

Halil Evren Sünnetçioğlu

***AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM* (HEAR THE OTHER SIDE TOO):
THE MEANING OF THE BATTLE OF LEPANTO (1571)
AMONG LATE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY OTTOMAN HISTORIANS**

MA Thesis in Comparative History, with a specialization
in Interdisciplinary Medieval Studies.

Central European University

Budapest

May 2013

AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM (HEAR THE OTHER SIDE TOO):
THE MEANING OF THE BATTLE OF LEPANTO (1571)
AMONG LATE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY OTTOMAN HISTORIANS

by

Halil Evren Sünnetçioğlu

(Turkey)

Thesis submitted to the Department of Medieval Studies,
Central European University, Budapest, in partial fulfillment of the requirements
of the Master of Arts degree in Comparative History, with a specialization in
Interdisciplinary Medieval Studies.

Accepted in conformance with the standards of the CEU.

Chair, Examination Committee

Thesis Supervisor

Examiner

Examiner

Budapest
May 2013

AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM (HEAR THE OTHER SIDE TOO):
THE MEANING OF THE BATTLE OF LEPANTO (1571)
AMONG LATE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY OTTOMAN HISTORIANS

by

Halil Evren Sünnetçioğlu

(Turkey)

Thesis submitted to the Department of Medieval Studies,
Central European University, Budapest, in partial fulfillment of the requirements
of the Master of Arts degree in Comparative History, with a specialization in
Interdisciplinary Medieval Studies

Accepted in conformance with the standards of the CEU.

External Reader

Budapest
May 2013

***AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM* (HEAR THE OTHER SIDE TOO):
THE MEANING OF THE BATTLE OF LEPANTO (1571)
AMONG LATE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY OTTOMAN HISTORIANS**

by

Halil Evren Sünnetçioğlu

(Turkey)

Thesis submitted to the Department of Medieval Studies,
Central European University, Budapest, in partial fulfillment of the requirements
of the Master of Arts degree in Comparative History, with a specialization in
Interdisciplinary Medieval Studies.

Accepted in conformance with the standards of the CEU

Supervisor

External Supervisor

Budapest
May 2013

I, the undersigned, **Halil Evren Sünnetçioğlu**, candidate for the MA degree in Comparative History, with a specialization in Interdisciplinary Medieval Studies declare herewith that the present thesis is exclusively my own work, based on my research and only such external information as properly credited in notes and bibliography. I declare that no unidentified and illegitimate use was made of the work of others, and no part of the thesis infringes on any person's or institution's copyright. I also declare that no part of the thesis has been submitted in this form to any other institution of higher education for an academic degree.

Budapest, __ May 2013

Signature

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In acknowledgements, although it is a courtesy to thank supervisors first, this is not necessarily the reason why I start with my supervisor, Tijana Krstić. It is not often that one finds a supervisor who always finds the time for listening to the little problems and roadblocks that unavoidably crop up in the course of my graduate school education. I would like to express my gratitude for her support, patience, and prudence in guiding, which were antidotes to my occasionally escalating perfectionism.

I am indebted to Professor Ferenc Csirkés, who introduced me to the delicacies of Ottoman ornate prose and its interpretation in his text seminar course. He read and provided feedback on the drafts of my thesis.

I thank Professor Judith Rasson, who edited some parts of my work.

With Ana Sekulić's help, I could read Venetian ambassadorial reports in a detailed manner. I am grateful for her presence in my life.

“History conversations” with *Azizim* (“my esteemed friend”) Murat Köroğlu have always been delightful. I appreciate the company of my friends Ayçe Yılmaz, Gergely Csiky, Işın Taylan, Narine Gevorgian, Marijana Misevic, and Johanna Tóth. I thank Csilla Dobos and Annabella Pál for providing a congenial environment for students. Special thanks to Zsuzsa Sidó for sparing me from the headaches of preparing the table of contents.

I am thankful to my family and particularly my grandparents for their love and care. My heartfelt gratitude goes to Sedat Bornovalı, who helped and encouraged me to do what I like to do in life.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	i
Introduction	1
Chapter 1: When the Seeds of Factionalism Were Sown for the Future Reign: Sokollu Mehmed Pasha versus Selim II's Favorites after Süleyman's Death (1566)	8
1.1. The Accession: How Should the Transfer of Power to Selim II Take Place?	10
1.2. Sokollu Mehmed Pasha Triumphant: Forestalling <i>Kat-ı Rahm</i> (Severing Ties) ...	15
Chapter 2: "Mischievous Factions and Scheming Courtiers:" Ottoman Factional Politics and Foreign Policy behind the War of 1570-73	19
2.1. Some Notes on Factionalism and Decision Making in Early Modern Ottoman Politics:	20
2.2. The "Cyprus Faction" in the Making:	22
2.2.1. Joseph Nasi:.....	22
2.2.2 Lala Mustafa Pasha:	26
2.2.3. Piyale Mehmed Pasha:	30
2.3. Cyprus Campaign in the Making:	30
2.4. Cyprus Campaign in Action:	34
2.5. The Battle of Lepanto:	36
Chapter 3: The Meaning of the Battle of Lepanto Contested: Uses of History in the Late Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Chronicles	41
3.1. The Battle of Lepanto as Penned by Declinist Forerunners: Mustafa Efendi of Thessaloniki (<i>Selaniki</i>) and Mustafa of Gallipoli ('<i>Ali</i>)	42
3.1.2. Event and Interpretation: The Battle of Lepanto and Decline.....	46
3.2. Eulogy at Play: Mehmed Za'im and Mehmed Çelebi (<i>Vusuli</i>)	57
3.2.2. The Battle of Lepanto as an Event with Little or No Significance:	62
Conclusion	67
Bibliography	69

Introduction

This thesis investigates Ottoman perceptions of the Battle of Lepanto (7 October 1571), as reflected in the late sixteenth-century Ottoman chronicles. I address the question of how the meaning of the Battle of Lepanto was negotiated in the contemporary narratives of Ottoman authors. The reconstruction of the Battle of Lepanto was a contested issue that informed the interplay between history writing and contemporary political discourse. From low to high-level officials, the significance of the Battle of Lepanto ranged from the utmost calamity to an event unworthy of mention, depending on their place within the contemporary intellectual milieu, patronage ties, and factional politics.

Literature Review:

The consequences of a clash between the Holy League (Papal, Spanish, and Venetian forces) and the Ottoman Empire, the Battle of Lepanto has been studied by Ottomanists almost exclusively based on Ottoman administrative records (*defters*) that helped to reconstruct the number of ships, sailors, and cannons involved in the battle and the size of the fleet constructed during the full-scale shipbuilding campaign that followed the defeat, as well as territories won or lost with the help of maritime operations.¹ Reflecting the views of European historiography, in which the Battle of Lepanto is typically seen as the turning point in power relations between the Ottomans and the “West” to the advantage of the latter, one strand of Ottomanist historiography continues to be engaged in discussion of whether or not the Battle of Lepanto marked the onset of decline of the Ottoman sea-power.² In this

¹ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi* [Ottoman History], vol. 3 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1948); 21-26; Andrew Hess, “The Battle of Lepanto and its Place in Mediterranean History,” *Past & Present* 57 (1972): 53-73; Halil İnalcık, “Lepanto in the Ottoman Documents,” in *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del ‘500 alla luce di Lepanto*, ed. Gino Benzoni (Florence: Olschki, 1974), 185-192; Colin Imber, “The Reconstruction of the Ottoman Fleet after the Battle of Lepanto, 1571-1572,” in *Studies in Ottoman History and Law* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1996), 85-101.

² Emrah Safa Gürkan, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde Osmanlılar’ın XVI. Yüzyıl’daki Akdeniz Siyaseti,” [Sixteenth-Century Mediterranean Politics of the Ottomans in the Framework of Ottoman-Habsburg

historiographical debate, narrative sources are deemed as anecdotal at best and unreliable for empirical research at worst compared to the *defters*, which leaves a limited space for extending the discussion to what the Battle of Lepanto meant for the Ottoman Empire at that time.

Only two studies have posed the question of Ottoman perceptions of the battle with reference to Ottoman chronicles. Robert Mantran³ asks whether the Battle of Lepanto was perceived as a serious defeat by the Ottomans, as the western part of the Mediterranean claimed. Besides, Mantran questions the short- and long-term consequences of the battle. He argues that information the Ottoman chronicles provide about the events before, during, and after the Battle of Lepanto are on the whole quite limited. Rather, the chronicles focus on the reactions of Sultan Selim II, grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, and grand admiral Kılıç Ali Pasha (newly appointed instead of Müezzinzade Ali Pasha, who was killed in the Battle of Lepanto). Even so, Mantran notes, the chronicles are valuable in clarifying factual details of the events surrounding the battle.

Onur Yıldırım⁴ approaches the problem from a similar positivistic angle. Yıldırım examines whether the Ottomans' feeling of superiority over the rest of the world was in fact disturbed after the Battle of Lepanto. He summarizes the factual information on the naval confrontation found in the chronicles as well as the reasons given for the defeat. He concludes that the actual end of the Ottoman superiority complex was more the failure of the second siege of Vienna against a combined Habsburg-Polish army in 1683 than the Battle of Lepanto. The problem with these two studies is that they treat information in the chronicles merely as facts divorced from their narrative context.

Rivalry] in *Osmanlı Dönemi Akdeniz Dünyası*, [The Mediterranean World during the Ottoman Times] eds. Haydar Çoruh, M. Yaşar Ertaş, and M. Ziya Köse (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2011), 41-44.

³ Robert Mantran, "L'écho de la Bataille de Lépante à Constantinople," *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 28, No. 2 (1973): 396-405.

⁴ Onur Yıldırım, "The Battle of Lepanto and Its Impact on Ottoman History and Historiography," *Mediterraneo in armi (secc. XV-XVIII) (Supplement of the Journal Mediterranean)* 2 (2007): 533-556.

For example, Yıldırım notes that

where their [chroniclers] narration of events is concerned, they adopted a descriptive method and usually shied away from passing judgments on the consequences of events. In their pursuits, they were often impeded by a series of concerns which included primarily the risk of being reported to the Sultan or a high-ranking official. Thus they left aside their own reactions to a particular event, and the views of the other parties, who might have been directly involved with this event, remain largely unaddressed.⁵

However, everything the chroniclers write can be considered “their own reactions.” What is at stake is not only what they say but *how* they say it as well as what they do not say. One can make sense of these editorial choices by focusing on the convergence of the chroniclers’ social and political background on the one hand and their narrative strategies on the other. As part of this convergence, facts are embellished, distorted, and reshaped. In this respect, omissions are also an integral part of the narrative that a historian can work with.

My own work considers the chronicles as products of their authors’ navigation through power configurations of the late sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire. Specifically, I study how the meaning of the Battle of Lepanto was contested in terms of the way the chroniclers assert themselves during the tumultuous times of changes “in the military regime, the monetary system, and the status hierarchies of the centralized state.”⁶ The chroniclers’ interpretation of the Battle of Lepanto constitutes literary investment in their precarious standing within the state apparatus. As a humiliating defeat, the meaning of the Battle of Lepanto was contested, providing Ottoman chroniclers thereby with opportunities to interpret this historical moment in relation to the power matrix in which they operated or hoped to access, against the background of a developing intellectual discourse of decline.

⁵ Ibid., 545.

⁶ Gülru Necipoğlu, *The Age of Sinan: Architectural Culture in the Ottoman Empire*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 257.

Sources and Methodology:

The core of this study (Chapter 3) focuses on the works of Mustafa of Gallipoli (*Künhü'l-Ahbar* / The Essence of Histories),⁷ Mustafa of Thessaloniki (*Tarih-i Selaniki* / Selaniki's History),⁸ Mehmed Za'im (*Cami'ü't-Tevarih* / Compendium of Chronicles),⁹ and Mehmed Çelebi (*Tevarih-i Sultan Selim Han* / History of Selim II).¹⁰ "Before we read the history, examine the background of the historian."¹¹ Common to the studies of Robert Mantran and Onur Yıldırım is not taking into account *Sitz im Leben* (social setting) of Ottoman chronicles they focus on. In doing so, both scholars disregard the time gap between the chroniclers they select to investigate that range from Selaniki (d. 1600?) to Muneccimbashi Ahmed (1631-1702).¹² Mantran's selection boils down to his presumption that the chroniclers he studies either depart from a common source or they copy each other on a number of points.¹³ Yıldırım, however, does not provide any justification for his selection of the chroniclers. In effect, the chroniclers they discuss in order to demonstrate the Ottoman perceptions of the Battle of Lepanto are not put into any meaningful context.

I aim to discuss Mustafa of Gallipoli, Mustafa of Thessaloniki, Mehmed Za'im, and Mehmed Çelebi who constitute the generation that lived through the Battle of Lepanto (1571)

⁷ Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî, *Künhü'l-Ahbâr*, 4. Rûkn: Tıpkıbasım [The Essence of Histories, 4th Pillar: Facsimile] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2009).

⁸ Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)* [Selânikî's History] ed. Mehmet İpşirli (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999).

⁹ Mehmed Za'im, "Câmi'ü't-Tevârih (202a-327b Giriş - Tenkitli Metin - Sözlük-Dizin)" [Compendium of Chronicles (202a-327b Introduction-Critical Edition-Dictionary-Index)] ed. Ayşe Nur Sır (PhD diss., Marmara University, 2007).

¹⁰ Necdet Öztürk, "Kazasker Vusuli Mehmed Çelebi ve Selim-nâme'si," [Chief Military Judge Vusuli Mehmed Çelebi and His Book of Selim] *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları* 50 (1987): 9-108.

¹¹ Lawrence Stone, "History and Postmodernism," in *The Postmodern History Reader*, ed. Keith Jenkins (New York: Routledge, 1997), 255.

¹² Robert Mantran's sources are: Sa'd ed-din, *Tadj ut-Tevarih* (1536-1599) [The Crown of Histories], Selaniki Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih de Selânikî* (d. 1600), Peçevi, *Tarih de Peçevi* (1574-1649) [Peçevi's History]; Solakzade, *Tarih-i Al-i Osman* de Solakzade [Solakzade's History of Ottoman Dynasty], Katib Çelebi, *Tuhfet ul-Kibar fi Asfar il-Bihar de Kâtib Tchélébi* [Katib Çelebi's Gift to the Great Ones on Naval Campaigns] (Hadji Khalfa, 1609-1658). Onur Yıldırım's sources are: Katib Çelebi, *Tuhfetü'l Kibar fi Esfari'l Bihar* (Istanbul: Darü't Tibaati'l Mamureti's Su, 1141); Peçevi, *Tarih-i Peçevi* (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1283); Solakzade, *Tarih-i Solakzade* (Istanbul: Mahmud Bey Matbaası, 1297); Selaniki Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selaniki* (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1281).

¹³ Robert Mantran, "L'écho de la Bataille de Lépante à Constantinople," *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 28, No. 2 (1973): 396.

and wrote histories in the last quarter of the sixteenth century. In some part of their careers, these chroniclers were in close contact with the Ottoman dignitaries who played an important role in the process of decision-making at the core of the Ottoman government. They witnessed factional politics in the court of the sultan and endured the resulting insecure patronage relations during and after the grand vizierate of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha. At the same time, each of the four chroniclers narrated the events from their own standpoint vis-à-vis power configurations. As a result, they produced different versions of the past in their texts in regard to the Battle of Lepanto.

These chroniclers were writing at the time of unstable patronage relations, when Ottoman political discourse was imbued with factionalism¹⁴ and decline.¹⁵ Following Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, frequently shifting appointments in the office of the grand vizierate caused a speedy rotation of key bureaucrats, administrators and judges. Starting with the fifth year (1579) of Murad III's reign (1574-1595), the rapid succession of grand viziers did not allow the promotion of their relatives and clients to the central and provincial administration posts as during the tenure of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha (1565-1579) who served under three sultans without interruption for fourteen years.¹⁶ In these precarious circumstances, the chroniclers were writing with an awareness that what they narrate as facts "would elicit an intense and predictable response on the part of"¹⁷ Ottoman grandees, who read histories in private circles.¹⁸

¹⁴ See: Elif Özgen, "Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Paşa and Factional Politics in the Court of Murad III," (MA, Bilgi University, 2010).

¹⁵ Cemal Kafadar, "The Myth of the Golden Age: Ottoman Historical Consciousness in the Post-Süleymânic Era," in *Süleymân the Second and His Time*, eds. Halil İnalcık and Cemal Kafadar (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1993), 37-48.

¹⁶ Günhan Börekçi, "Factions and Favorites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1603-1617) and His Immediate Predecessors," 196.

¹⁷ Rhoads Murphey, "Review Article: Musta Ali and the Politics of Cultural Despair," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 21 (May 1989): 248.

¹⁸ Emine Fetvacı, "Viziers to Eunuchs: Transitions in Ottoman Manuscript Patronage, 1556-1617," (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2005), 131.

As Gottfried Hagen remarks, common scholarly discussion of Ottoman historiography centers around chroniclers who are taken as representatives of group interests.¹⁹ Perhaps, one of the main challenges in the field is the limited number of critical editions of the texts, let alone studies establishing the sources used by Ottoman authors, comparative analyses of their themes, and their mutual influences.²⁰ My thesis faces a similar challenge. I wish to respond to this challenge by identifying certain common and individual patterns in the histories written by Mustafa of Gallipoli, Mustafa of Thessaloniki, Mehmed Za‘im, and Mehmed Çelebi. In doing so, I wish to reflect both idiosyncrasies and similarities in their relationship to the contemporary Ottoman political and intellectual circles within the framework of my thesis.

Among the chroniclers addressed in this study, Mustafa of Thessaloniki (Selaniki) and Mustafa of Gallipoli (‘Ali) represent low-to-mid segment of the Ottoman bureaucratic corps. In contrast, Mehmed Za‘im and Mehmed Çelebi (Vusuli) represent high-level appointees, having occupied prestigious posts in the bureaucratic service (*kalemiye*) and the religio-legal scholarly establishment (*ilmiye*), respectively. Their discussion of the meaning of the Battle of Lepanto for the Ottoman Empire reflects their preoccupations not only with the event itself but also with their career ambitions and the anxieties these entailed. Aside from educational and social provenances, their positions in the administrative hierarchy were intricately related to their intellectual milieu. Juxtaposing their accounts and studying their editorial choices can therefore reveal how the meaning of the Battle of Lepanto was perceived among the Ottoman elites as well.

It was not just the Battle of Lepanto (1571) that the chroniclers lived through. They were witnesses to the formation of power configurations that underpinned the war of 1570-73

¹⁹ Gottfried Hagen, “Osman II and the Cultural History of Ottoman Historiography,” in *Humanities and Social Sciences Online* < <http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=11651> > (accessed: January 2012).

²⁰ Douglas A. Howard, “Ottoman Historiography and the Literature of ‘Decline’ of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” *Journal of Asian History* 22, no. 1, (1988): 77.

(Chapter 2) and even the seeds of the internal divisions prompting the aforesaid power configurations during the transition between the death of Sultan Süleyman and accession of Sultan Selim II (Chapter 1). How they treat the continuities and ruptures in power relations in their portrayal of personalities active and influential between Selim II's accession and the outset of the war of 1570-73 cannot be considered independent from the Battle of Lepanto. Therefore, this thesis also explores how political turning points such as the succession of Selim II (Chapter 1) and emergence of a "Cyprus faction" (Chapter 2) are reflected in the Chronicles (Chapter 3). In Chapters 1 and 2, I put chronicles in dialogue with the Venetian ambassadorial reports in order to lay the groundwork for the last chapter, where I concentrate on chroniclers' idiosyncrasies in their narratives.

Chapter 1:

When the Seeds of Factionalism Were Sown for the Future Reign:

Sokollu Mehmed Pasha versus Selim II's Favorites after Süleyman's Death (1566)

On September 7, 1566, after midnight, the closest servants of the seventy-two-year-old Sultan Süleyman sent a top-secret letter to grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha. They informed him that the sultan, who was frail with old age and long suffering from the excruciating pains of gout,²¹ had passed away. Having read the letter, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha ordered the servants that Sultan Süleyman's death be divulged to no one.²² The question of who was to succeed had already been settled. Selim had been the heir-apparent (*veli'ahd*) since the execution of Prince Bayezid (23 July 1562), which ended the inter-princely rivalry.²³ However, his father's death left the army without its head, while it was far from Constantinople, trying to capture the Habsburg stronghold Szigetvár in south-western Hungary. The news of the sultan's death would have sparked havoc among the soldiers because there was no legitimate authority during the hiatus between the death of a sultan and the accession of a male member of Osman's lineage. The deceased sultan's legal dispositions, appointments, and titles to possessions would become null and void.²⁴

This precarious hiatus was an opportunity for Sokollu Mehmed Pasha to demonstrate his indispensability to the Ottoman dynasty and guarantee the extension of his grand vizierate under the rule of Selim II. At every accession, the new sultan would come from his provincial seat followed by his household, which was a miniature of the central government with his preceptor (*lala*), secretaries, counselor, and companions. This practice obtained until the

²¹ See: Metin Kunt, "Sultan Süleyman ve Nikris," [Sultan Süleyman and Gout] in *Muhteşem Süleyman* [Süleyman the Magnificent] ed. Özlem Kumrular, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2007), 93-99.

