**THE FRAGILITY OF THE LIBERAL PEACE EXPORT: AN ADVOCACY FOR THE EXTENSION OF FORMAL EDUCATION ACCESS IN THE LIBERAL PEACE PROJECT IN SOUTH SUDAN.**

By

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# Author's Declaration

I, the undersigned, Eno-Akpa Rene Nkongho hereby declare that to the best of my knowledge this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgement has been made. It contains no material previously accepted as part of the requirements for any other academic degree or non-degree program, in English or in any other language.

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# Abstract

This qualitative desk review of data from Afrobarometer, the National Democratic Institute, peacebuilding reports of international NGOs and reports of the Government of South Sudan, examines how the policy transposition of the liberal peace model in South Sudan is divorced from the country's local context. The research further examines how deep rooted historical exclusion from social welfare reinforces political exclusion or poor civic engagements among different ethnicities. The study finds that restricted access to formal education constitutes a structural source of violence and explains the regular relapse to post-settlement conflicts in South Sudan. It argues that the consolidation of democratic institutions and a free market economy modeled on the conservative and orthodox approaches to peacebuilding that broadly characterize the Liberal Peace Project in South Sudan yields only graduations of authoritarian peace, institutional peace and constitutional peace that tends to degenerate into regular violence in the country. This research concludes that by uncovering a framework that prioritizes an extended access to primary and post-primary vocational education (within an emancipatory approach to peacebuilding) is justifiable and would serve to yield peace dividends and avert the structural causes of violence as well as realize durable or sustainable civil peace in post war South Sudan.

# List of Acronyms

LPP-            Liberal Peace Project

UN-             United Nations

CPA-            Comprehensive Peace Agreement

GoSS-           Government of South Sudan

RSS-            Republic of South Sudan

NDI-            National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

IFI-             International Finance Institutions

IGAD-           The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

US-             The United States of America

SPLM/A-         Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army

NCP-            National Congress Party

PACT-           Partners Achieving Change Together

LSE-            London School of Economics

UNICEF-         United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

IRIN-           Integrated Regional Information Networks

# List of Tables and Figures

# The Map of the Republic of South Sudan

Source:  The United Nations (2011)

# Table of Contents

# Chapter One

## General Introduction

### 1.0 Background

Post Cold War civil conflicts are multidimensional, involving tensions around identity groups; a failure of legitimate or effective governance; discriminatory politics; widespread poverty and socio-economic inequality between constituent groups; war economies thriving on the capture and trade of natural resources; and easy access to small arms and light weapons (Barth & Douma et al., 2008; Kaldor, 2013). As a consequence, international efforts at peace operations have evolved through four generations: Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, International Statebuilding into Peacebuilding or the Liberal Peace Project -LPP (Young, 1994). Boutros-Ghali (1992) first injected the Peacebuilding notion into the UN in his *Agenda for Peace*, raising the need for multilateral international interventions in conflict zones to effect policy reforms beyond monitoring disarmaments and supervising the implementation of peace agreements among warring parties to effecting *post conflict peacebuilding. Peacebuilding* is therefore, a process aimed at reviving the state's capacity to identify, support and strengthen her socio-political and economic structures in view of averting structural causes that cause or nurture a relapse into violent conflict (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

From the 1990s, multilateral peacebuilding actors assumed that "there is a universally agreed normative and cultural basis for the liberal peace [model] and that interventionary practices derived from this will be properly supported by all actors" (Richmond 2007: 111). Subsequently, the international policy of post war reconstruction emphasized peace agreements, security sector reform, democratic institutions (constitution building, elections, rule of law

institutions, human rights enforcement) and free market economy installations in post-settlement Peacebuilding (Paris, 2010; Chandler, 2010). Unfortunately, about half of the Peacebuilding missions failed in about five years of liberal peace import, observed through recurring violence and raising policy failure alarms (Keith and Jutersonke, 2005), raising a need for the LPP to move graduate from institutional peace (non-violent status quo based on anchoring post conflict states within the normative and legal contexts of transnational organizations such as UN) and constitutional peace (resting upon the establishment of democratic values and free trade in post conflict states) to civil peace − founded on averting violence through immediate post conflict state response to citizen advocacy and mobilization for welfare needs and social justice (Richmond, 2006).

Both its critics and its advocates argue that the LPP is in crisis because their approach prioritizes building government capacity (which tends to guarantee institutional and constitutional peace) that will deliver inclusive, social welfare services only in the future over more immediate capacity building and instant service delivery, which brings about civil peace (Paris, 2010; Richmond, 2006, 2009). Critics argue that liberal peace missions have largely recreated states (Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, Angola, Haiti and even Cambodia) with weak domestic governance incapable of providing public goods, poor human rights records and contexts where the rule of law is increasingly questionable and where conditions for a relapse to armed violence are imminent (Keith and Jutersonke, 2005; Paris and Sisk, 2009). Furthermore, lack of local ownership (Chandler, 2010); close ended time frames of liberal peace mission that conceive of peace as a state of affairs rather than a dynamic process; lack of strategic coordination and inadequate attention to domestic tensions and local context (Paris, 2010; Paris and Sisk, 2009) have been explored as the cause of liberal peace failure. As a concept the LPP

2

connotes provision of post conflict humanitarian assistance; political, social and economic reconstruction; security sector reform and international statebuilding. The theories that guide the LPP can be categorized as conservative, orthodox and emancipatory (Richmond, 2006) but the practical methods for achieving sustainable peace or civil peace in post conflict countries like south Sudan are elusive (Ylonen, 2012; Richmond, 2006).

## 1.1 Statement of the Problem

One of the proponents of the emancipatory approach to peacebuilding Luckham (2009), emphasizes the relationship between democracy, security and development as being at the heart of global liberal governance. This relationship, he maintains, should inform the conceptualization of the fourth generation peace interventions. Peacebuilding is thus, reconstructed through local and international agency, and their mediation, to include institutions, rights, needs, culture, and custom, from security, political, economic, social welfare and justice perspectives dictated by the internal context of the mission (Richmond, 2008). Commenting on the fragility of the LPP in South Sudan Ylonen (2012) suggests that there is need for the peacebuilding interventions and the South Sudan Government to create political, economic and social institutions that are inclusive as well as providing wider access to welfare services. However, the practical ways to deliver civil peace through this emancipatory approach that guarantee structures preventing a relapse into conflict have remained elusive.

Since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA, 2005) to the independence (2011) and post independence of South Sudan, peacebuilding suffers from a lack of local reception and a lack of durable participatory governance and a frequent relapse into violent conflict (Ylonen, 2012). Jeffrey (2011) reminds us that in 1957, the Government of Sudan took over mission

3

schools in South Sudan and in 1962, did expel Christian missionaries from the South for allegedly inciting South Sudanese against the Arabization and subsequent Islamization of schools. This suggests that policies that exclude South Sudanese from formal education also reflect a quality of education far removed from the context of South Sudan is one key factor for anti-government agitation. This exclusion of South Sudanese from formal educational opportunities further explain how lack of formal education affected the ability of South Sudanese to participate in government beneficially or to yield the positive externalities of an educated environment which would generally, have led to improved welfare of the population in question.

Schomerus and Allen (2010) argue that liberal peacebuilding in South Sudan is detached from the internal reality thereby making stability in the country fragile. Among other things, they hold that that "tangible development progress, such as [the] building of hospitals or gaining access to quality education, are seen as vital in establishing peace and this realization needs to be at the heart of peace-building activities" (Schomerus and Allen, 2010: 10). Formal education-the medium for imparting pedagogic instruction, shared values, good attitudes and behaviors (Bush and Saltereli, 2000) is a social welfare institution, a social justice mechanism for marginalized and disgruntled groups and a locally determined need for the emancipatory approach to the LPP to take root in South Sudan.

