"A COIN WITH TWO SIDES":
THE POLITICS OF ENGAGING MEN IN THE PREVENTION OF MEN'S VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

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Abstract

In this thesis, I seek to explore the politics of men's involvement and engagement in the primary prevention of men's violence against women (VAW). In order to analyse how this politics plays out, practically, I consider a young-men focussed "gender-based violence" prevention project that has been implemented in the former Yugoslavia, by way of a case study. In so doing, I engage with the question of whether primary violence prevention efforts that are run by and for men can meaningfully address the problem of men's VAW. I argue that these efforts must be underpinned by women's leadership, feminist politics and gender theory in order to meaningfully address men's power and privilege, which undergird men's VAW, and ensure that they do not reproduce the structural inequality of the existing gender order. I conclude by restating the crucial, though fraught, nature of this work and suggesting ways in which it might be strengthened, in view of my analysis, as well as directions for future research.

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Contents

List of Abbreviations

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
DPA	Dayton Peace Accords
GEMS	Gender Equitable Men Scale
IMAGES	International Men and Gender Equality Survey
IPV	Intimate Partner Violence
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PLA	Participatory Learning and Action
PM	Perpetuum Mobile
RS	Republika Srpska
VAW	Violence Against Women

Introduction

The idea that men have a specific role to play in ending violence against women (VAW) has emerged relatively recently (Connell 2005a). Though the women's movement largely took a victim or survivor-focussed approach to VAW prevention, there is now a growing consensus among theorists and practitioners of violence prevention that, in order to combat men's VAW, men need to be involved in and addressed by these efforts. This thesis, then, considers what prolific theorist of men's VAW Michael Flood has called the 'delicate politics of involving men in preventing violence against women' about which, he says, a great deal more remains to be said (2011a: 360). Indeed, very little has been written about this politics, explicitly, with Bob Pease's "Engaging Men in Men's Violence Prevention: Exploring the Tensions, Dilemmas and Possibilities" (2008) being one notable exception. Pease, however, explores these dilemmas in general, while in what follows I explore them in relation to a particular project—an in-school project that engages young men. I note, here, that I share Pease's hesitation about raising some of these questions because, as he says, men's involvement in this work is still very rare (2008: 1). As Pease goes on to note, however, 'naming the dangers and potential misappropriations of this work is part of the process of improving and strengthening such projects' (Pease 2008: 1). Flood (2008) and Pease (2008) engaged in something of a debate around this politics and many of the ideas presented therein inform this study. In undertaking this analysis, I hope to address the key question of whether primary violence prevention efforts which engage men can hope to meaningfully address the problem of men's VAW.

In order to consider how the politics of men's involvement in VAW prevention plays out, practically, this thesis takes as a case study a young-men focussed "gender-based violence"[1] prevention project that has been adapted and implemented in the former Yugoslavia by CARE Northwest Balkans. The project, "Young Men Initiative: Engaging Young Men in the Western Balkans in Gender Equality and Violence Prevention", was piloted across Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia or BiH), Croatia, Kosovo and Serbia from 2007-10 and re-funded for the period 2010-13. I conducted fieldwork over a period of three weeks in April 2013, largely in the project site in Banja Luka, the administrative capital of the Republika Srpksa (BiH's majority-Serbian Entity), where the project's partner NGO Perpetuum Mobile is located. I performed a series of interviews with research, design and coordination staff from both CARE and Perpetuum Mobile, four "peer educators" who work on the project and four young men targeted by the project. I also reviewed project documentation. I discuss my case study and research methods in more detail in chapter two, as well as provide context around Banja Luka's recent political history and the operation of the NGO sector in BiH, at large, in so far as these issues come to bear on this study.

In chapter three, I discuss issues relating to the core concept of "masculinity". First, I consider how the project's concept of the "new Balkan boy" can be understood as a form of "nesting Orientalism" (Bakić-Hayden 1995), before turning to consider the project's central "Be a Man" ethic and its emphasis on men's victimhood. In chapter four, I consider the importance of women's organisations, women's leadership and feminist politics in the engaging men movement and how—and why—women's leadership and feminist politics are largely absent from YMI, as well as the implications of this. In chapter five, I discuss broader

[1] The project that I considered by way of a case study uses the term "gender-based violence", while I use the term "men's violence against women" in this thesis because I wish to be clear about the perpetrator and victim of the violence about which I am speaking. I acknowledge, however, that the project also has a stake in ending men's violence against other men, including peer and homophobic violence.

issues of structural inequality as they come to bear on the project, considering, first, whether and how the project addresses women's structural inequality and, second, whether and how a "young men's empowerment" approach flies in the face of the imperative to empower women vis-à-vis men. I conclude by summarising what all of this means for the project's critical efficacy and restating the crucial, though fraught, nature of this work. I also suggest ways in which this work might be strengthened, in view of my analysis, as well as directions for future research.

In the rest of this chapter, I consider, first, theories which have looked to understand the phenomenon of men's VAW and, second, the broader debates around involving men in the prevention of men's VAW in order to provide a contextual and theoretical background for my analysis.

Measuring and theorising men's violence against women

There is a great deal of academic literature on the endemic nature of the problem of men's violence against women (Hearn and Lattu 2000; Holter and Olsvik 2000; Pringle 2000). In the context of this study, the incidence of men's violence against women in BiH is of particular relevance; in the International Men and Gender Equality Survey (IMAGES), conducted in BiH between 2009-2012, twenty seven percent of men indicated that they had perpetrated violence against an intimate female partner, while forty five percent of women indicated that they had experienced violence perpetrated by an intimate male partner (Dušanić 2012: 36). Head researcher on the project Srđan Dušanić warns that it is likely that the incidence of violence is under-reported in this survey, given that people typically report more socially-desirable answers (personal communication, 18 April 2013). Among many other examples we might consider, a nationally representative sample of sixteen thousand

men and women in the United States documented that violence against women is predominantly male violence; indeed, '[o]f the women who had been physically assaulted since the age of 18, 92 percent had been assaulted by a male, and of the women who had been sexually assaulted, all had been raped by males' (Tjaden and Thoennes in Flood 2011a: 359). Further to this, it is well documented that most men's violence against women occurs within the context of relationships—studies in the UK suggest that up to twenty five percent of women have been victims of violence perpetrated by intimate male partners (Hearn and Pringle 2006). In Australia, intimate male partner violence against women is the leading cause of women's death, injury and illness (VicHealth 2004: 1). As prolific theorist of men's violence against women Michael Kaufman wrote of VAW some twenty years ago: 'If it were between countries, we'd call it a war. If it were a disease, we'd call it an epidemic… But it is happening to women, and it's just an everyday affair' (2011). Sadly, as the current statistics cited above suggest, Kaufman's words ring just as true, today.

Feminist scholars have been attempting to theorise the problem of men's VAW, per se, for the last four decades. Indeed, today, most theorists would agree that feminism has been 'the most important theoretical approach to conjugal violence/woman abuse' (Okun in DeKeseredy and Schwartz 2011: 12). Of the different feminist theoretical approaches, radical feminism has had the greatest impact upon the study of men's VAW (DeKeseredy and Schwartz 2011: 12). In the 1970s and 80s, while radical feminist activists were setting up the first "battered women's shelters", radical feminist theorists were beginning to sketch the nature of the problem of men's VAW, pointing to men's power and privilege vis-à-vis women under the existing gender order[2] as its root cause. Susan Brownmiller's

[2] I use the term "existing gender order" to describe what some radical feminists call "patriarchy"—while I find the concept of patriarchy useful, it has come under sustained critique, even within the feminist movement. For me, one of the most salient critiques of this concept is that the term patriarchy originally meant to convey the headship of men within families. While I agree with Pateman (1988) that the concept can be extended to

groundbreaking *Against Our Will* (1975) played a significant part in turning the issue of men's violence, particularly sexual violence, against women into a central concern of the feminist movement. Another important and controversial foremother of this thinking, Andrea Dworkin, described what she called the 'pathological view of female negativity' in this way:

> The male sex, in keeping with its positive designation, has positive qualities; and the female sex, in keeping with its negative designation, does not have any of the positive qualities attributed to the male sex. For instance, according to this model, men are active, strong, and courageous; and women are passive, weak, and fearful. In other words, whatever men are, women are not; whatever men can do, women cannot do; whatever capacities men have, women do not have. Man is the positive and woman is his negative. (1976: 98)

Dworkin goes on to explain the relationship of this gender inequality to men's violence against women—'systematic sadism', she says, is 'acted out on the bodies of women to render us opposite to, and the negatives of, men' (1976: 99). Notwithstanding critiques of this thinking—which have focused on its supposed representation of power as unitary and of violence as emanating from a single cause—contemporary theoretical and empirical feminist accounts of the causes of men's violence against women must be seen to have a radical feminist theoretical inheritance.

Radical feminist theory came to inform the development of much contemporary critical men's and masculinity studies (Edwards 2006: 25). Much of this work occurred in the 1990s and early 2000s and, as Connell notes in her landmark study *Masculinities* (2005b: xv), throughout the 2000s, much of this work was applied research, especially around the determinants of men's violence. As Connell suggests, then, the "gender order" may be understood as a set of relations, including that experienced at the level of the individual (masculinity/femininity), but also a set of ideological and symbolic practices and social and institutional arrangements. Individual masculinities are, for Connell (2005b), the socially-

describe gender relations, more broadly, I find that the term "existing gender order" more aptly describes the broad discursive, ideological, symbolic and institutional arrangements that characterise contemporary, male-dominated society.

constructed configurations of gender practice that men are compelled to perform[3]—they are the other of femininities and are, by their very definition, in a position of dominance vis-à-vis femininities. Here, Connell may be seen to echo Dworkin. In relation to the broader structures of violence-supportive masculinist culture, it may be seen, as critical masculinity studies scholar Michael Kaufman demonstrates in some detail in his *The Seven Ps of Men's Violence* (1999), that men's patriarchal power and sense of entitlement to privilege, as well as the permission provided to men by virtue of their status in the gender order, are the preconditions for men's VAW. In the topology that follows, then, I seek to highlight some contemporary theories with respect to men's VAW that have particular relevance to this study, with an emphasis on critical masculinity studies' vast contribution.

Within the body of contemporary work that has looked to understand men's VAW, theories which take account of individual masculinities and individual men's attitudes and beliefs with respect to gender as preconditions for their perpetration of VAW have been the most strongly articulated (Flood 2007: 1). Several meta-analyses have demonstrated that masculinist and patriarchal ideologies are strongly correlated with men's intimate partner violence (IPV) and sexual aggression (Sugarman and Frankel 1996; Stith et al 2000; Murnen et al. 2002). In the Bosnia IMAGES research, men with the poorest gender-equal attitudes, measured according to the Gender-Equitable Men Scale (GEMS)[4], were shown to be more inclined to commit sexual violence against women (Dušanić 2012: 38). Further, as Flood notes, '[t]he most consistent predictor of attitudes supporting the use of violence against women is attitudes

[3] I would note, here, that an understanding of gender practice is as distinct from the outdated concept of "gender roles", according to which gender is a set of pre-defined norms which are merely reproduced by individuals. As Connell notes, elsewhere, 'To speak of a *configuration of practice* is to place the emphasis on what people actually do, not on what is expected or imagined. There is no limit to the types of practice involved. It was once thought that gender could be defined as a special type of practice, for instance as social "reproduction" rather than "production". But masculinities are constructed in the sphere of production too' (1997: 2, emphasis in original).

[4] The Gender-Equitable Men Scale (GEMS) was developed by Instituto Promundo in Brazil in order to measure men's attitudes toward "gender-equitable" norms (Pulerwitz and Barker 2008).

towards gender roles—beliefs about appropriate roles for men and women' (2007: 2); this pattern is documented in a large number of countries and settings (Flood and Pease 2006; Flood 2007). Equally, men who emphasise their need for power and control in relationships with women are consistently shown to have a greater tendency towards VAW (Felson and Messner 2000; Lloyd and Emery 2000). Indeed, male dominance in married and non-married relationships—including dominance in decision-making and control of economic resources—is, cross-culturally, a significant predicator of men's VAW (Flood 2007). As Heise notes, '[e]galitarian relationships where men and women play equal roles in decision making appear to have the lowest rates of relationship conflict and the lowest levels of partner violence' (Heise in Flood 2007: 3).

