

**DECENTRALIZATION AND INTER-ETHNIC
COOPERATION: COMPARING MULTIETHNIC
MUNICIPALITIES IN MACEDONIA**

By

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Abstract

After a small-scale ethnic conflict between the Macedonians and Albanians in 2001, Macedonia adapted power-sharing at the central level of government combined with decentralization in the form of enhanced local self-governance. With its mosaic multiethnic structure, Macedonia belongs to the group of ethnically, culturally and religiously divided societies where decentralized institutions were designed to accommodate increased demands for minority rights and to encourage different ethnic communities to cooperate. Yet whether decentralization serves its goal cannot be observed from the aggregate country level (Varshney 2002, Mehler and Tull 2011). Since decentralization exhibits its impacts at the subnational level, it is crucial to assess whether there is a variety of inter-ethnic cooperation across subnational units. Hence, the research question of this thesis is: What types of inter-ethnic cooperation are there across multiethnic municipalities in Macedonia seven years after the decentralization reforms?

To address the research question, I engage in a systematic comparative analysis of nine multiethnic municipalities in Macedonia. The data gathering besides investigation of primary and secondary sources includes exploratory fieldwork through focus group interviews. Employing thematic and fuzzy set ideal type analysis, I derive four types of inter-ethnic cooperation among municipal councilors: dynamic, predominantly informal, pragmatic and minimal cooperation. Out of this analysis I derive hypotheses of the diverse impacts decentralization has across subnational units within the same country. I finally conduct fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to account why in some municipalities there is absence of dynamic inter-ethnic cooperation.

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List of Abbreviations

ANA - Albanian National Army
CICR- Committees for Inter-community Relations
DPA - Democratic Party of the Albanians
DPS - Democratic Party of the Serbs
DPT - Democratic Party of the Turks
DUI - Democratic Union for Integration
ELSG- Enhanced local-self governance
IEC- Inter-ethnic cooperation
KFOR - Kosovo Force
LDP - Liberal Democratic Party
LLSG- Law on Local Self-Governance
LTR- Law on Territorial Reorganization
OFA- Ohrid Framework Agreement
PDP - Party for Democratic Prosperity
SDSM - Socijal-demokatski sojuz na Makedonija (Social Democratic Union of Macedonia)
VMRO-DPMNE - Vnatresna makedonska revolucionerna organizacija –Demokratska partija za makedonsko nacionalno edinstvo (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Party for Macedonian National Unity)
UCK - Ushtria Clirimtare Kombetare (National Liberation Army– NLA/ONA)
UCK - Ushtria Clirimtare E Kosoves (Kosovo Liberation Army -KLA)

INTRODUCTION

After a small-scale ethnic conflict between the Macedonians and Albanians in 2001, Macedonia introduced power-sharing at the central level of government combined with decentralization in the form of enhanced local self-governance. Out of eighty municipalities in total, twenty-four are multiethnic with the potential to implement enhanced local self-governance. The new Law on Local Self-Governance of 2002 is embedded in the broader objective of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) of 2001. It aims to achieve peace through a process of integration and accommodation, institutional bargaining and compromise at both the municipal and state level, without creating federal or regional levels of governance. Against this background, Macedonia has been recognized as a country where decentralization contributes to the successful management of inter-ethnic conflict (Lyon 2011).

With its mosaic multiethnic structure, Macedonia fits in the group of ethnically, culturally and religiously divided societies where crafting formal institutions represents one of a range of attempts to accommodate increased demands for minority rights and prevent reescalation of ethnic violence. Some common solutions are of a territorial character, such as federalism, or a non-territorial character such as decentralization in a unitary state. Both include political power-sharing between levels of government and within the institutions at the same level (Bieber 2005, Weller and Wolff 2005, Lyon 2011). From this perspective, the concept of decentralization is gaining attention as a conflict management mechanism in divided societies (Bieber 2005, Siljanovska 2009, Wolff 2010).

Yet to be successful at the subnational level, the designers of politically decentralized institutions essentially aim to create space for socializing politicians from different ethnic communities in *cooperative behavior* rather than polarization (Horowitz 2001, Jarstad 2006, Treisman 2007, Wolff 2010). Deciding however whether decentralization achieves this goal cannot be done from the aggregate country level of analysis since there is variation of its impact across subnational units (Varshney 2002, Mehler and Tull 2011). It is therefore crucial to see whether and how inter-ethnic cooperation differs across subnational units within the same country once decentralization is employed as a conflict management mechanism. Hence, the research question of this thesis is: **What types of inter-ethnic cooperation do we see across multiethnic municipalities in Macedonia seven years after the decentralization reforms?**

This thesis is embedded in the broader literature on power-sharing which deals at length with institutional arrangements designed to mitigate conflict and sustain peace in divided societies, while preserving the unitary character of the state (Lijphart 1977, 1996; Horowitz 1985, 2000, 2008; Jarstad 2002, 2006; Dyrstad 2012). Both of the most prominent streams of the power-sharing literature, consociationalist (Lijphart 1997) and integrationist (Horowitz 1985) acknowledge the need for *joint rule and seeking consensus* among ethnic groups. In this context, Caspersen sees elite cooperation as a *compromise and inclusive rule* (2004, 570). Yet, erudite as it is, this literature still struggles to find analytically useful concepts to measure the success of power-sharing arrangements and related inter-ethnic cooperation (IEC refers to “inter-ethnic cooperation” from now on in the text).

Similar challenges arise for decentralization’s success as part of power-sharing arrangements that should supposedly trickle down their positive effect to the local level. Scholars have

looked at peace sustainability (Galtung 1996), the occurrence or intensity of violence (Raleigh et.al. 2010), ethnic coexistence (Babbitt 2011), inter-ethnic party coalitions (Bochsler 2011) or IEC among citizens (Pickering 2006). Nevertheless, even though widely used, it has been an arduous task to systematically conceptualize IEC among elected representatives, as we will see in the subsequent chapters.

Finally, I agree with Tull and Mehler who argue that peace does not necessarily trickle down to the subnational level in a uniformed fashion (2011, 5) and that the subnational level of analysis has largely been ignored (ISP 2012, 15). Along the same lines, Snyder argues that research at the subnational level allows for controlled comparisons, disaggregated data and a way to handle spatially uneven processes of political and economic transformation (2001, 94). The power-sharing literature lacks empirical data on how power-sharing is *de facto* implemented at the subnational level, especially when channeled through decentralization.

Following the gap in the literature outlined, and in light of the scarcity of systematic empirical data available from the subnational level, the diverse multiethnic municipalities in Macedonia provide a fruitful field for comparative empirical assessment of how IEC works in a decentralized institutional set up. For seven years, already both central and local governments have been *de jure* solicited to practice local power-sharing and slowly but surely they are starting to do it (Jenne 2012). Weller, in his study on divided societies, argues that only in Macedonia can a precarious stabilization be observed where territorial autonomy was avoided as part of a settlement; rather it was applied in a slyly disguised form of ‘enhanced local self-governance’ (2005, 230). This includes language, cultural and veto rights, special institutions for inter-community relations, ethnically mixed police patrols, equitable representation and redrawing municipal boundaries to accommodate minorities.

Intuitively, the broader phenomenon of interest would be how representatives of different ethnic groups cooperate at the local level. However, a fully-fledged research on cooperation among all relevant actors (citizens, mayors, councilors, local businesses, NGOs etc.) within a municipality is a time-consuming task, not manageable for this MA thesis. Hence, I concentrated on the *cooperation among elected municipal councilors from different ethnic communities* and take them as units of observation. The time span I am looking at is between the present and 2005, when both the Law on Local Self-Government drafted in 2002 and the Law on Territorial Reorganization from 2004 were swiftly implemented as a response to the demands for greater autonomy of the ethnic Albanian community.

I engage in a systematic exploratory comparative analysis of nine cases of multiethnic municipalities in Macedonia with the potential to implement enhanced local self-governance after the decentralization reforms. This potential refers to those municipalities that, besides their majority population have around 20% or more citizens from another ethnic community living in that municipality. Along with analysis of previous research, reports and official documents, focus group interviews conducted with municipal councilors representing different ethnic groups comprise the main data body of this exploratory research.

I use thematic analysis for analyzing the interview data in order to derive the main themes/dimensions/fuzzy sets of IEC. Grounded in my fieldwork data, I propose a multidimensional concept of IEC looking at how municipal councilors use both formal decentralization institutions and informal mechanisms and for whose benefits they do this. Based on these dimensions and using fuzzy set ideal type analysis (Ragin 2000, Kvist 2007), I derive different types of IEC: dynamic, predominantly informal, pragmatic and minimal IEC. Finally, I inquire into what combinations of conditions account for the absence of

dynamic IEC using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA).

Three objectives direct this research. First, I aim to show that *de facto* insight into the use of decentralization institutions intended to foster cooperation, can contribute both to further evaluation of local power-sharing and assessment of IEC. Municipal councilors change, yet the institutional drives for cooperation have to be evaluated and seen in combination with informal practices that pertain in the polity, as this research shows. My hope is that the operationalization of the concept may “travel” and facilitate analysis of the dynamics of subnational politics in other divided societies such as Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and African and Asian post-conflict societies. Secondly, by employing fuzzy set ideal type analysis for constructing a typology of IEC, I aim to show its potential as a useful data analysis technique that provides fine-grained insights into multidimensional phenomena which could possibly be used in further causal (Collier et al. 2012), cross case and policy analysis. Finally, I aim to show how different combinations of conditions can lead to the same outcome, in this case, non-occurrence of dynamic IEC.

In the first chapter I locate the problem of interest in the case of Macedonia after the 2001 ethnic conflict and the decentralization reforms that have been undertaken since 2005. Here I also set out the conceptual framework and address the academic debate on decentralization and IEC, identifying gaps in their clear conceptualization and thereby the need for an empirical exploration. Next, I delimit the scope conditions and case selection and designate and justify the methodology I use. In chapter three I present and discuss the types of IEC derived from the empirical fieldwork findings and fsQCA analysis findings. In the conclusion I assess the contribution of this research, and present suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER 1. THE CASE OF MACEDONIA: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

As already outlined, empirical field research in multiethnic municipalities in Macedonia comprises the core of this thesis. The research question as stated in the introduction is: What types of IEC are there across multiethnic municipalities in Macedonia seven years after the decentralization reforms? I will present Macedonian decentralization reforms from 2005 as the empirical field central to this thesis. This will help me to show that there is a wide-open space for comparative analysis on how municipal councilors cooperate within the decentralization institutional framework.


My empirical analysis, which yielded four types of IEC - namely, dynamic, predominantly informal, pragmatic and minimal IEC among municipal councilors - shows that it is useful to disaggregate the study of decentralization as a conflict management mechanism. Despite the same institutional design, municipal councilors will cooperate in a variety of ways across different manner across multiethnic municipalities because of different combinations of factors affecting the use of decentralization institutions.

1. 1 Decentralization Reforms in Macedonia

From 1946 to 1991 Macedonia was a Federal Republic in the Yugoslav Federation as one of the six administrative entities. In those times, ethnic coexistence was institutionalized by Tito's regime. Yugoslavia in the 1980s was described as administratively the most fragmented polity in the world (Hechter 2001, 152). In Figure 1, I present the design of decentralization when Macedonia was part of Yugoslavia. After its dissolution in 1991, there have not been significant violent conflicts in Macedonia among the major ethno-linguistic

groups. Their relations have been generally indifferent and peaceful, with the exception of small scale isolated incidents. For Macedonians, the cohesion of the state and its territorial unity was crucial. Within Yugoslavia, and after independence, the ethnic Macedonians finally found themselves recognized as a particular ethnic entity (Kenning 2009, 66).

Figure 1 Decentralization process of Macedonia while in Yugoslavia



The ethnic differentiation of the country was present in the Constitution from 1991, where Macedonia is referred to as the national state of the Macedonian people and in which full coexistence is secured between the Macedonian people and Albanian, Turk, Roma, Vlach and other nationalities that live within its boundaries (Constitution 1991, Preamble). This formulation was problematic for the Albanians, while the Macedonians thought the civic principles upon which the Constitution was drafted were sufficient for everyone to feel equal.

Ethnic differentiation is also present in politics, society, education and the media, and is reinforced by relative geographic concentration (Balalovska 2006, 13). Albanians mainly live in the Northwestern part of the country and the capital Skopje. Party politics also follows ethnic lines. The ethnic Albanian community has its Democratic Party of the Albanians (DPA), the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) and the transformed rebel UCK has become the Democratic Union for Integration (BDI/DUI). The Serbs have a Democratic Party of the Serbs (DPS), the Turks have the Democratic Party of the Turks (TDP/DPT) and

the Roma have the Union of the Roma of Macedonia. These distinctions reinforce the salience of ethnicity as a criterion for political representation.¹ Often, if parties are in coalition at the central level, the same constellation is reflected at the local level.

In the post-independence period, the political system has been characterized by the “preponderance of informal power-sharing arrangements between the parties of the two main ethnic communities, Macedonians and Albanians” (Holliday 2004, 158). An Albanian party has always been included in a coalition with the dominant Macedonian party. However, in this process of consolidation and centralization of power, the domestic impatience of the largest Albanian minority culminated in an ethnic conflict in 2001, justified as “a result of the one-sidedness of the laws on citizenship, language, education and voting rights” (Holliday 2004, 141). Engstorm argues, “the problem in Macedonia was never minority rights but lack of participation in the political life of the country” (in Ethnobarometer 2006, 22).


The ethnic conflict was waged between the Albanian paramilitary National Liberation Army (NLA) in Macedonia, and the Macedonian security forces between February and August 2001. The violence was concentrated in the municipalities of Tetovo, Skopje, Kumanovo and Arachinovo (Figure 2); 170 000 people were displaced and more than 100 were killed (IDMC 2004). Nowadays 770 Macedonians and Serbs remain displaced and fear to return to the Lipkovo- Arachinovo area (IDMC 2004).

Most ethnic Macedonians believe the armed conflict was a spillover from the Kosovo War (Balalovska et al. 2002, 11). Anxiety amongst Macedonians is fuelled by the fact that Kosovo and Albania present kin-states to the Albanian community in Macedonia. In some quarters,

¹ For succinct chronology of Macedonian-Albanian relations from 1990-2001 see Nikolov Marijan PhD thesis forthcoming: “Cost Efficiency of Municipalities in Service Delivery: Does Ethnic Fragmentation Matter?” Skopje, 2013

there is still support for the hovering idea of a “Greater Albania”, according to which Macedonia would lose territories mainly populated by Albanians.