In countries emerging from wars, a well designed formal education curricula may ease psychological violence (fear and hate) in the minds of survivors and victors, helping them to desist from being fanatics, or from supporting ideology that legitimize structural violence (Luc, 2001). Note must be made that formal education, in post war settlement countries may make or mar new public creating either " a conglomerate of self indulgent consumers;…angry soulless, directionless, hopeless masses; indifferent, confused citizens; or a public imbued with

4

confidence, sense of purpose…respect for tolerance" (Postman, 1996:18). This implies that formal education curricula in peace reconstruction countries like RSS should foster positive social relations, multiethnic integration and community development.

A review of 98 country cases from 1960–1990 (Psacharopoulos, 1994) shows that the private and social rate of returns from primary education stands at 20.8% and 18.2 % of the costs, reducing poverty and enhancing social welfare for countries that opt for policies that broaden access to primary education (McEwan, 1999). Moreover, post-primary vocational training would yield social benefits (positive externalities such as modernization and social integration of ethnic groups, improved civic engagement and improved standards of living). In addition to private gains (e.g. jobs, greater income, savings, investments), formal vocational training will help broaden the government revenue source and sustain peace dividends - the production of public goods for example, security and basic services (Bloom et. al., 2006).

However in its 2011-2013 Development plan, the Government of South Sudan (2011) holds that its education and health indicators are among the lowest in the world, reflecting the impact of protracted conflict and limited provision of social services. Only 27% of the adult population is literate and less than half of all primary school-age children are in school (51% of boys and 37% of girls). The ratio of qualified teachers to pupils stands at 1:117. Yet education is positioned with regard to budget as the last priority area in the 2011 to 2013 development plan. Apart from the fact that external actors (foreign states and intergovernmental organizations) commit inadequate funding and capacity building to revive access to quality education in South Sudan recorded as 6% of 2009 donor funding (Bennett et. al. 2010; House of Commons, 2012), the new deal for measuring progress in peacebuilding excludes education and only focuses on legitimate politics, security, legal justice, economic foundation and state revenues (Atree, 2012).

## 1.2 Objective of the Research, Research Questions and Methods

On the basis of consensus among critical scholars on peacebuilding (Paris 2010; Schomerus and Allen, 2010; Richmond, 2006 and 2009; Ylonen, 2012) the emancipatory approach (the need for social justice and welfare inclusion to LPP) as the most desirable means through which to achieve sustainable civil peace, this research project discusses how peacebuilding in South Sudan is removed from local context (locally felt needs) of conflict reconstruction. The research identifies and argues that the lack of formal education constitutes a structural source of relapse to conflict in South Sudan. As such, the consolidation of democratic institutions, modeled on the conservative and orthodox approaches to peacebuilding that characterize the current practices of the LPP in South Sudan do not target the root causes of violence and its recurrence. Also, this research uncovers the framework in which the prioritizing and setting of formal education could be justified and how it would serve to attain the LPP objectives of civil peace. Therefore the research aims at advocating to international peacebuilders that the emancipatory approach of LPP that is considered highly theoretical in peacebuilding and impracticable (Richmond, 2006) could be practiced through institutions of primary and post-primary vocational education in South Sudan. The main and subsidiary research questions underpinning this study are:

(1) To what extent does lack of access to social welfare institutions (formal education, especially) constitute a structural threat to durable peace in South Sudan?

(2) How can access to formal education enhance peace dividends (socio-political inclusion and social welfare) to sustain durable peace in South Sudan?

Together, they will highlight an advocacy that may induce international peacebuilding organizations to formulate a new policy to avert the problem of peacebuilding in Southern Sudan.

The study adopts both a bottom-up (felt needs) method and a top-down method that underpin the emancipatory approach of the LPP. It involves substantial, qualitative, desk research that reviewed reports, surveys and documents of peacebuilding stakeholders (civil society organizations, bilateral aid donors, multilateral peace agencies and the national government) of South Sudan. The study highlights the need to accomplish meaningful social, political and economic inclusion of a population easily induced to violence in South Sudan's peacebuilding process through increased access to primary education and post primary vocational training as an urgent policy implementation option that would disincentivize recourse to violence and rather induce durable or civil peace.

## 1.3 Justification of the Study

The LPP in South Sudan has since 2005 emphasized technical elements of democratization (security sector reforms, constitution building, elections, rule of law institutions) and a free market economy but recent surveys of South Sudan (March to June, 2011) by the National Democratic Institute suggests that the durability of peaceful governance, if accorded local context is not in democracy but in what institutions or services the government provides as immediate needs or peace dividends that form the basis structural violence. This research will in brief, recommend greater access to formal education as an indigenously felt priority need among others in South Sudan, which should determine peacebuilding priorities and durability.

The study does not suggest that sequencing should be executed in peacebuilding whereby, provisions of social welfare needs are prioritized over the establishment of necessary state institutions such as (laws, constitutional reform, electoral reform/ democratic elections or security sector reform). Rather, the study suggests that liberal peace building efforts be co-ordinated in ways that simultaneously envisage both goals. This study should not be read as

7

being blind to the difference between democracy and development. This is because ground-level experience in any post conflict country like South Sudan, shows that the outputs and outcomes of development are necessary for sustaining credible democracy or durable liberal peace.

Both advocates and critiques of the LPP generally agree that durable peace (civil peace) has eluded peacebuilding in South Sudan since the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with Sudan in 2005 and since the independence of South Sudan in 2011 (Chandler, 2010; Ryan, 2010; Ylonen, 2010; Schomerus and Allen, 2010). This suggest that the policies underpinning the LPP in South Sudan must be reformed to graduate from the Hyper-consevative, Conservative and Orthordox approaches that only yield victor's peace, constitutional and/or institutional peace to the policy alternatives of the emancipatory approach that guarantees durable or civil peace (Richmond, 2006; House of Commons, 2012).

This research seeks to uncover how social welfare limitations in formal education coalesce with political exclusion and ethnic domination, undergirds regular armed violence in RSS. The study also highlights the urgent need to extend access to formal primary and post primary vocational education as a social justice need in the RSS. Increased access to primary education will feasibly guarantee civil peace by enhancing political participation of South Sudanese thereby enhancing their social welfare through positive externalities that accrue from the completion of primary education (Psacharopoulos, 1994; McEwan, 1999).

## 1.4 Thesis Organization

To accomplish any form of peace in the LPP, one must understand peace as a concept and the various forms of liberal peace that are the target of peacebuiding projects, showing why and how civic peace should be an urgent policy goal in the LPP. This is what the second chapter will explore. Chapter two examines the liberal peace approaches (hyper-conservative,

conservative, orthodox and emancipatory) highlight the benefits and shortcomings of these approaches and how the dynamics or graduations within these approaches play out in actual practice. Furthermore, chapter explores whether civic or durable peace is compatible or incompatible with alternative peacebuilding frameworks: Barnnet's Rebublican Peace Model, Herbst's Conflict Burn Out perspective and Stephen Krasner's International Governance Model.

The third chapter will answer the first research question, exploring the historical underpinnings of violent agitations and conflict in South Sudan and the extent to which all approaches of the LPP in the country have failed to address exclusion from education, subsequently, failing to produce the much desired or needed civic peace with empirical findings. The fourth chapter suggests a framework for prioritizing increased access to formal education as a means of attaining durable peace in order to induce a policy implementation method of the emancipatory approach in the LPP in South Sudan. The last chapter sums up the research in the context of why the policy transposition of liberal peace into Sudan fails and recommend how liberal peace transposition should be conducted to succeed.

