CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY

The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan: A study of transnational factors

By Mohammad Wahdat Wassel

Submitted to

Central European University

Department of Political Science

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of the Master of Arts

CEU eTD Collection

Supervisor: Professor Matteo Fumagalli

Budapest, Hungary

2012

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

CEU eTD Collection

Acknowledgements:

I have conducted this study with the help and support of several people.

First of all, I am grateful to my supervisor, Professor Matteo Fumagalli, who was not only supportive and stimulating but also tremendously patient with me, as I changed my research question a couple of times before I reached a conclusion. Without his support this thesis would not have materialized.

I want to express tremendous gratitude to my wife Mina. She has been extremely supportive and patient when I was busy researching or writing for hours.

I also want to thank my friend Yama Wida for his insightful comments on the write-up.

Special thanks to my parents who always prayed for me and made sure that I ate well and exercised during busy times.

I am grateful to all my interviewees and Nader Omar.

I dedicate this thesis to my son Elias, who has just started to crawl.

CEU eTD Collection

MAP OF AFGHANISTAN

CEU eTD Collection

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CEU eTD Collection

List of Tables

CEU eTD Collection

List of Figures

CEU eTD Collection

ABSTRACT

In this thesis I investigate how a wide array of extraterritorial factors have affected the onset and protraction of insurgency in Afghanistan. Through a qualitative analysis of five exogenous factors which bear on the Taliban insurgency – rival neighbouring state, weak neighbouring state, refugees in neighbouring state, bisected ethnic groups along international borders, and extraterritorial sanctuaries for insurgents – I demonstrate that the Taliban insurgency is a typical case of transnational insurgency. One of the main findings of this thesis is that an interaction between state weakness in Pakistan on the one hand, and its foreign policy rivalry towards Afghanistan, India and the U.S. on the other, has allowed the Taliban insurgents find extraterritorial sanctuary and support. The support for the Taliban insurgents comes from Pakistan's intelligence organization (ISI), as well as from the nearly two million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and the bisected Pashtun ethnic groups along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. This study emphasizes that peace negotiations and reconciliation efforts have repeatedly failed in Afghanistan because the Taliban can evade the coercive power of U.S./NATO forces by retreating to their sanctuaries in Pakistan. I argue that Afghanistan is trapped in a jammed negotiation process where a dyadic negotiation track between the Afghan government and Taliban insurgents is hijacked by a third party: the host state. The underlying message of the thesis is that negotiation and reconciliation with the Taliban only becomes possible if ways are found to neutralize the extraterritorial support and sanctuary being provided to the Taliban insurgents.

CEU eTD Collection

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1. The Context and Parameters of this Research

After the 9/11 attacks, the United States and its international allies decided to overthrow the Taliban[1] regime in Afghanistan, which harboured al-Qaida and its leadership on their soil. The U.S.-led military intervention, conducted in coordination with the Northern Alliances, the Afghan resistance movement against the Taliban, started on October 7, 2001, and the Taliban regime was officially toppled in December 2001. The nation-building processes between December 2001 and 2005 were clear signs of a transition from war, dictatorship and barbarism to peace, democracy and tranquillity, and the Afghan people hoped that decades of devastating war and conflict had come to end. The irony of the U.S.-led intervention, however, was that it neither eliminated the Taliban leadership, nor reconciled it with the new political processes in Afghanistan.

The Taliban found sanctuary in neighbouring Pakistan, revived and reconstituted its organizational structures, and hit back. These sanctuaries and opportunities across national borders turned the domestic insurgency into what scholars call a 'transnational insurgency' (Salehyan 2009). Today, alas, the situation continues to deteriorate in many parts of the country, and the Afghan people still suffer greatly from the Taliban insurgency (Doronsoro 2009; Giustozzi et al. 2009; Rashid 2009; Ferguson 2011; Rubin 2007).[2] Since the major escalation of insurgency in 2006 and also as a result of fighting between pro-government

[1] The word *Taliban* means 'students' in Arabic, Pashto and Dari. The group came into effective existence in early 1994 (Ferguson, 2010:23). The Taliban is a group of extremist Sunni Muslim fighters that emerged from the old Mujahidin groups (Johnson 2007). The group draws its foot soldiers and commanders from the religious madrassas in the tribal areas of Pakistan, with most of its financial assistance coming from hard-liners in Saudi Arabia, and mentoring from the Pakistani Intelligence Services (ICG 2008:3; RAND Online). Their leaders primarily include former Mujahidin commanders who fought and helped defeat the Soviet army in Afghanistan. The Taliban are Pashtun by ethnicity (for the ethnic composition of Afghanistan, see table 1), which are a majority in Afghanistan and sizeable in Pakistan. The Taliban's initial rise to power is considered to have been a movement in response to the devastation and the lawlessness of the Mujahidin regime of 1992-1995 (Ferguson 2011:32-36).

[2] The current Taliban movement is a well-organized and coherent organization (Doronsoro, 2009:9) which is capable of strategic decision making, coordination, communication, deployment of financial and human resources and maintaining a consistent organizational structure including hiring and firing of personnel.

CEU eTD Collection

forces and insurgent groups, Afghan civilian fatalities reached 12,780 during the period 2006–2011 (see table 1). Moreover, the coalition countries and their citizens are growing impatient with the growing number of their own soldiers being killed in Afghanistan (Traynor 2010; Schwennicke 2010).[3] As of January 2012, there are 129,895 foreign soldiers in Afghanistan fighting against the insurgency, and since October 2001 more than 3,000 foreign troops have been killed there (Livingston and O'Hanlon 2012: 5, 11). Although billions of international aid have been spent in fighting the Taliban insurgency, and many successful operations have been conducted by the coalition forces and the Afghan National Army, which have killed hundreds of Taliban fighters, the insurgency is ongoing and insecurity still prevails across the country (Ferguson 2011). In recent years the Taliban have managed to take control of major portions of territory in the southern and eastern parts of the country, have infiltrated areas in the north, and have carried out several sophisticated and spectacular attacks in the capital Kabul (Rabasa et al. 2011:7).[4] At the moment of writing, civilian and military lives are taken every day and social and infrastructural progress worth billions of dollars is being ruthlessly destroyed.

CEU eTD Collection

[3] France, for instance, will pull out its 3,500 combat troops by the end of 2012 (see 'Hollande Sticking to Afghanistan Withdrawal by Year's End', *CNN*, 19 May 2012).

[4] Although there is a centralized command and control structure wherein all major operation decisions are taken, the Taliban still maintains a huge degree of flexibility and diversity in its activities, both in operations and mobilization. Local commanders are delegated high levels of autonomy to network with criminal groups, tax drug trafficking and enter into local-level agreements with communities, while preserving their loyalty to the central command linked to Quetta Shura councils and commission. Exceptions aside, there is no confusion or large-scale rivalry among the Taliban commanders or their fighters as to who is in control or should have the final say (Doronsoro, 2009:10). Organizational resilience has been a major advantage for the group. Despite the fact that every now and then high-ranking Taliban commanders are arrested or killed, serious losses are incurred in the battlefield and strongholds are attacked by NATO and Afghan forces in the country, the movement is able to restructure, regroup and reappoint new commanders while praising the martyrdom of the old ones (Doronsoro, 2009:10). Prime examples are the killing or arrest of their supreme military commanders such as Mullah Akhtar Osmani (killed in 2006), Mullah Beradar (killed in 2007), Mullah Dadullah (killed in 2007), Mullah Qayom Zaker (arrested in 2010), and Mullah Obaidullah (arrested in 2008) (Roggio, 2010:2). Contrary to expectations, the movement has further strengthened with the passing of time.

Table 1: Civilian Casualties 2006-2011

Year	Civilian fatalities
2006	929
2007	1,523
2008	2,118
2009	2,412
2010	2,777
2011	3,021
Total	**12,780**

Source: Adapted from UN Mission in Afghanistan UNAMA 2012[5]

For some experts, such as Lakhdar Brahimi[6] and Francesec Vendrell,[7] the exclusion of the Taliban and their sympathizers from the new Afghan setup in 2001 and the return of too many warlords and former Jihadi commanders to power were the initial mistakes which fuelled the conflict (BBC Persian 2012a[8]; BBC Persian 2011[9]). At that time, neither the international community nor the Taliban's former foes (the Northern Alliances) who dominated the new Afghan government wanted to have talks with the remnants of the Taliban regime. Subsequently, the international coalition countries and also the Afghan Government exerted every effort to eliminate the remaining pockets of Taliban resistance in Afghanistan (Rubin 2007). However, channelling all counterinsurgency efforts through the military and underestimating the importance of serious political settlement not only failed to bring a lasting peace, but also fuelled the resurgence of the Taliban across the country. In addition, because of the climate of overwhelming success following the U.S. intervention and the near-

CEU eTD Collection

[5] The report is available on line at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/20120204_afghan_civilians_deaths.pdf; see also http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/aug/10/afghanistan-civilian-casualties-statistics.
[6] Brahimi was the UN envoy to Afghanistan from 2002 to 2004.
[7] Vendrell was the EU envoy to Afghanistan from 2002 to 2007.
[8] Available online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/2011/12/111201_k01_bonn2_vendrell_iv.shtml.
[9] Available online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/2011/12/111201_k01_bonn2_brahimi_iv.shtml.

total defeat of the Taliban regime, the Taliban movement was totally ignored and considered a bygone phenomenon.

Despite the fact that the Taliban is often considered a 'small guerrilla' and weak movement, the momentum has seemed to be on their side since their resurgence in 2006. Their comeback has had a significant impact in the global political arena, involving the superpowers and the countries from NATO. In other words, the issue of the Taliban has become an issue for the globe, although at the moment the events strictly speaking only take place in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The return of the Taliban to the battlefield as insurgents, and their recent tactics – such as suicide bombings, commando-style attacks, and the use of road-side mines against national and international troops – have attracted world attention and had profound effects on the political process, raising the concerns of the international community and the Afghans alike (Doronsoro 2009).[10] This success has shown the world that the Taliban remains relevant as a political entity in Afghanistan. Massive military operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan have failed to eliminate them, because of the insurgents' ability to easily evade NATO and Afghan military operations by slipping into Pakistani territory. Cross-border infiltration, in which Taliban can effortlessly find sanctuaries in

[10] Throughout their operations, the Taliban have shown high level of professionalism, bravery and knowledge of complex coordinated operations. They have been able to mobilize and equip large numbers of fighters all around the country. Doronsoro (2009:5) gives the following conclusion in one of his papers, 'On-the-ground observations and reliable evidence suggest that the Taliban have an efficient leadership, are learning from their mistakes, and are quick to exploit the weaknesses of their adversaries. They are building a parallel government, have nationwide logistics, and already manage an impressive intelligence network.' Taliban fighters use advanced communication devices such as mobile phones, radios and satellite phones to coordinate operations inside the country and report battlefield performance to leadership cells outside the country. There have been frequent instances where Taliban groups have called for instantaneous backup support from across the borders when they have encountered disproportional attack from the NATO or Afghan government side. Furthermore, they have shown remarkable expertise in developing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and roadside bombs (Johnson, 2007:337 and Doronsoro, 2009:11), organizing massive jailbreaks like the one in Kandahar, and coordinating simultaneous (suicide) attacks in the capital Kabul and in the provinces. In addition, the Taliban have shown a great deal of activism through their online and offline media propaganda. In addition to using traditional radio, newspaper, night letters, and audio and video messages distributed on cell phones and public speeches (Doronsoro, 2009:11), they have mastered the use of the Internet. They produce their own videos in their media centres in Pakistan (i.e. al-Sahab) and broadcast them to a global audience on their websites (see, for example, http://alemarah1.org/english).

CEU eTD Collection

Pakistan and later re-enter Afghanistan to resume their anti-government operations, has been a major survival tactic. These cross-border activities are the focus of this thesis.

2. The Argument of this Thesis

Negotiation is the only viable option to end the Taliban insurgency; and negotiation and reconciliation will only become possible if the Taliban sanctuaries in neighbouring Pakistan are eliminated. The scholarship on transnational insurgency and political opportunities, on which I rely in this dissertation, teaches us that rebels with extraterritorial bases possess stronger bargaining power as opposed to when they are bound to their own country (Lischer 2005; Saideman 2001; Scherrer 2002; Salehyan 2008, 2009; Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1994, 2005, 2011; McAdam 2006; Sikkink 2005). Sanctuaries in neighbouring countries provide insurgents with an opportunity to evade the coercive power of their state of origin while enabling them to mobilize supporters, funding and logistical support both from outside and inside their country. Thus, they are under no robust pressure to bargain, negotiate and reconcile unless the concessions are clearly to their advantage. I call this a *jammed negotiation trap*.

3. Argument and Research Questions

My main argument in this dissertation is that because of the extraterritorial sanctuaries that the Taliban insurgents enjoy in the neighbouring country, Afghanistan is in a jammed negotiation trap where conventional dyadic peace negotiations between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban insurgents are unviable because of Taliban's bargaining power and the meddling of their host state. This study of Afghan insurgency drastically departs from conventional analyses that underscore a long range of internal factors[11] in the prolongation of

[11] Internal factors refer to those factors that are unfolding within the boundaries of Afghan territory. Therefore, the international community's mismanagement of aid or military operations inside Afghanistan is also considered an internal factor in this thesis.

CEU eTD Collection

the conflict – such as flawed U.S./NATO counterinsurgency strategies, especially in the case of Afghan civilian casualties (Masadykov et al. 2010; Doronsoro 2009; Dressler 2009; Ruttig 2009; Keling et al. 2010); institutional and political problems in Afghanistan such as unemployment, the economy and the lack of capacity of state institutions (Rashid 2007; Jonson 2007; Giustozzi and Orsini 2009; Rubin 2007; Lafraie 2009; Giustozzi 2010); or the mistakes of the international aid community such as inefficient and ineffective international aid, lack of accountability of international agencies and disproportionate aid distribution across Afghanistan (Pounds 2006; Baudienville and Davin 2008; OECD 2006; World Bank 2005; UN 2006; Asia Foundation 2007). Instead, I take a step back and look at the resurgence and endurance of the Taliban insurgency from a regional perspective. To address these developments I propose the following two overarching research questions to guide the chapters of the thesis: **What extraterritorial factors explain the resurgence and protraction of the Taliban insurgency; and Why has there been a deadlock on the negotiation and reconciliation fronts with the Taliban insurgents?**

In all I conducted 9 interviews in Kabul and outsourced another 4 interviews with current members of Taliban group in southern regions of Afghanistan (see methodology in Chapter Three). The questions that I raised both during the literature review and my interviews had two prime objectives: to find out how extraterritorial opportunities have helped the Taliban resurgence, and to explore the effects of these opportunities on the jammed negotiation trap that Afghanistan is in. Interview questions are set out in Chapter Three. In my interviews the interviewees[12] had the opportunity to express their own feelings and beliefs about the nature of insurgency and reconciliation with the Taliban, and they

CEU eTD Collection

[12] The interviewees were selected based on their expertise and involvement in current Afghan politics. Most importantly, I used the already established network of contacts that I had in Afghanistan from my job at the EU special representatives office in Kabul from 2007 to 2008. The interviewees are current or former staff of international organizations or foreign embassies. See Chapter Three (methodology) and Appendix B for more information on my interviews.

framed their answers in the way they wished. Chapter Three further elaborates the methodology of this research.

Definition of key terminology and concepts used in this thesis is necessary for a clear understanding of the analysis and arguments I present. Civil war, rebellion and insurgency are here treated broadly as similar concepts; they are therefore used interchangeably throughout this dissertation. Here, 'insurgency' is used to refer to a situation in which a state has lost control (or is losing control) over a significant part of its territory to one or more organized violent, nongovernmental groups that claim political ends for their violence. The conventional criterion for defining a situation as a civil war is the demonstration that 1,000 deaths have occurred directly as a result of the battle in a year (Kaufman 2001:17). My definition of insurgency is congruent with this established scholarly criterion. It is also important to note that the involvement of the state (and its foreign supporters stationed inside the country) in the conflict is a crucial element of insurgency. Clashes between two tribes, for instance, are not classed as an insurgency in this paper.

When I use the term *transnational insurgents* I mainly rely on the definition provided by Salehyan (2009). According to him transnational insurgents 'are defined as armed opposition groups whose operations are not confined to the geographic territory of the nation-state(s) that they challenge' (Salehyan 2009:15). Such groups evade the coercive powers of the state they are attacking by relocating their leadership cells to another state. The state that provides sanctuary for the insurgents of a neighbouring state is referred to as the *host state*, and the state whose insurgents are located in another country is called the *target state*. When I use the term *sanctuary* I mean a place of refuge or safety where one is immune from arrest (Merriam-Webster 2012).

The terms *bargaining*, *negotiation* and *reconciliation* are used interchangeably in this dissertation. Williamson (1995:18) defines *reconciliation* as a participatory process aimed at

CEU eTD Collection

opening up ‘the social space that permits and encourages individuals and societies as a collective, to acknowledge the past, mourn the losses, validate the pain experienced, confess the wrongs, and reach toward the next steps of restoring the broken relationship.’ Brecke and Long (cited in Semple 2010:6) define reconciliation as ‘returning to peace, harmony, or amicable relations after a conflict.’ When I refer to bargaining, negotiation or reconciliation, I mean a political process in which the warring parties and those who have great influence on those parties strike a deal and accept compromises to end the conflict.

This study is divided into five chapters. Chapter One introduces the audience to the subject, and presents the research question and the methodology that I will use to approach it. Chapter Two is dedicated to the review of theories of insurgency. Based on a sizable literature review, this chapter aims to examine the existing debates on the theories of transnational insurgency and subsequently draw up a conceptual framework to study insurgency in the context of Afghanistan. Chapter Three discusses the methodology and limitations of the research. Chapter Four analyses the resurgence and continuation of the Taliban insurgency based on the theoretical framework sketched in Chapter Two. It is in this chapter that I discuss the transnational aspect of the insurgency and the effects of transnationalism on the protraction of conflict by testing the hypotheses drawn in Chapter Two. Finally, the concluding chapter will provide the readers with a grasp not only of the transnational aspect of the Taliban movement, but also why the Taliban insurgency has gone on for so long. It also provides recommendations for future studies.

CEU eTD Collection

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter I review the literature on transnational insurgency. The chapter starts with a brief discussion on insurgency in general, and I then review 'motivation theories' of insurgency, as well as the existing literature on the Afghanistan case which uses motivation theories to explain the conflict. In this section I argue that motivation theories fail to give a holistic explanation regarding the causation and endurance of the conflict. Lastly, I present a discussion of transnational insurgency theories, which itself is built on 'opportunity theories'. It is in this last section that I draw my hypotheses for the case study in Chapter Four.

1. Insurgency

Political parties and movements engage in insurgency as a way of bargaining with the government, be it for political, economic or social reforms. In some instances, the purpose of insurgency can be striking a deal for a power-sharing government or the toppling of the ruling regime altogether (Rabasa et al. 2011:2). Insurgency is most often used in a context where the conventional mechanism of communications and negotiations fails and armed opposition groups find it relatively easy to destabilize the government and threaten national security, while evading the coercive powers of the state. Insurgencies may continue, costing lives and causing infrastructural damage, until the warring parties reach a negotiated deal. Protracted insurgencies are mostly prevalent in situations where the state is neither ready to accommodate the demands of the insurgents, nor able to dismantle the insurgent organization in its entirety. Insurgencies can last for years when the insurgents' demands are too high or unrealistic, and they themselves are unreachable by the state military forces, either because they are hiding in rough terrain or underground cells, or are located outside the sovereign territory of the state (Staniland 2005:21; Salehyan 2009:19). Quite often it is the latter strategy, *transnational insurgency*, which makes protracted rebellion feasible.

CEU eTD Collection

Insurgent activities can occur despite the fact that states have superior power and authority relative to other social organizations in a society, including insurgent groups (Hardin 1995; Olson 2001). These insurgent groups are sometimes defeated and dismantled by state power. In other cases, these groups last so long that their mere existence and continued struggle, be it armed or otherwise, manifests the weakness of the state authorities. This is because states are responsible for maintaining order (at least) within their jurisdiction, for which they own the monopoly of violence (i.e. the use of coercive force), to be deployed should that order be threatened by any group in the society. It is therefore puzzling that despite the high risk of defeat and death, rebellion still occurs, and indeed that examples are numerous around the globe: Rwanda, Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Myanmar, Kashmir, Northern Ireland and so on. Furthermore, it is puzzling why states with legitimate and unrestricted power and authority fail to contain and defeat insurgent groups. 'Motivation theories' and 'opportunity theories' are two major schools of thought that attempt to explain insurgencies (and contentious politics in general). Below I first briefly review motivation theories and the major literature on the Afghanistan case within this domain.

2. 'Motivation theories' of Insurgency

There are several theories which attempt to explain as to why groups become violent and engage in insurgency to get concessions from state parties.[13] The three overarching motivation theories of insurgency are 'grievance', 'greed' and 'circumstantialism'.

Grievance-based literature on Afghanistan

Ted Robert Gurr (1970), Collier (2007:23), Collier and Hoeffler (2006:11) and Hirshleifer (cited in Collier and Hoeffler 2006:11) address the best-discussed theory on how group grievances cause insurgency. They argue that when a group of people finds itself least

[13] The question is why insurgency and violence is embraced, as opposed to conventional means of political struggle to promote their demands.

