

YOUNG PEOPLE AS VOICES NOT BEING HEARD

CONTEXT INFLUENCE ON YOUNG PEOPLE'S POLITICAL (NON-)PARTICIPATION

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the impact of the politico-economic context on young people's political participation. It is well known that young people do not participate in politics and therefore are left without being heard by their governments. But it is unknown why in some countries young people participate more than in the others and what induces the differences in participation.

This thesis confirms the differences by conducting a logistic regression on twenty two European countries. Further on, this thesis has an aim to investigate possible influencing factor on the differences in young people's political participation among countries, and conceptualizes the possible context influence around young people's *from school to work* transition period of life. Countries' welfare state institutions intervene in this period by regulating education-labor systems linkage and therefore integrate young people into society in larger or lower extent. In order to assess the influence of context on young people's participation, one-way ANOVA and linear regression are used. However, the findings suggest that one cannot relate the context directly with the young people's likelihood of voting.

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INTRODUCTION

Underlying assumption of a meaningful democracy is that “people’s voices have to be loud and clear” (Verba et al., 1995, 1) in order to hold government accountable and responsive. However, some voices are not so loud and the government cannot hear them and respond to their needs. These are the voices of underprivileged citizens: poorly educated citizens, low-income citizens, young people, and to some extent, females (see Verba et al. 1995, Gallego 2007, 2009).

Although there is general trend in turnout decline (Franklin 2004), young people are a main part of that negative trend, so they are my main concern. Many studies have shown that young citizens are least likely to vote among all underprivileged social groups (Franklin 2004, Gallego 2007, Gallego 2009, Pultzer 2002, Bousbah 2012). IARD European Report on Youth summarizes the general trend in the political participation of young people as declining and becoming a major youth problem in most countries of Europe (IARD, 2001, 17).

This concern refers to political participation in traditional political processes such as voting, membership of political parties and representation in decision-making bodies. The IARD Report finds more satisfied results when it comes to new forms of political participation, such as youth councils (2001, 16). However, conventional forms, especially voting, are still understood as the main device to social integration and democratic citizenship. Therefore, the European Commission Youth Report has the same message as the IARD Report: “Active citizenship of young people, as the “political participation and participation in associational life are key components of the future of European Union. It is also a political priority at the European level” (EU Youth Report, 2009, 42). The Commission Report emphasizes that there is no general improvement in the results of efforts in increasing political participation of young people,

especially when it comes to conventional forms of it (2009). So the more general question guiding this thesis is simply: *Why do young people not engage in politics in order to be heard?*

Studies that tried to answer the above question were mainly concerned with particular individual characteristics of young people, such as no interest in politics, low level of social capital, low level of resources and stakes due to their life-cycle position, not being politically knowledgeable (Quintelier 2007, Fieldhouse et al. 2007, O'Thoole et al. 2003, Pultzer 2002, Franklin 2004, to some extent Verba et al. 1995). The conclusion of all these studies is that young people lack the mentioned features. However, there are differences among countries as emphasized by European reports on youth (IARD 2001, 2009), meaning that young people politically participate more in some countries than in the others.

Studies that concentrate on life-cycle and generational effects on voting intention draw the conclusion that these affect young people's likelihood of voting, but there is a difference in their political participation across countries (Gallego, 2009). Therefore, my research interest comes exactly at this point. Scholars can agree that certain individual level determinants affect young people's (non-)engagement in politics, but they did not offer an answer to why there are differences between countries. This suggests that certain features of politico-economic context, in which young people live and act, also affects the level of their political participation. Thus, my main research question is: **If there are differences between countries in the level of young people's political participation, whether or not these differences can be attributed to the countries' broader politico-economic context?**

'Broader politico-economic context' is not defined in the research question because this is one of the aims of the thesis. There have not been many attempts to do that (among all see Fieldhouse et al., Boubasch 2012, Pultzer 2008), and the authors mentioned did not make any considerable

effort to try to define the context that have the most influence on young people. The exception is Walther (2006), who begins with the concept of ‘transition period’ in order to develop typology of the relevant context. The concept refers to the period in a young person’s life that begins with leaving a formal education and ends with finding the first stable job. Moreover, the state intervenes in this period in the way that whether the transition period will go smoothly or not, depends on the politico-social structures of a certain country. The structures are understood as ones of the welfare state regime, and Walther based his transition regimes typology on the welfare regimes typology developed by Gallie and Paugnam (2001).

The four transition regimes identified are: (1) universalistic (Sweden), which is regarded as being the most facilitating one for young people’s transition period; (2) employed-centered (Germany), which is in this regard close to the universalistic regime, (3) liberal transition regime (UK), which is doing less for its young citizens, and (4) sub-protective regime (Spain), which can be regarded as the unsuccessful in facilitating the transition period. These are the identified transition regimes, but Walther does not provide any specific criteria on which he based his typology nor the possible measures on which regimes can be compared. Therefore, the thesis aims to conceptualize the dimensions on which each regime can be compared and later on empirically measured in order to answer the research question.

The two transition regimes dimensions are: welfare regime itself (based on Walther 2006 and Gallie and Puagnam 2001) and education-labor systems linkage (based on Hannan et al. 1997). The first one is taken because of the general institutional structures provided by the country, and the latter one because it captures the meaning and evaluation of the ‘transition period’ concept. The dimensions are later operationalized and measured through the level of de-commodification and stratification (Esping-Andersen, 1990) for the first one, and through the relationship between

education's outputs and labor market receiving or not receiving the same outputs (see Hanna et al. 1997) for the second.

With respect to the welfare regime and education-labor systems linkage dimensions, the four transition regime types are compared in order to set the expectation about how each can influence the political participation of young people. The underlying assumption behind the possible influence is Marshall's conception of citizenship (1950), which indicates that people can exercise their civil and political rights only if they are provided with minimum standard of living by the social rights. So my expectations are as following. I expect that the turnout inequality between young and the rest will be the smallest in the universalistic regime since this transition regime can be considered as least problematic in facilitating the transition period. On the contrary, I expect the sub-protective to have the biggest difference in political participation between young people and the rest. The employed-centered regime and the liberal transition regime are somewhere in between, with greater inequality expected in the latter one, because its welfare regime and education-labor system linkage features are not as facilitating as in the employed-centered regime.

In order to answer the research question and test the expectations, the empirical analysis is conducted in two parts. The first one has an aim to investigate the turnout inequality between young people (18-29) and the rest (29 and above) by conducting a logistic regression across European countries, which are my scope since most of the transition regime literature refers only to Europe. This should answer the first research question: Are there any differences between countries when it comes to the political equality of young people? Thus, political equality is operationalized through participatory equality, which is reduced only to voting. The second analysis has an aim to answer the second research question: Can the differences be attributed to

the context? To be able to do that, one-way ANOVA and linear regression are used and context variables used are operationalized along the two mentioned dimensions.

The thesis will proceed as following. First chapter deals with young people's non-participation in a broader field of political equality, and with the reasons for young people's political apathy of. The reasons are divided into two groups: individual and context-level ones. The second chapter introduces and explains the concepts of 'transition period' and 'transition regime', on which the conceptualization of the four transition regime types is done in the third chapter. Empirical analysis is conducted in the last chapter, which also deals with the discussion of the findings.

1 POLITICAL EQUALITY AND YOUNG PEOPLE: WHY DO THEY NOT VOTE?

In this Chapter I will firstly embed my research interest in the major field of political equality studies. Then, individual-level determinants, which are considered to influence young people's readiness to vote, will be briefly described. Research to date has tended to focus on these determinants rather than context-level ones, but so far has not been successful in answering the following question: *If young people do not vote in general, why are there still differences between the countries?* In order to investigate this question, I will examine context-level determinants literature.

1.1 *Young people as voices that are not heard*

In his well-known article, Arend Lijphart states that political equality and political participation are the basic democratic ideals (Lijphart, 1997, 1). This notion dominates the seminal work of Verba et al. (1995), in which the basic assumption is that those who are excluded from participation will be unable to express their own interests, and therefore will not be heard by the government (10, 1995). Furthermore, elections can be considered as the main device for achieving the goals of political equality in democracies, because of their simple mechanism: one person, one vote (Verba et al., 1995, 129). According to the authors, political equality is often defined in terms of voting because each vote has an equalizing weight and easily enables citizens to be heard (Verba et al. 1995, 12). It seems very simple, those who vote are going to be heard, yet some social groups, such as young people, are constantly not voting. As Verba et al. emphasize, 'the propensity to take part is not randomly distributed across relevant political categories' (1995, 11).

This situation implies that *loud voices* send a different message to public officials and government than messages of non-participants would (Verba et al. 1995, 11). This argument is similar to one Lutz makes, which states that de jure equal participation is mostly guaranteed in democratic countries, but de facto opportunities to participate are denoted by social and demographic characteristics of citizens (Lutz, 2006, 49). Along this line of argumentation, Lijphart emphasizes that inequality of influence is not randomly distributed but systematically biased in favor of privileged citizens (1997, 1). As such, he suggests the introduction of compulsory voting since elections can be considered as the main device to enhance political equality (1997, 2). The logic is very simple: by increasing the turnout, the biased influence will be decreased.

However, the picture of overcoming political inequalities is not very optimistic, since only few countries have introduced compulsory voting (e.g. Belgium, Australia). If one adds Gallego's summary conclusion of several studies (Blais 2002, Blais 2006, Franklin 2004, Gray and Caul 2000, Wattenberg 2002), which states that there is a general trend towards a reduction in turnout rates (Gallego, 2008, 25), the picture becomes even less optimistic.

But what is the most important for my research interest is that she also draws attention to the findings of Franklin (2004) affirming that the biggest part of decline in turnout can be attributed to young citizens. On the basis of previous studies, Quintelier comes to the very same conclusion and states that young people are the least likely to vote; youth membership of political parties is dropping; young people are less concerned with politics, less politically knowledgeable, do not participate in social or political activities, and they are more apathetic (2007). Gallego has come to the same point while investigating age among all other inequalities. Thus, age has the most

important impact on electoral turnout, meaning that young people vote substantially less than the rest (2007, 7).

So what might be the possible reasons for some people participating politically, and others not? Until now, the literature has affirmed two main reasons for it. The first one concerns individual-level attributes of young people, such as their attitudes, interests, knowledge about politics, etc. The other one deals with politico-economic and institutional features of context in which young people act and the way in which that context influences their readiness to participate. However, Verba et al.'s explanation of why some people participate and others do not is a starting point for many authors who deal with political equality.