Figure 2. Areas where violent ethnic conflict occurred in 2001



Adapted from Drystad 2012, 124

1. 1. 1 Complex Power-sharing

Power-sharing arrangements were put in place with the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) of August 2001, with the help of US and EU facilitators and all then relevant political parties in Macedonia. It prompted changes in the use of community languages, police work at the subnational level, public use of symbols, parliamentary arrangements and proportionality in the judiciary. Decentralization reforms followed as the main Albanian demand for achieving greater autonomy. The EU simultaneously monitors decentralization reforms as part of Macedonia’s democratic reform process (Crisis Group 2011, 18). The devolution of power was seen as a “zero sum game by both sides since one gained control of one community at the expense of the other” (Loomis, Davis and Broughton 2001, 17).

This complex political power-sharing reflects a delicate balance between consociational and

integrative approaches to peace building (Bieber 2005, 2006; Ilievski, 2007). This balance is reflected in a combination of measures designed both to favor multi-ethnicity and encourage the integration of ethnic communities (through equitable representation in public administration and enterprises, and parliamentary and municipal committees on inter-ethnic relations). These arrangements also institutionalize the social and cultural distance between the different ethnic communities through enhanced language rights and special voting procedures (Weller and Wolff 2005, Ragaru 2008, Siljanovska 2009, Lyon 2011).

Bieber argues that the previous Law on Local Self-Government of 1995 provided little power-sharing to the mixed municipalities and *little cooperation* took place at the local level (in Latifi 2003, 120-5). Cooperation at this level was occurring not because it was institutionally induced, but because it *leaned on personal ties* (ibid). The bottom line, argues Bieber, is that the OFA created a bi-national state *not bound to civic principles but recognition of distinct ethnic groups* (2005, 118). Macedonia ended up with institutionalized power-sharing both at the central and local level of government, differing from Lijphart's consociational model in the sense that the grand coalition is informal. The country also is not federal, but it decentralized.

1. 1. 2 The Character of Multiethnic Municipalities in Macedonia

The main ethnic groups in Macedonia are the ethnic Albanians and the Macedonians. This division coincides with the religious cleavages - Orthodox Christians and Muslims. Table 1 presents the ethnic composition of the population in the country.

Table 1. Ethnic composition of the population in Macedonia

Ethnic group	Macedonian	Albanian	Turk	Vlach	Bošniak	Serb	Roma	Others
Proportion of total population	64.18%	25.17%	3.85 %	0.48%	0.84%	1.78%	2.66%	1.04%

Statistical Office Macedonia 2005, 713

Regarding the largest ethnic communities, Table 2 presents the incremental rise of the Albanian population in Macedonia while at the same time reflecting the decline of the Macedonian population.

Table 2: Ethnic structure of the Macedonian population 1961-2002 (in %)

Ethnic group	1961	1971	1981	1994	2002
Macedonian	71.18	69.35	68.01	66.60	64.18
Albanian	13.02	16.99	19.76	22.67	25.17
Others	15.08	13.66	13.23	10.73	10.65

Adapted from Johansen 2004

Currently Macedonia has a one-tier decentralized system where the units of local governance are called “opština” or municipality: there are eighty of these plus the capital Skopje as a separate unit. The most recent changes to the decentralized system happened in March 2013, before the local elections, when the municipality of Kichevo turned predominantly Albanian when smaller municipalities were added to it. The municipalities have competence in the field of public service including urban planning, sports and cultural issues, social security and childcare, primary education, preschool education, basic health care and other services determined by the relevant laws (Law on Local Self-Government-LLSG 2002). By allowing most of the competencies to be administered at the municipal level, the reforms aimed to provide the local and culturally diverse communities with greater control over the management of their own affairs.

In 2005, forty municipalities experienced a change of territorial borders, demographic composition, as well as institutional changes when the Law on Territorial Reorganization was introduced (LTR 2004). This was a continuation of the decentralization reforms in Macedonia aimed at accommodating nationwide minorities by turning them into majorities on the local level. Notable cases include Struga and Kichevo. This solution was considered adequate because the ethnic Albanians' settlements do not constitute a specific larger territorial entity but comprise relevant local governments units only (Wolff 2010, 20).

1. 1. 3 Institutional configurations of enhanced local self-governance

All municipalities in Macedonia have a proportional representation (PR) electoral system with closed lists for electing local officials, while the mayor is elected on the basis of a majoritarian electoral system. Yet, what distinguishes Macedonian municipalities from one another is that they are either urban or rural; have or have not experienced ethnic violence in 2001; have different levels of ethnic fractionalization (Fearon 2003); and have or have not experienced change of their territorial boundaries as a measure of ethnic accommodation.² On the basis of the 20% threshold, meaning that the local minority in that municipality is 20% or above, the Law on Local Self-Government prescribes the following institutional mechanisms: language rights, qualified majority vote, CICRs, equitable representation in the public administration and mixed police patrols. I describe each of these mechanisms.

Languages spoken by more than 20% of the local population are to become official within the municipality, while recognition of languages of smaller ethnic communities are subject to the municipal council's decision. The Albanian language has acquired official status in 29 of

² Law on Territorial Reorganization 2004

the 80 municipalities (including the City of Skopje), Turkish in three, Serbian in one, and Romani also in one (Kenning 2009, 53).

Concerning *qualified majority vote* (2/3 of municipal councilors also known as veto power), the lack of application of the law is felt “especially acutely” in newly reorganized towns such as Struga and Tetovo, where minority Macedonians “feel sidelined” in the decision-making process (IRIS 2006, 14). The 20% threshold drafted in the law leaves smaller local minorities politically marginalized (Engström 2002, Bieber 2005) and subject to the goodwill of municipal councilors.

The *Committee for Inter-Community Relations (CICR)* is one of the mechanisms for balancing power relations when there might be inconsistencies or discrimination regarding ethnic questions in the work of the council and the mayor (LLSG Art. 55). It should also facilitate dialogue between institutions and citizens. Each ethnic community regardless of its numerical presence in that municipality has a representative on this committee. The way in which its members are elected is left to the discretion of the municipal councilors. They can either decide to elect members from within or outside the municipal council. The local situations with respect to these committees vary greatly among different municipalities (Ragaru 2008, 3). Finally, there is equitable representation in the local public administration, and local police patrols have to be ethnically mixed.

Given these prerequisites, **enhanced local self governance (ELSG) or local power-sharing** as a systematized concept, prescribed by law for Macedonia, means the following: the municipality is at least bilingual; there are Committees for Inter-Community Relations (CICR) established; there is equitable representation in the public administration at the

subnational level; police patrols should be ethnically mixed, and a double majority vote is used for questions regarding symbols, language, education, culture and personal documentation.

The combinations of these conditions of the cases under fieldwork study following the decentralization laws are presented in Table 3. I also add the condition of ‘change of territory’, which refers to whether the administrative boundaries of the municipality had to be changed by law (2004), and whether the change has particular implications for the institutional design of the municipality. Notably, Struga and Kichevo have shifted from a Macedonian to an Albanian majority in terms of ethnic population, while in Gostivar and Tetovo the proportion of Macedonians has decreased.

Table 3. Truth table of ELSG condition (1-presence/0-absence)

Municipalities/ Institutional conditions	At least bilingual	Equitable representation	Func- tioning CICR	Mixed police patrols	Use of Veto	Change of Territory	ELSG
1. Butel	1	0	0	1	1	0	1
2. Chair	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
3. Gostivar	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
4. Jegunovce	1	0	1	1	1	0	1
5. Krushevo	1	0	0	1	1	0	1
6. Kumanovo	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
7. Struga	1	0	0	1	1	1	1
8. Studenichani	1	0	0	1	1	0	1
9. Tetovo	1	0	1	1	1	1	1

The truth table serves for presentation of data only, not conjunctive analysis. ELSG refers to Enhanced Local Self Government as an “outcome”.

1. 1. 4 We have the institutions, now what?

As in other plural societies, the question in Macedonia certainly is not “*whether*” but “*how*” different ethnic communities are to live together. When decentralization measures are put in

place to satisfy the demands for greater autonomy of minorities within a unitary state, the need for inter-ethnic coexistence becomes imperative for sustaining peace. Hence, in parallel to the central level of government, IEC in the institutions of the local governments is also needed.

Various types of coexistence and cooperation have been identified in previous research in Macedonia, usually conducted by international organizations³ monitoring the progress of the decentralization reforms. Cases like Kichevo, Gostivar, Chair and Debar for instance (Taleski 2012) are considered to be multiethnic municipalities with a long tradition of *peaceful coexistence*. On the other hand, there are examples of “tense Struga and Kumanovo that stand in stark contrast to rather good interethnic relations in Debar and Gostivar” (IRIS 2006, 17).

In some multiethnic municipalities, not contaminated by the ethnic conflict, Malevska et al. find that for both citizens and local politicians the priority is the improvement of living standards (2007, 59). From previous research (Hartai and Evans 2011; Tomovska and Neziri 2011) and case knowledge, it is clear that some decentralization institutions in Macedonia did not work as expected, for example CICRs. Further, inter-ethnic relations are dire in municipalities where there was a change of territorial borders to accommodate ethnic communities - in particular, the Albanians.

Neither the literature nor previous research explicitly attest to what is meant by good IEC; even though there is a notion that it measures institutional performance and success (Lijphart 1997, Caspersen 2008, Dyrstad 2012). Furthermore, IEC has been approached in the manner of finding out whether there is more or less cooperation. Yet, even if we tend to think of

³ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), United States of America International Development (USAID), MCIC (Macedonian Center for international cooperation)

cooperation as a question of degree, we have to be explicit: cooperation more or less, in which aspect, and among whom, since the concept includes multiple dimensions and actors.

Therefore, I primarily aim to derive types of IEC among municipal councilors to overcome later issues of impreciseness and then use the resulting typology to assess combination of conditions that lead to certain type of IEC among municipal councilors. In the next section, I outline the conceptual framework, underlying this research.

1. 2 Decentralization and Inter-ethnic cooperation (IEC)

1. 2. 1. Decentralization

Power-sharing proponents argue in support of establishing institutions for the peaceful settlement of ethnic conflict within states, which then operate to assure a group against the “tyranny of the majority” (Lijphart 1975, 1977, 1996, 2008). Those institutional mechanisms usually include grand coalitions, proportional electoral systems, minority vetoes, and some territorial arrangements such as federalism or decentralization. In the most general terms, decentralization refers to “taking power away from the central government” (Schneider 2003, 35; Brancati 2006; Rodden 2004).

Treisman conceptualizes political decentralization as *greater decision-making authority of the local officials directly elected by the citizens of the subnational unit* (2007, 28). This is the background concept of decentralization that my analysis builds on. When I use the term decentralization as a systematized concept in the case of Macedonia, I refer to the *enhanced local self-governance (ELSG)* implemented in the multiethnic municipalities. This creates the institutional context in which municipal councilors cooperate.

Locality is where citizens see politicians go to work – where they ride their bikes or participate in sports. The municipal councilors talk to many citizens daily about “trifling” issues like electricity supply, potholes in the road or noise from lively youth late at night. The most basic needs of the local community are tightly woven into the fabric of a municipality’s day-to-day life. Thus, when we think of local governments, what comes to mind is a small, even parochial government easily approachable for citizens.

Some localities nourish a strong common local identity. Others have citizens affiliated with different political, religious, cultural and ethnic groups that could become lines of division or salient political cleavages (Posner 2005). In ethnically diverse municipalities, practicing local political power-sharing becomes a cumbersome task. Ethnicity as an identity choice becomes prominent since people want resources from the state. Having someone from their ethnic group in a position of power facilitates their access to resources (Posner 2005, 3).

1. 3 Inter-ethnic cooperation- conceptualization

The major task of my thesis is to explore the phenomenon of IEC and render it into an analytically useful concept. For this task, I initially used Adcock and Collier’s scheme for Conceptualizing and Measurement (2001, 531). The conceptualization of IEC was an iterative process of combining theory and empirical data. In the following section, I first (a) discuss and locate the *background concept of inter-group cooperation*⁴, and moving down the ladder of abstraction, I (b) conceptualize the *systematized concept of IEC among municipal councilors*⁵, on which basis I then derive types of IEC.

⁴ Broader constellation of meanings and understandings of a concept (Adcock and Collier 2001, 531)

⁵ Specific formulation of a concept used by a given scholar or group of scholars (ibid.) In my case, I am conceptualizing it as necessary and sufficient type)

Treisman looks at the socialization of politicians at the local level as a good intention of decentralization. Thus, if individuals committed to tolerance and multi-ethnic cooperation run local governments, they may cultivate similar commitments in new members but “if they are run by bigots and violent opportunists, then the socialization they provide may be in less pacific values” (Treisman 2007, 243). Hence he suggests that political decentralization is more likely to reduce conflict if local politicians *choose strategies of multi-ethnic cooperation over the politics of exclusion* (Treisman 2007, 244).

For Belloni and Deane the institutional (structural) and procedural (electoral) dynamics of the consociational system at its core discourages cooperation among ethnic groups since politicians and political parties have little or *no incentive to appeal beyond their own narrow ethnic constituency* (2005, 222). In her study of inter-ethnic relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Pickering concludes that institutions support positive inter-ethnic relationships *when they help people to address practical concerns* (2006, 79). She equates social networks with IEC (Pickering 2006, 83).

Lijphart also hopes that within the framework of consociational politics, there will be “*compromise and cooperation* on the elite level that will ‘trickle down’ and lead to a wider social moderation” (1977, 51). One of the main themes that emerged during my fieldwork deals with this aspect: is it really the case that members of the elite cooperate and the effects trickle down to citizens, or it is the other way around - citizens maintain a tradition of cooperation, hence press politicians to cooperate? This will serve my fsQCA analysis (Chapter 2). Finally, Horowitz also points to the subnational level, stating that dealing with members of other ethnic groups at the local level can socialize politicians “in dealing with conflict in a divided society before they must do so at the national level” (2008, 1218).

1. 3. 1 IEC- Background concept

1.3.1.1 Contact Hypothesis

To go deeper into the nature of inter-group cooperation, a good starting point is Allport's contact hypothesis (1954), part of his Intergroup Contact Theory. It states that inter-group contact tends to produce better inter-group attitudes and relations. In this view, people are perceived as fundamentally good, striving for mutual appreciation. If one has the opportunity to communicate with others and appreciate their way of life, understanding and reduction of prejudice will follow (Weiner 2008). Nevertheless, Pettigrew et al. (2011) find cases when it may actually lead to greater polarization and increased prejudice.