CEU eTD Collection

advantaged in a society, or where there is a disjunction between the various groups' social, religious and political aspirations, the least advantaged (or most discriminated-against) group feels subordinated and, subsequently, they become predisposed to insurgency (Collier and Hoeffler 2004:563). A large number of scholars (Masadykov et al. 2010; Munoz 2012:40-45; Livingstone and O'Hanlon 2012:15; O'Hanlon 2009:141; Dressler 2009) connect grievance theory with the huge number of civilian casualties[14] resultant from U.S./NATO operations in Afghanistan, and the resurgence of the Taliban. In addition to this, arbitrary detentions of Afghans and torture at U.S.-controlled prisons either in Afghanistan (i.e. Bagram Prison) or abroad (Guantanamo Bay), have also been factors that have contributed to the grievances of the Afghan population, specifically among the Pashtun population of the south and eastern regions of Afghanistan. Intimidation and perceived atrocities are thought to drive Afghans to take up arms and join the rank and file of the Taliban insurgents. These military mistakes are framed by the Taliban in a way that evokes the Afghan population's memory of the British and the Soviet Union's invasions (Doronsoro 2009).

Other scholars (e.g. Wood 2006) argue that emotional and moral grievances can be determining factors in the emergence and consolidation of insurgent collective action. In like manner, Fox (1997 and 2005) argues that challenges to religion can inspire collective actions such as holy war and insurgency. Reuter and Younus (in Giustozzi 2009) elaborate how the insurgency in Ghazni province of Afghanistan started to take shape when local Mullahs began spreading propaganda against the 'infidel' foreign forces and how they had denigrated Afghan society. They quote a local Mullah's sermon during Friday Prayer: 'Do you know young boys and girls are making sex openly on streets of Kabul. Our beloved Kabul is now turned to a stronghold of immorality and a piece of Europe. It has never happened in Afghanistan's history…' (2009:103). In fact, the Taliban's information campaigns (night

[14] According to American military figures, civilian deaths in air strikes grew from 116 in 2006 to 321 in 2007 (*The Economist*, August 28, 2008). From 2007 to 2010, civilian deaths from air strikes, according to UN figures, were approximately 530 (UNAMA 2012:24).

CEU eTD Collection

letters, advocacies and publications) have been extremely successful in highlighting the failures of the international community in delivering aid, their military mistakes, and the 'invasion' of Afghanistan by 'non-Muslims' (ICG 2008; see also Foxley 2007:2-8 and Semple 2012:60).

Under the heading of the grievance thesis we can also locate the 'primordialist' theories of conflict and insurgency. Primordialist theories believe that conflicts and insurgency occur because communities with distinct primitive bonds such as religion, blood, race, region and language fear each other or cannot agree on power-sharing government (Hutchinson and Smith 1996:8; Fearon 1999:3). Johnson (2007:323-34) argues that the Taliban insurgency has primordial roots. He maintains that Mullah Omar – the Taliban's notorious leader – and Hamid Karzai come from the Ghilzai and Duranni tribes respectively. The rivalry and animosity as to which tribe should rule Afghanistan dates back as far back as 1737, the first time the Ghilzai tribe's representative, Mir Wais, was overthrown by the Durrani leader, Ahmad Shah. The current conflict, on this view, is meant to be rooted in this old history of contention.

Likewise, income inequity and the way different social classes are structured leads to dissatisfaction and antagonism, and ultimately the tensions may pave the way for insurgency (Horowitz 1985; MacCulloch 2004; Murshed and Gates 2005). Aid ineffectiveness, giving military and civilian contracts to warlords and a specific group of NGOs (Pounds 2006), and lack of accountability of aid expenditure despite constant news of billions of dollars flowing into Afghanistan have grieved the Afghan population (Baudienville and Davin 2008; Waldman 2008; OECD Report 2006:9). Therefore, Afghans have started to oppose the internationally backed Afghan government and support the insurgency (Rashid 2007; Doronsoro 2009). It is believed that aid is wasted on projects that do not reflect the aspirations and interests of the Afghan people, is focused on major cities only (World Bank

CEU eTD Collection

2005:i), or is mostly abused by a circle of new Afghan elites in the capital and provinces. Disproportionality of aid expenditure in some provinces of Afghanistan has radicalized rival provinces. Waldman (2008:12) writes that 'If Helmand province (population 800,000) was a state, it would rank as the fifth largest recipient of USAID funds in the world' (see also 'Afghanistan aid must be spread', *Financial Times*, 19 March 2007). In addition, others (Waldman 2008:3; Rubin 2007) argue that the amount of aid is inadequate, in the sense that it has not had an impact on the lives of the population outside major cities (see also World Bank 2007:1). Poverty and joblessness are still considered as facilitators in recruiting youth into insurgent movements (UN Report 2006:2-3; Asia Foundation 2007).

Greed-based literature on Afghanistan

For some other scholars, 'greed', rather than 'grievance', is the main motive for insurgency. It is the desire for profit which leads to the formation of rebel movements. These scholars believe that rebels motivated by greed are not concerned about righting wrongs, but seek to create the opportunities to enrich themselves through looting. For example, Michael Hechter (1996; 92), Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2006: 3) and Weinstein (cited in Collier and Hoeffler: 2006: 13) suggest that the main motive behind the collective action of a group is not the well-being of that group, its rights, social conditions or attainment of any other public benefit. Instead, they argue that collective action by group members materializes when there is a benefit for those engaged in the action (see also Smith and Hutchinson 1996:9). Grossman (cited in Collier and Hoeffler 2004: 564) explains models of rebellion as a way of generating profits from looting, thus treating insurgents as indistinguishable from bandits or pirates. Numerous scholars highlight the significance of the 'greed' thesis in the current conflict and insurgency in Afghanistan (Rashid 2007; Johnson 2007; Foxeley 2007; Rubin 2007). The emphasis here is on the inclusion (Giustozzi and Orsini 2009) or exclusion of former warlords and particular Jihadi networks in the political and administrative institutions;

CEU eTD Collection

the disproportionality of the division of ministerial or other high-ranking seats in the government, where it is argued that Pashtuns have been underrepresented (Vendrell 2011; Doronsoro 2009); lack of capacity of Afghan state institutions in (effectively) disbursing international funds (Lafraie 2009); slow economic growth (Rubin 2007); and the pandemic of administrative corruption at both local and top levels of the state institutions (Ruttig 2009). For example, Rubin (2007:8) documents that former Jihadi commanders who have now secured high-ranking positions at the Ministry of Interiors (police) extract huge amounts of bribe money from drug traffickers. Corrupt police chiefs at the provincial level or inside the ministry have literally caused the failure of million-dollar counternarcotics projects. Drug money and the reinforcement of illegal networks and smugglers are considered to be one of the main sources of support for the Taliban insurgency (Schmidt 2010:61-67, Giustozzi 2010:12; Ghufran 2008; Motlagh 2006:24). Rubin (2007:8) calls the illicit drug economy a 'tax base' for the Taliban insurgents.

Meanwhile, local rivalries and jealousy among NGOs, private companies and tribes as to who gets contracts from the international community have also fuelled violence. In several parts of the country, especially in the south, the Taliban extort money from construction companies and in return allow them to operate. While on the part of the ordinary population that benefits marginally or not at all from the international aid, resentments have grown to the extent that they find the Taliban rule in their areas more just, transparent and fair than the Afghan government (Johnson 2007). This resentment and disappointment has often led the local population to support the Taliban insurgency (Doronsoro 2009; Rashid 2007), or have given the Taliban a chance to play on these grievances of the Afghan population (Giustozzi 2010: 11, Johnson 2007).

CEU eTD Collection

Circumstance-based literature on Afghanistan

Lynn Hempel (2004:4) suggests that rebellion itself is not the primary factor that instigates insurgency; rather, it is the circumstances that put people into specific positions such that insurgency starts to become the only choice for them (see also Wolff 2006:75; Kaufman 2001:19). Once these individuals take up those specific positions, they start viewing their interests in different ways. Thus, on this account there is a chronological twist: First something happens and a situation emerges, and *then* individuals are awakened in a way which results in their pursuing their interests through insurgency. The latent argument is that it is 'contexts and conditions' which make individuals materialistic (in an aggressive way) and provoke insurgency (Hempel 2004:4). A variation of circumstantialist theory is that individuals and groups do not initiate insurgency; rather, there are situations where groups engage in armed collective action in order to protect themselves and their property from other intruding forces including the government (Mason and Krane 1989; Goodwin 2001). Advocates of circumstance-based theories of insurgency posit that the absence of local level – that is district and village level – government administration, law enforcement organs and security forces in Afghanistan have made the insurgency more successful (MacDonald 2010; Rubin 2007). Ghufran (2008:154-157) documents the incapacity and ineffectiveness of government institutions in the provision of basic services outside Kabul. Furthermore, the police training project and judicial reform have been considered the biggest failures of the international community in Afghanistan. Studies demonstrate that not only are police and judges low in number or non-existent at district level, but they are also deeply corrupt and ineffective in meeting local needs (Foxley 2007:1; Rubin 2007; Johnson 2007). For instance, Kunduz Province, which is home to more than 1 million people, has only 1,000 policemen (Doronsoro 2009:19). In the absence of government administration and control, people feel the need to provide for their own security and so make local accommodations with insurgent

CEU eTD Collection

movements who have filled the vacuum of power in their localities with parallel or alternative forms of Sharia-based local administration (Giustozzi and Reuter 2011:2). Rashid (2007:17) emphasizes that many Afghan people believe that the war against the Taliban has been lost and, fearing their return, feel obliged to have relations with the insurgents or even directly support them. The solution to the rising insurgency from this point of view is that the Afghan government, with the help of international community, should be given adequate resources and leadership support to bring tangible change to the lives of the people and release them from the grip of insurgency (Roberts 2010; Jones 2008; Rubin 2007; ICG 2008:iii). Furthermore, the incapacity of the Afghan government ministries in budget disbursement and provision of basic services is yet another bottleneck that indirectly feeds insurgency (Waldman 2008:16; Rubin 2007; see also Lafraie 2009 and Jones 2008 on institutional incapacity and the weak Afghan state). Take, for instance, the year 2006, in which the Afghan government was not able to spend 66% of the aid money it received for development projects (Rubin 2007:12).

Although motivation theories offer a substantial degree of illumination as to the internal or domestic factors which lead to insurgency, they fail to incorporate the external variables or factors that can also contribute to insurgency – and which, therefore, may also be key to resolving it. Considered in the round, motivation theories do not provide a holistic explanation of transnational insurgency, and, unlike many other studies of the Afghanistan conflict, this thesis does not draw on motivation theory. Some scholars (Johnson and Mason 2006; Rubin 2007; Rashid 2007; Doronsoro 2009) acknowledge that the Taliban leadership operates from Quetta, Peshawar and parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. However, the ways out of the insurgency that they propose are largely focused on domestic factors (most of which I summarized above). They do not believe that the resurgence and protraction of the conflict can be explained in large part by reference to the

CEU eTD Collection

Taliban's sanctuaries outside the country. Numerous studies treat the Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan as a marginal part of the insurgency overall; yet I could not find any study that assigns them a significant role. Thus, in Chapter Four I attempt to fill this gap with the help of transnational insurgency theory. This thesis primarily looks at the situation from the point of view of how the transnational aspect of the Taliban rebellion has contributed to the re-emergence and protraction of the Taliban insurgency. The application of transnational insurgency theory to the Taliban case is what distinguishes this study from mainstream studies of the Taliban conflict.

'Opportunity theories' and insurgency

The motivational factors summarized above can be important factors in driving groups to take up arms and engage in insurgency; however, motivation alone is not enough. The prime argument in this dissertation is that motivation must be coupled with *opportunity* to rebel in order for groups to overcome the collective action dilemma and remain steadfast in the face of state military action against them. Opportunity for rebellion, regardless of motivation, remains a crucial factor that not only keeps the insurgency alive but also prolongs and damages those bargaining, negotiation and reconciliation programs that are aimed at settling the conflict. What opportunity theory adds to the understanding of insurgent action is the integration of diverse factors such as the possibility of success, cost of risking lives (on behalf of insurgent groups) and cost of collective action in general (Tilly 1978; Popkin 1979; Tarrow 1994, 2005, 2011; McAdam 2001; Kitschelt 1986; Sikkink 2005). That is, opportunity theory holds that insurgent groups calculate the cost of rebellion before they engage in it: they also calculate whether or not the government is able to suppress and eliminate them by evaluating the capabilities and limitations of the government forces.

The insurgents' opportunities for collective action, survival and growth can arise from both domestic and international circumstances. In the domestic realm, opportunity theory

CEU eTD Collection

includes the notion of weak state capacity both in the provision of basic services and in maintaining repressive capabilities uniformly throughout its territory, and the unwillingness of the state to undertake democratic reforms (Tarrow 2011:282; Kaufman 2001:34; Della Porta cited in Burca 2009:5; Herbst 2000). Most importantly, opportunity theories also emphasize the impact of exogenous factors on the emergence, structure and success of insurgent movements (Sikkink 2005:151; Wahlstrom and Peterson 2006:364). For instance, Tarrow (2011:282) elaborates on how the availability of influential allies across national borders affects the sustainability and longevity of movements.[15] In sum, the general hypothesis that can be drawn from opportunity theory is that rebellion occurs when motivated groups encounter the internal and external opportunities that they can tap to sustain their insurgency and minimize the risks of being targeted by state power. The case of Afghanistan is no longer a conventional domestic insurgency: it is *transnational insurgency*. Thus, in this thesis I do not focus on internal opportunities, but look mainly at the external opportunities that give rise to transnational insurgency. In the following sections, five specific hypotheses[16] are framed for the purposes of the case study in Chapter Four.

3. Transnational Insurgency

Existing studies of rebellion, insurgency, revolutions and conflicts focus largely on the internal factors contributing to the rise and growth of such phenomena. On the other hand, the bulk of the studies on international wars bring the nature and characteristics of the relationship between the conflicting countries to the forefront of their focus. Actors without borders are missed in both domains (Staniland 2005:21-22). Transnational insurgencies that have a crucial impact on the destabilization of the target state (country of origin of

[15] Much of the work by the current advocates of opportunity theories and transnationalism is focused on social movements, civil society organizations and corporation. This does not however mean that the theory is not applicable or cannot explain insurgent groups that use political opportunities outside national borders and 'go transnational'.

[16] The hypotheses considered in this chapter benefit hugely from the scholarly research of Salehyan (2009, and others of his papers).

CEU eTD Collection

insurgents) and simultaneously have detrimental spill-over effects on the host state have been ignored or understudied in the contemporary peace and conflict literature (Salehyan 2009:6). Indeed, few studies have focused on international factors in analysing domestic political violence. The remarkable contributions of some authors (for instance Kaldor 1999, Lake and Rothchild 1998, Lischer 2005, Saideman 2001 and Scherrer 2002) in bringing the transnational aspect of conflicts to the fore in the conflict resolution field have been crucial in engendering a new debate among scholars and a new focus for policy makers. However, these contributions have only just begun to make headway regarding this category of insurgency. There is still a lot to be explained.

What is unique about transnational insurgency is that it calls into question the fundamental claims of theories of insurgency or antagonism that posit the deteriorating economic situation of a country, political inequality, corruption, ethnic cleavages, state inability vis-à-vis service provision (Rabasa et al. 2011:2-4) and so forth as preparing the ground for the rise of insurgent activity. While transnational insurgency does arise from these or a combination of such endogenous factors, its growth and persistence transcends their explanatory power (Salehyan 2008 and 2009; Staniland 2005). Because these actors are not confined by the geography of the country of origin, policy reforms are rarely attractive enough for them to stop their antagonism, nor can robust military operations deter them. As argued earlier, the prime reason for the failure of counterinsurgency measures in such scenarios is the inability of states to exercise military power beyond their own territory without seriously endangering inter-state relations.

Although states have full authority to exercise power inside their borders (Salehyan 2009:27), this power is blurred and restricted when the state wants to exercise authority across a national border (Herbst 2000). This is because the prime purposes of international boundaries are to demarcate the legal, judicial and political jurisdictions of states. Although

CEU eTD Collection

globalization may have drastically changed the traditional concept of borders in economic and business terms, in political terms, and when it comes to the exercise of coercive powers, borders are still highly relevant. An incursion by the military or security forces of one state into another is considered an act of aggression, and violation of the sovereignty of another state can have serious repercussions (i.e. inter-state war) and can be costly to the invader.[17] This is rooted in classic Hobbesian and Weberian concepts of state sovereignty or territorial sovereignty, where the sovereign territory of one state is immune from military or any other forms of aggressive interference by another (Weber 1958:212-213, and Kahler and Walter 2006). Limited cross-border counterinsurgency operations do occur from time to time: for example, the U.S. drone attacks on Taliban strongholds in Pakistan, and the Cambodian attacks on the Khmer Rouge in neighbouring Thailand. However, even such small-scale violations of sovereignty can harm diplomatic relations. This immunity provides opportunities for insurgent groups. In a broader sense, in the context of a repressive or risky domestic environment, insurgent groups may use this opportunity to relocate their bases and activities outside the borders of their country of origin, enlisting the support of a sympathetic external organization or state in order to evade the coercive and repressive powers of the target state.

That is, the inability of a state, under normal circumstances, to unleash coercive power outside its national borders provides an opportunity for rebel groups to find safe havens in neighbouring state(s) in order to regroup and redeploy. Two issues become obvious under such circumstances: firstly, although the military power of the state may be disproportionately higher than the insurgent group's, the inaccessibility of these fighters tends to make them undefeatable and allows them to continue on for years. By going transnational,

[17] Humanitarian interventions, or other kinds of intervention where there is a clear asymmetry of military power between the target state and intervening states, are exceptions to the norm. But even in the case of a strong state going after transnational insurgents inside the territory of a weaker state, the costs of finding the insurgents, policing the occupied territories and responding to local uprisings are too high (Staniland 2005:25). Case studies of Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon and Rwandan's invasion of Zaire are clear examples (Salehyan 2009).

CEU eTD Collection

insurgent groups drastically reduce the costs of maintaining their organization and conducting violent activities (Salehyan 2007: 223; Salehyan 2009:10). Secondly, the nature of conflict changes from a state–insurgent dyad to a target state–insurgent–host state triangle. In sum, transnational insurgents thrive on the external opportunities provided for them outside the target state's territory. In the following sub-section I discuss the external opportunities and factors that may contribute to the longevity of transnational insurgencies. In each sub-section, testable hypotheses are proposed, to be assessed via the case study in Chapter Four.

External opportunities in a rival and weak neighbouring state

A rival neighbouring state can become a hotbed of transnational insurgents from the target state. In fact, if insurgency takes a transnational form and rebel groups make bases in the sovereign territory of a neighbouring country, this neighbouring rival state is either ignoring their presence and operations or is covertly or overtly supporting them. In either case, it is obvious that the host state has some interest in keeping the insurgency alive (Regan 2000; Byman 2005). Indeed, the host state can be seen as fighting a proxy war with the help of insurgent group from the target state (Midlarsky 1992). The literature on international relations and civil wars draws attention to several motivations for a neighbouring state to take a rivalling position. A state can harbour insurgents of an opponent neighbouring state in order to undermine that state by fuelling the insurgency, or it may use the insurgents as a foreign policy tool to put pressure on the neighbouring state or gain a stronger position in possible border (i.e. irredentism) or other international disputes. In fact, in a study of transnational insurgencies, Salehyan finds that rival neighbours have a significant effect on the onset and endurance of civil war (2009:77).

Recent research by Bapat (2009) explores a new dimension of rivalry, namely rivalry over receiving aid from the international community. Bapat's research indicates that host states receive a tremendous amount of international aid in order to fight transnational

CEU eTD Collection

insurgency and terrorism, and thus that a successful operation that eradicates the insurgency once and for all is not in the best interests of the aid-receiving country (2009:303-304). The host state has a stake in keeping the insurgency alive, but under control, in order to keep receiving international aid for counterinsurgency programs.

Another, different, analysis assumes that the incapability and weakness of the host state in asserting territorial control and evicting insurgent groups from a neighbouring state is a factor in the existence of transnational insurgency. There are a number of weak states which are not able to control remote areas of their territories (Rotberg 2002:127-128). This weakness of the host state means that uncontrolled or weakly controlled areas become hotspots for insurgent and terrorist groups (Salehyan 2009:45; Rice 2003). In such situations, regardless of whether host states confirm or deny the presence of insurgent groups, they avoid expending resources to fight them. In sum, the following two hypotheses can be drawn from the above literature for the case study in Chapter Four:

Hypothesis 1: Rebellion is more likely to occur when the state is bordered by a rival state.

Hypothesis 2: Rebellion is more likely to occur when the state is bordered by a weak state.