1.2 Individual-level determinants of not being heard

Verba et al. provide three basic reasons why people do not participate: because they lack resources, because they lack interests or because they are outside of recruitment networks (1995, 271). But the main emphasis is on the resources that people possess. Therefore, one who has time, money and civic skills has a greater probability to engage in politics (1995, 271). Bousbah considers resources as the most relevant determinant for young people's political participation (2012, 4) that goes in a direction of Franklin (2004) and Plutzer's (2002), emphasis on young citizens having less resources than others because of their life-cycle position. This reason is also mentioned by Quintelier in her literature overview, in which she provides the list of the main reasons for young people's non-participation.

According to her, young people, due to their life-cycle position, still do not have stable residence, household, children, so they do not have high stakes in politics (Quintelier, 2007, 166). Further on, she emphasizes that young people might value new forms of participation

(protesting, demonstrating, social movements) more and simply do not practice the old forms such as party membership or even voting. This corresponds to O'Thoole et al.'s view that when it comes to young people, broader definition of political participation has to be taken because if we only look at the old forms, we might conclude that young people are apathetic even if this is not true (2003, 47). Going back to Quintelier's overview, the third reason for young people's non-participation is simply their political attitudes, because it is often stated that they have less interest in politics, more negative attitudes, and also less trust in the political process (2007, 166).

Plutzer finds that the most important reason of young people's non-participation is that they do not acquire a habit of voting (2002). According to him, when young citizens become eligible to vote, socioeconomic status and political resources (in terms of Verba et al.' civic skills and interest) of their parents/family will determine their readiness to vote (2002, 54). So one whose parents have enough resources in terms of the living standard and are keen on political topics, will create the habit of voting faster when compared to those whose family's standards and interest in politics are lower. But what is the most important in Plutzer argument is that the resources of young people matter less if they acquire the habit earlier in their life, while the young person is still under family influence (2002, 54). This means that even if a young person does not have enough resources in terms of Verba et al.'s (1995) argument, they would more likely to vote if they created a habit of voting.

Plutzer's argument became very influential in the studies that deal with the political participation of young people, and in this regard I find it very plausible. His arguments will be included in my analysis in the proceeding chapters in terms of controlling the individual-level determinants of

voting. Thus, the level of education and household income will serve as resources that young person possess in the early stages of their political life.

1.3 Context related determinants of not being heard

The resources that individual's possess have been found as a decisive feature of political engagement by many authors (among all see Verba et al. 1995). However, resources might be affected by the context in which they are distributed. The most commonly mentioned are the general state of macroeconomy, generosity of welfare policies, labor market characteristics and electoral and political institutions. One state can provide more social security to their citizens than the other, as well as lower the cost of voting by having a certain institutional framework (summarized by Bousbah 2012). Therefore, depending on which country young people live in, their readiness to vote will vary.

Speaking more generally, Radclif argues that the state of macroeconomic conditions may influence turnout in two possible ways. First is that economic crisis can encourage people to vote, in the way that they can be more motivated to vote in order to enhance their economic position. Second possibility is that a sour economy may discourage people from entering political life, simply because people might be preoccupied with dealing with their own personal situation (1992, 444). He finds that an economic crisis affects participation to a lesser extent when social protection of the state high (1992).

Moreover, Gallego mentions that general economic changes, deregulation of the labor market and decrease in power of the trade unions have led to rapidly growing unemployment and uncertainty toward the future (2007, 3). The extent of labor market regulation was the main explanatory force for the probability of unprivileged citizens to vote in Schneider and Makszin

research on gender and education as inequality sources. The rationale is pretty simple; when labor market is highly regulated, resources will be distributed more equally among different social groups. They confirm this argument in their research by finding out that labor market regulation positively affects political participation of low educated citizens and females (Schneider and Makszin, 2010/ 2011).

Context related determinants of young people's political participation have not received much of attention when compared to education, income and gender. This cannot be considered justified because, as previously mentioned, young citizens, among all unprivileged social groups, are least likely to vote. So context specificities probably influence young people as well as the other unprivileged groups, but there has been little discussion on these among scholars.

However, several attempts have been made to deal with context specificities concerning young people specifically. One of those attempts is Fieldhouse et al.'s, in which main context feature is the overall country participation and the perception of the cost of voting by young citizens (2007, 818). But still, their main concern stays at individual-level determinants, such as being interested in politics. Bousbah went further and tried to explain young people participation by the context of electoral institutions and the extent of labor market regulation (2012). In her research, she uses Schneider and Makszin measures for labor market regulation and comes to conclusion that it affects young people's probability of voting (Bousbah, 2012). Schneider and Makszin developed them for investigating gender and education based political inequality (2010 and 2011), and Bousbah did not provide any specific reasons why these determinates might be of the same relevance for young people. She did not take into account Esping-Andersen's argument that unemployment benefits, wage settings, social expenditure and further similar measures affect

young people's well-being only indirectly (1990). But more discussion on this will be presented in the proceeding chapters.

Pacheco and Plutzer deal with context specificities concerning young people only that they examine the impact of social and economic hardship on young people's political participation (2008). They take Piven and Colward's general argument of civic/political cycle of poverty as a starting point. Their argument states that when poor citizens are demobilized, welfare state expenditures and social security provided by the state will not reflect their interest. Pacheco and Plutzer apply their argument on young people's political participation and claim that inequality and economic hardship will induce low turnout by disadvantaged (here young people) what will lead to poorly founded welfare state policies. This will again lead to inequality and economic hardship of the parties affected (2008, 571-574). Their argument seems plausible because it demonstrates that the disadvantaged by not voting still remain disadvantaged.

Along Pacheco and Plutzer's argument, the European Commission Document on Youth states that young people are more exposed to social exclusion and poverty than other social groups (2009). It is reported that 20 % of young people aged 18-24 are regarded as being in risk of poverty, and young people aged 24-30 face an even higher risk of poverty because they are no longer supported by their families and their integration to the labor market is still in an early stage (Commission Document on Youth, 2009, 40). Moreover, the Document emphasizes the extended periods of transition into the labor market that young people experience. In a number of countries, the age of entry onto the labor market has increased between 2000 and 2007 (especially in Greece, Italy, Romania and Slovakia). The positive trend of reducing transition period to labor market was only noted in Austria (2009, 42).

Despite the fact that Pacheco and Plutzer's argument captures the *geist* of how politico-economic context can influence young people's political participation, especially referring to the economic hardship, further in the article they distinguish macroeconomic influences from those related to socioeconomic status of individuals, which is a consequence of the social environment of a young person. Social environment is mainly operationalized and measured as having a politicized family or not, and through school environment features. Socioeconomic status is observed through individual-level information (whether or not the crime is committed, income, family origin) (Paecho and Plutzer, 2008). Therefore, they do not use any kind of country-level determinants that might affect young people political participation and the politico-economic context that relates mostly to young people remains undefined.

In sum, Fieldhouse et al. (2007), Bousbah (2012), Paecho and Plutzer (2008) did not manage to conceptualize the relevant context for young people. Conceptualizing one is therefore the aim of the next chapter. But before moving to it, explaining Marshall's main notion of citizenship (1965) is necessary since it can be considered as a starting point in context conceptualization. His notion of citizenship comes to the focus because it denotes the general political, social and economic context in which every citizen lives and acts.

Marshall's (1965, 71-135) conception of citizenship denotes citizenship as a status, which implies the access to various right and powers. He divides these rights into three groups: civil, political and social. Civil rights are mainly individual rights, such as liberty, right to property, equality before the law. Political rights encompass access to decision-making procedures, which is mainly done through election of national executive and legislative bodies. Welfare, security and education are social rights, which became the most important throughout the twentieth century.

In the introduction of Marshall's essays compilation (1965), Lipset emphasizes that the underlying idea behind each component of Marshall's notion of citizenship is equality (1965, x). Citizenship status provides each individual the status of being equal as a member of the community (Lipset, 1950, x). Moreover, Marshall further emphasizes that welfare, education and the level of financial security creates inequalities in a society through the system of stratification (1950, 105-126). Through the stratification, welfare states create society classes, and thus enable that social integration chances are not equality distributed throughout the society (1965, 105-126). In this regard Marshall finds the social rights as the most important ones because they enable civil and political right in the aspect of social integration of each citizen into society (1950, 105-126).

Generally speaking, the broader politico-economic context influences our chances to be equal in the way that the state, through its distribution of rights and duties, enables us to be relevant actors in our society. In this regard, Marshall's notion will come into the focus later indirectly through the conceptualization of the context relevant for young citizens since it is largely connected to the welfare state itself.

2 CONTEXT CONCEPTUALIZATION: FROM TRANSITION PERIOD TO TRANSITION REGIME

As it can be seen from the first chapter, there is a lack of existing research on the context influencing political participation. Although there is no main direction of what kind of context might be the most relevant for young citizens' likelihood of voting, there is an attempt to define one. Walther's conceptualization of adulthood transition regimes in Europe (2006) seems valuable as a starting point. But before conceptualizing different transition regimes across Europe, it is necessary to provide a brief definition and meaning of 'transition period' as being the background concept of 'transition regime'. After defining 'transition period', the chapter aims to explain how the concept of transition regime comes into the focus. It will be seen that it is highly connected to welfare regimes, on which the whole conceptualization is based. So the welfare regime is the first dimension in transition regimes conceptualization. The second one is education-labor system linkage, which is regarded as specifically relevant for young people's transition period.

2.1 Transition period

'Adulthood transition' is term used by Walther (2006), but more often the concept is labeled simply as 'transition from school to work' or 'youth transitions' (see Adamski and Grootings (eds.) (1989), Rayan, Garrona and Edwards (eds.) (1991), Pascual (2000), Hannan et al. (1997), Kogan et al. 2008). Most of the mentioned authors define this broad concept very similarly, but only the summary definition of it, developed by Kogan et al. (2008), will be provided, since it is the most recent one and captures the essence of its broad phenomena. The transition from school

to work can be described as ‘a dynamic process in which a person moves from the educational system to a relatively stable working position’ (Kogan et al., 2008, 2).

There are several approaches through which the transition from school to work can be studied. Most of them, namely psychological, cultural, post-materialist and generational approach concentrate on the individual objectives of young people in the transition period (Adamski and Grootings, 1989, 3). All of these mostly look at the family and socio-demographic conditions, the realm of values and the life-cycles changes, and then try to embed educational and social institutions into the mentioned trajectories (Adamski and Grootings, 1989, 3-10). According to the authors, it is a relatively new trend in social science to put the transition from school to work into the broader socio-political and labor market area context.