1.3.1.2 At least we have to meet

Reilly also argues that the *process of negotiation* itself brings possibilities of future cooperation, regardless of the significance of the matters under discussion (2003, 9). Along these lines, theorists of bargaining and cooperation among groups have emphasized the importance of regular, face-to-face meetings in building trust and developing cooperation and understanding. Even in competitive situations, *regular and reciprocal interactions* in and of themselves are likely to facilitate cooperation (Axelrod 1981, 69). This is actually a necessary condition, since group representatives, regardless of what they are doing, have to physically come together and at minimum talk to each other.

1.3.1.3 Finding a common goal

Regular meetings however revolve around certain issues. The less often leaders meet, the less they are able to explore their *common concerns and possibilities* for cooperation (Reilly 2003, 9). Cooperation across groups will happen when both groups find *superordinate goals of high appeal* (Sherif 1966, 24; Galinsky 2002, 94; Dyrstad 2012, 84). It becomes clear that the common goal component exists in theory as a crucial point of intersection for

representatives of different ethnic groups. At the local level, I argue this becomes a vital aspect of how we characterize IEC since the effects of local politics are so immediate. We have to see whether the goal is to bring benefits for all regardless of ethnicity, or safeguard benefits merely to one's own ethnic community. The latter can take the shape of exchange (Horowitz 2008). However, this exchange should not be at the expense of the other, or deprive the other of his/her benefits.

Finally, Fearon's and Laitin's research on IEC is based on prisoners' dilemma games. They concluded that groups cooperate if players are patient enough and *expect high enough likelihood of future interactions*, despite the absence of a third party like the state, since they are afraid that the other player might defect (1996, 718). Fearon and Laitin also point out, "in many even most places where ethnic groups intermingle, a well functioning state and legal apparatus does not exist, yet they cooperate, because the pay-offs of *ethnic peace are higher than ethnic violent conflict*" (1996, 718). However, they do not see their model as a comprehensive theory (1996, 731).

These theoretical underpinnings relating to decentralization and IEC, intersecting both political science and social psychology, hinted at and yet did not utterly provide a comprehensive concept of IEC that could be applied and "measured" at the subnational level of the multiethnic municipalities in Macedonia. However, they establish the framework for the analysis of my findings. Therefore, my conceptualization of IEC is mainly inductive since I begin with a set of empirical measures that capture the elements of the concept and then arrive at the ultimate dimensions, by looking at the observed patterns in the data (Collier and Gerring 2009, 173).

In line with these discussions and combined with my fieldwork data, a background concept of IEC includes *different actors* (mayors, citizens, councilors) that represent different ethnic communities at *different levels of government* (central, local), *using both formal (decentralization) institutional and informal mechanisms* to bring certain *benefits* to the communities they represent or to everybody.

1. 3. 2 IEC- Systematized concept

For the purposes of this thesis, I use set theory – the necessary and sufficient type of concept formation - to come to the systematized concept on which I construct my analysis (Goertz 2006a). Set theory for concept formation helps in showing the simultaneous presence of several dimensions (sets) that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient elements of the phenomenon of interest, in this case IEC (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 7).

With this approach, the concept's components are its *ontological properties*, while secondary level dimensions are seen as constitutive of the concept and not causally related (Goertz 2006a, 58). I opt for this approach since I see my concept dimensions as having qualitative differences within them. My motivation to use this approach is also driven by the fact that it further opens avenues for *classifying cases in multidimensional typologies*.

Therefore, for IEC to occur, municipal councilors at minimum have to convene and physically gather in order to come to decisions. Institutions legally bind them to do so. The opposite is the boycott of institutions - a full-fledged *non-cooperation*. Hence, I take physically meeting as both conceptually and empirically a necessary component of the concept of IEC. Nevertheless, both from theory and practice, we see that not everything can be channeled through these newly established institutions. Councilors also *use informal mechanisms* when they need to make decisions and govern. Finally, these decisions may

provide primarily for the group they represent or benefit everybody regardless of ethnic group belonging (e.g. superordinate Sherif 1996).

With the use of set theory, we can logically formulate the structure of the concept of IEC- inter-ethnic cooperation between municipal councilors of different ethnic communities (Figure 3 graphically illustrates the concept structure).


Dimensions of inter-ethnic cooperation (IEC):

- F- Cooperation using decentralization institutions
- I- Cooperation through informal mechanisms- beyond formal institutions
- G- Benefits of decision for citizens in that municipality brought up by municipal councilors

Concept structure:

$IEC = F * I * G$ (“*” means logical AND which in set theory takes the minimum values (lowest scores) across the concept dimensions (more on this in the methodology chapter)).

Figure 3. Systematized concept of Inter-ethnic cooperation (IEC) among municipal councillors



In the next chapter, I delimit the scope conditions, presenting the criteria for selecting cases and setting out the methodology I used for data gathering and data analysis, to prepare the ground for presenting the exploratory fieldwork findings.

CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: SCOPE CONDITIONS THEMATIC ANALYSIS, FUZZY SET THEORY, FsQCA

The aim of this thesis is, to locate different types of IEC. My study is limited to the period since the decentralization reforms were put in place in Macedonia, namely 2005. The basic criterion for falling within the scope of this project is to be a multiethnic municipality with a *potential for enhanced local self-governance*. I further present the process of case selection and scope conditions, and the methods used for data gathering and data analysis below.

2. 1 Case Selection and Scope Conditions

In order for a municipality to have enhanced local self-governance (LLSG 2002), it must – by law - have salient segmental cleavages. Zuckerman states that *segmental cleavage* differs from other political divisions by specific disagreements over policy and procedural issues on the basis of the cultural differences resulting from the different modes of interpreting the political world in divided or plural societies (1975). Posner conceptualizes ethnic cleavage as a category set comprised by language race and religion (2005, 16). He suggests an instrumental and situational view of ethnic identity, which I have adopted. Namely, individuals possess repertoires of identities, the relevance of which may wax wane depending on the context (2005, 11). Identity becomes instrumental when a person chooses which repertoire - or combinations of identity structure - serves him/her best in bringing material and immaterial payoffs (ibid).

The most salient segmental divide in Macedonia is the ethnic, drawn between the Macedonian and the Albanian communities. The Turkish, Serbian, Roma, Bosniak and Vlach communities are proportionally much smaller than the Albanian. The Law on Local Self Government, responding to the ethnic heterogeneity of the municipalities and the salience of the ethnic cleavages, prescribed a threshold of 20%⁶ as the proportion of the local ethnic community that was required, in order for the government to be legally bound to *enhance local self-governance*.

I do not strictly take a 20% threshold, since the last census in Macedonia is from 2002, and perhaps the structure of ethnic composition has slightly changed, a development which local representatives will be aware of. For instance, Gostivar and Studenichani, even though they are not legally obliged to, follow the provisions for accommodating ethnic communities prescribed by the law.


The municipal council has the discretion to decide whether it will introduce another language besides the official Macedonian, form CIER, and decide on voting procedures. This to some extent decreases the effect of new decentralization institutions, since it was possible to introduce these institutional mechanisms before 2001, if the municipal council so decided (e.g. Tetovo).

During my fieldwork, I attempted to diversify in terms of party structure, ethnic fractionalization, tradition of cooperation, and territorial border change, so that the hypothesis I draw on for further research can be analytically meaningful. The bolded names of the

⁶ Some experts label this threshold “magic 20%” since the criteria for delimiting it as such does not have any theoretical basis, but is designed only to accommodate the Albanian community (Ragaru 2008, Siljanovska 2009).

municipalities in Appendix C- Table 14 are those where field research has already been conducted, and data has been gathered.⁷ Those are Butel, Chair, Gostivar, Jegunovce, Krushevo, Kumanovo, Studenichani, Struga and Tetovo. In Figure 4, I present these municipalities on the map of the country.

Figure 4. Multi-ethnic municipalities where fieldwork was conducted



2. 2 Data Gathering – Focus group interviews

Besides primary and secondary data sources and examination of legal documents and previous research on decentralization in Macedonia, the main data body of this thesis is comprised of focus group interviews, while the data analysis combines thematic analysis with fuzzy set ideal type analysis for deriving different types of IEC. Based on the analysis of the interview data, I constructed a typology of IEC among municipal councilors across multiethnic municipalities in Macedonia.

My *units of analysis* are multiethnic municipalities in Macedonia and my *units of observation* are elected municipal councilors representing different ethnic communities whose mandate lasts from March 2009 to March 2013. I chose these units of observation upon the

⁷ For detailed ethnic composition of multiethnic municipalities in Macedonia see Appendix A.

assumption that the municipal councilors represent the interests of different ethnic communities within the municipality's decision-making processes.

I conducted focus group interviews to gain a more complete understanding of the topic under consideration, dealing with issues such as motivation, decision-making strategies or just how certain people think about an issue or topic (Krueger 1997, 69). Based on this data, I derive four different types of IEC- dynamic, predominantly informal, pragmatic and minimal. In gathering data, I have not merely looked at how Albanians and Macedonians cooperate, since IEC embraces other ethnicities as well.

Following Boyatzis' suggestions for connecting the units of observation and units of coding (1998, 66), I coded *perceptions that group members tell about the group*. Having more councilors of different ethnic background at the same time in the same place helped in controlling the information I obtained in this fact-finding endeavor.⁸ The focus group interviews were conducted in the period between July 1 and July 31.⁹

A list of preliminary questions along with those that emerged during the discussion is located in Appendix B. The questions aimed to identify the following information:

- What are the aspects of IEC among municipal councilors
- How do municipal councilors see their cooperation vis-à-vis decentralized institutions
- Why do municipal councilors cooperate
- How do municipal councilors see their cooperation vis-à-vis cooperation among citizens

⁸ More information on the way in which councilors were contacted and how the interviews were conducted is contained in Appendix B

⁹ For limitations of data gathering, see Appendix B.

2. 3 Data Analysis: thematic analysis, fuzzy set ideal type analysis, fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)

The data analysis includes two phases. First I use thematic analysis and fuzzy set ideal type analysis to turn the interview data into a typology of IEC. Then I use fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to demonstrate different paths that lead to the non-occurrence (absence) of **dynamic IEC**. I briefly describe the main rationale behind these data analytical tools.

2. 3. 1 Thematic Analysis

For analyzing the content of the answers from the focus group interviews, I use thematic analysis (Boyatzis 1998, 4), in order to derive the main dimension of IEC among municipal councilors. A *theme* is a pattern found in the information that at minimum describes and organizes the possible observations and at maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon (Boyatzis 1998, 8). Ryan and Bernard (2003, 86) refer to themes as abstract, often fuzzy constructs, which investigators identify before, during and after data collection.

With thematic analysis one constructs an explicit “code” or a scheme (presented in Appendix C, Table 15). This may be a list of themes, a complex model with themes, indicators, and qualifications that are causally related, or something in between those two forms (ibid). The coding process contains examination of the data to identify meanings, categories and subcategories or higher-level concepts and sub concepts (Boyatzis 1998). This can also be connected with another method, in my research, a fuzzy set ideal type analysis. Once I identify the predominant themes in my data, I transform them into fuzzy sets/dimensions/concepts using fuzzy set theory techniques.

2. 3. 2 Fuzzy set ideal type analysis

We can think of sets as social science concepts – data containers or dimensions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 24). Consequently, in set theory cases exhibit membership in sets. Sets can be *crisp* (two qualitatively different states 1- presence/0-absence, e.g. democracy (1) non–democracy (0)) or *fuzzy* (partial membership between 0 and 1; e.g. more/less democracy- quantitative differences) (Ragin 2000). The fuzziness of fuzzy sets stems from the imprecise conceptual boundaries of social science concepts (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 27).

Fuzzy sets theory offers the possibility of analysis of partial membership in sets, which becomes clearer with an example. If a country A has a fuzzy set membership score of 0.6 while country B of 0.8 in the set of politically decentralized states, they are both members of the set of politically decentralized states (have scores above 0.5 threshold). Yet country B is slightly more decentralized than country A. Or, if a country A has a membership score of 0.4 in the same set, it means that it is more out than in the set, yet, it still has partial membership in the set of politically decentralized countries.

With fuzzy sets, we operationalize concepts in the 0 to 1 metric (Kvist 2007, 477) where a country A is **fully in** a particular set when its fuzzy set membership score equals 1, and fully out if the score is 0. Hence, the 0.5 threshold is a turning point in a conceptual sense and when constructing sets, the researcher has to first decide where to position these anchor points. There are different scales for the fuzzy set membership depending on the data analyzed and the precision of the set memberships one strives to achieve. I chose Ragin's six value fuzzy set scale (2000, 156) presented in Table 4:

Table 4: Fuzzy set scale

1	Fully in
0.8	Almost fully in the set
0.6	More in than out
0.5	Crossover point
0.4	More out than in
0.2	Almost out of the set
0	Fully out

The knowledge used for calibrating data into sets has to be external to the data: obvious facts, accepted social science notions, knowledge from fieldwork and analysis of primary and secondary sources (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 32).¹⁰ All of these criteria are taken into consideration in my analysis. Hence, after the thematic analysis, I begin with fuzzy set calibration into three dimensions: constructive use of formal decentralization institutions, constructive use of informal mechanisms and general benefits for all citizens.

In Appendix C, Table 15, the qualitative interview data is presented as codes or verbal measures in the last column (Basturo and Speer 2012). I use this “coding” scheme to ascribe case’s fuzzy set values and position them along the three dimensions. Using logical operators AND (*) and OR (+), I show how I calibrated the qualitative data and what it takes for a case to get its fuzzy set score.

2. 3. 3 Why use fuzzy set theory?

My main inspiration for using fuzzy set ideal type analysis came from Kvist’s study of types of welfare states and how they change over time (2007). As I previously discussed (Chapter 1), the dimensions of IEC (inter-ethnic-cooperation) have not been succinctly defined as concepts so far. Also, municipalities can change over time in regard to their membership in the dimensions of IEC. Finally, since cooperation concomitantly happens on three dimensions in my analysis, using the fuzzy set scores with fuzzy set ideal type analysis helps

¹⁰ For more on turning qualitative data into fuzzy sets, see Appendix D

in building a typology of IEC. Schneider and Wagemann state that “using set theory for classifying cases in multidimensional typologies can be interpreted as a “specialized QCA without an outcome and thus without any causal interpretation” (2012, 9).

The typology on the other hand offers the possibility of classifying cases in a more revealing way (Collier et al. 2012, 225). Furthermore, as building blocks in social scientific explanations, typologies further can serve as both independent and dependent variables in causal analysis (ibid), or sets, as in my analysis for set relations.

