LEVERAGE AND LINKAGE:

COMPARING EXTERNAL DEMOCRATIZING PRESSURE AND REGIME OUTCOME IN AFRICA

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ABSTRACT
This study applies the Levitsky and Way’s leverage and linkage model on Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Angola to see if and how international factors were influential in determining the regime trajectories of these four cases in Africa. It asks why one of them democratized while others either remained authoritarian regimes or stalled in the transition phase even after having turnovers. The study argues that leverage and linkage operate in distinct ways and different degrees to raise the cost of authoritarianism. Different combinations determine the influence of domestic and international factors thus leading to variations in regime outcome. The regime outcomes from Ghana and Kenya largely follow the lines of the model. Their relatively strong ties to the West generated powerful and consistent international pressure that forced their autocratic regimes to democratize and introduce pluralist political systems in the early 1990s. Zimbabwe and Angola perfectly follow the line of the model. Zimbabwe, a case of low linkage and medium leverage, illustrates that leverage without linkage is not effective in raising the cost of authoritarianism. While Angola, a case of low leverage and high linkage illustrates that high linkage without a strong domestic pro-democracy movement and an effective opposition is unlikely to democratize.
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CHAPTER 1: FRAMING THE STUDY
This study is situated within the wider research on democratization which concerns itself with the causes of the political processes and conditions for fostering democracy. The number of democracies across the world has increased over the last few decades, Huntington’s (1991) “Third Wave” metaphor aptly describes the global spread of democracy from the 1970s to the 1990s in Latin America, Asia, Africa and Southern, Central and Eastern Europe. Scholars wrote of the “triumph of democracy” (Holden, 2000), “the end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992), “the democratic revolution” and how democracy had become a third “universal language” besides money and the internet (Diamond, 2000). The research on democratization has largely been on the structure and actor dimensions putting emphasis on domestic conditions and the interactions between the domestic political elites and citizens. Existing literature has treated democratization as an endogenous process occurring within ‘closed states’. There has been a tendency to treat domestic-structure and domestic-agency as too much of independent variables to the extent of separating “national politics” from “international politics/relations” (Gourevitch, 1978).

The realization that there exists a gap between domestic-oriented factors and empirical reality has more recently led to a growing body of empirical literature from various scholars on the subject of international dimension of democratization, among them include Peter Gourevitch (1978), Theda Skocpol (1979), Andrew Moravscik (1993), Robert Putnam (1988), Samuel P. Huntington (1991), Larry Diamond (2000), Hans Peter Schmitz (2006) O’Donell Guillermo (1992), Przeworski Adam (1986), Whitehead Laurence (1996), Schmitter Philippe (1996) and Lewitsky and Way (2010). It must be stated from the outset that the literature on the international factors to democratization is limited, even though there is a growing body of research on the
subject, it still cannot establish a causal relation between international factors and democratization.

The existing literature on the international dimension of regime change is skeptical about the significance of international factors on democratization. Mainstream research on democratization links socioeconomic development to the emergence of a stable democracy. Democracy is expected to emerge when either (1) increased wealth reduces the cost of toleration; or (2) strengthening of civil society as a result of modernization increases the cost of repression. Levitsky and Way (2010) argue that neither of these changes occurred on a large scale prior to the transitions experienced in Asia, Latin America, Africa or post-Communist Europe. Instead, they argue that changes in the post-Cold War world heightened the costs of authoritarianism in the developing world. According to them, it is changes in the international environment, and not domestic conditions that contributed immensely to the democratization wave in the 1990s.

Their framework for analyzing international influences on democratization captures an array of international influences that drove the 1990s democratization wave – diffusion, demonstration effects, political conditionality, transnational civil society, and new information technologies – and organizes them into two dimensions: Western leverage and linkage to the West. The dynamics of international influence on democratic transitions are poorly understood (McFaul, 2007) and among the questions that need to be answered include:

1 Hans Peter Schmitz (2006).
2 See Lipset (1981); Dahl (1971); Przeworski & Limongi (1997); and Robinson (2005).
“Do international factors, including democracy promotion policies of Western actors, play a significant role in encouraging or discouraging transitions to democracy?…What combination of domestic conditions and foreign “interventions” are most likely to lead to the weakening of nondemocratic regimes?…What are the pathways of external influence on domestic change and what does the nexus of interaction between external and domestic variables look like in reality?”

The aim of this study is to understand how external democratizing pressure from Western countries influenced regime outcomes in Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Angola. To fulfill this end, the study will conceptualize the international dimension of democratization (democracy promotion) in a framework developed by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way. In attempting to explain why some Western democracy promotion efforts have been effective in influencing reform while others have failed, they distinguish between “Western leverage (governments' vulnerability to external pressure) and linkage to the West (the density of a country's ties to the United States, the European Union, and Western-led multilateral institutions).”

An empirical mission will also be conducted to apply the Levitsky and Way framework to test if and how international factors matter in influencing domestic regime change. The overall ambition is to find an answer to the question: How does Western leverage and linkage (international factors) operate to effect domestic political change and variations in regime outcomes? This question will help us understand why the success of external democratizing

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pressures varied considerably across the cases. It will be important to see whether democratization occurred in countries where international influences appeared to be “thicker”.

The framework developed by Levitsky and Way for analysing the international influences on regime change will allow us to capture cross-national variation in the degree and nature of external democratizing pressure and regime outcomes.

The study hypothesises that leverage and linkage is an added value to external democracy promotion efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter Africa). Where there is leverage and significant linkage, the two will operate together to raise the cost of authoritarianism forcing domestic political elites to democratize. The first sub-question this research seeks to understand is whether leverage is sufficient enough to convince authoritarian regimes to democratize. Levitsky and Way argue that leverage is only effective when combined with linkage.

When we compare the identified cases, it is hypothesised that leverage alone – even in cases highly vulnerable to external democratising pressures – will not translate into an effective democratising pressure because Western pressure tended to ebb after the holding of multiparty elections which did not always translate into democratization. The second sub-question that this study seeks to understand is whether there is a positive causal relationship between leverage and linkage. Does the degree of linkage have a positive causal impact on the degree of leverage and vice versa? Although conceived as analytically distinct by Levitsky and Way, we hypothesise that leverage and linkage are intertwined and will have a positive causal relationship.
**Theoretical Mission**

The theoretical mission of this study is to identify the international factors to democratization and conceptualize them in the Levitsky and Way *Leverage* and *Linkage* theoretical framework to understand why some countries are more democratized than others. This framework is based on the assumption that the impact of international factors on democratization varies to a large degree, in the extent of the density of ties – economic, economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organisational, including cross-border flow of goods and services, capital, people, and information – between particular countries and the West.\(^7\) This study seeks to understand if and how densities of ties with the West, and vulnerability to Western democracy promotion pressures influence the level of democratization in target countries. The first step to apply this framework will be to conceptualize and measure the dependent factor – democratization (see chapter 2). The second step will be to identify the international dimension democratization and conceptualize it in the Levitsky and Way *Leverage* and *Linkage* framework (see chapter 3).

**Empirical Mission**

The empirical goal of the study is to apply the Levitsky and Way analytical framework to understand whether external pressures had significant influence on the democratization process of selected African countries. It is expected that this study will contribute to a better empirical understanding of influence external democracy promotion efforts on the democratization processes in Africa. However the primary aim of this study is to apply the Levitsky and Way’s framework to illustrate how Western leverage and linkage (international factors) cause domestic political change and variations in regime outcomes.

\(^7\) Levitsky & Way (2010).
**METHODOLOGY**

The methodology of this study will consider (1) the analytical framework to be employed; (2) the research design; and (3) the materials collected – literature and documents. The next two chapters will give special attention to literature on democratization including its measurement, conceptualization and international dimension. It will synthesise the literature on democratization to reach a more satisfactory theoretical framework. However, this section will first illustrate the dimension of analysis for this study, and then it will give a brief background of the analytical framework chosen for this study including discussing its main concepts.

**ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: LEVERAGE & LINKAGE**

In their *International Linkage and Democratization* (2005), Levitsky and Way offer a much more detailed theory of leverage and linkage for analyzing the international dimension of democratization which also helps in explaining regional variation in international influences and regime outcomes.\(^8\) They propose that their framework operates along two dimensions in the post cold war international environment: leverage, or the degree to which governments are vulnerable to external democratizing pressure and linkage, or the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) and cross-border flows (of trade and investment, people, and communication) between the US, EU and Western-led multilateral institutions.

External influence can only have impact if “asymmetrical power-relationship and a high degree of interdependence are in place – that is, if leverage is high, and linkages are dense.”\(^9\) Therefore, cross-national variation in international influence on democratization is explained by the vulnerabilities of target states to the West and the density of linkages.

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\(^8\) Jakob Tosstrup (2010)

\(^9\) Ibid
Levitsky and Way (2005) say that leverage, in the absence of linkages has rarely been successful in bringing democratic regime outcomes. But where linkage is high, like in Central Europe and Latin America, they say, international pressure has been a success in bringing about democratic regime outcomes.

In order to explain the variation in international influence on democratization, the model developed by Levitsky and Way is divided into two dimensions: Western leverage and Linkage to the West. Western leverage refers to the target government’s vulnerability to external pressures to democratize. The level of vulnerability is, however, influenced by the size and strength of the country and its economy. Therefore, small countries – weak economically and militarily such as sub-Saharan Africa – will be much more vulnerable to external pressures for reform than powerful countries such as India, China, and Russia. Where Western states have less strategic interests in the target state, the regime will be more vulnerable to external pressures unlike in a state where the West has important economic and security interests. Freezing aid, sanctions, and military intervention are the commonly employed punitive measures against vulnerable authoritarian regimes.