Adamski and Grootings described the situation in the paragraph above in 1989, but the similar is also claimed by Walther in 2006, who emphasized the fact that the youth transitions has been conceptualized as ‘general phenomenon regardless of context’ (2006, 123). He finds it necessary to determine how different socio-economic, institutional and cultural contexts allow for choice, flexibility and security of a young person (2006, 125). Along the same line are the thoughts of Kogan et al. who link their definition of school to work transition into the notion that the process of young people’s entry to the labor market is highly regulated and determined, and cannot be observed only through individual resources and characteristic (2008, 2). Their notion is based on Hannan et al.’s argument that individual resources are influenced by the institutional features of educational and employment systems, which are linked and operate together in the broader politico-economic context (1997). Therefore, different authors agree on the notion that youth transitions are influenced and determined by general politico-economic context. But despite the common emphasis on the importance of the context, the efforts to conceptualize and define

more specifically the features of the same context have been of limited progress. But in order to better understand the main aspects and limitations of the existing conceptualizations, it is relevant to briefly provide more general aspects of youth transition and context features linkage.

The general features of the above mentioned linkage may refer to Walther's claim that besides the fact that youth transitions have been prolonged, they also became de-standardized. This is due to extended periods of education, pluralization of lifestyles, labor market flexibility and the trend toward individualization. He also emphasizes the mismatch between the reality and the institutions that ignores this same reality. The consequence is that young people are excluded from society (2006, 120-124) and are uncertain about their own future, as claimed by Pascual (2000, 43). Therefore, young people's subjective perspectives are determined by the contextual effect of young people's transition to adulthood (2006, 124).

Moreover, young people's well-being is influenced by contextual features of the transition period, but contextual features of the transition period again depends, as emphasized by Pascual (2000) on contextual features of more general politico-economic context of a given country, mostly defined by welfare state regime. He states that there are various ways in which young people can gain access to the labor market and access options depend on country-level specificities (2000, 42). But what is common for most of European countries is that the transition period has been prolonged, although the extent varies across them (2000, 43).

Different policies across countries have emerged in order to facilitate the transition period for young people. Walther et al.'s state, in the report of their 'Yo-yo Research Project' (2002), that integration policies for young people have to be structured in a way to make young people as active participants in shaping the context of their transition into the labor market. The authors emphasize that the transitions of young men and women towards adulthood have become a

major political concern across Europe (2002, 39). Thus major programs across Europe have emerged in order to reduce the risk and uncertainty in the transition period, concerning mostly unemployment and formal institutions related to education and training (Walther et al. 2002).

2.2 Transition regimes

Whatever is considered as a device to integrate young people into society depends on a context in which these devices emerge. The finding of Walther's et al. project is that the policies, which are addressed to youth, depend on the general orientations towards politics in a certain context (2002, 12). The same conclusion comes from Pascual's study (2000) which states that policies will be governed by the dominant values and norms of the given polity. At this point the concept of transition regime comes into the focus.

As already stated, the transition period can be considered as a more general concept and refers to the period between a young person's exit from school and having a first stable job position. But the transition period is influenced and largely embedded in the politico-economic conditions of a given country. These conditions relate to, according to Walther, the existing institutions and to what is considered as normality in a certain context. Moreover, the institutions and 'normality', structured by a history, create the relations between individual rights and the demands from society and therefore create a regime (Walther, 2006, 124). Thus, transition regime can be conceptualized as the transition period trajectories influenced and directed by the institutions and normality of a given country's politico-economic and social context regime.

In order to put the transition regimes in a broader national context, Walther (2006) intersects his typology with Esping-Andersen (1990) and Gallie and Pugnam's (2000) welfare regimes typology. He takes the Gallie and Paugnam conceptualization of unemployment welfare regimes

more seriously into account, but he also refers to Esping-Andersen analysis in order to set more general institutional and economic structures. Gallie and Pugnam typology of a welfare state contains four types: (1) universalistic welfare regime, (2) liberal, (3) employment-centered and (4) sub-protective welfare regime (2000, 5). Esping-Andersen's conception of welfare state regimes is concentrated on the way in which the welfare production is mediated between state, market and households, and contains three types: (1) liberal, (2) corporatist and (3) social-democratic welfare regime-type (1990, 168). On the other hand, Gallie and Pugnam are more concerned with those aspects of welfare regimes that are concentrated on the protection of the disadvantaged in the labor market. They mostly look at the financial support for the unemployed and how the arrangements in a given institutional framework intervene in the process of job allocation (2000, 4). Since young people's transition period refers to the transition from school to labor market, Gallie and Paugnam's typology seems more suitable from Walther's point of view, and so his typology of transition regimes also contains four types and corresponds to the already pointed out Gallie and Puagnam's one.

However, Walther's transition regimes typology and conceptualization can be regarded as not fully developed. Walther does not have a clear set of criteria, on which he builds his typology. On the one hand, he does have particular aspects of interests: the structures of labor market, which are based on Gallie and Pugnam welfare state typology, and the education and training system, that together with the labor market structures results in particular programs and policies for young people (Walther, 2006, 125). On the other hand, he speaks more generally about the transition regimes features that affects young people and tries to organize those features accordingly to the four types. Since this is the case, it is necessary to provide more specific dimensions on which transition regimes can be explained in an organized way.

The issue of non-existence of a fully developed analytical framework for transition regimes was raised by Hannan et al. (1997). Their attempt to conceptualize the comparable features of transition periods, and therefore create a typology, is based on the following elements: (1) the national politico-economic context, (2) the education-labor market systems linkage and (3) the transition process itself and its outcomes (1997, 1-6).

However, in their typology the third element is completely ignored, and the authors do admit that the element is problematic and therefore need to be left aside (1996, 6). So their typology is entirely based on the education-labor systems linkage, which depends both on the educational system features and the labor market as being of occupational or internal characteristics¹ (1997, 2-12). The importance of the linkage between education and labor market is overall emphasized by other authors who deal with transition periods or transition regimes (Walther (2002, 2006), Breen (2005), Pascual (2000), Kogan et al (2008), Adamski and Grootings, 1989 etc.) and certainly deserve the central role in assessing transition regimes.

As a consequence of building transition regime conceptualization on the general features of the welfare state regime by Walther, and on the education-labor systems linkage as emphasized by Walther and Hannan et.al. I will use the two dimensions as being the most relevant for the transition regimes assessment.

2.2.1 Welfare regime

For the first dimension, the welfare state regime, the most important features as claimed by Walther are social security and labor market relations when it comes to the transition period of

¹ Scholars divide labor markets as being of occupational (OLM) or internal (ILM) ones. The OLMs are characterized by clear definition of jobs positions, and the same are consistent across industries and companies and the education system is organized in accordance. ILMs contains more specific firm needs and training is thus more individually targeted (see Mardseen 1990, Edwards 1979, Hannan et al 1997 etc.)

young people (2006, 123-126). These relations refer to general characteristics of welfare state regimes conceptualized by Gallie and Pagnam (2000). As already discussed, any measure towards young people social and labor market integration depend on the features of the welfare institutions in a certain country, so Walther's conceptualization is highly connected to Gallie and Pagnam's and Esping-Andersen's.

Gallie and Pagnam's conception of the welfare state refers to a system of public regulation that aims to protect individuals and to maintain social cohesion. In order to do so, the welfare state intervenes through the distribution of resources in economic, domestic and community spheres (2000, 3). Esping-Andersen emphasizes that, besides referring to the notion of social citizenship that grants our social rights when it comes to the concept of de-commodification, which is as a core idea of a welfare state, one has to take the notion of the welfare state as a system of stratification in order to fully understand welfare state relations (1990, 163).

The former concept, de-commodification, refers to the welfare state service understood as a matter of right, meaning that an individual can maintain a minimal standard of life without reliance on the market. On the other hand, Esping-Andersen also emphasizes that the welfare state is not just an intervening mechanism that has a main goal to correct inequalities produced by the market, but the welfare state has to be seen as an active force that orders social relations in the system of stratification. Different social policies create different stratification systems; social-insurance model in corporatist systems will create different types of social relations and social classes than the universalistic system that aims to promote equality of status (1990, 164-166). In his conceptualization of welfare regimes, Esping-Andersen relies on Marshall's notion of citizenship and by the state created social inequalities, according to Bay and Blakesaune (2002).

For a simpler and clearer conceptualization, it seems valuable to take the division between ‘beveridgian’ and ‘bismarcian’ systems (Esping-Andersen, Gallie and Pagnam) into account. According to Gallie and Pagnam, the former concept indicates the widest possible approach to social protection that is based on the notion of social citizenship, while ‘bismarcian’ stands for more restrictive approach in which social security is derived from participation in productive activity (2001, 7). This division captures the meanings of both concepts: de-commodification and stratification. This is the case because certain countries can have a high degree of social protection, regardless of the status, which corresponds to beveridgian type, but at the same time does not have to provide the high degree of de-commodification to their citizens (see Gallie and Pagnam 2000, Esping-Andersen 1990, Pascual 2000).

2.2.2 Education-labor systems linkage

When it comes to the education-labor market linkage, Breen argues that the two issues are of special significance in young people’s transition period (2005, 126). The success of young people’s entrance into the labor market mostly depends on (1) whether the education system provides specific skills or not and (2) whether the linkage between employers and schooling system exists (2005, 126). In his study on the variations of youth unemployment across Europe, Breen further connects the educational system signaling with the degree of labor market regulation. So, for the purpose of further conceptualization of transitions regimes, his conceptualization can be compared with Hannan et al.’s typology, which is, as previously mentioned, entirely based on the education-labor systems linkage.

According to Breen, the relationship between labor market regulation and educational outputs yields different youth unemployment relation regimes (2005, 127). A similar conclusion comes from Hannan et al., although they are not concentrated on youth unemployment only (1997, 15).

In Breen's case, depending on the degree of market regulation and the features of educational outputs, youth unemployment varies (2005, 126). Hannan et al., on the other hand, do not refer to market regulation structures but talking about the situations in which the education and labor systems can be isolated from each other (decoupled) or they are strongly interconnected (coupled) (1997, 15-16).

Breen states that when educational signaling and market regulation degree can be regarded as high, we can expect lower youth unemployment rates than in the countries that have high labor market regulation but low educational signaling. This is the case because high regulation reduces employer willingness to hire new people, but a clear message from education system reduces the risk. Countries with both features on a low level should be in better position than those with high regulation but low signaling, because employers are willing to hire new people since the employment structures are not highly regulated (Breen, 2005, 125-128).