2. 3. 4 Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)

Once I have derived and explained the typology of IEC, in the last part of my empirical endeavor, I use fuzzy-set QCA analysis (fsQCA) based on set theory to inquire into different combinations of factors that account for the **non-occurrence of dynamic IEC**.

This research project deals with nine cases, and I maintain that different paths lead to the same outcome (equifinality). I depart from causal complexity not the net effect of single variables. Set-theoretic methods are well suited for this task (Ragin 2000; Schneider 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). The configurational approaches are family of methods, known as QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis). All QCA variants: crisp-set (csQCA), fuzzy-set (fsQCA), multi-value mvQCA generate findings that are characterized by the features of causal complexity (Schneider 2008, 60). I use fsQCA to preserve both differences in kind and degree of case’s membership in the three sets/dimension that comprise the concept of inter-ethnic cooperation.

CHAPTER 3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: TYPES OF INTER-ETHNIC COOPERATION

The exploratory analysis aimed to discover how municipal councilors cooperate within local governance institutions, whether they find it conducive to cooperation, and why they cooperate at all. Simply, what types of inter-ethnic cooperation are there among municipal councilors representing different ethnic communities? Through thematic analysis of my qualitative data, I derived three dimensions that I transformed into fuzzy sets, on which I positioned my cases and ascribed them fuzzy set scores (Appendix C, Table 15): constructive use of formal decentralization institutions; constructive use of informal mechanisms and general benefits (for all citizens regardless of ethnicity).

In the following sections I first describe in detail the dimensions, present cases' fuzzy set scores (Table 5) and discuss the typology. In the second part of my empirical analysis, I look at what combination of contextual conditions account for the non-occurrence of the dynamic type of inter-ethnic cooperation performing a QCA fuzzy-set analysis.

3. 1 Constructive use of formal decentralization institutions (F)

Drawing on the literature on decentralization and theories of cooperation, I devised questions (Appendix B) aimed to comprehend how municipal councilors make use of new decentralization institutions and how they cooperate within them. For some decentralization institutions could be very useful, fulfilling their goal to accommodate ethnic communities and make them cooperate, while others could consider them redundant and in a need of reform. Certainly, as Moe argues (2005), political institutions may be structures of cooperation, but also power structures, while the political process raises institutions good for some and bad for others.

In the case of subnational units in Macedonia, the institutions established for accommodation and cooperation among the ethnic communities are language rights, qualified majority voting on cultural issues, Committees for Inter-Community Relations (CICR), equitable representation of minorities within the administration and ethnically mixed police patrols. Particularly relevant for the cooperation of municipal councilors are the municipal councils, the CICR and language rights, providing them the possibility of cooperating and coming to joint decisions.

On this basis, I construct the fuzzy set of *constructive use of formal decentralization institutions*. This measures to what extent decentralization institutions, assuming they are crafted to be more inclusive and make ethnic counterparts cooperate, use them, think they are pro forma, think institutions need to be reformed altogether, or serve exclusive interests of one ethnic community. I label it with the letter **F**.

To be **fully in** this set, councilors have to constructively use decentralization institutions where everybody could express opinions in their own language, every ethnic community is represented (if not through the municipal councilors then through the CICR which is a corrective for non-representation of smaller ethnic communities), CICRs are in full use and there are efforts for constructive debates leading to consensus. Within formal institutions, however, councilors may consider decentralization institutions redundant, pro forma or an obstacle, hence not use them constructively, which makes them more out of than in the set. Finally, they can use institutions excluding representatives from other ethnic groups. This makes a case **fully out** of this set.

3. 2 General Benefits of municipal councilors' decisions (G)

Weingast claims that the essence of institutions is to enforce mutually beneficial exchange and cooperation (2002, 670). Yet, as previously stated, Sherif (1996), Drystad (2012) and Babbit (2011) also claim that while cooperating, representatives of different ethnic communities need to also find superordinate goals. From here stems the other dimension around which the questions revolve, namely, when councilors cooperate within institutions, what do they want to achieve in terms of benefits. This determines the membership in the set of *general benefits (for all citizens)*, which measures to what extent decisions by councilors bring benefits to all citizens regardless of ethnicity or exclusively to the ethnic group they represent. I label this set with the letter **G**.

Fully in are the cases where municipal councilors find a superordinate goal they want to achieve for the benefit of all citizens regardless of ethnicity. Cases are also in this set if councilors mutually support each other's goals and participate in exchanges that balance the needs of the citizens, without harming any community. Yet, if councilors harness exchange based on nontransparent party or personal bargaining, or neglect other's group needs, they are more out than in the set. **Fully out** are the cases where municipal councilors exclusively care for the benefit of their own ethnic community and block proposals that would benefit the others.

3. 3 Constructive use of informal mechanisms (I)

Perhaps it is intuitive to think that the previous two dimensions capture IEC. However, the theme of additional *informal institutions or mechanisms* of cooperation recurrently emerged during the interviews. Hence, I find this feature together with formal institutions and the dimension of general benefits as a constitutive component of the IEC at the subnational level.

North (1990) as well as Helmke and Levitsky (2004, 727) define informal institutions/mechanisms as socially shared rules, usually unwritten - created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels. Informal mechanisms can be used for problem solving to increase the efficiency and performance of formal institutions or problem creating to undermine their performance (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 727). Solidarity among ethnic counterparts or inter-ethnic parties' cooperation exemplifies their presence.

The *constructive use of informal mechanisms* dimension becomes prominent since it moves municipal councilors beyond what they are obliged to do by law. They either find the local power-sharing mechanisms insufficient; they might want to go further and improve cooperation or obliterate cooperation by using derogative informal mechanisms like clientelism and corruption. In my research, this dimension indicates whether informal mechanisms nourish cooperation or identifies where there is no additional effort beyond institutions or no effort whatsoever for informal communication with ethnic counterparts. I label this set as **I**.

To be **fully in** the set of constructive informal mechanisms, councilors can form ethnically mixed party coalitions, allocate deputy positions for ethnic counterparts, recognize language rights when not legally required, address each other in the other's language, initiate sports activities, clubs, joint "peace" missions together when there are ethnic tensions, and even celebrate holidays together. These indicators are not trivial in divided societies. The threshold point when a case becomes more out of than in the set is when councilors engage in nontransparent bargaining; or when they only follow party interests and exclude some parties. Furthermore, councilors may think that it is more than enough that they are required to sit together in institutions and hence they do not communicate at all outside this context. Finally,

they can block positive initiatives for no reason, which makes them **fully out** of the constructive use of informal mechanisms set.

3. 4 Findings: Four types of inter-ethnic cooperation

Together these dimensions show whether councilors make use of decentralization institutions, whether they go beyond formal institutions in their cooperation, and for whose benefit they cooperate. Hence, the ideal typical situation (in an analytical sense) combines high set memberships in constructive use of formal decentralization institutions (F), constructive informal mechanisms (I), while providing general benefits to all citizens regardless of ethnicity (G). This type of cooperation is labeled as **dynamic cooperation-F*I*G**.

3. 4. 1 Property space of IEC among municipal councilors

Each case can have fuzzy set membership higher than 0.5 only in one ideal type or corner of the property space of IEC. Thus, if municipality Gostivar has 0.8 set membership score in F, 0.8 in I and 1 in G; I take the lowest score across the condition (the minimum principle from fuzzy set theory), which in this case is 0.8. This places Gostivar closest to the dynamic IEC type since it has fuzzy set membership score above 0.5 in it. We can also assess the membership of Gostivar in other types of IEC, like type $F^* \sim I^* \sim G$ where “ \sim ” means absence or negation of the condition. Here, Gostivar has set memberships of 0.8 in F, 0.2 in $\sim I$ (1-0.8) and 0 in $\sim G$. Hence, the minimum score across the three dimensions is 0 which means Gostivar’s set membership in type $F^* \sim I^* \sim G$ is zero (0).

In Table 5 I present cases' fuzzy set values according to the separate conditions and the values in the combinations (ideal types) of conditions using the minimum- lowest score across conditions.

Table 5. Cases' fuzzy set values in conditions and all logically possible combinations of conditions

Municipalities	Conditions			Combinations of conditions – Ideal types							
	F	I	G	FIG	~FIG	F~IG	FI~G	~F~IG	~FI~G	F~I~G	~F~I~G
Butel	0.6	0.2	0.8	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.2
Chair	0.2	0.8	0.8	0.2	0.8	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Gostivar	0.8	0.8	1	0.8	0.2	0.2	0	0.2	0	0	0
Jegunovce	0.4	1	1	0.4	0.6	0	0	0	0	0	0
Krushevo	0.4	0.6	1	0.4	0.6	0.4	0	0.4	0	0	0
Kumanovo	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.2
Struga	0.4	0	0.2	0	0	0.2	0	0.2	0	0.4	0.6
Studenichani	0.2	0.8	0.8	0.2	0.8	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Tetovo	0.2	0	0.2	0	0	0.2	0	0.2	0	0.2	0.8


Each combination of conditions implies a logically possible ideal type of IEC. Certainly, not every possible combination of conditions that comprise a certain ideal type of inter-ethnic cooperation will occur, or be of theoretical relevance (Kvist 2007, 479). This may happen either because the combinations are logically impossible in the social reality, as we know it, or because the logically possible combinations outnumber the empirical instances (Schneider and Wagemann 2012 154). In my analysis, the latter is the case. The fuzzy set ideal type analysis provided four types of IEC (Table 6).

Table 6. Types of IEC among municipal councilors

Types of IEC	Configuration of conditions/fuzzy sets	Cases
Dynamic	F*I*G	Gostivar, Kumanovo
Predominantly informal	~F*I*G	Chair, Jegunovce, Krushevo, Studenichani
Pragmatic	F*~I*G	Butel
Minimal	~F~I~G	Struga, Tetovo

If we plot each municipality's fuzzy set scores in a three-dimensional space (Figure 5), each corner represents the ideal type provides yardstick to show close the case is to that type.

Figure 5. 3D Representation of types of IEC among municipal councilors



F- Constructive use of formal decentralization institutions; **I**- Constructive use of informal mechanisms; **G**- General benefits of municipal councilor's decisions for all citizens regardless ethnicity

First I will address what I label **dynamic IEC** ($F*I*G$) that Gostivar and Kumanovo exhibit. The second type of cooperation is **predominantly informal IEC** ($\sim F*I*G$) in Chair, Jegunovce, Krushevo, and Studenichani. The third type of IEC is **pragmatic** $F*\sim I*G$ –where Butel sits. Finally, Tetovo and Struga exhibit **minimal IEC** ($\sim F*\sim I*\sim G$).

In the next section I discuss each type of IEC among municipal councilors, in relation to the three dimensions. I use the interviews data complemented with findings from secondary sources and contextual knowledge for illustration. Within each type of cooperation I derive factors/conditions that can serve for further conjunctural causation analysis (Ragin 1987,

2000, Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Finally, I conduct fsQCA analysis with four conditions that I assume account for the non-occurrence of dynamic IEC (~dyn).

3. 5 Dynamic IEC ($F*I*G$) – Gostivar and Kumanovo

Within the dynamic type of IEC among municipal councilors, decentralization institutions are respected by their users- municipal councilors. Fuzzy set scores allow us to assess the degree to which the cases belong to this type: Gostivar (0.8) scores higher than Kumanovo (0.6). Since Kumanovo experienced violent ethnic conflict in 2001, I assumed that this municipality would show polarized and non-cooperative behavior among municipal councilors, and reluctance towards the use of newly prescribed institutions. Contrary to my expectation, it exhibits the FIG type.

3. 5. 1 Taking decentralization institutions seriously

In Gostivar, “cooperation happens both while using the institutional mechanisms in a respectful manner, pleasant and constructive discussion, but also spontaneously and informally” (Interview 1). Councilors see the municipal council as the most relevant institution where different communities are represented and where different specialized commissions operate (Interview 1). For the councilors in Kumanovo, cooperation means “creating conditions where nobody feels less worthy because of the numeric presence of his/hers community” (Interview 2). Misunderstandings that might look discriminatory in the decision making process in both municipalities occur when there is a lack of information or lack of knowledge of particular legal regulations or procedures, yet these are surmountable obstacles that are solved through a discussion and clarification (Interview 1 and Interview 2).

In Gostivar, the municipal councilors think that current decentralization institutions both provided them with new opportunities and limited them within frames they are not entirely sure are useful for their cooperation (Interview 1). For instance, regarding the CICR, the councilors state, “it is rather a pro-forma institution, which only makes us look more democratic to the outsiders” (Interview 1). They think that the municipal council is sufficient by itself to address issues that propel ethnic tensions, while both the citizens and themselves do not need a specialized body to solve their problems on an ethnic basis (Interview 1).

Yet, even though unnecessary, they find it important to respect the law and set up such a committee. “Believe me, the CICR has no power, the municipal council is the place for real representation of ethnic communities. But because of good will we do it” (Interview 1). They find it positive that the committee has no work to do, indicating that inter-ethnic relations among the citizens are good. This shows that regardless of how these councilors find the new decentralization institutions, they do not forsake them altogether, but try to find ways in which they can improve them. The potential of the CICR lies in the fact that Gostivar has other minorities like the Roma who do not have their own representative in the municipal council. In this way, through the CICR, smaller minorities can possibly voice out their concerns.

Contrary to Gostivar, councilors in Kumanovo do not think the CICR is redundant, however, they find ambiguity in the way CICR is to be composed, which deems its activities abstruse. For instance, the members of the CICR in Kumanovo are also municipal councilors. Previous research on the CICRs recommend that in order for the CICRs to provide a balance against the municipal council, all communities should have their own representative who is outside the structure of the local government (Tomovska and Neziri 2011, 37). Yet, since this is not

legally prescribed, the CICRs become symbolic institutions without any power, while councilors themselves think it should include more relevant people and intellectuals outside the council - “until we do not change the way its members are elected, there will be no significant achievements” (Interview 2). Hence, there is clear goal to improve this institution.

Councilors from the municipalities within the dynamic type of cooperation take legally prescribed institutions seriously and vest hope in their constructive potential. Those in Kumanovo believe that “Macedonia is a rare case of high respect for minority rights and inclusive political institutions both at central and local level” (Interview 2). They pointed out that it is not always efficient to organize employment on the basis of ethnicity, and they hoped this criterion might vanish in time so “there will be no risk for the whole system to fail because of unprofessionalism” (Interview 2).