There is also a great deal of research on the relationship between gender unequal attitudes reproduced through masculinist peer and organisational cultures and VAW (DeKeseredy and Schwartz 2005: 357); the most detailed studies have been in respect of sporting, military and university cultures (Schissel 2000; Flood 2007). These studies demonstrate that, as Flood notes, men's IPV 'is shaped not only by peer norms and beliefs but by peer behaviours and interactions' (2007: 5); these behaviours and interactions include direct peer support for IPV, but also violence-supportive norms 'promoted by the processes of informal acculturation… including through leisure practices such as [men's] pornography use, sexual boasting, and strip shows' (Flood 2007: 5). As Flood (2009) notes, elsewhere, in relation to men's pornography use, consumption, especially of more violent material, intensifies attitudes supportive of sexual coercion and increases the likelihood of men's perpetration of VAW. In contrast with this research around the social determinants of VAW, there are few studies which identify a relationship between national cultures and men's perpetration of VAW (Flood 2007: 6); though, one 2003 cross-cultural study does demonstrate that cultures with

more egalitarian attitudes with respect to gender showed a greater intolerance to VAW (Nayak et al 2003).

We might also consider broader social practices relating to violence, per se, that may be seen to be predictors of men's violence against women—another element relevant to this study, and one around which there is some contention. There is some evidence to demonstrate that, as Flood suggests '[m]embers of disadvantaged communities may learn a greater tolerance of violence through exposure to violence by their parents, delinquent peers, and others in communities characterised by higher rates of violence in general' (2007: 7); he notes that two out of four studies show a correlation between this kind of violence and men's victimisation of women. Particularly relevant to this study, then, is childhood exposure to violence. Evidence has shown a weak-to-moderate link between what has been called "intergenerational transmission"—childhood exposure to violence and victimisation in the home leading to men's use of violence in later life (Stith et al 2000). Though, as Flood suggests, exposure to violence in childhood 'is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the future perpetration of abuse' (2007: 8); indeed, many men who, as adults, use violence against women were not subject to or the witnesses of such violence in childhood. Equally, there is no evidence to suggest that girls who grow up witnessing violence will go on to use violence (Edwards 2006: 52; Flood 2007: 8). Theories which take account of the broader social determinates of men's violence are sometimes called the "ecological model". Bob Pease (2008), another theorist of men's violence involved in anti-sexist activism for more than three decades, notes that an emphasis on childhood experiences of violence which does not take account of men's power and privilege under the gender order fails to adequately account for this violence. Flood has suggested that a distinctly *feminist* ecological model, which 'addresses determinants of men's violence against women at multiple levels of the

social order, while taking as given that gender and gender inequalities are central across these' is possible (2008: 1-2).

Finally, I wish to briefly take stock of what may be understood as the structural causes of men's violence, first considering the concept of men's privilege and the relationship of men's social privileges to their violence, before turning briefly to consider issues of masculinism as inscribed in the structures of states. This is important because, as noted above, the "gender order" designates experiences at the level of the individual and social relations, but also a set of *institutional* arrangements (Connell 2005b). One of Bob Pease's key concerns is detailing how men's social privileges undergird men's violence. The privileges that men-as-a-group hold (vis-à-vis women-as-a-group), for Pease, include 'respect, authority, services from women, monetary benefits, institutional power and control over one's life' (2008: 9). Pease notes that '[d]epending on men's location in the gender order, they will get more or less of these privileges', but that, broadly, it is this "patriarchal dividend" that leads men to defend the existing gender order (2008: 9). As Pease goes on '[m]ale privilege leads men to believe that they are entitled to receive services from women. When these entitlements are questioned or denied, they may enact violence in response' (2008: 9). Connell, then, discusses how a set of conditions which dismantle the structural inequalities brought about by men's privilege need to be met in order to address men's VAW, including: achieving equal employment outcomes for men and women, including women's equal representation in the apparatuses of the state, ending gender discrimination[5] and engendering anti-discrimination norms in public culture, including ending misogyny in the media (2003). Perhaps a more concrete example of

[5] As Pease and Flood (2005) point out, however, "addressing gender discrimination" should not, as it has tended to, come to mean addressing individual attitudes and prejudices at the expense of considering the 'wider context in which discrimination takes place' (2005: 2). As they discuss, '[r]ather than identifying the ways in which the individual's behaviour is socially reinforced and normalised… we tend to blame the individual for being prejudiced' (Flood and Pease 2005: 2); they note that 'these descriptions often hide the flipside of discrimination, which is privilege and how it is institutionally produced and supported' (Flood and Pease 2005: 2).

how structural inequality and men's privilege beget men's VAW, then, can be found in Flood's (2007) analysis of how access to economic resources can help to predict men's victimisation of women. In Australia, where Flood produces most of his work, some studies demonstrate that women's economic independence acts as a protective force against violence, allowing women to leave violent relationships (Flood 2007: 11). Though, there are also studies which show men's propensity to IPV being increased where their female partners earn more than they do (Flood 2007: 11)—but this is only true, as Flood warns, where these men hold patriarchal views with respect to "gender roles". As Flood usefully concludes, '[t]his demonstrates the need to combine structural *and* cultural explanations of intimate partner violence: both structural constraints or opportunities and cultural forces (gender norms and identities)' (2007: 12, emphasis in original).

Further to this, Connell (2005b) notes that men's social privileges, and monopoly on the use and means of violence, are undergirded by the masculinist state. As Edwards (2006: 58) notes of Connell, one of her key concerns is detailing the role of the masculinist state in supporting and perpetuating men's violence, including and especially through war. Connell details how colonial and anti-colonial wars involving armed conflict produced particular kinds of violent masculinities and particular gender orders (2009). Of the way that the structures of the masculinist state today reproduces men's dominance and, Connell argues, the conditions for men's violence, Connell has this to say:

> Neo-liberalism speaks a gender-neutral language of "markets", "individuals", and "choice", but has an implicit view of masculinity. The "individual" of neoliberal theory has the attributes and interests of a male entrepreneur. Institutionally, the strong emphasis on competition creates a particular kind of hierarchy among men. Meanwhile the increasingly unregulated world of transnational corporations places strategic social power in the hands of particular groups of men. Here is the basis of a new hegemonic masculinity on a world scale. (2009: 4)

While Edwards (2006) critiques Connell for being grandiose, such analyses, when applied tactically, are still critical in getting at the heart of men's VAW. This will become more apparent in the context of my later discussion about the masculinist Bosnian state.

Engaging men in the primary prevention of men's violence against women

In the last decade, research and programming around men's involvement in the prevention of violence against women has proliferated (Flood 2002-3, 2005-6, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Kaufman 2003; Berkowitz 2004a, 2004b; Katz 2006). There has also been a profound shift in focus toward primary prevention—that is, combating violence before it occurs (Flood 2011a: 360). As Flood suggests, '[v]iolence prevention work with men aims to lessen the likelihood that they will use violence. Effective strategies confront the beliefs, values and discourses which support violence, challenge the patriarchal power relations which sustain and are sustained by violence and promote alternative constructions of masculinity, gender and self-hood which foster non-violence and gender justice' (2005-6: 27). Flood characterises as 'bewildering' the variety of initiatives which exist today to target men and men's violence (2011a: 360). These interventions are occurring, according to Flood, at six different levels: the level of the individual, within community groups, with violence prevention practitioners, in and through communities as wholes, at the level of organisations and through policy and legislation (2011a: 361). These efforts are reaching men in various ways, including 'as participants in education programs, as targets of social marketing campaigns, as policy makers and gatekeepers, and as activists and advocates' (Flood 2011a: 359). Comprehensive topologies of primary prevention initiatives involving men have been provided elsewhere (Flood 2011a; Kaufman 2003).

School-based educational programs that aim to engage young men are the most widely adopted method for the primary prevention of VAW (Flood 2011a) and are the subject of this study. As Instituto Promundo, the Brazilian organisation that is a leader in the field, notes, these efforts are premised upon the assumption that education which questions gender inequitable norms and norms supportive of men's use of violence against women can, when combined with community-based campaigns and other methods, positively impact upon young male identities, attitudes and behaviours (2012). It is also typically envisaged that such programs will function to create non-violent male "allies" who will have a positive role to play among their peers and broader communities. In recent years, there has been a growing body of evidence to support the effectiveness of these strategies (Flood 2005-6, 2008). However, this evidence can be attributed in part to the widespread adoption of such programs (Flood 2011a: 362); indeed, systematic, longitudinal evaluations of these programs have yet to be conducted in most cases and are still required in order to further these prevention efforts (Pease 2008; Flood 2011a). This study does not constitute a program evaluation—indeed, such an evaluation would be impossible given time and resource constraints. As noted, this study considers, the 'delicate politics of involving men in preventing violence against women' about which a great deal also remains to be said (Flood 2011a: 360). With this in view, I will now turn to consider some of the rationales behind primary prevention efforts which look to engage men, before considering some of the dilemmas and controversies which beset such efforts.

One important rationale behind involving and addressing men in efforts which seek for the primary prevention of violence against women is that it is men who largely perpetrate this violence (Casey and Smith 2010: 953). Indeed, as discussed earlier, the widespread nature of the problem of men's violence against women is well documented. As Lorentzen notes, then,

the most obvious argument for the importance of involving men in VAW prevention is 'that helping the victimized women does not stop men from continuing to use violence. To be able to stop violence we have to work with boys and men' (2005: 2). Another rationale behind involving men in VAW prevention has been that, not only men are constituent parts of the gender order that perpetuates this violence, they are the gatekeepers of this order (Connell 2005a). Indeed, given that men are the overwhelming majority of heads of government, extra-governmental institutions and big business, men control the resources that women need to mobilise in their claims for justice (Connell 2005a). In this way, as Kaufman urges us to recognise, any attempt to address men's violence that does not likewise involve men 'fails to acknowledge men's role as gatekeepers of current gender orders' (2003: 3). As Kaufman goes on, '[s]imply put, if we do not effectively reach men and boys, many of our efforts will either be thwarted or simply ignored' (2003: 3).

Another reason often cited in the literature as to why men should be involved in efforts to end violence against women is that the same gender order that perpetuates gross inequalities and is supportive of men's violence also impacts negatively upon men—that is, it is argued that men, too, "have a lot to lose". For one thing, it is claimed that not all men exhibit the hegemonic masculinity that would make them the beneficiaries of the existing gender order (Connell 2005b). Indeed, gay men, men from lower socio-economic classes and other men who do not demonstrate hegemonic masculinity—what are sometimes called, after Connell, "subordinate masculinities"—are often the subjects of other men's violence (Kaufman 2003: 9-11). In this way it may be seen that men's power is not unitary and not all men have the same access to this power—men can thereby also stand to lose in relation to patriarchy. Further, it is claimed that the norms of masculinity require a suppression of the nurturing, emotional qualities that are deemed feminine—men are held to lead impoverished emotional

lives as a consequence of the prescriptions around masculinity (Kaufman 1999). This suppression of emotionality—and potential violent response—is seen to be related, too, to men's "violence against themselves", which may be seen to manifest, for example, in men's higher suicide rates (Kaufman 1999). Men are also seen to suffer as a result of men's VAW given that men are likely to have women in their lives whom they wish not to be the subjects of violence. Relatedly, this violence may fuel women's distrust and fear of men, which may be seen as another problem for many men (Flood 2011a: 259-60). In these ways, the literature has made a claim that men have a stake in dismantling the gender order that is supportive of men's violence.

Though a great many reasons for involving men in men's VAW prevention have been identified, and while the practice becomes more entrenched as a result, the women's movements' concerns around the practice deserve more attention than they have yet been afforded. One such concern has been that addressing men as perpetrators and partners would take the focus away from women as victims and survivors—that is, that such a strategy threatens to supplant a formerly woman-centred approach to the problem of men's violence (Flood 2011: 360). This is no trivial matter, as violence interventions are predicated on woman-centredness precisely to combat the male privilege that has created situations of endemic violence. Related to this, as Kaufman notes, the women's movement has also pointed to the danger that directing resources towards men and boys, as men-focussed prevention efforts do, might 'simply maintain the status quo, perpetuate gross inequalities in the division and allocation of social resources, and serve only to perpetuate the institutions and privileges that men and boys have traditionally enjoyed relative to women and girls' (2003: 5). Indeed, violence-related programming attracts limited funding and it has started to be the case that gender mainstreaming and other projects which have targeted men have

caused cutbacks in women's services (Bacchi 2004). With this in view, practitioners and theorists often argue that partnering closely with women's organisations—indeed, being led by their understandings formed through decades of work around VAW—is a necessary precondition of successful men-focused violence prevention (Kaufman 2003; Pease 2008; Flood 2011a). As we will see, later, this issue is relevant to young men-focussed VAW prevention in BiH.

