Mongolian Values and Attitudes toward Democracy

By

Mina Sumaadii

Submitted to

Central European University

Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science

Supervisor: Assistant Professor Levente Littvay

Budapest, Hungary

(2012)

Abstract

Mongolia is a distant satellite of the former Communist bloc. For most of modern history, it was isolated from the world due to the geopolitical struggles between Russia and China. As the Communist system collapsed and liberal democracy was established, economic, political and social elements underwent rapid change. Unfamiliar with local developments, many outsiders wondered why the country succeeded in democratization where other neighboring ex-Soviet states had failed. The odds were mainly against the country, due to high levels of poverty and geographical distance from established mature democracies. Nevertheless, in Mongolia the common answer is that the political culture was compatible with the principles of liberal democracy. This thesis is an empirical study of macro and micro developments based on modernization theory. It explores the values and attitudes of the general population in an effort to examine what makes it pro-democratic. The main finding is that the general claim of modernization theory is applicable to Mongolia, but in relation to political culture as a mediator between economic development and democratization. Additionally, the main implications contribute to understanding different aspects that concern democratic development.

Acknowledgements

There are many people whom I would like to thank for making it possible to complete this thesis.

Most of all, I would like to thank my family: my parents, Sumati and Sergelen, for their continuous support. Without them I would not have been able to pursue my endless education and would not have been what I am today. They also pulled me together when times got hard. I would also like to thank my non-political brother who told me to "start using human language more often."

My biggest thanks are to all of the CEU community.

Especially, I'm indebted to my thesis supervisor Levente Littvay for his guidance, support, patience, and introducing us to "The Art of Statistics".

My sincere thanks to my mentor Lea Sgier, who gave me some of the most valuable academic and career advice.

I would also like to thank Professor Tamas Rudas for teaching us to always aspire to statistical and substantive significance.

I thank my stats group: Christian Pasche, Csurgó Dénes, and Matteo De Simone. Together we battled log linear monsters.

In addition, I wish to express gratitude to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation's office in Mongolia, which sponsored many of the opinion polls from which the data were drawn. And in particular, Werner Prohl, the "funding" father of the Politbarometer project in Mongolia.

And, I would like to thank all the people who contributed to the database and the whole Sant Maral team for conducting interviews and collecting data.

Last but not least, I would like to thank all my friends for their support during times of great distress. Especially Stela, Maja, and Brian.

Anyone missed is also thanked.

Table of Contents

List of Figures and Tables

CHAPTER 1: Introduction

There is a great deal of literature on the causes and conditions of successful democratization. A variety of empirical studies in the post-Soviet bloc have been conducted in order to test different propositions, nonetheless due to lack of individual level data in Mongolia, the country has been neglected as a case. However, if left unstudied, there are several macro-level theories based on the work of Seymour Martin Lipset and Samuel Huntington that suggest it may be an outlier case. These theories would most likely consider Mongolia as a society classified by mass poverty and a combination of cultural and geographical distance from mature liberal democracies. Theoretically, these form the main unfavorable conditions which undermine society's ability to sustain liberal democracy.

Availability of data makes it possible to test whether suggestions that Mongolia is an outlier are justified. In order to contribute to the literature, this thesis addresses the question whether economic development is a sufficient and necessary condition for a political democracy to develop or be sustainable, why is Mongolia a democracy.

As democratization is a long process, answering the research question entails an in-depth case study of Mongolia during the transition and consolidation periods. In public, the general answer usually highlights the role of political culture, which is considered the main contributor to successful democratization. Thus, it is important to inquire not so much what democracy means an academic concept, but what it represents to the masses in order for them to support it. Especially because the pro-democratic culture claim is widely accepted as a matter of common sense, the main objective will be to make an empirical inquiry.

In order to do this, a theoretical framework will be built on general modernization theory, which holds that economic aspects matter to democratization. It is generally established as one of the most comprehensive theories to date given the complexity involved in analyzing changing societies. However, in this case a revised version will be drawn on to demonstrate that

Mongolia's success was conditioned by cultural factors. This culturally based argument will require making inferences about the entire population. Thus to approach the research question, quantitative large N analysis will be used to handle this level of generalization. The advantage of using this method is that it is more objective and offers proper internal generalizability of inferences. However, the concept of political culture is nation-specific and within a case study approach, it will not allow external generalization. In other words, the findings will be confined to inferences only about Mongolia.

Nevertheless, taking a quantitative approach in examining and testing a theory will entail the following deductive steps in the research process. First, the background of Mongolia's political development and its status with regard to democratization will be addressed. Second, a theoretical framework of preconditions and consolidation of democracy based on the general and revised modernization theories will be constructed. This will focus mainly on two recent branches of the general theory: the theory of economic development represented by Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi (1997), and the theory of democratic political culture represented by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel (2005). Third, the findings of Richard Rose and colleagues (1999 to 2008) in New Democracies Barometers will be used for theoretical specification and in identifying case-specific concepts, based on the legacy of communism and the similarity of survey items. This will facilitate the selection and construction of the operational definitions needed to test the general theory. Fourth, the empirical analysis of the resulting constructs will be performed using different statistical techniques. Finally, the results of the analysis will support or disprove the general theory.

Most of the empirical analysis of this thesis will be based on data drawn from opinion polls covering the period from 1995 to 2012. This will involve analysis of social and economic aspects that influence the population in their support for and willingness to participate in the democratic system. The main contribution of this study will be in highlighting the relevance of modernization theory to democratization processes. It will additionally be the first known

2

attempt to use this longitudinal data to test the general theory of modernization in Mongolia. The research will complement the existing literature that uses the pro-democratic political culture argument, and help uncover various issues of democratization in general.

The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 will introduce the relevance of the Mongolian case as a post-Soviet satellite. In Chapter 3, general modernization theory will be discussed and its main claims identified. Chapter 4 will cover the methodology used to address the research question, including theoretical formulations, analytical aspects, and operationalization. Chapter 5, which comprises the empirical analysis, is divided into three parts that test different theoretical aspects. Chapter 6 will summarize findings and link them together. Finally, the concluding chapter will discuss research limitations, specific aspects of findings, and related policy suggestions.

CHAPTER 2: Mongolia – a deviant case?

In *The Third Wave,* Samuel Huntington (1991) introduced the idea of three waves of democratization based on historical processes. Mongolia stands as a success story of democratization in the region, because it is considered "one of the more remarkable outliers of the post-communist universe in regards to democratization," because it is "the only third wave democracy east of the Balkans that avoided political erosion and successfully consolidated democracy" (Fritz 2002, 75). In addition to "the peaceful manner" of the process, it is also believed to be "one of the least likely cases" to undergo a successful transition to democracy (UNDP 1997, 27 cited by Pomfret 2000, 149; Fish 1998, 128).

Mongolia's geographical position between Russia and China heavily influenced most of its political developments in the 20th century and continues to affect policy-making (Narangoa 2009). However, in comparison to other post-Soviet countries in Central Asia, Mongolia managed to preserve its cultural heritage, language, and avoid "Russification" (OBG 2012, 8-9; Westad 2006, 40). Furthermore, in general, landlocked states outside Europe face the worst problems and are "uniformly poor" (Porter 2000, 32). These contribute to the "total anomaly" status according to macro-level system analysis based on the traditions of Lipset and Huntington (Sabloff 2002, 19).

In recent years, Mongolian democratic success has been widely associated with pro-democratic political culture (Fish 1998; Sabloff 2002; Ganbat 2004; OBG 2012). However, for most of the 20th century, the way to independence and modernity had appeared to be through Communism. Through the efforts of Russian and Mongolian Bolsheviks, in 1921 Mongolia became the second socialist state in the world, and a "testing ground for much of the Communist policy in the Third World: methods of education, cultural work, collectivization, and anti-religious propaganda that appeared later in other countries were first introduced by Soviet advisors in Mongolia, who ran the country on behalf of its Communist rulers" (Westad 2006, 51).

Such were the sacrifices for socialist modernity's strategy of ensuring separation from "traditional backwardness", in this case nomadic and Buddhist influences (2006, 51). Yet one of the main positive legacies of the socialist system was the rapid achievement of a high level of literacy for the whole population, which remains to this day.[1] In addition, the system benefited women by introducing gender equality laws, which eventually contributed to their active role in society (Rossabi 2005, 151).

Throughout communist period, Mongolia maintained a status similar to Soviet satellites. It wasn't incorporated into the territory of the Soviet Union and remained a buffer state due to the Soviet Union's geopolitical rivalry with China (Wachman 2009). A single-party state with the governing Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) was formed, which resembled a Soviet satellite and followed a path strongly influenced by the Soviet Union, to the extent that it collapsed in a similar fashion. The leaders of the MPRP followed Mikhail Gorbachev's *glasnost'* and *perestroika,* which led to open calls to end the dictatorial rule of the Party and the formation of the Mongolian Democratic Union (OBG 2012, 13). The young Mongolian reformers[2] developed programs that led to the largest demonstration in the country, and in 1990 the MPRP resigned and the first democratic elections were held (Rossabi 2005). Multiparty elections were introduced in the 1990s, and in 2007 the government officially declared the democratic transition to be complete.

The constitution of 1992 introduced a semi-presidential form of government, which resulted in constant power struggles between the office of the president and the parliament. The president is directly elected by popular vote, but his power is severely limited by the parliament, to which he is directly accountable. The prime minister is elected by the parliament and is also accountable to it. This creates sort of a system of checks-and-balances between the institutions, where there is much overlap between the offices of the president, the prime minister, and the

[1] NSOM Yearbooks 1995-2010 report 98-99% literacy.
[2] Most prominent of Mongolian young elites were educated in Moscow and Eastern Europe, which consequently echoed the transition processes of those regions.

parliament (Luvsandendev 2009, 81-82). This is considered one of the institutional strengths which prevented Mongolia from the drift into authoritarianism seen in former Soviet states in Asia (Fish 1998). Moreover, the country has consistently been ranked as democratic and free by foreign observers (Freedom House, Polity IV, UNDP).

In short, Mongolia's location between China and Russia historically limited its foreign policy options and resulted in a focus on preserving sovereignty and avoiding dependence on either neighbor (Narangoa 2009, Wachman 2009). In addition, the absence of a strong enough "national father figure" in the executive who could monopolize power during transition has also contributed to Mongolia's success (Fish 2001, 329). The efficiency of international donor contributions during the transitional period and especially during the systemic crisis in the late 1990s is also an important factor to consider (Fritz 2002). However, in the following chapters, I would like to examine another significant but hitherto largely neglected aspect which contributed to the successful transition and consolidation of democracy, despite all the favorable and unfavorable developments, which can described as the Mongolian "critical mass" (Norris 2005). This analysis of mass orientations will complement and empirically test the pro-democratic political culture argument of previous ethnographic and qualitative studies.

Finally, it should also be noted that the closest counterparts to Mongolia in Central Asia of the Third wave democracies are Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Their historical nomadic roots and Soviet legacies make them the most similar cases for comparison. Nevertheless, the current religious and social structures of these societies are different. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan no longer have significant nomadic populations. Moreover, the persistence of strong clan networks in politics and an Islamic tradition are among potential explanations for their failure in successful democratization (Rose 2002, 103). In contrast, Mongolia has a third of the population living as traditional nomads and clan influence is considered very weak, as two thirds of the population claim to be Chinggizids. Additionally, the dominant religion is Lamaist Buddhism, which possibly presents less of a cultural barrier to democratization (Fritz 2002, 77). A third factor is

6

that Mongolia is one of the least densely populated country in the world,[3] with a little less than half of the population residing in the capital, Ulaanbaatar (NSOM 2010). These features combined make it a unique case not suitable for a cross-country small n comparative analysis.

As a result, in this project I will mainly focus on an in-depth case study of Mongolia with theoretical support, based on general findings in states affected by lingering Communist legacies. Specific features unique to Mongolia may limit the applicability of drawing inferences for other former communist countries. Nonetheless, tracing some of the processes that led to its democratic success could contribute to understanding different factors contributing to democratization in Third wave democracies. The next chapter will address the theoretical framework of this thesis.

