Economist Kings - An Experimental Study of Expert Government as a Method of Crisis Management

by

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ABSTRACT

In my thesis I examine expert governments as a method of crisis management. My main research question is whether people evaluate austerity programs more positively if they were introduced by experts than if they were introduced by democratic means. I also study the effect of the extent of the crisis and well-being on the assessment of austerity and expert governments. I examined these questions with a laboratory experiment, and I found that in general, the presence of expertise makes people more accepting towards austerity.

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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION

"…philosophers [must] become kings…

or those now called kings [must]…

genuinely and adequately philosophize"

Plato on the ideal leader

Different times require different types of ideal leaders. For the era of Plato, it was the Philosopher King, a wise, moral man, a social engineer, who did not seek power for his own sake. In our time, in the era of economic crisis, we need a more practical leader, the connoisseur of the intricate ways international economy and fiscal policy, an Economist King. Both the Philosopher King and the Economist King is a technocrat: they are above party politics and pursuit political power only to realize the 'good society' (Fischer 1990). There is a slight problem with Plato's concept. As the Philosopher King was accused of being the prototype of totalitarian leaders by Karl Popper (Popper 2002), so are the Economist Kings – the non-elected technocratic executive leaders – of nowadays accused of being a rupture in the democratic system.

In my thesis I am going to scrutinize technocratic or expert governments from the perspectives mentioned above: on the one hand, as the ideal leaders of the era of economic crisis, so as an effective crisis management method, and on the other hand, as a possible threat to democracy. My main research question is whether expert crisis management is more accepted by people than democratic crisis management. To put it differently, in a more abstract form, I am going to examine whether electoral legitimacy could be substituted by expertize in times of crisis. My main hypothesis is that if austerity measures are implemented by

an expert government, these policies will be more widely accepted and will receive more positive evaluation than if they were introduced by democratically elected decision makers.

I am going to find an answer to this question by conducting an experiment, in which a crisis situation is going to be simulated and participants will be randomly assigned to groups where a non-elected expert handles the crisis and where they handle the crisis democratically. As crisis management today still mostly means introducing austerity measures, the crisis in my experiment will also be tackled with this method.

The logic of democracy assumes that people would be rather governed by democratically elected leaders than by leaders imposed on them, and therefore they comply more easily with the decisions of elected officials. Empirical data also support this thesis. Recent experiments show that the effect of a policy is greater when it is chosen democratically than when it is exogenously exposed on a group (Dal Bó et al., 2010), and the electorate is better off when their leaders are elected democratically rather than appointed exogenously (Corazzani et al., 2012). Dal Bó and his colleagues at Brown University compared the behavior of experimental subjects who could vote for a policy and of those on who the computer imposed the policy (eg. a fine on cooperative behavior in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game or change in the benefits). They found, that the effect of the policy on cooperative actions was 40 percent larger if its implementation was democratically chosen (Dal Bó et al. 2010). From an other point of view, Corazzini and his co-authors also demonstrated why democratically elected leaders are better for the citizens: the presence of a campaign makes candidates more benevolent (Corazzini et al. 2012).

I am not going to attempt to questions the validity of the above mentioned experimental observations. There is no need for it, as they are concerned with how voters behave in *normal* times, while the focus of my thesis, the caretaker governments only occur in times of *crisis*. This is, I believe a crucial difference. Crisis, as an anomy, by definition can fundamentally change the patterns of human behavior and reinterpret the roles of institutions (Durkheim, 2010). What

holds true about voting behavior and democracy in normal times might lose its validity in crisis. A study of expert governance, such as my thesis, could illuminate this discrepancy.

Several considerations lead me to decide that an experiment is the best way to find an answer to my question. First of all, if I engaged myself in comparative analyses of countries with expert governments – an other possible methodological approach - I would have to deal with a very small and yet very heterogeneous pool of subjects of analysis, as we have a few examples for technocratic governance from Latin America in the 70ies and 80ies, and from Europe from 2008 until now days. Explaining a lot of variables with only a few cases is not only problematic methodologically, but is also rather fruitless. Another relative advantage of experiments vis-á-vis comparative analyses is the higher level of abstraction, and thus the possibility to understand the logic and the dynamics of the examined phenomena in its purest form. A third argument in favor of my experiment is that it fits to the rich tradition of economic experiments which already proved to be a great tool in understanding similar phenomena in the field of political economy.

In the following chapters first I am going to relate my thesis to the scientific work already done in the topic of expert governance and define the main concepts used in my thesis. In order to connect the so far rather abstract discussion on technocratic governance with real world phenomena, in the next chapter I am going to deconstruct the concept of expert governance by analyzing the case studies of the recent European expert governments: the Monti government of Italy, the Papademos government of Greece, the Fischer government of the Czech Republic and the Bajnai government of Hungary. Moreover, in the same chapter, I will attempt to map out the attitudes towards caretaker governments in these countries and Europe in general with the help of data from the European Social Survey. After providing a solid theoretical background with an empirical outlook, the other half of my thesis will focus on the experiment: in Chapter 4 you can read about the design, while in Chapter 5 I will analyze the models built according to the hypotheses.

CHAPTER TWO – TECHNOCRATS, BUREAUCRATS, EXPERT GOVERNMENTS AND THE THREAT OF TECHNOCRACY TO DEMOCRATIC DECISION MAKING

'The fear that there will be one day established a despotism based on science is a ridiculous and absurd fantasy.'

Saint-Simon

When expert governments emerge into power, politicians opposing their appointment often cry the end of democracy[1], and even the technocratic prime ministers themselves feel that they are short of democratic legitimacy[2] Expert governments, from this perspective, appear like an autocratic solution to problems caused by democratic populism (Wintrobe, 2000). But why is this uneasy feeling about technocratic governments, if the executive is not directly elected in normal times either? And why this type of government still seems like an inevitable and good solution to certain problems? In this chapter, I explore the intricate relationship of democracy and technocracy by looking at the scarce literature on technocracy, on the economic consequences of different types of regime, and on the inefficiency of democratic decision-making.

First, I give an overview of definitions of technocracy and technocrats found in the literature and make a distinction between the different types of technocrats. There are two important distinctions I emphasize: on the one hand, there is a difference between

[1] Dominico Scipoliti, the leader of the Italian Northern League Party was wearing a black arm bandage on the day the house of representatives voted confidence for the Monti government. He said he was mourning democracy. Source: Database of the Hungarian News Agency (MTI), to which I had an acess as a journalist. News item from November 18, 2011. Title: Monti a képviselő háztól is bizalmat kapott (Monti recieved comfidence from the house of representatives)

[2] Jan Fischer, the prime minister of the Czech technocratic said that he knows his cabinet emerged as a result of political bargaining and not as a result of elections, and thus, he know that they will have to put an even greater emphasis on negotiating with societal actors. Source: Database of MTI. News item from October 9, 2009. Title: Bírja a mérvadó cseh politikai pártok támogatását Jan Fisher

bureaucrats and technocratic politicians, and on the other hand, it is important to distinguish between technocracy in democratic and technocracy in autocratic regimes.

Second, I analyze how democracy and the logic of voting lead to suboptimal policies. In this section I cite theories on the irrationality of voters and on the inherent short-termism of democracy. Even though voters cast their votes irrationally, short-term profit seeking politicians still try to please them, and as a consequence of this paradox, the economy becomes paralyzed or works ineffectively. Thirdly, I will look at theories concerned with the political economy of non-democratic decision-making, and I give an insight why an expert government might count as such.

Throughout the chapter, I will support the theories with examples of technocratic rule from Latin America in the 1960ies and the 1970ies, from the Eastern European countries in transition, and from the 21st century Europe.

2. 1 Technocrats, bureaucrats, autocrats and expert governments

Technocracy is not one of the widely contested concepts of political science, on the contrary, the agreement on its definition is one of the oldest in political science. Plato defined the ideal ruler of the ideal society – the Philosopher King - who would be a wise, well-educated man and would not seek power for its own sake (Plato, The Republic, Book IV). This Philosopher King is the early prototype of technocratic leaders, the one with a raison d'etre in an era when general knowledge was superior to specialized knowledge. In our times these moralizingr Philosopher Kings are the equivalent of presidents with a great theoretical knowledge in legal matters and with a great legitimacy stemming from their age and their integrity they guarded under every circumstance, like Nelson Mandela of South Africa or Arpad Goncz of Hungary. In modern days, however, different knowledge is necessary to lead a country to success, or save it from a crisis. Problems are rather material, than philosophic, and thus the understanding of the complex

structure of international economy has to be in the fingertips of today's ideal leader. They new type of technocratic leaders are the Economist Kings.

Since Plato, nevertheless there is by-and-large a consensus about what a technocrat but no agreement on the role technocrats should fulfill. In the followings first I am going to go through the main elements of the definition of technocracy and the different types of technocrats, and then I will turn to the changing roles they fulfill in modern times, with particular details on the cases when technocrats appear at the core of the executive power.

Technocratic thought, even though the idea of an expert ruler was raised as long ago when Plato lived, is intimately connected to the era of modernization, beginning in the seventeenth century (Fischer 1990). In the post-industrialist society science and technology became of central importance, and the value of knowledge and information multiplied. The post-industrialist economy requires high levels of specialization and functional differentiation (Durkheim 1997), and a fundamentally positivist thinking about how the world and the society works. These trends proved to be a fertile ground for the development of technocratic consciousness, which consists of a "set of beliefs about how the world works, a conception of the way it should work, and a set of tactics for changing it" (Fischer 1990 p 41). In sum, experts appeared in politics because the world became too complex to rule without specialized knowledge. This observation of Fischer's gives an explanation of why experts emerged to politics, but does not help us understand how the experts raised from the hinterland of politics to the fore of it.

If technocrats were mere experts of different fields somewhat connected to the state administration, political science would not be so interested in the phenomenon. However, as Fischer (*ibid.)* points it out, technocracy is more than expertise, it is the adaptation of specialized, ideologically neutral knowledge to the task of governance. The most well-spread definitions of technocracy concentrate on these three main elements of technocracy: the specialized knowledge, the value-free, systematic thinking and the role played in governance. As Centeno and Maxfield

write, the analysts of technocracy, mostly focusing on the Latin American technocratic regimes in the 1960s and 1970s, generally see technocrats as apolitical experts, whose growing role in the society anticipated the 'end to ideology' and lead to an increase in government efficiency (Centeno and Maxfield 1992). In his definition Fischer states that 'technocracy pertains the use of experts and their technical disciplinary knowledge in the pursuit of political power and the 'good society' in the spheres of both the state and the economy' (Fisher 1990, p 18).

There are theorists however, who argue that technocracy and politics are not so closely connected, and therefore it is analytically necessary to distinguish those experts who do engage in politics from those who do not. Domínguez in his book on the Latin American technocrats calls the latter group the 'technopols', who are, according to him technically highly trained, politically engaged figures (Domínguez 1997). The author uses Collier's definition of technocrats - "individuals with a high level of academic training, which serves as a principal criterion on the basis of which they are selected to occupy key decision making or advisory roles" (Collier 1979 p 403) – and adds to it the 'extra' qualities of technopols, who are at or near to the top of the government of their countries, draw on different specialized types of knowledge (ie. not only economic), actively participate in the political life of their countries and their purpose is to affect politics beyond the economic realm (*ibid.*). Similarly, Centeno and Maxfield, citing the tradition of Latin American researchers, distinguish between apolitical technicians, who professionally support and carry out the goals set by technocrats or 'technobureaucrats' (Centeno and Maxfield, 1992 p 58), who started to participate in policy formation as well, or, in other words, who have a word in defining the 'ends', for which the technicians provide the means.

All these types of experts have one important feature in common: they are all substantively different from civilian politicians. However, it is important to emphasize that while technocrats are a group clearly distinguished from civilian politicians, they are not the antithesis of them. Several theorists tried to grasp the difference between these subtypes of decision makers. Some,

like C. P. Snow, emphasize the aspect of knowledge. He argues that while politicians are generalists, technocrats are specialists in terms of expertise (in Collins and Evans 2002). Camp, another scholar writing on Latin America, notes that the two main differences between politicians and technocrats are the perception of their level of skills, meaning that their actual knowledge is not necessarily substantively different, but while technocrats are specifically appointed to certain offices because of their skills, politicians have other reasons to access office. This latter factor is further explained by Centano and Maxfield. They claim that technocrats are qualified for office by technical expertise, politicians can have access to offices if they are proven loyal to the ruling party (Centeno and Maxfield 1992).

Following from the logic of their selection to certain positions in the government or in the state administration it is clear that technocrats do not have such a unified opinion on issues as politicians of certain parties have (or at least ought to have when it comes to public debate or voting in the legislature) Therefore, technocracy can not be characterized as a political movement of any type, however, can be considered as in ideology.

