

**INFLUENCES OF POWER ASYMMETRY AND VALUE SIMILARITY ON  
THE PERCEPTION OF THREAT: THE HUNGARIAN CASE**

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## **Abstract**

International conflicts are a historically persistent part of relations between countries. With this in mind it is no surprise that many scholars focus on this subfield of international relations. A specific topic that was addressed in this paper was threat perception. The research based itself on Rousseau, Müller and Garcia-Retamero's Spanish-German study on how threat perception is influenced by power asymmetry, which according to rationalists increases threat perception, and value similarity, which according to social constructivists decreased threat perception. The paper put forth three major goals: to try and replicate their findings, to compare the results gathered in Germany and Spain with Hungarian respondents and to build upon the model more by testing how general knowledge, interaction and past suffering influences threat perception. The findings strongly supported the replicated finding of the social constructivist approach – value similarity does decrease threat perception. Additionally the study found that unlike German and Spanish respondents, Hungarians are more robust in their perception of Russians, their opinions are harder to influence. Finally, the study found that interaction is a good predictor of increased enthusiasm and warm feelings towards Russians in the Hungarian sample.

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## Introduction

International conflicts are a historically persistent part of relations between countries. There are numerous scholars in disciplines of social sciences that work on understanding these conflicts and the reason behind them. Conflicts rise from cultural and religious clashes, the inability to share resources or national tensions. Rummel (1976) has provided a comprehensive overview of international conflict behavior and factors associated with its causes:

*Caused by:*  
*Opposing interests and capabilities*  
*Contact and salience (awareness),*  
*Significant change in the balance of powers,*  
*Individual perceptions and expectations,*  
*Disrupted structure of expectations,*  
*Will-to-conflict.*

*Aggravated by:*  
*Sociocultural dissimilarity,*  
*Cognitive imbalance,*  
*Status difference,*  
*Coercive state power.*

*Inhibited by:*  
*Sociocultural similarity*  
*Decentralized or weak, coercive state power*

According to Doucey (2011), with the end of the Cold War era, or as she eloquently put it the, “bipolar world and its proxy wars”, the times beckoned in a new and contrasting age of aggression. In her work, Doucey mentions the converging underlying reasons for conflict: abundance of natural resources and poor economic performance (as hypothesized by Collier) or just predatory violence (as suggested by Kaldor). However, conflicts usually start or continue because some sort of greed (Doucey 2011) and as Rousseau, Müller and Garcia-Retamero (2012) put it, prejudice which underpins national tension. Prejudice is born out of fear that the out-group

can possess the capacity and means to inflict negative consequences on the in-group and the negative stereotypical image is closely related to threat perception (Rousseau, Müller, Garcia-Retamero 2012). A large part of understanding why conflicts arise comes from the understanding of tension and threat perception that countries face in the international arena, Rummel (1976) stresses this as well, pointing to perception of threat as one of the main triggers for conflict.

Regardless of whether a country is stronger or weaker in comparison to a proximate country, they can feel threatened. The locus of power merely shifts the reasons that make a country feel threatened. Even stronger countries feel threatened by the severe consequences of possible danger to their power's dominance (terrorism is a good example for threats of this sort). However, the lack of power, which allows for situational control, is usually a determinant for stronger threat perception (Kamans, Otten, Gordijn, 2010). With the Treaty of Maastricht, the European Union has substantially increased the number of its members from 12 to 27, bringing the Union borders closer towards Russia, invading its previously held sphere of influence and harkening a clash between European values and the different approach held by the government in Moscow (Larivé, 2008). A powerful foreign government that is the most worrisome for eastern and western Europeans alike (Rousseau, 2006).

In order to measure how two prominent theories in international relations: the rationalist theory (based on power asymmetries) and the theory of social constructivism (centered around value similarities) hold out, Rousseau, Müller and Garcia-Retamero conducted a comparative study in Germany and Spain, which was published in 2012. The two main assumptions they were trying to test were: 1. Does power asymmetry cause increased threat perception while value similarity decreases threat perception? 2. How does power asymmetry and value similarity interact in influencing the sense of threat perception? Their findings suggest that military threat perception

can be decreased in the cases when either values between countries are similar or when respondents' countries hold a positive balance of power. Additionally, the authors find that similar values trump negative power asymmetry and can alleviate perceived threat. Finally, testing for perceived economic threat showed no influence of power asymmetry (be it positive or negative), but it did increase when countries did not share similar values. This study aims to build on the body of literature on the topic of threat perception and expand on Rousseau, Müller and Garcia-Ratamero's work.

A specific sphere the authors neglected was representation from the specific European part of central-eastern Europe or the New Europe that had broken away from the Soviet Union sphere of influence with the fall of the old super power. Arguably there could be speculation, that Germany would fit this category to an extent, however contemporary Germany is usually seen as a continuation of West Germany as opposed to the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). Neglecting the New Europe in a field that focuses on threat perception that revolves around Russia leads to very little aspiration for universality. In this case, Hungary can serve as a great representation of what makes the Central and Eastern Europe specific and how does the lasting influence of almost half of a century in an oppressive super power's zone of influence continue in its people's mentality. This is something that Rousseau, Müller and Garcia-Retamero's work cannot aspire to. Granted, it would be academic arrogance to state that the findings in Hungary can easily be generalized to the entire sphere of Eastern and Central Europe. However, it would be a good starting point and a foundation on which further studies could be built. Studies that could challenge or support the cleavage between the Old Europe and New in the way they perceive the Russian threat.

There are three main goals set forth in this study:

1. Replicate: following in the steps of Rousseau, Müller and Garcia-Retamero and test how value similarity and power asymmetry influence threat perception, both one by one and in concordance.
2. Compare: compare the results of Rousseau, Müller and Garcia-Retamero study with the results gathered from a Hungarian population. Testing to see whether there are noticeable differences how Hungarian respondents feel threat perception in changing power asymmetry and value similarity situations.
3. Expand: test to see how interaction with Russian nationals and Russia; general knowledge about Russia and feelings of past suffering from Russia influence threat perception of the Hungarian respondents.

The paper will be structured in following way: chapter 1 will cover the literature overview separating it into smaller chunks by specific subtopic of the general idea in order to adequately present it. Following this, chapter 2 will build on the info in chapter 1 in order to highlight how the hypotheses will be formed, it will then highlight the methodology of the study, the statistics that were used and the results. Chapter 3 will then cover the results of the study and conduct a general discussion of the findings and limitations. Finally the paper will finish with the conclusion of the conducted study.



## Chapter 1: Literature review

A quick and accurate detection of threats in the social environment is paramount for the survival of a species. Based on the Darwinian evolution theory, the neurocognitive mechanisms that are behind the fast and effective uncovering of potential hazards and threats is stipulated to have evolved as an instrumentally crucial advantage. (Greene, Phillips, 2004). Threats can broadly be divided into two groups: threats against single individuals and threats against groups of individuals (MacKuen, Erikson, Stimson, 1992). Threat perception and the ability to react to it has been a vehicle of increased chance of survivability for our species and in fact any species still alive today. Our ancestors had to ward off a plethora of both psychical and social threats (Mead, Maner, 2011), which also included hostile members of other groups (Baer & McEachron, 1982). For this reason, people are now in possession of a complex psychological system that is geared to protect from specific threats, including potentially dangerous out-groups (Mead, Maner, 2011). This capability to gear a response to a specific threatening signal is necessary for adaptable usage in our environment (Nesse, 1999). This is especially true for intergroup threats, a very significant determinant for the survivability and evolution of the species (Kelly, 2005). As a result, people appear to have evolved a set of effective approaches to representing group cohesiveness and strength, in order to quickly and accurately assess whether fighting or fleeing would be an optimal option (Holbrook, Fesser, 2013).

According to Kenrick et al. (2005), human beings have started living in groups because of an understanding that investment in the well-being of a group brings them more benefits than they could achieve on their own. Because of this, they have also adapted their threat perceptions to defend that which is instrumental to the group's continuation (Matthews, Levin, 2012). Evolutionary psychologists hypothesize that the predisposition to cooperate has evolved along

with a mechanism for discrimination between in-groups and out-groups (Kurzban & Leary, 2001). More concretely, cooperation has become limited to closer individuals who would reciprocate the investment (Locke, Baik, Gohil, 2012). This was the beginning of small communities that would later bind together into larger groups and eventually nations.

At this point it would be wise to stress the three main types of threats that groups can face: 1. Military 2. Economic and 3. Cultural (Rousseau, Müller, Garcia-Ratamero, 2012). In other words, threat perception has become an instrument to safeguard against the military power of other nations, the economic dominance of neighbours and assimilation by competing cultures. Threat perception was and remains vital, as inadequate threat perception has proven to be costly throughout history. Gause (2007) provides a recent and compelling example: Kuwait's leadership underestimated the threat from Iraq in 1990. They believed that Iraq's attack might snatch a disputed part of the territory at best and rejected the idea that Saddam Hussein would occupy the entire country. Ironically, even as the U.S. forces were amassing in Kuwait in 2003, Saddam Hussein reappeared on the receiving end of underestimation as he was reluctant to believe that the U.S. would actually initiate a full scale attack on Iraq. Both cases illustrate the costly pitfalls of inadequate threat perception.