Regarding the perception of these new decentralization institutions, an Albanian councilor from Kumanovo, a local businessman, thinks that “politics based on ethnic affiliation does not improve the economic state of the people which is central” (Interview 2). For the Serb representative on the contrary, there are positive repercussions from the new institutions bringing first and foremost a greater equality. He states “previous institutions neglected different identities, while the Law on Local Self-Governance from 2002 lifted Serbian and Roma communities on equal footing with the Macedonian and Albanian” (Interview 2). This perception is normal since “the system is regarded legitimate by those who have been incorporated into it” (Chabal and Daloz 1999, 28). The Macedonian councilors also think that the institutions as they are now, are “narrowing down the distance that existed among the ethnic groups before” (Interview 2).

3. 5. 2 Informal mechanisms reinforce formal cooperation

We need to point out that municipal councils existed even before the new laws were enabled to establish special bodies and institutions that would help multi-ethnic cooperation similar to the CICRs and language rights. Hence, the perception that the law actually made this possible is not entirely warranted, especially not for smaller minorities who still lean more on informal recognition and cooperation from the other communities in their municipality. Recognizing the Roma and Turkish language for instance is based on informal ties and possibly calculations for coalitions, which leads me to the second dimension, the informal mechanisms of cooperation within this type.

Within the dynamic type of IEC, the *constructive use of informal mechanisms* reinforces and improves rather than hinders what is already happening in the formal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Both cases, Kumanovo and Gostivar have fuzzy set membership scores of 0.8 in this dimension. In both, councilors state they get out together in the city, initiate festivals and participate in sport events, in order to send a message of cooperation amongst citizens. Moreover, in both cases they use the discretion given by the municipal statutes to prescribe institutions that are not legally binding for them. For instance, in Kumanovo, Roma is an official language even though the population of Roma in Kumanovo is 4.03%, along with the Serbian language spoken by 8.59% of the population. The same is the case with the Turkish language in Gostivar spoken by 9.86% of the population.

In fact, Gostivar is not even legally bound to introduce enhanced-local self-governance institutions to accommodate locally non-dominant communities. Yet, with the territorial reorganization of the country from 2004, three rural municipalities were adjoined to Gostivar: Vrutok, Dolna Banjica and Chegrane, which changed the proportion of the Macedonian

population in the municipality from 26% to 19.5%. Gostivar, however, adapted the new decentralization institutions since councilors believe that Macedonians are so close to the threshold of 20% that they should get greater rights on the local level. Furthermore, Gostivar is fully in this set, since councilors rely heavily on informal mechanisms entirely to reinforce formal ones.

3. 5. 3 Local problems are not ethnic

Councilors from these municipalities explicitly stated that the local problems do not have an ethnic character: “we want to make decisions which will contribute to all” (Interview 1). They mainly deal with issues of infrastructure where ethnicity does not play a role. In Kumanovo, councilors state, “in a highly politicized society, we are pressed to “play the ethnic card” because then voters vote for us” (Interview 2). Even if they explicitly neglect other’s community needs, their electorate would reward them, which is not the case in Gostivar.

Some factors that I argue are relevant to the different degree to which these two cases belong to the dynamic IEC (F*I*G) are that in Gostivar the councilors consider their citizens to have good relations among different groups and a tradition of accommodation - “it is the citizens and their willingness to live together and cooperate that gives credibility to our institutions” (Interview 1). In Kumanovo, on the other hand, the councilors find themselves responsible and called to send signals of cooperation since “citizens live separated in different parts of the municipality, do not interact, and there is little cross-cutting” (Interview 2).

Another difference between these municipalities is that Kumanovo experienced small-scale ethnic violence in 2001, while Gostivar did not. Both municipalities did not experience

territorial redrawing that substantively changed the ethnic proportion of the population. Both municipalities at the time when the interviews were conducted, had dominant parties that do not resemble the party constellations that govern at the central level, and both have a mayor from the same party that has the largest proportion of councilors in the council. The proportion of the local population is similar, although, inverted: Macedonians are the majority in Kumanovo while Albanians are the majority in Gostivar (Table 7).

Table 7. Composition of population by ethnicity in Gostivar and Kumanovo (in %)

	Mac.	Alb.	Turk	Roma	Vlach	Serb	Bosn.	Other
Gostivar	19.59	66.68	9.86	2.76	0.02	0.20	0.05	0.04
Kumanovo	60.43	25.87	0.28	4.03	0.14	8.59	0.02	0.64

We may argue that within the dynamic type of IEC, formal institutions even if not fully considered to address the core problems multiethnic municipalities face, are yet taken seriously and there are attempts to transform them into useful mechanisms of cooperation. Informal mechanisms facilitate and reinforce these goals, engaging personal respect and interpersonal ties, as well as party cooperation to improve institutional cooperation. The benefits within this type of IEC are understood as something that should bypass ethnic criteria.

From here we can devise number of hypotheses that can serve further analysis. My claim, deriving from my typology and fieldwork data, is that: where a multiethnic subnational unit has ethnic fragmentation of approximately 60/20/20, has not experienced contested territorial redrawing, is not dominated by the parties at the center, this presents sufficient combination of conditions for a case to be a member of the set of municipalities with dynamic IEC. Unfortunately, since there are only two cases belonging to dynamic IEC, for the time being I

cannot investigate this hypothesis further, however it can be a subject of more in-depth case analysis. I can also assess why it is absent (~dynamic IEC) in the rest of the municipalities.

3. 6 Predominantly informal IEC (~F*I*G)- Chair, Jegunovce, Krushevo, Studenichani

Within the *predominantly informal IEC set*, municipal councilors operate differently from the dynamic IEC, bypassing formal institutions either because they think they are redundant and pro forma or do not have finances to implement them (e.g. hire a translator, provide salaries and offices for CICR's meetings). Nevertheless, this does not hinder their cooperation, which rests on constructive use of informal mechanisms already known to the councilors, based on mutual respect and "good will", as they put it. Two of the cases are almost fully out, and two are more out than in the set of constructive use of formal institutions. Jegunovce is fully in the set of constructive use of informal mechanisms; Chair and Studenichani are almost fully in this set, while Krushevo is more in than out of it. Also, councilors from these municipalities think local issues do not have an ethnic character; hence, they attempt to bring benefits to all regardless of ethnicity.

3. 6. 1 No money for new institutions

Within the constructive use of formal institutions, the CICRs do not function because Studenichani, Jegunovce and Krushevo cannot pay for external members to come and meet in the municipalities (Interview 3, 6, 7). Even if they can afford it, they consider the CICRs redundant since they think they can resolve ethnic issues without special institutions facilitating this process (Interview 3, 5, 6, 7). However, in Studenichani for instance, there are attempts to form a CICR even though it is not legally required. The councilors however know that the Turks are already above 25% in the municipality, so they will know they will have to cooperate in the near future. As and as Fearon and Laitin argue (1996), because of

expected future interaction, they cooperate with them now. In Jegunovce, Chair and Krushevo there are also attempts to establish such a committee, but they have not succeeded yet.

The municipal councilors in Chair expressed dislike for the aims and functioning of the formal decentralization institutions, stating, “In reality, new decentralization reforms additionally centralized the country” (Interview 5). For them, despite power-sharing institutions, they lack the competence, finances and decision-making power to make authentic decisions. They also mentioned that it is obscure how there are no institutional mechanisms to keep them as municipal councilors accountable (Interview 5).

3. 6. 2 Informal cooperation

In Studenicani there is lack of contact both in the institutions and among the citizens from different ethnicities. Councilors find their citizens polarized and not communicating sufficiently, which is a consequence of living in ethnically homogeneous villages. “If there are no employees in the municipality from their village, citizens do not have loyalty towards the local institutions. Hence they call me because they think no one else will listen to them” (Interview 3). Those that are mixed live together on daily basis and have better relations.

Hence, the councilors and the mayor play a major role in setting an example of cooperation and coexistence for the people (Interview 3). They emphasize that cooperation starts from the top, not from the bottom, when councilors engage in many informal activities like calming down tensions, meeting publically, initiating festivals, even helping some citizens financially

(Interview 3).¹¹ They also use foreign funding for humanitarian causes, for instance to help citizens with disabilities.

In these municipalities, councilors have also developed informal mechanisms such as not stringently applying language rights. They would rather speak Macedonian or Albanian respectively in order to understand each other better. In Studenichani with an Albanian majority of 68.38%, and a Turkish population of 19.05%, there is someone employed in the municipal administration that translates for the councilors either in Turkish or Macedonian, since the Turks do not speak Albanian, but speak Macedonian.

It is similar in Krushevo with the Vlach language, which is recognized as an official language of the municipality as a sign of good will. Nevertheless, all speak Macedonian when they deliberate in the council. It became a problem for the Albanians when the municipality did not want to employ an official translator, but they solved the problem by having employee already working for the municipality administration to help them with translation (Interview 7).

In Jegunovce for instance, there is inter-party cooperation that resembles the party coalition at the central level of governance. Hence, they have a president of the municipal council for two years of his mandate coming from the Macedonian party, then the next two years, coming from the Albanian predominant party in the council. In this way they informally share power in a constructive way that is inclusive and transparent.

¹¹ “We the municipal councilors of Studenishani go and play football in Drachevo, a Macedonian municipality. People, especially children see this. ‘Aha’, they think, Agim plays football with Vasil. This is good. We also go and drink coffee out or visit poor families together. Of course we argue among us, but that is in the meetings. We are still friends after that, and citizens observe this! We are drowning in debt, and do not have the luxury to fight over ethnic issues” (Int.3). / “When we have festivals and tournaments, none of the media comes. When there is incident among children, let’s say Turks and Albanians, the media exacerbates the problems by emphasizing ethnicity, when in fact it is a simple childish fight. But this for sure lapses in deepening of divisions among citizens. So we as councilors since they respect us, have to go and talk to people constantly” (Interview 3).

A potential factor, which makes councilors innovative and creative to satisfy all sides, could be a lack of financial resources. Contrary to the expectations that ethnic identity is employed when there are payoffs of it (Posner 2005), these councilors consider how they can allocate resources to everybody. Since those municipalities struggle with the basic issue of viability in running the government, they cannot focus on ethnic problems. There is nevertheless a possibility that in time ethnic issues become may more prominent.

Along these lines, additional conditions for being part of this type of IEC could be the *size of the municipality*. While living in smaller municipalities, councilors care what the citizens think because they literally see them almost everyday. They consider that playing the ‘ethnic card’ does not lead them anywhere they think (Interview 3, 4, 6). In Studenichani councilors say “we cannot make excesses on ethnic identity and such trivial issues when we barely have any financial means” (Interview 3). Furthermore, since they are only between 10 and 15 councilors, they have opportunities to develop much closer relations, between them which opens up additional opportunities, as Reilly argues, for discussing and thinking about common concerns (2003, 7).

What councilors call “*good will*” might be another reason for constructive use of informal mechanisms, yet we should not exclude the possibility that it might as well be that “*exchange*” is what actually makes them cooperate in this manner. For instance, in Krushevo, Vlach are 10% of the population, which can facilitate the Macedonians to vote laws that require a double majority. Since Macedonian parties are also highly polarized; one must focus has on their cooperation as well. Finally, in all these cases, the central government was also mentioned. One hypothesis could be that when the local government is either *neglected or by the central government*, councilors have to pursue informal types of IEC.

3. 7 Pragmatic IEC (F*~I*G) - Butel

In the *pragmatic IEC*, there is constructive use of formal institutions, but it scores low on the constructive use of informal mechanisms while at the same time providing general benefits regardless of ethnicity. Butel belongs to this type of IEC. Here councilors know they have to use the institutions to satisfy their ethnic constituency and councilors largely deal with bargaining across ethnic parties. This is a peculiar type of cooperation where councilors' constructively use formal institutions, yet as service to party interests.

3. 7. 1 Party centered politics

The formal institutions are used in part, yet essential features of the decentralization package are missing, such as the CICR. Councilors neglect this institution and share anecdotes of how they simply laughed the single time they gathered to form this committee (Interview 4). Both Macedonian and Albanian languages are generally used when the councils convene. Yet, the institutions tend to operate as a façade, discussing the bargains already made between political parties beforehand.

In this case, party cooperation is paramount. It mirrors the coalition between the dominant Macedonian VMRO-DPMNE and Albanian DUI party at the center, as well as mirroring the proportion of the ethnic population on the national level (Macedonians-62% and Albanians 25%). Hence, councilors use informal institutions, but in a non-transparent manner. "There is more discrimination on party than ethnic grounds" (Interview 4). Partisanship negatively affects ethnic communities as well, regardless of the fact that they have built social trust over the years (Interview 4). For instance, when there was a murder of five men in Macedonia in April 2012, where all suspects were Albanians, the ruling Macedonian party did not support peaceful protests and expressions of condolence because of a fear of divergence with their

coalition partner DUI at the center. Hence, the central power relations terminate the space for maneuvering at the local level.

Rather unexpectedly, councilors here bring general benefits as a result of the political bargaining that has happened beforehand, based on reciprocity. This type of cooperation is in line with Horowitz's argument, that in order for general benefits to be achieved, where everybody regardless of ethnicity is satisfied, councilors engage in *exchange* rather than attempt to find superordinate goals (Workshop at CEU, Horowitz 2013). Both "polarization and cooperation come from the relations among the parties" (Interview 4). Benefits satisfy all; yet, the way to get there is through previous party deals that are later simply rubber stamped in the council. For instance, councilors voted to exempt a church from taxes, followed right away by a vote for tax exemption for a mosque (Interview 4).

The pragmatic type of IEC is an example of how ethnic politics, particularly consociational elements entrench divides that have not been salient before. Similarly to the Northern Ireland case, consociational elements have converted simple issues into complex ethnic ones, requiring cumbersome exchanges to resolve" (Horowitz 2008, 1221). Butel illustrates a municipality where the tradition of cooperation lapses into an ethnic framework of politics.

3. 8 Minimal IEC ($\sim F \sim I \sim G$) - Struga and Tetovo

In the *minimal type* of IEC, there are two cases, Tetovo with 0.8 and Struga with 0.6 memberships in this type, both almost out of the (F) set, fully out of the (I) set, and almost out of the (G) set. This means that they barely use the new decentralization institutions, and use them in a way that safeguards particularistic ethnic interests. The Albanian majority party presents decisions that are already agreed upon before the meetings and they simply vote on

them, only with some marginal discussion. Councilors from the local minority, in these two cases the Macedonians, wither away from institutions, not feeling empowered to change or impact the decision-making process.