A third factor that limit leverage is the existence of a regional power that can provide alternative sources of economic, military and diplomatic support. In Asia, regional powers such as Japan and China mitigated external influences while in Eastern Europe and Central Asia Russia played the same role. In sub-Saharan Africa, there was no regional power to counter the influences of Western powers, but to a small extent, South Africa did play a role in supporting autocrats in

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Southern Africa.\textsuperscript{11} Levitsky and Way say that for leverage to be effective, it must be combined with linkage. Linkage is defined as the density of ties and cross border flows between a particular country and the US, the EU and Western dominated multilateral institutions.\textsuperscript{12} Levitsky and Way (2006) break it into five dimensions: economic, which includes trade, credit, and bilateral and multilateral aid. Geopolitical/intergovernmental includes diplomatic ties to Western governments, participation in Western-led alliances, treaties and organizations. Social linkage includes the flow of people across borders – migration, tourism, refugees, diaspora communities and Western educated locals. Information linkage is the flow of information and communication across borders while the last dimension is transnational nongovernmental. This refers to local ties to international nongovernmental organizations, churches, and other transnational networks.\textsuperscript{13}

But the most important linkage is geographical proximity. Countries in the neighborhood of the US and EU tend to have strong economic ties, extensive inter-government contact, high cross border exchanges – people, goods and information making them more vulnerable to external pressures to democratize. But the most important characteristic of linkage is “soft power”, it influences non state actors and citizens through diffusion of Western democratic values which “blurs the international and domestic politics, transforming international expectations into domestic demands.”\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{11} Levitsky & Way (2005).
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid
\textsuperscript{13} Levitsky & Way (2005).
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid
**Research Design: Process Tracing**

This study is an explanatory study that will describe and explain the phenomena under study. The study will use process tracing to explore the differences in the dependent factor (democratization/regime outcome) by existing differences in the independent factor (leverage and linkage). This method will allow us to reveal interesting and significant differences in the effects of leverage and linkage on the differences in the level of democratization in the cases under study. Process tracing involves the examination of “diagnostic” pieces of evidence within a case that contribute to supporting or overturning alternative explanatory hypotheses. Researchers must examine a number of histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other similar sources pertaining to their specific case in order to determine whether a proposed theoretical hypothesis is evident in a case under study.15

**Selection of Cases**

Case studies are detailed examination of a single example. They provide data of a richness and detail that are difficult to obtain from broader surveys. Therefore, the study gives detailed account of the external influences on democratization and variations in regime outcomes in Africa. The selection of cases has resulted in Kenya, Ghana, Zimbabwe and Angola being picked. Two selection biases have been considered: (1) cases have been selected to support the theory to be tested; (2) selected cases vary in the independent factor to allow us to illustrate how leverage and linkage operate to effect variation in regime outcome.

These cases have important similarities as well as differences. First, they are all former colonies. Second, these countries have been highly dependent on external political, economic and military

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support. As a consequence, their limited sovereignty makes them extremely vulnerable to foreign interests. However, these countries also share significant differences in terms of wealth, natural resources and in their level of engagement with the West. While Ghana and Kenya have more deepening ties with the West, Angola and Zimbabwe are more engaged with China, receiving diplomatic, economic and military support. These countries also differ significantly in their levels of democratic development.

**MATERIAL**

This study will rely on statistics, literature and documents developed by the US government, the UK Government, the European Union and Freedom House including local and international organizations involved in democracy promotion. The use of documents from the US, the UK and the EU will allow us to gain information on democracy promotion efforts and strategies from the West. The documents consist of published programs, papers, reports, communication as well as contracts. The Freedom House survey will provide data on the rankings of countries based on the degree of their political and civil liberties. These documents will be evaluated to ensure optimum reliability.

The review of literature will include concepts, theories and interpretations of the theoretical body on democratization, highlighting the existing knowledge as well as shortcomings. Newspaper items are also used extensively to reach the data that is necessary for the analysis. Almost all relevant official documents declared by the relevant institutions regarding the political development and human rights records of the cases under study and published between 1991 and 2013 are analyzed and classified.
OUTLINE OF THE STUDY
Based on this introduction, this study is divided into three parts. The first part, Chapter 2-3 sets out the conceptual, analytical and theoretical framework. The second part, Chapter 4, applies the theoretical framework on the cases under study. The third part, Chapter 5, summarizes the study and sheds light on the theoretical and empirical findings, contributions as well as limitations.

- **Chapter 1** has set out the theoretical and empirical goals of this study. It has also touched upon the methodology and gave a background of the analytical framework for this study, including discussing its main concepts.

- **Chapter 2** sets out to conceptualize and measure democratization. It touched on basic concepts of what constitutes democracy, transition and consolidation.

- **Chapter 3** starts by conceptualizing the international dimension of democratization. International factors to democratization will be conceptualized as democracy promotion – the process of external actors promoting democracy to domestic actors. This chapter will further explore the level of democratization in Kenya, Ghana, Zimbabwe, and Angola and explain the different trajectories taken by these countries that have resulted in two of them (Ghana and Kenya) attaining higher levels of democratization while the other two (Angola and Zimbabwe) have remain stuck in authoritarianism.

- **Chapter 4** applies the leverage and linkage analytical to study the international dimension of democratization and explore the roles played by the Western governments and Western-led multilateral institutions in influencing regime change and democratization in the identified cases.
Chapter 5 concludes and summarises the findings, contributions and limitations of the study on the role played by international factors in democratization. The chapter also highlights areas for possible research in future.
CHAPTER 2: DEMOCRATIZATION – CONCEPTS AND MEASUREMENT

This chapter is organised into two parts. The first part will begin by setting out the definition of democracy. The second part will discuss and conceptualize the dependent factor democratization including how it is measured.

CONCEPTUALIZING DEMOCRACY

The first step in dealing with the subject of democratization is to clarify the meaning of democracy as it is used in this study. The concept of democracy as a form of government has been defined in terms of sources of authority, purposes served by government, and procedures for constituting government (Huntington 1991). However, there is ambiguity when democracy is defined in terms of sources of authority. Democracy is seen as positive symbol virtually everywhere in the world and authoritarian regimes have described their one-party states as people’s democracies. Whereas defining democracy in terms of purpose of government does not give any indication about what the purpose is.

Debate on the modern conception of democracy has generally been divided into two main groups:

“...minimalist” or “procedural” and a “maximalist” perspective. “...One group seeks to balance democratic participation against other desirable rights of political order...by limiting the spheres of society that are organized democratically. The other group...sees such limits to democracy as an important cause for many of the ills of contemporary liberal democracies.”16

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16 Mark Warren (1991:8).
In his 1942 seminal study, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, Schumpeter developed an elite conception of democracy to avoid the deficiencies associated with the classical understanding of democracy in terms of “the rule of the people” or “the common good”. He defined democracy as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote (Schumpeter, 1970). The Schumpeterian conception of democracy has been very influential on a growing number of theorists determined to go against the classical vein and draw distinctions, for analytical purposes, between “…rationalistic, utopian, idealistic definitions of democracy on the one hand, and empirical, descriptive, institutional, and procedural definitions, on the other…”

Huntington follows the Schumpeterian mode and defines a political system as democratic to the extent that principal holders of government offices are selected through free, fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates are allowed to compete freely for votes and there is universal adult suffrage. Robert Dahl’s criteria for democracy or what he calls a “polyarchy” to denote a representative liberal democracy includes a widely inclusive adult electorate, existence of basic civil and political freedoms to speak, assemble and organize that are necessary for participation and electoral competition.

Procedural or minimalist democracy puts emphasis on two key dimensions that are critical for any political system to be considered as democratic – participation and contestation, a third dimension of basic civil and political rights has been added because it is argued that participation and contestation have to be based on civil and political liberties to be effective. This approach makes it effectively possible to analyze and compare political systems based on their level of

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democracy and judge which ones are becoming more or less democratic. So defined, Robert Dahl’s criteria for democracy entails a number of bench-marks:

1. Elected officials: Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials.
2. Free and Fair election: Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.
3. Inclusive suffrage: Practically, all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials.
4. Right to run for office: Practically, all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the government, though age limits may be higher for holding office than for the suffrage.
5. Freedom of Expression: Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the socioeconomic order, and the prevailing ideology.
6. Alternative information: Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by laws.
7. Associational autonomy: To achieve their various rights, including those listed above, citizens also have a right to form relatively independent political parties and interest groups. (Dahl, 1989:221; Dahl, 1971:3-20).

The procedural approach to democracy accords scholars with practical tools that can be applied to political systems across the world and easily compile a list of democratic and non-democratic countries including those that fall in between the grey zone. However, some scholars have expanded Dahl’s definition on procedural democracy to include civilian control over the armed forces (Burnell and Calvert, 1999:3), others have highlighted the ‘rule of law’ as not just a desirable addition to democratic governance but a necessary precondition to for a fully democratic state; “no state, no rechtsstaat, no democracy” (Juan Linz: 1997 120-121). Diamond regards respect for minorities and human rights as indispensable in a democracy “…Cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups, as well as traditionally disadvantaged or unempowered majorities, are not prohibited (legally or in practice) from expressing their
interests in the political process, and from using their language and culture.” (Diamond, 1996: 23). In this study, democracy is conceived in the procedural minimalist sense along Dahl’s seven bench-marks. Normative definitions of democracy would not provide useful analysis for this study, in Huntington’s words, elections, open, free, and fair, are the essence of democracy, the *sine qua non*.

**CONCEPTUALIZING DEMOCRATIZATION**

In this study democratization concerns the political process that leads toward democracy. Potter succinctly defines democratization as follows: “…political changes moving in a democratic direction” (Potter 1997: 3). This definition implies that democratization is an ongoing process and to understand this process we must understand the several phases involved. To understand democratization as a political process leading to democracy there is also a need to conceptualize the different types of political regimes. The different types of regimes influence the nature of the democratization process i.e. the less democratic the regime is the more troublesome the democratization process will be (Beetham 1999: 71-75). Based on this understanding, a discussion on the different phases of democratization will illustrate democratization as a political process entailing the transplacement of a regime from dictatorship to democracy.
**Phases of Democratization**

Having examined and conceptualized democratization and the different types of political regimes of interest to this study, the next phase of this chapter will discuss what entails transition and consolidation as conceptualized in the body of literature on democratization. If we define *democratization* as simply “political changes moving in a democratic direction” (Potter, 1997:3), it entails a “transition” to relatively more democratic regime from undemocratic one, and a process of consolidation on the way to a “consolidated democracy”. These two “phases” of transformation have constituted the main research agenda of the democratization literature.

**Transition**

O’Donnell and Schmitter in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, define “transition” as the interval between the authoritarian regime and the consolidated democracy. Transition starts simply with the “breakdown” of an authoritarian regime and ends when a relatively stable configuration of political institutions in a democratic regime is installed. Linz and Stepan say a democratic transition ends when:

> “…sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government *de facto* has the authority to generate new polices, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies *de jure.*”\(^{18}\)

\(^{18}\) Linz and Stepan (1996:3).
Many transition states mostly end up being electoral democracies where democratic practices are mixed with undemocratic ones. Such electoral democracies may put restrictions on popular participation, some may be influenced by vestiges of clientelistic channels from the previous authoritarian order, other electoral democracies may have limited civilian control over the military and while others have serious records of human rights violation. Larry Diamond has called these regimes as pseudo-democracy, illiberal democracy, hybrid democracy, delegative democracy, uncertain democracy, hollow democracy, frozen democracy and semi-democracy (Diamond 2002:23-25; Schedler 2002, Levitsky & Way 2002). In many of these countries, seasonal free, fair and regular elections are held, but participation beyond voting remains shallow and government accountability is weak (Carothers: 2002: 15). It is important for these democracies with adjectives to move forward with the political process towards democratic consolidation or risk regressing to authoritarianism.

