Becoming/Belonging:

Negotiating Time and Sexual Citizenship in Poland

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Abstract

In this thesis, I examine "sexual-temporal belonging," or the extent to which sexual practices, identities, and discursively embedded meanings produce exclusions and ways of relating within society through symbolic notions of time, including how sexual citizenship becomes marked by concepts of the future, past, or present.

I use post-colonial, post-socialist, and queer theories to engage in a critical discourse analysis of Poland from 2003 to 2008. I argue that in this period, Polish LGBT movements illustrate the way in which the borders of sexual-temporal belonging are negotiated tactically through concepts of looking both “forward" and "backward" rather than inevitably as a result of "modernity," involuntarily as the consequence of Western colonialism, or independently of discursive, material, institutional, and political constraints.

I stress that sexual-temporal belonging produces multiple configurations of sexual citizenship vis-à-vis EU membership, Polish nationalism, LGBT rights campaigns, and the relationship between homophobia and anti-Semitism. Ultimately, I challenge "progress" as the inevitable trajectory of sexual politics and furthermore, argue that although sexual-temporal belonging is riddled with contradictions and conflicts, negotiating its borders remains crucial for LGBT activists in Poland as a politics of survival and intelligibility.

Keywords: *time, sexual citizenship, Orientalism, LGBT, progress, post-colonialism, post-socialism*

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List of Abbreviations

1. CEE – Central and Eastern Europe
2. ECP – Europe for Citizens Programme
3. EU – European Union
4. EYF – European Youth Foundation
5. ILGA – International Lesbian and Gay (Bisexual, Trans- and Intersex) Association
6. KPH - *Kampania Przeciw Homofobii* (Campaign Against Homophobia)
7. LGBT – Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender
8. LPR – *Liga Polskich Rodzin* (League of Polish Families)
9. LTSU – Let Them See Us
10. NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
11. PiS – *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* (Law and Justice Party)
12. PO – *Platforma Obywatelska* (Civic Platform Party)
13. WSDF – What Are You Staring At, Dyke/Faggot?

Introduction

"Politically, the questions-'What time are we in?' 'Are all of us in the same time?' and specifically, 'Who has arrived in modernity and who has not?' - are all raised in the midst of very serious political contestations....it is my view that sexual politics, rather than operating at the margin of this contestation, is in the middle of it..."

Judith Butler, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? (2009: 102)

This is a thesis about time, sex, and belonging. And it is one that ultimately challenges "progress" as an inevitable component of sexual politics. To explain, I have engaged in a number of conversations in recent years in which the word "progressive" (sometimes a self-labeled identity) is used to describe a group of people, political action, or current event without an explanation about what "progressive" itself means. The supposedly self-evident definition is assumed to represent a diverse range of political affiliations: LGBT activists, feminists, "sustainable" environmentalists, anti-capitalist Occupiers in New York, etc. In this sense, "being progressive" is consistently bound with groups that, while interconnected in multiple ways, are certainly not homogenous, and yet continues to be used as the ineluctable trajectory that unites them all. Those who claim to "be progressive," thus, also claim a certain temporality in which time moves forward in clear, politically and morally bifurcated increments.

Borrowing from Judith Butler (2009), who critiques the enforcement of "secular" progress within hierarchical power relations as an extension of state violence, I would like to complicate "progress" and its relationship to *sexual* meanings. Why is progress so readily embraced within contemporary LGBT rights-related discourses? What is new/important/different about our understanding of "being progressive" today? Why do we presuppose it has something to say about sexual politics? What are such discourses *doing*? Overall, how can an examination of time and sexual politics as an inter-implicated relationship,

one in which notions of "belonging" surface, explain the complexity of global LGBT rights-related discourses and their impact?

As an incomplete answer to these tremendously complex questions, I argue that sexual belonging is always temporal belonging. By "sexual belonging," I mean the multiple ways in which sexual practices, identities, and discursively embedded meanings produce exclusions and ways of relating within major societal organizing paradigms, including the state, Europe, and the law. Moreover, I am interested in how sexual belonging becomes *temporally* ordered, or the way in which sexual belonging is co-produced alongside concepts of who belongs to the future, the past, or the present in certain ways, at measurable paces, with political consequences, and according to different actors wielding varying degrees of power and influence at given moments. Accordingly, this thesis argues that "progress" does not yield differences in sexual politics, but rather, that sexual politics, through shifting paradigms of sexual-temporal belonging, produces concepts such as progress, which are unstable, useable, and plural.

To traverse the wide landscape of social, cultural, and political theories surrounding sexual-temporal belonging, I have decided to apply my inquiries to a region of the world in which concepts about time and sexuality can be analyzed in useful and important ways: post-socialist Europe. I have chosen this area not only because I am currently situated here as a researcher, but also because the conditions under which time and sexuality can be untangled in post-socialist Europe are telling, as it is a region saturated with multifaceted tensions in which notions such as who entered capitalism "earlier" or "later," who is "truly" European, who has facilitated "successful" pride parades, and in general, who is considered "modern" and who is

considered "homophobic," configure sexual-temporal belonging in inconsistent, multi-layered, and hierarchical ways.[1]

More specifically, I have chosen Poland for my research, not because of any prior expertise, but because Poland's post-socialist discourses from the past ten years, including its intersection with post-colonial theory, provide a detailed, informative, and methodologically feasible picture of the way in which sexual-temporal belongings have been produced, contested, and utilized, especially given the country's recurrent role in discourses about post-socialist "transitional" processes, "backward" conservative politics, and in general, a disproportionate amount of international attention as a place where homophobia "takes place."

Thus, Poland's pre- and post-EU accession process, spanning from 2003 to 2008, serves nicely as a site of analysis. In the end, I demonstrate that Polish activists re-map the borders of sexual-temporal belonging tactically as both "forward" and "backward-looking" projects rather than inevitably as a result of "natural" progress, involuntarily as the consequence of Western colonialism, or independently of discursive, material, institutional, and political constraints. I argue that although such negotiated boundaries of sexual-temporal belonging risk reproducing problematic assumptions about time, space, the nation, memory, and bodies, their utility for activists is ultimately the result of the need to become intelligible as a means of survival.

Methodology and Structure

In terms of my research design, I combined post-colonial, post-socialist, and queer theories with concepts of sexuality, geography, and time. Methodologically, I have chosen to conduct a discourse analysis in which I analyzed three major processes that relate to time and

[1] As a "fun" example of this rich and complex narrative, see the 2013 Eurovision song "Swedish smorgasbord" in which the host country, Sweden, urged viewers to "follow [their] example" with specific reference to sexual-temporal belonging, including "evolved" men who are stay-at-home dads and "up-to-date" same-sex marriage (Eurovisionisto, 2013).

sexuality as delineators of belonging: Poland's 2004 EU accession, the 2005 Polish presidential and parliamentary campaigns, and the Polish LGBT movement from 2003 to 2008. I use "discourse" in the specific Foucadian (1978) sense in which genealogies of thought yield what is possible to articulate and what is thinkable at given moments for groups of people embedded within power relations that both discipline bodies and enable resistance. Furthermore, I follow Gayle Rubin's (1997) ethical call for sexuality research in which we can "understand better how sexual communities form [and] approach them as social groups with histories, territories, institutional structures, modes of communication, etc" (102).

As empirical data, I contextualized and examined a number of mostly English-language materials since I do not speak Polish that, collectively, constitute an incomplete but nevertheless analytically rich picture of sexual-temporal belonging in Poland, including: EU resolutions, treaties, reports and other documents about homophobia or sexual orientation; written materials from international LGBT NGOs that conduct research in Poland; campaign speeches from the 2005 election, including surveys and news articles about the results; Polish LGBT campaign posters and online sources; and quotes/information from Marches of Equality/Tolerance attendees (and right-wing protesters) that were already translated from Polish.

Unfortunately, however, time, sexuality, citizenship, and Orientalism as corroborating systems of power, contingency, fluidity, and hierarchy do not fit neatly within academic taxonomies as a coherent "literature." As a result, I begin my discussion in Chapter 1 on the intersection of post-socialism and post-colonialism to demonstrate their temporal frameworks and co-construction of the Eastern European Orient. I also illustrate how they produce (semi-included) post-socialist Others through post-colonial concepts like hybridity and friction.

In chapter 2, I explore how sexuality is implicated, not as a mere additive to these frameworks, but as a constitutive element thereof. I look at the sexual politics of post-socialism through a post-colonial lens to understand how erotic Others are produced in the imaginary of Eastern Europe. Additionally, I expand this discussion to sexual citizenship as meaning-making practices in which CEE countries are both included and excluded and as a result, obtain ambiguous citizenship. Finally, I return to time to frame how the internal geography of Europe becomes a way to demarcate *temporal-sexual belonging* through multiple, conflicting processes, including EU enlargement, nationalism, and LGBT movements.

In the bulk of my project, I elaborate on how negotiating sexual-temporal belonging is subject to multiple institutions, actors, and discourses. In chapter 3, I outline Poland from 2003 to 2008 and examine the EU accession and 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections as critical moments in which temporal-sexual belonging emerges through competing concepts of citizenship. In the last two sections mostly surrounding LGBT campaigns, I explore Polish LGBT activists as agents of sexual politics who interact and co-produce formations of temporal-sexual belonging through notions of "moving forward" and "progress" (Chapter 4) *and* "looking backward" as tactical devices in relation to memory and the national body (Chapter 5).

In this way, I challenge progress as the inevitable temporal rubric of sexual politics. Additionally, I show how temporal concepts become tactics and in many ways, provide the means by which LGBT activists are able to negotiate their intelligibility as a means of survival within hetero-normative society. In general, my focus on the extent to which sexual-temporal belonging is negotiated, a reinforcement of and challenge to Neo-Orientalism and nationalism, and not inherently "progressive," contributes to existing literature on post-socialist sexualities, post-colonial sexual geography, and queer temporalities by using a specific social movement to

demonstrate the complexity, utility, necessity, and exploitability of time as a dimension of sexual citizenship that enables survival, social readability, and the capacity to navigate ambiguous belonging.

Chapter 1:
Time, Post-Socialism, and Post-Colonialism: Theoretical Intersections

1.1 Introduction

Although post-socialism and post-colonialism have intersected in scholarly debates, their combined forces as analytic tools regarding sexuality have been thinly explored. I argue that through their temporal frameworks and applicability to sexual politics in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), they are not only interrelated, but compatible as theoretical tools with which we can analyze trans-national sexual power relations *and* the historical, social, and material remnants of the Cold War. Before I address sexuality, however, I examine time first since "post-ness" marks colonialism and socialism as systems with clear "before" and "after" periods—ontological distinctions contested by a wide range of theorists.

As a key voice in such conversations, Katherine Verdery (1996) perceives capitalism and socialism within post- and pre- discourses as "not simply…the intersection of two systems' temporal cycles but rather…the collision of two differently constituted temporal orders, together with the notions of person and activity proper to them" (37). In other words, rather than seeing socialism as a simple 'collapse,' Verdery articulates post-socialism as a synthesis of imagined temporal trajectories that yields material and political consequences for a specific region of the world (Ibid). Judit Bodnár (2001), operating under similar logic, notes that with post-socialism, "there is a general sense of relief in [socialist systems] becoming the 'past'" despite the broader contextual complexity of a system that "has not been quite established… [as] a distinct logic within the world system" (3). How can post-socialism obtain its post-ness when the broader system of socialism itself continues to be re-imagined and debated? Such discussions resonate

with post-colonial theorists, who debate colonialism as a system that did not merely "end," but remains alive and interactive in multiple ways.

Keya Ganguly (2004), for instance, critiques post-colonial "exceptionalism," writing that "there is no special postcolonial theory of time, nor any reason to assume that postcolonial studies has contributed uniquely to our understanding of time by virtue of its foci, range of experience, or methodological insights" (163). In concert, Katarzyna Marciniak and Kamil Turowski (2010) write that the "post" in post-socialism includes unfinished, interconnected shifts that shape and re-shape places like Poland. By focusing on artwork, they merge aesthetics and politics to expose the extent to which Poland's past is never "fully" complete, and that post-colonial and post-socialist theories risk reifying the borders of time as disconnected ruptures if not rigorously critiqued.

Furthermore, Ann McClintock (1992) argues that post-colonialism re-centers Euro-centric thought when it makes stark distinctions between temporal periods. As she elaborates: "The word 'post,' moreover, reduces the cultures of peoples beyond colonialism to prepositional time. The term confers on colonialism the prestige of history proper; colonialism is the determining marker of his-tory. Other cultures share only a chronological, prepositional relation to a Euro-centered epoch that is over (post-), or not yet begun (pre)" (86). She questions whether post-colonialism should reduce systems to such eras in which the colonizing core of the West becomes *the* means by which all politics, subjects, and systems can be measured.

In short, these contributions usefully inquire whether socialism and colonialism are "fully" "post" their systematization, and where they started from "in the first place." As I examine discursive negotiations of time in Poland, I use such conceptual tools to understand post-socialism/post-colonialism as messy, intertwined processes in which "the" beginning of

capitalism or end of socialism are not clear and furthermore, are subject to shifting, unstable colonial and hierarchical power relations between Western Europe (and by extension, the EU) and CEE. Moreover, when it comes to sexual belonging and the way in which it is temporally framed, the interlocking post-socialist and post-colonial frameworks allow me to recognize how practices of citizenship within Europe and the post-socialist countries (sometimes but not always) included symbolically within it, depend on ideas about economic and political systems' origins and endings (or lack thereof). As I attend to in the next section, they are also based on the Other of Europe: the Eastern Orient that occupies the same continent.