The Albanian language has been officially used in Tetovo ever since 1992, so the Law on Local Self Government from 2002 did not bring any significant changes in this regard. For the Albanians, decentralization was a positive step towards their accommodation, but they think they need even more rights and competences at the local level (Interview 9).

In Struga, in addition to my findings, another research from 2007 also shows that communication both among citizens and among councilors has been aggravated since 2004 (Malevska et al. 2007, 77). Malevska also finds that there is no coordination among councilors before the meetings (2007, 79), and most of the decisions are taken without consent on the Macedonian side. From the central level and that of the party leadership, the councilors are asked not to problematize questions that touch upon inter-ethnic relations, so that they will not destabilize the already fragile political situation (2007, 79).

3. 8. 1 Vague prescriptions for design of institutions

Struga and Tetovo, both “suffer” from a general problem noticeable in the Law on Local Self-government and the statutes of the municipalities: vague provisions for the use of double majority voting in the Law, and formation of CICRs which in the end rest on case-by-case interpretation. This is one of the greatest weaknesses of the law; since these particular provisions are intended to help, not fuel ethnic tensions.

The dominant ethnicity or party needs the votes from the other parties only for the qualified majority vote (2/3 vote) - prescribed for cultural issues. That is the reason cultural and symbolic issues normally stagnate in these municipalities or related decisions are implemented illegally, which sparks controversy. For instance, councilors in the municipality of Tetovo in 2012 decided to declare Ramush Haradinaj, a former leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army, an honored citizen of Tetovo without the consent by the Macedonian councilors (Deutsche Welle 2013). Macedonian councilors boycotted the meeting, and the decision was soon withdrawn since it was not voted on and passed with the required double majority.

3. 8. 2 Ethnic territorial gerrymandering

With the introduction of the Law from 2004, the proportion of Macedonian citizens in Tetovo decreased from 23% to 28% by adding Dzepchishte and Shipkovica. Tetovo was the stronghold of the NLA rebels in 2001, and most of the violence occurred in the surrounding area. This political landscape triggered migration of Macedonians from the municipality. One of the Macedonian respondents proposed, “municipality of Tetovo itself should be decentralized, with an additional Macedonian mayor, by which mechanisms Macedonians would feel protected” (Interview 9).

Even though Struga did not experience violent ethnic conflict, decentralization reforms brought the redrawing of territorial boundaries, which was contested. The changes occurred by adding the municipalities of Veleshta, Delogozdi, Labunishta and Lukovo to Struga, which changed the proportion of Macedonians from 47% to 32%, and turned the municipality predominantly Albanian - from 41% to 56%. Because of the equitable representation quotas, many Macedonians had to be fired in order for Albanians to be employed. Councilors therefore, depending on their ethnic background, perceive the institutions entirely differently.

In Tetovo, intra-party cooperation within the same ethnicity happens on certain issues. In addition, Macedonian councilors in Tetovo point to the relevance of the central level government composition's impact to their cooperation. If the Ministry of local self-governance is headed by an Albanian, which has been the case since 2001 on, and if the dominant parties in the council are also coalition partners in the central government; the mayor and majority in the council have absolute leverage in the municipality (Interview 9). Hence, when structural changes take place like in Struga where the ethnic composition of the population changed over night, coalitions will not be formed. Automatically, there is felt to be no need for the locally dominant ethnic community sitting at around 70% to be in an inter-ethnic party coalition when it already has the majority in the council as in Tetovo based on ethnic affiliation.

3. 8. 3 Ours and theirs

Councilors perceive local issues as “ours and theirs”. This is illustrated in the proposition of the Albanian councilor who said, “If you want to have a monument of Goce Delchev, fine, I will respect it. But I will also then build one of Skenderbeg and you should also respect mine” (Interview 9). The Macedonians also point out that the “Albanians will implement their interest as a majority, yet not from a power position or pressure, but simply demographic pressure, that replicates itself in the composition of the municipal council” (Interview 9). Even the Albanian councilor said that unfortunately, the council is not working in the direction of finding common interests for all - “seems there is no time for that” (Interview 9).

3. 8. 4 Why mobilize ethnicity?

Ethnicity in these municipalities is mobilized as the main cleavage, since the ethnic counterparts benefit from it (Posner 2005, 3). The relations are not those of mutual dependence, since the Albanians have secured a majority. Exchanges (Horowitz 2013) also do not work since the Macedonians do not have what to exchange. The councilors do not have informal contacts among themselves, which means that they interact much less (Allport 1954), hence, there are not many chances for discovering mutual and general benefits (Reilly 2003, Sherif 1966).

In contrast to the pragmatic type of IEC, in the minimal, again one ethnic group dominates, but the other serves as décor to the council. Informal cooperation is absent and it is all based on particularistic needs. Hence, the minimal IEC boils down to convening and voting, since it only formally exists as such. As Treisman suggests, here politics is done more in a manner of exclusion rather than tolerance (2005, 222). In these municipalities a positive notion of cooperation could not trickle down to the citizens, as Lijphart would hope, since both layers of citizens and elites are polarized. Finally, the accommodation is achieved in the most extreme way of crafting an ethnic demographic structure, which jeopardizes IEC.

Hence we may hypothesize that where contested territorial boundaries are redrawn or there is a secured ethnic majority in the council, together with polarization among both layers: citizens and elites, cases would be situated into the minimal type of IEC.

In the following section, based on these hypotheses, I conduct fuzzy set analysis on why dynamic IEC does not occur in some of the municipalities.

3. 9 Why not dynamic IEC? Fuzzy set sufficiency analysis

In this section I present a fuzzy-set (fsQCA) sufficiency analysis of combinations of conditions that account for the outcome: non-occurrence of dynamic IEC (~dyn). So far, I have derived a typology of IEC among municipal councilors with four types after conducting the fuzzy set ideal type analysis: dynamic, predominantly informal, pragmatic, and minimal IEC. The dynamic type of IEC is the one where both formal and informal institutions are used constructively by municipal councilors, reinforcing each other, in order to provide general benefits to the citizens in that particular subnational unit. But why do some, or only two out of nine municipalities in my analysis yield this type of cooperation, while in the rest we find other modes of cooperation?

Since only two cases exhibit dynamic-IEC, for the time being I inquire what combination of conditions account for the non-occurrence of the dynamic IEC (from now on referred to as ~dyn or absence of dynamic IEC). It is also useful to see whether the hunches I had while analyzing the different types of cooperation, combine in logically and empirically relevant paths for ~dyn. I do not consider any factor I derived to be necessary for the ~dyn, but different combinations of conditions as sufficient for the outcome ~dyn.

Sufficient is the condition or combination of conditions that can produce the outcome (Ragin 1987, 99). In this case, every time we see the condition, we look for the presence of the outcome. If we see instances of the outcome but not the sufficient condition, it does not undermine the claim of sufficiency. It just means that another path - sufficient condition or combination of conditions led to that outcome.

3. 9. 1 Factors accounting for non-occurrence of dynamic IEC

The set membership scores of the cases in the set of non-occurrence of the dynamic type of IEC can be calculated when we subtract each case's fuzzy set score in the outcome of dynamic IEC from one (e.g. $1-0.6 = 0.4$). Based on theoretical as well as context relevant knowledge for the phenomenon of interest, I propose the following four factors for the non-occurrence of dynamic IEC:

a) The first condition is whether a municipality has experienced **contested territorial redrawing (terr)**. The assumption is that, if it did, that has exacerbated the relations both among citizens and elites. As Bieber argues (2005), it is a zero sum game in which some are the winners (e.g. Struga) while others feel injustice has been done to them. Hence elites will have fewer incentives and less of a desire to cooperate.

b) Secondly, I look at whether dominant parties in that municipality (from the mandate 2009-2013) reflect the power relations or more precisely party relations and coalitions at the **central level (center)**. If they do, then local representatives would not have incentives for dynamic IEC since they simply have the support from the center, and reflect the political power constellation of the central level or the party directives.

c) As a third condition, I look at whether ethnic relations among the citizens in that municipality are derogated, or for a lack of demand by the citizens for their elites to cooperate across ethnicity. Hence, from the interview data, I calibrate a set called **tradition of cooperation (citiz)**, which refers to the extent to which citizens maintain cooperation, and hence press their politicians to cooperate. The lack of this tradition (**~citiz**) I claim would lead to the absence of dynamic IEC (**~dyn**).

d) Finally, we are familiar from theory that experience of ethnic violence plays a role in shaping the type of cooperation of ethnic counterparts (Horowitz 2008, Dyrstad 2012). Hence we may consider that the occurrence of **ethnic violence** in a particular municipality in 2001 would affect the relations both among citizens and political elites, and derogate their cooperation. To ascribe score to cases in this set, I use case knowledge and official reports on the ethnic conflict from 2001.

Table 8 presents all cases' membership scores in the proposed conditions. The last column contains the membership scores in the outcome ~dyn.

Table 8. Membership scores of cases in conditions for fsQCA analysis for the outcome ~dyn

Cases/conditions	terr	center	~citiz	violence	~dyn
Butel	0	1	0.4	0	0.8
Chair	0	0.8	0.2	0	0.8
Gostivar	0.4	0	0	0.4	0.2
Jegunovce	0	0.8	0.4	0.6	0.6
Krushevo	0	0.6	0	0	0.6
Kumanovo	0	0	0.6	0.8	0.4
Struga	1	0.4	0.8	0.4	1
Studenichani	0	0	0.6	0	0.4
Tetovo	0.8	0.4	0.8	1	1

3. 9. 2 Analysis of necessary conditions for ~dyn

As a good practice of QCA, I first test for necessary conditions for the outcome ~dyn. The consistency column in Table 9 displays the degree to which the conditions I have chosen are consistent with the statement of necessity for the ~dyn. The usual consistency threshold value for a condition to be necessary is 0.9. The coverage value displays the empirical importance of the condition, or what proportion of the cases is covered by that condition.

Table 9. Analysis of necessity for the outcome ~dyn

Conditions	Consistency	Coverage
ter	0.322581	0.909091
~ter	0.709677	0.647059
violence	0.419355	0.812500
~violence	0.709677	0.758621
citiz	0.645161	0.769231
~citiz	0.580645	0.947368
center	0.548387	0.894737
~center	0.580645	0.692308

As we could see from Table 9, none of the conditions or their negation turned to be necessary for the occurrence of the outcome of interest- (~dyn).

3. 9. 3 Analysis of sufficiency for ~dyn

After performing the Standard Analysis of sufficiency using fsQCA 2.5 software, with a case frequency cut off of 1 case, and a consistency threshold of 0.8, I got the following truth table (Table 10). Truth table rows present combinations of conditions or one of the possible AND combination of conditions. In my analysis there are $2^4 = 16$ possible combinations of conditions. I exclude from the analysis the logical remainders, or possible combinations of conditions that did not have enough empirical support (at least one case). This is an issue of limited diversity. Hence, I do not make any assumptions on the logical remainders. From the rows containing empirical instances. In the ~dyn column, I ascribe zero (0) to those rows that do not have consistency above 0.8. In the truth table, N represents the number of cases that empirically exhibit the combination of conditions in that row.

Table 10. Truth Table without logical remainders for the outcome (~dyn)

terr	center	violence	~citiz	N	~dyn	raw cons.	PRI cons.	product	Cases
0	1	0	0	3	1	1	1	1	Butel, Chair, Krushevo
1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Tetovo
0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	Studenichani
1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	Struga
0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	Jegunovce
0	0	1	1	1	0	0.8	0.5	0.4	Kumanovo
0	0	0	0	1	0	0.8	0.333	0.267	Gostivar

The expression of the solution term¹² provided by the Standard Analysis depends mostly on the goal of the researcher and the level of precision he/she desires (Schneider 2008, 66). Since I have directional expectation, I present and pay greater attention to the intermediate solution Table 11) (parsimonious and conservative solutions are reported in Appendix C).

After specifying the directional expectation that **~citiz** contributes to the outcome **~dyn** when present; **violence** when present; **center** when present and **terr** when present, I got the following intermediate solution.

Table 11. Intermediate solution with parameters of fit for the outcome ~dyn

Solution	center	+	~citiz*~violence	+	~citiz*terr	→	~dyn
Path consistency	0.900000		1.000000		1.000000	Cases not covered by any path	
Raw coverage	0.580645		0.387097		0.258065		
Unique coverage	0.290323		0.129032		0.096774		
Cases covered	Butel (1,0.8), Chair (0.8,0.8), Jegunovce (0.8,0.6), Krushevo (0.6,0.6)		Struga (0.6,1), Studenichani (0.6,0.8)		Struga (0.8,1), Tetovo (0.8, 1)	Gostivar Kumanovo	
Solution consistency	0.928572						
Solution coverage	0.838710						

Since the analysis showed that there are no necessary conditions for **~dyn**, one sufficient path of getting to **~dyn** is if the local governing parties resembles those at the **center**. Four cases

¹² The result of a truth-table analysis also known as logical minimization (Schneider and Wagemann 2012).

are covered by this sufficient path: *Butel, Chair, Jegunovce and Krushevo*. These are the municipalities where the dominant Macedonian party from the center, VMRO-DPMNE, is dominant at the local level as well while the dominant Albanian party at the local level DUI, is also in an informal grand coalition with VMRO- DPMNE at the center.

In the second path, **~citiz*~violence**, two cases are covered, *Struga* and *Studenichani*. The opposite of the hypothesis that the presence of violence derogates ethnic relations; the analysis showed that the absence of violence leads to ~dyn. Even though counterintuitive, yet, citizens on both sides, Macedonian and Albanian did not really take “ownership” of this conflict, even though the Albanians found it helpful for enhancing their rights. Macedonians on the other hand were dissatisfied with their political elites who bargained and allowed for territories to be taken away from the Macedonians. In this path ~violence is combined also with lack of tradition of cooperation ~citiz.

In the third sufficient path, we have a combination of lack of tradition of cooperation among citizens and contested territorial change **~citiz*terr**. Cases covered by this sufficient path are *Struga* and *Tetovo*. Generally, only *Struga*, *Tetovo* along with *Kichevo* in 2013 have been faced with the redrawing of contested territorial borders.

In the following Figures 6, 7 and 8, I present XY- plots of the separate sufficient paths, and the XY- plot of the solution term in Figure 9. Looking at these figures, and based on Figure 12 adapted by Schneider and Rohlfing (2013), we can identify types of cases, which can serve further within-case analysis.