Strong linkage, in Hannan et al.'s case, refers to the situation in which employers and schools are deeply connected in the way the labor market sector and the education system jointly decide on education requirements for encompassing defined job positions in national economy. The case of decoupled education-labor linkage refers to the situation in which employers are not involved in educational outputs. However, this situation has two possible sub-cases according to the authors. One is the case where market signals from schools are high, although there is no direct and institutionalized linkage. The other one possesses no direct linkage and does not display signals from the education system (Hanna et al. 1997, 15-18).

Therefore, both welfare state regimes and education-labor systems linkage are emphasized as the most important features for transition regimes (Walther 2006, 2002, Hannan et al. 1997, Breen (2005), Pascual (2000), Kogan et al (2008), Adamski and Grootings, 1989, Ryan et al.

(eds.) 1991), and on these two dimensions further conceptualization of transitions regimes will be conducted.

In sum, transition periods refer to the period that lasts from the point when young people leave their formal education to the point of finding a first stable job. Since the transition period is embedded in a larger national politico-economic context, many authors define that context as one of a welfare state. So the first dimension for transition regimes conceptualization is the welfare regime. The second one, especially important for young people, is education-labor systems linkage. In the next chapter the four transition regimes conceptualization that is based on the two dimensions, are provided and explained.

3 YOUNG PEOPLE'S SOCIAL (DIS-)INTEGRATION IN FOUR TRANSITION REGIMES

This chapter describes four transition regimes types along two dimensions: welfare regime itself and education-labor system linkage. Since post-socialist states were not the scope of welfare and transition regime literature, certain features of young people's transition period in these countries will be provided separately. Finally, transition regimes are connected with young people's political participation.

3.1 Four transition regimes

In this sub-section, four transition regimes types are conceptualized along welfare regime and education-labor systems linkage dimensions. The four transition regimes are: universalistic, liberal, employed-centered and sub-protective transition regime.

3.1.1 Universalistic transition regime (Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark)

3.1.1.1 Welfare regime

According to Gallie and Pugman, this type of regime is characterized by the comprehensive coverage of the unemployed, a high degree of financial support and an active employment policy, and thus belongs to Beveridgean system. This type is expected to be the least discriminating in terms of sex and age when it comes to unemployment because of the individualization of rights and the benefits being granted independently of resources (2000, 6). Universalistic welfare regime fully corresponds to Esping-Andersen's 'social-democratic regime type'. He defines this type of welfare state as a system that promotes an equality of the highest standards and not minimal needs, and also can be characterized as the most de-commodifying

welfare regime (1990, 169). The individual rights and responsibilities being embedded collectively in a common social responsibility, is emphasized by Walther (2006, 125).

When it comes to young people only, Walther states that in the universalistic transition regime, young people over the age of 18 are entitled to social assistance, regardless of the socio-economic situation in their families. They also receive an educational allowance if they take part in formal education or in any kind of training (2006, 125). Along the same lines, Esping-Andersen emphasizes that when it comes to being economically independent from the family, this regime encourages the state intervention regardless of the family's capacity to aid and support. Therefore, the ideal is to maximize capacities for individual independence and not dependence on the family for support (1990, 169).

3.1.1.2 Education-labor systems linkage

According to Hanna et al., a separate functioning of education and market labor systems, but in the same time market labor still receiving the high signals from schools (1997, 16) can be regarded as characteristics of the universalistic transition regime. Moreover, as emphasized by Walther, counseling is institutionalized through all stages of education and phases of transition in the labor market. Individuals' motivation for personal development is highly valued, which corresponds to a comprehensive school system in which national frameworks set general standards in education and training but are flexible to allow individuals to set their own learning and training plans (Walther, 2006, 126). The standardization of the national education system that comes along with 'little regulated content congruence' between educational outputs and labor system outcomes is also emphasized by Hannan et al. (1997, 16). Therefore, the characteristics of the education-labor system linkage belonging to this regime type can be summarized as employers not being involved directly in schools, but 'schools outputs and

signals about the learned and innate competencies of graduates are publicly certified and used actively by employers in making employment decisions' (Hannan et al. 1997, 16).

3.1.2 Liberal transition regime (UK and Ireland)

3.1.2.1 Welfare regime

In Gallie and Pignam typology, this regime is characterized by the commitment not to intervene too much in the protection of unemployed and not to undermine the laws of the market as such. Moreover, there is an emphasis on individual responsibility of avoiding dependence on the state for social assistance (2000, 6). The authors state that this type can be understood as being far from both principles, bismarcian and beveridgian. However, Espig-Andersen argues that beveridge-type does not automatically imply the highest degree of de-commodification but one has to look at the notion of equal benefits to all (irrespective of prior earnings and performance) (1990, 164). Thus, the liberal type of welfare state can be characterized as beverigian type, but with the small degree of de-commodification. Along the same line, Pascual refers to UK as belonging exactly to this type, in which solidarity among citizens is linked to the need to work and financed through taxes (2000, 33).

Walther summarizes the link of rights and responsibilities by explaining that this kind of regime values individual rights and responsibilities more than collective ones. Universal access to residual social security is provided but it is strongly linked to responsibilities (Walther, 2006, 126). Furthermore, the labor market contains a high degree of flexibility but the level of qualification in the work force is low. That is why the labor market can be characterized as fluid, with many access options (Walther, 2006, 126). The benefits, that are already limited, are

subject to means-testing by taking household income into account. This kind of arrangement can easily lead to poverty of unemployed, as emphasized by Gallie and Paugnam (2000, 6).

3.1.2.2 Education-labor systems linkage

The linkage can be defined as separate functioning of education and labor market systems (Hanna et al., 1997, 16). Walther characterizes the general orientation as one in which young people should be economically independent as soon as possible. Therefore, post-compulsory stage in education (after the age of 16) is organized to enable the flexible space for vocational and academic options, with a variety of exit and entrance options. This kind of arrangement should prepare individuals for self-responsibility, and strengthen them as entrepreneurs of their own labor (Walther, 2006, 126).

The lower level of youth unemployment, according to Breen (2005), should be present in countries belonging to this transition regime type. The education-labor systems linkage is characterized by low degree of market regulation and educational signaling, and youth unemployment should not be major issue since the low level of market labor regulation should increase employers' willingness to hire new workers (1997, 127). Although Breen identifies the educational signaling as low, Hannan et al. claims that the market still receives clear signals from schools when it comes to this group of countries (1997, 16). Walther does not refer specifically to education signals, but claims that in youth unemployment programs, straight labor market entrance is the main objective, while education and training opportunities are short-term and often lack quality (Walther, 2006, 126).

3.1.3 Employment-centered transition regime (Germany, Austria, France, to some extent the Netherlands)

3.1.3.1 Welfare regime

According to Gallie and Pugnam, this regime type is best defined by a high level of protection and financial compensation for unemployed, as well as by active employment policies. However, the system has a tendency to disadvantage those who had only obtained temporary jobs as well as those with little work experience (2000, 6). This type fully corresponds to the bismarckian system, in which the rights are attached to class and status and the state is ready to replace the market as a provider of welfare when it is necessary (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 168). Benefits entitled to status are particularly important for young people because the regime tends to, as claimed by the Gallie and Paugnam (2000, 6), sharply disadvantage young people because of their lack of continuous work experience. So this regime creates insiders and outsiders (Gallie and Paugnam 2001, Esping-Andersen 1990), which means that those who are part of the labor market are highly protected, and those who stay outside do not enjoy the same treatment.

The same is claimed by Walther; the uncertainty can be particularly high in this type of regime because young people are not automatically entitled to benefits if they are not paying insurance contributions. Youth unemployment refers to those who are not ready for allocation of social and occupational positions. Policies related to social integration of young people aim at integrating them in regular training rather than paying social assistance or forcing them to accept ‘any’ kind of job positions (2006, 128).

3.1.3.2 Education-labor systems linkage

Hannan et al. consider the linkage in this type as a ‘strong and direct shared’ linkage between schools and employees (1997, 15). This linkage is often supported by the state and is characterized by common agreement between employees and schools on the curriculum and definition of required skills (1997, 15). Because of the strong linkage, Breen comes to the conclusion that these countries have a low level of youth unemployment (2005, 127). Along the same line is Walther’s assessment. He describes the situation as one in which schools are organized more selectively in order to allocate young people’s careers and social positions in different directions (2006, 128). Moreover, vocational training, which is highly standardized, plays a central role and thus reproduces a highly regulated employment regime. Companies are included in vocational trainings, especially in Germany. Since social security is structured in a way that the state distinguishes between those who are included in standard work arrangements through social insurance, and those who are a part of residual social system, there is a difference in training quality for insiders and outsiders. Therefore, training routes, which are part of a corporatist constellation, provide those included (e.g. in vocational training) with a much better status than those relying on social assistance (Walther, 2006, 128).

3.1.4 Sub-protective transition regime (Italy, Spain, Portugal)

3.1.4.1 Welfare regime

According to Walther, this regime exhibits a low level of standard work arrangements and the high rate of unprotected living conditions. In this situation, family socio-economic protection and informal work play a major role (2006, 129). Moreover, as stated by Gallie and Paugnam, a sub-protective regime offers the unemployed less than minimum of what is considered as enough for the maintenance of a minimal living standard (also, few unemployed receive

benefits). Active employment policies are virtually inexistent and the probability of long-term unemployment is very high. In the end, the state of unemployment is deeply dependent on general economic development of the country (2000, 5). Due to this kind of features, the authors claim that this regime cannot be considered as the beveridgian or bismarcian type. However, Pascual argues that countries belonging to this welfare regime can be characterized as a mix of both types, combining state and citizens solidarity (2000, 37). Walther states that young people are not individually entitled to social benefits, and they are mostly engaged in uncertain jobs. In Italy, this is the case of informal economy and in Spain, it is mostly about fixed-term contracts (2006, 128).

3.1.4.2 Education-labor systems linkage

Hanna et al. do not provide a clear place for these countries in their typology (1996) and they are not mentioned in Breen's typology at all. Spain and Italy are characterized by de-coupled linkage between education and labor market, but the authors do not elaborate on signals (1996, 17).

Walther argues that segmentation in the labor market followed by a lack of training contributes to very high rates of youth unemployment. This situation is partially due to the fact that vocational training is weakly developed and companies are not widely involved in education, compulsory and post-compulsory. Many students drop out before obtaining the diploma (e.g. Italy), but there are also many overqualified young people (e.g. Spain). In both cases, transition to labor market is very long, and the higher education diploma can only guarantee some kind of status while waiting for a job, but not having the job (2006, 129-130).

