

# **National Identity Formation in a Post-colonial Society: Comparative Case Studies in Hong Kong and Taiwan**

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## **Abstract**

National identity formed in a post-colonial society is believed to be never fixed and is every changing according to the environment and culture, because of the transfer of sovereignty which leads to a confusion in identity. This thesis argues that institutions and policies, to a certain extent, shape national identity formation. Furthermore, the process of identity formation in a post-colonial society provokes civil resistance and social movement. This thesis will test the hypotheses from the vertical level – political parties’ adoption and policy implementation and the horizontal level – interactions between general public in Hong Kong, Taiwan and mainland China. It shows that national identities in both Hong Kong and Taiwan are changing.

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## Introduction

Australian cultural scholar Ien Ang once described Chineseness “as an open and indeterminate signifier whose meanings are constantly renegotiated and rearticulated” and there should not be only one Chinese identity, but many.<sup>1</sup> More specifically, East Asian scholar Lo Kwai-cheung points out that “Hong Kong culture itself is by no means fixed. It is instead a process of becoming, generated by various national forces and interests rather than by a single origin. [...] The post-1997 subjectivization of the Hong Kong people as Chinese nationals demonstrates that a different notion of Chineseness can always gratify new demands and that the return of the colony to its motherland might present a challenging perspective from which to examine the supposedly incontestable status of national identity.”<sup>2</sup> Lo implies that people from a post-colonial society tend to fall into identity confusion and struggle and this type of national identity is ever changing. The moment of transfer of sovereignty makes people question “Who am I?”

Questions such as “What is a national identity? How is it formed?” seem to strike those who were born and raised in a colonial society. Scholars like Judith Butler argue that national identity is simply an individual choice;<sup>3</sup> some like Anthony Smith would argue that it is

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<sup>1</sup> Ien Ang, “Can One Say No to Chineseness? Pushing the Limits of the Diasporic Paradigm.” In *Modern Chinese Literary and Cultural Studies in the Age of Theory: Reimagining a Field*, edited by Rey Chow, 281-300. Durham: Duke University press, 2000.

<sup>2</sup> Lo Kwai-Cheung, *Chinese Face/Off: The Transnational Popular Culture of Hong Kong*, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2005), 20.

<sup>3</sup> Judith Butler, *Genderturbulentie*, (Amsterdam: Boom, 1999).

socially constructed and culture plays the most important role in it;<sup>4</sup> others like Richard Jenkins would argue that national identity is an implication of boundary of social groups, a symbol of one's ethnicity.<sup>5</sup> The majority of scholars assume that national identity is not primordial. In that sense, how external factors influence the formation of one's national identity? What are the influential factors if national identity is socially constructed as constructivists propose?

In this thesis, national identity formation in a post-colonial society will be used as a prism through which to look at a phenomenon, and to argue that that institutions and policies shape national identity formation. The policy implementation process tends to provoke sensation in the society who feels the urge to retain their collective identity, characteristics and culture which produce their collective memories. As social movement scholars William Gamson and Charles Tilly put it, "collective actors" interests are the formation of social movements.<sup>6</sup> New social movement theorists agree that the objective for participants of such movements is to "[seek] recognition for new identities and lifestyles."<sup>7</sup> Hence, I will further argue that identity formation process in a post-colonial society provokes social movement. Hong Kong and Taiwan will be used as case studies to support my arguments.

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<sup>4</sup> Anthony Smith, *National Identity*, (London: Penguin Books, 1991).

<sup>5</sup> Richard Jenkins, *Social Identity*, (London: Routledge, 1996).

<sup>6</sup> Francesca Polletta, and James M. Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 27, no. August (2001): 283-305.

<sup>7</sup> Francesca Polletta, and James M. Jasper, *op. cit.*

National identity has become a prominent issue in Hong Kong and Taiwan since the late 1990s. Hong Kong has become part of China since the political transition in 1997 and “Taiwan’s autonomy” has always been an issue in the international arena, due to the history that China often claims Taiwan as part of the country. Although Hong Kong and Taiwan both have a strong linkage with China and their biggest ethnic groups are Han Chinese, the Chinese identity is simultaneously declining in both places.<sup>8</sup> Meanwhile, realization and recognition of a sub-national identity as “Hongkongese” and “Taiwanese” is rising.<sup>9</sup> The identity transformation process has not only had a personal effect, but has also shaken the relations between China and Hong Kong/ Taiwan, as well as changed the political environment in both places. What is the explanation for the changes in Hong Kong and Taiwan?

### ***Research Aim and Questions***

In the contemporary world, national identity is a form of identification. It is used by others to identify others’ nationality or ethnicity. More importantly, it is used for us to identify our relations to a particular group of people who share similar characteristics and behaviors. National identity is evolved, transformed and developed over time. As the historian

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<sup>8</sup> Mainland Affairs Council, “Self-positioning and national identity of people in Taiwan.” Last modified 1998. Accessed December 12, 2012. <http://tinyurl.com/dx235dp>.

<sup>9</sup> The Centre for Communication Research – the Chinese University of Hong Kong, “The Identity and National Identification of Hong Kong People (in Chinese).” Last modified 2012. Accessed November 11, 2012. <http://tinyurl.com/acq3hnz>.

Michael Ignatieff proposes, 'National identity is not fixed or stable: it is a continuing exercise in the fabrication of illusion and the elaboration of convenient fables about who "we" are.'<sup>10</sup>

National identity is closely linked with state and sovereignty. "Membership of a political community is institutionalized spatially within territorial states."<sup>11</sup> Therefore, political transition in a state will have a certain level of impact on one's identity definition, due to policy and regime change. In this thesis, identity formation in a post-colonial society is proposed as the scenario. Hence, the primary research questions are: how are people's identities formed and shaped in a post-colonial society? What is the crucial factor for identity formation in a post-colonial society?

Due to the political transition and the change of regimes, people from a post-colonial society tend to have confusion over their identity. In this sense, how did colonization influence people's choice of identity in Hong Kong and Taiwan? Furthermore, on the international level, since Hong Kong and Taiwan have close relations with China, how do China and its policy as an external factor influence the identity formation in these two societies? On the national level, as Hong Kong is one of the Special Administrative Regions (SAR) of China, how does the local government construct the national identity? And unlike Hong Kong, Taiwan has very complex relations with China. On the one hand, it has been administrated by its own government since 1949. On the other hand, it is often claimed by

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<sup>10</sup> Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*, (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 1998), 18.

<sup>11</sup> Stephen Kranser, "Sovereignty - An Institutional Perspective," *Comparative Political Studies*, 21, no. 1 (1988): 66-94.



China as part of the country. Under this complicated circumstance, how does the local government cope with the dilemma?

Lastly, on the sub-national level, based on all the above factors, is a “new” sub-national identity produced? If so, how is it formed under the dynamics between political parties in the context of Hong Kong and Taiwan? How do people in both societies respond to the change?

### ***Justification of the Case Selection***

It is important to understand the meaning of being Chinese and there are three groups of people to look into in order to answer the question – Mainland Chinese in China, Chinese diaspora, and Chinese who live in a post-colonial society. I chose to approach my research question from the third party perspective – Chinese who live in a post-colonial society.

There are two reasons to choose Hong Kong and Taiwan for further analysis: Firstly, Hong Kong was under the British administration for 156 years and experienced a political transition in 1997, the autonomy return and complexity of the Hong Kong political environment has imposed the society and its people a sense of national identity confusion; Secondly, Taiwan, which has undergone the Japanese colonial ruling for 50 years, is often claimed as part of China by the Chinese government. Hence, based on the complex relations these two places have with China, they will be useful as a starting point to look into the

question. Both places have shown tight, yet complex economic and political relations with China. They comprehend that their ancestors were from China, so did their rituals and customs, meanwhile they have a special attachment toward the dominant powers which they have spent some of their lives with. Under the complexity of feelings, a sub-national identity is generated. Therefore, in this thesis, focusing on the identity change in a post-colonial society, Hong Kong and Taiwan are suitable for further examination.

### ***Thesis Argument***

Two arguments will be presented in this thesis. Firstly, institutions and policies, in a certain extent, shape national identity formation. Both Hong Kong and Taiwan cases will demonstrate two ways of emergence of a sub-national identity in a post-colonial society. In the case of Hong Kong, I argue that the emergence of a sub-national identity “Hongkongese” is a bottom-up process, which the ‘Hongkongese’ identity emerged under the implementation of certain policy by the Hong Kong government and the interaction and negotiation between the general public and the Hong Kong government. Whereas for the case of Taiwan, the emergence of a sub-national identity “Taiwanese” is a top-down process, which the “Taiwanese” identity emerged under interactions between political parties. Secondly, the policy implementation process tends to provoke sensation in the society who feels the urge to gather together and protect their characteristics and culture which contain their collective memories. Under this circumstance, civil resistance will erupt. Hence, I further argue that

identity formation process in a post-colonial society provokes civil resistance and social movements.

### ***Methodological Approach***

In order to analyze the correlation between national identity change of the people and institutions and policies in a post-colonial society, conclusion of this thesis is grounded on data collection and analyses on data, policy and public reactions.

### ***Data Collection***

My thesis is grounded on existing surveys on ethnic/national identity in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and will mainly focus on two sets of ethnic/national identity surveys conducted by two prominent public opinion/research centres in Hong Kong and Taiwan. For the case of Hong Kong, data will be retrieved from the Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme (HKU POP). This set of survey on “Hong Kong People's Ethnic Identity” is conducted by POP every six months began in 1997. For the case of Taiwan, surveys on “Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese” will be examined. This series of survey, which carried out by the Election Study Centre, National Chengchi University in Taiwan, began to keep track of Taiwanese’s change of ethnic identity from 1992 - the year the former President Lee Teng-hui’s government began to launch various types of Taiwanization

campaigns. President Lee is pro-Taiwan independence, whereas the political party which he is affiliated with is pro-China and unification. The reason for analyzing this series of survey on ethnic/national identity is to observe whether or not self-affiliation of the people in Taiwan has changed under a set of Taiwanization policy, such as Name Rectification Campaign (NRC).

These two series of surveys include questions on self-declared identity, such as “What nationality do you consider yourself to be?” Hence, data result will be used to measure the percentage of respondents declaring “Hongkongese” or “Taiwanese” identity over time. For the cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan, surveys conducted by HKU POP and the National Chengchi University are structured according to the political party transition periods and implementations of major policy implementation and legal reform between 1997 and 2012 (Hong Kong), and 1992 and June 2012 (Taiwan). Therefore, percentage of respondents on declaring identity should be able to reflect their feelings toward implementation of identity construction policy during a certain period of time. It will then allow me to test my first hypothesis – institutions and policies shape national identity formation. In order to avoid subjective outcome, surveys on ethnic/nationality recognition conducted by other agencies in Hong Kong and Taiwan will also be compared, such as the Centre for Communication Research (Chinese University of Hong Kong), Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies (HKIAP) and the Taiwan Indicators Survey Research (TISR).

Lastly, I will also look into identity construction related policy when implemented by the Hong Kong and Taiwanese government between 1997 and 2012 (Hong Kong) and 1992 and 2012 (Taiwan) in order to test my first hypothesis – institutions and policies shape national identity formation. Due to the space constraint, I will only look into significant policies, such as Moral and National Education curriculum (MNE) in Hong Kong, and Name Rectification Campaign (NRC) in Taiwan. Assessment of implementation, level of acceptability, as well as influence to the general public will be followed.

For my second hypothesis – identity formation process in a post-colonial society provokes civil resistance and social movements – it will be tested from two perspectives: vertical and horizontal. From the vertical perspective, analyze the public reactions to the policies implemented by institutions and political parties. From the horizontal perspective, analyze the interactions between the people in Hong Kong and Taiwan towards a particular group of mainland Chinese.

### ***Outline***

This thesis seeks to explain how institutions and policies shape national identity formation in a post-colonial society and the emergence of a sub-national identity. As Hong

Kong and Taiwan will be used as case studies, the latter part of the thesis will be divided accordingly. In order to have a better understanding on how existing literature explains identity formation, the first chapter will be dedicated to a literature review on identity formation. The second chapter will provide an overview on Hong Kong and Taiwan identity formation. In the third and fourth chapters, cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan will be analyzed from two perspectives – vertical and horizontal – to evaluate the influence of China to these two places. The third chapter will analyze national identity formation from a vertical perspective – this chapter will provide us how politicians and political parties as institutions affect the choice of national identity in the society. It will focus on examining the dynamics between pro-China and pro-democracy political parties in Hong Kong and Taiwan, their adoptions of the Chinese identities and how their approaches towards China influence people's choice of national identity. The fourth chapter will examine the issue from a horizontal perspective – analyze the interactions between the people in Hong Kong and Taiwan with a particular group of mainland Chinese (For Hong Kong – cross-border births and their right of abode; for Taiwan – cross-strait marriage) and to examine the horizontal affect this group of people from China might bring to the national identity formation in these two societies. Chapter six will look into the research limitations and conclude.