Figure 6. Sufficient path 1 cons. 0.90 raw cov.0.58 unique cov.0.29




Figure 7. Sufficient path 2 cons. 1 raw cov.0.38 unique cov.0.29




Figure 8. Sufficient path 3 for ~dyn cons. 1.00 raw cov. 0.26 cov.0.097






Figure 9. Solution term for non-occurrence of D-IEC cons.0.94 cov.0.83



3. 9. 4 Cases for further case studies

FsQCA is a powerful tool for choosing cases for comparative process tracing of typical and/or deviant cases for coverage. Typical cases for sufficiency are located in zone 1 (Figure 10). In the group of typical cases, the ideal-typical typical case for sufficiency has a membership of 1 in the term and the outcome. In the absence of ideal typical case, the best typical case is located as closely as possible to the upper-right corner of area 1 in the XY plot.

Figure 10. XY plot and types of cases in fsQCA of sufficiency



Adapted from Schneider and Rohlfing 2013, 27

Applying the principle of unique membership and max. set membership to the cases in zone 1 (ibid., 27), I obtained Butel as the most typical case for sufficient path: **center** (Figure 6). This was expected, since Butel also belongs to the pragmatic type of cooperation, in which I discovered that what happens at the central level of government, transposes to the local politics in this municipality. Butel is also deviant case consistency in degree, since it has lower membership scores in the outcome. Studenichani, Struga and Tetovo are deviant cases for coverage, since they are members of the outcome but are more out then in the sufficient path.

In the second sufficient path ($\sim\text{citz}*\sim\text{violence}$) presented in Figure 7, Struga is the uniquely covered typical case, while Tetovo is the closest to ideal deviant case coverage. There are no deviant cases of consistency in kind. Finally, in the third sufficient path ($\sim\text{citz}*\text{terr}$) presented in Figure 8, Struga and Tetovo are typical cases, while Butel, Chair and Studenichani are deviant cases for coverage for this path. In all three sufficient paths, Gostivar and Kumanovo are individually irrelevant cases (zone 5), and this is normal, since they have low membership scores both in the outcome ($\sim\text{dyn}$) and the solution term. Finally, as seen from the plots, there are no true contradictory cases (qualitatively different memberships in the sufficient conjunction and the outcome).

This analysis showed that there are different paths to the $\sim\text{dyn}$. As my previous fuzzy set ideal type analysis showed, the non-dynamic IEC may be found in the form of predominantly informal, pragmatic and minimal cooperation. Assessing the four conditions with the fsQCA supported most of the claims I made while describing the types of IEC. However, this analysis may be further improved by including more conditions in the fsQCA analysis, and especially by including more cases. The drawback of this analysis also hinges on the fact that the cases that belong to the $\sim\text{dyn}$ are quite heterogeneous, yet we can still derive meaningful patterns through the combinations of conditions or different sufficient paths they represent.

CONCLUSIONS

With decentralization as the institutional context, it was theoretically and empirically stimulating to discover how elected representatives of different ethnic groups cooperate on the subnational level. As Gerring states, discovery indeed requires critical engagements with the status quo (2012, 28). This endeavor is rather challenging in a field like power-sharing that is both inflated with research, yet touches in the subnational arena merely in a cursory manner. Hence this thesis aimed to contribute to the lack of empirical insights on how de facto power-sharing works at the local level.

Distinctive patterns of inter-ethnic cooperation at the subnational level

My main research question inquired into the types of IEC across multiethnic municipalities among municipal councilors in Macedonia since the decentralization reforms in 2005. So far, authors like Wolff argue that Macedonia does not have local power-sharing (2010, 2011). However, decentralization arrangements that combine institutions for accommodation and integration of ethnic communities at the subnational level can be considered local power-sharing that displays itself in de facto different types.

Namely, in my analysis based on focus group interviews, I investigated nine multiethnic municipalities in Macedonia according to the following criteria: constructive use of formal institutions, constructive use of informal mechanisms and general benefits that follow from councilor's decision making. After conducting a thematic and fuzzy set ideal type analysis on my interview data, the cases clustered into four types of inter-ethnic cooperation: *dynamic, predominantly informal, pragmatic and minimal cooperation*.

In the *dynamic type* of IEC, municipal councilors constructively use decentralization institutions and try to improve them. Informal mechanisms reinforce cooperation within institutions, and municipal councilors strive to provide general benefits for all citizens living in their municipality, regardless of ethnicity. Gostivar and Kumanovo belong to this type of IEC. In the *predominantly informal type* of IEC, in which Chair, Jegunovce, Krushevo and Studenichani belong, councilors do not yet have the means nor the will to effectuate the formally prescribed decentralization institutions. Yet, their cooperation is based on informal mechanisms that still bring general benefits.

Within the *pragmatic type* of IEC where Butel belongs, party bargaining prevails and makes institutions function; yet the negative repercussions are reflected on the opposition parties that do not have any leverage in the decision-making. Furthermore, citizens are pushed into dealing with ethnic politics that was not known before to them. Another drawback is that the municipality may lose its authentic political space, since it is a mirror image of the elite cooperation at the central level.

Finally, the *minimal type* of IEC, containing Struga and Tetovo may lead to total indifference towards additional efforts to ameliorate cooperation, or pursue interaction beyond what is necessary with their ethnic counterparts. This type of IEC is seen as inevitable and safeguards the predominant ethnic group's interests.

Overall, cases have either high or low set membership in the constructive use of informal mechanisms and general benefits dimensions, while the set membership in the constructive use of formal institutions dimension varies. We may argue that when councilors bring

decisions disregarding ethnicity, there is also the presence of constructive use of informal cooperation. Also, within the same type of cooperation, we find notable differences among cases. These differences perhaps follow from de facto different understandings by municipal councilors on what elites should do with the newly established institutions.

Without attaching value judgments to these types of IEC, institutional designers should still be aware of what type of IEC they intend to pursue. In none of the municipalities do we find the full-fledged boycott of institutions, but there are for instance sporadic boycotts in Struga and Tetovo. As Spears argues, the issue with power-sharing is that “the devil is in the details” so research should no longer shy away from those details (2013, 39).

Why not dynamic IEC?

If the goal of decentralization is to bring aboard accommodation through new institutions at the local level, and align them with positive informal practices, why to some municipalities not have dynamic IEC. In order to go into explanatory analysis of the absence of dynamic IEC at the subnational level, I extracted conditions that are both theoretically and empirically driven: traditions of cooperation among citizens in a particular municipality; convergence of party coalitions on the central and local level of governance; contested municipal borders redrawing and the experience of inter-ethnic violence in 2001.

My fsQCA analysis showed there are three paths that contribute to the non-occurrence of dynamic IEC. One path is if the municipality government’s party structure resembles the one from the central level of governance. Another one is if a municipality has not experienced violence yet lacks tradition of cooperation among citizens. Third is if a municipality has experienced contested territorial borders redrawing, while also lacking a tradition of

cooperation among citizens who would thus then demand cooperation among elites. Further inconclusive factors that I tested, yet did not find meaningful results, are the size of the municipality; ethnic and party fragmentation and economic development. Nevertheless, these factors deserve further inquiry.

From this analysis, I argue that the most problematic factor is the contested territorial redrawing which is present in the cases that exhibit minimal IEC. The power-sharing theories so far quite recklessly suggest the redrawing of territorial borders for accommodation of ethnic communities (Lijphart 1977, Horowitz 1985, 2008). These suggestions come as if they are merely a matter of institutional design, not interference in the milieu of local life when overnight minorities become majorities, and vice-versa. I suggest further comparative inquiry of cases – particularly subnational units that have experienced contested territorial reorganization – which, I argue will almost always exhibit minimal, low, stagnant IEC. Certainly, it will depend how a researcher conceptualizes his/her outcome of interest.

Even though a lack of tradition of cooperation among citizens, which would press local politicians to cooperate, is present in two of the paths, I still consider contested territorial redrawing as a major factor that would drastically exacerbate inter-ethnic relations, and impact upon inter-ethnic cooperation. Struga is such a case. There had been a tradition of cooperation both among citizens and politicians before the territorial reorganization and the municipality has been unable to “recover” ever since. The municipality of Kichevo faced the same “scissors” in 2013, becoming predominantly Albanian. Hence it will present no surprise if it follows Struga’s steps.

Finally, the fsQCA analysis also provided fine-grained insights into how cases even within the same kind, differ in degree. As Schneider and Rohlfing (2013) suggest, after this type of analysis, further research can focus on typical cases to discover causal mechanisms, while research on deviant cases' consistency can help in identifying omitted conditions in the fsQCA analysis.

Further study of decentralization and inter-ethnic cooperation

As Spears inquires in the African sub-Saharan countries (2013), power-sharing employed as a conflict management mechanism will depend on whether institutions are generally weak in the country, dysfunctional or non-existent, and what challenges they create for formal power-sharing (e.g. lack of rule of law in Macedonia). Similarly to African states, politics in Macedonia is in general also based on patronage, clientelism and personalized politics. Hence, inter-ethnic cooperation across multi-ethnic municipalities in Macedonia is contingent on pre-existing institutional and societal features. Therefore, the benefits of decentralization are still hard to measure, yet looking from this temporal distance, they are not significantly different from what local leaders could achieve on their own through informal mechanisms.

Another important aspect for further research is to look at *externalities* of power-sharing agreements (Horowitz 2013, Spears 2013). In the Macedonian case, one of the externalities is creating zones with greater potential for ethnic conflict than before (e.g. Struga, Kichevo, Tetovo). Another one is migration of local populations because of the new institutional arrangements. Furthermore, perhaps the most devastating externality of the conflict that brought about these institutional arrangements is the perception that violent rebellion gets its rewards (Spears 2013, Vankovska 2002, Siljanovska 2011). I also consider an externality the fact that councilors in places such as Gostivar since 2005 when the Law on Local Self-

Governance brought the changes in institutional design, have to start thinking and calculating in terms of ethnic criteria, which was not as relevant before 2005. This leaves intact important questions like accountability, professionalism, and economic development.

I agree that it is too early to judge but very timely to analyze local power-sharing. For example, Ottaway argues that in Africa “the most durable institutions emerge by ongoing struggles and bargaining between politicians, ethnic leaders, and warlords in a process of autonomous recovery” (in Spears 2013, 49). This is what is currently going on in Macedonia, both at the central and local level. Formal institutions inevitably combine with informal practices, which have to be jointly assessed if we are to come to meaningful findings on decentralization’s successes and/or failures. Surely, central power-sharing should remain the main subject of examination, but it has to be complemented with what is going on at the subnational level, and even more importantly, with the local-central nexus of politics.

Displaying a typology of IEC across multiethnic municipalities in Macedonia, conducting fsQCA analysis of sufficient paths for the non-occurrence of dynamic IEC and deriving conditions relevant for further explanatory analysis hopefully modestly contributes to the study of power-sharing in the subnational arena. My hope is that fuzzy set ideal type analysis exhibits its powerful potential as an approach for comparative studies of a medium number of cases, able to grasp change of empirical concepts over time. I also hope that this research can serve not as a final product, but as an endeavor that can be much improved by including more cases and carrying out more in-depth interviews, as well as pursuing further within case analysis. Finally, my hope is that this research will stimulate further comparative analysis on varieties of types of local power-sharing and inter-ethnic cooperation both within and across countries.

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Software used for data analysis:

FsQCA Version 2.5 Available at: <http://www.compass.org/software.htm#fsQCA>

Appendices

APPENDIX A: Data

Table 12. Ethnic composition of population in multi-ethnic municipalities in Macedonia (in%)

Municipality	Total	Macedon.	Albanians	Turks	Roma	Vlach	Serbs	Bosniak	Other
Skopje	506 926	66.75	20.49	1.70	4.63	0.5	2.82	1.5	1.61
Butel (R)	36 154	62.25	25.19	3.61	1.55	0.33	2.86	2.68	1.53
Gazi Baba	72 617	73.67	17.22	0.83	2.87	0.32	2.89	0.98	1.22
Saraj (R)	35 804	3.89	91.53	0.13	0.77	0	0.05	3.16	0.47
Cair (U)	64 773	24.13	57	6.95	4.76	0.12	0.96	4.55	1.53
Suto Orizari (R)	22 017	6.53	30.32	0.25	60.6	0	0.31	0.806	1.19
Aracinovo (R)	11 597	5.14	93.8	0	0	0.01	0.09	0.56	0.4
Bogovinje (R)	28 997	0.13	96.23	4.08	0.02	0	0	0.03	0.51
Brvenica (R)	15 855	37.53	61.62	0	0	0	0.49	0.01	0.35
Valandovo (U)	11 890	82.68	0	11.21	0.27	0.01	5.37	0.01	0.45
Vasilevo (R)	12 122	82.15	0	17.28	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.48
Vraneshtica (R)	1 322	78.14	0.76	20.88	0	0	0.15	0	0.07
Vrapciste (R)	25 399	4.10	83.08	12.34	0	0	0.01	0.03	0.44
Gostivar (U)	81 042	19.59	66.68	9.86	2.76	0.02	0.2	0.05	0.04
Debar (U)	19 542	20.01	58.07	13.73	5.53	0.01	0.11	0.02	2.52
Dojran (U)	3 426	77.091	0.05	11.73	1.72	0.09	8.08	0.06	0.73
Dolneni (R)	13 568	35.90	26.65	19.14	0.1	0	0.12	17.54	0.55
Zelno (R)	24 390	0.29	99.2	0.01	0	0	0	0.02	0.48
Zajas	11 605	1.82	97.44	0	0	0	0.05	0	0.69
Zelenikovo (R)	4 077	61.86	29.58	0.02	2.26	0.02	1.1	4.69	0.47
Jegunovce (R)	10 790	55.26	43.02	0.04	0.36	0	1.01	0.01	0.28
Karbinci (R)	4 012	79.76	0	18.15	0.05	1.34	0.3	0	0.4
Kichevo (U)	30 138	53.55	30.53	8.06	5.41	0.25	0.29	0.02	1.89
Konche (R)	3 536	85.11	0	14.73	0	0	0.08	0	0.08
Krusevo (U)	9 684	62.8	21.32	3.25	0	10.53	0.39	1.41	0.3
Kumanovo (U)	105 484	60.43	25.87	0.28	4.03	0.14	8.59	0.02	0.64
Mavrovo I Rostushe (R)	8 618	50.46	17.21	31.1	0.12	0	0.07	0.36	0.68
Lipkovo	27 058	0.63	97.42	0	0	0	1.37	0.02	0.56

