Who does Trepča work for?: ambiguous property in northern Kosovo

By

Marko Balažević

Submitted to

Central European University

Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Supervisors: Prem Kumar Rajaram

Violetta Zentai

Budapest, Hungary

2013

ABSTRACT

The account offered in this thesis takes Trepča mining and metallurgical complex located in Kosovo as an exemplary condensation of the disintegration of two fundamental pillars of Yugoslavian socialist project and the subsequent unsuccessful attempts to weave them anew in a coherent discourse. Approached as a critical junction, the contestation over Kosovo, and subsequently over Trepča, illuminates the local scale and in turn offers a new light on the larger historical process of disintegration of Yugoslavia. Secondly, it answer to the question regarding conception of value in general and property in particular. The conclusion stemming from asking the former question is directly dependent on how we understand what is worthy and valuable and what is burdensome and undesirable. Not only is this answer not obvious, but moreover it begs another question: who is to determine what the value of an object or an entity is? Building my argument on ethnographic fieldwork and secondary sources, I argue that property regime is thoroughly relational to the patchwork of sovereignty-claimings in the constellation emerged in the disintegration of Yugoslavian federal state. The conclusion contributes to filling a gap between ethnographic accounts into property regimes in the context of post-socialism and the large body of literature dealing with historical aspects of Yugoslavia's disintegration.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Research and writing all too often feel like a solitary endeavor. Generally and as this thesis proves particularly, the final work is thoroughly co-authored. Although the signature inscribed on this thesis is mine it is only to say that the faults, shortcomings and injustices inflicted are my own. In every other respect I am grateful foremost to my supervisors Dr. Prem Kumar Rajaram and Dr. Violetta Zentai, for offering guidance and counsel in the times of doubt. I am grateful to all the people from Kosovska Mitroivica and Zvečan who shared their stories with all their hopes and fears. I owe many thanks to my colleagues on whose solidarity and mutuality I have leaned heavily equally when the sea was smooth as when it was stormy. A special thank you goes to Raia who has selflessly given her support, advice and love and who has shared the burden and endured the predicament of writing with me. Finally, my parents have been the biggest and most selfless support thought a difficult period. I dedicate this thesis to them.

TABLE OF CONTENT

Introduction: What is behind a myth?

> "The armies of the winners did not, it is true, occupy the territory of the losers. Still, given the nature of the conflict and the way it ended, it was logical for the losers to adopt the institutions and beliefs of the winers. It was logical in particular because the outcome represented a victory of the West's methods of political and economic organization rather than triumph of its arms" Michael Mandelbaum, "Introduction" in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.) Postcommunsim. Four Perspectives (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, 1996) 1-26, cited page 3.

> "Empire has located its existence not in the smooth recurrent spinning time of the cycle of the seasons. but in the jagged time of rise and fall, of beginning and end, of catastrophe."
>
> J.M. Coetzee *Waiting for the Barbarians*

An external observer, reasonably equipped with knowledge of the situation stemming from the friction of Serbia and Kosovo, would expect to encounter a close to impenetrable territorliazation, with all the belonging material reification in the form of fences, barricades, walls and militarized zones. Browsing though the national, regional and transnational media one can find ample of ominous accounts to anticipate stepping into a space resembling a mutating assemblage of West Bank, Northern Cyprus and Belfast. Yet taking one of the dozen of daily buses commuting between Serbia and northern Kosovo the same observer would be baffled with the absent presence of material signifiers enforcing the emerged enclavisation and delimitation.

The river Ibar marks the physical demarcation between two sides of ethnically divided city of Kosovska Mitroivica. There are at least three sharp examples of ethnically divided cities in the ethno-territorial patchwork that emerged during and after the wars and conflicts in the post-Yugoslavian space. Mostar in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Skopje in Macedonia, and

Kosovska Mitrovica in Kosovo are not unique specificities in the contemporary European history. The remnants of Franco-German conflicts and divisions are still visible in the socio-spatial organization of Brussels, Luxembourg, Strasbourg or Maastricht. Even stronger analogy is the one with Nicosia (Lefkosa) a city divided by the Green line, which separates the Turkish from the Greek part of Cyprus. What does stand as remarkable is that all three of these cities are divided with a river separating Christians from Muslims who used to live side by side and who have built complex and developed urban environments with cultural, social and industrial elements spanning on both sides of the river(s). Part of the reason why the conflicts for the Yugoslavian succession have been so bloody is to be found in a thoroughly multi-ethnic composition of its territorial units, from the local to the republican scale. The fear of becoming the minority (Jović 2001; Appadurai 2006) in the emerging sovereignty-claimings based on ethno-territorial principles, led to a wide scale of ethnic cleansing and enclavisation.

Kosovska Mitrovica a former flagship of Kosovo's industrial modernization, built along with and around the colossal Trepča mining and metallurgical complex, became the epitome and the metaphor for divided Kosovo after the war in 1999. Until the emergence of wide scale violence in 1998 and 1999, Kosovska Mitroivca was the only city in Kosovo with approximately equal number of Serb and Albanian inhabitants. In the rest of towns and cities in Kosovo, although Serbs were disproportionately represented on high political and economical positions, they were a minority. Following the war, the northern part of Kosovska Mitrovica is the only urban environment (apart from small towns of Zvečan, Leposavić and Zubin Potok which are all north of river Ibar) where Kosovo-Serbs still live.

The myth of Kosovo is the constitutive part, indeed the centerpiece, of contemporary Serbian nationalist narrative which has been repeatedly used for galvanizing popular mobilization in the last three decades. Narrative holds Kosovo to be the cradle of the medieval Serbian state,

the site of the heroic defense against the Ottomans in 1389 and the sacred place containing a number of the most important monasteries in Serbian history. It is also the anchoring point and the official seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church which is the crucial actor in the formation of the ideological coherence of the narrative of Serbian nationalism based on *Blut und Boden* (Malcolm 1998; Mertus 1999; Vickers 1998).

Apart from this ubiquitous mythical narrative, Kosovo harbors another important (mythical) element in the relentless Serbian claim over Kosovo. The Kosovo-Albanian struggle for autonomy has been repeatedly rendered as 'robbery' of the most valuable assets in form of mineral and other natural resources. The same narrative was dominantly taken up by the left and far left commentators[1] during and immediately after the NATO bombing of Serbia and Kosovo. The reason for the intervention was seen primarily in the resource grab of the alleged immense mineral wealth lying under Kosovo. In this narrative, Trepča is the metonymical exemplification of the alleged real reason behind the struggle for Kosovo's statehood independent of Serbia.

Myths as well as conspiracies, if they are to have any mobilizing potential, need to be grounded on a kernel of truth. Both of these narratives, are not only interconnected in a grand narrative, but are also partially true. Rather than discarding them as fallacies, we need to look into what is left out and think about the contradiction in the heart of it. The hidden remainder usually stands in a dialectical relation to the part and both need to be grasped in the totality they are forming. The account offered in this thesis takes Trepča as an exemplary condensation of the disintegration of two fundamental pillars of Yugoslavian socialist project and the subsequent attempts to weave them anew in a coherent discourse. To grasp the nature of the contestation over Kosovo, and subsequently over Trepča, we need to ask the question of its value. Why does it matter? Answer to this question points to a conception of value in

[1] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/sep/21/kosovo.comment Accessed on June 1st, 2013

general and property in particular. The conclusion stemming from asking the former question is directly dependent on how we understand what is worthy and valuable and what is burdensome and undesirable. Not only is this answer not obvious, but moreover it begs another question: who is to determine what the value of an object or an entity is? How does the distinction between assets and liabilities emerge? Moreover, can we conceive of assets and liabilities as objective and neutral in relation to justification principles?

These are the questions that lie at the base of the question of Trepča today. The enterprise is overdetermined by a fundamental contradiction of being worthless and valuable, an asset and liability, at the same time. A purely synchronic account of Trepča's contemporaneity falls not only short, but moreover leads to a skewed conclusion if historicization of its emergence is not provided. Only bathed in light of its coming to being can contemporary conflation of worth and worthlessness as overlapped with claims and contestations be adequately understood. When perceived solely though economic or formal-legal lens, the latter obscures the fundamentally political nature of its past and its future. The exact moment of the political is what connects the story of Trepča with the story of disintegration of the Yugoslavian project. These two aspects, on the one hand the trajectory of development and the decay of socialist industrial modernization and on the other the ethno-nationalist character of dissolution of the federal state have been taken apart in most of accounts. I explicitly lace up these two lines and present them as two equally constitutive elements of Yugoslavian modernization based on the doctrine of self-management. Today's predicament of Trepča is equally a manifestation of catastrophic dissolution of both pillars and it cannot be understood if not taken in its contradictory totality.

Another important aspect of the argument pursued below is that, although far from predetermined in any kind of mechanistic manner, the outcomes we read in and around

Trepča and northern Kosovo today are not shocking, out of margins or exceptional. Not only are they deeply rooted in longue durée historical processes, but are moreover a sharpened manifestations of a broader regional historical outcomes, and are indeed a critical junction embedded in global transformations.

Viewed as a relationally inserted critical junction, Trepča is trenchant example of a double polarization rooted in an agonistic landscape immanently inscribed with visceral violence. Disintegration of constitutive pillars of the Yugoslavian project is manifested in rise of polarizing inequality congealed by a horizontal centripetal forces rooted in identity politics most evidently crystallized in ethno-nationalism. The prior multi-ethnic coexistence of Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo is anything but an idealized rosy picture or mutuality and pluralism. There is a long history of semi-colonial rule over the Albanian population since the emergence of modern nationalisms in the Balkans by the end of the 19th century when the Ottoman Empire entered the final stage of its withering. However, the period of socialism with the pan-Yugoslavian ideology of brotherhood and unity pacified the ethnic tensions and more importantly brought development and prosperity (however limited and uneven in the broader picture). Along with modernization and development, socialism curtailed the ethno-territorial principle of political imaginary which logically leads to enclaves and ethnically divided spaces.

What is the nature of impossibility to 'reconstruct', that is effectively privatize, Trepča? The fact that approximately half of Trepča's facilities are located in the northern Kosovo which eschews both the sovereignty-claims of Kosovo and Serbia, lies at the heart of this problem. What this reveals moreover has a lot to do with Trepča, but even more, it unmasks the provisional and fundamentally dependent nature of political authority in the post-Yugoslavian space. It is at this very point that the congealed nature of the trajectory which the patchwork of provisional sovereignty-claiming projects have taken is revealed.

The *longue durée* of disintegration: bringing history and structure back in

The historical legacy of socialist Yugoslavia is riddled by a fundamental paradox: how is it possible that the country that was regarded as exemplary on its non-aligned path of socialist modernization ended its existence in the bloodiest conflict on the European soil since the Second World War? Yugoslavian socialist modernization achieved unprecedented emancipatory and developmental achievements and yet, the aftermath of its demise brought about a human catastrophe of a seismic scale. Thinking with and between the "dreamworld and catastrophe" as the title of Susan Buck-Morss's book (2000) (cf. Verdery and Chari 2009) states, seems highly perplexing if not outright unthinkable. Could there be a directly proportional correlation between these intensities?

It has been maliciously stipulated by liberal and conservative thinkers alike, that Yugoslavia was a great dungeon of people, submersing, repressing and brutalizing any notion of nationalism especially the ethnic kind and supplanting it with its own artificial ideology of brotherhood and unity as a pan-Yugoslavian nationalism (Perica 2002). Following this line of reasoning, it is only because the party-state suppressed the 'ancient and eternal hatred' (cf. Hayden 1995; Jović 2009) that the very achievements of socialist modernization were possible. The same achievements, as they have it, were possible at the expense of some nations for the benefit of others. This revisionist historical narrative is remarkably spread and present in almost all of the former republics of socialist Yugoslavia. However the linkage of economic and social achievements of socialist modernization and the rise of ethno-nationalist self-determinations guised as democracy have an uneasy linkage in these accounts.

After the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980, the partisan marshal and lifetime president of Yugoslavia, in every of the six republics and two autonomous provinces, one town or a city took Tito's name. The cult of personality he built during his lifetime was inseparable part of the ideology of brotherhood and unity which laced up and tied the Yugoslav republics in a federation. In 1981, Kosovska Mitrovica took up the name of Titova Mitrovica which remained its name until 1992 (cf. Lowinger 2009: 95-104). Located towards the north of Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, Titova Mitrovica symbolized both pillars of the Yugoslavian project of modernity: it was built around a colossal SOE Trepča and it was a thoroughly multi-ethnic town.