## Chapter 1 – Literature Review on Identity Formation<sup>12</sup>

This thesis aims to explore the relations between institutions and policies, and the change of national identity in a post-colonial society. Hence, this chapter attempts to analyze existing literature on identity formation, and to incorporate relevant materials to the cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan for further exploration on how a national identity is formed in a post-colonial society. Compatible literature will be discussed and analyzed from four different levels of identity formation, which can also be identified as identity formation path – First, identity formation as an individual development (internal); Second, development of a collective identity; Third, identity formation and the development of emotional attachment towards a group (external); Fourth, to view identity formation in a broader view, the self/other relations in politics. This chapter also serves to provide the broad idea of the current debate and argument in the field.

### 1.1 Identity Formation as an Individual Development

Historian Philip Gleason observes that the definitions of “identity” which we currently use seem to be inadequate, “elusive” and “ubiquitous”.<sup>13</sup> The present common concept of “identity” is rather socially constructed as an affiliation with a nation or a group, which is

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<sup>12</sup> Part of the statistics used in this chapter was extracted from papers which were written by me for the courses of *Introduction to the Study of Nationalism* (Professor Szabolcs Pogonyi); *East Asia in International Relations* (Professor Young Mi Kim); *Economic Nationalism* (Professor Thomas Fetzner).

<sup>13</sup> Philip Gleason, “Identifying Identity: A Semantic History,” *The Journal of American History*, 69, no. 4 (March 1983): 910, [http://www.soec.uni-jena.de/fileadmin/soec/media/GSBC/Veranstaltungen/Gleason\\_Identifying\\_identity\\_-\\_a\\_semantic\\_history.pdf](http://www.soec.uni-jena.de/fileadmin/soec/media/GSBC/Veranstaltungen/Gleason_Identifying_identity_-_a_semantic_history.pdf) (accessed April 15, 2013).

similar to what Benedict Anderson proposes. He emphasizes that a nation is a “socially constructed community, imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group.”<sup>14</sup> In this sense, Anderson believes that people of a nation have a similar interest and belief, and this makes them part of the same nation. Hence, a nation is “imagined”, as is identity affiliation with a particular nation. Apart from Anderson’s proposal, the contemporary debate on identity formation is dominated by two major camps – essentialists and primordialists, on one end of the spectrum, and modernists and constructivists on the other. Ethnic essentialists view ethnicity has a fixed attribution and somehow non-changeable. Their central theme is “nations are defined by a shared heritage, which usually includes a common language, a common faith, and a common ethnic ancestry.”<sup>15</sup> Whereas, constructivists like Alexander Wendt proposes that identity is “relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self.”<sup>16</sup> Wendt also further argues that social identities are “cognitive schemas that enable an actor to determine ‘who I am/ we are’ in a situation and positions in a social role structure of shared understandings and expectations.... [They are also] sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object.”<sup>17</sup> However, nowadays, we can come across the term “identity” in a wide range of disciplines and the broad spectrum of realms that “identity” touches on ranges from international relations to humanities. Comparative politics scholars like Donald Horowitz

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<sup>14</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*, (London: Verso, 1983), 6-7.

<sup>15</sup> Jerry Z. Muller, "Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs*, no. 501 (Mar/Apr 2008): 9-14.

<sup>16</sup> Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 397.

<sup>17</sup> Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *The American Political Science Review*, 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 395.



place “identity” in the central part of ethnic conflict, “identity” that groups recognize among themselves have strengthened the kinship and ties, hence it increases differences between groups and maximizes group conflict.<sup>18</sup> Apart from Horowitz, there are a few definitions are worth considering as references:

Francis Deng, a Sudanese international politics professor, describes identity “as the way individuals and groups define themselves and are defined by others on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, language, and culture.”<sup>19</sup> Deng’s conclusion on identity is valid on both cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan, but he failed to take non-kinship aspect into account. People in Hong Kong and Taiwan are regarded as Chinese, based on historical background and rituals, however majority of them do not self-affiliated as being Chinese, as China is not being part of their shared memory.

The cultural studies aspect on identity formation can also be taken into consideration. Theorists such as Stuart Hall note that “the question of identity is so problematic.”<sup>20</sup> Ien Ang also agrees that “identity” itself is a very ambiguous word because it is in a state of ever changing and it is constantly being interpreted and moulded by the discourses of environment, experience, culture, history and interaction with people. Therefore, Ang suggests “[identity] is strategically fabricated’ to present oneself to the outside world for the purpose of

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<sup>18</sup> Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic groups in conflict*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

<sup>19</sup> Francis M. Deng, *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995),

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<sup>20</sup> Stuart Hall, and Paul du Gay, *Questions of Cultural Identity*, (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 1996).

communication.”<sup>21</sup> When comparing with definitions from all the other fields, Horowitz and Ang’s definitions are relatively logical and fit in well with the cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan. National identity in both case is in the changing phase, as data will be shown in a later chapter, people in Hong Kong had a stronger affiliation with China when under the British colonization. However, after the handover in 1997, a sub-national identity of Hongkongese emerged. As what Horowitz suggests, when a sub-national identity started to emerge when the ties among the people in Hong Kong became stronger. Furthermore, when Ang suggests that “identity is strategically fabricated” for presentation, the cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan further demonstrate how sub-national identities of Hongkongese and Taiwanese are being shaped by civil society and institutions, in order to differentiate themselves from the Chinese identity and to show the outside world how they should be addressed. The sub-national identity formation in both cases is based on historical factors and recent collective memory. More importantly, it is about personal affiliation with a place of habitual residence.

## ***1.2 Identity Formation as an Individual Development in a Post-colonial Context***

As previously mentioned that Ang’s idea of identity is a concept of ever changing and it is constantly being shaped and conditioned by the environment and culture we were born into, which means our identity is not fixed at any time in any circumstance. In this sense, “cultural identity” as what Hall suggested is valid in here. Hall proposes that this type of identity

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<sup>21</sup> Ien Ang, *On Not Speaking Chinese: Living Between Asia and the West*, (London: Routledge, 2001), 24.

“searches for images which impose an imaginary coherence on the experience of dispersal and fragmentation.... [Cultural identities] undergo constant transformation. Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, they are subject to the continuous play of history, culture and power.”<sup>22</sup> Hall further explains that identity is merely a name and a sense of security to secure ourselves into eternity. In another literature, Hall et al also admit that identity is a “too complex, too under-developed, and too little understood in contemporary social science to be definitively tested.”<sup>23</sup>

Our perception of “who we are” is derived from our past, such as education that we have received, culture that we have been taught, and society that we have lived in, which play an important role in developing our identity. We become who we are nowadays based on the foundation which has been built and we grow up using what surrounds us to help position ourselves in the society. Hence, a political or cultural transformation of a society, to some extent, influences our identity development. People, who live in a society which has undergone colonization and political transition, are expected to experience a certain level of identity crisis and confusion. As will be shown in the cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan, people in both places have been undergoing identity transformation since the end of colonization. The post-colonial scholar Benita Parry asserts that “there are....critics who testify to the possibility that the identity struggle of one community can serve as a model for other resistant

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<sup>22</sup> Stuart Hall. “Cultural Identity and Diaspora.” in *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference*, edited by Jonathan Rutherford, 224-225. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990.

<sup>23</sup> Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert, and Kenneth Thompson, *Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies*, (Chicago: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 3.

discourses....”<sup>24</sup> An example can also be derived from a wide range of post-colonial literature, especially those written by Jean Rhys and Charles Baudelaire. In those literatures, authors often portrayed the protagonist as struggling with questions of identity – national identity, cultural identity etc. – caused by the psychological and mental conflicts which are triggered by the political transition and difference of the old and new world.

The critical theorist Homi K. Bhabha’s central idea is “hybridization”, which means multiculturalism leads to the emergence of a new cultural form. Bhabha does not see colonialism as a past, but something which constantly intrudes and transforms our present culture and history.<sup>25</sup> However, literature on identity formation in a post-colonial context is comparatively insufficient, especially from the field of social science, however Bhabha and Hall’s views on identity transformation under colonization is good enough to represent the situation in Hong Kong. Although the British colonialism has become part of history, but the colonization spirit is still somehow shaping the national identity in the society. Although the colonial period is over, “imperialism may still linger,” As it had been ruled by the British for 156 years.<sup>26</sup> Apart from that, the emergence of sub-national identities in Hong Kong and Taiwan makes sense when incorporating Ang’s theory of “identity is every changing” with Bhabha’s “hybridization”, due to the fact that national identities in both places are changing and the emergence of sub-national identities are caused by the complex historical background and political relations with China.

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<sup>24</sup> Benita Parry. “Resistance theory: theorising resistance.” in *Colonial discourse/ postcolonial theory*, edited by Francis Barker, Peter Hulme, and Margaret Iversen, 176. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994.

<sup>25</sup> Homi K. Bhabha, *Nation and Narration*, (New York: Routledge, 1990).

<sup>26</sup> Edward Said, *Orientalism*, (London: Penguin, 1994), 8.

### 1.3 Formation of a Collective Identity

A collective identity is not self-imposed, instead it is firstly constructed by the outside world. The German philosopher Georg Friedrich Hegel once refined the conceptual pair of self/other “Each is for the other the middle term through which each mediates itself; and each is for himself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own accord, which at the same time is such only through this medication. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.”<sup>27</sup> Hegel explains that we first identify ourselves because of the existence of the others. And based on the recognition of each other, a collective identity is formed.

A collective identity is a sense of recognition and attachment to a certain group. The application of a collective identity depends on the level of acceptance by whom it is applied to. “Unlike ideology, collective identity carries with it positive feelings for other members of the group.”<sup>28</sup> Polletta and Jasper emphasize that “if people choose to participate because doing so accords with who they are, the forms of protest they choose are also influenced by collective identities.... models of strategic choice that had movement leaders.... reflect what we believe, what we are comfortable with, what we like, who we are.”<sup>29</sup> In the cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan, Hongkongese and Taiwanese might not have the kinship or family ties, but based on

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<sup>27</sup> Georg Friedrich von Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 112.

<sup>28</sup> Francesca Polletta, and James M. Jasper, “Collective Identity and Social Movements,” *Annual Review of Sociology*, 27 (2001): 283-305.

<sup>29</sup> Polletta and Jasper, *Collective Identity and Social Movement*, 2001.

their sense of attachment to the place of habitual residence and collective memory, they chose to participate in social movement in order to defend their emerging sub-national identities. As what Hogg and Abrams describes, this is “the outcome of [the process] of self-categorization [which] is an accentuation of similarities between self and other ingroupers and differences between self and other ingroupers, that is self-stereotyping.”<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, individuals gain benefits by identifying themselves as being part of a collective identity, because as what Olson asserts, “Shared interests are simply not enough to motivate individual [to participate in a movement]”.<sup>31</sup> More importantly, “individuals share prior bonds with others that make solidaristic behavior a reasonable expectation.”<sup>32</sup> The formulation of this type of “loyalty” and obligation is according to self-interested “reputational concerns” which motivates participation.<sup>33</sup> Hence, as Socrates advises, in order to gain personal interest, participating in movement of collective identity is a relatively easier way and a rational action.<sup>34</sup>

#### **1.4 Development of a Sense of Membership and Belonging in Particular Groups**

As discussed previously, a post-colonial identity which is also regarded as a “cultural identity” is not based on kinship and family ties, instead it is based on experience of fragmentation and dispersal. When a person feels positively affiliated with a certain group, the form of movement they choose represents how they see themselves, as well as how the

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<sup>30</sup> Michael A. Hogg, and Dominic Abrams, *Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes*, (London: Routledge, 1988), 21.

<sup>31</sup> Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, (Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 1965).

<sup>32</sup> Bruce Fireman, and William Gamson. “utilitarian logic in the Resource Mobilization Perspective.” in *The Dynamics of Social Movements*, edited by Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy. (Cambridge: Winthrop, 1979).

<sup>33</sup> Dennis Chong, *Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement*, (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1991), 50.

<sup>34</sup> Chong, *Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement*, 1991..

outside world positions them. In this context, the sentiment of nationalism, which is also seen as a sense of belonging, arises.

The idea of “nationalism” which is being used in the present context is rather negative, as it focuses excessively on the feeling of oneness and pride among the people of a nation. However, in academia, “nationalism” seems to be disregarded as a prominent ideology, due to the rise of globalization.<sup>35</sup> Scholars like Kenichi Ohmae assert that global integration symbolizes the end of the nation-state.<sup>36</sup> However, Anthony Giddens sees globalization as a driving force for nationalism which encourages the creation of a sense of solidarity on top of just a region.<sup>37</sup> It is also argue that the continued creation of nationalism is caused by the existence of states,<sup>38</sup> while scholars like Ernest Gellner believe that “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist.”<sup>39</sup> Apart from this, nationalism is also seen as a feeling of devoted attachment to a country. In the literature, nationalism is often regarded as two different types – ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. These two types of nationalism both regard nations are creations, creation of ethnicity, but the former stresses kinship and a shared heritage are the definitions of nations, a common ancestry and a language are also included;<sup>40</sup> whereas, the latter regards a nation as

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<sup>35</sup> Timothy Brennan, “The National Longing for Form,” in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha, (New York, London: Routledge, 1990), 45.

<sup>36</sup> Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies*, (New York: Free Press, 1995).