As Fischer notes, technocrats can be found everywhere across the political scene and they can disagree on almost any issue (Fischer 1990). However, there are certain matters they do agree on, and these matters contribute to deeper understanding of the meaning of technocracy. They conceptualize social and economic problems in not only value free terms, but freed from their cultural, psychological and linguistic context. They also believe the superiority of a method and technical problem solving approach over normative reason (Fischer 1990, O'Donnell 1973).

This trend stems from the two basic thought school that serve as a basis of technocratic thinking: intellectual rationalism and neopositivism. Rationalism dictates, as O'Donnell states, that the only good solutions are the efficient solutions, and efficient solutions are the ones that can be straightforwardly measured (O'Donnell 1979 p 81). In his view rational politicians think that 'emotional issues are nonsense; the ambiguities of bargaining and politics are "hindrances" to

"rational" solutions' (*ibid.*). Neopositivism and the use of an abstract, highly technical language (a jargon, as O'Donnell calls it), on the other hand contributes to the maintenance of the sense of a cultural, political and moral neutrality (Fischer, 1990). Strict rationality and the exorcising of irrational politics, together with the usage of a jargon often leads to the isolation of the technocrats from other societal actors. This isolation is further deepened by the fact that technocrats are usually given the task to plan and execute unpopular or at least contested economic measure which, because of the pressures of the economic situation can not be debated publicly.

After defining the main aspects of technocracy, let us now turn to the special cases when technocrats are not influencing politics from the hinterland as advisers or relatively low-profile government officials, but they are in top-decision making positions. The bureaucratic-authoritarian (O'Donnell 1973) states of Latin America in the 1960ies and 1970ies (Agentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico respectively) are the primary examples of this kind of system in the literature. However, as Greskovits argues, whenever social and economic structural reform is to be pushed and enforced by the state, technocrats are likely to appear in top decision making positions (Greskovits 1998). This happened for example in the Eastern European countries in transition, where crucial and painful reforms had to enforced to switch to market economy. This trend can also be observed in the crisis stricken Europe today, when expert governments take over power and introduce austerity measures to navigate the country out of crisis. The latest examples are the Monti government in Italy (2011) , the Papademos government is Greece (2011), the Fisher government of the Czech Republic (2009) and the Bajnai government of Hungary (2009).

Although Greskovits does not refer to the reformers as technocrats, their characteristics defined by him have a lot in common with the above described definitions of technocrats. Greskovits' 'lonely economic reformers' are new or neutral to politics, share an educational, economic and

social background and usually act in isolation from other societal actors. Typical instances of this type of reformers are, beside the already mentioned Latin American cases, the reform teams shaping the transition of Eastern European countries during the 1990ies. The lonely reformers have their power partly because they enjoy the support of the higher leadership, and partly because they act beyond societal control, in some sort of political vacuum (Greskovits, *ibid*).

Nevertheless there is an important feature to note. Expert governments are expert governments partly because the media says so. In this sense expert governments are more of a communication concept than a type government. As Gimesi points it out, expert governments might not be different from a non-expert cabinet in any other sense than their public perception and the emphasis on the expertise of the members (Gimesi 2012). Expert governments might also pursue political goals and they, just like normal cabinets, cannot realize their actions without public support (Gimesi, *ibid).* Obtaining the support of the public is not evident, however, since expert governments face a legitimacy deficit at the beginning, as leaders imposed on the voters (irrespectively of the fact that the executive is not directly elected in the majority of the European countries in normal times either).

The media coverage, addressing the members of the cabinet as erudite technocrats who save their country from bankruptcy, contributes to the sense of legitimacy. As a demonstration I collected a few typical examples of the generally positive discourse on technocratic governments: 'Technocrats, by reputation, competence and experience, can persuade the markets and eurozone leaders that they represent change (...). The measures they need to implement are so tough that they would have failed to get the necessary political support if introduced by any politician' - wrote the BBC when explaining the situation in Italy and Greece in 2011 (BBC, 2011). The Economist also praised the then newly appointed expert governments: „When the usual run of rulers proves cowardly, indecisive or discredited, turning to the wisdom and expertise of a

technocrat, as both Italy and Greece have done in recent days, is particularly tempting. (…)' (The Economist, 2011).

Here it is important to note that from the viewpoint of the decision makers, expert governments as a communication concept have a great value. When appointing an expert cabinet parties in the parliament communicate that even though they support the work of the experts - thus they as well contribute to the crisis management -, these ministers are not closely connected to them. This way they not only hand over power, but also responsibility to the experts, and therefore minimize the political risk that their party will suffer popularity loss as a consequence of the unpopular measures.

In sum, while the definition of technocrats working in the background institutions of the governments is clear and uncontested, the more power they have, the less fine becomes the line between them and politicians. The quintessential representative of this problem is an expert government..

2.2 The political economy of governing irrational voters

After the deconstruction of the concept of technocracy and the related issues, I now turn to the question why and under what circumstances regimes appear with the predominance of expert decision makers at the top levels of power, such as the Latin American authoritarian regimes of the 1960-1970ies or the expert governments of the 21st century Europe. In this section I will touch upon the literature on the ineffectiveness of democratic decision-making and on the economic advantages of shaping policies without extensive bargaining.

One of the most intriguing problems of democracy is why democracies adopt bad policies if politicians are motivated to please voters who obviously do not want bad policies for themselves. In his book, Bryan Caplan (2007) tries to solve the puzzle why democracies adopt bad policies if the voters are in charge and who, obviously, do not want bad policies for themselves. As Bryan

Caplan observes in his book: 'in theory, democracy is a bulwark against socially harmful policies, but in practice it gives them a safe harbor' (Caplan, 2007 p 1). Caplan argues that the adoption of ineffective or clear-cut harmful policies follows from the inherent irrationality of the voters.

One possible solution of this puzzle is the inherent short-termism in the system. Strategic politicians look for policies that are visible beneficial in 4 years time, as that is when the next election is due. As the scholars of the political business cycle (Nordhaus et. al 1989) argued, populism is a consequence of the electoral cycle and decision makers are especially prone to bring on populist policies when elections are near.

The other factor explaining the paradox of democracy is the irrational behavior of voters. Human rationality is bounded by many factors, and when it comes to voting, emotions and ideologies powerfully influence our decisions, and make us 'turn of our rational faculties on subjects where we do not care about the truth' (Caplan, ibid, p 2). This means that voters do not vote according to their interests, they vote because they want, and they vote how they do just because (Brennan and Buchanan, 1984). Caplan and other economists complete this theory by saying that voters choose certain policies or actually, politicians who represent certain policies, because, on the one hand, it causes them satisfied sentiments, and on the other hand, because they only have to pay a minuscule part of the cost of a bad policy that usually effects large strata of the society.

An extra twist in this paradox of democracy is that no matter how irrational voters are, and how disconnected election results are from the voters' preferences, competition still impels politicians to heed what voters ask for, and not for what is good for them. In this sense, as Caplan says, democracy is the best-example of market failure. It is not surprising then that as the growing complexity of governance requires the entrance of more and more rational experts to the realm of politics, they are keen on substantively reforming this system built on uncertainty and irrationality. For technocrats the solution is to replace the irrational decision processes of democratic politics, which permanently leads to ineffective policies, with „rational" empirical-

analytical methodologies of scientific decision making, or what has been called „methodological decision-making" (Fischer 1990, p 22).

Methodological decision making can lead to a more market-like political set up, as Caplan argues, or, as the history of the Latin American technocrats shows to a decline in democracy paired with economic growth and stability (O'Donnell 1973). Recent examples of expert governments in Europe also provide an example for a short rupture in democracy being beneficial for democracy. These instances nonetheless go against one of the most basic and most widely accepted political science theory that democracy is good for economic growth and vice versa (eg. Lipset 1959, Rostow 1960). Is it possible then, that when a decline in democracy is paired with "methodological decision making", the economy, and thus in material terms the voters are better off?

In his book Ronald Wintrobe (2000) analyses this question – whether autocracy is good for economic growth – from a comparative political economy point of view. His main point is that dictators of any sort have advantage vis-ás-vis democratic leaders, in terms of organizing the economy. Even though technocratic leaders are not in every case dictators per se, as they were in Latin America, their capacities and modes of decision making show some spectacular similarities with that of the dictators described by Wintrobe.

One crucial difference between autocratic and democratic expert leaders is the time aspect. Under democratic circumstances technocratic governments govern the country for a pre-set time, while accomplishing pre-set, and usually strictly economic tasks (Gimes 2012). On the other hand, autocratic technocratic leaders do not have a time limit imposed on the, they can rule for multiple terms and their reforms reach well beyond the realm of economy (O'Donell 1978, Domínguez 1997).

Wintrobe argues that every democracy contains aspects of autocracy, and in many cases autocratic solutions have been applied to compensate for the failures of democracy, for example when "certain matters (are) taken out of the democratic process and put into the hands of an independent authority" (*ibid*, p 6). It is easy to see how expert governments can be understood as such an "autocratic solution": the decision makers need to minimize bargaining with interest groups in order to implement necessary measures tackling the crisis; and in a sense, their policies *must* be implemented, either due to international pressures, or due to the crisis, threatening with collapse. The overall message of technocratic governments is that certain issues are taken out from the messy process of politics and given in the hands of independent experts who can finally solve them.

Tyranny – "a regime run by a man whose policy runs contrary to the material interest of a section, large or small of his subject" (Wintrobe, *ibid*, p 23) - was successfully used to theorize the rise of Latin American technocratic authoritarian regimes in the 1960s and 1970s. O'Donnell calls these regimes, arising in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile, bureaucratic-authoritarian (BA). They came to power because of the economic crisis (O'Donnell 1978), and are defined as a "system of exclusion of the popular sector, based on the reaction of dominant sectors and classes to the political and economic crisis to which populism and and its developmentalist successors led" (O'Donnell, ibid, p13). O'Donnell finds that there is a "mutual indispensability" between international pressure and the appearance of BA states, and also, there is a sort of electoral affinity for these regimes. O'Donnell observed a quick decrease in prices and an incline in foreign investments after bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes took over power. This fits to the theory of Wintrobe, and also to what we could observe in the case of the recent European expert governments. They, in general calmed down the markets and brought the economy back from the rink (The Economist, 2011).

Wintrobe on the other hand has a more general approach to the question why autocratic solutions to democratic problems can emerge even when democracy is consolidated. According to his models, democratic politics easily lead to inaction, as there are certain issues never raised by politicians, because they are too salient and too divisive (eg. abortion or public debt), and therefore by adopting an unpopular position on such an issue can cost the party or politician a lot. Thus, the political preferences of voters are suppressed. A consequence of inaction is the decrease in trust levels, which leads to more widespread inaction (a larger Do Nothing Zone with Wintrobe's term), because the smaller the degree of credibility of the parties' platform the less likely they are to compromise on an issue (the smaller the chance of compromise with other parties, the bigger the chance of inaction, as neither party would like to come out as a looser from raising the issue). On the long run this erosion of credibility and inaction can lead to strong popular demands for any sort of action. 'Authoritarian governments are capable of giving "strong leadership" and of "acting on important issues" in circumstances in which democracies would be unable to act, simply because of their capacity to repress alternatives. From this point of view, the inaction zone is the price we pay for democracy' (p 271). In sum, dictators, and similarly technocratic leaders have a greater capacity to act, as they have a license to ignore other societal actors and interest groups, if the management of the crisis requires so.

2.2 Is technocracy a threat to democracy?

The easiest answer to the question above is it to say that it is a matter of degree and manner. Latin-American bureaucratic-autocrats seized power by coup d'état and therefore had no input legitimacy, and thus meant a clear-cut threat and the temporal end of democracy. Expert governments in Europe on the other hand were not so different from the 'normal' governments in terms of input legitimacy, since the executive power in the respective countries is always elected indirectly by the parliament. However, on the one hand voters tend not to think in terms of clear electoral rules and therefore expert governments have an undemocratic connotation. Even though the executive is not directly elected, parties without exception campaign with their

prime minister candidate announced, and people would be deeply disappointed if that candidate was not indirectly appointed as PM. Similarly, when the PM is replaced by a technocrat, voters feel that he is imposed on them from the outside. On the other hand, as I mentioned above, expert governments in order to fulfill their pre-set mission often need to neglect the immediate interest of large parts of the society to implement harsh austerity measures that lead to economic stability and growth only in the long run.