---

[3] Estimated at 2.78 mln resides on the territory of 1.5 mln km² (NSOM 2010, 47).

CHAPTER 3: Modernization Theory

In the previous chapter, Mongolia's background leading to its anomalous status was discussed. In the study of causes and conditions of successful democratization, general modernization theory is extremely useful in its scope and diversity. This chapter examines modernization theory in three stages. First, the general theory will be introduced. Secondly, the revised version will be discussed. Finally, the theory will be linked to the case study. The aim of this chapter will be to provide the foundation of the research question and specify the main theoretical claims.

3.1 General Introduction

The term modernization entails a number of concepts, in general indicating a shift from a traditional to modern society. In the context of Mongolia, the focus is on the aspect of modernization that is relevant to developing countries and the post-Communist bloc in their efforts to reach the level of developed countries.

Modernization theory originated in the Enlightenment era, and Antoine de Condorcet was among the first to link socioeconomic development and cultural change. At a later stage, Karl Marx and Adam Smith promoted competing versions of modernization: communism and capitalism, which connected human progress to the socioeconomic consequence of technological innovation (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 16). Consequently, most of the 20th century saw ideological clashes shaped by the two paths to modernity represented by the United States and the Soviet Union, both founded on ideas and plans for the betterment of humanity. They embodied "the great experiment" and believed that the development of the world depended on them. Their enemies and allies were chosen on the basis of their closeness to specific ideological values, and each sought ideological predominance in the international system (Westad 2006).

The Soviets "inherited" a multicultural space, with less than half of the population speaking Russian, and a historical tradition of modernizing through "Russification" of their non-

Russian subjects. Thus, "the destiny to clear the Asian wilderness and civilize the tribes of the East" was continued (Westad 2006, 40). In comparison, in the United States, the "Americanization" of foreigners at home and limitations on the immigration of "less civilized" people were implemented (2006, 18). Both powers viewed underdevelopment as a consequence of countries' internal characteristics, and saw traditional values as an obstacle to modernity. As a result both operated on the assumption that developed countries should stimulate development by instilling "modern" communist or capitalist values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 17).

The end of Cold War was seen as a triumph of capitalism and reinforcement of the notion that "democracy is the only game in town" (Linz in Rose and Shin 1999, 4). Nevertheless, continuing the assumption that "underdeveloped societies should adopt 'modern' values and institutions to become developed societies" resulted in modernization theory being associated with ideological bias and special interests, which eventually led to gradual decline in its acceptability (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 17-18). According to Huntington, the diversity of civilizations and the persistence of cultural norms prevent universal acceptance of liberal democracy from becoming the only alternative. Yet in general, modernization does not entail Westernization, it is just that "as the first civilization to modernize, the West leads in the acquisition of the culture of modernity" (1996, 73).

Finally, starting from the 1960s, modernization theory received empirical support through the work of Seymour Martin Lipset, who established a link between the level of development of a given country and its probability of being democratic (Wucherpfennig and Deutsch 2009). According to Geddes "[i]t is considered as one of the best established correlations; however, causes of this relationship are debatable" (cited in Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 169). In the original study, the patterns between averages of economic development indicators in European, English-speaking and Latin American countries allowed Lipset to conclude that "the more well-to-do a nation, the more likely it will sustain democracy" (1959, 30 in Wucherpfennig and Deutsch 2009). Subsequently, this positive relationship between economic

development and democracy has been contested multiple times and empirical studies, mostly confirming the theory, were made, as Wucherpfennig and Deutsch note.

3.2 Revised Modernization Theory

To begin with the context of developing countries in general, modernization entails moving to the central "standard" of modern society. The failures of communist models made democratic governance the main standard. Richard Rose pointed out that idealist and realist standards of democracy need to be distinguished, with the idealist standards being so high that their attainability becomes questionable even for long-established democracies (2006b). Accordingly, relying on them is inappropriate for the assessment of transitional or newly established regimes. Additionally, democracy is not only a controversial concept for academics, but also depends heavily on views from multiple polarities. In the end, Rose claims, it becomes particularly hard to narrow down. For this reason, he supports realist context-based standards and a Churchillian approval of democracy:

> "Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time."
> *(Churchill, cited in Rose 2006b, 13)*

For Lipset, the norm was a European society and the main prerequisite for democracy had to be a high level of economic development (Rose 2006a, 13). Moreover, he emphasized the importance of a large middle class, which relates to the importance of income inequality as a measurement of economic growth (Lipset 1960, 66). As a result, based on his theory Mongolia also fits the "least likely" profile in ability to democratize and consolidate democracy by corresponding to the principle that "a society divided between a large impoverished mass and a small favored elite would result either in oligarchy (…) or in tyranny" (1960, 75).

Wucherpfennig and Deutsch (2009) separated the more recent developments of modernization theory into two main branches: the theory of democratic culture represented by

Inglehart and Welzel (2005), and the theory of economic development represented by Przeworski and Limongi (1997).

Przeworski and Limongi (1997), in an attempt to challenge Lipset's claim, tested modernization theory on time-series analysis of cross-sections and concluded that modernization doesn't necessarily bring democracy. Their findings demonstrated that economics play a crucial role in democratic survival (1997, 177). They suggested that one of the main indicators of economic development should be per capita GDP as a good predictor of the stability of democracies (1997, 165). However, in a later work (Przeworski et al. 2000), the authors clarified that "the level of economic development, as measured by per capita income, is by far the best predictor of political regimes. Yet there are countries in which dictatorships persist when all other observable conditions indicate that they should not; there are others in which democracies flourish despite the odds" (Przeworski et al. 2000, 88). Nevertheless, Przeworski and Limongi's main finding was that that in countries with GDP per capita under $1000, the probability that a democracy would regress in a particular year was 0.125, leading to an expected life of eight years (1997, 165). This potentially explains the mechanism behind the systemic crisis of the late 1990s in Mongolia.

In contrast, the theory of democratic culture can be traced back to Almond and Verba (1963), who originally held that a key prerequisite of democracy is support for democratic norms and the associated behavior among citizenry (Wucherpfennig and Deutsch 2009). For Inglehart and Welzel (2005), the general public's democratic values are the appropriate method of indicating the prospects of consolidating democratic governments. Their empirical analysis, based on data of representative national surveys, demonstrated that growing and changing mass values produce pressure which helps to establish and strengthen democracy. In addition, among the different approaches in schools of political culture, they distinguish the human development approach, whose driving notion is that "civic values, rather than just specific orientation towards the political system and its institutions, are important for democracy" (2005, 247). More

specifically, mass "self-expression values" that emphasize human choice and empowerment form the cultural basis for democracy, or in other words, values that prioritize freedom and choice (2005, 248-249). Their main claim states that economic development brings social changes that are crucial for development or consolidation of democracy.

3.3 Modernization Theory Revised for Mongolia

In addition to Inglehart and Welzel's (2005) cultural influences, Arinudh Krishna argued that transitions to capitalism in each modern society have taken different trajectories because the problems presented by the emergence of capitalist economies were conditioned by diverse political, social, and cultural conditions (2008, 6). Hence, in order to establish a theoretical claim that the process of democratization in Mongolia is supported by modernization theory, the country's unique features should be considered.

From the beginning of the transition, and for most of the 1990s, Mongolia was in a state of continuous economic decline. Przeworski and Limongi's emphasis on the positive role of economic performance for newly established democracies' survival can only offer an explanation for the steady process of democratization in Mongolia without reverting back or leading to another alternative mostly for the period after 2000. The GDP per capita survival threshold was reached only in 2006 (EBRD, NSOM, World Bank). In addition, the lingering economic crisis with few advances and worsening conditions throughout the first decade led to an eventual systemic crisis, which at the time had a high chance of undermining the established regime. Hence, modernization theory's economic development branch, focused on the macro level, offers an insufficient explanation of democratization, especially due to the linearity it requires for democratic survival in new regimes. This leads to the notion that by itself, it does not provide for the underlying reasons for the start of democratization or an explanation for regime survival in the face of long economic downfalls (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 167-169).

Alternatively, modernization theory's political culture branch's potential explanation is the substantive role of human development. Inglehart and Welzel assert that democracy entails

more than successful institutional and constitutional arrangements of the elite, it depends on mass orientations (2005). They state that the main impact of modernization is that it raises people's aspirations for democratic institutions. Thus, in context of former Communist countries with low economic inequalities, the protests were mainly about political rights and civil liberties. However, Inglehart and Welzel also claim that a high-level of development is necessary for a transition to democracy, because it corresponds to dominance of pro-democratic "self-expression values" which drive democratization. In cases where societies have not reached a high level of development, the alternative explanation of successful democratization lies in the compatibility of their traditional values with the democratic political model, which is why "socioeconomic development is a powerful predictor of a society's values system, but it needs to be supplemented by taking the society's historical heritage into account" (2005, 78). Overall, their main claim holds that "socioeconomic development brings predictable cultural and political changes, and economic collapse tends to bring changes in the opposite direction" (2005, 20). For instance, when the Communist system collapsed, the material insecurity caused by economic downturn led individuals in the ex-Soviet states to regress to more traditional and "survival values" (2005, 38).

Furthermore, in consideration of the general separation into hunting and gathering societies and agrarian empires, scholars infer that the former are "relatively liberal, egalitarian, and democratic" in comparison to the latter, which predominantly emphasize collective values and conformity (2005, 35). The traditional culture of Mongolia is pastoral nomadism, which predisposes to high values of individual autonomy. This in turn suggests that Rose's (2008) realist notion of liberal democracy and a choice of "lesser evil" (by judgment that no other system does better to protect individual rights) will make it the preferred trajectory of development.

In summary, in the context of Mongolia, the main theoretical statement of modernization theory should still correspond to the notion that economic development is a

positive factor in democratization. Moreover, economic development is also favorable for further development of efficient democracy by being a driving force for social change. In other terms, this will imply approaching the mature liberal democracy standard in a consolidated regime. Alternatively, persistent economic decline and crisis will lead to reversal of democratization during the transitional period. In the same way, in a consolidated regime this will entail departing farther from mature democracy. However, it should be noted that being social science phenomena, these claims are "probabilistic and not deterministic" (2005, 157). That is to say, making predictive statements is subject to great uncertainty. In the end, this leads to the puzzle the present research seeks to resolve: If economic development is a sufficient and necessary condition for a political democracy to develop or be sustainable, why is Mongolia a democracy?

My suggestion is that considering Mongolia's history of low levels of economic development and economic downturns throughout the transition process, Inglehart and Welzel's (2005) revised claim of modernization theory with political culture as a mediator between economic development and democratization is applicable. This will require reassessment of how economic and social phenomena relate. That is to say, by reflecting that "genuine democracy is not simply a machine that, once set up, functions by itself [it] depends on the people" (2005, 2), special attention should be paid to associations between democratization, economic development, and political culture. The methodology of testing these general claims will be addressed in the next chapter.

14

Figure 1 Main Claim[4]

---

[4] Main claim is subject to the uncertainties of time (u_t)

CHAPTER 4: Methodology

In the previous chapter it was established that the main claim of revised modernization theory is that political culture is a mediator between economic development and democratization. Moreover, the research question is associational with the general purpose of finding the strength of associations between the constructs in this claim, and testing them with regard to the cultural context. Therefore, in this chapter a strategy for answering the research question will be introduced. The first section will address theoretical complications and ways to resolve them. The answer requires inferring about the entire population of Mongolia, and this will entail taking the quantitative approach as a proper method to handle this level of generalization. Accordingly, the second part will address the choice of empirical data. The final part will cover theoretical specification and operationalization of the variables contained in the claim and analytic methods.

4.1 Theoretical Specification and Empirical Data

To begin with some implications, in the context of Mongolia the answer will have to confront the empirical regularity, which argues that the existence of a large impoverished mass poses a challenge to democracy. This idea is explained by a number of factors, the main ones being related to attitudes and behaviors (Krishna 2008, 10-12). For instance, Lipset emphasized how the poor tend to be undemocratic, and by active participation actually harm the established system (1960, 63-64). Consequently, the answer will focus on attitudes and values that shape the concept of political culture and influence general support and participation in the political system.