²² Şefik Peksevgen, "Secrecy, Information Control and Power Building in the Ottoman Empire, 1566-1603," (Ph.D. dissertation, McGill University, 2004), 165-166.

²³ For a reference work on the struggle between Prince Selim and Bayezid, see: Şerafettin Turan, *Kanuni Süleyman Dönemi Taht Kavgaları* [Succession Struggles during the Reign of Süleyman the Lawgiver] (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1997).

²⁴ Halil İnalcık, "Decision Making in the Ottoman State," in *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Caesar E. Farah (Philadelphia: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993), 12.

reign of Mehmed III (r. 1595-1603), when the assignment of princely governorships - the Inner Asian tradition of giving each heir a sphere of influence within the family dominions and a chance for future rulership - fell into disuse.²⁵ There would be fierce rivalries and eventually compromises between the appointees of then-defunct reign of the deceased sultan and those to whom the new sultan had promised appointments during his principdom.²⁶

Selim's prolonged struggle against his brother Bayezid for the throne (1553-1562) exacerbated this conundrum as he accumulated a great number of moral and material obligations to his followers that could not be honored without seriously compromising the stability and continuity of the state-governing apparatus.²⁷ He had 350 top-level advisors to fill the high ranks of his palace administration. His army amounted to 4,956 men who were to join to the Janissary corps other than 8,000 peripheral supporters to whom permanent positions were promised as salaried members of the four lowest-ranking of the six standing cavalry regiments.²⁸ At the upper echelon, Selim's preceptor (hence his nickname, Lala) between 1556 and 1560, Lala Mustafa Pasha, is known to have been promised the office of grand vizierate as a reward for supporting Selim in the project of eliminating Prince Bayezid.²⁹ However, grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha was not merely an appointee of the late Süleyman. He had already built the bonds of trust and loyalty with Selim thanks to his equally considerable share in enabling Bayezid's defeat.³⁰ Besides, differing from Lala

²⁵ Halil Inalcik, "Decision Making in the Ottoman State," in *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire*, 12; Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 137.

²⁶ Halil Inalcik, "Decision Making in the Ottoman State," 12.

²⁷ Rhoads Murphey, *Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty: Tradition, Image and Practice in the Ottoman Imperial Household, 1400-1800*, (London: Continuum, 2008), 120.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 124.

²⁹ Şerafettin Turan, "Lala Mustafa Paşa Hakkında Notlar ve Vesikalar," [Notes and Sources on Lala Mustafa Pasha], *Belleten* 22 (1958): 551, 553, 556.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, *Kanuni Süleyman Dönemi Taht Kavgaları*, [Succession Struggles during the Reign of Süleyman the Lawgiver], 14, 62-63, 78-80, 96, 100, 106-110, 116-118, 139, 168-169.

Mustafa Pasha, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha had kinship ties with the Ottoman dynasty. He was married to Selim's daughter Ismihan Sultan since August 1562.³¹

This chapter surveys the tensions between Sokollu Mehmed Pasha and Selim II's princely household members, reflecting the friction on how the prospective sultan was to accede to the throne during the hiatus of unprecedented circumstances after Süleyman's death.³² In line with the secondary literature, I argue that this contentious succession was the pivotal moment which determined the fate of the immediate post-accession power balance in the imperial council, resulting in the victory of Selim's son-in-law Sokollu Mehmed Pasha. However, his predominance created considerable resentment towards him, prompting in turn the internal divisions and the eventual emergence of the "Cyprus faction," as I will show in Chapter 2.

1.1 The Accession: How Should the Transfer of Power to Selim II Take Place?

After the completion of the Szigetvár conquest, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha wrote a secret letter to Selim. The grand vizier asked Selim to leave his governorate of Kütahya for Buda. In order to conceal the death of his father, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha advised Selim to account for his departure by saying that he was setting out to join Sultan Süleyman, who had decided to winter in Buda.³³ The grand vizier entrusted the envoy Hasan Çavuş with handing the letter to Selim while on his way to deliver a *fetihname* of Szigetvár (declaration of the conquest of

³¹ Güneş Işıksel, "La Politique Étrangère Ottomane dans la Seconde Moitié du XVI^e Siècle: Le Cas du Règne de Selim II (1566-1574)," (Ph.D. dissertation, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 2012), 161-162.

³² Ahmet Refik Altınay, *Sokollu* [Sokolović], (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2009), 22-57; Radovan Samarčić [sic.], *Dünyayı Avuçlarında Tutan Adam: Sokollu Mehmed Paşa* [The Man Who Holds the World in His Palms: Sokollu Mehmed Pasha], trans. Meral Gaspıralı, (İstanbul: Sabah Kitapları, 1997), 136-184, For an important review of Radovan Samardžić - a specialist on Ragusan archives and sixteenth-century European sources - from an Ottomanist's perspective: see Gilles Veinstein, "Mehmed Sokolovitch, le Destin d'un Grand Vizir (Compte Rendu)," *Turcica* 27 (1995): 304-310; Metin Kunt, "Sultan, Dynasty, and State in the Ottoman Empire," *Medieval History Journal* 6, no. 2 (2003): 217-230; Şefik Peksevgen, "Secrecy, Information Control and Power Building in the Ottoman Empire, 1566-1603," (Ph.D. dissertation, McGill University, 2004); Metin Kunt, "A Prince Goes Forth (Perchance to Return)," in *Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World: A Volume of Essays in Honor of Norman Itzkowitz*, ed. Baki Tezcan and Karl K. Barbir, (Madison, Wis.: Center for Turkish Studies at the University of Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), 63-71; Zeynep Tarım Ertuğ, "The Depiction of Ceremonies in Ottoman Miniatures: Historical Record or a Matter of Protocol?," *Muqarnas* 27 (2010): 251-275.

³³ Ibid., 166-167.

Szigetvár) to the governor-general of Aleppo.³⁴ According to custom, Selim had to give a present to Hasan Çavuş since the envoy was in fact the bearer of the news of succession. Sokollu Mehmed Pasha implored Selim not to do so lest he expose Süleyman's death.³⁵

Selim did indeed conceal his father's death from Hasan Çavuş and only indemnified his travel expenses.³⁶ However, instead of joining the army, Selim proceeded to Constantinople, in order to accede to the throne in the Topkapı palace. He left Kütahya for Constantinople immediately. Before departing, Selim informed the Hisarbeg Mosque's preacher Feyzullah Fakih about Sultan Süleyman's death and demanded that the Friday prayer be delivered in his own name as Selim II.³⁷ On September 29, when he realized that there was no official welcome for his arrival in Üsküdar, Selim dispatched his trusted envoy, Ali Çavuş, to inform the lieutenant of the grand vizier (*kaymakam*) Iskender Pasha. Uninformed about Süleyman's death, Iskender Pasha remonstrated with Ali Çavuş about Prince Selim's unseemly behavior since a governor-prince's entrance into the capital without the permission of the sultan was forbidden. Iskender Pasha allowed Prince Selim to enter Istanbul only when he was shown the grand vizier's letter.³⁸ I suggest that, aside from this general prohibition, Iskender Pasha's caution also speaks to Süleyman's suspicion of Prince Selim. Even after the demise of Prince Bayezid, Süleyman had been closely monitoring the activities of his only son for fear that he would foment a coup, as Selim I had done against Bayezid II back in 1512.³⁹

³⁴ Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)* [Selânikî's History], 40.

³⁵ Şefik Peksevgen, "Secrecy, Information Control and Power Building in the Ottoman Empire, 1566-1603," 167.

³⁶ Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)* [Selânikî's History], 40.

³⁷ Şefik Peksevgen, "Secrecy, Information Control and Power Building in the Ottoman Empire, 1566-1603," 171; Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)* [Selânikî's History], 40.

³⁸ Metin Kunt, "Sultan, Dynasty, and State in the Ottoman Empire," *Medieval History Journal* 6, no. 2 (2003): 223-224; Şefik Peksevgen, "Secrecy, Information Control and Power Building in the Ottoman Empire, 1566-1603," 171; Metin Kunt, "A Prince Goes Forth (Perchance to Return)," 68.

³⁹ Güneş Işıksel, "La Politique Étrangère Ottomane dans la Seconde Moitié du XVI^e Siècle: Le Cas du Règne de Selim II (1566-1574)," 167.

On the same day, Selim's accession took place in the Topkapı palace. The attendants comprised the grand mufti (*şeyhülislam*) Ebussu'ud Efendi, the lieutenant of the grand vizier Iskender Pasha, the Istanbul judge (*kadı*) Kadızade Ahmed Efendi, the finance officers (*defterdar*) Küçük Hasan Çelebi and Balıkzade Ali Çelebi, Ataullah Efendi, Lala Hüseyin Pasha, and Celal Beg, retired scholar-jurists (*ulema*), and the scholar-jurists of the *Sahn-ı Seman* madrasas (the eight elite schools of the Fatih Mosque in Constantinople).⁴⁰ Representatives of European states, including the French ambassador Grantrie de Grandchamp and the Venetian *bailo* Giacomo Soranzo were also received in audience. However, the Habsburg ambassador Albert von Wyss was not called and remained in custody due to the ongoing state of war with Maximilian II.⁴¹

Meanwhile, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha sent another letter to Selim II, pleading with him to come to the army camp as soon as possible in order to take over his father's household and command of the army. The grand vizier wrote that he had been doing his best to conceal Süleyman's death for thirty-five days. However, the provisions of the military had diminished and the news of Selim II's accession in Constantinople was making control over the army more difficult. Three days after his accession in the Topkapı palace, Selim II decided to join the army and leave Constantinople for Belgrade.⁴² When he halted in Plovdiv, Selim II replied to Sokollu Mehmed Pasha. In this letter (*cevabname-i hümayun*), Selim noted that he had been informed of what Sokollu Mehmed Pasha reported. He found Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's measures appropriate and praised his service to the state. Then, he added: "May your outcome be favorable. But, your service is acceptable. Until I come with my retinue, you are the lieutenant of my sultanate and you shall report those who acted against the affairs of the

⁴⁰ Zeynep Tarım Ertuğ, "The Depiction of Ceremonies in Ottoman Miniatures: Historical Record or a Matter of Protocol?," *Muqarnas* 27 (2010), 261-262.

⁴¹ Güneş Işıksel, "La Politique Étrangère Ottomane dans la Seconde Moitié du XVI^e Siècle: Le Cas du Règne de Selim II (1566-1574)," 168.

⁴² Şefik Peksevgen, "Secrecy, Information Control and Power Building in the Ottoman Empire, 1566-1603," 172.

state and religion.”⁴³ Selim was indeed hinting that it was not certain whether Sokollu Mehmed Pasha would be re-appointed.⁴⁴

As the army approached Belgrade, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha wrote to Selim II, detailing how the accession ceremony should be performed. Selim showed the letter sent by the grand vizier to Ataullah Efendi, Lala Hüseyin Pasha, and Celal Beg, asking for their opinion.⁴⁵ Selim’s advisors were suspicious that Sokollu Mehmed Pasha had the ulterior motive of establishing his own political influence by asking Selim to have another accession ceremony.⁴⁶

Their concern was not unfounded. When Sokollu Mehmed Pasha had previously invited Selim to Buda, his nephew Sokollu Mustafa Pasha had just been appointed its governor-general. The grand vizier had enabled this appointment by capitalizing on the former governor-general Arslan Pasha’s (1565-1566) loss of several fortresses to the Habsburgs during sporadic fights along the border.⁴⁷ Furthermore, one of the first decisions of the Szigetvár campaign’s headquarters following Süleyman’s death was to entrust the conduct of military operations and negotiations with Maximilian II to the new governor-general of Buda Sokollu Mustafa Pasha.⁴⁸ His former office was the governor-generalate of Bosnia to which Sokollu Mehmed Pasha’s younger nephew called Lala Mehmed Pasha was appointed.⁴⁹

⁴³ *Sultan Süleyman’ın Son Seferi: Nüzhet-i Esrârü’l-Ahyâr der-Ahbâr-ı Sefer-i Sigetvar* [Sultan Süleyman’s Last Campaign: Pleasures of the Secrets of Auspicious Men from the News of the Szigetvár Campaign], ed. H. Ahmet Arslantürk and Günhan Börekçi (İstanbul: Zeytinburnu Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 2012), 183.

⁴⁴ Zeynep Tarım Ertuğ, “The Depiction of Ceremonies in Ottoman Miniatures: Historical Record or a Matter of Protocol?,” *Muqarnas* 27 (2010), 263; for Ertuğ’s full translation of Selim’s letter, see: 274, footnote 60.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 265.

⁴⁶ Metin Kunt, “Sultan, Dynasty, and State in the Ottoman Empire,” *Medieval History Journal* 6, no. 2 (2003): 223; Metin Kunt, “A Prince Goes Forth (Perchance to Return),” 68.

⁴⁷ Uroš Dakić, “The Sokollu Family Clan and the Politics of Vizierial Households in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century,” (MA thesis, Central European University, 2012), 54.

⁴⁸ Güneş Işıksel, “La Politique Étrangère Ottomane dans la Seconde Moitié du XVI^e Siècle: Le Cas du Règne de Selim II (1566-1574),” 168.

⁴⁹ Uroš Dakić, “The Sokollu Family Clan and the Politics of Vizierial Households in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century,” 58.

The advisors counseled Selim that there was no need for a second accession before the army in Belgrade.⁵⁰ Celal Beg's reasoning in his conclusion of the *meşveret* (consultation) session indicated a state conception that favored the capital as a center of power: "True, it is an old saying that no Ottoman ascends the throne without first passing under the swords of his household troops, but that is for contested right of succession and does not apply in your case."⁵¹ In contrast, for Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, Selim's succession to the throne could only be complete when he took over the imperial household, the army, and the whole government apparatus, from the viziers to the lowliest scribes.

As Zeynep Tarım Ertuğ demonstrates,⁵² contrary to Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's advice, Selim II did *not* hold the accession ceremony anywhere else than in Constantinople, although the miniatures of the aforementioned illustrated histories (and most of the secondary literature following them) depict the ceremony as having been carried out in front of the imperial tent in Belgrade. For instance, Feridun Ahmed Bey's contemporary work (*Nüzhet-i Esrarü'l-Ahyar Der Ahbar-ı Sefer-i Sigetvar*) mentioned Selim's omission of previously planned accession ceremony in Belgrade ambiguously: "After the funeral ceremony, the sultan entered the tent and greeted the statesmen from the throne that had been set up within the tent."⁵³ However, as per the rules of Ottoman protocol, the sultan's reception of visitors in the tent did not necessarily suggest that the accession ceremony had occurred. In point of fact, Mustafa Efendi of Thessaloniki (*Selaniki*), who as a young man was present on the Szigetvár campaign, explained in his chronicle how Selim entered the tent, even though no ceremony had occurred.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Zeynep Tarım Ertuğ, "The Depiction of Ceremonies in Ottoman Miniatures: Historical Record or a Matter of Protocol?," *Muqarnas* 27 (2010), 265.

⁵¹ Quoted in Metin Kunt, "Sultan, Dynasty, and State in the Ottoman Empire," *Medieval History Journal* 6, no. 2 (2003): 223; Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)* [Selânikî's History], 49.

⁵² Zeynep Tarım Ertuğ, "The Depiction of Ceremonies in Ottoman Miniatures: Historical Record or a Matter of Protocol?," *Muqarnas* 27 (2010), 266-268.

⁵³ Ibid., 266.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 266-267.

The Janissaries felt ignored and disgruntled about Selim's omission of the accession ceremony in Belgrade. The reason was not because they received a-less-than-customary accession bonus (*cülus bahşisi*). After all, the Janissaries were assured that the rest was to be distributed in Constantinople. Rather, what mattered to the Janissaries was that Selim II failed to honor their code. As a crucial part of the accession ceremony, the sultans would tell the Janissaries, "Your bonuses and promotions are granted" in return for their oath of allegiance. When the army had arrived in Constantinople, the Janissaries thought they still had not been provided with a satisfactory explanation about the sultan's disregard of them in Belgrade. In reaction, the Janissaries, walking in front of the sultan's carriage, proceeded slowly as they passed along narrow roads and slopes, thus hindering the sultan's progress to his destination. When the army arrived at Bayezid II's bathhouse on the Divanyolu, the Janissaries halted altogether, and injured their commander, 'Ali Agha, as well as the viziers, who were advising them to stay calm, by throwing them off their horses. Sokollu Mehmed Pasha and the fourth vizier, Ahmed Pasha, were able to talk to them only after placating them with large sums of money. When the Janissaries reached the Topkapı palace, a number of them passed through the Imperial Gate and shut it behind them so that the sultan could not enter. Those Janissaries who stayed outside made all the viziers dismount their horses. At the insistence of viziers, Selim II finally acquiesced to say to them, "Your bonuses and promotions will be accepted," and the janissary revolt was over.⁵⁵

1.2. Sokollu Mehmed Pasha Triumphant: Forestalling *Kat-ı Rahm* (Severing Ties)

The Janissaries' response to Selim II's omission of accession ceremony in Belgrade suggests that they shared Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's conception of the transfer of power. In other words, as members of the imperial household, the Janissaries thought that they would recognize the dynastic succession of the sultan-to-be through partaking in and thus tacitly approving the accession together with state dignitaries, scholars, and officials. That Sokollu

⁵⁵ Ibid., 269-270.

Mehmed Pasha continued to conceal Süleyman's death from the Janissaries even after Selim II's accession in the Topkapı palace reflects this view. However, for Selim and his advisors, the Topkapı palace had a primacy as the locus of accession because it was the center of imperial power since the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. The servants who did not attend the ceremony in the palace had to approve the authority of the new sultan. The only exception that required the participation of the Janissaries was if an heir to the throne had to struggle against other male members of the dynasty following the death of the sultan. Selim was the undisputed heir at the time of succession, however. In fact, after his victory over Prince Bayezid (1562), the representative of the King of France to Istanbul, Petremol, noted in September of the same year that Selim was ruling the empire but he was not yet seated at the imperial throne.⁵⁶ This remark was not a mere exaggeration. Indeed, starting with the end of the inter-princely rivalry, Sultan Süleyman sought the counsel of his heir-apparent Selim for the most important decisions on the administration of the empire and foreign affairs. He mentioned Selim's name in the treaties with other states as if his son were his co-regent whom he esteemed and honored.⁵⁷ Yet, the Janissaries did not abide by this equally cogent view and shouted "the accession is not valid."

The resulting Janissary uprising enabled Sokollu Mehmed Pasha to claim that he was right to ask Selim to come to the front and hold the accession ceremony before the victorious army of the Szigetvár campaign. Otherwise, both of the competing views on the manner of Selim II's accession were legitimate in the face of the question of where dynastic rule ended and where government began, which remained unresolved throughout the life span of the Ottoman Empire according to Metin Kunt.⁵⁸ In the end, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha managed to retain his tenure in the office of grand vizierate after Selim's accession. Some scholars

⁵⁶ Güneş Işıksel, "La Politique Étrangère Ottomane dans la Seconde Moitié du XVI^e Siècle: Le Cas du Règne de Selim II (1566-1574)," 162.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 166. For more information, see the relevant chapter (Un prince ottoman et sa diplomatie) of the aforementioned study in pages: 149-167.

⁵⁸ Metin Kunt, "A Prince Goes Forth (Perchance to Return)," 71.

suggest that Sokollu Mehmed Pasha might have turned a blind eye to or even fomented the Janissary uprising in order to give Selim a lesson since the grand vizier was informed of the machinations by his confidential clerk (*sır katibi*) Feridun Bey the night before the incident.⁵⁹ In any case, it is interesting how Selaniki obliquely noted that Selim II should have heeded Sokollu Mehmed Pasha rather than his favorites by attributing a quote to the grand vizier, conveying ominous anticipation. When it was understood that Selim was not to hold an accession ceremony in Belgrade, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha reportedly said the following: “Disorder happens, when grand vizier proposes the state of affairs and sultan acts in accordance with the consult of others (referring to Selim’s favorites from Kütahya). The others are not acquainted. They would not be confidant to secrecy. The fault is in this,”⁶⁰ thus deflecting the blame for the subsequent disorder (Janissaries’ uprising) to Selim’s favorites.

Sokollu Mehmed Pasha’s success over Selim II’s favorites by proving himself to the new sultan culminated in the entrenched position of the late Süleyman’s old guard in the imperial council and household. A new reign’s usual *kat-ı rahm*, the severance of ties with the old guard by redistribution of positions to the members of Selim’s princely household, did not take place. The princely household members were allowed lesser ranks and pay increases in Selim II’s imperial administrative team that hindered sultan’s task of achieving the optimal balance between old and new in appointments. Marino Cavalli, who was entrusted by Venice to renew the capitulations (‘*ahdname*’) with the Porte in 1567, counted Pertev, Ferhad, Ahmet, Zal Mahmud, and Piyale Mehmed Pashas in addition to Sokollu Mehmed.⁶¹ Although they were married to the female members of the dynasty, none of these five viziers had served in Selim’s princely household. Moreover, Selim II would have to establish the office of sixth vizierate in order to bring his erstwhile preceptor Lala Mustafa Pasha to the imperial council

⁵⁹ Ahmet Refik Altınay, *Sokollu* [Sokolović], 50; Zeynep Tarım Ertuğ, “The Depiction of Ceremonies in Ottoman Miniatures: Historical Record or a Matter of Protocol?,” *Muqarnas* 27 (2010), 269.