Other technocrats – the influential leaders of economic background institutions (eg. the National Bank), or the lonely economic reformers of Greskovits – pose a threat to democracy as a part of a greater trend of 'technocratization'. As Fischer emphasizes technocratic politics replace interest group politics and thus extend a monolithic system of interlocking economic and political institutions and constrain the room for debate. As a consequence, politics is reduced to the task of adjusting institutions and "keeping the machine running". This phenomenon is further aggravated by the fact that Western governments are so indebted nowdays that practically all of their budget is spent on the repayment of debts and on the already given expenses, such as pensions and other social payments (Streeck and Mertens 2010). These processes mutually reinforce each other: the more intricate the economic situation, the more technocrats are needed in the state apparatus, and the less space is left there for public debate or the role of interest.

In sum, technocracy, although a potential threat to democracy, might be a natural evolution of the democratic system that has to adapt to the challenges of a new era. As John Kemeny put it already 30 years ago: 'I have heard many times that although democracy is an imperfect system we some how always muddle through. The message I want to give you, after long and hard reflection is that ... it is no longer possible to muddle through. The issues we deal with do not lend themselves to that kind of treatment .. Jeffersonian democracy cannot work in the year 1980 - the world has become too complex' (in Fischer 1990, p 24).

CHAPTER THREE – EXPERT GOVERNMENTS IN PRACTICE – CASE STUDY OF ITALY, GREECE, HUNGARY AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

"Expert governments do not exist, only political governments do. Expert government is only a fig leaf behind which politics hide to cover its responsibility"[3]

Beppe Grillo, leader of the Italian M5 party

After scanning the scarce literature on the nature and problems of the rule of experts, in this chapter I am going to detail four recent examples of expert cabinets: the Greek, the Italian, the Czech and the Hungarian case. First, I list and detail those common patterns of these four expert governments that fill the short definition of the notion with content, then I describe the public morale in which these governments emerged.

3.1 Common Patterns –What are the essential qualities of an expert government?

In this section first I give a practical definition of expert governments, dipping from the recent experience, then briefly describe the circumstances under they came into power in Italy, Greece, Hungary and the Czech Republic, and finally I am going to give a detailed description of these governments along the definition, by focusing on their common characteristics.

3.1.1 Definition

In Chapter Two I defined expert governments by using Gimes's definition (Gimes 2012): expert governments are, on the one hand a type of government, which is headed by an expert coming from outside the realm of politics, and which have a definite mandate to achieve a specified goal

[3] Source: Database of MTI. News item from March 5, 2013. Title: Olasz kormányalakítás – Grillo nemet mondott a szakértő i kormányra is (Italian government forming: Grillo says so to expert governance)

or to realize a specified program during a pre-specified period, and on the other hand, expert government is a communication concept in the sense that if the media addresses a government as an expert one, than independently from the objective expertise and independence of the cabinet's members, the government will enjoy the benefits of being an expert government (Gimes 2012).

This two-folded definition is slippery when it comes to deciding whether a government, ruling temporarily, is an expert one or not. Therefore I came up with another definition, or a list of criteria that describes expert governments. According to the this definition, an expert government is a type of government that comes to power following a political crisis and amid an economic crisis, and not after legislative elections, it enjoys a broad support in the parliament, it is headed by an outsider, usually non-politician expert, and it has well-defined, pre-set tasks to complete. A further crucial feature of expert governments that they are addressed as such both in the opposition, the pro-government and the international media[4].

Four European governments in the 21st century qualify as an expert government: the Italian Monti cabinet, the Greek Papademos cabinet, the Czech Fisher government and the Hungarian Bajnai government. I focus my study only on these recent, European examples because I am interested in the political consequences of the current economic crisis. As this crisis is still not over, it is especially relevant to map out how the economic troubles effect the European democratic structures.

In the followings I go through the above detailed criteria and show how the factors manifested themselves in the examples. Not every case fulfills my criteria completely, therefore, I will also give an overview of the crucial differences between the governments.

[4] However, this feature cannot be examined here in detail because of the lack of linguistic skills and reasosn of space limit.

3.1.2 Common patterns:

Formation and tasks of expert governments

All of the four example governments emerged into power after their predecessor failed to tackle the crisis because of a political stand-off. In four out of the four cases a vote of non-confidence was involved in the story as well. Neither of these governments had much choice in deciding what program to follow, as they had to govern countries on the verge of full bankruptcy, and at that time the European Union was strongly pushing for austerity measures as a solution to the crisis.

The cabinet of Jan Fischer assembled at the beginning of May 2009 after Mirak Topolanek's central-rightist coalition government did not survive a vote of no confidence. The bloom of the economic crisis was the main reason behind the Topolanek government's failure. Originally the task of the Fisher-government was to deal with the day-to-day problems of the country, but certain events overwrote the script and the technocrat lead coalition government faced serious political and economic decisions. It was the Fischer-cabinet who managed to finish the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, and they also succeeded in implementing a large scale austerity package aiming at the reduction of public expenditure. Fisher and the three-party government coalition also had to deal with the issue of a planned and very unpopular US missile defense radar.

Mario Monti's technocratic government was sworn to office on the 16th of November 2011, after Silvio Berlusconi, Monti's predecessor lost his majority in the parliament amid an acute debt crisis. Berlusconi previously promised to leave his position in case the parliament votes for the new austerity measures. Monti's cabinet – 12 ministers with and 5 without portfolios – was composed entirely of non-elected, independent technocrats, who never took part in party politics

before. When Monti announced the list of his ministers he commented on it saying "we will be better off without politicians". The main task of the government was to help restore economic growth and stop the country from going completely bankrupt. As a part of this, they introduced a 30 billion euros austerity program.

The cabinet of Lucas Papademos succeeded the government of George Papandreu, as an interim government, after Papandreu failed to reach an agreement with the opposition pushing through reforms necessary to avoid financial collapse. Papandreu barely passed a vote of no confidence before his resignation. Papademos' cabinet, which also assembled in November 2011 as the Italian expert government, had a clear mission to fulfill: they had to execute a crisis handling plan approved by the credting 'troika' - the European Union, the European Central Bank and the IMF - at the end of October 2011 so that Greece could receive the 130 billion euros bail-out package without which it would have gone bankrupted.

In Hungary, the expert prime minister Gordon Bajnai came into power in 2009 after his predecessor, Ferenc Gyurcsány decided to resign, because he felt that his person is an obstacle in front of the necessary reforms. He was voted out of office with a constructive vote of non-confidence, which means that the parliament had to find a candidate acceptable for all before voting out Gyurcsány. Bajnai started his term amid very bad economic circumstances: the forint reached its historical low point and thousands of families were on the edge of eviction because they could not pay their debts which they took in foreign currencies (mainly Swiss frank). The Bajna cabinet's main task was to stabilize the economy and drive the country out of the crisis. Bajnai reduced public spending by approximately 45 million euro.

Outsider experts as prime ministers

The importance of the outsider, expert nature of the prime minister stems from the peculiarity of the Westminster political system, in which the prime minister has a great influence in appointing

and replacing ministers. In Greece, Italy and the Czech Republic, the president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, in Hungary, the prime minister selects the cabinet ministers and has the exclusive right to dismiss them. This power places the prime minister to a special position within the executive branch, and his expertise seems to "thick" to the members of his cabinet as well.

Jan Fischer is a clear cut case of an apolitical technocrat. To quote his own words: "I come to lead the government as a specialist, a non-politician, but nonetheless as a person who has considerable experience in the workings of the executive branch, of the various Ministries and of the civil service and it is for this reason that I have taken on this mission" [5]. Before taking the lead of the technocratic government Fischer worked as a statistician since his graduation and he became a well-respected expert of the field, holding memberships in various international professional organizations. From April 2003 until April 2009 he was the president of the Czech Statistical Office. Fischer also worked in projects affiliated with the IMF. Nonetheless, one fact casts a shadow about the "purity" of his technocracy: between 1980 and 1989 he was a member of the communist party. This, however do not tell us a lot about his political orientation. Being a communist party member that time was an acknowledged way of career pursuing. Fisher seemed to like the life of politicians, because after his term was over, he run on the 2012 presidential elections, but lost.

Fisher's cabinet was a mix of outsider experts and politicians. The original plan was that the parliamentary parties will nominate independent expert candidates, who are acceptable for all: the opposition and the government-coalition was to nominate eight-eight ministers. During the negotiations, however, some ministries were given to party politicians.

[5] Source: Media Center of the Czech Government. News item from April 9, 2009. Title: Jan Fischer is the new prime minister, http://www.vlada.cz/en/media-centrum/aktualne/jan-fischer-is-the-new-prime-minister-55831/

Mario Monti is also a quintessential example of an expert prime minister. He was teaching economics and political economy at several Italian universities, among them one of the most prestigious, the Bocconi University of Milan. He became the rector of the institution in 1984, and from 1994 until the present day, he is the president of the university. The "scientist prime minister" – who is, according to some conspiration theories, a free mason (Foreign Policy Online, 2011) – doesn't only have outstanding achievement in the field of academia, but he was a very successful commissioner of the European Commission from 1994 to 2004, first responsible for the inner markets, customs and taxes, and later for competition policy. He was invited to lead the technocratic cabinet by the president of Italy, Giorgio Napolitani. He was not affiliated with a political organization before he was appointed as prime minister. His ministers were also independent experts, none of them had party affiliation. In this sense, this "professor government", as the Italian media called it, is the most clear-cut example of an expert government.

Lucas Papademos is not less of a technocrat then Monti. He obtained his degree in physics and later in electrical engineering and then he switched to economics and completed a PhD in the US. He was a professor of Columbia University for nine years before he went back to Greece and was appointed as the leading economist of the Greek Central Bank. Later, he became the president of the institution and as such had an important role in preparing Greece to enter the eurozone. Just as Monti, Papademos also made a career in the European Union, he was the vice-president of the European Central Bank for eight years. Papademos was previously also offered a role in Papandreu's government, but he wanted to keep his political independence and rejected the offer. He served only as a freelance advisor to Papandreu.

Although Papademos' technocracy is not questionable, his cabinet's expertise is. All the ministries were held by politicians, and not by independent technocrats. Moreover, the politicians responsible for key portfolios such as the finance ministry or the ministry of foreign affairs were

not even experienced in the field. Nevertheless, the international media addressed the government as a technocratic one, because the prime minister was a non-elected, non-politician expert (BBC 2011, The Economist 2011, Foreign Policy Online 2011).

Gordon Bajnai was another type of expert than Fisher, Monti or Papademos. He came from the world of business and held political office – although was not the member of any party - before he was appointed as a prime minister. However, he always emphasized his distance from politics, and he had supporters and critics from both the left and the right side of the political scene. A policy analyst think-tank, Political Capital characterized him as the "anti-politician politician"[6] when he took office as the minister of regional development in the Gurcsány government. Before engaging himself in politics, Bajnai worked for several Hungarian and international companies. Between 2000 and 2005 he was the CEO of Wallis, a huge international investment company, and from 2006, he was the president of Budapest Airport Ltd. He was a very successful manager and was nominated as the most promising young European manager.

Bajnai's cabinet was a mix of independent experts and party politicians. The key portfolios were held by independent technocrats, but the other ministries showed a significant overlap between the Gurcsány and the Bajnai government. Eight out of sixteen ministers were independent technocrats.

Broad political support of the cabinet

Jan Fisher's expert cabinet enjoyed the support of all major parliamentary parties. The two biggest parties, the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) negotiated with Fisher and found his program acceptable and voted for his planned budget. During Fisher's predecessor cabinet, the Topolanek government ODS formed a coalition

[6] Krisztián Szabados, Péter Krekó: Az antipolitikus politikus, November 26, 2007 at http://www.nol.hu/archivum/archiv-469903?ref=sso Last accessed May 24, 2013

with the Green Party (SZ), while the opposition was composed from the ČSSD and the communist party (KSCM). The communist party was left out from the government forming negotiations, the other three party however nominated independent experts as ministers as I already detailed above.

The support of the CSSD and OSD was shown on the level of public statements as well. Jirí Paroubek, the leader of CSSD said that he believes that in the given situation having an expert government is the only way to go; and Mirek Topolanek, the leader of ODS said there is no need for a vote of confidence[7]. Václav Klaus, the then-president of the republic also expressed his support for the technocratic cabinet and said that in his opinion this government is a capable one and will be able to do a lot to tackle the crisis[8].

The Monti government also enjoyed a broad political support. His pure technocratic cabinet passed easily the confidence vote both in the senate and in the house of representatives. In the senate 281 representatives voted for his program and only 25 against it, while in the house of representatives 586 out of the 630 representatives supported him. Only the Northern League voted against the Monti-government. Domenico Scilipoti, the leader of the smaller governmental party of the preceeding Berlusconi cabinet appeared in the parliament wearing a black arm bandage on the day of the confidence vote and stated that he was grieving because democracy died with Monti's appointment[9].