During the 1980s, Kosovo witnessed increased tensions which were still not expressed fully as ethnic struggle, but were steadily forming in that direction. On the one hand, Kosovo-Albanian students and workers were striving for greater autonomy in administration and education, while on the other hand, the rising Serb nationalism utilized these unrests in order to curtail the existing autonomy and exacerbate the position of Albanian nationality living in Kosovo. In a metaphorically condensed maneuver, it can be said that in fact the dissolution of Yugoslavia began in Kosovo and it seems that it will be brought to its conclusion there (Vladisavljevic 2008; Ker-Lindsey 2011). In another condensing move, the ethnically divided town of Kosovska Mitrovica stands as a metonymical condensation and as a reminder that this dissolution indeed did began at this very place but like here, it is not close to its conclusion in the broader former Yugoslavian space.

International powers-that-be have been at best naïve but at worst dead wrong that the story of Kosovo would prove to be the last piece of the grand puzzle which started unfolding three decades ago. However, the history is far from being finished and there are plenty of ominous

signs that the seismic rupture will emanate its aftershocks of ethno-nationalist self-determinations and concomitant reterritorialiazations in the years to come. Unlike other ethnically charged places in the former Yugoslavia, northern Kosovo stands not between two sovereign states, but between a state in withdrawal and an incomplete state-building project. The latter is schizophrenically configured between a national project of civic citizenship brought to life by the 'international community' and the ethnically cleansed polity on which basis this project is supposed to be built. The principle of ethnic legitimation of self-determination and concomitant territorial disputes and border-drawings escaped the Pandora's Box in which they were safe-guarded and repressed by the Yugoslavian socialist project.

The (Post)-Yugoslavian *Sonderweg*?: The hidden history of Yugoslavian disintegration in the conjuncture of neoliberal turn

Beginning in the mid-1970s, and certainly by the 1980s, neoliberalism emerged as the dominant politic-economic articulation on the global scale. Simultaneously with the demise of the Keynesian economic doctrines and concomitant Fordist industrial modernization the "really existing state socialism" was in deep internal crisis. A wave of crisis, reforms, liberalizations and openings has swept the socialist block, *de facto* nudging these countries towards the emerging global economic system. In Yugoslavia the decade of the 1980s bears a contradictory culture of remembrance: it is often pointed out as the last decade of 'normal' life, or prosperity and peace, while on the other hand, the 80s witnessed the most turbulent and eventful decade following the Second World War. This decade is ridden with mass strikes, rebirths and reinventions of nationalism bearing ethnic and religious stamp, and the underlying economic crises paired with unyielding IMF policy towards Yugoslavia (Woodward 1995). In short, the last decade of careless life is at the same time remembered as the road leading to the biggest catastrophe in generations.

Any serious historicization of the aftermath of the Yugoslavian catastrophe cannot lapse into romanticization of the prior decades. In the same vein, one should discard the interpretation, so often pursued in liberal and conservative accounts, that the nationalist revival was only natural, given the artificial and forceful repression of in the aftermath of the Second World War which is in Yugoslavia remembered not only as a war against foreign occupiers but also as a bloody civil war. The rise of nationalist elites to power in almost all of the republics is easily explained off as being inherent to the people's natural strife for 'blood and soil' and desire to be led by strong leaders. The whole historiography and moreover the actual political practice is waged between conservative nationalist who insist on this interpretation and liberal (nationalists) who need this narrative in order to portray themselves as harborers of enlightened civic values. What is left-out of the mainstream accounts and successfully pushed on the margins of either dogmatic 'totalitarian' communism or simple lunacy of conspiracy theory prone pseudo-intellectualism is in fact a symptom of a much deeper and more sinister anesthetization of the possibility to offer different narration. The marginal position is of course the one that takes a materialist critical account of the underlying social relations. The last decade of Yugoslavian socialism was marked by a deep economic and political crisis. At the time the system was already thoroughly liberalized, following the introduction of elements of market and self-management in the 1960s and the political liberalization culminating in the constitution of 1974 which in fact confederalized the federation (Jović 2009). Building on internal political crisis, the falling rate of profit of its companies and general shortage of foreign currency, the crisis has to be seen in conjuncture with the general spread of sovereign-debt-related crisis and their relation to the international financial institutions, most prominently IMF.

Developments of the late Yugoslavian socialism are in most accounts explained either by focusing solely on the internal dynamics and the conflicts among the elites, or are lifted even further on the scale of international arena where standard discourse of realist and institutionalist approaches to international relations reign dominant. However, the development in question needs to be relationally, if not dialectically, situated between the global advance of neoliberalism and the internal contradictions and tensions of the Yugoslavian political and economic system. The disintegration of Yugoslavia is a process immanently inscribed in its constitutional and economic foundations. Its overt manifestation in the 1980s has roots several decades before it actually culminated. The process is thoroughly relational to the larger European (and global) transformations in the second half of the 20th century.

The centerpiece of Yugoslavian politic-economic project, which separated it from all the other countries of the so called 'Eastern bloc,' was the ideology and practice of self-management. If not outright contradictory, self-management was deeply ambivalent in as much it tried to reconcile genuine workers autonomy in decision making (a sort of economic democracy) and elements of market organization, both internally and towards foreign countries. Not dissimilar to the challenges which EU faces in reconciling democracy with (con)federalism, so has self-management been at the forefront of inter-republican strives and differences which ominously kept the national question on the back burner. The uneven development proved to be insurmountable obstacle given the constraints of market-like self-managed type of development. Being convinced that USSR would invade from the east, Yugoslavian leadership put heavy emphasis on re-locating the industry further west in Croatia and Slovenia, which only caught up with previous path-dependency of Hapsburg modernization. The federal funds for development were largely unsuccessful in evening out

this discrepancy as evident in the almost 7:1 proportion GDP between Slovenia and Kosovo (Jović 2009: 15). Therefore the (world) market aspect of self-management is inseparable from the fragile federalism as it works as a factor of disintegration (Unkovski-Korica 2013). The peculiarity of the self-management, being akin to economic democracy, was evident in the organization of enterprises as autonomous and competitive in which workers were, at least nominally, direct and equal shareholders. In effect, this idea could never enact itself fully exactly because of what the second pillar of the increased marketization and liberalization entailed: vesting the real executive power to the emerging managerial-technocratic class. On a larger scale, self-management was at the root of the idea of weakening the federal statism and centralization.

The social structure of late self-managed socialism in Yugosalvia was dominated by three social groups: political elite occupying the high ranks of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the technocratic-managerial elite managing the enterprises and banks, and the working class. The neoliberalism found its strongest advocates in the technocratic elite which pursued the goals of limited state intervention, expansion of market principles and decentralization under fiscal federalism (cf. Collier 2011). The living standard of people employed in primary and secondary industrial sectors, the base of the Yugoslavian economy, was suffering from severe shortage of liquidity and foreign currency. Class aspect of this crisis came to the forefront revealing the official ideology of equality and solidarity[2] as well as the organizational doctrine of workers self management as increasingly crumbling. Only in

2 Solidarity was the key element in this project of modernity. Solidarity is articulated through our ability to recognize suffering and injustice in the other. Arguable, socialist solidarity is not the only conceivable concept of solidarity as liberals like to point out, but unlike any other articulation of modernity, socialism was explicitly built on solidarity. This particular notion of solidarity as manifested in Yugoslavia, stems from being rooted in the ideology but moreover, embedded in its philosophy of history. This particular philosophy of history was modernist through and through, and solidarity was built in the emancipatory teleology of progress.

the context of downward pressures on highly mobilized working class can we situate the rise of nationalism as a strategy by the segment of republican elites to harness this mobilization in order to push through their agenda. However, we must reject a direct and unproblematic translation of (cf. Lowinger 2009) a widespread and genuinely workers' social movement into a 'birth of the nation' and subsequent nationalist mobilization (cf. Vladisavlejvić 2008). Workers mobilization was indeed sparked by the crisis which has its roots internally and as part and parcel of global neoliberal conjuncture evident in the debt crisis. This disintegration can be very well understood if we relate it to the double polarization outlined by Jonathan Friedman (2003). Further intensification of the marketization, horizontally resulted in increased salience of the 'national question' (working against federal integration) as well as vertical polarization between technocratic-managerial class and the working class. It is not surprising then, that these deep contradictions would emerge as an overt antagonism, when faced with an unyielding debt crisis and IMF policy, along with heightened societal expectations. The constitutionally wakened federal state could no longer keep the inter-republic tensions at bay which, when they eventually ended up being paired with liberal-democratic principle of one man one vote meant the introduction of the 'fear of small numbers' (Appadurai 2006). The political turmoil in the aftermath of the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia created new vested interests grounded in political power and corruption, and on the other hand yielded violent fragmentation and polarization of the societal totality.

The relation between ethnicity, territorialization and state-building

The unavoidable metaphor of the fall of the Berlin wall indeed marked the epochal transformation of materiality and the idea of European integration. With one of the main pillar of the *raison d'etre* of the project of European integration gone, finally the genuine

coming of Europe to itself was set as the dominant political teleology. For the first time has, roughly, half of Europe been brought into the same Messianic and ideational framework of self-understanding, which even today, after much of the Eastern Europe has been 'integrated' into the project, has failed in fulfilling its goals of post-nationalism, cosmopolitanism and borderless mutuality. Even its historical core, let alone the newcomers, has not been integrated under the 'Us Europeans' as political demos. Yet, once unleashed, the eastward stride of the alliance of Europeanization and global neoliberalism thoroughly grasped the transitional post-socialist societies. As was argued above, the neoliberal institutionalism of state-building upon a clean slate of paper proved to be thoroughly mistaken.

Eric Hobsbawn (2007:2) offers an understanding of Europe that stands in contradistinction to a merely geographical category on the one hand, and a view of Europe as a stabilized project of political integration on the other. The third view understands it as an "incomplete historical process that arose in some parts of geographical Europe and turned these parts into the driving forces of the historical transformation of the world and champions of global leadership". Explicitly bringing the contingent and processual nature of becoming-of-Europe, Hobsbawm emphasizes that a vast portion of European modernity, up until 1940, was in fact marked by a process of Balkanization[3]. This process is manifested in territorial conquests and disputes and in general in the expansion of the *raison d'etat.* Concomitantly it went hand in hand with a strive to "define one's identity in counterposition to one's neighbor" (3). The project of creation of a common European identity after the Second World War stands in opposition to the majority of historical experience of Europe. However, Hobsbawm points out that socio-economic prosperity and rights achieved in the decades following the war brought about a "greater differentiation with regard to inhabitants of other regions" (3).

[3] I am aware that the term "balkanization" is problematic and sufficiently used to convey a derogatory message. This is not the intention of my engagement with Hobsbawn, yet I do find his insight useful for the purposes of this work.

European identity and commonness was, according to this view, formed in counterposition to the exterior, not least of all to the United States. Hobsbawn concludes that indeed Europe has never been more divided and more unified in its history. “Especially because, for ideological reasons” writes Hobsbawm, “it is expanding towards Easter Europe, i.e. towards countries to which the traditional basis of the historical unity on which Europe is founded is alien” (3).

By the time of post-Cold War rethinking of the European project was already conceived as a multi-layered and multi-processual integration most notably building on the experiences of social, economic and cultural aspects of post-Marshall Plan Western Europe and the post-authoritarian transitions of Greece, Spain and Portugal. However, unlike the preceding phases of this project, the European project after the fall of the Berlin Wall in fact contributed and itself unleashed a new phase of (re)borderings and reterritorializations. These were manifested both in the old semantics and materiality of bordering but also in creation of new internal borderings. Post-Yugoslavian space has been subjected to the politico-economic field of force emanated by the European Union for more than two decades. Any notion of static relation between already existing 'natural' periphery and the center must be rejected in favor of a processual purview which views this relation as impregnated with tension and conflict which it tries to congeal. Borders and bordering as a pervasive politico-economic articulation never seized to be emanated, both internally and externally, despite its veiling under the ideology of freedom of movement in a post-national borderless supra-polity. Below, I am more interested in the external effects of new bordering as part and parcel of transitional state-building in the post-Yugoslavian sphere, especially as it relates to Serbia and Kosovo.