**Consolidation**

Many studies on democratization generally link consolidation at the end of the democratization process as signalled by the first free and fair open elections, the end of the uncertainty period and the implementation of a minimum quality of substantive democracy (Linz & Stepan 1996; O’Donnell 1993). Other studies use the metaphor “the only game in town” to refer to a consolidated democracy (Linz & Stepan 1996:15, Schedler 1998:91-98). The only game in town metaphor refers to democracy as the only legitimate framework for conducting political interactions and seeking public office. Consolidation is essentially transition from electoral democracy to liberal democracy, in O’Donnell’s words, the second transition from democratic government to democratic regime.
A consolidated democracy consists of, besides regular free and fair elections, a “...broad and
deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at both and elite and mass levels,
believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than
any other realistic alternative they can imagine.”(Diamond, 1999:65). The consolidation process
usually begins with drafting or rewriting a democratic constitution and institutionalization
process in the development of effective inclusive and representative political institutions -
civilian controlled military, inclusive executive, judiciary and legislature branches, and rule of
law, transparent public administration and the development of a democratic culture with
extensive civil and political liberties.

According to Huntington (1991), “…institutionalization is the process by which organizations
and procedures acquire value and stability.” In similar vein, Diamond says what transition
democracies need is political institutionalization inter alia:

“Strengthening the formal representative and governmental structures of
democracy so that they become more coherent, complex, autonomous, and
adaptable and thus more capable, effective, valued, and binding... institutionalization enhances trust and cooperation among political actors...Thus it
helps to draw reliable boundaries around the uncertainty of politics and to
facilitate trust, tolerance, and moderation, civility, and loyalty to the democratic
system” (Diamond, 1999:75).

Consolidation has also been defined using the “two election test” (Huntington 1991) or the
“generation test” (Beetham 1994). It has also generally been defined along three dimensions –
firm institutionalization as well as norms and behavior on different levels: the elite level, the top
decision makers, organizational leaders, political activists, and opinion shapers; the intermediate
level, parties, organizations, and movements; and the level of the mass public (Diamond,
Linz and Stepan offer a more comprehensive but similar definition of consolidation of democracy, they argue;

“Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant national, social, economic, political or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or by seceding from the state. Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of the public opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life, and when support for anti-system alternatives is quite small or is more-or-less isolated from pro-democratic forces. Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike become subject to, as well as habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the bounds of the specific laws, procedures and institutions that are sanctioned by the new democratic process” (Linz & Stepan 1997:16, cf. Linz & Stepan 1996).

By way of summary, three dimensions of consolidation come to fore: institutional, behavioural, and attitudinal dimensions of consolidation. Consolidation occurs when democracy becomes “the only game in town”, institutionally, behaviourally, and attitudinally.

**Measuring Democratization**

Most measurements of democratization, as widely accepted by scholars largely focus on: political competition among individuals and political groups; participation of citizen through directly electing the holders of political offices in free and fair elections and holding them accountable; the civil and political liberties that ensure competition and participation through freedom of speech, expression and assembly (Sorensen 1993:13). There are several indices that attempt to measure the degree of democracy in a large number of countries and they are generally grouped into those that on the one hand, separate between democracies and non
democracies, while on the other hand, those that measure democracy on a scale of more or less democracy leading to nominal as well as ordinal or interval results (Munk 2001:9).

Many researchers draw inspiration from Robert Dahl’s (1989) seven institutional guarantees of a democracy as a starting point. Tatu Vanhanen’s (2000) Index of Democratization, for example, adheres strictly to Dahl’s two dimensions – participation and competition – and applied to 172 countries. Vanhanen measures participation and competition as two qualitative indicators and the higher the degrees of participation and competition, the more democratized. Bollen’s (1990) index of participation also takes inspiration from Dahl but expands the number of dimensions to include more substantive forms of democracy such as adult suffrage, executive and legislative selection, effectiveness, limitations, political party and government legitimacy, constitutional development among others.

By contrast, Michael Coppedge and Wolfgang Reinicke’s Polyarchy Scale has contestation as its sole dimension, while Przeworski (2000) conceptualize democracy in a one-dimensional way as the contestation of political offices. Some of the most widely used measures of democratization, however, are based on a multidimensional view. Monty Marshall and Keith Jaggers’ Polity IV index, for example, captures three dimensions – ‘executive recruitment’: the process by which holders of political offices are selected, ‘political competition and participation’: the extent to which the public is able to influence political elites, and ‘independence of executive authority’: the relationship between the executive and other political institutions (Marshall and Jaggers 2007).
The Freedom House Index, which is used in this study, captures political rights (competition and participation) and civil liberties as two overarching dimensions, which are each composed of several sub-dimensions. For each dimension a seven-point scale is used, so that the highest ranking countries (that is, those with the highest degree of democracy) are 1–1’s and the lowest are 7–7’s. In other words, the index attempts to reflect the space of semi-democracy or semi-authoritarianism between outright authoritarian (7–7) and fully democratic (1–1) regimes. Countries with an average rating between 1 and 2.5 are considered free; those with an average between 3 and 5.0 are partly free; and those with ratings from 5.5 to 7 are considered not free.

The dimension of political rights include: free and fair elections of head of state or head of government, free and fair elections of legislative representatives, fair electoral laws and fair campaigning opportunities, possibility to endow elected representatives real power, rights to politically organize interests and ability to vote down competing parties, possibility to act as opposition and have real chance to gain power, absence of undemocratic domination of military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies and freedom of minority groups to reasonable self-determination and self-government, autonomy or participation in the political system. The civil liberties dimension encompasses freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, the rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights (Freedom House 2012). The index follows in the Schumpeterian tradition of free and fair elections as the minimum standard for a democracy. According to Freedom House, an electoral democracy is where:
“...voters can choose their authoritative leaders freely from among competing groups and individuals not designated by the government; voters have access to information about candidates and their platforms; voters can vote without undue pressure from the authorities; and candidates can campaign free from intimidations”\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{19} www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm (2005-04-22)
CHAPTER 3: INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF DEMOCRATIZATION

This chapter starts with a theoretical discussion on the international factors to democratization. It also explores the level of democratization in Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Angola and explains the different trajectories taken by these countries that have resulted in two of them (Ghana and Kenya) attaining higher levels of democratization while the other two (Angola and Zimbabwe) have remain stuck in authoritarianism.

THEORETICAL APPROACHES

In his famous essay on the interaction of domestic and international politics, Robert Putnam wrote that “…Domestic politics and international relations are often somewhat entangled, but our theories have not yet sorted out the puzzling tangle.”\(^{20}\) Scholars of comparative politics have expressed similar ideas concerning the discipline. More than three decades ago Peter Gourevitch stated that “students of comparative politics treat domestic structure too much as an independent variable, underplaying the extent to which it and the international system parts of an interactive system.”\(^{21}\) Douglas Chalmers observed that scholars of comparative politics frequently ignore international factors. When attention is paid, it is usually restricted to intervention, dependency, subversion or foreign aid (Chalmers 1993). Democratization has been one area of study in comparative politics in which the dismissal of international factors was perhaps more pronounced. Geoffrey Pridham has argued that the international context is the forgotten dimension in the study of democratization (Pridham 1991:1).

The global wave of democratization in the late 1980 and early 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe influenced scholars in the fields of international relations and comparative politics to build approaches that would help analysts explore the international factors to democratization.

\(^{20}\) Putnam 1993:431
\(^{21}\) Peter Gourevitch (1978:900)
In this regard, a number of interdisciplinary approaches have emerged to confront the fuzzy ‘international context’ of democratic regime change. However, as argued by Pridham, the international factors do not yet present a widely accepted theory:

“…the ‘international context’, really a collective term for different external influences, clearly requires close examination to establish its exact influence on the course of regime change in a particular region” (Pridham 1994:7).

Important approaches in the study of the international dimension of democratization include Laurence Whitehead’s ‘democratization through convergence’ (Whitehead 1991), Geoffrey Pridham’s ‘democratization through system penetration’ (Pridham 1991), and Douglas Chalmers’ ‘internationalized domestic politics’ (Chalmers 1993). Others include diffusion models like Samuel P. Huntington’s ‘snowballing or demonstration effects’ (1991), Daniel Brinks and Michael Coppedge’s ‘neighbor emulation’ (2006) and Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s ‘leverage and linkage’ (2001) which this study seeks to explore further in new case studies.

**Democracy Diffusion**

Couched in the language of ‘globalisation’, diffusion refers to the various interactions and interlinkages between two structures, one being the international context and the other being a single country situated within that context. The diffusion of global characteristics, within economics, technology and culture, was said to create an intensification of interactions, exchanges and meetings in the world that enhanced interdependence (Munk 1996). In the debate concerning globalization in the 1980s, it was argued that such interdependence influenced states, regions and
citizens. Global changes cut through geographical distances and influenced the domestic political, economic and cultural structures.\textsuperscript{22}

It was not until the ‘third wave’ of democratization that scholars switched their attention to the international dimension of democratization. Samuel P. Huntington’s three ‘waves’ of democratization is a predecessor of the diffusion approach. In his 1991 book, \textit{The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (1991)}, Huntington refers to the ‘snowballing’ or ‘demonstration effects’, enhanced by the tremendous expansion of global communications, of the “worldwide democratic revolution”. Distant downfall of authoritarian regimes in the mid-1980s seemed to have real relevance to elites and their public in far-off countries.

The diffusion of democracy may happen among countries that are geographically proximate or regions with similar political, economic and cultural structures or historical ties like colonialism. In follow up article, ‘After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave’, Huntington elaborates further the concept of diffusion. He argues that non-Western societies that have been more receptive to either electoral or liberal democracy tend to vary directly with the extent to which those societies have been subject to Western influences (Huntington 1997:10). He went on to recommend the formation of a network on democratic nations of the world under the aegis of Democratic International to institutionalize the channels of the diffusion of democracy in the world.

Huntington argues that democracy diffusion is not created by causes but by causers. Political leaders and publics have to act.\textsuperscript{23} Actors or agents have received considerable attention in the study of democracy diffusion. Diffusion agents help spread democracy by interpreting

\textsuperscript{22} Munk
\textsuperscript{23} Huntington third wave 1991:107
democratic ideas and ideals to a local setting. They are usually located in the domestic or global environment with transnational networks (Munk 1996, Uhlin 1995). Diffusion agents, such as Solidarity and Charta 77, played important roles in the democratization of Central Europe. Other important agents were students, gender movements, human rights movements, civil rights movements as well as intellectuals. These civil society agents received much of their power due to their transnational network with similar agents in the West.

