

Trust in changing institutions

Effects of the Ohrid Framework Agreement on the institutional trust in Macedonia

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Abstract

The Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) adopted in 2001 commenced a new chapter in the development of Macedonian democracy. The reforms that followed from the Agreement introduced power-sharing elements in the functioning of state institutions. In order to assess part of the implications of these reforms, this research aims at exploring the evolution of institutional trust in Macedonia from 1998 to 2013. Specifically, the development of trust in the government, the Parliament, the judiciary, the police and the civil service are examined, as well as factors that explain them, in the timeframe of 15 years. For the purposes of this research, survey data and data on the national level are analyzed using statistical tools.

This study has yielded several important findings. The general level of trust in the Macedonian institutions substantially increased in the period following the OFA. This increase was the most evident for the ethnic Albanian part of the population, which is seen as the major beneficiary of the Agreement. Furthermore, support for one of the parties which are part of the governing coalition (incumbent party) proves to be the strongest predictor for trust in institutions, and its effect increased substantially over time. Finally, the data indicates a slight decrease in the levels of institutional trust from 2008, especially among the ethnic Albanian population, most likely due to the strong nationalist discourse developed by the leading Macedonian party VMRO-DPMNE; however, the positive effects of the OFA were not diminished.

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List of Abbreviations

CRPM - Center for Research and Policy Making

DPA – Democratic Party of the Albanians

DUI – Democratic Union for Integration

EU – European Union

FYROM – Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

IDSCS - Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis” Skopje

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

NLA – National Liberation Army

OFA – Ohrid Framework Agreement

PDP – Party for Democratic Prosperity

SDSM – Social-Democratic Alliance of Macedonia

SIOFA - Secretariat for Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

US – United States of America

VMRO-DPMNE – Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity

WGI - World Bank Governance Indicators

1. Introduction

After a decade of challenging the very foundations of the Macedonian state by the ethnic Albanian minority of the country (Daskalovski, 2005:52), the situation escalated into a violent conflict in 2001 between the state security structures and the Albanian paramilitary organization - the National Liberation Army (NLA). The conflict ended with the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) in August 2001. As part of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, Macedonia amended its constitution and enacted a series of laws in the years following the Agreement. The implemented legal reforms effectively meant establishing a power-sharing model of democracy, i.e. consociational democracy, and abandoning the previous Western model of liberal democracy (Vankovska, 2013).

All four key power-sharing elements of consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1969, 2008) can be identified in the new Macedonian democratic model: mechanisms of group inclusion into the executive, proportional representation in the public administration, increased self-government, and veto rights (Bieber, 2013:134). A grand coalition was not institutionalized, but the practice of creating multi-ethnic government coalitions, which was present (even) before 2001, remained. The concept of "just and equitable representation" (OFA, 2001) introduced guarantees for larger representation of the minority ethnic communities in all administrative bodies. Regarding the territorial arrangements, the country did not introduce federal territorial organization, but a decentralization process was conducted, which significantly increased the self-rule of the local units of self-government (Maleska, 2005; Bieber, 2013; Vankovska, 2013; Goio and Marceta, 2009). After these constitutional and institutional changes, Macedonia can be classified and is referred to as a consociational democracy.

The initial motivation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement was to cease the armed conflict and to prevent it from escalating into an ethnic one. The Agreement achieved this goal; however, its success cannot be evaluated merely in terms of absence of conflict. The Agreement has profound implications on the functioning of Macedonian democracy, so its success should be evaluated in a broader context; namely, by examining whether it enables or endangers the functioning of the democratic system as a whole (Bieber, 2011:14). There is a need for a comprehensive assessment of the effects of the Agreement, and a well-grounded evaluation of whether it paved the way for a stable and healthy democratic development of the society, or provided a merely temporary solution to the problem which would eventually lead to future separation of the ethnic groups and even secession.

Public trust in the democratic institutions in the country is an important issue for democracy, since it is closely related to political legitimacy. Democratic governments are bound to cooperate with their citizens, because they are limited in the exercise of coercive power over people, and they need citizens' approval in order to be legitimate (Boda and Medve-Balint, 2012:2). As Almond and Verba indicate, greater satisfaction with the political system creates greater attachment to it (1963:191). Furthermore, high levels of institutional trust can significantly improve the effectiveness of the institutional performance, as well as policy implementation, and they are found to be closely related to law compliance (Marien and Hooge, 2011). Therefore, healthy levels of institutional trust of all segments in the society are necessary for the successful functioning of Macedonian democracy. Vankovska (2013) expressed great concerns about the legitimacy of the Macedonian democratic system, mostly because of the strong presence of the international factor during the negotiations and the signing of the Framework Agreement, as well as the elite nature of the power-sharing model (bargaining behind closed doors) in the decision-making processes.

The conflict and the changes introduced by the Ohrid Framework Agreement had a strong impact on the functioning of the Macedonian democracy in general, and the political institutions in particular. Namely, the Agreement's provisions for special procedures in the Parliament, decentralization, non-discrimination, just and equitable representation, use of languages, as well as the protection of identity and culture of the communities in the country (OFA, 2001), were all implemented with the purpose of greater integration of the ethnic minority communities in the country¹. A great part of the country's population, especially the ethnic Albanians, endorsed this reform. However, a sizable proportion of the citizens, mainly among ethnic Macedonians, had negative attitudes towards this change. Public opinion surveys indicate that two years after the Agreement, in 2003, only 38% of ethnic Macedonians as opposed to 91.6% of ethnic Albanians expressed support for the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The smaller ethnic groups in the country were also not very enthusiastic towards the Agreement, with 47.2% of them expressing support for it (Early Warning Report, 2003). Eight years after the Agreement, when much of its implementation had already taken place, the opinions about the Agreement remained divided: only 24% of ethnic Macedonians, as opposed to 83% of ethnic Albanians expressed support for it (Mitevaska, 2009). Bearing in mind the importance of the implications of this Agreement, I find it meaningful and relevant to analyze whether there are changes in the levels and factors that explain institutional trust, pre and post the conflict and the implementation of the OFA. Thus, my research question is:

RQ: How did the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement affect the levels of trust in Macedonian institutions and the factors that explain them?

¹ OFA also entailed a change in terminology, namely, the ethnic minorities term was replaced with communities.

The question regarding levels and factors of institutional trust pre and post the adoption of the OFA is relevant for Macedonia mainly because the general sustainability of this democratic system is at question. The consociational model of democracy in Macedonia was seen as the best institutional design for the conflict resolution after the 2001 situation. The analyses in the following period were focused on evaluating the full implementation of the OFA and establishment of the new institutional framework as such (see Risteska and Daskalovski eds., 2011; Klekovski ed., 2011), but the evaluation of the consequences or effects of this institutional arrangement, and the real possibilities of building a stable and healthy society remains an unfinished task. Therefore, this thesis aims to provide insight whether the democratic model chosen in 2001, is sustainable on the long run, and whether it leads to stabilization and democratic development of Macedonian society.

My analysis has shown that the levels of institutional trust increased substantively after the signing of OFA, especially for the Albanian part of the population. However, some of these positive effects were diminished few years later, most likely by the nationalist rhetoric of the government, which indicates that, institutional trust, just like the inter-ethnic relations in the country, is still very fragile.

In the first part of this thesis, I will briefly review the literature on institutional trust. Next I will describe the Macedonian context in which the conflict occurred, the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, the changes that this Agreement introduced on an institutional level, and I will provide short description of the political situation in the country after the Agreement. Then I will describe the theoretical framework, and the research design of this project, as well as the methodology and the data I use for the purposes of answering my research question. Finally, the findings of the analysis I have conducted will be presented and discussed in relation to the country's context.

2. State of the art

2.1. Defining trust

The Oxford dictionary of the English language defines trust as a "[f]irm belief in the reliability, truth, or ability of someone or something." Trusting someone or something entails certain expectations about the future behavior of the object of trust. Hardin's rational account on trust as encapsulated interest (Hardin, 1991) states that trusting a person with respect to certain matter indicates that we have a reason to believe that this person will act in our interest, because she has a reason to act in our interest. However, he does not believe that this kind of trust relation is possible between people and institutions. For Hardin trust is a relationship that is exclusive to people's relations, while between institutions and people most of the time there is a relationship of inductive expectations (1999). Naturally, the nature of the trust relationship between people, and people and institutions cannot be completely the same, since the object of trust has different characteristics. Nevertheless, stating that we trust, or have confidence in a political institution, means that we have an expectation that the institution will perform in a manner that respects the predefined and mutually agreed rules for action, as a framework in which the institution can operate. Furthermore, we expect that in the decision-making processes about future actions, the political institution takes our interests into account.

2.2. Theories on institutional trust

The academic interest in trust has been extremely pronounced in recent years. The main reasons for this are the declining levels of institutional trust noted in the developed Western democracies (Dalton, 2004; Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Norris, 1999), as well as the generally low levels of institutional trust measured in the new democracies in Central and

Eastern Europe (Mishler and Rose, 1997, 2001; Lovell 2001; Boda and Medve-Balint, 2012). Generally, there are two theoretical traditions which offer competing explanations about the origins of institutional trust: cultural theories and institutional (or performance) theories.

On the one hand, *cultural theories* treat the origins of institutional trust as exogenous. Trust is determined by early life socialization and cultural norms. According to Uslaner, one of the major advocates of this view, trust is not experience-based, but rather learned and transmitted in our socialization process, and depends on the optimistic or pessimistic worldview we hold; thus, trust is essentially a moral value (Uslaner, 2002). Therefore, we learn to be trusting or not early on in our lives. This approach finds that social and institutional trust are closely linked. Specifically, we project the learned social trust to the institutions, and with that we influence institutional performance (Mishler and Rose, 2001). Uslaner argues that "[g]ood government doesn't generate trust. But trust in others helps make governments work better (Uslaner, 2002:8)", and in his opinion, high levels of general trust, push towards the creation of more egalitarian societies. However, Uslaner also states that, although general trust cannot be enhanced by the government, it can be destroyed by it, giving the post-communist countries as an example (2002:48). Putnam (1993, 2000), Inglehart (1997) and Almond and Verba (1963) also advocate this culturally dependent, bottom-up approach.

The cultural theories assume a strong relationship between generalized, or social trust and political, or institutional trust. The existence of this relationship has been the focus of a number of empirical studies, and it has yielded inconsistent findings. Namely, Gronlund and Setala (2011), among others, confirm the existence of this direct relationship, however, Newton finds that their relationship is mediated by the effectiveness of social and political institutions (Newton, 2001:211).

On the other hand, *institutional or performance theories* treat the origins of institutional trust as endogenous. They find that institutional trust is a consequence of the institutional performance itself. On the basis of our experience about the performance of the political institutions (which is constantly updated) we make a judgment about how much trust or confidence we will place in our political institutions. So, well-performing institutions will generate trust towards them, while those who do not meet our expectations will generate distrust (Mishler and Rose, 2001). This is a top-down approach, as opposed to the bottom-up one adopted by cultural theories. Namely, the advocates of institutional theories challenge the direction of causal relationship between institutions and trust. According to Rothstein (2005), universal and trustworthy institutions facilitate the creation of trust, and not the other way around, as suggested by Putnam (1993, 2000). Herreros (2004) challenges Putnam's (2000) and Uslaner's (2002) view that the state can only have a negative impact on social trust. He argues that the state function of enforcer of third-party Agreements can have beneficial effects on social trust (Herreros, 2004; Herreros and Criado, 2008).

Gronlund and Setala (2011) test the relationship between institutional trust and satisfaction with policy outputs, as well as the perceptions of public officials in terms of honesty and incorruptibility. They find that the satisfaction with policy outcomes is the most powerful determinant of institutional trust, but also that the perceptions of public officials play a role. Similarly, Chanely, Rudolph and Rahn (2000) examine public trust in Government in the US, and find that declining trust in Government is associated with negative perceptions of the economy, scandals related to Congress and increasing public concern about crime.

The relationship between institutional design and/or type of democracy with political support has not been addressed in much detail in the literature. However, one study provides

evidence that the institutional design does in fact matter for institutional trust. Namely, Criado and Herreros argue that the type of democracy - majoritarian or proportional - affects citizens' perception of institutions (Criado and Herreros, 2007:1512). Using survey data, they provide evidence that the effect of institutional performance on institutional trust is higher in majoritarian than in proportional democracies, due to the fact that the attribution of political responsibilities is less clear in proportional as opposed to majoritarian democracies.

These two theoretical approaches have been tested in different contexts, in order to evaluate their explanatory power and primacy, in different regions and countries. Mishler and Rose (2001) tested these two theories in the post-communist context, and found that the strongest predictors of institutional trust in post-communist societies are individual perceptions about the political and economic performance of new democracies. Luhiste (2006) finds that both theories have merit in explaining institutional trust in the Baltic states.

Although both these theoretical traditions have found their application in different societal contexts, often the specific context of the society can have a great influence on the possibility of building and maintaining institutional and social trust. One particularly interesting type of society, where building trust seems to be especially challenging, is the one characterized by ethnic heterogeneity, and deep divisions along the ethnic lines.

2.3. Trust in divided societies

It is a common finding in the literature that social trust is lower in ethnically heterogeneous societies (Leigh, 2006; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000). Deep ethnical divides, can lead to the creation of "social traps", where the strong feelings of distrust prevent people from cooperating, even when they have common goals (Uslaner, 2005). As Uslaner argues, the only way to overcome these social traps is by creating universal and impartial institutions,

which will allow people to calculate their actions according to the expected reaction of institutions (2005:42).

