CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2013
| Author | Kuplen, Mojca |
|---|---|
| Title | The Problem of Ugliness in light of Kant's Aesthetics |
| Summary | A general objective of this dissertation is to give an account of ugliness that entails, as its necessary part, the explanation of its possible appeal. In particular, I propose a solution to the problem, known in philosophical aesthetics as ‘the paradox of ugliness’, namely how we can value something that we prima facie do not like and find positively displeasing. I develop my explanation of ugliness in light of Kant’s theory of taste put forward in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. Even though Kant did not write about ugliness, I argue that his explanation of the beautiful has much to say about its opposite. This, however, is not immediately apparent. Even more, recent studies have argued that Kant’s explanation of the feeling of pleasure in the beautiful leaves no possibility to accommodate judgments of ugliness. In short, the argument is the following: according to Kant, judgments of taste have a subjective universal validity, because they depend on the state of mind of free harmony between imagination and understanding that we all share, and which is a subjective condition of cognition. But this state of mind of free harmony produces the feeling of pleasure alone. Hence, there is no possibility to accommodate judgments of ugliness, that is, a universally communicable state of mind of free disharmony between imagination and understanding that would give rise to the feeling of displeasure within us. Worse yet, it has been argued by Paul Guyer that the existence of a disharmonious state of mind is inconsistent with Kant’s epistemological theory. A harmonious relation between cognitive powers is required for the basic awareness of the representation itself. Accordingly, we cannot even be conscious of a representation in which imagination and understanding were in disharmony. Hence, pure ugliness is epistemologically impossible. In this dissertation I argue for the opposite view, namely, that Kant’s theory of taste does allow for the possibility of pure judgments of ugliness. I critically review the main interpretations of Kant’s central notion of the free play of imagination and understanding, and then develop a new interpretation of free play, one, that takes into consideration Kant’s account of reflective judgments and the a priori principle of purposiveness, and which allows for the epistemological possibility of a disharmonious state of mind and ugliness. Finally, I apply my interpretation of ugliness in Kant’s aesthetics to resolve two main problems in contemporary aesthetics, that is, the possibility of appreciating natural and artistic ugliness, and the role of disgust in contemporary artistic representation. |
| Supervisor | Weberman, David |
| Department | Philosophy PhD |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2013/kuplen_mojca.pdf |
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