United We Stand, Divided We Fall:

Centralization in Nonviolent Civil Resistance

Movements.

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Abstract

This thesis examines how the level of centralization affects the outcome of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns. The findings of the statistical analysis show that campaigns led by a coalition or an umbrella organization are more likely to succeed than movements with other organizational structures, while spontaneous movements have lower chances to achieve political transformation. A detailed analysis of two cases of nonviolent resistance, Romania from 1987-1989 and Bulgaria in 1989, explores the casual mechanisms that link different levels of centralization to the outcome of nonviolent campaigns. It reveals that the existence of a strong coalition at the head of a nonviolent campaign enables the movement to conduct effective negotiations, prevents disruption of nonviolent discipline, and presents a viable political alternative once the previous regime falls. In contrast, the spontaneous character of a movement undermines its ability to conduct effective negotiations, maintain nonviolent discipline, and create a viable alternative on the political arena.

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Introduction

The 20th century was the bloodiest century in the history of mankind. Two world wars, decolonization, civil conflicts, terrorism and other acts of violence overshadow the cases of unarmed resistance that managed to achieve political transformations with limited casualties. However, even the less developed parts of the world with historically high levels of violence experienced a wave of unarmed insurrections in the last decade.

Despite the common misperception that military power is the most effective strategy against oppressive regimes, recent research in the field shows that nonviolent resistance campaigns are nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their violent counterparts.[1] The Solidarity movement in Poland, Otpor resistance in Serbia, the "People Power" campaign in the Philippines, "Diretas Ja" in Brazil, the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the most recent Arab Spring in the Middle East prove that nonviolent methods of struggle may be effective in unexpected places, including in brutally repressive polities.

However, such successful cases of nonviolent resistance are contrasted with numerous failed insurrections. Unarmed campaigns in Tibet, Palestine, Niger, Mexico, China, Burma, Belarus, and elsewhere show that nonviolent action should not be romanticized as the most simple and effective way of challenging oppression. Therefore, the question arises: how can we explain the divergent outcomes of nonviolent civil resistance? What makes one unarmed campaign successful compared to others?

Most studies of nonviolent action try to explain the effectiveness of an unarmed resistance campaign focusing on the strategic factor. Gene Sharp, Peter Ackerman, Jack DuVall and Kurt Schock argue that the clear articulation of a grand strategy and careful

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[1] Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

selection of nonviolent techniques distinguishes a successful campaign from a campaign that failed to achieve its goals.[2] However, no study has been undertaken that systematically examines the effect of organizational structure on the success of nonviolent civil resistance movements.

The main aim of this thesis is to investigate how the level of centralization affects the outcome of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns. The historical record shows that different campaigns have had different levels of centralization. Spontaneous insurgencies with no formal organizational structure, such as the Greek nonviolent movement against military rule in 1974, have the lowest level of centralization. Campaigns led by several groups, such as the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon or the "Diretas Ja" campaign against military rule in Brazil, were more organized but still lacked any central leadership. Campaigns led by an umbrella organization or a coalition of several organizations or parties, such as the People Power campaign in the Philippines, are characterized by higher levels of centralization. Finally, the most centralized are nonviolent resistance campaigns led by one party or organization with formal hierarchical structure, such as the Thai campaign against Thaksin Shinawatra's regime in 2005-2006 or the Greek campaign against Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis' regime in 1963.

The literature on social movements, namely the resource mobilization and political process branches, emphasizes the impact of organizational structure on the outcome of social movements. Marshall Ganz points out that "organizations differ in the likelihood they will develop effective strategy," meaning that differences in leadership and organizational structure may account for different strategic capacity of social movements.[3] Similarly,

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[2] Gene Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential*, (Boston: Porter Sargent, 2005); Peter Ackermann, Jack DuVall, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict*, (New York: Pagrave Publishers LTD, 2000); Kurt Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*, (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2005).
[3] Marshall Ganz, "Resources and Resourcefulness: Strategic Capacity in the Unionization of California Agriculture, 1959-1966," *American Journal of Sociology* 105:4 (January 2000), 1011.

according to Sidney Tarrow, certain organizational models are more likely to be successful than the others. He argues that "the most effective forms of organization are based on partly autonomous and contextually rooted local units linked by connective structures and coordinated by formal organizations."[4] Following the scholars of the political process approach, I will argue that campaigns should be centralized yet flexible enough to obtain maximal strategic capacity, maintain nonviolent discipline, be resilient in face of repression, and form sustained relationships with opponents and attract supporters.

The organizational structures that fit this model perfectly are an umbrella organization with horizontal leadership or a coalition of several organizations united under a common goal. Both these organizational types are characterized by diverse leadership and flexibility while providing participants with connective structures to construct a common identity and maintain a common strategy. Therefore, I will argue that nonviolent civil resistance movements led by an umbrella organization or coalition have better chances to succeed than spontaneous campaigns or campaigns led by an organization with a formalized hierarchical structure. This argument is consistent with my findings from statistical analysis of nonviolent campaigns between 1900 and 2006 and detailed case studies.

The structure of the thesis is as follows. The first chapter explains how the political process approach may help to eliminate the gap in nonviolent action scholarship regarding the level of centralization. The second chapter undertakes large-N statistical regression analysis of success of nonviolent civil resistance movements based on the database compiled by Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan.[5] The third chapter consists of detailed case studies of Romania 1987-1989 and Bulgaria 1989 analyzed through Mill's Method of Difference. The fourth chapter compares and contrasts the case study findings and derives conclusions about the effect of the level of centralization on the outcome of nonviolent civil resistance

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[4] Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 124.
[5] Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011.

campaigns. The findings from this study not only provide insight into variation in the trajectories of nonviolent resistance but also offer lessons that resistance movements' activists may consider in order to wage efficient unarmed struggle against oppressive regimes.

Chapter 1. Applying Social Movement Approaches to Address the Theoretical Gap in Nonviolent Action Literature

1.1 Nonviolent Action Literature versus Social Movement Literature

Existing literature on nonviolent action fails to account for organizational characteristics of movements as the determining factor of their success. Starting with Sharp, who established the theoretical foundation for nonviolent action back in the 1970s, scholars have tried to explain the success and failure of nonviolent campaigns through strategic capacity. Sharp, in his three-volume work *The Politics of Nonviolent Action,* takes a pragmatic approach to nonviolence, according to which activists should prefer nonviolent methods to violence not as a matter of principle but out of considerations of efficiency. Nonviolent civil resistance may prove more effective in achieving political and social change than violent methods of struggle.[6]

Sharp claims that the power of rulers is based on the obedience and cooperation that they receive from their subjects.[7] The aim of nonviolent action is to undermine the social roots of state power through certain methods. He divides these methods into three broad categories: methods of protest and persuasion, methods of noncooperation, and methods of nonviolent intervention. According to Sharp, strategic planning is the paramount factor for the success of nonviolent action. The methods should be implemented in an organized, disciplined, and continuous manner based on the specific context.[8]

Other scholars build on Sharp's ideas and provide descriptive accounts of nonviolent resistance campaigns in order to explain under which conditions resistance movements fail or succeed. Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall provide a detailed account of successful nonviolent

resistance movements thus testing Sharp's theoretical hypotheses concerning the factors that lead to successful outcome of nonviolent campaigns.[9] Kurt Schock follows the argument of strategic primacy and maintains that strategic factors explain different outcomes of nonviolent campaigns. Schock notes that factors such as tactical innovation, shifting between different methods of nonviolent action, and resilience distinguish a successful nonviolent civil resistance campaign from a campaign that fails.[10] Therefore, Schock like Ackerman, DuVall, and Sharp emphasizes the effect of strategic capacity on the outcome of nonviolent campaigns. However, they do not consider which endogenous factors contribute to different levels of such a crucial capacity.

Advocates of nonviolent action also emphasize the importance of loyalty shifts for success of nonviolent campaigns. Positive effect of loyalty shifts on the outcome of nonviolent civil resistance campaign has been argued by Hardy Merriman,[11] John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald,[12] Sharp,[13] and other nonviolent action scholars. Emergence of loyalty shifts weakens the pillars of support of the opponent while expanding the pillars of support of a nonviolent movement.[14] However, the presence of loyalty shifts cannot be a determinant of success by itself as it derives from the strategic capacity of the movement.

Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan in the book *Why Civil Resistance Works* conduct a large-N analysis of violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns and conclude that the major determinant of success of any nonviolent campaign is the number of participants. Higher levels of participation provide nonviolent movements with several mechanisms crucial for

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[9] Peter Ackermann, Jack DuVall, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict*, (New York: Pagrave Publishers LTD, 2000).

[10] Kurt Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).

[11] Hardy Merriman, "Theory and Dynamics of Nonviolent Action," in *Civilian Jihad. Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East*, Maria J. Stephan ,ed., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 17-29.

[12] John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, *Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

[13] Sharp.

[14] Merriman, 21.

their success, such as higher level of opposition resilience, tactical diversity, and innovations, the ability to produce loyalty shifts, and civic disruption.[15] Chenoweth and Stephan argue that nonviolent resistance campaigns prove to be more successful than violent campaigns because "nonviolent campaigns are more likely to attract higher levels of participation than violent campaigns because the barriers to participation are lower."[16]

Participation in nonviolent action does not require the same physical skills as participation in violent actions, as the range of tactics and measures in cases of nonviolence is much more diverse. Therefore, nonviolent movements are more likely to be joined by women, elderly populations, children, and people with disabilities. Besides physical barriers, nonviolent campaigns have lower moral barriers than violent actions. The unwillingness to commit violent acts against opponents may inhibit significantly the public's participation in violent movements. Nonviolent actions also have lower informational barriers (as nonviolent campaigns do not rely as much on underground clandestine activities as violent campaigns) and encounter fewer commitment problems.[17]

The argument that number of participants determines the outcome of nonviolent campaign is demonstrated by Chenoweth and Stephan through large-N analysis. The data confirms that "single unit increase of active participants makes a campaign over 10% more likely to achieve its ultimate outcome."[18]

Scholars of nonviolent action show how successful resistance movements use power to undermine their opponents and achieve their stated goals through nonviolent methods. However, by focusing on the strategic capacity and level of participation they fail to account for the endogenous characteristics that may affect these two parameters in the first place. Specifically, they do not address the question of movements' centralization and offer no

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[15] Chenoweth and Stephan, 10.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid, 32-39
[18] Ibid, 39-40

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systematic analysis of how different levels of centralization may affect the outcome of a campaign.