Are not the two decades of military, political and economic intervention over the post-Yugoslavian space in fact a peripherialization guised under the depoliticized and

dehistoricized teleology after the 'end of history' (Fukuyama 1992)? Rather than an exception (cf. Ong 2006) to the geopolitics of global capitalism, the effect of *peripherialization* is its exact part and parcel. The spatially and temporally relational perspective therefore reveals that 'fair' capitalism and its democracy are in fact illusions since capitalism in the periphery cannot function outside of dependence on the centers of capitalist world system. But is this not the exact, although increasingly crumbling, achievement of neoliberalism: not only to present itself as the only game in town, but in fact to portray itself as being inherently a system in equilibrium when in fact it needs constant displacement and violence to maintain this illusion (Harvey 2005)? Therefore, various consociative protectorates, conditionings, war crime tribunals, economic aid and restructuring are a 'new' form of structural power emanated by the force field of the European Union and the United States. The provisional nature of the consociative equilibrium, as evident in Kosovo, depends directly on being externally underpinned. Viewed from this vantage point, analogies with imperialism and colonialism in the hybrid forms they have undertaken in the 21st century seem justified.

Again, the fundamental difficulty of the argument being built here is, first, to prove that multi-ethnic mutuality is not an inherent impossibility as the historical accounts clearly exemplify and secondly, to explicitly reject mechanistic causality between the external politico-economic structures and the localized historical outcomes. Van der Pijl (2001) argues that the case of "the breakdown of Yugoslav federal unity up to NATO's war over Kosovo … can be reinterpreted as [a] moment in a triumph of a neoliberal strategy supported by a transnational, Atlantic capitalist class over a rival, corporate liberal one with its strongholds in continental European capital, European social democracies, and the southern European societies generally" (275-6). As important as this insight is, this is exactly the one sided position stemming not so much from the author's limitations to paint the complete picture in

a single article, but more so because of the systemic leaning of the author to interpret the outcomes as largely dependent on the global politic-economic scale. It is evident that there was an antagonism on this scale which emanated forcefully on the outcomes on the local scale but that should not preclude the internal dialectics of political and economic contradictions in the Yugoslavian federal system as it was caught up in the conjuncture with the rise of global neoliberalism.

As Sorensen (2009) argues, focusing solely on the macro aspect of global political economy is insufficient for understanding the collapse of Yugoslavia and its politico-economic aftermath. According to his frame, the macro structures and local scale are not connected mechanically and deterministically, but the former create an "opportunity structure" in which local contingencies are framed and conditioned. Sorensen criticizes the approach that arose in the 1990s which he labels under 'criminalisation of the periphery' (Sorensen 2009: 18-19). Although this approach takes into an account the macro-structure as an important element of the transition, it utterly ignores the effects brought up by the transformation of global capitalism. Not only is it oblivious to the relational effects that the insertion in the global politico-economic system have in excluding and marginalizing these peripherialized areas, but it fails to situate the general spread of ethnic conflict as related to the post-Cold War global transformation.

The position maintained in the line of reasoning here is that the outcomes are thoroughly relational not just in the horizontal structural manner, but also having in the spatial scales and temporal deployment of these relations. The concept of „critical junction", as argued by Kalb and Tak (2005) intends to "summarize the core analytical value of four closely interconnected sets of social relations for understanding any human collectivity," which goes against the

neglect of modernist sectarian social-scientific disciplines. The social relations tackled under this framework are relations "through time," relations in space, relations of dependency and power, found both in the external and the internal, and include domains such as economics, politics, family, and law. What is important to be mentioned here is that these relations are dynamic and dialectical and they "shape the place-making projects, capacities, aspirations and frustrations of modern subjects (3)." The importance of critical junctions lies in its undermining of vulgar reductionism, essentialism, and teleology imposed for example by the cultural turn. Moreover, outlining a critical junction poses a serious challenge to the belief that local outcomes are largely contingent in as much as "local communities choose from an abundant menu of global offerings in finance, economics, ideologies and cultural images (3)".

Any explanation of the surge of ethno-nationalism in Europe and beyond must be placed against the combined background of the "dual crisis" of popular sovereignty , on the one hand, and of labor on the other hand, a dual crisis that certainly characterizes the new millennium (Kalb 2009, 2011). Analogously with Mann (2003) who demonstrates the role of ethnified democracies going hand in hand with the decrease of the actual popular sovereignty, so does Friedman argue on the other pole of this relation that the "ethnification or ethnopolitical renaissance has been a straightforward struggle for exit or for control by local elites of key political and economic resources (Friedman 2003: 27)." The dual crisis as outlined by Kalb should be regarded as a general structural frame in which particular local historically configured junctions play out in specific alliances, confrontations, and fragmentation of ethnicity and class. The fear induced ethnic politics should not be viewed as directly caused by globalizing factors which are belonging, according to Eric Wolf's (2001) framework of power, to the "structural power". As Kalb writes "actual outcomes on local grounds are intermediated by various path-dependent critical junctions that link global

processes via particular national arenas and local histories, often hidden, to emergent and situated events and narratives"(Kalb 2009: 209).

It is evident that there is a fundamental tension in the (re)bordering and reterritorialization squeezed between *uti possidetis* (Vladisavljević 2004) inherited from socialist federalism and the newly instated liberal citizenship. This tension came tragically manifested in two multi-ethnic states where it led to war: Bosnia and Hezegovina and Kosovo. The liberal equation of citizenship and nationality created an irresolvable remainder in the emerging immediacy of the 'fear of small numbers' (Appadurai 2006; Jović 2001). An ethnicized notion of nationality bears a concomitant notion exclusionist citizenship so decisive for the incipient nation-state building according to the Europeanization[4] process. At this point it is of paramount importance to reject a primordialist explanation of the inherent disequilibrium of multi-ethnic polities contained together by the repressive state socialist regime. The fact that the most violent effects of the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation are not embedded in some ethno-essentialism and bloodthirsty primordialism (Sorensen 2009), but rather in the fact that, in the light of nation-state building, the US and the EU in fact supported and sanctified the minimalist principle of national self-determination.

Much like in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the interventionism of the 'International Community' faced a very substantial obstacle in Kosovo: how to 'unmake' the unleashed forces of ethno-nationalism in the foundation of the state-building projects? Analogously to the highly unstable consociational post-Westphalian sovereignty devised for Bosnia and Herzegovina

4 There is a wide semantic dissemination of the concept of Europeanization. At this place, under Europeanization I consider the complexity of discursive and extra-discursive processes woven around the externalization of the European integration taken in its dynamic and diachronic dimension. The appropriated notion does not neglect the internal aspects of continuous Europeanization, or indeed Europe as a process, but for the present argument it is focused on the Erupeanization emanated on the constitutive outside of European not-yet-Europe

documented in the Dayton Agreement, the political status in the case of Kosovo remains disputed until today. It is faced with a foundational impossibility of state-building squeezed between the civic nation-building on the one hand and the logic of further secessionism under ethno-nationalist particularism on the other. From the perspective of the 'international community' the former is impossible while the latter must be curtailed. Once sanctified, ethnic secessionism leads to a path dependent lineage of subsequent quasi-sovereigntist enclavisations and reterritorializations. And this is exactly the crux of the externally (provisionally) stabilized patchwork of ethnically sanctified sovereign claims spanning from Slovenia to Macedonia. Let us examine the constitutive elements of this statement.

The dispute over northern Kosovo is an example of the breakdown of the appearance of post-conflict equilibrium brought about and enforced by the 'international community'. Northern Kosovo itself is a more extreme case of the arbitrary nature of the stabilization-making that has been put in place (not only in) post-Yugoslavian space. It reveals in fact, that the territorial patches which emerged in the Yugoslavian secession are bent on a dynamic sovereignty-claiming which is inherently in disequilibrium. I am not arguing that there is such thing as a sovereignty equal with itself in its duality of de jure and de facto forms. Agnew (2005) argues that, contrary to the prevailing notions of sovereignty as being bounded by, and itself bounding an exclusive territory, *effective sovereignty* is not as neatly territorialized. Is there such a thing as de jure sovereignty from which de facto sovereignty would differ as an anomaly (Brown 2010)? Agnew proposes that *de facto* sovereignty, not strictly fixed and defined by territorial boundaries, is all there is to it. Rather than an inquiry into normative and conceptual notions of sovereignty, this inquiry is concerned with actual manifestations of sovereignty as "tentative and always emergent form of authority grounded in violence" (Stepputat and Hansen 2006: 297). A dynamic and processual notion of

sovereignty is being conceived in terms of a complex of fluid norms and practices that can display differentiation and heterogeneity, in a sense compromising and making trade-offs in order to respond to variable interplay of powers and interests (Ong 2005). The impossibility of Kosovo's consolidation, given the above outlined contradiction of its administrative dismemberment, is not an exception but rather stands as a historical and metonymical condensation of the seeming end of the journey of secessionist solutions sanctified and underpinned by international forces. Northern Kosovo, in its irreducibility to the logic of secessionist state-building casts a new light on the whole process of Yugoslavian aftermath. The same cast of light reveals that the emerging patchwork of enclavised sovereignty-claiming is maintained in a stabilized disequilibrium exactly because it is drawn into the gravitational force field of the European Union.

Disruptions and continuities: a history of Trepča's transformation

In the previous chapter I have outlined the political aspects of the prelude and the aftermath of Yugoslavian demise specifically in relation to Serbia and Kosovo. The instable nature of the emerging political arrangements built around ethnified sovereignty-claims and concomitant reterritorializations makes up the bulk of the argument. A provisional and disruptive attempt of stabilization is enforced laterally between involved collective actors and horizontally by the politic-economic centers of power. As the second part of the argument, I discarded the notion that the predicaments of local structures and communities are being directly caused and determined externally by historical and macro-structural forces. Northern Kosovo however is relationally scrutinized as an exemplification of the shadowy underbelly of the breakdown of neoliberal stabilization. Therefore, neither the inherently static and primordial nature of the localities and their population, nor the linear center-periphery determinism that produces local outcomes.

In the two chapters to follow, I aim at discerning the local concreteness of social and economic reproduction of life, framed by the outlined political constellation. The enacted political cartography of unstable and competing sovereignty-claiming has resulted in sharpening of the inevitable social and economic effects of this process. The outcomes will be read more as an example of the equally sharpened political manifestation, rather than exceptions to the rule. I turn to the socio-economic aspects of the demise of the second pillar of the Yugoslavian project with focus on its achievements in industrial modernization. This aspect does not stand as carved out and complementary to the political constellation, as piece of the pie, but is rather closely related, overlapped and historically produced by the political development.

Delimitation of the unit of study, as Comaroff (1982) argues, is a "consequential theoretical matter" (144). This very delimitation must avoid the trap of conflating the field of inquiry and the concrete reality 'out there'. It is the exact trapping for which much of the classical 'synchronic' and latter structural anthropology has been criticized—taking the spatial and temporal frames and articulations as neutral *a prioris.* Taking the social outcomes that are ubiquitously present at their face value would be logical continuation of the previously discarded essentialist and primordialist renderings of locality. According to it, the calamity following the demise of Yugoslavia is already always inscribed in the constitutive elements of the field of inquiry. Comaroff argues against dependency theory[5] which stipulates a direct center-periphery relation of the historical production of certain local spaces and their modes of production. His position therefore is aimed at showing the dangers of "predicating units of analysis upon overtly centrist perspectives" on the one hand, but also in rejecting the "ingenuous conceptions of local structures" (145). Put in constructive terms, Comaroff's analysis of local systems is founded upon a "recognition that the construction, reproduction and transformation of such systems is inevitably shaped by an ongoing dialectic between internal forms and external forces" (146). In outlining a *dialectics of articulation* between a local system and its contextual environment, Comaroff states that this interaction is dependent partially on its "(lateral) relation with other communities" but also on its "(vertical) linkages with emergent centers" (146). The very boundary-making of a local system is inserted between a *dialectic of articulation* (the relation between the local assemblages and their vertical contextual insertion) and *internal dialectic* (contradictions played out on the local level).

5 Arguably, dependency theory was already by and large discarded as theoretically and historically inadequate given the historical and theoretical developments of post-colonialism. More or less simultaneously, the word-system theory and its masterful anthropological rendering by Eric Wolf came about, all of which emerged as a corrective and critical successor to the dependency theory.

Mining in dark times

Early in the morning of August 14, 2000, close to a thousand NATO soldiers under UN peacekeeping mandate stormed the biggest metal-smelting facility in Kosovo. The led and zinc smelter in the town of Zvečan, just two kilometers north from Kosovska Mitrovica, is part of the Trepča Mining Complex. Decades of heavy pollution and environmental disaster have been used as a pretense to shut down and violently take over the centerpiece of the vast Trepča metallurgy-mining complex in the immediate aftermath of the civil war and the subsequent three-month-long NATO military intervention. This event marked the termination of a long creeping demise of the enterprise which made up an immense element of socio-economic reproduction of people's lives in Kosovo.