Similarly to the Czech events, the leaders of the two major parliamentary parties also supported Monti with their statements. Pierluigi Bersani, the president of the Democratic Party (PD) announced that his party wholeheartedly supports an ambitious technocratic government, while

[7] Source: The database of MTI. News item from October 9, 2009.
[8] Source: Ibid.
[9] Source: Database of MTI. News item from November 18, 2011. Title: Monti a képviselő háztól is bizalmat kapott (Monti recieved comfidence from the house of representatives)

the secretary general of the party People of Freedom (PdL) said that Monti should realize the harsh reforms demanded by the EU[10]. The PD was in opposition and the PdL was in government during Berlusconi.

One dimension of support was missing, nevertheless. Interestingly, even though the two major parties supported the Monti cabinet, they did not want to nominate ministers into it. By this move they ensured that the foreseeably painful austerity measures will not be connected to their parties, but also risked that the society will be less amending and there will be serious discontent, as the Monti government only loosely connects to the representatives they democratically elected.

The Papademos government was often referred to as a national unity government, therefore the multi-party support is one of its main characteristics. It was formed by the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), the New Democracy Party and the New Othodox Rally (Laos). In the three hundred members parliament 255 representatives supported the Papademos cabinet.

Nevertheless, as a consequence of the Greek political reality, the nominal support of the major parties is not enough for a successful reform. The previous measures also failed at the level of implementation, in the bureaucracy. As the area specialist of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Michail Mertens writes, Papademos was like a driver who was obstructed by the passenger on the seat next to him, and even though he pressed the accelerator to the hilt, the car did no move[11].

This is just one reason why the Papademos government is an example for a failed technocratic government. It could not fulfill its main task – to secure the 130 billion loan – because the parties in the interim government withdraw their support as soon as the voting on a new austerity package came too close. The extreme right wing Laos party called back three of its ministers, and the socialist also withdraw two. In my opinion, it shows again how important is that in an expert

[10] Source: Databese of MTI. News item from November 15, 2011. Title: Olasz kormányalakítás – Montit támogatja a két legnagyobb olasz párt (Italian government formation – Monti is supported by the two biggest Italian party
[11] Source: Database of MTI. News item from February 14, 2012. Title: Görögország: válság és remények (Greece: Crisis and hopes)

government parties keep distance from the members of the cabinet, in the sense that they are not politicians of the party. Without keeping this distance, as the Greek example demonstrates, when it comes to unpopular decision the initial broad political support evaporates.

The Bajnai government was doomed to have the same fate as the Papademos cabinet as it also had many party politicians and it was not even supported by the opposition party, Fidesz. Bajnai, nevertheless managed to execute the necessary reforms and restored economic stability. His cabinet was supported by the liberal (SZDSZ) and the socialists (MSZP) parties, and the majority formed by these parties in the parliament was enough to pass the legislations. MSZP and SZDSZ formed a government coalition during the preceding government for a while, but then two parties split. After the split the SZDSZ played the role of a quasi-opposition party. Thus, the Bajnai government, similarly to the Czech and the Italian case is an example for a set up when parties, which usually do not cooperate or are in a conflict put aside their differences and support a government.

In the Bajnai government's case we can also see the paractice of political risk avoiding by nominating non-partisan technocrats to key position. Although MSZP had eight ministers in the cabinet, they all held portfolios less important in the crisis management. The finance and the economics ministry was, for example in the hand of experts. Fidesz, the opposition party took this risk avoiding trend to a new level. Since at the time Bajnai was appointed it was sure that Fidesz will win the elections in 2010, they did not want to have any sort of connection with the expert government and therefore they did not even give their nominal support for it. Another reason for keeping such distance is that even if the Bajnai cabinet turned out be successful, Fidesz knew they would still won over MSZP, whith which Bajnai was often associated.

All the examples show that the broad political support is key to the success of the expert governments. In my opinion, this agreement between the parties does not only boost the

popularity of the government because there are less critical voices, but also because the constant debating well-known to democracies and sometimes so tiring for citizens is silenced for a while, and there is a sensation that politicians finally work instead of debating. As it was mentioned in Chapter Two, after long periods without significant actions, voters appreciate any sort of action. From these observation it seems that expert governments are popular because they are not so harshly criticized. In my experiment, detailed in Chapter 4 and 5 I will test whether in a crisis situation an expert government can be more accepted than a democratic decision making body just because it is composed of experts, and not only because of the lack of criticism.

3.2.2 Further similarities

There are some further similarities between the cases, which, on the one hand are not the defining characteristic of every case, and on the other hand are rather a consequence than an inherent feature of expert governments.

Firstly, expert governments and their leaders tend to be remarkably popular at the beginning of their rule. The Monti government enjoyed a long time not seen confidence of the people. The approval rating of the expert government was very high at the beginning, around 62 percent, and it evaporated only slowly after the introduction of the austerity measures. According to a survey conducted in March 2012, 60 percent of the Italians would have liked to have a technical government after the Monti cabinet's mandate is over. Thirty percent of them maintains this opinion even if the Monti government will not have enormous achievements[12]. The prime ministers personal popularity was around 67 percent in March, compared for example to the 28 percent popularity of Berlusconi at the same time. When the austerity program started to show its effects, Monti became less popular, and even huge protests were organized against his policies.

[12] Source: Database of the Hungarian News Agency. News item form March 20, 2012. Title: Az olaszok többsége bízik Montiban (The majority of the Italians trust Monti)

The popular approval of the Fischer government and especially of Fischer himself was extraordinary. According to a poll from March 2010, 90 percent of the Czechs considered Fisher favorably, making him the most popular prime minister of the Czech Republic ever. About 50 percent of the interviewed declared to trust the government, the highest rate since 2002, when Vladimír Špidla's cabinet got a 55 percent approval rate[13].

Gordon Bajnai started his term with a more modest support. In a survey in April 2009 35 percent of the respondents said that he believes Bajnai will do good for the country, and 18 percent thought the opposite. 79 percent of the people agreed with the statement that austerity measures are necessary to stabilize the country[14]. Bajnai's personal popularity was also on the rise. According to a survey by Századvég and Forsense from September 2009, Bajnai'spopularity rose the most during the second quarter of the year, even though his 45 points was still not enough to secure a position among the five most popular politicians[15]. Bajnai throughout was by far the most popular among the socialist, with whom he was often associated[16]. This is especially outstanding if we consider that his predecessor, Ferenc Gyurcsány was the least popular politician at the time.

Papademos is an exception here. The three-party coalition government was never very popular in Greece since the austerity measures it had to implement deeply divided public opnion. Nevertheless, polls revealed that the technocrat prime minister had a widespread support. When he took over the offie from Papandreu, Papademos' approval rate was around 60 percent but from January it quite steeply decreased to around 46 percent in February. At the same time, the

[13] http://blisty.cz/art/51555.html

[14] Source: Database of MTI. News item from April 17, 2009. Title: Népszabadság: Növekszik a bizalom a Bajnai-kormány iránt (Népszabadság: Trust in the Bajnai cabinet is on the rise)

[15] Source: Database of MTI. News item from September 29, 2010. Title: Századvég: Javul a szocialisták megítélése (Századvég: Perception of the socialists improved)

[16] Source: Database of MTI. News item from January 25, 2010. Title: Népszabadság: Orbán Viktor a legnépszerű bb politikus (Népszabadság: Viktor Orbán is the most popular politician)

number of people who did not trust that he can lead the country out of the crisis was increasing (Neoskosmos, 2012).

The initial popularity of the technocratic prime ministers evaporates by the end of their term and if they try themselves on competitive election, they do no succeed. This happened to Fischer, Monti and probably will happen to Bajnai as well in the upcoming Hungarian elections. Fischer run on the 2012 Czech presidential elections, and even though months before the election he was the most popular candidate, he lost to Milos Zeman[17]. Monti decided to run on the 2013 Italian legislative elections, but his success was moderate. 10,5 percent of the votes were casted on his list, and thus his electoral alliance was only the third on the election[18]. It is yet to be seen how elections will work out for Bajnai, who formed a new party in 2013 and according to the polls he is the most popular opposition candidate: 42 percent of those, who would like to change the current government would like to see Bajnai as the prime minister[19]. But, as Fisher's and Monti's example show, this might not be enough for a great success on the elcection.

The last common feature I would like to mention is the element of self-sacrifice. Both Monti, Papademos and Bajnai gave up his salary during his term[20]. This was a symbolic step to signal that they are not just another profit-seeking politician, but do their jobs to help the country. In my opinion it also helped to calm down people and avoid riots, because when multimillion euro

[17] Source: Database of MTI. News item from February 12, 2012. Title: Fischer a legnépszerű bb államfő jelölt Csehországban (Fisher is the most popular presidential candidate in the Czech Republic)

[18] Ábel Ravasz: Olasz választások: A gavallért, a komikus és a bankárok (Italian elections: The beau, the comedian and the bankars), February 27, 2013, at http://www.parameter.sk/rovat/paravelemeny/2013/02/27/olasz-valasztasok-gavaller-komikus-es-bankarok Last accesed at May 27, 2013

[19] Source: Database of MTI. News item from May 9, 2013. Title: Medián: A kormányváltást kívánók többsége Bajnait látja a legalkalmasabb vezető nek (Medián: The opposition sees Bajnai as the most capable leader)

[20] Sources:

Bajnai: Database of MTI, News item from March 31, 2009. Title: Havi egy forintért lesz kormányfő Bajnai (Bajnai will earn one HUF per month), March 1, 2012, at stop.hu

Monti: Amanda Morrow: Italian PM to give up salary, as cabinet agree 30bn austerity plan, December 5, 2011 at http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/italy/111205/italy-PM-monti-salary-cabinet-30bn-euro-budget-plan, last accessed at May 27, 2013

Papademos: hvg.hu: Papademosz lemondott a fizetéséről (Papademos gives up his salary),

austerity measures are introduced, the generous remuneration of politician can be a subject of hatred.

In sum, technocratic prime ministers enjoy a relative popularity at the beginning of their term, which tends to evaporate as their reforms begin to show their impact and as they more deeply get involved in politics. The harsh austerity connected to their names later seems to obstruct them in achieving political success.

3.2. Public morale in Greece, Italy, Hungary and Czech Republic

In this section I give a brief overview of the public morale in which the expert governments emerged recently in Europe. Even though seemingly replacing a normal cabinet with an expert government is more of an economic and political neccessity, then a decision that can take into account the public political attitudes, I believe looking at public opinion data to see whether the four countries had something in common in terms of morale can be enlightening. After all, appointing an expert cabinet is on the one hand a solution for a political and economic crisis, and on the other hand it is a method of political risk aversion. Therefore decision makers choosing this option must (or could have) first consider(ed) the possible consequences in terms of the reaction of the voters.

For this descriptive analysis I used the data from the fourth wave of the European Values Study (EVS). EVS is a particularly good survey for analyzing the attitudes toward expert governments, because it includes a question about what respondents think of the rule of experts, thus there is a direct measure of the attitude of interest. Unfortunately, the fourth (2008) was the last wave of this survey, therefore it was not possible to compare data collected before and after expert governments ruled the analyzed countries.

In the descriptive statistical analysis I will focus on structural variables that are more permanent than the usually rather volatile public opinion about the performance of a current government.

This focus allows me to investigate whether beside the undeniable unsustainability of a political situation there are other, structural factors that influence why the decision makers choose expert government as a crisis management method. I believe there are three such structural variables possibly influencing the attitudes toward expert governments: trust in certain political institutions, the overall satisfaction with democracy and the opinion about the performance of democracy. First, I am going to compare the four countries in terms of these variables, and then I include them into linear regression models to see the possible interactions between the variables. I compare the mean of each country to each other and to the European average[21].

3.2.1 The best system: Democracy or the rule of experts?

In this respect there is a striking difference between the Mediterranean and the Central European countries. As it is shown in Table 1 while Greece and Italy are deeply committed to democracy, and mostly reject the rule of experts, the Czech Republic and Hungary are more accepting towards the rule of experts and more critical towards democracy. In Italy 96,9 percent of the respondents said that democracy is fairly or very good, in Greece this ratio was 97,3 percent, while in the Czech Republic and Hungary, although the majority was still in favor of democracy, only the 81,5 and the 82,2 percent evaluated democracy as a good system. The Mediterranean countries outperform the European average in terms of the appreciation of democracy, while the Central European countries' means roughly equals to the European average.

[21] I have to note that this comparison serves mostly illustrative purposes, since the case selection happened on the dependent variable (having an expert government), however the limits of the thesis do not allow for a broader comparison.