1.2 The Orient within the Occident: European Others

Conveniently, debates on Orientalism within Europe assist me in moving from a broad understanding of post-socialism and post-colonialism as connected, temporal lenses to the particular subjects produced therein. In fact, such debates provide a conceptual channel through which power relations predicated on Edward Said's (1979) concept of Orientalism as "a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient" (3) can be articulated beyond a Global North/South dichotomy to include post-socialist nations as the Eastern Others of Europe (Wolff, 1994; Todorova, 1997; Burgess, 1997), particularly in the era of EU enlargement in which anxieties around what qualifies as an "authentically" European country become discursively salient and institutionally monitored (Kuus, 2004). Accordingly, I turn to recent developments in post-colonial theory that view the "Second World" as a site of colonial relations in which complex power relations and Othering processes can be directly interrogated (Cavanagh, 2004; Kania, 2009; Owczarzak, 2009). In the end, such manifold contributions to Orientalism (sometimes dubbed "Neo-Orientalism") usefully apply to Poland and its ambiguous status as an Other included (occasionally) within the temporal-sexual order of Europe.

For example, József Böröcz (2006) applies post-colonial theory to the "Second World" by dissecting the "inherent goodness" typically assigned to Western Europe. He questions why one half of the continent has been privileged as morally sound despite its historical record of genocide, oppression, and a whole host of pernicious human rights abuses. Böröcz concludes that the ambiguity of Central and Eastern Europe as an "elsewhere"—a place of difference disassociated from the presupposed goodness of (Western) Europe—produces anxieties that make it possible to imagine Western Europe as a coherent, self-contained space in opposition to its abject neighbor of the East.

However, the West/East binary becomes complicated when Orientalism operates *within* such boundaries. For instance, the concept of "nesting Orientalisms," or the way in which neighboring countries or neighbors within countries become marked as the "real" site of "primitive" existence has been debated by those interested in post-colonial theory as a post-socialist project (Bakić-Hayden and Hayden, 1992; Wolff, 1994). Michel Buchowski (2006) specifically cites Poland as an example of this phenomenon, writing that "domestic Orientalism cannot be confined in an isolated space, even if localized, since the Other can now live side by side with 'us,' occupy the same place, speak the same language and believe in the same god" (467). By tracing internal binaries within Poland, Buchowski carefully exposes the extent to which Orientalist discourses are not solely utilized as a weapon of the West wielded against the victimized East. As I demonstrate in my analysis of sexual-temporal belonging, multiple understandings of who does or does not belong *within* Poland reproduce similar discourses, such as Section 5.3, in which I examine how ultra right-wing nationalists and LGBT activists both "look backward" to Other each other sexually, either as racists whose homophobia echoes anti-Semitism, or unvaryingly un-Polish, Jew-like queers.

In addition, nesting Orientalism has been discussed as a process of traveling multiplicities that re-articulate who qualifies as the "East" and therefore, the inauthentic Europe. Merje Kuus (2004) sees this as "shades of otherness" that make "concepts of Europe and Eastern Europe more flexible and hence more durable" (479). According to Kuus, Central Europe as an imagined concept is informed and defined by former Yugoslavia as a place farther away from the "true" Europe. Similarly, Maria Todorova's (1997) detailed account of what she dubs "Balkanism," or the specific way in which the Balkans become trapped in "imputed ambiguity" (17) as not-quite European, complicates the West/East divide. She characterizes the violence, politics, and identity of the Balkans as an imagined Other of Europe, one that Central European countries (like Poland) can claim as the "truly" uncivilized spot on the European continent. This spectrum of authenticity and its calculability becomes more profound in the era of EU enlargement in which European sexual citizenship becomes more institutionally and economically rigidified (see both 2.2 and 3.2).

In order to more thoroughly examine these complexities within Neo-Orientalism, I look at the post-colonial concepts of hybridity, ambivalence, and shifting relations within a Central/Eastern European context to illustrate the way in which Eastness and Westness not only interact, but blend, penetrate, and complicate one another.

1.3 Blending, Performing, Resisting

Hence, I turn to hybridity and the notion that traveling interactions and exchanges produce shifting, unstable relations (Appadurai, 1991; Gupta and Ferguson, 1992; Bhabha, 1994; Cerwonka, 2008; Marciniak & Turowski, 2010). Hybridity is an important concept within post-colonial theory because it provides the theoretical tools to understand colonial relations as

complexly intertwined. Such thinking enables us to re-conceptualize belonging and power relations within a post-colonial framing of post-socialism (Owczarzak, 2009).

Homi K. Bhabha (1994) remains a central figure in this discussion because of his notion of the Third Space of Enunciation, in which "the structure of meaning and reference [is made into] an ambivalent process, [challenging] our sense of the historical identity of culture as a homogenizing, unifying force, authenticated by the orginary Past, kept alive in the national tradition of the People" (37). Bhabha argues that colonial power dynamics are not permanently frozen but rather, constantly yield paradigmatic shifts in which identities, relations, and concepts merge and reassemble. Instead of cultural authenticity, Bhabha's thinking frames colonialism as a process that produces ambivalent subjects, discourses, and spaces, undermining binary divisions.

However, the debate on post-colonialism has also included more skeptical perspectives. Anna Tsing (2005), who writes on globalization and its resultant friction, explains insightfully that complex relations across post-colonial spaces cause tensions that produce awkward, messy encounters. Although she sees these encounters as potentially productive, she reminds us that post-colonial relations involve important tensions—and compromises are not imminent. Tsing's contributions provide a theoretical framework within which it is possible to understand why, at certain moments, Poles can embody both a respectable nationalist Past and controversial "modern" European as a result of changing conditions, interests, and tactics; it is an effect of friction-forming encounters, discourses, and constraints.

In fact, within a Central and Eastern European context, the idea that the EU remains in control of unidirectional colonization vis-à-vis enlargement politics has been debated extensively. Central Europeans, as cited earlier, not only have their "own" Easts to Other as a way to identify the "real Europe," but furthermore, see their complex positions as a kind of middle location that

blends and mixes a fragmented Europe. As useful examples, Marysia Galbraith (2004) writes about the feelings of "between-ness" experienced by Poles before joining the EU and Janine R. Wedel (2001) analyzes the extent to which Eastern European politicians were able to appropriate Western notions of their backwardness to marshal financial aid.

In summary, by following this conceptual framework that centralizes the importance of Others as objects of knowledge while striving to not reify the colonizer/colonized as impregnable totalities, I can unfold the way in which colonial relations are shaped by interrelated, negotiated, and shifting hierarchies that produce ambiguity for CEE countries within EU citizenship politics. More specifically, by recognizing sexuality's central role in these discussions, I turn to the conditions and consequences of post-colonial and post-socialist discourses as productive sites of sexual difference, ambivalence, ambiguity, and friction in which European sexual citizenship emerges.

Chapter 2:
Time and Sexuality: The Temporal Dimensions of Erotic Others in Europe

2.1 Sexuality, Post-Colonial Geography, and the Pink Iron Curtain's Fabulous Fall

Fittingly, geographers of sexuality have begun to apply post-colonial theory to sexual/erotic geography, framing Orientalism as a process in which sexuality specifically is critically implicated as a contact zone (Hawley, 2001; Mills, 2003), or the way "in which peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other....usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict" (Pratt, 1992: 6). Importantly, this move visualizes sexual politics as an interactional activity that, while contingent on hierarchical power relations, involves some degree of contact and thus, change, collaboration, coercion, or connection.

More generally speaking, this debate has taken shape in two forms: earlier accounts of sexual geography, or "LGBT" geography, were used to read the world as a map of gays and lesbians living within different cultural spaces (Binnie, 2007). However, particularly with the emergence of queer theory and its hermeneutics, sexuality as a global dispersion of gays and lesbians, in which ontologically distinct identities ("gayness" and "Asianness"), for instance, competed for prominence (Altman, 1997), was eventually challenged by "queer geography." Queer geography became a lens through which the world can be read as an interconnected network of fluid sexual and erotic practices (Povinelli and Chauncey, 1999; Hemmings, 2007). Instead of presupposing pre-fixed gays and lesbians, debates turned to the interaction between localities and universalism(s), and even the effects of terms like "gay" or "lesbian" (Guadio, 2009). As a whole, queer geography exposes sexual elements of geo-political borders as unstable contingencies.

Within this move toward "queer geography," scholars have also focused on the role of globalization as a process that affects sexual practices, identities, and movements through mass media, globally circulated capital, and mobile bodies (Cruz-Malave & Manalansan, 2002; Binnie, 2004). Accordingly, sexual geography as a globalized process, contact zone, and queer politics, all of which highlight circumstances, interaction, and hierarchical differentiation, can be applied to Central and Eastern Europe.

To what degree, then, is sexuality central to the Self/Other parameters built *within* the continent of Europe? How are sexual practices and identities under EU citizenship subdued by and co-constitutive of European borders, either as the morally proficient and civilized Western territory or the ambiguous, un-modern East? As a partial answer to the latter, Kuhar and Takács (2007) emphasize in *Beyond the Pink Curtain* that "[western Europe] is not necessarily as far from [Eastern Europe] as sometimes suggested" (12). Their work acknowledges sexuality as a part of Orientalism, European citizenship politics, and LGBT rights discourses as a phenomenon with multiple meanings and directionalities. In fact, the essays in their book isolate the everyday practices of LGBT movements within Eastern Europe to reveal the distinct configurations of political actions that are contingent on both imagined and experienced encounters, from the unstable private/public divides within Polish LGBT communities in the era of online communication to the meaning of sexual politics in East Berlin. Such discussions undercut the West as the universal agent behind shaping sexual politics in CEE.

Next, by applying such debates to Poland, I argue that interacting groups with different interests and tactics—including the European Union, the Polish government, and LGBT organizers—co-constitute multiple forms of sexual citizenship temporally (and racially) as a form of ambiguous, unstable, multi-directional belonging.

2.2 The Ambiguity of European Sexual Citizenship

As I have discussed so far, post-colonial readings of post-socialism illustrate the ambiguity and friction produced within Neo-Orientalism. I have also shown that sexuality is a global, geographically framed politics, and thus, have read post-socialist Europe as a landscape of sexual geography subject to hierarchical relations, ambivalence, and colonial tensions. This leads me to the European sexual citizen-subject, a critical concept for sexual-temporal belonging. To explain, Lisa Rofel (1999) theorizes cultural citizenship as "belonging," or "a political attribute [and] process in which [culture] becomes a relevant category of affinity" (457), and this is exactly what concepts of Eastern Others—whether within nation states or among them—accomplishes: changing ideas of who belongs to Europe through sexual citizenship imbued with institutional, political, and symbolic meanings (Evans, 1993; Stychin, 1998, 2003; Binnie, 2004). In this way, the "real Europe" becomes defined through processes in which CEE nations are awarded fractions of European value, in part, based on sexual politics through their EU membership. Ergo, to be a European citizen is, in many ways, to *belong* sexually and furthermore, because EU membership, citizenship, and belonging are predicated on notions of "progress," "transition," and "accession," the ambivalent status of CEE is also always subject to temporal meanings.

Additionally, a post-colonial reading of these discourses reveals the way in which they co-produce sexuality *and* race (Young, 1995; Stoler, 1997) as elements of citizenships politics and sexual-temporal belonging. Eastern Others are constituted as a different race altogether, yet one with a kind of flexible durability that allows a "not-quite-European" race to achieve some degree of European-ness. In addition to Kuus (2004), who writes on such elasticity, Renkin (forthcoming) describes this racialized component of sexual-temporal belonging within European Neo-Orientalism as "the history of European difference-making, and the centrality of that history in the making of modern biopower [in which] sexuality, and closely linked concepts

such as homophobia, become so strongly salient for judgments of failed selfhood, citizenship, tolerance, and democracy" (15). As such, the complex interaction of a race of Eastern Others subject to notions of "intolerance," un-modern sexual "backwardness," and EU membership, produces the half-European sexual citizen-subject who both belongs and does not, depending on the context, decision-making apparatus, and sexual-temporal politics in question.

Finally, to make such connections between time, European geo-politics, and sexual citizen-subjects clearer, I examine debates about temporality, post-colonialism, and sexuality as the culmination of the theoretical inquiries and tensions I have mapped out thus far. How is "sexual progress" emblematic of authentic European-ness as an *evolutionary* process? Which regions are assigned "queer" time or "straight" time, linearity or "all-at-onceness," mixes of both, and what do such attributions imply and mean? To clarify these questions, I unfold a few debates on temporality within queer theory, including the queer time/straight time debate.