Northern parts of central Kosovo have been historically known for being rich in ores and minerals which have been exploited since the early middle ages. The modern history of mining in Kosovo is largely tied to the establishment of Trepča Mines Limited Company by British capital in the 1927. The British opened the Stari Trg mining shaft in 1931 and the led-zinc smelter facilities in Zvečan in 1940. During World War II, Trepča was taken over by German occupational forces and served as an important aid to the Wermacht war effort. After the end of WW2, the Trepča mining-metallurgical-chemical complex was expanded under the project of socialist modernization and industrialization and became the largest company in Kosovo. The complex was the major aspect of socialist modernization and development during the four decades of socialism, the specificity of which, as opposed to capitalist industrialization, was evident in the social embeddedness of this colossal enterprise. The societal totality of life in that part of Kosovo was largely developed and dependent on the latter. Urbanization, education, health care and other non-wage social paraphernalia were tied

to the complex which was comprised of over 40 different production facilities and at its peak employed close to 23,000 workers.

Despite the great social importance of the Trepča complex, throughout the socialist period, Kosovo was overdetermined by uneven development when compared to Slovenia which has approximately equal population (around 2 million). The persistent effects of uneven development, evident in the discrepancy ratio of GDP between Slovenia and Kosovo as 7:1, in fact did not lessen but were exacerbated by the last decade of Yugoslavian socialism (Jović 2009: 15-17). This effect cannot be easily explained, as it involves complex and path-dependent factors of long term development. However, the fact that Kosovo was dominantly inhabited by Albanians who were never successfully integrated in the Yugoslavian project was evident throughout the socialist period. This complex development needs to be viewed in light of diverse alignments and assemblages of emergent hegemonies that were enacted over, what has often been seen as the 'weakest link' of the Yugoslavian project. The economic and political liberalization during the 1960s and the 1970s was also reflected in the struggles of Kosovo-Albanian students and workers who, aligning themselves with the federal authority and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, tried to push against the hegemonic pressures from Serbian republican leadership which was the epitome of the nesting nationalism.

In light of relentless political contestation, the decade of severe economic crisis during the 1980s inevitably gave the 'Kosovo question' new salience both for Serbs and Albanians. In retrospect, the large-scale demonstrations of 1981 marked the beginning of the explicit crumbling and fragmentation of the Yugoslavian project, which manifested in political mobilization of Kosovo-Albanian students who called into question not only the political status (demanding greater autonomy within Yugoslavia), but also the increasing gap in inequality between Kosovo and the more developed parts of Yugoslavia. Given the nature of

self-managed socialism, the workers in Trepča (and especially miners who were dominantly Albanian) played a significant role in this turbulent decade. The question of exploitation and uneven development was explicitly framed around the Trepča Complex. Slogans such as *"Who does Trepča work for?"* and *"Trepča is working, Belgrade is being built"* came to the forefront in the workers' strikes. The strikes and demonstrations of the Kosovo-Albanians were met with heavy handed responses from the repressive apparatus in turn creating a vortex of increasing ethnification of the political and economic nature of Kosovars' dissent. The rise of Slobodan Milošević to power in 1987 marked an explicit utilization of this question in order to portray Kosovo-Albanians as hostile to the Serb minority which consequently led to the canceling of Kosovo's autonomy guaranteed by the Yugoslav constitution of 1974. Kosovo Serbs will prove to be a major resource in Milošveić's attempts to centralize Serbia by revoking the autonomies of Kosovo and Vojvodina, the autonomous provinces within the socialist republic of Serbia. In the midst of an onslaught of nationalist centralization under Milošević, on November 17, 1988, a number of miners from the biggest mining shaft in Stari Trg occupied the mines and, reinforced with the second shift, marched 70 kilometers south towards the capital of Priština in order to protest the constitutional breach and forced resignation of Kosovo-Albanian communist leaders enforced by Milošević. Although the dominant lens through which the miner's strikes are usually interpreted is in pure ethno-political terms, the strikes cannot be taken out of the relations of class struggle over the imposed austerity and cuts to workers' wages on top of belatedness of their payment.

The strikes and the loud political cries for autonomy marked the peak and the end of this phase of contestation over Kosovo in which Trepča played a crucial material and symbolic anchoring node. Trepča reached its peak employment in the '70s when it employed close to 23,000 workers. By the beginning of the '90s, the conservative (so called 'anti-bureaucratic')

revolution had swept Serbia and Montenegro, revoking the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo and initiated further Serbian hegemony over Yugoslavia (Vladisavljević 2008; Jović 2009). The years between 1991 and 1995 were marked by the biggest and bloodiest conflict on the European soil since WW2, which initially did not spill over into Kosovo. However, Serbia and Kosovo were severely hit by the imposed sanctions and the authoritarian rule of Milošević's party. These events had tremendous importance on the fate of Trepča.

The collapse of Trepča

Yugoslavia was no exception to the faith of heavy industry developed under specific social relations, organizational principles, economy of scale and export markets which all collapsed with the demise of socialism. In the introduction to the seminal volume on the first decade of post-socialism, Burawoy and Verdery write:

> "Industrial production was at the heart of socialist systems and (perhaps in consequence) has proven very difficult to change. An uncertain economic environment precludes the long time horizons necessary for transformative investments in production. Especially here, old patterns seem to reproduce themselves despite the introduction of new practices" (Burawoy and Verdery 1999: 3).

However, the goods Trepča was producing were for the most part primary resources and unlike the manufacturing industry, it could be expected that the complex could survive the demise of the frame of the previous mode of production. However, during the early '90s Trepča almost completely collapsed. Apart from build-up of structural inefficiency demanding increased internal refinancing, the collapse of Trepča can be also partially

attributed to the rising ethno-nationalist struggle, the overall dissolution of Yugoslavia and the UN mandated severe sanctions on the leftovers of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the period of 1992 to 1995.

There was an evident recomposition of work force in the Trepca complex. While the overall employment shrank severely, Trepča's facilities located north of Kosovska Mitrovica faced a very visible ethnic recomposition. In the period between 1989 and 1992 a vast majority of Albanians were either sacked or have left their jobs. As the result of the recomposition of the labor structure in which Albanians who were predominant in labor intensive aspects of the enterprise were sacked, marginalized or have withdrawn from employment has reversed the prior superfluity and overabundance of employed labor into acute shortage of manual extraction labor for the enterprise to function (Palairet 2003: 15-17). Mirroring that, Trepča faced an overabundance of office and support employees who were predominantly Serb.

Michael Palairet[6] repeatedly states that the overall Trepča activity throughout the decades of its functioning, both in socialism and afterwards, was "very largely driven (as ever) by the amount of external funding it could procure, since it was utterly incapable of financing itself" (Palairet 2003: 19). During the 1980s Trepča was dependent on subsidies from federal development funds that were necessary in order to cover the loses. Credits and aid were cut off by the end of the '80s due to general economic crisis, the debt crisis and the IMF policies towards Yugoslavia, and finally by the increasing rift between Serbia and Slovenia, in which the latter was refusing to input disproportionate funds into the 'black hole' of federal budget and its programs of aid and crediting. Heavy debts, loss of exports, lack of skilled labor and the general process of *primitive disaccumulation* (Burawoy 2009: 230) brought Trepča close to complete shutdown. By 1993 the complex was on the brink of paralysis, lacking raw

6 Michael Palairet is an economic historian at University of Edinburgh and his detailed account of Trepča's history concluding with the year 2000 is the richest secondary source on Trepča known to me. In this chapter I am relying heavily on his work.

materials, input materials and spare parts, and explicitly demanded state funds in order to continue with functioning. During 1993 and 1994 Serbia was hit with one of the most radical hyperinflations in history, hitting 5×10^{15} percent cumulative inflation over the period between October 1, 1993 and January 24, 1994.

Transformation of property regime

Until 1991 RMHK Trepča was a SOUR (Complex organization of associated labor) comprised of 21 subsidiaries each of which had its own director and board with broad autonomy in decision making. This 'confederate' organization of the enterprise came to an end when it was decided, much in reflection of the ongoing political turbulences, that Trepča will become a single legal person in the form of a joint stock company. Although a number of subsidiaries dropped out of the newly centralized joint stock company (most notably subsidiaries outside of Kosovo but also two from Kosovo) most of them 'agreed' to new legal and organizational form. The reorganization resulted in a joint stock company with a residual social status, but the government of Serbia was the majority shareholder. The shift from socially owned to majoritarily state owned property was effectuated through state takeover of a bankrupted bank (Kosovska banka [Bankos]) to which Trepča owed $82 million. The government of Serbia took over its claims and transformed them into shares, thus becoming the majority shareholder in Trepča. As Palairet emphasizes, these liabilities “became undischarged debts of the Yugoslav state, rather than corporate debts guaranteed by the state” (22).

This initial transformation in Trepča's legal form will prove to be decisive in the later disempowerment, but also as the foundation for latter (unsuccessful) claims made by the

workers. Until today the complex and antagonistic relation between nominal social (that is, workers') ownership and legal joint-stock form in which various statal and private actors hold shares has not been resolved.

> "Trepča's residual "social capital" of 11,360 million dinars was unissued, and was treated as the property not of the state but of "society". Its usufruct could be distributed (theoretically) according to the decision of the workers' council between dividends to the workers and the enterprise's development and social funds. In effect the "social" share was supposed to be the employees' un-alienated stake in the enterprise." (Palairet 2003: 23)

Post-socialist economies cannot be adequately represented in a public-private dichotomy model. Stark (1998) points out to the new forms of property in which the properties of the private and the public are dissolved, interwoven and recombined. He identifies the growing plurality of 'mixed property forms' that transgressed and blurred traditional property boundaries. Hence, the transformation of property regime should not be equated with privatization. The emerging new forms of property blur the boundaries between (1) public and private, (2) organizational boundaries between enterprises and (3) the boundedness of justificatory principles. Stark's concept of recombinant property denotes the process of triple boundary blurring. Complexity, according to Stark's account, is the interweaving of multiple justificatory principles on the same domain space. The clash of orders and regimes never produces equilibrium but only relative and localized stabilizations. Assets and liabilities have value not in themselves but in relation to legitimating principles. From the perspective of enterprises these new developments regarding the debt centralization lead to the

"organizational separation of debts from assets" (131). Doubly associative character of assets—what is valuable and what is a liability—means that there are no free floating resources. They need to be mobilized using diverse justificatory strategies.

The revival under Bjelić's authoritarianism

The calamitous years of Trepča's decline were brought to a reversal in 1995 when the Serbian government installed a trusted cadre, Novak Bjelić, under the project of reviving the enterprise. With the end of the UN sanctions on Yugoslavia, the regime was in need of foreign exchange liquidity and Trepča was deemed as an asset with easily exportable (primary) products. The new management and Bjelić personally were directly installed by Milošević's party, and in turn Bjelić obtained high party function, a seat in the parliament and his previous CEO position in FAGAR. The years of highly personalized and authoritarian rule over Trepča during the time Bjelić was its General Director, did see an increase in production, exports and increased revenues. Although this was largely portrayed as his personal achievement[7], as the 'savior' of Trepča, his success is largely dependent on the availability of domestic finance as well as foreign credit.

Between 1995 and 1999, under Bjelić rule, Trepča made wide acquisitions and brought under its umbrella all of the former subsidiaries as well as all the lead-zinc mines throughout Serbia, as well as numerous other enterprises, not necessarily related to the metallurgy industry[8]. (28-

7 Michael Palairet devotes a great deal of space and effort in detailing Bjelić's dominion over Trepča. A man of inordinate vanity, Bjeliü, by some device had himself acclaimed in Bucharest as "the best manager in the Balkans for 1995". He further emphasizes the unabashed appraisal in the enterprise newspaper "Trepča" and personal material gain such as a new Mercedes, as well as his arrogant demeanor when dealing with foreign trade partners.

8 Such as an aggressive takeover of a farming enterprise in Vojvodina (northern Serbia) where Bjelić sacked the workers and incorporated the property under Trepča umbrella.

30) These acquisitions resulted in sectoral and geographical diversification of Trepča, with its activity "oriented 74.1 percent within Kosovo, and 25.9 percent within Serbia" (Palairet 2003: 31).

Stark's account is written during the very early stages of post-socialist transition(s), but his prediction regarding the importance of path-dependent nature of these initial transformations of property stays largely valid. He introduces a notion of hybrid recombinant property in the form of inter-corporate networks which proves to be an alternative to a "dichotomously forced choice between markets and hierarchies" (129). He suggests that the proper unit of analysis is the *recombinet*, or the "network of recombinant property" which assumes a strategy of restructuring in which assets and liabilities are interconnected as networked attributes. Arguing that the logic of central planning could not be held appropriate for the new conditions, Stark recognizes the potential for "increasing the value of existing assets through their recombination" (129). As he argues, property transformation, especially in the cases of post-state-socialist transition is equally one of assets and rights as it is about liabilities and obligations.