Next, Larry Diamond's definition of political culture as "people's predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of its country, and the role of self in that system" can be interpreted as standing for relativist notions and consideration of concepts in their culture specific interpretations (1999, 163). This means that even if the general theoretical framework is based on most similar countries' generalizations, the theoretical constructs will be formulated and interpreted in respect to the Mongolian context.

Furthermore, ideally, analysis of these components and orientations should be handled by integrating quantitative and qualitative methods, the former managing the generalization, while the latter complement it by providing meaning and motivational factors. Nevertheless, testing the proposed general claim can be limited to quantitative techniques with an introduction of a constraint. That is to say, in the absence of any known previous research some of the inferences about underlying factors can only be speculated.

After that, the theory's generalization and influences of time need to be considered. To provide an adequate base for generalization, the empirical data for quantitative analysis will come from repeated surveys, which represent opinion of the population in Mongolia. By measuring mass opinion since 1995, it also helps to track social changes through most of the democratization period. Hence, the individual-level data offers the chance to test political culture components that hypothetically contribute to Mongolia's success in consolidating democracy. In addition, as Rose states, surveys are more reliable evidence than "compilations of anecdotes and press cuttings or diary entries" or writings of philosophers in that they offer insights into the political behavior of the national population (2006a, 3). Despite this, individual surveys capture opinions from certain periods of time, which in turn makes them susceptible to influences of that specific time (2006a, 7). On the one hand, this produces seasonality, which can potentially lead to finding superficial patterns. On the other hand, this offers observing trends, which assist in discovering systemic influences. Consequently, some of the results might not depict fundamental change, but simply occur because of current events. Nonetheless, I believe this data is the best available option to test social change components of modernization theory over an extensive period of time.

In sum, performing empirical (quantitative) analysis with the micro unit of analysis as the individual and transitioning to the macro level of political culture potentially resolves some of the methodological implications. Most studies of political culture rely on survey analysis, reinforced by the argument that only aggregated attitudes of individuals can influence macro-political

institutions, in turn representing the "connection between individual values and what governments do" (Rose 2006a, 20).

4.2 Empirical Constructs

In view of the fact that the key to Mongolian success in democratization lies in its political culture, aggregating individual-level data without considering standard demographics will entail an assumption of homogeneity of subclasses. On the one side, this benefits the analysis by producing inferences at a rather general level (Blalock 1969, 149-150). On the other side, it also raises the potential of committing an ecological fallacy if individual-level inferences follow from analysis of macro level or aggregated indicators (Robinson 1950). Nevertheless, if interpreted and used correctly, "survey data avoids the ecological fallacy of drawing inferences about individuals from aggregate data, such as election results, or from such reified terms as national history and traditions" (Rose 2006a, 3). Theoretically, the notion of political culture is considered a macro level construct, and also considering that "cultural and historical approaches predict common opinions among individuals within a country, and differences between countries" (Rose 2006b, 18, 20), add to support the assumption of homogeneity.

It is also significant that Krishna et al. claim that most analysts' findings have been based on aggregate level data, and conclusions of individual behavior were also derived that way (2008). Consequently, this produced a number of outlier cases where democracy was successful despite high levels of poverty. Their studies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, based on analysis of individual-level data, demonstrated that poor people in those regions do not value democracy any less than their richer counterparts.

In addition, Gerardo Munck (2007) points to the significant pitfalls and limitations of most measurements of democracy focusing either on minimalist or maximalist abstract definitions of democracy. In particular, relying solely on macro-level indicators introduces a limitation, which in general should be constrained by description of system-level democracy with system-level wealth as a key predictor (Booth and Seligson in Munck 2007, 97). In this case, if

political culture is key to answering the research question, indexes will not address citizen attitudes. Furthermore, considering the significance of economic factors in the main claim, it should be mentioned that in developing countries, the role of the informal economy is the most significant aspect not captured by macro measurements. For instance, it can be stated that "the less modern the economy, the greater the volume of economic activity that is omitted, because it takes place as unrecorded cash-in-hand transactions and within the household without any money changing hands" (Rose 2006a, 19).

For these reasons, in order to assess the role of political culture and economics, I will transition from micro level measurements to macro level constructs. The meso level will include aggregated mass opinion that will cover different aspects of political culture.

Figure 2 Micro to Macro Transition

4.3 Operational Definitions

Following on from 4.1 Theoretical Specification and Empirical Data, Pippa Norris' dimensions of political support consisting of evaluation of current political regime and "support for democracy per se" will be important for the analysis (2005, 37).

4.3.1 Support of Democracy

The dimension of political support seen in supporting democracy per se, which implies supporting it as a political good, can be assessed in different ways. Among three identified methods the first would be the assessment of people's preference of democracy over other types of regimes. This method was especially prevalent in post-Communist and transitional regimes where the citizens were believed to be "better judges of differences due to first-hand experience"

19

(Mishler and Rose 2000b, 10). The second method would be Inglehart and Welzel's analysis of primacy of "self-expression" over "survival" values, which reveals democratic support for intrinsic reasons or instrumental purposes. In other words, support of it as a political good or a source of economic gain. They state that the crucial factor in the Third Wave's democratization was the belief that democracy brings not only individual freedoms, but wealth as well. This shaped the main reason behind high levels of support of democracy despite low "self-expression" values in the society or the necessary level of acceptance of it as a political good, as a result, inferring that democracy is most likely supported for economic gain or instrumentally in those newly democratic countries (2005, 263-270).

The third evaluative method is a definition of democracy compiled from mass opinion. This was attempted in former studies in Mongolia. The East Asia Barometer survey asked respondents to provide a definition or meaning of democracy. This measurement was implemented to reflect whether "minimalist (procedural) or maximalist (substantive)" understanding of democracy prevails in the society (Ganbat 2005, 8). The findings led to the conclusion that "substantive interpretations of democracy among Mongolians are minimal at best" and most "identify democracy with a minimalist definition of basic freedoms" (2005, 10). In other words, that most people don't know exactly what they want in terms of democracy.

However, a further available subjective measurement of valuing democracy as a political good can be drawn from the general value theory elaborated by Schwartz, which describes values as "desirable, trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in people's lives" (2006, 0). These goals create belief systems that trigger action according to circumstances and are interrelated with many other competing values. Moreover, if values are "conceptions of the desirable, used in moral discourse, with a particular relevance for behavior" the degree to which particular values are prevalent can suggest the underlying belief system (2006, 28). In terms of supporting democracy as a political good, the values concerned are political, which involve only a segment of the individual's life (Schwartz 2006). Furthermore, even if

certain political values are held, most people are not actively engaged in politics to advance them, suggesting a limited role of politics in people's lives (Rose 2006a). Nevertheless, examining different levels of importance that people assign to values will offer general directions of their expectations.

In general, the three main principles of democracy are freedom, equality, and justice. However, the content of specific democratic values can be very extensive. The broad definition of liberal democracy includes valuing individual freedom, rights, justice, equality, and divergent views. The block of statements included in Politbarometer surveys covers a range of democratic principles and issues, which are measured by degrees of importance assigned to each value. This makes it possible to indirectly assess what democracy involves or represents to the masses, and will be selected for the analysis.[5] As a preferred analytic method, factor analysis will aid in reducing the information on democratic values and issues in order to evaluate support of democracy per se. In particular, it will represent a large number of relationships in a simpler way.

4.3.2 Evaluation of Current Regime

Former studies have underlined that, although Mongolians see political institutions with skepticism and are rather negative when evaluating efficiency of political participation, they are confident in their own ability to participate in politics. This phenomenon has been understood as a "frustrated desire for political influence" (Ganbat, Tusalem, Da-hua Yang 2008). Prohl and Luvsandendev also highlighted a negative evaluation of institutions, with an exception of the president (2008, 117-127). Furthermore, they established a correlation between belief in voter's influence and satisfaction with the political system, which corresponded with election cycles. This satisfaction was particularly high when people believed that casting votes was worthwhile (2008, 109-112). Consequently, this suggested weak political support for institutions, but not a disapproval of the political system as a whole. This allows us to infer that political self-confidence is at the core of these links. Thus, it will be necessary to look at the assessment of

---

[5] See Appendix 3: Liberal Democratic Principles and Issues 2008-2012 for list of values.

personal ability to influence politics, which generally in a democracy is manifested in belief in voters' influence, or in other words, belief in political efficacy. As a standard, it holds that if people are going to be affected by political decisions they should have a say in making them.

Following from this, Mishler and Rose indicate that in studies of popular support in post-Communist regimes, economic factors dominate, with the main disagreement being on the principal sources of economic effects (2000a). They stress the reciprocal effects of economic and political evaluations conditioned by countries' communist legacies. In those societies supports of political regime are significantly shaped by economic factors, as in command economies citizens were used to holding the government responsible for both macroeconomic and individual welfare (2000a, 5-6).

In case of Mongolia, Richard Pomfret (2000) describes the presence of two major economic stabilizers contributing to post-Communist development. One can be attributed to the "traditional pastoral lifestyle" and the other to the informal economy (2000, 152). The nomadic household is largely outside of the formal monetary economy and is subject to seasonal earnings. Such circumstances would mean that "household income is a poor proxy for poverty" (Bratton in Krishna et al. 2008, 31), and as a result relying on household earnings would present a limited picture of the micro level well-being. In addition, household contributions of migrant workers are not captured. These aspects of the informal economy were very crucial during the transitional period and the systemic crisis of the late 1990s and still are significant contributors to the main economy. In the end, suggesting that economic effects depicted in official statistics provide only "a partial picture of how individuals cope with the challenges of transformation through activities in multiple economies" (Rose 2006b, 8). Such gaps in economic data affect both household incomes and GDP per capita measurements. Consequently, the main economic considerations should be at a non-monetary level, yet depict material well-being, which can be captured by objectivity of the standard of living.

Finally, Mishler and Rose assert that people have a certain degree of patience in deficient regimes as long as there's a belief that circumstances are likely to improve in the nearest future (2000b, 11). In the context of post-Communist regimes these future expectations would also most likely be economic in nature due to the impact of social and economic transformations.

4.3.3 Regime Support Hypotheses

Following on from the above analysis, and Limongi and Przeworski's main claim that GDP per capita depicts macro-level economic development favorable to democratic survival, it is possible to put forward the following propositions. In particular, the main consequence of economic development should be increasing citizens' standard of living (*H1*). This is the first main step in developing the desired support for democracy on the micro level. In the context of Mongolia, however, due to very low levels of material security as a base, increasing the standard of living will lead to the belief that circumstances will improve in the foreseeable future (*H2*). This is a crucial step in a society with a high level of poverty.

Next, to secure these interests, the system will have to maintain legitimacy by providing elections as the general method of citizen participation in politics. All of this is reflected in the corresponding belief in the ability to influence political decisions or feeling of political efficacy, which for the general population is mainly limited to casting an effective vote (*H3*). Then, increasing material well-being should be associated with improving macroeconomic conditions and consequent positive assessment (*H4*). After that, testing the ability to make informed political decisions and assessing political involvement will lead to investigating societal interest in politics (*H5*). This has been posited, despite previous research and inferences from general political interest concluding that it either depicts the role of politics in the lives of ordinary citizens, or possibly represents high level of societal development (Rose 2006, Inglehart 2000). And finally, increasing material well-being should lead to increasing support of the regime (*H6*). Table 1 below shows the indicators selected, while Table 2 summarizes the hypotheses. Figure 3

illustrates the multilevel process of change, and Figure 4 depicts the assumed causal order for the micro level process in more detail.