Table 1 – Opinion on expert governments

Best Political System					
Rule of Experts					
	Hungary	Czech R,	Greece	Italy	EU Mean
Very bad (%)	5,2	12,4	58,6	22,3	15
Fairly bad	10,4	22,3	23,3	31,5	25,3
Fairly good	50,7	46,4	14	36,4	42,8
Very good		18,9	4,1	9,9	16,9
Democracy					
Very bad	4,2	5,2	1,5	0,8	3
Fairly bad	13,6	13,3	1,2	2,3	8,9
Fairly good	53,4	51,4	21,9	32,9	45
Very good	28,8	30,1	75,4	64	43,1

The situation is the opposite when it comes to the rule of experts. In Greece the vast majority, 81,9 percent of the respondents thought that the rule of experts is a rather bad system, in Italy 53,8 percent thought so. In Hungary and in the Czech Republic, the majority gave positive evaluation to the rule experts: in the first 84,4 percent, while in the latter 65,3 percent said that the rule of experts is a fairly or very good system. In this respect Italy and Greece are far more critical to expert governments than the European average, and the Central European countries are far less critical.

Although one possible explanation for this pattern is that the more threatening or closer is the crisis, the more appealing is the rule of experts, looking at the data from the earlier waves of EVS shows that this difference is a deep seated one, as the results are not very different from the 2008 one. Thinking highly of democracy and disparagingly of expert rule seems to be a fundamental characteristic of the Greeek and the Italian political thought. Thus, it cannot be stated that those European countries which had an expert government at one point during the last decade were, in general, more accepting towards the rule of experts before the expert cabinet.

3.2.2 Trust and corruption

The picture is more uniform among the countries in terms of trust levels. As visible from Table 2, the majority of all the four countries trust neither parties, nor politicians. In Hungary 90,4

percent rather not trusts parties and 79,3 percent distrusts the parliament, in the Czech Republic 83,7 percent does not trust parties and 83 percent does not trust in the parliament either, in Greece 83,1 percent distrust parties and 67,7 percent distrusts the parliament, and in Italy the ratio is 86,5 and 66,4 percent. All countries are slightly more distrusting in the mentioned political institutions than the European average: overall in Europe 79,3 percent do no trust parties and 63,8 do not trust the parliament.

Table 2 – Trust in parties and the parliament

Trust					
Trust in political parties					
	Hungary	**Czech R,**	**Greece**	**Italy**	**EU Mean**
None at all (%)	42,6	39,5	36,3	39,5	32,9
Not very much	47,8	44,3	46,8	47	46,4
Quite a lot	8,6	14,1	14,7	12,6	17,7
A great deal	1.0	2,1	2,2	0,9	3
Trust in parliament					
None at all	31,7	36,1	24,7	20,3	21,9
Not very much	47,6	46,9	43	46,1	41,9
Quite a lot	18,4	15,1	27,5	28,9	30,4
A great deal	2,3	1,9	4,7	4,7	5,8

It is interesting to see that the Mediterranean countries' devotion to democracy is also manifest here: they trust more in the parliament, the essential institution of democracy than in parties, the "operators" of democracy. It seems they trust in the system itself, but not in those who maintain it. Hungarians and Czechs distrust politics as a whole.

Trust can have great influence on the attitudes towards expert governments, since the most important distinguishing quality of this type of government is that its leader – or the whole cabinet – comes from outside politics. As it was described in the section above, the "outside" can mean various other sectors: the European institutions, the business sector, or independent background institutions of the state (like the National Bank or the), it is interesting to check whether these sectors enjoy wider trust of the population. This could be a plausible explanation

of why the expert prime ministers enjoy a high level of acceptance. Unfortunately, only trust in the European Union and in the business sector can be detailed here, as there was no question about confidence in independent background institutions (like the National Bank) in the EVS 2008 questionnaire.

Table 3 – Trust in EU and Major Companies

Trust					
European Union					
	Hungary	**Czech R,**	**Greece**	**Italy**	**EU Mean**
None at all (%)	10,9	17,6	17,8	7	14,5
Not very much	38	40	33,6	28	34
Quite a lot	43,1	35,5	40,5	52,4	41
A great deal	8,1	7	8	12,6	10,4
Major Companies					
None at all	18,8	17	44,7	14,5	19
Not very much	54,6	48	38,7	43,9	43,9
Quite a lot	23,9	31,2	14,4	36,8	32,1
A great deal	2,8	3,8	2,2	4,8	5

Table 3 shows a varied picture about these two dimensions of trust. While in Hungary and Italy the majority has confidence in the EU, people in the Czech Republic and Greece rather distrust the EU, although to a smaller extent than the political parties and the parliament. Major companies are distrusted in all of the four countries. Italians are the most positive in this regard, as 41.6 percent of the respondents trusts in companies; and the Greeks are the most distrustful towards major companies, with only 16.6 percent of them trusting in big businesses. Compared to the European average, Italians are outstandingly trusting both in the EU and in major companies, while Greece and Hungary are outstandingly distrustful towards these latter.

Expert prime ministers and prime ministers are, at the beginning of their rule, free from the negative connotations the word 'politician' has. This is one of their most important strengths, and is probably even more valuable if the previous government was especially corrupt. Trust and

corruption I believe strongly correlate, still, it is worth briefly looking at this possible explanatory factor of trust, to have a sharper picture of the public morale.

According to the Global Corruption Barometer of Transparency International (TI), the corruption perception index of political institutions was rather high in Italy, in Greece and in the Czech Republic before the expert governments came into power. Transparency International only started measuring corruption in Hungary after 2009, so there is no information about the corruption perception in Hungary from before the crisis.

Table 4 – Corruption Index

Corruption Index				
	Czech R, (2007)	Greece (2009)	Italy (2009)	EU+ mean
Pol,Parties (1 - not at all corrupt 5 - extremely corrupt)	3,6	4,4	4,1	3,7
Parliament	3,4	3,7	3,8	3,2
Businesses	3,3	3,4	3,3	3,4

Table 4 shows that in Greece and Italy people perceive political parties and the legislature as highly corrupt institutions. In both countries political parties scored the highest among all the institutions in the questionnaire. In the Czech Republic, however, political institutions are not the worse, there the religious bodies are perceived as the most corrupt. Political parties and businesses are perceived less corrupt by the Czech than on the average in the EU, while the parliament is a slightly bit more corrupt. Italy and Greece perform significantly higher than the EU average in all the three sectors.

In sum, these four countries are similar to each other in terms of political trust and they are more distrustful then the European average. Nevertheless, the trust in institutions other than political varies among the four countries. Except the Czech Republic, the majority in each country trusts in the EU, but even the Czechs trust the EU a lot more than their own political institutions.

3.2.3 Satisfaction with democracy

In terms of satisfaction with democracy, Hungary and Italy are the most deviant cases. Respondents in both countries were rather not satisfied with democracy: in Hungary 79,4 percent and in Italy 68,1 percent of them answered that they are not or rather not satisfied with democracy. The European average for discontent is 55,6 percent. Like in the rest of Europe, the majority is not satisfied with democracy in the examined four countries. However, the Czech Republic and Greece only slightly deviate from the European average in a negative direction, by 4,3 percent and by 0,9 percent, respectively.

Table 5 - Satisfaction with democracy

Satisfaction with democracy					
	Hungary	Czech R,	Greece	Italy	EU Mean
Not at all satisfied (%)	21,8	14,7	19,6	19,1	15
Rather not satisfied	57,6	45,2	36,9	49	40,6
Rather satisfied	19,8	37,6	35,4	29,9	38,5
Very satisfied	0,8	2,5	8	2	5,9

This wide-spread dissatisfaction with democracy in the four countries is more interesting if we compare it with the popularity democracy as a system enjoys, especially in Greece and Italy. Satisfaction with democracy reflects more the opinion about a current government, than the evaluation of democracy itself. However, this contradiction between thinking highly of democracy as such, but disapprovingly about the current status of it could create a tension, which is released when an expert government comes to power. As detailed in Chapter 2, expert cabinets to a certain extent mean a rupture on the body of democracy, but as *caretakers,* experts carry the promise that after they handled the crisis democracy can return in a better, more complete and renewed form. The tension between the ideal and the actual form of democracy is the greatest in Italy, where the most ideal-typical expert government emerged.

This phenomenon, however mostly stands for the analyzed Mediterranean countries. Even though in Hungary and in the Czech Republic people on average were less enthusiastic about

democracy, they were also more unsatisfied with the current status of it, thus in these countries they seem to have more modest expectations towards democracy.

In the rest of Europe, on average this tension between the ideal of democracy and the actual realization of it is smaller, because, as it was shown in Table 1 and Table 5, people are less convinced about the goodness of democracy and are less unsatisfied with the current status of it. This system is closer to an equilibrium, and the tensions could be resolved by less radical solutions.

3.2.4 Performance of democracy

As it is shown in Table 6, with the exception of Italy the majority of the respondents in the studied countries think that democracy causes bad economy and that it is an indecisive system. There is again a difference between the Mediterranean and the Central European countries: while in Greece and Italy people do not think that democracy cannot maintain order, in the Czech Republic and Hungary they tend to think so. In this sense, these two latter countries are outliers in Europe.

Table 6 - Democracy's performance

Democracy's performance					
Democracy causes bad economy					
	Hungary	**Czech R.**	**Greece**	**Italy**	**EU Mean**
Disagree strongly (%)	11,8	10,3	8,1	11	13,7
Disagree	45,6	51	44,6	61,6	51,5
Agree	35,7	31,6	35,7	23,7	28,2
Agree strongly	6,9	7,1	11,7	3,7	6,7
Democracy is indecisive					
Disagree strongly	6,5	8,8	9,7	7,5	10,2
Disagree	30,8	39	39,7	45,8	42,9
Agree	46,8	41,6	37,2	37,6	37,4
Agree strongly	15,9	10,6	13,4	9	9,5
Democracy cannot maintain order					
Disagree strongly	10,5	6,9	15,3	23,1	16,8
Disagree	45,3	38,3	53,8	59,9	50,6
Agree	35,7	41,7	24,1	14,2	26,4

It raises some question why Italians are so unsatisfied with democracy, as seen in Table 5, while when they have to evaluate segments of democratic performance they think positively about democracy. Again, in my opinion, this is caused by the fact that they separate democracy as an ideal, and democracy as an applied system. Democracy, in principal do no cause bad economy, for example, but politicians who operate it do. In the next section I am going to present how these variables connect with each other, by using linear regression models.

3.3 Linear Regression Models

The linear regression models reveal, that the variables detailed above interact substantively differently in the studied countries. With the regressions I tested what explains the variance in evaluation of expert governments. The outcome variable was the question asking how good the rule of experts could be in general. Beside the variables I described in the previous section I also included gender, education, income and satisfaction with life as explanatory variables. Table 7 shows the results of the linear regressions.

This combination of variables has the greatest explanatory power and the worse in Hungary. In the Czech Republic the trust in the parliament, satisfaction with democracy, the opinion about democracy's performance (whether it is indecisive and cannot maintain order), income and the interaction of the two trust variables have a significant effect on evaluating technocratic governments. In Greece gender, satisfaction with life and democracy's order maintaining capacity effects this evaluation. Democracy's economic performance only has a significant effect in Hungary and Italy. In these countries nothing else has a significant effect, therefore in Hungary and Italy technocracy as a form of government can be considered as a purely economic issue, while in Greece and Czech Republic the opinion patterns about expert government are a result of more complex political attitudes.

In summary, it would be hard to argue that there are systematic factors behind choosing expert government as the method of crisis management, or that there are countries more prone to have

expert governments. Italy, Greece, the Czech and Hungary are more different than similar in terms of public morale. Thus, I think that it is the nature of the crisis than the nature of the country that determines whether expert governments emerge as a solution.

Table 7 - Linear Regression Models

Ordinary Linear Regression Models								
	Greece		**Italy**		**Czech Republic**		**Hungary**	
	Estimate	P-value	Estimate	P-value	Estimate	P-value	Estimate	P-value
Trust in parties (a)	0.05	0.59	0.10	0.53	0.10	0.28	-0.11	0.24
Trust in parliament (b)	0.02	0.83	-0.02	0.89	0.30	0.00 **	0.02	0.77
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.01	0.67	0.07	0.19	-0.12	0.00 **	-0.02	0.54
Democracy causes bad economy (1)	0.13	0.32	-0.16	0.03 *	-0.01	0.83	-0.12	0.03 *
Democracy is indecisive (2)	0.09	0.08 .	0.04	0.65	0.15	0.01 *	0.02	0.59
Democracy cannot maintain order (3)	0.23	0.00 ***	-0.04	0.59	0.12	0.04 *	-0.03	0.54
Gender	-0.17	0.00 **	-0.06	0.54	-0.01	0.39	0.01	0.30
Education	0.01	0.36	-0.05	0.51	-0.01	0.87	-0.04	0.08
Income	0.02	0.70	-0.03	0.08 .	0.04	0.01 **	0.00	0.50
Satisfaction with life	0.03	0.01 **	-0.01	0.75	0.00	0.93	0.00	0.69
(a):(b)	-0.03	0.41	-0.06	0.34	-0.13	0.00 **	0.01	0.82
(1):(2):(3)	-0.01	0.15	0.01	0.19	0.00	0.79	0.01	0.06 .
R-squared	**0.06**		**0.06**		**0.11**		**0.02**	
Adjusted R-squared	**0.04**		**0.04**		**0.10**		**0.01**	

CHAPTER FOUR - THE EXPERIMENT

In the previous chapter I gave and explanation of why expert governments may emerge and why and how they become successful. According to the theories and examples I detailed, the appearance of an expert government is closely related to a political and/or economic crisis, and they are successful exactly because of the extraordinary situation, in which there is no place for political fight and conflicting interests, thus political parties agree on supporting an outsider, non-political force. Exert governments generally enjoy broader political support than normal governments and therefore critical voices are silent at least for a while. As a consequence, it is not a surprise that expert governments enjoy a relative high popularity as well.