⁶⁰ Quoted in Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)* [Selânikî’s History], 49.

⁶¹ Walter Andreas, “Eine Unbekannte Venezianische Relazion über die Türkei (1567),” in *Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften*, (Heidelberg: 1914), 13.

about three years later than his accession. This was an excess compared to Süleyman's reign in which the number of vizieral offices, including the grand vizierate, was not more than four. Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's predominance over the transfer of Selim's princely household from his princely governorship in Kütahya to Constantinople was also observable at the provincial level. Cavalli mentioned that *timar* holders had to go to the Topkapı palace and bring gifts not only for Selim II but also for Sokollu Mehmed Pasha in order to receive confirmation for their allotments. According to Cavalli, there was no official from a governor to a judge or a *zeamet* holder who did not give some of his income to Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, as a consequence of which the pasha accumulated amazing sums of wealth.⁶² Six years later than Cavalli's report, Costantino Garzoni even ventures to claim that after Selim II's accession, all the appointments and offices changed in line with Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's wishes and those who profited best from these changes were those who gave the most valuable gifts.⁶³ However, it was this predominance of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha after the hiatus that triggered discontent among the prominent members of Selim II's princely household. Their unfulfilled aspirations for the enhancement by the acquisition of the positions and power prepared the ground for the internal divisions in the court of Selim II, culminating in the rise of the "Cyprus faction" around 1569.

⁶² Ibid., 12.

⁶³ Eugenio Albèri, ed., *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato Durante il Secolo Decimosesto*, (Firenze: Società Editrice Firoentina, 1840), Serie III/1, 406.

Chapter 2:

“Mischievous Factions and Scheming Courtiers:”

Ottoman Factional Politics and Foreign Policy behind the War of 1570-73

Since Joseph von Hammer, the secondary literature has consistently posited a rivalry between a faction pressing for the Cyprus campaign (1570), and Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, who opposed a war against Venice.⁶⁴ In light of recent studies concerning the role of factions in the process of decision making at the core of Ottoman government,⁶⁵ this chapter is another attempt to reconstruct who was involved in the war of 1570-73's initiation and execution, with special emphasis on two, oft-neglected aspects. Firstly, I will explore the emergence of a “Cyprus faction” against the backdrop of the changing power balance in the wake of Selim II's accession (1566) and onwards. As I discussed in the previous chapter, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha managed to secure his tenure of grand vizierate and even considerably obstructed the redistribution of high positions to Selim II's princely household members. However, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's control over the decision-making process was not absolute - his opponents managed to gain Selim II's approval for the Cyprus campaign by encouraging his already existing inclinations towards the conquest. In this chapter, I use Ottoman chronicles to reconstruct a historical moment, corroborating them with Venetian ambassadorial accounts. This differs from my discussion of the same and other material in the third chapter, where I analyze the narrative strategies of the chroniclers in light of the events I reconstruct herein.

⁶⁴ Güneş Işıksel, “La Politique Étrangère Ottomane dans la Seconde Moitié du XVI^e Siècle: Le Cas du Règne de Selim II (1566-1574),” 225.

⁶⁵ Günhan Börekçi, “Factions and Favorites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1603-1617) and His Immediate Predecessors,” (Ph.D. Diss., Ohio State University, 2011); Elif Özgen, “Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Paşa and Factional Politics in the Court of Murad III,” (MA, Bilgi University, 2010); Emrah Safa Gürkan, “Espionage in the 16th century Mediterranean: Secret Diplomacy, Mediterranean Go-betweens and the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry,” (Ph.D. Diss., Georgetown University, 2011).

Secondly, and related to that, I seek to reconsider Selim II's input in the decision to launch the Cyprus campaign with reference to recent new research.⁶⁶ Specifically, according to the new findings, Selim II's image was unduly distorted among his contemporaries. He was portrayed as a man of pleasure, frustrated by the legacy of his father Süleyman, and notorious for indulgences in wine and hunting in his courtly life exclusively shared by favorites, artists, and, literary hopefuls. This image had seeped into scholarly literature and blended with facts.⁶⁷ Yet, as I also argue, Selim II was not divorced from the affairs of the state as he "read, signed, and sometimes commented on the decisions of the imperial council."⁶⁸

2.1. Some Notes on Factionalism and Decision Making in Early Modern Ottoman Politics:

The entrenched factionalism in Ottoman politics was a fact much lamented by the authors of Ottoman decline-and-reform literature.⁶⁹ There seemed to be no defined legal system to bind the members of the Ottoman political elite, and in this loosely structured system a variety of personal, informal bonds informed the competition for positions and power among rivaling groups. The bonds of these rival political groups (factions) may have been based on kinship, ethno-regional solidarity (*cins*), religious denomination, ideological and political persuasion, or pragmatic ends. The faction members resorted to misuse of power or extra-legal accusations like gossip, rumor, slander, and written denunciation resulting in official investigations (*teftiş-i amm*) and legal sanctions (appointment/dismissal). The accused had no legal measures other than the resorting to the same kind of accusations and scheming what they were the target of in the first place.⁷⁰ What complicates the matter is that a

⁶⁶ Güneş Işıksel, "La Politique Étrangère Ottomane dans la Seconde Moitié du XVI^e Siècle: Le Cas du Règne de Selim II (1566-1574)."

⁶⁷ Ibid. 13-14.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 193.

⁶⁹ Cemal Kafadar, "The Myth of the Golden Age: Ottoman Historical Consciousness in the Post-Süleymânîc Era," 46.

⁷⁰ Elif Özgen, "Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Paşa and Factional Politics in the Court of Murad III," 202, 2.

faction's affiliates (*tabi'*, *mensub* plural *tevabi'*, *mensubat*) might well have dissimulated, belonged to a number of factions, switched from one faction to another, or else stayed neutral in line with their interests.

Ottoman authors placed the beginnings of factionalism around the middle of Süleyman's reign (r. 1520-1566).⁷¹ Indeed, the increasing reference to explanatory schemes such as secret animosities, conspiracies, slander, or even corruption of officials is observable in the histories of the late sixteenth century.⁷² This does not mean that the Ottoman polity was free from internal divisions and that its agents were solely embodying the interests of the state prior to Sultan Süleyman. But, beginning in the late sixteenth century, Ottoman political discourse began to be permeated by factionalism and imbued with declinist sensibilities.⁷³ The notion of mischievous factions and scheming courtiers constituted one of the favorite topoi of the Ottoman authors who criticized the policies and practices of the day by contrasting "those fortunate days" of yore with "our times of corruption."⁷⁴ Ottoman authors' reflections on factionalism strikingly paralleled contemporary Venetian ambassadorial reports (*relazione*). After all, Venetian ambassadors (*bailo*) often managed to follow factional politics and penetrate through the decision-making process by handsome gifts or lavish payments presented to Ottoman officials from bottom to top and even to the members of the imperial family.⁷⁵ According to Costantino Garzoni's *relazione* that discusses Selim II's realm following the war of 1570-73, the Ottoman Empire had no foundation upon which to

⁷¹ Cemal Kafadar, "The Myth of the Golden Age: Ottoman Historical Consciousness in the Post-Süleymânîc Era," 46.

⁷² Elif Özgen, "Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Paşa and Factional Politics in the Court of Murad III," 197.

⁷³ Ibid. 197-198. Cemal Kafadar, "The Myth of the Golden Age: Ottoman Historical Consciousness in the Post-Süleymânîc Era," 46.

⁷⁴ Cemal Kafadar, "The Myth of the Golden Age: Ottoman Historical Consciousness in the Post-Süleymânîc Era," 46, 38.

⁷⁵ Emrah Safa Gürkan, "Espionage in the 16th century Mediterranean: Secret Diplomacy, Mediterranean Go-betweens and the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry," 241.

build the state. The empire would fall rather easily, especially because viziers (*li principali pascià*) do not aspire to anything else but to ruin one another's position, honor, and life.⁷⁶

2.2. The “Cyprus Faction” in the Making:

Throughout Selim II's reign (1566-1574), the Porte assumed a pro-status quo stance and avoided direct confrontation with its main rivals, the Habsburgs and the Safavids.⁷⁷ In this respect, the campaign to re-conquer Astrakhan in 1569 was meant to contain Muscovy's advance if not to expand at the Russian or Safavid frontiers with the help of the abortive so-called Don-Volga canal project.⁷⁸

The decision to conquer Cyprus constituted a deviation and abrogated the renewed peace treaty with Venice that was signed in 1567. This exception is a direct consequence of the shifting alliances and change in the balance of power in the imperial council from Selim II's accession onwards that led to the emergence of a “Cyprus faction.” In order to show the convergence of various interests under the banner of conquering Cyprus, I explore the leading figures of this enterprise – Joseph Nasi, Piyale Mehmed Pasha, and Lala Mustafa Pasha.

2.2.1. Joseph Nasi:

Although they were appointed to lesser ranks and offices, Selim II's favorites managed to infiltrate into power politics when his household was transferred from his provincial seat in Kütahya to Istanbul. As a newly emerging elite, the favorites carved out a power sphere of their own in the ever-widening gap between the sultan and his grand vizier, which was in part a result of the sultan's seclusion in the inner compounds of the palace and the growing depersonalization of his power via a bureaucracy. The power of the favorites

⁷⁶ Eugenio Albèri, ed., *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato Durante il Secolo Decimosesto*, (Firenze: Società Editrice Firoentina, 1840), Serie III/1, 329, 331.

⁷⁷ Güneş Işıksel, “La Politique Étrangère Ottomane dans la Seconde Moitié du XVI^e Siècle: Le Cas du Règne de Selim II (1566-1574),” 4.

⁷⁸ Güneş Işıksel, “La piraterie abkhaze et la réaction ottomane : une contribution au débat sur la fermeture de la mer Noire” in *Italy and Europe's Eastern Border (1204-1669)*, (eds.) Damian, Iulian Mihai / Pop, Ioan-Aurel / Popović, Mihailo / Simon, Alexandru, (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012), 195-196.

derived from their proximity to the sultan and those who had a place within the power matrix. They brokered information among the sultan, his court, and the outside world.⁷⁹

Among Selim II's inner circle only his close confidant, banker, and merchant Joseph Nasi possessed all the proximities that were conducive to emergence of a hawkish faction united for a rupture of the peace with Venice by a military expedition to Cyprus. Nasi was born in 1524 as a Portuguese New Christian (disparagingly referred to as *marrano*, literally "pig," or *converso*) into the Mendes/Benveniste family of bankers, which had monopolized the Portuguese spice trade during its most glorious years.⁸⁰ He fled the persecution of *conversos*, ongoing throughout the sixteenth century under the auspices of the Portuguese court and Inquisition established in 1536. After moving all around Europe, he left Venice for Constantinople early in 1554 with the help of Sultan Süleyman's physician Moshe Hamon.⁸¹ Together with the French ambassador to the Porte Gabriel d'Aramon, Hamon recommended Nasi to Selim's father Sultan Süleyman and convinced him to assist Nasi's arrival to Ottoman territory.⁸² Süleyman in turn demanded from the Venetian Doge that no obstacle to departing Venice be put in his way. By this time, Nasi had thrived in banking and become one of the wealthiest businessmen of Europe, which allowed him to have close relations with a number of royal courts. Among others, Nasi made friends with the Archduke Maximilian of Habsburg (future emperor from 1564 to 1576), Sigismund Augustus of Poland (1549-1572), and Henry II of France (1519-1559). In April 1554, he underwent the rites of circumcision as a Jew against the wishes of some of his Christian friends. It was then that he changed his baptized name João Miquez to Joseph Nasi.⁸³

⁷⁹ See: Şefik Peksevgen, "Secrecy, Information Control and Power Building in the Ottoman Empire, 1566-1603," (Ph.D. dissertation, McGill University, 2004).

⁸⁰ Herman Prins Salomon and Aron di Leone Leoni, "Mendes, Benveniste, de Luna, Micas, Nasi: The State of the Art (1532-1558)," *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, 88 (1998), 141-142.

⁸¹ Norman Rosenblatt, "Joseph Nasi: Court Favorite of Selim II," (Ph.D. Diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1957), 20.

⁸² Jean Chesneau, ed., *Le Voyage De Monsieur D'aramon* (Paris: Slatkin Reprints, 1887), 48, footnote 1.

⁸³ Norman Rosenblatt, "Joseph Nasi: Court Favorite of Selim II," 28-29.

Nasi had been the principal advisor to Selim II for foreign affairs both in diplomatic and financial terms since the early phase of his patron's fight against Prince Bayezid.⁸⁴ Back then, Selim must have welcomed Nasi for his knowledge and experience of European court manners and conduct as well as his deep insight into the European political scene. Indeed, a document from Archivo General de Simancas in Valladolid reveals the names of tens of Jewish spies that belonged to Nasi's intelligence network, dispersed all around Europe from Bologna to Ferrara, Prague to Candia, Lvov to Lublin, and Cracow to Cutin.⁸⁵ Besides his expertise in diplomacy and intelligence, Nasi was a valuable financier with the capital that he had accumulated through banking in Europe and used it to bid on lucrative tax farms. As a matter of fact, the revenue extracted from tax farm contracts constituted a major income for the Porte's treasury, which was a convenient tax collection form for an empire of vast territory and less advanced monetary economy compared to Europe.⁸⁶

As early as 1557, Selim contacted Archduke Ferdinand of Habsburg (1526-1564) seemingly through the instigation of Nasi by a letter, which is the first extant letter written by an Ottoman prince to a European ruler.⁸⁷ It is a note written in Latin on the overleaf that mentions Selim as the issuer, which reads: "Among Turkish princes, Selim, son of the sultan, sent to the emperor in November 1557."⁸⁸ However, the *elkab* used by Selim's chancellery (*intitulatio*) is unidentifiable from the script of the seal because it did not survive in full aside from "Selim sultan Süleyman Şah" and "*nigin*," most likely a suffix as part of an illegible

⁸⁴ Cecil Roth, *The House of Nasi: The Duke of Naxos*, (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1948), 16-18; Norman Rosenblatt, "Joseph Nasi: Court Favorite of Selim II," 31-32.

⁸⁵ Emrah Safa Gürkan, "Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean: Secret Diplomacy, Mediterranean Go-Betweens and the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry," 378.

⁸⁶ Halil İnalcık, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, (New York: CUP, 1994), 64-66.

⁸⁷ Gisela Procházka-Eisl and Claudia Romer, ed. *Osmanische Beamtenschreiben und Privatbriefe der Zeit Suleymans des Prachtigen aus dem Haus* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007), 107-108; Güneş Işıksel, "A Letter of Chahzade Selim to Charles IX of France on the 'Nassi Affair,'" *Cuadernos de Estudios Sefarditas* 7 (2007), 247; footnote 8.

⁸⁸ I thank my friend Murat Köroğlu for translating this note to me: "Lr. Sultani Selini filij Principes Turcaru(m) in mense Nouembri anno 1557 ad Caesaream Mstem datae." Gisela Procházka-Eisl and Claudia Romer, ed. *Osmanische Beamtenschreiben und Privatbriefe der Zeit Suleymans des Prachtigen aus dem Haus*, 107.

word.⁸⁹ The expression of *locatio* at the end, *bi-makam-ı Manisa*, indicates that the letter was written, when Selim was a prince-governor of Manisa. In it, he requests Ferdinand to find the former servant of his household, a certain Murat Agha, who was enslaved by Uskok pirates while sailing to Venice for fulfilling certain tasks on his behalf.⁹⁰ Selim uses this request as an occasion to establish relations with Ferdinand by noting that “...should you have any affair at our side, inform us with a letter of amity. Each service you would ask is very welcome. Should God the Almighty bestow upon this friend of yours opportunity and victory, we would maintain our affairs with your majesty in a friendly manner.”⁹¹ My interpretation is that by “opportunity and victory,” Selim refers to his aspiration of success in the rivalry against Bayezid, for which Nasi provided him a subsidy that contemporaries exaggeratedly valued at 50,000 ducats in spices and 30,000 ducats worth of jewels.⁹²

Two years after his victory over Bayezid, the heir-apparent Selim bestowed Nasi with the rank of *mütefferika* in 1564 in order to provide him with a reliable source of income to execute his activities and negotiations.⁹³ This rank was usually given to intermediaries like diplomats or dragomans, although otherwise it denoted a membership in the corps attached to the person of the sultan in the Ottoman palace.⁹⁴ Nasi rose to prominence after Selim II’s accession in Constantinople, when the sultan appointed him duke of the Ottoman vassal principality of Naxos in 1566 in exchange for an annual tribute of 6,000 ducats, 50 percent more than the amount charged from the previous dukes. When Sokollu Mehmed Pasha objected to Nasi’s appointment on the grounds that a Jew should not have the government of an Ottoman province, Selim II’s confidence in the utility of Nasi’s intelligence network and

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Cecil Roth, *The House of Nasi: The Duke of Naxos*, 17-18.

⁹³ Norman Rosenblatt, “Joseph Nasi: Court Favorite of Selim II,” 33, footnote 29.

⁹⁴ Emrah Safa Gürkan, “Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean: Secret Diplomacy, Mediterranean Go-Betweens and the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry,” 443.

expertise in diplomacy was evident from his reply: Nasi was a good servant and nobody was better informed about “Christian affairs” than he was.⁹⁵

2.2.2 Lala Mustafa Pasha:

Nasi must have cultivated a close relationship with other prominent figures of Selim’s princely household such as Lala Mustafa Pasha, Hoca Ataullah Efendi, or Celal Bey. Like Nasi, Lala Mustafa Pasha supported Selim in the project to eliminate Bayezid. It appears that his cooperation with Nasi continued. In 1560, the grand vizier Rüstem Pasha discharged and tried to exile Lala Mustafa Pasha to the distant Hungarian province of Požega. With Selim’s intervention, he was appointed governor-general of Van. Following the appointments as governor-general of Erzurum (1562) and Aleppo (1563), Lala Mustafa Pasha became the governor-general of Damascus and, in line with Nasi’s ambition, he proposed to the viziers the pressing necessity of military expeditions to conquer Cyprus as well as Shirvan and asked for appointment as the commander-in-chief. His justification was that the remnants of a mosque constructed under the auspices of the second caliph, ‘Umar, which at the time Cyprus was partially captured by Muslim armies, was disgraced as a pig abattoir under the Venetians. The proposal was dismissed.⁹⁶ According to his private secretary at the time, Mustafa of Gallipoli, who wrote the proposal, Lala Mustafa Pasha longed to conquer Cyprus and Shirvan on behalf of the Porte and pleaded with God every morning and evening to be the commander of this endeavor.⁹⁷

On August 15, 1568, during the protracted insurrection of Yemen, Selim II discharged Lala Mustafa Pasha from the task of reinstating the order, and appointed the governor-general of Egypt, Sinan Pasha, instead.⁹⁸ A delegation of pursuivants (*çavuş*) from the Porte arrived in Cairo to effect the transfer of command and investigate the dispute between Lala Mustafa

⁹⁵ Ibid., 378.

⁹⁶ İslam Ansiklopedisi, s.v. “Lala Mustafa Paşa,” (İstanbul: MEB Yayınları, 1971), v.8, 732-736.

⁹⁷ Mustafa Ali, *Künhü’l-Ahbar*, [The Essence of Histories], (İstanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2009), folio 445a.

⁹⁸ Şerafettin Turan, “Lala Mustafa Paşa Hakkında Notlar ve Vesikalar,” *Belleten* 22 (1958): 569.

and Sinan Pasha.⁹⁹ As a matter of fact, there was an old animosity between the two pashas. Lala Mustafa Pasha had Sinan Pasha's brother Ayas Pasha dismissed from the governorate of Erzurum and executed on the grounds that he had assisted Prince Bayezid in his flight to Iran during the inter-princely rivalry. Sokollu Mehmed Pasha exploited their animosity from the start by having Lala Mustafa Pasha appointed to suppress the Yemen insurrection and Sinan Pasha to supply the said campaign.¹⁰⁰ Mustafa of Gallipoli notes that he had read thirty contradictory orders sent by the Porte throughout the contest between Sinan and Lala Mustafa Pasha over the amount of troops and supplies.¹⁰¹ During this contest through reports (*arz*) written by Lala Mustafa Pasha and Sinan Pasha with the aim of denigrating each other, Mustafa of Gallipoli notes that Sinan Pasha accused Lala Mustafa Pasha of restoring Mamluke rule in Egypt and trying to poison him.¹⁰²

Mustafa of Gallipoli's account corresponds to Costantino Garzoni's *relazione*:

At that time, Sinan the Bosnian [*sic.*] was the pasha of Cairo, who, having an old feud with Mustafa Pasha - because he [Mustafa Pasha] killed his [Sinan Pasha's] brother -, accused Mustafa Pasha of his inefficiency (*aver mancato*) in the Yemen campaign and attempting to poison him [Sinan Pasha] and other Egyptian officials, in order to get hold of this region (*impadronirsi di questo paese*). The sultan easily believed this accusation because of the machinations of Mehmed, the grand vizier and Mustafa's principal enemy. In order to punish him [Mustafa Pasha], the sultan sent *ciaus-basci* [çavuşbaşı Burunsuz]¹⁰³ to Cairo for his execution (*acciò gli mozzasse la testa*) while ordering Sinan to provide every service to the *ciaus* so that he [*ciaus*] can easily carry out his task.¹⁰⁴

But, as Selaniki notes, the head of the delegation, çavuşbaşı Burunsuz, found Lala Mustafa Pasha and his troops armed and confined to a *menzil* of Katiye in Egypt.¹⁰⁵ Lala Mustafa was

⁹⁹ Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541-1600)*, (Princeton University Press, 1986), 50.