Pronounced, systematic discrimination of the ethnic minorities, or majorization, often leads to alienation of the minority communities from the political system and the wider society (Weller, 2010; Baldwin et al., 2007; Pantoja and Segura, 2003). The members of the minority communities would not be able to develop a feeling of commitment to the political system, and will not be able to consider it as theirs. In this situation, where the minorities in the society are discriminated, and their opportunities to participate in the political processes are extremely limited might lead to open expression of the minorities grievances, even in a violent way (Muller et al. 1982).

In order to provide stability in ethnically diverse societies, mechanisms of effective minority integration and representation into the political system should be set up (Bieber, 2003). One institutional design that aims at creating a balance between the power of the different ethnic groups in deeply divided societies in the consociational model of democracy advocated by Lijphart (2008). This democratic model assumes the creation of institutional mechanisms that will avoid the establishment of dominant part of the population, and will give space to the minority communities to have a say in the political processes in the country, and control over policies and areas of the political life that directly affect their well-being. However, according to Horowitz (1985) this model is leads to reinforcement of the ethnic divisions, and as an alternative to it, he suggests an integrative power-sharing model, which promotes the creation of cross-cutting cleavages. Nevertheless, the extensive research on several case studies conducted by Norris (2008) indicates that power-sharing models are indeed beneficial for deeply divided societies, since they lead to greater democratization. However, one can never underestimate the importance of context.

3. Timeline of developments in Macedonia

3.1. From independence to OFA

Macedonia is a multiethnic society. According to the last census held in the country in 2002, 64.2% of the population declared themselves Macedonians, 25.2% ethnic Albanians, 3.9% Turks, 2.7% Roma, 1.8% Serbs, and the rest as belonging to one of the smaller ethnic groups which are below 1% (Census of the population, 2002). At the same time, Macedonian society is considered as deeply divided, with the ethnic cleavages creating different and even parallel worlds in which citizens live. Studies measuring the social distance between ethnic groups confirm this fact (Jashari and Simkus, 2013; Pecijareski, 2011). This being said, it is evident that in order to maintain peace in the country, and to satisfy the needs of all ethnic segments, institutional arrangements need to accommodate the specific characteristics of the country's population.

The Republic of Macedonia declared its independence from Yugoslavia on November 21, 1991. A referendum was held earlier, on September 8, in which the large majority of the population supported the independence. The Constitution promulgated on November 1, 1991, established Macedonia as a Parliamentary democracy. However, the majority of ethnic Albanians abstained from voting in the independence referendum (Gromes, 2009:6), and the new Constitution was not supported by ethnic Albanian politicians in Parliament (Daskalovski, 2005:59). The reason for the abstaining from giving support to the new Macedonian state was the reluctance of Macedonian politicians to accept Albanian political demands for greater inclusion in the state-building process (Hislope, 2003).

The '90s was a very challenging decade for the young Macedonian democracy. As Daskalovski notes, in the early years of Macedonian independence, the political elites of the

country, representing Macedonian and Albanian ethnic segments of the population, clashed over the basic concept of the Macedonian state (Daskalovski, 2005:52). Along with the internal problems of the country, Macedonia also faced problems of an international character. Namely, Greece opened up the question regarding the constitutional name of the country. This led to the imposition of the Greek trade embargo on Macedonia in 1994 and 1995, which had a strong negative effect on the Macedonian fragile economy. The embargo was halted with the signing of the Interim Accord in 1995, according to which Greece recognized the country under the provisional name "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)", until a definite solution regarding the name was reached (Interim Accord, 1995). In addition, the UN sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro, as well as the unstable political situation in the region further disrupted the democratic development of Macedonia.

The tipping point which announced the definite destabilization of the country was the Kosovo war in 1999. During the conflict, Macedonia, a country with well over 2 million people, hosted over 350 000 refugees (Marolov and Ivanova, 2013). One of the most emphasized facts about the impact of the Kosovo crisis on the destabilization of Macedonia, was the lack of control of the "Ground Safety Zone", which was a buffer zone between the Serbian and Kosovo border. This enabled the smuggling of weapons and equipment to Macedonian territory (Khakee and Florquin, 2003:27). Without going into further detail, there is consensus among authors that the Kosovo war enabled the beginning of the conflict in Macedonia in 2001, causing a spillover effect (Cordell and Wolff, 2010:123; Kaufman, 2003:48; Liotta, 2010).²

The conflict between the National Liberation Army (NLA) and the state forces of Macedonia began on 22 January 2001, with a NLA unit attacking a police station in the

² For a detailed description of the political developments in Macedonia and the region from 1989 see: Daskalovski, 2005: 8-79; Ramet, 2010.

village of Tearce, killing one police officer and injuring two others (Daskalovski 2005:86). The conflict lasted until 19 August 2001, and resulted in the death of approximately 100 people and the displacement of over 100 000 civilians (Daskalovski 2005:91). The demands of the NLA during the conflict were ambiguous. As Daskalovski (2005:80) comments:

At the onset of the conflict, the organization's goals were unclear. Its communiqués claimed it was fighting against 'Slavo-Macedonian' oppressors and for a 'Greater Kosovo' or a 'Greater Albania'. Later, the NLA changed its rhetoric and argued that it was "fighting for the human rights of the Albanians in Macedonia and for constitutional reforms."

The conflict was settled by the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement by the heads of the largest political parties in the country, and special representatives of the EU and the US. The negotiations and the signing of the Agreement were largely encouraged and facilitated by the international community, who emphasized that the conflict needed a political and not a military solution. The push towards negotiations by the international factor was not met with enthusiasm by the Macedonian political elites, because they believed that they could defeat the rebels with military means. Finally they did agree to open the discussion about the inter-ethnic relations in the country; however, they refused to discuss these issues with representatives from the NLA (Daskalovski, 2004:11).

In May 2001, the four largest political parties in the country: VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, DPA and PDP formed a coalition "Government of National Unity." This coalition was again formed under the pressure of the international community, with the purpose of finding a peaceful solution to the conflict (Daskalovski, 2004:12). The talks were confusing and difficult, due to the fact that all four parties in the national unity government had different positions on the issue. The priority for the Macedonian political camp was the preservation of the unitary character of the state, while the Albanians pushing towards a solution that would entail federalization of the country. Each part of the Agreement was reached separately, as a

product of long and tense discussions (Popetrevski and Latifi, 2004). The role of the international factor in reaching the Agreement was very important. Namely, the EU and the US provided incentives for a speeded-up Euro-Atlantic integration of Macedonia to abandon the idea of ceasing the conflict through military means, and to negotiate a peace Agreement (Daskalovski, 2004:3, Ilievski, 2007).

Finally, the Agreement introduced the demanded constitutional reforms. This document made possible the introduction of power-sharing elements in the functioning of the Macedonian democracy and marked the beginning of significant institutional reforms. In the following part, the changes brought by the OFA Agreement are described.

3.2. The Ohrid Framework Agreement

As the Secretariat's for Implementation of the Framework Agreement's (SIOFA) report indicates, the immediate goals of the Agreement were: cessation of hostilities, and implementation of confidence-building measures, which include disarmament, disbandment and reconstruction, reintegration, return of refugees, and rehabilitation and reconstruction. The official date of cessation of hostilities is 5 July 2001. Disarmament was implemented in several rounds in 2001, 2003 and 2010 (Report on the Implementation Status, 2012:10). The NLA was disbanded already in September 2001, and the reserve police and army forces were demobilized in several stages afterwards, finishing in 2006 (Report on the Implementation Status, 2012:11). In March 2002 a Law on Amnesty was passed, which released from prosecution all persons suspected to have committed crimes related to the conflict (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 18, 2002). With the help of international donors, most of the damaged houses and infrastructure were reconstructed by the end of 2004 (Report on the Implementation Status, 2012:12).

The major changes introduced by the Ohrid Framework Agreement involve the amendments to the Constitution, as well as the laws which followed from the Agreement, regarding decentralization of the government, non-discrimination and equitable representation, special procedures in Parliament, as well as policies related to identity, culture, use of languages and education. These changes will be briefly summarized in the following part.

3.2.1. Constitutional amendments

As agreed by the heads of the major political parties in the negotiations in Ohrid, in November 2001, 15 constitutional amendments were passed by the Macedonian Parliament. Amendment IV replaced the Preamble of the Constitution, and identified the Macedonian people, as well as parts of the Albanian people, Turkish people, Vlach people, Serbian people, Roma people, Bosniak people and others who live on the territory of the country as constitutive peoples of the Macedonian state (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 91, 2001). With this, the concept of a nation state that was established by the previous Preamble of the Constitution was abandoned (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 52, 1992).

Amendment V introduced provisions regarding the usage of languages. Namely, in all units of local self-government where at least 20% of the population speaks a language other than Macedonian, that language can be used in official communication with local administrative bodies (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 91, 2001). So, the Macedonian language remained the official language of the country, however, the Albanian, Turkish, Serbian, Roma and Vlach languages are in use in local correspondence in several

municipalities.³ Amendment VI introduces the "[a]ppropriate and equitable representation of citizens belonging to all communities in the government and other public institutions at all levels" (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 91, 2001). Amendments VII, VIII and IX introduce guarantees of religious expression, identity preservation, and preservation and advancement of the historical and artistic goods of all communities in the country accordingly (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 91, 2001).

The work of Parliament has been regulated with Amendment X. Specifically, the Parliament can bring decisions only if the majority of the representatives are present, and a decision cannot be brought if less than one third of the representatives are not in favor. Furthermore, for laws concerning culture, use of languages, education, personal documents, and use of symbols, Parliament can bring decisions with the majority of votes of the present representatives, however, there must be also a majority of votes from the representatives belonging to the non-majority communities in the country (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 91, 2001). This provision has been known in the public discourse as the "double majority", or "Badinter majority," after the French constitutional expert who headed the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia, and who had originally proposed it. Amendment XI specifies that the Ombudsman is voted by Parliament also by the principle of double majority (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 91, 2001).

Amendment XII introduces the Committee for Relations between the Communities. The Committee is established by Parliament, and consists of 19 MPs, out of which 7 are ethnic Macedonians, 7 are ethnic Albanians, and one of each remaining ethnic minority: Turks, Serbs, Vlachs, Roma, and Bosniaks. Amendment XIII states that the State Security Council should reflect the ethnic composition of the population. The double majority rule is

³ Besides the criteria of 20%, a language may be put into official use in a municipality based on a special decision of the local council.

applied in the selection of 3 out of the 7 members of the State Judicial Council, as well as for the selection of 3 out of 9 judges of the Constitutional Court, with the Amendments XIV and XV accordingly (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 91, 2001).

The question regarding the local self-government is regulated in the Constitutional Amendments XVI and XVII. According to these Amendments, all laws related to the regulation of the local self-government need a double majority to be voted (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 91, 2001). Finally, Amendment XVIII states that the Constitution's Preamble, and the articles related to the rights of the communities can be amended only with a double majority, and a two-thirds majority of Parliament.

3.2.2. Decentralization

The decentralization process has been regarded as of great importance for the success of the OFA. Article 3.1. of the Agreement states: "A revised Law on Local Self-Government will be adopted that reinforces the powers of elected local officials and enlarges substantially their competencies in conformity with the Constitution..." Therefore, the implementation of the decentralization process began with the adoption of the Law on Local Self-Government in January 2002 (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 5, 2002). Two years after, three more core laws were adopted on this issue: the Law on the Territorial Organization of Local-Self Government (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 55, 2004), the Law on the City of Skopje (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 61, 2004), and the Law on Financing Units of Local Self-Government (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 61, 2004). All these laws significantly increased the competences of the units of local self-government.

The first stage of the process of fiscal decentralization of the units of local-self government began in July 2005 after the local elections, and it was implemented in several stages (Report on the Implementation Status, 2012:14). The second stage of the process began only in January 2012, and all of the local units were able to proceed to the second stage, except one municipality that remained in the first stage (Report on the Implementation Status 2012:15). The Law on Financing Units of Local Self-Government (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 61, 2004), was amended and supplemented on several occasions in 2004, 2007, 2009, and 2011. These legal reforms had the purpose of regulating the finances of the units, in order for them to be able to exercise their expanded scope of competences (Report on the Implementation Status, 2012:14).

The OFA also envisaged new a territorial organization of the country: "[b]oundaries of municipalities will be revised within one year of the completion of a new census..." (Item 3.2, OFA, 2001). This was implemented in 2004 with the Law on the Territorial Organization of Local-Self Government (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 55, 2004), which reduced the number of municipalities in the country from 123 to 84 (Report on the Implementation Status, 2012:16). In 2013, after the local elections, five municipalities were merged into one, which reduced the number of municipalities to 80.

As part of the decentralization process, the OFA included the provision that "local heads of police will be selected by municipal councils from lists of candidates proposed by the Ministry of Interior" (Item 3.3, OFA, 2001). This was included in the list of enhanced competences of the municipal council in the Law on Local Self-Government (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 5, 2002).