This gap in the scholarship of nonviolent action can be addressed by insights from the general literature on social movements. Nonviolent civil resistance could be seen as very specific forms of social movements based on the primacy of nonviolent resistance methods. Compared to social movement scholars, nonviolent civil resistance scholarship is primarily concentrated on popular challenges to government authority (campaigns against foreign occupants or oppressive regimes).[19] However, some broad approaches to social movements may help to illustrate how endogenous movements' characteristics affect the trajectories of nonviolent civil resistance.

Resource mobilization theory is an approach to social movements that pays considerable attention to leadership and the level of centralization in social movements. It gained prominence in the 1970s as a critique of the then-traditional theories of relative deprivation and collective behavior. The new perspective focused on institutionalized power relations, the rationality of actors, and strategic factors in social movements.[20] According to McCarthy and Zald, engagement in social conflict requires aggregation of resources.[21] Resources, critical to the success of a movement, may include money, time, organizational skills, media attention and external supporters, among others. Social movement organizations (SMO) are seen as carriers of social movements that are aimed at resource aggregation. McCarthy and Zald define a social movement organization as "a complex, or formal, organization that identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implements these goals."[22] Through SMOs people with similar beliefs and goals gather into groups, produce certain strategies and tactics, and create a

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[19] Schock, xvi.
[20] J. Craig Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1983): 528.
[21] McCarthy and Zald, 18.
[22] Ibid, 20.

basis for collective action. The efficiency of an organization is considered to be a key resource necessary for a social movement to be successful.

Supporters of the resource mobilization approach, however, pay excessive attention to centralized formal social movement organizations and disregard other models, such as umbrella organizations with horizontal leadership or coalitions. Therefore, to obtain a more balanced analysis of the role of the organizational structure in the success of social movements, I suggest turning to the political process approach.

The political process approach builds on resource mobilization theory and expands its theoretical focus. Emphasizing the importance of political opportunities and constraints, supporters of this approach argue that exogenous factors may affect the way people mobilize, prefer certain tactics and strategies over others, form alliances, and advance certain claims.[23] Changes in political opportunities and constraints provide openings that allow people to engage in contentious politics by strategically employing the model of collective action. Features of the political system provide movements with opportunities and constraints. Regime type is frequently claimed to be a determinant of success of social movements; democratic regimes are more constrained by normative, electoral, and institutional barriers, and are, thus, more open to different forms of contestation. In contrast, authoritarian regimes have fewer constraints and are more likely to respond to opposition with severe forms of repression.[24] However, the findings of Chenoweth and Stephan show that the overwhelming majority of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns emerged not in democracies, but in authoritarian regimes, and this did not affect their chances of success.[25]

Not only regime type but also the repressiveness of the regime may affect the outcome of a movement. There is no single view about the effect of regime crackdowns in nonviolent

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[23] David S. Meyer, «Protest and Political Opportunities», *Annual Review of Sociology* 30 (2004): 126.
[24] Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam.* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15.
[25] Chenoweth and Stephan, 66.

movements. Brian Martin argues that repression may decrease external support for the opponent and increase the internal solidarity of a campaign,[26] while Clifford Bob and Sharon Nepstad suggest that regime's backfiring may have a positive effect on public mobilization.[27] However, according to Chenoweth's study, violent regime repression reduces the likelihood of campaign success by nearly 35%.[28]

Additionally, there is a debate on whether a country's capabilities may be a predictor of the success of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns. Some scholars argue that regimes with access to a large number of resources are less likely to be defeated by oppositional movements.[29] Scholars of the asymmetrical warfare, however, empirically demonstrate that weak parties often achieve victory over powerful opponents.[30] Chenoweth and Stephan also prove that nonviolent campaigns have high chances to succeed regardless of the capabilities of the opponent state.[31]

Certain time periods may also provide people with structural openings. Chenoweth and Stephan suggest that campaigns that occurred in the end of the Cold War could be associated with a higher incidence of success due to the overrepresentation of successful pro-democratic movements during this period. However, their own statistical findings reveal that structural changes occurring during specific times did not have a systematic effect on the outcome of nonviolent campaigns.[32]

Finally, structural opportunities may include external factors such as international sanctions or external support. External state help may have both negative and positive effects on the outcome of nonviolent civil resistance campaign. On one hand, financial or strategic

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[26] Brian Martin, *Justice ignited: The Dynamics of backfire*, (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007).
[27] Clifford Bob and Sharon Nepstad, "Kill a Leader, Murder a Movement?" Leadership and Assassination in Social Movements. *American Behavioral Scientist* 50:10(June 2007), 1370-94.
[28] Chenoweth and Stephan, 68.
[29] Ivan Arreguín-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security* 26, № 1 (Summer 2001), 96.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Chenoweth and Stephan, 68.
[32] Ibid, 75.

assistance may help a movement to achieve its goals. For example, Otpor, the resistance movement in Serbia, received substantial funding from agencies linked to European governments and the United States. On the other hand, Daniel Byman claims that foreign support to the movement may complicate the strategic maneuverability of challengers.[33] Similarly, Chenoweth and Stephan point out that external state support may lead to a free-rider problem, delegitimize a campaign in the eyes of domestic population and drive away potential recruiters who are reluctant to act on behalf of a foreign state.[34] The effect of international sanctions on the outcome of campaigns is also highly controversial. According to David Cortright and Donald Seekings, international diplomatic pressure may harm the domestic population more than the targeted regimes.[35] Martin and Nikolay Marinov, in contrast, argue that international sanctions are often effective.[36]

The effect of structural opportunities and constraints on the outcome of resistance movements, thus, is more than ambiguous. Sidney Tarrow, one of the most prominent advocates of the political process approach, recognizes the importance of structural factors, but emphasizes that they alone cannot explain the success of social movements. He claims that "organizers use contention to exploit political opportunities, create collective identities, bring people together in organizations, and mobilize them against more powerful opponents."[37] The way people utilize the political openings depends on various factors, including the form of mobilizing structures. Mobilizing structures play an important role in channeling the collective action. Tarrow argues that the central dilemma for movement organizers lies in the creation of an organizational model that is robust enough to frame

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[33] Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
[34] Chenoweth and Stephan, 55.
[35] Donald M. Seekings, "Burma and US Sanctions: Confronting an Authoritarian Regime," *Asian Survey* 45:3 (May/June 2005), 438-441; David Cortright, "Powers of Persuasion: Sanctions and Incentives in the Shaping of International Society," *International Studies* 38:2 (April 2001), 115-120.
[36] Nikolay Marinov, "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?" *American Journal of Political Science* 49:3 (July 2005), 564-576; Martin, 2007.
[37] Tarrow, 3.

sustained relations with authorities and yet sufficiently flexible to allow informal ties that link participants and networks to coordinate and aggregate political action.[38] The problem with a centralized organization is that it may lose its capacity for disruption through permanent internalization of its base; however, the problem with a decentralized organization is that it may lack the infrastructure necessary to sustain a continuous interaction with authorities, allies, and supporters.[39] Therefore, a delicate balance between centralized organization and autonomy is required for a movement to succeed: "the most effective forms of organization are based on partly autonomous and contextually rooted local units linked by connective structures, and coordinated by formal organizations."[40]

Joint campaigning by coalitions of organizations often meets these criteria for organizational flexibility.[41] Coalitions or umbrella organizations with horizontal leadership provide connective structures that help to create a common identity among participants with different interests, preferences, and backgrounds. Such organizational structures allow each group to maintain control over its activities and "stress its particular interests and not feel lost in the crowd."[42] Once the goal of the campaign is achieved, the coalition or umbrella organization ceases to exist.

Marshall Ganz builds on the importance of flexibility of social movements' organizational models. He suggests that the type of organizational structure defines the strategic capacity of the social movement.[43] Comparing two agricultural unions in California, he argues that the different outcomes of these two campaigns could be explained by differences in their tactics and strategies, which in their turn could be explained through the differences in their strategic capacity. Strategic capacity measures the availability of

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[38] Ibid, 124.
[39] Ibid, 137.
[40] Ibid, 124.
[41] Ibid, 135.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ganz, 1003-1062.

important information about the situation, the ability to devise novel solutions using this information, and the level of participants' motivation. The level of strategic capacity of the social movement depends on the "leaders' life experience, networks, and repertoires of collective action and the deliberative processes, resource flows, and accountability structures of their organizations."[44] More democratic organizational structures that provide conditions for diverse ideas and democratic deliberation are more likely to produce a novel and effective solution to a strategic problem. Organizations with hierarchical accountability and bureaucratic leadership selection have lower strategic capacity than organizations with diverse leadership and mutual accountability.

Therefore, scholars of the resource mobilization and the political process approach emphasize the importance of endogenous factors, namely the level of centralization, for the success of a movement. Advocates of the nonviolent action approach, however, overlook the effect of such factors on a nonviolent movements' outcome. Kurt Schock and Robert Burrowes are two of the few nonviolent action scholars who observe that different levels of centralization may contribute to the successful struggle against oppressive regimes.