The idea of democracy diffusion has been elaborated in two analytical models. However, these models are restricted to the interaction of geographically proximate countries – excluding other states and international actors. Daniel Brinks and Michael Coppadge (2006) examine the magnitude and direction of regime change in a set of countries between 1972 and 1996. They found that countries tend to change their regimes to match the average degree of democracy or non democracy prevalent in their region, with countries in the US sphere being particularly more democratic (Brinks and Coppadge 2006:246).

A second diffusion model of democratization has been developed by Kristian Skrede and Michael D. Ward (2006). They found that the probability that an authoritarian regime will become democratic increased as more of its neighbouring states are democratic or experience transitions to democracy (Haerpfer and Wezel 2009).
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

Literature on ‘democracy promotion’ which have proliferated from the end of 1980s treat the ‘international context’ of democratization as a ‘global agent’, be it the USA, the EU, the UN or a transnational advocacy network like Amnesty International. This global agent has been shown as deliberately trying to impart and spread new ideas, values, and institutions for the purpose of spreading democracy in the world.

Philippe C. Schmitter and Imco Brouwer (1999) define democracy promotion as ‘aims to contribute to the political liberalization of autocratic regimes and their subsequent democratization in specific countries’. It refers to the pro democratic pressure to domestic political actors. A $5 to $10 billion dollar industry according to estimates provided by Peter Burnell, democracy promotion is carried out by such activities as “...sanctions, diplomatic protests, threats of military intervention, activities to promote the observance of human rights, the acceptance of civic norms, and the transfer of institutional models such as electoral systems.”

An impressive contribution to the study of democracy promotion was Laurence Whitehead’s *The International Dimensions of Democratization– Europe and the Americas* (2001). He explored different modes of external influences on democratization through ‘contagion’, ‘control’ and ‘consent’. He stressed these modes as the main headings for international factors to be grouped and analyzed under.

He suggested that each heading might include different actors, motivations and processes and that could bring further light on the international factors to democratization (Whitehead 2000:4-24).

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24 Peter Burnell (2008:38),  
25 Hakayan Yilmaz 2009 in inglehart
22). He added that different modes include different actors, motivations and processes which overlap. First consent or conditional cooperation (Schmitter 2001:29-30) refers to a mode of influence uses political and economic incentives to encourage regimes to democratize. It is the use of coercion by attaching specific conditions – democratization – to distribution of economic and political benefits to the recipient (Schmitter 2001:30, Whitehead 2001:395-412). Second, control refers to a mode of influence refers to deliberate acts or imposition or intervention from powerful actors beyond state borders and without domestic consent. The promoter promotes democracy to consolidate influence in its sphere of influence (Whitehead 2001:8-15). Third, contagion is a mode of influence that is non-coercive and unintentional. Countries replicate political institutions of their neighbours without any form of external coercion or influence whether governmental or otherwise (Whitehead 2001:5).

In their book *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War* (2010), Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way propose a model to analyze democracy promotion. Their model operates along two dimensions in the post cold war international environment: leverage, or the degree to which governments are vulnerable to external democratizing pressure and linkage, or the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) and cross-border flows (of trade and investment, people, and communication) between the US, EU and Western-led multilateral institutions. Their model is based on the presented ideas of democracy diffusion and democracy promotion. But what exactly are these ‘international factors’ to democratization?

As Schmitter argues, these factors are “notoriously” difficult to specify (Schmitter, 1996: 28-29). In order to overcome this complexity of international factors, Levitsky and Way’s model conceptualizes the ‘international factor’ to democracy promotion into two dimensions – leverage and linkage.
**The International Factor: Leverage and Linkage**

As discussed earlier, studies on the external dimension of democratization have focused on two mechanisms of international influence in the post-Cold War era: *diffusion* or ‘demonstration effects’ enhanced by the expansion of communication technologies, is said to spread global changes through geographical distances and influence domestic political, economic and cultural structures. Democracy may diffuse among countries that are geographically proximate or regions with similar political, economic and cultural structures or historical ties like colonialism.\(^{26}\) The other mechanism that has received a lot of scholarly attention is *democracy promotion* by Western powers particularly the United States, the United Kingdom, the EU and transnational advocacy networks like Freedom House. The primary force for regime change is external efforts by these agents to contribute to the political liberalization of authoritarian regimes abroad and their subsequent democratization through sanctions, multilateral conditionality, diplomatic protests, transfer of institutional models, and in a few cases direct military intervention.\(^{27}\)

Levitsky and Way argue that despite the heightened scholarly attention, the relationship between the international environment and regime change remains poorly understood. Firstly, they point out the failure to integrate the various mechanisms of international influence into a single coherent framework instead of just presenting “…a laundry list of the various mechanisms of international influence or limit the focus to a single mechanism.” (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Secondly, they argue that many studies fail to analyze how international influence varies across regions. Diffusion effects were “thicker” in Latin America and Eastern Europe than in Asia and the former Soviet Union (Whitehead, 1999). Democracy promotion was more pronounced in

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\(^{26}\) For more discussion on mechanisms of international influence, see Whitehead (1996), Huntington (1991; 997), and Schmitter (1996).

Eastern Europe in the 1990s whereas in Africa it was largely “rhetorical” and focused more on holding elections instead of deeper political reforms (Diamond 1999). The effectiveness of conditionality varied across regions. EU pre-accession process and tied to adopting liberal reforms was instrumental in transforming Eastern Europe, in Africa, political conditionality tied to aid and international finance had only a limited democratizing impact (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997:182).

Levitsky and Way’s model tries to capture this variation by integrating the different mechanisms of international influence into a concise theoretical framework by organizing them into dimensions: Western Leverage and Linkage to the West. They define Western leverage as the “governments’ vulnerability to external democratizing pressure.” This pressure may be exerted through positive conditionality (EU membership), punitive sanctions such as aid suspension and economic sanctions, diplomatic protests and in few instances military intervention (Levitsky and Way, 2006).

Departing from Vachudova’s (2005) definition of leverage as the exercise of economic and political power, they conceptualize leverage as not the exercise of such power, but the vulnerability of a country to such pressure. Leverage therefore is the “…regimes’ bargaining power vis-à-vis the West,” or their ability to avoid Western punitive actions in response to political repression or encouraging political reforms and the potential impact of such actions on their countries. In summary, Western leverage is high where a country lacks bargaining power and is severely affected by Western punitive actions. Western leverage is low when a country has sufficient bargaining power and can survive Western punitive actions. The degree of leverage is influenced by three factors.

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28 Levitsky and Way (2010).
The first is the size of the state and its economy. Weak states with small aid dependent economies are extremely vulnerable to Western pressure that those with large economies and substantial military power. External democratizing pressure exerted on India, China or Russia will have less impact than in much of Africa. A second factor limiting leverage is the existence of competing Western foreign policy and security objectives. Therefore, Western powers have exerted little democratizing pressure on major oil producers (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Angola) or states that are strategic in Western security objectives abroad (e.g., Pakistan, Ethiopia and Djibouti as important allies in the War against terror). The third factor limiting the degree of leverage is the existence of a regional power that can provide alternative sources of economic, military and diplomatic support. In Asia, (China and Japan), former Soviet Union (Russia), and Sub-Saharan Africa (South Africa, France and China) have been instrumental in mitigating the impact of Western pressure on authoritarian regimes to democratize (Levitsky and Way, 2006).

Linkage is critical to understanding why the effectiveness of international influence varied across regions and countries. Levitsky and Way define linkage as density of ties and cross border flows between a particular country and the US, the EU and Western dominated multilateral institutions. Levitsky and Way (2010) break it into five dimensions: economic, which includes trade, credit, and bilateral and multilateral aid. Geopolitical/intergovernmental includes diplomatic ties to Western governments, participation in Western-led alliances, treaties and organizations. Social linkage includes the flow of people across borders – migration, tourism, refugees, diaspora communities and Western educated locals. Information linkage is the flow of

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29 Ibid
information and communication across borders while the last dimension is transnational nongovernmental. This refers to local ties to international nongovernmental organizations, churches, and other transnational networks.\(^30\)

Linkage can be a product of extensive historical contacts including colonialism, military occupation and geopolitical alliances. It is also enhanced by cross-border trade, communication and travel (Levitsky and Way, 2006). However, the most important linkage is geographical proximity. Countries in the neighborhood of the US and EU tend to have strong economic ties, extensive inter-government contact, high cross border exchanges – people, goods and information making them more vulnerable to external pressures to democratize. Extensive political and economic contacts create interdependence among states creating opportunities for transmitting international influence. An important characteristic of linkage is “soft power”, it influences non state actors and citizens through diffusion of Western democratic values which “blurs the international and domestic politics, transforming international expectations into domestic demands.” \(^31\) Linkage is best understood when couched in the language of globalization, it is facilitated by extensive ties “…networks; organizations; and flows of people, information and resources among states”\(^32\) via long-term contacts.

Linkage can contribute to democratization in three ways: (1) it heightens international reverberation caused by autocratic abuse; (2) it creates pro-democratic domestic constituencies; and (3) it reshapes the domestic balance of power within authoritarian regimes by strengthening

\(^{30}\) Levitsky & Way (2005).

\(^{31}\) Ibid

\(^{32}\) Gleditsch (2000:13)
democratic and opposition forces. Extensive media coverage, penetration of transnational advocacy networks, as well as the flow of people and information, increases the chances of authoritarian brutal repression of pro-democratic forces to receive substantial attention in Western media. Extensive international media coverage of authoritarian abuses will increase the likelihood action from Western countries. “…lobbying by INGOs, exile and diaspora communities and religious and party networks often generates a “do-something” effect that puts pressure on Western governments to act.”

However, where Western media coverage is limited and INGOs penetration is weak, violations of human rights and brutal political repression have managed to slip through the radar of international media putting little pressure on Western governments to act. Linkage is also effective in creating pro-democracy domestic constituencies. Where linkage is extensive, elites, individuals, firms, and organization maintain personal, professional and financial ties to the West (Levitsky and Way, 2006).

These actors have a stake in ensuring their governments adhere to democratic norms or put their Western links – professional, markets, investments, jobs, and reputations – at risk. Linkage thus creates an elite constituency of intellectuals, technocrats and corporate leaders, who for fear of the professional or economic costs of associating with a norm-violating regime will have an interest in advocating for political reforms in their countries. Finally, linkage also reshapes the domestic balance of power within norm-violating regimes. Opposition ties to the Western governments, transnational party networks, and INGOs may provide critical resources, including protection and access to international media to pro-democracy groups.