Jervis (1976, 1988) stresses the importance of understanding the critical role of threat perception in defining dynamics in international relations (as seen in Machida, 2010). By definition, threat in international relations is either the intent or potential capacity of one country to inflict pressure or consequences on another country by using its power (Rousseau, Müller, Garcia-Ratamero, 2012). Power, according to Dahl (1957), is the capability of one actor to force another actor in doing something it wants in the situation where the second actor is reluctant or outright does not want to do it (Rousseau, Müller, Garcia-Ratamero, 2012). Building on this, Jervis

(1976, 1988) sees threat perception as an immensely important factor in shaping relations between countries (as seen in Machida, 2010)

When it comes to threat perception in international relations, two major schools and their contrasting views are prominent: realists in international relations view threat perception between groups as stemming from the asymmetries of power that exist between the groups in question. Social constructivists, the second major school, argue differently. They challenge that similarities and shared identities between groups can alleviate and in some cases completely erase the feelings of threat that come from other groups (Garcia-Retamero, Müller and Rousseau, 2012). As stated previously, asymmetries in power can come in different forms, based on, among others military strength, economic power, and cultural influence. Realists argue that threat is a function of asymmetry in power and states that are on the lower end of the power see-saw should feel threatened (Garcia-Retamero, Müller and Rousseau, 2012). Following these ideas, if one wants to adequately understand the role of power, one must study how weaker nations view dominant ones in international relations (Levin et al. 2012). Pratto et al. (2000) shows how prejudice towards the USA and Japan on the part of Taiwan was born out of unfavourable power asymmetry. However, recent studies find some support for the social constructivist view and support the claim that threat perception is in fact decreased in the face of shared identity (Rousseau, 2006, Rousseau, Veen, 2005). Finally, there can be a third approach which combines both the feeling of similarity and the asymmetries of power that groups hold. This view was tested by Garcia-Retamero, Müller and Rousseau in their 2012 study, on which this thesis will be based.

In their work, Garcia-Retamero, Müller and Rousseau (2012) use Russia as the best out-group example for European countries. (This is analogous to a previous study by Rousseau (2006) who uses China as the out-group for American respondents). Thus it is not that surprising since

Russia is perceived as the most challenging task the EU has to face at the start of the 21st century (Roberts, 2007). However, the aforementioned study has been conducted in Spain and Germany, both of which are relatively distant from Russia geographically; what is more, they are relatively less dependent (percentage wise) or interact less with it when compared to countries from the former Soviet bloc. This is especially true when one takes into account not only the historical background of the region, but also the changes that happened in Russia after Vladimir Putin came to power. This marked a transition that made Russia more powerful economically and allowed it to explore the power of its abundant reserves of hydrocarbons more extensively (Larivé, 2008). This brought about a two-pronged situation where EU and Russia are interdependent, i.e. EU needs Russia's hydrocarbon supplies and Russia needs the EU market (Larivé, 2008). It also brought in a plethora of complex energy-based relationships on the border zones. Some countries became completely dependent on Russia's fuel supply. Finland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are prime examples, with 100% dependence on Russia's supply; Hungary fits the category as well, with more than 60% of its hydrocarbon supply coming from Russia. This is highly dissimilar to the profile of the countries in the previous study by Rousseau, Müller and Garcia-Retamero; in that case the authors focused on Germany and Spain, which depend on Russia's fuel import to supply 36% of the market in the German case and 0% in the case of Spain (Commission of the European Communities, 2009; Ratner et al. 2013).

Based on this caveat, this study attempts to broaden the body of literature on the subject and expand the study to more countries, specifically touching upon those closer to Russia; this paper focuses on specifically Hungary. Countries in closer proximity to Russia should provide a deeper understanding of threat perception. However, it must be noted that historical interaction between states in the region might cloud the analysis. This is a problem that has to be highlighted as some

scholars propose the idea that group based fear and/or anger can be stronger antecedents to political intolerance or antagonism than threat, which can sometimes proxy for actual underlying hate and/or fear (Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009).

Additional modifications to the original study include testing for respondents' knowledge of the out-group country (an important factor that is often overlooked, although it strongly influences threat perception (Stein, 1988). Knowledge about the out-group can have diverging outcomes: if it is not ample enough it might increase the perception of threat, amplifying it. Alternatively, greater knowledge about the out-group can increase the chances of forming a shared identity and thus downplay the threat perception (Maoz, McCauley, 2008). However, staying in contact is not enough to form a shared identity because willingness for cooperation stems from historical kinship and reciprocal kindness, not merely contact itself (Locke et al., 2012).

Finally, an emotional response scale battery was added to the study. Emotional scales will be able to provide valuable countable and comparable information on how the respondents reacted while participating in the study. Expected emotional responses can be based on the fact that groups that perceive themselves as possessing less power tend to react more emotionally to conflicting situations (Iyer, Leach, 2008). Different emotions provide specific responses to a perceived threat (Cottrell, Neuberg, 2005). Understanding how threat elicits emotions, what kind of emotions and how the emotions later guide actions can help reduce prejudice amongst different groups and improve relations between them (Matthews, Levin, 2012).

## **1.1 Threat Perception**

As mentioned above, threats and their probability are an integral part of international relations. There are several methods of classification of threats; this study will differentiate them according to the approach proposed by Canetti-Nissim et al. (2008). The authors distinguish between realistic (military or economic threats) and symbolic (cultural) threats, and the present paper will focus on the former category. In the face of realistic power asymmetries in their region, countries tend to feel threat (Gause, 2007) and although the simplistic view is to attribute threat perception to aggressive politics, weapon advancements or other military power disparities, it is not unlikely to come across situations where economic resources or economic independence is the possible target of a stronger neighbour (Kamans, Otten, Gordijn, 2010). There are differences between military and economic threats, they elicit different emotional responses, might require a different coping strategy and are approached differently both by the stronger and the weaker side in the disparity (van Zomeren et al., 2004; Kamans, Otten, Gordijn, 2010; Cottrell, Neuberg, 2005, Mackie et al., 2005). However, it would be difficult to assess one as more threatening than the other. Although economic threats do not correlate as strongly with immediate danger, they have a strong implications for the future well-being of a group (Cottrell, Neuberg, 2005). In addition, they are often associated with military threat: as Xiang, Xu and Keteku (2007) put it: trade and economic prosperity have always been observed to “follow the flag”, making the link between economic might and military might readily noticeable.

Some scholars notice the shift in the locust of the problem for the weaker side: if a threat is a military one, safety becomes the main priority and elicits fear and avoidance like tendencies, on the other hand an economic threat focuses everything on valuable resources. This transfer of

priority shifts the prime emotion to anger, which helps in triggering actions beneficial to the new situation (Kamans, Otten, Gordijn, 2010).

The present study will address the fact that Hungary belongs to the former Soviet bloc, a past sphere of influence that Moscow is desperate to recover. This fact renders the current state of affairs especially problematic in view of EU enlargement (Larivé, 2008). According to Wiegand (2007), Russia has increased its usage of natural resources as leverage to retain political influence in the former Socialist states (Larivé, 2008). However, the interdependence of EU and Russia provides for a complicated situation: although Russia might hold a stronger position when interacting with individuals states, it does not hold a dominant stance when dealing with the entire EU as a unit. Even singular countries face different interaction with Russia individually. The old European flagman countries like France, Germany or the United Kingdom are very experienced in international high politics through the conduct of the two world wars, not only that but there is a deeply integrated sense of equality between them and Russia, an equality that goes back to the days of the Soviet Union where bilateral relations between USSR, Germany, France or United Kingdom were conducted on equal footing and equal ground (Bozhilova, 2010). This is not true for the new Europe which is made up of countries that do not have deep traditions of being equal to the highest echelons of modern politics and specifically had troubled relations with the USSR and now still with the Russian federation. This would not be as evident if relations between the EU and Russia would be conducted on that level, however Russia always preferred and still prefers vis-à-vis communication between European countries over communication with the European Union as a single entity, such rules to the game are acceptable and enjoyed by western Europe, however new (central and eastern) Europe does not share these same sympathies and many a

country in that group still feels deeply rooted antipathy or weariness of Russia in general (Dickel, Westphal, 2012). This situation creating a complex international tug of war.

## **1.2 Power Asymmetry**

In their work, Rousseau, Müller and Garcia-Retamero cover realist scholars from several distinct fields, including international relations (Grieco 1988 and Waltz 1979) and psychology, especially the branch specializing in conflict theory (Campbell 1965 and Sherif 1966), who are in consensus that asymmetrical power relations instinctively trigger at least the perception of threat and sometimes may even lead to intergroup conflict (Rousseau, Müller, Garcia-Retamero, 2012). The main argument that the ideas proposed by these scholars is based on, is that in a world where power considerations cannot be ignored, and states often have to resolve to self-help, all actors should be weary of stronger countries and states (Rousseau, Veen, 2005). Since power can be defined as a country's ability to control a situation and channel its influence according to its needs, it follows that even in situations where tension escalates into conflict, the stronger side should be able to exert and use its power to achieve an outcome favourable to it (Anderson, Berdahl, 2002). It is important to note that Grieco (1990) identifies power as a relative concept: it can only be measured in relation to neighbouring powers (Rousseau, Müller, Garcia-Retamero, 2012). As a result of this, weaker nations that are in the proximity of stronger neighbours tend to feel threatened more often, especially if the stronger nation is acting antagonistically towards them or their resources (Kamans, Otten, Gordijn, 2010). When it comes to present day EU-Russia relations there is no shortage of antagonism and strive for influence from Russia's side. The fact that Gazprom has for a considerable period of time not attempted to conceal political influence over its price



formation and that Moscow uses energy as an effective way of separating and dividing Europe can be traced back to Vladimir Putin assuming power. The further developments have induced many scholars to reevaluate their view that the peak of tension between the West and East of Europe should indefinitely be associated with the Cold War (Larivé, 2008). On the other hand, historical examples show that events cannot be solely explained by power divergences. If each and every development would be dictated by this factor and this factor alone, then half of the globe would be locked in a perpetual state of War or would at least be arming up for it.