Kurt Schock attempts to apply the assumptions of political process theory to the domain of nonviolent action in his book *Unarmed Insurrections*. According to Schock, a successful nonviolent civil resistance movement must have two important characteristics. First, it must be able to survive repression; second, it must be able to undermine the power of the opponent.[45] Network-oriented organizational structures are more efficient for withstanding state repression than hierarchical organizational templates. Schock argues that in comparison to highly centralized hierarchical structures, "network-organized challenges are more flexible, are more adept at expanding horizontal channels of communication, are more likely to increase the participation and commitment of members and the accountability of leaders, are

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[44] Ibid, 1005.
[45] Schock, 49.

more likely to innovate tactically, and are more likely to weather repression."[46] Federations and umbrella organizations coordinate diverse groups and provide for broad and sustained participation that is necessary for nonviolent resistance campaigns to succeed. What is more, umbrella organizations operating on the national level coordinate activities on many levels without allocating resources to establishing the formal bodies of a centralized organization with a hierarchical structure.[47]

A similar argument is offered by Burrowes in his book *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense*. He suggests that a nonviolent resistance movement requires a decentralized and open leadership structure.[48] In hierarchical organizational structures, one or a few individuals are responsible for all leadership functions. They design a unified strategy of a campaign and authoritatively disseminate it further to lower levels. While a centralized leadership model may have certain advantages, decentralized leadership is preferable for nonviolent civil resistance movements. First, decentralized leadership encourages personal responsibility when people partake in decisions that have an effect on their lives. Second, decentralized leadership has distinct strategic advantages. A centralized movement may be fatally weakened once its leadership has compromised or been removed by the opponent while a decentralized campaign is more likely to survive after leaders have been rendered ineffective, arrested, or killed. Third, the creation of decentralized leadership structures is required in order to satisfy relational, psychological, and economic needs of all participants of a resistance movement. [49]

Though he emphasizes the advantages of decentralization, Burrowes acknowledges that decentralized groups require a certain degree of coordination.[50] Coordination may be performed through a federation, a network, or a demarchy. A federation is a coalition of

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[46] Ibid, 50.
[47] Ibid, 51.
[48] Robert Burrowes, *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense. A Gandhian approach*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 190.
[49] Ibid, 192.
[50] Ibid, 195.

several organizations united under a common goal but with each maintaining control over its own actions. Decision making in federations is usually performed through a federated council consisting of representatives from each participant organization. A network is less centralized and consists of numerous small groups that operate independently. According to Burrowes, for such a network to succeed it requires a facilitator, which is "a group that has no policy positions of its own but is responsible for facilitating communication, coordination, and resource gathering."[51] Compared to these two concepts that have proven to be efficient empirically, demarchy is a new concept that requires a formation of several representative group randomly selected from volunteers.

Schock and Burrowes merely touch on the importance of centralization for the success of nonviolent civil resistance movements without offering a systematic analysis of how different levels of centralization may affect divergence in campaigns outcomes; therefore, there is room for both theoretical and empirical study of this question. This research will provide insight into whether the level of centralization affects the efficiency of a nonviolent campaign, and if so, which organizational model contributes most to the successful outcomes of nonviolent resistance.

1.2 Level of Centralization in Nonviolent Civil Resistance Campaigns

The central argument of this thesis is that nonviolent civil resistance campaigns should have a certain level of centralization but, at the same time, be flexible enough to be resilient in face of repression, obtain maximal strategic capacity, attract supporters, maintain nonviolent discipline, and form sustained relations with opponents. A coalition of several groups/organizations/parties or an umbrella organization with horizontal leadership provides a sufficient level of centralization yet is characterized by the flexibility to achieve its goals. Therefore, I will argue that nonviolent civil resistance movements led by an umbrella

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[51] Ibid.

organization or a coalition have greater chances to succeed than spontaneous campaigns or campaigns led by a party or an organization with a formalized hierarchy.

Hypotheses

Coalitions and decentralized organizational structures are usually characterized by diverse leadership that increases the resilience and strategic capacity of the movement. According to Stevenson, Pearce and Porter, a coalition is "an interacting group of individuals, deliberately constructed, independent of the formal structure, lacking its own internal formal structure, consisting of mutually perceived membership, issue oriented, focused on a goal or goals external to the coalition, and requiring concerted member action."[52] Compared to centralized organizations, coalitions and decentralized organizations avoid a hierarchy of formal authority; thus, the decision making process in a coalition is usually performed by a group of members through an executive committee or rotating leadership. For example, the Alianza Democratica was a coalition that led the Chilean pro-democracy movement against Pinochet government in 1983-1989. This coalition, uniting Republicans, Radical, Social and Christian Democrats, and some Socialist oppositional factions, was headed by an executive committee with a monthly rotating presidency.[53] Other examples of coalitions leading nonviolent civil resistance movements include the National Democratic Coalition during the Nigerian revolt against military rule from 1993-1999 and the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy during the Pakistani pro-democracy movement against Zia ul-Huq in 1983.

Nonviolent campaigns led by a coalition or an umbrella organization have two discernible advantages compared to those campaigns led by a formal, hierarchical organization. First, such campaigns are more likely to withstand repression from regimes. In order to achieve the goal of political change, the movements must to be able to withstand

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[52] William B. Stevenson, Jone L. Pearce, and Lyman W. Porter, "The Concept of 'Coalition' in Organization Theory and Research," *The Academy of Management Review* 10:2 (April1985): 261.
[53] Heraldo Munoz, *The Dictator's Shadow: Life Under Augusto Pinochet*, (Basic Books, 2008), 145.

repression and refuse to submit or retreat.[54] Schock points out that hierarchical organizations often lack both the flexibility and strategic capacities to resist repression.[55] He argues that network-organized challengers are "more adept at expanding horizontal channels of communication, are more likely to increase the participation and commitment of members and the accountability of leaders, are more likely to innovate tactically, and are more likely to weather repression."[56]

Burrowes similarly notes that centralized campaigns have distinct strategic disadvantages when repression occurs. Once centralized leadership has been arrested or rendered ineffective, the nonviolent campaign might be seriously weakened or even disintegrate.[57] Burrowes argues that the advantages of horizontal leadership have been repeatedly demonstrated historically. For example, "The Mothers of the Plaza" campaign in Argentina continued to effectively undermine the state's power even after the violent arrest of its initial organizers. "Despite the kidnap and murder of a dozen women- including Azucena De Vicenti, the woman who started the movement- and the violent harassment and arrest of hundreds more, other women continued to effectively organize their various activity."[58] In contrast, the Nigerian Ogoni movement against government and corporate exploitation led by a centralized organization- The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People - fell apart after the execution of its chief leader, Ken Saro-Wiwa.[59]

Second, nonviolent campaigns led by a coalition or an umbrella organization with diverse leadership possess better strategic capacity. Strategic capacity is critical to the success of nonviolent civil resistance movements. According to Sharp, "if the resisters lack a strategy by which to wage the struggle with maximum effectiveness, their chances of succeeding are

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[54] Sharp 2005, 381.
[55] Schock, 50.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Burrowes, 193.
[58] Ibid, 194.
[59] Clifford Bob, "Political Process Theory and Transnational Movements: Dialectics of Protest among Nigeria's Ogoni Minority," *Social Problems* 49:3 (August 2002), 395-415.

greatly diminished."[60] The tactics and methods resisters choose should be implemented in the framework of the grand strategy in order to utilize the movements' strengths and strike at the opponents' vulnerabilities.

Strategic capacity may depend on a movement's level of centralization. Political process scholars, and Sidney Tarrow in particular, emphasize that certain organizational structures are more efficient at taking advantage of emerging political opportunities than other organizational models.[61] Criticizing the resource mobilization approach with its emphasis on highly centralized formal organizational models, he argues that "the dilemma of hierarchical movement organizations is that, when they permanently internalize their base, they lose their capacity for disruption…"[62]

Aldon Morris proposes a connection between diverse leadership and strategic capacity of a movement. According to him, "movements are more likely to succeed if they attract leadership teams with diverse backgrounds, skills and viewpoints."[63] Diverse leadership encourages innovations and creativity and therefore enhances the movements' possibility of success.[64] Ganz also argues in support of decentralized organizational forms with diverse leadership. He points out that "leadership teams that combine insiders and outsiders, strong and weak ties to constituencies, and diverse yet salient repertoires of collective action have greater capacity to develop effective strategy than those that do not."[65]

Additionally, campaigns led by a coalition or an umbrella organization have an important advantage over campaigns led by several groups, organizations, or parties as they provide necessary connective structures between participants with different backgrounds. The existence of connective structures in social movements is highly important as it allows the

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[60] Sharp, 43.
[61] Tarrow, 127.
[62] Ibid, 137.
[63] Aldon Morris and Suzanne Staggenborg, "Leadership in Social Movements," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, Snow David A., Soule Sarah A., Kriesi Hanspeter, ed. (Blackwell, 2004), 36.
[64] Ibid, 37.
[65] Ganz, 1015.

production of a common identity among people with different preferences and interests.[66] Ganz suggests that successful movements create shared commitments, understandings, values, interests, goals, and collaborative action among the members.[67] Strong ties between different resistance groups facilitate learning, motivation and mutual trust, while weak ties may lead to divergence of goals and lack of a grand strategy.[68] According to the definition of coalition provided by Stevenson *et al*, "Coalitions are considered to consist of members who communicate with one another about coalition issue(s) and potential coalition action."[69] What is more, they must take joint or orchestrated actions in order to be considered a coalition.

Therefore, communication and joint actions performed by members of different groups within the coalition facilitate the creation of ties and shared identities necessary for successful nonviolent action. Creation of such ties between separate groups not united in a coalition or umbrella organization is much more complicated. Supporting this argument, Burrowes claims that the lack of such ties and coordination between leaders of different groups led to the failure of the Chinese pro-democracy movement in 1989.[70] The absence of an umbrella organization resulted in the absence of general coordination and conflicts between leaders of small student organizations.

Assuming that coalitions and decentralized organizations with diverse leadership possess greater strategic capacity, are more likely to withstand repressions, and provide necessary connective structures between participants, Hypothesis 1 follows:

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[66] Tarrow, 124.

[67] Michelle Ganz, "Leading Change: Leadership, Organization, and Social Movements," in *Handbook of leadership theory and practic*e, Nitin Nohria and Raksesh Khurana, ed. (Harvard Business School Press, 2010), 514.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Stevenson, Pearce and Porter, 261.

[70] Burrowes 198.

H1: Nonviolent civil resistance movements led by a coalition or a party/organization
with horizontal leadership are more likely to succeed than movements with other levels of
centralization.

Spontaneous resistance movements have the lowest level of centralization and lack any organizational structure. Movements with spontaneous structure have two major disadvantages compare to the movements with higher level of organization. First, a well-defined organizational structure with recognizable leaders maintains nonviolent discipline. Sharp points out that effective organization within the resistance group contributes significantly to achieving and maintaining nonviolent discipline as "clear lines of command and communication can produce both general and specific instruction on behavior."[71]

Maintaining nonviolent discipline in turn is crucially important for a campaign to succeed. Sharp emphasizes its importance claiming that "the use of guns alongside a nonviolent struggle weakens the nonviolent struggle."[72] The introduction of violence may lead to a collapse of a movement, because it tends to provoke disproportionately harsh repression from the opponents and to undermine any sympathetic feelings for the resisters that may be emerging within the opponent group.[73] For example, the Burmese pro-democracy movement protest against military junta in 1988 was very close to toppling the government. However, due to the weak organizational structure and the lack of centralized leadership citizens responded to the military actions with violence, fighting back with stones and swords, killing several Military Intelligence Service agents and engaging in arson. As the result, the military regained control over the country, and the oppositional movement was brutally suppressed.[74]

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[71] Sharp, 393.
[72] Gene Sharp and Afif Safieh, "Gene Sharp: Nonviolent Struggle," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 17:1 (Autumn 1987), 46.
[73] Sharp, 2005, 390.
[74] Schock, 96-97.

