DYNAMICS OF NGOS AND MEDIA COALITION BUILDING FOR POLICY ADVOCACY: CASE STUDY OF INDONESIAN NGOS-MEDIA RELATIONSHIP IN FREEDOM OF INFORMATION BILL CAMPAIGN

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Submitted to

Central European University

Department of Public Policy

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Public Policy

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Budapest, Hungary

2013

[Type text]

Author's Declaration

I, the undersigned, Bunga Manggiasih, hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. To the best of my knowledge this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgement has been made. This thesis contains no material which has been accepted as part of the requirements of any other academic degree or non-degree program, in English or in any other language.

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ABSTRACT

When NGOs want to advocate policy change, the support of mass media is usually crucial. In advocacy for freedom of information (FoI) legislations, the media is generally viewed as the natural ally. However, the relationship dynamics between NGOs and media in FoI advocacies are not necessarily effortless, as both sides have distinct features which may mold the coalition way of work. How does the dynamics of NGOs and media in FoI advocacy shape the coalition behavior? Using case study as the methodology, this thesis probes on such dynamics by looking at how the NGOs-media coalition building influence the Freedom of Information policy advocacy in Indonesia.

This thesis finds that the high expectation from NGOs, combined with lack of understanding of each NGOs' and the mass media's needs and interests, led to disappointments during the eight years of coalition. However, the shared beliefs and change of Koalisi persuasion strategy towards the media made them to survive the rift and push forward the legislation.

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INTRODUCTION

The 21st century saw an explosion of freedom of information (FoI) legislations around the world. No less than 54 countries enacted FoI[1] laws in 2000-2012, a sharp contrast compared with 26 countries in 1990-2000 as well as the decades before[2] (Vleugels 2012). Indonesia became a part of the rapid global expansion of FoI when the Freedom of Public Information Law was passed in 2008.

According to Peled (2012), there are four major reasons for the sweeping recognition of FoI. The first is Political – Democratic justification, as the right to know is considered as a prerequisite for a democratic regime because it boosts active public participation. The second one is Oversight Justification, which emphasizes that FoI leads to transparency, that facilitates effective monitoring of government activities. The third is Instrumental Justification, which views FoI as a necessary condition to apply most civil rights. The fourth is the Proprietary Justification, which stresses that information held by public authorities is citizens' property; therefore the public have the right to access it.

In a democracy, for a successful policy advocacy pushed forward by non-government organizations (NGOs)[3], coalition building with media is commonly seen as one of the key ingredients. This assumption is also attested in advocacy related to freedom of information legislations (Florini 2007).

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[1] The phrase freedom of information is commonly interchangeable with right to know, right to information, and access to information.

[2] Sweden is considered to be the first country to implement FoI in 1766. Finland came as the second in 1951, United States of America in 1966. Four Western Europe countries followed suit in 1968-1978, while the next decade saw six more countries to have the similar legislation (Vleugels 2012).

[3] NGOs here are defined as "formal, independent societal organizations whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or the international level" (Martens 2002: 283). This definition is broader than the one used by Union of International Associations which, albeit commonly used by many scholars, requires NGOs to be international but allows government components in NGOs.

Media plays not only an important role, but is also generally viewed as a natural ally as it relies on reliable information, thus logically they will support the promotion of access to public information (Michener 2010). However, each institution involved has their own agenda, which shapes the dynamics of the coalition and consequently the result of such advocacy.

This is important as policy makers, policy researchers and various stakeholders in policy advocacy need to know how to build the advocacy effectively and how to best overcome challenges in coalition building. Understanding the dynamics of NGOs and media in the advocacy process will contribute to hopefully build better coalitions for better policies in the future. Therefore, understanding how the dynamics of the coalition building shapes the coalition behavior is certainly necessary.

Nevertheless, there is a lack of study focusing on the relationship dynamics of NGOs and media coalition building for policy advocacy, especially in freedom of information legislation in the Southeast Asia region and Indonesia.

The region, albeit often overlooked in the shifting global power balances discourse which touts China and India as the new powerful actors, is not benign nor has little consequence to the future of Asia and the world. Dean (2011) points out that the regional block Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which can be considered as the most successful regional grouping in the world after the European Union, now acts as an important global actor, both politically and economically. As the largest country in the region, population-wise and landmass-wise, Indonesia is the anchor of ASEAN and plays crucial roles in its strategic moves. Labeled by The Economist (2009) as the only fully-functioning democracy in Southeast Asia, Indonesia has the most active civil society groups in the region which have been pusing for people-oriented agenda, including human rights and climate change (Dean 2011).

One such agenda is the policy advocacy done by Indonesian NGOs coalition for Freedom of Information Bill which took eight years, meaning the coalition managed to have enough stamina to survive, unlike in other civil society advocacies. The NGOs formed a coalition named Koalisi Kebebasan Memperoleh Informasi Publik (Koalisi KMIP, Coalition for Freedom of Public Information). In those years, the coalition worked side by side with the mass media. In general, national mass media showed support for the cause, by regularly covering the press conferences of Koalisi KMIP, interviewing and using quotes from Koalisi KMIP activists, giving column space for pro-bill opinions, and even featuring editorials which pushes for the Bill. As Antlöv, Brinkerhoff, and Rapp (2010) put it, the coalition regularly supplied the media with press releases which discussed and analyzed the drafts.

However, the relationship between media and the NGOs coalition was not without problems. Presidential and legislative election in 2004 stalled the campaign for months, mainstream media only started to amplify the freedom of information topic when they wanted to protect their interests, while the fluid, loose organization of the coalition also jeopardized the advocacy. Nevertheless, these dynamics were followed by efforts to maintain the movement and push the agenda forward. Therefore, it serves as an interesting case study to understand the coalition building dynamics.

As mentioned before, there is a gap of scholarly works on the dynamics of NGOs and media coalition building for policy advocacy, especially in freedom of information legislation in the Southeast Asia region and Indonesia. This thesis seek to help to fill the gap.

The thesis may also be used by policy makers and analysts as an input for their policy designs and analysis, particularly for policies which are closely related to the mass media, in Indonesia or other countries which share similar traits and historical trajectories with Indonesia.

METHODOLOGY

This thesis will use case study as the research method. According to Yin (2008), case study is best used as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, where the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. It has the 'how' or 'why' as the research question, involves empirical work, relies on multiple sources of evidence, requires no control of behavioral events, and focuses on contemporary events. Data is gathered from literature review as well as semi-structured interviews with NGOs coalition leaders and managing editors of the top two best-selling Indonesian newspapers, *Kompas* and *Jawa Pos*. The interviews were mosly done in the fieldwork in Jakarta in June 26th-July 11th 2012.

The structure of this thesis is as follows. The first chapter puts forward a theoretical framework of policy advocacy coalition, which focuses on the social movement and the advocacy coalition framework; and of the FoI advocacy. The second chapter lays out the policy advocacy in practice, particularly the relationship of NGOs and media in Freedom of Information legislation advocacy. The third chapter, as the core of the thesis, delves into the dynamics of the NGOs and media coalition building in the Freedom of Information Bill campaign in Indonesia. A conclusion chapter ends the thesis with a set of findings.

CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

Before analyzing the dynamics in policy advocacy coalitions, it is crucial to discuss the theoretical

frameworks which will be used as lenses in this thesis. This chapter converses about coalitions in

policy advocacy as well as the importance of FoI for democracy.