2.3 Queering Straight Time, Straightening Out Queer Difference

First and foremost, time has been about sex and sex about time. Before queer theory, sexual politics and its "inevitable" progression mirror what I discuss further in 4.3 as the "mature advancement" of gays and lesbians in which the trajectory of invisibility to visibility became a dominant narrative (Manalansan, 1997). However, with the expansion of queer theory, challenges to time and sexual politics proliferated as an effort to combat hetero-normative politics through resistance to citizenship within the neo-liberal state, including a more or less "foundational" text, Lee Edlemen's provocative *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive* (2004). His book questions whether homosexuals should be good citizens that prepare for a future ripe with the capacity to reproduce children and the nation, offering instead that the abject status of queers as unproductive, non-citizens might be something to embrace. Such arguments become part of the "anti-social" thesis in queer theory. In disagreement, Jose Esteban-Muñoz (2006, 2009), believes

Edelman "miss[es] the point that hope is spawned of a critical investment in utopia that is nothing like naïve but, instead, profoundly resistant to the stultifying temporal logic of a broken-down present" (2006: 825-826). Muñoz sees sexuality and future-oriented time as interlocking systems in which a future can be cultivated through reparative readings of the present and its possibilities.

In addition, sexuality and time have been debated as "queer time," or a temporality that importantly rejects normative processes. By commenting on sexuality's relation to time, for instance, Elizabeth Freemen (2010) clarifies that queer time is an interruption to "chrono-normative" sequences of causation and effect. Her understanding of temporalities that resist normative, hegemonic formations is important to bear in mind when looking at the way in which LGBT organizers use, re-write, and challenge concepts of both looking "forward" and "backward" to shape their politics, tactics, and movements in Poland because in many ways, they both challenge and (at times, tactically) embrace what Freeman would likely call a "chrono-normative" sequence. Additionally, her work resonates with J. Jack Halberstam's (2005) concept of queer time as a rejection of heteronormative reproductive logics; Halberstam sees queer time as a re-conceptualization of space within "postmodern geography," enabling the debate on queer time to include a spatialized component. This major point of Halberstam's leads into my next discussion in which we can see queer time as a negotiated concept within European geography.

Accordingly, I briefly visit one significant body of work that synthesizes the queer temporality apparatus of post-colonial theory as a post-socialist politics: Robert Kulpa and Joanna Mizielinska's *De-Centering Western Sexualities* (2011). In short, the book's authors, despite their notable differences, argue that CEE time is queer time, in opposition to the "normative" and/or "straight" time of "the West." As Kulpa and Mizielinska extend this concept further,

time in CEE is said to be queer because it does not fit neatly with the Western "time of sequence," in which events are linearly produced. In this sense, the authors see temporalities of progress regarding LGBT rights in CEE as formations following the collapse of Communism in Europe in which "change [was] sharper and more abrupt, literally bring[ing] the collapse of one world and the promise of '(brave)' new world' much more coincidentally than sequentially" (15).

Despite some major concerns, I find this point useful insofar as it creatively and crucially distinguishes between post-socialist countries and their Western counterparts for which "the" collapse of Communism was/is differently meaningful. To presuppose that state socialisms and their "post" years would not affect sexuality in a particular way is to dismiss a far-reaching, systematic, and regionally and historically specific set of circumstances. However, assigning Poland a "queer" prefix is limiting. By presupposing an absence of "straightness," queer time assumes that straight time is inherently and lucidly Western.

Helpfully, Mizielinska (2011) addresses some of these concerns, noting that "Polish LGBT activism cannot be simply categorized as 'identitarian' or 'queer' because it exists in a different geo-temporality from the 'West'" and that "queering politics can mean different things locally [and] what can be described as an identity approach from the US perspective can have its queer face on the local level" (86). In other words, she complicates queer time, emphasizing that it can resonate with the "straight time" of the U.S. while remaining queer in Poland. In this way, Mizielinska blurs the straight/queer time boundary, albeit by reifying the East/West binary (her thoughts are further explored in 4.2).

To intervene in this debate that hitherto mostly bifurcated queer time from straight time, the "all at once" from the "sequentially linear," I explore how institutions that can be characterized as potently "Western"—like the EU—regulate and interact with Poland to co-

produce sexual-temporal belonging. In this sense, I am suspicious of giving anybody "queer time" or "straight time" because I do not want to presuppose that Western time is, in fact, always already straight. Again, following the line of logic articulated by Bhabha (1994) in which temporalities in the Third Space of Enunciation are negotiated and blended, not traceable to some "origniary People" and their authentic "Past" (37), I see the EU as a symbolic house of "Western" thought that also engages with meanings of time in order to accommodate, control, and negotiate relations with Poland (discussed more in 4.4, in which I explain how Polish LGBT activists are able to, in part, influence EU projects against homophobia).

In the end, we are left with a number of questions I investigate throughout this project: How are conflicting concepts of Poland, Europe, and sexual citizenship shaped temporally and sexually to constitute the borders of who belongs? Under which circumstances are particular formations of sexual-temporal belonging the most dominant or useful, and what are the consequences of this prioritization? As a whole, how are temporalities produced as an effect, used as a tactic, enforced as a policy, and constantly in-flux as dimensions of sexual belonging? What does the temporal character of sexual citizenship practices within post-socialist European countries mean for the way in which we can re-conceptualize LGBT politics, homophobia, nationalism, and EU intuitional activity?

Chapter 3:
Time and Citizenship: Sexual Belonging and Euro-Local Tensions

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I situate Poland within the theoretical frameworks and scholarly debates described in the previous two chapters. I address how sexual-temporal belonging is regulated by the EU with the aid of the "toler-opticon," or the way in which self-automated disciplinary power surrounding discourses of tolerance for LGBT people is embodied and tracked. I also extend this analysis to sexual-temporal belonging as a marker of what constitutes the Polish state. By examining the 2005 Polish elections as an attempt to preserve "traditional" values and ward off anxieties about the future of the EU and its moral perversions, I argue that sexual-temporal belonging can be epistemologically produced through a series of sex panics predicated on certain understandings of the past and future.

Coupling these analyses, this chapter aims to set up 1) a general framework outlining the specificity of Poland between 2003 and 2008 and 2) the tensions between the EU and the Polish government as a productive site of analysis at which we can more thoroughly unravel sexual-temporal belonging as it relates to citizenship, both on the national and supra-national levels. Who belongs to Europe according to the EU, and who belongs to Poland or might not belong to Poland's future, according to the Polish government? Why are these authorities—forces wielding institutional power and discursive weight—powerful agents in governing sexual-temporal belonging, and what are the consequences?

3.2 EUrope: The "Toler-Opticon" and Monitoring Acceptance

First and foremost, the most tangible way in which the European Union constructs, solidifies, and administers its own identity formation as an adjudicator of European sexual citizenship principles includes the establishment of both legally-binding policies and well-funded

projects intended to galvanize civic engagement. I analyze both to demonstrate the breadth and potency of sexual politics as an integral part of the EU accession process in the production of the imaginary European citizen. Furthermore, I argue more explicitly that they fashion a type of "sexual belonging" that includes porous yet visible temporal contours.

Before elaborating on policies and programs, it is important to recognize European citizenship as a geo-political process. Accordingly, as the borders that comprise the EU expand, non-EU or soon-to-be EU Member States become hierarchically differentiated. Enrica Rigo (2005) describes this as "the social and political meaning of European citizenship [being] characterized by different levels of membership according to the legal status of individuals claiming full or partial inclusion" (6). Furthermore, she argues that "focusing on the temporal dimension of borders illustrates how membership in an enlarged Europe is developing as a plurality of diachronically differentiated legal positions. Following accession, citizens of the new member states enjoy a status of semi-membership [which also applies] to the countries in the succeeding waves of enlargement, reproducing a sort of waiting room for future citizens" (17). In short, the idea of who always already was, is now—at least in part—and may one soon day become, a part of the European Union produces temporal divisions that hierarchically differentiate degrees of Europeanness based on geographic and institutional inclusion, or the limitations and possibilities thereof. I wish to emphasize that such fragmentation amongst EU and non-EU members alike produces configurations of *sexual* belonging, as well.

To elucidate, what constitutes "being European" is indelibly sexual. Although the EU has been largely concerned with economic integration into a common market system, European citizenship also revolves around various "transitional" and "development" models that include sexual advancement as one of the signs of successful accession (Stychin, 2003; Graham, 2009).

This includes, for instance, Article 13 of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, which "empowers" EU Member States to ban discrimination based on sexual orientation[2]. The article's careful and rigorous consideration during EU accession negotiations, along with the 2007 incorporation of Article 5b in the 2005 Treaty of Lisbon, which encourages states to combat discrimination based on sexual orientation[3], suggests that new Member States are only considered fully eligible for the EU with at least some implementation of LGBT anti-discrimination laws.

Of course, the ramifications of such requirements must be analyzed more closely to clarify *how* they affect discursive sexual politics in Europe. As Chetaille (2011) points out, the Polish Labor Code incorporated anti-discrimination laws against sexual orientation in 2004 as a result of Article 13, but such changes implemented 'from above' merely heightened nationalist fervor that reified the boundaries of Poland (131; also discussed further in 3.3). However, despite such paradoxical consequences, she notes that "the accession process [also] had an indirect but significant influence on the development of NGOs [and] the Intergroup for Equal rights of lesbians and gay men of the European Parliament was essential in drawing the attention of the EU to sexual orientation issues in the negotiation process" (Ibid, 125). As a result, sexual orientation remains fundamental to negotiation processes and therefore, central to notions of how to become "authentically" European.

As yet another example, EU-funded NGOs such as ILGA-Europe, which published a number of reports in the years leading up to the 2004 enlargement, demonstrate the corroborating institutional logics that qualify sexuality as a marker of Europeaness. The 1998

[2] *Treaty of Amsterdam.* (2013, May 27). Retrieved from EUR-Lex: Access to European Union law: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html

[3] *Treaty of Lisbon* . (2013, May 27). Retrieved from EUR-Lex: Access to European Union Law: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12007L/TXT:EN:NOT

Equality for Lesbian and Gay Men: A Relevant Issue in the Civil and Social Dialogue (ILGA-Europe, 1998) report, for instance, according to Stychin (2001), "assert[s] a coherent identity which traverses Europe and, simultaneously, necessarily claims a certain 'naturalness' to the identity …in this way, the construction of rights appears to be founded on a belief in groups—'lesbians and gays'; 'Europeans'" (298). In other words, ILGA-Europe serves as an extension of EU belonging that presupposes "Europeanness" as a status to become and "LGBT rights" as a minoritarian movement to aid as necessarily analogous processes. To incorporate LGBT rights is to be more legitimately European and as a result, European citizenship is sexual citizenship predicated on specific legal modifications.

Moreover, this "Europeanization of sexual politics" continues to manifest as "benchmarks" within policies, resolutions, and assessments that evaluate the "suitability" of Central and Eastern European countries for EU membership (Binnie, 2004: 29). This suitability is sometimes directly measured, such as ILGA-Europe's "Euro Gay Scoreboard," in which "low scorers are exposed and shamed in the hope that they will better themselves" (Graham, 2009: 304). The calculability of sexual politics as European citizenship becomes quantitatively engrained as a way of keeping track of "progress." Occasionally, the numbers that gauge European sexual citizenship can be quite concrete, as a Dutch participant at the 2010 EuroPride March in Warsaw demonstrates when he said, "we feel like [Poland is] 20 years behind the Netherlands[4]." While his comments are separate from the policies and programs described above, the context in which his comparison is uttered—a Dutch in Poland—illustrates that difference is not only understood in terms of geographic segregation, but as a numerical and

[4] Poland hosts landmark European gay pride. (2010, July 17). *BBC News*. Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-10670489

temporal articulation, too. Such precise computations echo Foucault's (1979) "political anatomy of detail" in which "the mystique of the everyday is joined here with the discipline of the minute" (138-139). The minute details and quantifying propensities of "progress" not only discipline and define European sexual boundaries, but also evade altogether the wider scope of sexual political possibilities and realities when only particular, countable elements are stressed.

Besides "softer" regulation of sexual European citizenship, the EU also engages in *subsidiarity* policies in which countries that significantly "lag behind" expectations are met with direct intervention (Graham, 2009: 305). In this sense, the EU recognizes a movement in time that is unacceptably slow, and engages in direct engagement when such progress stalls (un)expectedly, including nations like Poland when they fall behind "the prevailing tide of change in the Union" (Ibid). For example, although not *subsidarity* per se, the EU Resolution "Homophobia in Europe" from April 2007, in which 12 out of 18 perambulatory clauses target Poland, epitomizes the tendency to engage in more "direct" attention/intervention when a delay in progress has become urgent[5]. As a whole, the proliferation of such politics not only exemplifies the extent to which sexual citizenship is discursively and legally produced by the EU, but also monitored as a way to calculate countries' capacity to cultivate "tolerance"—the key word associated with LGBT rights in nearly all of the aforementioned documents.

In fact, drawing from Foucault's (1979) notion of the panopticon, I argue that the EU operates as a "toler-opticon" of sorts—one in which the EU centralizes its authority as an arbiter of tolerance, marking, by the minute, and documenting carefully, by the country, the lack of tolerance and using such (often narrowly defined) "discoveries" to locate Member States on a

[5] *European Parliament resolution of 26 April 2007 on homophobia in Europe.* (2013, May 27). Retrieved from European Parliament: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2007-0167+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN

spectrum of Europeanness. For Foucault, the panopticon serves as the structural arrangement of a prison in which the guard tower stands at the center and prisoners in their cells are unable to verify if the guard is watching them. Therefore, they must imagine they are being supervised at any given moment. Foucault describes this as an "enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point…in which the slightest movements are supervised, in which all events are recorded…in which power is exercised without division, according to a continuous hierarchical figure" (197). It is through the EU's careful monitoring of precarious nations' LGBT "development" that the toler-opticon emerges; rather than a prison guard, the EU itself remains (more or less) the camouflaged hierarchical figure.