Table 1 Concepts and Indicators

Concept	Indicators:	Abbr	Level
Economic Development	GDP per capita	[ED]	Macro
Material well-being	Standard of living	[L]	Micro
Future economic expectations[6]	Future outlook	[F]	Micro
Political efficacy	Belief in Voter Influence	[V]	Micro
Macroeconomic performance	Present Economic Situation	[E]	Micro
Political involvement	Interest in Politics	[I]	Micro
Support of the Political Regime[7]	Satisfaction with the Political System	[S]	Micro/Macro

---

[6] It should be noted that this is Personal Future Economic Expectations, questionnaires structure makes it economic in nature (not shown here).
[7] 1995-2007 "How much are you satisfied with the present political system?" and 2008-2012 "How much are you satisfied with the Democracy and present political system?" To test confidence, comparison with satisfaction with government and opposition was done, which demonstrated that all three are highly correlated (Appendix 4: Systemic Variables).

Table 2 Summary of Core Hypotheses

Hypotheses	Statement
Main Hypothesis	If revised modernization theory in Mongolian context is supported then increasing economic development will encourage development towards mature liberal democracy.
Null Hypothesis	Decreasing economic development will lead Mongolian democracy away from becoming a mature liberal democracy.
Economic Development	*Hypothesis 1:* Increasing economic development will produce an increase in standard of living.[ED]→[L]
Future Economic Expectations	*Hypothesis 2:* An increase in standard of living will produce an increase in future economic expectation. [L]→[F]
Political Efficacy	*Hypothesis 3:* An increase in standard of living will produce an increase in belief in political efficacy. [L]→[V]
Macroeconomic Assessment	*Hypothesis 4*: An increase in standard of living will be associated with increase in evaluation of macroeconomic performance.[L]↔[E]
Political Involvement	*Hypothesis 5:* An increase in standard of living will produce an increase in political involvement. [L]→[I]
Support of the Political Regime	*Hypothesis 6:* An increase in standard of living will produce an increase support of the political regime. [L]→[S]

Figure 3 Multilevel Process of Change[8]

---

[8]Adapted from "Coleman's bathtub" (cited in Oakes 2008, 364).

Figure 4 Micro Level System

It can be seen that the processes depicted in Figure 3 require multilevel thinking. In order to examine them I divide the analysis of regime support into trend lines and log linear modeling for mathematical simplicity. These phenomena are influenced by the dynamics of time and as subjects to the same cause, the affected variables are most likely interrelated (depicted in Figure 4). Consequently, trend lines will cover the dynamics of change and make it possible to distinguish situational and structural factors at work. Log linear analysis will involve finding a model that can represent regime support.

In conclusion, ideally, evaluating support for democracy per se and regime support should provide the explanatory power to answer the research question. Nonetheless, the main theoretical claim and the research question are stated in a high level of abstraction appropriate for a macro level theory. This abstractness may inhibit empirical testing, because most concepts potentially carry a very large number of variables (Blalock, 1969). The high level of abstraction had to be taken down and apart to generate testable propositions. Therefore, several general assumptions will be

27

undertaken. First of all, the assumption of operationalization, which implies that all theoretical constructs can be measured and observed. Next, acknowledging the high level of abstraction suggests that all constructs can be measured in many different ways. In this case, this particularly affects the main theory and derived hypotheses. Moreover, it should be noted that variables are only partially representative of constructs. They are not the same, even more so when a high level of abstraction of the construct also suggests that it can be translated into many different variables. Thus, the decision that something has more or less of the construct is sometimes entirely up to the researcher (Blalock 1969, 1-9). Finally, for practical limitations, measurement and sampling errors[9] will not addressed in this project, introducing yet another assumption.

In the end, the main theoretical claim of revised modernization theory is stated as Economic Development and is associated with Democratization and Political Culture; they go together and are subject to the dynamics of time (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Therefore, ideally, the research question requires comprehensiveness and a multilevel answer. However, due to impossibility of the former, and the practical limitations of achieving the latter, simplicity will be introduced to provide mathematical thinking and clarity. Moreover, despite the scope, the availability of empirical data restricted inferences to be based only on recent development, thus whether the main claim holds will be a subject of time. As a result, the danger is that this simplification may lead to strong conclusions that will produce the feeling of "proof". Many of the assumptions made might be proven wrong or suffer from oversimplification. Nonetheless, with certain limitations on interpretations, testing of the proposed hypotheses will be carried out in the following chapter.

---

[9] The Politbarometer repeated surveys were conducted by one agency and using the same sampling techniques, which proved to work for Mongolia. It can be considered a good estimate of the Mongolian population, and is the only survey capturing public opinion throughout the transitional period and beyond.

CHAPTER 5: Analysis

In the previous chapter, three analytic methods were discussed to assess the support of democracy per se and regime support. Consequently this chapter will be divided into three sections. The first will bring time into the picture, and the main hypothesized variables relevant to regime support will be observed through trend lines. In the second section, through factor analysis the information on values and issues in democracy will be reduced to assess the support of democracy per se. In the final section, log linear analysis will conclude the analysis by testing the strength of associations and help disentangle causal arrows in the regime support model.

5.1 Trend lines 1995-2012

If the hypothesized systemic performance is "best" evaluated by the population, trend lines will depict those long-term social changes. They also offer an evaluation of the impact of time, and potentially estimate the dynamics of multilevel changes.

To begin with, one of the first hypothesized transitions was from macro-level economic development to micro-level individual well-being. It can be seen from Figure 5 that macro-level economic development experienced a sharp drop after 1989 with the start of the transition, and hitting its lowest point in 1993. It also depicts that the low continued throughout the rest of the 1990s, only bottoming out in the early 2000s. It thus corresponds to initial economic breakdown, long-term stagnation of 1990s, and eventual improvements. The subsequent sharp rise began from 2005, matching the start of growth due to mining developments.

Some substantial trends in well-being can be observed during this period, even if available data only covers the period after 1995. There are some fluctuations, with the first visible sharp drop matching the systemic crisis of the late 1990s, caused by stagnant economic conditions for most of the 1990s. In addition, the first actual victory of the Democratic Union led to two dismissals in the

government, which added to mass disillusionment with the competence of the established system (Prohl and Luvsandendev 2008, 110). Most probably, as Rose asserts with the passage of about a decade, people's patience deteriorates as they no longer evaluate current regimes by comparison to previous regimes or potential improvements, but based solely on their present performance (2006b, 8). As a result, the systemic survival at this stage is mostly attributed to the role of international donors and economic stabilizers (Fritz 2002, Rossabi 2005, Pomfret 2000). It can be speculated that the second sharp drop seen from 2004 to 2006 matches the decline of social welfare coverage as a result of failure of government coalition at the time, and the third sharp drop reflects the impacts of the global financial crisis.[10] Otherwise, overall there is a gradual increase, which suggests that the material conditions of citizens did improve, but with some drawbacks. Nevertheless, it wasn't until the development of internally based economic growth stimulated by mining development that the standard of living began to improve considerably.

Figure 5 Macro and Micro Economic Development Indicators[11]

Sources: World Bank 1981-2011; Politbarometer 1995-2012[12].

---

[10] 2008 financial crisis.
[11] Standard of living presented is a result of collapsing categories "very good","good", and "not good - not bad". As the dominant category is "not good - not bad" and "very good" is practically non-existent, this is the beyond "survival" level (complete figure in Appendix 5: Present Standard of Living).
[12] Politbarometers from 1995 to 2000 covered only Ulaanbaatar (UB), due to unique demographic structure of the society it can be argued that the samples are still representative of the whole population.

After that, the trend lines in satisfaction with the political system, belief in political efficacy, and assessment of macroeconomic conditions reveal considerable fluctuations related to changes in government. Nevertheless, macroeconomic evaluations are more negative, which probably reflects the underdeveloped institutions and persistence of poverty. Satisfaction with the political system showed a sharp rise in 2007, and reached a steady high point in the period between the fifth and sixth parliamentary elections. This coincides with the money distribution as an election campaign promise; nevertheless, this "incentive" was only partially fulfilled and thus the influence started to drop steadily.

Political interest remained rather moderate and stable for most of the period. However, during the fifth election cycle it started a steady drop, which has two potential explanations. One is the influence of the new generation that does not know the previous regime and, to put it simply, assigns less value to political aspects. The other is that with the passage of time, unrealistic expectations of democracy started weakening.

Finally, future economic expectations were mostly positive, but showed some fluctuations in the period between 1995 and 2000, another effect of the political crisis. Afterwards they rose gradually and remained steady. These trends are depicted in the following Figure 6, and shown in more detail in Appendices 5-9.

Figure 6 Major Trends[13]

(2.0 Very; 1.0 Rather; 0 Neutral; -1.0 Rather Not; -2.0 Totally Not)

---

[13] The variables measurement consisted of different Likert-scales of two, four, and five levels of measurement. Thus in order to create comparable trend lines I've standardized them using scaling from -2 to +2. Two level variable SUM(maxV*1:minV*-1)/Total, four level variable SUM(maxV*2:maxV*1:minV*-1:minV*-2)/TotalV, five level variable SUM(maxV*2:maxV*1:V*0:min:V*-1:minV*-2)/Total. For originals look at Appendix 5: Present Standard of Living; Appendix 6: Belief in Voters Influence – Political Efficacy; Appendix 7: Present Economic Situation – Assessment of Macroeconomic Situation; Appendix 8: Interest in Politics – Political Involvement; Appendix 9: Future Economic Expectations.

5.2 Factor Analysis

In Chapter 4, section 4.3.1 Support of Democracy the assessment of support for democracy per se was addressed, including the various values and issues included in the concept. In an ideal world, one's theory would suggest hypotheses for a confirmatory factor analysis model, they would be tested, and the appropriate conclusions would be drawn. However in practice, due to the "insurmountable uncertainties" of social science research, the choice was in favor of exploratory factor analysis to determine the structure of democratic value scale orientations. The analysis was made with SPSS and interpreted according to methods by Kim and Mueller (1978).

The basis of exploratory factor analysis is that there are a smaller number of unobserved variables that are responsible for covariation among the observed and measured variables. In other words, it is directed at understanding relations among variables by understanding the constructs behind them. Consequently, before attempting to use factor analysis, two assumptions need to be made. First, the *postulate of factorial causation*, which imposes a causal order that observed variables are a linear combination of some underlying factors, needs to be undertaken. Second, the *postulate of parsimony,* which often implies that the more parsimonious model is accepted on "faith"(Kim and Mueller 1978), needs to be adopted.

To begin with, the extraction procedure was Maximum Likelihood since it allows computation of assorted indices of goodness-of-fit of data to the model and tests the significance of loadings. The overall objective of this method is to find the underlying population parameters that will have the greatest likelihood of producing the observed correlation matrix. It also allows for the assumption that the exact number of factors and approximation of loadings is unknown. Moreover, in a large sample it offers statistical significance test which will make it possible to evaluate Kaiser's "eigenvalue greater than 1" rule.

Scree Plot evaluation was used to assess if the number of factors was appropriate. The chosen method of rotation was Varimax criterion, which assumes that the factors are uncorrelated, thus pattern matrix is equivalent to structure matrix resulting in an overall "clearer" structure. The criterion applied for suppressing lower level loadings was 0.35.

Finally, considering the consequences of relying on "faith" alone, the same analysis was rerun on available data sets that had the instrument.[14] The results consistently showed the presence of three factors, however there was a fourth factor that appeared as a result of seasonal variability.[15] Consequently, if the model is correct, Table 3 below summarizes the results.[16]

---

[14] The instrument was available for a total of 8 surveys from 2008 to 2012.

[15] Politbarometer of October 2009 has a fourth factor based in a statement "all parties have an equal chance to come into government" with a factorial loading of 0.93. Inferring from the public protests that occurred due to alleged fraud during the Parliament Elections in 2008, this factor's presence can be considered as "seasonal" or subject to "noise".

[16] Weights were applied when conducting 2012 April Factor Analysis due to overrepresentation of rural population in the sample. The χ^2 – value is dependent on the sample size, but the degrees of freedom are independent of the sample size. The large enough sample can produce an inflated goodness-of-fit. However, it should be noted, that in factor analysis, the larger the sample size in relation to the number of variables, the more reliable are the resulting factors.