Refugees and ethnic-alike groups in the neighbouring state

What makes transnational socio-political actors peculiar is that activists and supporters are beyond the boundaries of a single state, and that they are tied together in various formal or informal networks that directly or indirectly contribute to the violence in the target state (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Staniland 2005; Sandler 2003; Shelly 1995). Bisected ethnic groups can receive sanctuary and support from their counterparts across the border during times of domestic distress or when there is a threat of government repression. A sizeable

CEU eTD Collection

literature on international conflict demonstrates that, unlike states, other actors (political or social) may not be bound by borders, and may share ideologies and goals with the people of a neighbouring state (Chazan 1991; Carment and James 1995). Domestic actors, while pushing for the expansion of political opportunities internally, may also seek external political opportunities such as sources of support and sanctuary in the territory of neighbouring co-ethnic groups (Salehyan 2009:89-86). Where they are suppressed inside their own state, they may move their leadership over the border.[18]

Migrant diasporas in the neighbouring state(s) can further strengthen insurgency by providing insurgents with sanctuary (Salehyan 2009: 79; see also Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Sheffer 2003; Lyons 2006; Adamson 2006); diasporas and refugee communities, especially those who have fled their country for political reasons, become sources of recruitment and support for insurgent groups.[19] Neighbouring countries, as opposed to states further away from the target state, are attractive to transnational insurgents because of the ease of conducting combat operations from them.[20] Diaspora communities may provide support due to the violence, losses and persecution that they themselves have faced in their home country (Stedman and Tanner 2003; Salehyan 2010:1-2; Staniland 2005:22; see also Lischer 2005, Loescher 1993), and such support for the insurgency may give a sense of purpose for the thousands of refugees who have few productive opportunities in refugee camps and isolated localities.[21]

CEU eTD Collection

[18] This is what Tarrow calls 'externalization'; see Tarrow, 2011:438.

[19] For instance, in the past we have seen the support of Kurds, Tamils, Irish and other diaspora communities abroad for home-country opposition insurgent groups. However, it is not here argued that all diaspora communities are antagonistic towards their country of origin.

[20] However, this does not mean that transnational insurgents do not engage in propaganda and receive moral, material, financial and human resources support from across continents (Bayan et al. 2001:93-95). However, this is not the focus of this thesis.

[21] It is worth acknowledging that depending on the receiving state's capabilities, motivations and intention, refugees do not have to automatically support insurgency or become militarized (for more on this, see Lischer 2005).

From the above considerations, two related hypotheses on the effect of refugees in a neighbouring state and one hypothesis on the effect of bisected ethnic groups along international borders can be drawn for the purposes of the case study in Chapter Four.

Hypothesis 3a: Rebellion is more likely to occur when there are refugees in neighbouring states.

Hypothesis 3b: Refugees are more likely to contribute to rebellion if they are located in weak or rival states.

Hypothesis 4: Ethnic groups that are located near an international border are more likely to rebel.

Extra-territorial Sanctuaries

Transnational insurgency and rebellion differ markedly from two other common types of conflict: civil war and international war. Unlike transnational insurgency, in a typical civil war situation all parties to the conflict are confined to the territorial areas of one state. There may be foreign support or meddling, but the fighters and their leaders reside in the same territory as the ones they are fighting with. The concept of international war differs in that here, by definition, the militaries of two or more states are the parties to the conflict.

The core of the problem with a rebellion that spans national borders is that, regardless of how well-equipped and trained its army is, the government's ability to conduct an effective counterinsurgency operation is hugely circumscribed by its inability to conduct operations inside the territory of another sovereign state (Staniland 2005:22). For transnational insurgents there are may be no concrete frontiers but many strongholds, and even if some of these fall this is only a small blow to the organization based in a neighbouring state. For instance, despite heavy losses in Afghanistan proper, the Taliban leadership and the organization in general remain intact precisely because they are not in Afghanistan.

CEU eTD Collection

Furthermore, states face huge limitations in collecting intelligence about the activities, whereabouts and organizational structures of transnational insurgent groups that are outside their national borders (Salehyan 2007:222). Such a lack of crucial information creates bottlenecks for counterinsurgency and political settlement mechanisms such as negotiation and reconciliation programs. Rebel groups demand higher and more unrealistic concessions from the state because they are able to demonstrate the failure of the state security apparatus in counterinsurgency.

Conflicts can be ended when the state wins over the insurgents, the insurgents win over the state, or a negotiated political deal is reached for some form of power-sharing (Mason et al. 1999). The prospect of the state winning over the insurgents in the case of transnational rebellion is weak, especially when the host state is uncooperative. There is more to the failure of transnational conflict resolution, however, than just the territorial limitations of counterinsurgency operations. The additional factor that complicates the task of conflict resolution is the impediment to negotiations, dialogue and multi-layered political processes (Salehyan 2010:7). Under normal circumstances both the government and the insurgent group should prefer a peaceful settlement of the conflict instead of fighting a protracted war. However, once the insurgency takes a transnational form several factors (discussed in the previous section) give them an upper hand in the negotiation process. The state may rely on military power because it underestimates or miscalculates the strength of the transnational insurgents due to the lack of information and intelligence. The transnational insurgents will not prefer reconciliation, because of lack of urgency (they are in a relatively safe zone), and the potential for a better bargain in the future once the state is further weakened or delegitimized (Salehyan 2009:47) or its international partners withdraw.

There are two prime reasons why political settlements in most of the cases where transnational insurgency is involved leads to failure. Firstly, conflict resolution mechanisms

CEU eTD Collection

that concentrate on the insurgent group and the government in the state of the origin of the insurgent group fail to yield tangible results due to the exclusion of a major party: the host state. Obviously the inclusion of another party at the negotiation table as a real player (not observer or facilitator) further complicates the issue. The host state might use the insurgents on its soil as leverage to insert its own interests into the broader reconciliation deal (Cunningham 2006:875). In the case of rival neighbours, the host state can ask for a concession from the target state, and where the host state is weak, funds and other forms of economic support can be demanded in order to stick to the conditions of the deal. Any potential peace deal will largely depend on the host state's commitment to end the insurgent's ability to find sanctuary on its soil. Therefore, the demands of the host state are crucial in the success of a peace deal (Salehyan 2009:56). Secondly, those conflict resolution mechanisms that focus solely on the relationship between the target state and the host state also miss the whole picture. In the latter case, the underestimation of the transnational insurgent group fails to solve the regional conflict.

When insurgents mobilize outside the territory of their original state, they may be able to strike a better bargain in political negotiations than when the insurgency is nationally confined (Salehyan 2009:24). First, as stated earlier, transnational insurgent groups feel safe in their host nations while retaining the possibility of conducting sporadic and 'hit-and-run' operations in the target state to pressurize, destabilize and discredit the national government (Staniland 2005:22; Salehyan 2007:218). Second, while time is not on the national government's side because of its continuing incapability to provide security for its population, time and patience are abundant resources for transnational insurgents. Because of the above implications, striking a deal to end the conflict becomes extremely difficult in cases of transnational insurgency. Howsoever difficult the task of bargaining, negotiation and reconciliation may be, ignoring transnational insurgent groups or their host states in political

CEU eTD Collection

settlements and conflict resolution processes, alas, is not a viable option. The hypothesis that is drawn from this section is connected to the endurance of the conflict due to extraterritorial sanctuaries, and the failure of conventional negotiation approaches that only focuses on a dyadic dialogue – that is, between the target state and the insurgents. Thus, the following hypothesis is drawn for the case study in Chapter Four.

Hypothesis 5: Conflicts will endure longer when rebels have access to extraterritorial bases.

Framework in brief

To conclude this chapter, transnational insurgency theories issue in the following framework for analysis: the potential for insurgency to occur and endure becomes higher when insurgents find sanctuary and sources of support in a neighbouring state. In addition, insurgent groups operating from outside national territory evade the repressive power of the target state and thus increase their bargaining power. Lastly, transnational insurgency theories teach us that negotiations and reconciliation for political settlements are not successful without the active engagement and support of the host state. Taking these complexities into account, the approach that this study adopts leans towards a mechanism of conflict analysis that focuses on regional dynamics. I believe that protracted insurgencies like the ones we can see in Afghanistan cannot be studied only by evaluating endogenous factors; instead the intention here is to approach the insurgency from a holistic regional angle that takes into account insurgency drivers across national borders.

I attempt to test the hypotheses drawn in this chapter in the Afghanistan case in Chapter Four and see to what extent we can explain the Taliban insurgency through that lens. The next chapter explains the research methodology and its limitations.

CEU eTD Collection

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

This chapter elaborates on the research methodology that the author adopted in writing this thesis. The last part of the chapter explains the limitations of this research.

Research Methodology

I have mainly used qualitative research methods to collect my data. Initially, I conducted a review of the literature on Afghanistan. Other secondary sources were also collected, including the published documents and reports of Afghanistan Insurgency Assessment Reports, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), RAND Corporation, Institute of War and Peace Research (IWPR), Afghan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), and The Asia Foundation Survey of 2011.

First-hand data about the causes of the on-going insurgency and factors which contributed to the major escalation of the Taliban insurgency in 2006 were gathered and analysed through semi-structured interviews.[22] My research trip to Afghanistan in June 2011 and the face-to-face interviews I conducted enriched my understanding of the complexities of the Afghan conflict. However, due to a drastic change in my research focus I have not been able to use the material I gathered in this thesis. During April and May 2012, I conducted ten new detailed face-to-face, telephone/Skype and email interviews with experts in the field. My interviewees included five staff of international agencies (including one Political Officer from the U.S. embassy), two current scholars, and the director of one famous newspaper in Afghanistan (see Appendix B for detailed names, designations and dates of interviews). No government official that I approached was prepared to give interviews.[23] My interview questions included; 'Who are the Taliban?', 'How do you explain their organizational

[22] Semi-structured interviews were intentionally selected as the interview format to allow for flexibility and enable me to bring up new questions based on the information and arguments my interviewees provided.

[23] I believe this is because of the sensitivity of the research question. I approached a staffer of the Afghan National Development Strategy (the Afghan Poverty Reduction Strategy Program) and mid-level staffer of the Ministry of foreign affairs of Afghanistan. They both declined to comment.

CEU eTD Collection

structure?', 'Are the Taliban defeated?', 'Do you think that the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan has been a successful one?', 'If there has been a Taliban resurgence, what are the causes?', 'Do you consider the Taliban group an insurgent group?', 'What do you think about the Taliban attacks in Afghanistan?', 'How are the Taliban managing their survival?', 'Is there any neighbouring country supporting the Taliban movement?', 'How do that state/states support that Taliban?', 'Where are the Taliban and why can't the Afghan Government negotiate with the Taliban?', 'Is there a negotiation/reconciliation process going on?' and 'How can we bring an end to the Taliban insurgency?'.

I outsourced interviews with current members of the Taliban to a former staffer of the UN Office in Kandahar province (see limitations below). For interview with active Taliban members, my source used snowball sampling, finding contacts for and information about his next interviewee from the previous one. All in all he interviewed four active Taliban members from Kandahar and Helmand provinces. In a context of war and especially interviewing insurgents this can be considered to be a modest success in data gathering. The main questions I designed for my researcher were the following:[24]

1) Have you lived in a foreign or neighbouring country in the past? Which one?
2) Are there a lot of Taliban fighters outside the country? How many?
3) Who supports the Taliban?
4) Who is in power in the federally administrated tribal areas (FATA), Baluchistan and Khybar Pakhtunkhwa?[25] Is there government control?
5) Do Afghan refugees support the Taliban? How?
6) Do most Taliban travel back and forth to Pakistan?
7) What will happen to Taliban if Pakistan forces them to go out of their soil?

Qualitative research methods were mainly used for this study. Such techniques enable the researcher to get the opinions of the participants in the manner they want to express them.

[24] Meanwhile he was encouraged to ask follow-up questions.
[25] These are areas in Pakistan that allegedly harbour Taliban.

CEU eTD Collection

Unlike quantitative research, which mainly deals with statistical analysis and interpretation of numerical data, qualitative research is useful for investigating opinions, values, feelings, and enables the researcher to obtain potentially richer and deeper information by going into another person's opinions and beliefs (Kirton 2011:149-150). For example, in my interviews the interviewees had the opportunity to express their own feelings and beliefs about reconciliation with the Taliban and they framed their answers as they wished. During the interviews I established close contact with the interviewees and formulated new questions to capture the full meanings of their comments on this complex situation.

My previous work experience as Political Affairs Assistant at the office of European Union[26] in Afghanistan enabled me to formulate important questions about the causes of insurgency. In this capacity, I was involved in interactions regarding reconciliation and the causes of insurgency with the members of PTS, MPs and other relevant organisations.

Being a national of Afghanistan and a victim of decades of devastating conflict may have influenced my perceptions in a way which could lead to bias. However, I have paid attention to be impartial and objective in the exploration of the subject, and I also met with several native scholars who discussed and elaborated on the proximate and root causes of the insurgency, and this gave me the opportunity to offer my analysis without any bias.

Limitations

Given the critical situation in Afghanistan, I author was unable to reach and interview active members of the Taliban (i.e. insurgents) in order to reflect their opinions in this research. Therefore I enlisted a former colleague and former political officer of United Nations Office in Kandahar, Mr. Nader Omar, to conduct direct interviews with a limited number of Taliban fighters.[27] The questions and purpose of the interview were explained in detail to Mr. Omar.

[26] From 2007 to 2008, the author worked as Political Assistant for the Office of European Union in Afghanistan.
[27] See Appendix B for more information on Nader Omar.

CEU eTD Collection

Another limitation comes from the author's inability to travel to and interview people living in the actual war zones or southern provinces of Afghanistan, such as Helmand and Kandahar. Interviews with local people and most importantly those local people who are giving shelter to insurgents could indeed have provided this study with richer information for interpretation and analysis. To fill this gap, the author used various relevant reports which reflected local people's opinions on the causes of insurgency. The next chapter tests the hypotheses presented in Chapter Two.

CEU eTD Collection

CHAPTER FOUR: THE TALIBAN'S TRANSNATIONAL INSURGENCY

In this chapter, based on the theoretical framework and hypotheses drawn out in Chapter Two, I examine each hypothesis separately and thereby explain how the Taliban insurgency benefits from sanctuaries across the border and how these sanctuaries have led Afghanistan into a *jammed negotiation trap*, where there is no foreseeable conflict resolution programme in sight.

Section One: Rival neighbors

H1: Rebellion is more likely to occur when the state is bordered by a rival state.

Afghanistan shares borders with six countries (see figure 1); China (76km), Iran (936km), Pakistan (2,430km), Tajikistan (1,206km), Turkmenistan (744km) and Uzbekistan (137km) (Comras 2010: 71). To analyse whether these states are rival neighbours to Afghanistan, I focus not only on the *dyadic rival relationship*[28] (Diehl and Goertz 2000) between Afghanistan and its neighbours but also borrow the concept of *complex rivalry* from Valeriano and Powers (2011) to go beyond a simple two-state rivalry. Complex rivalry is defined as 'a group of at least three nation-states whose relationships are linked by common issues, alignments, or dispute joiner dynamics in which there is an active threat of militarized conflict between all parties and includes persistent long-term interactions' (Valeriano and Powers 2011:1). Therefore in my case study I include the United States (and its NATO allies), India and Russia. These are the states that have the highest stakes in war and peace in Afghanistan and yet are not its neighbours. Based on the concept of complex rivalries, the interaction of third parties in the region has tremendous effect on the relationship and behaviour of Afghanistan's neighbours.

[28] This refers to a rivalry between two states.

CEU eTD Collection

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan and the region

We start with China. From a dyadic perspective, I can find no written evidence[29] why China and Afghanistan could be considered as rivals.[30] Chinese companies (private and state-owned) benefit hugely from stability and peace in Afghanistan, obtaining billions of dollars' worth contracts in both mining and construction areas.[31] In fact China is free-riding in the fairly secure business environment provided by U.S. and NATO military forces in Afghanistan. From the complex rivalry perspective where we consider the U.S.–

[29] In addition, the issue was not raised during the interviews I conducted.

[30] The only dispute that is referred in the literature was over border marking, and was settled in 1963 through an agreement between Afghanistan and China (U.S. Department of State, paper available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/limitsinseas/IBS089.pdf).

[31] The number of contracts that Chinese companies have won in Afghanistan is tremendous, from railway construction (http://www.andrewgrantham.co.uk/afghanistan/tag/china/) to copper mines, telecommunication (http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-09/21/content_13745143.htm; see also http://www.indiandefencereview .com/geopolitics/China-leads-Great-Game-in-Afghanistan.html) and oil (see http://wsws.org/articles/2012/jan2012/ afch-j10.shtml). The sum total of the contracts exceeds 6 billion dollars. For a detailed analysis, see Aziz Huq, 'Chinese Takeout', *Foreign Policy*, 15 June 2010 (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/15/ chinese_takeout?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full).

CEU eTD Collection

Afghanistan—China triad there are two domains of speculation. The first is the presence of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan. Analysts speculate that China is threatened by the U.S. military presence in its neighbourhood. The second line of argumentation is that the U.S., by securing a military presence in Afghanistan, is attempting to contain growing Chinese economic power (Rumer et al. 2007:188). Both arguments are implausible. In fact China benefits more from the presence of the U.S. military in Afghanistan and the stabilization of the country than it would from the lack of it.[32] The continued cooperation of the Chinese government with the U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan, its engagement in reconstruction in the country and its friendly relationship both with Afghanistan and the U.S. government are evidence against considering China a rival to Afghanistan.

The three central Asian neighbouring countries have fairly stable, non-rival and cooperative relationships with Afghanistan. All of these countries have been threatened by the extremism and fundamentalism promoted by the Taliban regime during their rule and in the present (Witter 2011:1). Their fears are based on pragmatic reasoning regarding the spill-over effects of fundamentalism to their territories. In fact, with the exception of Turkmenistan, both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan suffer from protracted (armed) struggles by Islamic radical organizations (Rubin 2009: 166; Weitz 2004; Naumkin 2003). Indeed, establishing a moderate government in Afghanistan and eradicating the Taliban regime – which supported, for instance, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan which aims at the restoration of the Central Asian Caliphate by toppling all current regimes – is precisely what they dream of. From a triadic view, friendship, cooperation and neutrality of these states with Afghanistan and the U.S. remains intact, so long as the wave of democratization does not infiltrate their so-called authoritarian regimes.

CEU eTD Collection

[32] Insurgency, radicalism and war in Afghanistan could have drastic spill-over effects on the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and its separatist movements, which has been demanding separation from China for a while now (see also http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/myazdir.asp?id=2291, Bovingdon 2002, and Lo 2004:296).

The Russian interaction with the *rivalry complex* is similar to the three central Asian states. Although Russia does not welcome the U.S.'s military presence and deep economic engagement in its central Asian backyards, it still contributes tremendously to the U.S./NATO operations in Afghanistan and fears the revival of radical Islam in the region (Danreuther and March 2010). Russia has repeatedly emphasized that NATO should remain in Afghanistan beyond the current 2014 withdrawal plan (see 'Russia urges NATO to stay beyond 2014', *csmonitor*, 19 April 2012). Indeed, Russia's cooperative stance with respect to the Afghanistan intervention is further strengthened through its deep engagement in establishing the Northing Distribution Network – a new supply[33] route and 'a series of commercially-based logistical arrangements connecting Baltic and Caspian ports with Afghanistan via Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus' (CSIS 2012).[34] Thus, I argue that there is no significant dyadic or complex rivalry between any of these countries and Afghanistan or the U.S./NATO.

Iran, however, has a complicated relationship with Afghanistan. Iran had secured a great deal of influence in Afghanistan politics during the civil war by supporting Shia political parties, namely Hezbi Wahdat, Harakat Islami and others. Its relations with Afghanistan deteriorated during the Taliban regime, which only recognized the Sunni jurisprudence of Islam (Strand and Suhrke 2004:4), and it has played a cooperative role with the Afghan administration since the fall of the Taliban (IBP USA 2011:93). Apart from minor issues over the expulsion of Afghan refugees from Iran the two countries have no significant dyadic dispute or rivalry. Indeed Iran is vastly benefiting from trade relations with

CEU eTD Collection

[33] This route was specifically established after the U.S./NATO supply convoys were disrupted several times along the Pakistan-Afghanistan supply route either due to insurgency or because of heightened political tension between the U.S. and Pakistan (Kuchins et al. 2009).

[34] Available online at http://csis.org/program/northern-distribution-network-ndn; see also http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ rls/rm/182317.htm, and Kuchins et al. 2009.

Afghanistan. Economic relations with Iran make up nearly half of the Afghan economy.[35] The U.S./NATO interaction with the two countries, however, makes the relationship problematic. It is an established fact that the U.S. government considers Iran to be a threat to the region, and especially to Israel. Likewise, Iran considers the U.S. to be an imperial superpower masquerading as the international police force. Iran feels threatened by the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, and the threat is real. In the case of war with Iran, the U.S. could use its military bases in Afghanistan to attack with ease. A complex rivalry situation is evident here (Rais 2009:100). There have been numerous reports that the Iranian intelligence services have been covertly supporting some elements of the Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan. The allegations range from cash payments to Taliban to kill U.S. soldiers, to supplies of mines and ammunitions and training, and treating Taliban insurgents on their soil (see 'Iran pays the Taliban to kill U.S. soldiers', *Sunday Times*, 5/9/2010). Evidence to that end, however, has been non-existent or merely journalistic in nature. In sum, while Iran finds it in its interest to support a moderate Afghan government, it has a complex rivalry with Afghanistan when the interaction with the U.S. military presence comes into play.

The most perplexing and problematic neighbour of Afghanistan is Pakistan. In the interstate rivalry literature it is well established that territorial concerns and disputes drastically contribute to interstate rivalry (Vasquez and Leskiw 2001). There is a disputed border, the Durand line, between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 1893, as a result of an agreement between colonial British India and the Afghan Amir, the Durand line was drawn to fix the spheres of influence of the two states (Bajoria 2009). The uncontrolled area between Afghanistan and the then India, currently named the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA), Khybar Pakhtunkhwa (formerly known as North West Frontier Provinces (NWFP)) and Baluchistan, were constituted as a buffer zone between Russian and British interests.

