

Energy Security and the Foreign Policy of Weak States:
A Comparative Case Study of Georgia and Ukraine.

Michael Steen

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Department of International Relations and European Studies

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Supervisor: Matteo Fumagalli

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Abstract

The basic puzzle that this paper seeks to solve is why the Georgian government of Saakashvili was far more successful than Ukrainian government lead by Yushchenko in pursuing a pro western foreign policy against the wishes of the Russian state, their more powerful and historically dominant neighbour. This puzzle stems from the fact that an initial observation of the situation in the immediate aftermath of the Rose and Orange revolutions of 2003 and 2004 would indicate that Ukraine should have been far more successful than Georgia in this attempt. The relevance of this research area stems from the fact that it works to probe our understanding of weak states and how they are likely respond to increasingly scarce sources of energy. The work here seeks to contribute to literature surrounding the role of energy security in the formulation of state foreign policy. In particular the work looks to demonstrate how, on both a theoretical and real world level energy security can be seen to shape the behaviour of weak states on the international scene. In doing so the work builds upon the insecurity dilemma advanced by Job through the incorporation of the Copenhagen School's sectoral approach and the substation of military coercion with economic coercion.

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Introduction

The modern world is one that is becoming increasingly aware of the central role played by energy. Scholars such as Robertson have gone so far as to claim “a failure of energy security means that the momentum of industrialisation and modernity grinds to a halt, and survival itself becomes far less certain.”¹ Although it is important to recognise that Robertson is articulating a failure of energy security so sudden and total that it speaks to an almost apocalyptic vision, it articulates a fundamental truth about the importance of energy in the industrialised world. As Shaffer notes:

The age in which we live has been deemed the era of ‘hydrocarbon man.’ What we consume, how we live, the way we wage war, even the means of entertainment available to us have all been shaped by our access the energy produced by fossil fuels.²

Significantly however, different states and societies have different means and incentives that serve to define how they respond to the international system and their growing need for energy. The discussion here looks at how the growing need for energy affects the behaviour of states within the international system which exist in a continuing state of insecurity due their frail nature. Taking energy security as relating to an “an ability to meet immediate demand”³ and an understanding of weak states as being more vulnerable to internal than external threats, the discussion here attempts to demonstrate how energy security can be seen to shape the behaviour of weak states upon the international scene.⁴

Research Question

The basic puzzle that this paper seeks to solve is why the Georgian government of Saakashvili was far more successful than Ukrainian government lead by Yushchenko in pursuing a pro-Western foreign policy against the wishes of the Russian state, their more powerful and historically dominant neighbour. This question stems from the fact that an initial observation of the situation in the immediate aftermath of the Rose and Orange revolutions of 2003 and 2004

¹ Paul Roberts, *The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2004). p240

² B. Shaffer, *Energy Politics* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) p6

³ Paul Roberts, *The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2004). p238

⁴ B. Shaffer, *Energy Politics* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) p12

would indicate that Ukraine should have been far more successful than Georgia in adopting a pro-Western foreign policy. Georgia not only had three break away regions, two of which were occupied by Russian troops, but more significantly, it had little means of bargaining with Russia or defending itself against Russian aggression. Ukraine on the other hand, is not only a larger state with a higher level of economic growth than Georgia, but Ukraine also controlled the pipelines that allowed for the transmission of over 80 percent of Russia's gas exports to Europe.⁵ In fact, the only significant advantage Georgia had over Ukraine was that it was not wholly reliant upon Russia for its supply energy resources. This combined with the fact that Ukraine is in a far better geographical position when it comes to promoting relationships with western states, results in an obvious puzzle emerging. Why did the far better positioned Ukraine fail in its attempt to pursue a pro-western foreign policy, whilst the poorly positioned Georgia succeeded? It is this question that this paper seeks to solve, whilst also contributing to the literature surrounding the topic.

Why This Is Relevant?

The relevance of this puzzle stems from the fact that it works to probe our understanding of weak states and how they will likely respond to increasingly scarce sources of energy. This is important because weak states are playing an increasingly large role within international relations. This increase in prominence can be seen to be the result of the existing norms within international relations. As Thürer puts it, "International law is based on the principles of sovereignty and the equality of states. This gives the so-called small states a comfortable shelter, protecting them from the ambitions of the great powers. Sheep and lions lie side by side in peace because they are, as in the cages of a zoo, separated from each other by the bars of sovereignty."⁶ This principle of state equality allows weak and small states to increase their role within international relations. These weak states include both the internationally significant and important states such as Brazil, India, and China as well as, the emerging and notoriously fragile states around the world. However both weak and strong states alike are demanding an ever increasingly large amount of an ever-decreasing supply of energy resources. As this finite reserve of fuels decreases, satisfying the immediate demand for fuel is going to become an increasingly more difficult challenge. Scholars such as Moran and Russell have highlighted the fact that energy security has taken on a significance within international relations

⁵ D. Yergin. *The Quest: Energy, Security and the Remaking of the Modern World*. (London, Penguin, 2011) p336

⁶ D. Thürer, 'The Perceptions of Small States: Myth and Reality' in *Small States inside and outside the European Union: Interests and policies*. Ed. L. Goetschel. (Dordrecht, Kluwer Publishers, 1998) p38-39

that is equalled only by national security within the priorities of nations.⁷ Given this increasing priority given to energy security and the increased prominence of weak states it is intensely problematic that there is little existing literature on the implications of energy security for the foreign policy of weak states. One of the most recent examples of why this is a problem is the recent cancellation of the Myitsone Dam project by the Burmese government, despite the opposition of the Chinese government. This is a situation, which saw a major power in the region defied by an isolated and traditionally subservient neighbour.⁸ Significantly, the fact that the argument focuses upon the insecurity dilemma allows for the application of the theory to specific regions and societies of a state as well as the state as a whole.

What do we currently know?

The existing literature on energy security, although substantial, has primarily focused upon the realities of energy security rather than the theoretical implications. Scholars such as Valentine have noted that the “fuzzy nature” of energy security has led to a situation where the term has been redefined and reused by many different theorists and actors, to whom it means a variety of things.⁹ The simple act such as looking at the contents page of the Routledge Handbook of Energy Security demonstrates the plethora of different fields into which energy security has been incorporated, ranging from environmental studies and social development to public policy and energy services, and thus, the obvious potential for confusion.¹⁰ However, this does not mean that scholars have failed in their attempts to articulate what is meant by the term energy security. In fact, Valentine himself has demonstrated that the fundamental logic of much of the existing literature on energy security is based upon an “economic rationality.”¹¹ Significantly however, multiple scholars have devoted a large amount of time to the implications of energy security upon global politics and the foreign policy of states.¹² One of the primary

⁷ D. Moran and J. Russell ‘Introduction’ in *Energy Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of resource management*. Ed. D. Morlan and J. Russell (London, Routledge, 2009) p2

⁸ B. Blanchard, China calls for talks over shelved Myanmar dam. Reuters. October 1st 2011. Accessed May 30th 2012. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/01/us-china-myanmar-dam-idUSTRE7900N120111001>

⁹ S. V. Valentine. ‘The fuzzy nature of energy security’ in *The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security*. Ed. B. Sovacool. (New York, Routledge, 2011). p56

¹⁰ *The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security*. Ed. B. Sovacool. (New York, Routledge, 2011).

¹¹ S. V. Valentine. ‘The fuzzy nature of energy security’ in *The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security*. Ed. B. Sovacool. (New York, Routledge, 2011). p61

¹² See *Energy Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of resource management*. Ed. D. Morlan and J. Russell (London, Routledge, 2009)

Energy and Security: Toward and New Foreign policy Strategy. Ed. J. Kalicki and D. Goldwyn. (Washington Woodrwo Wilson Center Press, 2005)

B. Shaffer, *Energy Politics* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009)

conclusions to come out of this work is that “energy and [international] politics are intrinsically interlinked.”¹³ As a result, these works have served to demonstrate that, although energy security has been defined and utilised in a number of different ways, it can be seen to play a major role in the international system and in the relationship between states. Despite the extensive work upon the subject thus far, little attention has been played to the implications of energy security for the foreign policy of weak states.

Job has articulated the defining feature of a weak state as a situation in which the state is more vulnerable to internal threats than it is to external threats.¹⁴ Although traditionally thought of as irrelevant due to the fact that they were dominated by larger powers, scholars such as Coplin have noted that “weak states no longer serve as pawns for the great powers,” but do instead have the ability to act autonomously.¹⁵ This being the case, the focus has been directed at what can be seen as the decisive factors in explaining the behaviour of weak states. The most important contribution to this discussion comes from Job and Ayoob and the development of the insecurity dilemma as a means of understanding weak state behaviour. Working off of an understanding that weak states often lack an effective government, national cohesion, and a government monopoly on state power, these scholars have demonstrated how the security of different sectors of society is given prominence over national security and therefore, often result in the involvement of external powers in domestic politics.¹⁶ Utilising this framework as a means of understanding the behaviour of weak states, this discussion aims to develop a new understanding of the insecurity dilemma that incorporates energy security.

¹³ B. Shaffer, *Energy Politics* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) p41

¹⁴ B. Job. *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Regime, and State Securities in the Third World*. (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992) p12

¹⁵ W. Coplin, *Introduction to International Politics: A Theoretical Overview* (Chicago, Markham, 1971), p137

¹⁶ R. Jackson. “Regime Security” in *Contemporary Security Studies*. Ed. A. Collins. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) p149

Methodology and Case Selection

The research methodology utilised here is an inductive one, beginning with the observation that two states, in similar situations and pursuing the same foreign policy, experienced different degrees of success. This observation forms the starting point of the paper and leads to an analysis of the situation at the time of the colour revolutions before ultimately positing a hypothesis and conclusions regarding the theoretical implications of the research. For its overarching structure, the study utilises Mill's method of difference and his idea "If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon."¹⁷ Therefore, the cases selection must not only have a number of shared characteristics that can be seen to have affected the outcome, but also a crucial difference.

The discussion here focuses upon the post-Soviet states of Ukraine and Georgia and how energy security has affected their foreign policy during the last decade. Although it is important to note that there are other potential cases that could be used for the discussion, these two are particularly suited to a comparative case study. This comes as a result of the shared conditions under which their economies developed, their history of domination by Russia, and the fact that both states had a democratic revolution during the early years of the 21st century. The communist rule of these countries also resulted in the development of economies that were not suited to the capitalist system. Rather than the capitalist economic system of supply and demand providing the main mechanism for growth and development within the economy, the command economy meant that both countries were industrialised in a way that relied on a cheap and steady supply of energy from Russia. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 plunged both Ukraine¹⁸ and Georgia¹⁹ into a deep recession, due to the fact that both economies had relied upon the neighbouring republic of the Soviet Union as markets for their products. In 2004, both economies relied heavily upon an industrial sector that was dependent upon subsidised energy supplies from Russia. Georgia imported 54% of its energy from abroad and

¹⁷ J. Mill, *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation*. Vo. 1. (New York, Harper and Brothers. 1858) p225

¹⁸ R. Shen, *Ukraine's Economic Reform: Obstacles, Errors, Lessons*. (Wesport, Praeger Publishers, 1996) p32

¹⁹ J. Aves, *Georgia: The Economy in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 1999: A Political and Economic Survey*. (London, Europa Publications, 1999) p365-366

had an industrial sector that accounted for 26% of its GDP.²⁰ Similarly Ukraine had an industrial sector which accounted for 36% of its GDP and imported 44% of this energy.²¹ Over the next five years each state would remain in similar situation, however Georgia would be able to switch it supply to Azerbaijan in 2006 following heavy pressure from Russia to pay higher prices or sell much over its transmission, a move which saw Georgia increasing its imports of energy from Azerbaijan by over 1000% in terms of both gas and electricity.²² As a result of this, both economies were highly vulnerable to energy shocks instituted by their main supplier, Russia. In terms of foreign policy aims, following colour revolutions in each state, the new leadership articulated a desire to develop closer relations with the West, and in particular, gain membership of NATO, a move highly resented by Russia.²³ The major difference between these states is that whilst Ukraine had no alternative source of energy during negotiations with Russia, Georgia was able to replace Russian sources of energy with both domestic production and importation of gas from Azerbaijan.²⁴ Due to the fact that both states started off in a similar situation, except for this one crucial difference, they both pursued similar foreign policy objectives yet, achieved different levels of success. It is because of this that they are ideally suited for a comparative study of this kind.