Second, compared to spontaneous resistance, organizations and coalitions have a higher chance of being considered credible negotiating partners, raising the possibility of winning concessions. Sharp suggests that, in order to be successful in negotiations with the authority, "the potential resisters need to be well organized and relatively strong-the more organized and stronger the better."[75] Tarrow also emphasizes the shortcomings of completely decentralized movements with no organizational structure. Such an "anarchical countermodel" usually lacks infrastructure to uphold a sustained interaction with authorities, allies and external supporters.[76]

Therefore, assuming that spontaneity and the lack of organizational structure complicates the maintenance of nonviolent discipline and interactions with the authorities and allies, Hypothesis 2 follows:

H2: Spontaneous movements are less likely to succeed in nonviolent struggle than movements with more developed organizational structure.

1.3 Methodology

The goal of this study is to reveal whether the level of centralization plays a role in the success of a nonviolent civil resistance campaign. In order to achieve this goal, I divide my research in two parts. The first part will consist of a large-N statistical regression analysis of success of nonviolent civil resistance movements based on the database compiled by Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan.[77] The database consists of 323 campaigns emerging between 1900 and 2006, 106 of which are coded as non-violent. The analysis will be run on non-violent campaigns only, as this thesis does not aim to explore differences in success rates between violent and non-violent campaigns. In doing the analysis, I seek to establish a

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[75] Sharp, 371.
[76] Tarrow, 137.
[77] Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011.

correlation between levels of centralization of nonviolent campaigns (independent variables) and their outcome (dependent variable).

Independent variables of the level of centralization were coded manually based on multiple sources from the bibliography on nonviolent action compiled by April Carter, Howard Clark, and Michael Randle,[78] case studies from the Global Nonviolent Action Database,[79] and conflict narratives accompanying *Why Civil Resistance Works*.[80] In order to isolate the independent effect of organizational structure on the nonviolent movements' outcome, I control for intervening variables that can be expected to influence it. These include regime type, a simultaneous violent campaign, violence on the part of the regime, government capacity, external state support, and international sanctions.

Having established in large-N analysis that nonviolent movements led by an umbrella organization or a coalition have better chances to succeed while spontaneous movements are less likely to achieve their goals, the second part of this thesis will include in-depth case studies in order to identify causal processes that link the independent variables of these organizational models with the dependent variable of success of nonviolent civil resistance movements as suggested in the data analysis. These case studies were chosen from the list of cases used for the large-N analysis. The basis of the case selection is the variation of the independent and dependent variables. The first case, the Romanian campaign against the communist regime from 1987 to 1989, is characterized as spontaneous and failed to provide a nonviolent transformation. The second case, the Bulgarian campaign against the communist regime in 1989, is characterized by a higher level of centralization and achieved political change without bloodshed.

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[78] April Carter, Howard Clark and Michael Randle, *People Power and Protest since 1945: A Bibliography on Nonviolent Action,* (London: York Publishing, 2006).
[79] Global Nonviolent Action Database {Available at http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/}
[80] Erica Chenoweth, *Online Methodological Appendix Accompanying Why Civil Resistance Works*, (Wesleyan University, updated July 11, 2011), 38-141.

I have chosen to compare these cases because they meet the criteria for Mill's Method of Difference with several common characteristics. They both happen during the time period of 1980-1989 in the wave of peaceful democratic transitions in Eastern Europe. They had the same objective of regime change with the communist regime as a target; happened in the same region of the Eastern Europe and, were met with brutal regime repression; both regimes were authoritarian and received overt military help to fight the campaign. Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan would predict that the Romanian campaign would have greater chances to succeed as its peak membership is significantly higher: 100,000 participants versus 70,000 participants in Bulgaria. Sharp, Schock, Chenoweth and other nonviolent action scholars predict that the Romanian campaign also had a greater likelihood of success because the target's security forces defected during the conflict and no such defection was registered during Bulgarian pro-democracy movement. In spite of all that, the Romanian movement failed while the Bulgarian campaign succeeded.

Chapter 2. Quantitative Analysis

2.1 The dataset and the dependent variable

The dataset used for the empirical analysis was compiled by Chenoweth and Stephan and consists of 323 campaigns between 1900 and 2006. The unit of analysis is a campaign, defined as "a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective."[81] 106 out of 323 campaigns are coded as non-violent. Nonviolent campaigns are campaigns that rely primarily on nonviolent methods as opposed to armed or violent tactics.[82] Some of the nonviolent campaigns existed simultaneously with violent campaigns, which is reflected through the respective dichotomous variable ("VIOLSIM").

Following the argument of Chenoweth and Stephan, my research will focus on those most extreme forms of nonviolent resistance with three specific goals: antiregime, antioccupation and secession. Antiregime, antioccupation and secession movements provide a hard case for nonviolent scholarship because, compared to human rights, antiglobalization, and feminist movements, they are typically associated with violence on both sides. Four campaigns out of the 106 nonviolent campaigns were coded as having "other goals" and were excluded from the statistical model. The Chinese "Hundred Flowers Movement" was initiated by the government and was also excluded. Campaigns in Croatia in 1999-2000, Senegal in 2000, Slovakia 1989-1992, Ghana 2000, and Tanzania 1992-1995 lack available data on their level of centralization. Therefore, the statistical analysis included 96 campaigns that met the criteria of a non-violent campaign with the antiregime, antioccupation, and secession goals.

The dependent variable is the campaigns' outcome coded through an ordinal scale of failure ("0"), limited success ("1"), and success ("2"). A successful campaign had to satisfy the following conditions: the complete achievement of the claimed goals (antioccupation,

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[81] Online Methodological Appendix, 3.
[82] Ibid, 5.

regime change, or secession) within one year of the peak of activities and an apparent effect on the outcome (outcome as a discernible result of activities of a nonviolent campaign).[83] Ordinal scale of failure, limited success and success was used for analysis of correlations; however, following the argument of Chenoweth, a dichotomous indicator of success or failure was used for regression models to obtain meaningful coefficients.

2.2 The independent variables

The independent variables of centralization were coded for the purposes of this study. Four levels of centralization were identified in the process of empirical research; therefore, four independent dummy variables of centralization were introduced. Nonviolent actions that emerged in an unplanned manner without any organizational structure were coded as spontaneous ("1"); campaigns that were initiated by several organizations, groups or parties without centralized leadership were coded as campaigns organized by several groups ("2"); campaigns that were led by an umbrella organization or a coalition of organizations, groups, or parties were coded as campaigns led by a coalition ("3"); campaigns led by one organization, group, or party with formal hierarchical structure (e.g. bureaucratic leadership, elected or self-proclaimed leader, centralized decision-making process, hierarchical accountability) were coded as campaigns organized by one group ("4"). Each of these levels was coded as dummy variables in order to establish a correlation between each distinct type of organizational structure and the success of nonviolent campaigns.

Data on the level of campaign centralization are drawn from multiple sources, including encyclopedias, case studies from the Global Nonviolent Action Database,[84] conflict

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[83] Chenoweth and Stephan, 14.
[84] Global Nonviolent Action Database {Available at http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/}

narratives compiled by Chenoweth,[85] and sources from a comprehensive bibliography on nonviolent action compiled by Carter, Clark, and Randle.[86]

2.3 Control variables

Apart from the independent variables of centralization, there are other factors that may have an effect on the outcome of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns. Without controlling for these variables, it is impossible to establish the independent impact of organizational structure on the movements' success. I identified important control variables in the existing literature on nonviolent civil resistance. These include peak membership, security forces defection, regime violence, regime type, government capacity, simultaneous violent campaign, period of campaign occurrence, international sanctions, and external state support.

The LMEMBERS variable captures the logged number of members at the highest point of the campaign. According to Chenoweth and Stephan, nonviolent campaigns with higher level of participation are more likely to succeed. High participation numbers activates several mechanisms required for success, such as enhanced resilience, expanded civic disruption, tactical capabilities, and loyalty shifts from the regime supporters.[87] Security forces defection is a dichotomous variable that captures whether the target's security forces defected during the conflict.

Control variables of regime type, government capacity, and regime violence capture the opportunities for resistance created by the political structure.[88] Regime type (democracy dummy variable) measures whether the movement emerged in democratic or autocratic regime. Regime violence is a dichotomous variable identifying whether the regime used violence to crack down on a campaign. Government capacity variable is taken from the

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[85] Online Methodological Appendix, 38-141.
[86] Carter, Clark and Randle.
[87] Chenoweth and Stephan, 10.
[88] Ibid, 64.

Correlates of War data set and captures the material capabilities available to the regime. Cold War is a dummy variable indicating whether the nonviolent campaign occurred during (1949-1991) or after the Cold War (after 1991).

Simultaneous violent campaign is a dichotomous variable identifying whether a separate violent campaign was active simultaneous to the campaign in question or whether the violent methods were used along with nonviolent. According to most nonviolent action scholars, the presence of a radical armed wing in a movement is likely to have negative consequences, as it may justify repression and decrease support for the challenge.[89] Sharp suggests that the use of violence by a segment of challengers may unleash disproportionately severe repression, prevent loyalty shifts, and lead to the collapse of the movement altogether.[90]

External state support is a dichotomous variable indicating whether campaign received overt military or economic aid from another state to fight against the opponent as coded by Chenoweth and Stephan. International sanctions is a dichotomous variable indicating whether diplomatic pressure or international sanctions are imposed on the regime for its behavior against the resistance campaign.

2.4 Statistical model and results

Table 1. Cross-tabulation of Failure, Partial Success, and Success with Regard to Level of Centralization

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[89] Herbert Haines, "Black Radicalization and the Funding of Civil Rights: 1957-1970," *Social Problems* 32:1(October 1984), 31-43 ; Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1973.
[90] Sharp, 390.