3.2.3. Non-discrimination and equitable representation

Item 4 in the Framework Agreement specifies the provisions for non-discrimination and equitable representation. The Law on Prevention of and Protection from Discrimination (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 50, 2010) voted in 2010, protects all citizens of the country from all types of discrimination. Non-discrimination provisions have been adopted also in several other laws (Report on the Implementation Status, 2012:17). Furthermore, in 2007 a law was adopted that guarantees the religious freedoms of all citizens (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 113, 2007). In 2011, there were 35 registered religious communities (Report on the Implementation Status, 2012:18).

Regarding the principle of equitable representation, Item 4.2. of the Agreement specifies:

Laws regulating employment in public administration will include measures to assure equitable representation of communities in all central and local public bodies and at all levels of employment within such bodies, while respecting the rules concerning competence and integrity that govern public administration. The authorities will take action to correct present imbalances in the composition of the public administration, in particular through the recruitment of members of under-represented communities. Particular attention will be given to ensuring as rapidly as possible that the police services will generally reflect the composition and distribution of the population of Macedonia, as specified in Annex C.(OFA, 2001)

In order to implement this principle, substantive legal changes were made. According to the Report on the Implementation Status of all Policies deriving from the Ohrid Framework Agreement (2012:20), the Law on Civil Servants, the Law on Employment Relations, the Law on Public Enterprises, the Law on Local Self-Government, the Law on the Ombudsman, and many others were amended. Furthermore, several government strategies were adopted and one committee was established from 2003 to 2007, in order to improve the equitable

representation of all communities in Macedonia (Report on the Implementation Status, 2012:20).

3.2.4. Special procedures in Parliament

The special Parliamentary procedures that followed the Ohrid Framework Agreement were mentioned earlier in the description of the constitutional amendments. As described, a number of laws and some constitutional amendments can be adopted only with what is known as "double majority", or "Badinter majority." In the case of a dispute regarding the manner of voting, the Committee for Inter-Community Relations steps in and resolves the dispute (Report on the Implementation Status, 2012:19).

3.2.5. Policies related to identity, culture, use of languages and education

The Ohrid Framework Agreement dedicated special attention to the questions of identity, culture, use of languages and education. Part of these questions were already discussed in the description of the constitutional amendments. However, as part of the legal framework regarding these issues, the Law on Culture was amended in 2003 (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 49, 2003), in order to provide better legal grounds for nurturing the culture of the communities living in the country. Several cultural institutions were established in the following years, which are focused on the cultural preservation of the ethnic communities in the country, with a special focus on the Albanian ethnic community (Report on the Implementation Status, 2012:23). Furthermore, in 2004, the process of cultural decentralization was implemented, which delegated much of the control of local cultural institutions to the units of local-self government (Report on the Implementation Status, 2012:24).

Regarding the use of symbols, the Law on the Use of Flags of the Communities in the Republic of Macedonia was enacted in 2005, specifying that in all units of local-self government where people who are a minority at a national level, but are a majority in that specific unit, the flag of that community will be flown at all times together with the national flag, in front of and in the offices of the unit of local self-government (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No 58, 2005).

The use of languages by the communities in the country was part of the constitutional amendments described above. As part of the legislative framework regarding this issue, several laws have been enacted, regulating the use of languages of the communities on a local level and in Parliament, as well as, regulating the use of languages in publishing laws and writing names in official documents (Report on the Implementation Status, 2012: 25). All these laws and amendments of the existing laws substantively increased the usage of languages of the ethnic minorities, especially the Albanian, in official matters.

Finally, regarding the question of education, Item 6 of the Framework Agreement specifies that the education at elementary and secondary level should be provided in the native languages of students, the state should provide funding for university education in the languages spoken by at least 20% of the population, and, positive discrimination principles will be applied in the enrolment process of students at the state universities (Item 6, OFA, 2001). These provisions were implemented with amendments of the Law on Higher Education in 2003, as well as with the establishment (recognition) of the State University of Tetovo in 2004, whose language of instruction is Albanian (Report on the Implementation Status, 2012:26).

3.3.The political situation after 2001 and the Ohrid Framework Agreement

The political situation in the country after 2001 significantly stabilized, however, inter-ethnic relations remained fragile. The implementation of the Agreement started shortly after its signing, and it continued in the following years, focusing primarily on the adoption of the legal amendments following from the Agreement.

In 2002 before the Parliamentary elections, the NLA transformed into a political party - Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), and entered the government coalition the same year, together with the social democrats - SDSM. Since 2002, DUI has established itself as the major political party from the Albanian block, winning the majority of votes of the ethnic Albanian part of the population in all successive Parliamentary elections (State Election Commission, 2014). They have taken part in every governing coalition since 2002, except from 2006 to 2008, when the winning party in the Macedonian block - VMRO-DPMNE decided to form a coalition with DPA, their traditional partner, which is the other major party in the Albanian block.

In July 2004, large protests were organized by ethnic Macedonians, against the implementation of the proposed territorial reorganization of the country, and the redrawing of municipal borders. In November the same year, a referendum was organized to appeal the legislative decision for redrawing municipal borders. However, the referendum did not pass the required threshold of turnout; therefore it failed, and the territorial organization reforms were implemented (BBC, 2012).

In 2005, Macedonia gained the status of EU candidate country, while in 2006, it received an invitation to join NATO at the next summit in 2008. However, on the summit in 2008, Greece blocked the NATO invitation, as a result of the unresolved name dispute. The same year, Macedonia recognized the independence of Kosovo (BBC, 2012).

In 2006, the center-right political party VMRO-DPMNE won the Parliamentary elections, and coalitioned with the second largest party in the Albanian block - DPA, which caused openly expressed dissatisfaction from the winning party from the Albanian block - DUI. VMRO-DPMNE won all of the following Parliamentary elections held in 2008, 2011 and 2014, and in each case it formed a coalition government with DUI.

Since 2006, when VMRO-DPMNE formed the first of several successive governments, the leaders of the party started a nationalist discourse, which gained the most strength in 2008 after the Greek veto for the NATO membership. Namely, they commenced a process of reinventing the Macedonian identity, known in the public discourse as "antiquization." The name of this process comes from the idea that there is a direct link between today's ethnic Macedonians, and Ancient Macedonians (Vangeli, 2010:13). As Vangeli argues, this process commenced in December 2006, when the government led by VMRO-DPMNE renamed the Skopje Airport in "Alexander the Great." However, the antiquization process "snowballed into a wider phenomenon" after the Greek veto for joining NATO in 2008 (Vangeli, 2010). The activities that the government undertook as a part of this process include renaming of various buildings and public spaces with names associated with the Ancient Macedonian Kingdom, producing and broadcasting nationalistic video materials, inventing traditions, and promoting new archeological and ethnographic research that supposedly links the today's ethnic Macedonians with the Ancient ones. The biggest project that the government implemented was the grandiose "Skopje 2014" project, which involved

erecting numerous monuments, and construction of buildings in ancient and baroque style, which almost completely changed the look of the capital city. The antiquization process triggered strong negative reactions from Greece, and negatively affected the inter-ethnic relations in the country (Vangeli, 2010).

In the years following the Framework Agreement, several ethnic incidents have occurred, including riots, protests and clashes with the police, however none of them escalated into a major ethnic clash (Marusic, 2013). However, the governing political parties have been constantly accused by intellectuals, that they manipulate the public, and heat up ethnic tensions for boosting up their ratings (Unkovska, 2010; Zafirovski, 2010).

4. Theoretical framework and research design

4.1. Framework for analysis

The inter-ethnic relations and the implementation of all the measures specified in the Ohrid Agreement were the most salient political issue in Macedonia throughout the 2000s. It was no longer possible for people to avoid the ethnic issue, since it became institutionalized and present in the many aspects of the functioning of the state.

The effects of the Agreement were felt shortly after its signing, as soon as the policies related to identity, usage of languages, and especially regarding the policies of just and equitable representation, started being implemented. Because of the underrepresentation of the minority communities in the public bodies, the reforms entailed great waves of employment of dominantly ethnic Albanians in public administration. In the period 2004-2010, the employment of Albanians increased from 5.61% to 24.18%, while for all other non-majority communities these numbers were quite insignificant (compared by Risteska, 2013:32). This was a sensitive issue for a few reasons. Namely, Macedonia has maintained very high levels of unemployment throughout the two decades of independence, that stabilized around 30% of the working age population (CIA Factbook, 2013); therefore, employment opportunities were very important and much needed for the citizens of the country. Furthermore, the process of employment based on the ethnic key was severely criticized, since it largely disregarded the qualifications of the candidates, as well as the objective needs for new personnel in the administrative bodies. According to Risteska (2013, 29), ethnic employment can be divided into two periods: “positive discrimination and some merit-based recruitment (2004-2006), [and] the spoils system and no merit-based recruitment (2006-2011).” According to Risteska (2013), because of the fact that the SIOFA was

introduced as the main employing body based on ethnicity, the recruitment and training system from before was abandoned. This resulted in overcrowding of the public administration with unqualified and unnecessary employees, some of which were not even working in the body they were employed in, but figured as employees, and received a monthly salary. Finally, these employment opportunities were quickly picked up by the parties in government as a means for party mobilization, since they could secure support for their party by offering jobs. Therefore, employment by ethnic key, quickly turned into employment by ethnic and political party key (Risteska, 2013).

The signing of the Agreement triggered strong negative feelings among the ethnic Macedonian population of the country. The politicians from the Macedonian block, through their opposition to the Agreement manipulated the public opinion of ethnic Macedonians, creating fear that the terms of the Agreement would threaten the national identity (Brunnbauer, 2002:7). Ethnic Macedonians perceived the Agreement as pressured upon them by the international community, and felt betrayed by the US and NATO (Brunnbauer, 2002:8). They found themselves as being the 'losers' in the situation. Ethnic Macedonians feared that the Agreement would give enormous power to the Albanian community in the country, which might lead to demands for secession. Furthermore, the plans for decentralization were perceived by ethnic Macedonians as a possibility for creating ethnically dominant Albanian municipalities, where they would enjoy complete control. Similarly, the provisions for just and equitable representation in all public bodies were thought of as job losses, in the already very difficult job market. The ethnic Albanian population saw themselves as the 'winners', since they finally got their demands recognized. However, there was also a strong feeling of skepticism present among the Albanian part of the population, because they did not believe that the Agreement would be fully and effectively implemented

(Tsukatos, 2008:35). The negative feelings of ethnic Macedonians towards the Ohrid Agreement remained long after the Agreement was signed. A survey conducted eight years after the Agreement found that only 24% of ethnic Macedonians expressed support for it, while the support of ethnic Albanians was much higher - 83% (Mitevaska, 2009).

In order to have a comprehensive research on the topic of institutional trust in my analysis I include elements of both the cultural and institutional theories on trust. However, my focus is on three main explanatory variables which are closely linked to the cultural theories, and have particular importance in the Macedonian context. These variables are: belonging to a specific ethnic group, social trust, and support for one of the parties currently in government. The macro level, performance variables are also analyzed in relation to the general level of trust, in order to evaluate whether the performance of the country's institutions, and the general democratic developments in the country are related to the trends of declining/growing trust.

In terms of dependent and independent variables, my research question can be defined in the following manner. The dependent variable is institutional trust, however, in order to obtain more nuanced findings in relation to the implemented institutional changes, the trust in these institutions will be observed separately. Therefore, I have five dependent variables (DVs), which are as follows:

DV1: Trust in the government.

DV2: Trust in Parliament.

DV3: Trust in the judiciary.

DV4: Trust in the police.

DV5: Trust in the civil service.

Notably, the government as an institution went through the least changes in this process of institutional reform. Specifically, the power-sharing element of inclusion of all the important segments in the society into the executive was present even before 2001. The tradition of forming government coalitions between the largest Macedonian and Albanian party was uninterrupted since the independence of the country. However, the government is the most powerful political body in the country, therefore the citizens' general satisfaction with the political situation in the country is most likely to be reflected in the confidence they express towards this institution.

In contrast to the government, Parliament went through substantive changes, among which the most important was the introduction of the 'double majority' rule, which was described previously. The work of the judiciary was affected by the introduction of the provisions for selection of the Ombudsman, members of the State Judicial Council and judges of the Constitutional Court with the double majority principle.

Finally, the police and the civil service went through the biggest changes, as a result of the implementation of the fair and equitable representation provision. Namely, both these institutions went through considerable staff changes, as a result of the employment policies implemented in order for a fair, and proportional representation of ethnic communities. Furthermore, the work of the police was also affected by the decentralization process, which transferred more control over this institution to the local government.

Although it would be important to analyze trust towards other institutions in the country, such as the educational system, and the local government, data for such analysis was not available. Therefore, my analysis is limited only to these five institutions.

Regarding the independent variables, as it was stated before, my analysis includes elements of both cultural and institutional theories of trust. The full list of my independent variables (IVs) is:

IV1: Social trust.

IV2: Support for the incumbent party.

IV3: Ethnic group belonging.

IV4: Age.

IV5: Educational attainment.

IV6: Government Effectiveness.

IV8: Control of corruption.

IV9: Voice and accountability.

IV10: Political Stability and Absence of Violence.

IV11: Rule of Law.