### **1.3 Value Similarity**

With the realist point of view on the subject of threat perception covered, in order to cover the full scope of comparison one has to look at the other major approach to the topic – the social constructivist one. Social identity theory Tajfel (1978) and self-categorization theory Turner (1985) are theories that combine threat perception and the process of constructing one's identity and can be integrated under the umbrella term of social constructivism (Rousseau, Müller, Garcia-Retamero, 2012). Social identity theory is built around a two stage process. It presumes that people first instinctively place themselves in characteristic categories, thus separating what they define as “themselves” or “us” and “them”. Then, if people are willing to do so, they take up the values, norms and traits of the group that they integrate themselves into (Rousseau, Müller, Garcia-Retamero, 2012). Self-categorization theory goes in a similar vein, in the sense that it has the same first step of creating an in-group and an out-group. However, it does not involve a voluntary choice of taking up values and traits of the group. On the contrary in this theory it is assumed that the schemata associated with a certain group is integrated as soon as a person becomes a member of

the group (Rousseau, Müller, Garcia-Retamero, 2012). These theories can be linked to Laitin's (1998) "tipping model", which states that as a certain identity in a group becomes more monolithic and powerful, there is a tipping point where it starts to dominate and spreads throughout the group setting the norm (Rousseau, Veen, 2005). Both the social identity and self-categorization theories stress a very important and stable thing in every person's social existence: there is always an "us" and there is always "them", hence the way a Hungarian defines himself or herself, would also define how he or she would see Russians, Austrians, Spaniards etc. (Rousseau, Veen, 2005). Because of this, the overlaying ideology of a country can dictate the way that country and its people interact with others (Nau, 2002 as seen in Machida, 2010).

According to McCauley (2001), identification with the group can be best described as caring for the well-being of the group (Moskalenko, McCauley, Rozin, 2006). However, as noted previously, an individual is not locked within the in-group; there is always an out-group as well. People not only see greater similarity between themselves and other members of the in-group when compared to out-group members (DiDonato, Ulrich, Krueger, 2011), but in a similar vein perceive themselves as closer to people they like, as opposed to the ones they dislike (Montoya, Horton, Kircher, 2008). How does this influence the way people think about the out-group members? Perceiving someone as belonging to an out-group category can sometimes be sufficient enough motivation to dehumanize and discriminate against that person (Krueger, 2007). Both social identity and self-categorization theories mentioned earlier, unanimously predict a tendency to evolve discriminatory attitudes towards members not belonging to the same group (Rousseau, Müller, Garcia-Retamero, 2012). It's worth to note that this discriminatory effect does not limit itself to opinions. Group membership requires sticking to group norms, which in turn actively promotes a positive bias towards the in-group and the expression of negativity towards the out-

group (Nesdale et al., 2005). On the other hand, group memberships do not have to exclusively diverge people. According to Gulick (1955), sharing the same culture can help out in easing the tension between groups by promoting interdependence. This somewhat harkens back to Kant (1795), who specifically identifies liberalism as best the best fitting set of values for a pacifying factor's role, because of the ability to decrease tension between members of different groups (Rousseau, Veen, 2005). Interdependence is an especially powerful device for eliciting the effect of a stronger assumed similarity between groups working together (Orbell, Dawes, 1991). Consequently assumed similarity can become a potent and reliable predictor for a possible connection between groups, which in turn can make attraction become possible (Montoya, Horton, Kircher, 2008). Building on this, eventually even a friendship like connection can start to evolve between members of different groups (Selfhout et al., 2009).

However, the specific countries covered in this study are not known for a friendly bond which would stem from historical cooperation. On the contrary, both the past shared history of the two countries, which was marked with blood and conflict, and the current political reality do not render the two countries similar in terms of democratic values. This can be illustrated by the EU-Russia summit of 2007, when Russia was strongly criticized for its suppression of political freedom, centralization of power as well as a reemerging authoritarian regime (Larivé, 2008). In this sense, however, Hungary does not stand amongst the biggest opponents of Russia. Leonard and Popescu (2007) have identified five categories of European countries according to their approach to Russia. On this scale Hungary ranks in the middle and is identified as a friendly pragmatist. One possible explanation for this is the fact that, not in great contrast to Russia, there are tendencies in Hungarian politics that lean towards centralization of power and strengthening the regulation of the media. In general though, Hungarians are not expected to have positive views

of Russia. However, by controlling for the way they assume Russia to be of similar values, a noticeable improvement in their opinions is expected to show, even if in general the opinions would still stay negative.

## **1.4 Emotions**

Emotions are a widely covered topic in modern psychology. Several prominent scholars have tried to pin down basic emotions so as to provide the foundation for the myriad of secondary emotions that lack a universal spread across cultures. Of the researches specializing in emotions, the most prominent would probably be Silvan Tompkins (known for his double level emotions) and Paul Ekman (known for suggesting that basic emotions are encompassed by anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise). Although the identification of basic emotions is a prominent research field in psychology (Marcus, MacKuen, 2004), smaller lists or isolated emotions that would surround specific research questions are also studied. The strength of influence and causes of these emotions often become the focus of research. The scientific community understands the importance of knowing why people might be angry or scared and how such emotions can affect these people and influence their judgment (Marcus, MacKuen, 1994). Research on emotions has been conducted in more or less all fields of social and behavioral sciences; politics and political science are not an exception.

According to Marcus and MacKuen (1994), there are two approaches to influencing the direction and strength of the electorate's opinion. Political scientists stress the importance of convincing and persuading the electorate in order to shift the direction of their attitudes towards political realities. On the other hand, pollsters and political consultants focus on the tactic of

moving emotions and eliciting emotional responses. It should be noted that both strategies have some truth to them and political scientists should not ignore the value of emotional implications on the way the electorate's opinions are swayed and constructed. While largely ignored, the effect of emotional tactics on voter behavior has been explored by a few political science studies. Some of them have been running for a number of years, with ANES (American National Election Studies) being a prime example. Conducted since 1980, the comprehensive ANES studies of American voters cover an array of behavior influencing topics, including emotional reactions, thus giving solid data for researchers interested in the field emotional ties to political behavior. Emotional responses have been shown to have distinct and powerful effects on political behavior. However, emotions and their evaluation remain a broad subject, which requires some simplification and narrowing down to more concrete categories in order to be more accessible. Two prominent scholars of this field, Michael MacKuen and George E. Marcus, have been pursuing the goal of categorizing emotional responses in a number of their studies.

If one would simplify the span of emotional responses as encompassed by two axes of enthusiasm/depression, and anxiety/ reassurance, then the more direct effects of emotional responses can be identified. According to Marcus and MacKuen (1993), the prime influencing mood when it comes to candidate preference is enthusiasm, meaning that whichever candidate makes the voter more enthusiastic will be the candidate they choose. Additionally, enthusiasm is the principal emotional foundation for mobilization, in the sense that if greater enthusiasm can be roused by candidates, this will increase interest in the political campaign. The axis encompassing anxiety and reassurance is less powerful when it comes to influencing preferences for candidates. However, in some elections it might still be the deciding factor as voters tend to prefer the candidate which makes them less nervous; additionally, this axis is more important when it comes

to learning about the campaign. Political battles that raise more anxiety tend to make the electorate more aware and generate increased levels of knowledge on the candidates, their political views and major issues. Finally, the anxiety and reassurance axis tends to heavily influence the electorate's intention to rely on prior ideas and habits when making political choices. This is so because greater levels of anxiety arising from the campaign or the candidates themselves decreases the reliance on partisanship as the underlying foundation for political preferences and making political choices, thus giving up the spotlight to the contemporary mood of comparative enthusiasm. In the end, three specific dimensions of "precocious affective appraisal" are defined by the authors as anxiety, enthusiasm and aversion (Marcus, 2003 as seen in Marcus, Neuman, MacKuen, 2008).

In order to answer why specific emotional vectors or moods are chosen for such studies, Marcus and MacKuen, (1994) provide a comprehensive and simple explanation: usually the emotional vectors are chosen based on works of psychologists that specialize in this specific field. Meaning that it is preferred to use emotions that are considered basic or prime. This is based on the fact that they are more supported by the literature and their rigorous stability is proven by years of continuous research. Because of the reliance on using "basic" emotions in studies, the body of literature on them has grown throughout the years and the stable and powerful effects they have on different responses continues to make them prime choices for such studies. Continuing on from the choice of emotions, there still persists the question on how exactly the emotional background influences judgment making, especially in the political sphere.

Emotions serve a valuable role in helping the electorate navigate the various political realities, helping the voter to more accurately differentiate known and familiar situations that require stable and learned responses from unfamiliar and new situations that require attention and

new approaches (Wolak, Marcus, 2007). The theory of affective intelligence states that people respond to political situations not without being influenced by first hand on the spot appraisals, which are based in a dual system of emotional responses and are usually preconscious (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000). In situations where a person is in contact with familiar friends or foes, he or she leans towards the appraisal system which is based around the varying equilibrium between the emotions of enthusiasm and anger. Using the information gathered from that appraisal people assess the situation and resort to previously employed strategies of managing familiar and recurring events (Wolak, Marcus, 2007). The fact that people have already experienced similar emotional background in certain types of situations points to a reliance on previous coping tactics because of ease and quick accessibility. However, when people encounter unfamiliar circumstances, the second appraisal system which is based around anxiety is activated. As anxiety levels rise people tend to become more attentive to the immediate circumstances and tend to lean towards deliberate strategies instead of falling back on habitual responses (Wolak, Marcus, 2007). Because of this, precocious affective appraisal systems in themselves hold a two pronged effect: firstly, they allow for the detection of contextual situations that are suitable to tackle through previously learned routines. Secondly, they alert the person when a situation is novel and thus requires an attentive approach, since falling back to previous tactics and actions schemes would not be as effective (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000).