What should not be left out of the picture is that complexity of which Stark writes is not only conflictual, but has historically favored capital in relation to labor. State is the key entity here, as it manifests its "structural effect" (Mitchell 1999) when it centralizes the liabilities and horizontally socializes the debt. Is not the working class mostly disfavored by these governing practices? Not only are social ties and property value shattered and devalued, but the state itself is pumping public money into inflation of social inequality. Taking up the end of liabilities and obligations by the state is in fact socialization of the debt and risk. There is a direct connection between the state and society here. Property transformation and privatization are not only positive or direct practices regarding the objects of property but

have the effect of an indirect feedback loop which socializes the loses on the society as such. In fact, rather than 'overprivileged working class', the society as such is the definitive loser of transition.

Radiša, one of my key informants who is a former Trepča employee currently driving a licensless taxi in northern Kosovska Mitrovica, shared insights which, despite their subjective partiality, reinforce the narrative offered by Michael Palairet. Radiša, born in 1968, was employed in Trepča in 1990 as the operator of the internal logistic-transportation system in the largest mining shaft in Stari Trg. He used to operate the control panel of the elevators for lowering and raising miners and the excavated material. From his story it was evident that Stari Trg used to be an immense excavation point, which employed around 3,500 mineworkers at its peak.

The ground level of the Stari Trg mine stood at 760m above the see level, while the lowest level, so called 12th horizon was 50 meters bellow the see level. Therefore, the mining shaft spread more than 800m in depth. He said that, at the most laterally expanded levels, it took miners a lot of time to get to the excavation points and that there was an internal rail system to transport them horizontally on the levels indicating a massively spread mining shaft. He made a contrast between the earlier production capacities, at the time while Albanians were still employed and when Stari Trg peaked in the number of employed miners, and the later years (between late 1994 and 1999) when they were provided with new excavating machines. He showed visible ambiguity regarding this period, but he did not deny that, unlike in the years immediately before and after this perios, Trepča was producing significant output.

Radiša pointed out that in the past the mine was able to put out 60.000 tons of ore, while after 1995 with the new machines from Finland and Sweden they put out close to 70.000 tons with only 700 workers. He said that the transportational capacities could not keep up with the highly productive drilling machines which could easily equate the labor of 150 miners.

Unlike the mines digging on a constant basin, Stari Trg followed the 'ore vein' (*žila*). That is why there was a vast maze of tunnels spreading 12 levels deep each of which branched out horizontally. He said that the most productive years of the mining enterprise at Stari Trg were between 1995 and 1999 when the war broke out.

Labor antagonism in the period 1995-1999

During the period between 1991 and 1995, analogously with overall decline of Trepča's activity, there has been a radical ethnic homogenization which deprived the much needed skilled manual labor in the mining shafts and processing, previously dominantly conducted by Kosvo-Albanians. The need for labor was resolved by contracting the miners from Poland via Kopeks company, as well as miners from Slovakia, Czech Republic and Bulgaria. Flowing the exodus of some 200,000 Serbian refugees from Croatia in the summer of 1995, some of whom were populated in northern Kosovo, Trepča saw an increase of about 1,000 new workers from this migration wave (32).

Not only was a great majority of Kosovo-Albaninan workers sacked or otherwise left the employment, but moreover many of the crucial production facilities such as Stari Trg were surrounded by settlements dominantly or exclusively inhabited by Kosovo-Albaninas many of whom were former employees of Trepča. During the war in 1998, many of Trepča facilities were under constant attacks by the Kosovo Liberation Army and their aides among civilians in response to which the Serb workers organized the armed 'defense' of the mines. Throughout the period of civil war the production suffered catching a conjuncture with long-term structural problems of Bjelić's management of the mines, renderign the workers conditions to increasingly deteriorate.

According to Palairet's sources, there was an evident dissatisfaction among the majority of Trepča employees during this period stemming not only from irregular payment (which was 17% above the average wage in Serbia) but also because of disregard for their well being, for dismantlement of recreational and other non-wage benefits including the significant worsening of the canteen food (33). Bjelić continued his personalistic authoritarian rule by intimidation and having support in a minority of favored key employees who enabled his rule.

At the same time, due to shortage of labor, Bjelić was bent of increasing the rate of exploitation through the increase of minimum daily output and sharpened labor discipline as well as in limited investment in technology. Due to the deterioration of workers' conditions, despite the increased ethno-national cohesion, homogenization and rising ethnic tensions, the workers went on strike in the summer of 1998 despite the heavy handed response by the administration that deemed any disobedience illegal due to explicit regulations banning any kind of insubordinates (34). Although the instance of rebellion was suppressed by sacking of the protesters, the workers collectives passively resisted the Bjelić management during 1998 and up to the beginning of NATO's bombardment in the spring of 1999. This antagonism was one of the key elements in the general decline and ultimate failure of the attempt to exploit Trepča as the backbone of Milošević's increasingly crumbling authoritarian rule. In all of the accounts given by my interlocutors in Kosovo, the 1999 stands as the year that fundamentally transformed their life-world. During this period, the phrase "sovereignty and territorial integrity" could be heard a dozen of times a day in all forms of media outlets. Not only is Kosovo still a political conundrum, but also a stage of sharpened antagonisms between two notions of economic normativity. After the war of 1999 and the subsequent emergence of international protectorate, Kosovo was brought under an explicitly neoliberal model of 'development' and reconstruction. For Trepča's workers, this year marked the end of their

economic subsistence that already went through a turbulent decade during the 1990s. Thinking relationally between internal dialectic and dialectic of articulation the local outcome that emerged still remains fundamentally underwritten by affects of provisionality, impermanence and uncertainty.

Trepča is ours!: Lacing sovereignty and property regimes

Susan Buck-Morss made one of the most insightful interventions into a thoroughly relational thinking between two monumental projects of modernization in the twentieth century, namely socialism and capitalism. She traces their fundamental similarities, most notably (Fordist) industrialization as well as mass (hence *democratic*) politics as the foundation of sovereignty based on the friend-enemy logic. She makes a clear distinction between the foundation of mass sovereignty in these two projects however, where "[o]ne is based on a political imaginary of irreconcilably antagonistic, warring classes; the other is based on a political imaginary of mutually exclusive, potentially hostile nation-states" (Buck Morss 2000: 13).

The latter conception is still fundamentally haunted by the specter of Thomas Hobbes, although in its contemporary liberal-democratic modality, the war is internally pacified by the social contract and is gazing outside the fence of the nation-state. The paradox arising out of the externalization of the enemy is found in the impossibility of the national totality to become equal with itself. The nation-state, as the most important political project of European modernity, is underwritten by internal identity formation which always creates a remainder. National identity presumes not only external differentiation, but also internal (ethnic) homogeneity, which inscribes, at least potentially, visceral violence. These insights, as pushed to the extreme with the emergence of fascism, have become a commonplace in the liberal tradition. However, in the same tradition, the nation-state and sovereignty, imagined as they are, are seen as purely political (Buck-Morss 2000: 18). "The economy" emphasizes Buck-Morss (18), "is seen to inhabit a different terrain". Although capitalist mode of production has been the driving force behind the nation-state, there has been a radical decoupling of the economic from the political in capitalist modernity. "Within modern

Europe" writes Buck-Morss, "a fundamental distinction came to be made between political possession of territory and economic ownership, so that even the *enemy's* property rights were protected" (15). The capitalist property regime remained out of the question of sovereignty, at least among the Europeans, leaving the colonies out of this separation[9].

By the beginning of the 'short twentieth century' this "separation between the economy and the political became increasingly difficult to sustain" (19). The Yugoslavian modality of socialism, based on self-management as the alternative to both market and plan economy, posed a formidable challenge to this separation. At least doctrinally it discarded both the political state, which was supposed to wither away, and the economy based on exclusive private ownership of means of production. Collapsing the political and the economic was at the heart of the revolutionary struggle and the subsequent 'building of socialism'. As Buck-Morss emphasizes, the most radical nature of post-1917 socialist revolutions was that they were directed against the property order and not solely against the political order.

The fundamental ambiguity haunting the landscape of northern Kosovo is the affect of stunned temporality effectuated by being caught up in-between two logics of sovereignty. Not only two synchronic sovereignties which are functioning on the same ethno-territorial logic, but moreover diachronically. The being in-between is manifested as an abysmal existence in a delayed temporality between socialism and capitalism, between two competing

[9]"While keeping up the appearance of a separation between the economic and the political, it made a connection between these categories, so that 'freedom' took on an economic meaning and the political intervention was the way to achieve it. Schmitt calls this the American principle of *Grossraum* (great space), a form of economic expansion that employed state violence without political annexation" (Buck-Morss 2000: 17). This lengthy quote illuminates the explicit predicament of Kosovo after the NATO intervention of 1999 and subsequent explicit neoliberal economic agenda. The differential analogy with Iraq is the one of scale and intensity, but the maneuver, mechanism and political rationality is fundamentally the same. The spatial logic of expansion of the sphere of interest portrays the fallacy in the attempt to ideologically divorce economic from the political.

logics of sovereignty. It has been previously argued that the nature of emerging sovereignties after the demise of socialism is of provisional nature, impotently enacted as flamboyant claim making. Part of the reason why I read the relation of Trepča and northern Kosovo as an irresolvable remainder of the emergent externally stabilized patchwork concerns the intersection of property and sovereignty. It is in this exact moment where Trepča reveals the shadowy underbelly of not only recombinant property in a single plane of a property regime, but indeed as still caught up in the ambiguous space between two property regimes.

Spatial enclosures and the disjointed time: scaling northern Kosovo

Approaching the newly erected border crossing on the Serbian side, while traveling to my fieldwork, I encountered a long line of cargo trucks waiting to cross the customs and police checkpoint. It may seem paradoxical, yet the erection of permanent physically enforced border is a sign of stabilization in the relations between Belgrade and Pristina. The same 'normalization' of relations on this level, is on the other hand dominantly interpreted as a wedge between Belgrade and the Kosovo-Serbs inhabiting northern Kosovo who are militantly refusing to be territorially and politically 'integrated' in the frame of independent Kosovo. In the summer and fall of 2011, the same border crossing was the site of violent clashes between KFOR and the Serbs from the northern Kosovo. These were sparked by the attempt of Kosovo-Albanian special police forces to seize the crossing of administrative line between northern Kosovo and Serbia.

Despite the obvious material permanence the very experience of crossing is probably the most casual one in the post-Yugoslavian space. The bus, operated by a transportation company from northern Kosovo, stopped for the routine check by the Serbian police who did

not bother to check our documents. Some 500 meters down the road we encountered the checkpoint on the other side, stacked with EULEX (European Union Rule of Law and Police Mission to Kosovo) armored vehicles and security personnel, long barrel guns, barbed wire and metal containers. EULEX is assisted by the deployed KFOR military troops in mask uniforms who maintain posts and patrols along the road leading south towards Kosovska Mitrovica. Ominous presence of heavily armed international forces is starkly not reflected in their interest into interference into the daily traffic of cars and buses. Both locals and people from Serbia who frequently visit northern Kosovo are accustomed to their presence, yet it was often explicitly pointed out to me how unsettling the foreign military presence is. Time and again have the term 'occupiers' been used to describe this presence. Apart from a perhaps understandable irritation of being under unaccountable military protectorate, people still vividly remember not only the bombing campaign during 1999, but also NATO's alliance with Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) both during the war but also in its aftermath when KFOR under the mandate of the UN Security Council's resolution 1244 failed to disarm and effectively neutralize the KLA. The effects of this were most evident during the 2004 violent unrest, sparked by the an unclear drowning of three Albanian boys, which resulted in large-scale violent purges, murders and destruction of non-Albanian households and churches. During that time the KFOR and UNMIK failed to prevent the violence and the effective continuation of the process of ethnic cleansing initiated by the armed conflict of 1998 and 1999. Although the clashes between Serbs and EULEX tranquilized by the end of 2011 which resulted in the current erection of 'proper' border crossings, there are still remnants of the barricades as the material signifier of the ubiquitous sense of delineation and separation of northern Kosovo from the rest of Kosovo's territory.