¹⁰⁰ Şerafettin Turan, "Lala Mustafa Paşa Hakkında Notlar ve Vesikalar," *Belleten* 22 (1958): 565.

¹⁰¹ Jan Schmidt, *Pure Water for Thirsty Muslims: A Study of Muṣṭafā 'Âlī of Gallipoli's Künhü l-aḥbār*, (Leiden: Het Oosters Instituut, 1991), 100.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 328.

¹⁰³ Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)*, [Selânikî's History], 73.

¹⁰⁴ Eugenio Albèri, ed., *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato Durante il Secolo Decimosesto*, Serie III/1, 409.

¹⁰⁵ Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)*, [Selânikî's History], 73.

informed beforehand “by his friends in Constantinople.”¹⁰⁶ According to Garzoni, not only did he not disarm but he had more than two thousand horses and soldiers well armed with arquebuses. Neither *çavuşbaşı* nor Sinan dared to carry out Selim II’s order.¹⁰⁷ As Selaniki puts it, *çavuşbaşı* Burunsuz could only greet him with hello from the distance (*çavuşbaşı ancak irakdan merhabaya kadir olub*).¹⁰⁸

Thereafter, Lala Mustafa Pasha was subjected to a comprehensive official investigation (*teftiş-i amm*) on charges of “injustice, illegal appropriations of property, and distributing mortmain properties (*vakıf*) as timars.”¹⁰⁹ Lala Mustafa Pasha’s post as governor-general of Damascus and even life was jeopardized. He ordered his secretary Mustafa of Gallipoli to pen a letter to Selim II claiming that he was innocent.

The entire process of Lala Mustafa Pasha’s investigation was a factional affair based on enmity. Sokollu Mehmed Pasha reportedly said that Lala Mustafa Pasha deserved execution.¹¹⁰ He was only pardoned through the efforts of group of people close to Selim II: Celal Bey - his boon companion (*musahib*) of twenty years, Hoca Ataullah Efendi - one of his most trusted advisors since 1550, Hubbi Ayşe Hatun - his female companion and wife of his late religious tutor Şemsi Efendi, Siyavuş Agha - master of the horse (*mirahor*), Mehmed Çelebi (Vusuli) – Hubbi Ayşe Hatun’s son-in-law.¹¹¹ Interestingly, Garzoni also mentions Prince Murad (future sultan Murad III) as the one who helped to reinstate Lala Mustafa Pasha.¹¹² Moreover, saved from the investigation by Sultan Selim II’s protection, Lala Mustafa Pasha was promoted to the office of sixth vizierate and became the sultan’s

¹⁰⁶ Eugenio Albèri, ed., *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato Durante il Secolo Decimosesto*, Serie III/1, 409.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)*, [Selânikî’s History], 73.

¹⁰⁹ Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541-1600)*, 52; Şerafettin Turan, “Lala Mustafa Paşa Hakkında Notlar ve Vesikalar,” *Belleten* 22 (1958): 570-571.

¹¹⁰ Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541-1600)*, 53.

¹¹¹ Şerafettin Turan, “Lala Mustafa Paşa Hakkında Notlar ve Vesikalar,” *Belleten* 22 (1958): 573.

¹¹² Eugenio Albèri, ed., *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato Durante il Secolo Decimosesto*, Serie III/1, 410.

companion in January 1569.¹¹³ Venetian bailo Marc'antonio Barbaro states that Selim II made this decision without consulting Sokollu Mehmed Pasha.¹¹⁴

In the same year, in order to solidify his new favor with Selim II, Lala Mustafa Pasha proposed to launch the Cyprus campaign. As a matter of fact, Selim II had previous ambitions regarding Cyprus. While he was a prince, he commissioned his spies to obtain intelligence on the geographical characteristics, fortifications, and soldiers of Cyprus from its Orthodox community during a rebellion of discontented Greek islanders in 1562.¹¹⁵ Towards the end of 1569, Selim II went for a hunting trip to Edirne, taking with him the grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed, the second vizier Pertev, and the sixth vizier and sultan's companion Lala Mustafa Pasha. Selim II was to consult each of the viziers on the Cyprus campaign. Beforehand, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha urged Lala Mustafa Pasha not to support the campaign, which Lala Mustafa promised to do. At that time, they were, at least ostensibly, on favorable terms. When Lala Mustafa Pasha regained Selim II's favor, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha reportedly presented him with "twelve most beautiful horses and other valuable gifts" and apologized for what he did against him.¹¹⁶ However, when Selim II asked Lala Mustafa Pasha his opinion, he urged the sultan to attack.¹¹⁷ Around the first days of December, Selim II issued a decree concerning the mobilization of resources necessary for shipbuilding.¹¹⁸

¹¹³ Şerafettin Turan, "Lala Mustafa Paşa Hakkında Notlar ve Vesikalar," *Belleten* 22 (1958): 573; Jan Schmidt, "Muştafâ 'Âlî of Gallipoli, A Moralistic Littérateur on History and the Contemporary Ottoman World," in *The Joys of Philology: Studies in Ottoman Literature, History and Orientalism (1500-1923)*, (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2002), 124.

¹¹⁴ Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541-1600)*, 53, footnote 28.

¹¹⁵ Emrah Safa Gürkan, "Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde Osmanlılar'ın XVI. Yüzyıl'daki Akdeniz Siyaseti," 12; George Francis Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940-1952), 840: The ringleader was a Rhodian man of letters by the name of Jacomo Diassorinos, who was secretly in touch with the *beylerbeyi* (governor-general) of Anatolia, Iskender Pasha.

¹¹⁶ Eugenio Albèri, ed., *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato Durante il Secolo Decimosesto*, Serie III/1, 410.

¹¹⁷ Maria Pia Pedani, ed. *Costantinopoli, Relazioni Inedite (1512-1789)*, vol. XIV, (Padova: Bottega d'Erasmus), 142.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 136.

2.2.3. Piyale Mehmed Pasha:

The overseer of the shipbuilding project was not the third vizier, Piyale Mehmed Pasha. Although he remained known as “Kapudan Piyale Pasha,” he was deprived of the office of grand admiral (*kapudan-ı derya*)-cum-governor-general of Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid (the Aegean Islands) and promoted from the fifth to the third vizier. As part of his policy of controlling key positions, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha convinced Selim II that nobody should possess such great power on the sea and hold the vizierate simultaneously. The justification of his dismissal was that he had kept the greater part of the booty for himself allocated from his conquest of Genoese-held Chios (1566), which in fact he used to congratulate his father-in-law Selim on his accession and thereby leveraged himself to the rank of the fifth vizier. Instead, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha appointed to these maritime offices the janissary agha Müezzinzade Ali, who, in the words of the seventeenth-century historian Solakzade, “had never in his life directed even a caique.”¹¹⁹ As a reaction, Piyale Mehmed Pasha joined the “Cyprus faction.”

2.3. Cyprus Campaign in the Making:

While Cyprus campaign was in the making, there was an uncertainty on the part of the outside world as late as 1569 whether the Ottoman fleet would set sail to the Mediterranean and, if so, what the target would be. Speculations ranged anywhere from Spain to Puglia and Malta. Having signed an eight-year peace treaty with the Austrian Habsburgs in 1568, the Porte granted France trade privileges in the Levant through an *‘ahdname* (‘capitulation’) in 1569 in order to ensure its neutrality.¹²⁰ In the same year, Joseph Nasi achieved a promise of Ottoman support for the rebels of the Low Countries under the rule of Spanish Habsburgs. In an undated imperial letter addressed to the rulers and members of the Lutheran sect in Flanders, the Porte gave full political support to the Dutch insurgents to counter Spanish and

¹¹⁹ Gülru Necipoğlu, *The Age of Sinan: Architectural Culture in the Ottoman Empire*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 422.

¹²⁰ Halil İnalcık, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, 366.

Catholic oppression. While praising the religious beliefs of the Dutch and their struggle against the Pope, the letter also refers to the attacks in 1566 on the icons of the churches in Antwerp. The Pope's countermeasures were damned and mention was made that the Porte had closely followed all events.¹²¹

Sokollu Mehmed Pasha had no interest in this costly military undertaking of trivial benefit to his faction composed of his relatives, fellow countrymen, and trusted servants in the central and provincial administrations. He accumulated enormous personal wealth owing to a continuous stream of gifts from them and peace-oriented states.¹²² On June 11, 1569, about a year after the Porte issued decrees for the preparation of the campaign against Cyprus, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha took advantage of delicate relations with Venice. He placed an order for 900 Murano-glass oil lamps, with drawings indicating their size and shape, for the mosque under construction that he had jointly commissioned with Selim II's daughter and his wife, Ismihan Sultan, in addition to a large lantern for his residential palace in Kadirga.¹²³ The grand vizier justified his pro-Venetian stance by objecting that this undertaking would convert Venice from a neutral state into a foe by prompting it to participate in the formation of the Holy League in order to protect the status-quo of its economic and commercial interests in the Levant.¹²⁴

Nasi himself was deep in debt, aggravated by France's refusal to reimburse him for an old debt of 150,000 ducats. Given that he was one of the exclusive holders of the monopoly on wine exports to Poland, for Nasi the envisaged income from the duty on Cyprus wine must have been an important alluring factor.¹²⁵ However, in the very year (1567) the Porte renewed

¹²¹ Bülent Arı, "The First Dutch Ambassador in Istanbul: Cornelis Haga and the Dutch Capitulations of 1612," (PhD diss., Bilkent University, 2003), 48-49.

¹²² Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli, (1541-1600)*, 47; Gülru Necipoğlu, *The Age of Sinan: Architectural Culture in the Ottoman Empire*, 332.

¹²³ Deborah Howard, "Venice between East and West: Marc'Antonio Barbaro and Palladio's Church of the Redentore," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians*, 62, no. 3 (Sep., 2003), 309.

¹²⁴ Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 137-138

¹²⁵ Benjamin Arbel, *Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 58.

the peace treaty with Venice following the accession of Selim II, Nasi did not hesitate to inform the Venetian bailo that the Ottomans were planning an attack on Cyprus, hoping that this will improve his relations with Venice. His aim was no different than what he sought afterwards from Ottoman Cyprus, which was to reverse his economic misfortune.¹²⁶ Yet, far from amicable, the Venetians cursed Nasi as the greatest enemy a few years later. The mysterious fire in the Venetian Arsenal in 1569 was attributed to his agents, unjustly, but not so unexpectedly, given that he had an extensive network of spies in the Venetian domains. Rather, he manipulated this news of fire by exaggerating the casualties to the Venetian fleet, which must have proved crucial in Selim II's decision to launch the war on Cyprus.¹²⁷

Although the Porte was officially in friendly relations with Venice thanks to the peace treaty renewed in 1567, this impediment to war was bypassed by the legal opinion (*fatwa*) of Ebussu'ud Efendi. He had been appointed grand mufti by Süleyman in 1548 and retained his influential position as the highest religious and judicial official of the empire until his death in August 1574. He was Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's ally. Nevertheless, Ebussu'ud sanctioned the contravention of the peace treaty at the time. His argument was that if a land had once been ruled by Muslims and its mosques became dilapidated after being conquered by Christians, an existing pact could be considered void, which is strikingly similar to Lala Mustafa Pasha's justification in his proposal for the siege of Cyprus during his governor-generalship of Damascus.¹²⁸ At the same time, Venetians pressed Ebussu'ud to amend the *fatwa*'s content.¹²⁹ In turn, Ebussu'ud urged Selim II to prioritize helping out Moriscos in

¹²⁶ Ibid., 80.

¹²⁷ Emrah Safa Gürkan, "Espionage in the 16th century Mediterranean: Secret Diplomacy, Mediterranean Go-betweens and the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry," 379; Gábor Ágoston, "Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy: Ottoman Grand Strategy in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry," in *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, ed. Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 83.

¹²⁸ *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, "Shaykh al-Islām;" *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, "Sokollu Mehmed Pasha."

¹²⁹ Eugenio Albèri, ed., *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato Durante il Secolo Decimosesto*, Serie III/1, 324.

Spain¹³⁰ because “Cyprus campaign was lesser in cause than helping the Moors.”¹³¹ He did this under the influence of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha to whom he promised never to issue any *fatwa* against him in the future.¹³² But, to no avail.

Having contemplated the conquest of the island as early as 1562, Selim II was at first willing to join the military expedition, as mentioned in his decree dated April 22, 1570, addressing the preceptor of his son, Prince Murad. In it, he required Murad to reach Edirne and undertake the protection of the city, should he finalize his decision. Thereafter, he changed his mind and delegated the rank of commander-in-chief of the land forces to the sixth vizier, Lala Mustafa Pasha, of all the naval forces to the second vizier, Pertev Pasha, and admiral of the fleet Müezzinzade Ali Pasha accompanied by the third vizier, Piyale Mehmed Pasha.¹³³

Like Selim II, grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha remained at the center and exercised his power, not only in directing the organization, arming, and logistics of this military undertaking but also negotiating for a possible political settlement with Venice.¹³⁴ By concluding the war with a peace treaty, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha aimed to remind the state of his worth and further his own interest by handsome Venetian bribes in return for reinstating amicable relations, in addition to humiliating his rivals Nasi, Piyale Mehmed Pasha, and Lala Mustafa Pasha, who initiated the siege of Cyprus that he opposed.¹³⁵

¹³⁰ A crisis in the silk industry aggravated by Spanish king Philip II's fiscal policy made Moriscos decide to revolt on the eve of Christmas in 1568, after suppressive measures against their religion had been extended to all manifestation of traditional culture such as all oral and written use of Arabic and traditional dances the preceding year: H. G. Koenigsberger, George L. Mosse, and G. Q. Bowler, *Europe in the Sixteenth Century*. (New York: Longman, 1997), 309-311.

¹³¹ Eugenio Albèri, ed., *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato Durante il Secolo Decimosesto*, Serie III/1, 324.

¹³² Ibid.; *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, “Sokollu Mehmed Pasha.”

¹³³ İdris Bostan, “Kıbrıs Seferi Günlüğü ve Osmanlı Donanmasının Sefer Güzergâhı,” in *Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği* (Istanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2006), 90.

¹³⁴ *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. “Sokollu Mehmed Pasha.”

¹³⁵ Emrah Safa Gürkan, “Espionage in the 16th century Mediterranean: Secret Diplomacy, Mediterranean Go-betweens and the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry,” 365.

2.4. Cyprus Campaign in Action:

Despite the outbreak of war, both Sokollu Mehmed Pasha and Marc'antonio Barbaro, the Venetian bailo resident in Istanbul between 1567 and 1573, wanted to maintain open lines of communication. However, during the war, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha could not meet with the bailo and risk the accusation of treason by his factional rivals. They assigned Solomon Ashkenazi to be an intermediary between them; he was not only a close confidant and political advisor of grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha but also an entrepreneur with extensive trade connections and the physician of European ambassadors in the Ottoman Empire. He negotiated with the bailo on behalf of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha under the guise of being the bailo's personal physician.¹³⁶ Nevertheless, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha was cautious. As soon as the war began, he dispatched an order to the judge of Galata and Mustafa Çavuş, the Ottoman officer assigned to the Venetian bailo, to the effect that the bailo be kept in custody without contact with the outside world. His servants were searched when entering and leaving the house, in order to ensure that they did not carry any letters, and the bailo was forced to have janissaries accompany him outside so that he could not talk to anyone.¹³⁷

To avoid suspicions, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha went even further and ordered the *subaşı* of Galata to wall up Barbaro's windows, put spies around the house, and confiscate all his papers and inkpots. Contact with the outside world was strictly constrained for other members of the Barbaro family, too. Even Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's *çavuş* found his confinement "inhumane."¹³⁸ The pedantic measures of the grand vizier were not in vain, because Solomon was not solely Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's agent. He also maintained communication between the bailo and the Venetian authorities by smuggling the bailo's letters from his house; a dangerous operation as a consequence of which he was twice put in

¹³⁶Ibid., 303-304.

¹³⁷ Emrah Safa Gürkan, "The Efficacy of Ottoman Counterintelligence in the 16th Century Acta Orientalia," *Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 65, no. 1 (2012): 19.

¹³⁸Ibid., 19, footnote 47.

Ottoman prisons on the charge of betrayal after he had been spotted by Nasi's servants. He was saved by Sokollu Mehmed Pasha due to his indispensability in contacts with the Venetian bailo. In fact, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha ordered Ashkenazi to bribe the fourth vizier and Selim II's sister Mihrümah's son-in-law, Ahmed Pasha, to abrogate the order to imprison the bailo.¹³⁹

Meanwhile, having sailed from Istanbul to Cyprus in the spring of 1570, the Ottoman fleet was unhampered. In fact, the Ottomans were even welcomed by the Greek peasants of the island, who were very much discontent with the nobility and the state, a situation known to the Porte.¹⁴⁰ Agrarian life in Cyprus was based on the seigniorial system in which peasants were required to give up a substantial part of their produce to the landlords or leaseholders of the seigniorial estates, and they were obliged to render certain services and pay taxes to the state. The salt tax, the animal tithe, guarding the coast at night, and public service, which peasants were obliged to perform until the age of sixty, constituted the most bothersome duties. After 1558, they were required to serve in the peasant militia as well. Under these circumstances, there was rather limited incentive to improve productivity. Although the island's population increase¹⁴¹ was among the highest compared to other places in the Mediterranean, there were no large cities on Cyprus. Even so, Famagusta, with a population of 10,000, and Nicosia with 25,000 presented problems of food supply. Despite scarcities, the state continued to call on the island to provision the city of Venice, which had also experienced a spectacular demographic rise and had to feed its urban population.¹⁴²

¹³⁹Benjamin Arbel, *Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean*, 80.

¹⁴⁰Halil İnalcık, "Ottoman Policy and Administration in Cyprus after the Conquest" (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1969): 6.

¹⁴¹Benjamin Arbel, *Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean*, 37. Under Venetian rule (1473-1571) the population had risen from around 100,000 inhabitants to 190,000.

¹⁴²*Ibid.*, 45-46.

In 1566, when Ottoman grain reserves were closed to Venetian merchants due to a shortage in Anatolia,¹⁴³ a rumor about a ship in Nicosia loading grain for Venice ignited Cypriots to riot and stone the governor's palace. The governor suppressed the riots and executed three ringleaders, one of them a Greek priest.¹⁴⁴ Once the Ottoman army set foot on the island, "through inconsistency of temperament, or because of the yoke of slavery imposed upon them by the Cypriot nobles,"¹⁴⁵ the discontent "made them flatter themselves that they might find better luck under a new master..."¹⁴⁶ Though Venice decided to abolish their serfdom in the very last phase of its rule, it was too little, too late.¹⁴⁷

2.5. The Battle of Lepanto:

As a matter of fact, Venice was hard-pressed to seek allies for the defense of Cyprus. Spain was the only power in the Mediterranean with which the Ottoman Empire had not signed a peace treaty. Just a year before, in 1569, the governor-general of Algeria, Uluç Ali Pasha, re-conquered Tunis from the Spanish vassals, the Hafsid dynasty. However, as the Ottomans' adversary in the western half of the Mediterranean, Spain did not see any strategic interest in the easternmost island of Cyprus. Venice appealed to Pope Pius V (1566-1572) for aid. Throughout protracted missions and negotiations, the Vatican's call for a joint attack on Poland, the Safavids, the Habsburgs, and France came to nothing.¹⁴⁸ At the very time when Pius V turned to Muscovy, the czar had already sent his envoy to Istanbul to conclude an alliance.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴³Maurice Aymard, *Venise, Raguse et le commerce du blé pendant la seconde moitié du XVI^e siècle* (Paris: Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, 1966), 112, 114, tables, as cited in Halil İnalçık, "The Impact of the *Annales* School on Ottoman Studies and New Findings," *Review I*, no. 3/4 (1978): 81.

¹⁴⁴Benjamin Arbel, *Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean*, 47.

¹⁴⁵Claude Delaval Cobham, ed., *Excerpta Cypria: Materials for a History of Cyprus*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908), 92.

¹⁴⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷Benjamin Arbel, *Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean*, 41.

¹⁴⁸İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Kıbrıs Fethi ile Lepant (İnebahtı) Muharebesi Sırasında Türk Devletile Venedik ve Müttefiklerinin Faaliyetine Dâir Bazı Hazinei Evrak Kayıtları," [Some Registers on the Operations of the Turkish State and Venice and Its Allies during the Cyprus Conquest and the Battle of Lepanto] *Türkiyat Mecmuası* 3 (1935): 259, 261.

¹⁴⁹Halil İnalçık, "The Origins of the Ottoman-Russian Rivalry and the Don-Volga Canal (1569)," *Les Annales de l'Université d'Ankara* 1 (1946-47): 91-92.