The central explanatory variable in the cultural theories of institutional trust is social or generalized trust. Social trust refers to the levels of trust people express towards other people that they do not necessarily know. As Uslaner suggests, when asked "do you trust people in general, or you cannot be too careful?", we think not only about people like us, but also about people that are different from us, revealing one important component of bridging social capital we possess (Uslaner, 2008:104). In the Macedonian context, this variable indicates the level of trust people have towards people who are not necessarily in the same socio-economic position as them, or do not share the same religion, or belong to a different ethnic group. In diverse societies as the Macedonian one, higher levels of social capital indicate greater cohesion, and integration within the society. So I find it important to analyze

whether the levels of generalized or social trust have an impact on institutional trust, as the cultural theories suggest.

As Rose-Ackerman notes, in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, politicians have established a practice to run their governments in extremely partisan ways. Thus, they have created a polarized electorate that expects good treatment from the government, only if the party that they support is part of the it (Rose-Ackerman, 2004:9). Macedonia has not been an exception from this practice. Moreover, with the reforms introduced by the Ohrid Framework Agreement, especially in the part of just and equitable representation policies, the governing political parties have gained even more space to reward their supporters, and thus gave more reasons to citizens to equate the institutions of the country with the current government. Therefore, support for incumbent is my second independent variable, accounting for the support citizens express towards political parties currently in government.

My third independent variable is one of the central variables in this study, given the nature of the institutional changes introduced in Macedonia - ethnic group belonging. This variable account for the effect of ethnicity in evaluating the state institutions and will provide grounds for comparison between different ethnic groups.

A group of variables that is commonly used in analyses of institutional trust is the demographic characteristics of the individual respondents in surveys. These variables have secondary importance in my analysis, as opposed to the previous three, but they do provide important information about the origins of institutional trust. These variables are: age and educational attainment.

Regarding factors that are used in macro institutional theories as explanatory variables of institutional trust, I have selected a group of variables which indicate the general performance and development of the country at large. Namely, I use five of the six World Bank's Worldwide Governance indicators: government effectiveness, control of corruption, voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, and rule of law.

Having defined the concepts that I am working with, I will proceed with elaborating the expected results from my study.

4.2. Hypotheses

From the analysis, I expect to find a pattern in the changing levels of trust as well as the factors that explain them, which would be associated with the institutional changes introduced by the Ohrid Framework Agreement in Macedonia. Primarily, because of the winners and losers discourse, as well as the low support expressed by ethnic Macedonians for the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the reforms it entailed, I expect that the general levels of institutional trust of ethnic Macedonians will decrease in the years following the Ohrid Agreement; in contrast, I expect that the general levels of institutional trust of ethnic Albanians will increase.

H1. The levels of institutional trust of ethnic Macedonians will decline over time, in the period following the OFA.

H2. The levels of institutional trust of ethnic Albanians will increase over time, in the period following the OFA.

I do not make predictions about the smaller ethnic communities in the country, because I do not believe that they could be considered as a coherent group, since the Agreement had different effects on them. However, due to the small sample size of these ethnic communities, they cannot be analyzed separately.

Furthermore, although the just and equitable representation principle was a noble idea to offer equal opportunities for the advancement of all the communities in the country, the way this provision was, and still is implemented might lead to increased association of the political institutions with the parties currently in government. Namely, the employment strategies according to the ethnic and political party key discussed above, increase citizens' incentives to become supporters or members of the parties currently in government, because they will have more opportunities to gain benefits, such as employment in public administration. Therefore, citizens had increasingly more reasons to equate parties with state institutions.

H3. The citizens that support one of the parties in the government coalition will become more trusting of the political institutions in the period after the adoption of OFA.

In regards to social trust, I expect that it will have a consistent effect on institutional trust, as the cultural theories suggest.

H4. Social trust will have a consistent effect on institutional trust.

I do not have any expectations regarding the effect of age and education on institutional trust. The inclusion of these two variables in the analysis will only have the purpose of detecting possible differences between the younger and older, as well as the more and the less educated citizens in their likelihood to have confidence in the political institutions in the country.

The country-level governance indicators paint a broader picture about the general democratic development and stability of the country. So an improvement in the rule of law, political satiability, government effectiveness, control of corruption, or accountability should

indicate a better performance of the political institutions in the country. Therefore, I expect that improvement in these indicators would lead to greater institutional trust.

H5. Improvement in the governance of the country will lead to greater institutional trust.

After stating the theoretical framework of my research, in the next section I will describe the methodology and the data I am using in order to answer my research question, and to test my hypotheses.

4.3. Data

For the purposes of this analysis, I use data from several different sources. Namely, for the central variables of my interest, institutional trust, belonging to an ethnic group, social trust, support for the incumbent party, age and education, I use survey data covering the years from 1998 to 2013⁴. The sources of individual level survey data are summarized in Table 1. Detailed information about the wording of the questions used in the surveys, can be found in Appendix 1, while information about the sampling techniques used for gathering data in these surveys can be found in Appendix 2.

The country level data I am using in the analysis comes from the World Bank's Governance Indicators (WGI). Specifically, I am using five of the six governance indicators the World Bank has provided: *government effectiveness*, *control of corruption*, *voice and accountability*, *political stability and absence of violence*, and *rule of law*. All of these indicators are based on a large number of data sources, including household surveys, NGO reports, commercial business information providers, and public sector organizations. In short, government effectiveness indicates perceptions regarding the quality of public services, and

⁴ The starting point of the analysis is chosen based on the availability of data.

the civil service. The control of corruption indicator describes perceptions regarding the exercise of power for private gains. The voice and accountability indicator shows the presence of basic political and civil rights. Perceptions regarding the possible destabilization of the government are captured by the political stability and absence of violence indicator. Finally, the rule of law indicates the perceptions regarding the confidence in the rules of the society (WGI). The full description of these five indicators is provided in Appendix 3.

Table 1. Sources of survey data used in the analysis

<i>Month and year of data collection</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Sample size</i>
February 1998	World Values Survey (third wave)	995
November - December 2001	World Values Survey (fourth wave)	1055
May 2004	Survey conducted by Prof. G. Ivanov and the Faculty of Law "Iustinianus Primus", Ss Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, Macedonia	1091
December 2006	Survey conducted by the Institute for Democracy "Societas Civilis" Skopje (IDSCS)	1111
July - August 2008	Survey conducted by BRIMA Macedonia, for the purposes of the People Centered Analysis project led by UNDP and SEEU.	2797
July - October 2008	European Values Survey (forth wave)	1500
August - September 2009	Survey conducted by BRIMA Macedonia, for the purposes of the People Centered Analysis project led by UNDP and SEEU.	1163
December 2010	Survey conducted by the Institute of Sociological, Political and Juridical Research, for the needs of the Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (MCIC)	1300
April 2013	Survey conducted by Center for Research and Policy Making	1104

Because the survey data used in this analysis comes from different sources, there are small differences in the wording of the questions. However, there are larger differences in terms of the number of response categories on the survey questions. In order to be able to compare the data from the different surveys, I have recoded the variables, each containing only two categories, except for the variable belonging to a specific ethnic group, which was recoded into three categories.

Specifically, institutional trust was originally measured as the expressed level of confidence for each political institution in the country, usually by the question "[h]ow much confidence do you have in [the specific political institution]?" However, some of the surveys used a 10 point measurement scale, some used a 4 point scale, and some used just a 2 point measurement scale. For the purposes of the analysis, I recoded the variables which have more than a 2 point measurement scale to 2 categories, using median split.

Generalized, or social trust is measured through the question "Do you think most people can be trusted?" with two possible answers "most people can be trusted" and "you cannot be too careful". Only one survey used a ten-point scale on this question, so it was recoded into two categories, again splitting the scale in the middle. However, this question was not present in all surveys included in the analysis.

The question of belonging to a certain ethnic group is asked in most of the surveys. The question contains all of the ethnicities that reside in the Republic of Macedonia; however, for the purposes of my analysis I recoded the variable into three categories: Macedonian ethnic group, Albanian ethnic group and other ethnic groups. The third category covers all the smaller ethnic groups in Macedonia, since they are very small and the number of their respondents in the samples does not allow me to analyze them separately. In the European

Values Survey this question was not present, therefore I created a proxy by using two variables: language in which the survey was conducted, and vote choice.

Support for the incumbent party variable was constructed by the variable of vote choice, namely, the respondents that indicated that they would vote for one of the parties in the current governing coalition at the time of the interview were coded as supporters, while the rest of the respondents were coded as not supporters. In one of the surveys, the evaluation of the leaders of political parties was used as a proxy, while in another the question about to the party you feel the closest to.

Age was measured both as the number of years, and in age groups, depending on the survey. I found it most adequate to create to age groups: below, and above the age of 40. The only exception to this is the 2013 survey, where different age groups were used in the survey, therefore, the division was made again in two groups, but above and below the age of 35.

The level of education is measured in several different ways. The main difference among the surveys in the education variable is the number of categories they assigned, making some of the surveys more and others less detailed. However, all surveys allow me to recode the education variable into two categories which I find meaningful for the purposes of my analysis, separating respondents into those who have high school education or lower, and those who have some level of university education.

The governance indicators are measured on the same continuous scale, from -2.5 to 2.5. These variables have not been recoded, and they were used in their original form in this analysis.

For a better overview, the full list of the variables included in the analysis after recoding, at both individual and country level is presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Complete list of the explanatory variables included in the analysis

<i>Response variables</i>	<i>Categories</i>
Trust in government	1) Trust; 2) No trust
Trust in Parliament	1) Trust; 2) No trust
Trust in the judiciary	1) Trust; 2) No trust
Trust in the police	1) Trust; 2) No trust
Trust in the civil service	1) Trust; 2) No trust
<i>Individual level explanatory variables</i>	<i>Categories</i>
Belonging to a specific ethnic group	1) Macedonian; 2) Albanian; 3) Other
Social trust	1) Trust; 2) No trust
Support for the incumbent party	1) Support; 2) No support
Age	1) ≤ 39 ; 2) ≥ 40 ⁵
Education	1) High school or less; 2) University
<i>Country level explanatory variables</i>	<i>Range</i>
Government effectiveness	From - 2.5 to 2.5
Control of corruption	From - 2.5 to 2.5
Voice and accountability	From - 2.5 to 2.5
Political stability and absence of violence	From - 2.5 to 2.5
Rule of law	From - 2.5 to 2.5

4.4. Methodology

The analysis in this research project will be conducted using statistical tools, and then interpreted in the specific Macedonian context. Because the survey data which I am using for the analysis, has been collected in different years by different agencies, the variables had to be recoded into two and three categories, in order to obtain comparability across surveys. Given the nature of the data at hand, I found that loglinear modeling is the most appropriate tool for this analysis.

⁵ Except in the 2013 survey conducted by Center for Research and Policy Making, where the original categories were assigned differently than in the other surveys, therefore the variable age was recoded 1) ≤ 34 ; 2) ≥ 35 .

Loglinear models are suited for describing association structures among a set of categorical response variables (Agresti and Finaly, 2009:483; Agresti, 2007:204). They use conditional odds ratios to describe the associations (Agresti and Finaly, 2009:512). In this case, simple linear regression cannot be used, because one of the assumptions of this method is that at least the dependent variable is continuous (2009:255), which is not the case in my data. Alternatively, logistic regression could have been used for this analysis, however, I found loglinear to be more appropriate for several reasons. Logistic regression is more suitable when among the explanatory variables, we have both categorical and continues variables. In the case where all the variables are categorical, (like in my case), the logistic model would be equivalent to the log linear model (Agresti, 2007:219). Finally, I am focused in finding associations between pairs of variables, specifically, institutional trust and my main three explanatory variables, which can be achieved by using loglinear analysis, rather than building a general model that would explain institutional trust, for which logistic regression would be more appropriate (Agresti and Finaly, 2009:503).

Regarding the country level governance data, which is of secondary importance in my analysis, I adopted a much simpler method of analysis. Namely, since there are not enough time points for a sophisticated statistical analysis to be performed, these variables will be analyzed descriptively, observing their general trends over time.

In the next section, the findings from the analysis conducted are presented.

5. Findings

In this section, I first present the general trends in institutional trust in Macedonia for the period from 1998 to 2013. Then I present the loglinear models constructed to explain institutional trust in a given year, organized by institution in the following order: government, Parliament, judiciary, police and civil service. Finally, in the last sub-section, the governance indicators will be presented, in relation to the levels of institutional trust. The presentation of the findings is followed by their discussion and few comments on the limitations of the analysis.

5.1. General trends in the institutional trust in Macedonia from 1998 to 2013

This subsection presents the general levels of institutional trust in Macedonia from 1998 to 2013. The trends are presented by institution, starting from the government, followed by Parliament, judiciary, police and finishing with the civil service.

Figure 1. Confidence in the Macedonian Government 1998 - 2013




Figure 1 presents the general trend of confidence in the government in Macedonia from 1998 to 2013. The percentage of survey respondents that expressed confidence in the government in 1998 was very low - only 20.10% - and it halved in 2001 (10.96%), a mere few months after the violent conflict. However, already in 2004 there was a substantial increase: more than half of the respondents reported that they had confidence in the government. In 2006, the percentage of trusting people reached almost two-thirds of the survey respondents. In the following years, there was a slight decrease in the level of confidence; however, it still remained relatively high as compared to the levels of 1998 and 2001.

