History and Theory 41 (2) , 2002), pp. 179- 197, p. 180

⁵⁶ Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain, “Introduction: Twenty-first-Century Memories,” in Langenbacher and Shain(eds) “Power and Past: Collective memory and International Relations,” (Washington:Georgetown University Press, 2010)
http://press.georgetown.edu/sites/default/files/9781589016408_Intro.pdf , p. 2

1.3 Transforming National Identity – The Process of Europeanization

The process of Europeanization challenges traditionally defined national political community by creating competing narratives. The European Union consists of nation states, which have their own particular narrative. Some of these national narratives are shared by those nations that share similar experiences in the past. The eastern enlargement of the EU also led to the emergence of a so-called “divided memory between East and the West that has prompted representatives of post communist states to demand that communist crimes be convicted in the same extent as those of Holocaust”.⁵⁷ Maria Malksoo in her article deals with eastern European subaltern in enlarged Europe, also refers to a dominant Western European understanding of one of the most significant political event in 20th century, World War II.

Relating discussions between Eastern and Western remembering of the War have shown the importance of memory in the process of EU identity construction and EU representatives from both sides aim at creating a satisfactory solution for both sides. In addition, the rejection of European Constitution in 2005 by French and Dutch was also seen as a rejection of historical grounding for United Europe. In the words of Pakier and Strath this rejection” displayed lack of understanding of the historical complexity of this past upon which visions of the future might be built”.⁵⁸

Some like past chairman of the Association of German historians Johannes Fried believe that mnemonic consensus is necessary. He warns that “inspite of cooperation”

⁵⁷Radonic, 2012

⁵⁸ Malgorzata Pakier and Bo Strath, “ A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remeberance,” (Oxford:Berghahn Books, 2010), p. 1

the Europeans will not achieve “integration and collective identity” as long as their “national images diverge”⁵⁹ This transformation is seen as a process of Europeanization because some assume that just “as European national identities are influenced, but not replaced by a “common European identity”, national memories are likewise transfigured by a transnational European collective memory under the impact of Europeanization, yet not substituted for it”⁶⁰.

Studies of this term are concentrating mainly on the EU member states and the affects that this type of process has on their domestic political structures. Moreover, the same is happening in candidate countries that want to access EU and the first transfer imposed on them is of EU normative identity. Through institutionalization of national system EU imposes norms of appropriateness, formal and informal rules of conduct or proper ways of doing things. Normative suasion “suggests inclusive socialization, where all actors act according to the logic of appropriateness of shared norm”,⁶¹ which I have discussed earlier.

Transfer of EU “normative identity” to third countries is specific in a way that “the EU acts vis-à-vis its neighborhood as an ‘identity hegemon’ which might face fewer constraints outside than inside the EU, given its attractiveness to potential new member

⁵⁹ Johannes Fried , “Erinnerung and Vergessen. Die Gegenwart stiftet die Einheit der Vergangenheit “ (Historische Zeitschrift 273, 2001) pp. 561-93 quoted in Konrad H. Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger(eds.), *Conflicted Memories “Europeanizing Contemporary Histories,”* (Berghahn Books, 2007), p. 1

⁶⁰ Willfried Spohn, “National Identities and Collective Memory in the Enlarged Europe,” in Klaus Eder and Willfried Spohn (eds) “Collective Memory and European Identity: The Effects of Integration and Enlargement,” (Aldershot: Ashgate)pp. 1–14 quoted in Maria Malksoo, “The Memory Politics of Becoming European: The East European Subalterns and the Collective Memory of Europe,” (European Journal of International Relations 15(4), 2009), http://www.memoryatwar.org/pdf/Malksoo_EJIR_Dec_2009-1.pdf , p. 673

⁶¹ Karolewski, 2011, p. 942

states or associated partners.”⁶² Of course, in many countries there is still a strong resistance towards the process of Europeanization that is seen as a way of crumbling national values and interests.

Eder mentions three types of networks of social relations, namely supranational, transnational and postnational identity construction of Europe. Supranational network uses the “Jean Monnet success story”, that I have mentioned in the beginning, which accents EU as a successful political, economic or social project. This is actually a story of Europe, that is constructed in Brussels or Strasbourg and “rituals of enacting the EU story are European summits, European days, giving meaning to Europe’s flag and anthem”.⁶³ Here all national networks are connected to the center and through it they cooperate with the higher one, meaning EU institutions.

Postnational network is constructed by linking various national networks and in that way creates the idea of shared past and forms a new kind of transnational identity. Eder described it as a “story about Europe, where winners and losers, heroes and perpetrators of the recent past and of the present are related, change position and try to find a new position in an emerging European script/postnational script”.⁶⁴ This is related to collective memory construction but in this case it is merging national and postnational memories. Jarauch and Lindenberger emphasize that in the process of connecting different memory landscapes “the challenge is to create the greatest possible openness

⁶²Karolewski 2011, p. 939

⁶³Eder 2009, p. 439

⁶⁴Ibid 2009, p. 439

towards experiences and approaches of others”⁶⁵, avoiding that certain memories dominate over others.

Finally, transnational network is conflicting with the previous two since it is based on the idea of “hybrid” Europe. In this view national and non-national elements can exist together without real necessity of merging and form a stable international society.

Klaus Jacobs and Meier stress the conflicting projects of Europe where one wants to be important power in the world lead by power and interest. The other project in partial opposition promotes social Europe, where values such as human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance are promoted. Lastly the third one is protecting national states and its interest by strengthening them.