Further to this, Pease (2008) highlights the fact that efforts which involve men in violence prevention have a tendency to sideline a feminist ethic, with its gendering of violence. Indeed, many anti-violence programs that engage men promote a humanist approach that emphasises what men have to lose as a result of the gender order and its prescriptions around masculinity. Such approaches tend to favour a "cycle of violence" model which foregrounds childhood experiences of violence, often, at the expense of analyses which highlight the gendered nature power (Pease 2008). Pease notes, anecdotally, that male allies in violence prevention sometimes fail to 'stick to the script', de-gendering violence in their efforts to work with men as "partners" rather than "perpetrators" (2008: 8). Further, men's violence prevention often necessitates peer-education—that is, men speaking to other men. Such a model may serve, as Pease goes on to suggest, to devalue women's power and marginalise women's voices further (2008: 8). As we will see later, too, this retreat from the feminist understandings which have made men's involvement in VAW prevention desirable in the first place has also proved problematic in the context of BiH.

Another problem with men's involvement in ending VAW has been men's resistance to, and even backlash against, this sort of change. Connell identifies four aspects of men's resistance to change in favour of more gender equitable, less violence-supportive norms—as Pease

paraphrases, these include a desire to protect their 'material benefits, including the care and domestic services men receive from women', 'internalisation of hegemonic notions of masculinity', 'the ideological defence of male supremacy by men who have a deeply held sense of male entitlement' and 'resentment towards gender equality programs from men who get relatively little of the patriarchal dividend' (Pease 2008: 10-11). The men's engagement movement, then, often concentrates on what "men have to lose" as a result of the existing gender order; a number of theorists of men's VAW prevention take pains to point out that the notion that "men stand to lose", or that they stand to lose equally, echoes a resistance discourse and, indeed, is deeply flawed. As Pease notes, 'while there may be long-term gains for men [in dismantling the gender order], there are certainly short-term losses' (Pease 2008: 11)—that is, while men could hope to protect their loved ones and themselves from men's violence through their involvement in gender equality and violence prevention, they also stand to lose a vast array of material benefits afforded to them by virtue of their privilege. Flood suggests that resistance to change, while prevalent elsewhere, is not to be found in the movement which has looked to engage men in VAW prevention (Flood 2008); though, my research shows that there is a fine line between this men-as-victims discourse favoured by the engaging men movement and one which demonstrates outright resistance to change. Further, Pease sees that men's involvement in these campaigns has also led to a backlash in which men seek to disassociate the violence from men and masculinity and emphasise that "most men" do not do violence (2008: 11). This, as Pease so importantly recognises, 'fail[s] to understand the connections between men's physical violence and the wider forms of coercive control that permeate the majority of heterosexual relationships… It thus enables most men to disassociate themselves from the "bad" men who commit violence' (2008: 11). Pease goes as far as to suggest that this backlash can even bring about more violence. Kelly, too, has demonstrated that, in Sweden, where equality under the law has largely been established

between men and women, there are extremely high rates of sexual violence against women—she hypothesises that '[i]f violence against women is an expression of men's power, challenges to that power may, in the short term at least, result in increasing rather than decreasing levels of abuse' (2002: 15). In these ways, it may be seen why men's involvement in VAW prevention is not as simple as perhaps first imagined—men's resistance to and backlash against these efforts can present significant obstacles.

Finally, Connell's (2005a; 2005b) work is suggestive of a broader critique of primary violence prevention that has a focus on men's attitudes and identities; she calls us to understand that merely intervening in the discursive constructions of masculinity that are violence-supportive fails to adequately address the structural causes of men's violence. That is to say, men's identities and behaviours are predicated on their social privileges and monopoly on the use and means of violence, all of which are undergirded by the masculinist state and economic inequality (2005b: xix), which we cannot ignore in seeking to prevent violence. As Pease (2008) notes, too, masculinities research and prevention work with men must both be integrated with theories of social change where, in many cases to date, it has not been. As Kaufman (2003) and Flood (2011a, 2011b) have suggested, then, violence prevention with men, where it focuses on redefining masculinity, only, cannot meaningfully address men's violence—any such efforts must further seek to challenge and dismantle the structures of men's power and privilege. This study will also consider how a youth-focussed violence prevention project seeks to address issues of structural inequality, as well as how its peer education model—which emphasises young men's empowerment and directs VAW prevention resources to men working with and for men—may be seen to, paradoxically, reinforce structural inequalities.

Chapter Two: Methods and Context

Case study: the Young Men Initiative

In order to analyse how the politics of men's involvement in VAW prevention plays out, practically, I consider a young-men focussed gender-based violence prevention project that has been adapted and implemented in the former Yugoslavia by CARE Northwest Balkans, by way of a case study. In so doing, I hope to engage with the question of whether primary violence prevention efforts that target young men can meaningfully address the problem of men's VAW. The project, "Young Men Initiative: Engaging Young Men in the Western Balkans in Gender Equality and Violence Prevention" (hereafter YMI), was piloted across BiH, Croatia, Kosovo and Serbia from 2007-10 and re-funded for the period 2010-13.

The project's mandate is described, in a recent "case study" document, in this way:

> As in many other settings, patriarchal and rigid norms around gender and masculinities are still prevalent in the Western Balkans. These norms influence young men's attitudes, behaviours, and relationships with other young men, young women, families, and larger communities. From an early age, many young men are taught that being a "real man" means being a provider for and protector of one's family and community. Boys and young men are often raised to be aggressive and competitive, in preparation for these social roles. Many boys and young men are also often raised to be self-reliant, to not worry about their health and do not reach out for help when they may need it…
>
> Given the growing concern in the Balkans about rising levels of gendered and peer violence (including homophobic and xenophobic violence), it is imperative that civil society and governments understand more about how gender norms and other social influences shape young men's attitudes and behaviours, and how programs and policies can most effectively address these issues. (*Young Men Initiative—A Case Study* 2012)

These ideas were all reproduced in my interviews with project staff and will be discussed, in context, later.

During the project's pilot phase, participatory learning and action (PLA) research—which entailed workshops with around sixty young men in each of the pilot countries—was

undertaken in order for project design staff to gain an understanding of the particular issues facing young men in this region and, indeed, their concepts of the key issues of gender, masculinity and violence (*Young Men Initiative—A Case Study* 2012). Capacity-building with the local youth organisations who would deliver the project in each country was also undertaken (*Young Men Initiative—A Case Study* 2012). During the funding period 2010-13, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has provided the bulk of the project's funds, though the local partner organisations also receive funding, directly, from a number of other international foundations and agencies. Notably, UN Women provides funding to the Bosnian arm of the project. Today, the project operates in Bosnia (in Sarajevo and Banja Luka, as well as a smaller operation in Mostar), as well as in Croatia, Serbia and Kosovo, with plans to expand to Albania.

The project has three main parts—educational workshops, the *Budi Muško* (Be a Man) social marketing campaign and the related *Budi Muško Klub* (Be a Man Club, hereafter BMK). Educational workshops for boys aged around 14-18 are run, in schools[6], by male peer educators employed by the local partner organisations. The workshops are organised around four themes: gender, violence and violence prevention, sexual and reproductive health (and men's health, more broadly) and "skills building", including communication and negotiation. Issues pertaining to alcohol and other drugs, as well as to emotions and care-giving also represent strong themes within the workshops.

The Be a Man campaign was conceived of through a workshop process in which a group of young men involved in the PLA stage of the project participated. This group of young men felt that "be a man" was a concept which had, in the context of the former Yugoslavia,

[6] The schools are usually local "electro-technical" public high schools, as opposed to selective entry "gymnasiums", wherein, according to the project staff I interviewed, the incidence of boys' peer violence is higher.

extremely negative connotations attached to it. It was imagined that the term could be expropriated and subverted—i.e. that the concept could be redeployed with more positive meanings attached. The concept went through a testing phase and marketing experts were employed to develop it into a "brand" (Crownover, personal communication, 14 April 2013). The Be a Man Club, then, was envisaged as a way to extend and consolidate the skills and knowledge young men gained through the workshops. Once young men had completed a second stage of workshops—away from school at residential camps—they would become a part of a BMK and help to plan actions associated with the Be a Man campaign. In practice, many young men become involved with a BMK prior to having completed all of the associated workshops. For the young men involved with the project, the BMK is its cornerstone—indeed, they, and most people involved with the project refer to the project, as a whole, as "BMK" and to its participants as "BMKs". In Banja Luka, campaign actions, planned through the local BMK, have involved dance lessons in the city centre, a "longest hug" competition and awareness-raising around issues of women's rights on International Women's Day. Since March 2012, girls have begun to be actively involved in the project, at least in Banja Luka, as described to me by Jelena, a project volunteer (email communication, 2013). Young women peer educators started to be trained and workshops around similar issues started to be held for girls. Girls also started to become involved in the Be a Man Clubs—they began attending club meetings and helping to plan the actions associated with the campaign.

YMI provides a useful case study, because, for one thing, youth-focussed primary prevention programs delivered in schools are the most widely-adopted method of prevention—that is to say, it is, in some ways, "typical". Further, it was designed in consultation with Instituto Promundo, the Brazilian organisation understood as the leader in gendered-violence

prevention programming involving men—indeed, the educational workshops portion of the project was directly adapted from Promundo's *Program H*[7] gender equality promotion program. In this way, it may be seen that this project provides an "ideal type" for studying the politics of prevention.

Research methods: research design, ethical considerations and limitations

In order to conduct this research, I chose to focus on the YMI project site in Banja Luka, the administrative capital of the Republika Srpska (RS), the majority Serbian Entity of BiH. This choice was largely dictated by time and resource constraints—CARE's head office overseeing the project, as well as one of the partner NGOs who delivers the project, Perpetuum Mobile (hereafter PM), are situated in Banja Luka, making this choice a practical one. Further, a focus on Banja Luka has enabled me to think more carefully about how some of the political particularities of the RS—including issues relating to the return of war refugees and the Entity's post-war ethnic composition, as well as the operation of the NGO sector, therein—have impacted upon the experience of the project at this site. I discuss these issues in more detail below.

In conducting this research, I performed a series of voluntary, one-on-one, semi-structured interviews with coordination, design and research staff from both CARE and Perpetuum Mobile, four peer educators (two from PM and two from the project's partner organisation in Zagreb, Status M), a school "pedagogue", or counsellor, in each of Banja Luka and Zagreb and four young men from Banja Luka either targeted by the project's educational workshops or involved in the Banja Luka BMK. In total, I conducted thirteen interviews, all of which, bar the two pedagogue interviews and an interview with one BMK member, were recorded and transcribed. All interviews were conducted in English, bar the interviews with the two

[7] H stands for the "*homens*" and "*hombres*", the words for "men" in Portuguese and Spanish, respectively.

pedagogues, for which I engaged a translator to translate my questions and my informants' responses. English was the second language of all informants, excepting the project's director and head designer from CARE Northwest Balkans, who is an American. These interviews have allowed me to get at some core issues around the way the project was conceived and is practiced and, as such, have enabled me to gain a picture of how some of the promises and problems of men's involvement and engagement in primary VAW prevention identified in the literature come to bear on real projects. Further to this, I also reviewed project documentation, including the *Young Men Initiative—A Case Study 2012* document.

In performing interviews for research—and, particularly, research that will be shared with my research subjects—I note that there exists an ethical imperative to represent what people have said fairly and accurately. In what follows, I have tried to be as faithful to the spirit and letter of what my informants told me as possible. I am confident that my informants understood the implications of being interviewed—I provided CARE Northwest Balkans with a research proposal that was shared with the partner organisations and I explained my intention to gain data for my thesis to my informants at the time of my interviews. CARE Northwest Balkans was extremely open and transparent and I was given access, it seemed to me, to all of the people and information I asked for. Where I have quoted young adults who volunteer with the project or young men participants—all of whom were older than 16—I have changed their names to protect their anonymity. Jovan and Đorđe are the pseudonyms I assigned to the two young men participants I have quoted, directly, and Jelena is the pseudonym I assigned to one young woman volunteer I corresponded with via email and paraphrased in what follows.

I note, too, that as a young woman researcher working on a project run by and for men, and as a foreign feminist with a prior interest and involvement in VAW prevention programming

in a different context—on the other side of the world—my interpretations are no doubt coloured by my own experiences and biases. As Borland (1991) came to recognise with respect to her ethnography of her grandmother's life, reading a feminist ethic into people's experiences may not always reflect their own feelings about those experiences. Nonetheless, I have noted, already, why proceeding from a feminist framework in this particular work is so vital and it is on these grounds that I feel it is reasonable—as well as intellectually honest—to frame my analysis in this way.