Finally, following the delays of 1570 due to previously existing mutual jealousies and long-standing rivalries, the formation of the Holy League was proclaimed in St. Peter's Basilica on May 25, 1571. It was comprised of Spain, Venice, Genoa, Tuscany, Savoy, Parma, and the Knights of St John. Spain enrolled in the league on condition that Venice would come to Spain's aid in North Africa. Under the three-year alliance of the Holy League, a force of 200 galleys, 100 sailing ships, 50,000 infantry, and 4,500 cavalry was to be maintained. The aim was to fight a perpetual war against the Ottomans and the Muslims of North Africa, and, specifically, to re-conquer Cyprus and the Holy Land.¹⁵⁰

After the Porte had intelligence about the formation of the Holy League coming from various sources, the grand admiral, Müezzinzade Ali Pasha, received the following order:

When the news about the Infidels' intention to attack became known by everybody here, the *ulema* and all the Muslim community found it most proper and necessary to find and immediately attack the Infidels' fleet in order to save the honor of our religion and state, and to protect the Land of the Caliphate, and when the Muslims submitted their petition to the feet of my throne I found it good and incontestable. I remain unshakable in my decision.¹⁵¹

Benjamin Arbel provides some evidence on Ottoman Jews who had escaped from Venice; he describes the hardships that they had suffered, and cites the petitions requesting Selim II to arrest all the Venetians in Ottoman territories. However, Selim II's intention to retaliate was reversed by Sokollu Mehmed Pasha with recourse to the grand mufti Ebussu'ud's legal opinion stipulating that those who came to the empire in good faith should not be made to suffer, and if Venice had unjustly arrested the sultan's subjects, Muslims must not imitate such evil actions.¹⁵²

After an eleven-month siege, the conquest of Cyprus was completed with the capture of Famagusta on August 1, 1571. The allied fleet, led by Don Juan of Austria, the 23-year-old

¹⁵⁰Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571: The Sixteenth Century from Julius III to Pius V*. Vol. 4 (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1984), 1015-1016; Jan Glete, *Warfare at Sea, 1500-1600: Maritime Conflicts and the Transformation of Europe*, (New York: Routledge, 2000), 104.

¹⁵¹ Halil İnalcık, "Lepanto in the Ottoman Documents," 187.

¹⁵² Benjamin Arbel, *Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean*, 71.

half-brother of King Philip II of Spain, had set sail from Messina in early September and reached Corfu on September 26. There, he was informed that the Ottoman fleet had anchored off the Bay of Lepanto on the northern side of the Gulf of Patras after spending the summer raiding Crete and Venice's Adriatic possessions.¹⁵³ Equally well informed, the Porte repeated its order to the admiral of the withdrawn and wintering imperial fleet, Müezzinzade Ali Pasha, to attack: "Now I order that after getting reliable news about the enemy, you attack the fleet of the Infidels fully trusting in God and his Prophet."¹⁵⁴ At a war council held on October 4, Pertev Pasha and Uluç Ali Pasha were of the opinion that the Ottomans should take a defensive position in Lepanto, which was protected by a fortress armed with impressively long-range *balyemez* canons. In his speech, Uluç bolstered his argument by pointing to the exhausted and undermanned navy; many of the soldiers had returned to their homes, with or without the government's permission. Müezzinzade Ali Pasha prevailed by referring to the imperial order to attack.¹⁵⁵

The opposing fleets clashed on October 7 in the Gulf of Patras before eleven o'clock in the morning, and the Ottomans suffered a shocking defeat. Culling from major studies on the battle,¹⁵⁶ Halil Berktaş and Tosun Terzioğlu outline the first major defeat of the Ottoman fleet based on four factors: (1) the quantitative superiority of the allied fleet's naval artillery, as reflected in the three bow cannons on Ottoman galleys in contrast to the five on Spanish and Venetian galleys; (2) the considerable disorder and loss that six large vanguard Venetian galleasses triggered while breaking through the Ottoman lines; (3) Spanish arquebusiers' fire

¹⁵³Svatopluk Soucek, "Naval Aspects of the Ottoman Conquest of Rhodes, Cyprus, and Crete," *Studia Islamica* 98/99 (2004): 242.

¹⁵⁴Halil İnalçık, "Lepanto in the Ottoman Documents," in *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del '500 all luce di Lepanto*, ed. Gino Benzoni (Florence: Olschki, 1974), 188-189.

¹⁵⁵Svat Soucek, "İnebahtı Savaşı (1571) Hakkında Bazı Mülâhazalar," [Some Observations on the Battle of Lepanto (1571)] *Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi* IV-V (1974): 38.

¹⁵⁶Hugh Bicheno, *Crescent and Cross: the Battle of Lepanto 1571*, (London: Cassell, 2003); Angus Konstam, *Lepanto 1571: The Greatest Naval Battle of the Renaissance* (Oxford: Osprey, 2003); John Julius Norwich, *The Middle Sea: A History of the Mediterranean*, (New York: Doubleday, 2006); T. C. F. Hopkins, *Confrontation at Lepanto: Christendom vs Islam*, (New York: Forge, 2006); Niccolò Capponi, *Victory of the West: The Story of the Battle of Lepanto*, (London: Macmillan, 2006).

supremacy versus Ottoman soldiers' arrow, bow, and arquebus during the melee when Don Juan's and Müezzinzade's galleys at the center were almost clamped to each other; (4) and the annihilation of the Ottoman right wing under Suluk Mehmed Reis' command by the Venetian galleys of the allied fleet's left wing after it pressed the Reis' galleys to the shoals of the Bay of Skrofa by outmaneuvering his attempt to cut between the land and the opposing fleet.¹⁵⁷ Four hours after the battle was over, the wounded, killed, and drowned on the side of the allied fleet numbered roughly 15,000. In contrast, the Ottomans' loss of crew members and soldiers amounted to 18,000 killed and 10,000 captured. The Ottoman fleet was decimated; 100 galleys were seized and 60 sunk.¹⁵⁸

Sokollu Mehmed Pasha exploited the defeat to pacify his rivals. Following the battle, Lala Mustafa Pasha was charged with negligence for having lost too many men during the siege and he had to stand aside until 1577. In the same way, Piyale Mehmed Pasha was charged with having lost some ships in the waters near Cyprus and was compelled to resign.¹⁵⁹ Expecting to be appointed governor of the newly conquered Cyprus by Selim II, Nasi was left empty-handed. Having humiliated his rivals, Sokollu managed to prove himself to the state through conducting a full-scale shipbuilding campaign that gave substance to a fleet from scratch in six months.

What is more, on March 7, 1573, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha finalized a peace treaty with the Venetian bailo through the mediation of Solomon Ashkenazi, according to which Venice had to pay an annual indemnity of 100,000 ducats to the sultan for the fault of challenging the Porte. While the annual tribute of 8,000 ducats for Cyprus previously paid by Venice was

¹⁵⁷Halil Berktaş and Tosun Terzioğlu, "Osmanlı Denizcilik Tarihinin Evrensel, Karşılaştırmalı ve Teorik Çerçevesi: Bir Lisans Dersi (HIST 345: Deniz, Gemiler, İnsanlar) Aracılığıyla," [The Universal, Comparative and Theoretical Frameworks of Ottoman Maritime History: By Way of HIST 345: Sea, Ships, People] in *Türkler ve Deniz*, [Turks and the Sea] ed. Özlem Kumrular, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınları, 2007), 126-127.

¹⁵⁸Bülent Arı, "Akdeniz'de Korsanlık ve Osmanlı Deniz Hukuku" in *Türkler ve Deniz*, ed. Özlem Kumrular (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınları, 2007), 310, footnote 14.

¹⁵⁹Maria Pia Pedani, "Some Remarks upon the Ottoman Geo-Political Vision of the Mediterranean in the Period of the Cyprus War (1570-1573)," in *Frontiers of Ottoman Studies: State, Province, and the West*, ed. Colin Imber, Keiko Kiyotaki, and Rhoads Murphey (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), 31.

cancelled, the Venetian tribute of 500 ducats for the possession of Zante was raised to an annual assessment of 1,500 ducats.¹⁶⁰ For his good will towards Venice, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha was authorized to receive a lump-sum payment independent of the indemnity.¹⁶¹

The question arises as to the way late-sixteenth century Ottoman chroniclers represented this process leading up to the Battle of Lepanto in their narratives. Secondary literature related to the Battle of Lepanto has taken Ottoman chronicles at face value by mining them for facts without considering their authors' narrative strategies. This positivistic outlook does not allow for discerning what the important events such as the Battle of Lepanto meant to various Ottoman intellectuals of the era. In order to transcend this framework, one needs to consider the following set of questions: What are the Ottoman chroniclers' editorial choices and how do these choices relate to the power configurations and the intellectual milieu of the time when they were writing? How did their personal agendas shape their presentation of recent past? How does each one of the chroniclers diverge from one another? As the next chapter will show, the Battle of Lepanto constitutes a channel through which the Ottoman chroniclers discuss the present state of the Ottoman Empire, which was in turn informed by their alignment with patronage networks as well as broader understanding of the function of history writing.

¹⁶⁰Bülent Arı, "The First Dutch Ambassador in Istanbul: Cornelis Haga and the Dutch Capitulations of 1612," 53.

¹⁶¹Emrah Safa Gürkan, "Espionage in the 16th century Mediterranean: Secret Diplomacy, Mediterranean Go-betweens and the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry," 366.

Chapter 3:
The Meaning of the Battle of Lepanto Contested:
Uses of History in the Late Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Chronicles

This chapter concentrates on the contested meaning of the Battle of Lepanto (1571) by analyzing four late sixteenth-century Ottoman chroniclers. I investigate how the chroniclers portrayed the significance of the Battle of Lepanto in a series of events starting with the siege of Cyprus. As I show in chapter 1, for Selim II's reign, the formation of internal divisions in Ottoman decision-making apparatus gained momentum precisely at the moment of hiatus between the death of Süleyman and accession of Selim II. This, in turn, set the stage for further changes in alliances and contestations of power in the court of Selim II, resulting in the emergence of the Cyprus faction and the onset of the war of 1570-1573, as chapter 2 demonstrates. This chapter considers contemporary Ottoman chroniclers in order to see how they reflected the power configurations that underpinned the war of 1570-1573, with a particular attention to whether and how they spell out or omit factional contentions that were discussed previously.

I argue that the chroniclers' discussion of Lepanto and its place in Ottoman history is not so much related to factionalism or enlightening on this issue. Rather, it reflects the authors' larger sensibilities towards history-writing and their understanding of the overall meaning of Ottoman history and the moment in which they were writing, including how that moment could impact their precarious positions in the tumultuous Ottoman state apparatus. While low-to-mid-level bureaucrats represented by Selaniki and 'Ali placed the Battle of Lepanto at the center of their declinist scenario of what went wrong with the Ottoman enterprise, high-ranking bureaucrat Za'im and scholar-jurist Vusuli underplayed the defeat at Lepanto in favor of underscoring the glory of the preceding Cyprus conquest. The defeat at Lepanto provided room for Selaniki and 'Ali to concentrate their energies on decrying the

signs of decline as they saw and experienced them. They subtly tied their frustration with their undervalued positions into their portrayal and interpretation of the events. Alternatively, Za‘im and Vusuli seemingly allowed their concerns for patronage to inform their presentation of events that glosses over factional rivalries before, during, and after the war of 1570-73. These rivalries were still raging at the time they were writing their chronicles, which inevitably made Za‘im and Vusuli and their works integral to them. This chapter therefore argues that in the late sixteenth century, the contested meaning of the Battle of Lepanto lies at the intersection of factional politics, emerging sentiments of the decline, and Ottoman chroniclers’ preoccupation with maintaining or advancing through patronage networks by writing history.

3.1. The Battle of Lepanto as Penned by Declinist Forerunners: Mustafa Efendi of Thessaloniki (*Selaniki*) and Mustafa of Gallipoli (*‘Ali*)

Mustafa Efendi of Thessaloniki, about whose early life and family background very little is known,¹⁶² followed Mustafa of Gallipoli’s humble bureaucratic career in short entries in his history written under the pen name “Selaniki.” As a matter of fact, low-level appointees - as was Mustafa of Gallipoli - do not normally stand out in Selaniki’s history. However, Selaniki was interested in his namesake not necessarily for the prestige of his postings, but for the fame of his erudition.¹⁶³ For Selaniki, Mustafa of Gallipoli was “an outstanding man of learning.”¹⁶⁴ As a well-to-do merchant, with a special interest in literature and books, Mustafa of Gallipoli’s father ensured that his son received the best possible education available to a young man in a provincial town. The author of sixty-four works in prose and

¹⁶² Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v. “Selānīkī Muṣṭafā Efendi.”

¹⁶³ Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541-1600)*, 130; Jan Schmidt, *Pure Water for Thirsty Muslims: A Study of Muṣṭafā ‘Âlī of Gallipoli’s Künhü l-aḥbār*, 12.

¹⁶⁴ Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541-1600)*, 130.

poetry, Mustafa of Gallipoli adopted the pen name “‘Ali” (علي, the Sublime), when he began to compose verse of his own at the age of fifteen.¹⁶⁵

While ‘Ali was an educated madrasa graduate, Selaniki was a bureaucratic professional who learned his trade at various mid-level posts mostly in Constantinople. The difference in two men’s background is apparent in their prose. In contrast to ‘Ali’s highly stylized and literary writing, Selaniki’s prose was simpler and resembled that of a bookkeeper.¹⁶⁶

Both Selaniki (d. 1600?) and ‘Ali (1541-1600) were writing their respective histories (*Tarih-i Selaniki* / Selaniki’s History and *Künhü’l-Ahbar* / The Essence of Histories) around the same time.¹⁶⁷ Selaniki’s *History* spans from 20 September 1563 to April/May 1600, involving the reigns of Süleyman, Selim II, Murad III, and Mehmed III, whereas ‘Ali’s *Essence of Histories* (hereafter, *Essence*) comprises four volumes, which the author calls pillars (*rükûn*). The comprehensive aspect of ‘Ali’s *Essence* compared to Selaniki’s work stems from his wish to compose a digest of universal history, a genre that Islamic historians practiced for 600 years. Following the introductory sections containing the author’s preface and digressions on cosmogony, geography, ethnology, and historiography, the first pillar describes the history of the prophets from Adam until the “departure of Yusuf (Joseph)” in addition to the history of ancient dynasties. The second pillar continues the history of the prophets from the “departure of Yusuf” until the history of Isa (Jesus) with a particular focus on the history of Muhammad, the biographies of his companions and notable personalities of the initial centuries of the Islamic era, the history of the twelve Imams and the Persian and Ptolomaic dynasties. The third pillar deals with Islamic dynasties including the Umayyads

¹⁶⁵ Jan Schmidt, “Muṣṭafā ‘Ālī of Gallipoli, A Moralistic Littérateur on History and the Contemporary Ottoman World,” 124.

¹⁶⁶ Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541-1600)*, 130; Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v. “Selānīkī Muṣṭafā Efendi.”

¹⁶⁷ Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541-1600)*, 130.

and the Abbasids. Finally, the fourth pillar is devoted to the history of the Ottomans up to the Egri campaign of 1596 during the reign of Mehmed III.¹⁶⁸

With respect to their sources, Selaniki never refers to the works of other historians in his *History* but draws on oral sources as well as official state documents.¹⁶⁹ As for the section related to Ottoman history in ‘Ali’s *Essence*, the author largely relies on the works of nine Ottoman historians until the accession of Selim II, aside from archival documents, epigraphic material, his own works, and oral information. But, he cites literary sources less and less from the chapter on the reign of Selim II onward and completely stops doing so after the paragraph which describes the thirty-second event of Murad III’s reign.¹⁷⁰ Jan Schmidt suggests that ‘Ali’s reluctance to refer to his contemporary authors might have emanated from a certain disinclination of Islamic litterateurs to acknowledge local rivals.¹⁷¹ Interestingly, the *History* exists in twenty-five manuscript copies in various libraries including in Europe, but among Ottoman authors, including Peçevi (1575-ca. 1650), Hasan Beyzade (d. 1636/7), Katib Çelebi (1609-1658), and Naima (1655-1716), only Solakzade (d. 1657) uses Selaniki but does not acknowledge it.¹⁷² Conversely, ‘Ali’s *Essence* was extensively used in Ottoman historiography.¹⁷³

Cornell Fleischer observes a considerable degree of parallelism in Selaniki’s *History* and ‘Ali’s *Essence*, which bespeaks a shared intellectual milieu and orientation.¹⁷⁴ Beginning with the last quarter of the sixteenth century, Ottoman intellectual life was imbued with an increasing sensibility of the decline of the empire. Ottoman declinists were anxiously pointing at the signs of their social order’s transformation and questionability of Ottoman

¹⁶⁸ Jan Schmidt, *Pure Water for Thirsty Muslims: A Study of Muṣṭafā ‘Ālī of Gallipoli’s Künhü l-aḥbār*, 2-3.

¹⁶⁹ Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v. “Selānīkī Muṣṭafā Efendi.”

¹⁷⁰ Jan Schmidt, *Pure Water for Thirsty Muslims: A Study of Muṣṭafā ‘Ālī of Gallipoli’s Künhü l-aḥbār*, 44, 54-58.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 45.

¹⁷² Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v. “Selānīkī Muṣṭafā Efendi.”

¹⁷³ Jan Schmidt, *Pure Water for Thirsty Muslims: A Study of Muṣṭafā ‘Ālī of Gallipoli’s Künhü l-aḥbār*, 12-14.

¹⁷⁴ Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541-1600)*, 131.

military supremacy.¹⁷⁵ Selaniki and ‘Ali shared this anxiety. They were among the authors who initiated a powerful strand of decline discourse with an emphasis on *kanun*, i.e. imperial laws derived from established usage and royal decrees. Due to its grip on the imagination of the majority of administrators and intellectuals, this *kanun*-minded decline discourse would become dominant over other strands of decline discourse during the seventeenth century, with reformist treatises seeking to revive the idealized law and order of the old days as they understood it and as it suited their interests.¹⁷⁶

Deducing from studies on Ottoman decline-and-reform literature,¹⁷⁷ Heather Ferguson underscores the scholarly need for framing the Ottomans’ discursive production of decline as a constitutive aspect of shaping their own histories to better understand the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Ottoman dynamics.¹⁷⁸ Ferguson further suggests that one can trace this discourse by discerning how it permeated the interplay between Ottoman historians’ presentation of past events/acts and their interpretation.¹⁷⁹ In the hands of the pioneering declinists like Selaniki and ‘Ali, the presentation of the historical process from the siege of Cyprus to the Battle of Lepanto and its interpretation offers one of the first examples of this interplay, and thus insight into the incipient forms of the declinist discourse.

¹⁷⁵ Cemal Kafadar, “The Myth of the Golden Age: Ottoman Historical Consciousness in the Post-Süleymânîc Era,” 38.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹⁷⁷ Linda Darling, “Political Change and Political Discourse in the Early Modern Mediterranean World,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 38, no. 4 (Spring, 2008): 505-531; Pál Fodor, “State and Society, Crisis and Reform, in 15th-17th Century Ottoman Mirror for Princes,” *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 40 (1986): 217-240; Douglas A. Howard, “Ottoman Historiography and the Literature of ‘Decline’ of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” *Journal of Asian History*, 22 (1988): 52-77; Rifa’at ‘Ali Abou-El-Haj, “The *Nasihatnâme* as a Discourse over Morality,” in *Melanges, Progresseur Robert Mantran*, ed. Abdeljelil Temimi, (Zaghouan, 1988), 17-30.

¹⁷⁸ Heather Ferguson, “Genres of Power: Constructing a Discourse of Decline in Ottoman *Nasihatnâme*,” *Osmanlı Araştırmaları Dergisi / The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, 35 (2010), 81-82.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 82.

3.1.2. Event and Interpretation: The Battle of Lepanto and Decline

Selaniki notes that in the days of Selim II (r. 1566-1574) eight great accomplishments were achieved, each of which is worth the duration of one reign.¹⁸⁰ He ranks the conquest of Cyprus as the third¹⁸¹ in the list described under the title of “the accomplishments during the times of Sultan Selim II, whose standing is like that of Jamshid, whose troops are as many as the stars and who is the refuge of religion.”¹⁸² Selaniki does not necessarily celebrate the conquest of Cyprus or other successful initiatives in Selim II’s reign at the expense of discussing the Battle of Lepanto or as an excuse to mention it only in passing, like Mehmed Za‘im, or even by omitting to mention it altogether, like Vusuli. On the contrary, he devotes a separate section (“the arrival of the news about the enemy of religion, the confrontation of the fleet, and the defeat by the order of God”)¹⁸³ about the Battle of Lepanto, and so does ‘Ali. Within the chapter on Selim II’s reign, ‘Ali’s wording of the subtitle for the Battle of Lepanto (“the eighth striking incident”) stands in contrasts to the previous one, that is the conquest of Cyprus, which is designated as “the seventh great event.”¹⁸⁴

Both Selaniki and ‘Ali portray an uncontested and smooth decision-making process for the siege of Cyprus in the court of Selim II. Selaniki maintains that the idea to conquer the island was awakened in Selim II’s exalted conscience during his princehood.¹⁸⁵ Although Selaniki does not specify a date, the author’s claim is in line with the premise that Selim had already had an agenda for the conquest of Cyprus as early as 1562, i.e. before he assumed the throne.¹⁸⁶ According to Selaniki’s “story of the fleet of the Cyprus campaign,” Prince Selim dispatched his emissaries with a boat to Egypt to bring rarities, sugar, rice, and horses. The emissaries managed to escape a storm but Venetian sailors seized the horses and goods,

¹⁸⁰ Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)* [Selânikî’s History], 94.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 95.