Special mention has to be drawn to a specific debate which cannot go unmentioned, a debate that is linked to emotion-based studies that center on how and whether contradicting emotions should be pitted against each other in questionnaires or rather should all questions stay focused on a single emotion. In this regard focusing refers to the type of answers to a question that give an option of merely not feeling a stated emotion, as opposed to forcing the respondent to pick between

the emotion and an antagonistic emotion (example: happy/not happy – single emotion scale and happy/sad – dual antagonistic emotional scale).

An important part of measuring and studying arousal by emotions via arousal measurement (irrelevant of whether it is the frequency or intensity that takes up the focus), is the idea of paying attention to only one mood term or emotion at the time. The alternative to the aforementioned approach is putting two confronting emotional reactions on different sides of the scale. However, this dichotomous response format is prone to being critiqued for the possibly of losing valuable data by arbitrarily linking two opposing emotions. By doing so, there remains a possibly of forfeiting certain knowledge by cutting down on emotional combinations, i.e. it is of greater explanatory value to ask a respondent how pleased and how disgusted he might be rather than linking these two options into one scale (Marcus, MacKuen, 2004).

Although even prominent defenders of keeping scales rooted to one emotion at the time like Marcus and MacKuen agree that there is use for dichotomous emotional scales. In the end, they feel the added safety and possible additional information from keeping with one emotion per question is ample enough justification for sticking with only singular emotional scales. Following their example this study will do just that.



## Chapter 2: Formation of the assumptions and hypotheses

As mentioned previously, this study builds heavily on past research forming around it and aiming to broaden the body of literature both by comparison with past findings and inclusion of new material. Because of the chosen approach, some explanations on the changes to the original method as well as continuities of it are required. First of all, the hypotheses dealing with power asymmetry and value similarity are formed according to the original papers' initial assumptions, not according to the findings. For continuity's sake, checking the influence of the factors covered in the original study again seemed like the more appropriate approach rather than shifting the statements of classical theories according to the findings of Rousseau, Müller and Garcia-Retamero.

This study adds supplementary hypotheses based around new dimensions included in the research: 1. Hypotheses dealing with the influence of interaction with Russia on threat perception 2. Hypotheses dealing with the influence of suffering from Russia on threat perception 3. Hypotheses dealing with the influence of general knowledge of Russia on threat perception.

### **2.1 Hypotheses**

Hypotheses dealing with Value Similarity:

Hypothesis 1: Similarity check with Hungary. When provided with information that portrays Russia to be of similar values to European Union countries, it is suspected that the perceived

similarity between Hungary and Russia will increase. Additionally, power asymmetry is expected to not have an influence on similarity if given in isolation.

Hypothesis 2: Similarity check with European Union. When provided with information that portrays Russia to be of similar values to European Union countries, it is suspected that the perceived similarity between European Union countries and Russia will increase. Additionally, power asymmetry is expected to not have an influence on similarity if given in isolation.

Hypothesis 3: The influence of value similarity on threat perception check. When provided with information that portrays Russia to be of similar values to European Union countries, it is suspected that the threat perception of the respondents will be decreased.

Hypothesis 4: The influence of value similarity on the “warmth” of feelings check. When provided with information that portrays Russia to be of similar values to European Union countries, it is suspected that the warmth of the feelings towards Russia (measured with the feeling thermometer) will increase. Additionally, power asymmetry is expected to not have an influence on similarity if given in isolation.

Hypothesis 5: The influence of similar values on emotional responses. When provided with information that portrays Russia to be of similar values to European Union countries, it is suspected that the respondents will feel increased feelings of enthusiasm and decreased levels of anxiety and aversion. Contrary to that, when provided with information that portrays Russia to be of dissimilar values to European Union countries it is suspected that the respondents will feel decreased feelings of enthusiasm and increased levels of anxiety and aversion.

### Hypotheses dealing with Power Asymmetry:

Hypothesis 6: The influence of power asymmetry on threat perception check. When provided with information that portrays Russia to be of greater military might than Hungary, it is suspected that the perceived threat perception of the Hungarian respondents will increase. On the other hand, when provided with information that portrays Russia to be of lesser military might than Hungary and its EU allies, it is suspected that the perceived threat perception of the Hungarian respondents will decrease.

Hypothesis 7: The influence of power asymmetry on willingness to cooperate check. When provided with information that portrays Russia to be of similar values to European Union countries, it is suspected that the willingness of the respondents to answer positively to cooperation with Russia will increase.

Hypothesis 8: The influence of power asymmetry on emotional responses. When provided with information that portrays Russia to be of greater military might than Hungary, it is suspected that the respondents will feel decreased feelings of enthusiasm and increased levels of anxiety and aversion. On the other hand, when provided with information that portrays Russia to be of lesser military might than Hungary and its EU allies, it is suspected that the respondents will feel increased feelings of enthusiasm and decreased levels of anxiety and aversion.

### Hypothesis dealing with the interaction between Value Similarity and Power Asymmetry:

Hypothesis 9: The interaction between power asymmetry and value similarity check. When provided with information that portrays Russia to be of similar values to European Union countries in addition to Russia being portrayed to be of lesser military might than Hungary and its EU allies

it is suspected that the threat perception of respondents will decrease beyond a simple linear additive model. On the other hand, when provided with information that portrays Russia to be of dissimilar values to European Union countries in addition to Russia being portrayed to be of greater military might than Hungary it is suspected that the threat perception of respondents will increase beyond a simple linear additive model.

#### Hypotheses dealing with Suffering:

Hypothesis 10: The influence of suffering on threat perception check. Respondents who think that their family and Hungary have suffered from Russia are suspected to feel a greater threat perception. Contrary to that, respondents who think their family and Hungary have not suffered from Russia are suspected to feel a decreased threat perception.

Hypothesis 11: The influence of suffering on willingness to cooperate. Respondents who think that their family and Hungary have suffered from Russia are suspected to be less inclined to support cooperation between Hungary and Russia. Contrary to that, respondents who think their family and Hungary have not suffered from Russia are suspected to be more inclined to cooperate.

Hypothesis 12: The influence of suffering on the “warmth” of feelings check. Respondents who think that their family and Hungary have suffered from Russia are suspected to feel decreased feelings of warmth towards Russia (measured with the feeling thermometer). Contrary to that, respondents who think their family and Hungary have not suffered from Russia are suspected to have increased feelings of warmth.

Hypothesis 13: The influence of suffering on emotional responses. Respondents who think that their family and Hungary have suffered from Russia are suspected to feel decreased feelings

of enthusiasm and increased levels of anxiety and aversion. Contrary to that, respondents who think their family and Hungary have not suffered from Russia are suspected to feel increased feelings of enthusiasm and decreased levels of anxiety and aversion.

#### Hypotheses dealing with Interaction:

Hypothesis 14: The influence of interaction on threat perception check. Respondents who know Russian nationals or have been to Russia are suspected to feel a decreased threat perception. Contrary to that, respondents who do not know Russian nationals and have never been to Russia are suspected to feel an increased threat perception.

Hypothesis 15: The influence of interaction on willingness to cooperate. Respondents who know Russian nationals or have been to Russia are suspected to be more inclined to cooperate with Russia. Contrary to that, respondents who do not know Russian nationals and have never been to Russia are suspected to be less inclined to cooperate with Russia.

Hypothesis 16: The influence of interaction on the “warmth” of feelings check. Respondents who know Russian nationals or have been to Russia are suspected to feel increased feelings of warmth towards Russia (measured with the feeling thermometer). Contrary to that, respondents who do not know Russian nationals and have never been to Russia are suspected to feel decreased feelings of warmth towards Russia.

Hypothesis 17: The influence of interaction on emotional responses. Respondents who know Russian nationals or have been to Russia are suspected to feel increased feelings of enthusiasm and decreased levels of anxiety and aversion. Contrary to that, respondents who do not know

Russian nationals and have never been to Russia are suspected to feel decreased feelings of enthusiasm and increased levels of anxiety and aversion.

#### Hypotheses dealing with Knowledge:

Hypothesis 18: The influence of knowledge on threat perception check. Respondents who possess a greater knowledge of Russia are suspected to feel a decreased threat perception. Contrary to that, respondents who possess lower levels of knowledge of Russia are suspected to feel an increased threat perception.

Hypothesis 19: The influence of knowledge on willingness to cooperate. Respondents who possess a greater knowledge of Russia are suspected to be more inclined to cooperate with Russia. Contrary to that, respondents who possess lower levels of knowledge of Russia are suspected to be less inclined to cooperate with Russia.

Hypothesis 20: The influence of knowledge on the “warmth” of feelings check. Respondents who possess a greater knowledge of Russia are suspected to feel increased feelings of warmth towards Russia (measured with the feeling thermometer). Contrary to that, respondents who possess lower levels of knowledge of Russia are suspected to feel decreased feelings of warmth towards Russia.

Hypothesis 21: The influence of knowledge on emotional responses. Respondents who possess a greater knowledge of Russia are suspected to feel increased feelings of enthusiasm and decreased levels of anxiety and aversion. Contrary to that, respondents who possess lower levels of knowledge of Russia are suspected to feel decreased feelings of enthusiasm and increased levels of anxiety and aversion.