1.1 COALITIONS IN POLICY ADVOCACY

How organized groups influence policy change is one of the main questions of public policy studies

(Mueller et al. 2004). As it involves complex environments in which numerous actors with uneven

power relations interact in particular institutional arrangements (Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen

2009), the topic has attracted scholars to build ample literatures and theories about it.

There have been numerous research about policy advocacy, coalition building, roles of NGOs and

media in policy advocacy, as well as advocacy strategies and their effects. Mintrom and Vergari

(2005) highlight the relationships between advocacy coalition, policy entrepreneurship, and policy

change. Sherraden, Slosar, and Sherraden (2002) write about innovation in collaborative policy

advocacy. Meanwhile, Ritchie (1995) focuses on NGOs policy and its operational coalitions; and

Mueller, Page, and Kuerbis (2004) dwell on media role in policy advocacy in the United States.

It will be beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the concepts and theories thoroughly. Therefore,

what I will do here is to identify the ones which are relevant to the research question, particularly the

social movement theories and advocacy coalition framework.

1.1.1 SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Social movement is distinguished by cases of collective action "with clear conflictual orientations to

specific opponents, conducted in the context of dense inter-organizational networking, by actors

linked by solidarities and shared identities that precede and survive any specific coalitions and

campaigns" (Diani and Bison 2004: 283). Collective action here is commonly understood as a short-run mobilized efforts to address a particular issue to the authorities. Meanwhile, social movements, which can be built upon one or more collective actions, aim for social change and have more universal traits, not just for the interest of few people; therefore the movements are usually sustained in a longer duration of time. The advocacies for FoI legislations can be categorized as a social movement as the actors involved believe it is a needed social change, which will benefit most members of the society, and as any efforts to introduce and change legislations, such initiatives will take a considerably long period of time before reaching the determined goals.

The social movement literature has evolved from initially structuralist in nature, to concentrate on resource mobilization issues and political opportunities, to focus on path dependencies, and later dispersed towards different theoretical directions. According to Ruggiero and Montagna (2008), in the early years, scholars such as Durkheim, Marx, Engels, and Weber laid down the variables and concepts which would be central to social movement studies: conflict, movement, social change, and social injustice. The main questions inquired usually revolved around why people rebel against authorities. The explanation tends to be structuralist, with grievance as the main requirement of social movements. For example, Durkheim argues that conflict is caused by unjust division of labour in society, while Marx puts forward that conflict, or class struggle, is generated by unequal division of power between the owners of means of production and those who only have labour force (Ruggiero and Montagna 2008). The next decades saw scholars trying to focus on resource mobilization, examining how society support movements and what the constraints of such movements are (see Tilly 1973, McCarthy and Zald 1977). While resource mobilization focuses on the internal aspect of the movement, particularly the organizational features, the political process approach highlights external variables such as political and institutional environments (Ruggiero and Montagna 2008). This school of thought sees social movements arise and grow when political

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opportunities emerge or increase; and conversely movements weaken when opportunities decrease and threats increase (McAdam 1982, Tarrow 1996). Later, researchers shift the emphasis on path dependencies, temporality, and the timing of movements; how each movement is not disconnected but related to other movements (Koopmans 2004). Scholars also explore new theoretical directions, from expanding resource mobilization theory with social-psychological notions (Klandermans 1984), to viewing movements as cognitive praxis (Eyerman and Jamison 1991), to analysing emotions as the core part of collective action (Calhoun 2001).

Two main strands of theories in social movement, the resource mobilization and political process, can be situated in the larger domain of the rational choice model, where actors serve their own interests by trying to reach their goals while calculating the potential results (Ruggiero and Montagna 2008, della Porta and Diani 2006). In resource mobilization, social movements are defined as rational, purposeful, and organized action; whereas the political process approach views that political opportunities and institutional arrangements determine the success and failure of social movements. This leaves the ideational part of the social movements, such as the role of beliefs and normative values, unanswered.

Jenkins (1983) bridges that gap through arguing that actors in social movements are not only stimulated by their interests, but also by their internalized values and emotion. It means the outcome of social movements is shaped by organizational resources and institutional arrangements as well as collective solidarity, ideological commitment, and shared identity (Ruggiero and Montagna 2008). According to Jenkins (1983), pre-existing organizations with strong common identities and solid interpersonal networks exclusive to group members provide solidarity and the strong dedication of members, therefore serving as an ideal basis for the operation of social movements. On the contrary, groups with weak identities, few intragroup networks, and strong ties to outsiders are less probable

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to be successful. He also emphasizes the influence of changing cultural values to the outcome of movements, as what happened in the various civil rights movements in the United States of America in the 1960s. Jenkins observes that the middle class participation in those movements was rooted in a cultural value shift from self-concerns to the moral concerns for the predicaments of other members of the society.

The theories regarding policy advocacy as social movements are deeply rooted in sociological traditions. In order to better understand the dynamics of NGOs and media in Freedom of Information Bill in Indonesia, relevant public policy theories must be utilized as well. Advocacy Coalition Framework theory, which from a public policy point of view systematically analyses policy advocacy, is discussed in the next sub-chapter.

1.1.2 ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK

In public policy studies, the role of belief in the policy process is most notably addressed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith in the late 1980s with their Adcocacy Coalition Framework (Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009). It was developed as a response of what they viewed as the limitations of the dominant theory of the day, the stages heuristic, which breaks down the policy process into stages such as agenda setting, policy formulation, and implementation (Cairney 2012). It is considered as one of the most robust theory as it manages to account for enduring debates between advocacy coalitions about value conflicts in different geographical domains and political systems (Sotirov and Memmler 2012). The framweork has also been routinely assessed and revised by prominent figures of the school of thought in 1993, 1998, and 2007 (Cairney 2012). The last revision proposes the following flow diagram, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Advocacy Coalition Framework Flow Diagram

Source: Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen (2009: 123)

According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999: 118-120), the framework is built upon these
assumptions:

(i)   a central role of scientific and technical information in policy processes;

(ii)   a time perspective of 10 years or more to understand policy change;

(iii)   policy subsystems as the primary unit of analysis;

(iv)   a broad set of subsystem actors that not only include more than the traditional iron
triangles' members but also officials from all levels of government, consultants,
scientists, and members of the media; and

(v)   a perspective that policies and programs are best thought of as translations of beliefs.

Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen (2009) claim that the chief contribution of this framework is the

distinction between policy subsystems and the wider political environment. Policy subsystems,

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which are the main unit of analysis, consist of advocacy coalitions (which can be more than two coalitions, albeit simplified as 'Coalition A' and 'Coalition B' in the diagram), each with policy beliefs, resources, and strategies about guidance instruments; policy brokers, and governmental authorities. The actors are bounded by government decisions as well as institutional rules, resource allocations, and appointments. Their actions and interactions influence policy outputs and policy impacts. The policy subsystems are further induced by the broader political environment, which is delineated by relatively stable parameters, external events, long-term coalition opportunity structures, on top of short-term constraints and resources of subsystem actors.

As beliefs are recognized as the causal driver for political behaviour, the framework puts forward a three-tiered model of a belief system of the actors (Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009, Cairney 2012). The first tier is the deep core beliefs, which serve as the underlying personal philosophy of the actors; and are the broadest, most stable, and dominantly normative beliefs among the other beliefs. The second layer is the policy core beliefs, which are related to fundamental policy positions, span the substantive and geographic extent of a policy subsystem, and provide an ideal base to form coalitions as well as to coordinate members activities. The third tier is the secondary beliefs, which are more empirically based, such as the ones related to funding, delivery, the implementation of policy goals, and information gathering; thus making it the easiest to change compared with the other beliefs. Nevertheless, the framework also acknowledges the role of resources in policy advocacy, as shown in the analysis of the policy subsystem.