Argument and Structure

The argument put forward is that energy security can be seen to have played a crucial role in the failure of Ukraine to pursue a pro-Western foreign policy due to the vulnerabilities resulting from the insecurity dilemma faced by weak states. In such a situation, an external power that provides energy security represents an economic threat to the importing nations. As a result of this, the energy provider is able to either provide or deny regime security to the government, and thereby cause the weak state's government to become dependent upon this power. Having brought about this situation of dependence, the energy supplier then acts in a similar manner to the core nations described in dependency theory. That is to say they actively perpetuate the situation, counter any moves by the dependent state to relieve this situation and

²⁰ Tables 1 and 2. World Bank Data set. <http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do>
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²¹ Tables 1 and 2. World Bank Data set. <http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do>
[6/2/12 3:33:45 PM] Michael Steen: http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?sec_id=265&lang_id=ENG

²² Foreign Ministry of Georgia. *Relations with Azerbaijan*.
http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?sec_id=265&lang_id=ENG

²³ T. German 'Georgia and the Transatlantic Relationship: The New Kid on the Block' in *The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice*. Ed. A. Dorman and J. Kaufman. (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2011) p228

²⁴ B. Shaffer, *Energy Politics* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) p41

exact concessions. Crucially however, these concessions can be political and economic in nature and as such, allow the energy supplier to coerce the state into adopting or rejecting certain foreign policy objectives.

The structure of the paper first seeks to outline the theoretical groundwork for the hypothesis that economic coercion can replace military coercion within the insecurity dilemma literature and that this economic coercion can be based upon the ability to provide energy security. Having done this, the discussion moves on to look at the possible factors for the relative success and failure of Georgia and Ukraine in their attempts to adopt a pro-Western foreign policy. In order to achieve this, the paper begins with a summary of the theoretical literature relevant to the hypothesis.

The literature review chapter starts off by looking at the contribution of the Copenhagen School to our understanding of security studies and in particular, the concept of economic security. Secondly, it focuses upon the relevant literature within the field of energy security and seeks to highlight the relevant gaps existing within the literature. Having highlighted these gaps, the work then proceeds to provide a definition of weak state behaviour before summarising the insecurity dilemma. Having summarised the insecurity dilemma, I then move on to demonstrate how the concept of energy security can be seen to be linked with that of economic security and the insecurity dilemma before finally, providing a brief overview of dependency theory. Following the literature review, the analytical chapter of this paper examines the nature and impact of four variables that resulted in the successes and failures of Ukraine and Georgia's attempt to pursue a pro western foreign policy. These four variables are, the position of the president within the domestic political situation, the nature of domestic politics within Ukraine and Georgia, the impact of international aid upon domestic politics, and finally, the role played by energy security. In the final stage, I conclude the discussion with a summary of the paper before discussing the implications of its findings.

Chapter 1: Discussion of the Literature

The first part of the literature review focuses upon the contribution of the sectoral approach to security studies before looking at the particular way in which it will be utilised within the discussion. Since the end of the Cold War, significant work has been done in an attempt to understand what security means in the modern world.

Copenhagen School

The first part of the literature review focuses upon the contribution of the sectoral approach to security studies before looking at the particular way in which it will be utilised within the discussion. Since the end of the Cold War, significant work has been done in an attempt to understand what security means in the modern world and more particularly, whether it can still be thought of as a state centric and military focused subject. One the most significant contribution to this understanding has come from the Copenhagen School and the formulation of a sectoral approach to security. The work of scholars such as Buzan, serves to emphasise the constructivist mode of thought that security as a concept can be broadened so that the study of it can be expanded to encompass a variety of threats. Working off of the understanding that “Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change which they see as hostile.”²⁵ Buzan and others have demonstrated the multi-sectoral nature of security in the modern world. The argument has been made that security studies should focus on threats and vulnerabilities not just in the military sector, but also in the economic, political, societal, and environmental sectors.²⁶ As scholars have noted, this broadening of security serves to provide “a handy organisational scheme to anyone who sought to broaden the study of security beyond the threat, use and control of military force.”²⁷ Operating with this idea that there exist a number of different threats and vulnerabilities in the

²⁵ Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century” *International Affairs*, 67.3 (1991) p432

²⁶ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear. The National Security Problem in International Relations.* (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983) p116

²⁷ D. Mutimer ‘Critical Security Studies’ A Schismatic History’ in *Contemporary Security Studies* ed. A Collins. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) p60

modern world, the Copenhagen School has managed to fundamentally change and improve our understanding of security studies.

Due to the focus that shall be placed on economic security later, it is important to provide an understanding of what is meant by the term economic security. This is intensely problematic, due to the fact that, as the Copenhagen School recognises and has stated, “economic threats are without doubt the trickiest and most difficult ones to handle.”²⁸ As Buzan notes, unless a direct link can be made between an area of economic activity and the survival of the state, the potential for confusion between the natural workings of the market system and the development of any sort of economic threats and vulnerabilities is significant.²⁹ In his work, Buzan works hard to demonstrate how economic security can be linked to national security through its linkage to “military capability, power and socio-political stability.”³⁰ The most important insight given by Buzan into the nature of economic security is his articulation of the role played by goods that are deemed necessary for the states survival.³¹ As Buzan notes, the failure to supply these goods “threatens the power, welfare and political stability of the state.”³² As is discussed below, this understanding of basic goods plays a crucial role in our understanding of the link between energy and economic security. The linkage to economic security is important because the discussion seeks to utilise the concept of economic security and threats, and thereby develop the existing understandings of the insecurity dilemma and regime security to one that can be viewed in terms of both military and economic security.

Energy Security

The second subject that needs to be addressed is the existing literature surrounding energy security, and its contribution to our understanding of how it affects the international system. Arguably the best definition of energy security has come from Goldwyn and Kalciki, who noted “in its most fundamental sense, energy security is assurance of the ability to access the energy resources required for the continued development of national power. In more specific terms, it is the provision of affordable, reliable, diverse and ample supplies of oil and gas (and

²⁸ B. Buzan, *People, states and fear*: an agenda for international security in the post-cold war era. 2nd ed. (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990) p123

²⁹ B. Buzan, *People, states and fear*: an agenda for international security in the post-cold war era. 2nd ed. (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990) p124

³⁰ B. Buzan, *People, states and fear*: an agenda for international security in the post-cold war era. 2nd ed. (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990) p126

³¹ B. Buzan, *People, states and fear*: an agenda for international security in the post-cold war era. 2nd ed. (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990) p242

³² B. Buzan, *People, states and fear*: an agenda for international security in the post-cold war era. 2nd ed. (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990) p242

their future equivalents).”³³ Although the topic has only recently become such an important topic within academia, scholars such as Yergin have noted, the “the point at which energy security became a decisive factor in international relations was a century ago,” as a result of the Royal Navy’s decision to “convert their battleships from coal to oil.”³⁴ Although the importance of energy security is one which was highly evident in the Second World War, most noticeably when Stalin told his oil commissioner, “If you don’t stop the Germans getting our oil, you will be shot, and when we have thrown the invader out, if we cannot restart production we will shoot you again.” The economic risks of a failure of energy supply were not properly realised until later.

The economic risks of energy insecurity were most prominently revealed to the world during the 1973 oil crisis.³⁵ As Martin and Harrie note, the impact of the crisis was significant and resulted in “the worst recession among OECD in decades, causing significant political turmoil.”³⁶ As a result, the issue of securing a reliable supply of energy at times of both peace and war was recognised as posing “a considerable threat to national security” by the industrial nations of the world.³⁷ The primary benefit of these works is that scholars such as Shaffer have demonstrated that in spite of much international protest, “energy and politics are intrinsically linked.”³⁸ In making this link between international politics and national security, Shaffer demonstrates precisely why “energy is both a factor that influences as state’s foreign policy outcomes and a potential tool of foreign policy.”³⁹ The result of this recognition has been a large amount of literature on how energy concerns have affected the foreign policies of not only the most developed nations of the world, but also the policies of major energy suppliers.⁴⁰ However, despite the World Energy Council’s recognition that “none of the Millennium Development

³³ J. Kalicki and D. Goldwyn, “Introduction” in *Energy and Security: Toward and New Foreign policy Strategy*. Ed. J. Kalicki and D. Goldwyn. (Washington Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005) p9

³⁴ D. Yergin. *The Quest: Energy, Security and the Remaking of the Modern World*. (London, Penguin, 2011) p264

³⁵ H. Shukman “Nikolai Baibakov: Stalin’s oil commissar.” *The Independent* Accessed 29th May 2012. www.independent.co.uk/new/obituaries/nikolai-baibakov-stalins-oil-commissar-806962.html

³⁶ W. Martin and E. Harrie “The International Energy Agency” in *Energy and Security: Toward and New Foreign policy Strategy*. Ed. J. Kalicki and D. Goldwyn. (Washington Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005) p99

³⁷ W. Martin and E. Harrie “The International Energy Agency” in *Energy and Security: Toward and New Foreign policy Strategy*. Ed. J. Kalicki and D. Goldwyn. (Washington Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005) p99

³⁸ B. Shaffer, *Energy Politics* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) p1

³⁹ B. Shaffer, *Energy Politics* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) p28

⁴⁰ Some of the most prominent books being:

Pelletiere, *America’s Oil Wars*. (Westport, Praeger Publishers, 2004)

Kalicki and D. Goldwyn. *Energy and security: Towards a new foreign policy strategy*. (Washington D.C. Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005)

M. Goldman, *Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia*. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008)

Goals can be delivered without energy,” limited theoretically-driven or empirically-grounded work has been done on the implications of energy insecurity on the foreign policy of weak states.⁴¹ The existing literature is intensely problematic due to the fact that advocates policies that are proactive and only realistic options for strong and wealthy states who have the capacity for such action. Significantly, even scholars such as Schaffer, who have recognised the issues arising from dependency on one supplier, fail to discuss the foreign policy implications of such a situation.⁴² The discussion here seeks to fill in this void and focus upon the foreign policy implications for weak states of energy dependency.

Weak State Behavior

The situation of weak states and the implications of the insecurity dilemma faced by them are of great importance not only to this discussion, but also our basic understanding of weak state behaviour. In terms of understanding exactly what constitutes a weak state, the work of Jackson serves to provide a strong and coherent set of criteria.⁴³ Unfortunately, these criteria are not unproblematic as they are not only comprehensive but also designed to cover a large variety of states, therefore not all criteria apply to every case. Therefore, I shall focus upon those factors that are applicable to the cases of Ukraine and Georgia, both of which have consistently been ranked in the warning category of the Fund for Peace, Failed State Index.⁴⁴ The three defining features of state power articulated by Jackson are, firstly an “inability of state institutions to perform essential tasks and enact policy;” secondly, “coercive capacity in terms of the state’s ability and willingness to employ force against challenges to its authority;” and finally, “national identity and social cohesion in terms of the degree to which the population identifies with the nation-state and accepts its legitimate role in their lives.”⁴⁵ These characteristics are important as they not only demonstrate why Ukraine and Georgia can be considered weak states but they also lay the groundwork for later analysis of the literature and its applicability to these cases.