Comparative hypothesis:

Hypothesis 22: Comparative check. Taken the results of the study that are comparable with the data of Rousseau, Müller, Garcia-Retamero 2012 study, it is expected to see dissimilar values and negative asymmetry to be more potent in their influence on corresponding effects and similar attitudes and positive power asymmetry to be less potent in the Hungarian population.

## ***2.2 Research Experiment methodology***

First of all, participants will have to read a short paragraph that deals with the military power of Russia as compared with the countries of the European Union. The paragraphs would vary according to the group the respondents would be assigned to: that is, the power balance of Russia would be asymmetrical to either Russia's advantage or Russia's disadvantage. Additionally, paragraphs would also show value similarities between the European Union in general and Russia, either portraying Russia as sharing values or as having different ones. After reading the provided paragraph respondents would be asked to answer questions that deal with:

1. Degree of threat the respondents think Russia poses (both military and economy based)
2. Degree of similarities the respondents think exist between Russia and Hungary/EU countries
3. Degree of positive effect the respondents feel towards Russia
4. Degree of willingness the respondents have to cooperate with Russia

These are the questions that were given to the respondents in the original study. However with the expansion into countries that have bigger historical and geopolitical ties with Russia, additional questions are added to the survey:

5. Degree of general knowledge the respondents have of Russia
6. Degree of personal interaction the respondents have with Russia
7. Degree of suffering the respondents feel that their families and Hungary has undergone because of Russia

Democracy and markets as key values were selected because prior experimental research showed that these were the specific spheres that were mostly used by individuals when comparing states on a free and undirected manner (Rousseau, 2006).

### **2.2.1 Method**

#### *Participants:*

The participants were 198 contracted respondents, 102 males and 96 females. The age range is 18 to 31. They were randomly assigned to one of four groups, based on the balance of military power and the degree of value similarity between the countries. Respondents were provided with financial restitution and free coffee for participating in the study<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> The current study was not the only experiment the respondents were involved with. Additionally, three more experimental studies by other researchers were lined up in the session. Since the surveys were computer based,



*Demographics in groups:*

Value similarity + Negative power asymmetry group had 40 respondents out of which 21 were male, with the average age of 22.2 and on average the respondents have a high school education.

Value similarity + positive power asymmetry group had 51 respondents out of which 26 were male, with the average age of 21.9 and on average the respondents have a high school education.

No value similarity + negative power asymmetry group had 48 respondents out of which 24 were male, with the average age of 22.6 and on average the respondents have a high school education.

No value similarity + positive power asymmetry group had 59 respondents out of which 31 were male, with the average age of 22.2 and on average the respondents have a high school education.

The demographic information is presented in table 1.

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the placing of specific studies was randomized. Note, although all studies were dealing with politics they were very dissimilar in nature thus, randomization should have alleviated any unlikely, yet theoretically possible anchoring.

**Table 1. Demographic information of the four Value Similarity/Power Asymmetry groups**

	<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Average Age</b>	<b>Highest Age</b>	<b>Lowest Age</b>	<b>Average Education</b>
<b>Value Similarity Negative Power</b>	40	21	19	~ 22.2	27	18	High school diploma
<b>Value Similarity Positive Power</b>	51	26	25	~ 21.9	31	18	High school diploma
<b>Value Dissimilarity Negative Power</b>	48	24	24	~ 22.6	31	19	High school diploma
<b>Value Dissimilarity Positive Power</b>	59	31	28	~ 22.2	28	19	High school diploma

*The average age of the respondents is rounded up to the first decimal. The average education is determined by both the positioning of the achieved education in an educational ladder as well as being the mode.*

#### *Procedure:*

The participants had to complete a survey that took approximately 30 minutes. First, they had to read a paragraph that dealt with military capabilities and values of Russia. Depending on the group to which they were assigned, the paragraph compared Russia's military with the military of Hungary (Negative power asymmetry) or Russia's military compared to the military of Hungary and its EU allies (Positive power asymmetry). Also Russia was portrayed as having similar values to the western world (Value similarity) or as having dissimilar values to the western world (No

value similarity). After reading the paragraph the respondents had to answer a battery of questions. First, we asked the participants to fill out emotional scales that dealt with how they felt after reading the paragraph. On a scale of 1 to 7 where 1 indicated a strong feeling of an emotion and 7 indicated no feeling of that emotion they had to rank hatefulness, hopefulness, enthusiasm, anger, resentfulness, fear, pride, bitterness, worry and anxiousness. The data gathered from these questions were later separated into three bigger categories according to (Marcus, 2003) where Anxiety is represented by anxious, worried, afraid; Enthusiasm is represented by enthusiastic, hopeful, proud and Aversion is represented by hate, angry, bitter and resentful. In the next step, the respondents were asked how much of a military threat Russia is to Hungary on a 10-point scale where 0 meant not at all and 10 meant extremely threatening. Then they were asked how much of an economic threat Russia was on an identical scale as the one used for military threat. After that, respondent's feelings of similarity were checked: they were asked to identify how similar they thought Russia was to Hungary on a 5 point scale where -2 meant it was dissimilar, -1 meant more dissimilar than similar, 0 meant a neutral stance, 1 meant more similar than similar and 2 mean it was similar; an identical scale was used to measure respondents' perception on similarity between Russia and the EU. Continuing on, the respondents were asked about their feelings towards Russia, which they had to indicate using a feeling thermometer where 0-24 was very unfavorable or cold, 25-49 was unfavorable, 50 was neither warm nor cold, 51-74 was favorable and 75-100 was very favorable or warm<sup>2</sup>. In the next step, the respondents were asked questions dealing with their

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<sup>2</sup> It is worth mentioning, that this study followed closely in the footsteps of Garcia-Retamero, Müller and Rousseau's 2012 study. However, since in the original study the authors conducted a multivariate analysis of variance or MANOVA with trichotomous variable for the warmth towards Russia thermometer (ignoring MANOVA's assumption of a continuous normal distribution), this study took a different route. For this research it was decided to stick with statistical integrity and not run the warmth thermometer in a three category non-

willingness to cooperate with Russia. The questions dealt with: 1. International trade agreement that results in small economic gains by Hungary but major economic gains by Russia 2. Increasing trade with Russia 3. Sale of personal computers, which can be used for both civilian and military purposes, to Russia 4. Increasing Hungarian business investment in Russia 5. Increasing European Union business investment in Russia. All these questions had to be answered using a 5 point scale where -2 meant strong opposition to the idea, -1 meant opposition to the idea 1 meant support for the idea, 2 meant strong support for the idea and 0 meant that the respondent was not sure. With this in toll, the next part of the survey dealt with respondents' general knowledge of Russia. Six multiple choice questions were given (the correct answer is in bold, additionally every question had an option "I don't know"): 1. Who is the current prime minister of Russia? (Vladimir Putin, **Dmitry Medvedev**, Sergei Lavrov) 2. What is the population of Russia? (~ 50 million, ~ **140 million**, ~ 260 million) 3. Which of the following has a land border with Russia? (**Mongolia**, Afghanistan, Pakistan) 4. What was the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita of Russia in 2011? (~ **13,000 USD**, ~ 25,000 USD, ~ 55,000 USD) 5. Who is currently in charge of the Russian communist party? (Sergei Mitrochin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, **Genadij Zyuganov**) 6. Which of the following international organizations Russia does not belong to? (World Trade Organization, **Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development**, Council of Europe). All six questions were later compiled into one general category of knowledge that was represented by the sum of correct answers each person submitted. Next the respondents were given questions that dealt with suffering from Russia. They were asked to indicate: 1. Have they or anyone in their family suffered from Russia? 2. Do they believe that Hungary has suffered from Russia? The

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continuous scale, instead the variable was recoded in a more acceptable way. The results were checked using the method the authors of the original study used i.e. multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA).

respondents had to simply answer yes or no, however an option “I don’t want to say/I don’t know” was also offered. Finally, two questions dealing with personal interaction with Russia were given: 1. Do you personally know any Russian nationals? 2. Have you ever been to Russia? Both of these questions had a dichotomous options of yes or no. A more detailed overview of the questionnaire and initial paragraphs can be found in the appendix.

### **2.2.2 Statistics:**

Six separate multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) were run, alpha level .05, Bonferroni tests were used for post hoc analyses.

#### *MANOVA 1:*

Independent variables: Groups according to whether they received the paragraphs with positive power asymmetry or negative power asymmetry

Dependent variables: Anxiety, Enthusiasm, Aversion, Military threat, Economy threat, Similarity with Hungary, Similarity with EU, Feeling Thermometer and Cooperation questions 1 through 5.

#### *MANOVA 2:*

Independent variables: Groups according to whether they received the paragraphs with similar values or dissimilar values

Dependent variables: Anxiety, Enthusiasm, Aversion, Military threat, Economy threat, Similarity with Hungary, Similarity with EU, Feeling Thermometer and Cooperation questions 1 through 5.

#### *MANOVA 3:*

Independent variable: Groups according to interaction between power asymmetry and value similarity, which were defined by the paragraphs the respondents read before answering the questions

Dependent variables: Anxiety, Enthusiasm, Aversion, Military threat, Economy threat, Similarity with Hungary, Similarity with EU, Feeling Thermometer and Cooperation questions 1 through 5.

*MANOVA 4:*

Independent variable: Groups according to the variable Suffered, which was computed by adding up the answers for questions “Have you or anyone in their family suffered from Russia?” and “Do you believe that Hungary has suffered from Russia?”.