Additionally, like Foucault's panopticon, in which prisoners "[assume] responsibility for the constraints of power" (202-203) and engage in self-directed discipline rather than external pressure, the toler-opticon also produces LGBT activist-subjects who embrace the self-automated responsibility to monitor tolerance as an indication of European sexual citizenship. At the 2006 Equality Parade in Warsaw, for example, organizers wore t-shirts that read "Europe = Tolerance," a concept emphasized by many of the Western Europeans present at the parade, one of whom noted that Poland must follow by the rules now that it has "joined the club of the European Union" (Easton, 2006: 1). Here, we see LGBT event-attending Poles accepting tolerance as an extension of Europe and wearing it, literally, on their bodies.

As another example of the toler-opticon's far-reaching power, the EU has established a number of programs that either explicitly or implicitly mark the borders of sexual-temporal belonging, including the *Europe for Citizens Programme*, which was initiated in 2006 (hereafter

ECP)[6]. To contextualize, the program goals are to "ensure that citizens are actively involved in the process of European integration...to increase the sense of a European identity" (Ibid). To this end, the EU connects active citizenship with integration, which, in tandem with concomitant enlargement policies, is portrayed as an effective tool for formulating a coherent European identity. The program also stresses "enhancing tolerance" and "encourag[ing] the balanced integration of citizens and civil society...with particular attention to Member States of the European Union as constituted on 30 April 2004 and those from Member States which have acceded since that date" (Ibid).

To reiterate, although the program does not mention sexuality *per se*, tolerance has become discursively embedded as a synonym for gay-friendly laws. The 2005/2006 "All Different, All Equal Campaign[7]," which I unpack in greater detail in 4.4, included a broadly defined "intolerance" section that included LGBT rights-related campaigns. Intolerance is euphemistically interchangeable with homophobia and the way by which Eastern Other's inability to progress sexually becomes "the absolute antithesis of the modern, cosmopolitan, rational, tolerant citizen and society" (Renkin, forthcoming: 18). In general, tolerance and its discursively embedded meanings become inextricably bound with sexuality. To tolerate is to overcome homophobia and to "update."

[6] *Europe for Citizens.* (2013, May 27). Retrieved from Summaries of EU Legislation: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/culture/l29015_en.htm

[7] *All Different, All Equal.* (2009, October 07). Retrieved May 28, 2013, from DocStoc.comn: http://www.docstoc.com/docs/78976350/ALL-DIFFERENT-C-ALL-EQUAL

Thus, by emphasizing tolerance, the ECP prioritizes the way in which successful integration is contingent on adopting a set of moral characteristics that embrace difference through sexual tolerance. It also re-inscribes the idea that the newest Member States may require the most help in achieving these ideals and thus, are to be monitored more carefully. The program draws a boundary between nations that joined in 2004, including Poland, and the newest members from 2007 and beyond, but fails to elucidate on the logic for such divisions. We only are told that attention is of greater urgency.

Why is this distinction relevant enough to demarcate but not explain? Why are citizenship practices that involve "developing closer ties" (see footnote 6, pp. 24) cited as a project between the new-old EU members of 2004 and newly-new[8] beyond 2004? Such framing consequently presupposes successful implementation of EU values in "older" members, or Western Europe. Does the program imply that with age in the EU comes greater tolerance? The burgeoning growth of the EU is organized temporally and geographically to make sense of enlargement by pre-determining locations of tolerance. Here, we see the toler-opticon as sexual, political, and geographic divisions created through assumptions about time and its uneven distribution.

In this way, cultural citizenship—and specifically *sexual, temporally organized* citizenship—dictates the geography of belonging. Echoing Rofel's (1999) theories, the EU cultivates "belonging" through policies and programs that compartmentalize European states within geo-temporal zones as an organizing mechanism for clarifying who is sexually progressive, who is homophobic and therefore, within such dichotomous thinking, who has achieved their European destiny. Such classifications encourage the kind of "nesting Orientalism" mentioned earlier by

[8] The language "new-old" and "newly-new," while specific my point here is, in part, borrowed from Zillah Eisenstein, who uses similar language in her books and the course I took with her at Ithaca College.

dividing multiple temporal-geographic lines across the European continent, grouping all EU member states since 2004 together while simultaneously emphasizing the three-year-long delay of their Bulgarian and Romanian compatriots. As such, the ever-Eastward-moving border of modernity continues to be contested, with Croatia's anticipated 2013 accession as the most likely contender for truly yet-to-be, almost-but-not-fully-integrated European (sexual) citizenship.

3.3 The New-Old Poland: Let's Do the Time Panic (Again)

In this section I argue that in the past decade, Poland has experienced a number of sex panics, or "disputes over sexual behavior [as] vehicles for displacing social anxieties, and discharging their attendant emotional intensity" (Rubin, 1984: 267) that are central to the construction of sexual-temporal belonging. Specifically, I examine the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections in which both the conservative Law and Justice Party (PiS) and Lech Kaczynski, who denounced homosexuality as a part of his campaign, were victorious. This moment demonstrates how sexual belonging is temporally framed in relation to not only the EU, but the Polish state as well. As Gayle Rubin (1984) clarifies, "sex is always political. But there are also historical periods in which sexuality is more sharply contested and more overtly politicized. In such periods, the domain of erotic life is, in effect, renegotiated" (Ibid). Rubin argues that such re-negotiations of erotic life reassemble the hierarchies of sexual politics. As such, I argue that the presidential and parliamentary campaigns in 2005 serve as a moment in which *Polish* erotic life became overtly politicized and decisively re-negotiated *temporally,* redrawing the hierarchical boundaries of sexual politics around the future gay terror of EU membership.

First, it is important to clarify what exactly constitutes a sex panic before I thread it with sexual-temporal belonging. In addition to the definition cited by Rubin, sex panics are understood in general as one type of 'moral panic' in which "any mass movement [engages] in

response to a false, exaggerated, or ill-defined moral threat to society and proposes to address this threat through punitive measures" (Lancaster, 2011: 23). Of course, moral panics rooted in sexual politics compromise a significant portion of such mass movements. As I argued in 3.2, the EU has established sexual citizenship and various mechanisms by which belonging is enforced, monitored, and qualified. Such belonging also creates conditions conducive to moral sex panics, particularly as an extension of nationalism.

Don Kulick (2003) explains that Sweden, for instance, at the time of its accession, was worried about the EU's free movement policies that could (in the nation's imaginary) encourage Eastern European prostitutes to "exploit" Swedish territory and migrate en masse to Stockholm for penetrative services (211). The country's heavily racialized, anxiety-filled discourses about the possibility of prostitution liberalization with EU membership not only constituted a moral sex panic, but one in specific relation to the symbolic weight of joining the European Union. Importantly, it led to a wide range of social and political consequences for different groups of people based on their social position, including prostitutes subject to more abuse from police officers and clients unwilling to testify in courtrooms in cases of witnessed harassment—all because of the stigmatized, panicked position sex work absorbed.

In short, Kulick's commentary on Sweden's fear of the Eastern European prostitutes whose mobility EU membership may enable, while fairly specific, remains emblematic of the tensions produced when a large, supra-national body co-produces sex panics within nations. In this way, bodies like the EU resemble globalization and its paradoxical impact on notions of who/what constitutes the national body. Appropriately enough, Stuart Hall (1992) argues that globalization has produced "fragmented subjects" in which national identities as a "discursive device" emerge in contradictory forms; globalization both erases and strengthens the nation-state

as it collapses borders while reifying them (see Chapter 3, 611-617). In my analysis, Poland solidifies its imagined time of the past in order to thwart a time of the near-future in which Polish purity is threatened by the EU through relaxed policies toward homosexuality.

To begin with, the elections in 2005, the first ones to take place after Poland joined the EU, included a series of sex panics embedded within the rise of conservative politics. As Mizielinska (2011) writes: "for the first time, the parliamentary election campaign…was built around the issue of the 'gay question'" (86). Most importantly, a general temporal framework of the state of Poland was established early on by the Law and Justice Party (PiS) as a way of differentiating themselves from their main opponent, the Civic Platform Party (PO). By inculcating a binary differentiation of "liberals" or "solidarists," the PiS attempted to frame itself as the Fourth Republic of Poland, a new state united against the threats to old Polish morality and purity (Markowski, 2006: 819-820; Walczyszyn, 2012: 33).[9]

Lech Kaczynski, the PiS candidate, believed he was capable of formulating a New Poland built on traditional Catholic and national values, but equally prepared for a troubling future in need of accommodating problems like the EU, globalization, and crime (Gruszczynska, 2009: 322). Kaczynski, by demanding both a "moral change" for Poland[10] and simultaneously hoping to "restore trust in the state,[11]" rhetorically reflects both the moral/sex panic around which his campaign was structured and the desire to chart new territory for Poland by relying on the

[9] Of course using "solidarists" also resonates with the former trade union, Solidarity, and its important role in Polish memory. I discuss Solidarity's more specifically in 5.2, but for now, focus on the idea of a New-Old Poland as a rhetorical tool and its implications for sexual-temporal belonging regarding the EU and 2005 elections.

[10] Kaczynski to be next Polish head. (2005, October 24). *BBC News*. Retreived from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4367650.stm

[11] Polish centre-right claim victory. (2005, September 26). *BBC News*. Retreieved from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4279562.stm

ethically sound values of its nationalist past. Poland is decisively framed as a coherent place with origins that require preservation (at least the desirable elements), yet also as a future—a time-to-be with culture wars already anticipated. How does this translate into sexual belonging?

The answer is complex, as homosexuality in Poland was constructed as something that both did not belong to Poland and did belong to the European Union. For instance, the PiS was not the only conservative party whose voice had some prominence during the 2005 elections. The even more conservative League of Polish Families (LPR) stressed "traditional" family values and sexual purity, including most curiously that "although Poland may have joined the EU, they will have none of the EU's 'loose' attitudes toward sex; and sexual minorities are now positioned as a symbol of this 'looseness'" (Graff, 2006: 436). This "looseness," along with Kaczynski's statements, was tied not only to the EU, but also anxieties about what the EU might do with such looseness in the future (Gruszczynska, 2009; Mizielinska, 2011). This "looseness" characterizes the particular sex panic prevalent during the 2005 elections: one in which anxieties about the EU became an issue fit for preemptive combat.

Such discourses were not minimal in their impact, at least according to many LGBT activists. A survey conducted by Conor O'Dwyer (2010) shows that 56 percent of LGBT activists found sexual minorities in the 2005 elections "important" as an issue conservatives chose to emphasize, and none of the activists said it was "not very important," implying that it was central to the debate (237). In fact, according to Walczyszyn (2012), "while [the campaign] created difficulties for gay rights activists, it also renewed attention for their cause" (32-33), suggesting that there was as much to gain as there was to lose from highlighting the "gay question." In general, however, PiS and LPR used the election as a moment in which futures of possible moral doom could be harnessed for political leverage and electoral success, establishing a form of temporal-sexual belonging that promoted morally sound Poles of the past and warned

about the EU-funded gay Poles of the future—a border that, despite some resultant mobilization, certainly excluded more than it included by concentrating two nationwide campaigns on the immorality of homosexuality as an anticipatory threat.

As a whole, the 2005 presidential elections, coupled with EU sexual citizenship and its tolerance-monitoring apparatuses, illustrate the complexity of sexual-temporal belonging, chiefly in its conflicting formations. For conservative and nationalist Poles, figuring out who deserves or does not deserve to be a part of Poland, and how such belonging corresponds to questions of the past and future, is a process with distinct sexual meanings and exclusions. Correspondingly, the EU's attempt to locate violations of Europeanness is temporally policed and as such, remains in tension with nationalist rhetoric in Poland.

Additionally, I showed that the toler-opticon becomes a powerful system through which requirements for European sexual citizenship are accounted for and constantly reproduced. Finally, I outlined the extent to which perceived accomplishments of European (Union) values and apprehensively awaiting the morally depraved erasure of the Polish nation-state compete as notions of citizenship. Consequently, such processes re-sketch the borders of sexual-temporal belonging and cultivate the limited conditions under which mostly non-elite actors, such as LGBT or right-wing activists, tactically operate. The next two chapters flesh out in fuller details the way in which such borders constrain and enable activists who expand, challenge and sometimes embrace or use, hegemonic concepts of Europe, the Polish nation, sexual politics, and time.

Chapter 4:
Time and Space: Visibility and the Exploitability of "Progress"

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I compare two LGBT[12] campaigns in Poland vis-à-vis concepts of visibility as "maturity" and "progress" within the European Union's geo-political sphere. Through this comparison, I hope to demonstrate how different concepts of "moving forward" were produced and used by LGBT organizations throughout Poland's EU accession, undermining the assumption that sexual "progress" is a unidirectional march toward freedom that yields uniform outcomes regardless of the specificity and location of sexual subjects. I aim to clarify how these Polish LGBT campaigns are both effects and co-constitutive of configurations of temporal belonging that either "make do with" or "re-do" notions of visible, sexual progress. To what extent do moments of inclusion within or exclusion from the realm of "modern Europe" engender conditions under which Polish LGBT activists structure the temporality of their movements, politics, and tactics? How is sexual belonging implicated in this "transitional" process?