⁴¹ World Energy Council. 2012, the Year of Sustainable Energy for All, n.d.

http://www.worldenergy.org/documents/un_2012_initiative_statement_wec_100212.pdf.

⁴² B. Shaffer, *Energy Politics* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) p38-40

⁴³ R. Jackson. “Regime Security” in *Contemporary Security Studies*. Ed. A. Collins. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) p149

⁴⁴ The Fund for Peace, *The Failed States Index: 2005-2011*. Accessed 29th May 2012. Available at <http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi>

⁴⁵ R. Jackson. “Regime Security” in *Contemporary Security Studies*. Ed. A. Collins. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) p149

As Job notes, the result of this is that weak states are defined by a need to meet “internal rather than external threats.”⁴⁶ Whilst it should be recognised that the separatist movements in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Crimea serve to characterise these states as weak, the crucial part of this definition for the discussion are the inability of the state to enact policy and the ability to employ force against challenges to its authority.⁴⁷ The former is important as it can be seen to directly relate to the ability of the state to pursue domestic and foreign policies, whilst the latter is important due to the fact the discussion here focuses on the use of economic, rather than military, force against challenges to its authority. In terms of the characteristics listed by Jackson as indicating state weakness, his mentioning of “political instability” and “vulnerability to international actors and forces” are particularly relevant.⁴⁸ This comes from the fact that my hypothesis works on the idea that energy insecure states are particularly vulnerable to international actors who utilise economic force to affect the level of political instability within the state.

The specific situation of weak states, as most vulnerable to internal rather than external forces, has resulted in scholars identifying what Job called an “insecurity dilemma.”⁴⁹ This insecurity dilemma results from a situation in which each sector of society can be seen to prioritise their own security over that of the nation.⁵⁰ As Job notes, this results in a situation where the state is less able to provide security for its people, state institutions have less capacity to provide services and order, and the state and its people are more vulnerable to the “influence, intervention, and control by outside actors.”⁵¹ Importantly, Job and those that have followed him have focused upon the idea that regimes in weak states utilise military coercion in order to ensure their survival.⁵² Building upon this work, scholars have noted that in order to ensure security in weak states, regimes frequently make alliances with more powerful states, states that

⁴⁶ B. Job. *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Regime, and State Securities in the Third World*. (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992) p12

⁴⁷ R. Jackson. “Regime Security” in *Contemporary Security Studies*. Ed. A. Collins. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) p149

⁴⁸ R. Jackson. “Regime Security” in *Contemporary Security Studies*. Ed. A. Collins. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) p150

⁴⁹ B. Job. *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Regime, and State Securities in the Third World*. (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992)

⁵⁰ B. Job. *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Regime, and State Securities in the Third World*. (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992) p18

⁵¹ B. Job. *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Regime, and State Securities in the Third World*. (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992) p18

⁵² B. Job. *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Regime, and State Securities in the Third World*. (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992) p18

historically provided military support for the regime.⁵³ The argument here is that in this situation it is not only military coercion that can be put into effect, but also economic coercion. By utilising the Copenhagen School's sectoral approach to security, the work here argues that the ability of an outside power to ensure energy security allows them to provide, or withhold the necessary economic coercive force needed to ensure a particular regime's security.

Linking It Together

The link between the insecurity dilemma faced by weak states and energy security can only be made if a form of coercion that can not only substitute military coercion but is also related to energy security. The discussion here seeks to demonstrate how this can be done through the use of the Copenhagen School and the concept of economic security in particular. The link between energy security and economic security is one that has been put forth by a number of scholars, however the accommodation of energy security by the Copenhagen School's sectoral approach is highly complex. Despite the fact that scholars such as Roberts have stated, "a failure of energy security means that the momentum of industrialisation and modernity grinds to a halt, and survival itself becomes far less certain,"⁵⁴ the link between energy and economic security demands academic attention. This comes primarily as a result of the fact that, in the words of Ciută the subject of energy security has "received remarkably little conceptual attention."⁵⁵ The first indication of this link was best expressed by Valentine when he stated that "the dominant perspective of national energy security over the past few decades has been rooted in economic rationality."⁵⁶ This combined with his observation that "most nations exhibit a high correlation between economic growth and energy utilisation" is indicative of the ready link between energy security and the economic situation of a country.⁵⁷ One of the most important areas of economic security highlighted by Buzan is a s a crucial area is that surrounding the provision of "the national equivalent of basic human needs."⁵⁸ This particular section of Buzan's work is particularly important due to the fact that scholars such as Valentine

⁵³ R. Jackson. "Regime Security" in *Contemporary Security Studies*. Ed. A. Collins. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) p154

⁵⁴ Paul Roberts, *The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2004). p240

⁵⁵ Felix Ciută, "Conceptual Notes on Energy Security: Total or Banal Security?" in *Security Dialogue* April 2010 vol. 41 no.2 p123

⁵⁶ S. V. Valentine. "The fuzzy nature of energy security" in *The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security*. Ed. B. Sovacool. (New York, Routledge, 2011). p61.

⁵⁷ S. V. Valentine. "The fuzzy nature of energy security" in *The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security*. Ed. B. Sovacool. (New York, Routledge, 2011). p68

⁵⁸ B. Buzan, *People, states and fear*: an agenda for international security in the post-cold war era. 2nd ed. (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990) p242

and Roberts have argued that one of the fundamental characteristics of energy in the modern world is that it is an “essential service”⁵⁹ and that without it the survival of a modern society becomes far “less certain.”⁶⁰ The fundamental importance of energy to the survival of the modern state means that it takes on such a significance that access to it “becomes an essential part of their [the states] economic security” and thus, places energy in a position of similar, if not equal, importance as that of the basic resources needed to feed a population.⁶¹ One of the obvious and most significant effects of this is that those without a sufficient domestic supply of energy and are looking to ensure their economic security, must interact with the wider environment. When faced with such a situation, “the logical security strategies are to ensure continuity of supply by expanding the state to incorporate the state to ensure the continuity of supply (by expanding the state to incorporate the necessary resources, or by cultivating stable trading systems), and to buffer vulnerabilities by stockpiling essential goods.”⁶² The current system and the existence of norms that ensure the sovereignty of states combined with the fact that few weak states have the capability to launch an invasion of another territory, means that attempts to ‘expand the state’ are both not an option or advisable for the majority of states. A fact best demonstrated by Iraq’s unsuccessful invasion of Kuwait in the early 1990’s. This situation leaves the only possible long terms strategy as the cultivation of stable trading links. This necessity to cultivate stable trading links with other states in order to ensure economic security speaks directly to the fundamentals of the discussion over energy security. This comes as a result of the fact that energy is a politically charged issue on both the international and domestic stage, an understanding revealed by the literature surrounding both economic and energy security. As Shaffer and others have argued, energy has become “a standard and legitimate tool of foreign policy” and as such, can be significantly affected by the political considerations of the supplier in particular.⁶³ The noted importance of energy within international politics, combined with the fact that a failure in supply of goods that are essential to the “basic economic security of the state...threatens the political stability of the state,” demonstrates how energy security can affect regime security and therefore the foreign policy of a weak state. If the loss of energy security results in a level of political instability that destabilises

⁵⁹ S. V. Valentine. ‘The fuzzy nature of energy security’ in *The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security*. Ed. B. Sovacool. (New York, Routledge, 2011). p62

⁶⁰ Paul Roberts, *The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2004). p240

⁶¹ B. Buzan, *People, states and fear*: an agenda for international security in the post-cold war era. 2nd ed. (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990) p242

⁶² B. Buzan, *People, states and fear*: an agenda for international security in the post-cold war era. 2nd ed. (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990) p242

⁶³ B. Shaffer, *Energy Politics* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) p1

domestic politics to the extent that the government falls, in order to stay in power the regime must ensure that it secures not only a stable trading system but one that is cheap enough to satisfy the criteria for energy security as defined by Goldwyn and Kalicki.⁶⁴ The fact that energy is such a prominent feature of international diplomacy, combined with the poverty of most weak states, means that the regime in question will most likely have to make political concessions to a foreign power. This situation allows one to understand how the topic of energy security can be incorporated into our understanding of the behaviour of weak states and the insecurity dilemma in particular. If a regime gains control over the access to energy supplies in a way that ensures economic security, then it can use a form of economic coercion over the populace in order to ensure that it stays in power. And thus, be substituted for the military coercion that currently dominates the literature on the insecurity dilemma. Should the regime rely upon an external power in order to gain this economic leverage over the population, then the regime becomes dependent upon the external power for regime security and therefore, ultimately indebted to that power to a point where they could be coerced into adopting certain policies.

Dependency Theory

The final area that needs to be looked at is the literature surrounding dependency theory and its affect upon the foreign policy of states at the core of the international system. This literature is important as it has the potential to explain the actions of Russia in its relationships with its dependent neighbours. The origins of dependency theory lie in the study of the perpetual poverty that seemed to be defining characteristics of the countries of South America. As scholars have noted, the theory argues that a situation exists whereby the wealthy developed nations at the core develop their economies by controlling and “appropriating the economic surplus” of the world’s developing nations.⁶⁵ In terms of foreign policy dependency theory argues that “wealthy nations actively perpetuate a state of dependence by various means [and also] actively counter attempts by dependent nations to resist their influences.”⁶⁶ This countering of attempts by Russia’s neighbours to has become one of the most prominent features of Russian policy in the region.

⁶⁴ J. Kalicki and D. Goldwyn, “Introduction” in *Energy and Security: Toward and New Foreign policy Strategy*. Ed. J. Kalicki and D. Goldwyn. (Washington Woodrwo Wilson Center Press, 2005) p9

⁶⁵ J. MacGaffey, *Entrepreneurs and Parasties: The Struggle for Indigenous Capitalism in Zaire*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987) p12-13

⁶⁶ P. Pannu and Y. Tomar, *Communication Technology for Development*. (New Delhi, I.K. International Publishing House) p44

On a basic level, the dependence of nations such as Ukraine on Russia places them in a similar position to the dependent nations of the periphery. However, unlike the original dependency model, the core nations are not looking to appropriate the economic surplus of the country, but rather exact various concessions from the dependent nation. These concessions can be seen to be both political and economic in nature. This is most obvious if one looks at the way Russia has acted towards countries that are dependent upon it for energy supplies. The first concession demanded is that the local energy transmission system is given over to Russian ownership. As Goldman notes, it is this control over the transmission and the exclusion of rival suppliers has been a major priority of Gazprom and Russian policy.⁶⁷ Evidence of this includes the demands made by Gazprom during price negotiations with many of its neighbours for ownership of their transmission system, a policy that has been largely successful.⁶⁸ Moving on from this position, states could be put under pressure to ally themselves with Russia or pay substantially higher prices; this is the most obvious case of Gazprom's treatment of Belarus and Ukraine in 2005.⁶⁹ Significantly, Gazprom has since exacted higher prices and lower transmission fees from Belarus, in spite of their political allegiance,⁷⁰ and most impressively, a lease extension on a Russian naval base in Ukraine, despite the fact that it violates Ukraine's constitution.⁷¹

In concluding this section of the discussion, it is important to summarise what has been said. The section seeks to not only summarise the relevant literature surrounding energy security and weak state behaviour, but to also highlight the gaps in the existing literature. Having highlighted these areas I have attempted to demonstrate how the insecurity dilemma can result in a situation where the regime is dependent upon an external power not for military power, but rather, for the economic power needed to secure its position. Moving on from this, I have also briefly looked at the concept of dependency theory and how it can be utilised to understand the behaviour of Russia towards its energy dependent neighbours in the analysis of the following chapter.