In the words of Diez, “the EU’s projection of a ‘utopia’ occurs through the construction of the EU as a better ‘Self’, which allows EU actors to disregard their own shortcomings. In modeling itself on this utopia and by organizing its identity transfer, the EU constructs its collective identity”.⁶⁶ As exemplified from some scholars, EU has contradictory projects, and taking this into account it needs strong enough legitimizing instrument for protecting their image. In addition it is strongly interacting with national networks which just imply that, taken by constructivist view, social interaction result in identity formation. For this reason EU is an important factor in influencing member states

⁶⁵Konrad H Jarauch and Thomas Leidenberger, “Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary Histories,” (Oxford: Berghahn books, 2007), p. 5

⁶⁶ Thomas Diez, “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering “Normative Power of Europe,”” (Millenium: Journal of International Studies 33 (3), 2005), http://un-tuebingen.academia.edu/ThomasDiez/Papers/466166/Constructing_the_Self_and_Changing_Others_ReconsideringNormative_Power_Europe , p. 15

in various ways but my focus is on identity and memory in relations to Croatia as my case study.

1.4 Methodology

Since in my last chapter I tend to analyze two types of discourses that specially dominated during EU referendum campaign in Croatia, European versus Balkan and preserving sovereignty and entering European Union, there is a need for analysis of these discourses in order to present the process of Europeanization. The first one was about Croats perceiving themselves as more European than part of the Balkan and the second was mainly about the fear of losing independence by becoming a member of EU.

In my research I will use discourse analysis as a qualitative method because my aim is to discover socio-psychological characteristics found in the text that I am analyzing. My focus is analysis of linguistic features and semantics in Croatian newspapers articles published during EU referendum campaign. My aim is to relate them to their respective social and/or political context and in that way try to deconstruct their meaning and reveal its hidden motivation or agendas. As a nonscientific method it is critiqued for being biased which results in skepticism when it comes to proving researchers objectivity. The reason comes from being a matter of interpretation and the lack of hard data, but what can support its validity are strong enough arguments which I will try to offer in my last chapter.

As an object of my analysis I have chosen two leading web newspapers articles and one portal in Croatia, as empirical evidence. There are two online popular daily

newspapers in Croatia *Vecernji List* <http://www.vecernji.hr/> and *Jutarnji List* <http://www.jutarnji.hr/> and portal <http://www.tportal.hr/> . I will concentrate on the process of Europeanization of identity and memory and therefore rely on the body of media content distributed during recent Croatian EU referendum campaign that lasted from the 3rd - 22 of January 2012. I am analyzing one case, Croatia, since the context is important for me to prove my argument, and that will additionally allow me more detailed analysis of a political phenomenon of Europeanization as a result of European integration and enlargement process.

CHAPTER 2: JASENOVAC CASE STUDY- FROM HISTORICAL REVISIONISM TO EUROPLANIZATION OF MEMORY

In the first half of 20th century Europe went through horrors of two World Wars. Especially after World War II rebuilding in many aspects was necessary, and the idea of uniting Europe emerged in order to avoid that the crimes related to World War II, such as the Holocaust, could happen again. Ljiljana Radonic calls this a “negative European founding myth”.⁶⁷ Since collective identity is constructed on connecting past, present and future, the Holocaust can be understood as a crucial point of reference, relating to a shared European past. Furthermore, as I have mentioned in the beginning, forming identity of “United Europe” requires something more than just monetary and economic union and for that reason this idea of collective heritage helps in building a necessary common identity.

An International Holocaust conference was held in January 2000, on the 55th anniversary of the liberation of the NS-concentration camp Auschwitz-Birkenau. As an outcome the Holocaust Memorial Day was introduced. The Task force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research (ITF) recommended that respective countries implement this day, which was seen as a step in forming a “European memory” of the Holocaust. This process is referring to the creation of a

⁶⁷ Radonic, 2012

“certain moral-political attitude and practices in dealing with the profoundly different past”.⁶⁸ Meaning that different nation’s versions of World War II have been an obstacle on reaching the historical truth, since in the beginning the weight of guilt was on Germany’s shoulder. Today the things have changed and “patterns have emerged according to which individual European nations acknowledge their role in the Holocaust”.⁶⁹ Admitting crimes from the Second World War while expressing remorse and apologizing are moral-political practices mentioned.

What Jarausch stresses in his article is that besides the previous function of “European memory” there is the other aspect, which aims “at creating a transnational public memory that can legitimate the transformation of the European Union into a super-state”.⁷⁰ Legitimization power of memory plays a very significant role when used by political elites and commemorating Holocaust is strongly linked with promotion of democratic values and human rights. Present political communities reaffirm themselves from the image of absolute moral evil, thereby inextricably linking memory and morality.⁷¹ By supporting this type of remembering countries promote and build their self-image as protectors of humanity and critics when basic rights have been violated.

Museums as are historical representations are a good examples of states showing their commitment to respect the idea of tolerance and diversity through remembering the

⁶⁸ Pakier and Strath 2010, p. 27

⁶⁹ Jan-Warner Muller, ““On European Memory,”” in Pakier and Strath 2010 p. 31

⁷⁰ Konrad H. Jarausch, “Nightmares or Daydreams? A Post script on the Europeanization of Memories in Pakier and Strath 2010, p. 310

⁷¹ Ibid 2010, p. 32

seriousness of genocidal acts committed by supporters of fascist regimes. In the same line it shows their dedication toward respecting the tragic European past and the EU as a community of countries that were part of. According to Kränkenhagen, the development of European narratives in museums, collections and exhibitions accordingly provides an exemplary field of inquiry for understanding Europeanization as a cultural and political process.⁷² A lot of museums are historical-symbolic representations of Europeanization of memory and point to the influence EU as powerful political entity has in transcending values and standards on national level.

Concerning this, Radonic stated that establishing Memorial Centers in Hungary and Croatia was done according to “European standards”, with Germany as a model for the Europeanization of the Holocaust. She implies that these “European standards”, even not officially accepted at that moment, meaning commemorating Holocaust Remembrance Day, played a decisive role when Hungary’s Center was opened some time before the country became a member of the EU. In her opinion, external actor like EU had some influence in its establishment and the ways to portray tragic events that took place during the II Second World War in this country.