			Centralization				Total
			Spontaneous	Several groups	Coalition	Hierarchical	
0=failure; 1 = partial success; 2 = success	0	Count	7	7	4	3	21
		% within Centralization	38,9%	25,9%	11,8%	17,6%	21,9%
	1	Count	6	4	8	6	24
		% within Centralization	33,3%	14,8%	23,5%	35,3%	25,0%
	2	Count	5	16	22	8	51
		% within Centralization	27,8%	59,3%	64,7%	47,1%	53,1%
Total		Count	18	27	34	17	96
		% within Centralization	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Bar Chart

Out of 96 total cases of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns, 53.1% are coded as successes. That falls in line with Chenoweth's argument that nonviolent resistance campaigns

succeed much more often than commonly believed. 21.9% of campaigns failed to achieve their stated goals, while 25% campaigns were partially successful.

Turning to the level of centralization in nonviolent resistance movements, 18.8% were spontaneous campaigns, 28.1% were campaigns led by several groups, 35.4% were campaigns led by an umbrella organization or a coalition, and 17.7% were campaigns led by a formal hierarchical organization. Campaigns led by an umbrella organization or a coalition have the highest success rate of 64.7% and the lowest failure rate of 11.8%. Only 4 out of 34 campaigns with such a level of centralization failed to achieve stated goals. Spontaneous campaigns have the highest failure rate at 38.9% compared to all other levels of centralization. 7 out of 18 spontaneous campaigns failed to achieve stated goals. Additionally, spontaneous campaigns have the lowest success rate at 27.8% when compared to campaigns with higher level of centralization.

Campaigns led by several groups and hierarchical organizations fall in between in terms of their success and failure rates: movements led by several groups succeeded in 59.3% and failed in 25.9% cases, while movements led by a formal, hierarchical organization succeeded in 47.1% and failed in 17.6% of cases.

A Spearman correlation was used to reveal correlations between study independent variables and the dependent variable of success. The results suggest that association between success of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns and two coded independent variables (coalitions and spontaneous) is statistically significant, while the other two study variables (several groups and organization) do not reveal a statistically significant correlation. Therefore, these two organizational types were excluded from the regression model.

The results show that the success of nonviolent campaigns is correlated with security forces defection, regime repression, simultaneous violent movement, number of members, and regime type. All these indicators were included in the regression models as control

variables to check their influence on the success jointly with the study variables. The variable of the Cold War is correlated with both coalitions and spontaneous movements while the overt state support is correlated to coalitions; therefore, both Cold War and overt state support were included in the regression model as control variables. Government capacity and international sanctions did not reveal statistically significant association with either the dependent variable or study variables and were excluded from the regression models.

Table 2: Regressions on Success of Nonviolent Civil Resistance Campaigns

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
Coalitions		1.822 (1.019)*	2.561 (1.223)**	2.696 (1.198)**	3.458 (1.412)**
Spontaneous		-2.322 (1.356)*	-2.865 (1.402)**	-2.868 (1.479)*	-3.469 (1.574)**
Army defection	3.055 (.902)***	4.320 (1,339)***	5.212 (1.637)***	4.839 (1.391)***	5.782 (1.742)***
Number of members (logged)	0.279 (.185)*	0.296 (.220)	0.369 (.238)	0.124 (.265)	0.151 (.270)
Simultaneous violence	-1.020 (.767)	-2.112 (1.005)**	-2.766 (1.135)**	-2.971 (1.182)**	-3.661 (1.344)***
Democracy dummy	1.076 (.664)	-0.414 (.849)	-0.785 (.922)	-0.544 (.909)	-1.046 (1.026)
Regime violence	-1.154 (1.142)	-1.635 (1.326)	-2.382 (1.553)	-1.233 (1.370)	-1.868 (1.512)
External state support				-4.401 (2.215)**	-4.706 (2.458)*
Cold War			1.502 (.995)		1.542 (1,144)
Constant	-2.652 (2.020)	-2.395 (2.388)	-3.533 (2.599)	-0.585 (2.878)	-1.281 (2.907)
Pseudo R² (Nagelkerke)	0.466	0.616	0.647	0.686	0.708

All variables are standardized. *Significant at 5%; **significant at 1%; ***significant at 0.1%.

Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients along with the robust standard errors for five regression models (see Appendix for detailed output). The first model includes variables

strongly related to the success of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns. Army defection has a large, positive impact on the success; the number of participants also seems to be significant but at the lower 0.1 level. The existence of simultaneously occurring violent campaigns, regime type, and regime violence do not prove to be statistically significant (Model 1).

The second model includes control variables from the Model 1 and study variables of the *coalitions* and *spontaneous*. *Coalitions* is positively associated with the success of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns, while *spontaneous* has a negative coefficient (Model 2). The inclusion of study variables of two organizational types causes the number of participants to lose its statistical significance. It suggests that coalitions and spontaneous become more important determinants of success than number of participants. Empirically there is often a connection between the average size of a movement and its organizational structure. The Filipino People Power campaign from 1983-1986 was led by the United Democratic Action Organization and attracted over 2 million people. Similarly, the Nigerian revolt against Military rule 1993-1999 was led by National Democratic Coalition and attracted over a million participants. In contrast, spontaneous protests against military rule in Greece in 1974 attracted only 2,500 people and only 10,000 people participated in the spontaneous Tibetan revolt against Chinese occupation from 1987-1989. These and other cases show that the average size of coalition movements is bigger than that of spontaneous movements.

It is worth mentioning that the second model explains much more variance in the dependent variable than the first model without study variables. Pseudo R-squared increases from 0.466 to 0.616, suggesting that the model with variables for the organizational structure is much better specified than the model with control variables only.

The next two models show that both *coalitions* and *spontaneous* are robust to the inclusion of the variable indicating that the campaign occurred during the Cold War (Model

3) and the overt support dummy (Model 4). The fact that both study variables remained significant even when controlling for Cold War and intervention means that the organizational type is important during as well as after Cold War and whether or not there is external state support. The fifth model includes all the above mentioned control variables and has the highest predictive power of 70% (Model 5).

I used the output from Model 5, which has the highest predictive power, in order to calculate the predicted probabilities of *coalitions* and *spontaneous* for an average nonviolent civil resistance campaign. The Table 3 shows, that holding all other variables in the model at their means or modes[91], the chance of a spontaneous campaign to succeed is 8.3%. The chance of a campaign to succeed when it is neither spontaneous nor led by a coalition (when it is either led by several groups/organizations/parties or a formal, hierarchical organization) is 46.8%. The chance for a campaign to succeed when it is led by a coalition or an umbrella organization is 76.5%.

Of course, such numbers can only have meaning if cases have the assigned values. For example, the Tibetan revolt against Chinese occupation (1987-1989) meets the conditions for such hypothetical case. Being spontaneous, the Tibetan campaign would have a chance of 8.3% of succeeding, but if the movement had coalitional structure, it would have a much higher chance of 76.5%.

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[91] Ordinal variables were held at their means, dichotomous variables were held at their modes.

Table 3. Probabilities of Success Based on the Centralization Factor

Therefore, the results of the statistical analysis confirm both my first hypothesis that nonviolent civil resistance movements led by a coalition or a party/organization with horizontal leadership are more likely to succeed than movements with other levels of centralization and my second hypothesis that spontaneous movements are less likely to succeed in nonviolent struggle than movements with more developed organizational structure.

Chapter 3. Case Studies: Romania 1987-1989 and Bulgaria 1989

The discussion in the previous chapter suggests that different organizational types are associated with different outcomes of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns. Coalitions have a positive effect, while spontaneous movements reveal a strong negative effect on the likelihood of success. However, the statistical analysis cannot tell us why this is happening. Case-study is much more effective than large-N methods in testing the causal processes connecting the independent with the dependent variable.[92] Therefore, to explore the causal mechanisms that link different levels of centralization to the outcome, I will look closely at two cases: Romania from 1987-1989 and Bulgaria in 1989. According to Van Evera, we can perform controlled comparison through the Mill's Method of Difference, in which the investigator chooses cases with similar general characteristics and different values on the study variable.[93] The Method of Difference is one of the most common comparative methods, which consists of "comparing instances in which phenomenon does occur, with instances in other respects similar in which it does not."[94] Nonviolent civil resistance campaigns in Romania and Bulgaria were highly similar: they both occurred in Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War, had the same goal of regime change against the same communist regime target, and emerged in authoritarian regimes that received overt military help to suppress pro-democracy campaign; both campaigns were met with brutal regime repressions.

Although they are otherwise similar, the nonviolent campaigns in Romania and Bulgaria had different levels of centralization: the Romanian campaign against the communist regime is characterized as spontaneous while the Bulgarian campaign was led by a coalition of oppositional civil groups. The Romanian and Bulgarian cases also have different outcomes:

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[92] Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 54.

[93] Ibid, 57.

[94] John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic*, (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1972), Book III, chapter 8.

the Romanian campaign failed to provide a nonviolent transformation, while the Bulgarian movement achieved political change without bloodshed.

The cases of Romania and Bulgaria are especially interesting because based on two important indicators the Romanian nonviolent campaign had more chances to succeed than its counterpart in Bulgaria. First, it was characterized by higher level of participation, second, the security forces defected to the protest movement while no such defection occurred during the Bulgarian campaign.

3.1. Romania

The wave of democratization swept over Eastern European countries in the late 1980s. All the former communist countries of the region were transformed either through reforms from above or movements from below with the notable exception of Romania. The Romanian Revolution of 1989 was bloody and highly unsuccessful, as after deposition of dictatorial Nicolae Ceausescu new authoritarians seized power, making Romania the only country in Eastern Europe where the fall of the authoritarian regime was not successfully followed by stable democracy.[95]

Most authors argue that the exceptionalism of Romania can be explained by the extreme personalism and despotism of the Ceausescu regime and its special relationship with the Soviet Union. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan claim the sultanistic and totalitarian character of Ceausescu's regime could explain the impossibility of peaceful transformation in Romania and the phenomenon of the "captured revolution."[96] Accepting this point of view, in this case study I will emphasize how the repressive character of Ceausescu's regime shaped the

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[95] Sharp, 438.
[96] Juan J Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe,* (London: The Johns Hopkins Press Ltd., 1996), 355-359.

character of the Romanian opposition, which lacked any form of organization. Empirical data from the Romanian case illustrates statistical results of the low efficiency of spontaneous resistance in nonviolent movements.