The framework proposes four paths which enable policy change (Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009). The first alternative is external subsystem events, which shift the policy core characteristics of the subsystems. The second path is policy-oriented learning, when secondary beliefs of the actors change over a long period due to experiences of and new information about policies which are

gained in that particular duration. The third possibility is triggered by internal subsystem events. The

fourth path is through negotiated agreements between two or more coalitions in the subsystem.

Although extensive, the advocacy coalition framework focuses almost entirely on the structure,

content, stability, and evolution of policy belief system of the actors involved; but neglects how

those actors develop and maintain the coalitions. Fenger and Klok (2001) expands the framework by

injecting the notions of interdependencies of the participants in the policy subsystems as the crucial

factor of both the behaviors of actors in interorganizational relations and the outcome of coalitions.

The matrix of belief congruence and interdependency is summed up in Table 1.

Table 1: Coalition Behavior as the Result of Interdependency and Belief Congruence

Interdependency	Beliefs		
	Congruent	*Indifferent*	*Divergent*
Symbiotic	(1) Strong coordination	(2) Coalitions of convenience	(3) Unstable conflict, depolitization, learning
Independent	(4) Weak coordination	(5) No coalition	(6) Weak conflict
Competitive	(7) Coalition with severe collective action problems	(8) Weak conflict	(9) Strong conflict

Source: Fenger and Klok (2001: 164)

Fenger and Klok (2001) explain the terminology as follows:

- Symbiotic interdependency happens when the actions of one actor contribute to the actions or goal achievement of other actors.

- Independent interdependency occurs when each action of the actors will not affect other actors.

- Competitive interdependency comes about when the action of a particular actor interferes with or hinders the ability of other actors to act or to achieve their goals.

- Congruent beliefs ensue when the actors share similar beliefs.

- Indifferent beliefs happen when the actors do not necessarily have to agree or disagree with each other.

- Divergent beliefs occur when the actors have different beliefs.

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The combination of these types of interdependency and belief congruence, according Fenger and Klok (2001), creates these hypotheses:

1. When symbiotic interdependency meets congruent beliefs, the actors in the framework will be in the same coalition and will find it easier to coordinate their activities.

2. When symbiotic interdependency is combined with indifferent beliefs, the actors may form a loose coalition, mainly based on shared interests instead of shared beliefs.

3. When symbiotic interdependency coalesces with divergent beliefs, the result will be hard to be speculated as interdependency will bring actors together but the different beliefs will pull them apart. The actors may be challenged with unstable conflicts, which push them to depoliticize the coalition – by keeping the beliefs but compromising the strategy to enable them to work together – or to learn to adjust their beliefs.

4. When independent interdependency encounters congruent beliefs, there will be a weak coordination as the actors have less need to coordinate.

5. When independent interdependency comes across indifferent beliefs, no coalition will be formed.

6. When independent interdependency meets divergent beliefs, a weak conflict will occur because the actors have less reason to fight.

7. When competitive interdependency is combined with congruent beliefs, similar with when symbiotic interdependency encounters divergent beliefs, it is less clear what to expect, as beliefs bring the actors together but the competitiveness drives them apart. Nevertheless, as the framework assumes that beliefs are the main glue of coalitions, there might be coalitions but the actors will face severe collective action problems.

8. When competitive interdependency coalesces with indifferent beliefs, if any coalition could be formed in the first place, a weak conflict might occur in the coordination of their activities.

9. When competitive interdependency encounters divergent beliefs, a strong conflict is to be expected. The actors will most probably be in different coalitions, opposing each other, as each has different beliefs and types of interdependency.

The advocacy coalition framework, expanded with the notions of interdependency and belief congruence, will be the main lenses used to analyze the relationship dynamics of NGOs and media in FoI Bill campaign. To better understand such dynamics, the next sub-chapter will lay out the importance of FoI laws.

1.2 WHY FoI LEGISLATIONS MATTER

FoI has been hailed more and more as the oxygen of democracy (Mendel 2008). The list of the

effect of proper FoI legislations towards democracy seems to grow longer everyday. For example,

Article 19, an international FoI advocate, in its website lists these consequences once public

information is opened to everyone[4]:

- "It enables people to have informed opinions and to engage in full and open debate,

- ensures governments are scrutinised, thereby becoming more open, transparent and accountable and delivering good governance,

- enables elections to be free and fair by informing the electorate,

- enables journalists and civil society to expose corruption and wrongdoing,

- enables people to access their own personal information, a valuable part of respecting basic human dignity,

- enables people to make effective personal decisions, such as in medical treatment or financial planning, and

- facilitates the effective business practices by creating a culture of bureaucratic openness and providing information that can be useful for enterprise."

Birkinshaw (2006: 177-178) adds more reasons on why freedom of public information is important:

- "Information is used in the public interest and the interests all individuals,
- information is a necessity for accountability,
- information, particularly reliable information, is a prerequisite to establish effectiveness and efficiency of government;
- information is a necessary right of citizenship,
- information is power and its exclusive possession is especially so, both in terms of policy formulation and invasions of personal privacy by government.
- secrecy is a cloak for arbitrariness, inefficiency corruption, and so on,
- FoI reciprocates the trust that people place in government."

In a glance, FoI seems like an utopian solution which may tackle almost every problem in any

country. The above-mentioned claims may need further empirical proofs, although scholars will

agree that FoI functions well as a leverage for other human rights (Darch and Underwood 2010).

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[4] http://www.article19.org/pages/en/freedom-of-information-more.html

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Nevertheless, campaigns for FoI generally meet resistance from the government, as traditionally the state has monopoly over information.This is very much related to the notion that information is power (Birkinshaw 2006), therefore the holders of information are those who have power over the ones who have less knowledge. As a consequence, it is no surprise that the authorities who are used to control information are mostly reluctant to transfer the information to the greater public. However, the FoI advocates may be able to fight the resistance and push forward for a comprehensive FoI legislation. It happens in a lot of countries, including in Indonesia.

The details of the Indonesian case study will be examined after the next chapter, which looks closer into the relationship of NGOs and media in policy advocacy, particularly in Freedom of Information legislation advocacy.

CHAPTER 2: POLICY ADVOCACY IN PRACTICE

Numerous scholars admit that NGOs can influence policies (see, among others, Warleigh 2000, Prakash and Gugerty 2010, and Klugman 2011). Nevertheless, the level of effect differs according to various factors. For example, the success may depend on the issue at hand and the ability of the NGOs to construct necessary alliances (Warleigh 2000), whether they have enough credibility and are capable to show evidence of the particular issue at the right time (Kumar 2012), whether they have the capacity to mobilize public support (Phillips 2006), and whether they can strategically use the mass media to advance their initiatives (Jernigan and Wright 1996). Each factor has different importance and impact, although most are complementary in nature.

2.1 NGOs and Media in Policy Advocacy: An Overview

Policy advocates, be it government officials, legislators, corporations, or civil society organizations such as NGOs; regularly use the mass media as tools to change policies. The media become crucial allies because disseminating information about the policy advocacy will increase the leverage of the advocates (Fox 2001), which may lead to policy change. Even though measuring media effect on audiences is infamously difficult and attracting media attention is not enough to achieve permanent change, Jennigan and Wright (1996) note that abundant studies conclude that the media is capable to shape how the public, including policy makers and the media themselves, rank the importance of particular issues. The roles of media are setting the agenda for what issues shall be discussed, and influencing how these issues, along with their causes and cures, are perceived by audiences (Jennigan and Wright 1996).