# Chapter Two

## Conceptualising Peacebuilding, Peace and Theorizing Liberal Peace Approaches

### 2.1 Conceptual Roots of Peacebuilding

Gultung (1975) coined the term *peacebuilding,* suggesting the need to further peacemaking and peacekeeping operations by developing structures that remove the causes of war in states or avert situations that might induce violent conflicts using indigenous capacity for managing peace and resolving latent conflicts. Reflecting on the concept, Lederach (1997) expanded the notion of *peacebuilding* beyond post conflict agreements, describing it broadly as a comprehensive concept involving processes, approaches and stages needed to sustain peaceful relationships. Lederach (1997)'s conceptualization implies that *peacebuilding* is a dynamic social construct that precedes and proceeds peace agreements. Also, it implies holistic complex processes in which perceptions; behaviors, attitudes and structures causing conflicts are transformed at the psychological, social, economic, political and military levels within a state. The inclusion of the psychosocial dimension into the notion of *peacebuilding* hints the essential need of getting local actors and local context to be focused on for any meaningful *peacebuilding* process. For the purpose of operationalizing *peacebuilding,* I limit the conceptual scope of *peacebuilding* to a "hybrid of political and development activities targeted at the sources of conflict or the provision of long term economic and social conditions that target the root causes of conflict in post-conflict spaces" (The Brahimi Report, 2000: 44). Evolving as a discipline, policy and practice, *peacebulding* initiatives involve local and international actors in multidimensional, multisectoral, and multilevel activities aimed at preventing conflicts through Liberal Peace Projects- building democratic institutions, reduction of social inequalities and the

spread of market economies (Lund, 2003). A legitimate question would be: what kind of peace is hoped to be consolidated through the liberal peace projects?

## 2.2 Conceptualizing Peace and the Durability of Peace types

Peace as a concept is elusive but universal since all social or political communities profess different but at least, some notion of peace (Ryan, 2010): absence of conflict, social justice, order, freedom from want and freedom from need. As a universal concept, peace connotes the absence of war. That is why Howard (2000) conceptualizes peace as a war controlled and an ultimately, war abolished social order. From the perspective of the Liberal Peace Project, different actors, both local and international, implement different activities that gear to two broad types of peace: negative peace and positive peace (Ryan 2000).

### 2.2.1 Negative and Positive Peace and the question of sequencing

Negative peace depicts a status quo in which there is lack of violence and LPP activities connected to achieving peace involve, inducing parties to negotiations, peace agreements and cessation of hostilities through mediation, peacekeeping and peacemaking and security sector reforms to contain imminent violence (Ryan, 2000). Positive peace depicts the lack of violence due to LPP activities that support structural transformations of societies towards socio-political and economic system that foster inclusion, justice and equity (Ryan, 2000). In LPPs, actors are normally faced with the question of which one to priorities in their activities: negative or positive. Should both kinds of peace be pursued at the same time or should there be some sequencing in pursuing peace? Beneath these questions is a search for durable peace in Liberal Peace Projects.

In evaluating the search for durable peace in LPPs Richmond (2006) identifies four graduations of peace types used by various policy analysts and actors to evaluate the effectiveness and sustainability of peacebuilding outcomes. These include victors' peace, institutional peace, constitutional peace and Civil Peace.

## 2.2.2 Victor's Peace, Institutional Peace, Constitutional Peace and Civic Peace

*Victor's peace* in the LPP is a status quo depicting cessation of hostilities and armed violence resulting from military victory as a way of surmounting Hobbesian anarchy in which society is in a state of all against all (Richmond, 2006). Victor's peace has also been supported on international peacebuilding missions. For example, in 1998, peacebuilders in Bosnia quickly organized elections, which reinforced the power of the dominant Croat and Bosniak nationalist parties who were least interested in pursuing interethnic reconciliation (Chandler, 1999). This implies that the Victor's peace has both hegemonic and impositionary qualities resulting in negative peace in states where it is created and perpetuated, ignoring the weaker actors or stakeholders within the state where it is being executed thereby, creating necessary conditions for future wars or unrest by losers of war.

*Institutional peace* rests on liberal norms and laws which states multilaterally agree to guide the behavior for example, through the 1648 Westphalia Treaty or UN Charter and resolutions pertaining to international peace and security (Richmond, 2006). Just like Victors' peace in which was for example, created when the US militarily invaded Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia, invoking liberal ideas of instituting democracy and emancipating local populations, institutional peace, also flags international violation of sovereign state. Also, institutional peace is deemed as non durable peace since it connotes the neglect of local knowledge and local context in transposing institutions thought to create peace.

***Constitutional peace*** rests on Kant's categorical imperative that individuals should never be treated as means to an end and as such anchors on the notion that the consolidation of individual liberties through democracy, free trade and cosmopolitan values within states results in peace (Richmond, 2006). The question of the durability of constitutional peace is troubling because the fact is that local warlords may likely not find any incentive to set up domestic constitutional structures or political structures of a republic that guarantee separation or sharing of administrative, legislative and judiciary power that will outlaw much of their activities. This explains why in 1994, power sharing plans and democratic elections in Rwanda were aborted as extremist members of the then dominating Hutu government rather chose to orchestrate genocidal violence against the Tutsi, their political and ethnic enemies (Paris, 2010).

***Civil peace*** is founded on averting violence through immediate post conflict state response to citizen advocacy and mobilization for human security and social justice and it is generally considered (Richmond, 2006; Chandler, 2010; Ryan, 2010; Ylonen, 2010; Schomerus and Allen, 2010) as the most durable form of peace in any post conflict situation. This is because in civic peace a bottom-up and top-down approach to reaching a peacebuilding consensus among local actors is employed, facilitated by international actors, such that the result is the convergence of "the balance of power, institutionalism, constitutionalism and civil society" (Richmond, 2006: 299) that would bring about lasting peace in post conflict spaces. The argument that the absence of civil peace makes peace unsustainable in post conflict countries is reflected in the analysis of Paris (2010) that the peace building missions of El Slvador and Nicaragua that created political institutions that supported far reaching institutions and economic liberalization made socio-economic inequalities worse, thereby locking the country into conflict.

By their very nature the victor's peace, institutional peace and constitutional peace are state centric and easily take up elements of intervention, coercion and conditionality, generally undermining a balance of consent among warring parties in peacebuilding and making the LPPs fragile. Also, civil peace takes on tints of victor's peace especially when it defines emancipation in post conflict spaces through the hegemonic terms of democratization, rule of law and free market institutions. In actual practice, the aims of victor's peace, institutional peace and constitutional peace occurs in a top-down approach which largely ignores marginalized populations of post conflict situations that may find incentives in perpetuating disorder and violence in the future. Rather, civil peace is a bottom up and a non- state centric version of peacebuilding that focuses on individuals and marginalized groups and social justice in post war situations so as to achieve durable peace. In most LPP, peace is targeted through a combination of top-down or bottom-up approaches that combine, law, governance, civil society democratization and free trade in domestic constitutional documentation, and international treaties, or welfare provision activities of civil societies and NGOs, which are at the heart of new peace in war torn zones. In LPPs, it is therefore clear that these liberal peace types are targeted in various graduations of liberal peace approaches with the ultimate aim of attaining civic peace.

## 2.3 Theoretical Approaches to Exporting Liberal Peace

There are mainly four types: the Hyper-conservative Approach, the Conservative Approach, the Orthodox Approach and the Emancipatory Approach (Richmond, 2006). For conceptual clarity, these approaches can be distinguished but in actual practice, within the same liberal peace project, the approaches are dynamically used depending on who is the peacebuilding actor and at what stage the peacebuilding project is.

### 2.3.1 Hyper-Conservative and Conservative Approaches of the Liberal Peace Project

These conservative approaches to liberal peace employ the method of force and diplomacy, using military force or quasi military measures (long periods of peacekeeping) to cause ceasefire, mediation or negotiation (Richmond, 2006). Ontologically, peace is created through force and elite diplomacy and the nature of peace is the victor's peace and/or constitutional peace that may be a consequence of an international treaty but by nature, it is not institutional peace (Richmond, 2006). By implication, actors involved are usually state officials and regular or irregular military forces. This approach is succinctly captured by NATO and UN interventions into the conflicts of Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1995.

In 1995, Srebrenica, then a UN safe haven for Muslims was overpowered by General Ratko Mladic's Bosnian Serb forces. Bosnian Muslim males were separated from their families and massacred in their thousands despite the presence of Dutch UN troops. Consequently, NATO intervened to secure peace through air strikes against Serb positions, which as a result, helped Muslim and Croat forces to make big territorial gains, killing thousands of Serb civilians on the way (Chandler, 1999). Having created some sort of power balance between the warring factions, they were induced into signing the Dayton Peace Accord in Paris and a UN peacekeeping force was deployed to prevent a relapse into armed violence (Chandler, 1999). This example demonstrates how the cessation of hostility results from an interventionary military might guarantee victor's peace that graduates to constitutional peace (power sharing) preceding the peace accord.