With my experiment I would like to find an answer to the question whether expert governments have an advantage vis-á-vis democratic decision making even without the broad political support and the silence of critiques. In other words, I am curious whether expertise or democracy has a popularly appreciated value on its own. If the austerity measures introduced by an expert receive higher evaluation points than the austerity program introduced by democratic means it can be argued that the presence of expertise makes people more amenable for austerity measures, regardless of other political factors. The experimental set-up allows me to control for most of the other possibly influencing variables ant thus to observe the affect of democratic and expert decision making in its purity, while the design, I believe efficiently closely approximates the real world circumstances in which expert governments emerge.

4.1. Experimental Design: The quiz-game

At the core of my experiment is a quiz-game, based on the fifth test of Eysenck's intelligence test. In order not to exhaust the participants and to stick to the time limit, I randomly chose 20 questions out of the original 40. Beside the modest hourly wage I paid to the respondents, they

could also participate in a prize draw. Their chance to win the main prize corresponded to their final score on the test. The game was administered on computers, using the interface www.surveygizmo.com (English the translation of the survey used in the experiment is available on request).

The basic rules of the game were set by me, but subjects could also choose between the variations of some rules. One of the basic rules was that subjects gained positive points for good answers and negative points for bad answers, however, the exact numbers for positive and negative scores were seemingly chosen democratically: the participants could vote for a rule, but the announced outcome of the voting was pre-set in order to control for the effect of the rules. The participants could choose from the following two rules:

- the „populist" one: five points for the good answers and minus five points for the bad answers
- the safe one: three points for the good answers and minus three points for the bad answers

Before the voting it was also announced that economists did not find any of the rules sustainable or good enough, however, the leading researchers still decided to try them. By this I modeled the situation typical at times of elections: parties announce their program, but economists from the opposite side criticize it, and none of the program appears as an unquestionable one. This set-up also models how technocrats function when they are in the hinterland of politics: they signal their concerns, but it is often not taken to the level of policy. The majority of the respondents (78 percent) chose the safety rule. In the followings, I will refer to the time of the initial voting as Time 1. The whole timeline of the experiment is shown in Figure 1.

An additional announcement was that subjects played the game as a group: if they collectively gained too many negative points, the members of the group could be eliminated from the competition for the main prize. At one point in the game, every group was informed that things

were going in the wrong direction, and if they kept on playing as they were, they likely to be eliminated from the competition. This was the "crisis" in the game.

Here I attempted to model how the current debt crisis occurred in Hungary. Firstly, the crisis was partly caused by the elevated level of sovereign debt. A lot of people became seriously indebted because, on the one hand they overestimated their capacity to pay back the money, and on the other hand, they borrowed it in a foreign currency (this is a special trait of the Hungarian sovereign debt crisis). Of course, not everyone was deeply indebted, but the crisis affected everyone.

In my experiment, the role of credit is played by the negative points: it will have a collective effect if too many is collected, but not everyone will contribute equally to the collapse. Another component of the modeling is that by voting on the "populist" rule, subjects in fact overestimate their capacity to produce positive points, and thus compensate for the negative points they added to the common "bill". The announcement style of the crisis was also designed to model real world events. When, in the real world a crisis strikes, it does not mean immediate state bankruptcy, but it means that if things continue going to the same direction, total bankruptcy is likely to occur. Thus, the announcement of the crisis signaled exactly this.



Figure 1 - Timeline of the experiment

Three treatments were introduced during the experiment in connection with the crisis. Treatment 1 was to test how people evaluate austerity measures if they were introduced democratically or by non-elected experts. Treatment 2 was introduced to explore the effect of the extent of the crisis on the evaluation of austerity measures. Treatment 3 tested whether the subjects' perception of their subjective and objective financial well-being, or in this case, the scores gained, affects the evaluation of the crisis resolution method (see the structure of Treatments in Figure 2). The differences I expected between the treatment and control groups are detailed later in section 4.2.



Figure 2 - Treatment and control groups

The 198 participants were randomly assigned into treatment and control groups. For Treatment 1, the control group (Control Group 1, CG 1) consists of those who could democratically choose between two rules when the crisis occurred as it could be argued that in a European context democratic voting is the natural state of events, while expert governments (Treatment Group 1,

TG1) mean a rupture in this natural state. The treatment and the control groups of Treatment 1 were further divided into two subgroups in order to introduce Treatment 2. One of the subgroups were informed that there is 65 percent chance that their group will be eliminated from the prize draw (to this group I will refer as TG2/65 and CG2/65, as there are subjects in the group from both TG1 and CG1), while to the other group I announced that the chance is 95 percent (this group is TG2/95 and CG2/95 for the same reason). Here I compared the groups with a different chance of being eliminated from the competition, regardless of their membership in the democratic or the expert group. For Treatment 3 those were in the control group (CG 3) who had no information about their score before evaluating the handling of the crisis, while for the treatment group (TG 3) scores were announced around mid-time.

After the subjects were informed about the crisis (Time 2), CG 1 were asked to choose between the following two rules (the result was again pre-set, for the same reasons as before):

- In order to decrease the negative points of the group, we take 30 percent of the positive points from everyone and add it to the group's negative point account. We also change the rules and from now on you receive 2 positive points for the good answers and 1 negative points for wrong answers

- We keep on playing with the exact same rule as before

The pre-set result was the first option that represents austerity. The majority of the subjects (65 percent) voted for the austerity program. TG1 could not vote for the crisis alleviating rule, but after the announcement of the crisis, subjects were told that the researchers decided to introduce a new rule that was recommended by economic experts.

Subjects continued answering the test questions with the new rules before the first evaluation (Time 3). At Time 3 (T3), the subject pool was divided into two groups. The members of TG3 group first had to make a guess about their points within five ranges, and then they were

informed about their actual scores. Subjects in CG3 group did not have any information about their score. Both groups had to answer the same three questions regardless of their membership in TG1/CG1 and the TG2/CG2 groups. The questions inquired about the effectiveness and the fairness of the new rule and about its effect on the subjects' personal situation in terms of winning the main prize.

Respondents then finished the test. Before the final evaluation (Time 4, T4), they were again informed about the extent of the crisis, but this time none was informed about their personal situation. Those who were in TG2/65 and CG2/65 were told that now there would be only 10 percent chance of them being eliminated from the competition if they continued playing. Those in TG2/95 CG2/95 were informed that the chance of being eliminated would be 35 percent.

At T4, evaluating questions were framed differently than at T3. Respondents in TG1 were told that some members of the group could vote democratically when the crisis occurred and for subjects in CG1 it was revealed that the other part of the group received a new rule calculated by an expert. Then had to compare their new rule with the new rule of the others. Subjects did not know that everyone played by the same rules after the crisis, they purely had to rely on the information that a rule was democratically chosen or introduced by an expert.

The game went on without unexpected problems. The majority of the respondents understood the rules (on average 60 percent gave the right answer to the testing questions) and from their reactions during and after the game it was also manifest that the deceptions worked and they did believe that they could vote. The main prize proved to be a real motivating force. As superficially observed, subjects could not guess the topic of the experiment, they usually guessed that something in connection with their IQ is tested.

4.2 The experiment

The 198 participants of the experiment were recruited via a student job agency. This method of recruitment has the advantage of reaching out to different strata of the Hungarian society, but the disadvantage of homogenizing the data in terms of age and education levels (See Figure 4). Even though the education level was homogeneous, the normally distributed IQ-test scores show that was an appropriate level of variance in the mental capabilities of the subjects (Figure 3).



Figure 3 - Distribution of test scores



Figure 4 - Distribution of social ranks

The respondents were also heterogeneous in terms of political orientation. In this sense they can be considered as a representative sample of the Hungarian electorate, as most of the subjects – 57

percent - positioned himself on the right side of the left-right scale, and out of them 6,1 percent considered themselves extreme rightists. These ratios closely reflect the ratios corresponding parties would share if the elections were held this Sunday[22] (Figure 5).



Figure 5 - Position on the left-right scale

The participants were remunerated with 980 HUF/hour and they, as described above, also participated in a prize draw for a thirty thousand HUF worth voucher to a shopping mall. The experiment was financed by ACRO, the research support organization of the Central European University.

Three other political science experiments used the same subject pool as mine. The sequence of the experiments was randomized, except that my experiment was always the third one in the row in order to secure that the participants reach the voting points approximately at the same time, thus they believe that their vote matters. The randomization of the other experiments ensures that no systematic bias influence my results. A session with the four experiments took 1,5 – 2 hours. On average 5 subjects were present by session. The subjects were debriefed about the deceptions after all the sessions ended, via email.

[22] Opinion poll of TARKI, from April 2013. http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2013/kitekint/20130529_valasztas.html

4.3 Hypotheses

The experimental design allows me to test a wide range of hypotheses. Beside the bare comparison of TG1-3 to CG 1-3, there are a number of intriguing questions, like the subject's perception of austerity if (A) they did not initially vote for the rule causing the crisis, or (B) in CG 1 did not vote for the austerity rule; or the respondents changing attitude towards experts when realizing that democracy was also an option. In the following, I am going to detail the topics the data analyses will touch upon and I am going to formulate hypotheses for each.

4.3.1 Expert vs. democratic decision making: which one is evaluated as more effective, fairer, and more beneficial for the subject's economic well-being?

Hypothesis 1

As the survey results detailed in Chapter 2 indicate, experts as decision makers are generally appreciated. The initial popularity of expert governments also supports this claim, but, we can also see how this emergent popularity evaporates with time. My main interest is not the question why expert governments become so popular, but the question whether the harsh policies introduced by them "inherit" their popularity, so whether their policies are better evaluated than the same policies introduced by democratic decision making bodies.

It is not far-fetched to argue that if a more popular politician or decision making body introduces a policy, the policy itself will also be more popular than if it had been introduced by an unpopular government. I assume that these two concepts – the popularity of the government and the popularity of its policies – are inseparable and highly correlate (Harrington, 1993). During the experiment subjects did not evaluate the 'governance' itself, but its policies. The simple reason for this is that there was no elected government in the game, and it would be mistaken to associate the attitudes towards the researchers as attitudes towards a government. A further important difference is that the researchers created the polity, thus they are exogenous to it, while in a real world setting the government is a body endogenous to the polity.

One possible critique of the experimental set-up from this perspective is that CG 1, the democratic group, is actually a representation of direct democracy, i.e rules are not changed by a democratically elected body but by direct voting. Directly choosing the rules could possibly lead to an elevated feeling of responsibility for the occurring crisis. However, this side-effect of direct democracy was minimized by offering a selection of rules in which one of the rule could only seem appealing to the most risk taking participants. As I wrote it above, they were not many, thus there was a sense of collective irresponsibility, a well-know feature of democracy, as we could also see in the theoretic chapter (Caplan 2012).

The mock voting set-up with this particular set of rules models other feature of real world democracy as well. It happens often, for example, that a significant strata of the society is governed by a party or president they did not vote for or, that a democratically elected decision making body implements laws or policies opposed by the majority. What matters from the perspective of my thesis, is that the decision making *process* was democratic, the effect of being on the winning or the losing side can be controlled for in the statistical analysis.

Hypothesis 1 follows from these assumptions: Those subjects who could not vote for the crisis handling rule (TG1), but had to continue the game following a new rule calculated by experts will give more positive evaluation of the new rule than those who could vote (CG1).

Hypothesis 2

As was demonstrated with the examples of the recent European expert governments, after a short "honeymoon period" expert governments lose popularity, however they still tend to be relatively popular at the end of their term. I attempted replicate this popularity loss in my experiment, by framing differently the evaluating questions at Time 3 and Time 4, and revealing the existence of an alternative political situation.