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**LEVERAGE, LINKAGE AND VARIATION IN EXTERNAL PRESSURE**

Leverage and linkage operate in distinct ways and different degrees to raise the cost of authoritarianism. Different combinations determine the influence of domestic and international factors, this in turn leads to variations in regime outcome. As noted previously, where leverage and linkage is high, international factors dominate and may lead to democratization. Where leverage and linkage is low, domestic factors dominate and rarely do they lead to democracy. External pressure is usually limited to elections and large-scale human rights violations. Table 1 illustrates different combinations of leverage and linkage and how they shape external pressure for democratization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Linkage</th>
<th>Low Linkage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High Leverage</strong></td>
<td>Consistent and intense democratizing pressure</td>
<td>Strong, but intermittent and &quot;electoralist,&quot; pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Leverage</strong></td>
<td>Consistent but diffuse indirect democratizing pressure</td>
<td>Weak external pressure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Levitsky and Way (2010) *Competitive Authoritarian Regimes: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*

Where both leverage and linkage are high, there is likelihood of democratization to occur. Authoritarian incumbents are extremely vulnerable to external pressure and violation of democratic norms is likely to receive international attention and trigger punitive actions from Western governments. In such a context, incumbent face consistent democratizing pressures
from Western governments and are under the full glare of international media, intense monitoring by INGOs, and domestic pro-democracy groups, including technocrats and elites with economic and personal ties to the West. High linkage also increases the likelihood of Western governments to employ the mechanisms of leverage at their disposal, and when such punitive actions prove costly for the country, the incumbent will be forced to democratize. Cases of low linkage and high leverage are unlikely to result in democratization. However, international democratizing pressure is significant but it tends to be weaker and focused only in the lead up to elections leaving room for autocrats to stabilize their regimes. In such cases, democratization can only occur when there is a strong domestic movement for democratization. However, where domestic pro-democracy movements are weak, such cases are least likely to democratize.

In high linkage and low leverage cases, democratization is likely to occur. Albeit gradually and is contingent upon a strong and active opposition, Western pressure, though not substantial, although pressure from INGOs and international media may bring pressure to bear on the regime to democratize. Incumbents are likely to accept electoral defeat because their reforms are informed by the desire to maintain their international reputation as norm abiding.

Finally, in low leverage and low linkage countries, democratization is least likely to occur, as the incumbent is not vulnerable to Western pressure, abuses will rarely make international headline making it unlikely for Western governments to respond to the abuses with punitive action. Most low leverage and low linkage countries are likely to remain competitive authoritarian of move to full-scale authoritarianism.  

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35 For a comprehensive discussion on the dynamic of leverage and linkage, see Levitsky and Way (2010: 39-69).
MEASURING LEVERAGE

Low Leverage: Cases that meet one of the following:

1. Total GDP of more than $80 billion (Source World Bank, online: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD).
2. Annual production of more than 500,000 barrels of crude oil per day (Source U.S. Energy Information Administration, online: http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/).

Medium Leverage: Cases that meet one of the following:

1. Total GDP of between $30 billion and $50 billion.
2. Annual production of 100,000 to 250,000 barrels of crude oil per day.
3. Countries receiving black knight assistance at least one percent of GDP in terms of aid and FDI from a major power that is not the United States or the EU. China and South Africa are considered black knights in this study (Source Aid Data, online http://aiddatachina.org/map).

High Leverage: Cases that meet none of the criteria for medium or low leverage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Economy</th>
<th>Major Oil Producer (b/d thousands)</th>
<th>Medium Economy (US Millions)</th>
<th>Medium Oil Producer (b/d thousands)</th>
<th>Small Economy (US Hundreds)</th>
<th>Black Knight Support (US Billions)</th>
<th>Leverage Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>$39,200</td>
<td>79.63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>$33,621</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
<td>$9,656</td>
<td>$5.59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>$104,332</td>
<td>1,871</td>
<td>$4.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Measuring Linkage**

Linkage is measured by economic ties, i.e. the extent of trade (imports and exports) with the United States and the EU including Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).


1. *Low Linkage*: Measured by trade, ODA and FDI below $5 billion.
2. *Medium Linkage*: Measured by trade, ODA and FDI between $5 billion and $10 billion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Economic Ties (US billions)</th>
<th>Linkage Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>$13.5</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>$7.57</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>$1.75</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>$34.5</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 4: DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA – GHANA, KENYA, ZIMBABWE AND ANGOLA

This chapter aims to examine the complex processes of democratization in Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Angola. It identifies a variation in democratization level and regime outcomes between the four states. It is argued that Ghana has become a consolidated democracy, Kenya a ‘stalled’ transitional democracy, while Zimbabwe and Angola are argued to be authoritarian dictatorships. The variation in democratization is important to set out before illustrating the international factor in democracy promotion through the leverage and linkage model.

This is done in Chapter 5. This chapter consists of two steps. The first step discusses the troublesome democratization processes in Africa. Step two illustrates the progress and obstacles in the democratization process in Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Angola and sets out the variation in democratization level, concluding with a summary of the main findings in this chapter stressing the differences between the three states in the dependent factor (regime outcome).

TRAJECTORIES OF AFRICA’S THIRD WAVE DEMOCRACIES

The opening of the Berlin Wall in 1989 substantially changed the character of African politics in the early 1990s. Reflecting the combination of international and domestic pressures for change, Africa was swept by an apparent wave of democratization that saw virtually every country undertake some form of political reforms to restore democratic rule (Villalon and Von Doepp 2005). In some countries, political reform was quite limited as long standing autocrats developed new strategies for holding power in the post Cold War international context. However, in most countries democracy appeared to make significant inroads. Constitutional reforms were instituted
in quick succession and opposition politics was legalized.  

The apparent success of the “founding elections” that brought new elites into power in the early 1990s offered hope that democratic regimes might emerge and even prosper in Africa. Indeed, this called into question earlier conclusions that democracy was not viable in African countries “…by reason of their poverty, or the violence of their politics.” In fact, even well renowned scholars of African politics such as Michael Bratton considered the prospect of democracy in Africa to be “bleak.” Richard Joseph (2006) argues that this transformation can be traced to three significant factors: the weakening of most countries by the fiscal crises of the late 1980s; increased influence of international financial institutions and Western multilateral aid agencies in determining economic policy; and the global shift in power in favor of the U.S and its Western allies in the post Cold War World.

African countries have taken different trajectories since the political reforms of the early 1990s. Very few countries made it to the transition phase and even fewer made it to the consolidation phase. The transition from authoritarianism to democratic governance has met major obstacles and setbacks in terms of ongoing military intervention, political violence, electoral fraud, widespread logic of ‘reactive ethnic voting’, politics of belonging, violence and insecurity, extensive political controls and widespread poverty and inequality. The “stunning” turnover in 1990-1991, as Crawford Young puts it, which saw long entrenched presidents such as Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia swept away in elections (Richard Joseph 1997), was however, short lived.

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By the end of 1992 most African leaders had learned “how to control the process of competitive elections so that they can win a grudging stamp of approval from Western donors but still hang on to power.”\(^{41}\) Owing to the problematic democratic experience in Africa since 1990, we should neither be lamenting about the demise of democracy nor its triumph. Rather, we should recognize differences between and within countries, and consider a reality of contradictory trends. For example, before 1989, only Botswana and Mauritius held regular multi-party elections, but by mid-2003, 44 of the sub-continent’s 48 states had held ‘founding elections’, while 33 had undertaken a second set of elections, 20 had completed three sets of elections, and seven had held four or more uninterrupted electoral cycles.\(^{42}\)

These elections have led to peaceful transfer of power, for example, in Zambia and Cape Verde in 1991, Benin in 1991 and 2006, South Africa in 1994, Senegal in 2000, Kenya in 2002 and 2013, and Ghana in 2000, 2008 and 2013. However, in most of these cases, the incumbents were stepping down from office after reaching the end of their constitutional term limits and only five of these elections witnessed the unsuccessful candidature of an incumbent president, namely, Zambia, Cape Verde and Benin in 1991, South Africa in 1994, and Senegal in 2000 (G. Lynch and G. Crawford). Staffan Lindberg has observed that even where elections were not free and fair, African countries that have undergone consecutive election cycles, the “majority have become increasingly democratic.”\(^{43}\) The more successive elections a country holds, the more democratic it becomes. There are perhaps two obstacles to democratization that have been most prominent in Africa since the 1990s; these are decades old of authoritarian rule and its legacy and ethnic and national tension. The authoritarian legacy has triggered for centralization of

\(^{42}\) G. Lynch and G. Crawford
\(^{43}\) Quoted in Richard Joseph (2003).
power. There has been a potential danger in the new and fragile democracies that the elected party and/or leader have become fulfilled by the notion of power, resulting in centralization of power and oppression of oppositional ideas. This has created the risk of leading to obstructed political rights and civil liberties and unfree and unfair elections. The other obstacle has been the escalation of political tension that could lead to violence between national and/or ethnical groups. The overall democratization level and regime outcome in Africa is illustrated in table 2.

Table 2. Bratton and Van de Walle’s Typology: *Transitions Outcomes, Sub-Saharan Africa, 1994*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precluded Transitions</th>
<th>Blocked Transitions</th>
<th>Flawed Transitions</th>
<th>Democratic Transitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Benin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>CAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
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*Renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997
The political map of Africa has vastly changed since the Bratton and Van de Walle’s 1994 typology. It is only possible to see how these states faced the obstacles to democratization by examining their status twenty years after many of them held their “founding elections”. The gains have been modest, in terms of democratization. Many countries ranked as ‘democratic transitions’ by Bratton and Van de Walle in 1994 have witnessed serious reversals in their democratization level. Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic and Madagascar have retreated to military regimes. According to the 2013 *Freedom House Survey*, Ghana, Cape verde, Lesotho, Benin, Sao Tome, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Namibia, Mauritius and South Africa are ranked as free. These countries have successfully transitioned to liberal democracy and they only represent 13 percent of 50 countries and territories covered by Freedom House in Africa. Majority of African countries are either stuck in authoritarianism or flawed transitions. They continue to be plagued by military interventions, political violence, extensive political controls, widespread poverty, ethnic violence and electoral fraud.

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44 Freedom House 2013 Survey
Ghana’s Adoption of Democracy

Ghana has faced a successful democratization process. As illustrated in Table 3, transition into a fully consolidated liberal democracy happened in the late 1990s.

<table>
<thead>
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Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World Index, 1991-2013
And since 1998 and the first peaceful transfer of power in 2000 to an opposition candidate, Ghana has grown to become a consolidated democracy after years of reforms expanding the political rights and the civil liberties.\(^{45}\) Ghana’s democratic path began in early 1990s with the enactment of the liberal democratic 1992 Constitution. The Constitution provides a two term limit for the president, a parliament elected through universal adult suffrage, the protection of a wide array of human rights, and an independent judiciary.\(^{46}\) The new constitution afforded Ghanaians the opportunity to elect their representatives in the December 1992 presidential and parliamentary elections which was billed to be free and fair by election observers.