In short, this chapter demonstrates the way in which imagined geographic space, the visibility of sexualized bodies within it, and agents of LGBT social movements are both constrained and enabled by conditions of possibility that produce variants of time as one of the means by which the boundaries of sexual belonging transform. In the end, I illustrate that progress is neither a wholesale Western fabrication nor an unavoidable directionality. Instead, I demonstrate that sexual-temporal belonging is irreducible to Western assimilation or Eastern difference, locating it instead at Poland's ambiguous position in which the country "[belongs] to

[12] Although "B" (bisexual) and "T" (transgender) are used more often nominally than substantively in many of the movements I discuss, I use "LGBT" due to Poles' frequent usage of the "Western" acronym that is already inclusive of a B and T, at least ostensibly (see Mizielinska, 2011, pp. 93-94 for more).

multiple worlds, particularly in reference to [its] ambiguous position as not-quite-Western and not-quite-Eastern" (Owczarzak, 2009: 12). "Looking forward" as a shifting tactical tool of LGBT organizers illustrates the way such ambivalent territory is navigated and utilized advantageously.

4.2 Beginnings, Middles, or Endings: An Overview of Polish LGBT Timelines

First and foremost, it is important to explore the numerous imagined trajectories of Polish LGBT activism, whose genesis has been debated extensively. This debate provides an overview of the degree to which sexual "progress" and time are contested concepts. For instance, Agneiszka Graff (2006) argues that "there was no 'politics' of sexuality in Poland before the late 1990s" (434). She asserts that LGBT politics in Poland depended on "hopes and anxieties concerning Poland's place in the European Union (EU)," which culminated as the "birth of lesbian and gay identity and movement in a place that has long inspired to be seen as 'modern' and 'Western'" (Ibid, 435). In essence, she sees the pre-EU accession as *the* precondition for nascent LGBT-rights discourses.

Expectedly, her framing remains in tension with a number of other Polish scholars, such as Anna Gruszczynska (2009), who traces movements to the 1980s when underground materials regarding sexuality were routinely circulated. In addition, she clarifies how various groups, such as the Warsaw Homosexual Movement, were active in the late '80s, but denied registration from the government (2006: 10). Gruszczynska (2009) does, however, like Graff, recognize the degree to which the collapse of state socialism provided an institutional space for non-governmental organizations to "finally" emerge (314).

Importantly, Joanna Mizielinska (2011) writes that the 1990s provided the first opportunity for LGBT politics to surface in *specific* ways because of post-state socialist transitional processes rather than initiate them. She refers to the pivotal moment of 1989 as the "time of coincidence" in which Polish groups "suddenly" accessed models for LGBT and queer

activism developed in the West, resulting in a "queer mixture of ideas that represent various historical stages of Western LGBT activism" (Ibid, 85). For Mizielinska, crucial political and economic changes in Central and Eastern European countries provided wider accessibility to Western LGBT movements whose "stages" were hitherto unattainable, either directly because of state control or indirectly as a result of geo-political segregation and thus, utilized by Polish groups 'at once' rather than along the same timeline (Ibid).

In general, these debates unmask assumptions about progress as linear advancement with clear origins. Drawing from these multiple accounts, perhaps LGBT movements can be re-read as a *certain kind of progress*, something Judith Butler (2009) would call a "factious constellation" (104). In reference to the urgency and multiplicity of progress, Butler underscores that "what is happening 'now' is bound up with a certain geopolitical restriction on imagining the relevant borders of the world and even a refusal to understand what happens to our notion of time if we take the problem of the border (what crosses the border and what does not, and the means and mechanisms of that crossing or impasse) to be central to any understanding of contemporary political life" (103-104).

For her, time is neither trapped by culturally distinct borders nor flattened out homogenously through one-way colonialism (something Mizielinska's "Polish queer time" risks reproducing by portraying Poland as unequivocally different and the West as discernibly linear). Such discussions apply to the next section in which *certain kinds of progress* at given moments demonstrate how concepts of maturity, visibility, modern Europe, and the West are appropriated, reformatted, and utilized tactically. Through the comparison of two campaigns, I demonstrate how concepts of European sexual "progress" is, at times, useful for and utilized by Polish LGBT groups, and at other times, partially revised through different agentive capacities engendered by the ambiguous status of CEE countries included within the European Union.

4.3 Let Them See Us (as Europe): Making Do with Maturity

In 2003, the Campaign Against Homophobia (*Kampania Przeciw Homofobii*, or KPH), a Polish NGO, organized a campaign called "Let Them See Us" (LTSU). According to several Polish activists, this was arguably the "single most important event in [their] chronology" (Graff, 2006: 438). The campaign served as an attempt to highlight the quotidian existence of Polish gays and lesbians, displaying photos of same-sex couples as "ordinary people" on public billboards (many of which were eventually vandalized) and in art galleries[13]. According to the photographer, Karolina Bregula, the campaign was not meant to be provocative but, in contrast, "innocent" (quoted in Gumienny, 2003: 12). In short, "her aim was to combat the stereotypes of what a queer person looks like [in order] to show that gays and lesbians look just like everybody else" (Ibid, 11-12). In the photos, couples are bundled up in "normal" winter clothing, with heavy scarves and everyday jackets, standing in front of a snowy Polish winter backdrop, sometimes smiling, sometimes bearing more earnest faces, but always holding hands.

The campaign ignited controversy through such imagery and furthermore, through its funding from the Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Status of Men and Women (eventually dismantled under Kaczynski's leadership), which included discourses centered on the morality of using Polish money for projects supposedly repellant to national ethics. Enraged commentators, such as ones found in the nationalist daily *Nasz Dziennik*, wrote vitriolic editorials on the subject: "Using public money to propagate sexual deviations directly attacks the family; it is a waste of public money" (quoted in Kosc, 2003: 2). In general, the campaign caused an uproar that was certainly noticed—by both the EU and the general Polish public.

[13] *Past Actions.* (n.d.). Retrieved May 27, 2013, from Kampania Przeciw Homofobii : world.kph.org.pl

Most notably, by operating under the idea of exposure, the campaign uses and reproduces a progressive temporality of "once hidden, now visible." By revealing the innocuous gays and lesbians of Poland, LTSU implies that gays and lesbians were not being seen before, but now demand attention in the present; their visibility relies on a past invisibility for its intelligibility. I argue, however, that such visibility politics 1) relies on heteronormative space to be conceivable and 2) despite its resonance with Western hegemonic visibility politics, is not an 'exact copy' of a Western 'original,' but rather, a shifting series of tactics that produce a form of sexual-temporal belonging by "making do" with visions of progress.

First, I explore this broadly by arguing that LGBT progress through advanced visibility relies on an initial exclusion in hetero-normative spaces. For example, Jeffery Weeks (1992) argues that normalized spaces are heterosexualized spaces in which "a host of assumptions embedded in the practices of public life about what constitutes proper behavior" become sedimented over time (quoted in Gill Valentine, 1996: 146). Likewise, Valentine describes the process as one that relates to Butler's (1990) commentary on gender as a stylized performance, writing that "the heterosexing of space is a performative act naturalized through repetition and regulation" (Valentine, 1996: 146). Additionally, Lauren Berlant and Elizabeth Freeman (1992) theorize the way in which groups like Queer Nation expose heteronormative space by "demonstrating that the boundedness of heterosexual spaces is also contingent upon the (enforced) willingness of gays to remain invisible" (162). Heterosexual space, thus, relies on queers to remain invisible to maintain its normativity and subsequently co-produces the idea of mature, visible gays and lesbians; hidden, invisible heterosexuals of the past (assuming they meet other standards of normative sexual behavior[14]) are not, in contrast, conceivable. In this way,

[14] See Gayle Rubin (1984) for the various ways in which "good" and "bad" sex are categorized, punishing those who stray from the most accepted/normative sexual relations, which includes reproductive, married heterosexual couples.

"progress" becomes associated with the visibility of queers, but only in relation to their initial oppression within public heteronormative spaces.

Martin Manalansan (1997) recognizes these patterns as the conditions that produce "the 'straight' modern political subject [in whom] the 'gay' subject moves from the 'immature' concealment of his or her sexuality to the 'mature' visibility of political participation in the public sphere" (490). He critiques gay and lesbian visibility politics as a trajectory predicated on hegemonic Western assumptions about whose identities and economic practices are considered more valid "progression" by arguing that "the 'internationalizing' transnational gay and lesbian movement does not as yet contain a critique of its own universalizing categories [and] risks duplicating an imperial gaze" (488).

As an extension of this critique, scholars interested in post-socialist sexualities have pointed out that not only is the 'inevitable' visibility of mature sexual politics hierarchically enforced, but additionally, presupposes Western spaces as the realms in which such visibility emerges, such as the fact that "Stonewall never happened [in CEE and remains] an empty signifier…and yet is still a pervasive and monumental reference" for the spatially located origins of LGBT movements (Kulpa and Mizielinska, 2011: 2). Here, visibility and maturity politics are not only presumed trajectories, but presumed (Western) spatialities (out of the bars and onto the streets). How can we complicate such temporal-spatial politics when it comes to Central and Eastern Europe? The spatial differences within CEE sexual politics challenge the assumption that maturity/visibility politics are an exact duplication of what has been dubbed exclusively and palpably "Western." Because countries like Poland are both deemed partially Western *and* decisively Eastern, the country remains an ambiguous space irreducible to a mere 'copy' of Western time/space.

In other words, to say "let them see us" is also to say let them see us *here* in Poland. Although the campaign charted familiar territory, divisions between public/private spheres and the way in which they are constantly deployed and re-signified, not ontologically distinct as pre-fixed entities, differs contextually in Central and Eastern Europe (Gal and Kligman, 2000). Visibility politics within Poland's public sphere culminated as a product of the complex relationship between time and space immediately before EU accession, rendering Poles' usage of maturity politics something other than an exact replica of the 'West.' This relates to Judith Butler's (Imitation and Gender Insubordination, 1993) concept of the original/copy, which deconstructs the temporal contingency in which a copy cannot exist unless something has been deemed original; an original is consequently naturalized as the "realness" from which a copy derives. If Western time/space is re-centered as an original from which post-socialist, delayed transitions follow in the form of temporally progressive visibility, CEE is re-naturalized as a 'copy.' Let Them See Us is an event made possible due to a particular set of circumstances and in this way, interacts with Western visibility/maturity politics, but complicates and reformats them. Let Them See Us is, thus, not an exact copy of an original maturity politics because of its conditions and the fact that no "original" exists "in the first place" (Ibid).

To explain further, at the time of Let Them See Us, Poland's public sphere (as both an object subject to the toler-opticon *and* specifically situated within discourses as a "transitional" space) was monitored closely by the EU to assess the nation's qualifications directly before its 2004 accession, enabling activists to utilize a conceptual framework in which "participants…use[d] LGBT events to express their desire to fully participate in the new Europe, with its culture of tolerance and pluralism" (Graff, 2006: 437). Lamentably, Graff cites the EU's role in such discursive surveillance as *the* contributing factor to activists' appropriation of visibility politics, which I find limiting. Instead, I argue that the EU accession was partially

responsible for the conditions under which "Let Them See Us" was able to be executed *tactically*.

For example, Poland's 2002 and 2003 EU accession progress reports clarify that by mirroring "characteristics of a democracy, with stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights and *respect for and protection of minorities*" successfully, Poland was transitioning smoothly toward accession[15]. Such discursive regimes reproduce a temporality and spatiality of almost-nearly European and modern, granting permission to be considered part of a geographic area and temporal era. Thus, the relationship to an emerging EU status was ripe with possibilities and anxieties that provided LGBT activists a particular way to legitimize their visibility politics within pubic space. The call to protect minorities as an extension of Poland's monitored status and its hope for a successful future of EU membership afforded an opportune moment.

In fact, it served chiefly as what Michael de Certeau (1984) calls "making do" with the master's tools in which "ways of operating" enable the "weak" of society to tactically take advantage of temporal moments to undermine or resist systems of inequality (30). De Certeau distinguishes "strategies" from "tactics" insofar as strategies "pin their hopes on the resistance that the *establishment of place"* while tactics remain "a clever *utilization of time*" (Ibid, 38-39). Because LGBT activists in Poland are not establishing their own place, but rather, taking advantage of the time leading up to accession, they are utilizing a tactic in de Certeau's use of the term.

Additionally, de Certeau's argument is reflected in LTSU since activists used the campaign to demand certain legal reforms stemming from the EU's promise of bringing Poland into Europe/modernity inasmuch as they were able to perform "properly" as a European country, which included legally-binding minority protection and the potential for domestic

[15] *2002 Regular Report on Poland's Progress Toward Accession.* (2002). Retrieved May 27, 2013, from European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2002/pl_en.pdf

Comprehensive monitoring report on Poland's preparations for membership. (2003). Retrieved May 27, 2013, from European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/cmr_pl_final_en.pdf

partnership laws (Graff, 2006: 438); such exploitation of a particular criteria for membership that the government needed to engage with in any case exemplifies "making do" as an effective tactic. By utilizing visibility politics *as Poles* (Poles both obligated to implement anti-discrimination codes and anxious for EU approval), activists were able to adhere to expectations regarding visible sexual 'progression' that was useful to their struggle in the face of hegemonic Western strategies for what LGBT "freedom" and equality should look like. Thus, reducing LTSU to a 'copy' of Western hegemony that privileges the mature, visible queer within heteronormative spaces would prevent us from recognizing the extent to which the campaign was a series of conditional tactics deployed in face of the EU and juridical manipulability, and would re-inscribe vulgar Neo-Orientalist visions of Europe that fail to recognize their complexity and utility.