⁶⁷ M. Goldman, *Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia*. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010) p152

⁶⁸ M. Goldman, *Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia*. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010) p152

⁶⁹ M. Goldman, *Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia*. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010) p145

⁷⁰ M. Goldman, *Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia*. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010) p151

⁷¹ T. Kuzio 'Ukraine: Muddling Along', in *Central and East European Politics: From Communism to Democracy*. Ed. J. Caryl and S. Wolchik (Plymouth, Rowman and Littlefield, 2011) p357

Chapter 2: Analysis

The analytical section of the discussion seeks to look at the role played by energy security in the success of Georgia and failure of Ukraine to adopt a more pro western foreign policy. In doing so, the discussion focuses primarily upon the aim of each state to join NATO and to forge closer relationships with Europe. In addition to energy security, three other key areas have been highlighted for discussion. The first two of these issues relates to the domestic political situation in each state. The first area of domestic politics looks at the nature of the position held by Yushchenko and Saakashvili and the degree of power within the decision making process of their respective countries. The discussion then moves on to look at the popular politics of the nation; in particular, it looks at the composition of Ukrainian politics before moving on to look at the role played by the lack of cooperation between the pro-West factions of Ukrainian politics. The third area to be looked at is the international political situation, particularly the role played by the substantial level of United States support for Georgia following the Rose Revolution. Having discussed these three variables, the dialogue moves forward to assess the role played by energy security in determining the foreign policy adopted by each state.

Domestic Factors: Presidential Power

The position of Yushchenko and Saakashvili, as Presidents of Ukraine and Georgia respectively, resulted in Saakashvili having far more control over the political process in Georgia than Yushchenko had in Ukraine. Yushchenko came to power in Ukraine just after outgoing President Kuchma had signed into law a number of constitutional amendments; amendments that substantially changed the balance of power within Ukrainian politics. As D'Anieri notes, the 2004 reforms substantially enhanced the power of parliament and the Prime Minister at the expense of the President.⁷² Under the pre-2004 system, the president had the power to appoint his prime minister and, in the words of one scholar, held such a significant amount of power that “he had little incentive to collaborate with Parliament.”⁷³ Furthermore, the Parliament Yushchenko faced, was highly unlikely to produce a stable coalition in order to form government. As a result, the distribution of power was one that did “not allow the parliament to

⁷² P. D' Anieri Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics and Institutional Design. (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2007) p244

⁷³ P. D' Anieri Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics and Institutional Design. (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2007) p126

effectively challenge the president's power."⁷⁴ In contrast to this, Yushchenko had to deal not only with a prime minister who was appointed by the parliament, but also by one whose powers had been substantially enhanced. Although it is important to note that Yushchenko still held significant powers as President, he was working within a system that forced him to compromise with other prominent politicians?

The situation in Georgia can be seen substantially different to this one. As scholars have noted, there exists a dynamic within Georgian politics that results in a situation where, following an extra-constitutional seizure of power, "political power is consolidated and at the same time liberated from competitive pressures until the next round of extra-legal transitions in leadership takes place."⁷⁵ As Jawad has noted, following his rise to power, Saakashvili has not only applied authoritarian measures, but has also set about creating a 'super presidential' system where the president has "control over all political and state institutions."⁷⁶ As a result, it is possible to see that Yushchenko had far more institutional obstacles to his power than Saakashvili, and as such was in a far weaker position than his Georgian counterpart when it came to enacting policy.

Domestic Factors: Popular Politics

In terms of the popular politics it is possible to see that the serious divisions of Ukrainian politics serve to present a significant obstacle to the adoption of a pro-Western foreign policy. These divisions are significant because, as scholars such as Saunders have argued, "the unworkable nature of the semi-presidential, semi-parliamentary political systems in Ukraine combined with President Yushchenko's inability to either work with the leader of the two main parties or to build a working coalition in parliament has ensured that Ukraine made very little progress after the Orange Revolution in securing either NATO or EU membership."⁷⁷ The divisions can be seen to come from two major factors, firstly the regional divisions of Ukraine and secondly, the "elite infighting" that has characterised modern Ukrainian politics.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ P. D'Anieri *Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics and Institutional Design*. (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2007) p244

⁷⁵ V. Bunce and S. Wolchik, *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-communist Countries*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011) p166

⁷⁶ P. Jawad, 'Elections and Treatment of the Opposition in Post-Soviet Georgia' in *Presidents, Oligarchs and Bureaucrats: Forms of Rule in the Post-Soviet Space*. Ed. S. Stewart, M. Klein, A. Schmitz and H. Schroder. (Farnham, Ashgate Publishing, 2012) p150

⁷⁷ D. Saunders. 'A View from Ukraine' in *The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice*. Ed. A. Dorman and J. Kaufman. (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2011) p192

⁷⁸ T. Kuzio 'Ukraine: Muddling Along', in *Central and East European Politics: From Communism to Democracy*. Ed. J. Carty and S. Wolchik (Plymouth, Rowman and Littlefield, 2011) p364

Regional divisions play an important role in the chaotic nature of Ukrainian politics as they result in areas of the country that are either distinctly pro-Russian or pro-European. As Kubicek has demonstrated, not only can one “divide Ukraine into a number of distinct regions based upon historical experience, economic structure, ethnic composition, ties to bordering states, and language,” but doing so results in a clearer understanding of the political challenges faced by anyone body hoping to govern Ukraine.⁷⁹ The consequence of these regional divisions is that whilst the eastern and southern regions of the country vote for pro-Russian and autocratic parties, the central and western regions favour the more pro-European and democratic parties. As a result, the last decade of Ukrainian politics has been dominated by individuals who have significant support in at least one region whilst receiving little to no support in another.⁸⁰ Whilst it important to recognise that this has not always resulted in parties voting as regional blocks, however, it is important to note that within Ukrainian politics no one candidate or party can come anywhere near gaining total support.⁸¹ This is best reflected by the fact that the 2004⁸² and 2010⁸³ presidential elections as well as the 2006⁸⁴ and 2007⁸⁵ parliamentary elections were highly competitive and close-run. It can therefore be seen, that even in the immediate aftermath of the Orange revolution, Yushchenko and his allies faced an immediate domestic challenge to their attempts to pursue a pro-Western foreign policy.

A second and potentially more successful obstacle to Yushchenko’s adoption of a pro-Western foreign policy is the failure of the ideologically similar political parties to work together. Arguably the most prominent and important example of this infighting was the failure and fracturing of the pro-Western alliance between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, which came to power after the Orange Revolution.⁸⁶ This infighting and the ultimate failure of the pro-Western alliance in both 2005 and between 2007 and 2009, can be seen to have had two significant impacts upon Ukraine’s foreign policy.

⁷⁹ P. Kubicek, “Regional Polarisation in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and Legislative Behaviour” in *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Mar., 2000) p274-276

⁸⁰ P. D’ Aleri *Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics and Institutional Design*. (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2007) p108

⁸¹ P. D’ Aleri *Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics and Institutional Design*. (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2007) p113.

⁸² “Yushchenko wins Ukraine election re-run.” BBC News. 27th December 2004. Accessed May 21st 2012. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4127203.stm>

⁸³ R. Galph, “Pro-Moscow Yanukovich 'to win Ukraine election” BBC News. 8 February 2010. Accessed May 21st 2012. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8503177.stm>

⁸⁴ “Ukraine press sees election looming” BBC News. 12th July 2006. Accessed May 21st 2012. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5173520.stm>

⁸⁵ “Orange Ukraine eyes poll victory” BBC News. 1st October 2007. Accessed May 21st 2012. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7020378.stm>

⁸⁶ T. Kuzio ‘Ukraine: Muddling Along’, in *Central and East European Politics: From Communism to Democracy*. Ed. J. Caryl and S. Wolchik (Plymouth, Rowman and Littlefield, 2011) p354

The first major impact of this infighting was that it contributed greatly to Yushchenko's failure "to establish a stable and effective working government or coalition able to implement his domestic or foreign policy agenda."⁸⁷ The second impact of the infighting was that in both the short term and the long term, it paved the way for the pro-Russian Yanukovych to return to power. In the short term, Yushchenko was forced into making Yanukovych his new Prime Minister, if only for a short time.⁸⁸ More significantly however, is the fact that in the words of Riabchuk, when it came to the Presidential elections of 2010, Yanukovych was able to triumph due to the fact that his "Orange Rivals did their best to defeat themselves. Within five years, they had lost almost three million supporters who felt disappointed with their feeble policies, permanent infighting, and complete failure to deliver on extremely high expectations of the Orange Revolution."⁸⁹ The rise of Yanukovych to the position of President has served to reverse much of the work done by Yushchenko and Tymoshenko in their development of a pro-Western foreign policy. Not only has Yanukovych been seen to adopt a more pro-Russian foreign policy, but he has also jailed Tymoshenko, a move that has been condemned in the West as authoritarian and politically motivated.⁹⁰ These and other actions have resulted in Freedom House's annual survey of political rights and civil liberties downgrading Ukraine from "Free to Partly Free" and served to distance Ukraine and Yanukovych's government from its potential allies in Europe and the USA.⁹¹

In contrast to the situation in Ukraine, Saakashvili's time as President of Georgia has been marked up until recently by the lack of any significant level of opposition. As German put it, "Saakashvili has come to dominate Georgian politics in much the same way that his predecessor did, and his personality determines much of the country's policy-direction."⁹² Through various means, Saakashvili and his party have managed to keep control of Georgian politics. Starting off his rule with unparalleled success in the Georgian elections, where not only

⁸⁷ D. Saunders. 'A View from Ukraine' in *The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice*. Ed. A. Dorman and J. Kaufman. (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2011) p192

⁸⁸ T. Kuzio 'Ukraine: Muddling Along', in *Central and East European Politics: From Communism to Democracy*. Ed. J. Caryl and S. Wolchik (Plymouth, Rowman and Littlefield, 2011) p354

⁸⁹ M. Riabchuk. 'Yanukovych's Two Years in Power.' *On Wider Europe*. March 2012. Accessed May 27th 2012. http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/files_mf/riabchuk_yanukovychstwoyears_feb12.pdf

⁹⁰ Ukraine's jailed ex-PM Tymoshenko 'on hunger strike' BBC News. 24th April 2012. Accessed May 26th 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17824709>

⁹¹ Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2011: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties*. (Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2011). p9

⁹² T. German 'Georgia and the Transatlantic Relationship: The New Kid on the Block' in *The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice*. Ed. A. Dorman and J. Kaufman. (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2011) p214

did he win 96%⁹³ of the Presidential vote, but his party also gained 67%⁹⁴ of the vote in the parliamentary elections. Therefore, Saakashvili has managed to retain his and his party's dominant position. There are a number of reasons for the ongoing success of Saakashvili domestic popularity and his ability to adopt a pro-Western foreign policy. The first of these is that, unlike in Ukraine, there is little regional division despite the presence of two breakaway regions. As both South Ossetia or Abkhazia function as "de facto independent countries" they have their own government and do not vote for the Georgian President or Parliament.⁹⁵ More importantly, there has been little domestic opposition towards Saakashvili's pursuit of a more pro-European foreign policy. At his inauguration, Saakashvili's infamously raised the EU flag alongside that of Georgia⁹⁶ before stating "our steady course is towards European integration."⁹⁷ In spite of the fact that these actions antagonised the Russian government, what Saakashvili received was faced with little opposition over his chosen foreign policy. Significantly, during 2007 one of the main criticisms levelled at Saakashvili, was that he was not being assertive enough in his dealings with Russia, whilst his opponent, Okruashvili promised to take military action to recover the territories.⁹⁸ Potentially, the most important reasons for these high levels of support can be seen to come, not only from the euphoria that followed from the Rose Revolution, but also the strong feeling among Georgian people and politicians alike, that the Abkhazia and South Ossetia should be brought under the control of the government in Tbilisi. The depth of this feeling can be seen in the statement of the prominent Georgian politician Burjanadze who stated "No one can discuss in Georgia giving up Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It's like someone saying to you 'you'll stay alive, but I'll cut off your hands and legs and cut your eyes out.'"⁹⁹ An additional indicator of this feeling, and one that can be seen to have direct public support, was the adulation given to Gamsakhurdia. Gamsakhurdia was the first president of Georgia, an extreme nationalist and an implacable enemy of the separatists in Ossetia. The