3.2 Post socialist states in four transition regimes types

It needs to be emphasized that there is not much research on transition regimes in Eastern and Central Europe countries. Hannan et al. emphasize that, there has yet to be any attempt to study education-labor systems linkage nor the broader national context of such linkage in ‘peripheral’ countries, such as those of Central and Eastern Europe (1997, 7). These countries are not included in authors’ attempt to create a typology of education-market linkage.

On the other hand, Kogan et al. devoted the whole study of transition regimes in these countries. The authors also confirm Hanna et al. statement about the lack of relevant studies on the topic (2008, 2). However, Kogan et al. try to provide the initial assessment of CEE countries regarding the transition period/regime literature. They argue that the most important thing to begin with is on understanding of the differences between those countries, and that one should not look at those countries with so much in common only because they share socialist past (2008, 3).

But the transition period characteristics that all these countries share are that they all inherited highly centralized education system which contributed to the clearly defined link between school and job prospects in that time (Kogan et al., 2008, 7). This was not the case after the collapse of socialism, after which the restructuring of education and labor market took each country to a different path, though similarities in regions can be identified (Kogan et al., 2008, 8). However, the authors do not refer of any special types of the welfare state in these countries, but are rather more concentrated on the education-labor systems linkage. This and the lack of literature in general limit the attempt to conceptualize CEE countries in accordance to the four transition regime types.

But Bohle and Greskovits' conceptualization of post-socialist welfare regimes can be taken as starting point. Thus, their conceptualization is intersected with Kogan et al. findings. According to Bohle and Greskovits' conceptualization of the three regimes can be identified: 'pure neoliberal type in Baltic states, an embedded neoliberal type in Visegrad countries, and a neocorporatist type in Slovenia' (2012, 22).

The authors characterize the neoliberal type as the one with rapidly instituted market economies while at the same time the welfare state did not have a capacity to provide sufficient protection against inequalities. Moreover, Baltic states' social partnership can be denoted as the least institutionalized in East Central Europe (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012, 20). Kogan et al. emphasize that there are not as many students enrolled in vocational training as in other CEE countries, so the new entrants in labor market are disadvantaged when compared to experienced workers, because the former lack specific skills (2008, 20). However, market labor is very flexible and it limits the effect of general skills output from the educational system (2008, 20). But, according to Kogan et al., the general conclusion stays that there is a very little coordination between the employees and schools (2008, 20).

Visegrad states - Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary - belong to the embedded neoliberal type according to Bohle and Greskovits (2012, 22). The authors state that these countries mobilized a significant amount of resources to compensate the costs of the democratization period. Moreover, their welfare states can be characterized as generous that aim at compromising between market transformation and social cohesion. The social partnership institutions were initially well established, but their strength has dramatically declined over time, conclude Bohle and Greskovits (2012, 22).

When it comes to the education-labor systems linkage, Kogan et al. divide these countries into two groups. Poland and Slovakia belong to the first, and are characterized by limited theoretical learning in vocational schools and, because of that, labor market entrants lack practical experience (2008, 18). In this sense they are disadvantaged in comparison with experienced workers and therefore their labor market entry can be characterized as difficult (Kogan et al., 2008, 18). Because of the weak education-labor systems linkage, young people will be likely to take the lowest level fix-term jobs (Kogan et al. 2008, 18). The authors conclude that in these countries the transition periods can be regarded as the worst among CEE (2008, 30). On the other hand, Hungary and Czech Republic's labor market entry should not be as difficult as in Poland and Slovakia because of employment protection being quite low, and the majority of young people acquiring specific occupational skills (Kogan et al., 2008, 30). However, the authors emphasize that those without good education are at greater risk than in Slovakia and Poland (2008, 30).

Bohle and Greskovits examine Slovenian case as a separate one because the state placed a lot of effort in enforcement of social partnership institutions, in which collective bargaining agreements and social pact enabled the balanced market transformation (2009, 24). Slovenian welfare state has been 'far the most generous in East Central Europe' according to the authors and belongs to neocorporatist type (2012, 24). When it comes to education-labor systems linkage, Kogan et al. claim that Slovenia possesses high employment protection, which divides between the insiders, who are well protected, and outsiders, who lack the high protection (2008, 17). Moreover, a significant percentage of young people acquire vocational training after leaving school, and a differentiating-dual system is strengthened, similar to Germany. This should enable young people to find a job easily after leaving school, but those without any kind

of vocational training do not have high chances. The authors conclude that ‘high vocational specificity makes labor market entry processes in Slovenia similar to that in Germany’ (2008, 17).

Bohle and Greskovits have no special term for the welfare regime of Bulgaria and Romania, and they mostly refer to it as non-regime or Southern Eastern European type of welfare (2012, 185-188). According to the authors, Bulgaria and Romania adopted neoliberal market societies, similar to Baltic states, but are greatly different from them because of their weak social institutions. Moreover, these countries are characterized by low levels of political participation and the absence of large and stable social groups (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012, 185-188).

Croatia is more similar to Visegrad countries in the adoption of more socially and politically inclusive strategies the market transformation (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012, 185-188). Because of the legacy from Yugoslavia, Croatia’s state institutions were not as weak as in Bulgaria or Romania, but also not as established and strong as in Slovenia, mainly because of war (2012, 185-188). But the role of unions and social groups is far more stable and stronger than in Bulgaria and Romania (2012, 185-188). Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia were not assessed in transition regime theory, so the information on the education-labor systems linkage is not provided.

Because of the general lack of transition regime literature on CEE countries, their belonging to the four regimes types needs to be regarded as a provisionally in certain aspects. Slovenia has been separately investigated from Bohle and Greskovits and Kogan et al, and since their analysis was moving toward the welfare and education-labor systems features similar to those in Germany, Slovenia can be regarded as a proxy of the employed-centered regime. It can be similarly argued for the Visegrad states, but with a strong emphasis that Hungary and Czech

Republic are performing better in facilitating transition periods for their young citizens. Baltic states are close to liberal regime since their welfare state is rather weak, and thus Bohle and Greskovits use terms 'neo-liberal' type. Southern Eastern countries can be considered as belonging to the sub-protective type because of their weak social institutions.

3.3 Transition regimes and political participation

Verba et al.'s main rationale of political equality can be paraphrased in a way that those who are not loud, will not be heard (1995). In order to be heard and expect the representation of interests, the simplest device is voting (Verba et al. 1995). But there are three basic reasons why people do not politically participate: because they lack resources, they lack interests or they are outside of recruitment networks (1995, 271). But the main emphasis is on the resources that people possess; in terms of money and civic skills (1995, 271). The lack of resources is what most authors find the most important determinant of voting when it comes to young people (see Franklin 2004, Plutzer 2002, Bousbah 2012). But lack of resources of young people is to a great extent influenced by the institutional context, according to Hannan et al. (1997, 2). Moreover, the authors argue that the most important are those institutions that arrange the education system, labor market system, and the linkages between the two (1997, 2-3). The education-market systems linkages belong to the features of transition periods, as well as the broader national context of the welfare state (Hanna et al. 1997, Kogan et al. 2008). On these dimensions Walther conceptualizes the concept of the transition regime and build a typology on Gallie and Puagnam (2000) and Esping-Andersen (1990) typologies of welfare regimes.

So the broader context of the welfare regime influences education-labor market systems linkage in each country, which is the essential feature of the transition period. The welfare regime

therefore creates the transition regime, and the education-labor systems linkage differs among the transition regime types, as explained in second chapter. Transition regimes influence political participation in a similar way to welfare regimes, since transition regimes' conceptualization is based on one of the welfare regimes.

The way in which welfare regimes influence political participation is summarized in Bay and Blakesaune's article, which deals with youth economic hardship and political marginalization (2002, 134). The authors' arguments are based on Esping-Andersen's and Marshall's views of how the welfare state influences the concept of social citizenry (2002, 134) and therefore can serve as a justification for my expected formulations that are provided in paragraphs below.

Marshall (1965) identifies social rights as the key element of welfare state. But social rights imply the existence of minimal financial security, which is needed for realizing political and civil rights (Marshall, 1965). Esping-Andersen, according to Bay and Blakesaune, builds his concept of de-commodification on Marshall's social citizenry. In respect to the social citizenry notion, welfare state provides more or less financial security for its citizens, depending on a regime type.

Taking into account the transition regime conceptualization, I expect that the turnout inequality between young and the rest will be the smallest in universalistic regimes since this transition regime can be considered the least problematic in terms of high level of de-commodification and market receiving signals from education. On the other hand, I expect the sub-protective to have the biggest difference between young people's turnout and the rest. This is expected because this regime has the lowest level of de-commodification and education-market systems linkage can be considered as non-existing in way of the institutionalization and success of the outputs.

I expect that employed-centered regime and liberal transition regime will be somewhere in between, with greater inequality expected in the later one. This is expected because the liberal transition regime can be regarded as the beveridgian type in which rights are based on encompassing criterion such as citizenship or age border, but the level of de-commodification is not as high as in employed-centered regime. Thus, I expect that employed-centered regime will demonstrate less turnout inequality than liberal regime type.

4 OPERATIONALIZATION, MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

As my main aim is to investigate whether political participation of young people depends on the context of transition regimes, the analysis needs to be divided into two parts: one that deals with the examining young people's political participation in each country, and the other that deals with the possible context influence on it. But before conducting each type, empirical assessment of countries belonging to four regime types needs to be provided in order to set the expectations about the connection between each regime type and the level of political participation. This is necessary because, until now, only theoretical statements about which country belongs to which type have been provided. So, there is no empirical evidence that the countries really belong to a certain transition regime. In order to do so, context-related measures are used, which are, together with political participation measures, discussed in the research design section.

4.1 Research design

This section is divided into two sub-sections; one referring to the political participation part of the analysis, and the other one for the context-related. Since European countries are the ones mostly covered in the transition regime literature, these are my scope for the empirical analysis. The data used were taken from the European Social Survey for the first part of the analysis (Round 5 2010-2012, and Round 4 2008-2010 For Romania), and from the Eurostat statistics for the second one (2012 and 2013). Based on data availability, the countries analyzed are: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and UK.

4.1.1 Turnout inequality

The first part has an aim to investigate the turnout inequality between young people and the rest across European countries. Age as the determinant of the probability of voting has already been investigated by many authors (Gallego 2007, 2009, Quintelier 2007, Bousbah 2012, Filedhous et al 2007, Pacheco and Plutzer 2007) but, as Gallego emphasized (2007, 24), age became the most powerful determinant of voting when compared to the other relevant causes of political inequality: education, income and gender, and thus deserves further investigation. The mentioned authors were using age as a continuous variable and therefore their conclusions are drawn referring to age as a general predictor of voting without referring to the differences between young and old people, although young people were often their main research objective (Gallego 2008, 2009, Boubasch 2012, Filedhous et al 2007). In order to answer the research question, which is set around the differences between young and the rest, logistic regression is used for each country.