One of the challenges of policy advocacy for NGOs is the fact that the media, due to the workflow and habits as well as the influence of the owners or conglomerations, tend to give more space to sources from government officials and the lawmakers, thus supporting the status quo (Jennigan and

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Wright 1996, della Porta and Diani 2006). Furthermore, the media have their own agenda, which may or may not contradict with the agenda of policy advocates. Therefore, NGOs need to strategically use the media to get their attention and to make sure the media tell the stories according to NGOs' objectives.

To utilize media strategically, one of the most essential foundations is by understanding how the media works. Media always need stories, and they prioritize the ones to be featured based on the newsworthiness. As newsmaking is not an activity with scientific methodology (de Semir 1996), each mass media editorial board may have different way to define what is newsworthy and what is not; although journalism text books commonly explain that newsworthiness can be decided based on timeliness (how recent the story is), significance and relevance (of the story to the audiences), prominence of the news sources, the severity of the conflict, how unusual that particular story is, as well as geographical, emotional, and cultural proximity of the story to the audience. Newsworthiness is also strongly influenced and defined by the different biases and motivations of decision makers in the media, which can differ from editors, to business managers, to media owners. For example, for a media which has the tendency to advocate for human rights, the victims will be given more space than the perpetrators; for a media of which the owner is a political party leader, the politicians of his or her party will be counted as having more prominence than politicians from other parties; for a media which is a part of a conglomeration, stories that gloss over the success of companies in the same conglomeration may be prioritized more than success stories of rival corporations.

Furthermore, different media serve different audiences (Jennigan and Wright 1996). As a consequence, NGOs with narrow scope of advocacy may target their campaign to address key constituencies through particular media which serve them. However, this also means that NGOs with broad advocacy scope will have to work harder to attract the attention of more media outlets.

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Jennigan and Wright (1996) suggest several ways to catch media attention. The most important one is to frame issues with elements which emphasize their newsworthiness. NGOs also need to utilize credible spokespeople as focal points in the campaign, making sure they are able to speak eloquently about the issues at hand and are always ready to be contacted by the media. In addition, it is essential for policy advocates to release studies, create events, generate controversy, and demonstrate community support to show both the media and policy makers that the issues advocated are important.

A delicate concern in policy advocacy is confrontation and controversy (Jennigan and Wright 1996). Well-planned and well-timed sensations are powerful to draw media attention. The dilemma is how to get enough sensation through innovative or radical tactics, but without going too far to the extreme forms of action which may trigger a backlash to the advocacy (della Porta and Diani 2006). However, confrontation and controversy are not sufficient to achieve policy change. Moreover, opponents of the policy advocated may try to flame controversy to divide the NGOs coalitions or to create an image of discord in the said coalitions (Jennigan and Wright 1996).

As changing policies is a long-term process, NGOs need to place their media advocacy, which is the approach towards media, in a larger context so they can sustain long-term campaigns and achieve the goals (Jennigan and Wright 1996). By looking at how the local NGOs in the United States of America engaged the media in their campaign to limit tobacco and alcohol in the 1990s, Jennigan and Wright (1996: 314) find that "media advocacy is most successful when linked to a strong community organizing base and a long-term strategic vision, [as the] broader coalitions open the way to bigger policy gains." In other words, when a policy advocacy is supported by solid and large part of the community, instead of run by only several public figures, it will be more likely to attain media coverage in the long run.

To ensure long-term media support, Stead, Hastings and Eadie (2002) emphasize that the media should be constantly engaged in the advocacy. The media ought to be treated as active collaborators, with whom policy advocates construct shared agendas. Policy advocates should also be aware of the feedback and response from the media, which is valuable input for adjusting methods and objectives, if necessary, "in the greater cause of progress towards long-term aims" (Stead, Hastings and Eadie 2002: 362).

So far, we have discussed how NGOs and the media relate to each other in general policy advocacy. The assessment is important to guide the analysis on how the NGOs work with the media in FoI advocacy, as esxamined in the following sub-chapter.

2.2 NGOS AND THE MEDIA IN FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LEGISLATION ADVOCACY

In Freedom of Information (FoI) legislation advocacy, either in promoting adoption of FoI law, monitoring its implementation, or guarding its amendment; the mass media are usually seen as natural allies (Szekely 2007, Michener 2010, Mendel 2011). As media rely their livelihood on information, laws on public disclosure are preferable because these will reduce costs to gather information. Access to information means increasing the reliability of news that leads to a boost of public confidence towards the media (Michener 2010), which maintains or improves media consumption and advertisement in media, thus sustaining the livelihood of the media. FoI campaigns also serve as momentum to push for better press rights and to reform over-restricting laws (Trotti 1999). Furthermore, the media may support FoI advocacy because it is in the public interest (Michener 2010), to enhance transparency and accountability of the authorities while curbing corruption at the same time.

Mendel (2011) argues that an important parameter of successful FoI is the existence of a central NGO or network of NGOs which leads and coordinates civil society efforts, as well as builds media

support for the cause. This rings true in cases such as the Access to Information Programme in Bulgaria, the Open Democracy Advice Centre in South Africa, the Campaign for Freedom of Information in the United Kingdom, and the National Campaign for People's Right to Information in India. In these cases, an NGO or a network of NGOs took the lead and enlisted the media support to reinforce their cause. On the contrary, in countries like Canada and Ireland, where civil society is not unified or strong, the opposite will happen: efforts to initiate positive amendments and to avoid negative amendments of the current FoI legislations failed instead (Mendel 2011).

However, even though the media are key institutional platforms in democratic change, Szekely (2007) notes that their role in FoI advocacy may differ from case to case. For instance, Slovakian press cooperated with the NGOs coalition for FoI Bill, which resulted in a successful adoption of FoI law. In Ukraine, the mass media took a distance and were generally not involved in a similar campaign, while the media in Romania opposed it instead because they were a part of fraudulent information-related activities such as blackmail practices (Szekely 2007).

The press reluctance from supporting FoI advocacy, according to Mendel (2011), may root in two reasons. First, they are afraid that a formal system for providing public information will hinder the informal systems they traditionally rely on to obtain information, as the new system potentially introduces rigidities and delays that they do not currently face. Second, the media fear that with open access, their particular role as providers of information will lose ground, because when everyone can access information freely, the press has next to no function in society.

Meanwhile, Michener (2010) believes the deficit of coverage to be caused by two different factors. The first is a strong control over the media by presidents and their parties, and the second is the centralized media markets with concentrated ownership. These aspects weaken media independence from government, which hinder the press from actively advocating for FoI legislation. Michener

(2010) concludes from his research on FoI in Latin America countries, as the press grow weaker in supporting FoI advocacy, when coupled with strong presidencies (compared with the legislatures), the FoI law itself will be weak. It happened in Argentina, where weak news media coverage provided politicians with miniscule incentive to support more public disclosure; paired with strong consecutive presidents who were able to set up partisan and constitutional powers to hinder a comprehensive information bill to be passed; produced only a weak presidential decree on transparency. Conversely, in Mexico, where president Vicente Fox lacked control over the legislators and the mass media strongly supported reform efforts, a sweeping transparency law was enacted in 2002 (Michener 2010).

The prominent role of NGOs, as promoted by Mendel (2011), indeed played decisive part in the FoI advocacy in Mexico. In October 1999, dozens of different NGOs managed to push the presidential candidates to pledge support to five issues, including the guarantee of public information right (Michener 2010). After Fox was elected in 2000, NGOs, press associations, business organizations and the international community intensified their activity in FoI advocacy. Most notably, according to Michener (2010), their voices were heard because the media provided space for the issue.