⁹³ G. Sepashvili, 'Georgia Has a New President'. Civil Georgia. 25th January 2004. Accessed May 22nd 2012. <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=6098>

⁹⁴ N. Khutsidze, 'Distribution of Seats in the New Parliament' Civil Georgia. 31st March 2004. Accessed May 22nd 2012. <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=6594>

⁹⁵ C. King, "A Rose among Thorns: Georgia Makes Good" in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2004). p15

⁹⁶ 'EU Flags to Fly over Georgian Governmental Offices' Civil Georgia. 19th April 2004. Accessed 24 May 2012. <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=6716>

⁹⁷ 'Georgia Swears in new President' BBC News. 25th January 2004. Accessed 24 May 2012. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3426977.stm>

⁹⁸ M. Antidze, "Thousands protest against Georgia president" Reuters. September 28th 2007 accessed 24th May 2012. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/09/28/us-georgia-opposition-idUSL2885338820070928>

⁹⁹ As quoted in N. Petro "The Bear Trap: Russia and the West after the Crisis in Georgia" *Global Dialogue*, vol. 11, (August 2009). p2

man who has been described as “an emotional, ruthless and fervently ideological leader, whose rhetoric and activities had done much to antagonise the minorities” and who had “moved aggressively against separatist political noises coming out of South Ossetia” has recently been hailed as a “great statesman and patriot.”¹⁰⁰ This powerful feeling is most evident in the fact that Gamsakhurdia repatriated body was greeted by thousand of citizens in Tbilisi.¹⁰¹ Given the fact that recovery of these territories involves adopting a hostile position towards Moscow, it must be recognised that the desire for a united Georgia resulted in a great degree of support for Saakashvili and his foreign policy. Although it is important to note that Saakashvili has come to face increasing levels of resistance in recent years, these have primarily focused upon his abuse of power.¹⁰² Significantly, criticism of his foreign policy and the war with Russia actually echoes the anti-Russian assertion that Saakashvili was provoked into starting a war with Russia.¹⁰³ In fact, as one scholar put it “during periods when the perceived threat intensifies, the Georgian population tends to unite behind the government: the Russian military intervention in August 2008 boosted Saakashvili’s waning popular support.”¹⁰⁴ Due to the continued lack of opposition to Saakashvili and his pro-Western foreign policy orientation, it must be seen that his success must be partially attributed to his dominant position within Georgian politics.

International Aid

The third and final area that needs to be addressed before looking at the impact of energy security, is the impact of international aid upon the ability of each country to pursue a pro-Western foreign policy. This topic is crucial for the debate as U.S. support for Georgia contrasts greatly to the approach taken by the international community towards Ukraine following the Orange Revolution, and can be seen to have had an important and significant impact upon the Georgian economy. As German has succinctly put it, “Georgia has witnessed a veritable flood of assistance from the U.S.: financial support for Georgia totals over U.S. \$ 1 billion, making Georgians the second biggest per capita recipients of American aid after the

¹⁰⁰ N. Petro “The Bear Trap: Russia and the West after the Crisis in Georgia” *Global Dialogue*, vol. 11, (August 2009). p2

¹⁰¹ “Thousands Pay tribute to the First President.” *Civil Georgia*. March 31st 2001. Accessed 27th May, 2012 <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=14893>

¹⁰² Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2011: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties*. (Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2011) p255

¹⁰³ “Alasania: Saakashvili Must Resign”, *Civil Georgia*. January 25th 2009. Accessed 25th May 2012. <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20319>

¹⁰⁴ T. German ‘Georgia and the Transatlantic Relationship: The New Kid on the Block’ in *The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice*. Ed. A. Dorman and J. Kaufman. (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2011) p215

Israelis.”¹⁰⁵ This high level of support has been the result of not only the U.S.’s desire to promote democratic rights in the region but also because of the fact that Georgia has become a great ally for the US in the war on terror.¹⁰⁶ The consequence of this has been that not only has Ukraine received substantial financial aid but has also been able to modernise its army over a short period of time, although this has come at a cost of Georgia’s high commitment of troops to America’s wars in the Middle East. This international aid paved the way for continued economic growth and the strengthening of state institutions in Georgia, and was a decisive factor in the survival of both Saakashvili and the Georgian economy in the aftermath of the 2008 South Ossetia War.¹⁰⁷

As scholars have noted, not only did the war face Georgia with “substantial economic losses, while generating additional demands on the public exchequer” but these problems came at a time when the “impact of the global economic crisis began to bite.”¹⁰⁸ The ramification of this was a deep political crisis that saw many predicting the end of Saakashvili and his government. In spite of this grave political situation, Saakashvili was able to survive primarily as a result of high levels of aid from the international community. As McFarlane stated at the time, “President Mikheil Saakashvili has weathered the fallout of the war with Russia. Weak opposition and substantial Western aid have enabled the government to stabilise the economy and consolidate its political position.”¹⁰⁹ It is important to recognise that this strengthening of Georgia’s military, state institutions, and economy that have allowed Saakashvili to make substantial progress in his stated aim of turning Georgia into a “united strong state.”¹¹⁰ As a result of this, Saakashvili has been able to combat criticism about his authoritarian style by pointing to what he has terms an “uninterrupted Cycle of Success.”¹¹¹ Although one must note that Saakashvili has been proactive in gaining international support, and the development of

¹⁰⁵ T. German ‘Georgia and the Transatlantic Relationship: The New Kid on the Block’ in *The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice*. Ed. A. Dorman and J. Kaufman. (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2011) p223

¹⁰⁶ T. German ‘Georgia and the Transatlantic Relationship: The New Kid on the Block’ in *The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice*. Ed. A. Dorman and J. Kaufman. (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2011) p224

¹⁰⁷ S. Neil MacFarlane. “Post-Revolutionary Georgia on the Edge? | Chatham House: Independent Thinking on International Affairs”, March 2011, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/109629.p3>

¹⁰⁸ S. Neil MacFarlane. “Post-Revolutionary Georgia on the Edge? | Chatham House: Independent Thinking on International Affairs”, March 2011, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/109629.p2>

¹⁰⁹ . Neil MacFarlane. “Post-Revolutionary Georgia on the Edge? | Chatham House: Independent Thinking on International Affairs”, March 2011, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/109629.p1>

¹¹⁰ “Saakashvili’s Vows Improvement with Drastic Measures” *Civil Georgia*. January 25th 2004. Accessed 25th May 2012. <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=6090>

¹¹¹ “Saakashvili on Georgia’s ‘Uninterrupted Cycle of Success’” *Civil Georgia*. 9th April 2012. Accessed 29th May 2012. <http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=24646>

economic and social policies that have resulted in such success, it is important to recognise that much of this success could not have been achieved without substantial foreign support. This situation does bring about the interesting situation of witnessing Saakashvili, rather than any Ukrainian government, being seen to utilise the resources of an external power in or ensure the security of his own regime. This does raise the question of whether Saakashvili is dependent upon the United States for his own regime security, for example would Saakashvili remain in power if he refused to help the United States in its war on terrorism or the U.S. government became unwilling to support a figure who incorporated so many undemocratic practices into his method of government.

The highly successful interactions of Georgia with the international community is one that contrasts greatly with that of Ukraine. Whilst international involvement in Georgia has primarily resulted in helping Saakashvili stay in power and pursue a pro-Western foreign policy, almost the opposite can be said of Ukraine. Ukraine was hit especially hard by the financial crisis, which saw its GDP shrink significantly and the value of the hryvnya “hit an all-time low.”¹¹² The fact that the 2009 gas crisis started soon after this severe economic downturn served to not only increase the economic woes of the country, but to also highlight the role played by Russian gas supplies in determining the state of the Ukrainian economy.¹¹³ Financial aid to overcome this crisis was problematic due to the fact that the primary source of this aid was to come from the EU and the IMF. However both parties were insisting upon reforms to either the gas transmission service or the domestic gas market. The IMF and the EU both stipulated that the Ukrainian government must begin the process of raising gas prices to the market level before receiving any financial aid.¹¹⁴ The problem with this was that both moves were deeply unpopular with the Ukrainian public. With the presidential elections in January, none of the major politicians were willing to take make any concessions upon this issue.¹¹⁵ It is significant to note that this situation has yet to resolve itself and the 15.6 billion dollar bailout loan extended

¹¹² ‘Currency collapse in Ukraine.’ The Economist. 1st December 2008. Accessed May 29th 2012. <http://www.economist.com/node/12713824>

¹¹³ A. Nesterov, ‘Russia Ukraine Gas War Damages Both Economies.’ World Press. 20th February 2009. Accessed May 30th 2012. <http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/3307.cfm>

¹¹⁴ S. Cardis ‘Ukraine Must Reform to tap EU Energy Aid’ Bloomberg Businessweek. 27th August 2009. Accessed 29th May 2012.

http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/aug2009/gb20090827_935453.htm

T. Kuzio ‘Ukraine: Muddling Along’, in Central and East European Politics: From Communism to Democracy. Ed. J. Caryl and S. Wolchik (Plymouth, Rowman and Littlefield, 2011) p357

¹¹⁵ S. Cardis ‘Ukraine Must Reform to tap EU Energy Aid’ Bloomberg Businessweek. 27th August 2009. Accessed 29th May 2012.

http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/aug2009/gb20090827_935453.htm

by the IMF was frozen as a result of Ukraine's continued failure to raise gas prices.¹¹⁶ It is possible to see that there are two ramifications of the international communities actions that are particularly relevant to the discussion. The first of these was that the ongoing economic crisis had a negative effect upon Tymoshenko's presidential campaign. As Kuzio notes, the association between Tymoshenko and the economic crisis was a major factor in her failure to win the 2010 presidential elections and therefore, a contributing factor in not only the demise of the pro-European faction within Ukrainian politics, but also the rise of the pro-Russian Yanukovich.¹¹⁷ It is important to recognise here that this taint upon Tymoshenko's record, was one which international aid had allowed Saakashvili to avoid. The second ramification is that the crisis and the nature of the problems surrounding the negotiation of international aid serves to highlight the ready link within Ukrainian politics between the price of gas and the outcome of elections.