In this chapter I will try to show how the Croatian leader Franjo Tudjman, respected historian by profession, as an internal actor constructed certain perception of collective memory about the Ustashe and NDH in Second World War II by downplaying the misdeeds done in Jasenovac as a negative part of Croatian history. Furthermore, my

⁷² Stefan Kränkenhagen (ed), “ Exhibiting Europe: The Development of European Narratives in Museums, Collections, and Exhibitions,” (Linköping University Electronic Press Journal of current cultural research: 2011) http://www.cultureunbound.ep.liu.se/v3/cu11v3-exhibiting_europe.pdf#page=5

aim is to present the influence that EU as an external actor has in transforming the standards of remembering created in the 1990s.

2.1. Croatia and the Second World War

The Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska-NDH) created by Ante Pavelic, a fascist leader in year 1941, lasted until 1945, and was considered a puppet state of NS Germany. During this time, Croatian Ustashe established extermination camp Jasenovac one of the largest death camps in Europe. This was a radical fascist nationalist movement that supported the idea of Great and “pure” Croatia and targeted Jews, Serbs and Roma as their obstacle in realization of their political goals. “It is presently estimated that the Ustasha regime murdered between 77,000 and 99,000 people in Jasenovac between 1941 and 1945”.⁷³

Under the leadership of Franjo Tudjman for almost 9 years a specific kind of historical representation of Second World War dominated the political discourse. Historical revisionism was promoted by leading politicians from all sides during the breakdown of Yugoslavia, but in the case of Tudjman memory politics was also concentrated on giving a specific outlook on the wrongdoings of the Independent State of Croatia. Hajdinjak notes that “in order to justify their intentions for violent withdrawing of borders during 90s” both, Serbian and Croatian leaders, “launched an aggressive propaganda war with the intention of making their nations “remember” all the suffering

⁷³ “Jasenovac,” *United States Memorial Holocaust Museum*,
<http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005449>

they have allegedly endured in the past at the hands of “the others.”⁷⁴ This was just a way of constructing collective memory through the determination and demonization of “the other”, in the Croatian context, Serbs.

Tudjman saw the period of World War II as a “milestone in Croatian’s independence” and in Croatian history. He tried to somehow transform this negative memory, by “reconciling the Ustashe and Partisans”.⁷⁵ According to him they were both “fighting for the same cause - Croatia, albeit in different ways”.⁷⁶ This conclusion comes from his suggestion to bring the bones of Ustasha members and NDH soldiers that were killed at Bleiburg massacre⁷⁷ to a “national memorial” at Jasenovac. “One sign of change in collective memory”, that Tudjman used is shifting the focus from atrocities of Ustashe to started increasingly bringing up the story of the murders in Bleiburg in Austria”.⁷⁸

In addition, Bellamy stated that in order to promote the myth of Croatians Tudjman continues statehood throughout history referred to NDH as a “legitimate manifestation of Croatia’s historical statehood, even when it becomes illegitimate”.⁷⁹

⁷⁴ Marko Hajdinjak, 2006 p. 2

⁷⁵ Partisans were the National Liberation Army in Yugoslavia that was lead by Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) and commander Josip Broz Tito.

⁷⁶ Marinko Culic, “Tudjman: Anatomija Neprosvecenog Apsolutizma [Tudjman: Anatomy of Unenlighted Absolutism],” (1999, p. 105) cited in Ljiljana Subotic, 2012

⁷⁷ Bleiburg massacre is relating to the events that happened by the end of the war in 1945, when Axis forces refused to surrender and attacked Partisans.. Despite the orders from Tito Partisans executed unidentified number of people that were Nazi collaborators or supporters or were at least supposed to be, but also Chetnics, Russian Cossacks and even civilians. This is taken from the book: Jozo Tomasevich “War and Revolution in Yugoslavia 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration,” (San Francisco: Stanford University Press,2001) p. 766

⁷⁸ Manfred Gestenfeld ,”The abuse of the Holocaust Memory,” (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2009) <http://jcpa.org/text/holocaustabuse.pdf>

⁷⁹ Alex J. Bellamy, “The Formation of Croatian National identity,” (Manchester: Manshester University Press, 2003), p. 70

This myth is based on the assumption that Croatia, from the Kingdom of Croats established in the tenth century until present, had always kept its independence. The Union with Hungary from 1120 was also problematic, and historians therefore argued that Croatian nobles gave the throne, but still had not lost their well-kept sovereignty. A similar story relates to the period of Habsburg Empire, where the decision to join Empire was the result of free choice.

Another reason for the historical revision of NDH was the support of a large Croatian Diaspora, since many Croatian migrants had some type of connection with the fascist regime. Tudjman pursued their support because at that time there were different cleavages that he wanted to unite and see saw himself as “personification of that unity”.

⁸⁰ That is why, in Bellamy’s opinion, he had argued that Serbs have exaggerated the number of victims of the Ustasha regime. Tudjman himself had been accused of understating the number of victims by claiming “that only a few thousand of them were Jews and accused them of having been *kapos* and responsible for the killings there”.⁸¹ Furthermore, in his book “Waste Lands: Historical Truth”⁸², on the one hand, he acknowledges that Europe's Jews suffered “terrible hardships” during the war years, but, on the other hand, publicly rejects the idea that “6 million Jews have been killed during the World War II”.⁸³

⁸⁰ Bellamy 2010, p. 67

⁸¹ Gestenfeld, 2009

⁸² Originally “Bespuca - Povijesne Zbiljnosti” published in 1988

⁸³ Mark Weber, “Croatia's Leader Denounced as Holocaust Revisionist,” (The Journal for Historical Review 13(4), 1993) p.19 http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v13/v13n4p19_Weber.html

Tudjman additionally changed the name of streets, and places that commemorated the period of Tito's Yugoslavia. Moreover, Tudjman "rehabilitated some of the émigré 'heroes', despite their association with the fascist movement".⁸⁴ Everything that has been mentioned are examples of how the memory of Ustasha's, Jasenovac and NDH was being manipulated by the Croatian political leader Tudjman who understood the power of memory, and used it as a source of legitimization and mobilization of people in the process of Croatian national identity building.