¹⁸² Ibid. 94. I thank my professor Ferenc Csirkés for helping me to translate this section title.

¹⁸³ Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)* [Selânikî’s History], 81.

¹⁸⁴ Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî, *Künhü’l-Ahbâr*, 4. Rûkn: Tıpkıbasım [The Essence of Histories, 4th Pillar: Facsimile], folio 448a, 444a.

¹⁸⁵ Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)* [Selânikî’s History], 77.

¹⁸⁶ See: Chapter 2, 29.

although Venice was at peace with the Ottomans at the time. They did so under the frivolous pretext of suspecting that the goods did not belong to Selim and returned them only after many other mischiefs.¹⁸⁷

Immediately after this introductory paragraph, Selaniki advances to the mobilization of forces for the Cyprus campaign. It is interesting that Selaniki, who resorts to the discussion of omens that cast a particular light on the outcome of events, does not write about Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's opposition to the Cyprus campaign, which his rivals (Joseph Nasi, Lala Mustafa and Piyale Mehmed Pasha) and Selim II wished to launch. As I discuss in the previous chapter, the grand vizier was not interested in this military undertaking and did not want his rivals to gain sultan's favor at his own expense by becoming war heroes in the case of success. Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's justification was that this military undertaking would convert Venice from a neutral state into a foe by prompting it to participate in the formation of the Holy League, which indeed happened. One would expect Selaniki to ascribe this warning to Sokollu Mehmed Pasha.¹⁸⁸ After all, as I show in Chapter 1, the author ascribes a similar ominous anticipation to him earlier when the grand vizier realized that Selim II was not going to hold another accession ceremony in Belgrade during the succession process.¹⁸⁹

Although 'Ali is known to have put undue emphasis on the importance of personal animosities,¹⁹⁰ he does not hint at Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's opposition to the campaign, either. Yet, 'Ali differs from Selaniki in not attributing the decision to besiege Cyprus to Selim II. In his account the Venetian sailors' attack was not confined to Selim's ships, as Selaniki notes, but any Ottoman vessel en route to Egypt. Nevertheless, 'Ali suggests that there was an overriding reason for the Cyprus campaign that Lala Mustafa Pasha brought up to the Porte. One can surmise this from a subordinate clause that begins with *'al'el-husus*

¹⁸⁷ Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)* [Selânikî's History], 77.

¹⁸⁸ See: Chapter 2, 31.

¹⁸⁹ See: Chapter 1, 17.

¹⁹⁰ Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541-1600)*, 48.

(especially), following the long phrase on the aforementioned Venetian sailors' attack. As I previously mentioned in Chapter 2,¹⁹¹ according to 'Ali, when Lala Mustafa Pasha was the governor-general of Damascus, he proposed to the viziers the pressing necessity of a military campaign to conquer Cyprus and asked for appointment as its commander-in-chief. He writes that Lala Mustafa Pasha longed to conquer Cyprus as well as Shirvan on behalf of the Porte, and pleaded with God every morning and evening to be the commander of this endeavor. Lala Mustafa Pasha's justification was that the site of the remnants of a mosque constructed under the auspices of the second caliph, 'Umar, at whose time Cyprus was partially captured by Muslim armies, was used for slaughtering pigs under the Venetians. The proposal, penned by 'Ali himself as the private secretary of Lala Mustafa Pasha, was dismissed.¹⁹² 'Ali, however, continues by saying "God forbid! Heed what is said, ignore who said it,"¹⁹³ by which he arguably means that Lala Mustafa Pasha's proposal did not ultimately fall on deaf ears. As 'Ali notes, Lala Mustafa Pasha was first promoted to vizier and then became the commander-in-chief of the Cyprus campaign.¹⁹⁴

Neither Selaniki nor 'Ali refer to the controversial legal opinion (*fatwa*) issued by grand mufti Ebussu'ud Efendi in favor of the siege of Cyprus, which is another indication that they tried to portray the decision-making process leading to the campaign as seamless. It is highly unlikely that the two authors did not know about this particular *fatwa*.¹⁹⁵ For one, they do cite various other *fatwas* in their histories on several occasions.¹⁹⁶ More importantly, the content of the Cyprus *fatwa* occupied the agenda of the imperial council for a while.

¹⁹¹ See: Chapter 2, 26.

¹⁹² Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî, *Künhü'l-Ahbâr*, 4. Rûkn: Tıpkıbasım [The Essence of Histories, 4th Pillar: Facsimile], folio 445a.

¹⁹³ Ibid., 444b.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ In contrast, Peçevi (1575-ca. 1650), who follows 'Ali closely in his *History*, quotes the *fatwa* after briefly referring to the reasons at the beginning of the section on the Cyprus campaign: İbrahim Peçevi, *Tarih-i Peçevi* [Peçevi's History], vol. 1, (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1283), 486-487.

¹⁹⁶ Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)* [Selânikî's History], 167, 291, 468-70, 481, 491, 525, 582, 772, 855; Jan Schmidt, *Pure Water for Thirsty Muslims: A Study of Muştafâ 'Âlî of Gallipoli's Künhü l-ahbâr*, 54.

When Ebussu'ud had already issued the Cyprus *fatwa*, Venetians pressed the grand mufti to ameliorate the situation by amending its content. In effect, Ebussu'ud, who promised Sokollu Mehmed Pasha to never again issue any opinion against his interests, urged Selim II to prioritize helping the Muslim brethren in Spain.¹⁹⁷ Even, “public opinion” was against the Cyprus campaign.¹⁹⁸ Most importantly, what lay at the heart of this issue was the question of legitimacy. The *fatwa* was meant to bypass a major impediment to the war – the peace treaty that the Porte had already signed with Venice in 1567. As stated in the second chapter,¹⁹⁹ Ebussu'ud sanctioned the contravention of the peace treaty by arguing that if a land had once been ruled by Muslims and its *masjids* became dilapidated after being conquered by Christians, an existing pact could be considered void. Apparently, ‘Ali ascribes very similar reasoning to Lala Mustafa Pasha’s justification in proposing the Cyprus campaign when he was the governor-general of Damascus, while completely omitting Ebussu'ud’s *fatwa*. By circumventing political, diplomatic, and legal contentions surrounding the decision of the Cyprus campaign, ‘Ali draws a picture of unproblematic decision making, in which Lala Mustafa Pasha plays a vital role.

Although Selaniki joins ‘Ali in obfuscating the contentions, he credits Selim II rather than Lala Mustafa Pasha with the initiation of the Cyprus campaign. Selaniki goes even further in attributing the conquest of Cyprus to Selim II: “Selim the Shah took the island of Cyprus.”²⁰⁰ In this way, Selaniki circumvents yet another vexing issue which had to do with the role of the sultan in warfare by acknowledging the image of “the ruler who conquers through his lieutenants,” – an image promoted by Sokollu Mehmed Pasha’s protégés in illustrated histories as well.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁷ See: Chapter 2, 32-33.

¹⁹⁸ Güneş Işıksel, “La Politique Étrangère Ottomane dans la Seconde Moitié du XVI^e Siècle: Le Cas du Règne de Selim II (1566-1574),” 230: AS Ve, Senato, Ambasciatori Const., Dispacci, Filza 5, fol. 21 r- 25 v.

¹⁹⁹ See: Chapter 2, 32.

²⁰⁰ Selânîkî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânîkî (971-1003/1563-1595)* [Selânîkî’s History], 79.

²⁰¹ Emine Fetvacı, “Viziers to Eunuchs: Transitions in Ottoman Manuscript Patronage, 1556-1617,” 138.

Selaniki and ‘Ali portray the conquest of Cyprus as seamless as its initiation. This editorial choice enables the authors to celebrate the conquest and recuperate Cyprus from the shadow of Lepanto. Scholars maintain that the Cyprus campaign was a notably synchronized amphibious operation in Ottoman military history.²⁰² However, a subtle reading of ‘Ali suggests that the author narrates the conquest at the intersection of “those fortunate days” versus “our times of corruption.” For instance, ‘Ali praises Piyale Mehmed Pasha’s unconditional obedience to commander-in-chief Lala Mustafa Pasha. What amazes ‘Ali is the fact that Piyale Mehmed Pasha submitted to Lala Mustafa Pasha throughout the campaign even though the former was three ranks higher, more experienced in vizierate as well as a son-in-law to the sultan. ‘Ali digresses from his narrative to comment on this fact by adding that in “those times,” disputes over rank and fame were unknown.²⁰³ Thus, ‘Ali deems the Cyprus campaign as a reflection of his ideal state in which dynastic custom and *kanun* as well as hierarchy and chain of command were observed.

To a similar effect of idealizing the Cyprus campaign, Selaniki resorts to his recurring literary strategy of anticipation, but in this case auspicious, not ominous. He notes that “many among the Muslims drank the sherbet of martyrdom and when they reached the abode of paradise, they signaled in the world of dreams the glad tidings of conquest and victory to friends and truly that day the conquest and victory were achieved.”²⁰⁴ For Selaniki, the booty of the campaign was unprecedented, so much so that “if such a thing had been possible, it would have been already explained and stated.”²⁰⁵

After describing the departure of Pertev and Müezzinzade Ali Pasha with the navy from Constantinople, Selaniki again resorts to anticipation by referring to the news that the

²⁰² Svatopluk Soucek, “Naval Aspects of the Ottoman Conquest of Rhodes, Cyprus, and Crete,” *Studia Islamica* 98/99 (2004): 238 90-91. İdris Bostan, “Kıbrıs Seferi Günlüğü ve Osmanlı Donanmasının Sefer Güzergâhı,” in *Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği*, 90-91.

²⁰³ Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî, *Künhü'l-Ahbâr*, 4. Rûkn: Tıpkıbasım [The Essence of Histories, 4th Pillar: Facsimile], folio 445a, 445b.

²⁰⁴ Selânîkî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânîkî (971-1003/1563-1595)* [Selânîkî’s History], 78.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 79.

Holy League was assembling its forces. According to Selaniki, the officials who brought the news in July 1571 said that the Holy League was determined to take revenge for the loss of Cyprus.²⁰⁶ However, it is known that already during the siege of Cyprus, the Porte had been informed of the assemblage of Venetian forces near Corfu, waiting for the Spanish fleet to join in February 1571.²⁰⁷ By designating the arrival of the news from the Holy League as the starting point for his narration of the Battle Lepanto, Selaniki emphasizes that the Cyprus campaign was both a success and in a way an ill omen. This emphasis is all the more apparent given that Selaniki adds a warning, which he ascribes to the bearers of the news: “non-alertness [to the news of the Holy League’s mobilization of forces] is not permissible.”²⁰⁸ In juxtaposition to this warning, Selaniki writes that soldiers were abandoning the ships to indulge in plundering across the enemy islands.²⁰⁹ Thus, the author conveys that to the soldiers’ minds, the probability of a naval confrontation with the Holy League was distant.

Similarly, ‘Ali also contrasts the success of the Cyprus campaign to what came after and led to the Battle of Lepanto. However, ‘Ali does not underscore plundering activities for explaining the diminished number of soldiers on Ottoman vessels as Selaniki does. He also notifies Pertev Pasha’s decision to discharge the soldiers for the duration of the winter, while discussing the soldiers’ failure to estimate the courage of the Holy League fleet.²¹⁰ This nuance in emphasis, between Selaniki (greed) and ‘Ali (short-sightedness), becomes clear when they come to the moment of actual confrontation at Lepanto in their narratives. While in Selaniki, the news of the approaching fleet of the Holy League arrives at the time the

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 81.

²⁰⁷ Halil İnalcık, “Lepanto in the Ottoman Documents,” 185.

²⁰⁸ Quoted in Selânîkî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânîkî (971-1003/1563-1595)* [Selânîkî’s History], 81.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 82.

²¹⁰ Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî, *Künhü’l-Ahbâr*, 4. Rûkn: Tıpkıbasım [The Essence of Histories, 4th Pillar: Facsimile], folio 448a.

Ottoman soldiers were plundering,²¹¹ in ‘Ali, this news arrives when the undercrewed Ottoman fleet had anchored in the Bay of Lepanto.²¹²

In their representation of a war council held before the confrontation at Lepanto, ‘Ali and Selaniki criticize both the grand admiral Müezzinzade Ali Pasha’s reckless bravery in confronting the enemy with an undercrewed fleet and Pertev Pasha’s cowardice during the battle.²¹³ Selaniki blames Müezzinzade Ali Pasha more strongly. The reason why Selaniki emphasizes Müezzinzade Ali Pasha’s responsibility compared to ‘Ali lies in a particular decree. Scholars who have studied the events leading to the Battle of Lepanto argue that it was the decree sent by the Porte ordering attack on the fleet of the Holy League that played a decisive role in the defeat. They maintain that in the war council, Müezzinzade Ali Pasha referred to the decree and prevailed over the counselors who opposed the confrontation with the Holy League.²¹⁴ However, the content and issuer of the decree are different in ‘Ali’s *Essence* and Selaniki’s *History*. In the pen of ‘Ali, the decree is sent by the viziers in Constantinople and reads as follows: “Surely, you shall confront the fleet of the infidels. If you violate the order, you shall know that you are to be held responsible, dismissed, and scolded.”²¹⁵ In contrast, for Selaniki, the decree stated “surely, you shall plunder Zakynthos and Kythera and provide the soldiers of Islam with booty and find out the whereabouts of the Infidel fleet and attack.”²¹⁶

In ‘Ali’s account, the decree, as he relays it, waters down Müezzinzade Ali Pasha’s responsibility since he had no choice but to obey the order. Otherwise, his career and even his life would have been jeopardized. He chose martyrdom over disgrace as was the case with

²¹¹ Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)* [Selânikî’s History], 82.

²¹² Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî, *Künhü’l-Ahbâr*, 4. Rûkn: Tıpkıbasım [The Essence of Histories, 4th Pillar: Facsimile], folio 448a, 448b.

²¹³ Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)* [Selânikî’s History], 82; Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî, *Künhü’l-Ahbâr*, 4. Rûkn: Tıpkıbasım [The Essence of Histories, 4th Pillar: Facsimile], 449b.

²¹⁴ Halil İnalçık, “Lepanto in the Ottoman Documents,” 186; Svat Soucek, “İnebahtı Savaşı (1571) Hakkında Bazı Mülâhazalar,” *Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi* IV-V (1974): 38.

²¹⁵ Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî, *Künhü’l-Ahbâr*, 4. Rûkn: Tıpkıbasım [The Essence of Histories, 4th Pillar: Facsimile], folio 448a.

²¹⁶ Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)* [Selânikî’s History], 82.

Pertev Pasha. In contrast, for Selaniki, the decree had never reached the Ottoman fleet. If the soldiers and commanders plundered, they did so by “divine providence” rather than by the order of Selim II, to whom Selaniki attributes the decree.²¹⁷ Thus, Selaniki deflects the responsibility to Müezzinzade Ali Pasha in order to spare Selim II of the blame for the defeat at Lepanto. Moreover, Selaniki mostly uses regular past tense (*-di*), which grammatically conveys the authors’ witnessing the action. In contrast, when he refers to Selim II’s order to plunder and attack, Selaniki curiously switches to the narrative past tense (*-miş*), which signals the author’s deliberately crafted distance from the information he gives.²¹⁸

Regardless of the divergence on the part of these authors in assigning the responsibility for the defeat, the discussion about the Battle of Lepanto did not simply revolve around the misbehavior of the Ottoman troops or their commanding officers. In addition to offering their own interpretation, both Selaniki and ‘Ali foreground esteemed figures’ interpretation to convey the meaning of the Battle of Lepanto. The authors frame the defeat in a moralizing discourse in order to usher in the discussion of the present state of the Ottoman Empire, which for them seems to be crumbling down. The esteemed figure in Selaniki’s *History* is the chief of the Prophet Muhammad’s descendants (*naqib al-ashraf*). According to Gülru Necipoğlu,

the chief of the Prophet’s descendants (*naqib al-ashraf*) from whom the grieving Selim II sought consolation resorted to a time-honored interpretation of this debacle as divine punishment inflicted by God for the unapproved actions and sins of the Muslims. He recommended that the ‘monarch of Islam’ should rebuild his decimated fleet to show the unbelievers the ‘majesty and grandeur of the manifest religion’ and to re-confront them with ‘God’s sword of power and the mighty upper arm of Islam.’

However, Selaniki does not merely portray Selim II as a consoled figure. Arguably, Selaniki indirectly criticizes Selim II by noting that the chief of the Prophet’s descendants interpreted the defeat while discussing the hadith that reads as follows: “one-hour of justice is better than

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

seventy years of worship.”²¹⁹ Arguably, Selaniki indicates that the “unapproved actions and sins” are related to the sultan’s responsibility to provide justice.

For ‘Ali, it was the negligence of this very responsibility that played a key role in the defeat, which was unprecedented since the creation of the world and Noah’s construction of the first ship.²²⁰ By relaying a saint’s story, ‘Ali mentions the unjust treatment of the Ottoman commanders towards Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. The author refers to coercive recruitment of the craftsmen as galley slaves as if they were criminals, when the Ottoman navy short on rowers reached Gallipoli and other coastal towns. The commanders chained their feet in order to prevent their escape. Sympathizing with their severe conditions, ‘Ali argues that it would have been impossible for the imperial fleet to win given the unjust treatment of the Ottoman subjects by their commanders.²²¹ As a result, ‘Ali simply states “in short, the fleet was decimated.”²²² Shortly after the defeat, ‘Ali notes that he visited a shaykh. He told the shaykh of the defeat and shed many tears. The shaykh responds with a comment: God did not only create Muslims, but provided for all men.²²³ When the author’s and the shaykh’s interpretations are considered together, ‘Ali is in line with Selaniki in suggesting that the defeat was a divine punishment for the abandonment of justice, aside from the faults of commanders and troops.

Selaniki and ‘Ali narrate the Battle of Lepanto as a symptom of their anxiety about the decline of Ottoman social order. It is true that Selaniki and ‘Ali do not make a direct connection between what went wrong after the victory at Cyprus on the one hand, and the symptoms of their decline portrayal, on the other. But, one can surmise that their decline-minded sensibility informs their representations of the Battle of Lepanto. Prior to his

²¹⁹ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 89.

²²⁰ Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî, *Künhü’l-Ahbâr*, 4. Rûkn: Tıpkıbasım [The Essence of Histories, 4th Pillar: Facsimile], folio 449a.

²²¹ *Ibid.*

²²² *Ibid.*

²²³ *Ibid.*, 448b.

discussion of the meaning of the Battle through Selim II's conversation with the chief of Prophet Muhammad's descendants, Selaniki inserts a section entitled "Complaint about the Circumstances of the Age."²²⁴ But, which age? As Cemal Kafadar reminds, this phrase is one of the oldest clichés so much so that it is sometimes difficult to differentiate between a more specific critique of a particular ruler and a set of policies.²²⁵ Selaniki's "Age" is associated with the reign of Selim II as the author starts his explanation by a transition ("truly"), which connects his previous story to his complaints.²²⁶ In his previous story on operations of the new Ottoman fleet against the Holy League following the full-scale shipbuilding campaign in the aftermath of the Battle of Lepanto, Selaniki points to the grand admiral Kılıç Ali Pasha's refusal to order his soldiers to attack.²²⁷

The reason lies in the quote Selaniki ascribes to the grand admiral: "No efficient men have been left in the army."²²⁸ Selaniki, then, builds on the grand admiral's comment and begins his sentence with "truly," by which he places the comment within the broader problems of the empire. He decries the weakened morals of the soldiers who were motivated by worldly gains, bribery, unjust governors, distortion of meritocracy, and degradation of *'ulema* (religious scholars).²²⁹ He moves on to a verse to expand on the *'ulema*'s degradation, which he thinks is a sign of the Last Judgment:

The coin of the soul of scholars has been polluted with avarice
[but] because of their vanity this does not seem baseness to them.
Alas that life comes to an end
But this avarice does not die and become sand in the desert.²³⁰

In this respect, Selaniki's narration of the soldiers' irresponsible indulgence in plundering after the Cyprus campaign, while the Holy League was mobilizing its forces, represents one

²²⁴ Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)* [Selânikî's History], 87.

²²⁵ Cemal Kafadar, "The Myth of the Golden Age: Ottoman Historical Consciousness in the Post-Süleymânic Era," 41.

²²⁶ Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)* [Selânikî's History], 87.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Quoted in Ibid.

²²⁹ Ibid., 87-88.

²³⁰ Ibid., 88. I thank my professor Ferenc Csirkés for translating this stanza for me.

of the symptoms in his portrayal of the overall decline, and in particular the loss of military vigor to worldly gains.