Richmond (2006) holds that LPPs in which the US is the main actor as experienced in Iraq, tend to focus on victor's peace disguised in emancipatory rhetoric and that the sustainability

of such peace created by the conservative approaches is negligible or limited. The erosion of state sovereignty and the incompatibility of conservative approaches to the local context of conflicts are noteworthy. For lack of armed violence to subsist through this approach in conflict zones the military, technical and economic or development resources of foreign actors make local institutions in post conflict zones dependent on external help and unsustainable. As such, it makes the exit of international peace builders unlikely or only possible in the very long run. The sustainability of this peace rests on a "combination of inducement, consent, co-operation, occasionally verging upon the coercive or outright use of force" by an alliance of external actors and state authorities (Richmond, 2006). A more durable peace may find its manifestations in the Orthodox approaches that lead to constitutional or institutional peace.

## 2.3.2 The Orthodox Approach of the Liberal Peace Project

This is a top-down and limited bottom up approach to liberal peacebuilding, which holds that ontologically, "peace rests mainly on constitutional and institutional factors that are universal and can be created through epistemic transference of technical and knowledge frameworks (Richmond, 2006). This model conceptualizes the threats to peace as war or structural violence that is rooted in identity conflict, underdevelopment, terrorism, obstacles to trade and other barriers causing the non establishment of strong norms and regimes (Richmond, 2006). As such, continual relapse into pockets of violence in South Sudan will be interpreted as caused by the lack of participatory governance, the absence of state monopoly of force and an absence of state bureaucracies established in classic Weberian style that should translate into political and social order.

Working with state officials, regular and irregular military forces, international organizations, regulatory organizations and international finance organizations, institutional and constitutional civil governance measures are created to advance social progress and stability through democratic politics and neo-liberal markets in post conflict countries (Chandler, 2010). This approach uses a consensual negotiation framework, to evoke the consent of local actors to a peacebuilding agenda determined by foreign donors, international organizations and international finance organizations of post conflict reconstruction (Richmond, 2006). The Orthodox approach of the LPP is sensitive local actors and local needs basing on civil society activities and on right based activities through state building but assumes technical superiority or patronage and assumes normative universality of norms and conditionalities of a liberal international community to breed a new authoritarian state-centric peace (Chandler, 2010).

The Orthodox approach that leads to authoritarian, constitutional and institutional peace has been criticized from two broad perspectives: "a radical power based perspective… and a policy oriented idea-based perspective (Chandler, 2010:139). From a power based perspective, the LPP is critiqued for injecting liberal hegemonic values to meet the political economic and geostrategic needs of peacebuilders of the global North: opening up economies of the global South through demands for democratization and free markets ( Call, 2008) disguised as external regulatory control aimed at "saving, developing and securing the other" (Chandler, 2010: 142). This implies that in actual fact, the powers behind Orthodox LPP have no incentive to further or incorporate local concerns of culture and identities in post-conflict peacebuilding.

From a policy perspective, Paris (2004) criticizes Orthodox LPPs as undermining the effectiveness of international statebuilding. This is because focusing on reconstructing a sovereign state through external regulatory frameworks erodes the capacity of a state emerging

from conflict, making her institutions incapable of guaranteeing rights, the rule of law and good governance (Paris, 2004). In the context of these weak constitutions in post conflict statebuilding, the promotion of democracy and free markets cannot guarantee social progress and stability as assumed (Paris, 2004). This is because the emergence of competition in market economies of states under reconstruction normally lack urgently needed social welfare institutions to include many poor people who fall out of market competition in time of peacebuilding. This scenario of social welfare exclusion creates necessary conditions for relapse into armed violence. Consequently, all Post Cold War LPP projects of the UN (East Timor, Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, Angola, Haiti, Cambodia and South Sudan) which were either modeled on or ended up using the orthodox approach have not yielded durable peace (Keith and Jutersonke, 2005). However, despite its authoritarian element, constitutional and institutional peace guaranteed in orthodox approach is more durable than the victors' peace in the conservative models. From a theoretical and policy perspective, civil peace in Emancipatory approaches of the LPP would guarantee the most durable peace because of its mainly bottom-up method that includes social welfare in post conflict situations (Richmond, 2006).

### 2.3.3 The Emancipatory Approach of the Liberal Peace Project

This is a highly bottom up and also, top-down peacebuilding approach involving state officials, regular/irregular military forces, international organizations, international financial institutions and civil society personnel to focus on social movements, social actors, social issues, social welfare and social justice as a pathway to durable peace (Richmond, 2006). The emancipatory approach assumes the cause of conflict to be structural violence relating to identity, under-development, trade obstacles, lack of free communication, and lack of representation in governance and social injustices (Richmond, 2006). Ontologically, peace rests on social justice

and free communication between social actors and state officials who recognize the array of differences and identities of marginalized groups in post conflict reconstruction.

The emancipatory approach is dismissive of coerciveness or conditionality upon local actors and dependency of local institutions that retain custodianship of peacebuilding through provision of needs based activities that are modeled to improve social welfare and justice in countries emerging from conflict. Though this approach still carries within it assumptions of the universality of liberal peace, it sells it off to local actors including marginalized groups emerging from conflicts within a discursive or negotiating frame work (Richmond, 2006). Although the civil peace that should result from this emancipatory approach is considered most durable peace in post-conflict time, no post Cold-War context of post-conflict reconstruction are largely or completely identifiable with this approach. The reason is that much literature on peacebuilding failures point to the lack of social justice and socioeconomic well being and/or development as some of the factors that undermine the sustainability of liberal peace (Paris, 2004; Ryan, 2010; Ylonen, 2010; Schomerus and Allen, 2010). Deductively, one can assert that the lack of civil peace undermines the success of LPP. In any case aspects of civil peace are always the pursuit of agencies (DFID for example in South Sudan) or International Voluntary Organizations (like Oxfam, Plan, and Interpeace) whose version of liberal peace must be anchored on local needs assessment as well as donor. Depending on who are the major actors in peace building or the phases of post-conflict reconstruction, either of the three approaches may be used for attaining liberal peace on a single peacebuilding mission.

## 2.4 Graduations in Liberal Peace Projects

Depending on what the immediate impediments to peace are, the type of peace that is envisaged, the overall sustainability of peace in post conflict situations, liberal peace generally tends to graduate from conservative modes into institutional and constitutional modes or from highly interventionary to more consensual versions (Richmond, 2006). Emergency periods in post conflict countries may necessitate the conservative approach to peace as a way of promoting norms of the liberal international community so as to subsequently reinforce new constitutional mechanisms in post conflict states. As indicated before and as shown on the following figure, the emancipatory approach to liberal peace is most often the objective of peacebuilding but hardly the goal.

**Figure 1.  Current examples of the Liberal Peace Graduations in Peacebuilding**



Source: Richmond O., (2006), *The Problem of Peace: Understanding the "Liberal Peace,"*P.303

Although civil peace remains the overall objective of the LPP, the emancipatory model is in practice never the dominant approach of any peacebuilding mission. As such, the   main

criticism that has been made against this approach on conceptual grounds. In trying to create civil peace, there is the tendency to widen the local actors more (individuals and marginalized groups) whose interests and identities are necessary for more durable consensual peace. Reflecting on this scenario the creation of civil peace seems to take bigger discords, differences interest and antagonisms, making peace contested and creating the proclivity to war (Kaldor, 2013). This attempt to tip off liberal peace as unsustainable in post conflict spaces creates the need for a brief survey of alternative models to determine what may possibly guarantee peace in a post conflict context like South Sudan.