<sup>37</sup> Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 69.

<sup>38</sup> Craig Calhoun, “Nationalism and Civil Society: Democracy, Diversity and Self- Determination,” *International Sociology*, 8, no. 4 (1993 December): 387-411.

<sup>39</sup> Ernest Gellner. *Thought and Change*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 168.

<sup>40</sup> Jerry Z. Muller, “Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism,” *Foreign Affairs*, no. 501 (March/April 2008): 9-14.

voluntary and active participation of its citizenry is essential.<sup>41</sup> However, as Benedict Anderson mentions, “Nation, nationality, nationalism – all have proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone analyze.”<sup>42</sup> Nonetheless, there are a few distinguished definitions, such as “Nationalism, as an instrument of state-building”,<sup>43</sup> it is a bond feeling of solidarity of the people to a nation;<sup>44</sup> it is an idea of ‘chosen people, the emphasis on a common stock of memory of the past and of hopes for the future....’<sup>45</sup>

Although this thesis does not focus on the development of nationalism, it is still necessary to identify where nationalistic sentiments come from during the identity formation process. In this thesis, I argue that a sub-national identity in Hong Kong is developed through people’s self-affiliation as a member of a group and it is further strengthened under solidarity action, whereas the case in Taiwan demonstrates that a sub-national identity is developed by politicians and political parties. The sentiment of nationalism in this context does not involve kinship and family ties, but heavily involves voluntary civic participation in the society.

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<sup>41</sup> Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?” in *Becoming National: A Reader*, ed. Eley, Geoff and Suny, Ronald Grigor, (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 41-55.

<sup>42</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 1983, 3.

<sup>43</sup> Benedict Anderson, *op. cit.*

<sup>44</sup> Anthony D. Smith, “Gastronomy or geology? The role of nationalism in the reconstruction of nations,” *Nations and Nationalism* 1, no. 1 (1994): 18-19.

<sup>45</sup> Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of Its Origins and Background*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944), 11.



## 1.5 The Self/Other Relations in Politics

Identity is best understood as a process, rather than a fixed consequence and outcome. And it is not only about ourselves, but also about how we position ourselves to the outside world. Our identity is constantly shaped by the society, institutions and people surrounding us. The issue of identity comes to challenge politicians, as they begin to understand that identity is no longer a personal matter, but it becomes a collective force which influences the world. In the case of Taiwan, politicians recognize the importance of building the Taiwanese identity and utilize it as a chip, in order to generate support from the public. As Amy Gutmann describes, “politically significant associations that attract people because of their mutual identification are aptly called identity group”, politicians try to raise our bonds of community and strengthen social commitment through waking up our sense of belonging.<sup>46</sup> James Clifford asserts that the project of identity is rooted in desires and aspirations that cannot be fulfilled, identity movements are open-ended, productive.<sup>47</sup>

In sum, this chapter constructed a national identity formation framework, especially in a post-colonial context. Furthermore, it provides us an explanation on how a sense of belonging and affiliation are developed along the development of a national identity. Although the cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan rejected the primordial’s assumption which view all nations are built upon shared heritage, they demonstrate the development of identity is based on bond

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<sup>46</sup> Amy Gutmann, *Identity in Democracy*, (Princeton, oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003), 2.

<sup>47</sup> James Clifford. “Taking Identity Politics Seriously: the Contradictory, Stony Ground...” in *Without Guarantees: Essays in Honour of Stuart Hall*, edited by Paul Gilroy, Lawrence Grossberg, and Angela McRobbie, 94-112. London: Verso Press, 2000.

feelings and recognition of each other as Hegel asserts. Among all of the previously discussed literature, Hall provided us a very important framework on identity formation. He explains the process of an identity formed in a post-colonial context should be seen as an ever changing event and it is far from being eternally fixed. From there, we are given a perception on the Hong Kong and Taiwan identities are undergoing constant transformation and there is no such entity as permanent “Hongkongese” and “Taiwanese” identities. Existing literature continues to guide us on the next level of national identity formation – the development of nationalistic sentiment – scholars such as Ernest Renan propose that voluntary civic participation can be seen as a foundation for the national identity formation. And Amy Gutmann elaborates Renan’s point as politicians regard this type of civic participation as a collective force, hence they utilize it as chip to generate public support, as it will be further demonstrated in the case of Taiwan.

## Chapter 2 – Overview of Identity<sup>48</sup>

This chapter will provide background information on the evolution of Hong Kong and Taiwan identities. For the case of Hong Kong, the change of national identity of people in Hong Kong under the British colonization and after the political transition in 1997 will be analyzed. And for the case of Taiwan, analysis on identity formation under the dynamics and power shift between political parties will be included.

### 2.1 Hong Kong

Identity has always been an issue among the people in Hong Kong. They were even described by the media as “caught between the horns of nationalism and independence.”<sup>49</sup> When it comes to national incidents such as Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands) disputes, people in Hong Kong are feeling particularly nationalistic and even self-identified as being Chinese. “They waved Chinese flags as they waded jubilantly through the water to each the shores of the [Diaoyu Islands]....After a crew landed on the islands, singing China’s national anthem.”<sup>50</sup> However, when issues like democracy and human rights are being discussed, people in Hong Kong consciously realize the difference between China and Hong Kong.

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<sup>48</sup> Part of the statistics used in this chapter was extracted from papers which written by me for the courses of *Introduction to the Study of Nationalism* (Professor Szabolcs Pogonyi); *East Asia in International Relations* (Professor Young Mi Kim); *Economic Nationalism* (Professor Thomas Fetzer).

<sup>49</sup> MINORU TSUKISHIMA, “Hong Kong: Caught between the horns of nationalism and independence.” *The Asahi Shimbun*, Feature edition, sec. Osaka City News Section, April 28, 2013. <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/globe/feature/china/AJ201304280006> (accessed May 10, 2013).

<sup>50</sup> Chen Te-ping. “Hong Kong After Island Landing: Who You Calling Unpatriotic?.” *The Wall Street Journal*, sec. China, August 16, 2012. <http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/08/16/don't-call-us-unpatriotic-hong-kong-says/> (accessed May 10, 2013).

Vacillation between identities and being psychologically confused reflects the location and history of the city. In this section, we will first look at “the refugee mentality” as one of the features of the Hong Kong identity and it will be followed by the identity complexity among the people, as well as a discussion on the rise of the “Hongkongese” identity, which will be supported by an ethnic identification survey interview conducted by the HKU POP between August 1997 and December 2012.

### ***The Refugee Mentality***

David Faure describes Hong Kong is a coastal city in China – a colony city formed by Chinese. The identity confusion of Hong Kong people have been rooted since the beginning of British colonization.<sup>51</sup> Although Hong Kong was ruled by the British for 156 years until 1997, the Chinese culture has been well preserved in this place. The “Huairou” policy, which is a type of political means to win over people through conciliation, has greatly minimized the psychology confrontation between China and the people in Hong Kong. Rapid development of the economy before handover, and education reform toned down the tough image of “colonial rule”. Since then, double identities of “Chinese descendants” and “Overseas British citizens” have emerged.

The identity confusion of Hong Kong people is strongly linked with the refugee mentality. Before the British colonialism, Hong Kong was merely one of the unknown small

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<sup>51</sup> David Faure, *Society, A Documentary History of Hong Kong*, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997).

fishing ports on the southeast coast of China. Majority of the people lived in Hong Kong at that time were ethnic Han Chinese who spoke Cantonese.<sup>52</sup> Between 1949 and 1950, there were 776,000 refugees from other coastal areas in China and Guangdong Province to Hong Kong.<sup>53</sup> Since 1841, Hong Kong officially became a British Dependent Territory, hence migrants from China all in a sudden turned into refugees. The refugee population then skyrocketed to 2.5 million by 1953. In 1961, Hong Kong's population was 3.1 million – over 50.5 percent of them were born in China, 47.7 percent were born in Hong Kong and the remaining 1.8 percent born in other places – which means more than half of the entire population back then were immigrants from China.<sup>54</sup> Therefore, Hong Kong was a colonial city formed by Chinese refugees. The economic boom in Hong Kong in the 1960s and 1970s benefited most of the immigrants. Meanwhile, people live in China were still living in poverty. The disparity between these two places began to appear and the identity of “Hongkongese” was developed under the success and sense of attribution to the city. Choi Po-king, Hong Kong culture and identity scholar says “It is also evident that Hong Kong.... has developed its [own] unique identity and culture [under British colonization].” The Hong Kong religious studies scholar Kwok Nai-wang also stresses that “...although more than ninety-five percent of its population are ethnic Chinese.”<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Oxford English Dictionary, 3d ed., s.v. “Cantonese”

<sup>53</sup> G. B. Endacott, *Government and people in Hong Kong, 1841-1962: a constitutional history*, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1964).

<sup>54</sup> HKID, *Hong Kong Immigration Department 40th Anniversary Report*, (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 2001).

<sup>55</sup> Choi Po-king, “Introduction,” in *The Other Hong Kong Report 1993*, ed. P. Choi and L. Ho, (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1993), xxxiii; Kwok Nai Wang, and , *Hong Kong Braves 1997*, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Christian Institute, 1994), 111.

## *Identity Complexity*

The post-war generation in Hong Kong has very similar life style and education was due to the similar environment they were brought up in, which certainly had a direct effect on the formation of the “Hongkongese” collective identity. Besides, the younger generation has neither sufficient knowledge nor sense of being Chinese or of China the country, as it was not frequently mentioned in the textbooks under the British education system. Furthermore, negative portrayals of the mainland Chinese as “uneducated”, “money-minded” and “fierce” by the media have strengthened the resistance in Hong Kong. Therefore, the younger generation would identify themselves as “Hongkongese” rather than “Chinese”.<sup>56</sup> The political factor also complicates the identity of people in Hong Kong. The “de-ethnicization” means through education and government policy, which was practiced by the British colonial government, has also weakened the Chinese national sentiment in Hong Kong, as well as reduced the impact of China on Hong Kong.

The controversy of the term “Hongkongese” is based on the sovereignty transfer of Hong Kong and became part of China in 1997. Therefore, from a legal perspective, people in Hong Kong should be defined as “Chinese”. Sociologist Lau Siu-kai points out that “people in Hong Kong normally use ‘Hongkongese’ and ‘Chinese’ to address themselves.”<sup>57</sup> In order to facilitate analysis, it is necessary to define the term before further discussion. Due to the fact

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<sup>56</sup> Wong Wang-kiu, Li Siu-leung, and Chan Ching-kiu, *Hong Kong Un-Imagined: History, Culture and the Future (in Chinese)*, (Taipei : Maitian, 1997).

<sup>57</sup> Lau Siu-kai, “‘Hongkongese’ or ‘Chinese’: Identity Recognition of the People in Hong Kong between 1985-1995 (in Chinese),” *The Twenty-first Century*, no. 6 (1997): 43-58.

that the term “Hongkongese” has no legal definition, in this thesis, it will only be used to describe people who are from and have the sense of self-affiliation with Hong Kong.

The identity confusion and ambiguity among the people in Hong Kong are caused by refugee mentality and the changing environment. Hence, the identity of Hong Kong people is ever changing. The survey result confirms the assertion. In October 2012, the Centre for Communication Research and Public Opinion Survey (CCPOS) of the Chinese University of Hong Kong conducted a telephone interview with 1,009 people aged 18 years or over. It shows that the percentage of Hong Kong people recognizing themselves as “Chinese”, which refers to “*Zhuhua minzu*” (literally meaning nationality transcending ethnic divisions with a central identity of China as a whole) has been declining since 1997. Merely 16.5 percent of them self-recognized as “Chinese”. When compared with 32.1 percent in 1997, it has significantly dropped 19.5 percent in 15 years.<sup>58</sup> As the survey shows, national identity of people in Hong Kong is rather weak, especially after the sovereignty was transferred.

Apart from the CCPOS data, a survey conducted by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies (HKIAP) also indicates that, among 2,003 interviewees, the percentage of self-recognition as being “Hong Kong people” which refers to self-affiliation to Hong Kong and considers Hong Kong as their motherland, had escalated from 64 percent in 2002 to 81.8 percent in 2010.<sup>59</sup> The possible explanation for the significant drop in people

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<sup>58</sup> CCR – HKCU, “The Identity and National Identification of Hong Kong People (in Chinese).” Last modified 2012. Accessed November 11, 2012. <http://tinyurl.com/acq3hnz>.