The response variable is political inequality, which is operationalized through political participation, which is again reduced only through turnout inequality. It is recoded as the binary variable with dismissing those who are not eligible to vote. The yes/no are answers referring to whether someone voted or not. The main explanatory variable is age, again recoded as binary in order to assess the differences between young and the rest. Young people are defined as those from 18 to 29 years old. People become eligible to vote in most European countries when turning 18, and 29 can be set as the upper limit because of the prolonged transition periods (Walther 2002 and 2006, Pascual 2000, Adamski and Groorings (eds.) 1989).

Taking only the act of voting as a measure of political inequality is not without problems. It is known that young people can prefer newer forms of political participation, such as taking part in

demonstrations, acting politically on Internet or as being member in various kinds of organizations (Quinteler 2007, O'Toole et al. 2003). However, voting in elections can be considered as the main and simplest device in overcoming political inequality, as stated in Verba et al. (1995, 129). Therefore, the act of voting as a measure of political participation can be regarded as a good indicator of political inequality in a certain country.

The already mentioned other relevant determinants of voting - education, income and gender (among all see Verba et al. 1995) need to be included in the analysis in order to control for their impact. Bousbah summarizes the effect of each determinant based on the studies of other scholars (2012). As she stated, the level of education, as well as the level of income, positively affects political participation, in the way that an individual with a higher level of education and income has more resources at their disposal. Gender differences have been found also to affect political participation, but gender inequality is becoming less prominent (2012, 10). Thus the controlled variables are: the level of education, measured in years of education completed, income, measured in the deciles order on a household level, and finally, gender as a dummy variable (for the details of each variable's specificities see Appendix A).

4.1.2 Context influencing the turnout inequality

The welfare regime and the education-labor systems linkage have been denoted as the most important dimensions for transition regimes conceptualization. For the purpose of conducting ANOVA and linear regression², measures need to be developed for both concepts. The same measures are also used for testing the literature statements about countries belonging to a certain

² For using country-level variables in linear regression instead of doing multilevel analysis see Jusko and Shively (2005).

regime type. Measure development is not an easy task since the problem of valuable measures' non-existence can be identified.

Generally speaking, there is a lack of developed measures and accessibility of the data when it comes to studies on transition regime differences across countries (Hannan et al. 1997, 12). Even those who tried to build a clear typology of the transition regimes, such as Hannan et al. and Walther, do not propose any measures. As Hanna et al. state, every single measure used by scholars who deal with transition periods, transition regimes, youth unemployment and education outputs, suffers from serious methodological issues because of the lack of comparable data (1997, 16). Since this is the case, both concepts of interest will suffer from measurement limitations. These are presented separately in two sub-sections below.

4.1.2.1 Welfare regime

While discussing the measurement problem of welfare regimes, Powell and Barrientos emphasize that there is no operationalization of de-commodification and stratification into 'measurable indicators' (2008, 10). They conclude that the scholars ignored to do that although they have been extensively discussing Esping-Andersen's capital work (2008, 10). The most fundamental problem, according to the authors, is that all dimensions of welfare regimes (the two mentioned plus the family role) are measured through the outputs of a single one, mostly de-commodification, which by itself has problems of operationalization and measurement (2008, 11). Furthermore, the distinction between de-commodification and stratification has never been fully investigated and to date has remained unclear (Powell and Barrientos, 2008, 11).

Concerning welfare regime affecting transition periods, scholars often use measures that indicate the labor market regulation, or in other words the flexibility of labor system (see Hannan et al.

1997, Kogan et al. 2008, Breen 2005). These measures are mostly employment protection and unemployment benefits generosity.

However, as already stated in the first chapter, Esping-Andersen argues that general unemployment benefits or employment protection do not have an effect on youth's unemployment rates because new entrants in the labor market usually do not qualify for such benefits (2000). Along the same line, Bertola et al. indicate that unemployment benefits or protection can impact youth unemployment chances, but the impact is not stable once we include the education-labor systems linkage (2001). On the other hand, Kogan et al. uses these kinds of measures in their studies of transition regimes in CEE countries, by justifying that they should have at least an indirect impact on young people's transition periods (2008, 3-5). The same can be claimed for Breen and Bousbah although they are not even considering Esping-Andersen's argument.

On the other hand, Bison and Esping-Andersen argue that young people are the ones who are at the risk of being unemployed in the first place (2001, 70). With the highest risk, young people also tend to be at a greater risk of poverty. However, the authors argue that young people can get support from their families, work in the sphere of the gray economy, or take some ad-hoc jobs like baby-sitting, and their resources can be therefore wrongly assessed (Bison and Esping-Andersen, 2000, 72). Concerning the risk of poverty, the authors state that it can be a good indicator of the role of the welfare state in terms of de-commodification (2000, 71). It can demonstrate how good welfare state plays its role in providing to citizens the minimum to fulfill their basic needs. However, the authors argue that the welfare state is not a single player and the role of market and family delivery of welfare also need to be considered (2000, 71). But the problem of data is still present, especially when it comes to family financial support and other

sources of income for young people, so these cannot be well investigated in most of the cases (Bison and Esping-Andersen, 2001, 71).

Taking all mentioned into account, there is no agreement on a good way of capturing the distinction between welfare state regimes. But most of the authors use unemployment benefits, with more or less awareness of its methodological issues as a possible influence on the success of transition periods for young people. Thus, the unemployment benefits generosity (as a percentage of GDP) is used as a measure of welfare regimes distinction in the further analysis.

Unemployment benefits can, to some extent, capture the division between beveridgian and bismarckian types. As stated in Gallie and Paugnam, countries belonging to a sub-protective regime are least generous when it comes to unemployment benefit generosity. The most generous countries are those belonging to a universalistic regime. The liberal and employment-centered regimes are in between, but the latter one is more generous, according to Gallie and Paugnam (2001, 8-11). Therefore, UK, as a beveridgian type, has a relatively high proportion of unemployed persons covered by unemployment benefits. But the generosity of these benefits is not on a high level (Gallie and Paugnam, 2000, 10), which indicates that the level of de-commodification is not on a high level either.

But unemployment benefits cannot fully capture the level of de-commodification nor the stratification structure. The percentage of those who are at the risk of poverty can contribute to the understanding of the role of the welfare state, as was described by Bison and Esping-Andersen (2000). So a certain country can have high degree of unemployment benefits but the percentage of those who are at the risk of poverty can reflect the system of stratification and level of de-commodification of countries' citizens in general. As Powel and Barrientos

summarize ‘The space of social stratification is populated by standard concepts of equality, fairness and poverty’ (2008, 6). Therefore, this measure is also used in the analysis.

As already mentioned, risk of poverty should contribute to the distinction between countries on the level of de-commodification. The level of de-commodification denotes that an individual can maintain a minimal standard of living without reliance on the market (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 167). According to Esping-Andersen, the universalistic regime can be characterized as the most de-commodifying welfare regime (1990, 169). On the other hand, the liberal transition regime, although considered as *beverigian* type (Pascual 2000), can be characterized with the small degree of de-commodification because of the emphasis on individual responsibility and avoiding dependence on state social assistance (Gallie and Pagnam, 2000, 6). According to Gallie and Pagnam, a high level of protection characterizes the employed-centered regime for unemployed persons (2000, 6), but because of its system of stratification, the benefits are entitled to status (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 168). This means that those included will be highly protected, but those outside of market will not. In this sense the risk of poverty can assess the level of de-commodification for those not included, who are not covered by unemployment benefits. Based on this, employed-centered regime should be between universalistic and liberal regime regarding the level of de-commodification. The sub-protective regime, as stated by Gallie and Pagnam, offers the unemployed less than minimum of what is considered as enough for the maintenance of a minimal living standard (also, few of unemployed receive benefits) (2000, 5). Thus, this regime is characterized by the lowest level of de-commodification.

To sum up, the unemployment benefits generosity and the percentage of people who are at the risk of poverty are used as measures for welfare dimension of transition regime, which is mostly

concerned with the level of de-commodification. The two measures together should discriminate the countries along four transition regimes types.

4.1.2.2 Education-labor systems linkage

The importance of education-labor systems linkage has been emphasized to a great extent (Walther 2002, 2006, Hannan et al. 1997, Kogan et al., Pasucal 2000, Breen 2005). But, this dimension also suffers from the non-existence of developed measures and a lack of comparable data. Even Hannan et al.'s, who put this linkage in the center of their typology and analytical framework, do not provide any possible measures (1996). But they do emphasize the issues arising from the lack of the data. According to them, the biggest problem is that there is no measure that can fully address the differences between countries on this linkage, although countries can be grouped in accordance with the similarities of relevant features (1997, 16-18).

In his study of youth unemployment, Breen uses OECD's percentage in upper secondary education school and work-based training (Education at Glance, OECD) as his measure for education signaling (2005, 130). But OECD does not encompass all the countries of my interest, so this measure cannot be used. For European countries, Pascual proposes that the link between the level of unemployment and the level of education can serve as a measure of education-labor systems linkage (2000, 40). For example, the level of unemployment is less closely linked to people's level of education in Spain than in UK (Pascual, 2000, 40-42). For this purpose I will use Eurostat statistics in order to assess unemployment-education level relation as a proxy for the education-labor systems linkage.

Eurostat offers the statistics on unemployment ratio of persons not in education and training by educational attainment level and age group (unit is percentage, Eurostat, 2012). The age group encompasses those from 18 to 34 years old, and the chosen educational level is upper secondary

and post-secondary non-tertiary education (levels 3 and 4)³. This is so because most education-labor systems distinctions deals with secondary and vocational training that provide specific skills (Walther 2006, Breen 2005). Hannan et al. emphasizes the third level of education, but without exactly justifying why (1997, 17). It is important to emphasize that the Eurostat statistics on unemployment ratio by educational level has two important features that can be considered relevant for transition regimes. One is that it encompasses those who are no longer in any formal education or training (what is part of the definition of transition period), and the second is that it controls for a duration of being unemployed after leaving education. In this case, duration is defined as from 3 to 5 years. In this way, people who needed less to find a job are excluded, so the feature of transition period emphasized by many researchers reviewed (among all see Walther 2006), which is that the transition periods have been prolonged, is taken into account by this measure.