4.4 Let Us See You: Provocative Politics and Re-Doing Visibility

I now address a different campaign and its role in shaping sexual-temporal belonging: "What Are You Staring at Dyke/Faggot," (WSDF)[16], which was executed by the KPH in 2007. By unpacking WSDF, I demonstrate how temporal-spatial changes enabled activists to "re-do" rather than "make do with" visibility politics. I argue that being considered an ambiguous member of modern Europe afforded Polish activists an opportunity to not only take advantage of the EU's symbolic meaning and financial benefits, but to also shape the EU in return and influence its stances on homophobia through the All Different, All Equal Campaign, of which WSDF was a part (I unpack this campaign in greater detail later, including why this qualifies as "re-doing" rather than "making do"). In brief, however, All Different, All Equal emphasized diversity, centralized the importance of new members, and provided a flexible framework within which more provocative campaigns could be facilitated with fewer bureaucratic obstacles. I argue this is not an inevitable "step forward" from Let Them See Us, but rather, a type of sexual-

[16] Also known in Polish as *Homofobia. Tak to wygląda*, or "What Homophobia looks like"

temporal belonging that uses new institutional, symbolic, and political instruments for executing agency, employing tactics, and the re-writing the boundaries of sexual citizenship differently. WSDF reveals not only the exploitability of progress as an imagined narrative of European authenticity, but also the malleability of the EU that, while hegemonic, is also subject to the influence of Polish LGBT organizers, undermining the West as unstoppable linearity.

First and foremost, I would like to first break down WSDF. The 2007 campaign was intended to make people feel "insulted" and "shocked" (quoted in ILGA-Europe, 2007). It included two series of posters distributed throughout many large Polish cities. The first set, a series of 'teaser' posters, included the question "What are you staring at" followed by either "dyke" (*lesba*[17]) or "faggot" (*pedal*). According to organizers, they were supposed to "evoke the feeling of being attacked, being insulted and create an understanding of the effects of homophobia.[18]" As the campaign continued, new posters were displayed that included either a man or woman exhibiting a stone-cold stare with the word "dyke" or "faggot" above their head in large, black letters. Underneath the Polish phrases "*Słyszę to codziennie*" (I hear it every day) and "*nienawiść boli*" (hatred hurts) were written[19]. In this sense, the organizers hoped to combine both series of posters by redirecting the gaze—making the viewer feel as though they are being attacked for their sexuality and exposed to "symbolic summaries of all the homophobia and intolerance" in Poland (Ibid). Mizielinska (2011) describes the campaign as "in-your-face" politics that was arguably more provocative than its LTSU predecessor, although she stresses

[17] Although the word "lesba" might look like "lesbian," it is best translated into "dyke" according to most Polish scholars and queer/feminist advocates I have read, such as Mizielinska (2011) and Marianna Szczygielska (Personal Communication, 2013).

[18] *Projects KPH*. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2013, from Stop-Homophobia: http://www.stop-homophobia.eu/en/the-people/kph/projects-kph.html

[19] *Campaign Against Homophobia Presents* . (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2013, from Stop Homofobia!: http://www.stophomofobia.kampania.org.pl/

that both campaigns are distinctly queer in her vision of Polish difference (90-94).

In any case, instead of emphasizing the immature-to-mature spectrum of time, WSDF captured rage of the now. By evoking the "shocking" and controversial connotations of a provocative question, coupled with the mini-autobiographical image of pain induced by homophobic language, the KPH emphasized a temporal-spatial tactic that redid the visibility of sexuality, not as an aftermath to invisibility, but as a more hostile takeover of heterosexual public space. Importantly, WSDF was not in itself a critique of LTSU, but rather, an alternative approach predicated on a number of important differences. In a similar analysis of a Canadian feminist zine, Lauren Berlant and Elizabeth Freeman (1992) describe the straight spectator who "no longer [has] the privilege to consume in silence, or in tacit unconsciousness of or unaccountability for [their] own fantasies" (178). As they explain, using such tactics "queers" heteronormative spectatorship by forcing them to recognize their own participation in certain sexual political processes, including who is gazing at whom.

In concert, rather than consuming their own fears or anxieties of homosexuality in silence by being forced to "see them," Polish spectators are paradoxically and strategically centralized as both the dyke/faggot and the homophobe uttering the phrase. Such visibility politics stem from the financial, institutional, symbolic, and (always partial yet powerful) inclusion of Poland in the EU and by extension, a different location within the imagined narrative of progress. These differences provided tactical tools that enabled Polish LGBT activists to execute a campaign focused on difference rather than sameness, provocation rather than innocence, and in general, served as a specific moment in which the partial accessibility of the EU provided Polish activists an institutional body they could influence more directly. Therefore, I am referring to this as a "re-doing" rather than "making do" given the specificity of post-socialist Europe and EU enlargement politics in which an ambiguous status is granted to

countries like Poland, pulling them into a realm that is not easily categorized as the "strong" or 'weak" of European society (something not accounted for in de Certeau's neat dichotomy).

As Agnes Chetaille (2011) explains, "the Polish LG movement may have played an important…role in the transformation of EU institutions. Indeed, transnational activists working with the EU and the Council of Europe extensively used the 'case' of homophobia in Poland in their lobbying actions for a stronger EU stance against homophobia" (131). Such transformations are evident in the "All Different, All Equal Campaign," which was funded by the European Youth Foundation (EYF), an institutional source committed to fighting against anti-Semitism, xenophobia, racism, and "intolerance" (the more ambiguous category that included homophobia but not explicitly)[20]. The inclusion and influence of Polish activists within the development of a campaign that highlighted not only the need for integrating "diversity," but also the "search for balance" in East-West divides[21] established a channel through which sexual politics in Central/Eastern Europe could become centralized as an object of significance for projects and funding, reproducing both Orientalist imagery *and* providing temporary material aid.

Fittingly, the "All Different, All Equal" Campaign developed in Warsaw. The physical and symbolic location of the Polish capital city as the origin of an EU-funded anti-homophobia campaign exemplifies the extent to which Poland's position had been significantly adjusted. Starting a campaign in Poland, rather than monitoring its levels of tolerance, exposes the different levels of trust with which Poland was provided. Once again, this reproduces the Neo-

[20] *All Different, All Equal.* (2009, October 07). Retrieved May 28, 2013, from DocStoc.comn: http://www.docstoc.com/docs/78976350/ALL-DIFFERENT-C-ALL-EQUAL

[21] Council of Europe. (2013, May 27). *"All Different, All Equal" European Youth Campaign.* Retrieved from Council of Europe: http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/youth/Source/Coe_youth/ADAE%20Campaign/ADAE_documents/2006_ADAE_Plan_de_Campagne_en.pdf

Orientalist vision that CEE countries can only be trusted and serve as origins of LGBT campaigns *after* accession, yet it also provides new spatial-temporal frameworks within which activists can operate and influence the directionality of sexual politics.

For example, despite falling short of its expected budget to cover all campaigns across Europe, "All Different, All Equal" raised almost €2 million and given the wide scope and generosity of its structure, enabled activists to receive funds but implement them in multiple ways (see footnote 21). The campaign highlights that "the fact that not only the scope of the programmes, also the types of activities varied greatly, is a testimony of the impressive creativity of the campaigners" (from p.10 of footnote 20). In other words, Polish LGBT activists, rather than solely operating in relation to anxieties around future EU membership, were also engaged in an organization they could influence as quasi-members. In a way, this reflects Tsing's (2005) remarks on friction and awkward encounters that are potentially productive, yet not bereft of hierarchical power relations.

To be frank, this analysis by no means romanticizes the EU, which is not often responsible for lucrative funding of Polish LGBT projects, especially on local levels[22], yet it does demonstrate sexual-temporal inclusion shaped organizers' campaign in particular ways. In the end, Warsaw became a contact zone of exchange in which active involvement and funding enabled LGBT Poles to facilitate more provocative campaigns without relying on government funding, yet within such realms, also reproduced the narrative that changes come with EU membership and its accompanying "progress."The Neo-Orientalist component of progress does seem difficult for activists to completely evade, even if their campaigns are not "copies" of Western originals and include shifts in agentive, institutional, and political capacities.

[22] See O'Dwyer (2010) in which a number of gay and lesbian activists from Poland cite difficulties in obtaining funding from the EU when it is handled by Polish officials.

In any case, such discourses once again resonate with Michel de Certeau (1984), who cites the "enigma of the consumer sphinx" as the process in which the "weak" of society use products in unpredictable ways that might undermine dominant groups, narratives, and ideas (31). To reiterate, I refer to this as "re-doing" rather than "making do" because the ambiguous status of Poland after EU accession does not fit neatly within de Certeau's "tactics" and "strategies" binary. His distinction between strategies of the powerful and tactics of the weak fails to account this ambiguity of sexual politics within post-socialist European discourses in which both being included and excluded, symbolically, institutionally, and materially, creates differences we cannot easily bifurcate.

In the end, I return to Judith Butler's (1993) comments on copy/original thinking to stress that rather than one totalizing concept of progress and its inevitable copycats, "looking forward" remains permanently incomplete. No "original" Western progress is mirrored or unequivocally denied. As I argued, modernity and progress as "mature" visibility politics from the West became doable and useful in reaction to pre-EU anxieties and the temporal-spatial contingencies of 2003 as a form of "making do." In contrast, WSDF provided different possibilities in light of material and political developments and the way in which activists were partially included as agents able to shape the trajectory of those developments.

In short, temporal-spatial discourses influence Polish LGBT activity, particularly when it is considered either "in" or "out" of spatialized metaphors, "behind" or "forward" as temporal formations, and framed in terms of sexual "progress" or "maturity." Such fluctuations determine the limitations, conditions, and possibilities of activism. Many of these changes also reproduce problematic notions of Orientalism, re-center the importance of the EU, and in general, rely on a narrative of "progress," yet their specificity, complexity, and instability also demonstrate the utility of "looking forward" as a negotiated tactical opportunity.

Chapter 5:
Time and Memory: Looking Backward and the Importance of Sameness

5.1 Introduction

In this final chapter, I look at the way in which notions of the past are utilized and co-opted and as a result, produce, demarcate, and redefine sexual-temporal belonging. I move from variations of "progress" and tactics of "looking forward" to the role of "looking backward" and tactics of memory. This chapter seeks to unearth the manifold ways in which memories, historical analogies, and imaginations of the past are conducive to tactics different from the previous chapter with equally important political, social, and cultural implications. How does memory function as a means by which sexual citizenship is discursively produced as an extension or result of what is believed to have been done or known about Poland and who belongs within it? In which circumstantial ways have both Polish LGBT organizers and right wing nationalists taken advantage of "looking backward" to enable, structure, and execute their campaigns? In this sense, how does memory, the past, and looking "behind" lead to forms of sexual-temporal belonging that remain in contestation with one another?

To clarify, memory remains indispensible when it comes to "looking backward" because the past is imagined and constructed as a previously "known" occurrence. Also, memory is relational, political, and often tied to shared trauma (Smith & Watson, 2010). Thus, it is "inescapably intersubjective" and when people collectively remember, "they engage motives for remembering and question on whose behalf one remembers" (Ibid, 26). In other words, memory serves as a critical lens through which notions of belonging continue to be disputed. Who belongs/ed with us? Who is "us" in the present and how do we rely on a concept of "us" from the imagined past to draw such conclusions? Accordingly, this chapter illustrates that belonging is debated amongst different groups with competing interests as shifting paradigmatic views on

sexuality and its historical meanings. In Poland, such borders are defined both by national respectability via the memory of Solidarity, and incongruous understandings of what it means to compare Jews with queers. In general, this chapter focuses on the past rather than the future, the "looking backward" rather than forward, and memory and history rather than possibility and by extension, anticipatory anxiety, to outline the ways in which "looking backward" relies on reifying nationalist discourses and imagined histories, yet also yields valuable capacities to rouse public support without relying on narratives of "progress" toward European modernity and in this way, undermine the assumption that such "forward-thinking" tactics are the only ones useful to sexual politics and LGBT activism.

5.2 Solidarity, Resistance, and Respectability: Using Concepts of Poland

To begin with, I turn to Poland's Solidarity movement, whose historical weight became a tactical tool for Polish LGBT movements, especially in the case of the Poznan March of Equality. The west-central Polish city's march was canceled in 2005 after the mayor refused to grant a permit, but marchers held the event in protest, anyhow (Gruszczynska, 2006, 2009). The demonstration, in concert with similar remarks from activists in Krakow, demonstrates the way in which utilizing the past as a concept of Poland provided tools with which LGBT resistance could be compared to Solidarity's fight against the state in the 1980s. I argue that by modifying Solidarity's history, activists were able to become respectable Polish citizens and exploit "looking backward" as an exercise in re-defining sexual belonging as a "past-ness" re-found in the present based on civil disobedience.