Figure 2. Confidence in the Macedonian Government by ethnicity 1998 - 2013





Figure 2 presents the percentages of respondents who expressed confidence in the Macedonian government by ethnicity. As the graph shows, ethnic Albanians had less confidence in the government than the ethnic Macedonians and the other smaller ethnic groups in 1998 and 2001. What is surprising is the incredibly high level of trust of the smaller ethnic groups in the country in 1998. However, this might be due to the small sample size of

this particular part of the population. Nevertheless, in 2004 and 2006, the expressed confidence of all ethnic groups came close together, while in the period from 2008 to 2013, the confidence expressed by ethnic Albanians declined substantively in relation to the other ethnic groups in the country.

Figure 3. Confidence in the Macedonian Parliament 1998 - 2013




Following the trust in government, Figure 3 presents the percentages of survey respondents who expressed confidence in the Macedonian Parliament in a given year. Similarly to the confidence in the government, the respondents expressed very low confidence in the national Parliament in 1998 and 2001. In 2004 there was a sizable increase, since more than half of the respondents expressed confidence in Parliament. In the following years, this support gradually, yet only slightly, decreased, reaching the level of 32% of the respondents expressing confidence in the Parliament in 2013.

In Figure 4, the percentages of respondents who have confidence in Parliament are presented per year, and also per ethnicity. As the graph shows, in 1998 and 2001 ethnic

Albanians had slightly lower levels of trust, compared to ethnic Macedonians and the other smaller ethnic groups. In contrast, in the next three surveys, from 2004, 2006 and 2008, ethnic Albanians expressed higher levels of trust, as compared to the other ethnic groups in the country. However, already in 2010 and 2013, ethnic Albanians again showed much lower levels of confidence in the Macedonian Parliament than the other ethnic groups, especially ethnic Macedonians.

Figure 4. Confidence in the Macedonian Parliament by ethnicity 1998 - 2013




Next I present the data regarding confidence in the judiciary. As Figure 5 indicates, unlike in the case of confidence in the government and Parliament, there is no sharp increase in confidence between 1998 and 2004. During this entire period of 15 years, confidence in the judiciary remains quite low, reaching a peak in 2008, with almost 38% of the respondents indicating that they had confidence in the judiciary.

Figure 6 indicates the level of confidence in the judiciary by year and by ethnic group. The results are quite similar to the ones about confidence in Parliament and the government. Namely, ethnic Albanians indicated lower levels of confidence than ethnic Macedonians in

1998, while their level of confidence rose greatly from 2004 to 2008, and it was higher than the level of ethnic Macedonians. Finally, in 2010 and 2013, the data indicated a lowering of the level of confidence of all ethnic groups; however, ethnic Albanians suffered the greatest loss of confidence, and again their level was below that of ethnic Macedonians. The smaller ethnic groups in the country expressed surprisingly high levels of confidence in 1998, while in the other years, their level came very close to that of the ethnic Macedonians.

Figure 5. Confidence in the Macedonian Judiciary 1998 - 2013



The general trend of trust in the police is presented on Figure 7. In 1998 the level of confidence was relatively low, however it doubled in 2001, most likely as a result of the conflict. In 2004 the confidence further increased and it reached the level of 70% of the respondents expressing confidence towards this institution. In the following years it stabilized with around half of the respondents expressing confidence in the police.

Figure 6. Confidence in the Macedonian Judiciary 1998 - 2013





Figure 7. Confidence in the Macedonian Police 1998 - 2013



On Figure 8 we can see the level of confidence in the police by year and by ethnicity. It is evident that in 1998 and 2001 the ethnic Albanians expressed almost no confidence in this institution. In the following years their confidence greatly increased, however, it was again lower than the one expressed by the rest of the ethnic groups in the country. In 2010 and

2013 the gap in the expressed levels of confidence by the ethnic Albanians and the rest of the ethnic groups again increased.

Figure 8. Confidence in the Macedonian Police by ethnicity 1998 - 2013





Figure 9. Confidence in the Macedonian Civil Service 1998 - 2008




Finally, the data regarding confidence in the civil service is presented in the following part. Unlike for the other institutions, less data is available for the trust in the civil service, and therefore the analysis will be conducted only on these three surveys.

Figure 9 indicates the general trend of trust in the civil service in this time period of ten years. Namely, confidence in the civil service was very low in 1998 and 2001 - less than 20% of the respondents indicated that they trusted this institution. However, in 2008 there was a substantial increase, since almost half the respondents of the survey expressed confidence in the civil service.

Figure 10 shows the levels of trust in the civil service in the three years by ethnicity. It is notable that in 1998 and in 2001 the ethnic Albanians expressed much less trust toward this institution than the other ethnic groups in the country, while the smaller ethnic groups had substantively higher levels of trust, compared to the other ethnic groups. In 2008, the general level of trust of all ethnic groups was much higher, however, it is notable that the ethnic Albanians had 10% more trust in this institution than the ethnic Macedonians.

Figure 10. Confidence in the Macedonian Civil Service by ethnicity 1998 - 2008



Having this general overview of the trends in institutional trust, in the following part the loglinear models constructed to explain trust in each of these five institutions in the timeframe of fifteen years are presented.

5.2. Confidence in the government

Table 3 presents the coefficients from several models constructed for each year from 1998 to 2013 for which data was available, regarding trust in the government. The p-values of the models greater than 0.05 indicate that they are fitting, meaning that the null hypothesis of independence of the variables is rejected.

The conditional odds ratios of the ethnic group variable indicate that the odds of ethnic Macedonians were approximately 1.4 times greater in 1998, and almost 2 times greater in 2001 than the odds of ethnic Albanians to have confidence in the government. The odds of the smaller ethnic groups in the country were 2 times greater than the odds of ethnic Macedonians, and almost 3 times greater than the odds of ethnic Albanians to have confidence in the government in 1998. In 2001, the likelihood of ethnic Macedonians and the smaller ethnic groups for trusting the government evens out. Already in 2004 and 2006, we can see that the direction of the likelihood for ethnic Macedonians and Albanians for trusting the government is reversed. Namely, in this period the odds for ethnic Albanians are from 1.1 to 1.2 times greater than the odds of ethnic Macedonians to have confidence in the government. The difference is even bigger for the ethnic Albanians and the smaller ethnic groups in the country. Specifically, in 2004 and 2006, the odds of ethnic Albanians are 1.4 to 1.5 greater than the odds of the smaller ethnic groups to have confidence in the government. From 2008, until 2013, the relation is reversed again. Both ethnic Macedonians and the smaller ethnic groups in the country are increasingly more likely of the government, than ethnic Albanians.

Table 3. Conditional odds ratios from the log linear models constructed to explain confidence in the government in 1998 - 2013

Year	Model	Ethnic group			Incumbent support Yes	Social trust Yes	Education		Age	
		Mac.	Alb.	Other			≤ high school	university	≤ 39	≥ 40
1998	12, 13, 14, 15, 2345 (<i>p</i> = 0.182)	vs Alb. 1.36 vs others 0.48	vs Mac. 0.73 vs others 0.35	vs Mac. 2.05 vs Alb. 2.80	2.23	1.28	1.10	0.91	/	/
1998	12, 13, 15, 16, 2356 (<i>p</i> = 0.300)	vs Alb. 1.51 vs others 0.47	vs Mac. 0.66 vs others 0.31	vs Mac. 2.11 vs Alb. 3.20	2.26	/	1.08	0.92	0.93	1.07
2001	12, 13, 16, 236 (<i>p</i> = 0.746)	vs Alb. 2.33 vs others 0.87	vs Mac. 0.42 vs others 0.37	vs Mac. 1.14 vs Alb. 2.68	2.39	/	/	/	0.69	1.43
2001	12, 14, 16, 246 (<i>p</i> = 0.476)	vs Alb. 1.90 vs others 1.01	vs Mac. 0.52 vs others 0.53	vs Mac. 0.99 vs Alb. 1.87	/	1.19	/	/	0.78	1.28
2001	12, 15, 16, 256 (<i>p</i> = 0.164)	vs Alb. 1.96 vs others 1.03	vs Mac. 0.51 vs others 0.53	vs Mac. 0.96 vs Alb. 1.89	/	/	1.21	0.82	0.77	1.30
2004	12, 13, 15, 16, 2356 (<i>p</i> = 0.644)	vs Alb. 0.911 vs others 1.28	vs Mac. 1.10 vs others 1.40	vs Mac. 0.78 vs Alb. 0.71	2.66	//	0.81	1.23	0.97	1.02
2006	12, 13, 15, 235 (<i>p</i> = 0.089)	vs Alb. 0.86 vs others 1.27	vs Mac. 1.16 vs others 1.48	vs Mac. 0.79 vs Alb. 0.68	3.17	//	1.07	0.93	/	/
2006	12, 13, 16, 236 (<i>p</i> = 0.135)	vs Alb. 0.83 vs others 1.27	vs Mac. 1.20 vs others 1.52	vs Mac. 0.79 vs Alb. 0.66	3.14	//	/	/	0.81	1.23
2008	12, 15, 16, 256 (<i>p</i> = 0.766)	vs Alb. 1.48 vs others 1.09	vs Mac. 0.68 vs others 0.74	vs Mac. 0.91 vs Alb. 1.35	//	//	0.82	1.21	0.92	1.08
2008	12, 13, 14, 234 (<i>p</i> = 0.051)	vs Alb. 1.13 vs others 0.86	vs Mac. 0.88 vs others 0.76	vs Mac. 1.16 vs Alb. 1.32	1.99	1.38	/	/	/	/
2009	12, 13, 14, 234 (<i>p</i> = 0.485)	vs Alb. 1.23 vs others 1.10	vs Mac. 0.81 vs others 0.89	vs Mac. 0.90 vs Alb. 1.12	//	//	0.96	1.04	0.97	1.03
2010	12, 14, 16, 246 (<i>p</i> = 0.551)	vs Alb. 1.89 vs others 1.29	vs Mac. 0.53 vs others 0.68	vs Mac. 0.78 vs Alb. 1.47	/	1.32	/	/	1.05	0.95
2010	13, 14, 15, 16, 3456 (<i>p</i> = 0.434)	/	/	/	2.38	1.26	0.94	1.06	0.97	1.03
2013	12, 15, 16, 256 (<i>p</i> = 0.793)	vs Alb. 1.84 vs others 1.14	vs Mac. 0.54 vs others 0.62	vs Mac. 0.88 vs Alb. 1.61	/	//	1.11	0.90	0.94	1.06
2013	13, 15, 16, 356 (<i>p</i> = 0.329)	/	/	/	2.53	//	1.02	0.98	0.84	1.18

1 - Confidence in government; 2 - Ethnic group; 3 - Support for governing party; 4 - Social trust; 5 - Education; 6 - Age;

The strongest predictor of trust in the government seems to be the support for one of the parties in the governing coalition. Namely, the odds of respondents who declared that they support one of the incumbent parties in 1998 are 2.23 times greater than the odds of non-supporters to have confidence in the government. From 1998 to 2006 the likelihood of governing-party supporters to trust the government steadily increases, so in 2006, the odds of supporters are approximately 3.15 times greater than the odds of non-supporters to have confidence in the government. From 2008 to 2013, this likelihood slightly decreases, however it still has a relatively large value: odds of supporters are 2 to 2.5 times greater than the ones of non-supporters to trust the government.

Social trust has a relatively strong and consistent effect on trust in the government throughout the whole period of 15 years. Namely, the odds of people who have social trust are from 1.2 to 1.4 times greater than the odds of distrustful respondents to have confidence in the government. However, education does not seem to have a consistent direction or impact on trust in the government. In 1998 and 2001, the odds of people with high school education or less were 1.1 to 1.2 times greater than the odds of university educated people to have confidence in the government. In 2004 and 2008, in contrast, the odds of university educated people were approximately 1.2 times greater than the odds of less educated people to have confidence in the government, while in the rest of the years, the effect of education on trust in the government was negligible. Finally, regarding age, throughout the whole period of 15 years, people older than 40 are more likely to have confidence in the government than younger people. However, the size of the likelihood greatly varies over time.

Because both belonging to a certain ethnic group and support for the parties in the governing coalition have sizable effects in the models for years 2010 and 2013, but no fitting

model could be found which contains both their separate effects, in Table 2, more complex models are constructed that account for the joint effect of these two variables.

From the conditional odds ratios in Table 4, we can see that in both 2010 and 2013, the odds of ethnic Macedonian supporters of the parties in government are approximately 3.5 times greater than the odds of ethnic Albanians to have confidence in the government, while the odds of ethnic Macedonian non-supporters are only 1.5 times greater than the odds ethnic Albanians to have confidence in the government. The odds of ethnic Macedonian supporters are 1.35 times greater than the odds of smaller ethnic groups in 2010, and 1.5 times greater in 2013 to have confidence in the government, however, among non-supporters for the parties in government, the difference between these two ethnic groups is marginal.