With respect to the limitations of my research design, it is doubtless that I was unable to gain as full a picture of the project as possible—and, equally, was not able to locate my analysis within the local context as fully as may be desirable—given my inability to speak Serbian/Bosnian and the fact that my research trip for this project constituted the first time I had ever visited Bosnia. Indeed, I was unable to understand passing comments or what was being said, for example, at the BMK meeting I was able to attend. I was also unable to fully get a grasp of the broader symbolic and discursive order that characterises the lives of the young men engaged by this project. I tried to mitigate this by asking as many questions as possible during my fieldwork and by supplementing my understandings of context through reference to literature—both academic and project-specific. Further to this, my access to information about the project was largely mediated by those who have a vested interest in it—this has meant that I have had to be critical of the perspectives provided. Indeed, I was unable to get in contact with any women's or feminist organisations who work with YMI, or any other feminist organisations in the region, more broadly—this has meant that I was unable to gain a full picture of the violence prevention landscape in BiH or, indeed, expert perspectives on the work of YMI.

As already mentioned, too, most interviews were conducted in my native language, but in the second language of most informants—I have tried to take this into account in representing the spirit of my informants' reflections and have been careful to exclude or qualify information where I feel like my inability to converse in my informants' native language came to bear on my capacity to fully understand their views. Finally, I recognise that representing the project largely through the prism of one of its sites in only one of the countries in which it operates is not without problems—I have tried to mitigate this, first, by conducting further interviews in an additional project site (Zagreb) and, second, by conducting extensive interviews with high-level coordination and design staff from CARE. As noted earlier, however, while this is something of a limitation, it has also enabled me to reflect more deeply upon the political and other exigencies of BiH, the RS and of Banja Luka.

The post-war context of Bosnia, the Republika Srpska and Banja Luka

The context of Bosnia—and of Banja Luka—requires some explication, here, especially with respect to its recent political history, ethnic composition and the operation of its NGO sector. Before the Bosnian War (1992-5), Banja Luka—just as Bosnia, more broadly—was an ethnically-heterogeneous city, made up of local Serbs (Orthodox), Bosniacs (Muslims) and Croats (Catholics). Under the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords (DPA)—which ended the war and established Bosnia as an independent state with a complex system of domestic governance, overseen by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and "international community" (IC) actors such as the US, NATO and the EU—Bosnia was carved up into two "Entities". These Entities, which still exist today, are the Bosniac-Croat Federation (FBiH), of which Sarajevo is the capital and wherein Bosniacs represent the majority, and the Republika Srpska, of which Banja Luka is the administrative capital and wherein ethnic Serbs represent the majority. The third constitution defined under the DPA is that of the common state of

Bosnia and Herzegovina. The two entities of BiH are separated by the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), whose corridors largely approximate those created through the ethnic cleansing of the war years (Reményi 2004: 134). The DPA also set out the right of return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes, though, in practice, the RS and the FBiH remain largely ethnically homogenous. As Srečko Latal from the International Crisis Group notes of Bosnia, today: 'The great melting pot that Bosnia Herzegovina represented before the war, especially in the urban centres, no longer exists. BiH today is a sum of prevalently monoethnic local communities, cantons and regions. Even the larger cities like Sarajevo or Banja Luka are essentially inhabited by a single ethnic group' (Latal in Rossini and Kilkenny 2013: 122).

Though there is not room enough to discuss the complex politics of the DPA and the country's partition, one vignette from Banka Luka will serve to demonstrate their continued salience. By the middle of 2001, nearly 2,000 Bosniacs had returned to Banja Luka from where they had been displaced without major incident (Bose 2002: 159). Though, when the Ferhadija mosque—which had stood in Banja Luka for 414 years prior to being destroyed by Bosnian Serbs in 1993—began to be rebuilt in May 2001, mass demonstrations erupted, in which between 2,000-4,000 Bosnian Serbs participated (Bose 2002: 154-5). As Bose interprets:

> Minority returns by some evicted Muslim citizens… to the city may not be liked, but can be tolerated since such returns do not fundamentally undermine the role of Banja Luka as the centre of the Bosnian *Serb* statelet. However, the prospect of a reconstructed Ferhadija in the middle of Banja Luka, its dome and minarets competing with the rather newer monuments to the Orthodox faith a stone's throw away, is intolerable to some people. (2002: 160, emphasis in original)

As Bose goes on, the rebuilding of the mosque is seen by some to violate the principles of partition—a principle of space as belonging exclusively to an ethnic community, even while minorities reside there (2002: 160). As Touquet (2012: 215) notes, the RS, today, 'is an example of a nationalizing state, and its politicians often behave as if their entity were a

nation-state'. Serbian symbols and flags dominate Banja Luka and it is not uncommon for people therein to understand the RS, wrongly, as a sovereign state (Touquet 2012: 215). This kind of Serbian "nationalism", however, should not be confused with reverence for state institutions or politicians—Whitt discusses how trust in both international and local state institutions is extremely low among Bosnian Serbs (2010: 284), particularly given perceptions of wide-spread corruption.

As Helms notes, then, 'Bosnians have had to shift their expectations towards the state, as many (socialist) state functions have either disappeared or been taken over by foreign funded NGOs' (2006: 344). The operation of the NGO sector in Bosnia during and after the war, then, is worthy of consideration here. During the war, the relief effort was overseen by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in concert with between 250-500 NGOs (Bolton and Jeffrey 2008: 591). The significance of NGOs in Bosnia did not diminish following the end of the war; as Bolton and Jeffrey note, '[i]n the absence of a functioning state architecture, NGOs remained in Bosnia to provide welfare and relief to the victims of war' (2008: 592). As Bolton and Jeffery continue, in the intervening years, though many post-conflict humanitarian concerns have eased, organisations have 'shifted their focus from the provision of relief to meeting the more social welfare objectives of advocacy and minority rights' and the promotion of "civil society", more broadly (2008: 593). Indeed, as Simmons argues, the DPA, as Western foreign policy, more broadly, insisted upon the development of civil society as crucial to BiH's post-war economic and political transition (2007: 175); Simmons notes that 'in BiH the initial and almost sole responsibility for the growth of civil society has been the NGOs'' (2007: 175). From the start of the war until 2001, approximately 8,000 NGOs were operating in BiH, with a variety of missions, including 'democratization, human rights, women's rights, intercultural communication,

political education, ecology, relief, etc.' (Simmons 2007: 175). International enthusiasm for the operation of NGOs in Bosnia is not always shared by local populations—not least of all because of perceptions of their ignorance and corporate interests (Simmons 2007: 175). It should be noted, too, that, given that the relief effort was centred around Sarajevo, NGOs did not have as significant a presence in the RS as in the Federation—as Touquet argues, today, 'the Federation bears the hallmarks of a weak state, with multiple access points' for NGOs, while the 'Republika Srpska, on the other hand, has the characteristics of a strong state with fewer access points, centralized as it is' (2012: 217).

With respect to the operation of women's and feminist NGOs in the region, some consideration needs to be paid to historical legacies of anti-feminism. In Communist Yugoslavia, despite notional "equality between the sexes", a patriarchal social system of male leadership and feminine domesticity nevertheless predominated, with "feminism" being tantamount to "disloyalty to Yugoslavia" (Cockburn 1998: 157-60). In the post-communist political vacuum, the revived discourse of nationalism emphasised women's role, not in building socialism, but in reproducing the nation and, as such, women's relative emancipation under communism may be seen to have been supplanted by pre-communist doctrines of feminine domesticity. Nevertheless, as Simmons suggests, the appeal of "bourgeois feminism" could be seen in the 'Western-style feminist organizations [which] existed among educated urban women a decade before the dissolution of Yugoslavia' (2007: 175). Simmons discusses how fledgling women's organisations in BiH during the war were propped up by international donors, leading to their "NGOization" (2007: 176). Indeed, women have been some of the most active leaders and participants in the growing NGO sector in BiH (Helms 2003: 1). Helms discusses how this has presented a double bind for women—since the capacity for bringing about ethnic reconciliation and peace-building was

attributed to women, as women, this saddled them with the same essentialising notions of "nurturer" that precluded them from participating in the apparatuses of male-lead state power (2003). The upshot of this, though, has been that women's ability to work for women, outside of the structures of the corrupt state, has provided these women with a sort of moral authority (Helms 2003), not to mention material benefits. While the bulk of the IC's interest in women's organisations has been around multi-ethnic state building, and often operationalised this strategic essentialism, other more gender-critical feminist NGOs and projects operate across BiH around issues of gender equality, violence prevention and women's health. Notable examples are Medica Zenica, in Zenica, *Žene Ženama* (Women to Women) in Sarajevo and *Udružene Žene* (United Women) in Banja Luka (Helms 2003).

CARE has been operating in Bosnia, including in the RS, since before the end of the conflict. As described to me by the YMI director, CARE's gender equality initiatives in BiH prior to 2006 had tended to focus on women's empowerment. YMI, then, was CARE's first initiative to engage men in primary VAW prevention. Indeed, as many of my informants described, YMI was the first initiative of its kind in the former Yugoslavia. This project subscribes to the ideology, represented in the literature, that a focus on men's identities, attitudes, relations and behaviours—in short, masculinity—is crucial in order to curb men's violence against women.

Chapter Three: Working with "Masculinity"

"Balkan masculinity" and the "new Balkan boy"

Based on YMI's mandate, alone, the centrality of the concept of masculinity to the project should be apparent; more specifically, the YMI project operates around a concept of "Balkan masculinity". The concept of "Balkan masculinity" has had particular potency in the post-conflict period, though, the idea that Balkan men-as-a-group can be understood through reference to specific set of characteristics can be traced to long before the hostilities of the mid-90s[8]. Milojević discusses how compulsory drafting to military service in the former Yugoslavia was understood as a means by which boys would be "turned into men" (2012: 61). As she notes in relation to Balkan masculinity, then, 'a good Serbian man, for example, is a hero who fights for his people, refuses to negotiate and does not settle for less than total victory' (Milojević 2012: 61). She discusses, too, how this version of hegemonic masculinity 'has been reinforced in the collective consciousness of the Serbian and Yugoslav people' (Milojević 2012: 61). With respect to the post-Yugoslav period, Milićević notes that the "ethnicization" of the 1990s 'included an attempt to redefine the roles of men and women in a manner inspired by the traditional, patriarchal, pre-socialist past' and that the 'content of the revived normative masculinity required that men return to their roles as providers and, even more importantly, as protectors' (2006: 282). As Dimova discusses in relation to Albanians in Macedonia, then, contemporary concepts of masculinity in the region are also characterised, he says, by notions that "real men" are fully in control of their private lives—that is, their homes and families (2006: 307). Though there are few academic accounts of "Balkan

[8] van de Port's 1998 ethnography of a Serbian village, *Gypsies, Wars and Other Instances of the Wild*, traces how an historical concept of the Unreason of "Balkan people-as-a-group" and, indeed, Balkan men-as-a-group, can be read through the stories he collects at "Gypsy bars". As he writes 'the wild poses and savage scenarios of lack of control adopted in the Gypsy bars can be understood as an appropriation of the forbidden and disgraceful self-images of the Serbs' (1998: 219). Todorova's (1997) concept of "Balkanism", and Bakić-Hayden's "nesting Orientalisms" (1995), which I discuss later, provide an academic account of this phenomenon whereby people from "the Balkans" have been represented with reference to a set of (negative) characteristics by both those without and without the region.

masculinity", per se, Milojević's (2012), Milićević's (2006) Dimova's (2006) are some of the more recent of a growing body of literature[9].

"Balkan masculinity", as deployed by those working within YMI, then, is characterised by a lack of emotion, gender inequitable norms around male headship and roles within the household and family and a propensity for violence. Importantly, those within the project deem that this kind of masculinity can be read in the identities, attitudes and behaviours of the young men they work with. As John Crownover, the project's founder, head designer and current director explained to me in an interview:

> [A] crisis of manhood, not for all young people, I don't want to generalise, but for a lot of them, was very much apparent in this region—that a lot of young people were growing up in environments where they had very negative attitudes about gender relations, about sharing household responsibilities, about the role of men in the family, dating relationships and we saw very much that the culture of this region, as is often the case in many places, that alcohol plays very much an important part in the socialisation of young people, particularly of men.

The link being made, here, between the "culture of this region" and the incidence of men's violence-supportive behaviour is made more explicit by Perpetuum Mobile project manager Bojana Trninić, who told me in an interview:

> In [the] Balkan[s]… when you say masculinity, all of us, even if we fight against it, we have "what men should be like". Man, Balkan man, especially—I think especially Balkan man—is [a] very strong man, very closed, without showing emotion, and that's some kind of man that we see when we say masculinity.

Indeed, these were pervasive themes of my interviews. It was conceived, by those within the YMI project, that this "Balkan masculinity" could be re-imagined to be something more positive—and more gender equitable—and exported wholesale to a population of young men. As Perpetuum Mobile project coordinator and peer educator Saša Ostojić revealed to me in an interview, 'our vision of the project is actually creating a new "Balkan boy". We ha[d] one

[9] Greenberg's (2006) and Helms' (2006), which I discuss, later, as well as Bracewell's (2000) and Irvine and Lilly's (2007) are other such more recent academic accounts of "Balkan masculinity".

conference that was like "New Balkan Boy"—that was the name of the conference'. I discuss the way that this new form of non-violent, though still distinctly "Balkan", masculinity was promoted through the project below.