First and foremost, it is important to briefly visit the role of Solidarity as a local site of memory. Solidarity was the first non-state-controlled union in Poland. Alain Touraine (1983) describes Solidarity as a movement "powerful and complete enough to have its objective the liberation of the whole society" and documents thoroughly the extent to which Solidarity's

popularity among working class communities enabled the organization to capture the attention and devotion of millions of Poles (62). Although Touraine accurately predicted that Solidarity would continue to maintain a dominant presence in Polish national memory, it is important to recognize that such a hegemonic position has not been immutable, either.

For instance, Naomi Klein (2007) details the extent to which Solidarity's political goals were systematically gutted in the wake of capitalist "shock and awe" politics in which U.S. economist Jeffery Sachs convinced the financially downtrodden and desperate post-socialist Polish government to accept the "Sachs Plan," which "in addition to eliminating price controls overnight and slashing subsidies, advocated selling off the state mines, shipyards and factories to the private sector" and remained "a direct clash with Solidarity's economic program of worker ownership" (177). In addition to Klein's description, new movements, such as the Orange Alternative, developed and carried on the group's legacy through different creative and stylistic forms of activism, but did not nearly capture the same political thrust and energy as Solidarity (Kenney, 2002). In the end, however, it has been argued that Solidarity was a precursor to other anti-state politics and activity in the 1980s (Meardi, 2005). To this end, Solidarity remains strong as a working class social movement with an identity "responsible for the creation of an industrially strong and socially egalitarian society" (Touraine, 1983: 59), at least in Polish national memory if not institutionally or economically as a whole.

In general, Solidarity's relationship to political engagement, working class strength, and anti-communist activism became its cultural currency. According to Gruszczynska (2009) in her discussion of Kristi Evans (1992), "Solidarity memory functions in the Polish national imaginary…in the form of hegemonic 'frozen memory', one of recurring images being that of ZOMO squads breaking up illegal demonstrations" (323). Memory is 'frozen' insofar as Solidarity functions as a site of the national imagination through which resistance, pain, and

police brutality remain permanently engrained in the narrative of Poland; Polish history and Solidarity are not teased apart from one another and Solidarity's resistance is the history of the Polish people. Such repetitive imagery becomes sedimented over time and continues to (re)produce and validate what it means to be Polish.

More specifically, in her analysis of the Poznan March of Equality, Gruszczynska extends beyond frozen memory to explain how organizers of the parade used Solidarity to incorporate sexual minority rights into a pre-existing national imaginary. She sees the usage of Solidarity as a performative tactic that enabled mobilization and a re-articulation of citizenship. Furthermore, she notes they "used the framing [of Solidarity's legacy] not only to narrate the event, but also to legitimize their decision to defy the ban [of the parade] and engage in civil disobedience" (Ibid, 321).

In other words, the memory of Solidarity not only provided LGBT activists a framework within which one kind of temporal belonging was made possible (the shared past of defiance against the state), but also produced the conditions in which sexual belonging could be redefined. Solidarity became a discursive and historical meeting point at which the borders of (sexual) citizenship and respectability were redrawn. How did Solidarity serve as a channel through which new formations of sexual-temporal belonging emerged and relied on notions of the nation-state to locate these meanings? How is "sexual respectability" of the past re-imagined in the present as a Polish quality, and what purposes, politically and pragmatically, does this provide LGBT movements?

To elucidate, I turn to George Mosse (1985), who discusses the way in which emerging nationalisms in Europe beginning in the eighteenth century produced notions of sexual belonging. He argues that "nationalism helped control sexuality, yet also provided the means through which changing sexual attitudes could be absorbed and tamed into respectability" (10).

Additionally, and more specific to temporal-sexual belonging, Mosse further elaborates on sexuality's *nationalist* meanings, writing that "the distinction between normality and abnormality…provided the mechanism that enforced control and ensured security [for the state]" (Ibid) and more broadly, provided Germans a way to imagine their own "slice of eternity" as respectable citizens with a timeless, endless existence (Ibid, 9).

Thus, in the case of Poland, it is important to examine *how* LGBT activists redefined citizenship, Polishness, and a timeframe of the Past-within-Us to legitimize sexual minorities as respectable patriots fighting against the state, and furthermore, the strength of Poland that transgresses the boundaries of time. Several of the activists Gruszczynska (2009) interviewed for her discussion on the Poznan March of Equality, for instance, highlight how Solidarity validated their movement due to its cross-generational, nationally salient meanings. One interview activist Marta reveals that:

> *Those people, who are maybe a little bit older, who in '89 decided that everything's ok, they woke up now….After the march I was getting letters from people talking about the fight for freedom, who said that they were from a generation that thought they had won freedom in '89, but now it turns out that they must keep up the fight, that this is transmitted from generation to generation because the fight for freedom is never over…* (324)

Marta's remarks reflect the extent to which Solidarity was able to serve as a catalyst for support, though not necessarily throughout the entire Polish nation, which, based on voting patterns in the same year, suggests supports for conservative, anti-LGBT politics (as indicated in 3.3). Still, although widespread homophobic attitudes did not altogether disappear, such comparisons made enough of a difference to make use of as a tactical weapon of rhetoric. In fact, the temporal language utilized by activists underscores the connection to Solidarity as a Past whose haunting of Present can be re-deployed compellingly and expand the boundaries of who

belongs, sexually. At one of the 2005 demonstrations, protestors shouted during the parade's invasion by the police that "we've seen that *already*" and "it's *just like* in the 1980s" (Ibid, italics mine). This "just-likeness" allows Poles to draw comparisons amongst sexual minorities, Polish national memory, and political resistance as a moment of the now pregnant with the past. Activists from other Polish cities and organizations who were interviewed by Jon Binnie and Christina Klesse (2011) noted that the word "solidarity" needed to be stolen to re-imagine its meanings. Samuel, an activist from Krakow, said that:

> *The plan is to show the way [solidarity] is being used [by the conservative government] excludes a lot of people, except for heterosexual, conservative men and women. It's much more about stealing the meaning, the essential meaning and to show that this platform, which was supposed to be a starting point to develop society, was so exclusive* (119).

Samuel's comments illustrate the extent to which LGBT activists not only redefined sexual belonging as an extension of Solidarity, but also as concepts of the past that were initially exclusionary, but are now capable of being "re-remembered." This goes beyond Solidarity itself, and includes other national symbols, such as Krakow's Wawel royal castle, which was used as a symbol for the city's March of Tolerance or activists who utilized the Institution of National Remembrance to declare "Hyacinth," a police-initiated project from the mid-1980s that collected data on gay men, a communist crime (Chetaille, 2010: 129).

Interestingly, sexual-temporal belonging through such actions becomes represented as a past that must be preserved and interpreted newly to account for those who were left out. To this end, Polish LGBT activists look backward to emphasize what was and still is important about Solidarity (its formation as a powerful movement) while highlighting who was excluded (sexual minorities). This idea of "going back" to see the present differently becomes a way for

LGBT activists to use Solidarity and redefine temporal-sexual belonging, albeit it one that relies on reifying the borders of a Poland with its own history in order to be intelligible.

Notably, Mosse illustrates the way in which homosexuals were explicitly excluded from such national belonging as a way to maintain hegemonic formations of masculinity, the state, and importantly, its timeless energy. Thus, LGBT activists in Poland temporally redefined the sexual citizen. They were able to take the idea of the respectable citizen, which has consistently been defined in terms of hetero-normative logic, and reframe it so that gays and lesbians are included.

In general, by using Solidarity's narrative as the means by which to explain LGBT civil disobedience as a Polish action, Polish activists rearticulated Solidarity's role as one relevant to sexual minorities. By reminding Poland that good Poles are always already ready to fight the wave of unjust state regulation while simultaneously taking on new manifestations of disobedience (in this case, at Equality Parades), the Poznan March of Equality, along with activism in Krakow, became moments through which the respectable citizen and the inherited past of Polishness could be redefined to include different sexual meanings. In this way, tactics of memory and looking backward are similar to looking forward and defining progress insofar as they serve as approaches within circumstantial arrangements, yet also rely on fundamentally different temporal orders as the means by which sexual belonging can be re-conceptualized. Instead of reproducing Orientalist visions of Poland moving forward into European modernity, "looking backward" tactics solidify Poland and rely on nationalist rhetoric. However, they also expand and redefine national boundaries through the inclusion of LGBT people and in this way, find a new and useful way to survive as sexually stigmatized people.

5.3 Corporeal Contestations: The Gay-Jew Comparison

Finally, I turn to the comparison of homophobia with anti-Semitism. Historically, Jews have been essential to discussions on tolerance, discrimination, nationalism, and sexuality within Europe. Although Jews and homosexuality have been historically linked in multiple ways, the two social categories have also been compared *temporally*. Many LGBT organizations, particularly in Europe, speak of themselves as "new Jews" and compare the abuse, discrimination, and hatred wrought against them to the Jewish community and their centuries of torture, mistreatment, and exclusion. I argue that "gay-Jew[23]" analogies, therefore, serve as local forms of relational memory that are utilized by groups with different interests and rely on conflicting imaginations of the past and "looking backward." In fact, the multiple ways in which "gayness" and Jewishness have been discursively connected, articulated, and instrumentalized are critical in understanding "looking backward" as a means by which contested notions of the past reshape the boundaries and meanings of sexual-temporal belonging.

More specifically, I argue that the gay-Jew comparison produces two concepts of time worth investigating as incompatible tensions. On one hand, many LGBT activists use the analogy to define their position in Polish society as "newness," or a recent target of discrimination that resembles (and replaces) the mistreatment and abuse wielded against Jews, imagining the past as despicable practices re-born as homophobia. In contrast, right-wing organizers often portray gays and lesbians as the same problem and embodiment of sexual abnormality as Jews, which deserves the same treatment of violence, humiliation, and social condemnation. Together, these tensions collide powerfully and expose the extent to which looking backward is vital in shaping notions of sexual belonging within Poland, especially when

[23] Throughout this chapter, I use "gay-Jew" because it is used frequently in the literature I cite and recognize that I am using a term typically associated with men. This is not meant to exclude women, but works well stylistically and within the historical examples I'm using (see Boyarin, Itzkovitz, & Pellegrini, 2003, pp 5-6 for more on Jewishness, sexuality, and women).

antithetical viewpoints are simultaneously interpellated into discourse and their impact on understanding sexual discrimination as a temporal configuration.

To begin with, it is important to review the way in which gays and Jews have been historically compared and why their relationality is important for Europe in general. George Mosse (1985) cites the way in which Jews and homosexuals were fundamental to notions of sexual respectability, citizenship, and nationalism in pre-Nazi Germany. He writes that "Jews as a group were said to exhibit female traits, just as homosexuals were generally considered effeminate" (36). For Mosse, Jews and gay are interwoven as degenerate and perverse antitheses to the good, normal sexually respectable German citizen. On a similar note, in *Queer Theory and the Jewish Question* (2003), Daniel Boyarin et al see queers and Jews as abjects of European society not only "bound up with one another in particularly resonant ways" but also through a shared material history with "profound implications for the ways in which Jewish and queer bodies are lived" (1).

Additionally, Mosse cites Marcel Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past* in which Proust believes that "homosexuals, like Jews, were invested by their persecutors with all the moral and physical characteristics of a race…. that both the Jew and the homosexual felt themselves to be 'one of a brotherhood' and intuitively recognized other members of their group" (36)[24]. In short, Jews and gays, due to intersecting medical, symbolic, political, and historical factors, were coupled together, and remain important despite changes within both social categories.[25]

5.3.1 Same Bodies, Same Threat: Temporal Tactics of Right-Wing Nationalists

For my purposes, it is important to apply these historical and theoretical connections to Poland as a discursive site at which "looking backward" produces notions of who belongs

[24] Mosse refers to Proust as a "homosexual," which is problematic as an assumption, yet his summary of Proust's work remains important.

[25] See Sedgwick (1990): pp 75 for detailed information on such differences and their importance.

sexually, starting with right-wing nationalists. First, I turn again to Graff (2006), who provides a short analysis of the gay-Jew comparison in Poland. She writes that, "the link between gay people and Jews is not an abstract theoretical construct; it is made spontaneously by Polish homophobes, as in some graffiti I recently spotted on a Warsaw bus: 'It's not a myth, it's very true—you see a gay, you see a Jew' (my translation)" (445). Based on Graff's personal experiences, right-wing organizers see gays and Jews are the same problem and correspondingly collapse them together in insults, language, and symbolic meaning as impure, threatening elements to the heart of Polish society.

Beyond her examples, however, the All-Polish Youth's callous treatment of the late Nobel Prize winner Czeslaw Milosz (2013) only further demonstrates the collapsibility of gays and Jews, linguistically, symbolically, and politically. As Tomasz Kitlinksi (2013) writes, "After Milosz's death in 2004, the All-Polish Youth was responsible for a hate campaign against the writer. They accused him of not being a 'true Pole,' but rather a 'friend of Jews and sodomites.' He was characterized as suspicious, dangerous, and anti-Polish" (para. 12). The anti-capitalist poet and political dissident is not only framed as somebody who does not belong to Poland, but somebody whose lack of true Polishness, in part, stems from relations with Jews and "sodomites."