[35] Afghan officials quoted in *Huffington Post*, 9 May 2012 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/09/afghanistan-trade-deal-iran_n_1504062.html.

CEU eTD Collection

Afghanistan does not recognize the Durand line as the international border and claims territories well beyond it (Brasseur 2011:6), while Pakistan insists on its international recognition. Pakistan has time and again sponsored agents to provoke crisis in Afghanistan in order to escalate its bargaining demands (Ferguson 2010:52; Cohen 2011:9) and ultimately force Afghanistan into accepting the Durand line as the international border.[36] As one of my interviewees[37] argued, 'Pakistan is waiting for a better time and conditions to negotiate peace with us. In their thinking they believe they do not have to wait long, 2014 is close, that's why Pakistan is desperately fighting to not lose their grip on the Taliban.' In addition, Pakistan fears that a stable, strong and secure Afghanistan would be able to demand a review of the Durand agreement in which it might be able to secure some concessions, if not the whole disputed territory. This is what Pakistan does not want.

From a complex rivalry perspective there are two tracks that Pakistan follows. The first one is its rivalry with India, thus creating an India–Afghanistan–Pakistan triad (see Peterson 2011:1, Siddique 2011:41 and Ferguson 2010:53). India is the all-time rival of Pakistan; their disputes over the Kashmir region have led to several conflicts between them. India's friendly relationships, huge commitments and deep involvement with Afghanistan threatens Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan does not welcome the friendly relationship between India and Afghanistan at all. In interview, Dr. Rahimzai argued that 'Pakistan's tendency in supporting the Taliban was further exacerbated with elements of pro-Indian Afghan elites finding seats in the Afghan government'.[38] With India finding a strategic and strong partner in Pakistan's neighbourhood, Pakistan feels itself encircled by two states at once, which claim huge chunks of its territory: Afghanistan the FATA and parts of Khybar Pakhtunkhwa, and India the Kashmir (Verma 2011: 137). The second track concerns the U.S.–Afghanistan–

[36] Interview with Najla, staffer of an international organization in Kabul, Afghanistan, 13 May 2012, by email.
[37] Email interview with staffer of an international organization in Kabul who wished to remain anonymous, 17 May 2012.
[38] Interview with Dr. Mirwais Rahimzai Chief of Party of University Research Co/CHS, 20 April 2012 in Budapest.

CEU eTD Collection

Pakistan triad. There is no political rivalry involved in this complex in the way there is in the U.S.–Afghanistan–Iran triad; rather, the rivalry here is financial. Since the beginning of the 'war on terror' the U.S. government has given billions of dollars in aid to different institutions of Pakistan (see table 2), most of which has been for the purpose of fighting the insurgents, building military capabilities to eradicate terrorist and Taliban cells from uncontrolled Pakistan territories and modernizing the madrassas (religious schools). The 16 billion dollars of aid would not have been given to Pakistan had the Taliban insurgency not gained momentum after the collapse of their regime in 2001, or had the insurgency been suppressed in its initial phases in 2004-5. In a comprehensive study of transnational terrorism Babat (2011:303) argues that 'US military aid creates a moral hazard problem. If host states are provided with the tools to pacify their territory only if terrorist campaigns are ongoing, but will lose this aid once the problem of terrorism ceases, host states have little incentive to accelerate the demise of terrorist groups'. This is exactly what we see in the case of Pakistan. Two[39] of the several experts I interviewed for this researched reiterated that up until 2009 the international community and NATO were totally fooled by the double game that Pakistan was playing: joining hands on the war on terror while covertly harbouring and reconstituting the Taliban insurgency. In sum, Pakistan is considered both a dyadic and a complex rival of Afghanistan.

CEU eTD Collection

[39] Email interview with Rahmani from RAND Corporation 4 May 2012, and Interview with Najla, 13 May 2012, staff of an international organization in Kabul, Afghanistan.

Table 2: U.S. Aid to Pakistan 2001-2012

Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2001-FY2012
(appropriations, with disbursements in parentheses, rounded to the nearest millions of dollars)

Program or Account	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010	FY2011	FY2012 (est.)	FY2002 - FY2012 Total	FY2013 (req.)
1206	—	—	—	—	28	14	131	139	—	[e]		312	—
CN	— (1)	—	— (1)	8 (9)	24 (14)	49 (37)	54 (72)	47[d] (25)	43 (n/a)	39[e] (n/a)	[e]	264 (159)	[e]
CSF[a]	1,169	1,247	705[b]	964	862	731	1,019	685[e]	1,499	[f]	[f]	8,881	[f]
FMF	75 (75)	225 (225)	75 (75)	299 (298)	297 (298)	297 (297)	298 (298)	300 (300)	294[h] (83)	295 (148)	295	2,750 (2,097)	350
IMET	1 (1)	1 (1)	1 (1)	2 (2)	2 (2)	2 (2)	2 (2)	2 (2)	5 (5)	4 (0.4)	5	27 (18)	6
INCLE	91 (91)	31 (31)	32 (1)	32 (17)	38 (—)	24 (10)	22 (33)	88[g] (35)	170[h] (16)	114 (29)	116	758 (263)	124
NADR	10 (10)	1 (1)	5 (5)	8 (7)	9 (5)	10 (6)	10 (1)	13[g] (5)	24 (3)	25 (14)	21	136 (57)	19
PCF/PCCF	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	400 (125)	700 (160)	800 (376)	800	2,700 (661)	800
Total Security	**1,346**	**1,505**	**818**	**1,313**	**1,260**	**1,127**	**1,536**	**1,674[g]**	**2,735**	**1,277**	**1,237**	**15,828**	**1,299**

Source: Epstein and Kronstadt 2012, Congressional Research Service

To conclude this section, I have argued that out of six neighbouring states, two of Afghanistan's neighbours are rival states. Iran is engaged in a latent rivalry with U.S., while Pakistan is both a direct rival of Afghanistan and engaged in complex rivalry with India and U.S.. Hypothesis 1 therefore is supported by the above analysis. Insurgency in Afghanistan has indeed occurred. Rival neighbours do play a role in supporting the insurgents.

Section Two: Weak Neighbours

H2: Rebellion is more likely to occur when the state is bordered by a weak state.

To test this hypothesis I again look at all the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan and assess whether any of them is a weak state. I explore whether there is a correlation between the occurrence of transnational insurgency and the presence of a neighbouring weak state. To measure state weakness I borrow the latest index of Failed States 2011 from Fund for Peace as a proxy measure of weak states. The index is compiled from 12 variables that include economic, political, social and security indicators. The approach I follow is congruent with

CEU eTD Collection

Salehyan's (2009:90) claim that 'failed states, therefore, can and do provide fertile breeding grounds for rebel organizations', whether these are their own or of a neighbouring state. Furthermore, as another indicator of a weak neighbouring state I examine border protections and the guarding capabilities of these states; this is to account for cases in which, for instance, a weak state might have extraordinary border controls that make transnational insurgency and cross-border infiltration unviable (Schilling 1970; Bennet 2005).

The failed states index (FSI) data for 2011 (figure 2), which is also very much reflective of previous years, ranks Pakistan number 12 out of 177 in the global ranking of failed states.[40] Pakistan's status is indicated as being in the 'Alert' category, which makes it the weakest neighbouring country of Afghanistan (see figure 3). Iran receives 35th position in the global ranking, making it 23 points stronger than Pakistan, while Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are ranked 39th, 27 points better than Pakistan (see figure 2). China, ranked 72nd, and Turkmenistan, 75th, are categorized as close to 'moderate' in the FSI index. From the above ranking I conclude that the only country neighbouring Afghanistan which is in the domain of the top 30 failed states index is Pakistan. Thus the country requires a closer look to see how it performs on each indicator.

CEU eTD Collection

[40] For an interactive grid of the index visit http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2011.

FS-11-11 (11-07B)

Failed States Index Data 2011

		Demographic Pressures	Refugees and IDPs	Group Grievance	Human Flight	Uneven Development	Poverty and Decline	Legitimacy of the State	Public Services	Human Rights and Rule of Law	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention	TOTAL SCORE
12	Pakistan	8.8	9.2	9.3	7.5	8.5	6.6	8.6	7.3	8.7	9.4	9.1	9.3	**102.3**
35	Iran	6.1	7.9	8.5	6.7	7.0	5.4	9.1	5.6	9.0	8.6	9.2	7.0	**90.2**
39	Tajikistan	7.7	5.9	7.2	6.0	6.8	7.4	8.9	6.9	8.5	7.4	8.6	7.0	**88.3**
39	Uzbekistan	7.3	5.7	7.4	6.3	8.2	6.8	8.4	6.0	9.0	8.5	8.7	6.0	**88.3**
72	China	8.2	6.2	7.9	5.6	8.6	4.4	7.9	6.6	8.8	5.7	6.9	3.3	**80.1**
75	Turkmenistan	6.5	4.2	6.6	5.1	7.1	6.0	8.4	6.7	8.7	7.5	7.7	5.2	**79.7**

Figure 2: Failed States Index Data 2011

Source: Adapted from Fund for Peace, Failed States Index 2011



Figure 3: Fund for Peace regional map

Source: Adapted from Fund for Peace, Failed States Index 2011

CEU eTD Collection

A close look at the 12 indicators that rank Pakistan 12th on the FSI 2011 reveals that, with the exception of three indicators identified as 'weak', the country has received the worst ranking possible on all other indicators. That is, Pakistan has received 'poor' for 9 out of the 12 indicators that constitute the FSI index (see figures 4 and 5).[41] In sum, both from a holistic perspective and from an inside look it is demonstrable that Pakistan, which is one of the weakest states in the world and at the same time a neighbour of Afghanistan, provides a fertile ground for transnational insurgency. In later parts of this chapter (see section five) I elaborate how this state weakness, combined with other motivations and variables, has resulted in Afghan insurgent groups using territories on its soil to conduct insurgent activities in Afghanistan.

Figure 4: Social and economic indicators, Pakistan

Adapted from Fund for Peace, Country Profile Pakistan, FSI 2011, p. 4



Figure 5: Political and military indicators, Pakistan

Adapted from Fund for Peace, Country Profile Pakistan, FSI 2011, p. 5

[41] Please note that the coloring in both figure 4 and 5 does not signify anything more than to identify each indicator from the other.

CEU eTD Collection

The second indicator that I use to measure the weakness of a neighbouring state is the lack of border guards and protection from illegal infiltrations. The reason I rely on this variable is because non-existent border controls or porous borders provide an obvious opportunity for insurgent groups to evade domestic pressure and find safe havens beyond national borders (Bennet 2005:25).

We start with China. The border with China is the most inaccessible one, due to the hard and mountainous terrain (see figure 6). There is no pass or road connecting the two countries. Because of heavy snowfall and the high altitude of the mountains it is nearly impossible to guard the borders, and so presumably for insurgents to infiltrate back and forth.[42] Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Iran have tight border controls and policing systems in place (interview with Alavi[43]; interview with Bakhshi[44]; IWPR report 2006). Although drug trafficking, which constitutes a supra-national network, from Afghanistan to these countries is widely reported (UNODC 2008:27),[45] crossing the borders under normal circumstances always requires valid travel documents and visas (Margesson 2007:12). Illegal crossing points do exist but are mostly intercepted as soon as the vulnerabilities are identified. Therefore, I do not conclude that illegal border crossing to these five states is impossible, but I argue that it is extremely difficult both because of geography (mountainous in case of China, and with rivers separating the countries in the case of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) and because of border protection by these states.

CEU eTD Collection

[42] During the course of the literature review and the interviews I conducted, there was not a single instance where authors or interviewees mentioned cross-border movement, let alone insurgency, along the Afghanistan border with China.
[43] Interview with Sayyid Alavi, former UN political officer and current head of Jehad Danish Cultural Association, 13 May 2012, by phone.
[44] Interview with Kanishka Bakhshi, senior political officer at U.S. embassy in Kabul, 5 May 2012, by email.
[45] See for instance, ISW report at http://www.understandingwar.org/turkmenistan-and-afghanistan.



Figure 6: Topographical map of Afghanistan
Source: Google Maps, 2012

However, border controls, not only at official border crossing-points like Torkham and Spin Boldak (also known as Chaman) but also along the Afghan–Pakistan border, are literally non-existent for people of both countries (Giovanni 2008) [46]. Although the Pakistani authorities control trucks and other vehicles which cross from either side, pedestrians usually have freedom of movement. This freedom of movement is linked to the history of the disputed territories of FATA, Khybar Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. The Afghan government, fearing the loss of those territories to Pakistan and the local Pashtun and Baluch tribes on both sides, has longed struggled not to recognize the Durand line as the official border. Each week, an estimated 400,000 and 225,000 people commute between Afghanistan and Pakistan using the Torkham and Spin Boldak border crossings respectively (Altai Consulting 2009, cited in

[46] The view was reiterated strongly during an email interview with Rahmani, doctoral fellow at RAND, 4 May 2012.

CEU eTD Collection

Grare and Maley 2011:1), for various reasons as shown in figure 7. This in effect has given the tribes and anyone else disguised under tribal and ethnic identities the capacity to secure freedom of movement to and from Pakistan (see Bajoria 2009). In an interview with me, Rahmani elaborated that Pakistan has been keeping the border from all major Taliban strongholds to Pakistan unchecked.[47] In a telephone interview, Mullah Mansoor Akhund[48] told Nader that, 'I am talking to you from Chaman[49] right now. Pakistan is our second house. I feel at home here. I don't feel that I am an immigrant. They give money, food, human resource. And join jihad. I feel no problem when crossing the border. I have Pakistan ID card as well just in case I need it.'

Taliban insurgents have derived real benefits from this opportunity to move from Afghanistan to Pakistan whenever they are under military pressure, and infiltrate back at a later stage.

CEU eTD Collection

[47] Email Interview on 4 May 2012.
[48] Interview with Mansoor Akhund, head of commission for Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan (7 to 9 May 2012).
[49] Chaman is a well-populated town in Baluchistan province of Pakistan that borders Kandahar province of Afghanistan.



Figure 7: Reasons for travel to Pakistan
Source: Altai Consulting, 2009, p. 33

In the last part of this section I move beyond a simplistic analysis according to which transnational rebellion has become viable because Pakistan is a weak state. In this part I focus precisely on those chunks of territory in Pakistan that have become safe havens for the Taliban. It is a misunderstanding to assume that the Taliban insurgency is uniformly welcomed or accommodated throughout Pakistan. Here I analyse the strength of government authority in the areas bordering Afghanistan, namely the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA), NWFP (now known as Khybar Pakhtunkhwa) and Baluchistan (see figures 8 and 9). These are the regions in Pakistan that have turned into Taliban hotbeds (ICG 2006:i). The government of FATA describes the region as following on their official website:[50]

[50] http://fata.gov.pk/.

CEU eTD Collection

FATA, both historically and traditionally had a unique administrative and political status from the British times since 1849. However, in 1893, a demarcation was raised with Afghanistan called Durand Line. They controlled the area through a combination of effective Political Agents and tribal elders, while leaving the people with their traditions and internal independence. Pakistan inherited this system and more or less continues with it even today. Since the independence of Pakistan, FATA has not been accorded the same priority in terms of the development process being undertaken in other parts of the country.

Figure 8: Map showing FATA and NWFP

Source: Wikipedia available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:NWFP_FATA.svg

CEU eTD Collection

Figure 9: Map showing the disputed lands collectively called as Pashtunistan.
Source http://www.icosmaps.net/pashtunistan/015_map/iframe_3

FATA has retained a semi-autonomous status whereby the tribal leaders constitute the administrative, judicial and policing authority. Judgements are primarily made based on tribal codes and traditional institutions. In sum, there is no government, police, military or rule of law in FATA (Bajoria 2009). Islamabad's claim that it governs FATA through 'political agents' is merely wishful thinking (Margesson 2007:7). Ispahani (cited in Bajoria 2009) defines the relationship between Islamabad and FATA as 'live and let live', where both sides

CEU eTD Collection

refrain from interfering in the affairs of each other. A USIP report (2006:11) describes the situation along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border as follows:

> Trafficking in drugs, arms, and other items, including people, is an important element of network war, and smuggling is the classic livelihood of the borderlands; both of the major frontiers ethnic groups – Pashtuns and Baluch – gain much of their income from it. The borderlands already have become a land bridge for the criminal (drugs) and criminalized (transit trade) economies of the region. The transnational economic actors exploit the weakness and illegitimacy of statehood in the region to pursue profit, part of which pays for protection provided by transnational and parallel military and political forces.

Baluchistan province of Pakistan, which borders the Helmand and Kandahar provinces of Afghanistan, does not enjoy the same autonomy as FATA does. However, the Baluch people have for years been fighting for such autonomy. An ICG report (2006) describes the situation as follows: 'violence continues unabated in Pakistan's strategically important and resource-rich province of Baluchistan, where the military government is fighting Baluch militants demanding political and economic autonomy'. The fact that the Taliban's highest council of leaders is based in Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan, is not an accident. Not only does Pakistan pursue its rivalry agenda with Afghanistan, U.S. and India by harbouring Taliban insurgents in Quetta and FATA, but it has also neutralized and countered the Baluch and Pashtun nationalist and separatist movements by empowering a new network of transnational insurgents (ICG 2007:1-15) – the Taliban. To conclude, government control in FATA and some parts of Khybar Pakhtunkhwa regions in Pakistan is weak or non-existent because of systematic and historic administrative and political arrangements with the Pashtun tribes. This state weakness has resulted in radicalization of most parts of the FATA region, where not only have the Afghan Taliban found sanctuary and sources of support,[51] but spin-off Pakistani Taliban movements have also come into existence.

[51] In my email interview with Bakhshi, a senior political officer at U.S. embassy in Kabul, 5 May 2012, he contended that the 'ISI provides assistance to the training camps that function and generate Taliban insurgents and suicide attackers in the Pakistani territory and send them to Afghanistan via North Waziristan.'

CEU eTD Collection

The analyses in this section of the chapter thus strongly support H2. In other words, H2 can to a large extent explain the way the Taliban insurgents have tapped into state weakness in a neighbouring country to conduct their rebellion in Afghanistan. I have provided evidence and argued that Pakistan is the weakest state neighbouring Afghanistan, and that state weakness in Pakistan has dramatically contributed to the revival, growth and resurgence of the Taliban movement. Not only have the Taliban benefited from the porous and uncontrolled border to move back and forth as they please, but they have also used the opportunities that the weakly administrated regions such as FATA, Khybar Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan provide to establish their extraterritorial bases and training camps. In section five I look into this transnational insurgency from another perspective and argue that while Pakistan's governance is weak in the mentioned three regions, the state retains a vigorous degree of control on the Taliban insurgents through a shadowy network of intelligence officers. While testing H5 (see section five), I argue that although state weakness is a blunt truth in the case of Pakistan, the intelligence and military circles of Pakistan government hide behind the pretext of state weakness while maintaining firm control on the Taliban insurgency.

Section Three: Refugees in neighboring country

H3a: Rebellion is more likely to occur when there are refugees in neighbouring states.

H3b: Refugees are more likely to contribute to rebellion if they are located in weak or rival states.

Millions of Afghans have been living in Pakistan and Iran since the communist-led revolution that overthrew the Mohammad Daud regime in April 1978 (Grare and Maley 2011:2). The map below shows that both Iran and Pakistan received more than 3 million Afghan refugees

CEU eTD Collection

during the turmoil period of 1979 to 1990 (see figure 10). The black triangular plots that Lischer (2006:50) has made on the Pakistan side of the map are exactly where the majority of Afghan refugees have been concentrated: namely, Baluchistan, FATA and Khybar Pakhtunkhwa, which were described in the previous section. The majority of the refugees have been placed in several hundred large camps in FATA and Khybar Pakhtunkhwa, and a few in Baluchistan in Pakistan (Terry 2002:55-82, Lischer 2006:44-72; Margesson 2007:4).[52] In Iran, however, the Afghan refugees were largely dispersed in big cities and the capital Tehran (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2005:2-9). This has been the major difference between the Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan. In fact it was this concentration of refugees in camps (Younes and Duplat 2008:2) in tribally controlled regions of Pakistan that later fed into the armed struggle of the Mujahidin against the Soviet-backed regime in Afghanistan (Terry 2002:55-82 and Lischer 2005:44-72) and now fuels the Taliban insurgency. Refugees in camps constituted 42% of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan in 2002 (Margesson 2007:4).[53] In addition, the Afghan refugees were in general able to choose their own place of residence as they wanted (Grare and Maley 2011:4).[54] In addition to the camps, huge numbers of Afghan refugees currently live with their extended families, rent houses or even buy property in Pakistan. Whether from camped/settled refugees or otherwise, almost every Afghan insurgency in the past four decades has drawn upon refugees in neighbouring states.[55] [56]

CEU eTD Collection

[52] The choice of provinces where the camps should have been established was a strategic decision by the Pakistani government. Placing the Afghan refugees close to the border with Afghanistan served two important purposes; it provided an easy opportunity for incursions back into Afghanistan, and was also a persistent reminder of conflict and war and the need to seek protection of one of the several insurgent Afghan organizations during the 1980s (Harpviken, 2008:5).