## 2.5 Alternatives Models to Peacebuilding

Extrapolating from the notion of durable peace in this chapter, alternative models to the LPP would have to follow the following criteria: manifest an expanded scope and activities that make social, economic and political institutions of post conflict states inclusive and reflexive of stable social patterns in the host context. These criteria are important in averting the problem of the LPP as depicted in Bosnia (like in East Timor and Afghanistan),it undermined efforts to create inclusive institutions that turned out to be unstable and dependent on external support to legitimize effective functioning in the long run (Chandler, 1999). Secondly, for durable peace to maximize, alternative models to the LPP must provide conceptual and practical ways to lessen the obtrusive nature of international presence in peacebuilding by guaranteeing that local actors to conflict are free to maximize the freedom in choosing between alternatives and goals of durable peace (Paris, 2010). These will help avert the "crisis of credibility and of confidence… in the Western Liberal Peace Project" Cooper, 2007: 605). From this perspective I examine briefly the following alternatives:

### 2.5.1 Barnnet's Rebublican Peace Model

Barnett argues that in post conflict peace building, there is need to prioritize substantive, continuous deliberations among members of the society. These deliberations will enable individuals to consider the view of others…widen their appeal, find a common language, articulate common ends, … detach from self… and subordinate the personal to community (Barnett, 2006: 98). He argues that democratic elections do not guarantee this and proposes that a variety of methods of representation are necessary for establishing the process of creating a legitimate state that is restrained in its ability to exercise arbitrary power, which in turn maximizes conflict among factions (Barnett, 2006). Although this version of peacebuilding would guarantee improved political participation not necessarily in constitutionally guaranteed individual rights of the LPP, it qualifies more as a variant of the LPP, advancing individual freedom and government accountability in post conflict situation (Paris, 2010). Beyond these generally impressive liberal provisions emphasizing community needs, obligated citizen participation, civic duty and unity and popular sovereignty, its practice in actual post conflict situations is uncharted and no policy frameworks for effective implementation is put forward by Barnett.

### 2.5.2 Herbst's Conflict Burn-Out Perspective

Owing to the forgone analysis of failure in the LPP in post Cold War years, Herbst (2003) opposes the very idea of deploying international missions of peacebuilding. His main reason is that failures in LPP have frozen in place unstable distributions of power among warring factors and post-conflict political structures that are removed from postwar social, political and economic patterns (Herbst, 2003), making reconstruction futile. Reflecting on this

proposition, it would seem that Herbst assumes that war is policy by other means- a situation in which there is no economic, political or social vacuum emerging from destruction but a transformed socio-economic and political pattern in post war countries sustained by institutions of the victor's peace. Herbst (2003) therefore, advices that states be left to fail or fight to burn-out point, enabling new forms of political authority to consolidate in Hobbesian perspective of sovereignty where the victor is above and rather supervises a new social contract in post conflict. This argument is evidenced in the fact that civil conflicts that end in military victories (for example, in Uganda) tend to produce lasting peace than those that end in negotiated settlement (Paris, 2010). As earlier pointed out in this research, the resulting peace eventuating from this model is always negative (a provisional absence of armed violence) and unsustainable because the unresolved causes of conflicts relating to identity and exclusion problems remain an incentive for a relapse to war in the short and long run.

Compared with the LPP, from a policy perspective, Herbst's option is dangerous: victors may decimate losers (Rwandan Genocide); wars may go on unending (Democratic Republic of Congo); and spillover effects (refugees, arms trafficking) may pose international security problems (Paris, 2010). The destructive impacts rather than mere symbolic transformation of local governing institutions caused by any civil war is indisputable and the fact that most civil conflicts tend to end in negotiated settlements makes Herbst's perspective way removed for the context of peacebuilding as a policy practice nowadays (Paris, 2010).

### 2.5.3 Stephen Krasner's International Governance Model

To avert problems of durable peace in LPP, Krasner (2004) calls for international governance of failed states for an indefinite time period. That is to establish trusteeships or external governance interventions that show no intention of ceding authority to local actors

(2004). Just like in colonial times this induces local populations to grow increasingly resistant to external domination. As such, sufficient time needed to guarantee peace in those post conflict spheres are severely curtailed, making the peacebuilding mission more of an obstruction than facilitation for consolidating post conflict peace (Chandler, 2010; Paris, 2010). Krasner's approach does not meet the need to widen local actors and institutions to cover issues of social injustices in post conflict situation nor does it avert problems of perceived external intrusion in post conflict societies and as such the resulting peace will be fragile.

The even greater fragility of peace in alternative models shown above is sufficient to assert that the promotion of liberal democratic governance systems and market oriented economic growth in post conflict countries remains the most tenable approach to peacebuilding. Most countries that have hosted LPP are no longer fighting (Paris, 2010). Although this may not be the way to measure durability of liberal peace, it has caused some gains in post-conflict societies. Oxfam International (2007) estimated that armed conflicts in Africa from 1990 to 2005 did cost $284 billions, which is 15% of the GDP of countries in war. Furthermore, compared to African countries at peace, those in civil wars have 50% more infant mortality, 15% more undernourished people, 12.4 % less food per person on average, 20 % more of adult illiteracy and a life expectancy of 5 years less. This statistics support Paris's (2010) view that the cessation of current LPP projects is tantamount to the endorsement of lawlessness, predation, disease and fear on millions of persons in countries like South Sudan. The question of durable peace in LLP in places like South Sudan necessitates an emancipatory approach that accommodates minorities, resolve participatory governance issues and social welfare exclusion that underlie the root causes of armed violence in the country.

# Chapter Three

## South Sudan: Post CPA Peacebuilding and the Need for Reform

### 3.1 South Sudan: Preliminary Facts

The Republic of South Sudan (RSS) is a federal, presidential democratic republic that gained independence from the Sudan on July 9, 2011, following internecine civil wars dating way back to colonial times.  The country[1] has a land surface of about 239.285 square miles (similar size to France), and it is made up of ten states (see map) and eighty-six counties with a much dispersed, rural population of 10.31 million people, in a volatile conflict zone (House of Commons, 2012).  Seventy two (72) % of the population is aged 30 and less. The country has one of the worse social indicators in the world: 8 out of 10 persons live on less than $1.63 a day; a net primary education enrolment of 46%; a qualified teacher to pupil ratio of 1:117 and a literacy rate of 27% (House of Commons, 2012). The country's economy is unhealthily dependent on oil that guarantees 98% of GDP from which 35% of revenue is spent on state security and security sector reforms and 7% and 4% respectively are devoted to health and education (GoSS, 2011). From December, 2011 violent conflicts have been noted especially in the states of Jonglei, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile. The country is bedecked by lack of basic services, poor harvests, rising food prices, lack of jobs, lack of governance skills in public officials, corruption/nepotism in public institutions and political domination (House of Commons, 2012). These challenges are more likely to degenerate the existing authoritarian peace into war.

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[1] It is bordered to the north by Sudan, to the east by Ethiopia, to the west by Central African Republic and to the west by Uganda, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The reality of post CPA violence and post independence instability in the RSS has often been understood as caused by the interference of the North Sudan and tribal conflicts in the south (Schomerus and Allen, 2010). Far from this, Richardson (2011) asserts that land access, grazing rights, lack of public services and oil constitute the immediate causes of conflicts and threats to durable peace. The Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka in Abyei and the Misseriya and the Nuba in Southern Kordofan are on record regularly for such conflicts (Bennet et. al., 2010). These conflicts are founded on grievance in equality, security and exclusive institutions (de Waal, 2007), they are also cyclical and have deep historical roots (Bennet et. al., 2010). From its status as part of the Republic of Sudan, these challenges have been structurally embedded, thereby making the move towards positive peace that address the structural transformation of state institutions an imperative for today's RSS.

## 3.2 South Sudanese History and structural roots of Conflicts

The history of the RSS may easily be read as a story of a people agitating against structural exclusion, discrimination and grievance. The Ango-Egyptian Condominium that began in 1899 officialized racial and cultural distinctions in the 1930s (Jeffrey, 2011). Subsequently, only one southern Sudanese –the Buth Diu was selected to represent the three Southern Sudanese states at the 1951 Constitutional Commission whereas, sixteen persons from the six Northern Sudanese states and three British were selected to prepare the country for 1956 independence (Jeffrey, 2011).