Role of Energy Security

The final area to examine is the impact energy security can be seen to have had upon the foreign policy of each state. The discussion here seeks to demonstrate how the energy insecurity felt by Ukraine served to impact upon the domestic politics of Ukraine and ultimately, conditioned its foreign policy as one which remained pro-Russian. Having done this, I seek to demonstrate how a similar situation was averted in the case of Georgia, whilst also noting that energy security has impacted Georgian relations with Azerbaijan. The first and most important point to make about Ukrainian and Russian relations is that there is a clear link between the actions of Gazprom and the political aims of the Russian Federation. This is a fact most obvious in Putin's 2003 statement that Gazprom is "a powerful political and economic lever of influence over the rest of the world"¹¹⁸ and the fact that the government's 2003 energy strategy states that "the energy factor is fundamental within Russian diplomacy."¹¹⁹ That this was the case in Ukraine is best demonstrated by the fact that the gas crises can be seen to occur in response to political events within Ukraine that go against the wishes of the Russian government. As Yergin and others have noted, the subsidised gas that Russia supplied to its

¹¹⁶ 'IMF says Ukraine must raise gas prices to regain access to \$15.6 bln bailout loan.' Canadian Business. 28th May 2012. Accessed 30th May 2012. <http://www.canadianbusiness.com/article/85643--imf-says-ukraine-must-raise-gas-prices-to-regain-access-to-15-6-bln-bailout-loan>

¹¹⁷ T. Kuzio 'Ukraine: Muddling Along', in Central and East European Politics: From Communism to Democracy. Ed. J. Caryl and S. Wolchik (Plymouth, Rowman and Littlefield, 2011) p353

¹¹⁸ As quoted in Paul Gallis, "NATO and Energy Security" p4 available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22409.pdf>

¹¹⁹ B. Shaffer, Energy Politics (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) p123

Soviet neighbours is utilised in such a way that serves to further Russia's political ambitions.¹²⁰ In particular, the gas crisis of 2005-2006 has been recognised as being a response, not to the economic situation, but rather the political one and, in particular, the recent election of the pro EU and NATO Yushchenko.¹²¹ A man who the Russian government had both publicly and privately worked against in the recent elections, and had ultimately harboured those who were accused of trying to assassinate Yushchenko.¹²² Building upon this logic it is possible to see that, whilst there was always an economic element to gas crises, they were timed in order to have an impact upon the political situation within Ukraine as well. Following up on this understanding of the nature of these crises, it is possible to see that the gas crisis of 2007 and 2008 can be seen to have resulted from the success of an Orange coalition in the 2007 elections.¹²³ Finally, the 2009-2010 crisis can be seen as an attempt by the Russian state to influence up and coming Presidential elections at a time when Ukraine was particularly vulnerable to such action.

Although one could argue that the repeated clashes can be explained by other reasons, it is important to recognise that not only do these actions witness Russia executing its strategy of utilising energy supply as a political tool, but crucially that they have been particularly successful in affecting the politics of Ukraine. In the immediate aftermath of the 2005-2006 and the 2009 gas crises, the pro-Russian Party of Regions and their leader Yanukovych made significant gains. Then in 2010 Yanukovych gained the office of President in a victory over Tymoshenko and the now discredited Yushchenko.¹²⁴ An indication of the political power energy security can be found in the reluctance of politicians to raise gas prices to market levels for fear of a political backlash.¹²⁵ It is also significant to note that although all three major politicians have criticised opponents for making deals with Russia in order to ensure energy security, each one has made some sort of major concession when they have been in power. Yushchenko agreed to the creation of RosUkrEnergo and was criticised by Tymoshenko and Yanukovych, who later, as

¹²⁰D. Yergin, *The Quest: Energy Security and the remaking of the Modern World* (London, Penguin, 2011) p338

A. Jaffe and R. Soligo, 'Energy Security: the Russian connection' in *Energy Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of resource management*. (London, Routledge, 2009) p126

¹²¹ A. Jaffe and R. Soligo, 'Energy Security: the Russian connection' in *Energy Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of resource management*. (London, Routledge, 2009) p126

¹²² T. Kuzio 'Ukraine: Muddling Along', in *Central and East European Politics: From Communism to Democracy*. Ed. J. Caryy and S. Wolchik (Plymouth, Rowman and Littlefield, 2011) p348

¹²³ T. Kuzio 'Ukraine: Muddling Along', in *Central and East European Politics: From Communism to Democracy*. Ed. J. Caryy and S. Wolchik (Plymouth, Rowman and Littlefield, 2011) p352

¹²⁴ D. Saunders. 'A View from Ukraine' in *The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice*. Ed. A. Dorman and J. Kaufman. (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2011) p200

¹²⁵ T. Kuzio 'Ukraine: Muddling Along', in *Central and East European Politics: From Communism to Democracy*. Ed. J. Caryy and S. Wolchik (Plymouth, Rowman and Littlefield, 2011) p356-357

Prime Minister would uphold the agreement.¹²⁶ The agreement which Tymoshenko made in 2009 has not only been criticised by Yanukovich but has actually been jailed and ordered to “pay back” £119m.¹²⁷ Finally Yanukovich himself “signed a deal that extended Russia’s lease on its Crimean naval base for 25 years, even though the constitution does not permit the basing of foreign troops on Ukrainian soil.”¹²⁸ The fact that each leader has been forced to make some sort of concession, when combined with the extreme reluctance of any party to remove the subsidy for household gas and the noted correlation between the gas crises and electoral, indicates that ensuring energy security results in the government in power securing its position. This ready linkage between energy security and regime security sees the replacement of military coercion by economic coercion within the existing literature surrounding the insecurity dilemma. However, it is important to note that although a linkage can be found between energy and regime security, this does not render the contribution of the previously discussed factors, such as the infighting of the pro Western factions, to Ukrainian political instability moot. It does however demonstrate how Russia can be seen to have capitalised upon the insecurity dilemma faced by the Ukrainian people and its politicians in order to exact various concessions.

The situation in Georgia deserves discussing as, unlike the Ukrainian government, the Georgian government decided not to come to a deal with its Russian suppliers.¹²⁹ Instead of remaining dependent on Russia as its primary source of energy Saakashvili and his government promoted relations with Azerbaijan.¹³⁰ As Shaffer notes, this situation has benefited both sides considerably and has resulted in a great deal of co-operation between them.¹³¹ Significantly however, despite Russian attempts to utilise its position as a major market for Georgian products it has been unable to affect any significant change in policy on the part of Georgia. Interestingly, Georgian relations with Azerbaijan can be seen to, not unproblematically, mimic the behaviour of weak state elites attempting to secure their own military security. More specifically the situation described by Jackson where “weak state elites sometimes join together with other weak

¹²⁶ T. Kuzio ‘Ukraine: Muddling Along’, in *Central and East European Politics: From Communism to Democracy*. Ed. J. Caryl and S. Wolchik (Plymouth, Rowman and Littlefield, 2011) p356

¹²⁷ D. Sanford ‘Ukraine ex-PM Yulia Tymoshenko jailed over gas deal.’ BBC News. 11th October 2011. Accessed 28th May 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15250742>

¹²⁸ Freedom House, Ukraine. Accessed 30th May 2012. Available at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/ukraine>

¹²⁹ T. German ‘Georgia and the Transatlantic Relationship: The New Kid on the Block’ in *The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice*. Ed. A. Dorman and J. Kaufman. (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2011) p200

¹³⁰ B. Shaffer, *Energy Politics* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) p41

¹³¹ B. Shaffer, *Energy Politics* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) p41

states in regional defence arrangements designed primarily to prop each other up.”¹³² Utilising this understanding of weak state behaviour it is possible to see that Georgia and Azerbaijan are creating a type of regional defence arrangement in order to counter the threat posed by dependency on Russian energy. In pursuing this policy Georgia has made an agreement with Azerbaijan which cedes control over Georgia’s transmission network to Azerbaijan in return for below market prices on natural gas.¹³³ At this point it is however important to note that one cannot know for sure what the implications for Georgian foreign policy would have been if Georgia were reliant on Russia energy supplies. However what can be said is that not only has Georgia’s ability to find an alternative source of energy resulted in it being immune to the same pressure that have been exerted on other post Soviet states, but its behaviour with regards to Azerbaijan is indicative the presence of an insecurity dilemma based upon economic rather than military power.

¹³² R. Jackson. “Regime Security” in *Contemporary Security Studies*. Ed. A. Collins. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) p155

¹³³ E. Snamyan, Georgia cedes its natural gas network to Azerbaijan. *The Armenian Reporter*. 21st November 2008. Accessed May 29th 2012. <http://www.reporter.am/go/article/2008-11-21-georgia-cedes-its-natural-gas-network-to-azerbaijan>

Conclusion and Implications

In the discussion above I have attempted to demonstrate that there were a number of important factors that contributed to Saakashvili's success and Yushchenko's failure to adopt a pro western foreign policy. First of all, the Yushchenko faced a number of significant political obstacles when attempting to implement a pro western foreign policy. These obstacles existed on a number of levels and for a number of reasons. First of all, upon entering office Yushchenko had to operate as a president whose powers were substantially limited by the constitutional amendments that had recently been made. Secondly the nature of politics in Ukraine resulted in a number of significant setback for Yushchenko and the pro west faction within Ukrainian politics. First of all the regional divisions within Ukrainian society meant that, although Yanukovych was widely discredited in the 2004 presidential elections, he and his party still held a strong position within Ukrainian politics. As a result of this Yushchenko was faced with consistent opposition to his foreign policy from both Yanukovych himself and his party in the Ukrainian parliament. This weakness was exacerbated by the fact that Yushchenko consistently fell out with Tymoshenko and as a result the pro western faction within Ukrainian politics was ineffective when in government. A ramification of this was the discrediting of the 'Orange' faction within Ukrainian politics and the development of a belief that democracy resulted in the paralysis of government. This situation worked to increase the support of Yanukovych and the pro Russian faction within Ukrainian politics, and ultimately helped him and his party regain control of the Ukrainian government. In contrast to this Saakashvili has remained largely in control of the domestic political situation within Georgia throughout his time in office. Not only did Saakashvili benefit from the fact that his political rivals disappeared from the political scene but also he acted to ensure that he retained this position within Georgian politics. By both giving himself substantial powers under the Georgian constitution and creating what has been termed a 'super presidential' system and also suppressing his opposition, Saakashvili came to held a dominant and unrivalled position within Georgian politics.¹³⁴ Furthermore, unlike Yushchenko, Saakashvili faced no real domestic or public opposition to his pro western foreign policy but rather benefitted from a substantial level of support.

¹³⁴P. Jawad, 'Elections and Treatment of the Opposition in Post-Soviet Georgia' in *Presidents, Oligarchs and Bureaucrats: Forms of Rule in the Post-Soviet Space*. Ed. S. Stewart, M. Klein, A. Schmitz and H. Schroder. (Farnham, Ashgate Publishing, 2012) p150

Secondly, Saakashvili's was greatly helped by the substantial levels of aid that flowed into Georgia from the United States. These significant funds helped Saakashvili to achieve many of his domestic ambitions but to not also avoid the negativity associated with a serious economic recession and actually associate himself and his rule with Georgia's economic and political successes during this period. In contrast to this situation the pro west faction within Ukrainian politics can be seen to have not only lacked anywhere near the level of aid received by Georgia but to have been left in particularly vulnerable position when it came to the Russian gas shortage. The ramification of this was that Tymoshenko and the pro western faction within Ukrainian politics were left looking weak and tainted by the association with the severe hardship caused by the economic recession in 2009. This contributed to a environment that facilitated the gaining of the Presidency by Yanukovich and therefore the rejection of Yushchenko's pro western foreign policy.

Finally, when analysing the impact of pipeline politics upon the ability of each government to pursue a pro western policy it was possible to recognise that energy security played a decisive role within the political situation of Ukraine. The intense sensitivity that surrounds the issue of ensuring cheap gas for the Ukrainian populace, provided the Russian government with an easy means by which to not only influence Ukrainian domestic politics, but to also ensure the regime security of whichever faction formed a government. As a result of this situation the government in Kiev became dependent upon the Russian government and Gazprom, and was coerced into not only abandoning a pro western foreign policy but also making a number of concession to the Russian government. Interestingly, although Saakashvili managed to remain independent of the Russian government, he did cede control over Georgia's transmission system to Azerbaijan. Importantly however the actions of the Georgian and Azerbaijani government are similar to weak states elsewhere in the world, who are confronted with the insecurity dilemma. It can therefore be seen that the situation demonstrated as existing within the theoretical literature surrounding the topic, can be seen to have actually existed in the real world. As a result energy security can be seen to have played a significant role in determining the foreign policy adopted by Ukraine.