[53] After immense pressure from the international community, especially the U.S., Pakistan has gradually started closing down the Afghan refugee camps (Grare and Maley 2011:2).

[54] Unlike refugees in some other countries where they are legally and forcefully confined to specific localities by their host state, this has not been the case in Pakistan.

[55] See also RAND presentation online at http://www.fathom.com/course/21701739/session4.html.

[56] Amstutz (1986:229) writes how Afghan refugees were dragged into taking part in the Afghan war during the 1980s when the government of Pakistan imposed the conditionality of giving aid only to refugees registered with or joined to one of the seven Afghan resistance parties of the time.



Map 3.1 Afghan refugee flows to Pakistan and Iran, 1979 to 1990. UNHCR, *State of the World's Refugees* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 117. Modified by the author.

Figure 10: Afghan refugee flows, 1979-1990, Source Lischer, 2006:50

CEU eTD Collection

At present Afghanistan is still the number one refugee-producing country in the world (see figure 11). From the more than 3 million registered Afghan refugees[57] worldwide, about 63% of them reside in Pakistan and 34% live in Iran (see UNHCR data projection in figure 12). That is, nearly 97% of Afghan refugees live in those two neighbouring states. Therefore, hypothesis 3a that predicts the high likelihood of rebellion when refugees are located in a

[57] Registered refugees are referred to those who are registered with UNHCR.

neighbouring state finds ample support in the case of Afghanistan. Afghan refugees do exist, in large numbers, in two neighbouring states. In the following part I demonstrate that they do contribute to insurgency, or are used strategically by the host states to feed the Taliban insurgency.



Figure 11: Top three refugee producing countries
Produced from World Bank Refugee Dataset 2011[58]

CEU eTD Collection

[58] The Dataset is available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG.OR/countries.



Figure 12: UNHCR Refugee Statistics for 2011

Source: Graph produced by the *Guardian*, June 2010[59]

I now move to the second part of the hypothesis (H3b) which holds that refugees are more likely to contribute to rebellion if they are located in a weak or rival state. In sections one and two of this chapter I elaborated that among the six neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, Pakistan is the only weak country, while both Pakistan and Iran are rivals to Afghanistan. Here, I start by analyzing how state weakness and rivalry in Pakistan paved the ground for Afghan refugees to contribute to the Taliban insurgency. Afghan refugees in Iran and their contribution to the Taliban insurgency will be discussed in the last part of this section.

Although a large number of Afghan refugees returned back to Afghanistan from Pakistan after the collapse of the Taliban regime in late 2001, as figures 11 and 12 indicate

[59] Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/jun/20/refugee-statistics-unhcr-data.

CEU eTD Collection

still more than a million Afghan refugees still live in Quetta, FATA, and Peshawar, the capital city of Khybar Pakhtunkhwa. In fact, those Afghan refugees who prefer to stay in Pakistan are the ones who have developed deeper roots in Pakistan during the past four decades of war in Afghanistan. Margesson (2007:3) documents that 80% of the Afghan refugees living in Pakistan have lived there for the past two decades; more than 50% of those refugees were born there. They have little to gain from returning. In addition, the escalating Taliban insurgency has encouraged the Afghan refugees to stay in Pakistan for their own safety from the conflict in Afghanistan. Younes and Duplat (2008:2) argue that the persistent lack of attention to the Afghan refugee community in Pakistan by the international community has led to aid being provided by politically motivated actors. These actors range from international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaida, or domestic tribal leaders and hardliner religious political parties. The consequences of such a trend have been dire. Extremist ideologies, culture and institutions have penetrated very deeply among the vast majority of Afghan refugees, and the rest of the Pashtun society, that have been relying on such networks for decades.

The crucial role that one radical, independent religious institution – the madrassa – plays among the Afghan refugees and for the Taliban insurgency cannot be ignored. Fifty-five percent of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan are children under 18 years (Younes and Duplat 2008:2). With the absence of formal education systems, madrassas and religious schools have been the only place that these children are exposed to learning. There are said to be thousands of such schools in Pakistan (Ferguson 2010:69). In addition, madrassas have been the only institutions, other than the extended family, that provide free food, lodging and clothes (Ferguson 2010:65). In a poverty-struck region the majority of parents[60] consider surrendering their kids to madrassas as a full scholarship package where not only they are

[60] Ferguson (2010:65-68) argues that the first wave of the Taliban movement in 1990s was mainly constituted by the pool of orphan children whose parents were killed during the 1980s conflict and who had been sent to madrassas thereafter.

CEU eTD Collection

educated but their livelihoods are provided for as well. The majority of these youngsters receive religious fundamentalism and extremism from Sunni Islamic lessons in these madrassas (Ferguson 2010:68). Madrassa students (*talib*s, as they are called) are raised without the love of their parents and are isolated from their communities; they are brainwashed with made-up religious myths to the point that they become ready to commit suicide and explode themselves with pride in the name of religion. In fact, the majority of Taliban fighters and commanders, including the notorious leader Mullah Omar, have at some point been Afghan refugees and students of the religious madrassas in Pakistan (Ferguson 2011:27-34).[61] The madrassas have served as a breeding organization, providing recruitments for Afghan insurgent parties in 1980s, 1990s and 2000, until the present.

Safe haven and direct military support are two services that Afghan refugees offer to the Taliban insurgency. There is a rational and logical explanation for this generosity. The Taliban leadership, commanders and foot soldiers come predominantly from the Sunni Pashtun ethnic group of Afghanistan (Johnson 2007:317). As shown in figure 13, 81.5% of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan have the same background as the Taliban: Sunni Pashtuns. These vast pools of Afghan refugees not only provide lodging and food for the Taliban insurgents in need of sanctuary, but also help in facilitating access to medical care for the injured Taliban fighters (Bakhshi 2012; Rahimzai 2012; Rahmani 2012).[62] Mullah Sadiq, a Taliban insurgent interviewed by Nader, has revealed that 'in 2008 I was injured and I lost a hand. I was taken to Quetta and received medical treatment there. God bless the Mujahid nation of Afghanistan and my friends who took care of me in Pakistan.'[63] Furthermore, Mullah Abdul Akhund, a group commander of the Taliban in Kandahar, stated to Nader in interview that '70% of the refugees support the Taliban. When our fighters get injured the

[61] See also RAND presentation online at http://www.fathom.com/course/21701739/session4.html.
[62] During the interviews I carried out with Bakhshi (5 May 2012), Rahimzai (14 May 2012), and Rahmani (4 May 2012) (see references for their designations), there was an unprecedented uniformity in their views on the level of support that the Taliban receive from among the Afghan refugees in Pakistan.
[63] Nader's interview with the Taliban, 7-9 May 2012.

CEU eTD Collection

refugees help us. They provide us food. They even join the Jihad frequently.'[64] Most of these assistances are offered due to ideological commitments to the 'Jihad' that the Taliban are pursuing in Afghanistan or because of personal ties, familial bonds or extended tribal relations that they have with Taliban insurgents. However, because of the domination of the Taliban in FATA, Khybar Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, sometimes refugees have to offer assistance to the insurgency simply for the purpose of building a relationship for self-protection in these lawless territories.[65]

CEU eTD Collection

[64] Nader's interview, ibid.
[65] I thank Rahmani for clarifying this angle of the refugee's support for the Taliban (email interview with Rahmani from RAND Corporation, 4 May 2012).



Figure 13: Census of Afghans in Pakistan, 2005
Source: Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, Government of Pakistan, p. 9. Obtained from Margesson 2007:4

If we look from the *state-rivalry* angle, many of the developments – such as the prevalence of radical religious institutions, the radicalization of Afghan refugees and their freedom to contribute to the Taliban insurgency – appear to be intentional. From a holistic point of view the Pakistani intelligence agency has always held the position of a strategic manager when it comes to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. As elaborated earlier, Pakistan is threatened by secessionist movements in territories bordering Afghanistan: FATA, Khybar Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan – collectively called Pashtunistan (Wolpert 1982:120).[66] Detailing the

[66] The Kashmir region includes another secessionist movement. However, it is not covered in this thesis.

CEU eTD Collection

characteristics of these movements is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, what is relevant here is that Pakistan has time and again used the Afghan refugee card to pacify these nationalist sentiments by distracting the attention of the Pashtun communities (Grare and Maley 2011:6), including the Afghan refugees, by Jihad against Russia (promotion of Mujahidin[67]), Jihad against the lawlessness of the Mujahidin era (promotion of the Taliban[68]), and Jihad against the Christian invaders (promotion of the Taliban for the second time). Therefore, Afghan refugees indeed have been a strategic asset for the government of Pakistan in pursuing their interests and rivalries (see section one) with respect to Afghanistan, India and the U.S., by continuously supporting elements of anti-government insurgent groups. Grare and Maley (2011:9) correctly describe the strategic position of Pakistan on Afghan refugees: 'Pakistan has taken advantage for too long of the existing gap in the refugee and security regimes, aiding and abetting manipulation when it is in its own security interests, yet treating the problem as a humanitarian concern when it has to face the consequences of this manipulation.'

Afghan refugees in Iran are of totally different demographic characteristics. Not only are the majority of refugees from the non-Pashtun Hazara or Tajik ethnicity, but also several studies show that in contrast to whole-family migration to Pakistan, the refugees in Iran are

[67] After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the communist regime lost control of the country in 1992 to the Mujahidin political parties that were supported by the United States and the Pakistan government (Goodson, 2001:73 and Rubin, 2002:274). Soon after the victory of the Mujahidin, the several political parties, each of which had its own military wing, started a civil war for control of the capital and other major cities and the position of the head of state (Rashid, 2000:97, Goodson, 2001:74). When US funding dried up after 1992 (Lyon, 2006:164), the Jihadi commanders started to run their own militias with the help of money made from extortion, the illicit economy, banditry and road tolls (Sinno, 2009:62). Lawlessness and chaos could not have been more pervasive in Afghanistan in this period (Johnson and Leslie, 2004:5, Lyon, 2006:165, Ferguson, 2010:23). It was in the wake of these calamities that the Taliban movement came into being.

[68] The Taliban were barely an organization that could be counted as a movement during the Afghan civil war in 1992-4, until the Pakistani government chose a group of them from Kandahar province to carry out a small mission within Afghanistan. In the last months of 1994, the Pakistani government tasked them to protect a trade convoy that worked to open a trade route between Central Asia and Pakistan through Afghanistan (Ferguson, 2010:34-35). The mission was successful, as these Taliban were able to fight off rival Mujahidin forces and warlords. In less than four months, with the support of thousands of madrassa students from Peshawar of Pakistan, this small movement managed to capture nine of the then twenty-nine provinces of Afghanistan (Ferguson, 2010:36). These Kandahar-based Taliban were able to take over Kabul in September 1996 (Rashid, 2009: 127). They ruled more than 95% of Afghanistan during the period September 1996-October 2001, including the capital city of Kabul.

CEU eTD Collection

primarily young Afghan men who leave their families behind and seek labour in Iran to be able to send remittances back home (Turton and Marsden 2002; Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2005; Stigter 2005; Abbasi-Shavazi and Glazebrook 2006; Margesson 2007). The fact that a generation of Afghan children have not been exposed to fundamentalist madrassa education systems like the ones in Pakistan, which are the bases of recruitment for Taliban, explains the weak or non-existent centres of support for Jihad in Afghanistan. Not only religious ideology (predominantly Shia[69] refugees vs. Sunni Taliban), ethnic composition (Hazara and Tajik refugees vs. Pashtun Taliban) but also the remoteness of Afghan refugees in Iran from the Afghan border area (Margesson 2007:12) has made it extremely difficult for the Taliban movement to draw supporters from among them. Furthermore, while the Taliban foot soldiers are drawn from unemployed or religious students among the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, unemployment among Afghan refugees is not an issue in Iran. A case study of Afghan refugees in Tehran estimates that 84% of them are employed in the private sector (Abasi-Shavazi et al. 2005:27). There has not been a single study or report that demonstrates Afghan refugees contributing to the Taliban insurgency.[70] In sum, ideological, religious and ethnic background, and also conditions and geographic location of Afghan refugees in Iran have become a barrier for Taliban recruiters and advocates.

Based on the analysis provided in this section, I conclude that the Taliban insurgency has benefited tremendously from the Afghan refugees in a neighbouring state (H3a is plausible). As I have demonstrated above, two neighbouring states, Pakistan and Iran, have been the main destination for Afghan refugees. Hypothesis 3b however is only plausible for the case of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and not in Iran. In this section I have elaborated how an interaction between state weakness and rivalry with Pakistan has paved the way for

[69] A study of Afghan refugees shows that 80% of the Afghan refugees in Tehran are from Shia jurisprudence (Abasi-Shavazi et al. 2005:24).

[70] My argument does not however include Taliban cross-border infiltration when they come under pressure in Afghanistan or get injured. As explained in Section 1 of this chapter, due to the rivalry Iran has with the U.S. there are reports of Iran supporting the Taliban insurgents.

CEU eTD Collection

Afghan refugees to provide support and sanctuaries for the Taliban insurgents in Pakistan. Consideration of the case of Iran tends to contradict this hypothesis. Although we have shown that Iran is involved in a complex rivalry relation with the U.S. in Afghanistan, Afghan refugees in Iran have not been manipulated to support the Taliban insurgency or start an insurgency of their own. Based on H3b, Iran should have used the Afghan refugees as a cheap army to wage a proxy war against the U.S. in Afghanistan. It should have created new resistance elite leaders from among the Hazara and Tajik refugees and have framed a 'new Jihad' against the U.S. invaders in Afghanistan. It could have also created 'war-time' alliances between the Taliban insurgents and the Afghan refugees in Iran by bargaining for leadership positions within the Taliban movement for the Hazara and Tajik refugee elite in Iran in return for provision of support in the form of foot soldiers or otherwise. None of these scenarios has emerged. Further research is required on this contradiction to find out why a rival state has not tapped the refugees of the neighbouring state.

Section Four: Bisected ethnic groups

H4: Ethnic groups that are located near an international border are more likely to rebel.

Ethnicity does play a huge role in the Taliban insurgency; however, the above hypothesis (H4) only partially explains the insurgency in Afghanistan. This hypothesis, in light of the theories of transnational insurgency, predicts that because of the 'greater access to external territory and resources' (Salehyan 2009:64) that ethnic groups along international borders enjoy, they are more likely to rebel. I do not, however, see a uniform occurrence of such a trend in Afghanistan. On several occasions in this chapter I have demonstrated that the Taliban insurgency is led by certain tribes of the Pashtun ethnic group (see also Johnson 2007:323). As shown by the demographic map of Afghanistan in figure 14 (see table 3 below

CEU eTD Collection

for ethnic group size) the Pashtuns *are* located near a soft-international[71] border and they do enjoy sanctuary and support from other Pashtun tribes who are located just on the other side of the border. The real complication that the hypothesis meets in the Afghanistan case is when we take into account other ethnic groups such as the Turkmens, the Uzbeks and the Tajiks, who also live along international borders and who also have related ethnic groups (or an entire nation) on the other side of the border. As figure 14 shows, the Turkmen ethnic group is directly adjacent to Turkmenistan, while the Uzbeks are neighbours with Uzbekistan and the Tajiks with Tajikistan. In the time period of the insurgency covered in this thesis (2001-2012), Afghanistan has seen no insurgent movement or support for insurgents from among these ethnic groups. Unlike the segments of the Pashtun ethnic group which support the Taliban insurgency, these ethnic groups have adopted a non-violent approach to couching their demands and engaging in Afghan politics (Alavi 2012[72], Semple 2012[73]). Therefore, I conclude that H4 on its own is implausible. Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore under what circumstances ethnic groups do feed insurgency, I still argue that for ethnic groups to become antagonistic, whether they are located near international borders or not, interaction with other crucial variables is needed. In the case of the Pashtun insurgency in the form of the Taliban movement, their exclusion from political processes in Afghanistan since the beginning of the U.S.-led intervention has been a key factor. The opportunities for the group to participate in the political processes were completely taken away from them by labelling them terrorists. This exclusion of a well-entrenched movement, which prior to 9/11

CEU eTD Collection

[71] I use the term 'soft-international border' because the border line is disputed and there are is only limited controls on people crossing it.
[72] Interview with Sayyid Alavi former UN political officer and current head of Jehad Danish Cultural Association, 13 May 2012 by phone.
[73] Email interview with Michael Semple, former Deputy EU special representative for Afghanistan, 21 May 2012

controlled more than 95% of Afghanistan, surely had consequences,[74] especially when they found support and sanctuary in the neighbouring state of Pakistan.

Figure 14: Afghanistan ethnic group map

Source http://www.mapsofworld.com/afghanistan/afghanistan-ethnic-groups-map.html#

CEU eTD Collection

[74] Faizy (interview 9 May 2012) explained to me that 'during the first Bonn conference that basically laid a road map for the future of Afghanistan a hard core radical Pashtun voice that was represented by Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami was not considered. A strong regime that ruled the country for almost five years disappeared within days with few casualties and too little of their military and political wings were arrested or killed.'

Table 3: Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan

Ethnicity	Language	Religious Sect	Population
Pashtun	Pashtu	Sunni/Wahabi	35%
Tajik	Dari	Sunni	22%
Hazara	Dari	Shia/Ismailia	19%
Uzbek	Uzbeki	Sunni	14%
Turkmen	Turkmeni	Sunni	3.8%
Aimaq	Dari	Sunni	2.5%
Baluch	Baluchi	Sunni	1.5%
Pashai	Pashai	Sunni	0.5%
Nuristani	Nuristani	Sunni	0.4%
Arab	Dari	Sunni/Shia	0.4%
Qizilbash/Bayat	Dari	Shia	0.3%
Kyrgyz	Kyrgyzi	Sunni	0.3%
Gujur	Gujuri	Sunni	0.2%
Brahwi	Baluchi	Sunni	0.1%

Source: Goodson 2001 and Dorronsoro 2005

Section Five: Extraterritorial Bases:

H5: Conflicts will endure longer when rebels have access to extraterritorial bases.

I test the above hypothesis in the following manner: in the first part of this section I demonstrate that the Taliban insurgent groups *have* access to extraterritorial bases. Secondly, I establish that the Taliban's access to transnational sanctuaries and bases has played a crucial role in protracting an insurgency that should have long been solved either through military means or political settlement. I argue that because of the extraterritorial bases the Taliban have gained a strong bargaining position with regards to peace negotiations and simultaneously have become the hostage of their host state. I further assert that reconciliation

CEU eTD Collection

programs have failed time and again to secure a peace deal because of not taking into account the interests of the host state and the insurgent group.

Extraterritorial bases and support

Not more than a year after their defeat, the Taliban re-emerged on the Afghan political scene and declared war against the U.S./NATO forces and the Afghan government. The declaration of Jihad, however, came from hideouts outside Afghanistan. To put it baldly, there is a core Taliban leadership – the Quetta Shura[75] (Giustozzi 2008:83) – and, although it may be ideologically driven, that leadership's core argument is that they had gained power in Afghanistan from the Northern Alliance[76] in 1996, and since the latter has now been brought back by foreigners, they will patiently fight to overthrow the regime and build 'an Islamic Emirate based on Sharia' law (Doronsoro 2009:9). The Quetta Shura refers to the Taliban core leadership council, including the leader, Mohammad Omar, who is believed to be hiding in Quetta but still actively leading the insurgency in Afghanistan (Grare and Maley 2011:4). Shura meetings happen several times a year; however, sub-committees meet more frequently to sustain the day-to-day operations of the insurgency in Afghanistan (Waldman 2010:6). The Quetta Shura regularly appoints and replaces shadow governors in most of the 34 provinces of Afghanistan (Dressler 2009:7, Caristrom 2010). The governors are then tasked to manage the current affairs of the Taliban forces in the provinces, disrupt NATO and Afghan government activities and draw further foot soldiers for the movement from the communities.

The Quetta Shura emerged after the U.S. and the Afghan militia forces pushed the Taliban into their stronghold city of Kandahar during the initial months of intervention in 2001. As the collapse of the Taliban regime became imminent, the Taliban leader Mullah Omar sent a message to the Taliban, asking them not to resist any further, and promising that

[75] *Shura* means 'council' in Dari and Pashtu languages, and Quetta is the capital city of Baluchistan province of Pakistan.

[76] It was the alliance of Tajik (ethnicity) Mujahideen (holy fighters) commanders who overthrew the communist regime of Dr. Najibullah in 1992 and gained control of most parts of the country (Rubin 2002: x and 1).

CEU eTD Collection

they would regroup and fight back (interview with Rahmani, 2012). The leadership of the movement, including Mullah Omar, escaped to the city of Quetta while the foot soldiers vanished into the civilian population. It took Omar less than a year to regroup and reconstitute the Taliban resistance in Pakistan and initiate sporadic insurgent attacks in Afghanistan (Mazol 2009). The majority of the Shura's members are old leaders and commanders of the Taliban movement (Caristrom 2010). One researcher describes the Quetta Shura as composed 'of indigenous fighting units, facilitators, and foreign fighters. Quetta Shura commanders plan and lead offensive and defensive operations against coalition and Afghan forces, whereas facilitators manage logistical elements': the Taliban leadership in Quetta 'provides direction, guidance, and sometimes issues direct orders to the senior commanders' in Afghanistan (Dressler 2009:8). Some known members of the Shura are listed in Appendix A.