Symbiotic relationships between NGOs and media also found evidence in Japan, where 84 NGOs under the umbrella of National Citizen Ombudsmen Liaison Council (NCOLC) join forces to fight corruption by seeking greater transparency in government (Sirker and Cosic 2007). Corruption case of Sendai Mayor Toru Ishii, one of the largest inquiries into government corruption in Japan, triggered concerned lawyers to create NCOLC. They strived to apply Japan's FoI legislation to purge corruption in the government. In doing so, the most powerful partners are the news media, which are able to disseminate information of NCOLC investigation to citizens as well as to scare politicians of public rage from revelations of their misconduct (Sirker and Cosic 2007).

There are at least two different ways in which the media publish FoI issues (Mendel 2011). The mass media can report them the way they do it for other public interest issues, with a neutral tone as a matter of regular current affairs. Or, the media possibly take a more progressive stance by reporting the importance of public right to information.

NGOs which advocate for FoI legislation usually expect the media to do the latter, by explicitly supporting the promotion of FoI law. However, the expectation may or may not come true, as will be discussed in the following chapter, which looks closely at the dynamics of NGOs and the media in FoI Bill campaign in Indonesia.

In summary, although according to Mendel (2011) it is difficult to draw a deterministic causal link between the strong civil society and the result of the advocacy, nevertheless, it is logical to asume that they are related. Furthermore, if the advocacy managed to push for comprehensive and just FoI legislation, it would serve as an enabling environment to enhance media roles in strengthening democratic institutions (Price and Krug 2000).

CHAPTER 3: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION BILL CAMPAIGN: NGOS-MEDIA RELATIONSHIP IN INDONESIA

After discussing the theoretical framework as well as policy advocacy in practice in the previous chapters; this chapter sets to probe into the dynamics of NGOs and media relationship in Freedom of Information (FoI) bill campaign in Indonesia. Before analyzing the case study, I will briefly lay out the Indonesian political-economy context and the mass media landscape. The next sub-chapters give the backrgound of Koalisi KMIP as well as two newspapers in the case study, Kompas and Jawa Pos. Finally, the fifth sub-chapter analyzes the relationship dynamics by putting it into the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the interdependency between NGOs and the media.

3.1 POLITICAL-ECONOMY CONTEXT

Indonesia right after May 1998 was a country of change. The economic crisis which started to sweep Asia in 1997 finally pushed authoritarian president Soeharto to step down after ruling the country for 32 years. Procedural election of three decades, which only allowed three parties to compete and always pronounced the government party Golkar as the winner, was replaced by genuinely free elections. The opening of political restraints let 48 political parties to participate in the 1999 parliamentary poll, which is touted as the first free election after 1955, when Indonesia had the first poll after independence (Hadiz and Robison 2005). Later in 2004, for the first time, the citizens directly elected the president and vice president. After the 1945 Constitution was amended for four times, the power of president was reduced while the parliament and political parties started to play larger role in the politics. The amendments also ordered for decentralization, handing over most power which previously resided in the central authority to the local governments. The civil society found its momentum, and Indonesia saw a dramatic expansion in numbers and roles of civil society organizations in democratizing the country (Aspinall 2004). Meanwhile, suppression of the press

was scrapped as the transitory government introduced the new Press Law that no longer requires the non-electronic mass media to be licensed.

But Indonesia after the 1998 reformation was also ridden with problems. The economic crisis triggered various ethnic conflict and violence, causing more than a thousand casualties by the end of May 1998 (Martinez-Diaz 2006). The crisis also caused public debt to rocket from US$ 55.2 billion in 1996 to US$ 152 billion in 2000, due to the cost of bailing out the banks and restructuring the economy (Feridhanusetyawan 2003). Indonesian currency, rupiah, plunged from around Rp 2,000 per US dollar to around Rp 10,000; forcing prices to escalate and affecting millions of citizens deeper in poverty. However, perhaps the most problematic setback is that "many of the elements that had been nurtured under the authoritarian New Order[5] could survive within the framework of a new, more democratic, regime, albeit through new and more diffuse alliances and vehicles" (Hadiz and Robison 2005). Actors from the old Soeharto regime donned reformist veil and managed to stage the transition to contain the damage and to restrain movement power (Boudreau 2009).

Nevertheless, the collective disgust towards corruption and nepotism, two main features of the Soeharto regime, drove the civil society to constantly demand more transparency and accountability from the government. In response, to cope with public distrust the police force, the attorneys, and the courts; the government in 2002 established the anti-corruption agency Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) which since then has been taking over large corruption cases from those institutions. The government hauled a nationwide bureaucratic reform, starting with Finance Ministry, Supreme Court, and State Audit Board. Yet, it was not enough for the civil society, who initiated the campaign for Freedom of Information (FoI) legislation. Almost simultaneously, the government introduced its plan to push State Secrecy Bill and State Intelligence Bill (Nuraini 2011).

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[5] Soeharto named his regime "New Order", and labelled Soekarno's 22 years in power as the "Old Order".

3.2 NGOS IN INDONESIA

To understand the NGOs scene in Indonesia, it is important to trace its historical trajectories. According to Aspinall (2004), in the first two decades after the 1945 independence, Indonesian civil society mirrors the polarized political sphere, with labour unions, peasant associations, and other professional organizations linked to political parties. This amplified cleavages in society and sociopolitical conflict, which exploded in the anti-communist purge in the last years of Soekarno as the president. Starting in 1966, Soeharto ruled with authoritarian hands, strictly controlling and preventing the civil society to associate itself with politics. The regime loosened its grip in the 1980s, allowing development NGOs to be established as the government need them to help deliver services and to build local capacities (Cheema 2011). The reduced rigidity was also caused by donors agenda at the end of Cold War, who realized democratization became more important and they needed to work it with NGOs (Antlöv, Ibrahim, and van Tuijl 2006). These NGOs grew more assertive in the 1990s, being more critical towards Soeharto and even tried to organize repressed groups such as farmers and industrial labours, despite their power was much limited compared to the 1960s (Aspinall 2004). They became a crucial element in public pressure against Soeharto which emerged in mid 1990s and finally overthrow the regime in 1998 (Cheema 2011).

As the new regime brought back the freedom of expression and association, the civil society expanded swiftly and intensely (Antlöv, Ibrahim, and van Tuijl 2006). These scholars note that currently there are tens-of-thousands of NGOs, although the exact numbers is difficult to pin down as only NGOs that are legal entities obliged to report to the authorities.

The democratization process in Indonesia led to the emergence of discourse on good governance, accountability and transparency of public institutions (Cheema 2011). Consequently, NGOs which monitor state and other political institutions activities surfaced, making almost every aspect of public institutions to be watched closely (Antlöv, Ibrahim, and van Tuijl 2006). Furthermore, NGOs

started to involve themselves more into public policies, by forming coalitions to advocate change towards established policies as well as to promote new policies (Antlöv, Ibrahim, and van Tuijl 2006). These NGOs generate pressure towards particular legislations by enlisting the support of elected officials, using the courts strategically, and partnering with the media (Boudreau 2009).

3.3 MEDIA LANDSCAPE

The mass media has been playing noteworthy political role in Indonesia. In early independence from the Dutch, Indonesian press acted as the agent of change, dedicating the news for the newfound freedom (McCargo 2003). Unfortunately, president Soekarno in 1959 swapped the constitutional democracy with what he labelled "guided democracy", a populist authoritarian regime which keenly banned media showing opposition towards government.