<sup>59</sup> HKIAP, “Civic Awareness Survey and Research Report.” (in Chinese) Last modified 2003, 2010. Accessed November 9,

recognizing themselves as “Chinese” while a rise in recognizing “Hong Kong people” can be the result of the Chinese government imposing suppressive policies on Hong Kong under “One country, Two Systems” began in the late 1990s. One of the incidents was the 2002 proposal of enacting the Hong Kong Basic Law Article 23, which resulted in a massive demonstration with 500,000 people on 1 July 2003 and the resignation of two prominent Executive Council members.<sup>60</sup>

The sociologist Pierre Van den Berghe argues that ethnic groups are the reproduction of one’s own genes, and powerful racial and ethnic sentiments are an extension of kinship ties.<sup>61</sup> His “kinship” perspective brings forward the centrality of descent in defining ethnic groups.<sup>62</sup> David Horowitz also defines ethnic groups as “super-families”.<sup>63</sup> However, the formation of “Hongkongese” identity was based on as what Smith proposes as “the bond of solidarity and the collective memory.”<sup>64</sup> Smith stresses that nationalism draws in the pre-existing history of the “group” and their attempts to fashion history into a sense of common identity. Therefore, nationalism, as Smith suggests, does not require that members should all be alike, as long as they feel an intense bond of solidarity to the nation and to other members of their nation. The collective memory of Hong Kong people “growing up” under the 156 years of British colonization has provided them a sense of attribution, as well as recognition of an identity.

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2012. <http://tinyurl.com/c5kwhqt>.

<sup>60</sup> Elisabeth Yuan. “In Hong Kong, July 1 marks call for democracy.” *CNN*, sec. Asia, July 2, 2007. <http://tinyurl.com/chteo3a> (accessed November 9, 2012).

<sup>61</sup> Pierre Van den Berghe. *The Ethnic Phenomenon*. (New York: Elsevier, 1981).

<sup>62</sup> Pierre Van den Berghe. “Race and ethnicity: A sociobiological perspective.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 1. no. 4 (1978): 401-411. Pierre Van den Berghe. “Does Race Matter?” *Nations and Nationalism*. 1. no. 3 (November 1995): 357-368.

<sup>63</sup> Donald Horowitz. *Ethnic groups in conflict*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).


<sup>64</sup> Anthony Smith. *Nationalism and modernism: a critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism*. (London, New York: Routledge, 1998).



The emergence of local identity has certainly hindered the formation of the “Chinese” national identity and recognition of China as the “motherland”.

### *The Rise of the “Hongkongese” Identity*

**Figure 1.** Categorical Ethnic Identity in Hong Kong (August 1997 – December 2012)



Source: Public Opinion Programme, the University of Hong Kong

The HKU POP carried out a survey on “Hong Kong people’s ethnic identity” between August 1997 and December 2012 (see Figure 1). The result shows that the percentage of people who identified themselves as “citizens of Hong Kong” increased 10 percent from 36 percent in 2010 to 46 percent in 2012, while the percentage identifying themselves as “Chinese citizens” dropped three percent in two years. Robert Chung, Director of POP observes that the absolute rating of people’s identification with “Hong Kong citizens” reached a record high since the transition in 1997 and identification with “Chinese citizens” dropped to a 13-year low since the end of 1999. Apart from the POP survey, CCPOS carried out a

series of research between 1997 and 2010, the percentage of people in Hong Kong feeling aversion toward national symbols such as the “Chinese National Anthem” and “Putonghua” rose 2.2 percent and 4.7 percent respectively.<sup>65</sup> Recent cross-border tensions which caused by China’s increasing control over Hong Kong’s political system, such as the the Hong Kong Basic Law Article 23 and the Moral and National Education curriculum (MNE), are believed to be the source of the abrupt change of self-identification among the people in Hong Kong.

The sovereignty transfer in 1997 had a huge impact on Hong Kong people and their sense of affiliation as shown in previous survey data. Since 1997, the constitutional law “Basic Law” of Hong Kong is said to be safeguarding the rights and distinct identity of Hong Kong people under “One Country, Two Systems”, but the result is rather disappointing. According to the Basic Law Chapter 1, Article 2, HKSAR is authorized to exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power.<sup>66</sup> However, a decade and a half after the transition, increasing social unrest exposes Hong Kong people’s gradual increasing resistance to their new “Chinese” identity. The significant drop of number of people self-recognizing as being “Chinese”, while the increasing number recognizing themselves as “Hong Kong people”, can be the result of the incompetence of the Basic Law.

Above survey statistics demonstrate the identity of people in Hong Kong is changing. In

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<sup>65</sup> CCPOS, “The Identity and National Identification of Hong Kong People (in Chinese).” Last modified 2012. Accessed March 30, 2012. <http://tinyurl.com/acq3hnz>.

<sup>66</sup> HKSAR Government, “The Basic Law.” Last modified 2012. Accessed December 01, 2012. <http://tinyurl.com/c8xvap7>.

fact, the data clearly indicate that people in Hong Kong have a gradual stronger self-affiliation toward Hong Kong, rather than China, especially after 1997. The Basic Law under “One Country, Two Systems” was supposed to provide people in Hong Kong a transitional period, so that they can gradually adopt themselves with the Chinese system. However, the data also show that the gap between mainland Chinese and people in Hong Kong is widening. China’s economy has been recorded growth in a rapid pace since the 1990s, with about 9.5 percent yearly growth.<sup>67</sup> Although China has become the second-biggest economy in the world and the country’s Gross Domestic Product is expected to overtake the US’ in 2018, the economic prosperity does not change how people in Hong Kong identify themselves.<sup>68</sup> The Chinese government’s increasing control over Hong Kong, ranging from political reform to residency rights, has triggered Hong Kong people’s sense of protection to its own sovereignty. This type of sentiment encourages alignment of civil society and general public. More importantly, it strengthened the collective “Hongkongese” identity among these people. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a collective identity, which influences the forms of protest that people choose, is the reflection of people’s belief.

## **2.2 Taiwan**

Taiwan, which is also known as the Republic of China, its international status has always been controversial. Since the Kuomintang (KMT) was defeated by the Chinese Communist

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<sup>67</sup> Ami Sedghi. “China GDP: how it has changed since 1980.” *The Guardian*, News edition, sec. Data Blog, March 23, 2012. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2012/mar/23/china-gdp-since-1980>

<sup>68</sup> Ami Sedghi, China GDP, 2012.

Party in 1949, the former evacuated his government to Taiwan and established the Republic of China. It has been 64 years since the establishment of the Taiwanese government, but the sovereignty issue has not been resolved. A survey result released in March 2012 by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), one of the political parties in Taiwan, on how people view the claim “Taiwan and China are one country”, 77.9 percent of the interviewees disagree with the claim, while merely 17.5 percent agree with it, and the remaining 4.6 percent of people were not sure.<sup>69</sup>

### *Taiwanese Indigenousness*

Taiwan’s population is mainly comprised by Han Chinese and Taiwanese aborigines who settled on the island before the Han’s arrival. According to the Council of Indigenous Peoples, there are 527,767 indigenous people currently residing in Taiwan, occupying 2.25 percent of the entire population and representing 14 officially recognized “tribes”.<sup>70</sup> There are approximately 26 known languages spoken among the Taiwanese aborigines, which are collectively referred to as the Formosan languages.<sup>71</sup> Taiwanese aborigines faced tremendous cultural change as the island was ruled under colonial regimes since the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, especially under the rules of the Japanese and KMT between 1895 and 1987. Both governments attempted to reshape the aborigines in the mould of their identities, especially

<sup>69</sup> Staff writer. “77.9% thinks that Taiwan and China are One Country” (in Chinese), *Taiwan Daily*, March 29, 2012, Newspaper edition. <http://tinyurl.com/d5eqthl> (accessed December 11, 2012).

<sup>70</sup> Council of Indigenous Peoples, “Aboriginal population statistics.” Last modified February 16, 2013. Accessed May 13, 2013. <http://www.apc.gov.tw/portal/docDetail.html?CID=940F9579765AC6A0&DID=0C3331F0EBD>

<sup>71</sup> Elizabeth Zeitoun, and Yu Ching-hua, “The Formosan Language Archive: Linguistic Analysis and Language Processing,” *Computational Linguistics and Chinese Language Processing*, 10, no. 2 (June 2005): 167-200, <http://aclclp.org.tw/clclp/v10n2/v10n2a2.pdf> (accessed May 13, 2013).

under the KMT administration which emphasised Chinese culture, language and history.<sup>72</sup>

The KMT created a strong national Chinese identity by practicing centralized cultural policies because they believed that the Taiwanese aborigines would be eventually assimilated under such policies.<sup>73</sup> Although some tribes aligned with the colonial powers due to the freedom which they might gain under the alignment, certain tribes resisted colonial influences and created tensions between the KMT government and the Taiwanese aborigines.<sup>74</sup>

### ***Establishment of the Republic of China***

The Taiwanese aborigines had their first encounter with the KMT government in 1949. The KMT government pursued a set of highly centralized national cultural policies with their ideology in order to restore the Chinese identity and eradicate the Japanese influence, but it was ended after the abolishment of martial law in 1987 and Taiwan was gradually moving towards democracy.<sup>75</sup> KMT continued to hold its power on Taiwan under Lee Teng-hui's administration, but the Lee's government in general supported the protection and preservation of aboriginal culture and languages.

Although democratization brought a great change to Taiwan and its aborigines,

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<sup>72</sup> Henrietta Harrison, "Changing Nationalities, Changing Ethnicities: Taiwan Indigenous Villages in the Years after 1946." In *Search of the Hunters and Their Tribes: Studies in the History and Culture of the Taiwan Indigenous People*, edited by David Faure, 68-70. Taipei: SMC Publishing, 2001.

<sup>73</sup> Steven Phillips, *Between Assimilation and Independence: The Taiwanese Encounter Nationalist China, 1945-1950*, (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2003), 47-48, 140-141.

<sup>74</sup> John Robert Shepherd, *Marriage and Mandatory Abortion among the 17th Century Siraya*, (Arlington VA: The American Anthropological Association, 1995), 58-63.

<sup>75</sup> Richard W. Wilson, *Learning To Be Chinese: The Political Socialization of Children in Taiwan*, (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1970).


complexity of aboriginal acculturation and assimilation are still happening. Some tribes are currently seeking to revive their aboriginal identity and urging for an official distinct recognition from the government. For example the plain aborigines had experienced a nearly total acculturation into the ethnic Han group in the language perspective since their language was shifted from the Formosan languages to Chinese.<sup>76</sup> Apart from the aborigines, the ethnic Han is also experiencing an identity change in the society. Identity was almost a non-existent issue in Taiwan under KMT's ruling. During 1945 and the end of 1980, people in Taiwan had never had a chance to get to know China by themselves and all the information they received on China were filtered by the Taiwanese government. Furthermore, before the 1970s, the Republic of China was recognized as China. Therefore, the idea of people in Taiwan to identify themselves as Chinese is understandable. However, after KMT's step-down in the late 1980s, under DPP's lead, Taiwan's democratization and independent movement began to flourish, as well as the increasing opened cross-strait interactions, the identity of people in Taiwan has undergone a tremendous change.

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<sup>76</sup> Jolan Hsieh, *Collective Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Identity Based Movements of Plains Indigenous in Taiwan*, (New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2006).

## Changing National Identity

Figure 2. Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese (1992 – June 2012)



Source: Election Study Centre, National Chengchi University

Surveys on “Changes in Taiwanese/ Chinese Identity” has been conducted by the National Chengchi University since 1992 (see Figure 2), the figure illustrates that the percentage of people self-identifying as being both “Chinese and Taiwanese” remains approximately the same. However, in 2012, the percentage of people in Taiwan self-recognizing as being “Taiwanese” steadily increased 19.4 percent when compared with 36.9 percent in 2000, the year the DPP dominated the Legislative Yuan, while the percentage of self-recognizing as being “Chinese” dropped 9.9 percent when compared with 12.5 percent.

As shown, self-affiliation as being Taiwanese has risen in the past 12 years. The figure also demonstrates that the increasing self-affiliation as being “Taiwanese” began in the early 1990s is strongly associated when Lee Teng-hui from the KMT became President. Although President Lee is affiliated with a pro-reunification with China political party, he supports independence himself and made it clear to the public in an interview with *Deutsche Welle* (Voice of German radio) in 1999, he stated that “Taiwan and China were two separate countries on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.”<sup>77</sup>

Apart from the National Chengchi University’s survey, a series of surveys conducted by the Mainland Affairs Council (Taiwan) between 1989 and 1999 on “Self-positioning and National Identity of People in Taiwan” also indicates that, in 1989, 16 percent of the interviewees recognized themselves as being “Taiwanese”, 52 percent of them recognized themselves as being “Chinese” while the rest, 32 percent of people, chose not to answer. The result dramatically changed in five years as the proportion of self-recognizing as “Taiwanese” then became much higher than that of “Chinese” and the number constantly escalated until 1998.<sup>78</sup>

Self-affiliation as Taiwanese was increasing during Chen Shui-bian’s presidency between 2000 and 2008, President Chen and the pro-Taiwan independence DPP launched a set of

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<sup>77</sup> UNHCR, “Chronology for Aboriginal Taiwanese in Taiwan (Minorities at Risk Project).” Last modified 2012. Accessed December 17, 2012. <http://tinyurl.com/d8t5mg6>.

<sup>78</sup> Mainland Affairs Council, “Self-positioning and national identity of people in Taiwan.” Last modified 1998. Accessed December 12, 2012. <http://tinyurl.com/dx235dp>.