Table 3 Three-Factor Model of Liberal Democratic Values

Dimension	Variables	Factor		
		1	2	3
Libertarian	Everybody can believe in what he/she wants	.616		
	I can travel wherever I want	.586		
	Everybody can express his/her opinion freely	.565	.357	
	Media and research are uncensored in Mongolia	.537		
	Everybody has the right to enter one's desired profession	.496	.401	
	All parties have an equal chance to come into government	.469		
	All people have equal educational opportunities	.462	.433	
	Everybody can participate in the activities of their choice during one's free time	.446		
Egalitarian	All people are equally treated by the law		.630	
	Men and women have equal rights		.610	
	There is a free, democratic market		.546	
Social Liberalism	Income differences are kept as small as possible*		.537	.364
	Social differences are kept as small as possible		.402	.704
	The state provides for social justice in a market economy		.407	.622
	Everybody has the freedom to decide about his property			.606
	The state provides as many social security services as possible			.377
Eigenvalues		5.864	1.613	1.074
Percent of Variance explained		33.056	6.655	3.146
Cumulative Percent of Variance Explained		33.056	39.711	42.857

χ2 with 75 degrees of freedom = 1261.495

*in 2012 this variable was affected by variability, otherwise presents an indicator of Social Liberalism Dimension.

35

Table 3 summarizes the results of the three-factor model, which depicts the orientation in support of democracy per se. From the consistent presence of three factors, we can reject the null hypothesis of one-factor. Moreover, the high χ^2 allows us to accept that the model fits the observed data and proceed to the interpretation of the results.[17] In terms of evaluation, Kaiser's classic criteria of significance of factor loadings is of too high a standard for social science, thus the more realistic standard of 0.40 as low factor loading and 0.60 high factor loading is applied.

The factor names are based on the traditions of liberal political philosophy. The first factor, categorized as the Libertarian Dimension, can be identified by high factor loadings on statements that can be grouped by their adherence to the fundamental value of self-ownership in the theory of Robert Nozick. The second factor, categorized as the Egalitarian Dimension, is identified by higher priority of equal outcomes and market competition, grouped under economic egalitarianism linked with the traditions of John Maynard Keynes. The last factor, the Social Liberalism Dimension, can be identified by high factor loadings on statements valuing combinations of state's role in ensuring social justice and general equality, grouped by the theory of Karl Marx. However, the specificity of this dimension is in the inclusion of a high factor loading on the freedom to decide about one's property.[18]

Overall this suggests that respondents differentiate among the different values, and distinct value systems can be formed from them. Therefore, substantive interpretation and potential inferences from these value orientations will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 6.

---

[17] Despite the currently inflated χ^2, in smaller comparable samples it was still good to accept the three-factor models.
[18] It is suggested that this is not coincidental as it persisted in this dimension in other analyses. The possibility is that the nature of this value dimension implies that people will want redistribution, but will not want it to affect their property.

5.3 Log Linear Model

Now we move to the final stage: in trend analysis, current standard of living [L], future economic expectations [F], and feelings of political efficacy [V] were seen as the main positive factors in the hypothesized system.[19] Political interest [I] was rather moderate and seemed to go into decline. Macroeconomic conditions assessment [E] was mainly negative throughout the period. Consequently, this section will examine the strength of their links.

The system includes multiple associations among categorical social science variables, which can be handled by flexibility of log linear technique. In particular, instead of fitting data to a model, it suggests finding a model to fit the data. Moreover, it permits us to express categorical data in the form of a linear model by using log values. The software used for this part of the analysis was the "psych" package in R. For practical reasons and for clarity, categories were collapsed to create lower levels of measurement as described in Table 4.

---

[19] Figure 4 Micro Level System in Chapter 4.

Table 4 Recoding of variables

RESPONSE VARIABLE	
Original	**Recoded**
stfdemo – Satisfaction with democracy and present system (1) Satisfied, (2) Rather Satisfied, (3) Rather not satisfied, (4) Not satisfied	*stfdem (S)* (0) Dissatisfied (including categories 3 and 4) (1) Satisfied (including categories 1 and 2) → valid n: (0) 1883, (1) 2877; total 4760

EXPLANATORY VARIABLES	
Original	**Recoded**
voteinfl – In your opinion, how strong is voters' influence on political decision making? (1) Very Strong, (2) Rather strong, (3) Rather Little, (4) None	*voteinfl (V)* (0) Weak (incl. cat. 3 and 4) (1) Strong (incl. cat. 1 and 2) → valid n: (0) 1844, (1) 2642; total 4486
llevel – How is your personal and family's life level situation? (1) Very good, (2) Good, (3) Not good, not bad, (4) Bad, (5) Very Bad	*llevel (L)* (0) Bad (incl. cat. 4 and 5) (1) Average (incl. cat. 1, 2, 3) → valid n: (0) 1198, (1) 3795; total 4992
future – How do you evaluate your nearest future? (1) Rather Optimistic, (2) Rather Pessimistic	*future (F)* (0) Pessimistic (incl. cat. 2) (1) Optimistic (incl. cat. 1) → valid n: (0) 344, (1) 4268; total 4612
intpols - How much are you interested in politics? (1) Very strongly interested, (2) Rather interested, (3) Slightly interested, (4) Rather not interested, (5) Totally not interested	*intpols (I)* (0) Not interested (incl. cat. 4 and 5) (1) Interested (incl. cat. 1, 2, 3) → valid n: (0) 2213, (1) 2733; total 4946
macroecon - In general, how do you evaluate the present economic situation in Mongolia? (1) Very good, (2) Good, (3) Not good, not bad, (4) Bad, (5) Very Bad	*macroecon (E)* (0) Bad ((incl. cat. 4 and 5) (1) Average (incl. cat. 1, 2, 3) → valid n: (0) 2126, (1) 2661; total 4787

Next, to increase confidence in satisfaction with the democracy variable, it was compared to satisfaction with government and opposition variables. The trend lines in Appendix 4: Systemic Variables demonstrate that the three variables are highly correlated, which allows one to consider satisfaction with the political system as a "satisfactory" measurement for the evaluation of the established regime.

After that, explanatory and response variable associations were tested. Political interest was statistically tested on the relationship with other indicators, but in the end did not satisfy the criteria

of p-value below 0.05 for the χ^2 Test of Independence. Macroeconomic performance assessment [E] passed the test, but the resulting log linear models had rather poor explanatory power. [20] Substantively, this leads to the conclusion that egocentric evaluations dominate and contain the most explanatory power.

Therefore, satisfaction with democracy [S], standard of living [L], political efficacy [V], and future economic expectations [F] were tested, and they satisfied the criteria of p-value below 0.05 for the χ^2 Test of Independence. This implies that the variables are not independent, thus rejecting the null hypothesis of overall variable independence and allowing for log linear analysis. The χ^2 was 318.2 with df = 11 and p-value<.001(1.243e-61), indicating a statistically significant association between these variables. Moreover, Table 6 (n=3962) demonstrates that there are no zero cells, implying no reduction in test power. It also shows that these data will not fit a regular additive model, which requires the difference to be approximately equal.

Table 5 Cross tabulations of Political Efficacy, Standard of Living, Future Economic Expectations, and Satisfaction with Democracy

			StfDemocracy	
Political Efficacy	Standard of Living	Future Expectations	0 (Dissatisfied)	1 (Satisfied)
0 (Weak)	0 (Bad)	0 (Pessimistic)	52	19
		1 (Optimistic)	143	185
	1 (Average)	0 (Pessimistic)	40	27
		1 (Optimistic)	447	642
1 (Strong)	0 (Bad)	0 (Pessimistic)	47	29
		1 (Optimistic)	154	338
	1 (Average)	0 (Pessimistic)	45	36
		1 (Optimistic)	556	1202

---

[20] The models did not seem impressive: the best fitting model included multiple high order interactions and had a p-value of 0.10. Also the five-way models were not ran on previous surveys, only on April 2012, since it had a large enough sample size (n=5020). Other samples had an insufficient size (n=~1000) to provide reliable fit measurements. Two-way and three-way models, including macroeconomic assessment, also did not fit the data well. I did not find it necessary to exhaust all possible combinations.

Finally, in the process of searching for the "best fitting model", Knoke and Burke's (1980) work was used for reference. First, a baseline model [all explanatory][the response] or [VLF][S][21] was selected. Second, interaction terms were added to improve the fit. Third, the resulting models were evaluated for most substantive and statistical significance. In addition, running models at different periods of time and with different interaction terms makes it possible to evaluate the significance of different associations, which can aid in approximating the underlying causal structure. A further consideration is that larger samples require more complex models to pass goodness-of-fit tests. Thus, looking at previous comparable surveys with smaller sample size aided the search.

Table 6 Log Linear Models[22]

Model	Fitted Marginals	April 2012 Fit (p)	April 2011 Fit (p)	October 2010 Fit (p)	April 2010 Fit (p)
1	[VLF][S]	0	-	-	-
2	[VLF][VS]	1.998401e-15	-	-	-
3	[VLF][LS]	0	-	-	-
4	[VLF][FS]	5.675825e-08	-	-	-
5	[VLF][VS][LS]	7.993606e-15	-	-	-
6	[VLF][VS][FS]	0.5053405	0.727612	0.0592234	0.2473873
7	[VLF][LS][FS]	3.000488e-08	-	-	-
8	[VLF][VS][LS][FS]	0.4961563	0.5911393	0.5173547	0.2590765
9	[VLF][VLS][FS]	0.4488285	0.431616	0.6537358	0.1539966
10	[VLF][VFS][LS]	0.3548742	0.4968378	0.6396748	0.7843583
11	[VLF][LFS][VS]	0.756737	0.5921486	0.3573312	0.1894376
12	[VLF][VLS][LFS]	0.7862492	0.3939074	0.4729964	0.09464824

In the end I selected Model 11 for further analysis. The results in Table 6 under the April 2012 column show that this model has a very good fit (p=0.75) in comparison to less parsimonious Models 6, 8, 9, and 10. In addition, compared to 6, 9, and 12, it has stability at other points in time. Comparatively, it satisfied the condition of "best fitting" model (statistically significant and substantively meaningful) and is represented in the following figure.

---

[21] [S] conceptualized as the response variable, whose odds are a function of [L],[F], and [V].

[22] I did not rerun the models that did not fit the data in April 2012 on previous years.

Figure 7 Log Linear Model [VLF][LFS][VS]

This model contains two three-factor associations and one two-factor association. It can be interpreted as showing that standard of living is mutually related to political efficacy and future expectations [VLF] and mutually related to future expectations and satisfaction with democracy [LFS], and that political efficacy is related to satisfaction with democracy [VS]. Moreover, the hypothesized response variable [S] is allowed to interact with the explanatory variables [V], [L], and [F]. In this case it has a significant relationship with political efficacy, and a significant joint relationship with standard of living and future expectations. From Table 5 it can also be seen that statistically including interactions of standard of living and future economic expectations considerably improves the fit of the model. Substantively, this suggests the core influence produced by the simultaneous presence of the two. Hence, if the model is correct the following two tables summarize the results:

41

Table 7 Fitted Values for Model [VLF][LFS][VS]

(Model fit: χ^2= 1.18729, df=3, p=0.7567)[23]

			Stfdemocracy [S]	
Political Efficacy [V]	Standard of Living [L]	Future Expectations [F]	0 (Dissatisfied)	1 (Satisfied)
0 (Weak)	0 (Bad)	0 (Pessimistic)	51.24857	19.75138
		1 (Optimistic)	138.4143	189.5857
	1 (Average)	0 (Pessimistic)	42.29351	24.70645
		1 (Optimistic)	450.0437	638.9565
1 (Strong)	0 (Bad)	0 (Pessimistic)	47.75142	28.24862
		1 (Optimistic)	158.5857	333.4143
	1 (Average)	0 (Pessimistic)	42.70648	38.29355
		1 (Optimistic)	552.9564	1205.044

The results in Table 7 suggest that the fitted values do not deviate much from the observed values presented in Table 5. Therefore, the model has good estimative power.