Among his works, it is the *Essence* that conveys ‘Ali’s analysis of contemporary Ottoman decline most thoroughly.²³¹ It constitutes the major theme of the fourth pillar of the book. ‘Ali devotes the introductory part of this pillar to discussing the origins of the decline. The dominant pattern in ‘Ali’s understanding of history is the recurring decline of dynasties, which threatened to repeat itself in Ottoman history.²³² ‘Ali deems states and dynasties as temporary. Because man is weak, polities cannot last forever.²³³ The causes of Ottoman decline are manifold in the *Essence*.²³⁴ However, the primary responsibility lies with the ruler, as in the case of thirty-two extinct states that ‘Ali investigates in his *Fusul-i hall ü ‘akd fi usul-i harc u nakd* (Seasons of Sovereignty and Principles of Critical Expenditure), written contemporarily with the *Essence*.²³⁵ Like Selaniki, ‘Ali indicates the period when the signs of decline are felt and even dates it at several points. For ‘Ali, the succession of Selim II constitutes one of the stimulants for the onset of the decline, since he abandoned the dynastic mandate to rule and allowed himself and the government to be dominated by Sokollu Mehmed Pasha. ‘Ali argues that the grand vizier infringed on the *kanun* by nepotism and favoritism, although many of his protégés were worthy men.²³⁶ In narrating the events following the death of Süleyman, ‘Ali removes the sultan figure from the scene as a reflection of his premise that Selim II withdrew from the affairs of the state.²³⁷ In stark contrast to Selaniki’s *History*, in the *Essence*, there is not a single mention of Selim II from the siege of

²³¹ Jan Schmidt, *Pure Water for Thirsty Muslims: A Study of Muṣṭafā ‘Ālī of Gallipoli’s Künhü l-aḥbār*, 153.

²³² Ibid., 151.

²³³ Ibid., 145.

²³⁴ Ibid., 153.

²³⁵ Ibid., 145-150.

²³⁶ Ibid., 153-154, 159-160; Cornell Fleischer, “Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism, and ‘Ibn Khaldunism’ in Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Letters,” *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 18 (1983): 212-213.

²³⁷ Jan Schmidt, *Pure Water for Thirsty Muslims: A Study of Muṣṭafā ‘Ālī of Gallipoli’s Künhü l-aḥbār*, 134.

Cyprus to the Battle of Lepanto,²³⁸ except when ‘Ali mentions the arrival of the news of the defeat to the sultan.²³⁹ Even so, it is interesting that ‘Ali does not mention Selim II among those who felt morose for the defeat at Lepanto²⁴⁰ and gives all credit to “honorable deputy” (*vekil-i celil*)²⁴¹ Sokollu Mehmed Pasha in enabling the reconstruction of the fleet from scratch in five to six months.²⁴²

3.2. Eulogy at Play: Mehmed Za‘im and Mehmed Çelebi (*Vusuli*)

Mehmed Za‘im (1532 – d.?) and Mehmed Çelebi (1523/4 - 1590) were more renowned litterateurs at their own time than today. Mehmed Za‘im was known among his friends as a prominent rhetorician.²⁴³ Within Ottoman historiography, Peçevi (İbrahim of Pécs) oftentimes refers to his *Cami‘ü’t-Tevârih* (Compendium of Chronicles) for the events dating from 1542 onward.²⁴⁴ The work exists in eleven manuscripts in the libraries of Istanbul, Berlin, Vienna, London, Petersburg, and Cairo. However, in the secondary literature, only Joseph von Hammer seems to have made use of it.²⁴⁵

The manuscript copies of Mehmed Çelebi’s *Tevârih-i Sultan Selim Han* (History of Selim II) are located in the national library of Vienna, Fatih Library in Istanbul,²⁴⁶ and the Library of Leiden University as part of the Warner Collection.²⁴⁷ In addition, *Vusuli* penned *Cihadname* (The Book of Jihad) and *Risale-i Cündiye* (A Treatise on Soldiery).²⁴⁸ He also

²³⁸ Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî, *Künhü’l-Ahbâr*, 4. Rûkn: Tıpkıbasım [The Essence of Histories, 4th Pillar: Facsimile], folio 444a-449b.

²³⁹ Ibid., folio 449b.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Mehmed Za‘im, *Câmi‘ü’t-Tevârih* (202a-327b Giriş - Tenkitli Metin - Sözlük-Dizin) [Compendium of Chronicles (202a-327b Introduction-Critical Edition-Dictionary-Index)], 19.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 11.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 71, 13.

²⁴⁶ Necdet Öztürk, “Kazasker *Vusuli* Mehmed Çelebi ve Selim-nâme’si,” [Chief Military Judge *Vusuli* Mehmed Çelebi and His Book of Selim] *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları* 50 (1987), 13.

²⁴⁷ *Catalogue of Turkish Manuscripts in the Library of Leiden University and Other Collections in the Netherlands*, ed. Jan Schmidt, (Legatum Warnerianum in Leiden University Library, 2000), 72.

²⁴⁸ Necdet Öztürk, “Kazasker *Vusuli* Mehmed Çelebi ve Selim-nâme’si,” [Chief Military Judge *Vusuli* Mehmed Çelebi and His Book of Selim] *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları* 50 (1987), 12.

translated several works.²⁴⁹ In the secondary literature, however, none of these works has received due attention, including *Tevarih-i Sultan Selim Han*, which has been subject to critical edition by two scholars.²⁵⁰ However, Mehmed Çelebi was distinguished in his time by his own *divan* (collection of poems). He had a pen name “Vusuli.” His contemporaneous poets including Aşık Çelebi (1520-1572), Beyani Şeyh Mustafa (d. 1597), Kınalızade Hasan Çelebi (1546 - 1606), Kafzade Faizi (d. 1621/2), Riyazi Mehmed (d. 1644), and Ahdi Çelebi (d. 1593) placed him in their biographical dictionary of poets (*tezkiye*).²⁵¹ While introducing two poets with the same pen name “Vusuli” in his *Meşa‘irü’ş-Şu‘ara*, for instance, Aşık Çelebi differentiates Mehmed Çelebi on two counts that underscore his prominence. First, he notes for Mehmed Çelebi that he is also known as Molla Çelebi, which is a title of respect. Second, he refers to another poet with the pen name of Vusuli as *Vusuli-i diger* (the other Vusuli),²⁵² suggesting that this Vusuli is somehow less significant to Vusuli Mehmed Çelebi.

Both of these litterateurs were connected to the notable households before their incorporation into the imperial household. Mehmed Za‘im’s brother Pervane Agha was the gatekeeper (*reis-i bevvab*) of Malkoçoğlu Yahya Paşazade Ahmed Bey.²⁵³ Vusuli’s father Abdullah Agha, who was the son of a *sipahi* (cavalry),²⁵⁴ also served as a gatekeeper but for an even more powerful patron - the prince and future sultan Selim II.²⁵⁵ It is not until Süleyman’s campaign against the Safavids in 1554 that Mehmed Za‘im re-appears in historical record as the scribe of the Damascus governor-general, and a year later, of the

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 12, footnote 37.

²⁵⁰ Necdet Öztürk, “Kazasker Vusuli Mehmed Çelebi ve Selim-nâme’si,” [Chief Military Judge Vusuli Mehmed Çelebi and His Book of Selim] *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları* 50 (1987): 9-108; Walter Scheithauer, “Ein Selimnâme für Selim-i mest: Das Werk des Mehmed Vuşulî über Sultân Selim II,” (MA Thesis, Universität Wien, 1999).

²⁵¹ Necdet Öztürk, “Kazasker Vusuli Mehmed Çelebi ve Selim-nâme’si,” [Chief Military Judge Vusuli Mehmed Çelebi and His Book of Selim] *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları* 50 (1987), 9.

²⁵² Aşık Çelebi, *Meşa‘irü’ş-Şu‘ara*, ed. Filiz Kılıç (İstanbul: İstanbul Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, 2010), 564, 569.

²⁵³ Mehmed Za‘im, *Câmi‘ü’t-Tevârih (202a-327b Giriş - Tenkitli Metin - Sözlük-Dizin)* [Compendium of Chronicles (202a-327b Introduction-Critical Edition-Dictionary-Index)], 77.

²⁵⁴ *Catalogue of Turkish Manuscripts in the Library of Leiden University and Other Collections in the Netherlands*, ed. Jan Schmidt, (Legatum Warnerianum in Leiden University Library, 2000), 72; Walter Scheithauer, “Ein Selimnâme für Selim-i mest: Das Werk des Mehmed Vuşulî über Sultân Selim II,” VIII.

²⁵⁵ Necdet Öztürk, “Kazasker Vusuli Mehmed Çelebi ve Selim-nâme’si,” [Chief Military Judge Vusuli Mehmed Çelebi and His Book of Selim] *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları* 50 (1987), 10.

Baghdad governor-general. He eventually became Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's chancellery secretary by replacing Feridun Bey in 1574 and served in this post until the grand vizier's death (October 1579).²⁵⁶

Differing from Za'im, Vusuli remained tied to his first patron. When Sultan Süleyman ordered the transfer of Prince Selim's governorate from Manisa to Konya and later Kütahya, Vusuli was the judge of those two respective provinces. In fact, Selim married Vusuli to the daughter of his late religious tutor Akşemseddinzade Şemsi Çelebi and Hubbi Ayşe Hatun. For being the son-in-law of Selim II's future female companion Hubbi Ayşe Hatun, Vusuli was also referred to as "Hubbi Mollası." After Selim II's accession, he was appointed as the judge of Bursa and, afterwards, as that of Istanbul in June 1567. In December 1568, he was promoted as the chief military judge (*kazasker*) of Anatolia. Even though he was dismissed on the basis of a certain complaint, Selim II re-appointed Vusuli as the judge of Istanbul as a result of his personal investigation. However, he fell into disgrace early on in Murad III's reign (1574-1595).²⁵⁷

Mehmed Za'im's and Vusuli's initiative to write the *Compendium of Chronicles* and *History of Selim II*, respectively, may be read as related to the issue of patronage. Za'im started to write his work in March 1577 and dedicated it to his patron Sokollu Mehmed Pasha after he finished it in early March 1578.²⁵⁸ This was the time when Murad III had already made serious inroads into the grand vizier's standing. In April 1576, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's prominent protégé, the Head Chancellor Feridun Bey, was dismissed and exiled to Belgrade.²⁵⁹ In 1578, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's cousin, governor-general of Buda Sokollu Mustafa Pasha, was blamed for the explosion of the ammunition storage in the castle, which

²⁵⁶ Mehmed Za'im, *Câmi'ü't-Tevârih (202a-327b Giriş - Tenkitli Metin - Sözlük-Dizin)* [Compendium of Chronicles (202a-327b Introduction-Critical Edition-Dictionary-Index)], 78-79.

²⁵⁷ Necdet Öztürk, "Kazasker Vusuli Mehmed Çelebi ve Selim-nâme'si," [Chief Military Judge Vusuli Mehmed Çelebi and His Book of Selim] *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları* 50 (1987), 10-11.

²⁵⁸ Mehmed Za'im, *Câmi'ü't-Tevârih (202a-327b Giriş - Tenkitli Metin - Sözlük-Dizin)* [Compendium of Chronicles (202a-327b Introduction-Critical Edition-Dictionary-Index)], 11.

²⁵⁹ Rhoads Murphey, *Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty: Tradition, Image and Practice in the Ottoman Imperial Household, 1400-1800*, 130.

was in fact struck by lightning.²⁶⁰ In the same year, eighteen of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's closest aides were subjected to seizure of their *zeamet* estates and ostracized from the sultan's favor.²⁶¹ It is possible that under these precarious circumstances Mehmed Za'im presented his *Compendium of Chronicles* to Sokollu Mehmed Pasha as a way to strengthen his patronage ties with the grand vizier. However, Za'im lost his patron's protection as Sokollu Mehmed Pasha was assassinated by a dervish of the Hamzevi sect in October 1579, about a year after he finished his *Compendium of Chronicles*. Some scholars argue that the assassination meant to be revenge as the grand vizier was involved in the prosecution of Hamzevi sect. However, it was widely rumored at that time that Murad III was behind this assassination.²⁶²

In contrast to Za'im, Vusuli chose to dedicate his *History of Selim II* to Murad III rather than Sokollu Mehmed Pasha in order to gain the favor of the new sultan. Vusuli did not hold any official position from February 1575 to April 1587, except for half-a-year tenure of judgeship of Istanbul, lasting from June 1580 to January 1581. It appears that Vusuli's attempt turned out to be successful given that he was re-appointed as the judge of Istanbul in April 1587.²⁶³ That a manuscript copy of Vusuli's work is found among the effects of the chief white eunuch and Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's rival, Gazanfer Agha,²⁶⁴ further suggests the possibility of this success. The finding attests to Gazanfer Agha's possible encouragement of Vusuli and support in his seeking the patronage of the sultan. After all, Gazanfer Agha was known to have supported a number of scholars and poets by mediating their access to the sultan and finding them employment.²⁶⁵ This suggestion becomes all the more tempting when

²⁶⁰ Uroš Dakić, "The Sokollu Family Clan and the Politics of Vizierial Households in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century," 57.

²⁶¹ Rhoads Murphey, *Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty: Tradition, Image and Practice in the Ottoman Imperial Household, 1400-1800*, 130.

²⁶² Günhan Börekçi, "Factions and Favorites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1603-1617) and His Immediate Predecessors," 170-171.

²⁶³ Walter Scheithauer, "Ein Selīm-nāme für Selīm-i mest: Das Werk des Mehmed Vuşulî über Sulṭān Selīm II," XXVI-XXVII.

²⁶⁴ *Catalogue of Turkish Manuscripts in the Library of Leiden University and Other Collections in the Netherlands*, ed. Jan Schmidt, 74.

²⁶⁵ Emine Fetvacı, "Viziers to Eunuchs: Transitions in Ottoman Manuscript Patronage, 1556-1617," 259.

one considers what happened if those who were in disgrace would present their work to the grandees or the sultan: when Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's protégé Feridun Bey presented his *Münşeâtü's-Selatin* (epistolary collection of imperial chancellery) to Murad III in 1575, the sultan refused it without looking at it.²⁶⁶

The figures to whom Za'im and Vusuli dedicated their works shaped the content and portrayal of their histories. In line with his patron Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's image of an intellectual, Za'im prepared a universal history encompassing twenty-five dynasties including the Ottomans in his *Compendium of Chronicles*.²⁶⁷ It is known that the driving force behind Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's sponsorship of intellectual production was to subtly assure Selim II and remind Murad III that the grand vizier was indispensable for the dynasty.²⁶⁸ Possibly, Za'im's work stands at this juncture; Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's portrayal as an instrumental statesman in the imperial affairs, and the author's concern for his own tenure that depended on his patron's fate.

Alternatively, Vusuli's strategy was to tailor his abovementioned personal relationship with Selim II into his *History of Selim II*. Throughout the work, he stressed his uninterrupted ties with Selim, regardless of obstacles "the avarice" put in front of him that caused his dismissal but resulted in his re-appointment by the intervention of Selim himself.²⁶⁹ He inserted his advice and implicitly related them to the events, thus subtly representing himself as a valuable and loyal advisor to the sultan. At the same time, he did not forget to pay attention to Murad III. As Walter Scheithauer suggests, Vusuli did so with a

²⁶⁶ Uroš Dakić, "The Sokollu Family Clan and the Politics of Vizierial Households in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century," 81.

²⁶⁷ Mehmed Za'im, *Câmi'ü't-Tevârih (202a-327b Giriş - Tenkitli Metin-Sözlük- Dizin)* [Compendium of Chronicles (202a-327b Introduction-Critical Edition-Dictionary-Index)], 11.

²⁶⁸ Emine Fetvacı, "Viziers to Eunuchs: Transitions in Ottoman Manuscript Patronage, 1556-1617," 150, 215.

²⁶⁹ Necdet Öztürk, "Kazasker Vusuli Mehmed Çelebi ve Selim-nâme'si," [Chief Military Judge Vusuli Mehmed Çelebi and His Book of Selim] *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları* 50 (1987), 76.

special emphasis on the moments where Murad III figures in the story of Selim II, notably his circumcision festival and his accession to the throne following Selim's death.²⁷⁰

I argue that the way Za'im and Vusuli shaped the process from the siege of Cyprus to the Battle of Lepanto differs from Selaniki and 'Ali in that they aimed at preserving the status-quo of their alignment with the high-level functionaries and patrons. As I suggested above, Selaniki's *History* and 'Ali's *Essence* were imbued with the sense of decline. Their endurance in the face of instability with respect to their low-to-mid-level positions converged with their declinist sensibilities. In contrast, Za'im's *Compendium of Chronicles* and Vusuli's *History of Selim II* were informed by the need to eulogize the state at the time it was subject to criticism precisely by bureaucrats and intellectuals such as Selaniki and 'Ali. In that way, Za'im and Vusuli infused their narratives with their personal agenda. In their histories, the event and the contested meaning of the Battle of Lepanto have to be seen against the backdrop of unstable power configurations and intellectual milieu.

3.2.2. The Battle of Lepanto as an Event with Little or No Significance:

As I showed above, Selaniki and 'Ali relay a detailed narrative in order to mark a contrast between the conquest of Cyprus and the defeat at Lepanto. In setting up a contrast between a victory and a defeat, the authors enable their declinist sensibilities to seep into their narrative. Za'im and Vusuli, however, construct a rather different periodization in narrating the series of events from the siege of Cyprus to the Battle of Lepanto. In fact, as far as Vusuli's *History of Selim II* is concerned, the Battle of Lepanto never happened. For Mehmed Za'im, the Battle of Lepanto was a transition, sandwiched between the Cyprus campaign and the conquest of Saput and Anavarin fortresses.²⁷¹ That is to say, he does not use the defeat at Lepanto as a case in point to criticize any one, let alone to signal the decline of the Ottoman

²⁷⁰ Walter Scheithauer, "Ein Selīm-nāme für Selīm-i mest: Das Werk des Mehmed Vuşūlî über Sulţān Selīm II," IX.

²⁷¹ Mehmed Za'im, *Câmi 'ü't-Tevârîh (202a-327b Giriş -Tenkitli Metin - Sözlük-Dizin)* [Compendium of Chronicles (202a-327b Introduction-Critical Edition-Dictionary-Index)], 410-411.

state. Far from that, Za'im deflected all the reason for the defeat to the discretion of God.²⁷² I argue that the editorial choice of structuring, highlighting, and omitting specific events was informed by their concern for the precarious condition of their respective positions and their concern about patronage.

One apparent outcome of their periodization is reflected in de-emphasizing the factional rivalries that revolved around the decision making and responsibilities behind the foreign policy and military operations. Both Za'im and Vusuli fully credit Selim II for deciding on the Cyprus campaign.²⁷³ Za'im is as straightforward as that. He simply adds that Selim II ordered the mobilization of necessary resources and forces.²⁷⁴ Vusuli's description is more nuanced. While in line with Za'im's emphasis on the firmness of Selim II's decision, Vusuli offers pieces of advice in the form of stanza (*kıt'a*) before discussing how the decision is implemented. Here, the verse sets the scene for the outcome that unfolds in line with the advice itself, by which Vusuli subtly expresses his importance as an advisor. The advice is meant to urge the ruler to seek consultation on difficult matters. Thereafter, Vusuli notes that Selim II revealed his intention to conquer Cyprus to his viziers, among whom nobody objected. He conveys the unanimous agreement to launch the Cyprus campaign by even inserting a couplet relaying Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's blessing. Yet, a careful reading of the couplet suggests that Sokollu Mehmed Pasha did not have any other choice but to obey the sultan: "What is the sacrifice of life if not for the sultan / What is a heart if it cannot be thrown before the ruler?"²⁷⁵ Although it is well known that the grand vizier did not wish for the Cyprus campaign, as his slave, he could not question the order of the sultan. In this

²⁷² Ibid., 410.

²⁷³ Ibid., 399-400; Necdet Öztürk, "Kazasker Vusuli Mehmed Çelebi ve Selim-nâme'si," [Chief Military Judge Vusuli Mehmed Çelebi and His Book of Selim] *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları* 50 (1987), 79.

²⁷⁴ Mehmed Za'im, *Câmi'ü't-Tevârih (202a-327b Giriş - Tenkitli Metin - Sözlük-Dizin)* [Compendium of Chronicles (202a-327b Introduction-Critical Edition-Dictionary-Index)], 399-400.

²⁷⁵ Necdet Öztürk, "Kazasker Vusuli Mehmed Çelebi ve Selim-nâme'si," [Chief Military Judge Vusuli Mehmed Çelebi and His Book of Selim] *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları* 50 (1987), 80.

respect, while Vusuli reconstructs an undisturbed chain of command, he both hints at and disguises Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's strong opposition.

The way Za'im and Vusuli frame Lala Mustafa Pasha's thorny road to his appointment for Cyprus campaign is yet another attempt to gloss over the factional rivalries in the court of Selim II. In fact, the image of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's rival Lala Mustafa Pasha is far from that of an instigator for the Cyprus campaign. Instead, the authors place Selim II at the center of the affairs. For Vusuli, it was the complaints of Muslim pilgrims about Venetian maritime assaults that reminded Selim II of his previous intention to conquer Cyprus.²⁷⁶

Za'im does not content himself with one reason in underscoring Selim II's role. Aside from the Venetian assaults in violation of the peace with the Porte, the author contextualizes the matter in a broader historical perspective of Islamic past.²⁷⁷ From a purely stylistic perspective, this choice is meaningful once the genre through which Za'im conveys his narrative is considered, that of a universal history. However, what is at stake for the author is to obfuscate the contemporary political, diplomatic, and legal contentions surrounding the decision process leading to the Cyprus campaign to further highlight Selim II's authority. Namely, Za'im notes that both the third caliph Osman and later Melik ez-Zahir conquered Cyprus, implying that expelling Venetians from the island was legitimate because of the Islamic past of the island. He adds that Ottoman Empire tolerated the Venetian presence due to their amicable relations.²⁷⁸

Za'im further elevates Selim II's role by describing the dimension of his decision's firmness over the Cyprus campaign. Quite literally, by resorting to a pun, the author depicts Selim II's decision as the atom (*zerre*) of the sun and juxtaposes it with Sokollu Mehmed

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 79.