Table 4. Conditional odds ratios from the log linear model with interaction effect constructed to explain confidence in the government in 2010 and 2013

Year	Model	Incumbent support	Ethnic group			Social trust	Education		Age	
			Macedonian	Albanian	Other		≤ high school	university	≤ 39	≥ 40
2010	123, 14, 234 (<i>p</i> = 0.287)	Yes	vs. Alb	vs. Mac	vs. Mac	1.34	/		/	
			3.37	0.30	0.74					
			vs. other	vs. other	vs. Alb					
			1.35	0.40	2.49					
		No	vs. Alb	vs. Mac	vs. Mac					
			1.41	0.70	0.89					
			vs. other	vs. other	vs. Alb					
			1.12	0.79	1.26					
2013	123, 14, 234 (<i>p</i> = 0.953)	Yes	vs. Alb	vs. Mac	vs. Mac	//	1.12	0.88	/	/
			3.65	0.27	0.63					
			vs. other	vs. other	vs. Alb					
			1.59	0.44	2.29					
		No	vs. Alb	vs. Mac	vs. Mac					
			1.50	0.66	1.03					
			vs. other	vs. other	vs. Alb					
			0.97	0.64	1.55					
2013	123, 15, 235 (<i>p</i> = 0.574)	Yes	vs. Alb	vs. Mac	vs. Mac	//	/	/	0.86	1.15
			3.57	0.28	0.64					
			vs. other	vs. other	vs. Alb					
			1.56	0.44	2.28					
		No	vs. Alb	vs. Mac	vs. Mac					
			1.49	0.67	1.03					
			vs. other	vs. other	vs. Alb					
			0.97	0.65	1.53					

1 - Confidence in government; 2 - Ethnic group; 3 - Support for governing party; 4 - Social trust; 5 - Education; 6 - Age;

5.3. Confidence in Parliament

In Table 5 the log-linear models constructed to explain trust in Parliament from 1998 to 2013 are presented. As the coefficients in the table indicate, in 1998, the odds of ethnic Macedonians were 1.34 times greater than the odds of ethnic Albanians to express confidence in Parliament. Furthermore, the odds of the smaller ethnic groups were 2 times greater than the odds of ethnic Macedonians, and approximately 2.8 times greater than the odds of ethnic Albanians to have confidence in the Parliament.

In 2001, ethnic Macedonians were even more trustful towards Parliament than ethnic Albanians: their odds were 1.7 times greater, while the differences between ethnic Macedonians and the smaller ethnic groups decreased. Similarly to trust in the government, in 2004 and 2006, it was the ethnic Albanians that were the most trustful. Namely, the odds of ethnic Albanians were 1.3 times greater than the odds of ethnic Macedonians to have confidence in Parliament. Surprisingly, in 2008 the likelihood of all three groups evened out, and in 2010 and 2013, to have the ethnic Macedonians to be the most trustful of the Parliament out of the three groups. So the odds of ethnic Macedonians became 1.7 times greater than the odds of ethnic Albanians, and approximately 1.2 times greater than the odds of the other ethnic groups to have confidence in Parliament.

Support for the incumbent (one of the political parties in the governing coalition) is again a strong predictor for confidence in Parliament, as it was in the case of confidence in the government. Thus, the odds of the supporters of the incumbent were 1.7 times greater than the odds of non-supporters to trust the government in 1998. The effect of incumbent support slowly increased in the following period, and it reaches the odds ratio of 2.5 in 2004. From 2006 to 2010, the differences in the odds between incumbent supporters and non-supporters,

Table 5. Conditional odds ratios from the log linear models constructed to explain confidence in Parliament in 1998 - 2013

Year	Model	Ethnic group			Incumbent support	Social trust	Education		Age	
		Mac.	Alb.	Other	Yes	Yes	≤ high school	university	≤ 39	≥ 40
1998	12, 13, 14, 15, 2345 (<i>p</i> = 0,182)	vs Alb. 1.34 vs others 0.49	vs Mac. 0.74 vs others 0.36	vs Mac. 2.06 vs Alb. 2.76	1.68	1.35	1.04	0.96	/	/
1998	12, 13, 15, 16, 2356 (<i>p</i> = 0.817)	vs Alb. 1.34 vs others 0.47	vs Mac. 0.74 vs others 0.35	vs Mac. 2.14 vs Alb. 2.88	1.72	/	1.03	0.97	0.89	1.12
2001	12, 13, 23 (<i>p</i> = 0.149)	vs Alb. 1.78 vs others 1.05	vs Mac. 0.56 vs others 0.58	vs Mac. 0.95 vs Alb. 1.70	2.05	/	/	/	/	/
2001	12, 14, 16, 2356 (<i>p</i> = 0.663)	vs Alb. 1.67 vs others 1.24	vs Mac. 0.60 vs others 0.75	vs Mac. 0.80 vs Alb. 1.34	/	1.76	/	/	0.71	1.39
2004	12, 13, 15, 16, 2356 (<i>p</i> = 0.144)	vs Alb. 0.79 vs others 1.28	vs Mac. 1.26 vs others 1.62	vs Mac. 0.78 vs Alb. 0.62	2.46	//	0.86	1.16	0.98	1.02
2006	12, 13, 16, 236 (<i>p</i> = 0.161)	vs Alb. 0.77 vs others 0.90	vs Mac. 1.30 vs others 1.17	vs Mac. 1.11 vs Alb. 0.86	1.64	//	/	/	0.99	1.01
2006	12, 13, 15, 235 (<i>p</i> = 0.110)	vs Alb. 0.77 vs others 0.89	vs Mac. 1.30 vs others 1.16	vs Mac. 1.12 vs Alb. 0.86	1.65	//	0.95	1.05	/	/
2008	12, 13, 16, 236 (<i>p</i> = 0.198)	vs Alb. 0.99 vs others 1.07	vs Mac. 1.01 vs others 1.08	vs Mac. 0.93 vs Alb. 0.93	1.51	/	/	/	0.96	1.04
2008	13, 14, 15, 16, 3456 (<i>p</i> = 0.367)	/	/	/	1.48	1.24	1.14	0.88	0.98	1.02
2010	13, 14, 15, 345 (<i>p</i> = 0.237)	/	/	/	1.85	1.17	1.05	0.95	/	/
2010	12, 14, 15, 245 (<i>p</i> = 0.430)	vs Alb. 1.72 vs others 1.14	vs Mac. 0.58 vs others 0.66	vs Mac. 0.87 vs Alb. 1.50	/	1.23	1.02	0.98	/	/
2010	12, 14, 15, 246 (<i>p</i> = 0.595)	vs Alb. 1.72 vs others 1.14	vs Mac. 0.58 vs others 0.66	vs Mac. 0.88 vs Alb. 1.51	/	1.23	/	/	0.98	1.02
2013	12, 13, 15, 235 (<i>p</i> = 0.051)	vs Alb. 1.72 vs others 1.23	vs Mac. 0.58 vs others 0.71	vs Mac. 0.81 vs Alb. 1.40	2.48	//	/	/	0.89	1.12
2013	13, 14, 15, 345 (<i>p</i> = 0.383)	/	/	/	2.34	//	0.98	1.02	0.88	1.14

1 - Confidence in Parliament; 2 - Ethnic group; 3 - Support for governing party; 4 - Social trust; 5 - Education; 6 - Age

Macedonians who are supporters of the incumbent are 2.7 times greater than the odds of ethnic Albanians, to have confidence in Parliament. While among non-supporters, the odds of ethnic Macedonians are only 1.4 times greater than the odds of ethnic Albanians to have trust in this institution. However, for both supporters and non-supporters, there is no important difference between ethnic Macedonians and the smaller ethnic groups in the country.

5.4. Confidence in the judiciary

Table 7 presents the log-linear models constructed to explain confidence in the judiciary from 1998 to 2013. As the conditional odds ratios in the table indicate, in 1998, the odds of ethnic Macedonians were 1.4 times greater than the odds of ethnic Albanians to have confidence in the judiciary. The odds of smaller ethnic groups in the country were 2 times greater than the odds of ethnic Macedonians, and 2.8 times greater than the odds of ethnic Albanians to have confidence in this intuition. From 2004 to 2008, it is the ethnic Albanians that are more trusting in this institution than the ethnic Macedonians. Namely, the odds of ethnic Albanians were 1.1 times greater in 2004, and 1.6 times greater in 2006, than the odds of ethnic Macedonians to have confidence in the judiciary. In this time period the smaller ethnic groups in the country remained slightly more trusting than the ethnic Macedonians. In 2010 and 2013, the odds for trusting the judiciary turn again, so in 2010, the odds of ethnic Macedonians are around 1.1 times greater, and in 2013 almost 1.5 times greater than the odds of ethnic Albanians to trust the judiciary.

Support for the governing party has a fairly strong effect in the entire period of 15 years. In 1998 and 2004, the odds of supporters of the incumbent were 1.5 times greater than the odds of non-supporters to have confidence in the judiciary. The effect is reduced in the following period, since in 2006 the odds of supporters were 1.2 times greater, and in 2008 they were 1.3 times greater than the odds of non-supporters to have confidence in this

institution. In 2010, the effect of this variable completely disappears. However, in 2013 it is again present and quite strong: the odds of supporters of the incumbent were 1.7 times greater than the odds of non-supporters to have confidence in the judiciary.

Table 7. Conditional odds ratios from the log linear models constructed to explain confidence in the judiciary in 1998 - 2013

Year	Model	Ethnic group			Incumbent support	Social trust	Education		Age	
		Mac.	Alb.	Other	Yes	Yes	≤ high school	University	≤ 39	≥ 40
1998	12, 13, 15, 16, 2356 (<i>p</i> = 0.961)	vs Alb. 1.40 vs others 0.50	vs Mac. 0.71 vs others 0.35	vs Mac. 2.01 vs Alb. 2.81	1.51	/	1.03	0.97	0.90	0.11
1998	12, 13, 14, 234 (<i>p</i> = 0.051)	vs Alb. 1.30 vs others 0.50	vs Mac. 0.77 vs others 0.38	vs Mac. 2.00 vs Alb. 2.60	1.53	1.03	/	/	/	/
2004	12, 13, 15, 235 (<i>p</i> = 0.357)	vs Alb. 0.90 vs others 0.86	vs Mac. 1.11 vs others 0.95	vs Mac. 1.17 vs Alb. 1.05	1.44	//	1.07	0.93	/	/
2004	12, 13, 16, 236 (<i>p</i> = 0.076)	vs Alb. 0.90 vs others 0.85	vs Mac. 1.11 vs others 0.94	vs Mac. 1.18 vs Alb. 1.06	1.46	//	/	/	1.35	0.74
2006	12, 13, 16, 236 (<i>p</i> = 0.088)	vs Alb. 0.61 vs others 0.83	vs Mac. 1.64 vs others 1.37	vs Mac. 1.20 vs Alb. 0.73	1.18	//	/	/	1.14	0.88
2006	12, 15, 16, 256 (<i>p</i> = 0.124)	vs Alb. 0.62 vs others 0.84	vs Mac. 1.60 vs others 1.35	vs Mac. 1.18 vs Alb. 0.74	/	//	1.06	0.95	1.13	0.87
2008	12, 13, 15, 235 (<i>p</i> = 0.588)	vs Alb. 0.94 vs others 0.79	vs Mac. 1.06 vs others 0.84	vs Mac. 1.26 vs Alb. 1.19	1.31	/	1.14	0.88	/	/
2008	13, 14, 15, 16, 3456 (<i>p</i> = 0.348)	/	/	/	1.33	1.29	1.12	0.89	1.00	1.01
2010	12, 14, 16, 246 (<i>p</i> = 0.905)	vs Alb. 1.07 vs others 1.11	vs Mac. 0.93 vs others 1.03	vs Mac. 0.90 vs Alb. 0.97	/	1.21	/	/	1.10	0.91
2010	12, 13, 15, 16, 2356 (<i>p</i> = 0.326)	vs Alb. 1.08 vs others 0.97	vs Mac. 0.92 vs others 0.90	vs Mac. 1.03 vs Alb. 1.11	1.01	/	0.99	1.01	1.07	0.93
2013	12, 13, 15, 235 (<i>p</i> = 0.495)	vs Alb. 1.47 vs others 1.03	vs Mac. 0.68 vs others 0.70	vs Mac. 0.97 vs Alb. 1.43	1.69	//	1.01	0.99	/	/
2013	12, 13, 16, 236 (<i>p</i> = 0.754)	vs Alb. 1.47 vs others 1.03	vs Mac. 0.68 vs others 0.70	vs Mac. 0.97 vs Alb. 1.42	1.70	//	/	/	0.95	1.05

1 - Confidence in the judiciary; 2 - Ethnic group; 3 - Support for governing party; 4 - Social trust; 5 - Education; 6 - Age;

In this case, education has a more consistent effect on confidence in the judiciary, but it is again quite weak. From 1998 to 2008, the odds of people with high school education or less were approximately 1.1 times greater than the odds of university educated people to have confidence in this institution. The effect of education disappears in 2010 and 2013. Finally, age has also a relatively weak effect, and except for 1998 and 2013, people younger than 40 were slightly more trusting of the judiciary, than older people.

5.5. Confidence in the police

Table 8 presents the log-linear models constructed to explain the trust in the police from 1998 to 2013. As the coefficients in the table indicate, throughout the entire period of 15 years, ethnic Macedonians had a greater confidence in the police, than ethnic Albanians. In 1998 and 2001, ethnic Albanians had virtually no confidence in the police, which made the odds of ethnic Macedonians 2 times greater in 1998, and 10 times greater in 2001 than the odds of ethnic Albanians to trust the police. The odds of the smaller ethnic groups in the country were approximately 3.5 times greater in 1998, and 7 times greater in 2001 than the odds of ethnic Albanians, to trust the police. From 2004 to 2008, the difference between the likelihood of trusting the police between ethnic Albanians on the one hand, and ethnic Macedonians and the smaller ethnic groups in the country on the other hand, greatly decreased. Namely, the odds of ethnic Macedonians and the smaller ethnic groups were from 1.5 to 1.2 times greater than the odds of ethnic Albanians to trust the police. From 2010, this difference again increased, so the odds of ethnic Macedonians and the smaller ethnic groups were approximately 1.8 times greater in 2010, and 1.5 times greater in 2013, to trust the police than ethnic Albanians.