All of this belies, however, the almost simultaneous compulsion of some within the project to disavow the idea that there was something particular about "Balkan" masculinities—whether patriarchal tradition or the psychological legacy of a war-torn past—which makes Balkan men more inclined toward violence than other men. As the project's director further noted in our interview:

> There is a stereotype about this kind of Balkan mentality or Balkan manhood. I don't think that, having been involved in this project for a long time, I don't think there are great differences between most masculinities and certainly the patriarchal and the more hegemonic masculinities with it. As with all societies you find a variety of masculinities here as you do everywhere else. But certainly the ones that get the most attention, the ones that are kind of revered, elitist masculinities are similar here as they are in many other contexts.

In this way, the project's director is more explicit about his earlier qualification that it 'is often the case in many places' that men hold gender inequitable or violence-supportive attitudes. It may be seen that there is a tension here between framing men's violence in the context of both a specifically "Balkan mentality" and a post-war legacy and representing the problem of men's violent behaviour in the former Yugoslavia within a broader framework which looks to understand men's violence as a cross-cultural phenomenon. Indeed, the project's director even employs the language of critical masculinity studies, such as in the concept of "hegemonic masculinities", an academic tradition which, as discussed in chapter one, has found little evidence to suggest that particular cultural contexts are somehow more supportive of men's violence than others. This tension was also apparent in my interview with PM project manager Bojana—she provided what is seemingly the counter to her earlier assertion about Balkan men, stating that:

> I think it's more just people's perception—if you have that picture [of] what Serb man, or Muslim, or Croatian, or whatever, Balkan man, looks like, then when you walk to the town you will not see [it]. At least you will not see enough [of] that kind of man that you can say it's typical. I think that's what we can say the "meat" of what man should look like [is] and the stress [for men] is because they're not that kind of man… And we want just to show, like: be normal, you are like that so it's cool, it's okay. Don't be like real, typical. Even it's not real, typical to be like dirty, big, whatever—that's not typical. You cannot find it even in the villages.

This discussion represents, perhaps, the move to "fight against" the stereotype that Bojana pointed to in her earlier characterisation of a distinctly Balkan masculinity. For her, Balkan men "especially" are 'very strong… very closed, without showing emotion', though this is somehow only to be seen as a posture. In a similar formulation, project coordinator and Banja Luka local Saša suggested to me that the concept of "Balkan masculinity" is half perception, half reality (in his words, 'fifty-fifty'). He told me that '[in the] Balkans, I can really say that violence is related to masculinity very much', but went on to note that:

> I think that is a myth that the Balkan guys are violent guys—I don't think so. They are just more open, I don't know, and let's say more free than the others. And we have a bad history. You know, in the past, I don't know, fifty years, we had three wars.

In this way, though Saša perceives something unique about Balkan masculinity that renders it violent, he seeks to explain the incidence of violence in (relative) peacetime in Bosnia with reference to the former-Yugoslavia's "violent past", as well as to Balkan men's "freeness". Saša does not make the move to eschew the idea that there is anything "Balkan" about violence in the Balkans, even while he is keen to point out that Balkan men are not, themselves, innately violent. Each of these formulations are somewhat at odds with the project's overriding concept of "Balkan masculinity", which—as is the case with the broader usage of the concept—attributes Balkan men's violence not only to the psychological impact of wartime, but also to a supposed intrinsic propensity to violence in the region.

All of this may be seen as an expression of the very complex relationship those within "the Balkans"—especially people from the former Yugoslavia—have with "Balkanism". The term

Balkanism was coined by Maria Todorova in her *Imaging the Balkans* (1997). Through the concept of Balkanism, Todorova intended to capture how, 'as in the case of the Orient, the Balkans have served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of "European" and "West" has been constructed' (1997: 188). Milica Bakić-Hayden demonstrates how Balkanism may be seen to have been internalised by people from this region, themselves (1995). As Helms describes, in the context of Bosnia, 'rather than rejecting the polarization of east and west, [Bosnians] instead tend to shift the valences or boundaries of such dichotomies to suit specific political agendas' (2008: 91); she, after Bakić-Hayden, calls this move "nesting Orientalisms". In this way, as Bose (2002: 12-13) argues, a rhetorical strategy may be seen to exist whereby people, and particularly political leaders of the former Yugoslavia, extricate themselves from the "Balkan" label while at once designating it to other former Yugoslavs—such as ethnic others or villagers—with all of its pejorative connotations of violence, unruliness and incivility. For example, as Jessica Greenberg shows in the context of a discussion about representations of assassinated Serbian prime minister Zoran Đinđić:

> Nationalism, isolation, rural/suburban backgrounds, and "non-middle-class" values were linked to war and the Miloševic regime, while establishing democratic politics meant [Đinđić's supporters] disassociate[ed] themselves and the country from the "types" of people to whom responsibility for the war was increasingly attributed… The complicated discourse through which urbanites and large sections of the mass media understood the country's increasing political instability, war, and international isolation was organized around this dichotomy. (2006: 137)

As Helms describes, then, gender equality projects often 'become fused to wider discourses on post-war recovery… "joining Europe," or "becoming civilized"' (2006: 355). In this process, as Helms goes on, these projects target women, but also increasingly men and masculinities, with a view to producing the new kinds of political subjects that are required for this post-conflict transition; these subjects 'are constructed as non-violent, tolerant of difference, willing to compromise, and opposed to separatist nationalisms' (Helms 2006:

355). In this way, YMI may be seen to reproduce a kind of nested Balkanism which, in the context of post-war recovery, comes to be articulated through the aim to create a "new" Balkan masculinity or masculine subject (the "new Balkan boy"), typified by non-violence and tolerance, in short, "Europeaness". That these are, indeed, the characteristics of the "new Balkan boy" is demonstrated below. Even while the project's staff—particularly the project's director—are largely cognisant of the fact that hegemonic masculinities are everywhere constructed around violence and that idealised concepts of masculinity in the former Yugoslavia are historically and socially situated expressions of this male dominance, they are nevertheless unwilling to relinquish the concept of a specifically "Balkan" masculinity and, more significantly, one that needs to be re-imagined according to decidedly "Western", democratic values.

What it means to "Be a Man"

The norm of Balkan masculinity finds no better expression, for those within the project, than in the "Balkan" ethic of "be a man". As discussed, the project's Be a Man (*Budi Muško*) campaign was conceived of through a workshop process in which a group of young men involved in the PLA stage of the project participated. This group of young men identified that "be a man" was a concept which had, in the context of the former Yugoslavia, extremely negative connotations attached to it. As project assistant and peer educator Aleksandar Slijepcevic explained to me in an interview:

> In our society it's implanted this destructive model of behaviour like, "be a man". Like "be a man, you are strong, don't cry". "Be a man, don't be a girl"—you know, that's a sentence that our parents, grandmothers, say. And they're taught that way—it's a patriarchal way of living.

This "negative" model of masculinity is understood within the project to represent a somehow "fake" masculinity. As project coordinator Saša, speaking in general, told me, 'I'm raised with some kind of gender rules that I should follow and… we have just a perception of

that fake masculinity… It's very difficult to find your way and to see what is real gender and what is just a bad perception of that'. For the project, then, (Balkan) men are not *really* violent, they are simply confused about messages relating to violence that they receive from their communities. As the project's director, John, explained in our interview:

> When we started to kind of deconstruct some of the issues… we really saw that there was some kind of a "crisis of masculinity" amongst young men. We really saw that young men were growing up with negative role models, that they were really unsure what society was really trying to tell them, what were the real messages about positive men in society.

The concept of a "crisis of masculinity", which John referenced twice in our interview, originally surfaced in public discourse as a criticism of the feminist movement. This discourse meant to suggest that, because of feminism's sustained critique of dominant and dominating masculinity and the problems it causes women and society, more broadly, "masculinity", per se, is in "crisis"—that is, masculinity's core tenants are the very same things that feminism demands be dismantled (Pohl 2012). This concept is deployed within the project, however, to stand for young men's confusion about how they are to approximate the norm of violent, intolerant, anti-democratic Balkan masculinity, where it is at once valorised and disavowed within the society they are growing up in.

In responding to this "crisis", the project aims to take the "be a man" ethic and redeploy it with new meanings attached—that is, to subvert the original meaning and intent of the phrase, when uttered. As John described to me in our interview, 'because it was very much part of the discourse here, we wanted to try and challenge and change what "be a man" meant when people said it'. Within the project, the new, "healthy" masculinity what would be suggested by the term "be a man" was presented as somehow a *real* masculinity, as against an imagined violent masculinity; in this way, participants in the project are to understand that

they "are men" if they cultivate these new values. As peer educator Aleksandar described to me during our interview:

> And we like to change [men] in the way that if [they do] not accept the fight, if you turn your head around and go away, if you don't participate in that, you are also a man. And we are [teaching that] these good things that you can do… also make you a man. And you are a bigger man than you are if you're going in a fight.

With respect to what, besides non-violence, constitutes this new, "real" masculinity, PM project manager Bojana describes the change effected by the project by saying, 'the guys come in the office, they wash the dishes, they talk with each others about problems, they're not ashamed to cry. For me that's the real impact of this project'. Tolerance, and especially ethnic tolerance, it was described to me, are also important characteristics of this "new" masculinity. Indeed, for the project, a real man is someone who is his authentic self and who respects diversity—as the project's director explained to me in our interview:

> We're trying to recognise that one type of masculinity has often been rewarded, put up on a pedestal. We want young people to be themselves, to be able to develop in a positive direction, whatever that direction may be—we want to recognise that there's a variety of types of masculinities, that there isn't just one right direction to go with it, whether you're athletic or whether you're the computer nerd, so to speak, that you don't feel constrained by these unwritten rules that this is the only way for you to go to be considered a real and successful man.

By all accounts, this new ethic has been internalised by the young men involved. One BMK member, 17-year-old Jovan, described what it means to "be a man" to me in this way:

> To be a man I think it's to respect the kids, women, girls, to [not] fight with other people. Because I think with conversation you can… know something about some things which can happen if you [fight]. Or to think about your health.

When I asked sixteen-year-old BMK member and workshop participant Đorđe what it means to "be a man", he responded:

> Not muscle big guy—not that. Man who knows everything to work [knows how to do everything]. To help women, I don't know, dish wash and clean house and it's not just men, you know, fix the car, fix the window, or something. It's to be nice, actually, first of all. To know how to be a man.

Peer educator Aleksandar, then, described to me how this new, diverse, more gender-equal masculinity does *not* call into question the young men participants' inherent manhood—as he told me in our interview:

> This is a way to show them that that is not the way. That you are a man—whatever you do, you are a man. For me that's the explanation of masculinity. No matter what you do—if you are ironing your shirts, or fixing your car, you're a man doing one or [the] second thing.

Masculinity, for the project, then, is synonymous with being a man—masculinity merely gains a new set of meanings which *real* men are said to adhere to. That masculinity could be de-anchored from manhood is not a possibility according to the project's logic—men must be masculine, even though masculinity, itself, needs to be re-imagined. Relatedly, for the project, masculinity is rooted in biology. As the project's director explained to me:

> There is a great debate around whether gender is just completely a social construct or whether there are biological factors. I would tend to think that even now after Scandinavia has had the perfect gender equality laws and things that they have been doing at a high level, men are still going into certain professions, women are still going into certain professions. I think we would be hard-pressed to suggest that biology doesn't play some role also in our gender identity, so to speak.

This rehashing of a biology-as-destiny argument is not particularly surprising in view of the related "if male, then masculine" logic discussed above. According to this line of argument, men are masculine by virtue of, not only their socialisation under gender-ordered society, but because of some genetic or other predisposition towards masculine traits. This is, of course, confusing, given that the project ultimately relies on a concept that masculinity can be *reprogrammed*, i.e. that it is not innate and unchanging. Nevertheless, to "be a man", according to the YMI framework, you need to be born male-bodied, eschew "fake", violent masculinity and adhere to a "new" set of more positive values.