In New Order, uncritical "development journalism" served as agent of stability (McCargo 2003). Soeharto refined the state mechanism to control mass media, regulating the media outlets strictly by a combination of meticulous licensing system, monitoring, and censorship. The government only allowed licensed mass media to be published, and licenses would only be given as long as the media content complied to official guidelines, thus self-censorship was a common practice. Journalists must join the government-approved association, Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (PWI). In 1989-1990, Soeharto hinted of tolerating more political openness, triggering the media to report boldly on military abuses and corruption cases. This was ended hastily when three weekly publications, Tempo, Editor, and DeTik were banned in 1994 for publishing news alleging Soeharto's aide, BJ Habibie, of corruption. The government action backfired as protest from national and international communities poured in. Journalists formed a new journalist organization Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (AJI), which published underground news via internet, a loophole not yet much regulated by the state. During the last weeks of the regime, more critical reporting emerged. The mass media served as agent of change and together with the citizens brought down Soeharto.

The 1998 reform became the turning point, as no media license was required anymore. The business flourished rapidly, driven by capital interest, leading to media oligopoly and high concentration of ownership (Nugroho, Putri, and Laksmi 2012). Now almost all media outlets are controlled by twelve conglomerations. As the media become instruments by which businessmen and politicians transmit interests while gaining profit, they show obvious bias caused by interventions of the owners. Suh intervention may include publishing news that favour particular government and corporate policies.

Meanwhile, community media are in the development stage. Their progress after 1998 is not as fast and as thorough as the commercial, mainstream media because they face problems in competing with the latter (Nugroho, Putri, and Laksmi 2012).

As for media policies, Nugroho, Putri, and Laksmi (2012) view it is closely correlated with the dynamics of media. They consider the government as the regulator cannot manage to synchronize the policies with how fast the media industry environment is changing. As a consequence, the industry is now running loose without firm regulations.

3.4 KOALISI KMIP

Koalisi Kebebasan Memperoleh Informasi Publik (Koalisi KMIP, Coalition for Freedom of Public Information) was initially established as Koalisi untuk Kebebasan Informasi (KUKI, Coalition for Freedom of Information) in November 2000 by 30 NGOs and several prominent individuals (Antlöv, Brinkerhoff, and Rapp 2010). The coalition (henceforth will be addressed as Koalisi) aimed to draft and promote a Freedom of Information legislation, and also to raise public awareness of the importance of freedom of information. According to Agus Sudibyo, Koalisi spokeperson, they

believed Indonesia needed such legislation, because it would enable and strengthen good governance and corruption eradication, as well as to enhance public participation in policy-making[6].

Koalisi managed to secure allies within the parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR), targeting progressive members who showed interest in transparency and anti-corruption. International FoI advocacy organization Article 19 became the technical partner, giving input in the legal drafting and advice in the campaign (Antlöv, Brinkerhoff, and Rapp 2010). Koalisi pooled resources from the members of coalition, and also managed to get funding from foreign donors, particularly Ford Foundation and USAID. The draft was adopted as parliamentary initiative bill, Freedom of Information bill, in 2002. In 2003, Koalisi constructed a coalition statute as an effort to formalize the the coalition. In the next year they added an internet presence by opening an account in the free blogging platform, Blogspot, with the url http://kebebasan-informasi.blogspot.com.

Figure 2: Screenshot of KUKI Blog

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[6] E-mail correspondence, 27 April 2012.

As the national election 2004 drew near, the advocacy efforts came to a halt due to several factors. First of all, politicians who supported the draft were busy campaigning for the election. At the same time, the government showed resistance and Koalisi members were not equally active (Antlöv, Brinkerhoff, and Rapp 2010).

After the election, Koalisi had to work nearly from scratch. They needed to approach the new lawmakers and their staffs, maintain media attention, as well as secure more resources to continue the advocacy. Nevertheless, well-timed policy recommendations and media briefings helped Koalisi to gain new allies in DPR (Antlöv, Brinkerhoff, and Rapp 2010). When the parliament changed the name of the bill to be Freedom of Public Information Bill, Koalisi changed its name accordingly as Coalition for Freedom of Public Information (Koalisi KMIP). As it is joined by more NGOs and developed more solid organizational capacity, in 2007 they also upgraded their website with a better platform and their own domain, www.kebebasaninformasi.org.

Figure 3: **Screenshot of www.kebebasaninformasi.org**

When the government introduced the plan to enact State Secrecy Bill, Koalisi found another momentum as it served as the perfect antagonist for the FoI campaign. In fact, it also strengthened the informal collaboration inside Koalisi (Antlöv, Brinkerhoff, and Rapp 2010). Acting as policy advisors for both the legislatures and the government, Koalisi finally saw its goal achieved when the bill was passed in 2008.

Four activists of Koalisi were interviewed in Jakarta for this thesis. Koalisi spokesperson Agus Sudibyo gave initial information through e-mail on 27 April 2012 and 5 June 2012, and then he was interviewed in Jakarta on 9 July 2012. Mas Achmad Santosa, the founder of Indonesian Center for Environmental Law (ICEL), an NGO concerned with law reform for better, sustainable environment; was interviewed on 27 June 2012. The legal drafter from ICEL, Josi Khatarina, was interviewed on 3 July 2012. Anung Karyadi was interviewed on 8 July 2012. Karyadi was involved in Koalisi through two NGOs, Walhi in 2000-2002 and then Transparency International Indonesia in 2002-2007.

3.5 KOMPAS AND JAWA POS

Jakarta-based Kompas ('compass') is the leading national daily newspaper in Indonesia, a must-read of policy makers and prominent figures (Nugroho, Putri, and Laksmi 2012). It was founded in 1965 by two Catholic journalists, P.K. Ojong and Jakob Oetama, as an initiative of the Catholic Party. Kompas is known for its analytical depth and Oetama's distinct Javanese style of subtle and indirect criticism, while avoiding conflicts with the authorities and limiting news about conflicts (Hills 1994). Its trademark made Kompas endured the anti-communist purge in 1966 after the fall of Soekarno as well as 32 years of Soeharto authoritarianism.

In the beginning, Kompas established numerous newspapers as a strategy to transfer personnel in case the government would ban one of the newspapers. As the business proved to be prosperous,

Kompas founded more companies, both media and non-media, then established a holding company named Kompas-Gramedia Group (Yani 2002). In 2011 the group includes ten TV stations, 12 radio stations, 89 print media, and two online news portals. Outside the media industry, the group has nationwide bookstore chains, hotels and properties, manufacturing plants, event organizer, and university (Nugroho, Putri, and Laksmi 2012).

Oetama, now 81 years old, is now the President Commissioner of the group. He still has significant role in the newsroom and sometimes writes editorials for Kompas, but gave next to no attention to FoI Bill campaign as he is more interested in larger national issues[7].

Meanwhile, Jawa Pos ('Java Post') was founded by The Chung Shen, a former cinema marketing staff, in Surabaya, East Java, in 1949. In 1982 Shen's children did not want to continue the business and sold it to PT Grafiti Pers, publisher weekly news magazine Tempo. Grafiti Pers appointed Dahlan Iskan, who was the chief of Tempo bureau in East Java, to head Jawa Post. Iskan managed to boost sales from 6,000 copies to over 300,000 copies in five years, and in a decade, it was considered one of the best 20 corporations in Indonesia (Ida 2011). Iskan, then established local newspapers and now owns at least 171 print media, 20 television stations, and one online media under Jawa Pos Group as the holding company.