The sanctuaries for the Taliban in Pakistan 'do not fall from the sky'; they are facilitated by Pakistan's intelligence service (ISI) (Faizy 2012; Rahimzai 2012; Bakhshi 2012 and Waldman 2010:1).[77] During my interview with Faizy,[78] he argued that 'the main chain of command for Taliban managed to gain safe havens on other side of border. In due course, supported by certain elements in Pakistan and other radical groups, Taliban managed to re-establish parts of their prime activities, which enabled them to reach out to remote villages on country side.'[79] The ISI reportedly has representatives on all Taliban councils in Pakistan including the Quetta Shura.[80] Besides this, the most crucial role that the ISI plays is for the security of the Quetta Shura meetings, provision of safe locations for the meetings, and

CEU eTD Collection

[77] The views of Faizy, Rahimzai and Bakhshi were obtained during interviews the author had with them in Afghanistan in a field trip in 2011 and again in April/May 2012 (see reference list for their designations).
[78] Special advisor to the Centre for International and Strategic Analysis.
[79] Waldman (2010:1) also writes that 'according to Taliban commanders the ISI orchestrates, sustains and strongly influences the movement. They say it gives sanctuary to both Taliban and Haqqani groups, and provides huge support in terms of training, funding, munitions, and supplies. In their words, this is "as clear as the sun in the sky".'
[80] Waldman writes that a senior Taliban member revealed that three to seven ISI agents attend the Quetta Shura (2010:6).

transportation and handling of members.[81] In addition, it maintains a firm grip on the insurgent group and chastises commanders who seem to be engaging in activities without prior approval of the ISI. The arrest of Mullah Beradar, a leading Taliban commander and member of the Quetta Shura, is widely reported to be an example of ISI punishment for initiating peace talks with the Afghan government (interview with Bakhshi, 2012;[82] Gall and Mekhennet 2010). Moreover, while the Pakistan military forces do take counterinsurgency measures against Pakistani Taliban in Pakistan, Alavi[83] revealed to me during an interview that the Pakistani military cleanup operations do not target Afghan Taliban in Pakistan. This immunity of the Afghan Taliban makes sense when we take into consideration Pakistan's strategic national interests and rivalry relationships with actors such as the U.S. and India in Afghanistan (as explained in section one). According to a recent NATO report (cited in Shipman and Drury 2012) Pakistan has been directly aiding Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan and giving them shelter in its territory. According to a former UN political officer,[84] Pakistan is playing two roles: being a U.S. ally in the fight against terrorism, while also secretly supporting the Taliban in the event that they should retake power after NATO's withdrawal in 2014. The relationship between the transnational movement of the Taliban and the Pakistan government can be defined as a marriage of convenience,[85] where the Taliban needs sanctuary and arms from the ISI while Pakistan needs to secure its national interests in the region with the help of a proxy army.

The support that the Taliban insurgent group receives in Pakistan goes far beyond sanctuaries and safe havens. The involvement of different institutions of the Pakistani

CEU eTD Collection

[81] Interview with deputy minister under the former Taliban regime by Waldman (2010:6).
[82] Interview with Kanishka Bakhshi, senior political officer at U.S. embassy in Kabul, 5 May 2012, by email.
[83] Interview with Sayyid Alavi, former UN political officer and current head of Jehad Danish Cultural Association, 13 May 2012, by phone.
[84] Interview with Sayyid Alavi, 21 April 2012.
[85] However, there seems to be a high degree of hatred among the Taliban militants towards the ISI. All five of the Taliban insurgents interviewed by Nader explicitly or implicitly reveal that the Taliban members are frequently pressurized or blackmailed by the ISI to go to war or follow their interests (Nader, 5 May 2012).

government – namely the ISI and military forces – in setting up training camps,[86] raising funds domestically and from Gulf States, provision of ammunition and transportation machinery and emergency health care facilities, all on Pakistani soil, have been the backbone of Taliban resistance (interview with Rahmani, 2012;[87] see also Rashid 2008:221-25 and Waldman 2010:13). In an interview conducted by Nader, a member of the Taliban said 'Pakistan is a Mujahid nation [and] without their financial and military support the resistance would have been in a weak position.'[88] On the subject of training camps/madrassas,[89] Waldman's interviews (2010:16) with Taliban commanders reveal the following:

> One of the commanders from a central province described how he spent a year in a Pakistani madrassa in 2008, describing it as 'a big camp, really big, like a university with 2,000-4,000 people' (although he believes it is now much smaller). It included a military training camp, where they were taught combat techniques, such as how to lay IEDs, attack or ambush. He said two-thirds of the students were Afghans, and that their Afghan and Pakistani teachers were continually telling them, 'it was our duty to fight in Afghanistan'.

In addition, Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan heavily rely on logistical and tactical support from the Pakistani military forces, especially in the event that fighters come under pressure from NATO or Afghan forces in Afghanistan. In interview, Rahmani reported that escaping Taliban insurgents not only liaise in advance with Pakistani forces along the border for safe passage, but have also been provided with 'covering fire at the border crossing'. This indeed shows the magnitude of support that the Taliban insurgents enjoy from circles across the border.

CEU eTD Collection

[86] 'The interviews suggest that the ISI continues to sanction and support military training centers for insurgents and a large number of madrassas that actively encourage their students to fight in Afghanistan. All commanders reported that significant numbers of their fighters attend training camps in Pakistan that are run or backed by the ISI. One southern commander described how in his district, where there are some 600 fighters, around 70-80 fighters had gone to Pakistan for training this winter [2009-2010]. Emphasizing the continuing importance of such training, a south-eastern commander said that, 'of the 280 fighters in our district, some 80 per cent were trained in Pakistan'.' Waldman (2010:15)

[87] Interview with Rahmani, 4 May 2012.

[88] Interview by Nader for this thesis on 4 May 2012.

[89] The line between a madrassa and a training camp has become blurred in recent years. That is, religious schools and military training lessons have been integrated in the sense that a madrassa student automatically receives military training as well.

Other high-ranking Taliban councils (Shuras) that are present in Pakistan are the Peshawar Shura, which is in charge of operations in Eastern Afghanistan, the Miramshah Shura, which is sustaining insurgency in the south-eastern regions of Afghanistan, and the Gerdi Jangal Shura and two other Shuras for activities in north and north-eastern parts of Afghanistan (Ruttig 2009:61).[90] These councils are mostly responsible for the implementation of the decisions of the high council or the Quetta Shura. The only exception is the Miramshah Shura, which is largely represented by the Haqqani Network, and which retains a fair degree of independent decision-making power in regards to their operations in Afghanistan. The Taliban insurgency is further supported by loosely affiliated yet ideologically similar groups such as the Haqqani Network and Gulbudin Hekmatyar's Hezbi Islami. The Haqqani Network is operative in Khost, Paktya and Paktika, while Hekmatyar's network is active in Kunduz, Nangarhar, Nuristan and Kunar. Jalaluddin Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani network, has close ties with the Taliban. Haqqani joined the Taliban in the 1990s and served as Omar's minister of Tribal Affairs in the Taliban regime (Ruttig 2009:57-70). Another Taliban-affiliated insurgent group is Hekmatyar's Hezbi Islami (Islamic Party), which, although the group pre-dates the Taliban movement, relies largely on Taliban support networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan for their activities. Their activities, however, are quite limited in comparison to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Although these spin-off insurgent groups enjoy a great deal of autonomy in their operations, they are still loyal to the Taliban leader and accept Omar as their *Amir-ul-momenin*[91] or spiritual leader.[92] In this thesis I treat them under the umbrella of the Taliban insurgency and not as separate insurgencies, although, at the micro-level, there are visible differences as to how they operate, their

CEU eTD Collection

[90] Peshawar is the capital of Khybar Pakhtunkhwa, while Miramshah and Gerdi Jangal are districts in FATA.
[91] The term means 'Commander of the Faithful' (Ferguson 2010:43).
[92] Interview with Mullah Abdussalam Zaeef, the Taliban's former ambassador to Pakistan and a reconciled Talib (Ruttig 2009:61).

strategies etc.[93] Beside the Taliban leadership, the main circles of the Haqqani Network and Hezbi Islami have also found sanctuary in FATA and Khybar Pakhtunkhwa.

The ever-expanding insurgency has endured for a long period

The first sign of the Taliban's return was in March 2003, when a group of Taliban led by Mullah Dadullah killed an international staffer of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In 2004 and 2005, the security incidents became more frequent in some of the southern provinces, such as Kandahar, Zabul and Uruzgan (Masadykov et al. 2010:2). In 2006, there was a major escalation of the insurgency as attacks took place more widely in the southern regions, including the south-east and west. This meant that these regions were not accessible to international organisations without high risk. As we see in figures 15 and 16, not only has the Taliban insurgency continued for almost ten years now, but the number of attacks they have carried out each year has consistently increased (see also figure 5 for a yearly comparison of the percentage increase in AOG attacks).

Figure 15: Afghan Opposition Groups initiated attacks – Countrywide



Source: ANSO 2012:9

[93] For details on the specificities of the Haqqani network, see Waldman 2010:16.

CEU eTD Collection

Figure 16: AOG-initiated attacks, 2006-2008



Source: ANSO 2008: 1

Figure 17: Growth in AOD attacks



Source: ANSO 2012:9

The Taliban movement's success is pretty clear, as measured objectively in terms of geographic control and the disruption of programmes by the Afghan government and

CEU eTD Collection

international community. They have destabilized and dominated the entire southern part of Afghanistan and much of the eastern and western parts of the country (Doronsoro 2009:7). Ruttig (2009:57) writes that the Loya Paktia region, which covers Paktia, Paktika and Khost provinces in the south-western regions of Afghanistan and is inhabited by Pashtun tribes, is to a large extent under the control of the semi-autonomous Haqqani Network Taliban. In addition, Ruttig documents that there are three more Taliban groups holding power in this region: the Mansur family, another group directly loyal to the Quetta Shura, and the third loyal to specific Jihadi commanders in Quetta. Furthermore, the Hezbi Islami party also holds pockets of areas in Loya Paktya (Ruttig 2009:59-88) (see figure 18 for an illustrated map of Loya Paktia and the insurgent domination). Despite the predominance of different insurgent power networks, large-scale rivalry and animosity is rarely reported among these groups due to the unity of the top leadership of these insurgent networks. Furthermore, Reuter and Younus (2009:101-118) present a clear picture of how the insurgency in Ghazni province evolved from exploding a few bombs in 2003 to literally controlling all the districts with the exception of the provincial centre. Although sporadic attacks and IED explosions occurred frequently in Helmand province, large-scale coordinated attacks and resistance by Taliban insurgents only became prevalent in 2005 (Coghlan 2009:127). Coghlan (2009:151) argues that with the Taliban controlling huge parts of the province and living well from the drug economy taxation, 'the insurgency since 2001 has been the fiercest' in Helmand province. Furthermore as shown by the depiction of the Taliban areas of control in figure 19, Uruzgan (see Bijlert 2009:155), Kunar (see Kilcullen 2009:231), Kandahar (see Smith 2009:191), Nuristan, Farah, Zabul (see Zabulwal 2009:179), Nimroz, Badghis and parts of Herat and Ghor provinces (see Giustozzi 2009:211) have been deeply infiltrated by Taliban insurgent groups. Although from time to time they receive a heavy blow due to NATO and Afghan military operations, it does not take the Taliban central command in Pakistan long to appoint

CEU eTD Collection

new governors and provincial commanders, and send fresh forces from the other side of the border. In addition, the Taliban have also been able to infiltrate pockets of Pashtun-dominated areas in north Afghanistan, especially Kunduz, Baghlan, Badakhshan, Balkh, Takhar and the provinces (Yoshikawa 2010:1; Azarbaijani-Moghaddam 2009:247). To give a rough picture of the scale and strength of Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan as a whole I quote Walman (2010:15):

> …the Afghan insurgency may be over 35,000 strong, as reported by Jerome Starkey (*The Times* [London], 3 March 2010) and last year launched an average of 620 attacks a month. Assuming costs associated with each Talib average $150 per month, manning costs alone would exceed $60 million a year.

In sum, if one characteristic of the Taliban insurgency overshadows the others it is the persistent growth of their presence and attacks in Afghanistan.

CEU eTD Collection



Figure 18: Tribes and Insurgents in Loya Paktia

Source: Ruttig in Giustozzi 2009:63

CEU eTD Collection



Figure 19: Taliban logistical roads

Source Doronsoro 2009:21

Why can it not be settled?

The Taliban insurgency has endured for a decade now, with no prospect of ending either through military defeat or reconciliation and political settlement. As pointed out in Chapter Two, the chances that a transnational insurgency can be defeated through military means is miniscule because of the ability of insurgents to find safe havens in neighbouring states. This has been exactly the case in regards to the Taliban insurgency. The 130,000 international

CEU eTD Collection

security forces in the country, drawn from more than 50 countries[94] including the U.S., UK and Germany, as well as 200,000 Afghan police and soldiers, have failed to dismantle the Taliban leadership and eradicate the insurgency (interview with Faizy, 2012;[95] Masadykov et al. 2010:9). In addition to counterinsurgency operations, the government of Afghanistan with the support of the international community has time and again opened reconciliation and negotiation fronts with the Taliban.[96] All have been in vain. This again is very much consistent with what transnational insurgency theories predict: because of extraterritorial sanctuaries and support, transnational insurgents have a stronger bargaining position. Semple elaborates that 'the Taliban Movement has a long track record of difficult dealing. It is deliberately inaccessible and introverted ... It tends to exaggerate its bargaining power and to hold out too long in pursuit of unrealistic objectives.'[97] They become ready for negotiations or peace deals only if their demands are met. The challenge is the size of their demands – which would, for instance, mean giving the entire country of Afghanistan back to the Taliban. In the case of the Taliban insurgency we can see that from the onset the Taliban have maintained the same criteria for negotiations: 'all invading forces should leave Afghanistan before we become ready to come to negotiation table.'[98]

The fact that the insurgency has endured for almost ten years, and the inability of any national[99] or international negotiation tracks to end it through political means, also indicates

CEU eTD Collection

[94] See http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php.
[95] Interview, 9 May 2012
[96] Elaborating on the clashes and lack of coordination between the Afghan government and the international community as to who should lead the reconciliation programs is beyond the scope of this thesis. Several authors, however, have highlighted the internal clashes as a challenge to negotiation and reconciliation as well. For example, according to Tarzi (2010: 69) there have been 'a number of parallel and at times competing reconciliation programmes', which highlights the chaotic, divided, and inconsistent nature of the peace initiatives in the country. The recent uncoordinated efforts by the United States in Qatar and the Afghan Government in Saudi Arabia clearly exemplify this fact.
[97] Email interview with Michael Semple, former Deputy EU special representative for Afghanistan, 21 May 2012.
[98] See http://policyresearchgroup.com/newscomment/tri-nation_summit_in_islamabad_tailored_for_zardari_s_audience.html.
[99] For instance, the Independent National Commission for Peace (known as Programme Tahkim Sulh or PTS) was established in 2005 'to bring the armed hostilities to an end and restore the damaged national unity' (PTS,

another complication: the role of the host state. In Chapter Two it was noted that in transnational insurgencies the role and participation of the host nation is vital to the success of any negotiation process. I have demonstrated in earlier sections that Pakistan has strong stakes in keeping the Taliban insurgency alive. It has indeed turned the Taliban movement into a tool of foreign policy implementation in the region and beyond (Grare and Maley 2011:1). Earlier in this section I explored the magnitude of Pakistan's involvement in the strategic management of the Taliban leadership and fighters on its soil. A political settlement that is initiated by the Afghan government or the U.S. and its allies and which extends offers to the Taliban leaders to join the peace process is utterly nonsensical and will be doomed to failure unless it takes into account Pakistan's interests (see section one). In my interview with Sayyid Alavi,[100] he commented that 'the only viable way to bring the Taliban insurgency to an end is to accommodate and acknowledge the interests of Pakistan in the region. Any other approach regardless of how creative it is shall fail.' Alavi's argument is supported by the evidence on the ground. For instance, in June 2010, President Karzai convened a three-day National Consultative Peace Jirga – a traditional Afghan referendum for resolving disputes aimed at finding ways forward for negotiations and reconciliation with armed opposition groups including the Taliban. Almost 1,500 people attended this Peace Jirga, including tribal and religious leaders, government officials and other representatives who supported the Afghan Government's peace initiative. Alas, because of the side-lining of the core interests of the state that harbours the insurgency, the project could not go beyond rhetorical claims of 'brotherhood' and endorsement of a recommendatory paper. Moreover, a High Peace Council was established in September 2010 to promote reconciliation with a wider reintegration package and give further concessions to the Taliban in order to end the conflict (Lamb et al.

2009a). Despite some early achievements, the PTS ended in 2011 and failed to yield significant results that could have ended the ongoing insurgency.

[100] Interview with Sayyid Alavi, former UN political officer and current head of Jehad Danish Cultural Association, 13 May 2012, by phone.

CEU eTD Collection

2010). Despite productive talks with some senior Taliban, the assassination in September 2011 of Rabbani,[101] the head of the High Peace Council, and Arsala Rahmani,[102] an influential member, in May 2012, were major blows to the peace process. Many believe that the 'senior figures within the Taliban had tried to bypass the ISI and hold direct talks with Karzai's government and the U.S., and Pakistan responded with ruthless efforts to reassert control of any negotiations' (Boone 2011).

Most recently at the international level, there have been reports about talks between the Taliban and the U.S. regarding the establishment of the Taliban's political office in Qatar.[103] In support of this, the U.S. released several Taliban prisoners in order to build trust ahead of the upcoming talks (see Borger, 'Taliban to open Political Office in Qatar', *Guardian* [London], 3 January 2012). However, because the process circumvented both the Afghan and Pakistan governments it was disrupted and discredited by both parties. Earlier in 2009 Kai Eide, the former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Afghanistan, held secret peace talks with senior Taliban commanders in Kabul and Dubai (Borger 2010a). However, these efforts failed and according to Kai Eide 'we met senior figures in the Taliban leadership and we also met people who have the authority of the Quetta Shura to engage in that kind of discussion, but Pakistan's recent arrest of the Taliban commanders harmed the reconciliation process' (Doucet 2010; Black and Borger 2010). Kai Eide criticized Pakistan for damaging UNAMA's reconciliation efforts while he was in the process of talks with the Taliban. Referring to the arrest by the ISI of several Taliban leaders in Pakistan who were prepared to negotiate with Kabul, Waldman (2010:7) writes that they 'were intended to send a message to both the Taliban and the United States that negotiations could only take place if the ISI had a major role in, if not control over, the negotiating

[101] See *BBC News*, available online http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-14985779.
[102] See *BBC News*, available online http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18049265.
[103] In my email interview with Bakhshi (5 May 2012), he reported that the Qatar negotiation track too has been at a standstill or has failed all in all.

CEU eTD Collection

process.'[104] Furthermore, in my interview with Dr. Rahimzai he elaborated that 'Taliban are controlled by Pakistan [and] we saw that in several occasions those Taliban who showed some interest in the peace processes were killed by ISI.'[105] It is because of these complexities – the high bargaining power of the Taliban insurgents and stakes of a neighbouring state – that I call the situation in Afghanistan a *jammed negotiation trap*. As Semple posits, 'the Afghan conflict involves multiple stake-holders, all of whom have some capacity to block any deal contemplated by the others: Pakistan's ISI is one of these stake-holders.'[106] Without appeasing the concerns of the host state, in this case Pakistan, and accommodating their national interests, it would be irrational for the ISI and other Pakistani organizations to let go of its proxy army.[107] Referring to the sanctuaries in Pakistan, Rahmani[108] argues that 'the Taliban will not change their perception of the game until their supplies and funds pipelines are broken. So long as they receive political support from some states, supplies and money from alternative sources, they don't have any reason not to believe that they cannot go a few extra miles. Once these parameters change, Taliban will be at the negotiation table the next day.'[109] In sum, the trap is inescapable without winning the honest support of the state that harbours the Taliban.

Based on the above analysis I conclude that hypothesis 5 can be supported with ample evidence and robustly explains the protracted conflict in Afghanistan on the basis of the extraterritorial sanctuaries that the Taliban insurgents have in Pakistan.

CEU eTD Collection

[104] See also Dean Nelson, 15 May 2012, *Daily Telegraph* online, www.telegraph.co.uk.
[105] Similarly, Sayyid Najibullah Hashimi, the head of Hindokosh News Agency, told the author that the proxy war in Afghanistan has been inflamed from the other side of the border and that this has become a serious challenge to Afghan reconciliation efforts (email interview, 15 April 2012).
[106] Email interview with Michael Semple, former Deputy EU special representative for Afghanistan, 21 May 2012.
[107] Pakistan has invested time and resources to develop this asset since the 1970s when the first wave of building madrassas and training camps was initiated for the Mujahidin who fought the Soviet Army.
[108] Skype interview, 4 May 2012.
[109] Mullah Yahya, a Taliban fighter in Helmand province, asked by Nader about sanctuaries in Pakistan, replied that 'If Pakistan expels us. But I believe the government can't expel us. We are powerful. But if we don't have sanctuary to hide it is very difficult for us to fight'. Interview 7 May 2012.