Table 8 Estimated Odds and Odds Ratio Calculations for Model [VLF][LFS][VS]

			Stfdemocracy [S]	
Political Efficacy [V]	Standard of Living [L]	Future Expectations [F]	Odds	Odds ratio
0 (Weak)	0 (Bad)	0 (Pessimistic)	0.385404	3.553932
		1 (Optimistic)	1.369698	
	1 (Average)	0 (Pessimistic)	0.584166	2.430412
		1 (Optimistic)	1.419765	
1 (Strong)	0 (Bad)	0 (Pessimistic)	0.591577	3.553932
		1 (Optimistic)	2.102423	
	1 (Average)	0 (Pessimistic)	0.896668	2.430413
		1 (Optimistic)	2.179274	

From the results displayed in Table 8, it can be said that the odds of satisfaction with democracy improve with the presence of each factor, but much more significantly for those who are optimistic about the nearest future. Similarly, the odds improve in the presence of other factors, but

---

[23] Satisfies that in log linear modeling χ^2 goodness-of-fit should be small relative to degrees of freedom. Alternatively L^2 =1.18447, df=3.

not as significantly for those who are pessimistic. For instance, for those who don't believe in political efficacy and are pessimistic about the nearest future, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 0.38 and 0.58 (bad and average standards of living respectively). In comparison, regardless of standard of living, for those who don't believe in political efficacy but are optimistic about the nearest future, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are about 1.4. Alternatively, for those who believe in political efficacy and are pessimistic about the nearest future, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 0.59 and 0.89 (bad and average standard of living respectively). Likewise, regardless of standard of living, for those who believe in political efficacy but are optimistic about the nearest future, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are slightly greater than 2.1.

Furthermore, the consequences of the fitted model are the symmetry of odds ratios. Thus, for respondents who have a bad standard of living, regardless of whether they believe or not in political efficacy, as long as they believe that in the near future life circumstances will be better, they are 3.55 times more likely to be satisfied with the present political system. Alternatively, for respondents who have an average standard of living, regardless of whether they believe or not in political efficacy, as long as they believe that in the nearest future life circumstances will improve, they are 2.43 times more likely to be satisfied with the present political system. This corresponds to the notion that with rising material security, people become more critical of their political system.

To conclude, this chapter has interpreted technical aspects of assessing support of democracy per se and regime support. Findings based on the trends, factorial and log linear models will be elaborated on in the following chapter, which will review and connect them with the hypotheses[24] and lead to a discussion of potential systemic consequences.

---

[24] Chapter 4 Section 4.3.3 Regime Support Hypotheses.

CHAPTER 6: Findings

Having completed the analyses of regime support and evaluation of democracy per se, it is now possible to summarize the results and connect them with substantive issues. This chapter also addresses the regime support hypotheses generated in Chapter 4 Section 3.3 (page 23). The following three sections will start with the results of trend lines. Then the factorial model for democratic values will be discussed. Finally, a causal model of the micro level regime support will be presented.

6.1 Trend lines

First of all, the results from trend lines indeed indicated that material well-being improved together with general macroeconomic developments. This supports the claim that macroeconomic developments over time also improved micro-level living conditions, supporting *Hypothesis 1*. Moreover, future economic expectations reached their peak with the start of sustained economic development, supporting *Hypothesis 2*. However, even though throughout the examined period political involvement was stable and rather moderate, it has gone into a decline in the last few years. This does not support the notion that it will rise with material well-being, thus *Hypothesis 4* did not receive sufficient support. The most obvious possibility is that the positive change should entail a much larger time span. In addition, it is subject to a plurality of people's interests and also, despite some improvements, the general material level of well-being has not reached the favorable level. Then again, if the decline continues, it is potentially an indicator of mass disillusionment. Overall, this could suggest no improvement in the quality of the regime, which in the long run could prove harmful for the democratic system by undermining its support.

Belief in voter influence or political efficacy goes through considerable fluctuations with changes in government, reaching its peak in election years, which suggests the relevance of election

campaigns. Moreover, this trend is most closely correlated with satisfaction with the political system. Nevertheless, satisfaction with the political system had gradually improved to a slightly more positive evaluation, but with considerable fluctuations. Similarly, macroeconomic performance evaluations fluctuated with changes in government, but were rather negative. Even though there is a slight improvement over time, one might speculate that weakness of institutions and poor "rule-of-law" are related to this negative assessment. Thus, support of *Hypotheses 3, 5, and 6* will further require testing by log linear analysis.

6.2 Factorial Model for Democratic Values

The results of factor analysis revealed the presence of distinct value orientations. Considering that the larger the sample size in relation to the number of variables, the more reliable the resulting factors, we can accept the last factorial model as the most stable and proceed to the interpretations. Statistically, the first factor accounts for as much variance as possible, the second accounts for as much variance left unexplained by the first, while the third accounts for variance left unexplained by the first two. If Schwartz's general hierarchy of values (2006) is applied to democratic values, it can be argued that substantively, the Libertarian Dimension carries the most information. The values of freedom of belief, expression, and travel carry high factor loadings and contribute most to the description of this dimension. Moreover, they are consistently linked together and can be considered the main indicators of this orientation. In general, it is suggested that this value dimension constitutes a belief system reflecting a sense of personal liberty or inalienable rights.

In the Egalitarian Dimension, the values of equal treatment by law, gender equality, and democratic market carry high factor loadings and are the main indicators.[25] This dimension can be considered Keynesian for underlying substantive reasons, which does not necessarily imply the

---

[25] It should be noted that this dimension's indicators are less stable in comparison to the indicators of other dimensions when tested on smaller samples. However, they are consistently grouped together.

importance of general equality, but rather of equality of opportunities.[26] In the context of Mongolia, the low levels of material well-being will lead to an emphasis on the importance of freedom of opportunity, which is necessary to improve life circumstances.

The values of the state ensuring social justice in market economy, small income and social differences contribute to the Social Liberalism Dimension. However, this also includes a high loading on freedom of property. This dimension is most clearly defined and consistently present, reflecting the belief system valuing social justice in the society. It has consistent high factor loadings, reflecting the high priority of these values, which are likely to be emphasized due to the feelings of injustice caused by the present inequality in society. There are very few winners in the new system and a large impoverished mass, which is proportionally more visible in a small population.

Figure 8 Democratic Values

Factor Indicators:
- **Factor I Libertarian**
  - ✓ Freedom of Belief
  - ✓ Freedom of Travel
  - ✓ Freedom of Expression
- **Factor II Egalitarian**
  - ✓ Equal treatment by law
  - ✓ Gender equality
  - ✓ Democratic market
- **Factor III Social Liberalism**
  - ✓ State ensures social justice
  - ✓ Small income and social differences
 - ✓ Freedom of property

---

[26] Another potential name is Economic Egalitarianism.

6.3 Model for Regime Support

Trend analysis, factor analysis, and statistical results from log linear analysis disconfirm the complete hypothesized causal order on the micro level[27] at the current stage of development. The suggested substantive reason for this is the importance of self-centered economic assessments due to low levels of material well-being. Nevertheless, the implications of the model are that respondents with a bad standard of living, regardless of whether or not they believe in political efficacy, as long as there is belief that in the nearest future circumstances will improve, are three and a half times more likely to be satisfied with the present political system. Alternatively, respondents that have an average standard of living, regardless of whether or not they believe in political efficacy as long as they believe that in the near future life circumstances will become better, are two and a half times more likely to be satisfied with the present political system. For the respondents with a bad standard of living, future economic optimism plays a much more prominent role in regime support and they are less critical. Nevertheless in either case, systemic support and evaluation is dependent on the respondent's present living conditions, belief in political efficacy, and most importantly, on future economic optimism (*H1, H3, H6*). The following graphical representation of the micro-level system support was made from the results of log linear analysis:

---

[27] Chapter 4 Figure 4 Micro Level System.

Figure 9 Regime Support[28]

From Figure 9 it can be seen that the original micro-level system had to be altered. This suggested system disproves some components of the original micro level causal system and reveals that standard of living and future economic expectations are the core influences.

To conclude, the results of the analyses of value dimensions and log linear modeling are in favor of support of democracy motivated by economic gain as a form of governance in Mongolia. In addition, with Mishler and Rose (2000a,b) it can be argued that in transitional regimes, people can better assess their regimes against other alternative, altogether adding to the suggestion that they are mainly "rational Democrats". This also implies that self-centered economic assessments are more important for systemic evaluations. Moreover, in general, interests have to be secure and become favorable in the foreseeable future. This potentially accounts for the tolerance of systemic deficiencies in the society. Most importantly, even if there was some improvement in material well-being over time, society has not reached the level of material security necessary to overcome basic needs. Consequently, if there is a major influence of economic development in relation to support of the system, then it is most probably high hopes for a better future.

---

[28] Combined theoretical causal structure and statistical model. [U_{yt}] dynamic system subject to effects of outside and unmeasured variables.

CHAPTER 7: Conclusion

In conclusion, the main objective of the present research was to test a general theory in a national setting to uncover reasons behind successful democratization in a suggested anomaly state. Overall, the empirical analysis and findings do not contradict each other and are favorable to the general theoretical claim of modernization theory with regard to cultural conditions. However, testing the main theoretical claim entails a very ambitious scope, since tracing social changes covers an extensive time period, and should reflect society's entire historical process (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Moreover, social changes are organic and dynamic, which leads to uncertainties and risks in making predictive statements. Therefore, there are a few limitations to the present study.

7.1 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

First of all, the availability of data restricted empirical testing and some of the inferences. In particular, supporting individual-level data for the quantitative approach is only available from 1995, thus any claims prior to that period would entail using other approaches. Thus, the claim of political culture being an intervening variable can only be supported empirically from recent evidence. As a result, in taking a quantitative approach to testing an extensive theory like modernization, the substantial gap between the theory and available empirics presents a problem. In this case, the issue was that the use of population statistics and surveys was introduced relatively late.

Second, one of the main assumptions undertaken as a result of the quantitative approach was simplification, which does not cover the complexity of the world. Moreover, high levels of abstraction in the concepts suggest multiple ways of operationalizing concepts and selecting related indicators. Thus, necessitating many subjective decisions. Third, an assumption of homogeneity of subclasses was introduced to test the general theoretical claim of modernization theory which affects society as a whole. In other words, demographics were not involved in the analysis. However, for

more in-depth systemic analysis, and to properly challenge the established empirical regularity that poor are poor democrats, the next step should include analysis of subgroups in the populations.

Fourth, the dynamics of time are the main factor in the theory, but the final model did not include time. It was arrived at as a result of time by analyzing trend lines and statistical analyses. This was due to different sample sizes at earlier and later stages that do not affect comparability of surveys, but makes pooled data hard to deal with statistically, especially where weights were necessary.[29] Ideally, time should have been incorporated in the model of political support. Fifth, the underlying causal structure was suggested with a combination of theoretical claims and log linear technique. Nevertheless, if possible, the arrow directions should also be disentangled through a qualitative study.

Sixth, the decision was made for a regime support model to be based on self-centered economic assessment. Moreover, the Libertarian value dimension also implies strong individualist inclinations in the society. However, a better assessment of these tendencies requires analysis of a proper cognitive instrument which was beyond the scope of this project. Thus, the inferences were based on items that cover political aspects of life. In addition, the more specific reasons and motives behind the overall system evaluation require a qualitative analysis to support inferences beyond speculations.

And finally, for the purposes of explaining democratization in Mongolia and introducing a limitation to the scope of the research project, the examination of institutions was excluded, as the research objective was to explain the system's support and survival, not its quality. Nevertheless, institutional analysis would potentially have shed light on more systemic influences. Rose and Shin argue that most governance problems of Third wave countries were due to starting democratization

---

[29] April 2012 sample has an overrepresentation of the rural population. Samples prior to 2000 covered only Ulaanbaatar. Due to specifics of Mongolian demographics with half of the population residing in the capital, the samples can be justified as comparable, but that will introduce a bias in the pooled data.

before establishing democratic institutions (1999). This absence of mature institutions, which were necessary to properly regulate the adherence to the rule-of-law, consequently led to high levels of corruption, which is still a universal problem in those states. Moreover, even if there are elections, they are not sufficient to ensure that the government is accountable, thus the problem of corruption is persistent, consequently affecting trust and producing negative assessment of institutions (Rose and Shin 1999). For future research, this assessment of institutions will benefit in-depth evaluation of system support. If the general claim of modernization holds, it will also depict movement toward mature liberal democracy.