The remarkable number of subsidiaries makes Jawa Post Indonesia's most powerful media group in terms of market penetration scale (Nugroho, Putri, and Laksmi 2012). Besides mass media, the group also has paper mills, printing plants, power plants, and a telecommunication enterprise.

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2009 appointed Iskan as President Director of state-owned electricity company PT Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN); and later as State-owned Enterprises Minister in 2011. Iskan, now 61 years old, so far has stated no desire to be a president,

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[7] Interview with Budiman Tanuredjo, 27 June 2012.

although his quick action attracted popular attention, and he has been hailed as a candidate for the next presidential election in 2014 (Aritonang 2012).

According to Steele (2011), Iskan is more interested in profit than idealism in news-making. Media outlets in Jawa Pos group hardly criticize corporations connected advertisers and shareholders, and tend to be in favour of Iskan's policies as leader of PT PLN and later as minister. Similar with Oetama, Iskan has no more position in Jawa Pos editorial board but regularly writes a column. Although the editors said Iskan does not interfere the editorial decisions, he still contacts them when he found inaccurate and unbalanced news[8].

Kompas and Jawa Pos has slightly different news-making mechanism[9]. Kompas editors meet twice daily, at 9.30 am and 4 pm. Morning meetings aim to evaluate the edition of the day and to plan news for the day after. Editors then relayed the decisions to reporters. Afternoon meetings intend to budget news gathered so far, to decide what will be headlines, and to arrange the possible news in every page. Weekly editorial meetings are held for evaluation of the week's performance and to outline the next week's editions. Meanwhile, in Jawa Pos, the sequence starts earlier at afternoon meetings in Surabaya at 5 pm, to list news gathered as well as to prepare the ones for the next day. The editors then passed the decisions to reporters. Morning meetings in the next day evaluate that day's edition and update the news gathering plan, which must be delivered by the reporters.

The two newspapers also has different policies in managing news and advertisements. Kompas maintains that advertisers should not interfere at all to news content, although the marketing department is constantly updated of the editorial plan in order to find advertisers and sponsors accordingly. Jawa Pos from time to time link its news with advertisements, a practice they call "buy

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[8] Interview with Taufik Lamade (3 July 2012) and Imam Syafii (7 July 2012)
[9] Interview with Budiman Tanuredjo (27 June 2012), Paulus Tri Agung Kristanto (4 July 2012), Taufik Lamade (3 July 2012), and Imam Syafii (7 July 2012)

one get one", where advertisers will be given a certain amount of news coverage in particular rubric, based on the agreement.

Two editors of each newspapers who controlled news in the national desk in 2000-2008, the duration of FoI Bill campaign, were interviewed for this thesis. Two editors from Kompas, Budiman Tanuredjo (27 June 2012) and Paulus Tri Agung Kristanto (4 July 2012), were interviewed in Jakarta, on 27 June 2012 and 4 July 2012, respectively. Two editors of Jawa Pos, Taufik Lamade (3 July 2012) and Imam Syafii (7 July 2012), were interviewed through telephone because they resided in Surabaya.

3.6 BUILDING COALITION: KOALISI KMIP AND THE MASS MEDIA

As mentioned in the first chapter, the policy subsystem is influenced by relatively stable parameters, external events, long-term coalition opportunity structures, as well as short-term constraints and resources of subsystem actors (Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009). Before focusing at Koalisi and the media as a part of policy subsystem, I will assess the noteworthy factors which influenced the case of FoI bill campaign in Indonesia.

As relatively stable parameters, the basic attributes of FoI issue as booster of transparency and accountability made it easier to gain popular approval. In case of basic attributes of resources, the policy actors had different characteristic in funding and human resources. The government had relatively the most stable funding and personnel, the legislatures had stable funding but the personnel change every five years due to election, while the NGOs by nature had to be capable in competition of fundraising and the personnel turnover was relatively high as Indonesians in general viewed NGOs as insecure workfield, thus prefering work in stable places such as the government and large corporations. As for fundamental socioculture values and social structure, the government seemed to cling to the idea that secrecy worked better to protect national interests, while the civil society demanded for access to public information due to the trauma of corruption which had been

enabled by the secrecy notions. The basic constitutional structure helped FoI bill campaign, because after four amendments after 1998, the 1945 Constitution includes and guarantees the freedom of information.

Several external events also played roles in the FoI bill campaign. The 1998 reformation changed particular socio-economic conditions, especially for the media corporations, which could develop their business relatively free from government intervention (Nugroho, Putri, and Laksmi 2012). Public opinion was changed from fearfully obeying the government due to state repression to actively demanding for more rights.The absence of state pressures and the growing power of legislatures are two main changes in the systemic governing of Indonesia. The government plan to introduce State Secrecy Bill served as policy decision which also influenced the FoI Bill campaign process.

As for long-term coalition opportunity structures, no overlapping societal cleavages seemed to play role because such cleavages have not been clear since the Old Order, when the left and right parties were more clearly delineated, translated into competing civil society organizations (McCargo 2003). The current condition is a legacy of Soeharto's New Order, which swayed all political parties to the central as both leftist and rightist ideologies were condemned. The second factor, degree of consensus needed for major policy change, was not very high as the parliament and the government at the end managed to reach consensus and pass the bill. However, it needed considerable time to negotiate four main topics: the title, definitions of public institutions, the Information Commission, and criminal sanctions for offenders (Asriani 2008). The proposals recommended by the parliament and the government as well as the compromise at the end are as follow:

Table 2: **Proposals of Parliament and Government, and the Consensus**

Topic	Parliament Proposals	Government Proposals	Consensus
Legislation title	Freedom of Public Information	Right of Citizens to Obtain Information	Public Information Disclosure
Definition of public bodies	Including state-owned enterprises	Excluding state-owned enterprises	Including state-owned enterprises as well as all other state-funded institutions such as political parties and NGOs
Information Commission	An independent commission is needed to effectively implement the legislation	The existing Ombudsman can do the tasks	An independent commision will be set up, but government representations will sit as members. Members will have to gone through fit and proper test in the parliament
Criminal sanction for offenders	Public information should be used freely by public, by definition it cannot be criminalized	If information providers could be punished for misdeeds, the users who abused information should be punished as well	People who use public information against the law will be punished

Source: Asriani (2008)

The policy subsystem also faced short-term constraints and resources. The national legislative and presidential elections in 2004 stalled the FoI advocacy, and tension over distribution of funds was raised because members of Koalisi did not show the same level of coordination and efforts (Antlöv, Brinkerhoff, and Rapp 2010).

In the policy subsystem, at least two different coalitions can be identified. The first was the proponents of FoI bill, namely the Koalisi KMIP, progressive legislators, and the mass media. The second was the opponents of the bill, which included the government officials and conservative lawmakers. For the sake of brevity, the first coalition will be referred as "FoI Coalition", and the second one as "Secrecy Coalition". Put in the Advocacy Coalition Framework, the above-mentioned factors can be summed up in the following diagram:

34

Relatively Stable Parameters

1. Basic attributes of the problem: FoI issue as booster of transparency and accountability made it easier to gain popular approval.