2.2 Europeanization of the memory of Jasenovac

Soon after the death of Tudjman in 1999, a new era of democratization began in Croatia, by "inauguration of prodemocratic government under Ivica Račan from (Socijalna Demokratska Partija Hrvatske, Democratic Party, (SDP)) and the election of Stjepan Mesic as President of the Republic".⁸⁵ What has interestingly happened is the transformation of the former nationalist Tudjman's party Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, (HDZ)) into a pro-European oriented party. At the next elections, HDZ was reelected and the new prime minister of Croatia became Ivo Sanader who held that position from 2003 until 2009.

During the commemoration ceremony at the Jasenovac memorial in year 2005, he stressed that "the anti-fascist victory over fascism and National Socialism was the victory

⁸⁴ Bellamy, 2003, p. 70

⁸⁵ Tina Freyburg and Solveig Richter, "National Identity Matters: The Limited Impact of EU Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans," (Journal of European Public Policy 17:2, 2010), p. 269

of those values woven into modern Europe and modern Croatia”.⁸⁶ In his speech, he also used identity friendly approach, by stating that Croats were also victims but in the “Homeland War” that happened in the 1990s, they were victims of Serbian fascism. Sanader also equalized Partisans and Ustashe. Radonic took a quote from the ITF Ten Year Anniversary Book that states: “Democracy’s victory over totalitarianism is the victory of the values embedded in modern Europe and Croatia”.⁸⁷ She also notes, that equalizing making the crimes “appears to be a bottom-up, post-communist process as well as top-down, EU process.” This was the beginning of carefully and gradually transforming memory that was created under Tadjman’s governance from both levels and continued also after the Tadjman period, though in a less explicit manner.

The third permanent exhibition of the Jasenovac Memorial Center was in 2006. What was not mentioned in the exhibition was “the fact that Ustasha’s were a rare example of a regime that operated death camps, without Nazi orders”.⁸⁸ Today, there is still an emphasis on their full dependency of the Third Reich, “Pavelić and his closest colleagues were under the domination and complete influence of these states”,⁸⁹ such discursive construction points to the lack of responsibility when it comes to the crimes of Ustashe. This is no longer the case nowadays, when not only history of World War Second and the Holocaust, but also the crimes mentioned above is clearly portrayed.

⁸⁶ Vjesnik, 25/04/2005(Croatian state owned daily newspaper) in Radonic, 2012

⁸⁷ Task force for international Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research, (Ten Year Anniversary Book: Stockholm, 2009), p. 32 in Radonic, 2012

⁸⁸ Radonic, 2012

⁸⁹ “Jasenovac Memorial Site,” <http://www.iusp-jasenovac.hr/Default.aspx?sid=6793>

Also noticeable is the focus on individual victim stories. The reason for this individualization can be seen in the aim to avoid “confronting the issue of the perpetrators”.⁹⁰ Jovicic noted that “for the public to feel and comprehend the terror of the crimes, it was necessary to set up the exhibition to stress that the Jasenovac crimes were committed against tens of thousands of individuals who have their names and surnames, rather than just an anonymous mass reduced to the group term ‘victims.’”⁹¹ On the current Croatian website dedicated to Jasenovac, the Ustashe are portrayed as perpetrators – while naming the important ones - are mentioned along with their leader Ante Pavelic.

Radonic has stressed how both Holocaust Memorial Centers since their opening in Hungary and Croatia have went from public and government officials opposition to affirmation. She noted that the webpage of Memorial Center in Hungary has been on English and to see the Hungarian version one needed to choose an option and click on it. What she meant was that the page was created in favor of foreign than for domestic purposes. In the words of Radonic, “the involvement of Hungarian official during the Second World War in the beginning was not presented with putting emphasis on individual victims”.⁹² For her this meant that they could not or were not ready to fully acknowledge their misdeeds from the past and it was easier for them to focus on individual stories. Currently the website of this Center conveys the message that “1938 marks the beginning of the process where the Hungarian state deprived a specific group

⁹⁰ Radonic, 2012

⁹¹ Natasa Jovicic, “Jasenovac Memorial Museum’s permanent exhibition – The Victim as an Individual” (Review of Croatian History 2 (1), 2006) pp. 295-299, p. 297

⁹² Radonic, 2012

of its citizens from all that makes a man a man”. Moreover, until visitors reach the final room of the exhibition, “the lines on the wall representing individual lives run out, and the personal objects introduced in the first room disappear”.⁹³ If we take claims of Subotic into account than, seeing how now the narrative in museum is portrayed, presents a strong difference to the resistance that existed in the beginning.

There are certain similarities between the representation of negative memory that Hungary and Croatia shared when speaking of Second World War and this memory had a difficulty of being critically viewed by public and government officials. Confronting unpleasant memories of nation’s misdeeds in World War II as presented here does not go easy. There is a transition process through which a country needs to go. Commemorations such as museums are good places for one to see how this transition comes in place.

During the 1990s Croatia was in isolation which gave the opportunity to Tudjman to form a hegemonic discourse that would lead to the construction of a new collective identity and memory. After 2000, as we can see by the way the memory of Jasenovac was commemorated, and the raising influence that EU had in this period due to the negotiation process with Croatia possible EU membership, definitely contributed to more moral-political discourse about the so called “negative memory” of the Second world War. Accepting Croatia’s involvement in the crimes against humanity and

⁹³ “Holocaust Memorial Center,”

<http://old.hdke.hu/index.php?menu=030101&mgroup=1&app=info&pa%22Holocaust%20Memorial%20Center.%22%20http://old.hdke.hu/index.php?menu=030101&mgroup=1&app=info&page=main&artid=4ddb04e6d8e013776a928b5476583685.%20ge=main&artid=4ddb04e6d8e013776a928b5476583685>

reflecting this past critically, while recreating Tudjman's version of Second World War, was done not only externally but from the inside too. Pro-Democratic governments elected in 2000 started the process. Transformation into more open society resulted in more open-minded outlook into their past. So from amnesia to remembering, and from narrative of denying to one of accepting was the transition from the 1990's to present.