(R)									
Oslomej (R)	10 425	1.06	98.39	0	0	0	0	0.01	0.54
Petrovec (R)	8 255	51.43	22.86	0.91	1.62	0	5.03	17.47	0.68
Plasnica (R)	4 545	0.75	0.44	97.82	0	0	0	0	0.99
Radovis (U)	28 244	84.10	0.03	14.38	0.96	0.09	0.25	0	0.19
Rankovce (R)	4 144	97.92	0	0	1.38	0	0.43	0	0.27
Resen (U)	16 825	76.07	9.13	10.68	1.09	0.15	0.44	0.01	2.43
Sopiste (R)	5 656	60.18	34.33	4.3	0	0.07	0.57	0	0.55
Staro Nagoricane (R)	4 840	80.71	0.02	0	0.02	0	19.13	0	0.12
Struga (U)	65 375	32.09	56.85	5.72	0.18	1.04	0.17	0.16	3.79
Studenicani (R)	17 246	1.79	68.38	19.05	0.42	0	0.08	9.64	0.64
Tearce (R)	22 454	12.2	84.4	2.3	0.3	0	0.06	0	0.74
Tetovo (U)	86 580	23.16	70.32	2.17	2.72	0.02	0.7	0.18	0.73
Centar Zupa (R)	6 519	12.49	6.96	80.17	0	0	0	0	0.38
Chaska (R)	7 673	57.38	35.23	5.1	0	0.01	0.72	0.87	0.79
Cucer Sandevo (R)	8 493	47.32	22.88	0	0.27	0.19	28.56	0.01	0.77

R-rural, U-urban (As of 2005)

Table 13. Components of enhanced local self-governance

Institutional conditions / Municipalities	Legally bound (A)	Official Languages (B)	Equitable representation (C) M/A/T/R/V/S/B/O	CIER (0/1) (D)	Mixed police patrols (E)	Use of veto (F)	Change of Territory (G)
1. Butel	Yes	2 (M,A)	?	0	Yes	Yes	Yes
2. Chair	Yes	2 (M,A)	55/38/3 29/67/5	0/1	Yes	Yes	Yes
3. Gostivar	No	3(M,A,T)	?	0	Yes	No	No
4. Jegunovce	Yes	2 (M,A)	90/9 88/8/3	1	Yes	Yes	No
5. Krushevo	Yes	3 (M,A,V)	75/0/0/0/20 82/0/0/0/18/1	0	Yes	Yes	No
6. Kumanovo	Yes	4 (M,A,S,R)	No data 80/12/0/0/7/0/0/1	1	Yes	Yes	No
7. Struga	Yes	2 (M,A)	?	0	Yes	Yes	Yes
8. Studenichani	No	2 (M,A)	?	0	Yes	No	No
9. Tetovo	Yes	2 (M,A)	?	1	Yes	Yes	Yes

M-Macedonian; A-Albanian; T-Turkish; V-Vlach; S-Serbian; R-Roma

APPENDIX B: Fieldwork Data

The data are available both as voice memo and their transcripts.

a) Time of conducted focus group interviews:

16. 06. 2012	Interview with Dane Taleski on decentralization processes
03. 07. 2012	Interview 1: Gostivar Municipality -: Six interviewees
09. 07. 2012	Interview2: Kumanovo Municipality – Five interviewees
10. 07. 2012	Interview with Municipal council president of Studenicani
11. 07. 2012	Interview 3: Studenicani Municipality: Five interviewees
13. 07. 2012	Interview 4: Butel Municipality – Four interviewees
18. 07. 2012	Interview 5: Cair Municipality – Four interviewees
20. 07. 2012	Interview 6: Jegunovce Municipality: Five interviewees
24. 07. 2012	Interview 7: Struga Municipality – Four interviewees
25. 07. 2012	Interview 8: Krushe vo Municipality- Five interviewees
31. 07. 2012	Interview 9: Tetovo Municipality- Four interviewees

b) Topic guide for focus group interviews

1. What does inter-ethnic cooperation on the local level of government represents for you?
2. Do the decentralization reforms¹³ create better conditions for improvement of the inter-ethnic cooperation on the local level? Why?
3. Are there enough institutional mechanisms at disposal both to the citizens and their representatives in the local governments if they want to improve the cooperation among the ethnic communities?
4. How do you see the inter-ethnic relations and cooperation among the citizens and are there NGOs that have positive influence on the inter-ethnic cooperation?
5. How important is the role of the Committees for Inter-Ethnic Relations and what is their influence on the inter-ethnic cooperation?
6. Can you separate a factor you consider to be crucial for the improvement of the inter-ethnic cooperation in your municipality?
7. Does the mayor facilitate the inter-ethnic cooperation in your municipality and how?

Probes –sub questions (used for clarification or further investigation of a particular information)

- Was your intervention necessary so the conflict would not arise?
- Do you find the ethnic counterparts constructive in the debates?
- Is the council moderating the relations among citizens?
- Why the council did not approve your suggestion for ethnically mixed sports club?
- Decentralization was implemented to accommodate minorities, but you think efficacy of governance is the most important issue?
- Do citizens from other ethnic groups come and ask you for help?
- What do you do as councilors to balance tensions?
- Why is CICR pro forma?
- Are you saying that Law on Local Self- Governance is good, but simply not well implemented?
- Can you point to a particular example when you did something to calm down ethnic tensions?
- Are there common initiatives by the citizens that you put on your councilor's work agenda?
- How does the CICR contribute to your cooperation?
- What is the main reason for your cooperation?

¹³ Following the requirements of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, through the Law on Local Self Government from 2002, and its implementation from 2005

- Does the existence of a third larger ethnic community contributes somehow to your cooperation?
- Is there a need for this kind of Commission like the CICR in your municipality?
- On what questions is it easier to cooperate?
- Do you see cooperation among the citizens?
- Why did you recognize this minority language as official, even though it is not legally required?
- So you propose more symbolic emphasize on the common cultural heritage?
- Are you saying that the central government has negative impact on your cooperation?
- But don't you think that the building of cooperation comes from the bottom? Not that the central government has to push you to cooperate?
- So you think stronger link between the municipality and citizens' associations will contribute to the greater cooperation?
- What do you get out of doing things that are not legally bound for you?
- What does good will means to you?

c) Focus group interviews

Initially I contacted the president of the municipal council to agree on my visit at their municipal council session. To avoid purposeful sampling, I asked the president of the municipal council to ask councilors from different ethnic background to stay after their municipal council meeting for conversation with a researcher on the topic of decentralization and inter-ethnic cooperation. In most of the cases, councilors who stayed were the ones who had time, and there was no time and space to think strategically who should stay. Also, all of them were given the chance to stay for the group interviews.

The group discussions took place in the hall where the councilors usually convene, after my collaborator and I attended the municipal council meeting, and were conducted in Macedonian language since all respondents speak Macedonian. Approximately the group discussions lasted about 35-40 minutes, and had approximately four respondents. Except one, all group interviews were voice recorded and transcribed in detail in English language. In one instance, in Kumanovo municipality, the discussion was not conducted in a group, but two by two. This was because of convenience since I could not arrange that councilors will stay after their council's meeting.

d) Limitations of data gathering and alternative data gathering method

Alternatively, in-depth interviews would allow for a better and richer interpretation of meanings, since then the councilors would be more thorough in their answers. However, in focus groups municipal councilors control each other's answers and also simulate inter-ethnic cooperation by the mere fact that they get together and talk to the researcher about their cooperation. Furthermore, they were more feasible regarding the time limits of this research and the general aim, to find patterns in the data and derive indicators and dimensions of inter-ethnic cooperation. Of course, in depth interviews open venues for extending my research but this is an initial endeavor that I consider worthwhile.

Another possible weakness of this data gathering process is that sometimes participants may exaggerate their statements in order to impress, convince or hold back because of perceived threats or group pressure (Kruger 1997, 70). Yet the researcher observes the answers, and has an opportunity to follow up in order to amplify or clarify the responses (Kruger 1997, 70) and seek verification from participants on key points, which was done during the interviews. Namely, some questions were repeatedly asked: "so, you mean; "would the rest agree with you..." "Is this only your own perception..." etc. Also, while conducting the interviews, I was facilitated by another researcher, Milka Ivanovska, an MA candidate at the Central European University, with whom we were verifying the data after the interviews.

Further limitation to my study is the duration of the interviews (35-40 minutes) since longer time would allow for more information. However, given that the research aims at deriving basic information on what are the dimensions of cooperation and how it usually happens, the type of data I have still tackles the main research question of the thesis. Finally, this thesis would have benefitted from an in depth analysis on the particular policies and the discussions and votes, which for sure would deepen the relevance of the findings.

APPENDIX C: Methodology

Table 14. Case selection

Municipalities	Above 90%	90-80%	80-70%	70-60%	60-50%	Less than 50%
Macedonian Majority	43	Radovich (84.10) Valandovo (82.68) Vasilevo (82.15) Staro Nagorican e (80.71) Konce (85.11)	Vranestica (78.14) Gazi Baba (77.22) Dojran (77.91) Karbinci (79.76)	Butel (62.25) Krushevo (62.80) Kumanovo (60.43) Zelenikovo (61.86) Sopiste (60.18) SKOPJE (66.75)	Jegunovce (55.56) Kichevo (53.55) Mavrovo I (50.46) Rostuse (51.43) Chaska (57.38)	Dolneni (M 35.90; A 26.65; T 19.14) Cucher Sandevo (M 47.32; A 22.88; S 28.56)
Albanian Majority	Aracinovo (93.80), Bogovinje (96.23), Saraj (91.53), Zelino (99.20), Zajas (97.44), Lipkovo (97.42), Oslomej (98.39)	Vrapciste (83.03), Tearce (84.40)	Tetovo (70.32)	Gostivar (66.68) Brvenica (61.62) Studenichani (68.38)	Debar (58.07) Cair (57.00) Struga (56.85)	
Turkish Majority	Plasnica (97.82)	Centar Zupa (80.17)				
Roma Majority				Shuto Orizari (60.60)		

Calibration of qualitative data into fuzzy sets suggested by Basturo and Speer (2012):

- i. Description of operationalization of conditions and outcomes (in this analysis there are no outcomes)
- ii. Developing anchor points for the interview guidelines
- iii. Content (I use thematic) analysis to the raw interview data obtained in the field- instead
- iv. Summarizing the code output similar with Boyatzis' themes derivation
- v. Determine the fuzzy set scale and values – This goes in line with Kvist's phase of separate investigation of each dimension (2007, 5).
- vi. Assign and revise fuzzy set values of the conditions and the outcome for each case

Table 15. Fuzzy sets values for analysis of qualitative data (continuing on next page)

Condition	Measure Definition	Fuzzy Set Value Definition	Verbal Measure value
(F) Constructive use of formal decentralization institutions	<i>To what extent decentralization institutions, assuming they are crafted to be more inclusive and make ethnic counterparts cooperate, municipal councilors use, think they are pro forma or think institutions need to be reformed altogether.</i>	1 Constructive use of decentralization institutions $ABC+ACD+ABD$	A) CICR are in full use B) Everyone gets to express opinion in their own language C) Every community is represented
		0.8 Decentralization institutions are largely used $B * D (E+Z)$	D) Constructive debates aiming towards consensus E) CICR are taken into consideration Z) Communities are better represented (if not council in CICR)
		0.6 Attempts to use and improve decentralization institutions $B * D (H+J)$	H) CICR are useful but still have to be improved J) Problems are of technical nature and misunderstanding
		0.4 Institutions are captured by one group $N+O$	K) We as individuals solve problems, not institutions L) No clear instructions how to use this institutions M) We have no finances for these institutions
		0.2 Institutions do not solve real problems $K*(L+M)$	N) Institutions lack accountability O) Institutions are only voting machines of dominant parties
		0 Decentralization institutions are redundant $L+P$	P) Centralize us more
(I) Constructive use of Informal institutions		1 Constructive informal mechanisms $ABC+ACD+ABD+BCD+ABCD+BCDH+BCDE+BCE$	A) Ethnically mixed coalitions B) Deputy positions
		0.8 Joint activities of councilors $D (A+B+C+E+H)$	C) Address others in their own language

	<p><i>To what extent informal mechanisms nourish cooperation or there is no efforts beyond institutions or no effort whatsoever for informal communication with councilors from other ethnic communities</i></p>	<p>0.6 Attempts to reflect good will and cooperation C+D+E+H</p> <hr/> <p>0.4 No additional efforts to improve J(K+L)</p> <p>0.2 Cooperation Non-transparent, clientelistic cooperation K (L+M)</p> <p>0 No informal cooperation at all M*N</p>	<p>D) Joint initiatives for sport, culture, peace mission E) Showing example of friendship in front of the citizens H) Celebrate holidays together</p> <hr/> <p>J) It is enough that we have to cooperate in formal institutions K) Non-transparent bargaining deals of ethnic coalitions L) Care only for party members M) Unwillingness to support informal positive suggestions N) No cooperation beyond what is formally required</p>
<p>(G) General benefits for all citizens</p>	<p><i>To what extent decision by councilors bring benefits to all citizens regardless of ethnicity or primarily, or exclusively to the ethnic group they represent</i></p>	<p>1 Bring benefits of decisions to all citizens A*B</p> <p>0.8 Balancing needs of citizens C+D+E</p> <p>0.6 Mutual Support BC+ CD</p> <hr/> <p>0.4 Bargaining benefits H+G</p> <p>0.2 Neglect other's group needs G+K</p> <p>0 Do not care for other group benefits K+L</p>	<p>A) Aim for superordinate goals B) Do not overstretch demands C) Reciprocity in policies D) Proportional distribution of resources E) Negotiating initially unacceptable proposals</p> <hr/> <p>H) Tradeoffs: First one's own group then other's G) Party determines who gets what K) Disregard proposals if they come from other group L) Block proposals if those are beneficial for others</p>

a) Complex/conservative solution with parameters of fit for ~dyn (no assumptions on logical remainders and no directional expectations are specified.)

	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
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~terr*center*~no_citiz	0.451613	0.354839	1.000000
~center*no_citiz*~violence	0.290323	0.129032	1.000000
terr*~center*no_citiz	0.193548	0.064516	1.000000
solution coverage:	0.741935		
solution consistency:	1.000000		

b) Parsimonious solution with parameters of fit for ~dyn (The most parsimonious solution is a product of including both easy and difficult counterfactuals in the analysis.)

	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
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terr	0.322581	0.161290	0.909091
center	0.580645	0.290323	0.900000
~violence*no_citiz	0.387097	0.129032	1.000000
solution coverage:	0.903226		
solution consistency:	0.903226		