Because of the strong education-labor market linkage (Hanna et al. 1997) countries belonging to the employed-centered regime are characterized by having a close link between the level of education and the ease of finding jobs. On the contrary, the sub-protective regime is characterized by a weak link between the level of unemployment and chances to work. As Pascual states, it is very common that people can be considered as overqualified and their diploma does not provide any substantive signal to employees (2000, 27). Hannan et al. (1997) and Breen (2005) characterize liberal and universalistic regimes as those with de-coupled education-labor systems linkage, with the labor market still receiving signals from schools. In this regard, the link between education and unemployment levels can be considered stronger than the one in the sub-protective, but weaker than one in the employed-centered regime.

³ ISCED's categories (International Standard Classification of Education): (1) less than lower secondary, (2) lower secondary, (3) secondary, (4) post-secondary, not tertiary, (5) tertiary or higher.

In sum, three context-related measures – unemployment benefits, people at the risk of poverty, unemployment ratio by educational level – are used for empirically assessing countries' belonging to a certain regime type and for conducting one-way ANOVA and linear regression.

4.2 Measurement and Expectations

Gallie and Puagnam develop the welfare regime typology, on which Walther typology of transition regimes is based and it is used in this thesis as a base for transition regimes conceptualization as well. However, Gallie and Paugnam do not test their theory of grouping countries to a certain welfare regime but rather base their thoughts on the theory and descriptive presentation of the data (2000, 1-13). Along the same lines, Pascual presents descriptive statistics and detailed information only for four countries, although the implications drawn from these are understood as the features of broader welfare state types (2000, 29-45).

Since this is the case, the effort to discriminate precisely among twenty-two countries along incomplete measures is not feasible for the purpose of this paper and therefore needs to be left for further studies. But the three measures chosen can be descriptively provided for the representative countries in each type, as Gallie & Pugnam (2000) and Pascual (2000) did.

In Gallie and Paugnam, Sweden and Denmark represents the universalistic regime, Germany, France and the Netherlands in the employed-centered regime, UK and Ireland as liberal, and finally, Italy, Portugal and Spain stand for the sub-protective (2000, 8-13). In Pascual's version, data and information are presented for France, the Netherlands, UK and Spain. Esping-Andersen, although not presenting any data in his 1990 work, puts Germany as a representative country of the corporatist welfare regime (1990) that corresponds to Gallie and Paugnam's employed-centered regime. UK is an example of the liberal regime and lastly for the social

democratic regime, which equals to the universalistic regime, he refers to Scandinavian countries (1990, 168).

Taking into account all previously mentioned, the data for the three measures chosen – unemployment benefits, risk of poverty and education-unemployment relationship – are presented in Table 1 for four countries, each representing one type: Sweden representing the universalistic, Germany the employed-centered, UK the liberal and Spain for the sub-protective regime. In this regard, post-socialist states are not encompassed in the data because of their more or less provisional grouping along the regime types and because similar typology for them has still not been fully developed by the science.

Country	Unemployment benefits (% of GDP)	Poverty risk (%)	Unemployment by education level (%)
Sweden	1.3	16.1	5.7.
Germany	1.6	19.9	5.7
UK	0.7	21.6	10.4
Spain	3.6	26.3	26.2
<i>Source: Eurostat (2012, 2013)</i>			

Table 1: Four countries representing four transition regimes

In order to assess this table, one needs to start with Spain as a representative of sub-protective regime type since it has the highest unemployment benefits rate. It contradicts the view that countries belonging to the sub-protective regime are not very generous when it comes to unemployment benefits (Gallie and Puagham, 2000). However, the data also shows that Spain's expenditure on the benefits is 3.5% of GDP, the highest among all countries included. But, if one looks at the percentage of people who are at risk of poverty, Spain also possesses the largest number with 26.3%. Spain has the largest percentage of unemployed persons in general compared to the selected countries, but Eurostat analysts are not clear whether the larger

expenditure on unemployed persons is connected or dependent to the level of unemployment⁴. Since the risk of poverty is another measure to discriminate countries along de-commodification level, Spain is undoubtedly the country with the lowest level of de-commodification. Thus, Spain as a representative country confirms the status of sub-protective regime as one with the lowest de-commodification level.

Germany is the country with the second highest level of benefits generosity, and therefore confirms the status of the employed-centered regime as most generous, since it is stated that this regime highly protects those covered with unemployment benefits (Gallie and Paugnam, 2000). The data on risk of poverty in regard to Germany should reveal the status of those not protected, and Germany being in this respect second only to Sweden, which has the lowest percentage. Also, Sweden is close to Germany with respect to the unemployment benefits generosity. Therefore Sweden, as representative of the universalistic, and Germany as representative of the employed-centered transition regime, can be denoted as countries with the highest level of de-commodification, with Sweden having less people at the risk of poverty but Germany being more generous in benefits for the unemployed. The UK is least generous when it comes to unemployment benefits, and there 21.6% of the population is at risk of poverty, which shows the UK having a higher level of de-commodification than Spain, but still lagging far behind both Germany and Sweden.

Concerning the education-labor systems linkage, the situation is clearer. Sweden and Germany have the lowest percentage of those with secondary and upper secondary educational level who have been unsuccessful in finding a job more than three years. They are followed by UK, and Spain has the largest percentage, as high as 26.2% in the aged 18 to 34.

⁴ http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Labour_market_policy_expenditure

In sum, countries representing each transition regime type can be considered as following the typology according to data. The only outlier is Spain in regard to the generosity of unemployment benefits, but as I previously mentioned, this can be connected to the unemployment rates in the country. However, this situation is not going to be further investigated.

Since the countries' data follow transition regime typology, my expectations outlined at the end of the third chapter remain the same. I expect that turnout inequality between young and the rest will be the smallest in universalistic regimes since this transition regime can be considered as least problematic in terms of high level of de-commodification and the market receiving signals from education. Based on the Marshall's argument, it should therefore be the least problematic in social integration of young people. On the other hand, I expect the sub-protective regime to have the biggest difference between young people's turnout and the others because of its weak welfare state institutions and weak education-labor system congruence. The employed-centered and the liberal transition regime should be somewhere in between, with greater inequality expected in the latter one since the employed-centered regime can be considered as more de-commodifying and therefore less problematic when it comes to young people's social integration.

4.3 Findings and Analysis

As stated at the beginning of the research design section, the purpose of the analysis is twofold. First, logistic regression should demonstrate the turnout inequality between young people and the rest of the respondents. Second, ANOVA and two-step linear regression have an aim to see whether the inequalities, if they exist, can be connected to country-level features that are

relevant for transition regime distinction. The logistic regression results are presented below in Table 2 for 22 countries.

Country	Intercept	Young–Voting	Education	Income	Gender (female)
Bulgaria	0.716***	-0.778***	0.055***	-0.017	0.189
Czech Rep.	1.590***	-0.154***	0.028	0.020	0.286
Croatia	0.997***	-1.564***	0.004	0.063**	-0.246
Denmark	1.965***	-1.508***	0.035	0.036	0.115
Estonia	-1.144**	-1.100***	0.120***	0.095***	0.418**
Finland	0.179*	-0.378	0.010	0.176***	0.544***
France	0.590**	-1.268***	0.014	0.090***	-0.172
Germany	-0.651*	-0.677***	0.094***	0.201***	0.075
Hungary	-0.285	-0.555***	0.083***	0.057*	0.204
Ireland	1.206***	-1.366***	-0.049**	0.214***	-0.010
Lithuania	-0.387	-1.191***	0.063***	0.035	0.206*
The Netherlands	-0.377	-0.781***	0.088***	0.156***	0.344**
Norway	0.951**	-1.136***	0.092***	0.045	-0.506**
Poland	0.253	-0.780***	0.054*	0.040	0.189
Portugal	1.192***	-1.190***	0.020	n/a	-0.138
Romania	1.055***	-0.759***	-0.003	0.014	-0.247*
Slovakia	0.068	-0.387*	0.060*	0.045	-0.032
Slovenia	0.337	-1.080***	0.030	0.095**	0.079
Spain	1.508***	-0.760***	0.008	0.023	0.121
Sweden	1.566***	-0.936***	0.054	0.134**	0.008
Switzerland	-0.612*	-1.039***	0.092***	0.053	0.005
UK	-0.050	-1.551***	0.071***	0.065**	0.060
<i>Note: Statistical significance: * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$</i>					

Table 2: Logistic regression – Turnout inequality model

Table 2 shows that in all countries, with the exception of Finland, the turnout inequality between young people and the rest does exist. So young people in most of the countries do vote significantly less than the rest, with education, income and gender being controlled. These results are conformation of many studies that claimed such a situation (see Gallego 2007, 2009, Boubash 2012, Pultzer 2002, Franklin 2004). The findings presented in Table 2 also confirm that the other inequalities identified – education, income and gender bias – are not present to such extent as bias is connected to age.

In order to visually present the differences in turnout inequality between countries, the effect is calculated from the logit of each country model (see Appendix B for exact values) and plotted with the confidence interval against the names of the countries. These are presented in the Figure 1. The y axis of the graph represents the likelihood of voting for the rest in comparison to young people.




Figure 1: Turnout inequalities across countries

As in can been seen in Figure 1, country results do not correspond with grouping along transition regimes typology. Countries in which the smallest inequality is shown are Finland (more or less equal likelihood of voting for young people and the rest), Slovakia, Germany, Romania, Spain and Bulgaria. On the other hand, countries with the largest inequality are UK (the rest of the population is almost five times more likely to vote than young people), Croatia, Denmark and Czech Republic. Those with the lowest levels belong to different transition

regimes: Finland as universalistic, Slovakia as post-socialist employed-centered, Germany as pure employed-centered type, and Spain as sub-protective with Romania as a post-socialist version of the latter. The same can be claimed for countries with the largest inequality showed by logistic regression. UK belongs to the liberal, Croatia to the post-socialist version of the sub-protective, Denmark to the universalistic and Czech Republic to the post-socialist version of the employed-centered regime. Therefore, almost all transition regimes can be found on the both sides of the spectrum and transition regimes, according to the figure, cannot be connected to political participation.

However, in order not to draw hasty conclusions on the basis of a single figure, ANOVA and linear regressions were also conducted. In both, context-related variables described in the research design section are used. For the purpose of ANOVA the three context-variables are split on their median value and the binary variable is created in accordance. The response variable in both cases is the effects calculated from the logits. The results are presented in Table 3 and 4.