The fundamental implication of this understanding is that as long as weak states remain energy insecure they will remain vulnerable to manipulation by outside power. Utilising the understanding that dependency model provides a powerful guide to the way in which the energy supplier will act in such a situation it is possible to see that the establishment of a domestic source of energy is the only means by which a weak state can seek to escape from this situation. This is essentially problematic due to the fact that weak states often lack both the funding and

technology to make such technological advancements. An interesting area for further development would be to look at how new renewable energy technologies serve to impact upon this situation. This lies in the fact that, if such advanced technology is not widely available or easy to produce, there is a real chance that weak states will remain in a situation of dependence not upon the energy supplier but rather on those who control the technology needed to ensure long term energy security. As a last point of note, a possible future application of this theory would to apply it to regional situations in large weak states. In doing so scholars could potentially provide a means by which regional conflicts in separatist regions, such as the Xianjing province in China, could be brought under the control of a central government. Should such a practical application of the theory work it could be utilised to help resolve conflicts in some of the most dangerous regions of the world.

Appendix

Table 1: Industrial Sector as a Percentage of GDP (World Bank)

Series Name	Country Name	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Afghanistan	20	19	23	25	28	26	26	21	22	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Albania	19	21	21	22	20	20	19	19	19	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Algeria	53	55	56	61	62	61	62	62	62	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	American Samoa
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Andorra
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Angola	68	67	66	73	70	67	67	59	62	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Antigua and Barbuda	15	15	15	17	21	21	22	22	19	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Argentina	32	35	36	36	36	34	32	32	31	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Armenia	39	42	41	45	45	44	44	36	36	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Aruba
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Australia	26	26	26	27	28	20	20	21	20	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Austria	29	29	29	29	29	30	30	29	29	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Azerbaijan	50	53	55	64	69	68	70	61	65	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Bahamas, The	15	16	15	15	17	13	14	14
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Bahrain
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Bangladesh	26	26	27	27	28	28	29	29	28	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Barbados	16	16	16	18	23	23	23	23
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Belarus	37	39	41	42	42	42	44	42	44	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Belgium	25	25	25	24	24	24	23	22	22	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Belize	20	18	18	17	21	21	23
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Benin	14	14	13	13
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Bermuda	10	10	10	10	9	9	9	9	8	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Bhutan	38	39	38	37	39	45	44	43
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Bolivia	29	29	31	32	35	36	38	36	37	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Bosnia and Herzegovina	22	23	25	25	25	29	30	28	28	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Botswana	55	50	51	51	54	53	53	40	45	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Brazil	27	28	30	29	29	28	28	25	27	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Brunei Darussalam	61	64	68	72	73	71	74
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Bulgaria	27	28	27	29	31	32	30	31	31	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Burkina Faso	21	22	23	23	22
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Burundi	19	19	19	20
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Cambodia	26	26	27	26	28	27	24	23	23	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Cameroon	32	31	31	30	31	31
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Canada	31	31	32	32	32	32
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Cape Verde	15	15	15	16	16	16	17	16	16	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Cayman Islands
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Central African Republic	15	16	14	14	14	14	14	15
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Chad	15	24	47	60	61	54	49
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Channel Islands
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Chile	40	38	41	43	49	49	45	43	43	..

Series Name	Country Name	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	China	45	46	46	47	48	47	47	46	47	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Colombia	30	31	32	33	34	34	35	34	36	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Comoros	12	13	12	11	12	12	12	12
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Congo, Dem. Rep.	21	21	24	27	28	28	28	24
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Congo, Rep.	63	61	66	72	76	73	77	71	75	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Costa Rica	29	29	30	29	29	29	29	27	26	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Cote d'Ivoire	23	22	23	26	26	25	26	25	27	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Croatia	28	28	29	29	28	27	28	26	27	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Cuba	25	22	21	19	20	20	21	20	21	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Curacao
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Cyprus	19	19	20	19	19	19	20
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Czech Republic	37	36	39	38	38	38	38	38	38	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Denmark	26	25	25	26	26	26	26	22	22	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Djibouti	16	16	17	17	16	17
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Dominica	18	16	16	15	16	16	16	15	15	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Dominican Republic	35	34	33	32	32	32	32	32	32	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Ecuador	32	31	34	36	38	39	41	36	38	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Egypt, Arab Rep.	34	35	36	36	38	36	38	37	38	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	El Salvador	32	32	31	30	29	28	28	27	27	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Equatorial Guinea	89	89	92	94	94	95	96	93
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Eritrea	23	21	21	22	19	20	27	22
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Estonia	28	28	28	29	29	30	29
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Ethiopia	14	14	14	13	13	13	13	11	14	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Faeroe Islands
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Fiji	23	22	23	19	19	18	18	18	20	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Finland	33	33	33	32	34	34	32	28	29	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	France	22	21	21	21	21	21	20	19
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	French Polynesia
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Gabon	52	52	55	61	61	60	64	53	60	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Gambia, The	15	14	13	13	14	15	15	15	16	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Georgia	24	26	26	27	25	24	22	22	23	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Germany	29	29	29	29	30	30	30	27	28	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Ghana	28	28	27	27	21	21	20	19	19	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Gibraltar
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Greece	20	19	19	19	20	19	19	18	18	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Greenland
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Grenada	19	20	19	26	23	22	20	15	14	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Guam
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Guatemala	29	29	30	29	30	30	20	20	19	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Guinea	34	31	34	39	43	43	47	52	47	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Guinea-Bissau	13
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Guyana	29	27	27	20	27	30	31	31	33	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Haiti
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Honduras	30	30	29	29	30	29	28	27	27	..

Series Name	Country Name	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Hong Kong SAR, China	11	11	10	9	8	7	8	7
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Hungary	30	30	31	30	30	30	30	30	31	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Iceland	25	23	24	24	27	26	27	25
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	India	26	26	28	28	29	29	28	27	26	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Indonesia	44	44	45	47	47	47	48	48	47	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Iran, Islamic Rep.	41	41	43	45	44	44
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Iraq	73	70
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Ireland	41	38	35	35	34	34	31	32
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Isle of Man
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Israel
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Italy	28	27	27	27	27	27	27	25	25	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Jamaica	24	25	26	25	25	25	23	22	22	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Japan	30	30	30	30	30	29	28	27
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Jordan	27	27	29	29	28	30	33	32	31	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Kazakhstan	39	38	38	40	42	41	43	40	42	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Kenya	17	18	18	19	18	19	20	19	20	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Kiribati	10	10	9	7	8	8	9	10
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Korea, Dem. Rep.
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Korea, Rep.	36	37	38	38	37	37	36	37	39	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Kosovo	20	20	20	20	20	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Kuwait	49	51
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Kyrgyz Republic	23	22	24	22	20	19	24	27	28	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Lao PDR	25	26	28	24	27	27	28	25	30	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Latvia	23	22	22	22	22	23	23	21	22	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Lebanon	23	22	22	21	20	22	22	23	21	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Lesotho	35	34	32	33	35	36	37	33	32	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Liberia	8	11	13	16	17	19	17
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Libya	66	75	69	75	79	76	78
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Liechtenstein
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Lithuania	30	32	33	33	33	33	32	27	28	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Luxembourg	18	18	18	17	16	16	14	12	13	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Macao SAR, China	12	13	12	15	20	19	17	11
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Macedonia, FYR	30	29	28	28	29	31	30	27	28	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Madagascar	14	15	16	16	16	16	16	16
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Malawi	18	19	17	17	17	16	16	16
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Malaysia	45	47	49	50	50	47	48	44	44	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Maldives	21	22	27	31	28	19	18	15	15	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Mali	28	24	24	24	24	24
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Malta	44	44	40	39	38	38	38	33
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Marshall Islands
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Mauritania	26	24	27	33	47	40	41	35	44	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Mauritius	31	30	29	28	28	27	28	28	27	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Mayotte
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Mexico	26	33	34	34	36	35	37	34	34	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Moldova	23	25	17	16	16	15	14	13	13	..

Series Name	Country Name	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Monaco
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Mongolia	26	28	32	36	43	42	34	33	38	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Montenegro	24	23	22	21	20	21	21	20	20	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Morocco	27	28	29	28	27	27	30	29	30	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Mozambique	23	26	27	25	26	26	24	24	23	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Myanmar	13	14	16	18	19	20	23	25	26	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Namibia	32	28	29	29	35	36	38	33	20	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Nepal	18	18	18	18	17	17	17	16	15	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Netherlands	24	24	24	24	25	25	26	24	24	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	New Caledonia
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	New Zealand	25	24	25	25	25
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Nicaragua	30	29	30	30	30	29	29	29	30	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Niger	17	17
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Nigeria	31	37	42	44	42	41
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Northern Mariana Islands
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Norway	38	38	40	43	44	42	45	39	40	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Oman	53	54	55
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Pakistan	24	24	27	27	27	27	27	25	25	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Palau	18	17	18	16	18	21
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Panama	16	14	18	17	16	17	17	17	17	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Papua New Guinea	37	37	39	41	45	45	48	45	45	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Paraguay	22	23	21	21	20	20	20	21	20	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Peru	30	31	33	34	37	37	37	35	34	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Philippines	35	35	34	34	33	33	33	32	33	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Poland	29	30	31	31	31	32	32	32	32	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Portugal	27	26	26	25	25	25	24	23	23	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Puerto Rico	49	49	49	48	47	47	48	50	50	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Qatar
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Romania	38	35	35	35	37	35	25	26	26	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Russian Federation	33	33	36	38	37	36	36	34	37	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Rwanda	14	12	14	14	14	14	15	14
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Samoa	28	31	31	31	30	31	29	26	28	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	San Marino
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Sao Tome and Principe	17	18	21	21
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Saudi Arabia	51	54	58	63	65	66	70	60	62	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Senegal	25	24	25	24	23	24	22	22	22	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Serbia	29	28	30	29	29	28	28	28	27	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Seychelles	30	27	28	22	20	20	20	19
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Sierra Leone	25	25	24	24	23	24	23	23	21	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Singapore	32	31	33	32	31	29	27	28	28	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Sint Maarten (Dutch part)
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Slovak Republic	34	35	37	36	39	38	39	35	35	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Slovenia	35	35	34	34	34	35	34	31	32	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Solomon Islands	12	11	9	8	7	6	6	6
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Somalia
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	South Africa	33	32	31	31	31	31	33	31	31	..