Dependent variables: Anxiety, Enthusiasm, Aversion, Military threat, Economy threat, Similarity with Hungary, Similarity with EU, Feeling Thermometer and Cooperation questions 1 through 5.

*MANOVA 5:*

Independent variable: Groups according to the variable Interaction which was computed by adding up the answers for questions “Do you personally know any Russian nationals?” and “Have you ever been to Russia?”

Dependent variables: Anxiety, Enthusiasm, Aversion, Military threat, Economy threat, Similarity with Hungary, Similarity with EU, Feeling Thermometer and Cooperation questions 1 through 5.

*MANOVA 6:*

Independent variable: Groups according to the variable Knowledge, which, as already mentioned before, was computed by adding up the scores for all the general knowledge questions about Russia.

Dependent variables: Anxiety, Enthusiasm, Aversion, Military threat, Economy threat, Similarity with Hungary, Similarity with EU, Feeling Thermometer and Cooperation questions 1 through 5.

### 2.2.3 Results

In this part the results will be overviewed grouping them together by factors whose effects have been tested.

Before reviewing the final results a few important steps have to be addressed. Firstly, the results for the emotional questions were tested in order to see whether they would fall into the right categories. A Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was run and gave a result of .843, which meant that a factor analysis was possible. Three factors managed to explain 73,84% of all variance (Table 2). It must be mentioned that the model does not fit perfectly. Only the category of Enthusiasm shows a nice fit, while the emotional category of Anxiety shows overlapping, as emotional responses meant for the category of Aversion fall into this category a well. Additionally, the emotional response of bitterness, which should have fallen in the category of Aversion does not fit the model (Table 3). However, keeping in mind the theory the emotional responses were based on in concordance with the fact that a two variable approach would have only explained 65,66% of the variance, it was decided to stick with the three categories. An approach that did not go against the theory (Marcus, 2003).

**Table 2. Variance explanation using the factor rotation method**

Emotional response categories	Explained percent of variance
1	46,611
2	65,658
3	<b>73,835</b>

*Only three categories were included as the theory did not support a higher number of categories.*

**Table 3. Component matrix of the emotional subscales**

Emotional component Matrix			
Emotion	Anxiety	Enthusiasm	Aversion
Hateful	,712	-,111	<b>,421</b>
Hopeful	-,285	<b>,794</b>	,045
Enthusiastic	,024	<b>,860</b>	,127
Angry	,843	,062	<b>,402</b>
Resentful	,859	,055	<b>,277</b>
Afraid	<b>,788</b>	,033	-,314
Proud	,224	<b>,706</b>	-,206
Bitter	,844	,057	<b>-,030</b>
Worried	<b>,786</b>	-,105	-,341
Anxious	<b>,788</b>	,046	-,354

*Loadings of variables onto factors that are shown in bold represent how the subscales are supposed to fall into factors according to theory.*

Category of knowledge: no one in the sample of this study managed to answer all six questions correctly. Additionally, there were only 9 people who got four answers correctly, and even fewer – 2 people got five answers correctly. Because of that, knowledge was recoded in the following way: 0 correct answers – no knowledge group (37 participants), 1 correct answer – low knowledge group (71 participant), 2 correct answers – average knowledge group (43 participants) and 3+ correct answers – high knowledge group (47 participants).

Category of interaction: 117 respondents had neither been to Russia nor knew a Russian national; 76 people had either been to Russia or knew a Russian national and only 5 people both knew a Russian national and had been to Russia. Owing to the gathered data, the variable was recoded into a dichotomous one where 0 answers in interaction categories – no interaction group and 1+ answers in interaction categories – interaction group.

With these issues addressed, the results for separate MANOVAs will now be covered.



### *Power Asymmetry*

Box's Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices was first run. A significance value of 0.614 was achieved,  $p > 0.05$ ; we see that the data is homogenous and a MANOVA can be run.

However,

Wilks' Lambda turned out to have a significance value of 0.766. Checking for outliers did not increase the fit of the model so it was not run. Because of this, Hypotheses 6 through 8 were discarded.

### *Value Similarity*

Box's Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices was first run. A significance value of 0.194 was achieved,  $p > 0.05$ ; we see that the data is homogenous and a MANOVA can be run. Wilks' Lambda turned out to be of a 0.001 significance value  $p < 0.05$ ; the model was good. Checking Levene's equality of error variance discarded two variables. Military threat (significance value 0.003,  $p < 0.05$ ) and Economic Threat (significance value 0.000,  $p < 0.05$ ). Additionally, one more variable had to be revised before analysis could be run: Similarity with EU countries (significance value 0.032, thus we needed to change the alpha to 0.025 to keep the variable,  $p < 0.025$ ).

Test of between subject effects showed statistically significant differences in two variables: Similarity with EU countries (Value similar group: mean -0.58, standard deviation 1.034; Value dissimilar group: mean -1.15, standard deviation 0.909) (Table 4) and Enthusiasm (Value similar group: mean 12.1, standard deviation 3.525; Value dissimilar group mean: 14.29, standard deviation 3.89) (Table 5).

**Table 4. Descriptive statistics for Similarity with the European Union based on power asymmetry**

<i>Similarity with EU</i>	Mean	Standard Deviation	Alpha level
Value Similar	-0.58	1.034	0.00
Value Dissimilar	-1.15	0.909	

*Lower numbers in the mean means less similarity*

**Table 5. Descriptive statistics for the Enthusiasm emotional scale based on power asymmetry**

<i>Enthusiasm</i>	Mean	Standard Deviation	Alpha level
Value Similar	12.1	3.525	0.00
Value Dissimilar	14.29	3.89	

*Higher numbers in the mean means less enthusiasm*

#### *Value Similarity x Power Asymmetry*

Box's Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices was first run. A significance value of 0.189 was achieved,  $p > 0.05$ ; we see that the data is homogenous and a MANOVA can be run. Wilks' Lambda turned out to be of a 0.1 significance value  $p < 0.1$ ; the model was good using a more liberal alpha level of 0.1. Checking Levene's equality of error variance discarded two variables Military threat (significance value 0.013,  $p < 0.05$ ) and Economic Threat (significance value 0.003,  $p < 0.05$ ). Test of between subject effects showed statistically significant differences in two variables: Similarity with EU countries (significance value 0.001,  $p < 0.05$ ) and Enthusiasm (significance value 0.000,  $p < 0.05$ ). The Bonferroni post hoc test showed where the significant differences were amongst branches:

Similarity with EU countries:

Value similarity x Negative power asymmetry (Mean -0.55, Standard Deviation 1.108) with Value Dissimilarity x Negative power asymmetry (Mean -1.21, Standard Deviation 0.922); Value similarity x Negative power asymmetry (Mean -0.55, Standard Deviation 1.108) with Value Dissimilarity x Positive power asymmetry (Mean -1.1, Standard Deviation 0.94); Value similarity x Positive power asymmetry (Mean -0.61, Standard Deviation 0.981) with Value Dissimilarity x Positive power asymmetry (Mean -1.1, Standard Deviation 0.94)

(Results are summarized in table 6)

**Table 6. Results of the tests between subjects effects (Bonferroni post hoc analysis)**

<b>Similarity with EU</b>	Value similarity Negative power	Value similarity Positive power	No value similarity Negative power	No value similarity Positive power
Value similarity Negative power		1.000 p>0.05	<b>0.011</b> <b>p&lt;0.05</b>	<b>0.037</b> <b>p&lt;0.05</b>
Value similarity Positive power	1.000 p>0.05		<b>0.015</b> <b>p&lt;0.05</b>	0.051 p>0.05
No value similarity Negative power	<b>0.011</b> <b>p&lt;0.05</b>	<b>0.015</b> <b>p&lt;0.05</b>		1.000 p>0.05
No value similarity Positive power	<b>0.037</b> <b>p&lt;0.05</b>	0.051 p>0.05	1.000 p>0.05	

*Results in bold show a statistical significance. Alpha level 0.05*

Enthusiasm:

Value similarity x Negative power asymmetry (Mean 11,73, Standard Deviation 3.748) with Value Dissimilarity x Negative power asymmetry (Mean 14.73, Standard Deviation 3.945); Value similarity x Negative power asymmetry (Mean 11,73, Standard Deviation 3.748) with Value Dissimilarity x Positive power asymmetry (Mean 13.93, Standard Deviation 3.841); Value similarity x Positive power asymmetry (Mean 12.39, Standard Deviation 3.748) with Value Dissimilarity x Positive power asymmetry (Mean 13.93, Standard Deviation 3.841)

(Results are summarized in table 7)

**Table 7. Results of the tests between subjects effects (Bonferroni post hoc analysis)**

<b>Enthusiasm</b>	Value similarity Negative power	Value similarity Positive power	No value similarity Negative power	No value similarity Positive power
Value similarity Negative power		1.000 p>0.05	<b>0.001</b> <b>p&lt;0.05</b>	<b>0.026</b> <b>p&lt;0.05</b>
Value similarity Positive power	1.000 p>0.05		<b>0.013</b> <b>p&lt;0.05</b>	0.192 p>0.05
No value similarity Negative power	<b>0.001</b> <b>p&lt;0.05</b>	<b>0.013</b> <b>p&lt;0.05</b>		1.000 p>0.05
No value similarity Positive power	<b>0.026</b> <b>p&lt;0.05</b>	0.192 p>0.05	1.000 p>0.05	

*Results in bold show a statistical significance. Alpha level 0.05*

## Suffering

Box's Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices was first run. A significance value of 0.025 was achieved,  $p < 0.05$ ; we see that the data is not homogenous so the MANOVA was not run. Checking for outliers did not increase the fit of the model so it was not run. Owing to this, Hypotheses 10 through 13 were discarded.