Taiwanization campaigns, especially *Name Rectification Campaigns* (NRC). The campaign plays a significant role in the Taiwanization movement as it involves changing and replacing names of government bodies and private corporations which carried “Chineseness”. NRC was launched on 11 May 2002 by the former Presidents Lee and President Chen, as well as the pro-Taiwan independence DPP. NRC was launched in 2002 was because Chen and the DPP had elected as the President and the ruling party respectively. Furthermore, Chen personally holds a relatively strong opinion against reunification with China, as in one public occasion, he commented that it is abnormal for people not to dare to call Taiwan an independent sovereign nation [...] Taiwan must not fall into the trap of being regarded as part of China, or [to] become a special region of China like Hong Kong.<sup>79</sup>

The complication of Taiwanese identity, to a certain extent, is caused by the historical background of Taiwan. The country is often drawn into the debate of the “Taiwan issue” as China often claims sovereignty over it. Although Taiwan has been administrated by its own government for the past 64 years, it is not yet a member of the United Nations (UN) and as of 2011, there are only 22 UN State Members who have officially recognized it as a state.<sup>80</sup> Under the political perplexity, people in Taiwan are often regarded as “people from Taiwan province”, which also implies that Taiwan is a province of China. Hence, for those who are against the idea of Taiwanese independence, being Taiwanese is identical to being Cantonese

<sup>79</sup> Lillian Wu. Taipei Central News Agency. “(World News Connection) President Wants Constitution That Fits Taiwan People.” Last modified October 6, 2003. Accessed December 22, 2012.

<sup>80</sup> Taiwan Foreign Policy and National Security Yearbook 2011, (USA: International Business Publications, 2011) <http://tinyurl.com/b2jheux> (accessed December 11, 2012).

or Henan, which is merely identification for ethnic groups in China. Since the 1990s, politicians in Taiwan started to worry that “the issue of provincial” would hinder Taiwan’s democratization, as well as the formation of national identity, therefore they began to come up with definitions of being a true Taiwanese.

### ***Reproducing National Identity***

When the national identity is being reproduced from time to time under different politicians, people in Taiwan seemed to be indecisive on their national identity and they are unsure whether or not they should be addressed as Chinese or Taiwanese by the outside world. “A national identity is to be found in the embodied habits of social life. Such habits include those of thinking and using language.”<sup>81</sup> Michael Billig argues that although nationalism has transformed itself into a form of banality, omnipresence and unconsciousness, the power of this banal form of nationalism when ‘flagging’, is still strongly presented. DPP and President Chen attempted to minimize the Chinese influence in the country in order to create a “purely” Taiwanese environment by renaming government bodies and persuading private corporations to do the same. As Rogers Brubaker believes, this attempt is a production and reproduction of nationhood and ethnicity.<sup>82</sup> In 1999, President Lee even came up with a definition of “new Taiwanese” – “Anyone who lives in Taiwan loves Taiwan and is willing to sacrifice for this


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<sup>81</sup> Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 1995), 8.

<sup>82</sup> Roger Brubaker, Margit Feischmidt, Jon Fox, and Liana Grancea, *Nationalist Politics & Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 3.

place can be regarded as Taiwanese.”<sup>83</sup> Apart from Lee’s definition, President Chen also came up with a widely acceptable definition – “Both the indigenous people from hundred years or a decade ago, they are Taiwanese, they are the true masters of Taiwan.”<sup>84</sup> When President Lee was facing military threat by China in the 1996 election, as well as President Chen in his inauguration, they often used slogans such as “To be a true Taiwanese”, “Long live the people of Taiwan”.<sup>85</sup> All these morale-boosting slogans can be regarded as an identity integration appeal, which makes the qualification of being a Taiwanese become wishful thinking and politically driven.

Figure 3. Taiwan People’s Self-identity (in Chinese)



Source: Taiwan Indicators Survey Research (TISR)

In August 2012, Taiwan Indicators Survey Research (TISR) published a survey (see Figure 3) result on “Taiwan people’s self-identity” and compared it with an identical survey

<sup>83</sup> Lee Teng-kui, *Taiwan's claim*, (Taipei: Yuan-Liou Publishing, 1999).

<sup>84</sup> Chen Shui-bian, *The Son of Taiwan: My Childhood, Business Philosophy, and National Vision*, (Taichung: Morningstar, 2000), 118, 152.

<sup>85</sup> Staff writer. “Lee faces China’s military threat (in Chinese).” *United Daily News*, sec. 2, March 6, 1996; Susie Chiang. “Chen Shui-bian’s inauguration speech (in Chinese).” *Economics Times (Taiwan)*. May 21, 2004.

which was conducted in September 2008. When interviewees were offered to choose more than one identity, the result was not surprisingly different to the rest of the surveys which we have discussed earlier. Among 1,007 interviewees in 2008 and 2012, 95.5 percent of them self-identified themselves as “Taiwanese” in 2008, and the number slightly increased 0.4 percent in 2012; and merely 46.6 percent of the interviewees self-identified themselves as “Chinese”, which was a two-percent increase when compared with the result in 2009. The 2012 survey holds a similar result as the 2008 one, which implies that self-identification and affiliation among the public in Taiwan is relatively stable after the re-election of Ma Ying-jeou in January 2012.

The identity confusion among the people in Taiwan is caused by its complex historical background and sensitive relations with China, but the national identity change among the people in Taiwan is a consequence of power struggle between political parties. Identity has become a tool for the politicians to win over people’s hearts, because as mentioned in the previous chapter, attracting people with their mutual identification has a politically significant effect. When comparing with the case of Hong Kong, the reproduction of Taiwanese identity is a rather top-down process which caused by institutions and policies. In the following chapter, national identity changes in Hong Kong and Taiwan will be analyzed from two perspectives – vertical and horizontal. From the vertical perspective – political parties’ adoption of Chinese identities – analyze the dynamics between political parties in Hong Kong and Taiwan and their approaches towards China. From the horizontal perspective – analyze

how a particular group of mainland Chinese people (For Hong Kong: cross-border births and their right of abode; For Taiwan: cross-strait marriage) and their interactions with the general public in Hong Kong and Taiwan influence the national identity change and formation in both places.

## Chapter 3 – Vertical Perspective: Political Parties' Adoption of Chinese Identities<sup>86</sup>

The sense of “groupness” occurred by recognizing and associating ourselves with people with certain specificities. “An identity is established in relation to a series of differences that have become socially recognized. These differences are essential to its being. If they did not coexist as differences, [identity] would not exist in its distinctness and solidarity.”<sup>87</sup> This type of identity association creates tensions in the society as members of a certain group might claim their distinctiveness, use that to challenge dominant powers and further internalize themselves and marginalize the others. The political theorist William Connolly also agrees that “...the fullness of self-identity for one constituency by marginalizing, demeaning, or excluding the differences on which it depends to specify itself.”<sup>88</sup> In this chapter, the case of Hong Kong will demonstrate that a sub-national identity as “Hongkongese” is a bottom-up scenario, which emerged under the sense of “groupness” and further strengthened by the resistance power against government-imposed policy,, whereas in the case of Taiwan, a sub-national identity “Taiwanese” is constructed under the dynamics between political parties and it can be seen as a top-down scenario.

The cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan demonstrate political parties tend to strategize their

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<sup>86</sup> Part of the statistics used in this chapter was extracted from papers which written by me for the courses of *Introduction to the Study of Nationalism* (Professor Szabolcs Pogonyi); *East Asia in International Relations* (Professor Young Mi Kim); *Economic Nationalism* (Professor Thomas Fetzer).

<sup>87</sup> William Connolly, *Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 16.

<sup>88</sup> William Connolly, *Identity\Difference*, 2002.

campaigns and attract support from the general public by stating their preference and loyalty to a particular identity, especially national identity. Ailsa Henderson asserts that “....attempts to mobilise identity behind a political project, nationalist parties encourage the creation and acquisition of a definable identity package that provides citizens with the tools to interpret their past, present and future.”<sup>89</sup>

### 3.1 Hong Kong

Hong Kong moved away from colonial governance in 1997, since then, the political environment in Hong Kong has undergone a tremendous transformation. The British colonial government provided the city an early-shape of democratization by encouraging political participation. “The emergence of political groups was a by-product of this process, and the elections carried out under British political reforms accelerated the development of political parties.”<sup>90</sup> The English novelist George Orwell once mentioned:

*“Who controls the past,” ran the Party slogan, “controls the future: who controls the present controls the past.”*<sup>91</sup>

In Hong Kong, although there are a limited number of political parties, the majority of them are assertive and influential to a certain extent. Opposition parties in Hong Kong often

<sup>89</sup> Ailsa Henderson, “Political Construction of National Identity in Scotland and Quebec,” *Scottish Affairs*, no. 29 (Autumn 1999): 121-38, [http://www.scottishaffairs.org/backiss/pdfs/sa29/SA29\\_Henderson.pdf](http://www.scottishaffairs.org/backiss/pdfs/sa29/SA29_Henderson.pdf) (accessed May 5, 2013).

<sup>90</sup> Anthony Fung, “The Dynamics of Public Opinion, Political Parties, and Media in Transitional Hong Kong,” *Asian Survey*, 38, no. 5 (May 1998): 474, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645504> (accessed May 4, 2013).

<sup>91</sup> George Orwell, *1984*, (London: Secker & Warburg, 1949), 35.

have no chance of gaining power in the Legislative Council. In the 2012 Legislative election, among 70 seats, pro-Beijing parties won 43 seats while pro-democracy won only 27 seats, when comparing to the previous election in 2008, pro-democracy won 23 seats and pro-Beijing 37 seats.<sup>92</sup> Since Hong Kong has no legislation for political parties, there is no legal restriction for and definition of political parties. Most parties are registered as societies and companies regarding their political preferences. There are four major political parties in Hong Kong, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB), the Liberal Party, the Civic Part (CP), and the Democratic Party (DP). DAB is the largest pro-China political party, while DP is one of the major pan-democracy parties.<sup>93</sup> Both political parties take contrasting stances on issues involving China and the sovereignty of Hong Kong. DAB's main claim is that "it is natural for ethnic Chinese in Hong Kong to be patriotic", as the party was initially formed by the Xinhua News Agency.<sup>94</sup> DP supports the restoration of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong and it consistently stresses the principle of "One Country, Two Systems".<sup>95</sup> Although both parties do not explicitly and directly discuss the issue of "constructing Chinese identity", the way of the parties deal with social issues exposes their orientations, which have a certain level of influences on the national identity formation of the general public. The issue of Moral and National Education (MNE) curriculum makes the political parties' stances even more visible.

<sup>92</sup> The HKGIC, "287 validly nominated candidates for Legislative Council Election." Last modified August 07, 2012. Accessed May 17, 2013. <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201208/07/P201208070334.htm>.

<sup>93</sup> Staff writer. "Hong Kong pro-Beijing party chairman dies." *Reuters*, U.S. edition, sec. World, August 8, 2007. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/08/08/us-hongkong-china-idUSHKG27734220070808> (accessed May 4, 2013).

<sup>94</sup> Chan Ming K., and Alvin Y. So, *Crisis and Transformation in China's Hong Kong*, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2002), 119; Bob Beatty, *Democracy, Asian values, and Hong Kong: evaluating political elite beliefs*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003).

<sup>95</sup> DP, "Party beliefs (in Chinese)." Last modified 2013. Accessed May 4, 2013. [http://www.dphk.org/?page\\_id=2](http://www.dphk.org/?page_id=2).



The controversial MNE, which proposed by the Education Bureau of Hong Kong, is a transformation and a “strengthened version” of the current curriculum of Moral and Civic Education (MCE) for upper primary and junior secondary schools.<sup>96</sup> It emphasises rule of law, human rights and national education. Nevertheless, the sense of “civic attitudes” towards China has remained low among Hong Kong students. From a survey conducted by the Commission on Youth on “Civic Awareness and Research on Moral Values” in 1998, 54.3 percent of 3,040 secondary school students aged from 14 to 19 years old think that they have no sense of belonging to mainland China.<sup>97</sup> Furthermore, HKIAP’s survey in 2002 shows that merely 29.2 percent of 1013 people aged 15 to 24 considered themselves “Chinese” after the handover.<sup>98</sup> In order to strengthen national identity of the younger generation, some schools are even required to use national symbols, as well as to raise a Chinese national flag on some occasions.<sup>99</sup> As Rogers Brubaker argues, ethnicity and nationhood are produced and reproduced as basic categories of social and political life, so they become an everyday experience.<sup>100</sup>

The revised MNE guideline was published in June 2012, and has three main focuses:

<sup>96</sup> CDC. *Guidelines on Civic Education in School*. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Printer, 1996).

<sup>97</sup> The Commission on Youth, “Civic Awareness and Research on Moral Value.” Last modified August 1998. Accessed November 9, 2012. <http://tinyurl.com/c5kwhqt>.

<sup>98</sup> HKIAP, “Civic Awareness of Young People after the Handover.” Last modified May 2002. Accessed November 9, 2012. <http://tinyurl.com/c5kwhqt>.

<sup>99</sup> Lee W. O.. “The Development of Citizenship Education Curriculum in Hong Kong after 1997: Tensions between National Identity and Global Citizenship.” (Hong Kong: Springer, Comparative Education Research Center, the University of Hong Kong, 2008).