Martyn Rady points out that the first signs of incipient resistance to the Ceausescu regime began to appear in the 1980s.[97] Serious popular protests began in 1986 with a strike against reduced bread rations in Transylvania that initially led to concessions, but later these concessions were cancelled, and the main activists suspiciously disappeared.[98] The next serious popular uprising happened on November 15, 1987, when tens of thousands of workers protested in Brasov. They marched through the center of the city and besieged a local party headquarters, protesting against wage cuts and demanding normal living conditions.[99]

Lacking a clear strategy and defined goals, the protest in Brasov was brutally suppressed by the army with its leaders arrested; however, further demonstrations in Timisoara, Iasi, and Bucharest followed. In December 1989, people gathered on the streets of Timisoara in order to protect László Tőkés, the Hungarian reform minister who was ordered to move to a remote village because of his criticism of the governmental reforms.[100] Over 5,000 people surrounded the party headquarters. The army did not touch the demonstrators until Ceausescu ordered to deal with them "a la Tiananmen Square." As a result, a bloody massacre with thousands of people killed happened during the night of December 17.[101]

Appalled by the news coming from Timisoara, Romanians took to the streets in Arad, Cluj, Targu Mures, and Constanta demanding an end to the blood-letting.[102] By December 21, when protests broke out on the streets of Bucharest, the army defected and serious fighting

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[97] Martyn Rady, *Romania in Turmoil*, London: IB Tauris&Co LTD., 1992, 73.
[98] Ackerman and DuVall, 436.
[99] Rady, 73.
[100] Gale Stokes, *The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe*, (New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993), 163.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Rady, 99.

began between the army, now loyal to the nation, and the Securitate forces that were still loyal to the dictator.[103] On December 22, protestors supported by the army stormed the headquarters of the Central Committee, and Ceausescu was ousted. In spite of the successful defeat of Ceausescu, no democratic transition followed as power was seized by the "National Salvation Front" consisting of the communist "old guard".[104]

Rady claims that the protests emerging in 1987-1989 attracted significant numbers of people yet "lacked both organization and clear purpose."[105] He puts special emphasis on the fact that the opposition in Romania, compared to other Eastern European countries, was highly fragmented and disorganized. He comments that "unlike Poland, Romania lacked an independent trade union apparatus and, unlike Czechoslovakia, no samizdat society had yet emerged."[106] Intellectual opposition remained fragmented, like other groups of Romanian society.

Rady's argument, that nonviolent actions in Romania 1987-1989 lacked any organizational structure and, therefore, had limited chances for success, is shared by Anca Mihaela Pusca. She notes that "demonstrations were largely reactionary and did not have a clear and certainly not a unitary platform on which to stand." The demands of the opposition were formulated only on the last phase of the movement when the regime was obviously faltering, and the opposition struggled to come up with the list of demands satisfactory for all the participants.[107] Quoting the participants and witnesses of Timisoara, she concludes that people were drawn on the street either by accident or sheer curiosity. No one had an idea of what was happening; "some thought the prisoner had escaped, others that foreign forces had

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[103] Stokes, 165.
[104] Rady, 75.
[105] Ibid, 73.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Anca Mihaela Pusca, *Revolution, Democratic Transition and Disillusionment. The Case of Romania*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 101.

invaded Romania."[108] Michael Randle, in his book *People Power. The Bulding of a New European Home,* offers an extensive interview with Helmuth Frauendorfer, who was one of the opposition activists in Romania in the late 1980s. Frauendorfer confirms that compared to the pro-democracy campaigns in other Eastern European countries, all protests and demonstrations in Romania were disorganized and fragmented. He argues that people were driven onto the streets out of desperation and despair- "It was an entirely spontaneous revolt!"[109] Therefore, most historians providing the descriptive account of events in Romania 1987-1989 agree on its unique spontaneous character.

Similarly, historians agree that the spontaneous character of the opposition in Romania in the late 1980s had a negative effect on its outcome. First of all, the absence of any kind of organization undermined the ability of the movement to conduct effective negotiations with its opponent. In the rest of countries of Eastern Europe peaceful negotiations allowed for a smoother transition; however, in Romania demonstrators were unprepared to negotiate.[110] Pusca states that protestors were invited at the table of negotiations on December 20 in Timisoara, but they did not have an organized committee or a well-articulated list of demands:

> The delegation sent in to negotiate with the party elites was formed by an ad hoc committee of representatives and thus most members of the delegation did not know each other, and did not have a plan of action or a concrete list of demands when faced with prime-minister Dascalescu's aggressive demands.[111]

Having no grand strategy or clear plan of demands, the revolutionaries started asking for insignificant personal items such as passports, flats and food. The whole negotiation turned into a mess ruled by confusion and fear. The only concrete demand that demonstrators agreed on was the immediate resignation of Ceausescu, a demand that was certainly not open for

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[108] Ibid, 97.
[109] Michael Randle, *People Power: The Building of a New European Home*, (Stroud: Hawthorn Press, 1991), 111.
[110] Pusca, 103.
[111] Ibid.

negotiation at that point. [112] As the result, the negotiations with the party elite failed completely.

Second, the lack of a well-defined organizational structure with recognizable leaders prevented the maintenance of nonviolent discipline that is paramount in any nonviolent campaign. Although most authors refer to the revolution in Romania as violent, they always explain that the violence occurred entirely on the side of the authorities. However, according to Peter Siani-Davies, who provides a detailed account of the Romanian revolution, protestors frequently resorted to violent methods and, thus, provoked the shooting. [113] He says that most of the riots were accompanied with stone-throwing, hand-to-hand fighting, and arson.

> In Tagru Mures the protests were initially peaceful, and it was only after nightfall that serious violence erupted, accompanied by the breaking of windows […] As the night fell stones were thrown, more cars were set on fire, and the shooting began again, leaving a number of protesters dead. [114]

Randle also concludes that the revolution lost its nonviolent momentum when the army started fighting on the side of the protestors. The author mentions that "some soldiers in Timisoara took the part of the people and returned fire on the Securitate prior to 22 December." [115] Romanian activist Helmuth Frauendorfer interviewed by Randle also confirms that the defected army did not keep nonviolent discipline but fought back. [116] Following the arguments for the primacy of nonviolent discipline offered by Sharp, Ackerman, DuVall and other nonviolent action scholars, the regime's repressions would not have been as brutal if the opposition maintained peaceful character of protests. Maintaining that discipline in turn would have been easier if the movement was more organized and centralized.

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[112] Ibid, 103-104.
[113] Peter Siani-Davies, *Romanian Revolution of December 1989*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005), 62-80.
[114] Ibid, 80.
[115] Randle, 42.
[116] Ibid, 115.

The third and probably most important negative effect of the disorganized character of Romanian Revolution became evident after Ceausescu's defeat. The lack of any organized oppositional groups that would unite broad strata of society led to the "capture" of the revolution by reactionary communist factions. Nagy bitterly points out that once massive protests spontaneously burst out on the streets of Romanian cities in late 1989, the only group that was sufficiently organized to come to power was the group of the communist "old guard" within the party. It is they who turned out to be the principal beneficiaries of the revolution.[117]

This view, that the lack of centralization in the uprising prevented the creation of a viable alternative to the disaffected party veterans, is shared by Linz and Stepan. They conclude that the Revolution did not produce democratic leaders or organizations with sufficient organizational resources and national visibility. "The uprising was too short, spontaneous, and politically manipulated to produce a governing alternative."[118] Randle argues similarly that the outcome of the parliamentary and presidential elections was basically predetermined, because the revolution did not bring to the forefront any well-organized groups while reconstituted parties were also fragmented and not strong enough to present a governmental alternative to the National Salvation Front.[119] As a result, the orientation of the government continued to be socialist, in spite of allegedly democratic rhetoric. By the 1990s Romania was the only country in Eastern Europe where the defeat of the dictator was not shortly followed by the democratic regime.[120]

The low level of organization of the Romanian revolution had three discernible negative effects on its outcome: it undermined the ability of the movement to conduct effective negotiations with the Ceausescu's regime, prevented the maintenance of nonviolent

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[117] Rady, 75.
[118] Linz and Stepan, 359.
[119] Randle, 71.
[120] Ackerman and DuVall, 438.

discipline, and facilitated the capture of power by hard-line communists. Recognizing the amorphous and leaderless character of Romanian revolution and its negative consequences, historians have debated over why the large opposition and reformist movements that led to change in other Eastern European countries were nonexistent in this case.[121] Three explanations are the most prominent in the scholars' debate.

The first and certainly the most common explanation of nonexistence of organized and nationally known groups in Romania is the exceptionally repressive nature of the Ceausescu's regime. Richard Hall claims that regimes structure their opposition; therefore, "the characteristics of the Ceausescu regime all but ensured that, were anti-regime protest to break out, it would be largely spontaneous, the catalyst would be individuals and groups at the fringes of society." He argues that in Hungary and Poland the peaceful transition towards democracy was possible because the less repressive nature of the communist regimes there offered greater opportunities for dissent. Of course, opposition in these countries was also outlawed, manipulated, and continuously harassed, but not to such an extent that it could not exist whatsoever.[122] The sultanistic nature of the Ceausescu's regime ensured that societal opposition, if it existed at all, would be disorganized, clandestine, leaderless, and ideologically stunted. Comprehensive control over society and within the party was so total that any opposition seemed quixotic and suicidal, "dissent was seen as a solitary gesture, unlikely to generate demonstrations of solidarity or new expressions of dissent."[123]

Linz and Stepan similarly explain the exceptionalism of the Romanian case through strong sultanistic and totalitarian qualities of the regime. [124] According to them, Ceausescu's regime allowed no space for the development of a second oppositional culture as in

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[121] Nestor Ratesh, *Romania: The Entangled Revolution*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), 14.
[122] Richard Andrew Hall, "Theories of Collective Action and Revolution:
Evidence from the Romanian Transition of December 1989," *Europe-Asia Studies* 52 (September 2000), 1071.
[123] Ibid, 1072.
[124] Linz and Stepan, 352.

Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany and, to a lesser extent, Bulgaria. In no other state was the fear of the dictator and the penetration of his security services as intense as in Romania: every typewriter had to be registered and every conversation with a foreigner was considered to be a crime. They cite the results of the survey of independent movements conducted in Eastern Europe by Radio Free Europe, that show that Romania had only two independent organizations with unknown leaders compared to 60 in Poland, 27 in Czechoslovakia and 21 in Hungary. Therefore, Linz and Stepan conclude that the "sultanistic and totalitarian combination virtually precludes a transition in which a democratic and well-organized opposition in civil society brings down the regime without being met by violence."[125]

The second explanation is offered by Nestor Ratesh and deals with the different role of the working class in Romania compared to other Eastern European countries. Ratesh draws attention to the fact the Romanian working class was much younger than the working class in other countries. In Romania it partially consisted of displaced peasants who did not have enough time to assimilate into the urban environment and obtain urban values; therefore, authorities could frighten and manipulate this segment of the population with ease. What is more, the author argues that in Romania there was a lack of communication between workers and intellectuals, who frequently treated the former with contempt. Therefore, Ratesh suggests that the weakness and marginality of the working class may explain the non-existence of such organizations as Civic Forum or Solidarnost in Romania.[126]

The third explanation deals with the weak civil society in Romania. Mircea Mihaies illustrates that most Romanians do not have an idea of civil society. He argues that the Romanians do not have enough of a political culture for an organized democratic transformation: "The only thing that matters is the small personal arrangement, the small,

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[125] Ibid, 357.
[126] Ratesh, 15.

barely warm spot. Passivity and living with evil have defeated any kind of vitality."[127] Helmuth Frauendorfer, in his interview to Randle, offers the same explanation to the exceptionalism of opposition in Romania. He reminds us that Romania lived under Ottoman domination before 1878 and then existed as three separate countries, which were united under the Greater Romania only in 1918. After the Second World War, parts of Romanian territory came under the rule of the USSR and Bulgaria. According to Frauendorfer, long periods of existence under foreign domination led to the lack of a weak sense of identity combined with chauvinism and nationalism. He concludes, the development of democracy in Romania proved to be more difficult than in other countries of the region.[128] Therefore, there can be different explanations of why the Romanian movement had the lowest level of organization and centralization. However, all historians agree that the spontaneous character of pro-democratic campaign in the country had a negative effect on its outcome.

3.2 Bulgaria

During the rule of the communist leader Todor Zhivkov, who came to power in 1954, Bulgaria became one of the most repressive authoritarian regimes in Europe. This regime was characterized by the ruthless suppression of dissent, an ubiquitous secret police and harsh censorship.[129] However, despite the highly totalitarian character of the communist regime in Bulgaria, opposition began to organize in the late 1980s. Several oppositional groups united in the Union of Democratic Forces, causing a political crisis in the country that led to the resignation of Zhivkov, negotiated the multi-party elections in June 1990, and pushed the communists out of government in 1991.

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[127] Mircea Mihaies, "The Neighbors of Kafka: Intellectual's Note from the Underground" in *The Revolutions of 1989*, Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed., (New York: Routledge, 1999), 254.
[128] Randle, 117.
[129] Minton F. Goldman, *Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe. Political, Economic and Social Challenges*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 83.

Linz and Stepan show that totalitarian regime in Bulgaria dealt with opposition effectively up to 1988. Groups were harassed and prevented from meeting, and their leaders were arrested and prosecuted, leaving space only for individual acts of resistance.[130] However, after 1988 the situation began to change. The mainstream of Bulgarian dissent came from three major sources: the ethnic Turkish community, the intelligentsia, and the environmental movement.

Ethnic Turks played an important role in undermining the position of Todor Zhivkov and his communist party. Since 1985, Zhivkov had been implementing harsh discriminatory policies against Turks living in Bulgaria, forcing them to abandon many religious and cultural practices and give up Turkish names.[131] In response to this forced assimilation, the Bulgarian Turks and others concerned with human-rights abuses of the Turkish minority started to form groups. The most prominent of them, the Democratic League for the Defense of Human Rights, was formed in May 1989. Activists of the Democratic League organized a series of demonstrations, work stoppages, and hunger strikes against the persistent pressure of the Communist regime. Demonstrations that took place in May 1989 attracted over 15,000 people and were assaulted by the militia and troops using guns, smoke bombs, dogs, and tanks. Dozens of people were killed and many participants were injured and arrested. As a result of the demonstrations, Turkish community leaders, organizers of protests, and other Turks (around 5,000 people) were deported from the country. Some 300,000 Turks left the country voluntarily afterwards.[132] These protests and the brutal reaction of the government, acted as a push for more vocal opposition from other segments of society.

The intelligentsia constituted the second source of dissent in Bulgaria in the late 1980s. At first, the new Bulgarian intelligentsia did not have much reason to oppose the

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[130] Linz and Stepan, 335.
[131] Randle, 35.
[132] Ibid.

regime. Zhivkov "artfully cultivated their loyalty by acknowledging their achievements, flattering them, and reminding them obliquely of the regime's munificence toward them."[133] However, by 1988, educated Bulgarians who were aware of what was going on in the USSR became frustrated with the regime's failure to adopt the reforms of *perestroika* and began to create a belated democratic opposition.[134] In the fall of 1988, the Club for the Support of Perestroika and Glasnost was formed at Sofia University. After the brutal suppression of Turkish protests, members of this group started sending appeals to the national assembly that criticized the actions of the government.[135]

The third source of dissent in Bulgaria came from environmental activists. The first demonstrations against contamination of the air with chlorine gas began in December 1987 in Ruse, where activists staged an exhibition with data proving ecological decline in the area. In April 1989, the environmental organization Ecoglasnost was established, connecting environmental issues with governmental policies. In October 1989 at the CSCE environmental conference in Sofia, Ecoglasnost organized a series of protests and demonstrations: "Demonstrators planted themselves in the same spot in central Sofia each day, holding up placards condemning the regime's environmental record." Protests were suppressed by the police in a week, with demonstrators beat up and arrested.[136] The brutality of the regime had the reverse effect and on November 3, the final day of the conference, Ecoglasnost organized a mass demonstration of over 5,000 people who marched through the centre of Sofia and presented a petition of 11,500 signatures to the national assembly.[137]

Under growing pressure from the opposition, some of Zhivkov's colleagues tried to stay in power by uniting against the unpopular leader. According to John Feffer, "with an

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[133] Goldman, 89.
[134] Randle, 146.
[135] Stokes, 146.
[136] Ackerman and DuVall, 431.
[137] Randle, 36.

opposition about to explode onto the streets, the Bulgarian reformers within the Communist Party had decided to forestall an East German scenario with prompt action against Zhivkov."[138] Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov and Politburo member Andrei Lukanov pushed Zhivkov to resign, hoping that his departure might enable the Communist Party to maintain its leadership. Mladenov, who took the place of Zhivkov after his resignation, was willing to introduce limited reforms to pursue a perestroika-style of political development.[139]

Vesselin Dimitrov, in his book *Bulgaria: the Uneven Transition*, provides a detailed account of the events in Bulgaria in late 1980. According to Dimitrov, Mladenov and his colleagues "came to power with little more than the ambition of emulating Gorbachev's perestroika. They aimed not so much to dismantle communism as to endow it with a human face."[140] However, such limited reforms were not enough and came too late. Opposition in Bulgaria transformed from weak spontaneous dissent into a recognizable force at the beginning of December 1989 with the organization of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). The UDF was founded on December 7 and consisted of opposition groups with various origins and aims:

> The Founding Declaration of the UDF was signed by the Club for Glasnost and Democracy, the Ecoglasnost Independent Society, the Independent Society for the Protection of Human Rights, the Podkrepa Independent Labor Federation, the Committee for the Protection of Religious Rights, Freedom of Conscience and Spiritual Values, the Club of Individuals Subjected to Repressions after 1945, the Independent Students' Society, the Civil Initiative Movement, the Bulgarian Workers' Social Democratic Party ….. and the Nikola Petkov Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union.[141]

The UDF was headed by a coordinating council that included three members from each group. Zheliu Zhelev, one of the most prominent dissident intellectuals expelled from the ranks of the Communist Party in the 1960s, became the Union's first Chairman. According to

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[138] John Feffer, *Shock Waves. Eastern Europe after the Revolutions*, (Boston: South End Press, 1992), 232.
[139] Goldman, 90.
[140] Vasselin Dimitrov, *Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition*, (London: Routledge, 2001), 37.
[141] Nassya Kralevska-Owens, *Communism versus Democracy: Bulgaria 1944 to 1997*, (Sofia: American Research Center in Sofia, 2010), 175.

the Founding Declaration of the UDF, all the groups constituting the Union "preserved their autonomy, specific profile and subject of activity, prestige and place won in the country's public life."[142]   Therefore, the UDF was formed as an umbrella organization with diverse leadership and a flexible structure "in order to further the development of the democratic processes." At the same time, the UDF compiled a clear-cut program of demands, including a demand for a new democratic Constitution, new labor and social legislation, democratic parliamentary elections, rehabilitating unlawfully repressed individuals and depoliticizing the army and the militia.[143] Despite the different backgrounds and aims of the oppositional groups, the UDF provided them with the connective structures that helped to create a common identity among participants – the identity of the anti-communist struggle.

The existence of a centralizing organizational structure influenced the outcome of the Bulgarian revolution in four major ways. First, the opposition united under the umbrella of the UDF was more capable of mobilizing people. The UDF leaders, not satisfied to play the role of satellites to a reformed Communist Party, were determined to push for the creation of a fully competitive democratic system. The coalition comprised of the most influential oppositional groups had multiple channels for attracting people. As a result, the first mass rally organized by the UDF gathered over 70,000 "excited people streamed to the square … to welcome the new opposition leaders."[144] On December 14, 1989, the UDF led the first truly massive demonstration in Sofia that showed communist leaders the power of a popular revolution. Nassya Kralevska-Owens mentions that the number of protestors reached 50,000. The UDF called people to form a human chain around the National Assembly, demanding to abolish Article 1 of the Constitution, which guaranteed the leading role of the Communist

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[142] *New Political and Public Forces*, BTA Parelleli, (Sofia: Courier Press Service, 1990), 4.
[143] Ibid.
[144] Kralevska-Owens, 185.

Party.[145] Mladenov and his colleagues finally realized that the course of limited reforms was no longer enough to maintain the regime and a transition to democracy was inevitable.[146] The creation of a coalition was important for mobilization of people united under the common goal.