If it is men who, by consequence of socialisation and biology, are masculine, then femininity and, by extension, women, remain othered. While it is no doubt true that the project tries to

re-imagine traditional "gender roles"—especially with respect to domesticity, i.e. the young men are now washing dishes, where this would have been unimaginable before—and while this is a positive step, it is also true that men retain a certain primacy of place in the gender order according this logic. Under this rubric, men merely help women with what remains *women's* work (as Đorđe noted, being a man means to "help women… dish wash and clean house"). Here we see echoes of a neo-liberal ethic according to which men and women are different, but equal. Indeed, the project's director described men and women's difference to me in this way:

> You could at some point generalise that these [new masculine qualities] are just human things, but boys identify that they are male, that they are a boy, and I don't think we should be afraid to use the word man, manhood, a boy. There are differences, whether it's biological or whether it's just social construction—there can be debates between degrees of everything between boys and girls. We don't want there to be differences in opportunities, but as we see in some of the most progressive countries, where opportunities have generally been equalised, there are still different directions that boys and girls go.

According to this line of argument, women need only be given the same opportunities as men in order for perfect equality to have been said to be achieved. Differences in outcomes can then be attributed to innate differences; that men's innate qualities tend to lead them to higher paid jobs, for example, does not warrant explanation. In this way, the problems for women brought about by a men and women's difference logic are perpetuated.

It may even be seen that this logic helps to consolidate men's place in the existing gender order, given the whole host of new, positive qualities that are now attributable to masculinity and not femininity, men and not women. Speaking to me about the "backlash" discourse in the former Yugoslavia around gender equality programs, the project's director had this to say:

> There's been this discourse among some right wing organisations and religious-affiliated groups that programs—sometimes specifically they're saying our program, sometimes they're saying in general—are designed to either feminise boys, make them gay, or a whole host of silly accusations.

These accusations are "silly" because the ideal of the project is not to feminise boys, but to masculinise them, anew; indeed, the central ethic of the "be a man" mantra is, as Aleksandar suggested to me, 'whatever you do, you are a man'. Femininity remains other *and* less desirable. Indeed, when I asked each of the four BMK members I interviewed whether the positive qualities, discussed above, that are now attributable to being a man were the same qualities that made people "human" or, indeed, women "women", the answer was, unequivocally, "no". It could be argued that imbuing the concept of "being a man" with more positive connotations is merely a compromise position in a society that would reject, outright, any move to point to masculinity (and femininity) as inherently problematic concepts, though this case was never put to me. I suggest that, even if this were the motivation behind this model, it seems naïve to imagine that you could spend time and resources imbuing young men with a concept of a positive masculinity that is inherently the other of femininity with the intention of later revealing that this was only a "half way house" on the road to "true" gender equality.

Men as victims of the prescriptions of violent masculinity

The concept of diverse masculinities, discussed above, becomes important to the project, too, for what it suggests about who suffers as a result of the prescriptions around "being a man". That subordinate men also stand to lose under the existing gender order is often given as reason for the importance of men's involvement in gender equality programming, as we have seen. That "not all men are equal" is a strongly-held tenant of YMI—as John, the project's director, told me: '[i]n the great hierarchy of patriarchy and everything, not all men are equal in that scale and these tend to be men that are lower in that scale and we particularly wanted to target'. This might seem like a curious suggestion, since one would imagine that it is those who exhibit the kind of "hegemonic masculinity" that requires violence and precludes gender

equality who would need to be "targeted", particularly. This speaks, I argue, to the men-as-victims ideology that undergirds the project. In a project where men work with men around "men's issues", a partnership approach comes to predominate—men are not potential perpetrators, but victims of a gender order that besets them with a host of problems. This is particularly true given that the project works with young men, who are subordinate in the existing gender order vis-à-vis adult men. At various times, my attention was drawn to the problems men are faced with because of the requirement that they perform masculinity. These problems, it was detailed to me, included: peer violence, poor educational attainment, unhealthy alcohol consumption and excessive pressure to be successful. Even health disparities were held to be important reasons to address young masculinities; as the project's director noted in our interview, 'we've known for a long time about different health disparities that exist between men and women. We know there's a reason women tend to live longer lives. Men [die] between 6 and 7 years… earlier [than women]'. As the project's director summarised with respect to subordinate masculinities:

> So in many parts of the world we know that lower income men have greater challenges—whether it's poverty in the home, family, unemployment and everything and this impacts, I think in a variety of different ways, the choices that some young men make. If we're looking at issues of emotional and mental health, there's certainly, for upper-middle class young men, stresses around to be successful, to do well [at university], to a lot of things. We see huge incidences in the US around suicide for college-age young men and so forth.

While it is no doubt true that men suffer men's violence and that men's health and educational attainment are affected by certain prescriptions around masculinity, the very notion that men stand to lose the same way that women do under the gender order is deeply flawed—this ideology fails to acknowledge the ways that the gender order is fundamentally predicated on men's systemic privilege vis-à-vis women and how dismantling it would be to dismantle this privilege (Pease 2008). A focus on men as victims can also be seen as extremely insensitive to women survivors, given the epidemic-proportions of the problem of

men's VAW. Fundamentally, too, in a project which is framed in terms of the promotion of "gender equality", this conception mischaracterises the imperative behind gender equality—that is, addressing women's discursive, symbolic, material and structural inequality vis-à-vis men. Indeed, making gender equality projects *about* men's victimisation disappears the core issue of men's power, privilege and permission and the ways that these are the preconditions for men's gender unequal attitudes and their violence against women. This will become even more apparent when I discuss how the concept of gender equality is, itself, deployed within YMI in chapter four.

Chapter Four: Women's Organisations and Feminist Politics

Partnering with women's organisations

In view of YMI's emphasis on men's victimhood under the existing gender order, partnering with women's and feminist organisations may be seen to become all-the-more important for the project's critical efficacy. Many, if not all, of the staff members I interviewed recognised the importance of such partnering. Indeed, project coordinator and peer educator Saša, speaking to me of one of the project's feminist partner organisations in Zagreb, the Center for Education, Counselling and Research (CESI), identified that:

> They are actually involved in [the] making of this project, just to see the other side. Not to make some project that is cool for me and not cool for you, but to involve them and… to make one project that is okay for two of us. Because we are group of twenty young boys making one project and [there] is a big possibility to become one project who is not so friendly with girls. That's the reason we came up with the idea to engage some feminist organisations to show them and for them to be involved in the making of this project so we know if one girl sees our project, that will be okay for her.

The International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) is another women's organisation involved with the project—they are an official partner, having collaborated with YMI on the evaluation of the project's pilot phase. Director of Status M, the project's partner NGO in Zagreb, Natko Gereš told me that they collaborate with two other Croatian women's organisations who work with survivors of men's violence: Be active, Be emancipated (B.a.B.e) and *Zenska Soba* ("Women's Room"). According to Natko, B.a.B.e representatives have attended all of Status M's conferences and shown support for their work. PM project manager Bojana, who was, herself, involved in setting up women's shelters in Banja Luka, observed to me that: 'if we have [a] topic about violence and preventing violence and we want to have more impact, then we call the organisations who really work with victims, then they come to our workshops'.

But this partnering with women's organisations working with survivors of violence—and often, too, around primary, secondary and tertiary prevention—has not been unproblematic for YMI. Project Manager Saša Petković, overseeing the project from the perspective of CARE Northwest Balkans, told me that CESI originally reacted strongly against the project. In an interview with me, Saša noted that: 'In the beginning of the project in 2006, [CESI had] been considered as [a] full partner organisation, but they gave up because their feminist view of the gender was opposite of our view'. Saša went on to tell me that CESI held this view 'because they didn't have enough information about gender and about the engagement of young men and boys', but that, after some time, CESI changed their minds and started supporting YMI, though not in full partnership. As discussed in chapter one, the women's movement—supported by theorists of men's involvement in the prevention of men's violence against women—has highlighted a number of concerns around men's involvement in VAW prevention, from concerns over the scarcity of resources, to the threat to women-centeredness, to the de-gendering of violence, to backlash, co-option, the perpetuation of structural inequalities and an emphasis on men's victimhood. It is with all of this in view—as well as women's organisations' expertise crafted through decades of work around the issue—that partnership with women's and feminist organisations is held to be a necessary precondition of successful men-focused violence prevention. While YMI doubtless recognises the importance of such partnership, it is also true that they hold themselves to be experts in certain fields where they feel the women's movement is unskilled, such as peer education and the "engagement of young men and boys". Notwithstanding that, for example, CESI also works in youth-based healthy relationships training—as does the broader women's movement—some within YMI seem unwilling to accept that feminist organisations have legitimate critiques of their work, preferring to insist that they do not 'have enough information'. Putting aside the question of how competently feminist organisations engage

with young men and boys, this is not a sentiment particularly suggestive of the kind of partnership theorists of men's involvement have been advocating and bespeaks, rather, the tendency that Pease (2008) and others (Lang 2002; Ruxton 2004) warn against, whereby men threaten to "take over" and co-opt violence prevention. As Pease urges, men's accountability to women's organisations in VAW prevention must 'go beyond consultation and liaison and be guided by women's *leadership*' (2008: 16, emphasis added).

Rejection of a feminist ethic

The project's professed desire to partner with women's and feminist organisations belies, too, what could reasonably be characterised as its essential rejection of a feminist ethic. This is not to say that some of the project's priorities are not, themselves, feminist, but my research demonstrates that these priorities are not typically identified as such and are articulated, instead, from what was described to me as a "youth work", "human rights" or "empowerment" perspective. As the project's director detailed to me when I specifically asked him about the extent to which the project deploys a feminist ethic:

> I would say that some of our ideas and thoughts are probably feminist-friendly and are supported by the literature and discourse, and probably some of them are not and come from a more youth work perspective, or come from more an empowerment perspective that's a bit different.

I will go on to consider how this "empowerment" approach to VAW prevention is articulated and how it functions to, paradoxically, disappear VAW in chapter five. For now, suffice it to say that this ethical framework was pitted as against feminism, with feminism, in the view of everyone involved in the project with whom I spoke, being unable to account fully for the issues with which YMI was grappling. While there was a certain gesturing towards feminism's "important role" in combating VAW, at least on the part of higher level programming staff, there was also a strong sense in which a peer education model could cover ground that a feminist theoretical framework could not. This is encapsulated in the

project director's comment, made in the context of a discussion about feminist understandings of men's privilege, that:

> There are different levels of understanding—youth organisations are not trying to replace the women's groups, the feminists, the academic institutions and everything like that. There are some things that they do well and better than others can do, and there are some things that others can do that are better.

The "others" he is citing, I was given to understand, are youth organisations and what they can "do better" is engage young men in ways that are relevant to their lives. For other staff, from coordination staff, to peer educators, to researchers, the mention of "feminism" provoked, if not hostility, then certainly suspicion. One peer educator, when asked to what extent the project has a feminist ethic, replied, simply, "no". PM's project manager, Bojana, was more circumspect in her search to distance herself and the project from feminism, suggesting to me in our interview that:

> I think that the project [has] some kind of, but very small impact of feminist [is impacted in a very small way by feminism]. If we see feminism like equality of men and women, then I think that we have that feminism… In the beginning, a lot of people th[ought] that this project is trying to make woman from the man—that they're not men at all. Then I think that's not true. This project, I think it's unique because we want to see differences between men and woman—but not inequality.

This last explanation helps to illuminate, perhaps, why a project that looks to address men's violence against women—and does so from within a professedly "gender conscious" framework—would reject the notion that it is, itself, feminist. Indeed, as noted in chapter two, feminism in BiH, as in other parts of the former Yugoslavia and in many post-socialist states, has attached to it deeply negative connotations (Funk and Mueller 1993; Drakulić 1993; Pavlović 1999). As noted, in communist Yugoslavia, despite notional "equality between the sexes", a patriarchal social system of male headship and feminine domesticity nevertheless predominated, with "feminism" being tantamount to "disloyalty to Yugoslavia" (Cockburn 1998: 157-60). In relation to the situation in Bosnia, as Cynthia Cockburn points out, while there was a burgeoning women's movement in the former Yugoslavia: 'the

Yugoslav women's movement, focussed in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana, had had slight expression in Sarajevo and had passed the rest of Bosnia by' (1998: 189). In the post-communist political vacuum, the revived discourse of nationalism emphasised women's role, not in building socialism, but in reproducing the nation and, as such, women's relative emancipation under communism may be seen to have been supplanted by pre-communist doctrines of feminine domesticity. As Pavlović discusses in relation to post-war Croatia, feminism was portrayed in the media 'as being both crudely equivalent to hatred of men and a part of the old Marxist/communist/Yugoslav milieu' (1999: 137). She notes how ironic this is, given that, under communism, feminism was held to be 'an anti-Communist and anti-Marxist element, which drags into [Yugoslavia] the decadent ideology of the West' (Pavlović 1999: 137). In Bosnia, today, this tradition of anti-feminism and of understanding feminism as a movement of men-hatred—or one which, as Bojana notes, looks to "turn men into women"—has continued salience.