Series Name	Country Name	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	South Sudan
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Spain	29	29	29	30	30	29	28	26	26	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Sri Lanka	28	28	29	30	31	30	29	30	29	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	St. Kitts and Nevis	26	24	23	22	22	22	22	20	16	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	St. Lucia	17	18	19	21	23	19	18	17	17	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	St. Martin (French part)
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	18	19	19	19	19	21	20	19	18	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Sudan	21	22	26	28	29	31	34	26	33	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Suriname	31	31	35	37	39	41	42	39
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Swaziland	45	47	46	45	47	47	46	51	47	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Sweden	28	28	28	28	28	28	27	25	27	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Switzerland	27	27	27	27	28	28	28	26	27	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Syrian Arab Republic	32	29	35	36	35	33	34	31
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Tajikistan	39	37	32	31	27	27	27	24	22	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Tanzania	21	23	22	23	23	23	23	24	25	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Thailand	42	44	43	44	44	45	44	43	45	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Timor-Leste
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Togo	19	22	23	24
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Tonga	21	20	19	19	18	19	19	19	18	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Trinidad and Tobago	45	53	55	60	61	60	63	53	52	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Tunisia	30	29	28	29	30	31	33	32	32	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Turkey	29	29	29	29	29	28	28	26	27	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Turkmenistan	42	41	40	38	36	54	54	54	54	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Turks and Caicos Islands
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Tuvalu
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Uganda	24	24	22	25	24	27	27	26	25	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Ukraine	35	35	36	32	36	37	34	30	31	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	United Arab Emirates	48	49	52	56	58	55	58	53
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	United Kingdom	25	24	23	23	23	23	23	21	22	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	United States	22	22	22	22	22	22	21	20
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Uruguay	24	26	26	27	26	27	26	26	26	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Uzbekistan	22	23	26	23	27	32	31	33	35	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Vanuatu	9	8	8	8	8	8	9	10
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Venezuela, RB	50	52	55	58	56	54
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Vietnam	38	39	40	41	42	41	40	40	41	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Virgin Islands (U.S.)
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	West Bank and Gaza
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Yemen, Rep.	42	43	45	49	49	36	34	38	29	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Zambia	26	27	28	32	35	38	41	34	37	..
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Zimbabwe	21	21	26	29	32	33	31	28	27	..

Table 2: Energy Imports as a Percentage of Total Use (World Bank)

Series Name	Country Name	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Afghanistan
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Albania	52	49	42	49	44	50	44	27
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Algeria	-397	-406	-410	-417	-376	-346	-334	-283
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	American Samoa
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Andorra
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Angola	-529	-486	-504	-679	-709	-795	-830	-749
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Antigua and Barbuda
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Argentina	-47	-43	-29	-26	-18	-13	-9	-9
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Armenia	60	65	64	66	67	71	73	68
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Aruba
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Australia	-136	-133	-137	-134	-130	-139	-133	-137	-157	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Austria	68	70	70	70	70	67	66	64	66	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Azerbaijan	-72	-65	-59	-96	-182	-328	-340	-439
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Bahamas, The
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Bahrain	-137	-132	-127	-115	-99	-94	-89	-85
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Bangladesh	19	19	18	19	16	16	16	16
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Barbados
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Belarus	85	86	87	86	86	86	86	85
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Belgium	76	77	77	76	76	75	75	73	73	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Belize
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Benin	32	34	35	33	38	41	41	43
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Bermuda
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Bhutan
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Bolivia	-98	-114	-194	-167	-127	-187	-170	-128
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Bosnia and Herzegovina	25	21	25	28	26	29	27	25
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Botswana	42	46	45	45	46	52	52	54
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Brazil	15	10	13	10	7	8	8	4
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Brunei Darussalam	-811	-722	-699	-729	-586	-525	-482	-506
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Bulgaria	44	48	45	46	46	50	48	44
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Burkina Faso
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Burundi
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Cambodia	23	24	26	27	28	30	31	29
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Cameroon	-69	-61	-55	-50	-53	-46	-45	-28
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Canada	-55	-47	-49	-47	-53	-53	-52	-53	-55	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Cape Verde
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Cayman Islands
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Central African Republic
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Chad
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Channel Islands
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Chile	66	68	70	68	68	70	69	68	69	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	China	1	2	5	4	7	7	6	8
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Colombia	-166	-179	-183	-184	-186	-197	-204	-211
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Comoros
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Congo, Dem. Rep.	-5	-5	-5	-4	-3	-3	-2	-2

Series Name	Country Name	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Congo, Rep.	-1348	-1068	-1075	-1029	-1190	-903	-920	-989
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Costa Rica	55	58	47	43	44	45	46	45
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Cote d'Ivoire	6	-3	-3	-10	-25	-12	-11	-15
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Croatia	55	57	56	57	54	56	56	53
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Cuba	33	34	37	44	46	44	46	52
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Curacao
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Cyprus	98	98	98	98	98	97	97	97
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Czech Republic	26	25	24	27	27	26	26	26	26	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Denmark	-50	-42	-60	-66	-46	-37	-39	-29	-18	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Djibouti
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Dominica
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Dominican Republic	81	81	78	76	77	77	77	77
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Ecuador	-142	-139	-175	-173	-172	-154	-159	-141
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Egypt, Arab Rep.	-18	-18	-16	-26	-25	-22	-24	-22
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	El Salvador	45	46	45	45	44	42	39	38
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Equatorial Guinea
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Eritrea	27	30	35	34	26	26	19	23
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Estonia	28	25	30	25	26	22	22	12	11	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Ethiopia	7	7	7	8	8	6	7	7
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Faeroe Islands
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Fiji
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Finland	54	57	57	51	51	56	53	50	52	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	France	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	French Polynesia
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Gabon	-737	-781	-770	-706	-631	-593	-579	-657
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Gambia, The
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Georgia	48	49	54	65	69	68	64	61
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Germany	60	60	60	60	60	59	60	60	61	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Ghana	29	28	26	25	30	31	27	24
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Gibraltar	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Greece	64	66	65	66	67	66	68	66	66	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Greenland
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Grenada
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Guam
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Guatemala	26	26	30	32	34	37	34	39
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Guinea
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Guinea-Bissau
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Guyana
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Haiti	25	25	28	26	26	28	28	28
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Honduras	54	56	57	56	50	54	55	50
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Hong Kong SAR, China	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Hungary	56	60	61	62	62	62	60	56	57	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Iceland	25	25	25	24	22	19	17	16	15	..

Series Name	Country Name	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	India	20	19	21	21	23	24	24	26
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Indonesia	-49	-53	-48	-54	-67	-69	-69	-74
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Iran, Islamic Rep.	-87	-101	-92	-81	-80	-76	-67	-62
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Iraq	-299	-153	-212	-190	-190	-218	-243	-272
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Ireland	89	87	87	89	89	91	90	89	87	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Isle of Man
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Israel	96	96	91	90	87	87	83	85	83	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Italy	84	84	84	85	85	85	85	84	83	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Jamaica	89	89	89	89	90	91	88	84
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Japan	81	83	82	81	80	82	82	80	81	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Jordan	95	94	95	96	96	96	96	96
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Kazakhstan	-128	-135	-125	-131	-106	-98	-105	-121
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Kenya	14	12	13	15	16	15	15	17
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Kiribati
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Korea, Dem. Rep.	5	4	2	-3	-3	-7	-3	-5
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Korea, Rep.	82	81	82	80	80	81	80	81	82	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Kosovo
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Kuwait	-389	-450	-461	-456	-486	-457	-450	-332
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Kyrgyz Republic	52	48	46	46	45	52	56	61
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Lao PDR
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Latvia	60	59	58	58	59	61	60	50
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Lebanon	96	95	96	95	96	95	97	97
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Lesotho
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Liberia
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Libya	-290	-348	-373	-438	-468	-448	-423	-327
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Liechtenstein
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Lithuania	42	41	43	54	59	59	58	50
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Luxembourg	98	98	98	98	98	98	98	97	98	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Macao SAR, China
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Macedonia, FYR	40	40	42	46	44	51	46	42
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Madagascar
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Malawi
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Malaysia	-58	-52	-63	-46	-41	-30	-28	-34
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Maldives
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Mali
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Malta	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Marshall Islands
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Mauritania
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Mauritius
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Mayotte
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Mexico	-50	-54	-55	-49	-46	-39	-29	-26	-28	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Moldova	97	97	97	97	97	97	97	96
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Monaco
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Mongolia	18	19	20	-34	-31	-47	-65	-138
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Montenegro

Series Name	Country Name	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Morocco	95	94	94	95	95	96	96	95
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Mozambique	-2	4	-8	-18	-22	-20	-23	-22
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Myanmar	-30	-35	-41	-45	-48	-53	-47	-48
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Namibia	74	75	77	78	80	79	82	81
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Nepal	10	10	10	11	9	9	10	11
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Netherlands	20	25	14	21	20	23	16	19	16	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	New Caledonia
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	New Zealand	15	21	23	24	22	17	13	13	10	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Nicaragua	43	42	41	41	39	46	45	45
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Niger
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Nigeria	-103	-120	-128	-124	-124	-118	-106	-111
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Northern Mariana Islands
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Norway	-842	-767	-764	-736	-693	-680	-635	-656	-563	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Oman	-601	-534	-499	-453	-346	-310	-286	-346
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Pakistan	24	20	20	19	22	24	24	24
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Palau
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Panama	70	72	70	71	73	74	75	79
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Papua New Guinea
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Paraguay	-62	-67	-66	-64	-70	-68	-68	-56
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Peru	22	18	25	20	12	13	16	4
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Philippines	49	48	47	45	45	42	42	40
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Poland	10	12	14	15	20	25	27	28	33	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Portugal	86	83	85	86	82	82	82	80	75	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Puerto Rico
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Qatar	-446	-429	-421	-452	-442	-396	-478	-487
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Romania	23	25	27	27	30	30	27	18
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Russian Federation	-68	-73	-81	-85	-83	-84	-82	-83
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Rwanda
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Samoa
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	San Marino
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Sao Tome and Principe
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Saudi Arabia	-277	-324	-285	-299	-264	-285	-276	-235
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Senegal	52	51	54	55	55	57	57	57
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Serbia	27	29	34	36	38	36	36	35
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Seychelles
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Sierra Leone
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Singapore	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Sint Maarten (Dutch part)
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Slovak Republic	64	65	65	65	64	67	65	65	64	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Slovenia	51	53	51	52	53	53	53	49	50	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Solomon Islands
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Somalia
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	South Africa	-28	-27	-20	-21	-20	-14	-8	-12
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	South Sudan
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Spain	75	75	77	79	78	79	78	77	74	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Sri Lanka	45	46	46	45	43	45	43	45

Series Name	Country Name	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	St. Kitts and Nevis
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	St. Lucia
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	St. Martin (French part)
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Sudan	-61	-65	-74	-78	-86	-130	-131	-123
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Suriname
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Swaziland
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Sweden	39	39	35	33	35	33	33	33	36	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Switzerland	53	53	54	58	55	51	52	53	52	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Syrian Arab Republic	-120	-115	-55	-22	-10	3	6	-5
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Tajikistan	36	32	37	34	38	40	40	35
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Tanzania	7	7	7	8	8	8	8	8
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Thailand	43	44	46	43	42	41	39	40
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Timor-Leste
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Togo	15	18	17	16	14	15	17	17
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Tonga
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Trinidad and Tobago	-95	-128	-134	-117	-119	-114	-121	-117
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Tunisia	14	20	20	19	22	11	18	15
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Turkey	68	70	70	72	72	73	71	69	71	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Turkmenistan	-244	-241	-227	-230	-218	-200	-204	-109
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Turks and Caicos Islands
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Tuvalu
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Uganda
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Ukraine	43	45	44	43	40	41	40	33
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	United Arab Emirates	-268	-308	-304	-303	-307	-259	-220	-183
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	United Kingdom	-18	-11	-2	8	15	16	20	19	27	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	United States	27	28	29	30	28	29	25	22	22	..
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Uruguay	51	54	70	65	75	61	67	63
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Uzbekistan	-6	-10	-15	-20	-20	-23	-23	-24
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Vanuatu
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Venezuela, RB	-254	-238	-287	-251	-236	-228	-216	-204
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Vietnam	-27	-24	-31	-37	-38	-31	-21	-20
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Virgin Islands (U.S.)
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	West Bank and Gaza
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Yemen, Rep.	-336	-287	-234	-210	-173	-131	-111	-101
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Zambia	6	7	8	8	8	6	8	8
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	Zimbabwe	11	10	7	9	10	10	10	10

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