## Interaction

Box's Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices was first run. A significance value of 0.119 was achieved,  $p > 0.05$ ; we see that the data is homogenous and a MANOVA can be run. Wilks' Lambda turned out to be of a 0.06 significance value  $p < 0.1$ ; the model was good. Checking Levene's equality of error variance discarded the Cooperation question 1 (significance value 0.01,  $p < 0.05$ ). Additionally, two more variables had to be revised before analysis could be run. Cooperation question 2 (significance value 0.039, thus we needed to change the alpha to 0.025 to keep the variable,  $p < 0.025$ ) and Similarity with Hungary (significance value 0.04 thus we needed to change the alpha to 0.025 to keep the variable,  $p < 0.025$ ). Test of between subject effects showed statistically significant differences in two variables: Enthusiasm (No interaction group mean 13.85, standard deviation 3.755; interaction group mean: 12.47, standard deviation 3.925) and Thermometer (No interaction group mean 1.82, standard deviation 0.877; interaction group mean: 2.16, standard deviation 0.915)

## Knowledge

Box's Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices was first run. A significance value of 0.029 was achieved,  $p < 0.05$ ; we see that the data is not homogenous so the MANOVA was not run. Because of this, Hypotheses 18 through 21 were discarded.

## Chapter 3: General Discussion

To summarize the findings in the study: it can be safely assumed that Power Asymmetry in its own right did not produce an effect on the way the respondents felt about Russia and perceived the possibilities of cooperation with the country. On the other hand, Value Similarity produced two noteworthy findings: differences in perceived similarity with the EU and Enthusiasm. When both power asymmetry and value similarity were paired, two noteworthy findings were noticed: again, respondents perceived different levels of similarity between Russia and the EU countries as well as felt differing levels of Enthusiasm. Both varying levels knowledge and assumed suffering produced data, which was convoluted and was not included in the study. Finally, varying levels of Interaction between Russia and its nationals with the Hungarian respondents showed differing levels in enthusiasm felt in addition to differing levels of warmth felt towards Russia.

### 3.1 Power

Several reasons can be hypothesized as to why power asymmetry did not have an effect on the respondents. Even without the problem with the model being convoluted, checking the means shows very little difference between groups. There are several possible reasons as to why that happened:

When the positive power asymmetry question was given to respondents in Germany and Spain (Garcia-Retamero, Müller and Rousseau, 2012) it might have been easier for them to associate EU allies with their own military strength. This is because in comparison to most other EU members these two countries have powerful militaries. Hungary does not have a substantial military when compared to Russia's, so it might have been harder for the respondents to take the

positive power asymmetry into account and associate their country with a globally strong military. Additionally, Hungary is closer to Russia than Germany or Spain. Also with the relatively recent examples of Russia's military in action during the Georgian-Russian war, the perception of Russia having a weak military is harder to imagine. Finally, it is possible that a military action is harder to conceive as a possible outcome of disputes with Russia. To quote Katinka Barysch: *Angry mobs outside the Estonian embassy in Moscow; Russian energy deals in Central Asia that seek to frustrate the EU's hopes of diversifying its energy supplies; trade dispute over meat; concerns over the murders of Vladimir Litvinenko and Anna Politkovskaya; Kremlin threats towards the Czech Republic and Poland over missile defense; disagreements over Ukraine's EU aspirations and the 'frozen' conflicts in Georgia; Russia's threat to veto UN plans for Kosovo's independence* (Katinka Barysch, 2007 as seen in Larivé, 2008).

In the same vein, EU-Russian interaction must also be analysed. In recent years Russia used different strategies to express aggression: control of hydrocarbons and political prices associated with them, fifth column tactics, and singular smaller incidents. Perhaps the respondents saw a possible active military intervention as highly unlikely. Although Russia did have a recent war with Georgia, Georgia is not a member of the EU or NATO. Thus, although there are countries who have many disputes with Russia, especially Lithuania and Poland (Leonard, Popescu, 2007), in recent history there were no obvious hints of Russia actually risking a military confrontation with EU/NATO. Hence, maybe Russia's threat is now associated with Economy and a paragraph dealing with aggressive economic manipulation would have proved to be more effective for Hungarian respondents (Kamas, Otten, Grdijn, 2010)



### **3.2 Value Similarity**

Hypothesis 1 (dealing with similarity between Hungary and Russia) was rejected.

**Hypothesis 2 (dealing with similarity between Hungary and European Union countries) was supported.**

Hypothesis 3 (dealing with threat perception) was rejected.

Hypothesis 4 (dealing with “warmth” of feelings) was rejected.

**Hypothesis 5 (dealing with emotional responses) was partially supported i.e. assumptions about anxiety and aversion were rejected, while the assumption dealing with enthusiasm was supported.**

Similarity with EU:

Although both people in similar value group and the dissimilar value group found Russia on the dissimilar side of the scale when compared to the EU, similar value group found Russia to be closer to the EU, than the dissimilar value group and the difference was statistically significant. There might be several explanations why Russia was found to be closer to EU, but not closer to Hungary when asked about values like expanding markets and freedom of expression. Firstly, the wording of the question framed it as closeness to European Union countries and not Hungary specifically, so the question in itself proposed a closer association between Russia and the European Union. Additionally, perhaps Hungary, especially with its current right wing leaning politics, is harder to associate with freedom of expression, especially after the new controversial legislations of 2010 (Freedom House), while EU along with the values it aspires to is easier to associate with freedom of expression and free markets. Either way, it is important to stress it once

again that even with similar value paragraphs Russia was not found to be similar to EU (similar value condition mean -0.58). Finally, with Russia joining the WTO in 2012, the possibility that the similar value paragraphs seemed to stress something that might have already been widely publicized in the media could have had a stronger effect on the respondent's opinions. However, this speculation should be taken with a grain of salt taking into account the low correct answer response rate in questions dealing with general knowledge about Russia that was witnessed.

#### Enthusiasm:

People in the similar value group had a cumulative score on the Enthusiasm scale that was right in the middle i.e. neither enthusiastic nor not (mean 12.1, Standard Deviation 3.525; score if all three variables were scored neutral 12), while people in the dissimilar value group scored on the less enthusiastic scale (mean 14.29, Standard Deviation 3.89; Note: higher scores mean less enthusiastic). When we break down the results into the three smaller emotional scales the picture becomes somewhat clearer, results presented in Table 8:

**Table 8. Descriptive statistics of the emotional subscales of the Enthusiasm scale**

	Similar Values	Dissimilar Values
Hopeful	<b>Mean:3.45</b>	Mean:4.55
Enthusiastic	Mean:4.12	Mean:4.74
Proud	Mean:4.52	Mean:4.99

*Mean in bold highlights the biggest difference*

Hope was the sub-scale that made the big change in the results. Perhaps the joining of the WTO the previous year and the information given in the paragraph gave the impression of change happening in Russia, which was accepted as showing hope. When the out-group is seen in a social dilemma, assumed similarity can increase intention to work together (Orbell, Dawes, 1991). Russia could be seen as undergoing a transition, a welcomed transition that brought hope for the future in

the respondents. However, as previously mentioned the low response rate for the question dealing with knowledge about Russia casts a shadow of doubt on this explanation. Most people did not know what international organization Russia was not part of, so it is probable that most of them did not know that Russia had joined the WTO.

### **3.3 Power x Value Similarity**

Hypothesis 9 (dealing with threat perception) was rejected. However, some interesting findings dealing with similarity between Russia and European Union as well as enthusiasm of the respondents were found.

Interaction effect proved what the first two analyses hinted at: as suggested by social constructivists, value similarity was a stronger determinant than the realist school approach of stating that everything is determined by power asymmetries. Statistically significant differences were only found where groups diverged on values i.e. results were compared between groups with similar values and dissimilar values. Possible explanations for that were already provided. One pair in particular did stand out, as although it had succeeded in the previously stated requirement, it did not produce significant differences.

### **3.4 Suffering/Knowledge**

Both variables had to be discarded because of non-homogenous data. In the future, there should be more work and theory put into these variables in order to make them compatible with the rest of the questionnaire.

### **3.5 Interaction**

Hypothesis 14 (dealing with threat perception) was rejected.

Hypothesis 15 (dealing with willingness to cooperate) was supported.

**Hypothesis 16 (dealing with “warmth” of feelings) was supported.**

**Hypothesis 17 (dealing with emotional responses) was partially supported i.e. assumptions about anxiety and aversion were rejected, while the assumption dealing with enthusiasm was supported.**

People who had come into contact with Russian nationals and/or have been to Russia scored more favorably in both the enthusiasm emotional scale and the feeling thermometer they felt towards Russia. These findings go along with the theory. According to Stephan, Stephan (2000) although it is the quality and not the quantity in interaction that is most important in alleviating feelings of threat, there is also a tendency that any interaction, even a less friendly one, at least reduces uncertainty about the out-group and its behavior. Thus, eventually quantity of interaction also influences a more positive outlook on the out-group (Raijman, 2011). It is quite understandable then that people who know Russian nationals or have been in Russia had a lot more

contact with both the people there and the country itself, be it through actual experiences or interacting with the people they knew. Additionally, one might speculate that people who said that they knew Russian nationals had at least a somewhat deeper degree of interaction with them i.e. knew them enough to actually be able to say that they KNOW them, in this regard we can then assume that the interaction with them should have been at least noticeably pleasant. This assumption fits with the theory of Marcus and MacKuen (1993), which states that enthusiasm is activated once people have prior experience that can provide guidelines for easier assessment.