As the YMI project director suggested to me, during our interview, of feminist organisations in contemporary Bosnia:

> They have a much more difficult time reaching young people because of the general misconceptions or perceptions of those types of organisations—that they're hostile to men, or whatever propaganda somebody has supported with that. That kind of demonisation of the word as something kind of scary. Most boys if they've heard of it have heard of it probably in some negative way.

While it may seem reasonable to be cautious in your deployment of feminism, armed with the understanding that it is likely to provoke hostility among the population you are targeting, being hostile to feminism, yourself, when you are engaged in the prevention of men's violence against women is an altogether different matter. As highlighted in chapter one, and as Pease (2008) suggests, where men are involved in the prevention of men's VAW, there

exists a problematic tendency to sideline the very feminist ethic which made clear, in the first place, why such strategies were necessary—this tendency is doubtless apparent in YMI.

It may be seen that another reason why the project is so reticent to take up feminism is their self-professed desire not to become too enmeshed in "theory". This aversion to theory leads, I argue, to a concomitant misunderstanding of the feminist concept of gender. As the project's director, John, told me of YMI's relationship with theory:

> I think you can get lost sometimes in the theorisation of a lot of men's violence against women and violence in general and everything like that and we've tried not to do too much of that. They've been exposed to a lot of well known people involved in that type of work, which I think is important and good and it's there. And some of them have taken to it more than others.

In this way, gender theory is held as tangential to their work—indeed, the project's partners are free to "take to it" as they see fit. Nevertheless, John described to me how, in the first few years of the project, staff received "gender training" in order to critically reflect upon their own experiences and assumptions and engage with the material being taught to young men meaningfully. This training was represented to me as staff's obligatory, but cursory, exposure to "theorisation"—"theory" would stand, thereafter, as against the "practice" of youth work. John described, too, how some staff and some organisations were excluded from the project at this early stage because they were not, in his words, 'where they should be' in this process of becoming "gender conscious". While this sounds promising, of PM's two peer educators, one could not recall any details of the training he received and the other told me he had never received any such training.

Project staff, then, seemed wholly unprepared to critically engage with the feminist concept of gender, the concept upon which, by their own description, YMI's work centres. On the question of what gender is and how the concept is deployed in their work, both coordination

and education staff tended to echo a sentiment that "gender is gender equality". The below two descriptions of "gender", one from the PM project manager and the other from the project coordinator, were typical:

> We work a lot on the gender equality. And we're trying to divide that sex and gender and to make a clear difference between sex and gender… when you divide that in two parts, it's really easy to explain for some guys what is gender equality and why gender equality is important. So, actually, when we talk about gender, we really work on gender equality and gender-based violence.
>
> For us, gender is equality. And that's what we're trying to have in the office and also have in all activities in project that we are implementing.

While these sentiments are admirable, and while there is, here, a recognition of the social-constructedness of gender, the implications are worrying. A lack of engagement with theory means that the feminist *analytical* concept of gender—gender as a frame, rather than an object, of analysis—disappears, completely, and is replaced by an uncritical "do-gooder" ethic whereby all the word "gender" functions to stand for is that there are multiple "genders" and that each should be treated "equally". This formulation makes it impossible to fully understand and analyse men and women's respective places under the hierarchical gender order—indeed, the concept of "gender" does not simply designte that there are two "genders", the members of each having particular experiences as a consequence of prescriptions around their genders, but a *hierarchy* which guarantees men's systemic privilege vis-à-vis women and, indeed, men's violence against women. Given this failure to engage with feminism and gender theory, it is unsurprising that the concept of gender equality, itself, also comes to be deployed within the project in some troubling ways.

Gender equality: from a "coin with two sides" to "Pandora's Box"

The YMI project and its staff demonstrate some understanding of the relationship between gender inequality and men's violence against women. As PM's project manager told me in an interview:

> It's still [an] enormous number of women who have violence and it's still—I can dare to say half of the people who think that's okay… That's something that we can change. So for me there is a link [between gender inequality and violence]—there is a lot of gender equality topics that are not connected with gender-based violence, but I think if we passed that gender-based violence, if you change that, then we can talk in all levels [about gender equality].

For the PM project manager, then, the "link" between gender inequality and violence is that violence begets inequality. The CARE project manager, though, made the point that it is inequality that begets violence quite clearly to me in our interview, saying that: 'we believe that if there is gender equality, [the] level of gender violence will be definitely decreased'. When pressed further on why it would be the case that gender inequality would breed men's violence against women, the CARE project manager detailed: '[because] of some popular expectations of what is expected of female[s], about girlfriends, about women, generally, to be providers of the food, housekeepers, reproductive machine[s] or other things'—the implication being that, if women are held to exist for the service of men, rather than as men's equals, men will be more inclined to, or less inhibited from, doing violence to them. This, at least, demonstrates an engagement with some of the theories of the causes men's VAW detailed in chapter one.

On the question of what gender equality means, or what it would look like, however, the project demonstrates some of the more problematic tendencies prevalent among men-centred VAW prevention, as discussed within the critical primary prevention literature. Within YMI, gender equality means that men, as well as women, need to gain access to some privileges from which they have traditionally been excluded. As the project's director told me in an interview:

> There's two parts to gender equality. In this region, still, if you were to say "gender", people would say "oh, you're talking about women". And we would say, "well, not necessarily". In some circumstances, yes, but people don't really see that gender equality was more, too, about men's liberation from the constraints of always having to live up to some expectation that a) they didn't want to and b) they couldn't,

> anyway. And so it's really also to some extent about men being able to make different choices and being comfortable with that, as well as making sure that women have the same opportunities that they've traditionally been excluded from.

In our interview, CARE's project manager continued in a similar vein:

> We consider gender as a coin with two sides. So it means that gender—gender means female and male rights. And there is no gender balance if male side is not satisfied as well… Our core value is that we believe that gender equity must be established in society. So gender equity means that female respects male and male respect female.

Finally, PM's own project manager echoed this sentiment to me:

> I think, in most of the cases, the men are not also equal, especially in the family, in father[hood]. They're not included from the beginning, even in the laws—they're excluded [from being] equal parents. And they're excluded… like they have that pressure to be strong, man of the family. They need to give money for the family and everything. So I think that's also big pressure. That's not equality that we want to see between men and woman.

That gender equality is a "coin with two sides", or that is has "two parts" to it, is evocative of the men-as-victims sentiment discussed earlier. While the prescriptions of violent masculinity certainly beset some men with a host of problems, the idea that the concept of *gender equality* should or does somehow take account of these issues is to fundamentally misunderstand the hope represented by the gender equality moniker and movement—that is, justice for women in a deeply male-dominated society. More worrying, still, is this idea that men need to gain equality with women in some realms—as though men's lack of involvement in family life somehow bespeaks women's privilege vis-à-vis men. The concept of men's power and privilege so fundamental to understandings of men's violence, as painstakingly detailed by theorists of men's violence like Michael Kaufman (1999), all but disappears in this formulation of the problem of gender inequality.

When pressed on questions of men's privilege, then, only the project's director identifies that 'men have been the beneficiaries of a social order for eons of time'. When I questioned other project staff and boys participating in the project with respect to men's privilege, none

seemed willing or able to identify the existing gender order as something from which men stand to benefit, even as women stand to lose. The current gender order is, in YMI discourse, wholly and unanimously bad for everyone. The project's director explained this inability to recognise men's privilege in an interview with me even before I had identified it:

> I think on a practical day-to-day level a lot of that is very abstract and that's not something in the work with young men that we are dealing with on a day-to-day basis. Some of the partners might get that, some of them might not. I think that to simplify things in a way that our young people are able to understand—we very much focus on them looking at the world that they live in and trying to develop the skills to be able to cope in that world and to understand what is wrong, what is right in many situations. So being pissed off at your girlfriend could be okay, being pissed off and hitting your girlfriend is not okay.

All of this amounts to a de-gendering of the concept of gender equality and, relatedly, of men's violence against women. While the project doubtless demonstrates an understanding of the relationship of masculinity to violence, the missing piece of this puzzle appears to be an understanding of the relationship of masculinity to femininity—that is, an understanding of gender as relational and of men's and women's respective places in that set of power relations. Worth holding in view is the warning that Pease (2008) and Kelly (2002) offer, discussed in chapter one, that such fundamental misunderstandings of the problem of gender inequality can lead to backlashes, even within the self-same movements which look to address the problem of men's violence against women. While, by and large, I did not notice a great deal of evidence of such a backlash, perhaps the most worrying exchange I had was with the head researcher on the project who, by his account, was also deeply involved in the project's design. In an interview with me, he had this to say of gender equality:

> Actually gender equality bring[s] really some new challenges I would say… If you have more gender equal relations in the marriage, where fathers are more involved in the things about kids and house, then you have [the] challenge [of] how to now agree about things—who's doing what… Problem could be if your kid is on the antibiotics and if you ask [your wife], "did you give him antibiotics?" And she said, "no, I thought you give, I didn't also". So he didn't get the medicine. So, actually, with this newer and different norms in marriage you have also new challenges like how to agree who's doing what… Also there is, I think, some data in Norway like in the

> marriages where [there] is bigger gender equality, you have more actually divorces. Sometimes that gender equality is like Pandora's Box.

While gender equality as a "coin with two sides" is a problematic mischaracterisation of the issue at hand, gender equality as "Pandora's Box" is a deeply troubling formulation that is well within "backlash" territory. Again, while I would not characterise this as a generally-held view, that a key figure within the project would express such a sentiment is evidence enough of a deep-seated problem—and one, as discussed, which is not unfamiliar in the arena of men's engagement in VAW prevention.

Chapter Five: Structural Inequality

Beyond "individual masculinities"

Notwithstanding some of this "de-gendering", the project—and CARE Northwest Balkans, more broadly—has an understanding of the need to address the "relational" and "structural", as well the merely "individual" causes of men's violence. As project director John Crownover explained to me in my interview with him:

> When we are designing programs… we really try to come through things from a variety of pathways. So we have the individual level—this is where we've been the strongest. This is where we've really been engaging with young people, building relationships… really trying to impact them in a positive way... And then we look at the relational—we know that these young people don't live in a void, that they're impacted from various directions, from teachers, educators… And then we look at the structural and look at the policies and try and look at what it is that can occur at a policy level to try and address some of the inequalities that exist and so forth.

Indeed, there is an important recognition here that, even while the project might not have issues of structural inequality as its focus, there is a need to engage in advocacy around these issues. To this end, PM project manager Bojana described her role to me in this way, '[My role involves] coordinating with all partners on this topic in the country, governmental institutions, other NGOs, media, gender centres of government, everything, schools, universities, whatever can be a partner of this project'. Perpetuum Mobile as an institution, then, is deeply enmeshed in the political structures of the Republika Srpska. As they insist, and as the Gender Centre of the Republika Srpska Government's public relations officer corroborated to me in an interview, PM has a very close working relationship with the apparatuses of government in the Entity. As one informant, a local in Banja Luka, described to me, Perpetuum Mobile is known for having this "close relationship" with government and even regarded suspiciously for this reason—indeed, many locals, as I learned in my two weeks in Banja Luka, hold the government to be corrupt and dysfunctional.

All of this speaks to the inherent problem with the way PM and YMI have approached the issue of the structural supports of gender inequality, even while they recognise the need to address them—they have tried to do so from with the same structures that engender this inequality. There is, of course, a pragmatic motivation for so doing; as CARE project manager Saša Petković explained to me, 'government is [a] really, really important player—without support of ministries we cannot work either in the schools or [with] teacher[s] on [an] individual level'. "Work with governments", then, becomes not an effort to point to and address the structures of gendered power—the masculinist state, as Connell (2005b) puts it—that undergird women's systematic inequality, but a move to ensure governmental support for the work that the program is doing at the "individual level". Indeed, in the upcoming "phase three" of the project, as the CARE project manager described to me, the aim is to gain the approval of all BiH government education ministries to make the YMI educational workshops a compulsory part of school curriculum. While all of this represents worthy goals, executed pragmatically, it does not function to address "structural inequality" in the sense in which Connell and other theorists of men's violence intend.

Aspects of the "masculinist state" in Bosnia that gender justice promotion projects could and should consider might include, for example, the fact that, '[t]he political agenda in BiH has generally been set by the Dayton Peace Accords, according to male norms and standards, and by male politicians'(Björkdahl 2012: 298). Indeed, women's representation in political life in Bosnia has plummeted in the post-war years. Where women's parliamentary representation was assured in the Yugoslav era through a quota system, the first democratic elections did away with this system; after the 2006 elections, as Björkdahl notes 'there was not a single woman who held a ministerial position in the Council of Ministers of BiH' (2012: 298). As Björkdahl further notes, '[w]omen [are] also in the minority within their political parties, and

most political parties in BiH have not included in their documents the principles ensuring gender equality' (2012: 298). Indeed, that women are extremely under-represented in the political structures and processes in BiH is a fundamental problem of women's inequality that gender equality promotion projects that have a concept of the structural, as well as individual, aspects of inequality could engage in advocacy around.