Many factors that are possibly behind the popularity loss simply cannot be modeled in an approximately 40 minutes long experiment. For example, it is senseless to model the time factor. Attitudes are not likely to change within 10 minutes, especially if very similar questions are asked. Therefore I attempted to model what could be behind the lost popularity. One reason is certainly the stagnation or the worsening of the economic condition. The modeling of this also faced some obstacles as the only 'income' for the subjects was the points they earned and the only 'tax' they paid was the one they paid for the wrong answers. The subject's situation worsened in different ways, however. As a consequence of the austerity rule, they could gain less points in total, and they 30 percent of their already acquired points were redistributed.

I suspect that besides the economic reasons why expert governments might fall from voters' favor because after some months it becomes clear that there might have been another way of handling the crisis. I examined this expectation by forming the evaluating questions slightly differently at T4. At that point subjects were asked: "The other part of the group could vote when the crisis occurred or continued the game with a new rule calculated by independent experts of economy. What do you think, how effective was their new rule?" This way subjects were informed about an alternative political situation. Then, in the analyses evaluation at Time 3 and Time 4 can be compared. I assume that subjects will compare the new rule of the other group to the new rule of their group when evaluating at Time 4, thus they will evaluate expert decision making compared to democratic decision making. I await that after revealing the existence of an alternative political situation, subjects in CG1 will give higher points to the new rule of TG1, while TG1 will prefer their own new rule.

***Hypothesis 2*:** I expect that subjects in the expert group will on average give lower points at the final evaluation (Time 4) than they gave at the mid-term evaluation (Time 3), and subjects in the democratic group will on average give higher points at the final evaluation than at the mid-term evaluation.

4.3.2 How does the knowledge of the subjects about the extent of the crisis affect the evaluation of the crisis?

Hypothesis 3 and 4

The examples of the Greek, Italian, Hungarian and Czech expert governments displayed a rather clear-cut picture of the relationship between the extent of the crisis and the appreciation of the experts' decisions. While Greece was arguably in the deepest trouble among these countries, the Papademos government faced the harshest popular opposition. The Czech PM, Fischer, was the most popular of the mentioned expert leaders who managed to stay popular even at the end of his term, and the Czech Republic was the least threatened by a full-blown crisis.

The perception of the extent of the crisis could be operationalized in various ways, as it has many components: the feeling of insecurity in terms of losing a job and not being able to make ends meet, the worries about the rising prices and maybe most importantly, the domination of the public discourse by the topic of the economic crisis.

I also have to note that crisis in my understanding not only means the situation when everything has already fallen apart, it is also the situation threatening with an elevated chance of bankruptcy. In the experiment I partly relied on this definition to create a crisis-like atmosphere at Time 2. I explicitly used the word crisis multiple times in the description of the situation. To create a measurable variable for the extent of the crisis I gave numeric cues to the subjects. I told TG2/65 and CG2/65 that there is 65 percent chance of crisis, while TG2/95 and CG2/95 was informed that there is a 95 percent chance of being eliminated from the completion.

I expect that the sensation of the crisis' depth can have two effects on the evaluation of austerity measures. On the one hand, the deeper the crisis is, the more people will appreciate if somebody does something against it, therefore, even austerity will be welcomed (Wintrobe, 2000). On the

other hand, I expect that a deep crisis makes people more amenable to non-democratic, and especially expert decision making. From these assertions follow two hypotheses:

Hypotheses 3: The more threatening the crisis is, the more positive evaluation will be given to the austerity measures both in the expert and the democratic group.

Hypotheses 4: The more threatening the crisis, the better evaluation will be given to the austerity measures introduced by experts both at the mid-term and the final evaluation.

4.3.3 How does the subject's knowledge about their own well-being (the number of points collected) affect their evaluation of austerity?

Hypothesis 5 and 6

Another factor possibly influencing the evaluation of austerity measures is the personal financial well-being of the respondents. Well-being has two dimensions in this experiment: the objective one, which means simply the number of points a respondent collected; and a subjective one, which refers to the discrepancy between the self-estimated well-being of the participants and the actual points collected by him.

I have the following expectations about the subject's objective well-being. If someone has many points even though the group is in crisis, he will not sense the crisis so threateningly as someone who has fewer points. They will likely to be satisfied with their own performance and thus their chance of winning the main prize. They will also be likely to think that they did not contribute to the appearance of the crisis. All of these factors will influence well-off subjects in a way that they will feel austerity measures as an unnecessary action that just impedes their chance of winning, and therefore they will give a worse evaluation to the measure.

Discrepancy between the actual and the estimated points works slightly differently. Here the disappointment or the pleasant surprise about one's score can be an influencing force. As scores

are first revealed at Time 3, when the austerity measure was already introduced, I think that disappointed subjects will give a worse evaluation to the measure than those who are pleasantly surprised with their score or performed exactly how they expected.

Another intriguing question connected to the issue of well-being, is how only the mere information about the subjects' score affects the evaluation. As scores can be understood as cues (Kahneman and Tversky, 1996), they surely help the evaluation, so I think there will be a significant difference between the evaluations of CG3 and TG3. Those who received information about their score will have a more explicit opinion and will be less likely to give neutral answers (4 points, exactly in the middle of a 7-point scale).

Thus, I have two hypotheses about the influence of personal well-being on the evaluation of the austerity measures:

Hypotheses 5: The better the personal financial well-being of the subjects, the worse evaluation they will give to the austerity measure both in the expert and in the democratic group.

Hypotheses 6: Subjects with negative discrepancy between their expected and actual scores will give worse evaluation to the austerity measures, then those who underestimated their performance on the test and thus have a positive discrepancy.

4.4 Further Analysis

Hypothesis 1 is considered as my main hypothesis, while the others will nuance the picture. Although they are worth testing on their own, I suspect that there is an interaction as well between the factors used in the hypotheses. Therefore, I also built robust regression models to control for the possible interaction between on the hand the treatments, and on the other hand between the treatments and certain demographic variables.

5.1 Expert vs. democratic decision making:

Hypothesis 1: *Those subjects who could not vote for the crisis handling rule (TG1), but had to continue the game following a new rule calculated by experts will give more positive evaluation for the new rule than those who could vote (CG1).*

Hypothesis one is tested by a two sample t-test. I compare the answers given to the evaluating questions at Time 3. At this point, every subject receives the same questions. They had to mark on a 7 point scale how effective and fair the new rule - the austerity measure - was, and if it bettered or worsened their situation. They also had to give a guess about the chance of the crisis.

Table 8 – Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1 - Evaluation at Time 3					
	Expert (TG1)	Democratic (CG1)	Difference	P-value	
Effectivity	4,05	3,64	0,4	0,05	*
Fairness	4,38	3,84	0,54	0,003	**
Own situation	4,09	3,59	0,49	0,005	**
Chance of crisis	52,25	57,75	5,5	0,08	

As we can see from Table 8, there is a significant difference between TG1 and CG1 at all questions but the chance of crisis, and subjects in TG1 gave better evaluation to the austerity rule. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is confirmed. Even though the difference is not significant, the effect is visible also at estimation of the chance of crisis: those in the democratic group saw a greater chance for the crisis situation happening again. The treatment most significantly effected the evaluation of the measure's fairness. In TG1, the austerity measure was thought to be more fair on average by 0.5 points than in CG1.

Nevertheless, I have to note, neither the expert's new rule, nor the democratically introduced new rule was evaluated positively. What happened is that subjects had a more neutral reaction to the new rule if it was suggested by an expert, while they tend to see more negatively the new rule if

they themselves chose. it At the end of the day it seems that expertise has a neutralizing effect, but people still not cheer for austerity.

5.2 Effect of the appearance of political alternative :

Hypothesis 2: **:** *I expect that subjects in the expert group will on average give lower points at the final evaluation (Time 4) than they gave at the mid-term evaluation (Time 3), and subjects in the democratic group will on average give higher points at the final evaluation than at the mid-term evaluation.*

Before comparing the evaluations at Time 3 and Time 4, in Table 9 I compared the difference in evaluation between TG1 and CG1 at Time 4. The results – even more significant than at Time 3 - exhibit a very interesting turn of events.

Table 9 - Evaluation at Time 4

Hypothesis 2 - Evaluation at Time 4 (T-test)					
	Expert	**Democratic**	**Difference**	**P-value**	
Effectivity	4.11	4.21	-0.10	5.859263e-01	***
Situation	4.01	2.78	1.23	1.125584e-05	***
Switch group	4.41	3.27	1.13	5.060306e-06	***

At this point subjects in CG1 evaluated the new rule of the expert group (TG1) and vice versa. The subjects did not know anything about the new rule of the other group but the way of introduction, thus they had to evaluate by relying on the cue word "democratic means" and "expert". It is striking that the expert's rule only received higher scores for effectiveness, but otherwise, subjects in CG1 thought that people in the other group were in a worse situation than they. Experts are generally associated with effective problem management (Fischer 1990), therefore, it is not surprising that the word "expert" induces better effectiveness scores.

CG1's satisfaction with its own situation is also showed by the low score they gave to the question asking whether they would rather be in the other group (see at Switch group in Table 9). On the contrary, in TG1 people would have switched to the democratic group, which shows that democracy in itself is appealing for those who are not in a democratic political setting. CG1-

subjects comfort in their own group in the meantime shows, that if people are in a democratic setting, expert decision-making is not appealing for them.

Comparing the evaluations at Time 3 and Time 4 for both Treatment 1 groups nuances the picture.

Table 10 - Difference between the evaluation T3 and T4

Hypothesis 2 - Difference between evaluation at T3 and T4 (T-test)			
	Mean diff.	**P-value**	
Effectivness - Expert	-'0,05	0,73	
Effectivness - Democratic	0,56	0,003	**
Situation - Expert	0,08	0,65	
Situation - Democratic	0,81	0,002	**

In Table 10 the results of a one sample t-test are displayed. I tested whether the mean difference between the evaluation at Time 3 and Time 4 are significantly different from 0. The results show a mixed picture. Subjects in TG1 did not differentiate significantly between their new rule and the new rule of CG1, while CG1 gave significantly worse evaluation to its new rule in terms of effectiveness (by 0,56 points), while they evaluated their situation much better then the situation of TG1 (by 0,81 points).

These results bear two conclusions. On the one hand this means that Hypothesis 2 has to be rejected, because subjects did not give significantly better evaluation to the austerity rule of CG1 than to their own austerity rule. On the other hand, the relative political situation does seem to have an effect in a democratic setting. The results in Table 9 and Table 10 show that people do not like expert decision making if it is opposed to democratic decision-making.

This finding is only seemingly contradictory to the confirmed Hypothesis 1, according to which the expert's austerity received a better feedback then the democratically introduced austerity. The two findings, in my opinion, logically follow from the experimental set-up and quite accurately

model the fate expert governments. When crisis appears people easily become disappointed by democracy, the system that lead to the problems, while an expert, coming from outside the system can readily be considered as capable problem-solver. This can be a reason for the difference in evaluation at Time 3. But, when subjects saw at Time 4 that the crisis was solved by the new rule they chose, they again were satisfied by the system (democracy) and thus assumed that the other system can not be better, because there people could not choose. The possibility of choosing seems to have a value on its own.

The behavior of TG1 is also logical. They, on average gave better points to their austerity rule than CG1, because they trusted expertise. But when asked about the new rule of CG1, they did neither say it was better, nor that it was worse, because the only thing they knew was that the other group could choose, but this *per def* means that they could choose a better or a worse rule. After all, what subjects saw was that at the beginning of the game the community chose an unsustainable rule.

The findings in Table 9 and Table 10 accurately show the controversial attitudes towards expert governments. Expertise, as such can be attractive when democracy seems incapable of solving a crisis, but if there is a possibility of solving the problem by democratic means, this latter is preferred. In a democratic system, then, what can cause the initial popularity of an expert government? In a crisis situation expert cabinets can appear appealing for two main reasons: firstly, democracy can temporarily be forgotten as a real option of problem solving; and second, political actors agree on temporarily suspending the harsh criticism of the government, so austerity measures are adopted by the legislature with a relative ease, making decision making unusually fast and effective compared to normal democratic circumstances. My experiment, I believe gives a valuable insight to the mechanisms of the first factor, but further studies are needed to understand better the effects of the second factor.

5.3 Effect of the extent of crisis

Hypothesis 3: *The more threatening the crisis is, the more positive evaluation will be given to the austerity measures both in the expert and the democratic group.*

Here I expected that regardless of the subject's placement in TG1 or CG1, if the crisis is more severe, they will see the austerity measure more positively. Subjects in TG2/65 were informed at Time 3 that there is a 65 percent chance of falling out from the prize draw. In the other group (TG2/95) the chance was 95 percent. At Time 4 they were informed that the chance was 35 percent (TG2/95) and 10 percent (TG2/65).