<sup>100</sup> Rogers Brubaker. “Ethnicity Without Groups.” (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).

self-recognition, development of moral attitudes and recognition of identity.<sup>101</sup> MNE curriculum was supposed to be phased into primary schools in 2012 and secondary schools in 2013. However, due to the huge opposition from the public, the Government has decided to postpone the commencement by introducing a 3-year trial period and allow the schools to commence it at the latest in 2015.<sup>102</sup> The heated debate over the implementation of MNE as a curriculum, which was provoked by the approval of the revision from the Secretary for the Education Bureau in April 2012, has turned into a political duel between the “pro-Communist party”, who supports national identity recognition and “Hong Kong independence activists”. As a commentator from the *China Daily* describes, the British colonization “sow[ed] the seeds of estrangement between Hong Kong and the Mainland. And the white-washed population in Hong Kong needs to be reprogrammed.”<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> EBHK, “Guideline on Moral and National Education.” Last modified 2011. Accessed November 9, 2012. <http://tinyurl.com/buo2qrl>.

<sup>102</sup> Staff reporter “Hong Kong Protesters of National Education Wary of Integration With Mainland China” *International Business Times*. <http://tinyurl.com/c25wvah> (accessed November 9, 2012).

<sup>103</sup> Violetta Yau. “Local parents don’t buy brainwash mumbo-jumbo.” *China Daily (Asia Pacific)*, Current Affairs edition August 04, 2012. <http://tinyurl.com/b6dwf6q> (accessed November 17, 2012).

Figure 4. Council Meeting (Voting Result) 15 June 2011

投票 VOTE: 10  
日期 DATE: 16/06/2011  
時間 TIME: 04:37:40 下午pm  
動議 MOTION: 「德育及國民教育科課程」議案  
MOTION ON "MORAL AND NATIONAL EDUCATION CURRICULUM"

動議人 MOVED BY: 何俊仁 Albert HO

	功能團體 Functional Constituencies	地方選區 Geographical Constituencies	最後結果 Final Result
出席 Present	24	23	
投票 Vote	24	22	
贊成 Yes	3	12	
反對 No	16	9	
棄權 Abstain	5	1	
結果 Result	否決 Negated	通過 Passed	否決 Negated

個別表決如下 THE INDIVIDUAL VOTES WERE AS FOLLOWS:

議員 MEMBER	投票 VOTE	議員 MEMBER	投票 VOTE
<b>功能團體 Functional Constituencies</b>		<b>地方選區 Geographical Constituencies</b>	
何鍾泰 Dr Raymond HO	反對 NO	曾鈺成 TSANG Yok-sing	出席 PRESENT
李國寶 Dr David LI		何俊仁 Albert HO	贊成 YES
吳靄儀 Dr Margaret NG	贊成 YES	李卓人 LEE Cheuk-yan	贊成 YES
張文光 CHEUNG Man-kwong	贊成 YES	李華明 Fred LI	
梁劉柔芬 Mrs Sophie LEUNG	反對 NO	涂謹申 James TO	贊成 YES
黃宜弘 Dr Philip WONG	反對 NO	陳國林 CHAN Kam-lam	反對 NO
黃容棋 WONG Yung-kan	反對 NO	梁耀忠 LEUNG Yiu-chung	
劉焯強 LAU Wong-fat		劉江華 LAU Kong-wah	反對 NO
劉健儀 Miriam LAU		劉慧卿 Emily LAU	贊成 YES
霍震霆 Timothy FOK	反對 NO	鄭家富 Andrew CHENG	
石禮謙 Abraham SHEK	反對 NO	鄧耀宗 TAM Yiu-chung	反對 NO
李鳳英 Li Fung-ying	棄權 ABSTAIN	馮檢基 Frederick FUNG	
張宇人 Tommy CHEUNG	棄權 ABSTAIN	余若薇 Audrey EU	贊成 YES
方剛 Vincent FANG	棄權 ABSTAIN	王國興 WONG Kwok-hing	反對 NO
李國麟 Dr Joseph LEE		李永達 LEE Wing-tat	贊成 YES
林健鋒 Jeffrey LAM	反對 NO	張學明 CHEUNG Hok-ming	反對 NO
梁君彥 Andrew LEUNG	反對 NO	湯家驊 Ronny TONG	贊成 YES
黃定光 WONG Ting-kwong	反對 NO	甘乃威 KAM Nai-wai	贊成 YES
詹培忠 CHIM Pui-chung	棄權 ABSTAIN	何秀蘭 Cyd HO	贊成 YES
劉秀成 Prof Patrick LAU	反對 NO	李慧瑋 Starry LEE	反對 NO
林大輝 Dr LAM Tai-fai	反對 NO	陳克勤 CHAN Hak-kan	反對 NO
陳茂波 Paul CHAN		梁美芬 Dr Priscilla LEUNG	反對 NO
陳健波 CHAN Kin-por	反對 NO	黃成智 WONG Sing-chi	贊成 YES
梁家驊 Dr LEUNG Ka-lau		WONG Kwok-kin	反對 NO
梁國柱 CHEUNG Kwok-che	贊成 YES	葉劉淑儀 Mrs Regina IP	
葉偉明 IP Wai-ming	反對 NO	梁家傑 Alan LEONG	贊成 YES
葉國謙 IP Kwok-him	反對 NO	梁國雄 LEUNG Kwok-hung	
潘佩珊 Dr PAN Pey-chyou	反對 NO	陳淑莊 Tanya CHAN	贊成 YES
謝偉俊 Paul TSE	棄權 ABSTAIN	Albert CHAN	
譚偉豪 Dr Samson TAM	反對 NO	黃毓民 WONG Yuk-man	棄權 ABSTAIN

秘書 CLERK

Source: Legislative Council of the Hong Kong SAR of the PRC

The pro-democracy legislator, Albert Ho, moved a motion without legislative effect on MNE curriculum at the Council meeting of 15 June 2011. However, the motion (see Figure 4) was voted against by the majority of the pro-China legislators.<sup>104</sup> In July 2012, DAB issued a press release urging the government to form a MNE committee for promoting and implementing the curriculum in September.<sup>105</sup> Maria Tam Wai-chu, member of the DAB,

<sup>104</sup> Legislative Council of HKSAR, "Background brief prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat for the special meeting on 27 June 2011 on Moral and national education." Last modified June 27, 2011. Accessed May 5, 2013. <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-11/english/panels/ed/papers/ed0627cb2-2172-2-e.pdf>.

<sup>105</sup> DAB, "Concerned about the establishment of the Commission on Moral and National Education Curriculum (in Chinese)." Last modified July 30, 2012. Accessed May 13, 2013.

once commented that all countries have the responsibility to promote MNE, but sensitive issues such as the Tiananmen Massacre need not to be mentioned in the curriculum.<sup>106</sup> On the contrary, legislators from the pro-democracy party stressed that Tiananmen Massacre and one-party system issues which are left out of the curriculum are in fact a good start for the students to learn about their motherland.<sup>107</sup>

The implementation of MNE curriculum has led to several public responses and has provoked sentiment among the general public in Hong Kong. “Scholarism” and “National Education Parents’ Concern Group”, which were respectively founded by a group of secondary school students and more than 1000 parents, became the leading pressure groups against MNE. Later on, these two groups together with other organizations formed the “Civil Alliance Against the National Education”, which gathered more than 90,000 protestors in a march on 29 July 2012 to call for the retraction of MNE. In late August, Members of Scholarism began their occupation and hunger strikes at the Hong Kong government headquarters. On 1 September, approximately 40,000 students and teachers went on strike and it has even generated the sympathy of Hong Kong people who reside overseas to support the campaign.<sup>108</sup>

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<http://www.dab.org.hk/?st=22,23&t=5&mmode=da&year=2012&month=07>.

<sup>106</sup> Staff writer. “June 4th and the Death of Li Wang-yang need not to be mentioned in the MNE curriculum (in Chinese).” *Ming Pao*, sec. Local News, July 26, 2012. <http://hk.news.yahoo.com/譚惠珠-六四李旺陽沒必要入教材-213831747.html> (accessed May 13, 2013).

<sup>107</sup> Staff writer. “Hong Kong people worried about the MNE becomes the Chinese Communist brainwashing tool.” *DWnews.com*, sec. Hong Kong & Macau, May 19, 2011. <http://hongkongmacao.dwnews.com/big5/news/2011-05-19/57732928.html> (accessed May 13, 2013).

<sup>108</sup> iSUN AFFAIRS, . “The movement against Hong Kong’s National Education module spreads overseas.” *iSUN AFFAIRS* (blog), September 08, 2012. <http://tinyurl.com/ajeg6a2> (accessed November 17, 2012).

The CCPOS conducted a telephone poll with 819 people over 18 years old on “Self identity and national identity” in October 2012. The statistics show that there has been a steady decline in the number of Hong Kong people who self-identified as “Chinese”, merely 12.6 percent. Only 2.4 percent of those were born after the 1980s identify themselves as “Chinese”, but 33.3 percent of them self-identify as being “Hongkongese”.<sup>109</sup> Anthony Fung, Director of the CCPOS, commented that the rising number of social movements in recent years has indicated that the local consciousness is gradually becoming stronger in Hong Kong.<sup>110</sup>

In sum, China’s increasing control over Hong Kong’s policy is demonstrated in the case of MNE curriculum. Public consultation on the curriculum provoked a huge sensation among the general public in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong government claimed that MNE curriculum is for “strengthening the national identity” among the younger generation, whereas the people in HK see it as a brainwashing tool of the Chinese communist party. Stances over the issue taken by DP and DAB explicitly exposed their ultimate political orientations. Alignment between the civil society and general public in Hong Kong against the MNE curriculum issue is built upon the sense of “groupness”.

<sup>109</sup> CCPOS, “Hong Kong People’s Self-identity and National Identity.” Last modified November 2012. Accessed May 14, 2013. <http://www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos/images/pressrelease.pdf>

<sup>110</sup> Staff writer. “Self-identifying as “Chinese citizens” set a new low since 1996.” *Ming Pao*, sec. Local News, November 12, 2012. <http://hk.news.yahoo.com/港人國民認同感見新低-抗拒國旗國歌新高-80 後重港人身份-211134318.html> (accessed May 14, 2013).

### 3.2 Taiwan

When comparing to Hong Kong, the political environment and dynamics between political parties are significantly different in Taiwan. Department of Civil Affairs monitors political parties in Taiwan and there are currently 232 registered parties, but only five of them, DPP, KMT, Taiwan Solidarity Union, People First Party, and Non-Partisan Solidarity Union, hold positions in the Legislative Yuan. As Taiwan has very complex relations with China, political parties within the country are also split into two major camps - Pan-Blue coalition and Pan-Green coalition. The significant distinction lies in their ideologies on the independence-unification issue.<sup>111</sup> The Pan-Green coalition is mainly consisting of the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union, which favours Taiwan independence; the Pan-Blue coalition, which consists of the KMT, the People First Party, and the New Party, tends to favour eventual unification, greater economic linkage and softer policy with China. As the result of the 8<sup>th</sup> Legislative elections in 2012, KMT from the Pan-Blue coalition was elected as the majority party.<sup>112</sup> The presidencies of Lee Teng-hui from the KMT and Chen Shui-bian from the DPP have contributed to the rapid increase in Taiwanese identity.<sup>113</sup> Smith proposes that this is the civic identity, which entails not only a historic territory, a legal-political community, a set of duties and rights, but also an element of a day to day experience participation in the

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<sup>111</sup> Shelley Rigger, "Machine politics and protracted transition in Taiwan," *Democratization*, 7, no. 3 (2000): 135-152.

<sup>112</sup> Andrew Jacobs. "President of Taiwan Is Re-elected, a Result That Is Likely to Please China." *The New York Times*, World edition, sec. Asia Pacific, January 14, 2012.

[http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/15/world/asia/taiwan-presidential-election.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/15/world/asia/taiwan-presidential-election.html?_r=0) (accessed May 15, 2013).

<sup>113</sup> According to the poll survey between 1992 and June 2012 which conducted by the Elections Study Centre, National Chengchi University.

political sphere.<sup>114</sup> In this sense, a sub-national identity is developed under the influence from the political parties, as well as their interactions with the general public. This section will argue that party politics in Taiwan, the dynamics between the major parties KMT and DPP, and the parties' adoptions and approaches towards China, shape national identity formation among the people.

The tension between China and Taiwan began from 1949, when the KMT evacuated and escaped to Taiwan. As being a party which emphasised unification with China, the KMT insists on the 1992 Consensus which recognizes the "One China principle".<sup>115</sup> Taiwan was under KMT's single-party rule for 38 years until the lifting of martial law in 1987. Lee Teng-hui took leadership and the presidency of the KMT in 1991, the year which also signifies the beginning of democratization in Taiwan. During his presidency, he was outspoken on Taiwan independence and promoted the Taiwanese localization movement which is a movement emphasising the separate Taiwanese identity, culture and economy. Although the KMT lost the elections between 2000 and 2008, the idea of independency has been seeded since.