By men, for men: the perpetuation of structural inequality?

Beyond addressing structural inequality, as identified in chapter one, are considerations of how gender equality programs that engage men can function to themselves reinforce those same inequalities by, as Kaufman notes, 'simply maintain[ing] the status quo, perpetuat[ing] gross inequalities in the division and allocation of social resources, and serv[ing] only to perpetuate the institutions and privileges that men and boys have traditionally enjoyed relative to women and girls' (2003: 5). With this in view, I turn, finally, to consider whether and where the issue of institutional structural inequality comes to bear on YMI.

As noted, the program adheres to a model that they describe, variously, as a "youth work", "empowerment" or even "human rights" approach—as noted in chapter four, this was as against a feminist approach. The Director of Status M, the project's partner NGO in Zagreb, described this approach, and the project as a whole, in an interview with me in this way:

> This is a project which is for youth. This is a project which is working with youth and their problems. This is a project which is aware that youth problems are… not just coming from one point, but you have to see the whole of the context and you have to see it through a gender lens or put it in a gender perspective. And then you have to realise that building knowledge and skills to these young people is actually providing them mechanisms of self-support or mechanisms of being more ready for different situations that they come upon… we have a holistic approach, mostly building skills and analytic thinking with young people and realising their contexts as being lots of violence, lots of problems with emotions, with drugs, alcohol, health, especially reproductive health in this age, and lack of their activism and their involvement and everything. And using this gender transformative tool in a way it was to get them to

> reaffirm themselves as men, to realise what gender is and to use this as motivation to being a new man to face all of these issues.

This "gender transformative tool", or what project staff sometimes describe as "gender conscious practice", was described to me, by the project's director, as 'one aspect of youth work'. For the director, 'youth work is very much about social inclusion, solidarity, social justice and we see that the lack of equality—be it between men and women, be it from the LGBT community, be in from a variety of sectors—is an injustice of which youth workers have a role to play in addressing it'. Gender and gender equality become something of a vehicle for addressing what the project sees as the broader "issues young men face". Young men's empowerment in respect of these issues, then, becomes the project's driving motivation. That young men have a set of problems that they need tools to be able to address, that they need opportunities to be involved in activism and in the community and that they need to gain skills to be able to participate meaningfully in the workforce become central concerns for the project. As peer educator Aleksandar, who has been involved with the project since 2009 and employed by Perpetuum Mobile for the last two years, notes of himself, 'before 2009, okay, I'm going to school, I'm back, I'm not involved [in] anything, I don't work [doing] anything. And afterwards, okay, I have the tools and possibilities to change something in society'. In an interview he gave me, he noted the following of the young men involved in the project, today:

> They come from the high school not ever get[ting an] opportunity to be responsible for something. Just to be responsible for some kind of action—to organise people, to organise some kind of logistical stuff. That's important for them. And when they, afterwards, come to some kind of job, they will have the sense of responsibility. So, for me, that is positive in that way—it [teaches] you something that you cannot learn inside of school.

All of this may be seen as another aspect of the YMI imperative, discussed in chapter three, to create a "new" Balkan masculine subject—active participation in the democratic

institutions of a burgeoning civil society is somehow seen as against apathetic acceptance of clan or ethnic-based nationalist, anti-democratic sentiment.

The boys are given these opportunities for their empowerment within the BMKs, but also through the residential camps they attend, often on the seaside in Croatia. As noted, the camps were envisaged as an opportunity for boys who had passed the first level of workshops to extend their learning and to be rewarded for their participation in the project. In practice, boys often attend camps without having a great deal of involvement with the project, at large. Of the camps, Jovan, who had never attended a YMI workshop, but had attended several camps, had this to say:

> There we start some beautiful friendships and a lot of learn[ing]. And we say something [to the other campers] about Banja Luka, about us, they [say] something about their cities. And that was… the best. When, for example, Be a Man Club can make something with two different people, two different cities and make something in one and there [isn't] any problem and [there is] a lot of success, then that is something which is very good.

Đorđe who, by contrast, had attended both workshops and camps, echoes a similar sentiment, saying, 'I enjoy [the camps] because when we go to the camps there [are] your friends, you're playing, joking… And you learn [something] on camps and workshops'. The boys also have opportunities for empowerment through the support of a team of professionals. As Jovan noted to me in our interview:

> We here, we are like family. I think this is my second home—when I finishing school, I come here to help them if they need something. And this Bojana, I think she is for me like [a] second mum. I can [tell] her everything. And we have a pretty good conversation here and can learn a lot.

Peer educator Aleksandar noted, too, of the project, that it 'is a way to talk about everything [the boys] want' and that he worked with the boys in such a way as to always be available to answer their questions on any topic.

While the boys no doubt gain a great deal through this model, the question becomes: does a concern for empowering men completely fly in the face of the gender equality movement's call to empower women vis-à-vis men? Does it, as Kaufman warns, merely serve to 'perpetuate gross inequalities in the division and allocation of social resources' (2003: 5)? PM project manager Bojana described to me how she had pushed to have young women involved in the project, saying: 'even if we work with the boys, the girls are also important for boys, for equality, for peer violence, for everything, they're important'. Since March of 2012, almost six years after the project's inception, young women started to have an active presence in YMI (Jelena, email communication, 2013). Young women have started to be involved in workshops around healthy relationships and even attend the BMKs, at least in Banja Luka. When girls attend the Banja Luka BMK, they have a meeting separate from the boys wherein, I was told, they discuss "girls' issues", before joining the broader meeting, where they help to plan the public actions that are the primary focus of the BMKs. In no way, though, is work with women a central concern of the Young Men Initiative—in the project's conception, as Bojana noted, girls are important *for* the project's aims, rather than important *to* the project. Indeed, as peer educator Aleksandar explained to me, 'I think there's a need to work with young women, but there's more need for young men because in our society it's implanted this destructive model of behaviour like, "be a man"'. While one could make a case for not having women as targets, or primary targets, of a program that looks to address men's (potential) violence, where the project becomes one "for youth" and *about* youth empowerment, more broadly, it becomes very difficult to make a case for men's engagement, only.

Further to this, women do not have a very big presence in the running of the project. As PM project manager Bojana notes of PM, 'that's the reason why we keep [a] woman in position

of coordinator, because in all other countries it's only men. And we don't want to see this story is only men's story—like other organisations have only woman story'. The two male peer educators who work with young men in Banja Luka, then, are employed by PM, while the young woman who works on the project, including as a peer educator with young women, does so on a voluntary basis—though, she is remunerated when she takes in-school workshops (Jelena, email communication, 2013). The male employees have also had a variety of opportunities for professional development that the young woman volunteer has not—they have attended conferences in Northern Ireland and a delegation of them got to attend a MenEngage[10] conference in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. In this way, not only are boys presented with further opportunities for their empowerment—when the problem of gender inequality is boys' differential access to power vis-à-vis girls, in the first place—but so too does women's structural inequality with respect to their professional opportunities vis-à-vis men come to be overlooked and even compounded.

All of this also begs another crucial question: does young men's empowerment support the imperative to prevent gender-based violence, the project's main goal and the grounds upon which it attracts funding? It was clear to me, even in the absence of a comprehensive empirical study, that the young men involved with the project that I encountered held much more gender-equitable attitudes than are, say, represented in the BiH IMAGES data and support for violence was completely non-existent. Indeed, violence against women was, for the young men, unequivocally bad. As the project's director suggests of the projects results:

> So key issues around gender inequality—as gender roles roll into household roles as a father or future father, parent, we've seen some positive changes in that. In the violence, we've seen some incremental changes around the intentions and around the attitudes but, still, some challenges around the actual change in behaviours.

[10] MenEngage is an alliance of nongovernmental organisations that seeks to engage men and boys in gender equality programming.

Indeed, a question will always remain around whether a change in attitudes can effect a change in behaviour. While a great deal more could be said about this, the key issue, here, is what the function of *empowerment* becomes in this paradigm. Is, for example, creating opportunities for young men to network and build skills important for imbuing them with gender-equal, non-violence supportive attitudes? While this question may seem glib, the case was put to me that young men only act out violently because they experience violence in their young lives and do not have the emotional intelligence or skills to react otherwise. This, I suggest, relies on an ecological model for understanding violence—a model which emphasises childhood and other experiences without accounting for the specifically gendered nature of men's violence. It is as though, while the perpetrators of violence are gendered through the project's engagement with masculinity, the victims are de-gendered—for YMI, men learn the script of masculine violence, go on to do violence to women and other men, indiscriminately, and need only be empowered to act otherwise in order that this violence be curbed. I would make the case that gender equality-promotion (and gender-based violence prevention) and young men's empowerment are not one and the same thing. Men do not need to be empowered to stop doing violence, or to be prevented from doing violence—they need to be *challenged*, with respect to their attitudes, identities, relations, behaviours and the structural supports of their power and privilege under the existing gender order. The threat, otherwise, is that resources that could be mobilised to address a gross structural inequality go only towards supporting that self-same inequality.

Conclusion

I wish to make a point that may not be clear from the preceding analysis: I deem the engagement and involvement of men—and, indeed, young men—in the prevention of men's violence against women to be crucial. It is crucial because the problem of men's VAW is widespread and endemic, because, in the four decades since the women's movement put the issue on the agenda, very little has changed and because, as Michael Kaufman so fruitfully notes, 'if we do not effectively reach men and boys, many of our efforts will either be thwarted or simply ignored' (2003: 3). I also wish to make the point that very few—far too few—men are actually involved in these efforts and many more need to be encouraged to participate. Though, as I have attempted to demonstrate in this thesis, the involvement of men in men's VAW prevention is not unproblematic. It cannot be enacted in any way deemed pragmatic by well-meaning men—the stakes of this work are far too high and the politics far too delicate for this.

I also wish to make the point that a great deal more research remains to be done in this field. Indeed, I was unable, given time and resource constraints, to seek the reflections of the women's and feminist organisations also working in VAW prevention in BiH—this piece of research would, of course, be extremely important for understanding the critical efficacy of men's VAW prevention involving men. Further, being my first foray into this field, and given the very brief period I was able to spend in BiH, I have left a deal to be said about the local context of Bosnia and the Republika Srpska—indeed, local and other researchers with an interest in the former Yugoslavia could reflect, further, on the key concept of "Balkan masculinity", especially as it is deployed in regional gender equality projects.

Through my research, however, I was able to point to some key issues around men's engagement and involvement in the prevention of men's VAW. In chapter three of this study, I discussed issues relating to the core concept of individual "masculinity". First, I considered how the project's concept of the "new Balkan boy" can be understood as a form of "nesting Orientalism", before turning to consider the project's central "Be a Man" ethic and its emphasis on men's victimhood. I intended that this discussion would help to illuminate why gender-justice-as-masculinity-redefinition can be problematic; fundamentally, if masculinity, which has been and continues to be in a position of dominance vis-à-vis femininity, cannot be de-anchored from manhood, gender inequality—and the problem of men's violence—cannot be meaningfully addressed. In chapter four, I turned to consider the importance of women's organisations, women's leadership and feminist politics in the engaging men movement. Crucially, the feminist analytical concept of gender helps us to understand men and women's differential experiences in gender-ordered society—the men's engagement movement cannot, as it has tended to, abandon these important understandings if it is to meaningfully engage with men's violence. In chapter five, I discussed broader issues of structural inequality as they came to bear on men's engagement projects—issues of structural inequality, including how they are addressed by these projects, but also how they are reproduced by these projects, need to be given much more serious consideration. It is not enough to cite partnering with women's organisations, or to cursorily invite women to participate in "men's projects", in order to have addressed the very real issue of the scarcity of social resources available to address gender justice and men's VAW.

Men's engagement in the prevention of men's VAW, then, is both promising and problematic. In order for primary violence prevention efforts which look to engage young men—and, indeed, all such efforts involving men—to meaningfully address the problem of

men's VAW they must, as I have suggested through my analysis, take much more serious account of the women's movements' concerns and of feminist politics, more broadly. Otherwise, they risk reproducing the same structural inequality that is supportive of men's violence. To this end, I would recommend greater women's participation and women's leadership in these efforts—including more women and feminists, like myself, prepared to engage in research in this field. I also recommend a much more critical reflection upon and inclusion of gender theory in the development and execution of such projects, in order that they are able to strike at the heart of men's power and privilege, which undergird men's violence against women—women's lives, at least, deserve to be taken this seriously.

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