Additionally, Graff expands her earlier comments in, "Looking at Pictures of Gay Men: Political Uses of Homophobia in Contemporary Poland," (2010) in which she explains that rather than a linear narrative of superimposing the gay on the Jew as a "spontaneous" link, gay-Jew comparisons are also the result of structural anti-Semitism that manifests in multiple ways. Most importantly, to understand the co-optation of gay-Jew analogies for right-wing organizers, Graff explains that anti-Semitism functions systematically even with few Jewish bodies in present-day Poland because it "is not a discourse of exclusion *aimed at an existing ethnic or religious*

group; rather, it is a logic of hatred, suspicion, and fear, a deep structure of irrational sentiment *largely independent of historical and demographic reality*." (592, italics mine).

In brief, her theorizing summarizes the extent to which physical and material experience—dead and alive bodies of queers and Jews—are perhaps irrelevant to right-wing organizers. The historical imagination and memory of Jews and gays become blurred, bound together so tightly that their separation is nearly un-thinkable. For the All-Polish Youth, gays and Jews are omnipresent threats that are not predicated on demographics. Instead, the two combined are always already suspicious and share traits of anti-Polish essence. The gay body and the Jew body need not be present physically since they are always present together symbolically. Looking backward becomes a way of articulating such stagnation in which gays and Jews continue as the same threat.

5.3.2 The New Jew: Bodies and the Temporal Distribution of Discrimination

As an alternative way of interpreting Jews and their relationship to homosexuality, many LGBT organizers in Poland rely on sexual-temporal belonging predicated on the separation of the gay and Jew in order to identify homophobia as a "newness" that superimposes itself upon anti-Semitism of the past. In fact, notions of the "new Jew" as an oppressed homosexual have become discursively salient and tactically useful during the timeframe in which my work is situated, and are important to expose how memory and sexual belonging can be contingent on time as a sequential process in which living bodies dictate how eras of discrimination are conceptualized.

As an example, seminars like one at Warsaw University in 2006 entitled "Are Lesbians Poland's New Jews?" demand our attention for their neat demarcation of the old-Jew and the new-Lesbian binary (cited in Graff, 2006: 445). In this temporal framework, gay and lesbian

politics operationalizes gay-Jew analogies by looking backward to anti-Semitism as a similar experience that includes violent and discriminatory experiences, yet one that remains visibly new. As an extension of this discourse, filmmaker Agnieszka Holland noted in an interview that "it seems to me that the Jew has been exchanged for the homosexual" (Kitlinksi, 2013: para 16). Why an exchange? What is it about bodies and their relationship to discourses on time and sexuality that make such exchanges thinkable? Even analyses such as Gregory E. Czarnecki's chapter on "Pre-War Anti-Semitism and Present-Day Homophobia" (2007), which thoroughly recognize homophobia and anti-Semitism as interrelated systems, discuss homophobia as a modern problem, in part, due to "the low number of Jews in Poland" which, in a footnote, he approximates around five to ten thousand (328). How do "bodies in time" shape the temporal tactics of looking backward for LGBT activists trying to push boundaries of sexual belonging? How does the minimal number of visible Jewish bodies in modern-day Poland make this "new lesbian" or "exchanged Jew" possible as a rhetorical, political (and tactical) device? And what are the consequences?

It would seem that LGBT groups rely on differences in the physical presence of living bodies in order for their claim to "newness" to be intelligible and in this way, assume that since many Jewish bodies are not present in Poland, gay bodies take up political space as the new Jew. But to what extent do the above statements presuppose the necessity of a *physical* presence of Jewish bodies? As Elizabeth Grosz (1995) reminds us, "the exploration of conceptions of space and time are necessary correlates of the exploration of corporeality…bodies are always understood within a spatial and temporal context, and space and time remain conceivable only insofar as corporeality provides the basis for our perception and representation of them" (84).

Thus, by conceptualizing time as a series of eras in which bodies marked, treated, and living in certain ways die, ending the era to which they are attributed, it makes sense for LGBT groups to conceptualize themselves as a newness given the paucity of Jewish bodies in Poland. Yet if the All-Polish Youth shouts "labor camps for lesbians!" at an Equality March in 2004 (see Graff, 2006: 439), they cite both images and material consequences of the past, similar to the way in which Poznan March of Equality Members cited Solidarity. Aren't Jews, if not physically present, symbolically present and therefore, not "fully" erased or replaced?

As Judith Butler notes in *Bodies That Matter* (1993), notions of totally erasable or re-appropriated words like "queer" are not only impossible, but dangerous, as the notion that such words can be re-claimed fully presupposes that the discourses from which words extract meaning are fully tractable. She argues that the discourses which produced queer's derogatory status are not capable of being fully removed, despite the way in which queer can be reclaimed vis-à-vis creative and political force. Essentially, she understands that the deployment of the term queer needs to be done so carefully, as "a self-critical dimension within activism, a persistent reminder to take the time to consider the exclusionary force of [outness]" (Ibid, 227). She calls for an activist politics that uses terms in such a way that we both recognize the lack of control we have in the meaning of them and find ways to urgently and persistently expand, muddle, question, assess, and contextualize them. The consequences of "new Jew" politics as a tactic for LGBT activists "looking backward" might otherwise result in the kind of temporal-sexual belonging predicated on the erasure of performative meaning about which Butler warns.

Besides, the "erase-ability" of Jews cannot be reduced to corporeality, as utterances within the Polish language continue to reproduce symbolic marginalization. For instance, as Graff (2010) explains, in present-day Poland "the word Jew functions as a slur and slander in everyday speech,…'Jewish' (*zydowski, po zydowsku*) means suspect, devious, sinister, unpleasant, or

badly done; it can also mean inside out, or upside down. 'Jew'—often spoken in a hushed voice—is a remnant of a repressed history fossilized in language" (592). In this sense, the symbolic presence of Jews—deployed through rhetorical devices, racist slurs, and protest slogans—has not disappeared, yet in order for the lesbian to be the "new Jew," such remnants of anti-Semitism must disappear into the ground along with Jewish bodies. The lack of living, countable Jewish bodies in Poland somehow enables some LGBT activists to adopt a "newness" that overwrites Jews of the past. Such political transmutation is, at best, a palimpsest. As a result, although LGBT activists have found a creative way to compare the atrocities committed against them, such tactics also reproduce a sexual-temporal belonging that depends on the wholesale separation of oppressed groups, both historically as "eras of discrimination" and corporeally as bodies in time.

In the end, temporal-sexual belonging can be seen as a process in which bodies, time, and the "looking backward" shape memory of the past. For right-wing organizers, gays and Jews are the same embodiment, physically and symbolically, or the same threats against the state and thus, require no "newness" to their name. For LGBT organizers, this newness is essential and, in part, based on assumptions about what bodies in time and space mean for political purposes. To this end, gay-Jew analogies demonstrate a fascinating, complex effect of conflicting temporalities as tactics, political concepts, and discourses with sexual meanings. Time is not only contextual, but co-optable. Moreover, gay-Jew analogies reveal the ways in which competing forms of temporal-sexual belonging emerge simultaneously.

While the gay-Jew comparison risks reifying historical paradigms and erasing the meaning of anti-Semitism as a present-day reality in Poland through "new Jewness," such tactics nevertheless serve as yet another example of the way in which LGBT activists find new ways to both push the boundaries of sexual-temporal belonging while reproducing more problematic

borders as a means of survival. Because the gay-Jew analogy has a history, substance, and influence within European politics, it is understandably used at times and cannot be dismissed as a wholesale trivialization of history.

Such thinking echoes my previous comments on the use of Solidarity, which reifies Polish borders to a degree, yet remains tactically advantageous as a way of galvanizing public support, something that has historically been difficult for any group that embodies non-normative sexual practices, identities, and discourses. Therefore, "looking backward" has its contextual utility and like its "looking forward" counterpart, is replete with problematic or questionable consequences. Still, as I have demonstrated and argued throughout my project, both remain crucial at given moments for LGBT movements to become intelligible and cultivate belonging.

Conclusion

From an overarching perspective, this thesis addressed the ways in which configurations of temporal-sexual belonging were produced in Poland from 2003 to 2008. By examining the country's 2004 accession and the "toler-opticon," I illustrated that the EU as an institutional body monitors sexual citizenship temporally, locating the EU within the "modernity" toward which candidate countries "progress." By extension, I examined the 2005 Polish parliamentary and presidential elections in which the concept of Poland as a nation became reified temporally and sexually by demarcating a moral past to preserve in order to combat an immoral future predicated on EU sexual "looseness" toward homosexuality.

Combined, these analyses showcased the way in which competing and co-constitutive forms of citizenship structure sexual-temporal belonging and establish the institutional, symbolic, and discursive frameworks within which activists operate. Importantly, these frameworks also reproduce, at times, Neo-Orientalist politics of EU enlargement in which Central and Eastern European countries like Poland are ambiguously both included within and excluded from the realm of modern Europe.

In my sections regarding LGBT activism, I tried to undermine the prevailing assumption of "sexual progress" as an inevitable trajectory. In Chapter 4, I illustrated that *certain kinds of progress* are produced circumstantially and advantageously. Additionally in Chapter 5, I illustrated that "looking backward" is equally central to LGBT rights-discourses within Poland. Whether utilizing the historical memory of Solidarity or the possibility of becoming "new Jews" based on assumptions about time, space, and bodies, LGBT organizers (and at times, right-wing

nationalists) utilize a wide range of tactics surrounding history, memory, the national body, and "eras" of discrimination in order to determine who belongs to Poland.

As a whole, my project demonstrates the complexity and contradictory nature of temporal-sexual belonging *as a negotiation*. At times, activists both reify national and supra-national geographic boundaries (that of the "real," "modern" Europe, or the "pure" Polish nation) while simultaneously expanding, challenging, or "queering" them through the addition of LGBT minorities. The consequences of such negotiations that constantly redefine sexual-temporal belonging based on circumstances, discursive thinkabilities, and various institutional, material, and political limitations are difficult to assess, yet if review my analysis comprehensively, Polish LGBT activists resemble what Erin Davis (2009) calls "situating fluidity." Davis believes transgender people, who expand our understanding of what constitutes one's gender *and* reaffirm particular gendered arrangements by acting in socially intelligible ways as a man or woman, demonstrate the degree to which gender fluidity is not idealized, boundless freedom from pernicious imprisonment. Instead, it breaks boundaries while recognizing that some boundaries will, or *must*, stay to dodge manifold forms of violence or social rejection.

In the end, her discussion on the "situated-ness" of fluidity is similar to the way I conceptualize Polish LGBT activists' roles in circumstantially and tactically shaping the boundaries of sexual-temporal belonging. Rather than an ultimate freedom that relies on inevitable, forward-moving progress, utopias of the future, or colonial critiques of the EU's "toler-opticon" and the Polish states' homophobic nationalism, activists, at times, negotiate and utilize concepts of time that are advantageous at given moments, even while problematically reproducing Neo-Orientalist visions of the "new Europe," or erasing anti-Semitism through "new Jew" metaphors. Significantly, Davis' work is about survival and so is sexual-temporal

belonging in Poland. In many ways, LGBT activists in Poland locate and produce ways to survive through their negotiations of what time and sexuality collectively mean. Sometimes, they accept the frameworks cultivated by the EU, the Polish state, or the historical and imagined memory of both, yet also seem to expand and challenge them by tactically redrawing and renegotiating their borders. In general, despite my hesitations about locating where "tolerance" or homophobia take place, the point remains that all LGBT and queer people are subject to the harsh realities of discursive and physical violence, and in the end, activism around sexual politics must take into consideration the serious limitations of its movements in order to produce survivable conditions, intelligible meaning, and tactical force (which is not to say they are exempt from critique).

Unfortunately, this thesis, like any intellectual or analytic project, is also constrained and limited. For example, a more detailed analysis of the peformative nature of activists' temporal tactics could more complexly address the way in which concepts of the audience, speech-acts, and language culminate as shifting performativity through which sexual-temporal belonging is produced. I avoided this route given my lack of training in performativity, but find it extremely appealing and a possible new direction for my thinking.

Moreover, this project could benefit by more rigorously integrating the "anti-social" thesis mentioned earlier by applying temporal tactics and survival politics of intelligibility to debates about queer utopias and "no futures," both of which concentrate heavily on the possibility of tomorrow or the lack thereof. How can the possibilities of re-addressing yesterday, for instance, challenge this otherwise dichotomous debate in which utopias are either embraced or rejected? What about temporal tactics, such as the ones seen with Polish LGBT movements, which navigate time as an exercise in "looking backward?" Do the reified national boundaries of

Poland that I explored through Solidarity, for instance, resemble the Futurch Edelman (2004) despises? I would, in short, see this project expanding its use of queer theory to complicate sexual-temporal belonging even further.

In the end, addressing my concerns at the very beginning, I think it is important to continue to question the prolific use of a "progressive" adjective and its ambiguous meanings so that such survival tactics can be incorporated into our politics. As somebody engaged in queer and feminist politics, I find it crucial that we do not collapse radical politics into "progressive" timelines without interrogating more thoroughly what that means and could mean. By continuing to challenge time and refusing to endow it with universal, self-evident directionalities, LGBT and queer activism, including other communities in solidarity, can continue to fight against systematic inequalities without reducing such struggles to inevitable trajectories by complicating the picture of how sexuality, its politics, and new meanings, are often temporal as a negotiation, tactic, and politics of survival.

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