As shown in Table 11 and 12 Hypothesis 3 can not be confirmed, the depth of the crisis does not have a significant effect on the evaluations. The only exception is the estimation of the chance of crisis at Time 3. As subjects received a numerical cue before the evaluation, it is not surprising that those who saw a greater number also gave a bigger chance for crisis (about cues see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).

Table 11 - Chance and evaluation at T3

Hypothesis 3 - Chance and evaluation at Time 3					
	65 % chance	95 % chance	Difference	P-value	
Effectivity	3,78	3,93	0,14	0,48	
Fairness	4,05	4,21	0,15	0,40	
Own situation	3,76	3,94	0,17	0,33	
Chance of crisis	50,73	58,20	7,47	0,01	*

Table 12 - Chance and evaluation at T4

Hypothesis 3 - Chance and evaluation at Time 4				
	10% Chance	35% Chance	Difference	P-value
Effectiveness	4,22	4,1	0,12	0,49
Situation	3,68	3,24	0,44	0,1
Switch Group	4,02	3,77	0,24	0,33

The only exception is the estimation of the chance of crisis at Time 3. As subjects received a numerical cue before the evaluation, it is not surprising that those who saw a greater number also gave a bigger chance for crisis.

Even though the difference is not significant, my directional expectations were backed by the analysis. When the crisis was threatening, subjects in TG2/95 gave slightly better evaluation to the austerity measure on average. However, when the crisis situation consolidated, and evaluating questions were asked again at Time 4, the effect of the chance changed. At Time 4 TG2/65 was informed that the chance of crisis was reduced to 10 percent, and in TG2/95 it was announced that the chance is 35 percent. In this case, the group where the chance of crisis was lower gave more positive evaluations, nonetheless the difference was not significant between the two groups. This is not surprising, as the lesser chance of crisis means that the more effective was the crisis handling.

Hypothesis 4: *The more threatening the crisis, the better evaluation will be given to the austerity measures introduced by experts both at the mid-term and the final evaluation.*

To test this expectation, I had to check whether Treatment 1 and 2 combined together had an effect on the evaluation. To test my expectation, according to which the combination of TG1 and TG2/95 should produce more positive evaluations, I conducted a two-way ANOVA. If the hypothesis was right, the F-value of the interaction between Treatment 1 and 2 should be significantly different from one. As we can see from Table 13, this is not true. Thus, subject's evaluation of austerity measures were not significantly more positive in TG1 if the crisis was more severe. Thus, hypothesis 4 cannot be confirmed.

Table 13 - Interaction of Treatment 1 and 2

Hypothesis 4 - Interaction of Treatment 1 and 2 (ANOVA)				
		F-value	P-value	
Effectiveness	65% / 95%	0,49	0,48	
	Exp/demo	2,23	0,13	
	Interaction	0,28	0,59	
Fairness	65% / 95%	0,71	0,39	
	Exp/demo	4,27	0,04	*
	Interaction	0,001	0,97	
Situation	65% / 95%	0,98	0,32	
	Exp/demo	4,48	0,03	*
	Interaction	2,28	0,13	

5.4 Effect of well-being

***Hypothesis 5**: The better the personal financial well-being of the subjects, the worse evaluation they will give to the austerity measure both in the expert and in the democratic group.*

First I tested whether the bare information about the scores had any effect on the evaluation at Time 3. I only tested Time 3 because I announced the scores right before subjects had to evaluate the measure at Time 3. By Time 4, other treatments could influence the evaluation, therefore the effect of the information about the scores could be most clearly seen at Time 3.

Table 14 - Evaluation and information about the scores

Hypothesis 5 - Evaluation and information about the scores					
	TG3	CG3	Difference	P-value	
Effectiveness	3,78	3,93	0,14	0,50	
Fairness	4,22	4,07	0,14	0,43	
Situation	3,91	3,82	0,09	0,64	
Chance of crisis	17,07	20,93	3,86	0,004	*

In Table 14 we can see the results of two sample T-test. Only the estimation of the chance of crisis was significantly different in TG3, so in the group which received information about their score. Otherwise, there is no connection between the evaluation of the austerity measure and the information about the score.

If my expectations were right, in a Pearson's correlation the number of points and the evaluating points would have had a strong, negative correlation. However, as shown in Table 15, only the evaluation of effectiveness correlates weakly with the scores, and the correlation is positive, so goes against my directional expectations.

Table 15 - Correlation between scores and evaluation

Hypothesis 5 - Correlation between scores and evaluation (Pearson's correlation)				
	Effectiveness	**Fairness**	**Situation**	**Percent**
Correlation with score (r2)	0,23	0,1	0,13	-'0,02
P-value	0,02 **	0,33	0,23	0,84

Hypotheses 6: *Subjects with negative discrepancy between their expected and actual scores will give worse evaluation to the austerity measures, then those who underestimated their performance on the test and thus have a positive discrepancy.*

Table 16 - Discrepancy and evaluation

Hypothesis 6 - The effect of discrepancy (T-test)					
	Negative discrepancy	**Positive discrepancy**	**Difference**	**P-value**	
Effectivness	3,26	4,42	1,15	0,001	***
Fairness	3,88	4.5	0,61	0,08	
Situation	3,65	4,21	0,56	0,16	
Chance of crisis	17.88 %	14.82 %	3,06	0,26	

Although the effect of negative discrepancy between the estimated and the actual points shows the expected direction (Table 16), the difference between negative and positive discrepancy is only significant at the evaluation of effectiveness. Thus, Hypothesis 6 can only be confirmed partly. One explanation of this is that effectiveness is the most closely related with economics and thus with financial well-being among the four variables, and therefore, information about the subject's well-being had the most powerful effect there.

However, it is interesting that the information on the scores itself did not effect significantly the evaluation of the new rule's effect on the subject's own situation. One would logically expect a

much stronger effect here. Nevertheless I have to note that this t-test could only be conducted on a small subsample, as giving information was a randomly assigned treatment, and that can be a reason for the unsatisfying p-values. In the negative discrepancy group there were 26 people, and in the positive discrepancy group there were 28 (I excluded those with no discrepancy from the analysis, because it was already discovered that the bare information about the scores did not have an effect). In the forthcoming section, I solved the problem of missing data with multiple imputation, and in the regression controlled for the effect of other variables, and there discrepancy had a more significant effect.

5.5 Robust regression

To discover the effect of the treatments on the evaluation of the austerity rules while controlling for the effect of, on the one hand, the other treatments, and on the other hand, other, demographic variables I run two clustered linear regression models. The models were built in a stacked database compiled from the answers to the three evaluating questions. The outcome variable is therefore the aggregated evaluation at Time 3 and at Time 4.

Ordinary linear regression would distort the results for two reasons. First, in the stacked data standard errors clustered around the three questions, and second, half of the dataset was missing because of the experimental set-up (only half of the subject pool received certain treatments). Thus, first I applied multiple imputations to the data with the Amelia package for R (Honaker, King, Blackwell 2011) Then I run a Generalized Estimating Equitation (GEE) model that controls for the clustering of the standard error, in the Zelig package (Owen, Imai, King and Lau 2013), which allows for running regressions in multiple imputed datasets.

From the demographic variables I included three satisfaction variables (economy, life and government), left-right self-positioning and interest in politics. I expected that the satisfaction variables will have a positive effect on the evaluation, as people more satisfied with their life, the

status of the economy and the work of the current government tend to be more satisfied with other things as well.

Table 17 - Robust regression T3

Clustered linear regression with multiple imputations Evaluation at Time 3		
	Estimate	**P-value**
Treatment 1	0,53	0,00 ***
Treatment 2	0,29	0,45
Situation	0,00	0,98
Fairness	0,27	0,05 *
Satisfaction with life	-0,03	0,53
Satisfaction with economy	0,07	0,37
Satisfaction with the government	-0,03	0,55
Discrepancy	-0,17	0,02 *
Lef-right position	0,11	0,04 *
Interest in politics	-0,01	0,90
Choice at T1	-0,04	0,78

In Table 17, we can see the result of the robust regression in which the outcome variable was the aggregated evaluation at Time 3. All things being equal, three variables affect significantly the outcome: Treatment 1, discrepancy and left-right self-positioning. The regression also revealed that the question concerning the fairness of the method received significantly higher points than the other questions.

When other potential influencing factors are controlled for, the effect of Treatment 1 is manifested even more strongly than in the simple t-test. Subjects in the treatment group on average gave 0,53 points higher score for the crisis management than subjects in the control group. Treatment 2 do not have an effect even if other variables are controlled for. In line with my expectations, negative discrepancy between the estimated and the actual points of subjects also significantly influences the evaluation at Time 3. Those, who expected good results but actually performed badly on the test gave significantly lower points.

Among the demographic variables the self-positioning on the left-right scale have a significant effect. The more right are people on the scale, the better evaluation they give to the austerity rule, regardless of they other traits and membership in treatment or control groups.

As the GEE model does not provide an R-squared, I use the R-squared calculated it for the naïve regression. Clustered standard error does not effect the R-squared, so this is a good estimation of the variance explained by the model. The multiple R-squared of this model was 0,21. This means that the model explains 21 percent of the variance in the answers.

Table 18 - Robust regression T4

Clustered linear regression with multiple imputations

Evaluation at Time 4

	Value	P-value
Treatment 1	0,75	0,00 ***
Treatment 2	-0,85	0,07 .
Effectiveness	0,71	0,00 ***
Switch Group	0,44	0,01 **
Satisfaction with life	-0,03	0,62
Satisfaction with economy	0,17	0,07
Satisfaction with government	-0,13	0,04 *
Discrepancy	0,02	0,73
Left-right position	0,01	0,82
Interest in politics	-0,09	0,32
Choice at T1	0,03	0,88

In Table 18 we can see which variables affected the evaluation at Time 4. The effect structure changed since Time 3. Here evaluation significantly depends on the question asked. Subjects tend to give higher point to the questions asking about the effectiveness of the rule of the other group and whether they would switch to the other group. This latter means that not matter whether they were in the treatment or the control group, subjects prefer switching group.

Treatment 1 also has a significant effect here, and the significance level of Treatment 2 was raised. The discrepancy experienced at Time 3 do not have an effect at Time 4 anymore. One

possible explanation is that subjects wishfully think, and expect a growth in their points, which are not announced before evaluating at Time 4.

At Time 4 satisfaction with the current Hungarian government also had a positive, significant effect on the evaluation of the austerity measures, ceteris paribus. An explanation for that is what I already described above, that people more satisfied with the government tend to be more satisfied with other things as well.

The model fit of this second model is much worse than of the first model. Multiple R-squared was 0,05, meaning that the model explains only 5 percent of the variance.

CHAPTER SIX - CONCLUSION

I began my thesis with a quote from Plato's Republic - *'philosophers [must] become kings…or those now called kings [must]…genuinely and adequately philosophize'* – and I must also conclude with this quote. Plato offers two options: or philosophers should seize the power and rule, or the ones who rule must acquire the same qualities as philosophers. My thesis, I believe, revealed, that the only real, but necessary option is the latter one.

Plato's words reinterpreted to my thesis mean that ideally independent experts must lead the country, or the current top executive leaders must become independent expert. These are two different ways of smuggling expertise into politics: the first opens the possibility of circumventing the democratic means, while the latter offers a potential way for developing democracy.

My experiment showed that this latter option is favorable to people. Participants evaluated arbitrary expert decision making significantly more positively only when there was no democratic option. This means that subjects appreciate expertise – they would want them to be kings -, but they appreciate to possibility of choosing even more. Thus, I conclude that technocrats do have a place in high politics, but the ways of entering must be democratic.

What about, then, the threat of technocracy to democracy? If we follow the logic of Fischer, it would not be eliminated just because experts appear in top decision-making positions by democratic means (Fischer, 1990). According to him, technocracy by nature excludes the main features of democratic negotiation. I believe, nevertheless, that this is only a matter of the quantity of experts in high politics. If it reaches a tipping point, expert decision making will become an organic part of democratic decision making, and will, I believe significantly increase its quality.

External validity of experiments is always questionable (Barabas and Jerit, 2010). For the time of experiment, subjects were living in an artificial world, where they earned lottery tickets by answering IQ test questions and underwent crisis that was solved in 10 minutes. This is certainly far-fetched from the real world, but I believe the set-up approximates it sufficiently to make cautious inferences about expert governments as a method for crisis management. The results are in line with the attitudes observed towards actual expert governments, and this indicates that the design successfully modeled the emergence and logic of crisis and technocratic government. The other factor, why drawing inferences is possible is that subjects pool, although homogeneous in terms of age and education level, was heterogeneous in terms of social position and political preferences.

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