Variables	Df	<i>F</i> value	<i>p</i> value
Unemployment benefits	1	0.1654	0.6890
Population poverty	1	0.8204	0.3770
Education-labor linkage	1	0.9873	0.3336

Table 3: ANOVA

The ANOVA and linear regression results confirm the findings from Figure 1. So it cannot be concluded that transition regimes are connected with the political participation of young people, at least when it comes to what I have suggested in terms of the conceptualization and measurement.

It was already emphasized and discussed that the measures for transition regime comparison suffer from severe methodological issues and are not adequately developed. Moreover the whole study of transition regimes is relatively new (Hanna et al. 1997, Walther 2002, 2006). But, the order of countries in presented Figure 1 does not contain any of macro-level measures and it is visible from that point that countries do not follow transition regime belonging. This could mean that the problems might occur on individual-level measurement.

Variables	Estimate	Standard error	<i>t</i> value	<i>p</i> value
(Intercept)	3.29219	0.90226	3.649	0.00199**
Unemployment benefits	-0.18949	0.29175	-0.650	0.52469
Population poverty	0.06992	0.04874	1.435	0.16953
Education-labor linkage	-0.04128	0.03511	-1.176	0.25599
<i>R</i> ² : 0.11				

Table 4: Linear regression

Along these lines, I also have mentioned that the participatory measure that I used might not be appropriate for the assessment of political participation of young people. Quintelier argues that scholars should devote more time to finding a valuable measure in order to be able to have clearer insight into the features of young people's political participation. She emphasizes that young people can be disproportionately attached to new forms of political engagement (2007, 167). She also finds it important to solve the problem of measurement with respect to the way survey questions do not correspond to young people's view of politics (2007, 168). This means that young people have a different conception of what political is from 'older' people, and therefore survey questions cannot encompass the suitable meanings of politics. Since my participatory measure only refers to the act of voting, it is far from capturing different types and meanings of political activities. But voting is chosen as the most common and simple device for

the purpose of achieving political equality (see Verba et al. 1995), and in this respect, it can serve as an indicator of inequality differences between countries.

It has been already emphasized through this thesis that age can be considered as one of the largest influences on the intention to vote when compared to education, income and gender. The bulk of explanations why it is so comes from studies that deal with individual-level determinants of age influencing their choice to vote, which can be an indicator for the common thought of scholars that county context does not matter so much.

One of the most cited reasons why young people do not vote comes from Plutzer (2002), who finds that the ‘habit of voting’ plays a major role in who votes and who does not. Since young people do not possess the habit because of the simple reason of only being eligible to vote recently, they cannot develop the habit in the period while they are still young. Plutzer’s argument is similar to life-cycles and generational explanations of young people being non-politically active. The explanations are mostly related to the fact that young people do not have stakes in politics because they still do not have their own family and their own resources from a stable job and therefore are simply not very interested in what politics could do for them (among all see Qunitelier 2007, Gallego 2009).

In this regard, studies find that the individual-level determinants are present in most of the countries studied (Gallego 2009, Fieldhouse et al. 2007), so one might conclude that the variations of politico-economic contexts between countries do not play any major role when it comes to the political participation of young people. However, differences of turnout inequality do exist between countries, and my intention was to investigate what possible rationales can be behind this.

There is a lack of studies that tried to deal with the relevant country-level determinates of voting. Here, I will only mention Boubasch (2012), who tried to determine the influence of country variables that might be relevant for young people's intention to vote. Her multi-level analysis on 36 countries has showed that the labor market regulation variable (complied of employment protection, wage coordination, government intervention, unemployment benefits duration and generosity, density of union membership etc.) affect young people's act of voting. But she did not provide any theoretical framework for why this might be the case. So, my purpose was to conceptualize the theoretical framework of the relevant context for young people and determine if that affects their political participation. However, my analysis conducted for each country separately shows that it does not. Future studies on this topic are therefore recommended.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis was to investigate the impact of the transition regime context on political participation of young people. The results suggest that one cannot draw the conclusion that the participatory inequality between young and the rest is directly influenced by the transition regime types features.

The conclusion that can be directly drawn is that age still plays a major role as a determinant of voting. Logistic regressions confirmed the findings of previous studies claiming that age has a substantive impact on voting in the way that young people do vote less than the rest of the population (among all Gallego 2009, Plutzer 2002). What this paper did differently from previous research was that age was made a binary variable. This enables one to directly refer to the differences between young and the rest in terms of their readiness to vote. Thus, the conclusion does not go toward the general impact of age, but rather in the specific direction of young people's political participation for twenty two countries. Therefore, the conclusion made from the first part of the analysis is that young people do vote significantly less than the rest in all the countries except Finland.

The turnout inequalities identified for each country served as a justification for the second part, which had the aim to investigate the possible impact of context on them. It had the justification in a descriptive graph, where the effects of 'being young' on voting were plotted against countries. At first glance, it appeared that universalistic, employed-centered, liberal and sub-protective transition regimes do not follow the expectations that were based on the conceptualized theoretical framework. Additional analysis was needed in order to draw any satisfactory conclusion.

For this purpose, ANOVA and linear regression were conducted, in which the response variable was the calculated effect of ‘being young’ on voting, and the response variables were the context measures developed in accordance with the transition regime conceptualization. The two mentioned methods showed that a conclusion cannot be drawn from the direct connection between probability of voting and macro-level determinants because the results were without any significant statistical relevance. However, the last chapter emphasized the measurement problem that might have induced unsatisfactory results.

Firstly, the political inequality measure was not encompassing enough. It was operationalized through the political participation, which was again reduced only to voting, which is only one form of political action. This might reduce the relevance of the inequality assessment because it is emphasized in the literature that young people do prefer some other forms of political engagements, such as demonstrations or membership in civil organizations (Quintelier 2007, O’Thoole et al. 2003). These forms were not encompassed in the analysis and therefore turnout inequality between young people and the rest did not capture the full assessment of young people’s political participation.

Secondly, transition regimes’ measures can be regarded as not fully developed ones. The chosen measures – unemployment benefits generosity, people at the risk of poverty, and education-unemployment relation – suffer from severe pitfalls in discriminating countries along the transition regimes conceptualization. To some extent, it was shown that ‘representative countries’ for each regime do follow the theory. However, it cannot be concluded that the chosen measures are therefore suitable. But because of the lack of developed measures in the literature (see Hannan et al. 1997) and the lack of comparable data, my attempt was also to

contribute to the science in this respect by formulating and developing the measures for transition period literature.

Finally, twenty two countries are far from a representative sample, and therefore no causal inference can be drawn based on this paper. Some of the countries, which belong to the transition regime types, based on the theory, were not included because of certain technical features in ESS database. This is the case for Italy and Austria, which had too much missing data and therefore were not included in the integrated file in the database. Because of the European countries scope, the theoretical implications exclude countries such as US and Latin American states.

In sum, one cannot conclude that the transition regime context directly influences young people's readiness to vote and because of the pitfalls mentioned above, the whole empirical analysis needs to be taken with reservation. However, the underlying attempt of this thesis was to contribute to the context determinants of political participation, and more specifically, to the conceptualization of the relevant context for young people only.

The concept definition was based on the transition period in a young person's life and denotes the period that starts from the point of leaving formal education to the point of finding their first stable job. The level of economic and social hardship experienced by young people in this period is influenced by the broader politico-economic context of a certain country. Based on the relevant authors' theoretical frameworks (see Walther 2006, Gallie and Paugnam 2000, Esping-Andersen 1990, Hannan et al. 1997), the welfare regime's structure and education-labor systems linkage features are recognized as the most relevant dimensions for the context influencing transition period. The two dimensions served as a base for conceptualizing the four transition regimes types.

Despite the unconfirmed expectations and the limitations of the empirical analysis, this thesis achieved its purpose in taking one step forward in advancing the investigation to the unanswered question of why young people do not vote. It might be the case that individual-level characteristics are decisive ones, because, as the literature claims, most young people are not interested in politics due to their life-cycle position (among all see Plutzer 2002). This was indirectly confirmed with this thesis since the analysis showed that young people do vote significantly less than the rest of the population in almost all countries included in the analysis. But what remains to be answered is why countries differ in young people's political participation.

The answer to this question needs to be left for future studies. This thesis made a small step in trying to offer an answer and provided the general impetus for the future assessment of young people as unheard voices.

APPENDIX A – LIST OF ORIGINAL VARIABLES AND THEIR RECODING (EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY AND EUROSTAT)

Variable	Originally asked/named	Original measurement	Recoded variables
Voting (ESS)	Did you vote in the last national election?	Ordinal 1 Yes 2 No 3 Not eligible to vote	Binary 1 – Voted 0 – Did not vote
Age (ESS)	Age of respondent, calculated	Continuous	Binary 1 – young (18-29) 0 – the rest (29>)
Education (ESS)	About how many years of education have you completed, whether full-time or part-time?	Continuous – Years of education completed	Not recoded, see “Original measurement”
Income (ESS)	Please indicate your household's total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources?	Ordinal – From 1st decile to 10th decile	Not recoded, see “Original measurement”
Gender (ESS)	Sex of the respondent	Binary – Male/female	Not recoded, see “Original measurement”
Unemployment benefits generosity (Eurostat)	Unemployment benefits	Percentage of GDP	For the ANOVA purpose: binary – median split (1.36)
People at the risk of poverty (Eurostat)	People at the risk of poverty or social exclusion	Percentage of population	For the ANOVA purpose: binary – median split (24)
Education-labor systems linkage (Eurostat)	Unemployment ratio of persons not in education or training by educational attainment level (upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education) and by age group (18-34)	Percentage	For the ANOVA purpose: binary – median split (13)

APPENDIX B – CALCULATED EFFECT OF BEING YOUNG ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND THEIR CONFIDENCE INTERVALS

Country	Effect	Lower limit	Upper limit
Bulgaria	2.177	1.603	2.957
Czech Rep.	4.489	2.707	7.472
Croatia	4.693	3.417	6.446
Denmark	4.518	2.737	7.458
Estonia	3.004	2.138	4.221
Finland	1.459	1.046	2.034
France	3.555	2.469	5.120
Germany	1.967	1.450	2.670
Hungary	1.742	1.233	2.460
Ireland	3.921	2.961	5.192
Lithuania	3.290	2.256	4.797
The Netherlands	2.183	1.419	3.358
Norway	3.114	2.125	4.565
Poland	2.181	1.568	3.033
Portugal	3.287	2.373	4.553
Romania	2.136	1.634	2.793
Slovakia	1.473	1.004	2.162
Slovenia	2.944	2.001	4.330
Spain	2.139	1.423	3.216
Sweden	2.550	1.482	4.390
Switzerland	2.827	1.886	4.238
UK	4.718	3.537	6.293

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