DPP proposed policies such as grand coalition and reconciliation with China before KMT became the ruling party in 2000. However, when the DPP won the election, it began to focus on national identity reconstruction – a separate identity from the Chinese. In 2002,

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<sup>114</sup> Anthony Smith, *National Identity*, (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 11-12.

<sup>115</sup> Dong Xiao. "1992 Consensus." *Xinhua News Net*, sec. Taiwan, April 05, 2006.  
[http://news.xinhuanet.com/tw/2006-04/05/content\\_4385932.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/tw/2006-04/05/content_4385932.htm) (accessed May 15, 2013).

former President Chen Shui-bian proposed “One Country on Each Side” at an annual event.<sup>116</sup> He stressed that “with Taiwan and China on each side of the Taiwan Strait, each side is a country.”<sup>117</sup> TVBS conducted an opinion poll right after President Chen made his statement, 54 percent agreed with “One Country on Each Side”, while 29 percent disagreed and the remain 16 percent had no opinion. A week later, 52 percent of the interviewees still agreed with the statement.<sup>118</sup> In April 2013, TISR telephone interviewed 1,009 people aged 20 years and over. 56.2 percent of them agreed that Taiwan and China is a “state-to-state relations”; 26.4 percent held the opposite view.<sup>119</sup>

“A national identity is to be found in the embodied habits of social life. Such habits include those of thinking and using language.”<sup>120</sup> Michael Billig argues that although nationalism has transformed itself into a form of banality, omnipresence and unconsciousness, the power of this banal form of nationalism when ‘flagging’ is still strongly presented. As Billig believes, the thesis of banal nationalism suggests that nationhood is near the surface of contemporary life. ‘We’ do not forget ‘our’ nationality which is due to the continuous flagging of ‘our’ identity and we are constantly being reminded. Therefore, NRC, which is part of the localization movement, works as a constant reminder to the people in Taiwan about their nationality as being “Taiwanese”. More importantly, to strengthen nationalistic sentiment as

<sup>116</sup> Lin Chen-bai, and Liu Li-yi. “President Chen: Taiwan and China - One Country on Each Side.” *China Times*, sec. Taipei, August 04, 2002. <http://forums.chinatimes.com/report/2002ten/internal/92010807.htm> (accessed May 16, 2013).

<sup>117</sup> Lin Chen-bai, One Country on Each Side, 2002.

<sup>118</sup> TVBS Poll Centre, “Public Opinion on Chen's "One Country on Each Side" (in Chinese).” Last modified August 04, 2002. Accessed May 16, 2013. <http://www.tvbs.com.tw/code/tvbsnews/poll/2002-08/20020805/020805.asp>.

<sup>119</sup> Taiwan Indicators Survey Research, “Taiwan Mood Barometer Survey.” Last modified April 29, 2013. Accessed May 16, 2013. <http://www.tisr.com.tw/?p=2725>

<sup>120</sup> Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism, 1995, 8.



Billig believes.

NRC was launched on 11 May 2002 by the former Presidents Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian as well as the pro-Taiwan independence DPP. The reason for NRC to be launched in 2002 was because Chen and the DPP had elected Lee Teng-hui as the President and the ruling party respectively. Furthermore, Chen personally holds a relatively strong opinion against reunification with China, as in one public occasion, he commented that it is abnormal for people not to dare to call Taiwan an independent sovereign nation [....] Taiwan must not fall into the trap of being regarded as part of China, or [to] become a special region of China like Hong Kong.<sup>121</sup>

As Taiwan has experienced various types of colonial regimes, the locals felt the urge to protect their disappearing culture, as well as awaking the hidden local identity – “the hidden agenda was the assertion of the Taiwan local identity, not just in literature but also in politics against the Mainlander domination.”<sup>122</sup> The Taiwanization movement stresses the promotion of Taiwanese literature, encouragement of the wide speaking of dialects; and rectification of names of government bodies and state-run enterprises, which is considered as the most significant dimension of the movement, as it involves renaming the majority of the official bodies, as well as private companies. As the campaign is named “Name Rectification”, it aims at rectifying something which is seen as incorrect and eliminating any official names that

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<sup>121</sup> Lillian Wu. Taipei Central News Agency. “(World News Connection) President Wants Constitution That Fits Taiwan People.” Last modified October 6, 2003. Accessed December 22, 2012.

<sup>122</sup> Taotao Liu, and David Faure, *Unity and diversity: local cultures and identities in China*, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1996), 150-151.

present “Chineseness”. However, during the period of NRC, the opposite Pan-Blue Coalition often claims that the act of rectification is simply an attempt to ultimately embrace independence, which opposes reunification with China. 2000 then became the turning point for Taiwan as KMT lost their ruling power, Chen Shui-bian was elected as President and the pro-Taiwan independence DPP became the ruling party. In the case of Taiwan, if we agree with Benedict Anderson that “a nation is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”,<sup>123</sup> NRC would then be considered as an attempted creation of history, the attempt to break away from the settler’s memory, the old regime, and to act as a declaration and announcement of the pre-establishment of “Taiwan as a nation-state”.

The loss of the presidential election by the pro-unification KMT in 2000 and the launch of NRC have resulted in a structural change in the society, which strengthened Taiwanese identity and the rise of Taiwanese culture as reflected in the previously shown survey which conducted by the National Chengchi University. Taiwanese localization movement not only strengthened a sub-national identity, it also provoked a new Taiwanese culture. National identity is continuously being reproduced, re-embedded and reconstituted in a globalizing world, as Billig believes<sup>124</sup> Taiwan has been in a period of re-producing Chinese culture and identity which had been imported by the KMT since 1949. However, beginning from the Chen administration, the voice of Taiwanization is becoming gradually stronger, especially

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<sup>123</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 1983, 6-7.

<sup>124</sup> Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, 1995.

with his implementation of NRC. People in Taiwan started to restore the “lost” Taiwanese culture.

*One phenomenon that has resulted from the Taiwanization movement is the advent of Taike subculture [which] emphasize[s] the uniqueness of popular, ground roots Taiwanese culture, which in previous time[s] had often been seen as provincial and brutally suppressed by Chiang Kai-shek.*<sup>125</sup>

*Taike* is composed of two morphemes. “Tai” is the abbreviation of Taiwan and “ke” can either mean “a guest” or “a visitor”. The above quote illustrates how Taiwanization in general has gained from the cultural sphere, especially in pop culture and linguistics, between 2000 and 2008. Ultimately, NRC not only helped to build nationalistic sentiment among the people in Taiwan, but also helped to develop a uniqueness sub-culture in the society.

Although history has a big role in shaping Taiwanese national identity, political parties have always been the core player in the process as demonstrated in the National Chengchi University poll survey. The emerging Taiwanese identity is seen as a sequence of party politics. This type of sub-national identity can be understood in a constructionist way as “imaged political community” which stresses the invention of a nation, rather than ethnic perennialism.<sup>126</sup> People in Taiwan feel the urge to construct a new identity which entirely belongs to themselves since this island has experienced several times of colonization.

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<sup>125</sup> Georg Woodman, *Cultural Shock-Taiwan: Cow Mentality, Rubber Slipper Fashion in BinLang Country*, (USA: Xlibris Corporation, 2010), 107.

<sup>126</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 1991.

In this chapter, identity has been shown to be constructed under different circumstances. For the case of Hong Kong, the sub-national identity as “Hongkongese” is formed under the resistance power against the national identity construction policies by the government. While for the case of Taiwan, a sub-national identity is constructed under the dynamic between political parties. Therefore, the former case demonstrates a bottom-up scenario, whereas the latter can be seen as a top-down one. In sum, both societies are experiencing an external power – China – to influence their national identity formation process. However, due to their historical background of being dominated by foreign powers, both Hong Kong and Taiwan are constructing their sub-national identity in order to resist the external power.

## Chapter 4 – Horizontal Perspective: Interaction between the General Public in Hong Kong, Taiwan and mainland China<sup>127</sup>

As previously mentioned that the nature of ethnicity has been dominated by a debate between essentialists and constructivists, the former's view on national identity assumes that group identities, which are based on consanguinity, race, territory and language, possess "a deep coerciveness".<sup>128</sup> Whereas, the constructivist approach rejects primordialism and regards national identity as an "imagined political community".<sup>129</sup> The cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan therefore reject the primordial hypothesis, affirm that the formation of a sub-national "Hongkongese" and "Taiwanese" identities is based on the experience of everyday life at grassroots level, participation in the political sphere in the community, as well as the collective recognition of culture, memory and lifestyle.<sup>130</sup>

This chapter will look into the national identity formation issue from a horizontal perspective. It aims to analyze the interaction of people in Hong Kong and Taiwan with a particular group of mainland Chinese (For Hong Kong – cross-border births and their right of abode; for Taiwan – cross-strait marriage and business), and to examine the affect these groups of people might bring regarding the national identity formation in these two societies.

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<sup>127</sup> Part of the statistics used in this chapter was extracted from papers which written by me for the courses of *Introduction to the Study of Nationalism* (Professor Szabolcs Pogonyi); *East Asia in International Relations* (Professor Young Mi Kim); *Economic Nationalism* (Professor Thomas Fetzer).

<sup>128</sup> Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 259.

<sup>129</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined communities*, 1983.

<sup>130</sup> Anthony Smith, *National Identity*, 1991.

## 4.1 Hong Kong

As the Norwegian social anthropologist Fredrick Barth claims, “Ethnicity is the product of a social process rather than cultural given, rather than ascribed through birth,” hence a membership of a particular society such as “Hongkongese” in the case of Hong Kong represents a “given” characteristic of the social world.<sup>131</sup> The bond feeling of solidarity will also be aroused by being a member of a particular group, because it emphasises a common memory of the past and hopes for the future.<sup>132</sup> For more than 150 years, Hong Kong was a separate political entity.<sup>133</sup> Compared to China, Hong Kong even has its own government, legal system, currency and Olympic team. “The Hong Kong identity has remained distinct from and to some extent opposed to Chinese identity with its attachment to a particular tradition, ethnicity, and nationality.”<sup>134</sup> Prior to the transfer of sovereignty in 1997, Hong Kong and China had little interaction and it was limited to business exchanges. In July 2003, the Hong Kong government launched the “Individual Visit Scheme” (IVS) which allows individual travellers from Macau and mainland China to travel to Hong Kong without priorly applying for a visa, and the Scheme was extended to 49 cities in Guangdong, Jiangsu, Fujian, and Zhejiang provinces in 2004.<sup>135</sup> According to the Travel Industry Council of Hong Kong, 4.93 million visitors from mainland China who travelled to Hong Kong under the IVS as at

<sup>131</sup> Fredrik Barth, *Ethnic groups and boundaries: the social organization of culture difference*, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969), 2.

<sup>132</sup> Hans Kohn, *Nationalism*, 1944.

<sup>133</sup> Francis Lee, and Joseph Man, “Political Attitudes, Political Participation, and Hong Kong Identities After 1997,” *Issues and Studies*, 2 (2005): 1-35.

<sup>134</sup> Gordon Mathews and Ma Tai-lok, *Hong Kong, China: Learning to Belong to a Nation*, (London: Routledge, 2008), 11.

<sup>135</sup> The CEDB, “Individual Visit Scheme.” Last modified May 15, 2013. Accessed May 18, 2013. [http://www.tourism.gov.hk/english/visitors/visitors\\_ind.html](http://www.tourism.gov.hk/english/visitors/visitors_ind.html).

the end of 2004.<sup>136</sup> The IVS has helped to boost the Hong Kong economy after the SARS outbreak and attracted approximately 80 million visitors from mainland China have travelled to Hong Kong, bringing in more than HK\$630 billion.<sup>137</sup> However, apart from benefiting the economy, the Scheme is also bringing about negative impacts on the society, such as rise in property and commodity prices. Most importantly, the IVS led to the influx of pregnant mainland women giving birth in Hong Kong and later on claiming the right of abode for the newborns. The problem of expectant mothers from mainland China cross the Hong Kong's border to give birth raises tensions between the people of mainland China and Hong Kong, because they create pressures on the city's maternal service and affect the chance of local mothers to access obstetrics service.<sup>138</sup>

Government statistics show that the total number of newborns to mainland mothers skyrocketed from 620 in 2001 to nearly 44,000 in 2011.<sup>139</sup> And the trend is expected to continue to grow. The inducement which caused them to cross the border to give birth in Hong Kong was because of the grey area in the Hong Kong Basic Law Article 24(1), which allows certain classes of people to hold the Hong Kong permanent resident status and acquire the right of abode, especially the most controversial class of people – “Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative

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<sup>136</sup> Staff reporter. Travel Industry Council of Hong Kong, “The benefit of mainland individual visitors to Hong Kong.” Last modified February 2005. Accessed May 18, 2013.

[http://www.tichk.org/public/website/en/publications/voice\\_tic/The\\_Voice\\_of\\_TIC\\_2005\\_no\\_2/Special\\_Topic/special1.pdf](http://www.tichk.org/public/website/en/publications/voice_tic/The_Voice_of_TIC_2005_no_2/Special_Topic/special1.pdf).

<sup>137</sup> Amy Nip. “Individual visit scheme to Hong Kong 'shouldn't be expanded', says tourism chief.” *South China Morning Post*, Hong Kong edition, sec. Tourism, February 17, 2013.