Semantically the very name of Kosovska Mitrovica already points to its spatial inscription in Kosovo. Yet the very spatial entity of Kosovo has starkly different connotations north and south of the river Ibar. For the people living in the former, Kosovo is still the primordial heart of Serbia, while for the latter, Kosovo is the state belonging to them by natural and historical right. Speaking about two halves implies an approximation of equality when in fact the northern part comprises roughly 15% of the whole city. In June 1999, Serbs have fortified themselves on the northern shore of Ibar. The northern side was built during the years of socialism as a modern 'workers' dormitory' with housing projects and the very local communal necessities. Shortly after 1999, Serbs have configured a new city center, formed the local municipality and relocated provincial institutions from Pristina. The line of demarcation is still porous and allows for traffic, yet any cross-river interaction is subject to very strong social norms. Until today, the northern part has been a permanent node of escalating violence with detonations, protests, burnings and barricades.

The majority of Kosovo-Serbs, approximately two thirds, live south of the river in predominantly rural enclaves. Their economic existence is dismal with rampant unemployment reaching well above 70% and marked by very few opportunities to become full citizens of the multi-ethnic independent Kosovo. Although they rely on aid coming both from Belgrade and Pristina, Kosovo-Serbs from the 'south' are much more willing, having no other options, to cooperate with the new Kosovo authority. They participate in Kosovo's elections, where they elect mostly the local parties and politicians to sit in the parliament in Pristina. Although enclaved, they maintain a sustained interaction with Kosovo-Albanians. Unlike the Kosovo-Serbs living in the enclaves, the ones living in the so called northern Kosovo are in seemingly better political and economic position.

The road to EU for Serbia leads across the blocked bridge on Ibar. The infamous 'North' has been the thorn for Pristina and international administrators and for long Serbia's foot in the door of Kosovo's territorial integrity and sovereignty—however both of those seemed under a relentless question mark. The barricaded bridge separating the northern from the southern part of Kosovoska Mitrovica is not just a metaphor, but figures explicitly among EU officials as the physical mark where the unfolding of neighborly relations between Belgrade and Pristina has to begin. In the triangle where the agreement between Belgrade, Brussels and Pristina has been reached, the people from the northern Kosovo are overtly left out in the cold. In the past two months, Belgrade has mounted a tourniquet on the political leaders of the Serbs from northern Kosovo to accept and start implementing what has been agreed on after ten rounds of discussions in Brussels.

Talking with the 'ordinary' people in northern Mitrovica and Zvečan, I repeatedly encountered sentiments that spoke to manipulation, but most strikingly an underlying abandonment. Maybe in contradistinction to the majority of Kosovo Serbs south of Ibar, who never had much illusions regarding their predicament, Serbs in the North have been fed the cold soup of rampant nationalism based on portraying them as the last bulwark and irreconcilable defenders of Serbian Kosovo. For decades they have been nudged and instructed how to resist on barricades rather than behind a negotiation tables.

During my stay in Kosovska Mitrovica I spoke with a local sociologist employed as a social worker in the Center for Social Work located less than 50 meters from the barricaded bridge on Ibar. The young women in her mid thirties spoke with authority and openness regarding the difficult situation of Serbian people both north and south of Ibar. She captured the fear stemming from the implications of abandonment of the imagined bulwark of 'Serbness'. She said: “We want to be part of Serbia; I mean we are part of Serbia and that should remain.

Survival of people here is the top national priority for Serbia. We are the ultimate frontier. Look at Israel and how much they help the settlers."

People living in northern Kosovo have formed their political visions and imaginations in the times when the Serbian national project was 'defended' on Kosovo, when all of the 'national interests' were subordinated to the celestial territory which already changed its owner in all the terrestrial books. Today, when the grand illusion is finally coming home to roost, the sense of shame, disappointment and betrayal floods over the damn where it has been ominously held back by years of irresponsible politics coming from Belgrade. Stating that the Serbs in the north have no other state then Serbia and conversely that Belgrade has no other people then the Serbs, is emptied out of any content and has little worth for either side. The hard line of Serbs from the north, and the lip service made to it by their leaders, is not surprising given its historical and political foundations. On the one hand the summoned and galvanized ethnic hatred is hard to dispense with when 'the others' have emerged victorious and aligned with the despised 'West'. But no less importantly and in conjunction with the former element, there is a strong vested interest of a handful of 'professional patriots' occupying the key political and economic positions, who find it lucrative to maintain the indefinite status-quo of de facto statelessness. The same elite, previously supported by all the Belgrade governments from Milosevic onwards, is yet to be called to questioning regarding the profiteering from the financial 'black hole' of (not only, but mainly northern) Kosovo, in which Serbia has poured some $ 7.9 billion in the period from June 1999 until today[10], amounting to 20% of Serbia's annual GDP for 2013[11].

Walking around northern Mitrovica I could not shake off the feeling of being brought back to Serbia as it looked in the '90s. Material presence of a variety of contemporary markers of our

10 http://kolikokostakosovo.info/

11 "Serbia". International Monetary Fund. Accessed on June 1, 2013.

everyday-life-world is ubiquitously present, yet the very space was underwritten by an uncanny feeling of time being out-of-joint. Tapping into my memory, as reinforced by historicized reifications of visual and textual permanence, I came back to what affectively predetermined my early childhood: a sense of skewed order and predictability, an inversion of freedom where the predictability of the rule of law is absent. Internalization of many of the achievements of 'late transition,' as evident in most of the places in post-Yugoslavian space, came apart in what I encountered in the very configuration of the urban environment.

The former 'workers' dormitory' on the northern shore of the river Ibar, just 2km away from Trepča's smelting complex, had to be reinvented as an urban place *for itself*. All the facilities and utilities that remained in the much bigger southern part of Kosovska Mitrovica had to be recreated which more often than not entailed improvisation. Barricaded and carved out, northern Mitrovica is facing the paradoxical situation of clinging on the improvised provisionality of the totality of its urban environment. The very refusal of Serbs in northern Kosovo to succumb to the pressures to integrate with the rest of Kosovo, and in Mitorivca's case to unite with the southern part of the city, reads as an insistence on the permanence of the impermanence. The solidification of the interrupted and provisional temporality is at the basis of the resistance to the over-arching affect of uncertainty. There is a visible tension created by the insistence on maintaining the affect of temporal interruption, delay and provisionality which further fuels the sense of abandonment I took a note of in the very beginning of this chapter. Lack of transparency and predictability grounded in the rule of law and institutions is overtly present. The vast majority of cars have no license plates, shops operate without paying customs or taxes, electricity and water are consumed without paying, while the public services (e.g. health care and education), fully funded by Belgrade, operate with little to no transparency.

Tepča is ours: socialist remnants in a nationalist skin

The disjointed spatial and temporal affect haunting northern Kosovo ever since the war in 1999 is equally inscribed in what has historically emerged out of the economic backbone and generationally the largest employer in (northern) Kosovo, namely Trepča. In the midst of the 'late transition' or the 'post-postsocialism'[12] in the European periphery where the dictates of the Washington consensus remain the politic-economic orthodoxy, Trepča is not exempt from the over-arching framework of privatization. The lateral contestation over Trepča, waged on the national scale between Belgrade and Pristina, conveys little doubt regarding the privatization as the adequate model for the transformation of the property in question.

Unlike the vast majority of SOEs in Kosovo and equally so in Serbia, privatization[13] of Trepča still has not been carried out and seems to be very difficult if not outright impossible (Gashi 2012; Korovilas 2006). From the account given above it becomes apparent that the fate of Trepča is laced up with the question of stateness and sovereignty in and over northern Kosovo. Moreover the complexity stemming from the immense accumulation of debt in the previous regime, a myriad of claim holders with differential viability of transforming claims

12 Steven Sampson (2001) argues that the initial phase of transitional post-socialism as an emic lived experience of confusion is over and that a new era of post-postocialism (PPS) emerged around the millennial turn. "PPS is a new way of life, profoundly different from the transition period. If the postsocialist interim was 'agency over structure', in post-postsocialism structure is emphatically back" (298). As Sampson argues the "irrevocable integration into global frameworks is the hallmark of post-postsocialism" (299) but is also followed by deep fragmentation (302).

13 A broad and thorough privatization has been inscribed in the Rambouillet Accord—the unsigned treaty underwriting the full military occupation of Yugoslavia in 1999—in the chapter four which unmasks the neoliberal political rationality. As Neil Clarke points out, the scaled down Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was not member of international governing and financial institutions (IMF, WTO, WB, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), stemming from being ostracized during 1990s as a rogue state. The plan for occupation of Yugoslavia called for a widest possible privatization of government held assets and installment of free market economy. The latter economic plan was implemented under UNMIK administration of Kosovo in the period 2000-2008, and continued in the same vein since the unilateral proclamation of Kosovo's sovereignty in 2008. cf. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/sep/21/kosovo.comment

into assets (shares or debt) and last but not least, the legal pluralism in the triangle of UNMIK, Pristina and Belgrade (Gashi 2012) shrouds the case with dense ambiguity. It becomes apparent that Trepča, as an object of property relations, cannot be subsumed under a conception bounded to a notion of exclusive rights over disposition which is predominant in the 'standard liberal model' (Hann 2005: 110) Property then does not designate the relations between persons and things but rather the "social relations between persons with respect to things" (111). Chris Hann points out to the welfare benefits and social security as inherent elements of a broader understanding of property. As he writes, "[o]wnership *per se* seems to become less important than the political negotiation of complex forms of co-management between and among local and state actors" (121). In the end, Hann elucidates that the processes of privatization in post-socialist states is accessible through multiple frameworks (120). In this respect, the formal change in the ownership structure has to be inserted in a multilayered outlook in which the 'stake holders' are also those who were beneficiaries of various forms of social security tied to that property such as large SOE. As various anthropological accounts show, the 'effects of property' must be "explored at all the layers of social organization and practice" (121).

Humphrey and Verdery (2004) suggest the concept of *property regime* in order to grasp the political and institutional frameworks which are usually absent in discussions of objects of property. "Property can be seen variously as sets of relations, as a powerful political symbol, as processes of appropriation, and perhaps most important, as a historically contingent Western "native category" that has strong effects in the world" (20). There is an apparent lacing of property and sovereignty on a lateral scalar plane, but more fundamentally, Trepča is still caught up in a diachronic dualism between two different property regimes having roots in the year of 1991 when Trepča was reconstructed as a joint stock company with a residual social (workers)

ownership.

Stemming from this, Trepča is irresistibly bathed in the light of a complex question: what kind of property is Trepča? More precisely, what is its relational value and how is this value cast in the territorially and politically imbued stunted temporality (cf. Navaro-Yashin 2012)? Talking with the numerous people variably involved with Trepča, I encountered a complex understanding of its value. In the following ethnographic account I follow a lead offered by Humphrey and Verdery: "An important matter for ethnographic inquiry into property should be, when is property language used? – that is, when is a conflict or phenomenon called a matter of property, rather than something else? Who uses that language, in what contexts?" (Humphrey and Verdery 2004: 11) This kind of inquiry shows us property language, not solely as overt instrument in a political struggle, but more thoroughly as a political category linking the overall hopes and fears of people.

Through the locked gate

The fact that Trepča is still by far the biggest employer in northern Kosovo, with estimates ranging from 3,300 to 4,000 employees. However, the fact that only around 1,000-1,200 people are actually employed at any given time turns to be a widely known truism. Discrepancy opening in this gap is not baffling, but it does call for a situated account regarding the actual significance of this enterprise for the economic subsistence of the people in northern Kosovo. The 'ethnographic inquiry into property' I initiated faced a frontal collision with a shroud of reservation and distrustfulness when it came to voicing the 'property language'. Otherwise hospitable and cordial, people I interacted with showed a visible withdrawal and unwillingness to discuss matters of high sensitivity, not least because I was an 'outsider'[14]. Upon my arrival I

14 The delineation between outsider and insiders is highly relational of which I am aware. The perception emanating from my presence was one of the same ethnic kin, with political views probably but not certainly

had a conversation with my gatekeeper whose position in Trepča at first promised a smooth and easy access to the field.

> "Listen! If I, from my position in the office of the general manager, cannot do anything for you, then you can imagine what the situation is. People here are betrayed, disappointed and desperate. They have no interest in explaining to anyone from the outside about what is going on. You cannot do anything here if you are not from here."

This highly pessimistic welcome caught me by surprise (given her prior willingness to help) and although it bespoke of fear and desperation, I had foreknowledge pointing to a more sinister side behind the resistance to be given access. Before my arrival, I reached out to a friend studying in Belgrade whose father is a Trepča employee. Upon disclosing my intentions I received a discouraging response from her.