CHAPTER 3: HOMELAND WAR AND THE PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMINALS

Homeland War is referring to Croatian War of Independence (1990-1995) that begun when Croatia wanted to separate from Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). This resulted in conflict between Yugoslav People's Army (YNA) and Croatian forces that supported independence. Franjo Tudjman, during and after the war promoted victimhood narrative, in which Croats were victims of Serbian aggressors. When International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) requested from national government to prosecute Croatian war criminals this caused internal conflicts in the country and in with international political and legal actors.

For politicians and citizens "the tribunal indictments of Croatians had the effect of equating the guilt of Croatians and Serbs. To most Croats, this is reprehensible since Serbs are perceived as the aggressors of the Homeland War".⁹⁴ Though tribunal

⁹⁴ Victor Peskin and Mieczyslaw P. Boduszynski, "International Justice and Domestic Politics: Post-Tudjman Croatia and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia," (Europe-Asia Studies 55(7), 2010), pp. 1117-1142 , p. 1118

prosecutes individuals not nations; the opposition toward ICTY was strong due to “image” created through narrative promotion imposed by Tudjman. Lack of cooperation was the result of national identity trying to resist the change and preserve historical representation of war from the 1990s. Since the country was in political isolation when the narrative was created, foreign influence and the process of democratization from 2000 transformed the story by promoting more positive and open attitude towards Croatian crimes in the War, which eventually led to compliance and cooperation.

3.1 Collective victimhood – Tudjman’s narrative about the Homeland War

As every country involved in the war, Croatia also went through a nation (re)building process. It is important to note that, “In times of major and rapid social changes, modified perception of national belonging and consequently of common national identity will emerge”.⁹⁵ As I have discussed in my previous chapter, Tudjman “portrayed fascist Independent State of Croatia as a predecessor of present independent state of Croatia”⁹⁶

Croatia’s memory of the 1990s has also been modified; in both cases memory was used as a legitimizing instrument for Tudjman political goals. Past becomes manipulated in order to serve and suit current political needs. In creating the myth of collective

⁹⁵ Hajdinjak, 2006, p. 2

⁹⁶ Ibid 2006, p. 2

victimhood, besides the one mentioned, the discriminatory function of memory plays the most important role. President Tudjman compared Serbs to a “cancer, destroying the very heart of Croatian nation.”⁹⁷ In my opinion demonizing “the other” helps in forming collective national identity by uniting citizens while referring to the enemy as a source of problems that government and people go through.

For the nation-building process in Croatia, the myth of collective victimhood plays decisive role in creating national identity. This myth is of utmost relevance when the cooperation with ICTY or lack of the same is in question. Hesitation of governments to fulfill the requirement and extradite war criminals is a good example of seeing the importance of national identity in relation to national politics. Freyburg and Richter confirm that in the case of Croatia regarding ICTY, “if national identity runs counter to democratic requirements, this will ‘block’ compliance by framing it as inappropriate action “.”⁹⁸

3.2 Problematic relationship ICTY-Croatia- From noncompliance to compliance

Political conditionality, if strongly in opposition to national identity, can be ineffective, as it was the case in Croatia and ICTY relationship. Here domestic political actors follow the “logic of appropriateness” that corresponds to constructivist approach. In decision-making process, actions of governments are influenced by social ideas, values

⁹⁷ Mariana Lenkova, (ed.), “Hate Speech in the Balkans”, (Athens: International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 1998) p.39 in Hajdinjak, 2006

⁹⁸ Freyburg and Richter 2010, p. 263

and meanings that are essential parts of identity. From the rationalist perspective followed by the “logic of consequentialism” and based on the cost-benefit calculations this can be explained by arguing that complying with requirements of EU is politically costly.

Freyburg and Richter have tried to prove that identity is the main reason for resisting prosecuting war criminals and complying with the conditions imposed by EU. They extend their argument by presenting the transition in two phases:

In Phase 1 (2001-5), Croatia self - conception as innocent heroic still largely prevailed, which framed extradition of alleged war criminals as an inappropriate governmental reaction. Yet, in Phase 2 (2005-8), it became obvious (2005-8), that this self-conception was being challenged by an identity version of Croatia as part of a European family, prescribing co-operation with the ICTY as the ‘right thing’ to do.⁹⁹

In the first phase what is questionable, taking realist view into perspective is, why there was no step forward in prosecuting war criminals since 2003, when the public opinion was more prone to accept the extradition of wanted war criminals so there was no need to worry about political costs of compliance. In the second phase, there was an identity conflict between preserving the narrative of victimhood from the 1990s and protecting Croatian war criminals or accepting European standards of appropriate behavior in relations to ICTY. This was resolved by arresting Ante Gotovina, who was at time considered by many a hero of the war and this was a step forward from previously perceiving this act as betrayal and as something negative and unacceptable.

⁹⁹ Freyburg and Richter 2010, p. 272

This identity friendly approach showed that there was a partial identity change, which was strongly influenced by EU as an external actor. In the case of prosecuting war criminals there were two narratives of appropriate behavior competing, European and national one. Historical narrative created during the 1990s about innocence of Croats in the War and European that was interested in building democratic political culture and finding the “historical truth” came to a collision at first. Since identity is socially constructed, through the interaction of domestic and EU actors, there has been certain modification and transformation of the former. “Normative identity” of EU has influenced national level firstly by exporting legal rule and norms and later the social ones influencing behavior, by saying “what is right, and what is not”.