The political domination of Southern Sudan by Northern Sudan was a major cause of the Torith revolt of 1955, when the Southerners first demanded for a federation at independence (Jeffrey, 2011). From 1957 to 1962 all Christian schools of the South were taken over by the

26

Government of Sudan in what is called Arabimization and Islamaization (Jeffrey, 2011; Richardson, 2011). This imposition of the Arabic language and content and culture on formal education had several implications. Firstly, it severely limited the access of Southerners to schools and promoted a sort of education that legitimized cultural suppression and social exclusion of the Southern ethnic groups. Secondly, it lowered the retention rates of Southern Sudanese at school, which translated into exclusion of Southerners from skilled professions or from public service institutions and political participation.

The problem of South Sudanese exclusion from education by the Sudanese government caused the 1963 Start of Anya-Nya movement vowing to liberate South Sudan but it ended up in a 1972 Addis Ababa Accord between the Anya Nya and Sudan Government (Jeffrey, 2011). In 1978 huge oil deposits were discovered in Southern Sudan near Bentiu (Unity State) and Heglig. In 1980, Nimeriy decreed changes in Southern Sudan's borders, thereby nursing the current conflict over Heglig as a disputed geographical area today between Sudan and RSS (Bennett et. al. 2010). This caused the 1981 Anya-Nya II resurgence. This was followed in May 1983 by a mutiny of Southern Sudanese soldiers that saw John Garang heading the SPLA/SPLM formation. Alongside mutineers and other armed groups, they unceasingly fought for the independence of South Sudan (Jeffrey, 2011) till the CPA of 2005.

Internecine conflicts in the history of South Sudan shows that peace accords that do not target the structural causes of conflict, which in this case is exclusion from social welfare services,  domination or suppression of ethnic identities, centre-periphery inequality, conflict over resources, intra-elite competition and brute causes or criminality risk relapsing into a cycle of violence (de Waal, 2007). If accountable institutions are not in place to guarantee immediate socio-political inclusion, social welfare and  economic equity for the majority of her citizens,  a

27

country risks not attaining durable or civic peace but an unstable institutional and constitutional peace.

**3.3 The CPA in the Search of Institutional and Constitutional Peace in South Sudan**

The CPA is significant as a starting point for the LPP or Peacebuilding in South Sudan in which the IGAD and many western states headed by the US induced the signing of the CPA and went forth to dominate the post CPA implementation program (Ylonen, 2012). The CPA was the accord signed between the NCP of the Sudan and the SPLM/A of Southern Sudan in 2005, establishing a Government of National Unity and an interim government of Southern Sudan to end 22 years of civil conflict rooted way before 1956, to end civil war between the parties (Bennett, 2010). The CPA reflected checks on territorial security, sharing of political power and wealth between Sudan and South Sudan (CPA, 2005).

As such, the CPA granted 70% of the executive, legislative and political institutions of the Southern Sudan to the SPLM/A, 15% to other Southern Sudan Parties and 15 % to the Government of Sudan (CPA, 2005: 32-33). Popular grievance among Southern Sudanese was addressed by providing that a plebiscite could be conducted to assess the need for self determination by 2011 if they felt the unity with Sudan was "unattractive" (CPA, 2005: 2). This CPA was hailed for addressing the economic marginalization of South Sudanese and their exclusion from state institutions through democratization, the observance of Human Rights and resolving questions around citizenship and promoting free markets (Ylonen, 2012). In this context the basic functions of government took precedence over wider concerns of political inclusion, civil society and social welfare (Bannet, et. al., 2010).

This implies that the CPA has taken on a statebuilding role. From this perspective, the structural causes of violent conflicts in South Sudan are seen as or thought of as rooted in the lack of democratic institutions, the inability for the state to monopolize the use of violence and the absence of state structures to guarantee political and social other (Ylonen, 2012). External peacebuilders tend to strengthen local institutions of governance, the rule of law and security sector reform. The CPA became the basis for foreign peace building missions to concentrate on border security, wealth sharing, army demobilization (Bennett et. al., 2010) and to a lesser extend good governance (Ylonen, 2012). From the perspective of institutional and constitutional peace and civil peace, the CPA may be characterized as unsuccessful.

Firstly, the areas of Abyei, southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile were significant areas of the civil war of 1985 -2005, from where many joined the SPLM/A to fight for a democratic Sudan (Bennet et. al., 2010). However, the CPA negotiations did not include representatives of the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile; Darfur and Red Sea Region insurgents and many political and military fragmentations of southern Sudan, thereby legitimating a kind of authoritarian peace or victor's peace on SPLM/A and NCP, the main parties to CPA (Ylonen, 2012). Moreover, the exclusive nature of the CPA meant that the mechanisms for transnational justice (evaluating and adjudicating atrocities of the civil war) in Southern Sudan were left to the whims and caprices of the SPLM government, projecting the authoritarian nature of the victor's peace, which tends to relapse into violence in the future. As such, this CPA simplified a complex history, dynamics and actors of the southern Sudanese conflict into a fragile constitutional peace.

The fragility of this constitutional peace was manifested in the first milestone of the CPA -the first multiparty national elections held in 25 years in Sudan in 2010. At the national level,

the NCP won 73% of the seats, while the SPLM won 22%. Omer Hassan al-Bashir was re-elected as President of the Republic, with SPLM leader Salva Kiir Mayardit re-appointed as first Vice-president (Bannett et. al. 2010). However, each protagonist was alleged to have suppressed local populations with military threats in the countdown to the election process (Bannett et.al., 2010). This explains why there were some post-election destabilization in Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei by independent candidate losers who retain their private militias (Bannet et. al., 2010; Richardson, 2011). After the elections, most of the opposition lost representation and significant human rights abuses were recorded against the SPLM government by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor and the US Department of State (Ylonen, 2012). Furthermore, in failing to observe the UN multilateral treaties on peace and Human Rights to which South Sudan is a party, the country failed to manifest any sustainable institutional peace. All these depict the fragility of the LPP in the RSS.

### 3.4 The Republic of South Sudan and the search for Durable Peace

The historical causes of conflict in South Sudan (categorized as new war) may seem intractable (Kaldor, 2013) but the internal causes of regular post-settlement violence suggests that statebuilding priorities retain major elements of the structure of political power that undergird the historical past of the RSS (Bannet et. al., 2010). In prioritizing this statebuilding, the LPPs in the RSS are undermining durable peace in the country. See Schomerous and Allen's (2010:10) incisive review of the LPP in the RSS.

### 3.4.1 The Orthodox Approach of the LPP in South Sudan: International Interventions

International peacebuilders use the orthodoxy approach of the LPP: prioritizing internationalization of RSS by habituating new political norms that tend to reflect conditions and

benchmarks of global governance institutions, promoting values like accountability, transparency, separation of powers and elections. To sustain liberal peace in RSS however, the National Democratic Institute recommend that these interventions would have to consider concomitantly more emphasis on "better access to services that leads to improvements on the quality of life and guarantee peace dividends" to marginalized and politically excluded groups (Schomorus and Allen, 2010: 71).

Table One: **Key Conflict Areas addressed by International Interventions**

| Reform of justice and security institutions | Culture of justice, truth and reconciliation | Good governance | Socioeconomic development |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Reintegration of demobilised soldiers is insufficient** | Uncertainty about the future and false expectations | North/South disparities, and intra-South marginalisation | Status of the Three Areas. **International attention diverted from the Three Areas** |
| **Undeveloped police and justice systems** | Hardening of ethnic identities | **Tensions around centralisation and weak structures at State levels** | Migration of armed pastoralists (this has not featured in 2005); discontented and under-employed youth |
| **Incomplete disarmament among the population** | Unresolved issues of access to natural resources | Lack of representation | Returnees want access to resources. **Return destabilises communities** |

 Source: Bannet et. al., (2010), *Aiding the Peace*, p. 43.

   Figure Two shows the orthodox approaches of multilateral interventions like the UN and bilateral (largely, the US) promotion of Liberal peace. The bolded areas of intervention in post conflict Sudan indicated on the figure -reintegration of soldiers, development of police and justice systems, tensions around centralization / weak state structures and the return and reintegration of refugees dominate the LPP in RSS. However, these must be pursued at the same time with felt needs of the local communities in RSS if peace is to be sustained.