Second, in the course of demonstrations the UDF managed to restrain the demonstrators and prevent an attack on parliament. The UDF leaders urged the protestors not to respond to provocative actions and to maintain nonviolent discipline.[147] The crowd of demonstrators, consisting mostly of youth, could easily go too far and reverse the gains of the past weeks:

> The demonstrators, shouting "resign, resign" and "down with the party," surrounded the Parliament building for several hours before being persuaded to disperse after nightfall. Leaders of Bulgaria's main opposition group pleaded for restraint, fearing the crowd would become violent and try and force its way into Parliament. One witness described the mostly youthful protesters as "behaving like a mob." "This is not the way," said Zheliu Zhelev, who heads the Union of Forces for Democracy in Bulgaria. "Democracy should be achieved in a democratic way."[148]

The leaders of the UDF gave speeches urging the demonstrators to remain peaceful and not to storm the building, preventing the outburst of violence in the campaign.

Third, after the demonstrations the Union managed to emerge as a credible negotiation partner and achieved important concessions from the Communist leaders. According to Dimitrov, Communist leaders started seeing the UDF as a desirable negotiation partner. First, it showed its ability to mobilize popular discontent by organizing the protest on December 14. And second, by maintaining discipline among protestors and preventing the attack on the Parliament, it showed its political responsibility. Thus, the UDF was invited to participate in

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[145] Ibid, 192.
[146] Dimitrov, 38.
[147] Ibid.
[148] Guillermo Angelov, "Parliament Postpones Crucial Vote, 20,000 protest," *United Press International*, (December 14, 1989), accessed through LexisNexis Academic on May 27, 2011.

round-table negotiations as it happened in Hungary and Poland.[149] These negotiations that started in early January proved a turning point in the transition to democracy in Bulgaria. The UDF leaders had a clear-cut list of demands and managed to achieve important concessions from Communist leaders. The BCP signed an agreement that safeguarded fundamental freedoms and civil rights of the individual, legalized the existence of political parties, and disbanded the secret police. The most important achievement of the round-table negotiations was the agreement to hold the first democratic multi-party elections in June 1990.[150]

Finally, the oppositional coalition was strong enough to present a viable governmental alternative to the transformed Communist Party. On the threshold of parliamentary elections, the UDF managed to transform itself from a coalition of oppositional civic groups into an organized political force. Even though, as Dimitrov notes, the BCP (transformed Communist Party) gained the majority of the seats in parliament, the UDF received over 36% of the votes and emerged as a strong political opponent. Not satisfied with the results of the elections, the UDF organized a series of strikes and street demonstrations that forced President Mladenov's resignation in July 1990. The head of the UDF, Zheliu Zhelev, became the first noncommunist head of Bulgaria in over 40 years. Further protests and large anti-BSP demonstrations in Sofia and other Bulgarian cities eventually made Prime Minister Lukanov resign as well. A truly democratic constitution was adopted in the country in July 1991.[151]

The high level of organization and centralization of the Bulgarian revolution thus had four discernible positive effects on its outcome. The existence of the coalition of oppositional groups helped to mobilize a large number of people, to maintain nonviolent discipline on the streets despite the radical moods in the crowd, to enable the movement to conduct effective

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[149] Dimitrov., 40-41
[150] Ibid.
[151] Ibid, 42.

negotiations with the communist leaders, and finally to overthrow the Communist regime by presenting a viable political alternative.

3.3. Comparative analysis

Different levels of centralization of the pro-democracy movements in Romania and Bulgaria played an important role in different outcomes of nonviolent civil resistance in these countries. The spontaneous character of the opposition in Romania undermined the ability of the movement to start effective negotiations with Ceausescu's regime and obtain significant concessions. Protestors did not have a coherent list of demands, which made the constructive discussion impossible. In the case of Bulgaria, the Union of Democratic Forces had a clear-cut list of demands, and its leaders were able to conduct effective round-table discussions with the opponent. As the result of these negotiations, many issues were settled, including the date of the first multi-party elections.

Second, the low level of organization in the case of Romanian revolution prevented the maintenance of nonviolent discipline. Lacking effective leadership, protestors in Romania frequently responded to violence with violence, and sometimes even provoked the shooting in the first place. In the case of Bulgaria, the UDF managed to restrain the demonstrators and prevent an attack on Parliament. The UDF leaders called the demonstrators to maintain nonviolent discipline and ignore governmental provocations.

Third, the lack of centralization in the Romanian uprising prevented the creation of a viable alternative to the hard-line communists. After Ceausescu's defeat, the only group that was sufficiently organized to come to power was the group of communist leaders. The revolution did not bring to the forefront any democratic leaders or well-organized groups that would provide a viable alternative to the existing party. In contrast, the Union of Democratic

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Forces managed to transform itself into a well-organized political force and push to change the political course in Bulgaria.

Conclusion

The present thesis has examined how the level of centralization affects the outcome of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns. The argument that certain levels of centralization contribute to the successful outcome of nonviolent campaigns was demonstrated through large-N statistical analysis of 96 cases. The findings of this analysis show that campaigns led by a coalition or an umbrella organization with diverse leadership are more likely to succeed than movements with other organizational structures. The analysis of predicted probabilities shows that campaigns headed by coalitions have a 76.5% chance to achieve a political transformation. Additionally, the findings of the regression analysis show that spontaneous movements, having the lowest level of centralization, are less likely to succeed than movements with other organizational structures. The analysis of predicted probabilities shows that spontaneous campaigns have only a 8.3% chance to achieve a political transformation holding all other variables at their means and modes.

In order to explore the casual mechanisms that link different levels of centralization to the outcome of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns, I conducted a comprehensive analysis of two cases of nonviolent resistance: Romania from 1987-1989 and Bulgaria in 1989. These cases were selected based on Mill's Method of Difference from the results of the statistical analysis. Comparison of these two cases showed that different levels of centralization played an important role in different outcomes of nonviolent civil resistance. The spontaneous character of the opposition in Romania undermined its ability to conduct effective negotiations with Ceausescu's regime, maintain nonviolent discipline, and create a viable alternative to the hard-line communists. As a result, the Romanian campaign of 1989 was extremely bloody and highly unsuccessful, as Ceausescu was replaced by other communist leaders.

In contrast, the existence of a strong coalition at the head of the Bulgarian pro-democracy campaign enabled the movement to conduct effective negotiations with Communist leaders, to prevent disruption of nonviolent discipline, and to provide the UDF as a viable alternative to the Communist Party. As a result, the Bulgarian anti-communist movement achieved political change without bloodshed.

The findings of this thesis open up interesting avenues for further research. First, it would be interesting to compare the importance of the level of centralization in nonviolent and violent civil resistance campaigns. The dataset compiled by Chenoweth and Stephan allows one to conduct such an analysis. Second, it would be interesting to include more recent cases of the nonviolent resistance, such as Arab Spring, in the dataset and compare the results.

The findings of the present research have important implications for our understanding of nonviolent action with both theoretical and practical value. Theoretically, they show that a movement's organizational type may be an important predictor of the success of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns, something that has so far been overlooked by the theoreticians of nonviolent action. The study also has practical implications. Its findings may serve as guidance for resistance movements' activists as they try to achieve political transformation through nonviolent methods.

Appendix

Model 1

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	60,095[a]	,350	,466

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	defect	3,055	,902	11,479	1	,001	21,231
	regviol	-1,154	1,142	1,021	1	,312	,315
	violsim	-1,020	,767	1,767	1	,184	,361
	lmembers	,279	,185	2,290	1	,098	1,322
	demdum	1,076	,664	2,626	1	,105	2,933
	Constant	-3,024	2,020	2,239	1	,135	,049

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: defect, regviol, violsim, lmembers, demdum.

Model 2

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	45,109[a]	,462	,616

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	defect	4,320	1,339	10,408	1	,001	75,197
	reqviol	-1,635	1,326	1,521	1	,218	,195
	violsim	-2,112	1,005	4,415	1	,036	,121
	lmembers	,296	,220	1,800	1	,180	1,344
	demdum	-,414	,849	,238	1	,626	,661
	spont	-2,322	1,356	2,932	1	,087	,098
	coal	1,822	1,019	3,194	1	,074	6,182
	Constant	-2,395	2,388	1,006	1	,316	,091

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: defect, reqviol, violsim, lmembers, demdum, spont, coal.

Model 3

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	42,538[a]	,485	,647

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 7 because parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	defect	5,212	1,637	10,131	1	,001	183,416
	reqviol	-2,382	1,553	2,351	1	,125	,092
	violsim	-2,766	1,135	5,935	1	,015	,063
	lmembers	,369	,238	2,405	1	,121	1,446
	demdum	-,785	,922	,725	1	,395	,456
	spont	-2,865	1,402	4,173	1	,041	,057
	coal	2,561	1,223	4,382	1	,036	12,943
	cw	1,502	,995	2,279	1	,131	4,492
	Constant	-3,533	2,559	1,906	1	,167	,029

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: defect, reqviol, violsim, lmembers, demdum, spont, coal, cw.

Model 4

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	39,085[a]	,514	,686

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because
parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	defect	4,839	1,391	12,106	1	,001	126,390
	regviol	-1,233	1,370	,810	1	,368	,291
	violsim	-2,971	1,182	6,317	1	,012	,051
	lmembers	,124	,265	,220	1	,639	1,132
	demdum	-,544	,909	,359	1	,549	,580
	spont	-2,868	1,497	3,672	1	,055	,057
	coal	2,696	1,198	5,068	1	,024	14,822
	statesup	-4,401	2,215	3,949	1	,047	,012
	Constant	-,585	2,878	,041	1	,839	,557

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: defect, regviol, violsim, lmembers, demdum, spont, coal, statesup.

Model 5

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	37,021[a]	,531	,708

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 7 because
parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	defect	5,782	1,742	11,022	1	,001	324,398
	regviol	-1,868	1,512	1,527	1	,217	,154
	violsim	-3,661	1,344	7,425	1	,006	,026
	lmembers	,151	,270	,311	1	,577	1,163
	demdum	-1,046	1,026	1,039	1	,308	,352
	spont	-3,469	1,574	4,856	1	,028	,031
	coal	3,458	1,412	5,999	1	,014	31,749
	statesup	-4,706	2,458	3,665	1	,056	,009
	cw	1,542	1,144	1,816	1	,178	4,673
	Constant	-1,281	2,907	,194	1	,660	,278

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: defect, regviol, violsim, lmembers, demdum, spont, coal, statesup, cw.

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