In contrast, “Tudjman regime did little to respect international norms. As a consequence, Croatia was largely isolated by the end of the 1990’s”.¹⁰⁰ Since the discourse was not contested, there were not strong enough narratives that could compete or challenge those which were promoted during his regime. After 2000, new pro-democratic government has been elected (SDP) which meant a beginning of social and political change, especially in relation to ICTY. Croatia’s oscillation between ethno-nationalist sovereignist isolationism and European integration constituted a significant cleavage within Croatian politics and the triumph of the latter in 2000.¹⁰¹

During the last 12 years, Croatia has gone through various stages in regard to the cooperation with ICTY. Different social and political circumstances have resulted in

¹⁰⁰ Peskin and Boduszynski, p. 1124

¹⁰¹ Dejan Jovic and Christopher K. Lamont, “Introduction Croatia after Tudjman: Encounters with the Consequences of Conflict and Authoritarianism,” (Europe-Asia Studies 62(10), 2010), pp. 1609-1620, p. 1614

incontinency towards EU conditionality. Incontinency in relationship was under the influence of political leaders. The more the narrative is in contradiction to EU version the more difficult the cooperation will be. Jovic and Lamont stress that under the leadership of two important political actors there has been a rapid improvement in cooperating with ICTY. “Under former president Ivo Josipovic and former Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor, Croatia experienced rapid pace and transformation ”while dealing with three legacies from the past “Croatian’s involvement in the Bosnian War; widespread political corruption within state institutions and public firms and most importantly cooperation with the ICTY”.¹⁰²

Leaders can have great influence in creating desirable discourse due to their position and larger access to sources of spreading narratives, which would in return create certain type of collective identity, that would respond to the current “political need”. In this chapter narrative of the past from Tadjman era, after 2000 was been contested by the EU, and through turbulent Croatia’s relationship with ICTY, it can be seen that transformation happened as a result of social interaction between the actors. Furthermore, I also discussed that through that interaction the previous memory of Croatian victimhood as part of their national identity has been modified, which confirms the idea of “dynamic” side of identity. In addition, the process of gradual Europeanization of memory of collective victimhood created during the 1990’s is shown through compliance and noncompliance in regard to ICTY.

¹⁰² Jovic and Lamont 2010, p. 1611

In the next chapter I will discuss another Tudjman's historical narrative of Croatian continuous statehood which aimed at preserving it, and when Croatia had referendum deciding to enter EU or not in 2012, this narrative was the main source of euroscepticism. On the other, some feared, that the history will repeat itself and that EU would be new Yugoslavia. Additionally, tracing ethno-national European Croatian heritage and stressing that they have no connection with Balkan was being used by Tudjman but not in that measure as it was the case during the EU referendum campaign.

CHAPTER 4: EUROPEAN UNION AS NEW YUGOSLAVIA?

Tudjman vigorously promoted historical claim to statehood in the 90s, where he wanted to create a continuous line in Croatian right to full sovereignty. In the words of Bellamy he did not promote so much the idea of European heritage of Croats because "it is only with the advent of Croatian state that it is possible to speak about Croats with any clarity".¹⁰³ Tracing origins is difficult task and hard to prove so in the 1990s when Croatia was fighting to become independent state reference to statehood seemed more reasonable. In difference to 2012, when "the political need" to form a pro-European narrative requested putting more emphasis on Croats; as if being a part of Europe and rather than the Balkan. The context of two referendums plays a significant role in what narrative will the political actors use to gain public support.

4.1 Croatian's right to statehood

¹⁰³ Bellamy 2003, p. 35

This narrative takes the time frame from Kingdom of Croats established in the tenth century to present day. The story of continuous line of sovereignty stumbled upon two historical events that did not fit. The first was union of Croatia and Hungary, where historians argued entering the union was a voluntary act. The second one was connected to the period of Habsburg Empire, where again being a part of this Empire was also a result of a free choice. When Yugoslavia is in question, that Croatia was a part of from the end of Second World War until 1991, the claim is how this federation was illegitimate. *Sabor*, representative body of Croatian citizens, "had not freely chosen to enter into the union, unlike –it is claimed – the union with Hungary in 1102 and Austria in 1526".¹⁰⁴

As a result Yugoslavia was considered as something to be avoided and as a negative part of Croatian history, which would be invoked in the debate over becoming a part of European Union while eurosceptics have related it to new Yugoslavia. In one of the articles in Croatian newspapers it was noted that "Even though Croatia in the 1990s wanted to enter European Union so it could escape from Yugoslavian heritage, today European Union is a new community of 'enslaved people'-Euroslavia".¹⁰⁵ In contrast, political actors have addressed the fear of losing sovereignty or independence by taking a different approach.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid 2003, p. 57

¹⁰⁵ EEF, "Entering in Euroslavia we will lose independence and sovereignty." (org. Ulaskom u Evroslaviju izgubit cemo samostalnost i suverenost) *Vecernji List*, 18 01, 2012.
<http://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/ulaskom-euroslaviju-izgubit-cemo-samostalnost-suverenost-clanak-367319>
 Note: All of the articles in Croatian newspapers have been translated by author of this thesis

The president of Croatia Ivo Josipovic in his public statement have stated that “our history has been difficult and that many have doubts about unification with other countries and people” and he further stated that “full freedom, human rights, freedom of speech and faith, labor rights and quality of living standard that Homeland has given us, can be completely fulfilled only on European terms”. He also noted that, “EU assures us lasting peace and security” while in the same time “Croatia will not lose its sovereignty and wealth or natural resources. Croatian name, language and culture cannot be forgotten; it would be even more important part of European Heritage”.¹⁰⁶

Here he is first acknowledging the hardship that Croatia has gone through unifications, while not referring directly to “the countries” that caused difficulties for Croats, thus making it more open for interpretation. Against this, he emphasizes the importance of core values that Europe especially promotes, like protecting human rights, preserving peace and providing security. Josipovic mentions Homeland War and in that way stresses that the same values were promoted than, thus creating connection between Croatian and European values. Additionally, he addresses the main fears that were among people in regards to entering EU, like losing part of their national identity; “Croatian name, language and culture”. What Josipovic tries to do is to merge national narrative about need to preserve their independence and national identity and European narrative engraved in democratic and liberal values.