President Jerry Rawlings’ successful liberalizing reforms in the late 1990s are illustrated by Ghana’s robust and independent media, substantial expansion of civil and political liberties, emergence of a dense and vibrant civil society, rule of law (Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi) and civilian control over the military for a country that has experienced five military coups in three decades after independence.\(^{47}\) However, some argue that President Rawlings should not be credited for Ghana’s return to democracy (Yeebo 1991, Shillington 1992, Folson 1993). Instead, changes in the post Cold War international environment and agitation from domestic civil society groups are largely responsible for Ghana’s democratic breakthrough. The cash-strapped Rawlings’ administration was vulnerable to external pressures at a time when aid and loans from donors and international financial institutions were tied to “good governance” and democratic reforms. This imposition re-energized the hitherto uncoordinated civil society organizations, whose struggles for democratization before then had been sporadic and inconsistent (Boafo-Arthur 1998).


\(^{46}\) See [http://www.judicial.gov.gh/constitution/second_schedule/home.htm](http://www.judicial.gov.gh/constitution/second_schedule/home.htm)

\(^{47}\) ([http://africanelection.tripod.com/](http://africanelection.tripod.com/))
Faced with pressure from external actors and domestic civil society groups, President Rawlings instituted a raft of measures to end his military regime in preparation for the 1992 presidential and parliamentary elections. Political liberalization began, however, in the late 1980s when the regime allowed contested but no-party elections at the District Assembly level. A new constitution was promulgated in 1992 after getting over 90 per cent approval from voters, a ban on political party activities was lifted the same year and Flight Lieutenant Rawlings stepped down from the military to contest the elections as a civilian after reorganizing and transforming his PNDC party with pseudo-military structures into the National Democratic Congress (NDC) with effective party wings (Ninsin 1995). Rawlings won the 1992 election with close to 60 percent of the vote. The opposition cried foul but election observers validated the results as representing popular will. The next election in 1996 took place in a much more reformed electoral environment and Rawlings’ win was not disputed.48

A series of incremental reform continued from 1996 forward, and in December 2000, the leader of the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) John Agyekum Kufuor won the election and Ghana made history by a peaceful democratic handover of power to other party for the first time. Ghana has since then held two sets of elections; in 2008 the National Democratic Congress (NDC) under Atta Mills made a comeback after he defeated former foreign minister Nana Akufo-Addo of the NPP by less than 1 percent in a runoff vote.49 Following the death of President Atta Mills in July 2012, Vice President John Dramani Mahama assumed office in a peaceful handover and went on to win the December 2012 elections with 50.7 percent of the vote.50 There is no question

48 The leader of the opposition, John Agyekum Kufuor, graciously conceded defeat and congratulated Rawlings on his victory.
50 Cite..
that over the course of two decades, Ghana has shifted decisively away from violent military politics to a stable liberal democratic order.

**KENYA’S STALLED TRANSITION DEMOCRACY**

In comparison to Ghana, there have been major obstacles in the democratization process in Kenya. The democratization process has faced major ‘rollbacks’ after the 2002 democratic election marking Kenya’s first peaceful handover of power from the Independence party KANU to the opposition party NARK. This is illustrated in Table 4 where the country transitioned from Not Free to Partially Free in 2002 and since then the country’s democratization has been on a reverse trend with respect to civil and political liberties. The reverse transition has continued under President Mwai Kibaki’s disputed second term in office.

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Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World Index, 1991-2013

“Politics...is not like football, deserving a level playing field. Here, you try that and you will be roasted.”

- Daniel arap Moi, President of Kenya

The quest for democracy in Kenya has been long and persistent, it is considered “...one of Africa’s most notorious cases of stalled democratic transition” (Ndegwa 2003:145, Murunga and Nasong’o 2007:9). Kenya began its transition in 1991 when President Moi capitulated to international and domestic pressures for political reforms to ‘level the playing field’ and introduce a more plural political system. The President repealed the clause in the constitution that enshrined his party KANU as the sole political party in preparation for the first multiparty elections in 1992. Despite widespread unpopularity, Moi won the presidential elections in 1992 and his party secured majority seats in parliament. This was made possible by divisions among opposition elites’ failure to agree on the presidential ticket leading to the incumbent victory with only 36.9 percent of the votes cast against a combined opposition vote of 63.1 percent.

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51 Quoted in Levitsky and Way (2010).
In the 1997 elections, Moi won again, this time with 40.60 percent against a combined opposition vote of 57.9.\(^5^3\) Shortly after the 1997 elections, there was widespread but unduly optimism that Kenya’s democracy had been consolidated after holding two multiparty elections (Holmquist and Ford 1998). Democracy was thought to be “the only game in town.” While holding two multiparty elections was a right step in Kenya’s democratic development, however, it must be noted that these elections were neither free nor fair. They took place against the backdrop of an uneven playing field. The incumbent engaged in panoply of all devious practices from gerrymandering, stuffing ballot boxes, vote buying\(^5^4\), and ethnic cleansing leading to the disfranchisement of 10,000 to 200,000 voters\(^5^5\) (Brown 2001).

The 2002 election of a reformist opposition leader Mwai Kibaki and the peaceful handover of power by President Moi after 24 years of rule heralded a new era for democratic consolidation in Kenya. Kibaki won 62 percent of the vote and his party won 125 out 210 parliamentary seats.\(^5^6\) Kenya was hailed as one of the success stories of the recent global wave of democratization and indeed, Kibaki’s first term in office saw the civil society become more vibrant, civil and political liberties expanded and the media even more independent.\(^5^7\) However, Kenya’s trend has been characterized with breakthroughs and frequent major reversals. Optimism for Kenya’s democratization quickly dissipated when the closely contested and hotly disputed 2007 reelection of President Kibaki prompted a post-election crisis that led to the deaths of over 1000 people and displacement of almost 700,000 in just two months.

\(^5^3\) Source: Compiled from the Independent and Electoral Boundaries Commission of Kenya. Figures exclude fringe candidates.
\(^5^5\) Human Rights Watch. *Ballot to Bullets*
\(^5^6\) Electoral commission kenya
\(^5^7\) http://www.cfr.org/kenya/democracys-decline-case-kenya/p30116?cid=rss-analysisbriefbackgroundersexp-democracy_s_decline_and_the_ca-022813
In 2010, Kenya adopted a new liberal democratic constitution with an expanded Bill of Rights, separation of powers among the branches of government, devolution of power to the grassroots, provision of a Senate, a Supreme Court and extensive checks on Executive power. The electoral system was overhauled and constituency boundaries reviewed in preparation for the 2013 elections. Kenya once again saw a peaceful transfer of power after the election of Uhuru Kenyatta in an election that was free and fair, however, the possibility of violence was high had the defeated candidate Raila Odinga, then Prime Minister, refused to concede defeat. Kenya’s democratic experience highlights the ‘fallacy of electoralism’, it provides a clear example of how even modestly successful elections can lead to ‘democratic rollback’. Kenya remains an ‘imperfect democracy’, neither fully democratic nor authoritarian. It’s in the fuzzy ‘hybrid regimes’, however, with new institutions in place – a reformed judiciary and a tamed presidency – one can only be optimistic that 2017 will mark the watershed election where Kenya may finally decide to escape its fuzzy status as a hybrid regime and become a fully liberal democracy.

**Zimbabwe’s Rejection of Democracy**

While the first two decades of Independence saw the consolidation of democracy after the end of White minority rule in 1980, Zimbabwe’s democratization process halted after the June 2000-2002 presidential and parliamentary elections. As illustrated by Table 5, Zimbabwe has been on an inexorable course towards authoritarianism with totalitarian traits.
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Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World Index 1991-2013
Since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has maintained a pluralist political system dominated by long-serving President Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party (Sithole 2001). The president and his party have won the first five elections after Independence with decisive majorities, only facing real electoral threat for the first time in the 2000-2002 elections from the powerful opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) (Choto 2012). The 2002 elections were fundamentally flawed; President Mugabe unleashed a campaign of violence, terror and racism targeted at opposition supporters and leaders. As observed by Chitiyo, the elections were run as a military operation. Under ZANU-PF’s campaign slogan ‘The land is the economy and the economy is the land’, a “rogue element” of liberation war veterans and Mugabe’s supporters invaded and seized White owned commercial firms.

Mugabe has continued to use violence, terror and intimidation to win electoral contests. Reports from elections observers and human rights groups reported that opposition candidates were subjected to violence, intimidation and arbitrary arrests in the 2005 parliamentary elections. Journalists were constantly harassed and civil society activists were arrested and many reported being tortured. Commonwealth Election Observer Group reported that the election “…was marked by tension, political intimidation, violence and apprehension.” In the March 2008 elections, the opposition leader and popular trade unionist Morgan Tsvangirai led in the first round of presidential elections with 48 per cent to Mugabe’s 45 per cent forcing the country to go to a run-off.

58 Parliamentary elections were held in June 2000 in which Zimbabwe had a ‘hung’ parliament for the first time in history. The presidential election, widely criticized for not meeting international standards, was held in 2002.
59 Commonwealth Observer group Report
60 See Knox Chitiyo’s ‘Zimbabwe Security Sector Reform’, 2009:9
61 See Choto (2010).
In the second round of elections President Mugabe unleashed an unprecedented campaign of violence using state resources, the opposition leader Tsvangirai who won of the first round of the vote was forced to withdraw from the race fearing for the safety of his supporters. Running unopposed, Mugabe secured a sixth term in office with 90.2 percent of the votes.\textsuperscript{62} Facing mounting international pressure, President Mugabe and opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai reached an agreement to form a coalition government and institute political reforms and write a new constitution in preparation for the 2013 elections (Choto 2012).

Due to his advanced age, at 81, these elections may be President Mugabe’s last and there is widespread optimism that these elections may herald a new era for Zimbabwe’s tortuous path to democratization. Cautious optimism must be exercised though, for this transition to be possible, the highly partisan military and police force must be reformed. A seemingly embedded culture a political violence, terror and intimidation which is the “…one central means employed to ensure the long-standing incumbent President Robert Mugabe wins all elections”\textsuperscript{63} must be addressed. The prospects for complete transition in Zimbabwe are however bleak, it will most likely remain a hybrid regime where “the collapse of one kind of authoritarianism yielded not democracy but a new form of nondemocratic rule.”\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{62} Freedom House Country Report.
\textsuperscript{64} Levitsky and Way, ‘The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism’, 63.
ANGOLA’S AUTOCRACY
The democratization process in Angola halted after the country’s first multiparty election in 1992. As illustrated in Table 2.4, Angola has retained an authoritarian system only making marginal gains in civil and political rights over the years. On September 2008, the country embarked on its democratization path by holding election since the end of the civil war in 2002.