Therefore, to do justice to the subject, subsequent explanations and development of this topic will have to incorporate population subgroups and evaluate institutional dimensions as a start. In addition, a qualitative study would potentially supplement some of the cognitive, historical, and cultural inferences. In the end, the potentials for improvements and further explorations are considerable. Nonetheless, despite all the limitations, the evidence in this study allows us to identify several implications with reasonable confidence. Based on the general findings, it is possible to make the following policy suggestions.

7.2 Policy recommendations

If the regime support model and underlying value structure is true, it is important to consider the potential consequences for further systemic developments. The Mongolian geopolitical situation and findings in this study suggest that it is subject to both internal and external risks.

7.2.1 Internal Risks

Based on the evidence, Mongolian people were identified as mainly "rational democrats." Even if society is predominantly poor,[30] the findings suggest that people in general are not against democracy. The most probable difference is that the proportion of those valuing democracy for

---

[30] According to NSOM 2010 almost 40% living under the poverty line.

economic gains (instrumental support) is more prevalent. According to Inglehart and Welzel, the main problem with this instrumental support is that it generally entails less tolerance in society (2005, 115-123). In addition, the communist system's equally distributed poverty was replaced with a system of market competition, which resulted in winners and losers of the new system. However, as Prohl and Luvsandendev revealed, the issue is that there are very few winners and too many who consider themselves losers (2008). The view that "winner takes all" is leading a feeling of social injustice in society. In particular, the small population of the country, mainly concentrated in the capital, makes inequality very visible. Even if the government has little transparency and accountability, people can easily observe errors and injustices.

Despite the flaws, the current trajectory of development in Mongolia is toward liberal democracy, and considering the values of "rational democrats", it is a system that will best reflect their needs. One of main focuses for future development will be to ensure the rule-of-law, which is related to institutional dimensions, as it is "not just a desirable addition to democratic governance but a necessary precondition for a fully democratic state" (Rose 2008, 4); in other words, it is essential for developing a mature liberal democracy. Thus, it will be necessary to support the system by improving the quality of the regime so as to eventually address the injustice felt in the society.

From the start people had very high and unrealistic expectations of what this system would bring. According to Miller and Listhaug, the need for social justice was very important for most in the post-Communist space, as the feelings of unjust outcomes were the leading factors in mass dissatisfaction with the regime and the demand for democracy (in Norris 2005). People were hoping that democracy would deliver justice, because they had experienced injustice under the previous system. The eventual disillusionment was inevitable. In the findings, the three dimensions of expectations of democracy per se underline the emphasis on combining a market economy with social interventions by the state. Therefore, for decision-making to appeal to the masses, it is crucial

to find a balance between economic liberalism and more state intervention. Ian Shapiro argues that the main method to deal with the mass feelings of injustice is to use democratic means to ensure justice (2011). In other words, this implies persuading people that justice can be meted out using the tools available in democracy.

First, this includes real opposition to the government, which will resist questionable decisions and represents possibility for change (Shapiro 2011). Current analysis revealed that people do not distinguish between the government and the opposition.[31] This suggests that even if there is dissatisfaction with a corrupt government, the elections just create a rotation without improvement (Rose 2008, 6), in the end adding to feelings of injustice. Thus, strengthening the role of actual opposition will be one of the first steps in dealing with mass discontent.

Second, other than active opposition, there is also a need to improve civil society. So far, most of civil society was sponsored by international donors, but "the rise of a robust civil society cannot be initiated from the outside" (Offe 2000, 96). The government needs to foster domestically initiated civil society. Because there will always be groups dissatisfied with decision-making, the opposition will represent the larger groups, and civil society will be necessary to support the interests of minor groups.

As a third measure, the regime should continue to ensure equal economic opportunities in the society. If we divide the population into active and passive groups, one of the achievements of the system is that opportunities for improvement in well-being are accessible for the active part of the population. The large factor is that a combination of low population and economic growth creates a considerable demand for human resources in many sectors. The shortage of people contributes to equal opportunities for advancement or a form of meritocracy.

---

[31] See Appendix 4: Systemic Variables.

In the case of the passive part of population, until now distribution of different types of incentives were applied to encourage support for the regime. However, this conditioned support in the long-run has multiple implications, especially considering the inflated expectations for the future and the underlying belief systems of self-entitlement: they mainly expect to receive, but not give. One of the main consequences is that this results in the "free-rider" society. Nevertheless, Michael Porter states that economic development is shaped by "the tug-of-war between productivity-enhancing aspects of economic culture in a nation and productivity-eroding aspects of culture" (2000, 22). This suggests the benefit of focusing on improving human resource potential as a measure to ensure further productivity. Overall these measures will be among the general remedies leading to some social justice within capitalism as a valid goal.

Ignoring these remedies, on the other hand, will create a basis for internal risks in Mongolia. One particular risk factor is the large young population with high material demands and expectations in comparison to previous generations, who has no first-hand knowledge of alternatives. Moreover, the general sociological claim is that people compare themselves to similarly-situated others, leading to problems arising from the fact that most winners in the society were recently no different from others. That applies to potential problems with older cohorts. Consequently, since the regime has been established for some time now, the population will not have the necessary degree of patience if the balance between standard of living, future optimism, and political efficacy is undermined, adding to the danger of radicalization in society. Przeworski et al. assert that "both democracies and dictatorships are threatened when the rich get relatively richer, but only democracy is threatened if the poor get relatively poorer" (2000, 121). However, for Mongolia it will most probably not undermine democracy, but the quality of the social environment, by triggering the risk factors.

In the end, if the inferences in this study are true, then the "rational democrats" are a contradictory conclusion. On the one hand, the concept is favorable to liberal democracy, because it

is the system that will adjust to their value orientations. On the other hand, that self-interest does not imply high morals. Whether this is bad for democracy is more or less an issue of applying idealist or realist standards of what liberal democracy should require or represent (Mishler and Rose 2000b). The context-based evaluation suggests that it matters more for quality rather than systemic persistence. In this case, the hypothesis of a revised modernization theory states that improving the material well-being of the mass will lead to eventual social improvement and support of democracy as a political good (intrinsic support).

7.2.2 External Risks

The current institutional dimension in Mongolia still suffers from the legacy of the communist system, which is resilient to change. Despite the recent enthusiasm for rapid economic development, the problem of the absence of mature institutions will be the core factor in determining whether the country can escape the "resource curse" related to the mining boom. Thus, this will be one of the main policy challenges in the nearest future.

The findings also support the claim that this macro-level development positively affects micro-level well-being, which poses another risk, if the economy is mainly supported by external demand. The analysis of macro indicators revealed the rise of economic development corresponding to mining developments. This suggests that domestic growth is largely influenced by external factors. The problem is that current economic development is driven by neighboring China. Thus, if growth in China slows down, this will also significantly affect Mongolia.

Nevertheless, democracy will likely stay, but the main issue will be quality or type. If in the previous system, democracy seemed like a better alternative, now the proposed alternatives will not necessarily meet the demands of the population. Francis Fukuyama examines the alternative trajectories of political and economic development represented by sovereign democracy, benevolent dictatorship, and authoritarian capitalism, but these trajectories were formed in societies that

traditionally held hierarchical structures (2011). The recent crisis in capitalist systems points to the advantage of authoritarian modernization in dealing with economic issues; however, the extent of stability of these regimes and their ability to sustain themselves in the long run can be questioned (Fukuyama 2011). Considering the values of "rational democrats", improving the existing system is preferable to pursuing other polarities.

To conclude, the present study has sought to show that historical and cultural factors form the pro-democratic inclinations in the society and constitute the cultural base for liberal democracy. At the moment, findings favor the main theoretical claim; however, only time will show whether it holds. Inglehart and Welzel maintain that "modernization is not linear" and goes through different phases which impact belief systems (2005, 5). One of the main reasons behind Mongolia's status as an anomaly was due to expectations based mostly on the period of time when macroeconomic performance was especially bad. Fritz's dependent democratization concerns and correspondence to the profile of "too poor, too far from established democracies, lacks democratic prehistory, and the old elite was too well entrenched to make a full transition likely" (2002, 95), also made success in consolidating democracy doubtful. Nevertheless, consolidation does not mean that the regime has reached the level of a mature liberal democracy. Mongolian democracy passes the minimal standards of democracy, but the quality of the regime needs to improve in order to direct and manage positive reforms, particularly in order to minimize serious internal and external risks. If the claims of modernization theory hold, then sustained economic development will eventually allow the country to catch up with its developed counterparts. Additionally, the Soviet legacy of high levels of literacy, together with a predominantly young population, suggest a much shorter required time and resources to implement the necessary changes. But all this will ultimately be determined by good and responsible governance.

In sum, this thesis examined the claim of pro-democratic political culture in Mongolia, which at the moment is widely accepted by the public as a common sense argument. In the process, empirical support was built on the basis of inferences from revised modernization theory represented by Inglehart and Welzel (2005) and findings in New Democracies Barometers by Rose et al. in order to find the scientific basis. Additionally, the generated case-specific theoretical propositions and methodology have made a small contribution to the existing literature by demonstrating how unique features can be managed. This work offers insights into how liberal democracy was sustained in a society culturally distant from the West. The findings empirically supplement previous studies, which used the political culture argument, but were restricted by availability of data or their approach. In the end, considering the complexity of analyzing changing societies, this study can be used as a starting point for further research on Mongolia's democratic development in particular, and on uncovering different issues of democratization in general.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Timelines: Politbarometers and Elections

<table>
<tr><td colspan="10">Politbarometers conducted by the Sant Maral Foundation[32]
(each survey is marked "•")</td></tr>
<tr><td>1995</td><td>1996</td><td>1997</td><td>1998</td><td>1999</td><td>2000</td><td>2001</td><td>2002</td><td>2003</td></tr>
</table>

<table>
<tr><td>2004</td><td>2005</td><td>2006</td><td>2007</td><td>2008</td><td>2009</td><td>2010</td><td>2011</td><td>2012</td></tr>
</table>

<table>
<tr><td colspan="18">Parliamentary elections</td></tr>
<tr><td>1995</td><td>1996</td><td>1997</td><td>1998</td><td>1999</td><td>2000</td><td>2001</td><td>2002</td><td>2003</td><td>2004</td><td>2005</td><td>2006</td><td>2007</td><td>2008</td><td>2009</td><td>2010</td><td>2011</td><td>2012</td></tr>
<tr><td>MPRP</td><td colspan="4">MNDP/MSDP coalition</td><td colspan="4">MPRP</td><td colspan="4">MPRP/MDC coalition</td><td colspan="5">MPP</td></tr>
</table>

<table>
<tr><td colspan="19">Presidential elections and names of incumbent presidents</td></tr>
<tr><td>1995</td><td>1996</td><td>1997</td><td>1998</td><td>1999</td><td>2000</td><td>2001</td><td>2002</td><td>2003</td><td>2004</td><td>2005</td><td>2006</td><td>2007</td><td>2008</td><td>2009</td><td>2010</td><td>2011</td><td>2012</td><td>2013</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Ochirbat</td><td colspan="4">Bagabandi</td><td colspan="4">Bagabandi</td><td colspan="4">Enkh-bayar</td><td colspan="5">Elbegdorj</td></tr>
</table>

CEU eTD Collection

---

[32] 1995-1999 surveys covered only the capital, but considering Mongolian demographics and sampling procedure it can be argued that all are comparable especially in respect to most tested variables (explanation can be provided upon request). Sample size was different (n=~1000 to1300), the largest collected in April 2012 (n=5020).