Jadranka Kosor, former Prime Minister of Croatia also emphasized how “all of us who think that entering is a good thing, choose the road of stability, peace and

¹⁰⁶ VL, “Josipovic: Entering EU we will have even better living standard.” (org. Ulaskom u Uniju imat cemo bolji zivotni standard) *Vecernji list*, 20 01, 2012. <http://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/josipovic-ulaskom-uniju-imat-cemo-bolji-zivotni-standard-clanak-368349>

prosperity”¹⁰⁷ and she also expressed gratitude to her co-workers, negotiation team and most importantly citizens who were defending country during the Homeland War. Again, the image of Europe was perceived similarly and by addressing and thanking war participants she wanted to state that “EU road” today was the path that in the 90s Tudjman’s Croatia was heading.

Fear of loosing independence was stressed by the President of the Croatian Parliament Boris Sprem, who noted that, “Croatia will keep her authenticity and stand on its own feet, with wider perspective and bigger possibilities.”¹⁰⁸ Preserving sovereignty has been an important narrative as it was in the other two cases by means of insuring the public that the same will not be threatened but improved. Entering EU here is presented as not being in any kind of opposition with Croatian “right to statehood”.

These statements made by three important political actors show their intention to transform statehood narrative into less rigid, stressing that accepting EU does not mean that they would immediately be in conflict. What Josipovic, Kosor and Sprem all try to do, is to reconcile these two narratives, in this way gradual Europeanization comes in place.

¹⁰⁷ Maja Sturina and Ante Srzic, “Croatia is, after Greece, first country that will independently enter EU,” (org. Hrvatska je nakon Grčke prva zemlja koja ulazi samostalno u EU) taken from <http://www.tportal.hr/>, 19 01, 2012. <http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/171303/Hrvatska-je-nakon-Grcke-prva-zemlja-koja-ulazi-samostalno-u-EU.html>

¹⁰⁸ Luc, “Josipovic, Milanovic and Sprem: Big Yes has been said to Europe” (org. Josipovic, Milanovic I Sprem: Izreceno je da Evropi) 22 01, 2012. *Vecernji List*, <http://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/josipovic-milanovic-sprem-izreceno-je-veliko-da-europi-clanak-368759>

4.2 Tracing Croatian Origins – European not Balkan

Franke Wilmer states “culture and history are basic materials used to construct ethnic meaning”.¹⁰⁹ Traditions as such are relevant since, as he further notes, they “construct collective identity in both positive (who we are) and negative (who we are not) terms.”¹¹⁰ In relations to Croatia, looking on a concept of civic identity is more appropriate since the question of being European or Balkan is more a question of representing certain values and traditions, without necessarily meaning that Croats are not of Slavic origin or any other for that matter.

To explain this more, civic identity by definition is “based on well-defined territory, a community of laws and institutions, a single political will, equal rights for members of the nation and common values, traditions or sentiment that bind people together”.¹¹¹ Eisenstadt and Giesen, stress that civic codes consider collective identity as representing “routines, traditions and institutional or constitutional arrangements of a community are regarded as a core of that identity”.¹¹² For this reason I will focus more on looking this way at identity construction, when discussing Croatian perception of being more European, especially in the time that was just before the EU referendum.

¹⁰⁹ Franke Wilmer, “Identity, Culture and Historicity: The Social Construction of Ethnicity in the Balkans,” (World Affairs Institute: Ethnicity and Politics 160 (1), 1997), pp. 3-16, p. 5

¹¹⁰ Wilmer 1997, p. 6

¹¹¹ Dusko Sekulic, “Civic and Ethnic Identity: The Case of Croatia,” (Ethnic and Racial Studies, 27(3), 2004), pp.455-483, p. 460

¹¹² Samuel L. Eisenstadt and Bernhard Giesen, “The Construction of Collective Identity,” (European Archive for Sociology 36, 1995), pp. 72-102, p. 80

Period under Tudjman's leadership stands in strong contrast with the present values in Croatia; since Tudjman's period, values are based on aggressive ethno-nationalism strongly influenced by violent ethnic conflict that Croatia had been through. In 2000 pro-European Democratic Party (SDP) has been elected and that led to a shift toward more European values of respecting human rights, tolerance and solidarity. What was common for Tudjman and the transformation that happened after 2000 is the reluctance to portray Croatian nation as part of the Balkans.

Balkan was seen as "backward", lacking modernization and urbanization, ex Prime Minister of Croatia Nikica Valentić, when the EU referendum passed, had stressed that "the most important thing is that we said Balkan goodbye".¹¹³ Additionally for Croats this term was associated with Yugoslavia, something that they want to estrange from, especially Tudjman. He promoted inconsistent attitude, while in the same time wanted to separate Croatia from Balkans by claiming their Europeanness thus making the relationship with EU more difficult. The Croatia-EU relationship worsened when the EU introduced the Regional Approach for the "Western Balkans", a concept that Tudjman's government, keen to dissociate the country from ideas of Yugoslavia and the Balkans, intensely disliked".¹¹⁴

His idea of what European means, has been modified after the regime change in 2000. Telling how Croats are European was no more just a rhetorical narrative with

¹¹³ M. Spogar and D. Vuković, "Our choice is a good message for Europe," (org. Nas izbor je dobra poruka za Evropu) *Vecernji List*, 22 01, 2012. <http://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/v-pusic-nas-izbor-dobra-je-poruka-europu-clanak-368736>

¹¹⁴ Dejan Jović, "Croatia and the European Union: Long Delayed Journey," (Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 8(1), 2006), pp. 85-103, p. 86

nationalist undertone as Tudjman had presented. After his death and new democratic government elected, this narrative of Croatian Europeanness has transformed too. The only thing that was the same is the negative connotation that Balkan, as a term, had among Croatian citizens. On the other hand, being part of Europe and not of Balkan did not anymore have just a discriminatory function of “us” against “them”; it now meant that Croatia has evolved from “backwardness” to a modern and better state based on core democratic values, and it represented the transition of this country in last 12 years.