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<td>NF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>NF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The 1992 elections were expected to usher in a new dawn of peace and democracy for a country that has been at civil war for nearly three decades after attaining independence from Portugal in 1975 (Roque). The ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) won the parliamentary poll and its candidate President José Eduardo dos Santos polled 49.6 per cent of the vote to the opposition National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) leader Jonas Savimbi’s 40 percent. A run-off was called since none of the candidates secured a majority, but a last minute boycott of the election by UNITA plunged the country in another civil war that would halt the democratization process for two decades.

The 2008 elections were fundamentally flawed. The regime appointed members of its own party to run the electoral commission and recruited officers from the intelligence, the military and the presidency to ‘advice’ the electoral commission. There was widespread corruption in campaign financing, MPLA was accused of instigating violence in UNITA’s electoral strongholds to disenfranchise voters, and there were reports of widespread voter bribery. These tactics ensured MPLA’s decisive victory in the election securing 191 seat out 220 in the country’s parliament. MPLA’s strategy of political violence, co-opting the opposition, persecuting opponents, a sophisticated intelligence service and an extensive network of patronage, diverting annually one billion dollars to these networks and private accounts of party supporters, has ensured the demise of virtually any opposition. The 2008 can be seen as not a transition election, but an election that consolidated MPLA’s grip on Angola’s politics. Angola is not an electoral

65 Roque
66 MOLA received campaign donations amounting to $300 million from state owned enterprises.
67 Roque
democracy,\textsuperscript{69} it is an authoritarian system that is exclusive, oligarchic and uses fraudulent elections to gain domestic and international legitimacy. Any prospect for democracy in Angola will have to come from the ruling party itself or the military. The opposition is virtually nonexistent and Angola is now a de facto one-party state.

\textsuperscript{69} http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/angola
CHAPTER 5: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN GHANA, KENYA, ZIMBABWE AND ANGOLA

This chapter applies the analytical framework presented in Chapter 3 with the aim of illustrating the international factor in democratization. The international factor is conceptualized as democracy promotion which is captured in the leverage and linkage analytical framework. The framework is applied on Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Angola as the target states of democracy promotion. The framework seeks to analyse the influence external democratizing pressures on regime outcomes. Table 6 illustrates the level of democratization in the cases under study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Rights</th>
<th>Civil Rights</th>
<th>Status 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Partially Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MEDIUM LEVERAGE AND MEDIUM LINKAGE: GHANA AND KENYA

Ghana and Kenya are cases of medium leverage and medium linkage. Their regime trajectories were similar in many ways. Their relatively strong ties to the West generated powerful and consistent international pressure that forced their autocratic regimes to democratize and introduce pluralist political systems in the early 1990s. Response to external pressure was however uneven. While Ghana’s Jerry Rawlings invested in credible political reforms that eventually led to Ghana transitioning to a liberal democracy in 2000, Kenya’s transition was more protracted and complicated by serious ethnic tension and violence.
Nevertheless, extensive Western engagement through democracy assistance, diplomatic disapproval, targeted sanctions at public officers perceived to be frustrating reforms and the intervention of the International Criminal Court in 2010 to prosecute perpetrators of the 2007 ethnic violence has created strong incentives for democratic behaviour.

Ghana

International pressure from financial institutions and donors was perhaps the most influential factor in Ghana’s transition to a liberal democracy. President Rawlings enjoyed broad public support for restoring order and overseen the recovery of the economy since taking over power in 1981 after years of devastating political and economic crises occasioned by military coups (Handley 2007). He would have won any elections held in that period. His decision to liberalize Ghana could therefore not have been due to the fringe agitations for political reforms from civil society groups (Nugent 2001).

Instead, his decision to reform the political system was informed by a pragmatic response to Ghana’s financial vulnerability and his desire to retain Ghana’s status a model reformer for embracing market reforms in the late 1980s. Between 1983 and 1990 Ghana received more than $3 billion in development aid, the new international context following the ebbing of Cold War meant political conditionalities were tied to foreign aid and bilateral assistance. Rawlings calculated that political reforms were inevitable if Ghana was to continue enjoying Western support and legitimacy.

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70 See Jefferies (1989).
Ghana’s trajectory after the 1992 ‘founding elections’ deferred from that of Kenya, Zimbabwe and Angola. Rather than reconsolidating power through heavy handed measures to contain political opposition, President Rawlings invested heavily in constitutional reforms and strengthening the new democratic institutions created by the 1991 Constitution. He was central in his country’s shift in political direction. The reform process was essentially a one-man show – his regime unilaterally appointed a commission to write a new constitution in 1991 and led all reform initiatives in the electoral commission, the judiciary and other important political institutions.\textsuperscript{72} Civil and political liberties were expanded and the media was more independent under Rawlings.\textsuperscript{73} His reluctance to use coercive capacity allowed the opposition and civil society to thrive. Rawlings reforms paid off, Ghana has had two democratic turnovers since his retirement in 2000.

In summary, Ghana’s transition to liberal democracy was a combination of external pressure, though not so substantive, the regime’s willingness to liberalize and a strong domestic democracy movement. Democratization was a top down initiative led by a regime primarily motivated with accessing international finance, at a time when foreign aid and loans were tied to democratic governance, and its desire for international recognition as a model reformer. The West did not exert substantive or rhetorical pressure on Ghana; the regime was committed to democratic reforms. Leverage and linkage did not play a major role on influencing the democratization of Ghana, the regime’s desire to access funding from international financial institutions and donors was a major factor in its decision to liberalize.

Kenya

In a context of medium leverage, medium linkage and a strong domestic democratization movement, external and domestic pressures were evenly distributed on President Daniel arap Moi’s post-1992 ‘founding elections’. Kenya, however, remained non-democratic due to the dynamics of the political environment immediately after liberalization, elite fragmentation threatened Moi’s hold onto power as various political elites formed their own political parties. However, unlike Rawlings of Ghana, Moi was willing, and did in fact use coercive capacity to suppress dissent through arbitrary arrests and detention of pro-democracy activists, forcing the opposition to go underground. Donors were satisfied with trading-off elections with deeper political reforms. This is the logic that explains inconsistencies in Western pressure and conditional aid where leverage and linkage are not substantial. Moi also privatised violence and instigated ethnic clashes to disenfranchise and terrorise opposition supporters.

Just like Ghana’s Rawlings, Moi’s decision to introduce multi-party politics was informed by the desire to access international finance. In 1991, donors had suspended $350 million in aid calling on the president to open up the political space forcing Moi to announce just days later the legalization of opposition parties and allowing presidential elections the following year. In the years leading to the 1997 presidential elections, President Moi chose privatised violence as his repressive strategy in response to the sustained push for reforms by opposition leaders, pro-democracy activists, human rights groups, and religious NGOs (Nasongo, 2007: 34). The heavy handed nature of Moi’s repression triggered punitive measures from the donor community. $400

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74 Branch (2008)
75 Murunga (2007:277)
76 Roessler (2005)
77 Mutua (2008: 78).
million in aid was suspended pending further political reforms in the electoral process.\textsuperscript{78} Moi quickly introduced minor electoral reforms including the repealing of repressive laws, and a more balanced electoral commission was constituted. The 1997 elections were, however, rigged by KANU.\textsuperscript{79}

The post-2002 NARC regime that ousted KANU from power in a free and fair election promised far reaching reforms including writing a new constitution. The reform process, however, halted after the Kenyans rejected the regime proposed constitution in the 2005 referendum. This was a deliberate sabotage of the constitution review process by a regime that knew the existing constitution, with extensive executive powers, would still serve their interests. External pressures for political reforms were not substantial and were largely focused on corruption and human rights related issues. The fight for political reforms was left to domestic civil society groups and the opposition party. International pressure for political reforms resumed after the disputed 2007 reelection of President Kibaki which prompted a post-election crisis that led to the deaths of over 1000 people and displacement of almost 700,000 in just two months.

Western countries refused to recognize the president’s reelection and put much more pressure on the incumbent to form a unity government with the opposition candidate Raila Odinga. The reactions of the donors were a vast improvement over their responses to previous elections and eruptions of political violence (Brown 2007). They placed greater priority on the need for political reforms and prosecute those responsible for the chaos. Making it clear privately and publicly that it would it would not be ‘business as usual’ in the area of financial assistance until the regime takes practical steps to institute political reforms.

\textsuperscript{78} Barkan (1998:218)
\textsuperscript{79} Kagwanja (2001:85-87)
External pressure for reforms was sustained by the donor community and transnational and domestic civil society leading to the adoption of a liberal democratic constitution in 2010 and the peaceful transfer of power in 2013 in a free and fair election.

By way of summary, the Kenyan case illustrates how the convergence of external and domestic demands for democratization affected the regime's coercive strategy. Sustained demands for political reforms heightened the incumbent’s vulnerability, forcing him to resort to privatized violence to neutralize threats to his regime. Privatized violence was a strategy adopted to suppress pro-democratic forces and at the same time distance the regime from human rights abuses so as not to engender the flow of foreign aid and international finance. This study hypothesized that leverage and linkage are intertwined and will have a positive causal relationship.

The experience in Kenya does illustrate how linkage has had a positive causal impact on leverage. Domestic and transnational civil society linkages have been instrumental in promoting democratization in Kenya. Economic linkages with the West, extensive going by the criteria set by this study, have significantly contributed to the democratization process. Threats of foreign aid suspension forced President Moi to institute a raft of political reforms that finally yielded a democratic and peaceful transfer of power in the 2002 elections. Civil society linkages generated grassroots pressures on Western governments by bringing to attention the brutal suppression of pro-democracy activists. Human rights groups and religious NGOs were instrumental in bringing pressure to bear on President Moi’s regime to release ‘political prisoners’, calling on Western governments to condemn the arbitrary arrests of and excessive use of force and police brutality.
meted out on pro-democracy activists. The high international profile of political repression raised the cost of repression thus constraining brutal crackdowns on opposition.

**MEDIUM LEVERAGE, LOW LINKAGE AND BLACK NIGHT SUPPORT: ZIMBABWE**

Zimbabwe is a case of medium leverage and low linkage combined with black night assistance from South Africa and China. In 2011 South Africa was Zimbabwe’s leading trade and accounted for more than 55 percent of FDI making South Africa the most influential country on President Mugabe’s regime with good worth $2.3 billion traded in 2012. Relations with China started before Independence when Beijing supplied Mugabe’s guerrilla with weapons to fight his liberation war. China remains a critical supplier of foreign aid assistance, diplomatic support, economic and trade deals, and close military ties following years of international isolation which eroded Zimbabwe’s ties to the West.