²⁷⁷ Mehmed Za'im, *Câmi'ü't-Tevârîh (202a-327b Giriş - Tenkitli Metin - Sözlük-Dizin)* [Compendium of Chronicles (202a-327b Introduction-Critical Edition-Dictionary-Index)], 400.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

Pasha's obedience as the dust seen through the sunlight (*zerre*).²⁷⁹ In this way, unlike Vusuli, Za'im completely disregards any trace of opposition or disagreement with Selim II's decision.

As suggested, Za'im and Vusuli do not juxtapose Cyprus and Lepanto in order to elaborate on the downward turn of the state. For Vusuli, Cyprus was a glorious event with achieved turning points that the author constructs through inserting his advice in a number of transpositions of prose to verse or simply by evoking esteemed figures.²⁸⁰ Apposite to the previously mentioned stanza that the author inserts before narrating how Selim II's decision was implemented, Vusuli evokes sages (*ehl-i daniş ü binîş*) in asserting that battle without consultation is a fatal error. Then, his story related to Lala Mustafa Pasha's conduct of the Cyprus campaign unfolds in perfect harmony with this advice. Vusuli notes that Lala Mustafa Pasha opens up a consultation session on the matters of what would be necessary for the conquest, which castle to besiege, and from which direction to strike. Furthermore, Vusuli inserts additional advice as to what needs to be done before and during the siege, specifically related to the organization of ammunition and the optimal balance between courage and prudence. Then, everything what Vusuli narrates is in line with his advice, culminating in the conquest of Cyprus. Throughout his siege narrative, although the author puts himself in dialogue with the pashas by inserting his advice first and portraying that the pashas happen to carry out what he suggested, he does not take a direct credit for the success. Rather, he ascribes it to Selim II.²⁸¹

Za'im also credits Selim II with the victory at Cyprus. However, he does not stop there nor does he omit reference to the Battle of Lepanto like Vusuli. Without laying any

²⁷⁹ Ibid., 400-401.

²⁸⁰ I borrow this idea from Heather Ferguson's article in which she discusses the mechanisms of expressing declinist discourse in *Nasihatname* genre among the Ottoman intelligentsia; see: Heather Ferguson, "Genres of Power: Constructing a Discourse of Decline in Ottoman *Nasihatnâme*," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları Dergisi / The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, 35 (2010), 14.

²⁸¹ Necdet Öztürk, "Kazasker Vusuli Mehmed Çelebi ve Selim-nâme'si," [Chief Military Judge Vusuli Mehmed Çelebi and His Book of Selim] *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları* 50 (1987), 83, 83-87.

ground for the transition between Cyprus and Lepanto, Za'im tells the reader that the defeat (*kesr ü inhizam*) took place by the discretion of God (*takdir-i Huda-yı la-yezal mukarenetiyle*) without referring to any fault lines or misbehavior among the Ottoman commanders.²⁸² By doing so, the author gives no strong sense of rupture from the glory that was in the background of the portrayal of Cyprus campaign. After glossing over the Battle of Lepanto with these fleeting notes, Za'im further smoothens the indications of rupture by advancing to the conquests of the fortresses of Saput and Anavarin after the reconstruction of the fleet. In doing so, Za'im suggests that the Battle of Lepanto was a Pyrrhic victory of the Holy League eclipsed by Ottoman conquests of Cyprus as well as Saput and Anavarin fortresses.

As this chapter shows, each of the four chroniclers provides their own versions of the war of 1570-73. 'Ali and Selaniki who served in lower levels of bureaucracy bisect the war of 1570-73 into mutually exclusive events: a victorious siege of Cyprus versus crushing defeat at Lepanto. Through constructing this contrast, they communicate the beginnings of Ottoman decline. In this respect, the Battle of Lepanto is one of the first events through which 'Ali and Selaniki articulate the incipient forms of declinist discourse. As higher level officials, Za'im and Vusuli diminish or disregard the significance of the Battle. While Za'im sandwiches the Battle in between two successful military campaigns, Vusuli leaves a gap in the succession of events by omitting the Battle. This plurality of voices and interpretations for the Battle of Lepanto speaks to the chroniclers' involvement with the patronage relations, intellectual production as well as factional struggles.

²⁸² Mehmed Za'im, *Câmi'ü't-Tevârih (202a-327b Giriş –Tenkitli Metin - Sözlük-Dizin)* [Compendium of Chronicles (202a-327b Introduction-Critical Edition-Dictionary-Index)], 410.

Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis was to explore the contested meaning of the Battle of Lepanto (1571) in the hands of late sixteenth-century Ottoman chroniclers. It was the chroniclers' stance in patronage networks, intellectual currents, and factional rivalries that informed their editorial choices which in turn made the Battle of Lepanto polysemous.

The analyses of the chroniclers' (Chapter 3) narratives demonstrate that their representation of events do not simply mirror their patrons' power pretensions that particularly came to the fore at the time of Selim II's succession (Chapter 1) or when Cyprus campaign was at stake or when the campaign evolved into the Battle of Lepanto (Chapter 2). Rather, the chronicles obfuscate, embellish, distort, and reshape power struggles according to both their authors' position within the political hierarchy of the day and contemporary intellectual milieu.

This thesis approaches the Battle of Lepanto from three aspects: those of patronage, politics, and production of knowledge. A further study would broaden this framework by incorporating the illustrated histories. As the first courtier to harness the propaganda potential of illustrated histories through patronage, the grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha made the point of eulogizing the dynasty when the eyebrows were raised among Ottoman intellectuals at the state of the empire following Süleyman's death. In doing so, he exploited the increasing contemporary sensibilities for the decline of the empire by portraying himself as the continuator of Süleymanic traditions, which were often considered by Ottoman intelligentsia as the "golden mean between imperial magnificence and law-abiding justice vis-à-vis the subjects."²⁸³ Studying how the illustrated histories were received by the Ottoman

²⁸³ Cemal Kafadar, "The Myth of the Golden Age: Ottoman Historical Consciousness in the Post-Süleymanic Era," 48.

chroniclers and whether they made any impact at all beyond the strictly court circles²⁸⁴ can shed further light on contemporary discussions as to the meaning of the Battle of Lepanto. This investigation is worthy of pursuit when a particular indication is considered: even a sharp-tongued litterateur like ‘Ali who was ostracized from Sokollu Mehmed Pasha’s patronage circles and accused the grand vizier of nepotism and favoritism acknowledged his instrumentality by crediting him with saving the empire through swiftly rebuilding the fleet in the aftermath of Lepanto.

All of this amounts to a question of how to read Ottoman histories. As my thesis suggests with four different interpretations of the Battle of Lepanto, internal divisions and constantly shifting alliances at a given time have to be considered with the question of the chroniclers’ own position within these power configurations, but also within the intellectual trends of the time. In this way, individual voices of each Ottoman chronicle can be discerned. Historians can therefore further explore the mutual influences of chroniclers and how a particular representation of a political and social phenomenon cuts across different genres as well as the nature of knowledge production and consumption in the Ottoman Empire.

²⁸⁴ On this issue see: Emine Fetvacı, “Viziers to Eunuchs: Transitions in Ottoman Manuscript Patronage, 1556-1617,” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2005).

Bibliography

Primary Sources:

- Albèri, Eugenio, ed. *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato Durante il Secolo Decimosesto*. Vol. 1. Florence: Società Editrice Fiorentina, 1840.
- Andreas, Walter. "Eine Unbekannte Venezianische Relazion über die Türkei (1567)." In *Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften*. Heidelberg, 1914.
- Arslantürk, H. Ahmet and Günhan Börekçi, ed. *Sultan Süleyman'ın Son Seferi: Nüzhet-i Esrarü'l-Ahyar der Ahbar-ı Sefer-i Sigetvar* [Sultan Süleyman's Last Campaign: Pleasures of the Secrets of Auspicious Men from the News of the Szigetvár Campaign] İstanbul: Zeytinburnu Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 2012.
- Aşık Çelebi. *Meşa'irü's-Şu'ara* [The Senses of Poets]. Edited by Filiz Kılıç. İstanbul: İstanbul Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, 2010.
- Chesneau, Jean, ed. *Le Voyage de Monsieur D'aramon*. Paris: Slatkin Reprints, 1887.
- Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî. *Künhü'l-Ahbâr, 4. Rûkn: Tıpkıbasım* [The Essence of Histories, 4th Pillar: Facsimile]. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2009.
- Gisela, Procházka-Eisl and Claudia Romer, ed. *Osmanische Beamtenschreiben und Privatbriefe der Zeit Suleymans des Prachtigen aus dem Haus*. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007.
- Mehmed Za'îm. "Câmi'ü't-Tevârîh (202a-327b Giriş - Tenkitli Metin - Sözlük-Dizin)" [Compendium of Chronicles (202a-327b Introduction-Critical Edition-Dictionary-Index)]. Edited by Ayşe Nur Sır. Phd diss., Marmara University, 2007.
- Öztürk, Necdet. "Kazasker Vusuli Mehmed Çelebi ve Selim-Nâme'si." [Chief Military Judge Vusuli Mehmed Çelebi and His Book of Selim]. *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları* 50 (1987): 9-108.
- Peçevi. *Tarih-i Peçevi*. [Peçevi's History]. Vol. 1. İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1283.
- Pedani, Maria Pia, ed. *Costantinopoli, Relazioni Inedite (1512-1789)*. Vol. XIV. Padua: Bottega d'Erasmus, 1996.
- Scheithauer, Walter. "Ein Selîmnâme für Selîm-i Mest: Das Werk des Mehmed Vuşûlî über Sultân Selîm II." MA Thesis, Universität Wien, 1999.
- Schmidt, Jan, ed. *Catalogue of Turkish Manuscripts in the Library of Leiden University and Other Collections in the Netherlands*. Legatum Warnerianum in Leiden University Library, 2000.
- Selânikî Mustafa Efendi. *Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)* [Selânikî's History]. Edited by Mehmet İpşirli. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999.

Secondary Literature:

- Altınay, Ahmet Refik. *Sokollu* [Sokolović]. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2009.
- Arbel, Benjamin. *Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995.
- Arı, Bülent. "Akdeniz'de Korsanlık ve Osmanlı Deniz Hukuku." [Piracy and Ottoman Maritime Law in the Mediterranean]. In *Türkler Ve Deniz* [Turks and the Sea]. Edited by Özlem Kumrular, 265-318. İstanbul: Kitap Yayınları, 2007.
- . "The First Dutch Ambassador in Istanbul: Cornelis Haga and the Dutch Capitulations of 1612." PhD diss., Bilkent University, 2003.
- Berktaş, Halil and Tosun Terzioğlu. "Osmanlı Denizcilik Tarihinin Evrensel, Karşılaştırmalı ve Teorik Çerçevesi: Bir Lisans Dersi (HIST 345: Deniz, Gemiler, İnsanlar) Aracılığıyla." [The Universal, Comparative and Theoretical Frameworks of Ottoman Maritime History: By Way of an Undergraduate Course (HIST 345: Sea, Ships, People)] In *Türkler ve Deniz*, [Turks and the Sea] Edited by Özlem Kumrular, 93-145. İstanbul: Kitap Yayınları, 2007.
- Börekçi, Günhan. "Factions and Favorites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1603-1617) and His Immediate Predecessors." PhD diss., The Ohio State University, 2010.
- Bostan, İdris. "Kıbrıs Seferi Günlüğü ve Osmanlı Donanmasının Sefer Güzergahı." [The Cyprus Campaign and the Itinerary of Ottoman Fleet's Expedition] In *Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği*, 87-110. İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2006.
- Casale, Giancarlo. *The Ottoman Age of Exploration*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Cobham, Claude Delval. *Excerpta Cypria: Materials for a History of Cyprus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908.
- Dakić, Uroš. "The Sokollu Family Clan and the Politics of Vizierial Households in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century." MA Thesis, Central European University, 2012.
- Ertuğ, Zeynep Tarım. "The Depiction of Ceremonies in Ottoman Miniatures: Historical Record or a Matter of Protocol?" *Muqarnas* 27 (2010): 251-275.
- Ferguson, Heather. "Genres of Power: Constructing a Discourse of Decline in Ottoman *Nasihatnâme*." *Osmanlı Araştırmaları Dergisi / The Journal of Ottoman Studies* 35 (2010): 81-116.
- Fetvacı, Emine. "Viziers to Eunuchs: Transitions in Ottoman Manuscript Patronage, 1556-1617." PhD diss., Harvard University, 2005.
- Fleischer, Cornell. *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541-1600)*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.

- . "Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism, and 'Ibn Khaldunism' in Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Letters." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 18 (1983): 198-220.
- Glete, Jan. *Warfare at Sea, 1500-1600: Maritime Conflicts and the Transformation of Europe*. New York: Routledge, 2000.
- Gürkan, Emrah Safa. "The Efficacy of Ottoman Counter-intelligence in the 16th Century." *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 65, no. 1 (2012): 1-38.
- . "Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean: Secret Diplomacy, Mediterranean Go-Betweens and the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry." PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2012.
- . "Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde Osmanlılar'ın XVI. Yüzyıl'daki Akdeniz Siyaseti." [Sixteenth-Century Mediterranean Politics of the Ottomans in the Framework of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry] In *Osmanlı Dönemi Akdeniz Dünyası*. [The Mediterranean World during the Ottoman Times] Edited by M. Yaşar Ertaş, Haydar Çoruh, and M. Ziya Köse, 11-50. Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2011
- Hagen, Gottfried. "Osman II and the Cultural History of Ottoman Historiography." In *Humanities and Social Sciences Online*. <http://www.hnet.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=11651> (accessed: January 2012).
- Hess, Andrew. "The Battle of Lepanto and Its Place in Mediterranean History." *Past and Present* 57 (1972): 53-73.
- Hill, George Francis. *A History of Cyprus*. Vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940-1952.
- Howard, Deborah. "Venice between East and West: Marc'antonio Barbaro and Palladio's Church of the Redentore " *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 62, no. 3 (2003): 306-325.
- , Douglas A. "Ottoman Historiography and the Literature of 'Decline' of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries." *Journal of Asian History* 22, no. 1 (1988): 52-76.
- Inalcik, Halil. *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*. New York: CUP, 1994.
- . "Decision Making in the Ottoman State." In *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire*. Edited by Caesar E. Farah, 9-18. Philadelphia: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993.
- . "The Impact of the Annales School on Ottoman Studies and New Findings." *Review* 1, no. 3/4 (1978): 69-96.
- . "Lepanto in the Ottoman Documents." In *Il Mediterraneo Nella Seconda Meta del '500 alla Luce di Lepanto*. Edited by Gino Benzoni, 185-192. Florence: Olschki, 1974.

- . *Ottoman Policy and Administration in Cyprus after the Conquest*. Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1969: 5-23.
- . "The Origins of the Ottoman-Russian Rivalry and the Don-Volga Canal (1569)." *Les Annales de l'Universite d'Ankara* 1 (1946-47): 47-106.
- Işıksel, Güneş. "La Politique Étrangère Ottomane dans la Seconde Moitié du XV^{ie} Siècle: Le Cas du Règne de Selim II (1566-1574)." PhD diss., Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 2012.
- . "La Piraterie Abkhaze et la Réaction Ottomane : Une Contribution Au Débat Sur La Fermeture de La Mer Noire." In *Italy and Europe's Eastern Border (1204-1669)*, Edited by Iulian Mihai Damian, Ioan-Aurel Pop, Mihailo Popović, Alexandru Simon. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012
 <http://www.academia.edu/1791702/La_piraterie_abkhaze_et_la_reaction_ottomane_une_contribution_au_debat_sur_la_fermeture_de_la_mer_Noire> (accessed: August 2012).
- . "A Letter of Chahzade Selîm to Charles IX of France on the 'Nassi Affair.'" *Cuadernos de Estudios Sefarditas* 7 (2007): 247-254.
- Kafadar, Cemal. *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
- . "The Myth of the Golden Age: Ottoman Historical Consciousness in the Post-Süleymanic Era." In *Suleyman the Second and His Time*. Edited by Halil İnalcık and Cemal Kafadar, 37-48. Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1993.
- Kunt, Metin. "A Prince Goes Forth (Perchance to Return)." In *Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World: A Volume of Essays in Honor of Norman Itzkowitz*. Edited by Baki Tezcan and Karl K. Barbir, 63-71. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007.
- . "Sultan Süleyman ve Nikris." [Sultan Süleyman and Gout] In *Muhteşem Süleyman*. [Süleyman the Magnificent] Edited by Özlem Kumrular, 93-99. İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2007.
- . "Sultan, Dynasty, and State in the Ottoman Empire." *Medieval History Journal* 6, no. 2 (2003): 217-230.
- Mantran, Robert. "L'écho de La Bataille de Lépante à Constantinople." *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 28, no. 2 (1973): 396-405.
- Murphey, Rhoads. *Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty: Tradition, Image and Practice in the Ottoman Imperial Household, 1400-1800*. London: Continuum, 2008.
- . "Review Article: Mustafa Ali and the Politics of Cultural Despair." *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 21 (1989): 243-255.

- Necipoğlu, Gülru. *The Age of Sinan: Architectural Culture in the Ottoman Empire*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.
- Özgen, Elif. "Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Paşa and Factional Politics in the Court of Murad III." MA Thesis, Bilgi University, 2010.
- Pedani, Maria Pia. "Some Remarks upon the Ottoman Geo-Political Vision of the Mediterranean in the Period of Cyprus War (1570-1573)." In *Frontiers of Ottoman Studies: State, Province, and the West*. Edited by Keiko Kiyotaki Colin Imber, and Rhoads Murphey, 23-35. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005.
- Peksevgen, Şefik. "Secrecy, Information Control and Power Building in the Ottoman Empire, 1566-1603." PhD diss., McGill University, 2004.
- Rosenblatt, Norman. "Joseph Nasi: Court Favorite of Selim II." PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1957.
- Roth, Cecil. *The House of Nasi: The Duke of Naxos*. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1992.
- Salomon, Herman Prins and Aron di Leone Leoni. "Mendes, Benveniste, De Luna, Micas, Nasci: The State of the Art (1532-1558)." *The Jewish Quarterly Review* 88 (1998): 135-211.
- Samarčić, [sic.] Radovan. *Dünyayı Avuçlarında Tutan Adam: Sokollu Mehmed Paşa* [The Man Who Holds the World in His Palms: Sokollu Mehmed Pasha]. Translated by Meral Gaspıralı. Istanbul: Sabah Kitapları, 1997.
- Schmidt, Jan. "Muştafâ 'Âlî of Gallipoli, a Moralistic Littérateur on History and the Contemporary Ottoman World." In *The Joys of Philology: Studies in Ottoman Literature, History and Orientalism (1500-1923)*, 123-143. Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2002.
- . *Pure Water for Thirsty Muslims: A Study of Muştafâ 'Âlî of Gallipoli's Künhü L-Aḥbār*. Leiden: Het Oosters Instituut, 1991.
- Setton, Kenneth M. *The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571: The Sixteenth Century from Julius III to Pius V*. Vol. 4. Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1984.
- Soucek, Svatopluk. "Naval Aspects of the Ottoman Conquest of Rhodes, Cyprus, and Crete." *Studia Islamica* 98/99 (2004): 219-261.
- , Svat. "İnebahtı Savaşı (1571) Hakkında Bazı Mülâhazalar" [Some Observations Regarding the Battle of Lepanto (1571)]. *Tarih Entitüsü Dergisi* 4-5 (1974): 35-48.
- Turan, Şerafettin. *Kanuni Süleyman Dönemi Taht Kavgaları*. [Succession Struggles during the Reign of Süleyman the Lawgiver]. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1997.
- . "Lala Mustafa Paşa Hakkında Notlar ve Vesiklar." [Notes and Sources on Lala Mustafa Pasha]. *Belleten* 22 (1958): 551-593.

Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı. "Kıbrıs Fetihi ile Lepant (İnebahtı) Muharebesi Sırasında Türk Devletile [sic.] Venedik ve Müttefiklerinin Faaliyetine Dair Bazı Evrak Kayıtları" [Some Registers on the Operations of the Turkish State and Venice and Its Allies during the Cyprus Conquest and the Battle of Lepanto]. *Türkiyat Mecmuası* 3 (1935): 257-292.

Veinstein, Gilles. "Mehmed Sokolovitch, Le Destin d'un Grand Vizir (Compte Rendu)." *Turcica* 27 (1995): 304-310.

Yıldırım, Onur. "The Battle of Lepanto and Its Impact on Ottoman History and Historiography." *Mediterraneo in armi (secc. XV-XVIII) (Supplement of the Journal Mediterranean)* 2 (2007): 533-556.