In conclusion, then, I have demonstrated that several transnational factors have contributed to the ever-growing strength of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Neighbouring state rivalry (H1), weakness of neighbouring state (H2), Afghan refugees in neighbouring state (H3), extraterritorial bases of support for the Taliban insurgency (H5) and support of similar ethnic groups along the Pakistan border (H4) have all directly and in interaction with each other given momentum to the conflict in Afghanistan. Although H3b and H4 meet contradictions in the context of Afghanistan, the theory of transnational insurgency sheds considerable light on the nature of the insurgency and the reason why it has gone on in Afghanistan for so long.

CEU eTD Collection

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

Introduction

In this thesis I looked at the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan from the point of view of transnational insurgency theory. Unlike 'motivation theories' of insurgency, which focus mainly on internal or domestic causes of rebellion, transnational insurgency theory, which builds on the foundations of 'opportunity theory', addresses the external or extraterritorial factors that can contribute to the onset and perpetuation of insurgencies. It is the application of transnational insurgency theory to the Taliban case that distinguishes this study from mainstream studies of the Taliban conflict. My aim in adopting this perspective was not so much to make a contribution to the theory of transnational insurgency, as to provide a more holistic understanding of the Taliban insurgency, and to get a clearer picture of what prevents it from being brought to a conclusion.

The puzzle from which I drew my thesis argument and research questions is that despite massive international involvement both militarily and civilian, the flow of billions of dollars of international aid and unprecedented economic and infrastructural development in Afghanistan, the Taliban insurgency has not only endured but has continuously gained momentum. My main argument in this dissertation was that because of the extraterritorial sanctuaries that the Taliban insurgents enjoy in the neighbouring country, Afghanistan is in a jammed negotiation trap where conventional dyadic peace negotiations between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban insurgents are unviable because of Taliban's bargaining power and the meddling of their host state. To address these developments I used the following two overarching research questions to shape the thesis: What extraterritorial factors explain the resurgence and protraction of Taliban insurgency?; and Why has there been a deadlock on the negotiations and reconciliation fronts with the Taliban insurgents?

CEU eTD Collection

Findings

I answered the research questions with the help of five hypotheses drawn in Chapter Two, where I reviewed the transnational insurgency scholarship. The hypotheses involved evaluating the effects of five exogenous factors on the Taliban insurgency: rival neighbouring state, weak neighbouring state, refugees in neighbouring state, bisected ethnic groups along international borders and extraterritorial sanctuaries for insurgents. In Chapter Four I tested these five hypotheses and came to the following conclusions.

On the effects of a rival neighbouring state on the onset and endurance of insurgency I found that out of Afghanistan's six neighbouring states, two are rivals – Iran and Pakistan. Iran is engaged in a 'complex rivalry' with the U.S. in Afghanistan, while Pakistan is both a direct rival of Afghanistan and engaged in 'complex rivalry' with India and the U.S. in Afghanistan. In the case of Pakistan I found that the country is deliberately supporting the Taliban insurgents on its soil to win a better deal from Afghanistan when the time comes for resolving the disputed territories (the Durand Line). Simultaneously, Pakistan is pursuing two other objectives: namely to continue to receive billions of dollars in aid from the U.S./NATO for fighting 'terrorism', and to sabotage India's deeper ties and influence in Afghanistan. In Iran's case, however, the findings contradicted expectations. Despite some allegations of Iranian support to the Taliban insurgents, I found no reliable data in support of the hypothesis.

On the effects of a weak neighbouring state on insurgency I found that the weakest state neighbouring Afghanistan is Pakistan. I explained that the Taliban insurgents have tapped state weakness mainly in three regions in Pakistan: FATA, Baluchistan and Khybar Pakhtunkhwa. State weakness in Pakistan has dramatically contributed to the revival, growth and resurgence of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. Furthermore, on the effects of refugees in a neighbouring state on insurgency I found that Afghan refugees in Pakistan

CEU eTD Collection

contribute tremendously to the Taliban insurgency by providing food, shelter, financial and human support, while the Afghan refugees in Iran play no role in the Taliban insurgency. I do not believe that this contradiction invalidates the hypothesis, however; what we can draw from this is that further research is needed to find out as to when refugees contribute to insurgency and when they do not. From this study I speculate that factors such as refugee colonies close to the border, poor living conditions and ethnic ties of refugees with the Taliban movement have contributed to insurgency in Pakistan. None of these three factors are visible in the case of Afghan refugees in Iran. This could be a point of departure for future studies but here I do not draw any conclusions.

On the effects of bisected ethnic groups living along international borders the finding is not as the hypothesis predicted. That is, in Chapter Four I demonstrated that only one ethnic group – the Pashtuns – has found sanctuary from their co-ethnic counterparts across the border, while no other ethnic group that is similarly bisected has contributed to the insurgency in Afghanistan. Other ethnic groups such as the Turkmens,[110] the Uzbeks and the Tajiks, who also live along international borders and who also have related ethnic groups (or their entire nation) on the other side of the border have pursued their demands non-violently. I do not conclude from this that bisected ethnic groups living along international borders are not likely to rebel; rather, what I contend is that the interaction of bisected ethnic groups with other extraterritorial variables, such as weak or rival neighbouring state, is necessary before they rebel.

The last variable I evaluated was the effect of extraterritorial bases on the onset and protraction of insurgency. I found that the Taliban insurgents not only have their leadership councils in Pakistan, but also receive huge amounts of support, protection and military training from there. I also demonstrated that while the Taliban needs Pakistan to fund and

[110] Turkmen ethnic group in Afghanistan is directly adjacent to Turkmenistan, while the Uzbeks are neighbours with Uzbekistan and Tajiks with Tajikistan.

CEU eTD Collection

protect them in Pakistan, the Pakistani government needs the Taliban to implement its national interests in the region. Furthermore, I also elaborated that the peace negotiations and reconciliation efforts have repeatedly failed because the Taliban can evade the coercive power of U.S./NATO forces by hiding in their extraterritorial sanctuaries in Pakistan. I have argued that Afghanistan is trapped in a jammed negotiation process where a dyadic negotiation track between the Afghan government and Taliban insurgents is hijacked by a third party: the host state. In sum, I have shown that negotiation and reconciliation with the Taliban only becomes possible if ways are found to neutralize Pakistan's support to Taliban insurgents.

The limitations of this study are numerous; four in particular are worth mentioning. Almost all the hypotheses connected Pakistan and the Taliban insurgency in some way or another; however, in this study I conducted no interviews with Pakistani experts or government officials, and so was unable to benefit from their perspectives. Furthermore, I was unable to interview refugees in Iran and Pakistan. Due to time and resource restrictions, I was unable to interview representatives of the U.S. military to determine to what extent they too see the Taliban's transnational mobility as a strategic asset in the insurgency. And due to the security concerns which normally pertain to research on ongoing conflicts and insurgencies, I was unable to conduct extensive research among Taliban who are actively engaged in conflict. However, I do not think that this limitation invalidates the broad conclusions of this research. I believe, though, that the thesis would have benefited enormously had I been able to interview Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan. In addition, because of length restrictions, this study did not attempt to offer insights on how to make the host state – in this case Pakistan – help solve the Taliban insurgency. I have only argued that without their committed help and participation in peace negotiations, the insurgency cannot be ended. Lastly, the spill-over effects of Taliban insurgency on neighbouring states,

CEU eTD Collection

especially on Pakistan, have not been included in this study. For this study it would have been helpful to have demonstrated that Pakistan is not deriving unqualified benefits from the situation as it stands: harbouring that Taliban has had huge costs on Pakistan, including the emergence of a new generation of radical Pakistani Islamist movements. It will be for future studies to focus on the effects of transnational insurgents on host states.

I believe the conflict in Afghanistan is solvable if the main actors are correctly identified and their demands are accommodated in a realistic peace settlement. This would of course mean that the Afghan government and its international partners give huge concessions to Taliban and their extraterritorial sympathizer – Pakistan.

CEU eTD Collection

CEU eTD Collection

Appendix A

Box 1: Known active members of the Quetta Shura

The list below consists of the known members of the Quetta Shura. There may be additional members who are not listed, while some leaders on this list may no longer be on the shura.

• **Hafiz Abdul Majeed** is the current leader of the Quetta Regional Military Shura. He served as the Taliban's intelligence chief.
• **Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund** was the governor of Kandahar and the Minister of Foreign Affairs during Taliban rule in Afghanistan.
• **Mullah Mohammad Hassan Rehmani** is considered to be very close to Mullah Omar, and has been described as his 'shadow'. He was the governor of Kandahar province during the reign of the Taliban.
• **Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir** is the head of the Gerdi Jangal Regional Military Shura (Helmand and Nimroz provinces) and the Taliban's 'surge' commander in the South. Zakir is a former detainee of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility in Cuba.
• **Agha Jan Mohtasim** is the former Finance Minister during the Taliban regime and the son-in-law of Mullah Omar. Mohtasim is a close confidant of Omar and thought to be a possible successor to Mullah Baradar.
• **Amir Khan Muttaqi** is the chief of the Information and Culture Committee.
• **Siraj Haqqani** is the leader of the Miramshah Regional Military Shura and the commander of the Haqqani Network. He is also the Taliban's regional governor of Paktika, Paktia, and Khost.
• **Mullah Mohammad Rasul** was the governor of Nimroz province during the reign of the Taliban.
• **Gul Agha Ishakzai** is the chief of the Finance Committee. He served as Mullah Omar's personal financial secretary and was one of Omar's closest advisers.
• **Abdul Latif Mansur** is the commander of the Abdul Latif Mansur Network in Paktika, Paktia, and Khost. He serves on the Miramshah Shura and was the former Minister of Agriculture for the Taliban regime. Mansur is thought to lead the Peshawar Regional Military Shura.
• **Mullah Abdur Razzaq Akhundzada** is the former corps commander for northern Afghanistan. He also served as the Taliban regime's Interior Minister.
• **Maulvi Hamdullah** is the Taliban representative for the Gulf region. Hamdullah is considered to have been since 1994 one of Mullah Omar's closest aides. In addition, Hamdullah led the Finance Department in Kandahar during Taliban rule from 1994 until November 2001.
• **Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Mansour** is the former Minister of Civil Aviation and Transportation, and former shadow governor of Kandahar who is considered to be a possible successor to Baradar.
• **Maulvi Qudratullah Jamal** runs an investigative committee that deals with complaints from Afghan citizens against local Taliban personnel. Jamal also operates as a liaison to the Taliban's global supporters. He served as the Taliban's chief of propaganda from 2002-2005.
• **Maulvi Aminullah** is the Taliban commander for Uruzgan province.
• **Mullah Abdul Jalil** is the head of the Taliban's Interior Affairs Committee.
• **Qari Talha** is the chief of Kabul operations for the Taliban.
• **Sheikh Abdul Mana Niyazi** is the Taliban shadow governor for Herat province.

CEU eTD Collection

Source: The Long War Journal, accessed 23 April, 2012

CEU eTD Collection

Appendix B

List of interviews I conducted:

Abdul Suboh Faizy, Email Interview, former advisor to ISAF civilian chief in Afghanistan and current special advisor to Center for Internaitonal and Strategic Analysis, on 9th May 2012

AQ, Email interview with staff of an international organization in Kabul who wished to remain anonymous 17 May 2012

Hashim Alavi, Phone Interview with Sayyid Alavi former UN political officer and current head of Jehad Danish Cultural Association, 13 May 2012.

Idrees Rahmani, Email Interview with Rahmani from RAND Corporation 4th May 2012

Kanishka Bakhshi, Email Interview, senior political officer at US embassy in Kabul on 5 May 2012

Michael Semple, Email Interview, former Deputy EU special representative for Afghanistan and current Fellow at Carr Center for Human Rights, Harvard University, 21 May 2012

Mirwais Rahimzai, Interview in Budapest, MD, MBA, MPH (USA), Chief of Party/ (Country Director) University Research Co/(CHS) Health Care Improvement Project/USAID Afghanistan 20th April 2012 in Budapest

CEU eTD Collection

Najla, Email Interview with staff of an International Organization in Kabul, Afghanistan on 13 May 2012

Sayyid Najibullah Hashimi, Email Interview, the head of Hindokosh News Agency (Afghanistan), Email Interview, 15 April 2012

Interviews with Taliban members conducted by Nader:

[I used to work with Nader Omar at the same organization – Japan International Cooperation Agency, in Afghanistan. I was based in Kabul and Nader worked for the Kandahar office. In 2007 he moved on to United Nations Kandahar Office. He not only is a Pashtun and comes from Kandahar province but has maintained a huge network of friends and contacts both on the Afghan government side and the Taliban. I chose Nader for this task because of his past experience in the region and competence. Although the Taliban insurgents have not asked for anonymity but Nader believes that they use aliases to protect themselves.]

Mulla Sadiq – group commander in Helmand Province

Mulla Abdul Akhund – district commander in Panjwayee, Kandahar

Mulla Mansour Akhund – in charge of a commission in Helmand – Kandahar – Uruzgan

Mulla Yahya – From Helmand, mid-level fighter and logistics coordinator in Helmand province

CEU eTD Collection

REFERENCE LIST

Abbasi, M. J. and D. Glazebrook, 2006, "Continued Protection, Sustainable Reintegration: Afghan Refugees and Migrants in Iran", *AREU* [Online] http://areu.org.af/EditionDetails .aspx?EditionId=138&ContentId=7&ParentId=7&Lang=en-US [Accessed on 21 April 2012]

Abbasi-Shavazi, M. J, D. Glazebrook, G. Jamshidiha, H. Mahmoudian, and R. Sadeghi, 2005, "Return to Afghanistan? A Study of Afghans Living in Tehran, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Tehran", *AREU*, [Online] http://www.areu.org.af/EditionDetails.aspx?EditionId=127&ContentId=7&ParentId=7&Lang=en-US [Accessed on 17 May 2012]

Adamson, Fiona, 2006, Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security, International Security 31 (1): 165-99

ANSO (2012) 'Quarterly Data Report' [Online] Available from: http://www.ngosafety.org/store/files/ANSO%20Q4%202011.pdf [Accessed on 15 January 2012]

Asia Foundation (2007) 'Afghanistan in 2007: A Survey of the Afghan People' [Online] Available from: http://asiafoundation.org/pdf/AG-survey07.pdf [Accessed on 02 March 2012]

Bajoria Jayshree, 2009, "The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border", Council on foreign relations, [Online] http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/troubled-afghan-pakistani-border/p14905 [Accessed on 21 April 2012]

Bapat Navin A, 2011, "Transnational terrorism, US military aid, and the incentive to misrepresent", , *Journal of Peace Research* 2011 48: 303 originally published online 8 April 2011

Baudienville Geraldine and Davin Eric, 2008, "AID EFFECTIVENESS IN AFGHANISTAN PAPER PREPARED FOR THE PARIS CONFERENCE" *Commissioned by the French Government* Altai Consulting, [Online] http://www.altaiconsulting.com/docs/development-strategy/Altai%202008%20Paris%20Conference.pdf [Accessed on 21 April 2012]

Bayman et al. (2001) 'Trends in outside support for insurgent movemennts', RAND, [Online] Available from: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1405.pdf [Accessed on 19 May 2012]

Bayman, Daniel, 2005, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

BBC Persian, 2011, 'Forgetting Taliban was a mistake' [Online] Available from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/2011/12/111201_k01_bonn2_brahimi_iv.shtml [Accessed on 17 March 2012]

BBC Persian, 2012a 'Francesc Vendrell: We shouldn't have supported the warlords' [Online] Available from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/2011/12/111201_k01_bonn2_vendrell_iv.shtml [Accessed on 21 April 2012]

CEU eTD Collection

BBC, 13 May 2012, "Afghan peace negotiator Arsala Rahmani shot dead", [Online] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18049265 [Accessed on 21 April 2012]

Bennet, M, 2005, Border Security – One step toward resolving the conflict in Iraq, Air University, [Online] http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA476200 [Accessed on 13 May 2012]

Black, I. and Borger, J. (2010) 'Pakistan arrest put stop to Taliban' [Online] *Guardian*, Available from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/18/pakistan-arrests-taliban-un-envoy [Accessed on 15 April 2012]

Blood, P. R., 1994, Pakitan: A Country Study. Federal Research Division. Library of Congress, [Online], http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/pktoc.html, [Accessed on 17 March 2012]

Boone, J. (2011) 'Taliban stay quite on killing of former Afghanistan president Rabbani. [Online] available from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/21/taliban-stays-quiet-rabbani-assassination [Accessed on 31 May 2012]

Borger, J, 3 January 2012, "Taliban to open political office in Qatar", [Online] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/03/taliban-open-political-office-qatar [Accessed on 13 May 2012]

Borger, J. (2010) 'UN in secret peace talks with Taliban' [Online] *Guardian*, Available from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/28/taliban-united-nations-afghanistan [Accessed on 15 April 2012]

Bovingdon, G. 2002, "The Not-So-Silent Majority: Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang", *Modern China*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp. 39-78

Brasseur Brad L., 2011, "Recognizing the Durand Line, A Way Forwa rd for Afghanistan and Pakistan?", East West Institute, [Online] http://www.ewi.info/recognizing-durand-line-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan [Accessed on 07 May 2012]

Brasseur, Brad, 2011, Recognizing the Durand Line, East West Institute, Online, http://www.ewi.info/recognizing-durand-line-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan [Accessed on 21 April 2012]

Búrca, Aoibhín de, 2009, Webpapers on Constitutionalism & Governance beyond the State, Suicide Missions: the 'political opportunity structure' and constraints of constituency (University College Dublin), Year 2009 | No 1

Byman et al. 2001, "*Trends in Outside Support for insurgent Movements*, RAND, [Online] http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1405.pdf [Accessed on 07 May 2012]

Carment, David and James Patrick, 1995, Internal Constraints and Interstate Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Crisis-Based Assessment of Irredentism. Journal of Conflict Resolution 29 (1): 82 – 109

Chazan, Naomi, ed, 1991, Irredentism and Internaitonal Politics, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner

CNN, 19 May 2012, "Hollande sticking to Afghanistan withdrawal by year's end", [Online] http://edition.cnn.com/2012/05/18/us/france-afghanistan/index.html?hpt=hp_t3 [Accessed on 07 May 2012]

CEU eTD Collection

Cohen, M. (2011) U.S. Must Accommodate Pakistan's Interest in Afghanistan, World Politics Review [Online] Available from: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/print/7568 [Accessed on 05 May 2012]

Collier Paul 2007, Poverty Reduction in Africa, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, University of Oxford http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/pdfs/PovertyReductionInAfrica.pdf [Accessed 15 April 2012].

Collier, Paul , Anke Hoeffler and Cathy Pattillo, 'Africa's exodus: Capital flight and the brain drain as portfolio decisions', Journal of African Economies, Vol. 13 (2), pp. ii15-ii54, 2004.

Collier, Paul and Hoeffler Anke, 2006, Shocks and Growth: Adaptation, Precaution and Compensation, Department of Economics, Oxford University, (Online) http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/pdfs/Shocks-n-GrowthAdaptation.pdf [Accessed 15 April 2012].

Comras, V. D., 2010, *Flawed Diplomacy: The United Nations and the War on Terrorism.* Potmac Books Inc.

Cunningham, David, 2006, Veto Players and Civil War Duration, American Journal of Politcal Science 50 (4):875 – 92

Danreuther R. and L. March (eds) 2010, *Russia and Islam: State, society and radicalism* (Routledge)

Diehl P. and Goertz, G. (2001) War and peace in international rivalry, University of Michigan Press, United States

Doronsoro Gilles, 2009, "Taliban's winning strategy", [Online] http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf [Accessed on 17 May 2012]

Dressler J and Forsberg C, 2009, "The Quetta Shura Taliban in Southern Afghanistan", [online] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/QuettaShuraTaliban_1.pdf [Accessed on 07 May 2012]

Dressler, J. A. (2009) Security Helmand, Institute for the Study of War, [Online] Available from: http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/SecuringHelmandPDF.pdf [Accessed on 02 May 2012].

Epstein and Kronstadt, 2012, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, Congressional Research Service, [Online] http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41856.pdf [Accessed on 17 May 2012]

Epstein, S. B. (2012) Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistances, Congressional Research Service [Online] Available from: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41856.pd [Accessed on 23 May 2012].

Fearon, J. D. (1995) Rationalist Explanations for War. *International Organization*, 49 (3), pp. 379-414.

Fearon, J.D. (1999) *Why ethnic politics and prk tend to go together* [WWW] Available from : http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/papers/Pork.pdf [Accessed 15 April 2012].

Ferguson James, 2010, Taliban: the unknown enemy, Da Capo Press, Great Britain

CEU eTD Collection

Fox, J. (1997) Nationalism and Ethnic Politics: The salience of religious issues in ethnic conflict: A large N- Study, 3 (3), pp. 1-19.

Fox, J. (2000) The Journal of Conflict Studies: The Effects of Religious Discrimination on Ethno-Religious Protest and Rebellion, XX (1), pp. 1-20.

Foxley Tim, 2007 "The Taliban's propaganda activities: how well is the Afghan insurgency communicating and what is it saying?" A SIPRI Project Paper [Online] http://www.sipri.org/research/conflict/publications/foxley [Accessed on 17 March 2012]

Gall C. and Mekhennet S., 16 February 2010, "Taliban Arrest May Be Crucial for Pakistanis', *The New York Times,* [Online] http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/17/world/asia/17intel.html [Accessed on 21 April 2012]

Ghufran, N. (2008) Afghanistan in 2007: A Bleeding Wound. *Asian Survey, University of California Press,* 48 (1), pp. 154-163.