Support for the incumbent has a moderate effect on trust in the police. Namely, the odds of supporters of the party in government were from 1.2 times, to 1.9 times greater than

the odds of non-supporters to have confidence in the police. In the more recent years, there is notable strengthening of the effect of this variable.

Table 8. Conditional odds ratios from the log linear models constructed to explain confidence in the police in 1998 - 2013

Year	Model	Ethnic group			Incumbent support	Social trust	Education		Age	
		Mac.	Alb.	Other	Yes	Yes	≤ high school	University	≤ 39	≥ 40
1998	12, 13, 14, 234 (<i>p</i> = 0.216)	vs Alb. 2.08 vs others 0.61	vs Mac. 0.48 vs others 0.29	vs Mac. 1.63 vs Alb. 3.40	1.31	1.01	/	/	/	/
1998	12, 13, 15, 16, 2356 (<i>p</i> = 0.691)	vs Alb. 2.31 vs others 0.61	vs Mac. 0.42 vs others 0.26	vs Mac. 1.65 vs Alb. 3.91	1.36	/	1.14	0.87	1.07	0.93
2001	12, 14, 16, 246 (<i>p</i> = 0.573)	vs Alb. 9.00 vs others 1.33	vs Mac. 0.11 vs others 0.15	vs Mac. 0.75 vs Alb. 6.80	/	1.14	/	/	0.84	1.19
2001	12, 13, 15, 235 (<i>p</i> = 0.156)	vs Alb. 10.02 vs others 1.28	vs Mac. 0.10 vs others 0.13	vs Mac. 0.78 vs Alb. 7.86	1.33	/	0.91	1.10	/	/
2004	12, 13, 15, 16, 2356 (<i>p</i> = 0.175)	vs Alb. 1.44 vs others 1.01	vs Mac. 0.69 vs others 0.70	vs Mac. 0.99 vs Alb. 1.43	1.83	//	1.11	0.90	0.97	1.03
2008	12, 15, 16, 256 (<i>p</i> = 0.766)	vs Alb. 1.24 vs others 1.05	vs Mac. 0.81 vs others 0.85	vs Mac. 0.95 vs Alb. 1.17	//	//	0.88	1.13	0.89	1.12
2008	13, 14, 16, 346 (<i>p</i> = 0.449)	/	/	/	1.23	0.94	/	/	0.84	1.18
2008	12, 15, 25 (<i>p</i> = 0.419)	vs Alb. 1.33 vs others 0.78	vs Mac. 0.75 vs others 0.59	vs Mac. 1.28 vs Alb. 1.71	/	/	1.12	0.89	/	/
2010	12, 13, 15, 16, 2356 (<i>p</i> = 0.209)	vs Alb. 1.77 vs others 1.02	vs Mac. 0.56 vs others 0.57	vs Mac. 0.98 vs Alb. 1.74	1.44	/	0.96	1.04	0.96	1.04
2010	12, 13, 14, 234 (<i>p</i> = 0.077)	vs Alb. 1.86 vs others 1.09	vs Mac. 0.53 vs others 0.58	vs Mac. 0.92 vs Alb. 1.71	1.53	1.20	/	/	/	/
2013	12, 13, 15, 235 (<i>p</i> = 0.355)	vs Alb. 1.56 vs others 0.99	vs Mac. 0.64 vs others 0.63	vs Mac. 1.01 vs Alb. 1.58	1.89	//	1.02	0.98	/	/
2013	12, 13, 16, 236 (<i>p</i> = 0.320)	vs Alb. 1.55 vs others 1.01	vs Mac. 0.64 vs others 0.65	vs Mac. 0.99 vs Alb. 1.54	1.92	//	/	/	0.83	1.20

1 - Confidence in the police; 2 - Ethnic group; 3 - Support for governing party; 4 - Social trust; 5 - Education; 6 - Age;

Education again seems to have a weak and inconsistent effect, while age has a moderate and consistent one. Namely, the odds of people older than 40 were 1.1 to 1.2 times greater than the odds of younger people to have confidence in the police.

5.6. Confidence in the civil service

Table 9 presents the log-linear models constructed to explain trust in the civil service from 1998 to 2008. In 1998, the odds of ethnic Macedonians were 1.3 times greater, than the odds of ethnic Albanians to trust the civil service, while the odds of the smaller ethnic groups were 2 times greater than the odds of ethnic Macedonians.

Table 9. Conditional odds ratios from the log linear models constructed to explain confidence in the civil service in 1998 - 2008

Year	Model	Ethnic group			Incumbent support	Social trust	Education		Age	
		Mac.	Alb.	Other	Yes	Yes	≤ high school	University	≤ 39	≥ 40
1998	12, 13, 14, 234 (<i>p</i> = 0.182)	vs Alb. 1.31 vs others 0.50	vs Mac. 0.77 vs others 0.39	vs Mac. 1.98 vs Alb. 2.59	1.45	1.22	/	/	/	/
1998	12, 13, 15, 16, 2356 (<i>p</i> = 0.222)	vs Alb. 1.40 vs others 0.49	vs Mac. 0.71 vs others 0.35	vs Mac. 2.06 vs Alb. 2.88	1.49	/	0.99	0.01	0.91	1.10
2001	12, 13, 15, 235 (<i>p</i> = 0.645)	vs Alb. 2.50 vs others 0.84	vs Mac. 0.40 vs others 0.34	vs Mac. 1.19 vs Alb. 2.97	1.10	/	0.92	1.09	/	/
2001	12, 14, 15, 245 (<i>p</i> = 0.250)	vs Alb. 2.51 vs others 0.84	vs Mac. 0.40 vs others 0.33	vs Mac. 1.19 vs Alb. 2.99	/	1.07	0.92	1.09	/	/
2001	12, 13, 16, 236 (<i>p</i> = 0.167)	vs Alb. 2.50 vs others 0.84	vs Mac. 0.40 vs others 0.34	vs Mac. 1.18 vs Alb. 2.97	1.10	/	/	/	1.00	1.00
2008	12, 13, 15, 235 (<i>p</i> = 0.257)	vs Alb. 0.88 vs others 0.95	vs Mac. 1.13 vs others 1.08	vs Mac. 1.04 vs Alb. 0.92	1.31	/	1.15	0.87	/	/
2008	13, 14, 15, 16, 3456 (<i>p</i> = 0.585)	/	/	/	1.31	1.05	1.17	0.85	1.05	0.95

1 - Confidence in the civil service; 2 - Ethnic group; 3 - Support for governing party; 4 - Social trust; 5 - Education; 6 - Age;

In 2001, the differences increased, so the odds of ethnic Macedonians were 2.5 times greater than the odds of ethnic Albanians, and the odds of the smaller ethnic groups were 3

times greater than the odds of ethnic Albanians, to have confidence in the civil service. In 2008 the situation changed, so the odds of ethnic Albanians were 1.13 times greater than the odds of ethnic Macedonians, and 1.08 times greater than the odds of the smaller ethnic groups in the country, to have confidence in the civil service.

Support for the incumbent has a moderate effect on trust in the civil service. In 1998 the odds of incumbent supporters were 1.5 times greater than the odds non-supporters to trust the civil service. In 2001, this difference decreased, so the odds of supporters were only 1.1 times greater than the odds of non-supporters to trust this institution. In 2008, again this difference increased, so the odds of incumbent supporters were 1.3 times greater than the odds of non-supporters to have confidence in the civil service.

Education and age seem to have small and inconsistent effects on trust in the civil service. Only considerable effect is that in 2008, when the odds of high school or less educated people were 1.15 times greater than the odds of university educated people to have confidence in this institution.

5.7. Institutional trust and governance

Finally, in this subsection the trends of institutional trust from 1998 to 2013 are presented in relation to the governance indicators for the country.

Figure 11 presents the relationship between the levels of confidence in the government, and the five governance indicators. As we can see from Figure 11, the level of confidence in the government follows closely the trends of government effectiveness, and voice and accountability. Rule of law and control of corruption also follow somewhat similar trends, but to a lesser extent, while political stability surprisingly indicates a completely opposite trend from the one of confidence in the government.

Figure 11. Trends in the level of confidence in the government, and governance indicators 1998 - 2013






Figure 12. Trends in the level of confidence in Parliament, and governance indicators 1998 - 2013



In Figure 12 the trends of the levels of trust in Parliament and the governance indicators are plotted. As the figure indicates, the trends of trust in Parliament on the one hand, and rule of law and government effectiveness, on the other hand, are quite similar. The trend of voice and accountability is also somewhat similar to the one of trust in Parliament.

Figure 13. Trends in the level of confidence in the judiciary, and governance indicators 1998 - 2013



In Figure 13, the trends of trust in the judiciary and the governance indicators are presented for the period of 15 years. Similarly as in the cases with trust in the government and in the Parliament, the trend of the trust in judiciary is most similar to the one of government effectiveness and voice and accountability. It is surprising how the trend of rule of law does not bear great similarity to the one of trust in the judiciary.

Figure 14 indicates the trends in the development of trust in the police, and the governance indicators in the time period of 15 years. Again, the trend of the trust in the police is the closest to the trend of government effectiveness and voice and accountability. However,

in this case, the graph indicates exact opposite trends of trust in the police and political stability.

Figure 14. Trends in the level of confidence in the police, and governance indicators 1998 - 2013




Figure 15. Trends in the level of confidence in the civil service, and governance indicators 1998 - 2008




Figure 15 presents the general trends of trust in the civil service and the governance indicators. In this case, only three time points were available for analyzing the levels of trust in the civil service, therefore, it is more difficult to estimate the trend precisely. However, from the graph it is notable that almost all of the governance indicators have similar trend as the one of the confidence levels of the civil service, except for the rule of law.

5.8. Discussion of the findings

The findings indicate that, in all five institutions taken under investigation, the general levels of trust increased substantively after 2001. The biggest changes on a general level are observed in the case of trust towards the government, Parliament, and the civil service, while in the case of the police and the judiciary they are not so dramatic. The expressed trust towards the institutions of the ethnic Albanian part of the population had the highest growth in the post 2001 period. Namely, in all five analyzed institutions, except for the police, until 2008, the ethnic Albanians expressed higher levels of trust than the ethnic Macedonians. This general increase in trust can be partly attributed to the general improvement of the functioning of the Macedonian democracy, as the governance indicators show. The control of corruption, government effectiveness, and voice and accountability indicators show substantive improvement of over time, as well as political stability from 2005 to 2008. However, government effectiveness, voice and accountability, and political stability all note a slight drop after 2008, which partially explain the slight drop of the general institutional trust levels from this year.

Nevertheless, the general governance indicators cannot explain why it was exactly the Albanian community that noted the greatest increase in the trust levels after 2001. The most plausible explanation is that the Ohrid Agreement and its implementation in the following

years gave the biggest contribution towards the increased levels of institutional trust of the Albanian part of the population.

There are two possible explanations why the OFA made the ethnic Albanians more trusting towards the Macedonian institutions. The first one draws from the winners-and-losers rhetoric. Namely, the ethnic Albanians perceived themselves as the winners of the conflict, and the Agreement gave them a feeling of increased control, and a greater inclusion in the Macedonian political system. In this explanation, the effect of specific policies and legal reforms that were implemented does not bear importance. The second explanation focuses exactly on the effects of the policies deriving from the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The ethnic Albanians gained trust in the Macedonian institutions because they felt the positive effects of the reforms, i.e. were more satisfied with the functioning of the institutions themselves. However, these two explanations are not mutually excluding.

Regarding the slight drop of the general trust levels from 2008, there are a few possible explanations. Namely, the Greek veto for the NATO accession in 2008 caused a general disappointment among the population for the general advancement of the country. However, the biggest loss of confidence goes to the ethnic Albanian part of the population, therefore, the general decreased levels, are partly due the great loss of confidence that the ethnic Albanians experienced. In regards to why specifically the ethnic Albanians were the ones that lost the most confidence, there are two not mutually exclusive explanations. Namely, "the honeymoon period" of the Ohrid Framework Agreement has passed, and the enthusiasm around it has decreased. The other explanation is that, in exactly this period, the major Macedonian governing party VMRO-DPMNE, who enjoyed great support from the ethnic Macedonian part of the population, commenced a very strong nationalistic discourse, and a process of rebuilding the Macedonian national identity. This issue became dominant in

the public discourse, while the issue of ethnic relations was slightly set aside. This was followed by strong reactions of discontent from the Albanian community in the country, which might be the reason for their declined levels of trust.

Regarding the expectations I had about the results from my analysis, it seems that my first hypothesis that the levels of institutional trust expressed by ethnic Macedonians will decline in the period after the adoption of OFA was disproved. So, ethnic Macedonians, regardless of the negative feelings towards the Agreement, gained confidence in the country's institutions in the period after 2001. My second hypothesis, however, was confirmed by the findings of my analysis, since the confidence levels of ethnic Albanians substantively increased after the signing of the Agreement, and for several years, they seemed to be the highest among the country's population.