2. Basic distribution of resources: policy actors had different characteristic in funding and human resources

3. Fundamental sociocultural values and social structure: government clinged to secrecy notions, civil society demanded for access to public information to eradicate corruption

4. Basic constitutional structure: FoI is guaranteed by 1945 Constitution

Long-Term Coalition Opportunity Structures

1. Overlapping societal cleavages: non-existent

2. Degree of consensus needed for major policy change: not high, but took considerable amount of time

Policy Subsystem

FoI Coalition   Policy brokers   Secrecy Coalition

Strategy   Strategy

Decisions by governmental authorities

Institutional rules, resource allocations, and appointments

Policy outputs

Policy inputs

External Events

1. Change in socio-economic conditions: media corporations developed business relatively free from government intervention

2. Changes in public opinion: changed from fearfully obeying the government to actively demanding for more rights

3. Changes in systemic governing coalition: the absence of state pressures and the growing power of legislatures

4. Policy decisions: plan to introduce State Secrecy Bill the absence of state pressures and the growing power of legislatures

Short-Term Constraints and Resources

1. National elections 2004

2. Tensions over funding

Figure 4: FoI Bill Campaign in Advocacy Coalition Framework

Now let us focus on the policy subsystem, especially on the relationship between Koallisi KMIP and the mass media in the FoI coalition. In the interviews, both Koalisi activists and editors of Kompas and Jawa Pos proclaimed their beliefs on the importance of FoI Bill for Indonesia and the media.

"FoI is at the heart of democracy, especially when we are talking about good governance. To further develop Indonesia, we need democracy, and access to public information is one of its foundations." (Santosa)

"It will leverage other human rights. For example, it is difficult to attain the right to live healthily if we don't have enough information. FoI can improve legislation because FoI will boost public participation. It will also minimize corruption." (Khatarina)

"Access to information is very important, the underlying spirit is to get more transparency, which is very much needed (by Indonesia). With transparency, the tendency to abuse the power can be reduced. And it goes along with our work in media." (Tanuredjo)

"There were cases when we needed to particular information but the government refused to disclose it, claiming the information as state secrets. We hoped the FoI bill would ease our news coverage and investigation by classifying the public information more clearly and by setting the mechanism to procure these information." (Syafii)

Koalisi used several strategies to get media support. According to Sudibyo, Koalisi KMIP regularly visited editorial offices of prominent mass media, held press conferences, sent press releases to reporters, and wrote opinion articles to be published in the media. However, there was no agreement on a common agenda setting.

"There are many advocacy coalitions doing roadshows to the media, 'selling' their ideas. We can decide to 'buy' it or not. We may buy the ideas if they matched our ideas and points of views." (Tanuredjo)

Koalisi highly expected the media to be automatically supportive toward the advocacy. Indeed, in the visits to the media, the editors repeatedly asserted that what Koalisi advocated was in line with the positions of the media, thus they would support the campaign. Nevertheless, Koalisi saw that the support was inconsistent as the media tended to be passive.

"The media should be internal partners of the advocacy, but evidently we had to lobby them because they placed themselves as spectators. Instead of internalizing the issue in the newsmaking, they became outsiders

instead.This is ironic because in other FoI advocacy, media and lawyers are the ones who actively engage in the process." (Sudibyo)

Editors refuted the view that the media did not support the advocacy sufficiently. The problem was the workflow of media could not permit follow-up news if there were no significant development in the policy process.

> *"We keep running the news, we even made special reports on FoI, but of course not everyday. Perhaps they (Koalisi KMIP) wanted us to feature the issue everyday, but we had to feature it as it only if there had been considerable development." (Lamade)*

Kompas editor Kristanto added, perhaps the support also ceased because the advocacy took a very long time, thus eroding the stamina of the supporters as well as giving an air of despair.

Sudibyo views the lack of support as an effect of the tendency of Indonesian mass media to quickly switch from one topic to another, and to focus on conflicts and controversies. The media has not been savvy enough, or simply are not concerned, to sort which topic should be featured to further improve democracy. In addition, Karyadi notices that the mass media corporations were more worried about legislation which would directly influence their livelihood. For example, the Broadcasting Bill was frequently featured as most newspapers were part of conglomerations which includes television stations as their subsidiaries.

Seeing the lack of endorsement from the media, Koalisi adjusted their media strategy.

> *"We had to link FoI to controversial issues, such as corruption, state secrets, and environmental damage. If FoI topic was discussed alone, it would not be sexy enough to be featured by the media." (Sudibyo)*

> *"We tried to not only approach the editors, but also the reporters because they were the ones who wrote the news. We took note of the mass media preference in publishing opinion articles. We contacted and contracted particular activists and scholars to write opinion articles which supported the advocacy and sent it to the mass media which frequently featured their articles." (Karyadi)*

The media took the bait and featured FoI more, albeit constantly linked to other issues which were considered more appealing for the readers. Furthermore, Kompas and Jawa Pos used FoI issue to

back the news about the refusal of national televisions to the Broadcasting Bill, which would require them to give up air frequencies to local television stations.

Nevertheless, particularly during the last year of the advocacy, the media gave more attention for the cause. The media helped Koalisi KMIP to provide the final push for the lawmakers to pass the bill, although Koalisi activists interviewed for this thesis insist that had the media dedicated more support, the policy advocacy might have been faster and better.

If we examined the coalition behavior closer with the interdependency and belief congruence combination as formulated by Fenger and Klok (2001), there would be several noteworthy lessons from the dynamics of NGOs and media in FoI bill campaign in Indonesia. Initially, Koalisi and the media seemed to have congruent beliefs and symbiotic interdependency as they affirmed similar beliefs and considered their coordination as mutually symbiotic. Therefore, the combination should have produced a strong coordination. However, due to their internal and external factors of the media as wellas internal and external factors of the policy subsystem, the media then swayed their beliefs and interdependency intermittently. At times the media put their eyes for profit above the belief that FoI legislation was direly needed by the public and the media. This change in belief shifted the coalition to be one of convenience, as the media only coordinated with Koalisi KMIP when they could take advantage out of it. At other times, Koalisi KMIP seemed to be more dependent to the media than the other way around. The lack of symbiotic interdependency shifted the coordination to be a weak one, hence unable to boost the advocacy as efficient as Koalisi wanted. Nonetheless, as Koalisi KMIP adjusted the approach toward the media, they managed to strengthen the coalition and made it more effective in the advocacy.

Conclusion

The campaign for FoI Bill in Indonesia had gone through highs and lows during the eight years of advocacy. Along the lines of Advocacy Coalition Framework proposed by Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen (2009), external events, long-term opportunity structures, short-term constraints and resources, as well as several relatively stable parameters influenced the relationship dynamics of Koalisi KMIP and the mass media as a part of the policy subsystem. Particular combinations of belief congruence and interdependencies further shaped the coalition dynamics.

In the early years of advocacy, Koalisi and the media had similar beliefs and symbiotic interdependency, promising a strong coordination as the result behavior. However, the internal and external factors of the media combined with the internal and external factors of the policy subsystem shifted the media's beliefs and interdependency from time to time. This changed the coalition behavior toward coalition of convenience and weak coordination. Nevertheless, as Koalis KMIP adjusted their media advocacy, the coalition could be strengthened and finally the FoI Bill was passed as a law.

In other words, the high expectation from the NGOs, combined with lack of understanding of each others' needs and interests, led to disappointments during the years of coalition. Nonetheless, at the last year of coordination, the shared beliefs and change of Koalisi persuasion strategy toward the media made them to survive the rift and push forward the legislation.

As we reached the conclusion, this thesis hopefully fills the void in research in FoI legislation advocacy, particularly in Indonesia, as mentioned in the first chapter. Naturally, due to its limitations, this thesis may not provide a finale statement which can be used to generalize the FoI campaign dynamics in other geographical or temporal sphere. Yet, this may shed some insights on

how the dynamics of NGOs coalition and the media shaped the coalition behaviour in media-related

policy advocacy, at least in Indonesia.

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