Giovanni Janine di, 2008, Pakistan's Phantom Border, online, http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/07/pakistan200807 [Accessed on 28 April 2012]

Giustozzi A. 2010, "Negotiating with the Taliban", [online] http://tcf.org/publications/2010/6/pb716 [Accessed on 02 May 2012]

Giustozzi Antonio and Reuter Christoph, 2011, "The Insurgents of the Afghan North" [Online] http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/AAN-2011-Northern-Insurgents.pdf [Accessed on 07 May 2012]

Giustozzi et al, 2009, Decoding the new Taliban, Columbia University Press, New York

Giustozzi, A. (2010) Between Patronage and Rebellion Student Politics in Afghanistan, *Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.* [Online] Available from: http://www.areu.org.af/EventDetails.aspx?EventId=12&contentid=9 [Accessed on 02 May 2012].

Giustozzi, A. (2010) The Riddle of Negotiations in Afghanistan. [Online] Available from: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2010/07/16/the-riddle-of-negotiations-in-afghanistan/ [Accessed on 18 April 2012].

Giustozzi, Antonio and Orsini, Dominique, 2009, *Centre-periphery relations in Afghanistan: Badakhshan between patrimonialism and institution-building. Central Asian survey,* 28 (1). pp. 1-16.

Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede and Andrea *Ruggeri. 2010.* Political Opportunity Structures, Democracy, and Civil War. Journal of Peace Research 47(3): 299-310.

Goodson, L.P. (2001) Afghanistan Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban. University of Washington Press.

Goodwin, Jeff. 2001. No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Grare Frédéric and Maley William, 2011, "The Afghan Refugees in Pakistan" Middle east institute, foundation pour la recherché strategique, [Online] http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/Afghanistan/09_grare.php [Accessed on 21 April 2012]

CEU eTD Collection

Gurr, T. R. (1970) Why Men Rebel? *Princeton University Press.*

Hardin, Russel, 1995, One for All: The logic of Group Conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Harpviken, B., 2008, "From "Refugee Warriors" to "Returnee Warriors" Militant Homecoming in Afghanistan and Beyond", Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW)

Harpviken, Kristian Berg; Astri Suhrke & Arne Strand, 2004. 'Afghan Refugees in Iran: From Refugee Emergency to Migration Management', *CMI Policy Brief*. Bergen/Oslo [Online] http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Research-and-Publications/Publication/?oid=164492 [Accessed on 13 May 2012]

Hechter, M. (1996) Ethnicity and Rational Choice Theory. In: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A.D. (eds.) *Ethnicity.* Oxford University Press. pp. 90 – 97.

Hempel, L. (2004) International Journal of Comparative Sociology: What's It Worth to You? The Questionable Value of Instrumentalist Approaches to Ethnic Identification, 45 (3-4), pp. 253 – 275.

Herbst, Jeffrey, 2000, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Horowitz Donald, 1985, Ethnic groups in conflict, University of California Press, USA

Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A.D. (eds.) (1996) *Ethnicity.* Oxford University Press.

IBP USA, 2011, *Afghan Diplomatic Handbook* . International Business Publication, USA.

IBP USA, 2011, Russian Investment, Economic, Ecological and Business Risk Atlas. International Business Publication, USA.

ICG (2007) Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Baluchistan. *International Crisis Groups.* [Online] Available from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/b69_pakistan__the_forgotten_conflict_in_balochistan.pdf [Accessed on 18 May 2012].

ICG, 2006, PAKISTAN'S TRIBAL AREAS: APPEASING THE MILITANTS, Online, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/125_pakistans_tribal_areas___appeasing_the_militants.ashx [Accessed on 21 May 2012]

ICG, 2008, "TALIBAN PROPAGANDA: WINNING THE WAR OF WORDS?" [Online] http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/158-taliban-propaganda-winning-the-war-of-words.aspx [Accessed on 21 April 2012]

International Boundary Study, May 1, 1969, Afghanistan – China Boundary, No. 89 – [Online] http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/limitsinseas/IBS089.pdf [Accessed on 13 May 2012]

International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Global Migration and Transnational Politics Working Paper no. 5, [Online] http://www.prio.no/Research-and-Publications/Publication/?oid=181639 [Accessed on 07 May 2012]

Jean Wood Elisabeth, 2003, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador, Cambridge University Press, New York

Johnson and Mason 2006, "Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan", [Online]

CEU eTD Collection

http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/docs/pubs/understanding%20the%20taliban%20and%20insurgency%20in%20afghanistan.pdf [Accessed on 21 April 2012]

Johnson, C. and Leslie, J. (2004) *Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace.* Zed Books London . New York.

Johnson, T, 2007, The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnahah (night letters), Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 18, No. 3, 317 – 344, September 2007

Johnson, T. H. (2007) On the Edge of the Big Muddy: the Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan. [Online] Available from: http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Pubs/Johnson_CEFQ_May%2007.pdf [Accessed on 03 May 2012].

Jones Seth G., 2008 "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency State Failure and Jihad, *International Security"*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring 2008), pp. 7–40

Jones, S. G. (2008) Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, RAND, [Online] Available from: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG595.html [Accessed on 12 May 2012]

Kahler, Miles and Walter Barbara, eds. 2006, Territoriality and Conflict in an era of Globalization, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

Kaldor, Mary, 1999, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Kaufman, S.J. (2001) *Modern Hatreds*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London.

Keling et al, 2010, "Taliban: How it Emerged and why U.S and Pakistan Failed?" The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences Volume 5, Number 5, 2010

Kitschelt Herbert P. 1986, Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies, British Journal of Political Science (1986), 16 : pp 57-85

Kuchins et al, 2009, "The Northern Distribution Network and the Modern Silk Road", CSIS, [Online], http://csis.org/files/publication/091217_Kuchins_NorthernDistNet_Web.pdf, [Accessed on 21 April 2012]

Lafraie, 2009, "Resurgence of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan: How and why?" [Online] http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/JIRD_ResurgenceOfTaliban_Afghanistan.pdf [Accessed on 07 May 2012]

Lake, David and Rothchild Donald, eds. 1998, The international Spread of Ethnic Conflict, Princepton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Lamb, R. D. (2010) 'Afghanistan's National Consultative Peace Jirga' [Online] Available from: http://csis.org/publication/afghanistans-national-consultative-peace-jirga-0 [Accessed on 03 February 2012]

Lischer Sarah Kenyon, 2006, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press

Livingston, I. S. and O'Hanlon, M. (2012) 'Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan' [Online] Available from: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index.pdf [Accessed on 26 April 2012]

CEU eTD Collection

Lo, B. (2004) The Long Sunset of Strategic Partnership. *International Affairs*, 80(2), 295-309.

Loescher, Gil, 1993, Beyond charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Lyons, Terrence. 2006, Diasporas and Homeland conflict. In Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization, edited by Kalher and Walter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

MacCulloch, Robert, 2004, The impact of income on the Taste for Revolt. American Journal of Political Science 48 (4): 830-48

MacDonald Norine, 2010, "Afghanistan Transition Missing Variables", ICOS, [Online] http://www.icosgroup.net/static/reports/afghanistan_transition_missing_variables.pdf [Accessed on 13 May 2012]

Margesson R., 2007, "Afghan Refugees: Current Status and Future Prospects", CRS report for congress [Online] http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33851.pdf [Accessed on 07 May 2012]

Masadykov, T et al. (2010) *Negotiating with the Taliban: toward a solution for the Afghan conflict. Crisis States Research Centre*, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK [Online] Available from: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28117/ [Accessed on 20 May 2012].

Mason, David and Krane Dale, 1989, The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror. Internaitonal Studies Quarterly 33 (2), 175 – 98

Mason, David et al, 1999, Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars. Political Research Quarterly 52 (2): 239 - 68

McAdam, D. (2006) "Collective Action," in George Ritzer (ed.) *Encyclopedia of Sociology.* Blackwell Press.

Midlarsky, Manus, ed, 1992, The Internationalization of Communal Strife. New York: Routledge

Motlagh Jason, 2006, "Taliban, Take Two, the American Conservative", [Online] http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5035261407 [Accessed on 21 April 2012]

Munoz, 2012, "U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001–2010", Rand, [Online] http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1060.pdf [Accessed on 21 April 2012]

Murshed, Mansoob and Gates Scott, 2005, Spatial-Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal. Review of Development Economics 9 (1), 121 -34

Myman, D. (2007) Understanding Proto-Insurgencies. RAND Corporation, [Online] Available from: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2007/RAND_OP178.pdf [Accessed on 09 May 2012].

Naumkin, V., 2003, Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, University of California, Berkeley

CEU eTD Collection

Nelson, D. 15 May 2012, "Taliban infighting over US talks breaks down into terror campaign" [Online] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9267433/Taliban-infighting-over-US-talks-breaks-down-into-terror-campaign.html [Accessed on 17 May 2012]

OECD, 2006, "Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration: Afghanistan", [Online] http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/10/38949502.pdf [Accessed on 07 May 2012]

O'Hanlon, M. (2010) Staying Power: The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan beyond 2011, *Foreign Affairs*, [Online] Available from: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66551/michael-ohanlon/staying-power [Accessed on 03 April 2012].

Olson, Mancur, 2001, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships. New York: Basic Books

Petersen, Brita, 2011, A Study of Pakistan's Interests in Afghanistan: Fear and Prejudice, Online, http://www.boell.org/web/142-841.html [Accessed on 21 May 2012]

Pounds Nick, 2006, "Where does the money go? – A study on the flow of aid to NGOs in Afghanistan", Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, unpublished

Rabasa, A. et al, 2011, "From insurgency to Stability", Rand, [Online] http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1111.1.pdf [Accessed on 13 May 2012]

Rais, R. B., 2009, Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity, and the State in Afghanistan. Lexington Books.

RAND, "The Taliban and Afghanistan's refugees" [Online], http://www.fathom.com/course/21701739/session4.html, Accessed on 13 May 2012

Rashid, A. (2007) Letter from Afghanistan: Are the Taliban Winning? (Online) http://www.oakton.edu/user/2/emann/ASIA140/CurrentHistoryPDFs/LetterFromAfghanistan.pdf [Accessed on 15 March 2012]

Reagon, Partick, 2000, Civil Wars and foreign Poers: interventions and intrastate Conflict. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press

Rice, Susan, 2003, The New National Security Strategy: Focus on Failed States. Bookings Institution Policy Brief, No. 116

Roberts Rebecca, 2010, Reflections on the Paris Declaration and Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan, Areu, [Online] http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1013E-Reflections%20on%20the%20Paris%20Declaration%20and%20Aid%20Effectiveness%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf [Accessed on 07 May 2012]

Roggio, B. (2010) The Afghan Taliban's top leaders, [Online] Available from: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/02/the_talibans_top_lea.php#ixzz1vqEkMOSM [Accessed on 05 April 2012]

Rotberg Robert, 2002 "Failed States in a World of Terror," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 4, (July/August 2002): 127-141;

Rubin, B. , 2009, *Guide to Islamist Movements* . M.E. Sharpe, Inc.

Rubin, Barnett R, 2007, "Saving Afghanistan" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, Issue 1

CEU eTD Collection

Rumer, E. et al., 2007, Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow and Beijing. M.E. Sharpe, Inc.

Ruttig Thomas, 2009, "The Other Side" AAN, [Online] http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/200907%20AAN%20Report%20Ruttig%20-%20The%20Other%20Side.PDF [Accessed on 13 May 2012]

Ruttig, Thomas. 2009b. 'The Haqqani Network as an autonomous entity' in A. Giustozzi (ed) *Decoding the New Taliban: insights from the Afghan field'*. London: C. Hurst & Co.

Saideman, Stephen. 2002, Discrimination in International Relations: Analyzing External Support for Ethnic Groups. Journal of Peace Research 39 (1):27 – 50

Sakwa R., 2004, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, (Routledge)

Salehyan Idean, 2008, No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International Conflict University of North Texas, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 70, No. 1, January 2008, Pp. 54–66

Salehyan Idean, 2008, The Externalities of Civil Strife: Refugees as a Source of International Conflict University of North Texas, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 52, No. 4, October 2008, Pp. 787–801, online, http://www.cas.unt.edu/~idean/RefugeesWar.pdf [Accessed on 24 April 2012]

Salehyan Idean, 2009, Rebels without Borders: Transnational insurgencies in World Politics, Cornell University Press, USA

Salehyan Idean, 2010, "TRANSNATIONAL INSURGENCIES AND THE ESCALATION OF REGIONAL CONFLICT: LESSONS FOR IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN" [Online] http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub971.pdf [Accessed on 07 May 2012]

Salehyan, I. (2008) The Externalities of Civil Strife: Refugees as a Source International Conflict, *University of North Texas, Journal of Political Science*, 52 (4), pp. 787 – 801.

Salehyan, Idean, and Gleditsch Kristian, 2006, Refugees and the Spread of Civil War. International Organization 60 (2):335-66

Sandler, Todd, 2003, Collective Action and Transnational Terrorism, The World Economy 26 (6): 779-802

Scherrer, Christian, 2002, Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, mass Violence and Regional War. Westport, CT: Praeger

Schilling 1970, "Analytic Model of Border Control", RAND Publication, [Online] http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM6250.html [Accessed on 07 May 2012]

Schmidt, Farhana, 2010, From Islamic Warriors to Drug Lords:The Evolution of the Taliban Insurgency, *Mediterranean Quarterly* 21:2

Schwennicke, C. (2010) 'Why Nato Should Withdraw from Afghanistan' [Online] Spiegel. Available from: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,708850,00.html [Accessed on 06 January 2012]

Semple Michael, 2012, The Revival of the Afghan Taliban 2001-2011, online, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/research/2012/Semple_ArticleOrientII_2012.pdf, [Accessed on 25 May 2012]

CEU eTD Collection

Semple, M. (2010) Reconciliation in Afghanistan. USIP, USA

Sheffer, Gabriel, 2003, Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad, New York: Cambridge University Press

Shelly, Louise, 1995, Ethnic Diasporas and US Foreign Policy. Political Science Quarterly 109:811-42

Siddique, Qandeel, 2011, PAKISTAN'S FUTURE POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN: A LOOK AT STRATEGIC DEPTH, MILITANT MOVEMENTS AND THE ROLE OF INDIA AND THE US, DIIS REPORT 2011, online, http://www.diis.dk/graphics/publications/reports2011/rp2011-08-pakistans-future-policy_web.pdf, [Accessed on 28 April 2012]

Sikkink, K. "Patterns of Dynamic Multilevel Governance and the Insider-Outsider Coalition." In Della Porta and Tarrow eds., Transnational Protest and Global Activism 2005: 151-173

Sinno, A. (2009) Explaining the Taliban's Ability to Mobilize the Pashtuns. In: Crew, R.D. and Tarzi, A. eds. *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan*. Harvard University Press. pp. 59 – 89.

Staniland Paul, 2005, Defeating transnational insurgencies: The best offense is a good fence, The Washington Quarterly, 29:1, 21-40

Stanley Wolpert, 1982, Roots of Confrontation in South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and the Superpowers (New York: Oxford University Press,)

Stedmann, John and Tanner Fred, 2003, Refugee manipulation: War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution

Stigter, Elca, 2005, *"Transnational Networks and Migration from Faryab to Iran"*, AREU, [Online] http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/504E-Migration%20from%20Faryab%20to%20Iran-CS-web.pdf [Accessed on 07 May 2012]

Stigter, Elca, *2005, "Transnational Networks and Migration from Herat to Iran"*, AREU, [Online] http://areu.org.af/EditionDetails.aspx?EditionId=120&ContentId=7&ParentId=7 [Accessed on 17 May 2012]

Tahir, M. (2006) Afghanistan- Turkmenistan: Blurred Borderlines. Institute for War and Peace.

Tarrow, Sidney, T. (1998) *Power in Movement: Second Edition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Tarrow, Sidney, T. (2011) *Power in Movement: Revised and Updated Edition*. Cambridge: Cambridge

Tarrow, Sidney, T. (2012) Strangers at the Gates: Movements and States in Contentious Politics,, Cambridge University Press

Tarzai, A. (2010) 'Recalibrating the Afghan Reconciliation Program' [Online] Available from: http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/prism1-4/Prism_67-78_Tarzi.pdf [Accessed on 03 April 2012]

Terry Fiona, 2002, Condemned to Repeat?: The Paradox of Humanitarian Action (Ithaca: Cornell University Press

CEU eTD Collection

The Fund for Peace (2011) 'Country Profiles: Pakistan, Failed States Index 2011' [Online] Available from: http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=states-pakistan [Accessed on 06 May 2012]

The Fund for Peace (2011) 'Failed States Index 2011' [Online] Available from: http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/library/cr-11-14-fs-failedstatesindex2011-1106q.pdf [Accessed on 05 May 2012]

Tilly, Charles, 1978, From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Traynor, I. (2010) 'Nato maps out Afghanistan withdrawal by 2014 at Lisbon summit' [Online] The Guardian. Avaialble from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/20/nato-afghanistan-2014-withdrawal-lisbon [Accessed on 05 January 2012]

Turton, David, and Peter Marsden, 2002, Taking Refugees for a Ride? The Politics of Refugee *Return to Afghanistan*, Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), [Online] http://www.areu.org.af/EditionDetails.aspx?EditionId=268&ContentId=7&ParentId=7 [Accessed on 21 April 2012]

UN (2011) The Situation in Afghanistan and its implication for peace and security. *General Assembly and Security Council.* [Online] Available from: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20S2006%20727.pdf [Accessed on 29 April 2012].

UNAMA, AFGHANISTAN ANNUAL REPORT 2011 PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT, Kabul, Afghanistan February 2012, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/20120204_afghan_civilians_deaths.pdf[Accessed 15 April 2012].

UNHCR (2009) Research study on cross border population movements between Afghanistan and Pakistan. *Altai Consulting* [Online] Available from: http://www.unhcr.org/4ad448670.html [Accessed on 08 May 2012].

University Press 2011

UNODC, 2008, "Illicit Drug Trends in Afghanistan", [Online] http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan//Opium_Surveys/Illicit_Drug_Trends_Report_Afg_13_June_2008.pdf [Accessed on 07 May 2012]

USIP, 2006, "Resolving the Pakistan- afghanistan Stalemate", [Online] http://www.cic.nyu.edu/afghanistan/docs/stalemate.pdf [Accessed on 13 May 2012]

Valeriano Brandon and Powers Matthew, 2011, "Complex Interstate Rivalries", [Online]http://tigger.uic.edu/~bvaler/Complex%20Interstate%20Rivals%20II%20version%20final%202011.doc [Accessed on 07 May 2012]

Vasquez, J. and C. S. Leskiw., 2001, "The Origins and War-proneness of International Rivalries." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4: 295-316.

Vendrell 2011, "Conference on Afghanistan", boellstiftung, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QsOAxW1p6fY&list=WL041219ABDE43E268&feature=mh_lolz [Accessed 15 May 2012].

Verma, 2011, *Indian Defence Review*. Indian Defence Review. [Online], http://www.indiandefencereview.com/author/Bharat-Verma/1 [Accessed on 12 March 2012]

CEU eTD Collection

Wahlstrom and Peterson, 2006, Between the State and the Market Expanding theC oncept of 'Political Opportunity Structure' Department of Sociology, University of Goteborg, Goteborg, Sweden, ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 2006

Waldman Matt, 2008, "Falling short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan", Acbar Advocacy Series, [Online] http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6B8F790E6E26231EC1257412004B5482-Full_Report.pdf [Accessed on 17 May 2012]

Waldman, M. (2010), Golden Surrender? The Risks, Challenges, and Implication of Reintegration in Afghanistan, *AAN* , [Online] Available from: http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=731 [Accessed on 03 May 2012].

Waldman, Matt (2010) *The sun in the sky: the relationship between Pakistan's ISI and Afghan insurgents*. Crisis States working papers series no.2, no. 18. Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Weber, Max, 1958, From Max Weber, Edited by Gerth and Mills, New York: Galaxy

Weitz, R, 2004, Storm Clouds over Central Asia: Revival of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)?, The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 27:505–530, 2004

Williamson, A. (1995) Beyond Violence: The Role of Voluntary and Community Action in Building a Sustainable Peace in Northern Ireland. University of Ulster, Northern Ireland

Witter D., 2011, "The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan & The Islamic Jihad union", Institute for the Study of War [Online] http://www.understandingwar.org/reference/fact-sheet-islamic-movement-uzbekistan-imu-islamic-jihad-union-iju [Accessed on 21 April 2012]

Wolff, S. (2006) *Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective.* Oxford University Press.

World Bank, 2005, "Afghanistan: Managing Public Finance for Development" [Online] http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/Resources/305984-1137783774207/afghanistan_pfm.pdf [Accessed on 07 May 2012]

World Bank, 2007, Review of Technical Assistance and Capacity Building in Afghanistan, Discussion paper for the Afghanistan Development Forum

Yoshikawa Lynn, 2010, "AFGHANISTAN: IN A TIME OF CONFLICT", refugees international, [Online] http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/field-report/afghanistan-time-conflict [Accessed on 13 May 2012]

Younès Kristèle and Duplat Patrick, 2008, "AFGHANISTAN: INVEST IN PEOPLE" Refugees international, [Online] http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/in-depth-report/afghanistan-invest-people [Accessed on 13 May 2012]

CEU eTD Collection