Appendix 2: Politbarometer

Variables – Systemic Analysis

|	**Labels**	**Value Labels**
1995-2007	How much are you satisfied with the present political system?	Satisfied – 1 Rather satisfied – 2 Rather not satisfied – 3 Not satisfied – 4 No Answer – 8 Don't Know – 9
2008-2012	How much are you satisfied with the Democracy and present political system?	Satisfied – 1 Rather satisfied – 2 Rather not satisfied – 3 Not satisfied – 4 No Answer – 8 Don't Know – 9
1995-2012	In general, how do you evaluate the present economic situation in Mongolia?	Very good– 1 Good– 2 Not good, not bad– 3 Bad – 4 Very Bad– 5 No Answer – 8 Don't Know – 9
1995-2012	How much are you interested in politics?	Very strongly interested - 1 Rather interested - 2 Slightly interested - 3 Rather not interested - 4 Totally not interested – 5 No Answer – 8 Don't Know – 9
1997-2012	In general, how satisfied are you with the government?	Satisfied – 1 Rather satisfied – 2 Rather not satisfied – 3 Not satisfied – 4 No Answer – 8 Don't Know – 9
1997-2012	How satisfied are you with the opposition?	Satisfied – 1 Rather satisfied – 2 Rather not satisfied – 3 Not satisfied – 4 No Answer – 8 Don't Know – 9
1995-2012	How is your present personal and family's standard of living?	Very good - 1 Good - 2 Not good, nor bad - 3 Bad - 4 Very bad - 5

		No Answer – 8
		Don't Know – 9
1995-2012	In your opinion, how strong is voters' influence on political decision making?	Very strong -1
		Rather strong - 2
		Rather little - 3
		None - 4
		No Answer – 8
		Don't Know – 9
1995-2012	How do you evaluate your nearest future?	Rather Optimistic – 1
		Rather Pessimistic – 2
		No Answer – 8
		Don't Know – 9

Appendix 3: Liberal Democratic Principles and Issues 2008-2012

Label: The following statements describe democratic principles and issues. Please rate the importance of each statement listed below:

Label	Value Label
I can travel wherever I want	Very Important – 1
Everybody can believe in what he/she wants	Rather Important – 2
Everybody can express his/her opinion freely	Rather not Important – 3
Media and research are uncensored in Mongolia	Totally Unimportant – 4
Everybody has the right to enter one's desired profession	No Answer – 8
Everybody can participate in the activities of their choice during	Don't Know – 9
one's free time	
There is a free, democratic market	
Men and women have equal rights	
All parties have an equal chance to come into government	
All people have equal educational opportunities	
Income differences are kept as small as possible	
All people are equally treated by the law	
The state provides as many social security services as possible	
Everybody has the freedom to decide about his property	
Social differences are kept as small as possible	
The state provides for social justice in a market economy	

*Appendix 4: Systemic Variables[33]*

Satisfaction (positive)

---

[33] Trend lines are the result of collapsing categories "satisfied" and "rather satisfied." It can be seen that the three are strongly correlated, which led to a conclusion that respondents do not distinguish between the government and opposition.

*Appendix 5: Present Standard of Living*

*Appendix 6: Belief in Voters Influence – Political Efficacy*

Appendix 7: Present Economic Situation – Assessment of Macroeconomic Situation

Appendix 8: Interest in Politics – Political Involvement

Appendix 9: Future Economic Expectations

References

Alsted, Jacob. 2001. Models of Human Motivation in Sociology. Studies in Sociology. Denmark: Roskilde University.

Batbayar, Tsedendamba. 2003. Foreign policy and domestic reform in Mongolia, *Central Asian Survey*. 22(1), p. 45-59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0263493032000108612 (accessed 19 February 2012).

Blalock, Humbert. Jr. 1969. *Theory Construction: From Verbal to Mathematical Foundations.* Eaglewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Boix, Carles. 2011. Democracy, Development, and International System. *American Political Science Review*. 105(4), p. 809-828. http://www.princeton.edu/~cboix/apsr-boix-2011.pdf. (accessed 14 January 2012).

Carothers, Thomas. 2002. The End of the Transition Paradigm. *Journal of Democracy*. 13(1) p. 5-21. http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Carothers-13-1.pdf (accessed 19 February 2012).

Diamond, Larry. 1996. Is the third wave over? *Journal of Democracy*. 7, p. 23–24. http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/237.pdf (accessed 29 February 2012).

Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation.* Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press. (E-book).

Firebaugh, Glenn. 2000. Empirics of World Income Inequality. *American Journal of Sociology* 104, p. 1597-1630. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/210218 (accessed 12 December 2011).

Fish, Steven M. 1998. Mongolia: Democracy without Prerequisites, *Journal of Democracy*, 9(3), p. 127–140. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v009/9.3fish.html (accessed 19 February 2012).

Fish, Steven M. 2001. The Inner Asian Anomaly: Mongolia's Democratization in Comparative Perspective, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 34, p. 323–338. http://polisci.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/FishM/MongoliaDemocratization.pdf (accessed 19 February 2012).

Fritz, Verena. 2002. Mongolia: Dependent Democratization, *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*.18 (4), p. 75-100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714003620 (accessed 19 February 2012).

Fukuyama, Franscis. 2011. *Toward a Theory of Political Development*. In *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*, p. 442-619. London: Profile Books. (E-book).

Ganbat, Damba, Rolin Tusalem and David Yang, 2008. The Mass Public and Democratic Politics in Mongolia. In *How East Asians view democracy*, ed. Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan, and Doh Chull Shin. New York: Columbia University Press.

Gottard, Anna, Giovanni Maria Marchetti, and Alan Agresti. 2011. Quasi-Symmetric Graphical Log-Linear Models. *Scandinavian Journal of Statistics*. 38, p.447-465.

Gunther, Richard and Jose Montero R. 2004. *Attitudes toward Democracy in Seven Countries: Dimentional Structure and Behavioral Correlates*. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde. *(385) Studies in Public Policy*.

Højer, Lars. 2009. Absent powers: magic and loss in post-socialist Mongolia. 15(3), p. 575–591. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9655.2009.01574.x/full (accessed 19 February 2012).

Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. *A World of Civilizations*. In *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, p.1-85. New York: Samuel and Schuster.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1997. After twenty years: the future of the third wave. *Journal of Democracy*, 8, p. 3–12. http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/toc/tococt97.html (accessed 29 February 2012).

Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, 2005. *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kim, Jae-on and Charles Mueller. W. 1978. *Introduction to Factor Analysis: What It Is and How To Do It. Volume 13*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

Kim, Jae-on and Charles Mueller. W. 1978. *Factor Analysis: Statistical Methods and Practical Issues. Volume 14*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

Knoke, David and Peter J. Burke. 1980. *Log-linear Models. Volume 20*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

Krishna, Arinudh, ed., 2008. *Poverty, Participation, and Democracy: A Global Perspective*. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press.

Landman, Todd. 2008. *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction.*3rd ed. New York: Routledge.

Larsen, Stein U., ed., 2000. *Challenges of Theories on Democracy*. New York: Columbia University Press.

    -Lipset, Seymor. M. On the General Conditions of Democracy.p.11-30.
    -Inglehart, Ronald, Changing Values and Changing Societies. p.54-90.
    -Offe, Claus. East European Exceptionalism. p.90-99.

-Waldrauch, Harald. Incommensurability? On the comparison of Eastern and Southern regime changes. p.99-147.

Lhamsuren, Munkh-Erdene. 2010. The Transformation of Mongolia's Political System: From Semi-parliamentary to Parliamentary? Asian Survey, 50 (2), p. 211-334. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2010.50.2.311 (accessed 29 February 2012).

Li, Narangoa. 2009. Mongolia and Preventive Diplomacy: Haunted by History and Becoming Cosmopolitan. 49(2), p. 358-379. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2009.49.2.358 (accessed 19 February 2012).

Lipset, Seymour M. 1960. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. New York: Doubleday & Company.

Luvsandendev, Sumati. 2009. Mongolia. KAS Democratic Report. http://www.kas.de/upload/Publikationen/2009/dr2009/dr_mongolia.pdf.

Mishler, William and Richard Rose. 2000a. Learning and Re-learning Regime Support: The Dynamics of Post-Communist Regimes. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde. *(326)Studies in Public Policy.*

Mishler, William and Richard Rose. 2000b. Political Support for Incomplete Democracies: Realist vs. Idealist Theories and Measures. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde. *(333)Studies in Public Policy.*

Munck, Gerardo L. 2009. *Measuring Democracy: A Bridge between Scholarship and Politics.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

National Statistical Office of Mongolia. *Statistical Yearbook 2010.* Ulaanbaatar.

Norris, Pippa, ed. 1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pomfret, Richard. 2000. Transition and Democracy in Mongolia, Europe-Asia Studies. 52 (1), p. 149-6. http://www.jstor.org/stable/15375 (accessed 19 February 2012).

Prohl, Werner and Sumati Luvsandendev. 2008. *Voters Voices: People's Perception of Mongolia's Political and Economic Transition as Reflected in Opinion Polls from 1995 to 2007*. Ulaanbaatar: Munkhiin Useg.

Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1997 Modernization: Theories and Facts. World Politics. 49 (2), p. 155-183. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25053996 (accessed 14 January 2012).

Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and development Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (E-book).

Robinson, William.S. 1950. Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals. (Reprint) *International Journal of Epidemiology*. 38, p.337-341. http://ije.oxfordjournals.org/content/38/2/337.short (accessed 19 May 2012).

Rose, Richard and Doh Chull Shin. 1999. Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third Wave Democracies. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde. *(314)Studies in Public Policy.*

Rose, Richard and William Mishler. 2000. Regime Support in Non-Democratic and Democratic Contexts. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde. *(336)Studies in Public Policy.*

Rose, Richard. 2002. *How Muslims View Democracy: Evidence from Central Asia. Journal of Democracy .* 13(4), p. 102-111. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jod/summary/v013/13.4rose.html (accessed 5 May 2012).

Rose, Richard. 2006a. *Political Behavior in Time and Space*. Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen. *(414) Studies in Public Policy.*

Rose, Richard. 2006b. *Diverging Paths of Post-Communist Countries: New Europe Barometer Trends since 1991.* Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen. *(418) Studies in Public Policy.*

Rose, Richard. 2008. *Democratic and Undemocratic States.* Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen. *(444) Studies in Public Policy.*

Rossabi, Morris. 2005. *Modern Mongolia: From Khans to Commissars to Capitalists*. Berkley: University of California Press.

Oakes, Michael. 2009. Commentary: Individual, Ecological, and Multilevel Fallacies, International *Journal of Epidemiology*. 38 (2), p. 361-368. http://ije.oxfordjournals.org/content/38/2/361.extract (accessed 19 May 2012).

Sabloff, Paula. L. W. 2002. "Why Mongolia? The Political Culture of an Emerging Democracy," Central Asian Survey. 21 (1), p. 19-36.http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02634930220127928 (accessed 19 February 2012).

Sanders, Alan. J. K., 1992. Mongolia's New Constitution: Blueprint for Democracy. Asian Survey. 32(6), p. 506-520. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645157 (accessed 19 February 2012).

Schwartz, Shalom, H. 2006. "Basic Human Values: Theory, Methods, and Applications," unpublished manuscript. http://www.unienna.it/scienzepsicologiche/doc/tirocinio/Schwartz_paper.pdf (accessed 5 May 2012).

Schwartz, Shalom, H. 2009. "Basic Human Values," seminar paper. http://ccsr.ac.uk/qmss/seminars/2009-06-10/documents/Shalom_Schwartz_1.pdf (accessed 5 May 2012).

Shapiro, Ian. 2011. *Democratic Justice: A Reply to Critics*. In *The Real World of Democratic Theory,* p.297-339. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (E-book).

Wachman Alan. M. 2009. Mongolia's Geopolitical Gambit: Preserving a Precarious Independence, While Resisting "Soft Colonialism"". EAI Fellows Working Paper 18.

Westad, Odd, A. 2006. *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wucherpfennig, Julian and Franziska Deutsch. 2009. Modernization and Democracy: Theories and Evidence Revisited. Living Reviews in Democracy. 1. http://democracy.livingreviews.org/index.php/lrd/article/viewArticle/lrd-2009-4/13 (accessed 14 January 2012).

Empirical Data

Sant Maral Foundation in Mongolia (1995-2012) *Politbarometers*.

World Bank (1981-2011) *GDP per capita (current US$)*. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/country/mongolia