Regarding the third hypothesis stating that, after the Framework Agreement, supporters of the currently governing parties will become increasingly more trusting in institutions over time, the findings are not so straightforward. In the case of government, there is a strengthening of the effect of incumbent support on trust in this institution after OFA, until 2006. However in the following years, the findings indicate that this effect is much more stronger for ethnic Macedonians, than for ethnic Albanians. The findings are also similar in the case of trust in Parliament, while for the other institutions the findings are inconsistent. So my hypothesis is not entirely supported, nor refuted.

Regarding hypotheses four and five, my analysis has provided evidence to support them. Thus, social trust does have a consistent effect on institutional trust, and as the governance in the country improves, the levels of institutional trust improve as well.

5.9. Limitations of the study

This study suffers from several limitations, which can partly be addressed by future research on the topic. The first limitation comes from the need to combine several data sources, in order to obtain overview of the developments in institutional trust in a larger timeframe. The surveys used in the analysis do not have the exact same wording of questions, scales of measurement, and sampling techniques, which is a potential problem for the comparability of the data. Furthermore, the list of variables used in this study is limited by the availability of data. Further research should include variables regarding the citizens' perceptions of the fairness and effectiveness of institutions, in order to obtain more nuanced picture about the factors that affect the levels of institutional trust.

The country level data regarding the governance in the country is also a subject of limitations. Namely, World Bank Governance indices are constructed using a number of data sources; however, we cannot be entirely sure that they do in fact reflect the real situation in the country, since they are in the end, a product of human judgment.

Finally, in this study it is impossible to separate the effects of the Ohrid Framework Agreement as such, and the improved governance in the country, i.e. their effects are confounded. Further research should strive to obtain more detailed data which will indicate whether the increased trust in institutions after OFA is a result of the Agreement per se, or of a general improved perception regarding the fairness and the work of the institutions.

6. Conclusion

This study has explored the development of institutional trust in Macedonia in a timeframe of fifteen years, during which major institutional changes were implemented, as a result of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Using statistical analysis, the effects of social trust, ethnicity, support for the incumbent party, age, education, and governance, on institutional trust were examined, and interpreted in the specific Macedonian political context.

The analysis has shown that OFA did have a positive effect on institutional trust, especially among the ethnic Albanian population of the country. However this gained trust was very fragile, since part of it was diminished few years later, most likely as a result of the government's Macedonian nationalistic discourse.

This study adds a piece in the puzzle in understanding of the effects of the Ohrid Framework Agreement on the development of Macedonian democracy. However, in order to obtain more detailed explanations and greater understanding on the issue of institutional trust, more detailed data should be collected.

Appendix 1: Wording of questions in the surveys used in the analysis⁶

Variable: Institutional trust

World Values Survey	I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? - The police; - Parliament; - The Civil Services; - The Government; - Justice system;
Prof. G. Ivanov and the Faculty of Law "Iustinianus Primus", Ss Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, Macedonia	What is your confidence/trust in: - Parliament; - Government; -Judiciary; - Police 1) complete trust; 2) partial trust; 3) partial distrust; 4) complete distrust; 5) don't know
Institute for Democracy "Societas Civilis" - Skopje (IDSC)	Do you have confidence in the: - Government; - Parliament; - Judiciary? 1) I do have confidence; 2) I don't have confidence;
People Centered Analysis project led by UNDP and SEEU	Do you have trust in the: - Central government; - Police; 1) High level of trust; 2) Some trust; 3) Little trust; 4) No trust; 99) DN;
European Values Survey	Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all? - Police; - Parliament; - Civil service; - Justice system; - Government;
Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (MCIC)	How much confidence do you have in the: - Parliament; - Government, - Judiciary; - Police; 1) A great deal of confidence; 2) Partial confidence; 3) Small amount of confidence; 4) No confidence at all; 5) DK;
Center for Research and Policy Making (CRPM)	How much confidence do you have in the: - Government; - Parliament; - Judiciary;- Police; 1) I have no confidence at all; 2) I mostly do not have confidence; 3) I mostly have confidence; 4) Complete confidence; 5) DK

⁶ As stated in the official and available documents of the surveys.

Variable: Social trust

World Values Survey	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? 1) Most people can be trusted; 2) Can't be too careful; 3) DK
Prof. G. Ivanov and the Faculty of Law "Iustinianus Primus", Ss Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, Macedonia	/
Institute for Democracy "Societas Civilis" - Skopje (IDSC)	/
People Centered Analysis project led by UNDP and SEEU	/
European Values Survey	Using this card, do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? How would you place your view on this scale? 1- 10
Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (MCIC)	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? 1) You should be very careful; 2) Most people can be trusted; 3)DK;
Center for Research and Policy Making (CRPM)	/

Variable: Age

World Values Survey	(exact age)
Prof. G. Ivanov and the Faculty of Law "Iustinianus Primus", Ss Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, Macedonia	Age: 1) up to 29; 2) 30 - 39; 3) 40 - 49; 4) 50 - 59; 5) above 60;
Institute for Democracy "Societas Civilis" - Skopje (IDSC)	Age: 1) up to 29; 2) 30 - 39; 3) 40 - 49; 4) 50 - 59; 5) above 60;
People Centered Analysis project led by UNDP and SEEU	(exact age)
European Values Survey	(year of birth, age calculated)
Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (MCIC)	Age: 1) 18 - 29; 2) 30 - 39; 3) 40 - 49; 4) 50 - 65; 5) above 65;
Center for Research and Policy Making (CRPM)	Age: 1) 18 - 34; 2) 35 - 54; 3) above 55;

Variable: Education

World Values Survey	<p>What is the highest educational level that you have attained?</p> <p>1) Inadequately completed elementary education; 2) Completed (compulsory) elementary education; 3) Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type/(Compulsory) elementary education and basic vocational qualification; 4) Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type/Secondary, intermediate vocational qualification; 5) Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type/Secondary, intermediate general qualification; 6) Complete secondary: university-preparatory type/Full secondary, maturity level certificate; 7) Some university without degree/Higher education - lower-level tertiary certificate; 8) University with degree/Higher education - upper-level tertiary certificate;</p>
Prof. G. Ivanov and the Faculty of Law "Iustinianus Primus", Ss Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, Macedonia	<p>Education:</p> <p>1) Unfinished primary; 2) Primary; 3) Secondary; 4) Vocational; 5) College;</p>
Institute for Democracy "Societas Civilis" - Skopje (IDSC)	<p>1) Unfinished primary; 2) Primary; 3) High school; 4) Vocational; 5) University;</p>
People Centered Analysis project led by UNDP and SEEU	<p>Education:</p> <p>1) No education; 2) Unfinished primary; 3) 1-3 primary school grades; 4) 4-7 primary school grades; 5) Primary education; 6) Unfinished secondary; 7) Three-year secondary education; 8) Four-year secondary education; 9) Two year college education; 10) University education; 11) Master; 12) PhD; 99) no answer</p>
European Values Survey	<p>What is the highest level you have completed in your education?</p> <p>0) Pre-primary education or none education; 1) Primary education or first stage of basic education; 2) Lower secondary or second stage of basic education; 3) (Upper) secondary education; 4) Post-secondary non-tertiary education; 5) First stage of tertiary education; 6) Second stage of tertiary education;</p>
Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (MCIC)	<p>Highest level of education:</p> <p>1) Incomplete primary; 2) Primary; 3) High school; 4) College.</p>

Center for Research and Policy Making (CRPM) Education:
1) Elementary; 2) High school; 3)University; 4)Post-graduate

Variable: Ethnic group

World Values Survey	Ethnic group: 1) Macedonian; 2) Albanian; 3) Turkish; 4) Roma; 5) Serbian; 6) Jewish/Vlach; 7) other;
Prof. G. Ivanov and the Faculty of Law "Iustinianus Primus", Ss Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, Macedonia	Ethnic belonging: 1) Macedonian; 2) Albanian; 3) Turkish; 4) Serbian; 5) Roma; 6) Vlach; 7) Bosnian; 8) other;
Institute for Democracy "Societas Civilis" - Skopje (IDSC)	Ethnic belonging: 1) Macedonian; 2) Albanian; 3) Turkish; 4) Serbian; 5) Roma; 6) Vlach; 7) Bosnian; 8) other;
People Centered Analysis project led by UNDP and SEEU	Ethnicity: 1) Macedonian; 2) Albanian; 3) Turkish; 4) Roma; 5) Serb; 6) Vlach; 7) other;
European Values Survey	*proxy: Language of interview (mac/alb) + vote choice
Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (MCIC)	Ethnicity: 1) Macedonian; 2) Albanian; 3) Turkish; 4) Roma; 5) Serb; 6) Vlach; 7) Bosnian; 8) other;
Center for Research and Policy Making (CRPM)	Ethnicity: 1) Macedonian; 2) Albanian; 3) Serb; 4) Turkish; 5) Roma; 6) Bosnian; 7) Vlach; 8) other;

Variable: Support for the incumbent party

World Values Survey	Which party would you vote for: first choice (list of political parties)
Prof. G. Ivanov and the Faculty of Law "Iustinianus Primus", Ss Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, Macedonia	*proxy: What is your opinion on: (leaders of political parties)
Institute for Democracy "Societas Civilis" - Skopje (IDSC)	For which party would you vote if there are elections tomorrow? (list of political parties)
People Centered Analysis project led by UNDP and SEEU	/
European Values Survey	If there was a general election tomorrow, can you tell me if you would vote? IF YES: which party would you vote for? (list of political parties)
Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (MCIC)	*proxy: To which party do you feel the closest? (list of political parties)
Center for Research and Policy Making (CRPM)	For which party would you vote if there are elections tomorrow? ((list of political parties)

Appendix 2: Sampling methodology of the surveys used in the analysis⁷

<i>Month and year when the survey was conducted</i>	<i>Owner of the data</i>	<i>Organization which conducted the survey</i>	<i>Sampling methodology</i>
February 1998	World Values Survey	British Macedonian Social Surveys Ltd. (BRIMA), Skopje	Population: Total resident non-institutionalized population of Macedonia 18 years and older. Respondents were selected by a stratified random sample. Stratification criteria were region and type of residence (urban vs. rural). 100 sampling points were randomly selected proportional to the distribution of population in 22 settlements in seven regions. Within each sampling point households were selected by method of random route. Within each household the respondent is randomly selected using the "Kish selection grid".
November - December 2001	World Values Survey	BRIMA Skopje, in association with BBSS Gallup International	A nationally representative multi-stage random probability sample of the population aged 18+ was used for this survey. The sample design was drawn based on data as presented by the Republic Institute of Statistics (1994 census results), incorporating characteristics of the surveyed universe per age, gender, education, type of settlement, national affiliation and region. Sampling methodology and the sampling procedure: face-to-face interview, paper and pencil, in-home of the respondent. Selection of households was executed on random route principle – ibid. Selection of a respondent is carried out via "next birthday" selection key.
May 2004	Prof. G. Ivanov and	Institute for Democracy,	Stratified random sample of the population 18+, representative to 2002 census. Telephone

⁷ As stated in the official and available documents of the surveys.

the Faculty of Law "Iustinianus Primus", Ss Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, Macedonia

Solidarity and Civil Society (IDSCS), Skopje, Macedonia

interview with standardized questionnaire.

December 2006	Institute for Democracy "Societas Civilis" - Skopje (IDSC)	Institute for Democracy "Societas Civilis" - Skopje (IDSC)	Population: Total resident non - institutionalized population of Macedonia 18 years and older. Telephone survey. Stratified sampling, using gender, ethnicity, age and education as criteria for shaping the strata.
July - August 2008	People Centered Analysis project led by UNDP and SEEU	BRIMA Macedonia	Stratified random sample, using municipal data as basis for stratification. Random route methodology, face-to-face interviews.
July - October 2008	European Values Survey	Faculty of Philosophy of the University Ss Cyril and Methodius of Skopje, Republic of Macedonia	The framework of the sample was made using the data from the Census 2002. The stratification of the sample is made having in mind the eight NUTS 3 regions and according to type of settlement-town / other, and based on these 16 strata were created. Distribution of the population, aged 18 and over, was made for the eight regions and depending on the type of settlement-town or other settlements, according to their ethnic affiliation on the Census 2002. According to this distribution appropriate allocation, regarding their ethnicity (Macedonians, Albanians, Vlachs, Roma, Turks, Serbs and other), was made. Clusters containing eight households of the same ethnicity were also made. For the purpose of facilitating the fieldwork a new adequate allocation was made in terms of clusters in the eight regions and urban / other sectors. A total of 252 selected clusters containing eight

households and units that has to be realized in the survey. The final sample contains a total of 2016 households. Settlements with less than 1,000 inhabitants were excluded from the final choice.

December 2010	Macedonian Center for International Cooperation	ISPPI	Population: Total resident non - institutionalized population of Macedonia 18 years and older. Quota sampling, using gender, ethnicity, age, place of residence and region as criteria for shaping the quotas.
May 2013	Center for Research and Policy Making	Center for Research and Policy Making	Population: Total resident non - institutionalized population of Macedonia 18 years and older. Quota sampling, using gender, ethnicity, age and region as criteria for shaping the quotas.

Appendix 3: Description of the Worldwide Governance Indicators⁸

<i>Voice and accountability</i>	Captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.
<i>Rule of law</i>	Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
<i>Government effectiveness</i>	Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies
<i>Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism</i>	Measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism
<i>Control of Corruption</i>	Captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.

⁸ As stated on the official Worldwide Governance webpage: www.govindicators.org.

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