By comparing what international peacebuilders pursue, what the Government of RSS pursues and the funding priorities of the main actors of peacebuliding, we discover a gap between the international objectives of legitimating the new state and the actual local needs for sustainable peace.

Figure Two:  **Funding Priorities of the RSS (GoSS) versus Funding Priorities of**
               **International Peacebuilders**

## GoSS estimates of relative donor support for 6 priority sectors (amounts in millions of USD)

| Sector | GoSS | Donors |
|---|---|---|
| Security | 438 | 12 |
| Basic Education | 99 | 27 |
| Roads | 184 | 93 |
| Water | 28 | 25 |
| Production | 29 | 47 |
| Basic Health | 52 | 94 |

Source:  Government of South Sudan (2010:3).

Figure Three shows how peacebuilding funding to some basic services such as water and education easily elude international intervention into post conflict Sudan despite the felt local need of access to these services in RSS.  When this figure is casted against the wider Government of South Sudan  (2010) budget,  Security accounts for 35% of the country's expenditure, basic services like health and education account for 7% and 4% of budget and rural development accounts for 3.4% of the budget (House of Commons, 2012). From the perspective

of the emancipatory approach to liberal peace the RSS is increasingly being set for relapse into violence because of the lack of peace dividends and adequate social welfare among marginalized and rural communities emerging from conflict. Returnees expect better levels of services, non discrimination along tribal lines (or Dinka domination) and deconcentration of development in Juba. Without these, local populations may begin to anticipate violence and politicians will continue to develop power bases centered on ethnic identity to eventually crumble the current existing negative peace (Bennet et. al., 2010).

The international interventions into peacebuilding in Sudan shows that it has largely been a top-down process aimed at replicating *westernity* without regard to local context. The current LPP approaches highly prioritize centralized urban political institutions over heterogeneous local needs preferences, which retard the peace that the citizenry wish for themselves leading to authoritarian peace that narrows down political participation of citizens to elections. To guarantee durable civic peace in RSS, Richmond suggest that orthodox peacebuilding must depart and the LPP must focus on "how one can move beyond hegemonic, authoritarian peace towards and everyday notion of peace sensitized to the local as well as the state and the global… and resting on a just social order and solidarity" (2008: 109).

### 3.4.2  Social Welfare Exclusion and the LPP in South Sudan: Evidence from Local context

Afrobarometer's (2002) survey on what legitimizes a democratic society showed that 89% of respondents pointed to basic needs provision (water, food and shelter) while 75 % want "democracy to deliver…education,  even more strongly that they insist on regular elections, majority rule, competing political parties or freedom to criticize the government" (Afrobarometer, 2002: 2).  Similarly, a survey of Southern Sudan by the NDI reported that the

move for secession from Sudan is "to avert domination of Arabs… and …that independent Southern Sudan will be more prosperous" (Levy and Cook, 2010: 7). This implies that the fragility of the democratic institutions in the RSS that translate into frail liberal peace is wanting from the perspective of delivering immediate improvements in the socioeconomic sphere.

Afrobarometer's survey of nineteen African states undergoing peacebuilding in 2008, found out that 66% of the populations judged their governments to have economic policies that does not benefit, but instead worsen the standards of living of the poor (Little and Logan, 2008). Also, 50% of those surveyed judged their local government institutions to be illegitimate, using revenues for public gain rather than providing public services (Little and Logan, 2008). This suggests that in a country recovering from conflict like the RSS, the attainment of durable peace can tend to be fragile.

In view of graduating from an orthodox approach to an emancipatory approach that leads to durable peace in the LPP, Grindle (2004) has suggested that government's that have weak institutions must concentrate on providing public services such as security in poor neighborhoods and in local markets. Also, the government in such a situation should concomitantly assess what needs constitute, as well as what local populations' perception of peace dividends is (Grindle, 2004). This implies that international intervention in the LPP of South Sudan would best yield durable peace if it supports the RSS to efficiently respond to services needed by the most vulnerable local populations in the short and long run.

A foreign peacebuilding actor (NDI) in the RSS conducted a survey[2] using 67 focused groups and a sample of 700 persons representative of all states, location, tribe, religion, gender and age group from March to June, 2011 on two issues: Firstly, what local populations of the RSS prefer as the object of peacebuilding among *Democracy, Development or Both*

CEU eTD Collection

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[2] The raw data of this survey is available for reference at the website http://www.popularpeace.org/#!research_data/c96h

(Roberts, 2012). Secondly, the survey sought to determine what democratization agenda should be pursued in peacebuilding (Roberts, 2012). Participants overwhelmingly (59.1%) preferred that in peacebuilding, development (well being, improved standards of living) should precede democracy (elections); 37.7% preferred democracy to development and 3.2% preferred that both democracy and development be pursued in the LPP of the RSS (Roberts, 2012). While those who preferred development thought of democracy as politics and an urban affair, those who believed in democracy define it in terms of the socio-economic dividends it may offer in post-conflict times. This resonates with the view that the narrow definition and support for liberal peace by the international community in line ''with the overarching neoliberal economic paradigm and failure to embrace an inclusivist approach to peacebuilding" works against ''effective reconstruction, growth and development" (Pemunta, 2013:192). A Primary educated, Christian male in Juba for example, said "with democracy, government will hear the cry of the people and then bring development" (Roberts 2012: 15). Democracy was also thought of as a way to handle tribalism, nepotism and corruption that make public service institutions inefficient and ineffective (Roberts, 2012). The Second survey question on which priorities public services in the RSS must focus on in peacebuilding showed that:

As a first, second and third preference for peace dividend education constitutes 24.9%, 32.8% and 21.8% of the whole sample surveyed. In general access to education is the second significant measure of expected peace dividend in the RSS. It is only second to access to water as the first, chosen by 27.5%, 14.6% and 19.5% of the surveyed sample as their first, second and third preference in public service provision if the LPP in South Sudan is to yield durable peace. Healthcare features in general, as the third public service provision that should underpin durable peace in the RSS.

Figure Three: **Local Preferences for Peace Dividends in the RSS**

Source: Roberts (2012), *Surveying South Sudan: The Liberal, the Local and theLegitimate*,P.17

The data of figure four corroborates with another survey of the RSS by the LSE and PACT, a development organization. The LSE/PACT study concludes that better access to social services guaranteed through infrastructural development and improved quality of life would be the most remarkable aspects of any durable peace in South Sudan (Schomerus and Allen, 2010). But how should social welfare be initiated and sustained for South Sudan's most venerable groups? A religious leader in Raja County, South Sudan put it "information and knowledge is desperately needed for us to become informed citizens" (Schomerus and Allen, 2010:71). This is because as the following chapter will briefly advocate, providing a framework to serve as a policy recommendation of this study, education does not only improve the quality of civic engagement but also the quality of life for the educated and of the community in which he or she lives.

# Chapter Four

**An Advocacy for Increased Access to Formal Education in the LPP**

**4.1 Formal Education and the Durability of Liberal Peace in South Sudan**

Formal schooling and training in conflict transformation sensitizes a society to the inequities of the system to facilitate intergroup dialogue; healing and reconciliation; and nurturing the idea or capacity for peace through integrated schools having curricula related to community relations, vocational training and community development at primary and post primary vocational levels (Bush and Saltereli, 2000). The need for education to help citizens to contribute to quality participatory governance has been avidly expressed in South Sudan (Schomerus and Allen 2010). It has been made clear that restricted access to education or an inappropriate curricula such as the Arabimisation or Islamisation of Southern Sudanese schools (Jeffrey, 2011; Richardson, 2011) led to the deterioration of interethnic relations (Bush and Saltereli, 2000), created an unskilled, corrupt, and Dinka dominated civil service (House of Commons, 2012), making liberal peace unstable in South Sudan. Although UNICEF's current Peace Education in South Sudan organizes workshops in mediation, negotiation, conflict management and non-competitive dialogue, it is a top-down process that helps in resolving immediate and proximate causes of violence and not the structural causes in rather abstract ways (Bush and Saltereli, 2000).