The final hypothesis in this paper suggests that negative power asymmetry and dissimilar values will have a stronger effect on the respondents and positive power asymmetry and similar values – a weaker effect than in the Rousseau, Müller and Garcia-Retamero (2012) study. The hypothesis was partially supported. On one hand, similar values did in fact have a lowered effect on the Hungarian population, as framing the information in such a way did not decrease military threat from Russia in any significant manner. On the other hand, dissimilar values did not have a strengthened effect, as even if the respondents were assigned to a group that framed Russia as an authoritarian non-capitalist country, the economic threat they felt was not significantly increased.

### **3.6 Limitations**

It should be mentioned that there are several limitations that this study did not manage to avoid.

1. As mentioned previously, this study decided to forfeit a certain level of continuity in order to preserve statistical integrity. The underlying goal of the study was to compare the

findings in Hungary with the previously published findings of Garcia-Retamero, Müller and Rousseau's 2012 study in Germany and Spain. The fact that this study added new factors and questions is complimented by a shift in statistical approach, which makes comparisons more complicated. However, the data gathered for this paper allows for future revision with a more comparable statistical approach.

2. In the future it might be reasonable to not force the emotional responses into concrete categories based purely on theory. As value similarity check on Enthusiasm showed, keeping all 10 emotional scales separate might provide additional and although smaller in scope, but more accurate assessments of effects. Although the theory stated that there is a possibility of an overlap between the scale of aversion and anxiety (Marcus, Neuman, MacKuen, 2008) the overlap in this case was extensive. Hence, an alternative might be discarding the emotional sub-scales that did not fit models like bitterness did. More conservative approaches might also provide more approachable data.
3. Similarity with the EU was included in this study alone; it was not present in the original paper. Several problems came from this. First of all, the way the paragraphs were phrased, or more specifically, the value condition where it pitted Russia not against Hungary, but against EU, might have worked for the original study, where the only similarity check was done with the countries in which the study was conducted. However, in the present study, with EU getting a separate similarity check, it might have made the results incomparable with the original study. Another problem that was caused by this inclusion was the fact that both similarity checks, i.e. "How similar do you view Russia and Hungary?" and "How similar do you view Russia and European Union countries?", were given in a fixed order instead of randomized order. There is a strong possibility that there might have been an

anchoring effect, which might have influenced the way the respondents approached the questions dealing with Russia's similarity with Hungary.

## Conclusions

As a whole, this study into threat perception showed the Hungarian population to be more robust against given information than German or Spanish respondents when it came to Russia. Value movements between similar and dissimilar and power asymmetries had negligible effects on both economic and military threat perception. The close proximity with Russia and the long and complicated history might have created a stable image of what Russia is and how it is to be approached an image that is harder to change in Hungary than in its Western neighbors. Winston Churchill once called Russia “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma”, although as the years passed Russia became more easily understood by the West, their understanding of the subtlety of the country cannot match that of countries in the post-soviet bloc, which could more closely follow the transition of the country from what was the Soviet Union to the federation that it is now. Simple understanding that can be grounded in a longer and closer interaction between the two (Raijman, 2011) an interaction that is behind the stability of view. However, this robustness was grounded to Hungary itself, as similar values were capable of tipping the respondents’ perception of Russia to be closer to the European Union. Additionally, past interaction with Russia and its nationals made some of the respondents feel warmer feelings towards the country to the east. Continuing on, enthusiasm seemed to be an emotional vector that was not stable and prone to being influenced by the right circumstances. All of this paints the picture of as Russia having a monolithic image in the minds of Hungarians, one that cannot be changed by simply increasing military might. Russia is similarly threatening to most Hungarians, who feel that this country is not at all close to their motherland. However, Russia taking up a western value system as well as more interaction with Russians and Russia in general might increase the level of warmth felt for it and influence the enthusiasm that is felt towards the country. It seems that although Hungarians



are strongly critical and possess negative opinions towards Russia, a shift in values might spark enthusiasm that is forming around hope for a change in the future, a change that might make the average Hungarian feel as if Russia is not Yin to his or her country's Yan.

## Appendix:

Initial paragraphs:

Shared value condition + power asymmetry in Russia's favour:

We would like to ask you a few questions about relations with Russia. Please read the following:

Many people believe that Russia is becoming more like the European Union due to the expanding role of markets in the economy and recent increases in freedom of expression and assembly for many groups in society. Many people focus on the fact that the Russians have increased defence spending by over 10% a year for the last several years.

Shared value condition + power asymmetry not in Russia's favour:

We would like to ask you a few questions about relations with Russia. Please read the following:

Many people believe that Russia is becoming more like the European Union due to the expanding role of markets in the economy and recent increases in freedom of expression and assembly for many groups in society. Many people focus on the fact that total Russian defence spending remains only about 10% of the defence spending of Hungary and its NATO allies.

Diverging value condition + power asymmetry in Russia's favour:

We would like to ask you a few questions about relations with Russia. Please read the following:

Many people believe that Russia is becoming less like the European Union due to the control of the economy by government bureaucrats and the tightening grip of the President over society.

Many people focus on the fact that the Russians have increased defence spending by over 10% a year for the last several years.

Diverging value condition + power asymmetry not in Russia's favour:

We would like to ask you a few questions about relations with Russia. Please read the following:

Many people believe that Russia is becoming less like the European Union due to the control of the economy by government bureaucrats and the tightening grip of the President over society. Many people focus on the fact that total Russian defence spending remains only about 10% of the defence spending of Hungary and its NATO allies.

Emotional response questions:

Now we would like to understand how you feel about the story you just read. People have various emotional reactions to stories like this one; we'd like to get your own personal reaction. Please concentrate on your feelings rather than your thoughts.

Hateful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Hateful
Hopeful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Hopeful
Enthusiastic	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Enthusiastic
Angry	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Angry
Resentful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Resentful
Afraid	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Afraid

Proud    1       2       3       4       5       6       7    Not Proud

Bitter    1       2       3       4       5       6       7    Not Bitter

Worried    1       2       3       4       5       6       7    Not Worried

Anxious    1       2       3       4       5       6       7    Not Anxious

Questions on perception of Russia:

Military threat perception:

On a “0” to “10” scale where 0 means no threat at all, and 10 means extremely threatening, how much of a military threat is Russia to Hungary?

Economic threat perception:

On a “0” to “10” scale where 0 means no threat at all, and 10 means extremely threatening, how much of an economic threat is Russia to Hungary?

Similarity perception 1:

On a “-2” to “2” scale where -2 is very dissimilar, 2 is very similar and 0 is not sure, how similar do you view Russia and Hungary?

### Similarity perception 2:

On a “-2” to “2” scale where -2 is very dissimilar, 2 is very similar and 0 is not sure, how similar do you view Russia and European Union countries?

### Feeling thermometer:

I'd like to rate your feelings about Russia using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favourable and warm toward Russia. Ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favourable toward Russia and that you don't care too much for Russia. You would rate the country at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the country. How would you rate Russia? \_\_\_\_\_ degrees.

### Policy cooperation 1:

On a “-2” to “2” scale where -2 strongly oppose, 2 is strongly support and 0 is not sure, would you support or oppose an international trade agreement that results in small economic gains by Hungary but major economic gains by Russia?

### Policy cooperation 2:

On a “-2” to “2” scale where -2 strongly oppose, 2 is strongly support and 0 is not sure, do you favour or oppose increasing trade with Russia?

### Policy cooperation 3:

On a “-2” to “2” scale where -2 strongly oppose, 2 is strongly support and 0 is not sure, do you favour or oppose the sale of personal computers, which can be used for both civilian and military purposes, to Russia?

Policy cooperation 4:

On a “-2” to “2” scale where -2 strongly oppose, 2 is strongly support and 0 is not sure, do you favour or oppose increasing Hungarian business investment in Russia?

Policy cooperation 5:

On a “-2” to “2” scale where -2 strongly oppose, 2 is strongly support and 0 is not sure, do you favour or oppose increasing European Union business investment in Russia?

Questions on general knowledge about Russia:

General knowledge question 1:

The current prime minister of Russia is:

☐ Vladimir Putin

☐ Dmitry Medvedev

☐ Sergei Lavrov

☐ I don't know

General knowledge question 2:

What is the population of Russia?

☐ ~ 50 million

☐ ~ 140 million

☐ ~ 260 million

☐ I don't know

General knowledge question 3:

Which of the following has a land border with Russia?

☐ Mongolia

☐ Afghanistan

☐ Pakistan

☐ I don't know

General knowledge question 4:

What was the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita of in 2011?

☐ ~ 13,000 USD

☐ ~ 25,000 USD

☐ ~ 55,000 USD

☐ I don't know

General knowledge question 5:

Who is currently in charge of the Russian communist party?

☐ Sergei Mitrochin

☐ Vladimir Zhirinovsky

☐ Genadij Zyuganov

☐ I don't know

General knowledge question 6:

Which of the following international organizations Russia **does not** belong to?

☐ World Trade Organization

☐ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

☐ Council of Europe

☐ I don't know

Questions of personal interaction with Russia:

Personal question 1:

Have you or anyone in your family suffered from Russia?

☐ Yes

☐ No

Personal question 2:

Do you believe that Hungary has suffered from Russia?

☐ Yes

☐ No



Personal question 3:

Do you personally know any Russian nationals?

☐ Yes

☐ No

Personal question 4:

Have you ever been to Russia?

☐ Yes

☐ No

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