Zimbabwe has held regular elections without democratizing. Western pressure, just like in Kenya, has been at best sporadic and unsustained, focusing in the lead up to elections. However, external pressure came to bear when Mugabe’s ZANU-PF faced its real first threat of electoral defeat in the 2000-2002 elections from the opposition MDC (Choto 2012). Widespread discontent over economic stagnation and the strengthening of civil society and the opposition party presented a significant threat to Mugabe’s grip on power (Alexander 200).

The regime unleashed a campaign of violence, terror and intimidation on opposition supporters and pro-democracy activists triggering external punitive measures. The United States, the UK

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80 Maria Nzomo (1993)
and the EU imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe, however, South Africa and China refused to comply. Western sanctions crippled Zimbabwe’s economy setting the country back more than half a century. Despite sustained Western and domestic pressure for change, Mugabe has been able to whither the storm, relying on extensively using coercive capacity and privatized violence on the opposition and their supporters, and rigging himself in power in the 2005 and 2008 elections.

In summary, Zimbabwe presents a case of competitive authoritarian stability that relies extensively on coercive capacity and privatized violence. Despite sustained external and domestic pressure for political reforms since the 2000-2002 elections, the regime has been stable and president Mugabe has announced his intention to run for a sixth term in the elections scheduled for 2013. A case of low linkage and medium leverage combined with a strong domestic push for democratization is expected to raise the cost of authoritarianism and force domestic political elites to democratise. As this study hypothesises, that leverage alone – even in cases highly vulnerable to external democratising pressures – will not translate into an effective democratising pressure because Western pressure tended to ebb after the holding of multiparty elections which did not always translate into democratization. Levitsky and Way argue that leverage is only effective when combined with linkage. Zimbabwe illustrates that leverage without linkage is not effective in raising the cost of authoritarianism; Western leverage is even made less effective by Zimbabwe’s status as a black knight client. Financial and political support

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85 [https://www.gov.uk/arms-embargo-on-zimbabwe](https://www.gov.uk/arms-embargo-on-zimbabwe)
86 In then-Southern Rhodesia had an average income of $760 per year (in constant 1990 US$ at purchasing power parity rates). In mid-2005 the average Zimbabwean had fallen back to that level, wiping out the income gains over the past 52 year. See Michael Clemens and Tod Mos. *Costs and Causes of Zimbabwe’s Crisis* (2005).
from China and South Africa have has been instrumental in retaining Mugabe’s authoritarian regime in spite of Zimbabwe’s high vulnerability to Western pressure.

**LOW LEVERAGE AND HIGH LINKAGE: ANGOLA**

As previously noted, the democratization process in Angola has taken place under predominantly war-time conditions. The botched 1992 elections were expected to provided the much needed momentum for democratization, instead, it plunged the country into a two decade long civil war. This has had the effect of stifling the growth of civil society in Angolan politics. The few independent voices that existed were either infiltrated by state police, forcefully repressed or made irrelevant in policy making by the government’s backed civil societies such as FESA. 

Angola is yet to hold a presidential election since the 1992 “founding elections” and parliamentary elections held in 2008 failed to meet regional and international standards. 

As discussed earlier, these elections only served to consolidate the president’s grip on power. President José Eduardo dos Santos pushed for the adoption of a new constitution that many observers fear has put Angola on a path to a fully authoritarian state. The “government” as understood, has been abolished by the 2010 constitution and it conflates all powers – legislative, executive and judicial – in the president’s office without any checks and balances. The constitution also introduced an electoral college, effectively denying the people the right to directly elect their president.

Post-war Angolan democratization process has been halted by the 2010 constitution. With a virtually nonexistent opposition and a weak civil society, any prospect for democracy will have

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88 Drivers of Change Report
89 Huma Rights Watch
90 See National Endowment for Democracy presentation: *Corruption in Angola: An Impediment to Democracy* [http://www.ned.org/events/corruption-in-angola-an-impediment-to-democracy](http://www.ned.org/events/corruption-in-angola-an-impediment-to-democracy), also see
to come from the regime itself or the military. In summary, Angola is a case of low leverage and high linkage. In 2010, it was the largest oil producer in Africa and its economy has grown from $10.7 billion in 2002 after the civil war ended to $107 billion in 2012. It traded goods worth $34 billion with the West in the period between 2011 and 2012 and in 2009, IMF granted Angola $1.4 billion in loans to encourage economic reforms. Western leverage is very low and the Angolan regime knows that too well. The emergence of Angola as the biggest source of oil for the US and a major supplier for the EU, competing Western foreign policy objectives, and the presence of China as an alternative power has limited Western influence on Angola.

Given China’s growing presence in Angola – it has disbursed over $15 billion in loans to Angola since 2003 and has $4 billion worth of ongoing projects\(^91\) – the West is careful not to antagonize the regime in Luanda only to “loose out” to China. It is the West in this case, that risks punitive actions. Cases of high linkage and low leverage are likely to democratize only when there is a strong domestic movement for democratization. Where the incumbent’s coercive capacity is weak and opposition forces are strong, the likelihood of a democratic transition is high. This however, is not the case in Angola. The regime faces virtually no opposition and the civil society is weak to challenge the regime’s grip on power, which can and has used coercive capacity on fringe pro-democracy groups without triggering costly international punitive action. Direct bilateral and multilateral pressure has not been substantial given the competing Western foreign policy and strategic objectives in Angola. The West is more concerned with its strategic interests than genuine democratization, and any pressure to democratize has been ‘soft’ and ‘rhetorical’.\(^92\)

\(^91\) See Aid Data, [http://aiddatachina.org/map](http://aiddatachina.org/map)

\(^92\) Former US Secretary Clinton urging for reforms in Angola on a state visit in 2009, see [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8192247.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8192247.stm).
Angola will likely remain a stable authoritarian regime, or move in the direction of full-scale authoritarianism, or it has already has since the adoption of the 2010 constitution.

**CONCLUSION: LEVERAGE, LINKAGE AND REGIME OUTCOME**

Domestic factors had hitherto dominated the research on democratization to the neglect of international factors. It was not until the ‘third wave’ of democratization that scholars switched their attention to the international dimension. However, despite the growing interest in the international factors to democratization, the relationship between the international environment and democratization remains poorly understood. There is need for further research on these international factors and conceptualize them into a single coherent framework.

Studies on the external dimension of democratization have focused on two mechanisms of international influence: diffusion or ‘demonstration effects’ and democracy promotion. Many of these studies have failed to analyze how international influence varies across regions and the likely impact of this variation in regime outcomes. Levitsky and Way’s Leverage and Linkage model tries to capture this variation by integrating the different mechanisms of international influence into a concise theoretical framework by organizing them into dimensions: *Western Leverage* and *Linkage to the West*.

This study applies the Levitsky and Way’s leverage and linkage model on Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Angola to see if and how international factors were influential in determining the regime trajectories of these four cases in Africa. It asks why one of them democratized while others either remained authoritarian regimes or stalled in the transition phase even after having turnovers. The study argues that leverage and linkage operate in distinct ways and different
degrees to raise the cost of authoritarianism. Different combinations determine the influence of domestic and international factors thus leading to variations in regime outcome.

Where leverage and linkage is high, international factors dominate and may lead to democratization. Authoritarian incumbents are extremely vulnerable to external pressure and violation of democratic norms is likely to receive international attention and trigger punitive actions from Western governments. Where leverage and linkage is low, domestic factors dominate and rarely do they lead to democracy. External pressure is usually limited to elections and large-scale human rights violations. Cases of low linkage and high leverage are unlikely to result to democratization. However, international democratizing pressure is significant but it tends to be weaker and focused only in the lead up to elections. In such cases, democratization can only occur when there is a strong domestic movement for democratization. In high linkage and low leverage cases, democratization is likely to occur, albeit gradually and is contingent upon a strong and active opposition. Western pressure, though not substantial, INGOs and international media may bring pressure to bear on the regime to democratize. Incumbents are likely to accept electoral defeat because their reforms are informed by the desire to maintain their international reputation as norm abiding.

Finally, in low leverage and low linkage countries, democratization is least likely to occur, as the incumbent is not vulnerable to Western pressure, abuses will rarely make international headline making it unlikely for Western governments to respond to the abuses with punitive action. Most low leverage and low linkage countries are likely to remain competitive authoritarian of move to
full-scale authoritarianism. Table 7 summarizes the results after applying the model on the four cases under study.

Table 7: Leverage, Linkage and Regime Outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Leverage</th>
<th>Linkage</th>
<th>Regime Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Liberal Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Electoral Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The regime outcomes from Ghana and Kenya largely follow the lines of the model. Their relatively strong ties to the West generated powerful and consistent international pressure that forced their autocratic regimes to democratize and introduce pluralist political systems in the early 1990s. Response to external pressure was however uneven. While Ghana invested in credible political reforms that eventually led to its transition to a liberal democracy in 2000, Kenya’s transition was more protracted and complicated by serious ethnic tension and violence after introducing multiparty politics in 1992. However, Ghana’s regime outcome was also to an extent not so much hinged on the configurations of leverage and linkage as the regime’s own credible commitment to reform and its desire to maintain its international reputation.

Zimbabwe and Angola perfectly follow the line of the model. Zimbabwe, a case of low linkage and medium leverage, illustrates that leverage without linkage is not effective in raising the cost of authoritarianism; Western leverage is even made less effective by Zimbabwe’s status as a
black knight client. Financial and political support from China and South Africa have been instrumental in blurring Western pressure on Zimbabwe. Angola on the other hand, a case of high linkage and low leverage is expected to democratize if there is a strong domestic movement for democratization, however, opposition is virtually nonexistent in Angola. Any prospect for democratization will have to come from the ruling party or the military, in the coming years however, Angola will likely remain a stable authoritarian regime, or move in the direction of full-scale authoritarianism.

It would have been critically important to conduct in-depth interviews with current or past decision makers to understand the real incentives behind the reasons some countries chose to reform. Conducting interviews would have helped us better understand how Western leverage and linkage played out in influencing decision-makers in the target countries to introduce some form of political reforms. Unfortunately, due to the limited time, and the scope of this study, it was not feasible to conduct interviews.

The findings of this study have important implications for understanding the relative importance of domestic and international factors in the democratization process in Africa. Domestic factors are likely to dominate in many of the countries in Africa because of their relative weak linkages with the West. However, in the few countries where linkage is substantially extensive, as illustrated by Ghana and Kenya, Western democratizing efforts may be instrumental in bringing pressure to bear on autocratic regimes to democratize. However, the rising influence of other global powers such as China will considerably limit the effectiveness of external democratizing pressure. In the face of this new geopolitical reality, the international environment may not be favourable to democracy promotion in Africa. Western powers, particularly the United States
will likely put high priority on their strategic interests over democracy leaving room for Authoritarian regimes to endure.
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