Peacebuilding Education should rather be a bottom-up process in which children of primary age are incentivized (through provision of meals at school, for instance) to stay at school, where they will be reoriented to attitudes of peace. In a limited top-down process, international peacebuilders should support the RSS to build primary schools and post-primary schools, teacher training colleges and vocational institutions so as to support durable peace. It is

a process founded on the experiences and opportunities to augment the capacity for wellbeing among a highly unskilled and unemployed South Sudanese youth by providing them with immediate and relevant vocational training that facilitates entrepreneurship, trade and higher incomes that incentivizes them to avert proclivity to war. As an indispensible factor, Peacebuilding Education should immediately be incorporated into current orthodox (Domocratization and free market institutionalization) of the current LPP in Sudan in order to actualize the Emancipatory approach to LPP that results in durable civic peace.

### 4.1.1 Access to Primary Education and the Durability of Liberal Peace

After the CPA the number of primary pupils has increased from about 700,000 to 1.6 million but the RSS does not yet have the capacity to keep up with the demand for education. Additionally, donor support for education remains highly insufficient in reconstruction programs in the country (IRIN, 2012).  UNICEF estimates that in Sudan, 70% of children aged between 6 and 17 have never been to school, 1 out of 10 pupils complete primary school and less than 2% of the population have completed primary schooling (IRIN, 2012).  This lack of access to education is (pictured on Appendix 1 in which pupils in Yei, Jonlei state are photographed sitting on makeshift benches under a tree) reflected in the lack of teachers space and classrooms for learning.  Wandera, an adult learner in Kuol, South Sudan who thinks that education will preclude war in the country asserts that:  "Education is very, very important for peace. If you are educated you will able to know what peace is, you will be able to educate people about reconciliation, forgiveness and coming together to solve problems" (IRIN, 2012: np).

Luc (2001) holds that formal education facilitates sustainable peace in three ways that are relevant to the South Sudanese Context, if the syllabi are designed to foster community relations

and community development. Firstly, primary education would be a fora for effective interethnic communication. Considering that about 66 ethnic languages are spoken in South Sudan (IRIN, 2012), the use of English as a common language will serve as a good means of interethnic communication. Secondly it helps dismantle sentimental walls relating to perceived domination by the Dinka or other forms of groupings such as the SPLM (Luc, 2001). Increase access to primary schooling takes away despair from victims of social exclusion because it nurtures individuals with requisite skills for future political participation and solves in the long run, political tensions (Luc, 2001). Hannah Bol, in Kuol, asserted that "Now that schools have been opened, everyone has seen that education is important and that they need to come, and that war and guns are not the future" (IRIN, 2012, np). Luc (2001) thirdly, holds that formal primary schooling in integrative schools promote an integrative political climate. The government of the RSS currently runs on the basis of exclusive circles of patronage and marginalization (Bennett et. al., 2010). Participation in governance would therefore, become skilled-based with the introduction of formal education.

### 4.1.2 Vocational Training, Peace Dividends and the Durability of Liberal Peace

This study has established that there is a strong correlation, almost favouring causal link between the provision of peace dividends (schooling, health services, jobs, higher living standards- Social development) and the durability of peace. "The lack of livelihoods opportunities for youth and the potential for creating and exacerbating tensions and relapse to violence" in post war states has also been noted (Bennet. et. al., 2010: xvii ). This has been recorded especially in Lakes, Warrap, Jonglei and Upper Nile States, which are the most conflict-affected regions in South Sudan. In the survey conducted by the NDI on what locals in South Sudan preferred as peace dividends, some said "If we are educated…we would not so

much think of government to do for us everything;" "we would create our own project and work on our own roads but we do not have the skills so we really need education to be the priority here" (2011: 9).

This suggests that for international peace building interventions to solidify peace, the RSS must be supported to create an enabling environment for young people's livelihoods and/or employment. Considering the very low literacy levels in South Sudan, the setting up of rural craft schools in carpentry, masonry, pottery, and agriculture and institutes for electricity and electronics, maintenance, production engineering, dress making, nursing, clerical studies are necessary if durable peace is to be attained. For our intent, vocational studies help academically less able students, instilling technological knowledge related to some particular function, craft and trade ((Psacharopourus, 1997). In the following figure, I devise a framework to show how vocational education brings about peace dividends to sustain peace.

Figure Four: **The Links between Vocational Training and Peace Dividends**

In the past, vocational training has been criticized as a financially costly policy to implement, being of lower value to academic or general education in terms of the low income it attracts and the false probability that it can guarantee quicker employment (Psacharopuourus, 1997). Nowadays, vocational education is seen as training that facilitates specific vocational skills for a lifetime that would manifest in entrepreneurship, poverty reduction and the integration of idling young people in South Sudan into the working world of the informal or private sector (Che, 2000; Oketch, 2007).

In practice, vocational education would train the workforce for self-employment and to raise the productivity of the informal sector (Oketch, 2007). The availability of skills would attract more foreign direct investments, modernizing South Sudan and promoting heterogeneous communities that facilitate interethnic integration. Vocational training has been likened to some form of social engineering: transforming unemployed youth to find employment, providing poor segments in society with a rising income and improved living standards and supplying to a community emerging from the destruction of war, middle level technicians such as, nurses, midwifes, plumbers and brick layers ((Psacharopuourus, 1997). This is why vocational education is considered as socially useful work, which would help citizens develop stronger awareness of the contribution of their work to the wellbeing of society (Che, 2000). When Social Welfare development for all is triggered through the extension of access to formal schooling, the democratization and institutionalization of the free market that yield fragile authoritarian peace, constitutional peace and institutional peace graduate into an emancipatory approach that addresses social injustices to yield durable civic peace.

# Chapter Five

## General Conclusion

This study has found that the deep root causes of relapse to violence in South Sudan are historically situated on ethnic segregation orchestrated by the Anglo-Egyptian rule of the then Southern Sudan. This dual rule left the area bereft of public goods, social welfare institutions or solid economic development outcomes. This segregation extended to political exclusion as at independence, of more than 900 positions of post colonial administration, people from the three states of southern Sudan only got appointed into 8 (GoSS, 2011).

Shortly, after independence restricted access to Social welfare, especially formal education informed ethnic domination over or exclusion of Southern Sudanese in the realm of political participation. Consequently, the incomprehensible nature of the CPA that legitimized the Dinka's domination of the SPLM/A government caused the exclusion of significant local actors from the peace deal. Subsequent political participation has further undermined the search for durable peace. Because most of the liberal peace building in independent South Sudan fails to implement projects that simultaneously strengthen democratic institutions as well as address the deep rooted causes of relapse to conflict - lack of social welfare institutions that should lead to peace dividends, the liberal peace that is this far instituted or constituted is indeed, fragile.

Surveys conducted by Afrobarometer (2002&2008) and the National Democratic Institute (2011) indicating local preference for the immediate delivery of formal education, health, other basic needs (clean water) over democratization, suggests that the Liberal Peace Export to South Sudan is divorced from local context making the transposition of liberal peace projects ineffective and making liberal peace fragile in the country. This asymmetry of information on what constitutes need for durable peace between international peacebuilders

(principal) and the South Sudanese citizens and locals (agent) has exacerbated ethnic marginalization and made the institutional installations of the LPP faulty.

The issue of 'marginalization it translates to equate to lack of services (like water, health and education) against areas/peoples in the Jonglei and Blue Nile states, that are also lagging behind representation in political structures. The role of the State in regulating such disparities has been minimal or even negative. It operates on the basis of exclusive circles of patronage and marginalization. Marginalization plays out as the stick and patronage as the carrot within the context of social welfare exclusion and inclusion among different ethnic groups ( Bennet et. al.,2010).   Although the emancipatory approach is considered impractical in the LPP, this research recommends the provision of primary education and post-primary vocational education (detailed in Chapter 4) as a policy implementation path to actualize the emancipatory approach to the LPP in South Sudan.

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# Appendix 1

Children Attend Classes under a tree in a village near Yei in South Sudan



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