During the EU referendum campaign: there was an article saying that on the day of referendum “we decide will we come back home in EuroAtlantic association of values, or will we be tied to Balkan region, as we were in the past”.¹¹⁵ Here the “we” is intended to create a sense of unity among pro-European citizens and form a feeling of shared past, while forming a link with values that this pro-European attitude promotes. Balkan is clearly depicted as opposite for what Euroatlantic association stands for, political, cultural and social “backwardness” of system. Here in difference to Tudjman, being part of Europe actually meant, not only separating themselves from Serbs who were due to the War seen as an aggressor and enemy, but a move away from the system that existed than.

In regard to this, another article stated that “Croatia has successfully managed to change and become a better country with developed society, and set an example to other countries in neighborhood who are still called “Western Balkans” only Croatia does not

¹¹⁵ Iva Vidovic, “Milinovic: Deciding to say Yes on the Referendum,” (org. Odlucimo se da na referendum kazemo sudbonosno da) *Vecernji List*, 19 01, 2010. . <http://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/milinovic-odlucimo-se-referendumu-sudbonosno-da-clanak-367836>

belong there any more”.¹¹⁶ This relates to my previous explanation of shift in what being European meant for Tudjman and what European narrative means now. In addition, when talking about European heritage there is no stress on the “other” as Kosor stated “Croatia with her history, culture and tradition of Christianity belongs to Europe and today we have to confirm it on the referendum, which I no doubt think it would be successful”.¹¹⁷

In the previous example, it can be seen that Kosor is referring to Europeanness of Croatian national and cultural identity without creating the “other”. This presents the transformation of narrative that was used by Tudjman in order to distance from the enemy. Moreover, Kosor has emphasized the European heritage of Croats more since “the political need” was giving affirmative vote on the referendum.

One of the “heroes” of the War for Independence, former General of the Croatian army Ante Gotovina that is in Hague now, also was quoted in *Jutarnji List*, “In this way I want to state that I will tomorrow vote for Croatia to become a member of EU-where Croatia historically belongs and with the referendum it will just formally affirm it. Croatia’s place is in the EU”.¹¹⁸ His statement of supporting EU raised much interest and

¹¹⁶ Tomislav Kvasnec, “Europe or Balkan: We choose the Future,” (org. Evropa ili Balkan: Mi biramo budućnost) 22 01 2012. <http://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/dan-odluke-europa-ili-balkan-biramo-buducnost-clanak-368555>

¹¹⁷ Hina, “Ending Negotiation Process: Croatia is coming Home,” (org. Završetkom pregovora Hrvatska se vraća kući) 22 01, 2012. taken from <http://www.tportal.hr/>, <http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/171869/Zavrsetkom-pregovora-Hrvatska-se-vraca-kuci.html>

¹¹⁸ “Gotovina urged Croatian to come out on Referendum,” (org. Ante Gotovina poziva Hrvate da se odazovu Referendumu), 21 01 2012. *Jutarnji List*, <http://www.jutarnji.hr/i-ante-gotovina-poziva-hrvate-da-se-odazovu-referendumu--lijepoj-nasoj-je-mjesto-u-eu-/1001458/>

probably in same way influenced voting on referendum. “It represents a strong-blow to Eurosceptics campaign based mostly on war veterans cry for freedom and sovereignty they have shed their blood for during the war”.¹¹⁹ What is interesting here is that he came to be in some way a mediator between nationalistic and pro-European groups in Croatia. Some time after the War, he was seen as protector of nation and its interests and now EU he considered EU as part of them, in spite the fact that he was, under their pressure, sent to Haag.

Overall, what is important to state here is that the narrative has changed and that the process of Europeanization influenced the perception of what Europe and being European means. As seen in the chapter, combining two narratives on the Croatian EU referendum in an appropriate manner lead to successful outcome.

¹¹⁹ Rich F. Fitch, “Gotovina’s Yes on the Referendum,” 21 01 2012, *Hello Europe its Croatia Calling*, <http://croatiacalling.info/2012/01/gotovinas-yes-in-the-referendum/>

CONCLUSION

In a short period of time Croatia went from being newly independent state to becoming a part of something bigger, a union of states, from one regime to another, from nationalistic to pro-European rhetoric. This process that I presented as a process of Europeanization affected many segments of Croatian society, but on I was more focused is the matter of identity and memory. My argument was situated firstly in a specific time frame, from the beginning of 90's until present. In the first decade, Tudjman as a statesman and historian had created his own version of "what was" and "what was not" and constructed different narratives that dominated the public sphere. This was due to isolation of country and the same have been contested when the new government was elected in 2000. Soon after, these narrative or memories of the past run counters with European ones. In contrast to the Tudjman's era where there was no such a strong foreign influence of EU.

Constructing memory has proven to be a powerful instrument in creating a public support for a current "political need". In the context of Croatia, where forming a desirable collective memory was particularly significant, "the political need" was having two referendums; referendum for independence and referendum for accessing EU. What I have argued is that memory in circumstances, when important political questions are at stake and identity crises present, forming collective memory matters a great deal. Franjo Tudjman understood the power of the past and by using memory politics constructed suitable identity. Moreover, EU has its own stories that serve the purpose of creating cohesion and solidarity, which just monetary or political union cannot create.

In regards to my argument I have pointed out, three things; firstly I argue that identity in politics matters, secondly I showed that constructing identity in the time of crises is of special significance and thirdly I pointed out that memory and identity are strongly connected by showing the transformation of historical narratives through Europeanization. Taking this into account, I have proved that memory and politics in the time of identity crises are closely related as it has been showed in the case of Croatia.

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