> "Because of the situation he does not want to go into this story, so that he would not be connected to someone inquiring into sensitive things because of all the machinations and shady business that is going on in Trepča. People can get fired over the smallest thing."

sympathetic to the 'Serbian cause'. But there was a lack of deep intimacy stemming from the shared future predicament (cf. Herzfeld 1997). A Kosovo-Albanian neighbor living on the northern side of Ibar, falls into different inside-outside delineation. S/he is someone known, sharing a different kind of intimacy stemming from the necessity to cooperate in order to secure for everyday existence. I overheard a conversation between two Kosovo-Serbian drivers of a bus. One man was asking for a lawyer for his son who robbed a store, and the other recommended a local Kosovo-Albanian lawyer qualifying him with "he is an Albanian, but he is a good man. He can help you". Not long after the conversation, the bus stopped in the village Lešak and the two drivers had a cordial business conversation with three Albanian men loading a small van. The conversation switched between Serbian and Albanian with ease.

Not being granted the 'official approval' from the high instance of the general manager's office, proved to be an insurmountable stigma throughout my fieldwork. It was also the most common exit strategy for most of my interlocutors whenever the conversation touched upon the 'property language' and the current functioning of Trepča. The chief of staff, of whom everyone I spoke to had only words of praise describing him as an educated, intelligent and a 'good' man, was the one whose approval I needed. Speaking to him over the phone I sensed a shade of regret and discomfort, but he was firm in maintaining that "Trepča is not interested in cooperating in this project." Upon my insistence he agreed on answering to several questions via email, nevertheless the answers never arrived.

Between the public and the social: Trepča in the community

Navigating through the loop of being repeatedly referenced to the instance which refuses to give me access, I relied on being physically present in the places where access is not that easily deniable. I frequented Trepča's workers' center in the town of Zvečan where the monumental Trepča smelter is located, some 2km north from Kosovska Mitrovica. In itself, the social function of the large, red-painted structure across from the newly renovated Zvečan municipality building bespoke a great deal regarding the disjointed temporality of my site of inquiry. The workers' center was devised during socialism as a part of the numerous social subsidiaries fulfilling the aspect of extra-waged social and cultural benefits. The three-story spacious building today hosts a number of community functions, blurring the difference between the property of Trepča and the municipality. Entering the big hall I encountered several people in their early twenties arranging tables in a broad half circle, for what later proved to be an archaeological exposition[15] to be held that evening. I was warmly greeted by

15 During the medieval ages, one of the higher peaks around Zvečan was the base for building an important stone-walled fortress overseeing four roads of regional commercial importance. It also served the purposes

a man in his mid-sixties whose function in the workers' center can be approximated to that of a janitor. He is one of a half of dozen men who are positioned as 'janitors' in the workers' center, but are in fact Trepča's employees without real employment in production activities. I inquired into my guide's employment and he revealed that he is retiring in the fall of 2013. An economist by training, he has been employed in Trepča ever since he graduated from the university. He held a position in the exports department and has spent a significant period of time in a number of countries during 1970s and early 1980s, including Iraq, Libya and Algeria. He gave me a tour around the building, which started off by presenting the cinema/theater hall equipped with 400 seats, renovated four years ago. Laterally to the theater on the ground hall, a part of the drama and music school belonging to the university[16] in Kosovska Mitrovica, is accommodated. The 'janitor' spoke about a covered swimming pool under Trepča's umbrella, located some 2km uphill from the worker's center. The place is lively with schoolchildren, students, men in suits and teenagers in kimono's practicing karate in a smaller hall latterly attached to the main building. On the first floor communal library is placed. Speaking with the librarian, a woman in her late twenties, I found out that she was employed a year ago as Trepča employee, just like the rest of the staff in the center. Since the school library has a poor book collection, the Trepča/municipal library is regularly frequented by elementary and high school students. The librarian said that she has an appointment with Trepča's management where she needs to file a request for a computer so she can make an electronic catalog for the books which would make her work much easier. All of these utilities are overtly open to public access serving the community rather than being designated

of protecting the mining shafts which were exploited since the early middle ages.

16 University in northern Kosovska Mitrovica is still nominally labeled as the University of Pristina, designating a impermanent and provisional dislocation which is an ubiquitous feature of reinvented urban and institutional environment in northern Mitrovica. Despite the effects of spatial and temporal dislocation, the university attracts many students from almost all cities in Serbia, creating a very vibrant and lively student community in northern Mitrovica. http://www.pr.ac.rs/en/home/about-the-university/history

exclusively for Trepča employees. It is at this point that the diachronic 'in-between' property regimes manifests and casts the shade of ambiguity.

On a very base, material level, it is obvious that the public services provided by Trepča are crucial for the social and cultural reproduction of the people living in northern Mitrovica and Zvečan. On a deeper level, this conflation reveals that Trepča's social value cannot be accessed through a narrow understanding of property. Verdery (1999) takes up a property analysis that invokes "the total system of social, cultural, and political relations" which destabilizes the assumptions of prevalent property conceptions (54). From this perspective Trepča manifests features that can be illuminated by the concept of 'fuzzy property'. Fuzzy property is a feature that appears ambiguous if observed from a formalistic narrow account of property in terms of exclusive ownership, but it might appear very unambiguous from the perspective of locally embedded actors. The concept of fuzziness according to Verdery, lies exactly in "the *lack* of routinized rules and crystallized practices around private property in the context of postsocialism, as well as in the constraints on exercising bundles of powers" (55). Although Veredery is referring to *private* property in the context of post-socialism, Trepča as a commercial, profit seeking enterprise, can also be accounted for through the lens of fuzziness. Verdery elucidates a conception of property not as a bundle of rights, but rather as a bundle of powers. Therefore taken in the frame of a locally situated property regime, the emergent assemblages of property relations and regimes are not universally or 'objectively' chaotic.

Trepča is ours!

The old phrase 'all politics is local politics' has a particular salience in the context of local politics around Trepča. As I was sitting in the hall of the workers' center one day, chatting with one of the idle Trepča janitors, I was introduced to a bearded man wearing a suit who is the president of the assembly of the Zvečan municipality. He agreed to see me in his office the following day. During the course of the interview he offered a factual overview of the most recent period of Trepča's activities. After seven years of none, or barely any activity, beside the brief period of maintenance work, the production was started in Trepča North (TN). "In 2006 *we* restarted the production process from scratch. Eventually Trepča was able to get the production running. The crucial part of today's economic viability of TN is the reliance on the two out of four mines and a flotation[17] in Leposavić." By the time the production was restarted, the effects of a definite ethnic division north and south of Ibar were firmly solidified.

Because the smelter in Zvečan was shut in 2000, TN is able to produce only the semi-processed half-product in the form of lead and zinc concentrate, which has significantly lower market value than the pure ores. The years of decay and pillage have left the smelter in a dire condition. Asked about reinvestment in it, he said: "Such investment would amount to $50 million and under given political and legal uncertainty such an investment is impossible." Since the legal status is still unresolved and uncertain Trepča is unable to get any bank loan or external funding (investment) for modernization and expansion of production capacities. "Since 2006 Trepca North is operating without any external aid or donation," he pointed "and

[17] Some 20km south east from the mine Crnac is the floatation facility near the town Leposavić. There the minerals and ore is separated from the bulk of the crude material coming from the mines.

is completely economically self sufficient to make profit. Trepča was able to make moderate investments in the production line of the flotation with technology imported from Finland."

Since UNMIK founded Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA) which overtook oversight of it, Trepča remained unitary legal person as inherited from the previous regime in the 1990s. However, it effectively functions as two separate parts reflecting the ethnic boundary materialized in the river Ibar, with majority of facilities still located in the south including the vast Stari Trg mine. Following the proclamation of Kosovo's independence in 2008, KTA was succeeded by Kosovo Privatization Agency (KPA) as the body which overlooks and, in the final instance, determines the fate of Trepča. Despite the efforts of local officials, as well as some of my interlocutors, to portray northern Trepča as independent, the truth is that the functioning of the northern part is highly bounded to Pristina's authorities. To a lesser extent the socio-economic reproduction of life is also dependent on Belgrade which still pays approximately €100 of minimal wage to all the employees, and provides a fully funded package of public services (healthcare and education) in the four municipalities comprising northern Kosovo.

Although the mining localities[18] of Crnac and Belo Brdo are functional and are producing a solid output, the functioning of the northern part of Trepča is highly dependent on the government in Pristina. During my visit of the Crnac mining shaft, located in the hills on the far north-western edge on the very delineation with Serbia, I encountered two trucks being unloaded in a well-fenced yard. Besides the two trucks, there was also Kosovo Police Service's SUV, two KFOR military jeeps, and one EULEX police vehicle. After the

[18] Talking about the Crnac mining locality, which today employs several hundred miners and support staff, one of my interlocutors stated: "If I would compare Stari Trg with Crnanc, it would be like comparing Hotel Palace with a rathole."

unloading was done with, I went with the director of the mine and his deputy into the office building. I asked about the rather heavy security presence during the unloading of the material to which deputy responded: “Explosives and fuses come from the outside, Bulgaria and Croatia and elsewhere. They are overlooked by KFOR and EULEX”. A fact he did not explicate on is that Pristina is directly controlling the supply of the explosives necessary for the extraction of ore in the shafts. Several of my interlocutors who have first hand insight into it, confirmed that the negotiations with Pristina are maintained on daily basis. The chief of staff spends half a dozen days in Prisitna every month. However, the explosives are only one aspect for northern Trepča. The regular auditing inspections by KPA and the necessity to cooperate with the state unrecognized by the Serbia (nor the Serbs for that matter) when exporting the products. The president of the assembly of Zvečan recalled an instance when last year KPA just 'sat' on Trepča North's clearing account and withdrew €2.5 million on the name of the taxes calculated for Trepča as a whole including the larger southern part. Until the summer of 2012, Trepča North was still functioning under UNMIK regulations. The violent conflict regarding the border crossings and customs was resolved in early 2012, effectively integrating the customs and since then Pristina imposed its customs regulation instead of UNMIK regulation. Trucks need to go to southern Mitrovica to get the customs clearing before they can continue their journey. In the summer of 2012 KPS arrested 19 truck-drivers on their way to ship away the agreed exports to Switzerland. For the following four months, Trepča was effectively blocked and unable to pay its employees. According to one of my interviewees, the workers continued coming to work and performing their duties in the same manner as before, not missing to mystify the resilience and unity of 'the people'. He pointed that Trepča is strategically and economically of paramount importance for the livelihood of the people in Northern Kosovo. A great number of families live off Trepča, directly and indirectly. “When Trepča receives salaries, the whole town livens up. It is at the

same time leverage in the hands of Pristina to economically strangle the north into submission. A hungry man will eventually knock even on the door of his enemy (*krvnik*)," he concluded.

The usage of 'property language' is a relational key to unlock the ambiguous lacing of property and sovereignty and in doing so offer an answer to what exactly is the object of property. What is evident in the discourse of the president of the assembly of Zvečan is the repeated usage of *we* which bears no small evocation of the sovereign language. When the king's head was cut off, the sovereign *we* (Foucault 1976 [2003]; Kantorowicz 1957) was transplanted onto a collective subject of the people. The evocation of the sovereign *we* still bears a claim upon ultimate authority over a territory. Sovereignty binds territory and property in this discourse. However, this case is only a painfully sharpened exemplification of impotent and crumbling sovereignty-clamings that have emerged in the post-Yugoslavian spatial patchwork. The more it loses grounding, the louder it is evoked. In the same logic it renders the property, which enters the antagonism only as a layer, fundamentally belonging to the same contestation. The property language that emphasizes a dehistoricized, separate and autarkic Trepča North manifests the paradox of provisional spatiality and stunted temporality in northern Kosovo. The question of the 'old debt' is explicitly cast aside, and the TN, as if it emerged from the ashes, has nothing to do with the 'south'. The discourse built around Trepča is just an aspect of the attempt to 'stabilize the impermanence'. Imbued with these features, TN discursively emerges as a human-built channeling of the nurturing manna springing from the sacred land rightfully belonging to the chosen people. It is visible then how the economic and the political are collapsed into one another, enabling a local politician to speak of *we* when referring to activities of Trepča North.

Homogenization underlined by the *we* discourse functions in the frame of internal dialectic casting a downward pressure upon articulation of an internal antagonism and relations of power. Social power implies going beyond functionalist designation of power residing in actors and institutions, but rather as an "integral property of the patterns of relationship between sets of people (Kalb1997: 3)." What are explicitly masked and congealed in the homogenizing *we* discourse are class relations emerging around Trepča. Class is not simply an articulation of interest, but rather, from a relational materialist point of view, it is about "the friction of interests" (1997: 10) as manifested in a "field of force".