<http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1152002/individual-visit-scheme-hong-kong-shouldnt-be-expanded-says-tourism> (accessed May 18, 2013).

<sup>138</sup> Staff reporter. “Mainland-HK ties challenged by cross-border births.” *China Daily*, , sec. Hong Kong, June 07, 2012.

[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/HK15th/2012-06/07/content\\_15483470.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/HK15th/2012-06/07/content_15483470.htm) (accessed May 18, 2013).

<sup>139</sup> Staff reporter, Mainland-HK ties, 2012.

Region.”<sup>140</sup> Between January 2007 and April 2011, the Hong Kong Census and Statistic Department conducted a series of survey on babies born in Hong Kong to Mainland women.<sup>141</sup> Interviewees were classified into two groups – father being (Type I) or being not (Type II) a Hong Kong Permanent Resident. Among 5,142 people in the group of Type II, about 63 percent of them indicated their desire of coming back and living in Hong Kong. The number has increased 2 percent when comparing to the result in 2007, in which 1,575 people were interviewed.<sup>142</sup> Since the number of expectant mainland mothers is expected to grow and 63 percent of them indicated their desire of return, it is foreseeable that there will be a large number of Chinese returnees obtaining the Hong Kong citizenship and residing in Hong Kong. The “Hongkongese” identity is formed under a sense of affiliation and belonging. Hence, the increasing number of mainland Chinese obtain Hong Kong citizenship will not only provoke issues of population and insufficient social resources, but also the meaning of being a “Hongkongese”.

The right of abode issue first raised media attention in October 1999 when a group of mainland Chinese assaulted the Hong Kong Government Headquarters and self-immolated. Since then, the issue has widened the gap between the general public who support and against the right of abode to be extended to mainland Chinese who were born in Hong Kong. The problems of expectant mainland women giving birth in Hong Kong and claiming right of

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<sup>140</sup> The HKSAR, “The Basic Law.” Last modified July 13, 2012. Accessed May 19, 2013. [http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter\\_3.html](http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_3.html).

<sup>141</sup> The CSD, “Babies Born in Hong Kong to Mainland Women.” Last modified September 2011. Accessed May 19, 2013. <http://www.statistics.gov.hk/pub/B71109FB2011XXXXB0100.pdf>.

<sup>142</sup> The CSD, Babies Born in Hong Kong, 2011.



abode for their children have certainly created and strengthened tension between China and Hong Kong. And the tension further aroused resentment of the people in Hong Kong towards the mainland Chinese, as well as strengthened their rejection to the Chinese identity. Referring back to the HKU POP survey on ethnic identity, it demonstrates that the percentage of people self-identifying as Chinese is obviously declining, whereas the number of people self-identifying as Hongkongese is escalating since mid-2008. Recent years, people in Hong Kong began organizing protests and petitions show their anger towards the mainland Chinese.<sup>143</sup> As demonstrated, people in Hong Kong have become more out-spoken on defending their rising sub-national identity as “Hongkongese”.

The case of Hong Kong demonstrates that formation of a national identity need not be based on blood ties and consanguinity. Collective memory and hopes for the future play a big role on one’s national identification and how one sees him or herself. The case further demonstrates that the interactions among people also affect how one’s national identity is formed, especially when people in the society feeling threatened regarding their identity.

## **4.2 Taiwan**

China and Taiwan had a very limited diplomatic relations until the last two decades. Although there are still ups and downs in the relations between the two governments from

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<sup>143</sup> Peter Simpson. “China slams survey that shows rising Hong Kong resentment.” *The Telegraph*, World News edition, sec. China, January 12, 2012.  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9010457/China-slams-survey-that-shows-rising-Hong-Kong-resentment.html> (accessed May 19, 2013).

time to time, interactions between people in these two societies are gradually growing stronger. The ‘Three Links’ proposed by the Chinese government in 1979 for ultimate unification eventually commenced in 2008. It signifies the commencement of direct post, shipping and flights between China and Taiwan.<sup>144</sup> In November 1987, it marked a significant change in the cross-strait relations as people from Taiwan could enter China for the purpose of visiting their families. However, it has been mostly “high profile people such as scientists, technology leaders, journalists, actors, scholars and athletes.”<sup>145</sup>

Increasing personal visits has also pushed cross-strait economic exchange forward. New agreements between the two governments in 2008, which allowed Chinese nationals to enter as part of group excursions, and 2011, as an independent individual, have further increased and stimulated interaction. According to the Ministry of Economic Affairs (Taiwan), the bilateral trade surplus for Taiwan was US\$26.6 billion in 2011, an increase of 4.7 percent compared to 2010.<sup>146</sup> Following the increasing development of business exchanges between China and Taiwan, areas such as sports, tourism and art, as well as cross-strait marriages are seen to be developing significantly. This section will examine the national identity formation at the interpersonal level through cross-strait marriage.

Cross-strait marriage does not merely represent an establishment of a marriage, but political

<sup>144</sup> Zhiling Lin, and Thomas W. Robinson, *The Chinese and Their Future: Beijing, Taipei, and Hong Kong*, (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1993), 356.

<sup>145</sup> Guo Y.Z., Kim S.S., Timothy D.J., and Wang K.C.. “Tourism and Reconciliation between Mainland China and Taiwan.” In *Tourism Management*, edited by Chris Ryan, 997-1005. Amsterdam: Elsevier Ltd, 2006.

<sup>146</sup> Bureau of Foreign Trade, “The Bilateral Trade between Taiwan and Mainland China.” Last modified 2011. Accessed March 16, 2013.

connotation is also embedded. The rise of cross-strait marriage brought uncertainty and confusion to the relations, and it works as a reminder to Taiwan to strengthen its own identity against China's claims sovereignty over the island. Statistics from the Ministry of Interior in 2010 shows that there was an increasing flow of people from mainland China, mainly women, who entered Taiwan as spouses of Taiwanese nationals since the end of 1980s. And in 2003, cross-strait accounted for 20 percent of all marriages of the country..<sup>147</sup> According to the statistics, in every 100 newborns, there are four newborns with mainland spouses and eight born with foreign spouses, and the trend is expected to increase in the future. The number implies that the "Taiwanese" identity is diluting and the society itself is under a tremendous transformation.<sup>148</sup>

"Chinese spouses are called "*dalu xinniang*" (mainland bride) by the locals, a term that has derogatory connotations. The word "*dalu*" (mainland) is associated with negative undertones that refer to the backwardness of China."<sup>149</sup> And the word "*xinniang*" (bride), which means newly-wedded women, "implicates that Chinese spouses will never be accepted as competent women by Taiwanese society."<sup>150</sup> The rise of cross-strait marriage caused two contrasting attitudes among the general public in Taiwan towards mainland brides. On the one hand, they understand their Chinese origins and the shared ethnic background and language.

<sup>147</sup> DSML, "Statistics of marriages with a foreign, Mainlander and Hong Kong spouse until the first half of year 2010." Last modified 2010. Accessed May 20, 2013. <http://www.moi.gov.tw/stat/index.aspx> on 20 January 2012.

<sup>148</sup> Yang Yi-li, "Taiwan's changing face: a new wave of immigration (in Chinese)," *Commonwealth Magazine*, 272 (2003), <http://www.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=28906> (accessed May 21, 2013).

<sup>149</sup> Momesso L., and Sun M. P., "Chinese spouses empowerment through community communication: a case study of CARES," *Chinese Journal of Communication*, 3, no. 2 (2010): 185-219.

<sup>150</sup> Sandel T. L., and Liang C. H., "Taiwan's fifth ethnic group: a study of the acculturation and cultural fusion of women who have married into families in Taiwan.," *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication*, 3, no. 3 (2010): 249-275.

On the other hand, they regard mainland brides as a threat because of the poverty in China. Media in Taiwan even portrayed the cross-strait marriage as “marrying the enemy”.<sup>151</sup> Qinqin from Fujian province said: “[...] Taiwan provides me many things I need. Its social system, health insurance and culture are a lot better than the mainland’s.”<sup>152</sup>

Divorce rate among cross-strait couples is comparatively high and rising. Official numbers show that 3,651 cross-strait couples filed divorce in 2002 and in 2006, 14,000 cross-strait couples registered marriage, another 7,057 filed for divorce.<sup>153</sup> The divorce rate has skyrocketed 48.3 percent in four years. In order to reduce the number of cross-strait marriages, the duration for mainland spouses to obtain citizenship is six years when other foreign spouses only take four years to obtain ones. Besides, they are not allowed to work in the public sector for the first ten years after naturalization, as well as not allowed to vote even they are fully naturalized in part because of their questionable political loyalties.<sup>154</sup>

Discriminative policies such as the length of naturalization and the right to work in public sector against the mainland brides reflect the Taiwanese subjectivity towards mainland China, more precisely, rejection of the Chinese identity.<sup>155</sup> This act of rejection can be seen as a type of nationalistic sentiment to protect and preserve its own identity. As shown in the

<sup>151</sup> An. “Marrying “the enemy” across Taiwan Strait.” *Xinhua News Agency*, sec. China, December 15, 2012. [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-12/15/c\\_132043188.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-12/15/c_132043188.htm) (accessed May 23, 2013).

<sup>152</sup> Cindy Sui. “Wedding bell blues in Taiwan.” *Asia Times Online*, , sec. Greater China, February 15, 2008. <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JB15Ad01.html> (accessed May 23, 2013).

<sup>153</sup> Cindy Sui, Wedding bell, 2008.

<sup>154</sup> Cindy Sui. “200,000 mainland-born residents ineligible to vote in Taiwan.” *The New York Times*, sec. Asia Pacific, January 08, 2008. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/08/world/asia/08iht-taiwan.1.9074180.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed May 23, 2013).

<sup>155</sup> Cindy Sui, 200,000 mainland-born residents, 2008.

precious chapter that politicians in Taiwan play a very important role in shaping the Taiwanese identity, the influx of mainland brides became a force, yet an excuse, for them to further strengthen the sub-national Taiwanese identity.

“In the real world there are many others. When others enter, each of them external to myself, problems arise.”<sup>156</sup> The French philosopher Levinas explicitly points out that collective identity has its own order in a society, the entrance of the others upsets the order, “simply by being others”.<sup>157</sup> In this chapter, both the cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan demonstrated how the interactions among people in a society affect the level of self-recognition as a member of a particular group. Rejection of self-recognizing as being “Chinese” in Hong Kong and Taiwan, to a certain extent, is influenced by the entrance of a particular group of mainland Chinese – expectant mothers (Hong Kong) and mainland brides (Taiwan). Their entrance upset the local group and it further confuses the identity formation in both places.

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<sup>156</sup> Emmanuel Levinas, *The Levinas Reader*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1989), 247.

<sup>157</sup> Iver Neumann, *Collective Identity Formation: Self and Other in International Relations*. (Working paper, European University Institute, Florence, 1995), EUI Working Paper (RSC No. 95/36).

## Conclusions

The cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan prove that national identity formation in a post-colonial society is an ever changing event and it will not be eternally fixed. According to the HKU POP and the National Chengchi University surveys, national identities in Hong Kong and Taiwan are changing. This thesis argues that sub-national identities as “Hongkongese” and “Taiwanese” are evolving, whereas the identity of “Chinese” is declining. Furthermore, self-affiliation of the people in Hong Kong and Taiwan to these two places is becoming stronger. “Hongkongese” and “Taiwanese” understand their origins, but their sense of belonging to China is being replaced by the rising sub-national identities. Although Hong Kong and Taiwan have similar culture, the emergences of a sub-national identity are different. This thesis argues that the sub-national identities in Hong Kong and Taiwan can be analyzed from a vertical and horizontal perspective. From the vertical perspective - the “Hongkongese” identity is a bottom-up effect and it has further been demonstrated that the sub-national identity is built upon bond feeling, group-recognition, and it is further strengthened by the society and civil resistance power. Meanwhile, the emergence of “Taiwanese” identity is seen as a top-down process – a consequence of party politics and it is heavily shaped by institutions and policies. From the horizontal perspective – both of the cases studies demonstrated the interactions between the people in Hong Kong and China/ Taiwan and China affect the national identity formation in these two places. Cases also further demonstrated that the self realization process brings tensions to a society because of the

difference one might discover. More precisely, it might lead to exclusions of other groups and rejection of a certain identity, for example Chinese identity, as the thesis argues.

Analysis of this thesis is based on data retrieved from two major surveys on ethnic/national identity. Due to the nature of the surveys, numbers of interviewees and political affiliation of the research centre, the surveys result can be biased. However, the survey results show that “Hongkongese” and “Taiwanese” identities are increasing, while the “Chinese” identity is declining.

Relations between China and Hong Kong/ Taiwan are complex. The problem attached to these them has rooted since colonization. The rising sub-national identities deepen uncertainty and widen the gap in the Hong Kong-China and cross-strait relations. Comparing Hong Kong with Taiwan, the former has a rather limited space to further develop its local identity under the concept “One Country, Two Systems”. Whereas, for Taiwan, a sub-national identity is not only a local identity, but it is gradually evolving and ready to face the world.

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