> "Class, therefore, implies a close consideration of the interaction of the global and local histories; it directs attention to the particularities of place, as well as to the interlinkages of the space. Class presumes a double vision: on a geographical as well as on historical relationships; and above all on their continuous interaction." (Kalb 1997: 7)

Trepča seen from a taxi

Commuting between north Mitrovica and Zvečan, I relied on an astonishing abundance of taxi vehicles, charging the standardize price of €0.7 for the ride. A 300-meter-long stretch of the main street in Mitrovica is stacked with a wide array of cars, most of them without license plates. In a generally chaotic traffic, taxi is a widely used local means of transportation, although there is a reasonably regular public transportation. Why is there such a disproportionate supply of taxi service in relation to the relatively small local population, one might ask? The extent of usage and the abundance of vehicles pointed to a substantial

cumulative revenue stemming from taxi driving. Taking a few rides every day during my stay, I have found out that nine out of ten taxi drivers are Trepča workers. Speaking about the predicaments of his job one of the drivers said: “Look at this anarchy here. You import a used car, take of the plates and start driving taxi.” He spoke of the lawlessness and anarchy as abnormal, veiled in a sense of shame and despair. He is one of the internally displaced Trepča workers who fled after the violent unrest in March 2004. Previously employed in the battery factory further south, he was sacked from his job there and had to move north. Now he is one of the several thousand workers of Trepča North who find sporadic employment in the so called 'rotation scheme'.

Speaking about the over-abundance of labor and rotations in the structure of employment, the president of the assembly in Zvečan pointed out that TN has taken over all of the displaced workers from the southern facilities. “Not a single worker was left on the street,” he lamented, “we have become a social institution”. He stated that Trepča needs a social program which would ensure severance payments to the unnecessary labor power and that Serbia should participate in such a program. If that would happen, Trepča would have more funds to reinvest. Such investments would employ far (three to six times by his estimates) less workers and relieve Trepča from the 'constraint'.

The exact mechanism of rotation remained enigmatic till the end, since almost all of my interlocutors had a different version of its functioning. Probably the most revealing insight into the rotation mechanism and other labor aspects came from a taxi driver Radiša, who drove me up to the mountains to visit the Crnac mine. Driving up to the mountains in the far north-western corner of Kosovo, I had ample of time to get to hear Radiša's story. His family moved in March of 2004 from the village Svinjare, situated on the southern outskirts of Kosovska Mitrovica, to northern Mitrovica. In the period between 1999 and 2004 he was

hired under UNMIK management on various maintenance works in the facilities of Trepča, which ceased after KFOR could not guarantee them safety. After the exile he could not be effectively employed as an electrician in TN and remained an employee only on paper receiving the minimal salary and the stipend of €30. He said: "I could have done some prequalification, but then, there are people who are already qualified for various maintenance occupations. Besides, you need a connection (*veza*) to get more employment. Otherwise, they employ you for one month per year and you have to be at their [arbitrary] disposal for the rest of the year." He mentioned that his wife is employed like this, so she finds occasional employment in Trepča's facility in Zvečan. Radiša's story is just one of many, where several generations of the wider family were employed in Trepča. Not only his wife, but his father, brother and uncle were also employed in Trepča. "It is not good when the whole family is dependent on one company," he stated. A father of two children, today he drives a taxi to complement the household income. Asked about the future of Trepča in the light of ensuing privatization he said: "Honestly, what do I, or that Albanian over there, care about who owns it. I don't care who the owner is as long as something gets on moving and people find employment. We had enough of high politics messing up everything."

CONCLUSION

The social, political and economic aspects of everyday life in Kosovo are highly overlapped. There is very strong sense of conflation between the perceptions of state and nation, but also of the socio-economic aspects of that conflation. Yet, this statement says very little if not relationally situated in order to specify what exactly 'highly overlapped' means. From the perspective of the standard western liberal societal normativity, the polity in its societal totality is carved and separated into functional spheres. They are admittedly porous and imperfectly bounded, yet they exist as highly important markers of ordering and making the societal totality legible. Questioning the validity of the imposition of this particular taxonomic apparatus has been widely present in the literature critically investigating the post-socialist 'transitional' societies. Dichotomies, binaries and opposites which so prominently order our understanding of the totality of our social life-worlds had to be rejected in their assumption of being neutral and natural in the context of post-socialism. These accounts criticized the grand 'totalitarian' narrative and concomitant revolutionary rupture of 1989-1990 with its post-end-of-history trajectory of indefinite yet imperfectable liberal teleology. Post-totalitarian tabula rasa, however, proved to be much closer to Freud's mystic writing pad, with multi-layered sedimentation of interwoven lineages going deep. The pronounced end of history was not only congealment for the liberal trajectory of the future, but also served as an ahistoric anesthetic erasing the historical lineage. And yet it is exactly in this lineage that we find stronger or weaker junctions which create path dependence in an ontologically weak sense.

The conflation and overlapped nature of the life-world I encountered, however, surpasses my own post-socialist experience as well as the accounts I came across in the literature. Explaining it by notions of chaos or informality seems only partially justified as explanatory tool if an account of emergence and coming-to-being of this constellation is not offered. The three main pillars of economic subsistence in northern Kosovo are comprised of flourishing small businesses and trading activity in 'illegal' and 'legal' goods, the provision of employment and public services through public institutions funded by Serbia, and the Trepča enterprise as still the largest employer in northern Kosovo. What struck me as remarkable is the way in which an individual might be involved in all three of these spheres. The formal sectoral boundaries are non-existent and what matter is one's social capital and ties. However, although there is rampant inequality in terms of access to material standard of living, there is a strong sense of communal belonging expressed as rampant nationalism. In this particular locality, this nationalism fosters pale remnants of former socialist notions of belonging, entitlement and ownership yet it is rendered through the lens of ethno-nationalism which often congeals very private interests of a minority of individuals. Trepča as an economic enterprise is still regarded as inherently 'ours' and bounded to secure for the people. However, behind the mask of militant nationalism and the "we effect," 'ordinary' people are more cynical and realize that the situation is utilized for the benefit of some.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Agnew, J. 2005. "Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 95(2): 437-461.

Appadurai, A. 2006. *Fear of small numbers: an essay on the geography of anger*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. Print.

Brown, W. 2010. *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*. New York: Zone Books.

Buck-Morss, S. 2000. *Dreamworld and Catastrophe: the passing of mass utopia in East and West*.
Cambridge: MIT Press.

Burawoy, M. 2009. *The extended case method: four countries, four decades, four great transformations, and one theoretical tradition*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Burawoy, M and Katherine Verdery. 1999. "Introduction." Pp 1-17. In *Uncertain Transition: Ethnographies of Change in the Post-Socialist World.* M. Burawoy, K. Verdery, eds. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield

Chari, S. and Katherine Verdery. 2009. Thinking between the Posts:Postcolonialism, Postsocialism, and Ethnography after the Cold War. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 51(1):1-29

Collier, S. J. 2011. *Post-Soviet Social: Neoliberalism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics*. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.

Comaroff, J. 1982. "Dialectical Systems, History and Anthropology: Units of Study and Questions of Theory." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 8(2): 143-172.

Foucault, M. 2003. *Society must be defended: lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76*. Translated by , Mauro Bertani, Alessandro Fontana, François Ewald, and David Macey New York: Picador

Friedman, J. 2003. *Globalization, the State, and Violence*. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.

Fukuyama, F. 1992. *The end of history and the last man*. New York: Free Press.

Gashi, H. 2012. "Legal Conflict Regarding the Privatization of Socially Owned Enterprises: Amendments to the Law on the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court, the Law on PAK and other relevant laws". *Comparative Law/Rechtsvergleichung*

Hann, C. 2005. Property. In *A Handbook of Economic Anthropology*. Ed. Carrier, Edward Elgar: 110-
124.

Hansen, T.B. and Finn Stepputat. 2006. "Sovereignty Revisited." *Annual Review of*

Anthropology 35: 295-315

Harvey, D. 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hayden, Robert. 1995. "The Use of National Stereotypes in the Wars in Yugoslavia." In Andre Gerrits
& Nanci Adler, eds., *Vampires Unstaked: National Images, Stereotypes and Myths in East Central Europe* , pp. 207-222. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Herzfeld, M. 1997. *Cultural Intimacy: social poetics in the nation-state*. New York: Routledge.

Hobsbawm, E 2007. Interview with Eric Hobsbawm and Doanld Sassoon: European Identity and
Diversity in Dialogue.
http://w2.bcn.cat/bcnmetropolis/arxiu/en/page7e6e.html?id=21&ui=38

Humphrey, C. and Katherine Verdery 2004. Introduction In *Property in question: value transformation in the global economy*. English ed. Oxford, U.K

Jović, D. 2001. "Fear of becoming minority as a motivator of conflict in the former Yugoslavia"
Balkanologie Vol. V, n° 1-2

--------. 2009. *Yugoslavia: a state that withered away*. West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University
Press.

Kalb, D. 1997. *Expanding class: power and everyday politics in industrial communities, The Netherlands, 1850-1950*. Durham: Duke University Press.

------. 2009. "Conversations with a Polish Populist: Tracing Hidden histories of Globalization, Class,
and Dispossession of Postsocialism (and beyond)." *American Ethnologist*, 36(2): 207-223.

Kalb, D. and Herman Tak. 2005. *Critical Junctions: Anthropology and History beyond the Cultural Turn*. United States: Berghahn Books.

Kalb,D. and Gabor Halmai. 2011. *Headlines of Nations, Subtexts of Class: Working Class Populism and the Return of the Repressed in Neoliberal Europe*. United States: Berghahn Books.

Kantorowicz, E. 1957. *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology,* Princeton University Press.

Ker-Lindsay, J. 2011. "The 'Final' Yugoslav Issue: The evolution of international thinking on Kosovo" In *New Persepctives on Yugoslavia: Key issues and controversies* eds. Djokić, D. and James Ker-Lindsay. New York. Routlage

Korovilas, JP. 2006. "Is Privatisation in Post-conflict Kosovo Possible?." *Comparative Economic Studies*, 48, (326–350)

Lowinger, J. 2009. "Economic Reform and the 'Double Movement' in Yugoslavia: An Analysis of Labor Unrest and Ethno-Nationalism in the 1980s." *A Dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Baltimore, Maryland*

Malcolm, N. 1998. *Kosovo: A Short History*. London and New York: Macmillan and New York University Press.

Mann, M. 2005. The *Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mertus, J. 1999. *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Mitchell, T. 1999. "Society, Economy and the State Effect" pp 76-97 in *State/Culture: State-Formation After the Cultural Turn* edited by G. Steinmetz, Cornell University Press.

Navaro-Yashin, Y. 2012. The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Postwar Polity. Duke University Press.

Ong, A. 2005. "Graduated Sovereignty in South-East Asia" Pp. 83-104. in *Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault, Governmentality, and Life Politics*, edited by Jonathan Xavier Inda. Balckwell Publishing

-------. 2006. *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Perica, V. 2002. *Balkan idols: religion and nationalism in Yugoslav states*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Palairet, M. 2003. "Trepca 1965–2000." A Report to LLA.

Sampson, S. 2003. "Beyond Transition: rethinking elite configurations in Balkans". In Hann, Christopher M., ed. *Postsocialism: ideals, ideologies and practices in Eurasia*. Routledge

Sorensen, J.S. 2009. *State Collapse and Reconstruction in the Periphery: Political economy, ethnicity and development in Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosovo* New York. Bergham Books

Stark, D. 1998. "Recombinant property in East European capitalism." Pp 116-146 In *The Laws of the Market*. Ed. M. Callon

Van der Pijl, K. 2001. "From Gorbachev to Kosovo: Atlantic Rivalries and the Re-Incorporation of Eastern Europe". *Review of International Political Economy* Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 275-310

Verdery, K. 1999. "Fuzzy Property: Rights, Power, and Identity in Transylvania's Decollectivization." pp. 53-82 In *Uncertain Transition: Ethnographies of Change in the Post-Socialist World* M. Burawoy, K. Verdery, eds. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Vickers, M. 1998. *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Vladisavljević, N. 2004. "Yugoslavia's successor states". In: Calvert, Peter, (ed.) *Border and territorial disputes of the world.* John Harper Publishing, London, UK, pp. 390-398.

---------. 2008. *Serbia's Antibureaucratic Revolution: Milošević, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wolf, Eric R., and Sydel Silverman. 2001. *Pathways of Power Building an Anthropology of the Modern World*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Woodward, Susan L. 1995. *Balkan tragedy chaos and dissolution after the Cold War*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution